- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

[Senate Hearing 112-590, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

S. Hrg. 112-590, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3254

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

----------

PART 1

MILITARY POSTURE
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

----------

FEBRUARY 14, 28; MARCH 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 20, 27, 2012

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 1

MILITARY POSTURE b U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND b U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND b U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND b DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY b U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND b
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY b DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE b U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

S. Hrg. 112-590, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3254

__________

PART 1

__________

FEBRUARY 14, 28; MARCH 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 20, 27, 2012

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut

Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

Ann E. Sauer, Minority Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

----------

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Posture
february 14, 2012

Page

.................................................................
Panetta, Hon. Leon, Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Robert
F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).............. 12
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 26

U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Transportation Command
february 28, 2012

Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command..... 172
Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command......................................... 182

U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command
march 1, 2012

Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command/
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe............................... 272
Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.......... 324

U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command
march 6, 2012

Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 394
McRaven, ADM William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 404

Department of the Army
march 8, 2012

McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army...................... 468
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 504

U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command
march 13, 2012

Fraser, Gen. Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.. 608
Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 625

Department of the Navy
march 15, 2012

Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy............... 686
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........ 703
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps........ 717

Department of the Air Force
march 20, 2012

Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the U.S. Air Force......... 842
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 845

U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command
march 27, 2012

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Defense.. 948
Alexander, GEN Keith B., USA, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, and
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
Service........................................................ 962

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY POSTURE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin,
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss,
Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, Cornyn, and
Vitter.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Travis E. Smith, special assistant.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald
J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Thomas
K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F.
Phillips, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional
staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K.
Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority
investigative counsel; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff
member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Elizabeth
C. Lopez, research assistant; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member;
Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Mariah K.
McNamara, Brian F. Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Greene,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant
to Senator Webb; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator
Manchin; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony
Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Tyler Stephens and Clyde Taylor
IV, assistants to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to
Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown;
Brad Bowman and John Easton, assistants to Senator Ayotte; Ryan
Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Sergio Sarkany,
assistant to Senator Graham; Dave Hanke, assistant to Senator
Cornyn; and Charles Brittingham, assistant to Senator Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee this
morning welcomes the Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E.
Dempsey, USA, for our hearing on the Department of Defense
(DOD) fiscal year 2013 budget request, the associated Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP), and the posture of the U.S. Armed
Forces. The committee also welcomes the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), Robert F. Hale, who has joined the
Secretary and the Chairman at the witness table.
Let me start by thanking all of you for your continued
service to our Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines here at home and in harm's way around the globe, and to
their families. They are truly deserving of the Nation's
affection and support.
Your testimony today marks the beginning of the committee's
review of the fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD. This
year's request includes $525 billion for the base budget and
$88.4 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO). The
fiscal year 2013 base budget request is $5 billion less than
the fiscal year 2012 enacted level of $530 billion, and the OCO
request is $27 billion less than last year's enacted level of
$115 billion.
The fiscal year 2013 budget conforms with the Budget
Control Act (BCA) that Congress passed last summer. The Senate
approved the BCA on a bipartisan basis, with 74 Senators voting
for it. The BCA locked in defense and non-defense discretionary
spending caps over 10 years. The defense caps reduced projected
defense spending by nearly half a trillion dollars over 10
years, and DOD responded with a new strategy and a new program
to meet the Nation's security challenges and preserve our
military capabilities.
The BCA also included language requiring Congress to pass
legislation with additional far-reaching deficit reductions. If
Congress does not come up with a deficit reduction package by
next January, one that locks in another $1.2 trillion in
deficit reduction over 10 years, then automatic spending cuts,
called ``sequestration,'' will be imposed on both defense and
non-defense programs.
The budget the President sent us yesterday avoids
sequestration by meeting the $1.2 trillion additional deficit
reduction target, approximately one-half in further cuts in
spending and one-half in additional revenues.
The defense budget request for fiscal year 2013 not only
conforms to the funding limits of the congressionally-mandated
BCA, it also reflects the results of DOD's comprehensive and
inclusive strategic review initiated by President Obama in
April last year and the strategic guidance that resulted.
We look forward to the witnesses' explanation of the
process that they went through to develop the new Defense
Strategic Guidance, their assessment of this guidance's most
important features and potential risks relative to the current
and anticipated strategic environment, and how this budget
request supports its strategic priorities and manages strategic
risk in the near- and long-terms.
The administration has called for two more base realignment
and closure (BRAC) rounds. In my view, however, before we
consider another round of BRAC, DOD ought to take a hard look
at whether further reductions in bases can be made overseas,
particularly in Europe. While DOD has announced the removal of
two of the four combat brigades currently stationed in Europe,
even after the brigades are withdrawn there will still be over
70,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in Europe. Finding
further reductions and consolidations in our overseas force
posture should be our first priority before another BRAC round.
The fiscal year 2013 defense budget request reflects the
continuing conflict in Afghanistan, but also reflects the fact
that the process of transition has begun and continues apace.
Afghan security forces (ASF) are assuming responsibility for
securing the Afghan people in more and more areas throughout
Afghanistan. Progress on security is real. A second round of
areas to be transitioned to an ASF lead will be completed later
this year. Then approximately 50 percent of the Afghan
population will live in areas where ASF have the lead for
providing security, with coalition forces playing a supporting
role.
I have long-pressed for ASF to move increasingly into the
combat lead and to assume responsibility for securing more and
more Afghan territory and communities as the size and
capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan
National Police (ANP) are built up. The success of our mission
in Afghanistan depends on getting the ASF in the lead, with the
support of the Afghan people, thereby putting the lie to the
Taliban propaganda that the coalition is an occupying force.
The Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman recently made clear
there was full agreement on transition, saying: ``We have
always maintained that Afghan security is an Afghan
responsibility.''
Last June, President Obama said that the 33,000 U.S. surge
force would be removed from Afghanistan by the end of this
summer. That means that 68,000 U.S. troops would remain in
Afghanistan after the drawdown of the surge. He also said that
after the reduction of the U.S. surge force, U.S. troops will
continue to draw down ``at a steady pace.'' Yet the fiscal year
2013 OCO budget request now before Congress is based on an
assumption that there are no additional reductions in the
68,000 troop level in Afghanistan throughout all of fiscal year
2013.
The question that I hope our witnesses will address this
morning is whether they expect further reductions in U.S. troop
levels in Afghanistan during fiscal year 2013 below 68,000 and
what associated cost savings would result. If that decision has
not yet been made by the President, what is the timetable for
its being made?
I also hope Secretary Panetta will clarify his surprising
statements earlier this month that, ``Our goal is to complete
all of the transition to a training, advisory, and assistance
role in 2013,'' and that he said, ``Hopefully by the mid- to
latter-part of 2013, we will be able to make a transition from
a combat role.''
There are many reports about reconciliation talks with the
Taliban. If Taliban statements are true that they will open a
political office in Qatar, it would have the potential to be a
positive development. I am concerned, however, by reports that
in exchange for the opening of this office, the administration
is considering transferring five Afghan Taliban detainees from
the Guantanamo detention facility to Qatar. Such a significant
step strikes me as premature and should be considered, in my
view, only following positive discussions and not preceding
them.
Another concern I have regarding the progress of the
reconciliation talks is the reported decision by the Government
of Afghanistan to open a second channel in the dialogue with
the Taliban that would be in Saudi Arabia. It seems to me that
this would create the potential for confusion. The United
States has said it is committed to an Afghan-led reconciliation
process. That is another reason that the discussion process
ought to be pursued through a single channel, with both the
Afghan Government and with us, fully coordinated and
participating together, whether it takes place in one or two
venues.
With respect to the realignment of U.S. marines on Okinawa,
Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I have advocated changes in
the current plan in ways that support the strategic goals of
the U.S. regional military posture while avoiding excessive and
unsustainable costs associated with large and elaborate new
bases. The announcement last week that the United States and
Japan are reconsidering elements of the plan is welcome news,
but the steps are not yet adequate.
There are other challenges, of course. There is strong
bipartisan determination on this committee and in Congress to
do all we can to counter the threat that Iran poses, including
stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. President Obama
has focused considerable diplomatic effort towards that goal
because, in his words, ``America is determined to prevent Iran
from getting a nuclear weapon. And I will take no options off
the table to achieve that goal.'' The administration is
bringing the world together, as it should, to speak with one
voice against Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Relative to Egypt, the decades-old relationship between the
United States and Egypt is under strain. In recent days,
General Dempsey traveled to Cairo to engage the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces of Egypt on the very troubling decision by
the Egyptians to charge 19 Americans and dozens of other
individuals for operating programs in support of Egyptian civil
society. The committee is eager to learn the findings of
General Dempsey's visit because the decision by the Egyptians,
if unresolved, will negatively affect funding decisions that
Congress makes in the coming months.
Relative to Syria, the regime of President Al-Assad is
waging war on the people of Syria and, despite the condemnation
of the Arab League and almost all nations, China and Russia are
preventing the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council from
taking any effective action. If the situation is left as it is,
there is also a significant threat that surrounding countries
could be severely impacted. Our witnesses will, hopefully,
discuss options that we have to help end the slaughter, as
limited as those options might be.
On cybersecurity, the Defense Strategic Guidance notes that
both state and non-state actors pose the capability and intent
to conduct cyber espionage and the capability to conduct cyber
attacks on the United States, with possibly severe effects on
both our economy and our security. The Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) in recent Senate testimony placed the
cybersecurity threat in the top tier alongside terrorism and
nuclear proliferation and other proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
A recent report from the National Counter-Intelligence
Executive stated that entities operating from within China and
Russia are responsible for the massive theft of U.S. commercial
and military technology that could threaten our national
security and our economy. We should let China and Russia know
in no uncertain terms that cyber economic espionage will have
very negative consequences for normal trade relations and other
relations.
Finally, in the area of personnel, DOD proposes numerous
personnel-related reforms aimed at slowing the increase in
personnel and health care costs, which continue to rise at
unsustainable rates. These reforms include a significant
reduction in military end strength over the next 5 years, other
personnel-related reforms, and a commission to review military
retirement benefits. I agree with General Dempsey, Admiral
Winnefeld, the Service Chiefs, and the Services' senior
enlisted advisers, who urged me in a letter dated January 25,
2011, to grandfather the retirement benefits of those currently
serving. We owe it to our servicemembers and their families to
address any change in their compensation and benefits in a
manner that acknowledges the commitment that we made to them
when they volunteered to serve in our Armed Forces.
Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and Mr. Hale, we look
forward to your testimony, and I now call on Senator McCain.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

This morning the committee welcomes Secretary of Defense, Leon
Panetta, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin
Dempsey, for our hearing on the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year
2013 budget request, the associated Future Years Defense Program, and
the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces. The committee also welcomes Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale who has joined the
Secretary and the Chairman at the witness table.
Let me start by thanking all of you for your continued service to
the Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at home
and in harm's way around the globe and to their families. They are
truly deserving of the Nation's affection and support. I also want you
to know that we very much appreciate the positive way you all have
worked with this committee and the relationships you have fostered with
our members.

BUDGET

Your testimony today marks the beginning of the committee's review
of the fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD. This year's request
includes $525 billion for the base budget and $88.4 billion for
overseas contingency operations (OCO). The fiscal year 2013 base budget
request is $5 billion less than the fiscal year 2012 enacted level of
$530 billion. The OCO request is $27 billion less than last year's
enacted level of $115 billion.
The fiscal year 2013 base budget request conforms with the Budget
Control Act that Congress passed last summer. The Senate approved the
Budget Control Act on a bipartisan basis with 74 Senators voting for
it. The Budget Control Act locked in defense and non-defense
discretionary spending caps over 10 years. The defense caps reduced
projected defense spending by nearly half a trillion dollars over 10
years and the Department responded with a new strategy and new program
to meet the Nation's security challenges and preserve our military
capabilities.
The Budget Control Act also included language requiring Congress to
pass legislation with additional far-reaching deficit reduction. If
Congress does not come up with a deficit reduction package by next
January, one that locks in another $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction
over 10 years, then automatic spending cuts, called sequestration, will
be imposed on both defense and non-defense programs. We need to find a
comprehensive deficit reduction plan that will avoid these drastic and
arbitrary cuts. The budget the President sent us yesterday avoids
sequestration by meeting the $1.2 trillion additional defense reduction
target--approximately one-half in further cuts in spending and one-half
in additional revenues.

STRATEGY

The defense budget request for fiscal year 2013 not only conforms
to the funding limits of the congressionally-mandated Budget Control
Act, it also supports the results of the Department's comprehensive,
carefully managed, and inclusive strategic review initiated by
President Obama in April last year and the strategic guidance that
resulted. The requirement for a new strategic review, following so
closely on the heels of the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review, was driven
in part by the fiscal crisis confronting the Nation. As former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, cautioned us in August 2010:
``The most significant threat to our national security is our debt.''
Senior military leaders have made it clear that updating and where
necessary adjusting the Nation's security strategy was their first
order of business and the budget they have sent to us this year was
built after and to support that new Defense Strategic Guidance.
In looking more toward the future, the new Defense Strategic
Guidance places emphasis on potentially growing strategic challenges in
the Asia-Pacific region, but intends to do so without ignoring the
enduring challenges of the Middle East. Consistent with this shift, the
Department will place more emphasis on systems that project our
military power, assuring access and freedom of operations in any
region. It sustains the growth in Special Operations Forces (SOF) and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and increases
investment in unmanned systems and cyberspace capabilities. The
guidance deemphasizes stability operations in the near and distant
future and therefore reduces the size of Army and Marine Corps ground
forces to slightly above pre-2003 levels. Finally, as a strategic and
operational hedge, implementation of the reductions in current
capabilities such as end strength and force structure will be
accomplished in a way that allows for stopping or reversing the changes
depending on developments in the strategic environment or the emergence
of an unforeseen crisis.
We look forward to the witnesses' explanation of the process they
went through to develop the new Defense Strategic Guidance, their
assessment of this guidance's most important features and potential
risks relative to the current and anticipated security environment, and
how this budget request supports its strategic priorities and manages
strategic risk in the near- and long-terms.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

The administration has called for two more base realignment and
closure (BRAC) rounds. In my view, however, before we consider another
round of BRAC, the Department ought to take a hard look at whether
further reduction in bases can be made overseas, particularly in
Europe. While the Department has announced the removal of two of the
four combat brigades currently stationed in Europe, even after the
brigades are withdrawn, there will still be over 70,000 U.S. military
personnel deployed in Europe. Finding further reductions and
consolidations in our overseas force posture should be our first
priority before another BRAC round.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

The fiscal year 2013 defense budget request reflects the continuing
conflict in Afghanistan, but also reflects the fact that the process of
transition has begun and continues apace. Afghan security forces are
assuming responsibility for securing the Afghan people in more and more
areas throughout the country. Progress on security is real. The second
round of areas to be transitioned to an Afghan security lead will be
completed later this year. Then, approximately 50 percent of the Afghan
population will live in areas where Afghan security forces have the
lead for providing security, with coalition forces playing a supporting
role.
I have long pressed for Afghan security forces to move increasingly
into the combat lead and to assume responsibility for securing more and
more Afghan territory and communities, as the size and capabilities of
the Afghan Army and police are built up. The success of our mission in
Afghanistan depends on getting the Afghan security forces in the lead
with the support of the Afghan people, thereby putting the lie to the
Taliban propaganda that the coalition is an occupying force.
The Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman recently made clear there was
full agreement on transition, saying: ``We have always maintained that
Afghan security is an Afghan responsibility.''
Last June President Obama said that the 33,000 U.S. surge force
would be removed from Afghanistan by the end of this summer. That means
that 68,000 U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan after the drawdown
of the surge.
He also said that after the reduction of the U.S. surge force, U.S.
troops will continue to draw down ``at a steady pace.'' Yet the fiscal
year 2013 OCO budget request now before Congress is based on an
assumption that there are no additional reductions in the 68,000 troop
level in Afghanistan throughout all of fiscal year 2013. The question
that I hope our witnesses will address this morning is whether they
expect further reductions in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2013 below 68,000 and what associated cost savings would
result. If that decision has not been made by the President, what is
the timetable for its being made? I also hope Secretary Panetta will
clarify his surprising statements earlier this month that, ``Our goal
is to complete all of [the transition to a training, advisory and
assistance role] in 2013'' and that ``Hopefully by mid- to the latter
part of 2013 we'll be able to make a transition from a combat role.''
There are many reports about reconciliation talks with the Taliban.
If Taliban statements are true that they will open a political office
in Qatar, it would have the potential to be a positive development. I
am concerned, however, by reports that in exchange for the opening of
this office, the administration is considering transferring five Afghan
Taliban detainees from the Guantanamo detention facility to Qatar. Such
a significant step strikes me as premature and should be considered in
my view only following positive discussions, not preceding them.
Another concern I have regarding the progress of the reconciliation
talks is the reported decision by the Government of Afghanistan to open
a second channel in the dialogue with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia. It
seems to me this would create the potential for confusion. The United
States has said it is committed to an Afghan-led reconciliation
process. That is another reason that the discussion process ought to be
pursued through a single channel, with both the Afghan Government and
the United States fully coordinated and participating together, whether
it takes place in one or two venues.
The wild card in the peace process is what role Pakistan will play.
In the past few months, our relations with Pakistan have hit a low
point. If Pakistan is committed to peace and stability in the region,
it needs to begin by ending the safe havens in Pakistan for insurgents
who are attacking our forces, the Afghan forces and the Afghan people.
Pakistan cannot expect to have a normal relationship with the United
States until it deals with the threats to us emanating from these
militant sanctuaries for militants in Pakistan.

SECURITY POSTURE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

The Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes the U.S. military
presence and posture in the Asia Pacific, and rightly so. The recent
death of North Korea's Kim Jong-il creates new uncertainties about
possible threats to regional security, and questions about China's
rapid military growth. Its increasing assertiveness in areas like the
South China Sea remind us that our presence and constructive engagement
in the region remains important to the security interests of the United
States and the region. The committee remains keenly interested in the
plans for U.S. force posture in the Pacific.
With respect to realignment of U.S. marines on Okinawa, for
example, Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I have advocated changes to
the current plan in ways that support the strategic goals of the U.S.
regional military posture while avoiding excessive and unsustainable
costs associated with large and elaborate new bases. The announcement
last week that the United States and Japan are reconsidering elements
of the plan is welcome news, but the steps are not yet adequate. For
instance, there is apparently no intention to reconsider the plan to
build the unaffordable Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on
Okinawa, nor does it appear that the U.S. Air Force bases in the region
are being considered as part of the solution although they now have
excess capacity. It is important that any changes be jointly agreed
upon and jointly announced, and that they go far enough that a more
viable and sustainable U.S. presence in Japan and on Guam results.

OTHER CHALLENGES

Iran
There is a strong bipartisan determination on this committee and in
Congress to do all we can to counter the threat Iran poses, including
stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. President Obama has
focused considerable diplomatic effort towards that goal because, in
his own words, ``America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve
that goal.'' The administration is bringing the world together to speak
with one strong voice against Iran's nuclear ambitions.
The administration has sought to make clear the benefits available
to Iran and its people if it complies with international norms and
obligations, but also to make clear the negative consequences if it
decides to produce nuclear weapons. Concerted, coordinated,
international diplomatic and economic pressure will hopefully make Iran
understand in practical terms the consequences of its actions, and will
convince Iran not to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon.

Arab Spring
The impact of the Arab Spring has had significant implications on
security and stability in the region, including U.S. security
cooperation, military-to-military relations, and counterterrorism
cooperation. The Department's new Defense Strategic Guidance places
considerable emphasis on partnering with foreign nations and their
militaries on matters of mutual interest. The committee will be
interested to hear from the Secretary and the Chairman on the impact of
the Arab Spring, and the problems and opportunities it has created for
our security.

Egypt
The decades old relationship between the United States and Egypt is
under strain. In recent days, General Dempsey traveled to Cairo to
engage the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on the very troubling
decision by the Egyptians to charge 19 Americans and dozens of other
individuals for operating programs in support of Egyptian civil
society. The committee is eager to learn the findings of General
Dempsey's visit because the decision by the Egyptians, if unresolved,
will negatively affect funding decisions that Congress makes in the
coming months.

Syria
Finally, the regime of President Bashar-al-Assad is waging war on
the people of Syria and despite the condemnation of the Arab League and
almost all nations, China and Russia are preventing the U.N. Security
Council from taking any effective action. If the situation is left as
is, there is also a significant threat that surrounding countries could
be severely impacted. Our witnesses will hopefully discuss options we
have to help end the slaughter, as limited as those options might be.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Given the existing and growing threat of ballistic missiles from
nations such as North Korea and Iran, Congress has been supportive of
efforts to develop and field effective ballistic missile defenses
against these threats. The completion of Phase 1 of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) at the end of 2011 provided an initial level
of protection against Iran's regional missile threat to Europe, and is
expected to be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)
initial missile defense capability later this spring. The Department is
continuing to develop additional EPAA capabilities to counter future
Iranian missile threats.
NATO and the United States continue to pursue cooperation with
Russia on missile defense, since it could enhance our security against
the common threat of Iranian missiles. Although this has been a
contentious issue with Russia, a new independent study released at the
Munich Security Conference points the way to a practical and beneficial
approach to such cooperation, similar to the NATO approach. If there is
U.S.-Russian cooperation on this, it would send a powerful signal to
Iran and might help dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons and
missiles to carry them.

CYBERSECURITY

The Defense Strategic Guidance notes that both state and non-state
actors possess the capability and intent to conduct cyber espionage and
the capability to conduct cyber attacks on the United States, with
possibly severe effects on both our economy and on our security. The
Director of National Intelligence, in recent Senate testimony, placed
the cybersecurity threat in the top tier, alongside terrorism and
proliferation. A recent report from the National Counterintelligence
Executive stated that entities operating from within China and Russia
are responsible for the massive theft of U.S. commercial and military
technology that could threaten our national security and economy. We
should let China and Russia know, in no uncertain terms, that cyber
economic espionage will have very negative consequences for normal
trade relations.
In addition to defending its own networks, the Department of
Defense has an important role to play in supporting the Department of
Homeland Security in improving the security of all government networks
and those of the Nation's 17 designated critical infrastructure
sectors, which includes the Defense Industrial Base,
telecommunications, energy, transportation, and banking and finance,
among others. The security of those networks is also vital to the
Department of Defense, which depends on them to mobilize, deploy, and
sustain our military forces.

COUNTERTERRORISM

The Department's strategic guidance continues to place U.S.
counterterrorism activities among its highest priorities. The United
States has had a number of significant successes in the last year--most
notably, operations against Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki--and
U.S. counterterrorism efforts are becoming more global as al Qaeda and
its affiliates disperse to Yemen, Somalia, Iran, North Africa, and
other prospective sanctuaries.
The budget priorities outlined by the Department appropriately
emphasize the capabilities possessed by Special Operations Forces to
conduct counterterrorism, building partnership capacity, and other
missions in support of geographic combatant commanders. The committee
looks forward to learning more about how these forces will be utilized
under the Strategic Guidance to meet demand for engagements with
partner nations, particularly in the Asia Pacific, while continuing to
counter al Qaeda and affiliated organizations elsewhere.

PERSONNEL

Finally, in the area of personnel, the Department proposes numerous
personnel-related reforms aimed at slowing the increase in personnel
and health care costs, which continue to rise at unsustainable rates.
These reforms include a significant reduction in military end strength
over the next 5 years, other personnel-related reforms, and a
commission to review military retirement benefits. I agree with General
Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, the Service Chiefs, and the Services'
senior enlisted advisors who urged me, in a letter dated January 25,
2011, to grandfather the retirement benefits of those currently
serving. We owe it to our servicemembers and their families to address
any change in their compensation and benefits in a manner that
acknowledges the commitment we made to them when they volunteered to
serve in our Armed Forces.
Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, we look forward to your
testimony.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join in
welcoming Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey to discuss the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2013; his proposal
to reduce the budget for DOD by $487 billion over the next 10
years, and the impact of these reductions on FYDP for DOD.
While the other members of this committee and I will
continue to scrutinize these proposals, I can say today that I
do not fully endorse this budget request. Indeed, I am
seriously concerned about how we arrived at this point. On
April 13, 2011, the President of the United States announced
his intention to reduce the DOD budget by $400 billion through
2023. However, his announcement was unsupported by any type of
comprehensive strategic review or risk assessment. In fact,
then-Secretary Gates testified before Congress that he only
learned the night before about this massive proposed cut in our
defense spending.
Now, the President proposes $487 billion in cuts over 10
years, and we're told that these proposed cuts are not budget-
driven, but based on a thorough strategic review of our defense
priorities. Respectfully, this doesn't add up.
Unfortunately, this defense budget continues the
administration's habit of putting short-term political
considerations over our long-term national security interests.
In Afghanistan, our military commanders initially asked for a
surge of 40,000 troops. The President disregarded their advice,
sent 30,000 troops instead, and announced a date when they
would begin withdrawing. Our commanders then recommended
maintaining the full surge force throughout this year's
fighting season, but the President again disregarded their
advice and announced reductions to our force levels that the
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen,
said were more aggressive and incurred greater risks than he
advised. Finally, in Iraq, the President disregarded the advice
of his commanders again, dragged out negotiations with the
Iraqi Government with no intent to maintain a presence of U.S.
troops. Now, with the political and security situations
unraveling, it is difficult to argue that Iraq today is, to use
the President's phrase, ``stable and self-reliant.''
It seems as though many of the President's most significant
decisions about our national defense have been fundamentally
disconnected from conditions on the ground and the advice of
our military commanders, including commanders that the
President himself selected. I fear that this defense budget and
the broader plan to cut $487 billion from DOD over 10 years
only continues this dangerous and regrettable pattern.
By any objective assessment, the worldwide threats to our
Nation, our interests, and our ideals are not diminishing. They
are growing. Yet the defense budget before us would reduce the
size of our force by more than 125,000 military personnel. It
would jeopardize our nuclear modernization plan by making
critical cuts to our nuclear weapons infrastructure programs.
It would eliminate 20 percent of the Army's brigade combat
teams (BCT), 6 Marine Corps battalions, 4 tactical air
squadrons, 7 Air Force combat squadrons, and 130 mobility
aircraft. Perhaps most concerning of all, in light of the
administration's own identification of the Asia-Pacific region
as the focus of U.S. defense strategy, this budget would
require the Navy to reduce shipbuilding by 28 percent, to
retire seven cruisers and two amphibious ships earlier than
planned, to delay the next generation ballistic missile
submarine, and to postpone the purchases of one Virginia-class
attack submarine, two littoral combat ships, and eight high-
speed transport vessels.
Furthermore, while this defense strategy and its related
budget cuts clearly increase the risks to our national security
objectives, there has been no formal risk assessment provided
to Congress. How can we and the American people determine
whether the additional risks associated with this strategy are
acceptable if we do not know the specific nature of those risks
as defined by the U.S. military?
These cuts pale in comparison to what DOD would face under
sequestration, an outcome that Secretary Panetta has correctly
stated would be ``catastrophic'' for our national defense. Yet,
here too, domestic politics are taking priority over national
security, with the President saying he would veto an effort by
Congress to eliminate sequestration that does not include
raising taxes.
Our message to you, Secretary Panetta, and to the President
of the United States: If it is as catastrophic as you state,
then why don't we sit down? Why doesn't the President sit down
with us and we work out a way to avoid what you and General
Dempsey have described as catastrophic consequences for the
national security of this country, rather than the President
sitting in the Oval Office and saying he'll veto any bill that
doesn't have tax increases in it?
In short, we have come to a critical turning point when
decisions of the utmost importance for our national security
must be resolved, and the consequences of those decisions, for
better or worse, will forever shape our Nation's destiny.
Defense spending is not what is sinking this country deeper
into an unsustainable national debt. If we act under the
assumption that it is, we will create something that is truly
unaffordable, the hollowing out of the U.S. military and the
decline of U.S. military power. We can either take the easy
route of dramatic cuts to force structure and investments,
which diminish our military capabilities and increase risk. Or,
we can balance more modest and strategically-directed
reductions in defense spending with an aggressive plan to
address the broader cultural problems plaguing our defense
establishment, the waste and inefficiency with which DOD buys
goods and services under the undue influence of a
noncompetitive military/industrial/congressional complex.
I believe we must tackle this cultural problem head on. We
must cut congressional earmarks and pork barrel spending on
programs that the military does not request and does not need.
We must have transparent and auditable financial statements,
and we must eliminate the shameless cost overruns that
characterize too many of our largest defense programs.
From my review of these programs, this point is clear: The
phenomenon of acquisition malpractice, which a senior DOD
official publicly described just a few days ago, can be found
in many more programs than just the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
It pervades the entire major defense acquisition program
portfolio, revealing a cultural problem in the acquisition of
goods and services that is unsustainable. Before DOD further
risks force structure to achieve budget savings, practices like
this must end now.
Now is the time to set politics aside for the sake of the
one issue that we can all agree on is nonnegotiable to the
future health and success of our Nation--our national defense.
We need to start with goals, move to strategy, and allow that
rigorous process to inform the budget we create. The
administration's approach thus far has been too defined by
short-term domestic political considerations. The
administration has not led. For the sake of our national
security, Congress should.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of
our witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Secretary Panetta.

STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT F. HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER)

Secretary Panetta. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin,
Senator McCain, members of the committee. I ask that my
statement be made part of the record and I would like to
summarize some of the key points.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record and, by
the way, the balance of my statement that I didn't give will
also be made part of the record.
Secretary Panetta. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2013.
Let me begin, as always, by thanking you for the support that
you provide to servicemembers and to our military families.
These brave men and women, along with DOD's civilian
professionals who support them, have done everything asked of
them and more, during more than a decade of war. I want to
thank you for the support that you have given them in the past,
the present, and hopefully in the future.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD was the product
of an intensive strategy review that was conducted by the
senior military and civilian leaders of DOD, with advice and
guidance of the President. The total request represents a $614
billion investment in national defense that includes $525.4
billion for DOD's base budget and $88.5 billion in spending to
support our troops in combat.
The reasons for this review are clear. First, the United
States is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war
and after very substantial growth in defense budgets.
Second, with the Nation confronting a very large debt
problem and deficit problem in this country, Congress passed
the BCA of 2011, imposing a reduction in the defense budget of
$487 billion over the next decade. We at DOD decided to step up
to the plate, and that this crisis provided us an opportunity
to establish a new strategy for the force that we would need in
the future. That strategy has guided us in making the budget
decisions and choices that are contained in the President's
budget.
The fact is, we are at an important turning point that
would have required us to make a strategic shift probably under
any circumstances. The U.S. military's mission in Iraq has
ended. While we still have a tough fight on our hands in
Afghanistan, 2011 marks significant progress in reducing
violence and transitioning to an Afghan-led responsibility for
security, and we are on track to complete this transition by
the end of 2014 in accordance with our Lisbon commitments.
Having just returned from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) ministerial, I can assure you that all of
the NATO nations are in line with the strategy that we are
approaching with regards to Afghanistan. We are in a
transition. We are transitioning security to Afghan forces, and
our hope is that as we make the final transition in 2014, that
they can take the lead on combat operations. We will be there.
We'll be in support. We'll be combat-ready to support them
through that process. I want to assure you that NATO is fully
in agreement with the strategy that we are moving in in
Afghanistan.
Last year, in addition, the NATO effort in Libya also
concluded with the fall of Qadafi, and successful
counterterrorism efforts have significantly weakened al Qaeda
and decimated its leadership.
But despite what we have been able to achieve, unlike past
drawdowns when threats have receded, the United States still
faces a very complex array of strategic challenges across the
globe. We are still a Nation at war in Afghanistan. We still
face threats to our Homeland from terrorism. There is a
dangerous proliferation of lethal weapons and materials. The
behavior of Iran and North Korea continue to threaten global
stability. There is continuing turmoil and unrest in the Middle
East, from Syria to Egypt to Yemen and beyond. Rising powers in
Asia are testing international rules and relationships, and
there are growing concerns about cyber intrusions and attacks.
Our challenge is to meet these threats, to protect our
Nation and our people, and at the same time, meet our
responsibility to fiscal discipline. This is not an easy task.
To build the force we need for the future, we developed a
new Defense Strategic Guidance that consists of five key
elements.
First, the military will be smaller and leaner, but we want
a military that is agile, flexible, ready, and technologically
advanced.
Second, we will rebalance our global posture and presence
to emphasize Asia Pacific and the Middle East, because those
areas represent the threats for the future.
Third, for the rest of the world, we need to build
innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and
partnerships from Europe to Latin America to Africa.
Fourth, we will ensure that we have the capability to
quickly confront and defeat aggression from any adversary, any
time, anywhere.
Fifth, this can't just be about cuts. It also has to be
about protecting and prioritizing key investments in technology
and new capabilities, as well as our capacity to grow, adapt,
and mobilize as needed.
We've developed this new Defense Strategic Guidance before
any final budget decisions were made, in order to ensure that
the decisions that are here, the choices we made, reflect the
new defense strategy. While shaping the strategy, we didn't
want to repeat the mistakes of the past. Our goals are to
maintain the strongest military in the world, to not hollow out
the force, to take a balanced approach to budget cuts by
putting everything on the table, and to not break faith with
our troops and their families.
Throughout this review, we also wanted to make sure that
this was an inclusive process. General Dempsey and I worked
closely with the leadership of the Services and the combatant
commanders and consulted regularly with Members of Congress. As
a result of these efforts, DOD is strongly unified behind the
recommendations that we are presenting today.
Consistent with the BCA, this budget reflects in the next 5
years a savings of $259 billion. That's compared to the budget
plan that was submitted, obviously, to Congress last year.
We think this is a balanced and complete package that
follows the key elements of the strategy and adheres to the
guidelines that we established. The savings come from three
broad areas.
First, efficiencies. We have redoubled our efforts to
discipline the use of taxpayers' dollars, and that has yielded,
we hope, about one-quarter of the targeted savings that we have
in this package.
The second area is force structure and procurement reforms
and adjustments. We've made strategy-driven changes in both
force structure and procurement programs to achieve roughly
half of the savings in this package.
Finally, on compensation. We've made modest but important
adjustments in personnel costs to achieve some very necessary
cost savings in this area. This area represents about one-third
of our budget, but here it accounted for little more than 10
percent of the total reduction that we've presented.
Let me walk through each of these areas. First of all, with
regards to disciplining defense dollars, if we're going to
tighten up the force then I, like Senator McCain, believe very
strongly that we have to begin by tightening up the operations
of DOD. We have to reduce excess overhead, eliminate waste, and
improve business practices across DOD.
The fiscal year 2012 budget proposed more than $150 billion
in efficiencies, and we continue to implement those changes.
But we also identified another $60 billion in additional
savings over 5 years through measures like streamlining support
functions, consolidating information technology enterprise
services, rephasing military construction (MILCON) projects,
consolidating inventory, and reducing service support
contractors.
As we reduce force structure, we also have a responsibility
to provide the most cost-efficient support for the force. For
that reason, the President will request Congress to authorize
the BRAC process for 2013 and 2015. As somebody who went
through the BRAC process in my own district, I recognize how
controversial this process is for Members and for
constituencies. Yet, it is the only effective way to achieve
needed infrastructure savings.
To provide better financial information, we are also
increasing our emphasis on audit readiness and accelerating key
timelines. In October 2011, I directed DOD to accelerate
efforts to achieve fully auditable financial statements. We
were mandated to do it by 2017; what I have ordered is that we
move that up to 2014.
But efficiencies alone are not enough to achieve the
required savings. Budget reductions of this magnitude require
that we make adjustments to force structure and procurement
investments. The choices that we made have to fit the five
elements of the strategy that we developed for the future
military force.
First, we knew that coming out of these wars, as I said,
the military would be smaller, but our approach to
accommodating these reductions has been to take this as an
opportunity to fashion an agile and flexible military that we
need for the future. That highly networked and capable joint
force consists of an adaptable and battle-tested Army that
remains our Nation's force for decisive action, capable of
defeating any adversary on land, and at the same time being
innovative about how it deploys its forces; a Navy that
maintains forward presence and is able to penetrate enemy
defenses; a Marine Corps that remains a middleweight
expeditionary force, with reinvigorated and amphibious
capabilities; an Air Force that dominates air and space and
provides rapid mobility, global strike, and persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and a
National Guard and Reserve that continue to be ready and
prepared for operations when needed.
To ensure this agile force, we made a conscious choice not
to maintain more force structure than we could afford to
properly train and equip. If we do it the other way, we
guarantee a hollow force. We wanted a force structure that we
could effectively train and maintain.
We are implementing force structure reductions consistent
with the new Defense Strategic Guidance for a total savings of
$50 billion over the next 5 years. The adjustments include, as
was pointed out, a resizing of the Active Army from 562,000 to
490,000 soldiers by 2017. This will transition down in a
responsible way.
We'll gradually resize the Active Marine Corps from about
202,000 to 182,000. We'll reduce and streamline the Air Force's
airlift fleet. We'll retire some aging C-5As and C-130s. But at
the same time, we'll maintain a fleet of 275 strategic
airlifters and 318 C-130s, a fleet that will be more than
capable of meeting the airlift requirements of the new
strategy.
The Navy will protect our highest priority and most
flexible ships, but we also will retire seven lower priority
Navy cruisers. The reason we're doing that is that these
cruisers have not been upgraded with ballistic missile defense
capability and would require significant repairs. That's the
reason the Navy chose to do that.
Second, the New Strategic Guidance made clear that we must
protect our capabilities needed to project power in Asia
Pacific and the Middle East. To this end, the budget maintains
the current bomber fleet, it maintains the aircraft carrier
fleet at a long-term level of 11 ships and 10 air wings, it
maintains the big-deck amphibious fleet, and it restores Army
and Marine Corps force structure in the Pacific after the
drawdown from Iraq and as we draw down in Afghanistan, while
continuing to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East.
Our goal is to expand our rotational presence in both areas.
The budget also makes selected new investments to ensure we
develop new capabilities to project power in key territories
and domains. We're going to put $300 million to fund the next
general Air Force bomber. We're putting $1.8 billion to develop
the new Air Force tanker, $18.2 billion for the procurement of
10 new warships, including 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2
Aegis-class destroyers, 4 littoral combat ships, 1 joint high-
speed vessel, and 1 CVN-21-class aircraft carrier. We're also
investing $100 million to increase cruise missile capacity of
future Virginia-class submarines.
Third, the strategy makes clear that, even as Asia Pacific
and the Middle East represent the areas of growing strategic
priority, the United States will continue to work to strengthen
its key alliances, to build partnerships, to develop innovative
ways, such as rotational deployments, to sustain our presence
elsewhere in the world.
To that end, we make key investments in NATO and other
partnership programs. We're putting $200 million in fiscal year
2013 and nearly $900 million over the next 5 years on the NATO
alliance Ground Surveillance System, one that was just approved
by the NATO ministerial in this last meeting; $9.7 billion in
fiscal year 2013 and about $47 billion to develop and deploy
missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S. Homeland and
strengthen regional missile defenses as well.
The new strategy envisions a series of organizational
changes to boost efforts to partner with other militaries.
We're allocating a U.S.-based brigade to the NATO response
force and will rotate U.S.-based units to Europe on a regular
basis for training and exercises, increasing the opportunities
as well for Special Operations Forces (SOF) to advise and
assist our partners in other regions.
Fourth, the United States must have the capability to fight
more than one conflict at a time. But we are in the 21st
century and we have to use 21st century capabilities. That's
the reason this budget invests in space, in cyber space, in
long-range precision strike, and in the continued growth of
SOF, to ensure that we can still confront and defeat multiple
adversaries even with the force structure reductions that I've
outlined earlier.
It also sustains the nuclear triad of bombers, missiles,
and submarines to continue to ensure that we have a safe,
reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent. Even with some
adjustments to force structure, the budget sustains a military
that I believe is the strongest in the world: an Army of more
than 1 million Active and Reserve soldiers with 18 divisions,
approximately 65 BCTs, and 21 combat aviation brigades; a naval
force of 285 ships, the same size force that we have today,
that will remain the most powerful and flexible naval force on
Earth; a Marine Corps with 31 infantry battalions, 10 artillery
battalions, and 20 tactical air squadrons; and an Air Force
that will continue to ensure air dominance, with 54 combat-
coded fighter squadrons and the current bomber fleet.
Lastly, we can't just, as I said, cut. We have to invest.
We have to leap ahead of our adversaries by investments in the
latest technologies. That's why this budget provides $11.9
billion for science and technology (S&T). It includes $2.1
billion for basic research. It provides $10.4 billion to
sustain the continued growth in SOF. It provides $3.8 billion
for unmanned air systems and it invests $3.4 billion in cyber
activities.
At the same time, the New Strategic Guidance recognizes the
need to prioritize and distinguish urgent modernization needs
from those that can be delayed, particularly in light of
schedule and cost problems. Therefore, the budget has
identified $75 billion in savings over 5 years resulting from
cancelled or restructured programs. Some examples: $15.1
billion in savings from restructuring the JSF, by delaying
aircraft purchases so that we can allow more time for
development and testing; $1.3 billion in savings from delaying
development of the Army's ground combat vehicle due to
contracting difficulties; $4.3 billion in savings from delaying
the next generation of ballistic missile submarines by 2 years
for affordability and management reasons.
In addition, we terminate selected programs: the Block 30
version of Global Hawk, which has grown in cost to the point
that it is simply no longer cost-effective; the weather
satellite program, because we can depend on existing
satellites, resulting in a savings of $2.3 billion.
All of this requires that we have to have and maintain the
ability to mobilize and to regrow the force if we have to. That
means we need to maintain a capable and ready National Guard
and Reserve. One of the things we are doing is that the Army is
going to retain more mid-grade officers and noncommissioned
officers so they'll be there with the experience and structure
we need if we have to move quickly to regrow the force. The
Reserve component has demonstrated its readiness and importance
over the past 10 years of war and we must ensure that it
remains available, trained, and equipped to serve in an
operational capacity when necessary.
Another key part of preserving our ability to quickly adapt
and mobilize is maintaining a strong and flexible industrial
base. I'm committed to make sure that our budget recognizes
that industry is our partner in the defense acquisition
enterprise. We have to maintain a base if we're going to be
able to mobilize and be prepared in the future.
Finally, with regards to our most important element of our
strategy and our decisionmaking process: our people. This
budget recognizes that they, far more than any weapons system
or technology, are the great strength of the U.S. military. One
of the guiding principles in our decisionmaking process was
that we must try to keep faith with our troops and their
families. For that reason, we've determined to protect family
assistance programs, to sustain these important investments in
this budget that serve our troops and their families, and
continue to make efforts to ensure that these programs are
responsive to their needs.
Yet, in order to build the force needed to defend the
country under existing budget constraints, the growth in costs
of military pay and benefits must be put on a sustainable
course. This is an area of the budget that has grown by nearly
90 percent since 2001, about 30 percent above inflation, while
end strength has only grown by 3 percent. So this budget
contains a road map to try to address those costs in military
pay and health care and retirement in ways that we believe are
fair, transparent, and consistent with our fundamental
commitments to our people.
On military pay, there are no pay cuts. We've created
sufficient room to allow full pay raises in 2013 and 2014.
However, we will provide more limited pay raises beginning in
2015, giving troops and their families fair notice and lead
time before changes take effect.
The budget devotes about $48, almost $50 billion to health
care costs. It's a big part of our budget, an amount that has
more than doubled over the last decade. In order to continue to
control the growth of these costs, we're recommending increases
in health care fees, in copays and deductibles that are to be
phased in over 4 to 5 years. None of these fee proposals would
apply to Active-Duty servicemembers and there will be no
increases in health care premiums for families of Active-Duty
servicemembers under this proposal.
We also feel that it's important to address the military
retirement costs as well. What we urge is the establishment of
a commission with authority to conduct a comprehensive review
of military retirement. But we have made clear, the President
and DOD, that the retirement benefits of those who currently
serve should be protected by grandfathering their benefits.
Members of the committee, putting this together, this kind
of balanced package, has been difficult, and at the same time
it has been an opportunity to try to think about what force do
we need now and what force do we need in the future. I believe
we, the Service Chiefs, the combatant commanders, have
developed a complete package to try to address our threats for
the future and to try to ensure that we achieve our strategic
aims.
As a result, the fiscal year 2013 request is balanced, it
keeps America safe, and we think it sustains U.S. leadership
abroad. Please take a look at each of the individual parts of
this plan. I encourage you to review this entire budget. This
has to be a partnership. But I ask you also to bear in mind the
strategic tradeoffs that are inherent in any particular budget
decision. This is a zero sum game. There is no free money here.
The need to balance competing strategic objectives is taking
place in a resource-constrained environment. We'll need your
support and partnership to implement this vision of the future
military.
I know these are tough issues. This is the beginning, it's
not the end of this process. But make no mistake, the savings
that we are proposing are significant and broad-based and will
impact all 50 States. But this is what Congress mandated on a
bipartisan basis, that we reduce the defense budget by almost
half a trillion dollars. We need your partnership to do this in
a manner that preserves the strongest military in the world.
This will be a test for all of us of whether reducing the
deficit is about talk or about action.
Let me be clear. You can't take a half a trillion dollars
out of the defense budget and not incur additional risks. We
believe they are acceptable risks, but they are risks. We're
going to have a smaller force. We'll depend on the speed of
mobilization. We have to depend on ingenuity in terms of new
technologies for the future, and very frankly, when you go
through this there is no margin for error.
This is why Congress must do everything possible to make
sure that we avoid sequestration. We are more than prepared to
work with Congress to try to develop an approach that will
detrigger sequestration. This approach would subject DOD to
another $500 billion in additional cuts that would be required
to take place in a meat-axe approach. We are convinced that it
would result in hollowing out the force and inflicting severe
damage to our national defense.
So the leadership of DOD, both military and civilian, is
unified behind the strategy we've presented, behind this
budget, and behind the need to avoid sequestration.
I look forward to working closely with you in the months
ahead. This is going to be a tough challenge, but it's what the
American people expect of its elected leaders, to be fiscally
responsible in developing the force for the future, the force
that can defend the country, the force that supports our men
and women in uniform, and a force that is and always will be
the strongest military in the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Leon E. Panetta

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2013.
Let me begin by first thanking you for your support for our
servicemembers and our military families. These brave men and women,
along with the Department's civilian professionals who support them,
have done everything asked of them and more during more than a decade
of war.

DEFENSE STRATEGY REVIEW

The fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Department of Defense
(DOD) was the product of an intensive strategy review conducted by the
senior military and civilian leaders of the Department with the advice
and guidance of President Obama. The total request represents a $614
billion investment in national defense--including a $525.4 billion
request for the Department's base budget, and $88.5 billion in spending
to support our troops in combat.
The reasons for this review are clear: first, the United States is
at a strategic turning point after a decade of war and substantial
growth in defense budgets. Second, with the Nation confronting very
large debt and deficits, Congress passed the Budget Control Act of
2011, imposing limits that led to a reduction in the defense budget of
$487 billion over the next decade.
Deficit reduction is a critical national security priority in and
of itself. We at the Department decided that this crisis presented us
with the opportunity to establish a new strategy for the force of the
future, and that strategy has guided us in making the budget choices
contained in the President's budget. We are at an important turning
point that would have required us to make a strategic shift under any
circumstances. The U.S. military's mission in Iraq has ended. We still
have a tough fight on our hands in Afghanistan, but over the past year
we have begun a transition to Afghan-led responsibility for security--
and we are on track to complete that transition by the end of 2014, in
accordance with our Lisbon commitments. Last year, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) effort in Libya also concluded with the fall
of Qadhafi. Successful counterterrorism efforts have significantly
weakened al Qaeda and decimated its leadership.
But despite what we have been able to achieve, unlike past
drawdowns when threats have receded, the United States still faces a
complex array of security challenges across the globe: We are still a
nation at war in Afghanistan; we still face threats from terrorism;
there is dangerous proliferation of lethal weapons and materials; the
behavior of Iran and North Korea threaten global stability; there is
continuing turmoil and unrest in the Middle East; rising powers in Asia
are testing international relationships; and there are growing concerns
about cyber intrusions and attacks. Our challenge is to meet these
threats and at the same time, meet our responsibility to fiscal
discipline. This is not an easy task.
To build the force we need for the future, we developed a new
Defense Strategic Guidance that consists of these five key elements:

First, the military will be smaller and leaner, but it
will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.
Second, we will rebalance our global posture and
presence to emphasize Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.
Third, we will build innovative partnerships and
strengthen key alliances and partnerships elsewhere in the
world.
Fourth, we will ensure that we can quickly confront
and defeat aggression from any adversary--anytime, anywhere.
Fifth, we will protect and prioritize key investments
in technology and new capabilities, as well as our capacity to
grow, adapt and mobilize as needed.

STRATEGY TO FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET

We developed this new Defense Strategic Guidance before any final
budget decisions were made to ensure that the budget choices reflected
the new defense strategy.
While shaping this strategy, we did not want to repeat the mistakes
of the past. Our goals were: to maintain the strongest military in the
world, to not ``hollow out'' the force, to take a balanced approach to
budget cuts, to put everything on the table, and to not break faith
with troops and their families. Throughout the review we made sure this
was an inclusive process, and General Dempsey and I worked closely with
the leadership of the Services and combatant commanders, and consulted
regularly with Members of Congress.
As a result of these efforts, the Department is strongly united
behind the recommendations we are presenting today. Consistent with
title I of the Budget Control Act, this budget reflects $259 billion in
savings over the next 5 years and $487 billion over the next 10 years
compared to the budget plan submitted to Congress last year. Under the
5 year budget plan, the base budget will rise from $525 billion in
fiscal year 2013 to $567 billion in fiscal year 2017. When reduced war-
related funding requirements are included, we expect total U.S. defense
spending to drop by more than 20 percent over the next few years from
its peak in 2010, after accounting for inflation.
This is a balanced and complete package that follows the key
elements of the strategy and adheres to the guidelines we established.
The savings come from three broad areas:

First, efficiencies--we redoubled efforts to make more
disciplined use of taxpayer dollars, yielding about one quarter
of the target savings;
Second, force structure and procurement adjustments--
we made strategy-driven changes in force structure and
procurement programs, achieving roughly half of the savings;
and
Finally, compensation--we made modest but important
adjustments in personnel costs to achieve some necessary cost
savings in this area, which represents one third of the budget
but accounted for a little more than 10 percent of the total
reduction.

Changes in economic assumptions and other shifts account for the
remainder of the $259 billion in savings. Let me walk through these
three areas, beginning with our efforts to discipline our use of
defense dollars.

MORE DISCIPLINED USE OF DEFENSE DOLLARS

If we are to tighten up the force, I felt we have to begin by
tightening up the operations of the Department. This budget continues
efforts to reduce excess overhead, eliminate waste, and improve
business practices across the department. The more savings realized in
this area, the less spending reductions required for modernization
programs, force structure, and military compensation.
The fiscal year 2012 budget proposed more than $150 billion in
efficiencies between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2016, and we
continue to implement those changes. This budget identifies about $60
billion in additional savings over 5 years. Across the Military
Services, new efficiency efforts over the next 5 years include:

The Army proposes to save $18.6 billion through
measures such as streamlining support functions, consolidating
information technology enterprise services, and rephasing
military construction projects;
The Navy proposes to save $5.7 billion by implementing
strategic sourcing of commodities and services, consolidating
inventory, and other measures; and
The Air Force proposes to save $6.6 billion by
reducing service support contractors and rephasing military
construction projects.

Other proposed DOD-wide efficiency savings over the next 5 years
total $30.1 billion, including reductions in expenses in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Defense agencies.
Additionally, we are continuing the initiative to improve the
Department's buying power by seeking greater efficiency and
productivity in the acquisition of goods and services. We are
strengthening acquisition support to the warfighter, executing
acquisitions more efficiently, preserving the industrial base, and
strengthening the acquisition workforce. This budget assumes that these
policies produce savings of $5.3 billion over the next 5 years.
In terms of military infrastructure, we will need to ensure that
our current basing and infrastructure requirements do not divert
resources from badly needed capabilities.
As we reduce force structure, we have a responsibility to provide
the most cost efficient support for the force. For that reason, the
President will request that Congress authorize the Base Realignment and
Closure process for 2013 and 2015. As someone who went through BRAC, I
realize how controversial this process can be for members and
constituencies. Yet, it is the only effective way to achieve
infrastructure savings.
Achieving audit readiness is another key initiative that will help
the Department achieve greater discipline in its use of defense
dollars. The Department needs auditable financial statements to comply
with the law, to strengthen its own internal processes, and to reassure
the public that it continues to be a good steward of Federal funds. In
October 2011, I directed the Department to emphasize this initiative
and accelerate efforts to achieve fully auditable financial statements.
Among other specific goals, I directed the Department achieve audit
readiness of the Statement of Budgetary Resources for general funds by
the end of calendar year 2014, and to meet the legal requirements to
achieve full audit readiness for all Defense Department financial
statements by 2017. We are also implementing a course-based
certification program for defense financial managers in order to
improve training in audit readiness and other areas, with pilot
programs beginning this year. We now have a plan in place to meet these
deadlines, including specific goals, financial resources, and a
governance structure.
These are all critically important efforts to ensure the Department
operates in the most efficient manner possible. Together, these
initiatives will help ensure the Department can preserve funding for
the force structure and modernization needed to support the missions of
our force.

STRATEGY-DRIVEN CHANGES IN FORCE STRUCTURE AND PROGRAMS

It is obvious that we cannot achieve the overall savings targets
through efficiencies alone. Budget reductions of this magnitude require
significant adjustments to force structure and investments, but the
choices we made reflected five key elements of the Defense Strategic
Guidance and vision for the military.

1. Build a force that is smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible,
ready and technologically advanced

We knew that coming out of the wars, the military would be smaller.
Our approach to accommodating these reductions, however, has been to
take this as an opportunity--as tough as it is--to fashion the agile
and flexible military we need for the future. That highly networked and
capable joint force consists of:

an adaptable and battle-tested Army that is our
Nation's force for decisive action, capable of defeating any
adversary on land;
a Navy that maintains forward presence and is able to
penetrate enemy defenses;
a Marine Corps that is a ``middleweight''
expeditionary force with reinvigorated amphibious capabilities;
an Air Force that dominates air and space and provides
rapid mobility, global strike and persistent ISR; and
National Guard and Reserve components that continue to
be ready and prepared for operations when needed.

To ensure an agile force, we made a conscious choice not to
maintain more force structure than we could afford to properly train
and equip. We are implementing force structure reductions consistent
with the new Defense Strategic Guidance for a total savings of about
$50 billion over the next 5 years.
These adjustments include:

Gradually resizing the Active Army to 490,000,
eliminating a minimum of 8 BCTs and developing a plan to update
the Army's brigade structure;
Gradually resizing the Active Marine Corps to about
182,100, eliminating 6 combat battalions and 4 Tactical Air
squadrons;
Reducing and streamlining the Air Force's airlift
fleet by retiring all 27 C-5As, 65 of the oldest C-130s and
divesting all 38 C-27s. After retirements, the Air Force will
maintain a fleet of 275 strategic airlifters, and 318 C-130s--a
number that we have determined is sufficient to meet the
airlift requirements of the new strategy, including the Air
Force's commitment for direct support of the Army;
Eliminating seven Air Force Tactical Air squadrons--
including five A-10 squadrons, one F-16 squadron, and one F-15
training squadron. The Air Force will retain 54 combat-coded
fighter squadrons, maintaining the capabilities and capacity
needed to meet the new Defense Strategic Guidance; and
Retiring seven lower priority Navy cruisers that have
not been upgraded with ballistic missile defense capability or
that would require significant repairs, as well as retiring two
dock landing ships.

The strategy review recognized that a smaller, ready and agile
force is preferable to a larger force that is poorly trained and ill-
equipped. Therefore, we put a premium on retaining those capabilities
that provide the most flexibility across a range of missions. We also
emphasized readiness. For fiscal 2013, the Department is requesting
$209 billion in the base budget for Operation and Maintenance, the
budget category that funds training and equipment maintenance among
other aspects of operations. That represents an increase of 6 percent
compared to the enacted level in 2012, even though the overall base
budget will decline by 1 percent. Striking the right balance between
force structure and readiness is critical to our efforts to avoid a
hollow force, and we will continue to focus on this area to ensure that
we make the right choices.

2. Rebalance global posture and presence to emphasize Asia-Pacific
and the Middle East

The strategic guidance made clear that we must protect capabilities
needed to project power in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. To this
end, this budget:

Maintains the current bomber fleet;
Maintains the aircraft carrier fleet at a long-term
level of 11 ships and 10 air wings;
Maintains the big-deck amphibious fleet; and
Restores Army and Marine Corps force structure in the
Pacific after the drawdown from Iraq and as we drawdown in
Afghanistan, while maintaining persistent presence in the
Middle East.

The budget also makes selected new investments to ensure we develop
new capabilities needed to maintain our military's continued freedom of
action in face of new challenges that could restrict our ability to
project power in key territories and domains. Across the Services, this
budget plan requests $1.8 billion for fiscal year 2013, and a total of
$3.9 billion over the next 5 years, for enhancements to radars,
sensors, and electronic warfare capabilities needed to operate in these
environments.
Other key power projection investments in fiscal year 2013 include:

$300 million to fund the next generation Air Force
bomber (and a total of $6.3 billion over the next 5 years);
$1.8 billion to develop the new Air Force tanker;
$18.2 billion for the procurement of 10 new warships
and associated equipment, including 2 Virginia-class
submarines, 2 Aegis-class destroyers, 4 Littoral Combat Ships,
1 Joint High Speed Vessel, and 1 CVN-21-class aircraft carrier.
We are also requesting $100 million to develop the capability
to increase cruise missile capacity of future Virginia-class
submarines;
$2.2 billion in fiscal year 2013 for the procurement
of an additional 26 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft;
$1.0 billion in fiscal year 2013 for the procurement
of 12 EA-18G Growler aircraft, the Navy's new electronic
warfare platform that replaces the EA-6B; and
$38 million for design efforts to construct an Afloat
Forward Staging Base planned for procurement in fiscal year
2014. This base can provide mission support in areas where
ground-based access is not available, such as counter-mine
operations, Special Operations, and ISR.

3. Build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and
partnerships

The strategy makes clear that even though Asia-Pacific and the
Middle East represent the areas of growing strategic priority, the
United States will work to strengthen its key alliances, to build
partnerships and to develop innovative ways to sustain U.S. presence
elsewhere in the world.
To that end, this budget makes key investments in NATO and other
partnership programs, including:

$200 million in fiscal year 2013 and nearly $900
million over the next 5 years in the NATO Alliance Ground
Surveillance system. This system will enable the Alliance to
perform persistent surveillance over wide areas in any weather
or light condition;
$9.7 billion in fiscal year 2013, and $47.4 billion
over the next 5 years, to develop and deploy missile defense
capabilities that protect the U.S. Homeland and strengthen
regional missile defenses. The request includes the Phased
Adaptive Approach that is being deployed first in Europe and is
designed to protect NATO allies and forces from ballistic
missile threats; and
$800 million for the combatant commanders exercise and
engagement program. Jointly with the State Department, we will
also begin using the new Global Security Contingency fund that
was established at our request in the fiscal year 2012
legislation.

The new strategy also envisions a series of organizational changes
that will boost efforts to partner with other militaries. These
include:

Allocating a U.S.-based brigade to the NATO Response
Force and rotating U.S.-based units to Europe for training and
exercises;
Aligning an Army BCT with each regional combatant
command to foster regional expertise; and
Increasing opportunities for Special Operations Forces
to advise and assist partners in other regions, using
additional capacity available due to the gradual drawdown from
the post-September 11 wars.

4. Ensure that we can confront and defeat aggression from any
adversary--anytime, anywhere

The strategic guidance reaffirmed that the United States must have
the capability to fight more than one conflict at the same time. Still,
the strategic guidance recognizes that how we defeat the enemy may well
vary across conflicts.
This budget invests in space, cyberspace, long range precision-
strike and the continued growth of Special Operations Forces to ensure
that we can still confront and defeat multiple adversaries even with
the force structure reductions outlined earlier. It also sustains the
nuclear triad of bombers, missiles and submarines to ensure we continue
to have a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent.
Even with some adjustments to force structure, this budget sustains
a military that is the strongest in the world, capable of quickly and
decisively confronting aggression wherever and whenever necessary.
After planned reductions, the fiscal year 2017 joint force will consist
of:

An Army of more than 1 million Active and Reserve
soldiers that remains flexible, agile, ready and lethal across
the spectrum of conflict, with 18 divisions, approximately 65
Brigade Combat Teams, 21 Combat Aviation Brigades and
associated enablers;
A Naval battle force of 285 ships--the same size force
that we have today--that will remain the most powerful and
flexible naval force on earth, able to prevail in any combat
situation, including the most stressing anti-access
environments. Our maritime forces will include 11 carriers, 9
large deck amphibious ships (although we should build to 10
such ships in fiscal year 2018), 82 guided missile cruisers and
destroyers, and 50 nuclear powered attack submarines;
A Marine Corps that remains the Nation's expeditionary
force in readiness, forward deployed and engaged, with 31
infantry battalions, 10 artillery battalions and 20 tactical
air squadrons; and
An Air Force that will continue to ensure air
dominance with 54 combat coded fighter squadrons and the
current bomber fleet, with the Joint Strike Fighter in
production and the next generation bomber in development. Our
Air Force will also maintain a fleet of 275 strategic
airlifters, 318 C-130s and a new aerial refueling tanker.

5. Protect and prioritize key investments, and the capacity to
grow, adapt, and mobilize

The force we are building will retain a decisive technological
edge, leverage the lessons of recent conflicts and stay ahead of the
most lethal and disruptive threats of the future.
To that end, the fiscal year 2013 budget:

Provides $11.9 billion for science and technology to
preserve our ability to leap ahead, including $2.1 billion for
basic research;
Provides $10.4 billion (base and OCO) to sustain the
continued growth in Special Operations Forces;
Provides $3.8 billion for Unmanned Air Systems by
funding trained personnel, infrastructure, and platforms to
sustain 65 USAF MQ-1/9 combat air patrols with a surge capacity
of 85 by fiscal year 2016. We slowed the buy of the Reaper
aircraft to allow us time to develop the personnel and training
infrastructure necessary to make full use of these important
aircraft. We also protected funding for the Army's unmanned air
system Gray Eagle;
Invests $3.4 billion in cyber activities, with several
initiatives receiving increased funding relative to last year.
The scale of cyber threats is increasing and we need to be
prepared to defeat these threats, mitigate the potential
damage, and provide the President with options to respond, if
necessary. We are investing in full spectrum cyber operations
capabilities to address the threats we see today and in the
future. The Department is also pleased to see progress being
made in Congress regarding cyber legislation and is supportive
of the bipartisan legislation being introduced by Senators
Lieberman and Collins; and
Provides $1.5 billion to fund the Department's
Chemical and Biological Defense program.

At the same time, the strategic guidance recognizes the need to
prioritize and distinguish urgent modernization needs from those that
can be delayed--particularly in light of schedule and cost problems.
Therefore this budget identifies about $75 billion in savings over the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) resulting from canceled or
restructured programs. Key modifications and associated savings over
the FYDP include:

$15.1 billion in savings from restructuring the Joint
Strike Fighter by delaying aircraft purchases to allow more
time for development and testing;
$1.3 billion in savings from delaying development of
the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle due to contracting
difficulties;
$2.2 billion in savings from curtailing the Joint Land
Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System due
to concerns about program cost and operational mobility;
$4.3 billion in savings from delaying the next
generation of ballistic missile submarines by 2 years for
affordability and management reasons; and
$0.8 billion in savings from delaying selected Army
aviation helicopter modernization for 3 to 5 years.

We will also terminate selected programs, including:

The Block 30 version of Global Hawk, which has grown
in cost to the point where it is no longer cost effective,
resulting in savings of $2.5 billion;
Upgrades to High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles; we will focus our modernization resources on the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, resulting in savings of $900
million; and
The weather satellite program, because we can depend
on existing satellites, resulting in savings of $2.3 billion.

We have also invested in a balanced portfolio of capabilities that
will enable our force to remain agile, flexible and technologically
advanced enough to meet any threat. We will ensure that we can
mobilize, surge, and adapt our force to meet the requirements of an
uncertain future. To that end, ground forces will retain the key
enablers and know-how to conduct long-term stability operations, and
the Army will retain more mid-grade officers and noncommissioned
officers. These steps will ensure we have the structure and experienced
leaders necessary should we need to re-grow the force quickly.
Another key element is to maintain a capable and ready National
Guard and Reserve. The Reserve component has demonstrated its readiness
and importance over the past 10 years of war, and we must ensure that
it remains available, trained, and equipped to serve in an operational
capacity when necessary. We will maintain key combat support
capabilities and ensure that combat service support capabilities like
civil affairs are maintained at a high readiness level. We will also
leverage the operational experience and institute a progressive
readiness model in the National Guard and Reserves in order to sustain
increased readiness prior to mobilization.
In keeping with the emphasis on a highly capable reserve, this
budget makes only relatively modest reductions in the ground-force
Reserve components. Over the next 5 years, the Army Reserve will be
sustained at 205,000 personnel, the Army National Guard will marginally
decrease from 358,200 to 353,200 personnel, and the Marine Corps
Reserve will sustain an end-strength level of 39,600 personnel. The
Navy Reserve will decrease from 66,200 to 57,100 personnel over the
next 5 years. Over the same span, the Air Force Reserve will decrease
from 71,400 to 69,500 personnel, and the Air National Guard will
decrease from 106,700 to 101,200 personnel.
Another key part of preserving our ability to quickly adapt and
mobilize is a strong and flexible industrial base. This budget
recognizes that industry is our partner in the defense acquisition
enterprise. A healthy industrial base means a profitable industrial
base, but it also means a lean, efficient base that provides good value
for the taxpayers' defense investments and increases in productivity
over time.

ENSURING QUALITY OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Now to the most fundamental element of our strategy and our
decision-making process: our people. This budget recognizes that they,
far more than any weapons system or technology, are the great strength
of our U.S. military. All told, the fiscal year 2013 budget requests
$135.1 billion for the pay and allowances of military personnel and
$8.5 billion for family support programs vital to the well-being of
servicemembers and their families.
One of the guiding principles in our decisionmaking process was
that we must keep faith with our troops and their families. For that
reason, we were determined to protect family assistance programs, and
we were able to sustain these important investments in this budget and
continue efforts to make programs more responsive to the needs of
troops and their families. Yet in order to build the force needed to
defend the country under existing budget constraints, the growth in
costs of military pay and benefits must be put on a sustainable course.
This is an area of the budget that has grown by nearly 90 percent since
2001, or about 30 percent above inflation--while end strength has only
grown by 3 percent.
This budget contains a roadmap to address the costs of military
pay, health care, and retirement in ways that are fair, transparent,
and consistent with our fundamental commitments to our people.
On military pay, there are no pay cuts. We have created sufficient
room to allow for full pay raises in 2013 and 2014 that keep pace with
increases in the private sector. That means for 2013, we propose a pay
increase of 1.7 percent for servicemembers. However, we will provide
more limited pay raises beginning in 2015--giving troops and their
families fair notice and lead time before changes take effect. Let me
be clear: nobody's pay is cut in this budget nor will anyone's pay be
cut in the future years of this proposal.
This budget devotes $48.7 billion to health care costs--an amount
that has more than doubled over the last decade. In order to continue
to control the growth of these costs, we are recommending increases in
health care fees, co-pays and deductibles to be phased in over 4 to 5
years. None of the fee proposals in the budget would apply to Active-
Duty servicemembers, survivors of servicemembers who died on Active
Duty, or retirees who retired due to disability. Most of the changes
will not affect the families of Active-Duty servicemembers--there will
be no increases in health care fees or deductibles for families of
active-duty servicemembers. Those most affected will be retirees--with
the greatest impact on working-age retirees under the age of 65 still
likely to be employed in the civilian sector. Even with these changes,
the costs borne by retirees will remain below levels in most comparable
private sector plans--as they should be.
Proposed changes include:

Further increasing enrollment fees for retirees under
age 65 in the TRICARE Prime program, using a tiered approach
based on retired pay that requires senior-grade retirees with
higher retired pay to pay more and junior-grade retirees less;
Establishing a new enrollment fee for the TRICARE
Standard/Extra programs and increasing deductibles;
Establishing a new enrollment fee for the TRICARE-for-
Life program for retirees 65 and older, also using a tiered
approach;
Implementing additional increases in pharmacy co-pays
in a manner that increases incentives for use of mail order and
generic medicine; and
Indexing fees, deductibles, pharmacy co-pays, and
catastrophic caps to reflect the growth in national health care
costs.

We also feel that the fair way to address military retirement costs
is to ask Congress to establish a commission with authority to conduct
a comprehensive review of military retirement. But the President and
the Department believe that the retirement benefits of those who
currently serve should be protected by grandfathering their benefits.
For those who serve today I will request there be no changes in
retirement benefits.

FULLY SUPPORTING DEPLOYED WARFIGHTERS

The costs of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) are funded
separately from the base budget in a stand-alone fiscal year 2013
request of $88.5 billion. That funding level represents a decrease of
$26.6 billion from the fiscal year 2012 enacted level.
This year's OCO request, which ensures that deployed troops have
all the financial resources they need to conduct their challenging
missions, primarily supports operations in Afghanistan but also
requests relatively small sums for the Office of Security Cooperation
in Iraq (OSC-I) and the repair or replacement of equipment redeploying
from Iraq.
Our fiscal year 2013 OCO request includes funding for added
personnel pay and subsistence for deployed forces; communications;
mobilizing Reserve component units; transportation; supplies;
deployment and redeployment of all combat and support forces; force
sustainment; and sustainment and replenishment of war reserve stocks.
For fiscal year 2013 we request $5.7 billion in funding for the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It is critically important that
we maintain sufficient financial support to ANSF so that they can
ultimately assume full security responsibility across Afghanistan.
Much tough fighting lies ahead in Afghanistan, but the gradually
improving situation permits the remainder of the U.S. surge force to
redeploy by the end of September 2012, leaving 68,000 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan at that time. The fiscal year 2013 OCO request assumes a
continued level of about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan. While future
changes in troop levels may be implemented during fiscal year 2013,
those decisions will be based on advice from field commanders about
conditions on the ground.
In Iraq, OCO funding supports continued security assistance and
cooperation with Iraqi Security Forces through the OSC-I in the areas
of common interest, including counterterrorism, counter-proliferation,
maritime security, and air defense. This funding is critical for the
U.S. to strengthen its long-term partnership with Iraq. Additionally,
to ensure that U.S. forces redeployed from Iraq are ready and equipped
for future operations, this funding replenishes equipment and stocks
for these forces.

A BALANCED PACKAGE

Members of the committee: putting together this balanced package
has been a difficult undertaking and, at the same time, an important
opportunity to shape the force we need for the future. I believe we
have developed a complete package, aligned to achieve our strategic
aims. We have achieved buy-in from the Service Secretaries, the Service
Chiefs, combatant commanders, and the senior enlisted leaders of the
Department.
Our strategy review preceded and guided the budgeting process. This
strategy-first approach enabled the Department to balance strategic
priorities, place individual budget decisions within a broader
strategic context, and ultimately, to guide us in making some tough
choices.
As a result, the fiscal year 2013 request is a carefully balanced
package that keeps America safe and sustains U.S. leadership abroad. As
you take a look at the individual parts of this plan, I encourage you
to do what the Department has done: to bear in mind the strategic
trade-offs inherent in any particular budget decision, and the need to
balance competing strategic objectives in a resource-constrained
environment.
Each decision needs to be judged on the basis of the overall
strategy that it supports, recognizing that unwinding any one piece
puts our whole package in jeopardy. The bottom line is that I believe
there is little room for modification to preserve the force and
capabilities we believe are needed to protect the country and fulfill
assigned missions.
Ultimately that means we will need your support and partnership to
implement this vision of the future military. I understand how tough
these issues can be, and that this is the beginning and not the end of
this process. Make no mistake: the savings we are proposing will impact
all 50 States. But it was this Congress that mandated, on a bi-partisan
basis, that we reduce the defense budget, and we need your partnership
to do this in a manner that preserves the strongest military in the
world. This will be a test of whether reducing the deficit is about
talk or action.
My hope is that now that we see the sacrifice involved in reducing
the defense budget by almost half a trillion dollars, Congress will be
convinced of its important responsibility to make sure that we avoid
sequestration. That would be a doubling of the cuts, another roughly
$500 billion in additional cuts that would be required to take place
through a meat-axe approach, and that we are convinced would hollow out
the force and inflict severe damage on our National defense.
So the leadership of this department, both military and civilian,
is united behind the strategy that we have presented, and this budget.
I look forward to working closely with you in the months ahead to do
what the American people expect of their leaders: be fiscally
responsible in developing the force for the future--a force that can
defend the country, a forced that supports our men and women in
uniform, and a force that is, and always will be, the strongest
military in the world.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Panetta.
General Dempsey.

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF

General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you, as always,
for this opportunity to discuss the President's defense budget
proposal for fiscal year 2013. This budget represents a
responsible investment in our Nation's security. At its core,
it is an investment in people, the sons and daughters of
America who serve this Nation in our military. Allow me to open
with a few words about them and what they have accomplished.
The last 10 years of war have been among the most
challenging in our Nation's military history. Through it all,
the joint force has persevered and it has prevailed. Our
families have stood with us deployment after deployment after
deployment and so have you. Together, we have fulfilled our
solemn vow to protect and defend America, her citizens, and her
interests.
As I sit with you today, our service men and women remain
globally engaged. They are deterring aggression, developing
partners, delivering aid, and defeating our enemies. They stand
ready, strong, and swift in every domain, every day.
I had the privilege to be with a few of them while
traveling to Afghanistan and Egypt this past week. As always, I
witnessed extraordinary courage and skill--in the young
soldiers just off patrol in the deep snows of the Hindu Kush,
in the men and women of the NATO training mission managing the
development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and
the brave and vigilant Marine Corps security detachment in our
embassy in Cairo, and in the superb junior airmen who flew us
to the right place at the right time.
They exemplify a professional military with a reliable
record of performance. In just the past year, for example, we
further crippled al Qaeda. We helped protect the Libyan people
from near-certain slaughter, while affirming NATO's important
role beyond the borders of Europe. We brought to a close more
than 20 years of military operations in and over Iraq and, like
we did in Iraq, we are steadily transitioning responsibility
for security onto Afghan shoulders. We also helped Japan
recover from a perfect storm of tragedy and destruction.
Of course, these were just the most visible
accomplishments. Behind the scenes and beneath the surface, we
defended against cyber threats, sustained our nuclear deterrent
posture, and worked with allies and partners to build capacity
and to prevent conflict across the globe. We continue to
provide this Nation with a wide range of options for dealing
with the security challenges that confront us.
An increasingly competitive and uncertain security
environment demands that we be alert, responsive, adaptive, and
dominant. This budget helps us do that. It's informed by a real
strategy that makes real choices. It maintains our military's
decisive edge and our global leadership. Moreover, it ensures
we keep faith with the true source of our military strength,
and that is our people.
With this in mind, allow me to add a few additional
comments to those of the Secretary. First, this budget should
be considered holistically. I caution against viewing its
programs in isolation because it represents a comprehensive and
carefully devised set of decisions. It achieves balance among
force structure, modernization, pay, and benefits. Changes that
are not informed by this context risk upending the balance and
compromising the force.
Second, this budget represents a way point, not an end
point, in the development of the joint force we will need for
2020 and beyond. It puts us on a path to restore versatility at
an affordable cost. Specialized capabilities, once on the
margins, become more central, even while we retain conventional
overmatch. It builds a global and networked joint force that is
ably led and always ready.
Third, this budget honors commitments made to our military
families. It does keep faith with them. There are no freezes or
reductions in pay. There's no lessening in the quality of
health care received by our Active-Duty servicemembers and
medically wounded veterans.
That said, we cannot ignore the increasing costs of pay and
benefits. To manage costs, we need pragmatic reform. All of
this can be done in a way that preserves our ability to recruit
and retain America's talented youth.
Finally, all strategies and the budgets to resource them
carry risk. This one is no different. In my judgment, the risk
lies not in what we can do, but in how much we can do and how
often we can do it. This budget helps buy down that risk by
investing in our people and in the joint capabilities they most
need.
To close, thank you. Thank you for keeping our military
strong. Thank you for taking care of our military families, for
supporting those who serve and who have served and who will
serve. I know you share my pride in them. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:]

Prepared Statement by GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is my privilege to update you on the state of the United
States' Armed Forces and to comment on the President's budget proposal
for fiscal year 2013. The context for this year's posture testimony is
unique. Our military has transitioned many of our major operations, and
we have a new Defense Strategic Guidance that sets priorities. We are
also facing real fiscal constraints and an increasingly competitive
security environment. The President's proposed fiscal year 2013 defense
budget accounts for these realities. It provides a responsible
investment in our Nation's current and future security.

GLOBAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Today our Armed Forces stand strong. We are proud of the
performance and accomplishments of our men and women in uniform over
the past year. They have carried out far-ranging missions with much
success. They have defended our Homeland, deterred aggression, and kept
our Nation immune from coercion. Despite a decade of continuous combat
operations, our troops and their families remain resilient.
U.S. Forces-Iraq recently completed its mission. More than 20 years
of military operations in and over Iraq came to conclusion. The
security of Iraq is now the responsibility of the Iraqi people,
leaders, and security forces. We have transitioned to a normal
military-to-military relationship. Diplomats and civilian advisors are
now the face of the United States in Baghdad. To be sure, Iraq still
faces challenges to the country's future. But as we look to that
future, we will continue to build ties across Iraq to help the people
and institutions capitalize on the freedom and opportunity we helped
secure.
In Afghanistan, we are seeing the benefits of the surge in combat
forces begun in early 2010. The security situation is improving. By
nearly every measure, violence has declined. The Taliban are less
capable, physically and psychologically, than they were 2 years ago.
Afghan and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) have
maintained persistent pressure on insurgent groups and have wrested the
initiative and momentum from them in much of the country. But these
groups remain determined, and they continue to threaten the population
and the government. Combat will continue.
Key to long-term stability in Afghanistan is the development of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In 2011, the Afghan National
Army grew by 18 percent. The Afghan National Police grew by 20 percent.
These forces, combined with the nascent but ever more capable Afghan
Local Police, are steadily assuming responsibility for Afghan security.
The process of transition began in July, and today, after nearly
completing the second of five ``tranches'' of transition, Afghan
security forces are now responsible for the day-to-day security of
almost half of Afghanistan's population. Developing the ANSF, degrading
insurgent capabilities, and turning over responsibilities have allowed
us to begin a measured draw down of our forces in Afghanistan. We have
withdrawn over 10,000 of the surge troops and will withdraw the
remaining 23,000 by the end of this summer. By that time, we expect the
ANSF to achieve their initial operating capability and to be
responsible for securing nearly two-thirds of the Afghan population.
They are on track to meet the goal of assuming full lead for security
by the end of 2014.
Sustaining progress in Afghanistan requires dealing with some
significant challenges. The ANSF and other national and local
government institutions require further development. Corruption remains
pervasive and continues to undermine the capacity and legitimacy of
government at all levels. Insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan remain
largely uncontested. Ultimately, much more work remains to achieve the
political solutions necessary to end the fighting in Afghanistan.
Our military has been vigilant and active in other areas and with
other missions to keep America and our partners safe. We decapitated al
Qaeda and pushed this terrorist network decidedly closer to strategic
defeat through the successful special forces operation targeting Osama
bin Laden. We supported NATO in its U.N. mission to protect civilians
in Libya allowing them to end Muammar Qaddafi's tyrannical rule. We
responded quickly to the devastating earthquakes and tsunami that
struck Japan, saving lives and acting on our commitment to this key
ally. We fended off cyber intrusions against our military's computer
networks and systems. We helped counter aggression and provocation from
Iran and North Korea.

A TIME OF TRANSITION

While our military continues to capably and faithfully perform this
wide array of missions, we are currently in the midst of several major
transitions. Any one of them alone would be difficult. Taken together,
all three will test our people and our leadership at every level.
First, we are transitioning from a war-time footing to a readiness
footing. With the end of our operations in Iraq and Libya and the
ongoing transition of security responsibilities in Afghanistan, our
troops are steadily returning home. From a peak of more than 200,000
troops deployed to combat 2 years ago, we have fewer than 90,000 today.
This shift cannot lead us to lose focus on ongoing combat operations.
But, it does mean we must give attention to restoring our readiness for
full spectrum operations. We need to reset and refit, and in many cases
replace, our war-torn equipment. We need to modernize systems
intentionally passed over for periodic upgrading during the last
decade. We must retrain our personnel on skills used less often over
the last decade. We will have to do all of this in the context of a
security environment that is different than the one we faced 10 years
ago. We cannot simply return to the old way of doing things, and we
cannot forget the lessons we have learned. As described in the
Department's recently released strategic guidance, we should adjust our
missions, our posture, and our organizational structure in order to
adapt to ever evolving challenges and threats.
Second, our military is transitioning to an era of more constrained
resources. The days of growing budgets are gone, and as an institution
we must become more efficient and transparent. We must carefully and
deliberately evaluate trade-offs in force structure, acquisition, and
compensation. We must make the hard choices, focus on our priorities,
and overcome bureaucratic and parochial tendencies. In sum, we must
recommit ourselves to being judicious stewards of the Nation's
resources.
Third, tens of thousands of our veterans--and their families--are
facing the transition to civilian life. Many enlistments are coming to
their normal conclusion, but we are also becoming a leaner force. As we
do this, we must help our veterans find education opportunities,
meaningful employment, and first-class health care. We must pay
particular attention to those bearing the deepest wounds of war,
including the unseen wounds. We must help those who have given so much
cope with--and where possible, avoid--significant long-term challenges
such as substance abuse, divorce, depression, domestic violence, and
homelessness. Addressing these issues is not the exclusive
responsibility of the Services or veterans organizations. How we
respond, as a military community and as a Nation, conveys our
commitment to our veterans and their families. It will also directly
affect our ability to recruit and retain our Nation's best in the
future.
I have outlined several priorities for the Joint Force to help us
anticipate and navigate the challenges these transitions present. We
will maintain focus on achieving our national objectives in our current
conflicts. We will begin creating the military of our future--the Joint
Force of 2020. We will also confront what being in the Profession of
Arms means in the aftermath of war. Above all else, we will keep faith
with our military family. In doing all these things, we will provide an
effective defense for the country and strengthen the military's
covenant of trust with the American people.

A RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT

The President's fiscal year 2013 Department of Defense base budget
of $525 billion and overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget of $88
billion represent a responsible investment in our Nation's security.
The decisions underlying them flow from the strategic guidance the
Department of Defense issued last month. This guidance set priorities
for assessing our programs, force structure, and spending in the
context of a persistently dangerous and increasingly competitive
security environment. With those priorities in mind, the budget
proposal strikes an appropriate and necessary balance between
succeeding in today's conflicts and preparing for tomorrow's
challenges. It accounts for real risks and real fiscal constraints,
marrying versatility with affordability.
The tradeoffs were complex, and the choices were tough. They will
produce $259 billion in savings over the next 5 years and a total of
$487 billion over the next 10 years. They will not lead to a military
in decline. Rather, this budget will maintain our military's decisive
edge and help sustain America's global leadership. It will preserve our
ability to protect our vital national interests and to execute our most
important missions. Moreover, it will keep faith with the true source
of our military's strength--our people.
The merits of this budget should be viewed in the context of an
evolving global security environment and a longer term plan for the
Joint Force. Coming on the heels of a decade of war, this budget begins
the process of rebalancing our force structure and our modernization
efforts and aligns them with our strategy. Essentially, we are
developing today the Joint Force the Nation will need in 2020, and our
plans to build this force will unfold over the course of several budget
cycles. This budget is the first step--a down payment. If we fail to
step off properly, our recovery will be difficult, and our ability to
provide the Nation with the broad and decisive military options will
diminish.
It is worth addressing head-on some of the major changes we are
planning as we adapt to changing global opportunities and challenges.
Just as this budget must be viewed in the context of a broader plan,
these changes must be viewed in the context of our evolving force. They
represent a comprehensive, carefully devised package of decisions that
strikes a fine balance. They are not, and cannot be viewed as,
individual, isolated measures. In all cases, needed capabilities are
preserved or, when necessary, generated, through one or several
programs.
This budget will make critical investments in our future force.
Certain specialized capabilities, once on the margins, will move to the
forefront. Networked special operations, cyber, and Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance will become increasingly central. The
results will be a Joint Force that is global and networked, that is
versatile and innovative, and that is ably led and always ready. This
force will be prepared to secure global access and to respond to global
contingencies. We will be a military that is able to do more than one
thing at a time--to win any conflict, anywhere.
Particular attention will be placed on our anti-access/area-denial
capabilities. The proliferation of technology threatens our unfettered
access to the global commons--access that is fundamental to global
commerce and security. As we rebalance our global posture to emphasize
the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, we are adjusting our
operating constructs and the systems we employ. This includes divesting
some outdated ships, planes, and equipment as well as investing in new
programs. We will also commit to our partnerships and to helping
develop our partners' security capabilities.
Similarly, this force will place added focus on our military's
cyber defense capabilities. The threats to the average American's day-
to-day life and our military capabilities that emanate from cyber space
have evolved faster than many could have imagined. We must adapt to
these threats with similar adroitness and capacity. This budget allows
for us to expand many of our nascent cyber capabilities and to better
protect our defense networks. Similarly, bipartisan cyber legislation
being introduced in Congress is a good first step in developing
protection for our Nation's critical infrastructure. With much work to
be done, we look forward to working with agencies across the government
and with our allies and partners to confront this broad range of
emerging threats.
While some additional capabilities for our Joint Force will be
needed, others will not. The Joint Force of the future will be leaner
than today's. We will no longer be sized for large scale, prolonged
stability operations. As a result, we expect to draw down the Army from
562,000 to 490,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017, and the Marine Corps
from over 202,100 to 182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016. Some of
this reduction was planned several years ago when Congress authorized
temporary end strength increases to support our operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
But in making ourselves leaner, we will not make the mistakes of
previous draw downs. We will not retain organizational structures that
lack the people, training, and equipment necessary to perform the tasks
we expect from them. We will be realistic about the organizations we
keep, while also maintaining our ability to reconstitute and mobilize
forces. We will still be able to respond to any large scale
mobilization against us. To do this, the Joint Force will retain
capacity in our Reserve components and our industrial base should they
be required to surge. We will maintain the Army Reserve end strength at
205,000 and reduce the Army National Guard by only 5,000 down to
353,200. The Marine Corps Reserves will be retain their current
strength.
Another major concern among our troops, their families, retirees,
and with the American public is military compensation and benefits. I
want to make it clear that cuts in spending will not fall on the
shoulders of our troops. There are no proposed freezes or reductions in
pay. There is no change to the high quality health care our Active-Duty
members and medically retired Wounded Warriors receive. But we cannot
ignore some hard realities. Pay and benefits are now roughly one third
of defense spending. Pay will need to grow more slowly in the future.
We are also proposing a commission to review of military retirement. To
control the growth of healthcare costs, we are also recommending
changes to TRICARE. These adjustments include modest, new or phased-in
increases in health care fees, co-pays, and deductibles largely for our
retirees--but not our Active-Duty servicemembers. Even with these
increases, TRICARE will remain one of the finest medical benefits in
the country.
Overall, these proposed changes value both the demands of military
service and our duty to be good stewards of the Nation's fiscal
resources. They will sustain the recruitment, retention, and readiness
of the talented personnel we need. Most importantly, they will sustain
our enduring commitment to our troops and their families--we must never
break faith with them. I want to note, however, that keeping faith with
our service men and women is not just about pay and benefits. It is
also about ensuring we remain the best trained, best equipped, and best
led force on the planet.
The last, and perhaps most critical issue, is risk. This budget and
the strategy it supports allow us to apply decisive force
simultaneously across a range of missions and activities around the
globe. They mitigate many risks, but they accept some as well, as all
strategies must. The primary risks lie not in what we can do, but in
how much we can do and how fast we can do it. The risks are in time and
capacity. We have fully considered these risks, and I am convinced we
can properly manage them by ensuring we keep the force in balance,
investing in new capabilities, and preserving a strong Reserve
component. We can also compensate through other means, such as
effective diplomacy and strong partnerships. I believe that these risks
are acceptable and that we will face greater risk if we do not change
from our previous approaches.

CONCLUSION

In the upcoming year, our Armed Forces will build on the past
year's achievements, adapt to emergent challenges, seize new
opportunities, and continue to provide for our common defense. We will
continue to face threats to our security, whether from aggressive
states or violent terrorist organizations. But our military will be
ready for them, and our response will be a source of pride for the
American people. In all of our efforts, we will aim to maintain
strength of character and professionalism--at the individual and
institutional level--that is beyond reproach.
As we embark on this critical new course, we will need Congress'
support to help us build the Joint Force the Nation needs and to
strengthen our relationship with the American people. As I stated
before, this budget and the choices that underlie it should be
understood in the context of the comprehensive, carefully balanced,
multi-year plan they support. These choices were tough. Some decisions
will be controversial. But they call for an investment that allows our
force to take the steps necessary to ensure our Nation's defense for
years to come. We ask Congress to support this budget and, more
importantly, to avoid the deep and indiscriminant cuts that
sequestration would impose.
I thank this committee, and the entire Congress, for all you have
done to support our men and women under arms and their families. Your
resolute attention to their needs and to our security has been both
invaluable and greatly appreciated.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
Mr. Hale, do you have any opening comments to make?
Mr. Hale. No, sir, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Okay, let's have a 7-minute round. I doubt
that we'll get to a second round, but if there is any time
after our first round, because I expect a good turnout, we will
try a very short second round.
General Dempsey, let me start with you. Do you and each of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully support the new Defense
Strategic Guidance?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, we do.
Chairman Levin. Do you and each of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff fully support the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
request?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, we do.
Chairman Levin. Now, can you tell us why?
General Dempsey. Because we addressed it in the order in
which you just presented it. Faced with the reality of a new
fiscal environment, we took a look at our strategy and we made
what we thought were important adjustments to it, not just
based on the new fiscal reality, but also based on the lessons
of 10 years of war and where we thought the security
environment would take us in the out-years.
I'm an advocate of looking beyond this particular budget
submission, out to 2020, and we did that, with not only the
Service Chiefs, but also with the combatant commanders. Then,
having decided on what adjustments to make to our strategy, we
built a budget to support it. So for that reason, we support
it.
Chairman Levin. General, you made reference to the risks
that are increased when there are budget reductions. Would you
expand on that, as you did in your prepared testimony, as to
whether those risks are acceptable and why?
General Dempsey. As I said, Senator, every strategy incurs
risks because there's never--at least I've never in my 38 years
experienced any strategy that was completely unconstrained. So
I think it's important to note that there's always risk in
every strategy and in every budget to support it.
There's two kinds of risk we deal with. One is risk to our
missions: Can we accomplish the tasks given to us by the
national command authority for freedom of access, to defeat our
enemies, to deter aggression? Then the other is risk to force,
which gets at a phrase that would be familiar to you in terms
of operations tempo: How much can we ask of the All-Volunteer
Force in terms of its deployments and redeployments and
redeployments?
In both cases, we assess the risk to mission and the risk
to force. We have found that there are portions of our
capabilities that are more stressed. Again, that's not anything
new to us. What we've been doing now for the past month and
will continue to do is to look for ways to mitigate those
risks.
But we're very confident, because we've worked this
collaboratively, that we can mitigate risks by adapting lessons
from the last 10 years of war, new emerging capabilities. I've
mentioned two notable ones to you in the past, special
operating forces and cyber. The integration of all those and
the interdependence of the joint force is what allows us to
mitigate the risk to our operations plans and to do so at a
sustainable rate.
But there are risks, because there is always uncertainty in
the future.
Chairman Levin. Now to both of you: The OCO funding level
of $88.4 billion is based on the assumption that there will be
68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan for all of fiscal year 2013.
You reiterated that, Secretary Panetta, in your opening
statement. Now, that assumes that there will be no further
drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan during the 12 months
after the 33,000 U.S. surge forces are withdrawn by the summer
of this year. That's what the budget assumes.
But last June, when the President announced the plans for
the drawdown of the U.S. surge forces, he also said that after
reduction of those surge forces, ``Our troops will continue to
come home at a steady pace, as ASF move into the lead.''
First, General Dempsey, are we on track to complete the
withdrawal of the 33,000 U.S. surge force this summer?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir, we are. If I could just
elaborate a bit, General Allen's already reduced the force by
10,000. I don't yet have his plan for the reduction of the
additional 23,000, but in a visit with him last week he assured
me that he would have that plan to us by about the 1st of
April.
Chairman Levin. Do you continue to support the President's
decision to withdraw the U.S. surge force by the end of the
summer?
General Dempsey. I do and will continue to do so, unless
General Allen comes back in to me and tells me we're incurring
too much risk. But my own personal observation at this point is
yes.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Panetta, how do you square the
fiscal year 2013 OCO funding assumption that the troop level of
68,000 will remain in Afghanistan through fiscal year 2013 with
the President's statement that U.S. troops will continue to
draw down after this summer ``at a steady pace as ASF assume
the lead for security''?
Secretary Panetta. Mr. Chairman, as the President stated,
we'll continue that process. But at this point, no decisions
have been made as to how that will take place, because we're
focusing, obviously, on the drawdown of the surge. The number
that we have there is, frankly, a target number in order to
support the OCO funding that we would need for the future.
Chairman Levin. Will the decision be made as to when
reductions will be made from the 68,000 level--and that level,
again, is going to be reached by the end of this summer. When
will that decision be made on further reductions after the
68,000 level is achieved?
Secretary Panetta. I think the target right now is
obviously to focus on the reduction of the surge. As General
Dempsey pointed out, we haven't received the plan from General
Allen as to how we'll complete the reduction of 23,000. Once
we've done that and we've learned the lessons from that, I
think then we would apply it to deciding the next steps with
regards to further reductions.
Chairman Levin. That will be done by the end of the summer
as currently contemplated?
Secretary Panetta. Right.
Chairman Levin. So when would the next decision be made on
reductions beyond the surge reductions?
Secretary Panetta. I suspect we'll begin that discussion
process in the latter part of this year.
Chairman Levin. Begin it or make a decision by the end of
the year?
Secretary Panetta. I assume we'll begin it, and if we're
fortunate, we'll be able to make that decision. But the first
thing is to discuss the lessons that we've learned and what we
should apply and what level of force are we going to need for
2013.
Chairman Levin. Do you assume there will be further
reductions beyond the 68,000 during fiscal year 2013?
Secretary Panetta. Again, no decisions have been made.
Chairman Levin. You assume that there will be.
Secretary Panetta. I assume that, in line with what the
President said, we'll continue to make transitions downward.
Chairman Levin. Would there be savings then from any
additional reductions below 68,000?
Secretary Panetta. Will there be savings? Of course.
Whatever we decide to do, it will achieve some savings.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses again.
General Dempsey, were you asked by the administration to
perform a risk assessment to our national security interests as
a result of these cuts?
General Dempsey. I have been asked and it's also codified
in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that I perform
a Chairman's risk assessment annually.
Senator McCain. Is that forthcoming?
General Dempsey. I have completed it. DOD has it, and they
are required to submit with it a risk mitigation strategy.
Senator McCain. So we have not received your risk
assessment yet?
General Dempsey. You have not, sir.
Senator McCain. I want to return just for a second.
Secretary Panetta, you again talk about the cataclysmic effects
of sequestration. We are in total agreement. I hope in your
meetings with the President that you will urge him to sit down
with us and see if there are ways that we can avoid the effects
of this.
Have you made any plans yet to comply with the effects of
sequestration in 2013?
General Dempsey. No, we haven't.
Senator McCain. In your view, Secretary Panetta, is Iraq a
stable and self-reliant nation?
Secretary Panetta. Iraq is a nation that has the capability
to govern and secure itself. Does it continue to face risks in
that process? Does it continue to face challenges in that
process? It certainly does.
Senator McCain. Do we still have U.S. military forces
operating in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. We have a small number that are assigned
there, approximately, I believe the number we're looking at is
about 600 military and civilians that are assigned to the
security operations there.
Senator McCain. General Dempsey, I know you just returned
from Egypt. All Americans are concerned about the events there
concerning Americans who have had to move to the U.S. embassy
in order to preserve their safety and security. We realize the
absolute criticality of our relationship with Egypt and the
role that Egypt plays in the Middle East. What advice, what
recommendation, do you have as to how the U.S. Government
should be handling this very, very tough situation?
General Dempsey. Senator, I had planned this trip to Egypt
before the nongovernmental organization crisis, and it is a
crisis, occurred. So when I met with Field Marshal Tentawi,
General Annan, and General Mwafi, the key leaders with whom we
interact and have interacted for decades, I explained to them
that I was coming there to talk to them about our military-to-
military relationship, about Syria, about Lebanon, about the
Sinai, but that I couldn't do that because we had this issue
that was an impediment to that. I spent about a day and a half
in conversation with them, encouraging them in the strongest
possible terms to resolve this so that our military-to-military
relationship could continue.
Senator McCain. The result of those conversations?
General Dempsey. I am convinced that potentially they were
underestimating the impact of this on our relationship. When I
left there, there was no doubt that they understood the
seriousness of it.
But I'd like to add, Senator, I know of the amendment
that's being proposed to break our military relationship and
cut off all aid, and I think my personal military judgment is
that would be a mistake.
Senator McCain. I want to assure you that we are discussing
that and ways to certainly avoid that action at this time. But
I hope you explain to the rulers, who are the military and
leftovers from the Mubarak regime, that this situation is
really not acceptable to the American people. Our relationship
with Egypt is vital, but the fact is that the welfare of our
citizens is even more vital.
General Dempsey. We completely agree, sir, and I did make
that clear.
Senator McCain. General, would you think it's a good idea
to trade five high-ranking Taliban as a, ``confidence-building
measure'' to move the negotiations with the Taliban forward?
General Dempsey. I have some issues with the
reconciliation, but generally speaking I'm in support of
reconciliation. But I am concerned about our ability to
maintain vigilance and control of those individuals. So I am
supportive of reconciliation.
Senator McCain. I don't know of any living person who
isn't.
General Dempsey. I join that group.
Senator McCain. Does that mean that you, at this particular
moment in time, would support the trade or the release to
Qatar, understanding that under very loose security conditions,
would be advisable at this time?
General Dempsey. Sir, the Secretary has some certification
requirements by law, and I'm supportive of the Secretary of
Defense's approach to that and supportive of his effort to
ensure we have those certifications.
Senator McCain. Again I ask, with respect, for your opinion
as to whether you think it's a good idea or not at this time?
General Dempsey. Yes, I do.
Senator McCain. Do you agree that it's a good idea,
Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely no decisions have been made
along this line. I can tell you this, that, based on the law
that's passed by Congress, I have to certify that anybody who
leaves Guantanamo cannot wind up going back to the enemy, and I
have to be convinced that those kinds of protections are in
place before I certify that anything like that happens. I have
made very clear that unless I am convinced that in this kind of
situation those steps are taken to ensure that these
individuals do not wind up going back to the battlefield, I'm
not going to certify that kind of transfer.
Senator McCain. Even though approximately a quarter of
those who have been released in the past have gone back into
the fight.
What is the progress of our negotiations with the Afghan
Government, President Karzai, on a long-term security
agreement, which we failed to reach in Iraq? What are the
prospects of that and what are you expecting, and can you give
us a timeframe?
Secretary Panetta. We are continuing to work with President
Karzai and our counterparts in Afghanistan to try to develop
and agree on a strategic agreement. There are two areas that we
still have difficulties with, one of which involves the
transfer of detention facilities. The other involves night-time
raids. We continue to try to see if we can work out some kind
of compromise on those issues.
As far as the basic agreement, I think most of the
elements, frankly, are in place. So I'm confident that,
hopefully within the next few weeks, we'll be able to reach
some kind of agreement.
Senator McCain. I thank you. I thank the witnesses. I would
just add a comment. General, when the enemy thinks you're
leaving, it's very unlikely in my study of history that they're
ready to make an agreement, and they certainly have that
impression throughout that part of the world.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, Mr. Hale, good morning and
thank you for your service and your testimony.
As I look at the budget that's been submitted and I hear
your testimony today, it seems to me that in this budget the
U.S. military and our national security are being asked to pay
the price for the fiscal irresponsibility of our government
over the last decade. The budget that you've submitted to us
certainly in its bottom line is one that you were mandated to
submit by the BCA that Congress adopted and the President
signed last summer. But I must say as one member of this
committee, one Member of the U.S. Senate, that as I look at
what you have had to do to meet the bottom line requirements of
the BCA, it represents, in my opinion, unacceptable risk to our
national security, without proportionate changes in the threats
that we face around the world.
This budget for the coming fiscal year would represent an 8
percent reduction in spending beneath what was planned in the
5-year defense plan for the coming year, a 9 percent reduction
for the 5 years. It, as we've discussed, would require the
reduction of our Army and Marine Corps by 125,000 personnel. It
would call for the termination or delay of several, in my
opinion, critical defense equipment systems.
It's hard for me to conclude that there's any reason you
would make such a recommendation other than the fact that
you're required by law to do it. In other words, what drives
this presentation is the budgetary pressure, as I said, the
accumulated weight of the fiscal irresponsibility of our
government over the last decade, and the specific requirement
of the BCA, not the threat environment in the world.
Mr. Secretary, as you said, and I agree, this morning:
``The United States still faces a complex array of security
challenges across the globe. We're still a nation at war in
Afghanistan. We still face threats from terrorism. There's
dangerous proliferation of lethal weapons and materials. The
behavior of Iran and North Korea threaten global stability.
There's continuing turmoil and unrest in the Middle East.
Rising powers in Asia are testing international relationships
and there are growing concerns about cyber intrusions and
attacks,'' said by you, Mr. Secretary, this morning.
I agree with all that, and I think in that context my
conclusion, I state again, is that there's always risk, but
that the risk involved in this budget is unacceptable.
Therefore, I believe that we have to have the political courage
both in facing the budget for fiscal year 2013 and the threat
of sequestration to work together across party lines and with
the President and the administration to reduce the impact of
these proposed cuts. We have to do it responsibly.
We either have to find savings elsewhere or we have to have
the political guts to raise revenues to pay for an adequate
defense to, in my opinion, fulfill our constitutional
responsibility to provide for the common defense.
You have complied with the BCA in making this budget
recommendation to us, but in my opinion, if we accept it, we're
not fulfilling our responsibility under the Constitution to
provide for the common defense. So I hope we can work together
to essentially alter what we required you to do in the BCA and
to do it in a fiscally responsible way.
There is risk here and I appreciate, General Dempsey, that
in response to Senator McCain's question, you said that you'd
be preparing a Chairman's risk assessment for us. The Defense
Strategic Guidance that DOD did, issued in January, really is
the equivalent of a follow-on to a Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). In the QDR, of course, we require a Chairman's risk
assessment.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, that we don't act on
this request and that the Appropriations Committees don't act
on a budget request for DOD, before we get your risk
assessment, because I think it's that important.
But for now, since, Mr. Secretary, you said quite directly,
with the directness that we've come to expect of you, that
there is risk here, inevitably. You can't cut this much money
out of the defense budget without risk. So I wanted to ask you
and General Dempsey in advance of the formal report, what are
the two or three top risks that you are concerned about that
this budget places on our military and on our national
strategy?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, first of all, I'm abiding by
the law, the law that was passed by Congress that required the
reductions that we've proposed. I think, just to your comment,
we have tried to step up to the plate and do our duty here. I
think in weighing how you address this issue, you also have to
take into consideration the national security threat that comes
from the huge deficits and the huge debt that we're running.
We're running a debt now that's comparable to our gross
domestic product (GDP). At some point, Congress and the
President have to address that larger issue. What I'm doing
here is basically doing my part, as dictated by Congress.
With regards to the threats, as I said, you can't take a
half a trillion dollars out of the defense budget and not incur
some risks. The main concerns that I see are that we are going
to have a smaller force, and when you have a smaller force the
ability to move that force where you have to is not going to be
as easy as it would be with a larger force, the ability to move
quickly, to be agile, to be able to deploy them. I think we can
do it under the plan we've presented, but it clearly is an
additional risk.
The risk of mobilizing if we face a serious crisis and we
have the need to mobilize, our ability to mobilize quickly, to
pull the force together, as we had to do, frankly, after
September 11, our ability to be able to do that and respond
quickly and be able to deploy that force involves some risks. I
think we've designed the way to do that by keeping a strong
Guard and a strong Reserve, but nevertheless, that's an
additional risk.
We depend an awful lot on technology here. I think
technology is very important, but our ability to develop that
technology, to make sure that it works, to make sure that we
have that leap-ahead capability, is something that involves
some risks.
Lastly, as I said, when you shave the budget by a half a
trillion dollars, it leaves very little margin of error.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Panetta. That, I think, is probably the biggest
risk of all.
General Dempsey. If I have time, Senator, I'd like to
respond, because I will preview my risk assessment for you. I
did not assess unacceptable risk in my assessment, and I don't
believe this budget incurs unacceptable risk. I will tell you
that I am prepared to say that sequestration would pose
unacceptable risk, and here's why it's important to note.
It's pretty clear. There's physics involved. In this budget
we have decided to off-ramp a certain number of service men and
women, and we've about maxed out our ability to do that with
the proper dignity and respect to the force. So 10,000, 15,000
a year is about as many as you can ask to leave and still have
enough influence on how they do that.
That's maxed out right now. It's pretty clear to me that
we're going to have some challenges with infrastructure and
changes to it, whether this committee and others agree with our
recommendation for BRAC. So if we fix those two variables in
sequestration, I can't ask soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines to leave quicker than they're going to leave, and I
can't touch infrastructure--sequestration leaves me three
places to go to find the additional money: operations,
maintenance, and training. That's the definition of a hollow
force.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you both for your answers.
They're helpful to me. With all respect, I consider this budget
to represent unacceptable risk to our national strategy, and I
hope members of this committee across party lines will work
together to reduce that risk in a fiscally responsible way.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just get on the record, Secretary Panetta, that
there will be some of us at this table, and I'd be one of them,
that would be opposing another BRAC round, really for two
reasons: one, I think we've reduced our force, our capability,
to an unacceptable level, and to bring our infrastructure down
to meet what I consider to be as a member of this committee an
unacceptable level, I think, is something I would not want to
do.
Then the second thing is, the problem we're facing right
now is really an immediate problem. Everything is on fire.
We're trying to put out the biggest fires. I'm going from
memory now, but as I recall, all these BRAC rounds--and I've
been here since the very first one--you lose money in the first
5 years. So it's not going to really gain anything in terms of
that. So there's going to be opposition up here.
Secretary Panetta, I saw you on television on 60 Minutes,
and I didn't envy you when you had to answer the question, to
stop and think about how many combat operations there are, and
you started counting on your fingers. So it is something that
we've been talking about here. It is something very serious.
But when you talk about the budget, I just want to get in
here, so that--now that we have the President's new budget, we
keep hearing about inheriting deficits and all of this. During
the 8 years of President Bush, and these are the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) figures, it was right at $2
trillion. This President in his budget that he's proposed is
$5.3 trillion in just 4 years. So, obviously, you're talking
about just a huge amount of money.
I saw in this morning's Washington Post they're talking
about everything is growing in government, except--there it
is--the military. I agree with the statements of the two
previous speakers, that this is supposed to be our number one
concern up here, defending our country.
So anyway, I just would like to not press the thing. It's
already been talked about enough on risk. But I only ask the
question: When you actually meet with the Chairman and you come
up with your risk assessment, when did you say that would be?
Secretary Panetta. I anticipate it will be over here by the
end of the month.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
One of the commands that doesn't get a lot of attention is
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and we remember that was divided
into three commands. I think everyone in this room knows that
we have done the right thing. However, I look at it as the
forgotten command. It doesn't seem to get the attention.
One of the things about AFRICOM is it gets its resources
from the U.S. SOF that are in Europe, and right now, excepting
the fact that as the pressure gets on in the Middle East, a lot
of the terrorism, the potential terrorism, is going down
through Djibouti and the Horn of Africa and spreading out
there, so one of the great things that's happening with AFRICOM
is the SOF are training the Africans.
The number breaks down to about one SOF guy or gal is going
to be responsible for 100 forces. I've seen this down there. I
know it's happening. So the question I'd ask you, do you think
there are impacts by moving out of the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) some of the SOF insofar as Africa is concerned?
Secretary Panetta. First, I agree with you on the benefits
of having an AFRICOM focused on those issues on that continent.
Actually, we source our requirements into Africa and elsewhere
through a global force management process. So it tends to be
that European SOF have a particular habitual relationship, but
there could be SOF and, for that matter, general purpose forces
employed in Africa.
We move the force around where it's needed. So I don't
think the issue you described there with EUCOM will have any
effect on Africa.
Senator Inhofe. I'm glad to hear that. I appreciate that.
This is an issue that no one's talked about yet and I don't
know why I've been so close to it, but a good friend of mine,
Specialist Christopher D. Horton, was killed over there. In
fact, I was supposed to be meeting with him in Afghanistan a
month later, but he was killed. His wife, Jane Horton, has
worked for me and we've become very sensitive to the redacted
investigation reports to families.
I've talked to General Odierno about this. We've made
progress on this. But I'm hoping that you will help us continue
with that, because we have some of them--in the case of one of
them, it went all the way from May 2010 until just about a week
ago. I'd like to have some special attention given to that
issue. The families of Specialist Augustus J. Vacari and Second
Lieutenant Jered W. Ewy were killed in July 2011 and I think
they should have their reports. So we're making progress, but
I'm hoping that that's something that, with all these problems
we're dealing with, that you'll be aware of and want to be of
some help.
General Dempsey. Could I just respond briefly, Senator?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Dempsey. I'm very aware of that, and in fact, as
you recall, I was at Specialist Horton's funeral with you. I
just want to make two points. One is, this is the first
conflict in which we've done a collateral investigation on
every death, the first time in the history of warfare. We've
learned the hard way, it's very resource intensive and it's
important to get it right.
The timeline on which these investigations are provided to
families has been gradually improving and is the same, it's
important to note, for Active, Guard, and Reserve. So it's not
that the Active families get the investigation done faster than
the Guard and Reserve. It's just a very challenging task, one
which we're addressing.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. We went back and
checked between the Active and the regular component and that's
right.
My question actually is meant to be a compliment, because
we're making great progress on that.
General Dempsey. Well, then, I withdraw my comments.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. In looking at the reset, we're going to be
looking at a real problem after having gone through this for 12
years, and it's going to be--my concern is that it comes from
the right sources, that it's not going to come from the base
budget. Is it your intention to have this come from the OCO
when this time is before us? Do you think it will have a
deteriorating effect on the base budget, on the reset, the cost
of reset?
General Dempsey. That's exactly why the OCO bill tends to
be as high as it is, because we're not just looking at the cost
of current operating forces. It's the recapitalization
challenge we face beyond that. Is that a fair statement, Bob?
Mr. Hale. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. The last thing, because my time has
expired, I had occasion to go down to Fort Worth and see the
progress, what's happening right now with the F-35. There have
been a lot of delays and I would just hope that we have a
commitment from the two of you to progress on that program,
because that's a very needed platform that we will be pursuing.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, we need a fifth generation
fighter. The F-35 represents that fifth generation fighter.
We're committed to it. We just want to make sure it's done
right.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, Mr. Hale. We've
talked a lot, and I think appropriately so, about the risks to
the national security of the United States. But those risks are
mitigated, not simply by what's done in the DOD budget; it's
also mitigated by what's done in the Department of State (DOS)
budget, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget, TSA,
the FBI, a whole host of agencies that contribute directly and
indirectly to the national security of the United States.
We've talked about the sequester, but to simply shift those
costs in a potential sequester without additional revenue,
strictly do it by cutting more, will invariably catch the FBI,
DHS, TSA, contracting, and other functions that might not be in
the purview of DOD, but significantly contribute to the risk
that we run as a Nation. Is that an accurate perception, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. Oh, absolutely. I think, Senator,
national security is dependent on all of the things you just
cited, but frankly, it's dependent on more. We're talking about
sequester on defense, but sequester also takes place on the
domestic side of the budget. Very frankly, our national
security is dependent not just on the national defense side of
that ledger; it's dependent on the quality of life that we
provide for our citizens. So all of that could be impacted
through sequester.
Senator Reed. One other aspect of this whole debate, as has
been pointed out, has been, particularly with respect to those
platforms that you've decided are not affordable at this
juncture. But I would presume--and, General Dempsey, you might
comment--that one of your calculations is not just the number
of platforms, but the capability of platforms. As you've made--
particularly when it comes to both aviation platforms and
ships, that you and your colleagues have made careful
calculations about increased capabilities with those remaining
ships versus what you'd have to do with the airplanes; is that
accurate?
General Dempsey. It is accurate, Senator. We mapped the
budget decisions to the strategies. Fundamentally, are we going
to deliver the strategy we've described, given the decisions
we're about to make.
As we've talked for years, we are moving toward platforms
that are both more capable, but also multi-role. So for
example, the A-10, and by the way, the uniform I wear, I'm a
huge advocate of the A-10, the Warthog, because it provides
close air support. But we're at a point where we think it's
prudent to force ourselves into a more multi-role capability in
that regard.
So we did, we mapped the decisions to the strategy.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
One of the other aspects that's been brought up, and I
think it goes to my initial question about the broader scope of
national security, is that proactive engagement. I think one of
the lessons of the last few years, proactive engagement is very
helpful to us. Had we been more engaged in some countries, we
might have mitigated the dangers we faced in the last decade.
When you talk about your meeting in Egypt, when you talk
about your multiple meetings in Pakistan, when you talk about--
a lot of that is, one might argue, just as critical to national
security, but is not measured in terms of brigades or lift,
airlift, et cetera. It goes also to the issue of special
forces, not so much in their counterterrorism mission, but in
their training and their collaboration mission.
Can you comment on, General Dempsey, on how this budget
will encourage proactive engagement at every level?
General Dempsey. We've accepted as a core competency of all
the Services building partner capacity. So when you have a
chance to have Ray Odierno in here, for example, he'll talk
about his desire to meet our strategy by taking general purpose
forces who have been completely consumed in Afghanistan and who
will be less consumed now and applying them in that role, a
regionally aligned brigade, for example. So AFRICOM has a U.S.
Army brigade in the Army Force Generation readiness cycle that
can deploy in any number of ways, as headquarters, or it can
send teams, it can reorganize itself, to go and engage nations
in the particular combatant where it might be needed.
So I think this budget does that and it is one of the ways
that we are mitigating risk, as you suggest.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, you suggested and I think you
said that one of the fastest growing areas of cost in your
budget is personnel costs, particularly health care costs.
You're looking at a very tight budget this year. I think even
if we're able to settle some of our political fights up here,
the idea of the defense growing at the rate it grew over the
last decade is not within anyone's purview.
At some point, if you don't take effective steps with
respect to personnel costs, it becomes so big, in my view, that
it eats into what is the great risk General Dempsey sees in
sequestration: it all comes out of operations, maintenance, and
training, and suddenly you have a force that is there, but it's
not capable.
Do you have a notion of sort of how much time we have left
before this, these uncontrolled, unless we take steps, these
costs eat up all of the operations and maintenance?
Secretary Panetta. As I mentioned, this is an area of the
budget that's grown by 90 percent, and it consumes now close to
half of the defense budget. Right, Bob?
Mr. Hale. About a third.
Secretary Panetta. About a third, about a third of the
defense budget is in the compensation area. The problem is at
that rate of growth that's going on, it's moving more and more
into these other key areas of the defense budget and crowding
them out. So if compensation is not touched, if we don't
control the costs of growth in the compensation area, what it
means is that we're going to have to take it out of force
structure, we're going to have to take it out of training,
we're going to have to take it out of other systems, and it's
going to mean that ultimately we won't have a balanced approach
to dealing with the defense savings that we need to deal with.
So even in talking with members, in talking with the
generals, in talking with the chiefs, they acknowledge that, as
tough as this is--and it is tough, because it affects,
obviously, troops and their families and retirees--but if we
don't begin the process of developing some kind of cost control
in the out-years and limiting the growth that's taking place,
then we're going to pay a very high price within the next few
years.
Senator Reed. Is that your conclusion, General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. Senator, it is. We talk a lot about
keeping faith and oftentimes that's equated to how many dollars
we're putting in a soldier's, sailor's, airman's, or marine's
pocket. But it's a lot more than that. Keeping faith is making
sure they're the best trained, best equipped force on the
planet. To do that, we have to balance the budget against all
of the various levers we have to pull.
Senator Reed. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to thank both of our witnesses for their service.
Secretary Panetta, I want to ask you about the David
Ignatius article from February 2. Let me just read the way it
begins: ``Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has a lot on his mind
these days, from cutting the defense budget to managing the
drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. But his biggest worry
is the growing possibility that Israel will attack Iran over
the next few months. Panetta believes there is a strong
likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in April, May, or June,
before Iran enters what Israelis describe as a `zone of
immunity' to commence building a nuclear bomb.''
Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Ignatius accurately characterize
your view and would you like to comment on that?
Secretary Panetta. No, I usually don't comment on
columnists' ideas about what I'm thinking. Usually it's a
dangerous game to get into.
But let me just express my thoughts, that Iran is of great
concern. We have common cause with Israel, we have common cause
with the international community with regards to the concerns
about Iran. We have made very clear that they are not to
develop a nuclear weapon. We have made very clear that they are
not to close the Straits of Hormuz. We've also made very clear
that they are not to export terrorism and try to undermine
other governments.
Those are areas that concern us, and it concerns the
international community. As a result of that, the international
community has taken strong steps on sanctions, on economic and
diplomatic areas to bring pressure on Iran and to isolate them.
I guess my preference, my view, is that we ought to keep the
international community together in applying that kind of
pressure.
Senator Wicker. Do you believe there's a strong likelihood
that Israel will strike Iran in April, May, or June?
Secretary Panetta. I think, as the President has suggested,
we do not think that Israel has made that decision.
Senator Wicker. Were you mischaracterized? Did you have a
conversation with Mr. Ignatius?
Secretary Panetta. As I said, the comments that are
included in a column about what I'm thinking or what I'm
possibly worried about is up to the columnist.
Senator Wicker. But did he interview you?
Secretary Panetta. We talked, but we talked about a lot of
things, frankly.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Were you trying to send some sort of
signal to the international community, either to Iran or
Israel?
Secretary Panetta. No.
Senator Wicker. So you do not have a position as to whether
it is likely that Israel will make such an attack this spring?
Secretary Panetta. I do not.
Senator Wicker. All right. Thank you for clearing that up.
I will say that there were no quotation marks in that column,
but it did sound a whole lot like a quote.
As I understand it in the budget, in compliance with the
BCA, Mr. Secretary, there's half a trillion dollars worth of
cuts. If we had the sequestration, that would be another half a
trillion. Now, what was your conversation with the
administration, with OMB, within DOD, about submitting a budget
that doesn't comply with the statute, because sequestration is
the law of the land right now as I understand it?
Did you consider submitting a budget that outlined the
catastrophic results if sequestration does go into effect? Then
what is your strategy to, as you say, detrigger, to work with
this Congress to detrigger sequestration, which is the law of
the land, you will acknowledge?
Secretary Panetta. It is. Obviously, our approach was to
deal with what the BCA had provided in terms of targeted
savings in the defense budget. We frankly developed the
strategy that we presented to based on really trying to lay out
a strategy about where our force structure needed to be between
now and 2020 and do it in a responsible way to protect our
military force and to be able to respond to the threats that
are out there.
Sequestration has this, frankly, mindless formula that's
already built into it, that basically cuts across the board.
It's not as if we can take sequestration and make sense out of
the damn thing. The fact is, it's going to happen the way it's
supposed to happen, through this kind of mindless formula
that's there.
So our approach, frankly, was to not pay any attention to
it. If it's going to take place in January 2013--and I hope
that's not the case--then it will take place under its mindless
procedure. But I don't think we ought to try to bring some kind
of common sense to what is a crazy process.
Senator Wicker. Let me underscore what Senator Lieberman
said, that this budget makes us worry about risks. I understand
what General Dempsey said, that he believes that there are
risks, but they're not unacceptable. But the sequestration
would prove unacceptable, and I hope there's a strategy to get
that through.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for mentioning the industrial
base. We're at 8.3 percent unemployment right now. Undoubtedly
the President is going to send a spending bill to Congress
which he believes and the administration believes will create
more jobs. It makes no sense to me, at a time when there's an
effort to create more jobs with other spending, to cut defense
spending, which gives us the twofer of protecting the country
and protecting the industrial base, which is a whole lot of
Americans out there working to provide us with the
infrastructure we need.
It is a fact, is it not, that this budget will have an
adverse effect on our industrial base? Is that not right, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. We've taken a lot of steps to try to
protect against that happening, because as I've said, we
absolutely have to protect our industrial base and those
industries that support the defense budget. We can't afford to
lose any more. So for that reason, we've designed an approach
that will keep them in business with regards to the systems
that we're trying to develop for the future.
Senator Wicker. Albeit with fewer industrial manufacturing
jobs.
Secretary Panetta. I understand that, and that does have
some impact.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
I've asked Senator Akaka if he would yield 1 minute of his
time to me and he's graciously said he would, because I want to
clarify this issue of the budget and sequestration. As I read
the budget which was submitted to us, there is additional $3
trillion in deficit reduction above the trillion that has
already been taken, which would, if this budget were adopted as
submitted, avoid sequestration totally.
Now, half of the additional $3 trillion is in revenue
increases, including, as the President's budget says, tax
reform, including the expiration of tax cuts for single
taxpayers making over $200,000, married couples making over
$250,000, by adoption of the Buffett rule. Then the budget
document says that the President is offering a detailed set of
specific tax loophole closures and measures to broaden the tax
base that, together with the expiration of the high income tax
cuts, would be more than sufficient to hit the $1.5 trillion
target, which means if this budget were adopted and the revenue
were included--and the revenue represents about half of the
additional deficit reduction--you avoid sequestration.
Is that your understanding?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, my understanding is that in the
President's budget there is a plan, obviously, to provide for
the kind of additional deficit reduction that the country
needs. But obviously, if it were adopted it would de-trigger
sequestration.
Chairman Levin. Okay, because that's not been stated here
this morning, but I think it's very, very important. I tried to
say it in my opening statement, but I don't know that I said it
clearly enough. The budget that was submitted to us says it
very clearly. That's the strategy. Whether Congress adopts it
or not is a different issue, but sequestration can be avoided
and hopefully will be, and the President has submitted his way
to avoid it in his budget document.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for clarifying
that, and I do look forward to the President's budget being
brought to the Senate floor for an up or down vote.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. I think the Republican
alternative will also be brought to the Senate floor, if there
is one. We look forward to seeing an alternative budget as
well.
So much for that. Back to Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Aloha to Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, and thank
you so much for your leadership and all you do for our country.
Mr. Secretary, my aloha to Sylvia, too. I notice that the PGA
Tour was just at Pebble Beach. Had you chosen a different path
than you're on now, you could have been at home in Carmel
playing in the Pro-Am with your friends. But no, your
dedication to continue serving our country puts you before us
today. That says a lot, a lot about you and who you are. I've
known you, as we know, since we served together in the House.
In all seriousness, I really appreciate your dedication and
your hard work, Mr. Secretary. I add my appreciation to the
brave men and women of the Armed Forces who lead and their
families for their service and sacrifice.
Secretary Panetta, it is impossible to overstate the
importance of our military engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region. It's obvious that there are many challenges in this
area, given the new focus on this vital region. If you look at
continuing developments in the Pacific, our conventional
adversaries are advancing and it is critical we maintain our
superiority in the region.
Given the many demands on the defense budget, as you
mentioned, and the unique mission and environment we have in
the region, my question to you is, how does DOD's fiscal year
2013 budget impact our military readiness in the Pacific
region?
Secretary Panetta. That's obviously a primary concern for
us, because we do believe that it is important to maintain a
strong presence in the Pacific. For that reason, we maintain
the 11 carriers in the Navy in order to ensure that we have
sufficient forward presence. There's nothing like a carrier to
be able to allow for quick deployment in that area, and that
will give us a great capacity to be able to show our force
structure in the Pacific.
In addition to that, we're going to maintain, obviously, a
military presence. We already have one in Korea, but we're
going to maintain an additional rotational presence with our
Marines throughout that area. We've just developed an agreement
with Australia to do a rotational presence there. We're working
with the Philippines on hopefully a similar arrangement there
as well.
In addition to that, obviously, we have our air bases and
the forward deployed air assets that will give us the
capability to cover that area as well. So we feel very good
about the force structure that we have in this budget and our
ability to maintain a real presence in the Pacific.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
General Dempsey, the United States has been attempting to
engage China with military-to-military exercises and other
cooperative opportunities, including humanitarian and disaster
relief operations, and you've done well. General, how do you
foresee these efforts at engagement proceeding as the U.S.
focuses resources in the Pacific?
General Dempsey. I think the strategy is actually quite
sound. By the way, it's important to note we never left the
Pacific, so the idea of rebalancing ourselves globally is just
that, it's rebalancing. It's not a light switch on or off or a
pivot. That word got ahead of me a bit.
We're rebalancing our strategy and we're doing that based
on the trends, demographic trends, economic trends, and
military trends. In so doing, we do have the opportunity to
increase our engagement with the People's Republic of China,
because there are many things with which we have a common
interest. They've been working with us in the Gulf of Aden on
counter-piracy for some time.
We've had military-to-military engagement. It hasn't been
as consistent as we'd like it. We have a chance, I think, now
in the coming months to reemphasize it. I think that will
assist us in implementing our strategy. So this is an
opportunity for us, Senator, and we intend to take it.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I am a true believer in our Special Forces.
Having visited the SEALs conducting training operations, I have
seen firsthand the talent and dedication of our Special Forces
personnel. Special Forces units are likely to do more in the
future. I want to make sure that as an end result, as end
strength numbers are reduced, that the career fields--they
could be fields in communications and logistics as well--which
support and help the Special Forces complete their missions are
not reduced to a point which could limit the overall readiness
of Special Forces units.
General, can you share any thoughts also on this?
General Dempsey. I can, sir. To your point, one of the
lessons of the last 10 years or certainly among the lessons of
the last 10 years is that the SOF have demonstrated their
versatility and their capabilities, not just in the
counterterror realm, but also in the building partner capacity,
security force assistance.
One of the things we've been talking about with the Service
Chiefs is finding a new paradigm where we will partner
differently with SOF to give us greater capability, synergy.
The sum is greater than the individual parts. We're working on
that. The Army, for example, is working on habitual
relationships of the enablers you're talking about--lift,
medical, communications.
So I can assure you there will be no degradation to our
Special Operations community. But I also want to assure you we
cannot put all of our eggs in that basket because, as I've said
in previous testimony, SOF are just that, they're special. If
we go too far in that direction, then the conventional force
becomes the special and the SOF no longer have that capability.
So we just have to find the right balance, and we're working on
it.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, there's no question that
Special Forces--through their agility and their ability to
deploy quickly, represent a very important force for the
future. They've been very effective, as we know, in terms of
terrorism. But as the General has pointed out, they've also
been very effective at developing partnerships with other
countries, working with them, doing exercises, providing
advice. They have a great capability there.
So I think the kind of force we're looking at, obviously,
as the General has pointed out, is to maintain a strong Army
that can confront a land enemy and be able to defeat that enemy
in a land war, but at the same time develop the kind of
rotational capability, using Special Forces, using the Marines,
using elements of the Army as well, to be able to have a
presence elsewhere in the world. That would give us the best of
all things.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Panetta. By the way, Senator, I should point out
that we are increasing our Special Operations. I think the
numbers, we're going to increase them by 3,000. We're putting
about $10.4 billion more along those lines.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, since you brought up the budget, certainly
I'm looking forward to voting again on the President's budget.
It's been over 1,000 days since the Senate's put out a budget.
I and the American people would like that to be different and
have that come up at some point.
That being said, I have, with 7 minutes, a lot of other
questions. I'm going to submit some for the record. Mr.
Secretary, one of them I will be discussing is the Global Hawk
Block 30 program. I'm going to be asking about the cost
comparisons between the U-2 and the Global Hawk, have they been
reviewed, particularly as it relates to sustainment? Can the U-
2 alone provide the ISR necessary in order to meet the
operational requirements? That will be one of them.
In addition, I live in an innovative State, Massachusetts,
and we have an innovative base, Hanscom, in dealing with the
cybersecurity threat. I agree with the chairman--before we talk
about any BRAC closures, I would hope that we would continue to
work on the cybersecurity emphasis on areas and bases like
Hanscom, because I think that is the next real area where we
need to focus on, as referenced in your earlier testimony.
Taking it a step further, the Air Force has proposed
restructuring its civilian workforce to the tune of about
16,000 civilian contracted employees. I would ask that you keep
in mind these restructuring efforts as it affects the small
businesses, as Senator Wicker and others have referenced and
you referenced in your comments. It affects, obviously,
Hanscom, Westover, and other bases throughout the country. I
know Senator Ayotte and I are deeply concerned about that.
One of the observations I made as I served in Afghanistan
this summer was, obviously, the drawdown. I have felt that we,
if we do it thoughtfully and methodically, can transfer
authority and control over to the Afghans, but if we do it too
quickly, we're going to be in deep trouble and we'll lose all
those benefits that we had.
One of the things that I referenced and acknowledged
through speaking and meeting with all the generals and with
General Allen, is the fact that we have so many audits going on
right now, without referencing any particular directorate, one
general had 75 audits going on at once. So I said to him: ``How
can you actually expect to do the drawdown, as General Allen's
doing, and then continue to do your mission, keep our soldiers
safe and secure, and then complete the audits?'' He says: ``We
can't; something has to give.''
So, General Dempsey and Mr. Secretary, I would ask you to
seriously look at that. If we're going to be doing this
drawdown, we absolutely need to address these audit issues,
there's so much duplication right now, and it's just, I think,
some agencies justifying their existence. So I'm hoping you can
comment on that issue.
General Dempsey. I won't comment on them justifying their
own existence, because they'll audit me if I do that and I
don't want to go there. [Laughter.]
Senator Brown. I hear you.
General Dempsey. But I share your concern, sir. I've been
on the receiving end of it, and there is clearly a need to be
auditable because the Nation is investing incredible resources.
But it has gotten a bit out of control, and my J-8 and the
Under Secretary for Policy are both working to squeeze those
audits to make sure they're not redundant, because some of them
are redundant. They're absolutely duplicates. If you read them,
which I have, you'll see they're the same exact thing. There
has to be a central location or a central effort to do that,
because the troops can't do their jobs and work 24/7 on audits
and then go expect to perform the mission, which is obviously
very serious.
That being said, in Iraq, with obviously us being out of
there, is it accurate that we now have over 100,000 civilian
contractors there doing the job that ultimately our soldiers
did? In fact, if that is so, is the cost two to three times
more than what we were paying our soldiers? If that is the
case, where is that money coming from?
Secretary Panetta. Go ahead.
General Dempsey. Thanks, sir. [Laughter.]
I don't have the exact numbers. At one time towards the end
of the calendar year, I was tracking those numbers on a daily
basis.
Senator Brown. It's substantial.
General Dempsey. Oh, it is substantial, sir.
Senator Brown. We're paying two to three times more, and
we're paying two to three times more than we were paying the
average soldier.
General Dempsey. In some functions we are paying more.
Security force or security details are more expensive, but
other places, logistics, transportation, we're not paying as
much as you would normally pay a soldier.
But we have that information, if you place that question in
the record.
Senator Brown. Yes, I'd like to do that and get that for
the record, because I'd like to know where that money is coming
from and how that's being worked into the budget.
[The information referred to follows:]

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged that contractors
are part of the total force, providing an adaptable mix of unique skill
sets, local knowledge, and flexibility that a strictly military force
cannot cultivate or resource for all scenarios, permitting our nation
to concentrate military resources on those areas which are inherently
governmental. Contractors provide a broad range of supplies, services,
and critical logistics support in many capability areas, while reducing
military footprint and increasing the availability and readiness of
resources.
Currently, there are 10,967 contractors on the Department of
Defense (DOD) contracts in Iraq. Of that, private security contractors
make up 2,991, 84 percent of which are third country nationals (TCN)
that earn, on average, lower salaries than U.S. servicemen. The average
TCN security contractor earns $17,751 per guard, per year. In
comparison, pay and benefits (annual composite rate) for an E-5 is
$76,381.
DOD funds to support these contracts are requested in the Overseas
Contingency Operations budget.

Senator Brown. In terms of the reverse, General Dempsey, in
terms of the understanding of the term ``reversibility,'' it's
a general concept designed to ensure the total force stays
prepared for unexpected contingencies as the Active component
inevitably gets stronger. How does the Guard and Reserve work
in? I know you referenced it briefly, but I would think,
obviously being in the Guard, that you would get more valuable
dollars, more bang-for-the-buck, so to speak?
Is there an effort, a real sincere effort, to push a lot of
the training responsibilities, mobilization, et cetera, to the
Guard and Reserves?
General Dempsey. This effort, the new strategy and the
budget to support it, has caused each Service to relook at how
they balance across components--Active, Guard, and Reserve.
I'll give you an example why that's an important conversation.
Senator McCain in his opening comment cited that we were
reducing 20 percent of the BCTs in the Army. That's true for
the Active component brigades, but if you look at the totality
of BCTs, which after this change will be 68, then the 8 is
really an 11 percent degradation or decline in BCTs.
So your point is an important one. We have to look at what
this total force and the joint force provide, not strictly what
we're doing to any one of them, and we are doing that.
Senator Brown. I would ask you to pay particular attention
to the Air Guard and take a look at moving some missions into
the Guard portfolio, because you do get a better bang-for-the-
buck, I would argue.
The other big elephant in the room, aside from
sequestration, is the fact that we have approximately 1 million
servicemembers expected to join the veterans ranks in the next
5 years, and unemployment among young veterans is very high,
and it's high also in the Guard and Reserves. Is there a 5-year
plan to meet the expected demand, and how are we working with
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to address these
important issues?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, you've raised a very important
point, because as we go through these additional drawdowns we
absolutely have to make sure that a support system is out there
as our men and women come back from service. We are working
with the VA in a number of areas, number one to try to provide
a jobs pool so that these veterans will have the opportunity to
get jobs in the private sector.
Second, we're working with the VA to try to improve the
seamless approach, so that when it comes to health care and
benefits, that people can move without long delays, without a
lot of bureaucracy, from coverage under the defense budget to
coverage under the veterans budget.
In addition to that, we're providing a lot of counseling
and support systems by all of the Services to make sure that
these families are supported once they come out so that they
can readjust. If they want to go into education, the education
benefits are provided. If they want to get a job, jobs are
provided. If they want to go into small business, we provide
the small business loans to assist them.
So there is a pretty solid package. We have to continue to
work at it and make sure that it's working and that it's
meeting the need. But we are very concerned that we have that
support system for these troops when they get out.
Senator Brown. I'd be eager to offer my assistance on those
very real issues. It's something that we've been working on in
Massachusetts for a very, very long time and have some real
knowledge about that issue.
Mr. Chairman, I'm presuming we'll have an opportunity to
add questions for the record and there will be a time allotted
to do so, the response?
Chairman Levin. Yes, there will be questions that are asked
for the record, and we'll ask our witnesses to promptly
respond.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Right after Senator Nelson's turn, we're going to take a 5-
minute break. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. Currently, progress
is being made toward the new U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
headquarters at Offutt in Nebraska, a new command and control
complex for STRATCOM. Now, the entire project has been
authorized, but because of the nature of this project DOD will
have to request phased-in or incremental funding as we move
along over a multi-year construction project.
Much has been said about cyber today. Mr. Secretary and
General Dempsey, could you explain the basis for, the need for
a new headquarters dealing with almost every aspect of our
military, defense and offense? Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, we think it's extremely
important because STRATCOM is obviously extremely important to
defending the Homeland. In order to defend the Homeland, you
have to develop the capabilities that we're facing right now,
and cyber obviously is one of those areas. Our ability to
develop the latest technology, the latest abilities in order to
not only defend ourselves, but understand what that threat is
about, is extremely important. We have to be able to develop
the kind of communications systems that are the state-of-the-
art, so that they can deal with quick communications.
In that area, any time we face a threat there is an
immediate response that has to take place and has to take place
quickly and effectively. Frankly, we need good systems in order
to make sure that happens. So for all those reasons, it's
important to our future that we develop that kind of capability
there.
Senator Nelson. It's safe to say that what the internal
components are within the structure would be equally important
as the structure itself. In other words, it's going to be a
high tech complex to be able to deal with the modern challenges
we have.
General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. Without talking about the structure
itself, I will tell you that the Service Chiefs, combatant
commanders, and I have begun a series of strategic seminars to
look at ways to better integrate, to learn lessons, and to
ensure that we can deliver our strategy with the force that
this budget will provide.
We know we can. We're looking at now how do we mitigate
change. One of the emerging insights I'll share with you is
that any regional conflict in the future--and we're looking out
in this budget to 2017. So in 2017, any regional conflict will
impact in the continental United States, in the Homeland,
without a doubt. That is to say, the Homeland is no longer a
sanctuary in 2017.
Therefore, commands like U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and
STRATCOM become more important in that environment.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I have a lot of concerns about our presence in Iraq. We've
had questions raised about the number of contract employees
there, contractors. I also understand that DOS is now in a lead
role trying to decide what the mission is in Iraq. We have the
largest embassy in the world and it's growing, physically
growing, but we don't have an established mission.
I know that part of this will be DOS, but I assume that DOD
also has a vital role in establishing that mission.
Secretary Panetta, might you fill us in on what progress is
being made to establish a mission? It seems like we have the
cart before the horse here, but perhaps you can help us.
Secretary Panetta. Frankly, I think DOD has a pretty good
plan there that we're implementing. We have about eight sites
that we're located in. We're working with foreign military
sales (FMS) that are being provided to the Iraqis. We're
providing training. We're providing support. It's both DOD and
contract individuals that are working in those sites. It's
pretty limited, but it's very helpful to the Iraqis in terms of
their ability to develop security for the future.
In addition, we're open to continuing to discuss with them
additional opportunities, particularly with regards to other
operations, going after al Qaeda, et cetera, that we think are
important to continue as well.
So I think we feel pretty good about the mission that we're
performing right now there.
General Dempsey. Yes, absolutely, sir. We've built the
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq based on the capabilities
that the Iraqi Government wanted us to support them, how they
wanted to be supported, notably with the program of record for
FMS and then institution-building. We have our resources mapped
to those functions, and I'm very confident that we have the
Office of Security Cooperation sized about right for now.
If they were to choose to expand our relationship in any
way, we could do so.
Senator Nelson. There seems to be room within that
structure to expand, because of the size of the structure. I
don't mean to minimize the necessity of having the presence in
Iraq, but it seems like the structure is going to be more than
adequate to take care of our needs. When I emphasize ``more
than adequate,'' it's consistent with the DOD Inspector
General's criticisms or observations about the size of the
structure and continuing to expand without a stated mission. I
hope we can get where we feel like we can state what that
mission ultimately is.
I'd like to turn to Iran for just a minute. It seems like
every time we check any of the news today Iran is involved in
it--questions about Iran engaging in terrorist activities in
two locations around the world in the last day or so, the plot
to take out the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Al-
Jubeir. You said, Secretary Panetta, on 60 Minutes, it's a red
line for us and it's a red line obviously for the Israelis if
they have the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon with a
missile. What are your opinions about that, if you might be
able to enlighten us a bit more?
Secretary Panetta. As I said, we have a number of concerns
here that we worry about with regards to Iran. Those are
concerns that we share not just with the Israelis but with the
entire international community. As the President himself has
stated, we will not tolerate an Iran that develops a nuclear
weapon, and yet they continue, obviously, to try to improve
their nuclear enrichment capabilities. That's something that
concerns us a great deal.
They continue to threaten the possibility of closing the
Straits of Hormuz, and we have made very clear that that is a
red line for us, that that Strait is extremely important to
free commerce and to shipping and to the shipping lanes, and
would have a huge economic impact if that were to happen. That
too is unacceptable and not tolerable for the United States.
We're concerned about Iran and the spread of terrorism, the
fact that they seek to undermine legitimate governments around
the world. That too concerns us. We think that the approach of
the international community to apply sanctions, to apply
diplomatic pressure, is having an impact. It has isolated Iran.
It's made very clear to them that they have to change their
behavior. I think that we need to keep that pressure on. That's
an important effort. I think the international community is
unified in that effort, and I guess my hope would be that we
could all stick together in ensuring that we continue to
isolate Iran and make very clear to them that they should
choose to join the international community, the rules and the
laws and the regulations of the international community, and
become part of that family. If they choose otherwise, then--
that would have serious implications.
Senator Nelson. Our concern is more than just about their
nuclear capacity, although that is a very important part. But
are the actions that they're taking beyond being pesky, in
terms of what they are intending to do?
Secretary Panetta. It's far beyond being pesky. It's
deliberately supplying equipment and arms to others to engage
in terrorist activity, and that too concerns us very much.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
We'll take a short break.
[Recess from 11:46 a.m. to 11:56 a.m.]
Chairman Levin. We'll come back to order.
Senator Portman has yielded to Senator Graham, and then
we'll put Senator Portman back in his order when he returns.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. If we could earmark, I would help Ohio. So
I just want to let Rob know I appreciate this very much.
[Laughter.] I have to run.
Secretary Panetta, do you believe it's a viable strategy
for the United States to try to contain a nuclear-armed Iran?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, indeed.
Senator Graham. The idea of containment. Shouldn't we
prevent them from getting a nuclear capability, not contain
them?
Secretary Panetta. It's not just contain, but it's
obviously doing everything we can to prevent them from
developing.
Senator Graham. Right. I guess my question more correctly
asked is, if they get a nuclear weapon, do you think the idea
of containment is a way to go? Should we prevent them versus
containing them?
Secretary Panetta. No, I think we have to prevent them.
Senator Graham. Because if they got a nuclear weapon the
damage is done. Other nations follow suit. Terrorists are more
likely to get the material. So the Secretary of Defense's view
is that the idea of containing a nuclear-armed Iran is not the
way to go; the idea is to prevent them from doing it.
Hopefully, we can do it through sanctions and diplomatic
engagement. I hope we can.
Okay, China. General Dempsey, there are a lot of media
reports that the Chinese routinely, the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), engages in cyber attacks of our business and
national security infrastructure. Do you believe that is a
reality of the 21st century?
General Dempsey. I believe someone in China is hacking into
our systems and stealing technology and intellectual property,
which at this point is a crime. I can't attribute it directly
to the PLA.
Senator Graham. Let's say if we could find that the PLA was
involved in hacking into our defense infrastructure, would you
consider that a hostile act by the Chinese?
General Dempsey. I would consider it to be a crime. I think
there are other measures that could be taken in cyber that
would rise to the level of a hostile act.
Senator Graham. What would they be?
General Dempsey. Attacking our critical infrastructure.
Senator Graham. That could be a hostile act?
General Dempsey. I think so.
Senator Graham. Allowing us to respond in kind?
General Dempsey. In my view that's right, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So I'm going to have lunch with the Vice
President of China in about 20 minutes. So what do you want me
to tell him? [Laughter.]
General Dempsey. Happy Valentine's Day. [Laughter.]
Senator Graham. All right, okay. I'll do that.
Chairman Levin. By the way, Senator Graham, in my opening
statement I made it very clear that the cyber espionage going
on from China has to stop and it's mighty serious stuff. So you
can pass along, if you would, that comment as well.
Senator Graham. All right. Would you consider it a hostile
act?
Chairman Levin. I sure would.
Senator Graham. Okay, I would, too.
Chairman Levin. But Happy Valentine's Day. [Laughter.]
Senator Graham. It ought to be an interesting lunch.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Panetta, in 2014 the game plan is to transition
to Afghan security force control; they're in the lead, is that
correct?
Secretary Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Graham. We'll have a training mission, we'll be
providing intelligence gathering, providing capabilities they
are not quite yet capable of doing, like airlift; is that
correct?
Secretary Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Graham. Do you support the concept of a follow-on
force past 2014 that's part of a strategic partnership
agreement, that would have a military footprint post-2014 that
would allow American air power to remain in Afghanistan along
with special forces units, at the Afghans' request? Do you
think that is in our national security interest to consider
such a follow-on force?
Secretary Panetta. I believe, as the President has stated,
that we have to have an enduring presence in Afghanistan. We
need to, obviously, discuss what those missions are, but I
think clearly counterterrorism operations is one of those
missions. Training and advising is one of those missions.
Providing the right enablers is one of those missions.
Obviously providing air support is one of those missions as
well.
Senator Graham. So you would agree with the concept that
post-2014 if we had a configuration of American forces with
adequate air power to assist the Afghan security forces, plus a
Special Forces component, the Taliban days are over in terms of
military conquest?
Secretary Panetta. That ought to be the goal.
Senator Graham. I think that ought to be the goal and I
think you could do this with 15,000 or 20,000 troops, with
several air bases spread throughout the country. To a war-weary
public: We have air bases everywhere. If we leave Afghanistan
and the issue is in doubt about the future of the Taliban, we
will regret it. If we leave Afghanistan in a way to create a
certainty about the Taliban's future, I think we can hold our
heads up high.
Do you think Iran is watching what we're doing in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta. I would think without question.
Senator Graham. General Dempsey, what is your biggest
concern and your best hope about Iraq?
General Dempsey. I'll start with the best hope, and that is
that they appear to be committed to resolving the contentious
issues among them politically, not through violence, with the
exception of a few of the violent extremist organizations which
remain there.
My biggest concern is that they could potentially come to a
decision that they no longer need our help. They might look
elsewhere. That's why our Office of Security Cooperation there
remains a very vital part of our strategy.
Senator Graham. Do you see the security situation in Iraq
getting worse or better?
General Dempsey. I see it as being in a form of stasis
right now. I think it is what it is for the foreseeable future,
with of course the potential for it, based on some political
decisions they might make, with increasing tension, for example
in the Arab-Kurd region.
Senator Graham. When it comes to the military budget, I
don't see DOD as a job creator for America. That's one of the
benefits, but I don't think we should view DOD as a way to just
create jobs to deal with unemployment. I think we should have a
robust defense capability to defend our values. So in that
light, I do believe it's appropriate to reduce defense
spending, and I do believe it's appropriate to consider another
round of BRAC, as hard as that is for my colleagues. So just
count me in in the process of having to make hard decisions,
even in the defense area.
When it comes to TRICARE premiums, is it sustainable--is
the mandatory spending part of the budget sustainable without
reform?
Secretary Panetta. No.
Senator Graham. So the question for the country is, if I
don't get courtmartialed in the next couple of years and get to
be a retired colonel and receive my TRICARE benefits when I'm
60, it is okay to ask a guy like me to pay more. They haven't
been adjusted since the 1990s, is that correct?
Secretary Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Graham. General Dempsey, you're willing to pay
more?
General Dempsey. I am, sir.
Senator Graham. I guess the point is that we're so far in
debt, no one group is off the table. It's hard to ask those
who've done the most to secure our freedom to give more, but
I'm willing to do it. To the retired community, I'm willing to
grandfather the current system, but I'm also willing to look
outside the box, because if we don't do something in terms of
health care growth and entitlement, retiree benefits, you're
going to compete the retired force with operational needs, and
that's just not where we want to go.
So thank you both. I don't know if $487 billion is the
right number, but I'll work with you to get a number that is
robust.
One last question. Do you see a scenario in the next decade
where 100,000 American troops could be involved over a
sustained period of time? If you do, how would reducing the
Army and the Marine Corps by 125,000 affect those operations?
General Dempsey. First of all, I don't know the answer to
that, sir. But I think we wouldn't want to shape a future where
we completely ignored the possibility.
The force we're building on the fiscal year 2013 to 2017
budget is capable, we assess, of stability operations, long-
term stability operations or prolonged conflict, up to a force
of about 50,000. The other 50,000 would have to come out of the
Guard and Reserve.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham. You have my
proxy at lunch, by the way. [Laughter.]
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, first let me just say that as
somebody who spent 5 years in the Pentagon, one of them as a
serving Marine and the other as a defense executive, I
appreciate all of the work that's gone into this presentation.
We're going to have our disagreements, but, having sat on the
Defense Resources Board for 4 years, I know how much effort has
gone into what you brought over here.
There are already reports--I was back in my office--on the
discussion to slash the Army and the Marine Corps. I think for
the record we ought to point out that what we're looking at
here is historically consistent with the end point of sustained
ground operations. In fact, if my numbers are correct, if you
go back to the pre-September 11 military and look at 2017,
which you're projecting in your testimony, Secretary Panetta,
the Army is going to be about 9,000 higher than it was pre-
September 11 and the Marine Corps is going to be again about
9,000 higher than pre-September 11.
So I look forward to working with you on a lot of different
issues, and some on which we may have disagreement. But again,
I have great respect for all of the energy that's gone into
this, preparation of this budget.
I want to talk about basing in the Pacific. Chairman Levin
mentioned this in his opening comments. Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain and I have spent a great deal of effort on this. I
agree, General Dempsey, with what you said. I don't see a pivot
here. I think we've always been there, we've always needed to
be there. I've been speaking for many years about the need for
us to reconfigure our presence in a way not that downsizes or
not that confronts or attempts to contain China, as some people
are saying, but just as a way to strengthen our alliances and
our presence out there.
There's a strong strategic dynamic in the region. There's
also a very important and potentially volatile political
dynamic in Japan if we don't get this right and if we don't get
it right soon. This has been going on for more than 15 years.
We can't kick the can down the road--I'm not asking for your
comment on this, but this is more along the lines of getting
your bank statement. There are a couple things that are due to
us and they're very important in our consideration. One is the
reporting requirement that is scheduled to come out of the
independent study that was mandated by the NDAA. There's a 90-
day period for which the bill was signed, which I think was
December 31, for the study to come to the Secretary of Defense
and then the Secretary of Defense would have up to 90 days, not
necessarily mandated, to report to us on this independent
evaluation of the basing structure.
It's very important. It's going to happen at the same time
that there are environmental statements and other issues taking
place on Okinawa about the basing system there. I'm very
interested in getting this study and seeing if we can't move
forward in a very timely way to resolve this.
The other one is the Marine Corps laydown. I have spoken
with the Assistant Commandant about the numbers that they're
using. I support this transition in concept. I've had many
conversations with the Marine Corps and with others about this
earlier. But we do need to see it. We need to see the laydown.
It's again a part of the NDAA.
The question that I actually have in this short period of
time relates to the evolving situation in Syria. General, I
would like to ask if you might characterize for us, for lack of
a better term, the on-the-ground opposition that now exists to
the Syrian regime? What proportion of this is domestic? What
proportion is foreign? What are your observations?
General Dempsey. My observations, Senator, are that it is a
much different situation than we collectively saw in Libya. I
think that's an important point to make, because we don't have
as clear an understanding of the nature of the opposition.
We're working in the intelligence community to develop it. But
there are some significant differences vis-a-vis Syria. There
is a chemical and biological warfare threat. There's a very
significant integrated air defense system, a very credible
military.
We're watching the trend lines on their military to see if
they are still under the control of the regime. There's also
huge regional implications, big players and actors who have
vested interests there. So this is one where we have to not
only understand what's happening on the ground, but also look
at the regional context in which we're dealing.
Of course, we will, when asked, provide options to the
national command authority. But this is a very different
challenge.
Senator Webb. First let me reiterate that I had serious
concerns about the Libyan operation and the nature in which the
President exercised unilateral authority. But on the Syrian
situation, do you have any indication about the makeup of the
on-ground opposition to the regime, how much of it is domestic
and how much of it is in fact not?
General Dempsey. As I sit here today, the Free Syrian Army,
which is generally speaking the centerpiece of the opposition,
is for the most part domestic, although we also know that other
regional actors are providing support for it. That complicates
the situation.
Senator Webb. There were reports over the weekend that al
Qaeda has been involved as a part of the opposition. Do you
have any confirmation of that?
General Dempsey. No confirmation. I saw the same report.
Senator Webb. But have you discounted it?
General Dempsey. No, not at all. Syria is an issue of a
Sunni majority rebelling against an oppressive Alawite Shia
regime. All of the players--this is what I mentioned a moment
ago--in the region it seems have a stake in this. So those who
would like to foment a Sunni-Shia standoff--and you know who
they are--are all weighing in in Syria. It is the last
remaining piece in the puzzle of what you and I probably months
ago would have described as the Arab Spring, but this is a very
important moment in the region and all the players are weighing
in.
Senator Webb. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, thank you for being here
this morning.
I told Secretary Panetta that I was going back and forth
between the Senate Budget Committee and this committee. It's
been interesting because I'm really seeing two different points
of view and really world views. I commend both of you today and
your comments about the need for us to deal with the
unsustainable growth on the entitlement or mandatory side of
the spending. In response to your question from Senator Graham,
is the mandatory spending for the military sustainable, you
gave a simple answer, no.
I will tell you, to be honest, having just engaged in the
Senate Budget Committee about the President's budget, which was
submitted yesterday, it not only adds another $12 trillion to
our debt, taking it up to over $25 trillion, but it really
takes the pass on any of the tough decisions that have to be
made on the biggest part of the budget and the fastest growing
part of the budget, and that's the entitlements side.
It actually grows, under their own numbers, from about 64
percent of our total budget now--this would be Medicare,
Medicaid, Social Security, interest on the debt. That grows
from 64 percent now, so the largest part of our budget, to 78
percent during the 10-year window of the President's budget and
yet there is no mention of Social Security, no reforms.
On Medicare, the only reform I can see on the beneficiary
side happens after the next term of whoever's President, and
that's on some slight means testing changes.
So my concern is exactly what you have outlined today, and
I quote you from your overview document, where you said: ``Our
growing national debt, if not addressed, will imperil our
prosperity, hurt our credibility and influence around the
world, and ultimately put our national security at risk.''
General Dempsey, you talked about that during your
nomination hearing last year, and I again appreciate the
approach you have taken. I'm very concerned that if we continue
down the path that has been outlined we will all be here many
more hearings like this one, talking not about how to improve
our national security, but instead talking about how budgets
have been crowded out by unsustainable practices elsewhere in
our government and we simply can't afford the force we know we
need.
So, with that, if I could focus on two things in terms of
the defense budget, because I do think there is room, despite
my concern about the bigger budget crowding out defense, within
defense to find savings. Two areas I want to touch on quickly
if I could are personnel and the area of procurement.
On the personnel side, I appreciate the fact that you both
again have focused on compensation, health care benefits.
You've proposed a retirement review. These are all tough
issues. I think we all agree that our men and women in uniform
are our single greatest asset and we need to be very cautious
on the personnel side.
On the other hand, we need to be sure that we are not
crowding out, even within the defense budget, the need for us
to be sure that we have adequate resources for operations and
maintenance.
So I would ask you this. When you look at what you have
proposed, in essence you've taken out one issue to a commission
on the retirement issue, again a very delicate issue, and you
have some suggestions on changing compensation in the military
health system here, although I would suggest more would have to
be done to meet your own criteria you've laid out.
My question to you is, is there a more holistic approach
here, in that this does relate to retention and obviously our
ability to attract the great professional force that we have
now?
General Dempsey. We thought about bundling these issues
together into, as you described it, a holistic look at pay,
compensation, health care, and retirement. The chiefs and I
were of the opinion that we wanted to address the issue we saw
before us that we knew had to be changed, and that was pay,
compensation, and health care, but take the time to study the
impact of retirement change, because one of the things we're
concerned about is, although it's counterintuitive, you know
that about 70 percent of the force retires--not retires, but
separates before retirement, but 100 percent of the force, when
asked, even at the 5-year mark of their career, will say to
you: Don't screw around with my retirement or I may not stick
around, even though they know that the chances of them actually
retiring is only about 30 percent.
So there's a psychological factor with retirement benefits
here that we don't fully understand yet. We want to take some
time to understand what the impact of retirement reform would
be on both recruitment and retention. That's why we all felt,
the chiefs and I, that we should separate these.
Senator Portman. Secretary Panetta, any thoughts with
regard to this, given your background on the budget issues?
Secretary Panetta. I think it's important, as a former OMB
Director that I was, that we have to approach this budget based
on the fact that there's no holy ground here. You have to look
at everything and you have to question everything. We
approached it on that basis.
We talked about allowances, we talked about pay, we talked
about pay raises, we talked about all the health care areas. We
looked at a number of those areas. We felt we have to take a
step to make sure that compensation is part of the answer to
what we have to achieve here in savings. For that reason, we
selected the areas that we looked at.
I think it's important that all of this has to relate to
what it means to the soldier, the uniformed man or woman who is
there on the battlefield. How do we make sure that we provide
the benefits that are necessary to attract the very best?
Frankly, we have the very best operating on behalf of the
United States today. How do we do that, how do we maintain that
benefit base that's important, but at the same time, understand
that we have to control these costs in the out-years?
That was the dilemma that we had to confront. We think we
approached it in the right way. Is there more that can be done?
Probably.
Senator Portman. I know that members of the committee know
this, but maybe for someone watching, this is an increasing
part of your budget, just as it is for the Federal budget, as I
mentioned, if you look at your percent of spending on TRICARE,
for instance, as a percent of your overall budget.
So as one member of the committee--and I think I speak for
a lot of other colleagues, including at least one I heard speak
earlier--we look forward to working with you on that and trying
to be supportive.
On procurement, we don't have time to go into it because my
time is up. But just again, to focus on competition, the need
for us maybe to spend a little more upfront to be sure we have
a competitive process because it'll save so much over time. I
look forward to maybe a follow-up question in writing in that
regard.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service to our country. As some of
you know, I have spent a lot of time working on contracting
issues as a member of this committee and other committees. I
don't need to tell you what a huge piece of your budget
contracting represents. The Project on Government Oversight
released a report last year that is the first in-depth analysis
that's been done in a while about the cost of personal services
contracts as compared to the costs of a Federal employee.
That study showed that we are paying contractors 1.83 times
more than the government pays Federal employees, and that's
including taking into account the benefits package that goes
along with the personnel costs of hiring a Federal employee.
I think there's been an awful lot of talk around the Senate
about freezing Federal employees' salaries and cutting the
number of Federal employees, but there's been very little real
difficult work of trying to hold down the cost of personal
services contracts.
Secretary Panetta, with the reductions of DOD personnel
contained in this budget, what are you doing to ensure that
reducing--because what's happened over the years is, while
we've tried to hold the line on Federal employees, contracting
has just ballooned. You are by far number one in that. Number
two is DHS. So I'd like you to address that if you could,
either you or Mr. Hale.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, you've provided tremendous
leadership on this issue, and it is of great concern to me
personally because it is an area that has expanded
dramatically. Almost everywhere I go in my new capacity, I see
contract employees obviously providing a lot of services. Some
of them are very important and they perform a very important
role. Some of them I question whether or not we could perform
the same role and be able to do it at a smaller price.
We did look at this area as part of our efficiency approach
to trying to see if we could gain some savings, and I'd like to
ask our Comptroller to speak to that.
Mr. Hale. Just briefly, I think you know, Senator
McCaskill, we had an initiative a couple of years ago to in-
source jobs where it was cost-effective. We are still looking
at where it's cost-effective. I think with these budget
cutbacks we're looking at what the right mix is. Probably both
contractors and civil servants are going to come down over the
next few years in our budget.
We have to try to find the right mix. I don't claim we have
an easy formula, but I think we are looking at it in that
context, which is the right one: What's the most cost-effective
way that we can get the work done?
Senator McCaskill. We're going to have a hearing on this in
the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight of the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and what I will be
looking forward to seeing is what kind of strict analysis is
DOD embracing to get a handle on contract employees versus
full-time Federal employees? Because it surprised me when I got
here that not only do we not know how many contractors there
were in Iraq, we didn't know how many contractors there were
sitting in government buildings within 5 miles of where we're
sitting right now. That is a huge problem, that the contractors
just became task orders, as opposed to keeping a handle on how
this monster got out of hand.
We also are going to have some legislation coming from the
Wartime Contracting Commission that finished its work. I will
look forward to direct input from you about the legislation
that we will be hopefully filing this week, and we will be
working with this committee to try to get some of its
provisions included in the defense authorization.
As I look at Afghanistan, $16 billion GDP, $2 billion of
that is not from us. That is a huge impact on that country. As
some of you are aware, I've also been looking at the way that
the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds have
been used over there in terms of infrastructure and how for the
first time in the budget there was actually an infrastructure
fund embedded in the budget coming from the military to do the
things that traditionally the DOS had always done. That is,
large infrastructure. It was like CERP on steroids, is
essentially what the infrastructure fund was.
I'm going to quote what the Counterinsurgency Advisory and
Assistance Team (CAAT) said. The CAAT, which provided a report
directly to General Allen, found that the CERP was not
achieving counterinsurgency goals. I'm going to quote this
report:

``Current incentives promote spending CERP funds
without sufficient accountability. There is no system
for determining what projects are likely to advance
counterinsurgency effects and no apparent desire to
objectively evaluate whether counterinsurgency
objectives were achieved. Commanders at various ends of
the spectrum are judged by the amount of funds
committed, obligated, or spent over actual measures of
effectiveness. This situation is not only wasteful, but
allows for corruption, insurgent resource capture, and
delegitimization of the Afghan state. We retain primary
responsibility for project success or failure while the
host government and population are spectators.''

I know that CERP has been something that has been held near
and dear, and now the Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund is an
outgrowth of that because we've gotten beyond fixing window
fronts to large highway construction projects, without the kind
of rigorous analysis in terms of sustainability. As we drop off
the cliff in Afghanistan in terms of what we're giving this
country of GDP, aren't we creating a scenario that a lot of
this money is going to go into the category that it went into
in Iraq, and that is, a lot of wasted taxpayers' dollars on
Afghanistan infrastructure?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, I'll have a general comment on
the actual use of those funds, but let me say this. I share the
concern that you've indicated. As we do draw down and as we
turn over these responsibilities to the Afghans, one of the
issues that we have to think long and hard about is the
sustainability of these efforts.
For example, in the Afghan force that takes over and
provides the principal security for the country, what is the
level that we need? Is it sustainable? Can this country provide
the support system that it has to? What kind of economic base
is that country going to have for the future? The issues that
you've raised all relate to that question. What are we looking
at in terms of the future of this country and can it sustain
itself?
That's going to be something we're going to have to give a
lot of consideration to. Not only the United States, but
obviously all of our NATO allies have to take a hard look at
what we do to try to sustain this country in the future if
we're going to be successful there.
General Dempsey. I'll just add, Senator, I first of all
hope we don't drop off a cliff. One of the things we've been
discussing is the glide slope in every sense. It's our glide
slope, it's the ANSF glide slope. It's our funding glide slope.
If we do drop it off a cliff, it will have the result you
just predicted. That's the reason that I would suggest we can't
fall off a cliff in Afghanistan. We have to transition this
thing responsibly.
As for whether they have the capacity to deal with all of
this, that has been--I've done this in several countries around
the world, to include Iraq most recently, and that is always
the most difficult part of these missions, is building the
capacity, the capability and then the capacity, to--it's really
institution-building. It's pretty easy to build infantry
battalions. It's pretty easy to partner with them and embed
with them. But the institution that sits above it all has to be
developed.
I would suggest to you that we've made some pretty
significant progress in that regard since about 2008, and it is
part of our strategy going forward. But I share your concerns.
I'm not sure that I share the understanding of all of the
results of that study you just cited, because depending on when
it was done and who did it and where they did it, it could have
a very different outcome other places. I'd suggest to you that
we owe you some information on that going forward.
Senator McCaskill. I have to tell you, I think that some of
the stuff that we've built in Afghanistan, we can go ahead and
build the stuff, we can hire the people to build it, our know-
how can provide the leadership to build it, and I think it's
been like wishful thinking that the institutional capacity of
this country will catch up. We have a power generation facility
in Afghanistan that's sitting there as an expensive extra power
generator because they can't even use it, and it was hundreds
of millions of dollars of American taxpayers' money.
That kind of stuff, we just can't afford to do that. I have
a modernization to move some of this money back to the United
States for infrastructure, and I think it's important that we
do that because of the needs of this country, and the real
problem that a lot of this money for security purposes is
ending up in the bad guys' hands, and we know that. There's
been way too many instances that we've found it.
So I appreciate the more information you can give me about
what kind of rigor you're bringing to the sustainability
equation, because I can't find that rigor and I've looked for
it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, Secretary Panetta, Mr. Hale, thank you for
your leadership during very challenging times for DOD.
I appreciate very much that we need to find savings in
defense in a way that does not undermine our national security,
no question. But please count me out when it comes to BRAC, and
here's why. I want to echo concerns that Secretary Panetta
himself, having gone through this process, raised before the
House committee in October, where, Mr. Secretary, you said:

``I went through BRAC. I know that all the dollars
that people looked for huge savings in BRAC, and yet
they didn't take into consideration the cleanup, they
didn't take into consideration all the work that had to
be done. They didn't take into consideration all the
needs that had to be addressed. In many cases it wound
up costing more. In fact, the recent Government
Accountability Office report found that it cost us for
the 2005 BRAC round 67 percent more than we estimated,
and in fact we're not going to see any savings from the
2005 round until 2018, 13 or 14 years down the line. So
I have serious questions whether we save any money from
a BRAC process. Particularly at a time when we're still
making decisions about our global posture and our
force, end strength of our forces, I don't think it's
the right time for a BRAC process where we may not save
a dime, frankly. That's what really concerns me at the
end of the day.''

I want to ask you, Secretary Panetta, about our
reengagement rate at Guantanamo. Director Clapper testified, I
believe it was last year or in the spring, that our
reengagement rate of those who had been released from
Guantanamo Bay was 27 percent. Do you know what the number is
now, and has that percentage of 27 percent getting back into
the fight gone up?
Secretary Panetta. I think 27 percent was over the long
period stretching back into the last administration, where most
of the individuals were transferred. I believe under the ones
that have been transferred under this administration that it's
less. I can't remember the exact percentage.
Senator Ayotte. But overall it's been--whatever
administration released it, Director Clapper said the overall
reengagement rate is 27 percent; is that correct?
Secretary Panetta. That's true, and I think that number is
correct. I'll get back to you on the specifics.
[The information referred to follows:]

Data regarding the reengagement rate of former Guantanamo Bay
detainees is collected and distributed by the Office of the Director
for National Intelligence (ODNI). In March 2012, ODNI released updated
public statistics on detainee reengagement for all detainees
transferred from Guantanamo Bay through December 29, 2011: Out of the
total 599 Guantanamo detainees transferred, 95 or 15.9 percent are
confirmed to have reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activity, and an
additional 72 or 12 percent are suspected of so reengaging.

Senator Ayotte. That would be great. I just want to know if
the overall reengagement rate, regardless of who released them,
has increased at all.
The reason I asked is, in follow-up to Senator McCain's
question earlier about what we've heard could be the
administration's potential release of five Guantanamo prisoners
in exchange to the Taliban, I just wanted to raise concerns
about it on a couple of fronts. Number one, as I see it,
according to the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post,
of these five people--let's be clear. If these reports, public
reports, are accurate, we're talking about individuals who,
senior-most Taliban commander in northern Afghanistan, someone
who is an alleged war criminal in his role for the massacre of
Shiite Afghans. Two of them are potentially involved in killing
of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative, an American
CIA operative. Of the remaining three, one is alleged to have
helped smuggle weapons in to attack U.S. troops and is loyal to
the Haqqani network, another one is directly associated with
Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar and then the final one may
belong to al Qaeda and his release has been called highly
problematic.
All five of these individuals were characterized by the
administration in 2010, if these reports are accurate about who
these individuals are, all five of them were deemed by this
administration in 2010 ``too dangerous to transfer, but not
feasible for prosecution.''
I know that you have to certify, Secretary Panetta. Two
years later, is there something changed about these individuals
that we're unaware of? My follow-up would be, as I understand
the administration's plan, this is in exchange for goodwill
from the Taliban. If we are going to release five, if these
reports are the case, these public reports of who these
individuals are, dangerous individuals who could get back and
reengage with our troops, and who aren't just soldiers, they
appear to be leaders among the Taliban and Haqqani networks,
that if we were to release them in exchange for a measure of
goodwill, it seems to me that, why aren't we getting a
ceasefire if we're going to put out people that are so
dangerous?
So two questions to you: First, has something changed from
2010 of the assessment of these five individuals in terms of
being too dangerous to release? Second, do you think this is a
good deal if we're only going to get a goodwill gesture from
the Taliban?
Secretary Panetta. Let me reemphasize that absolutely no
decisions have been made with regards to reconciliation. There
have been some discussions, but the conditions for
reconciliation have been made very clear, that the Taliban has
to lay down their arms, they have to renounce al Qaeda, they
have to recognize the constitution in Afghanistan. As far as I
know, none of those conditions have been met at this point, and
obviously would be part of the discussions.
As to whether or not as part of whatever these discussions
involve that there was a transfer as part of that, under my
obligations as Secretary, I have to certify that these
individuals will not return to the battlefield, and I have to
be convinced that steps are taken to ensure that that does not
happen. Until I am assured that that's the case, I'm not going
to certify.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. These are
very dangerous individuals if they are as they've been reported
by the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, and in
particular to transfer them for a so-called goodwill gesture. I
appreciate your list of conditions of a ceasefire, laying down
of arms, and I obviously am very concerned to transfer these
individuals at all, given how dangerous they have been in the
past.
Frankly, we haven't always been right about this. We've
been 27 percent wrong, whatever administration we're in. In
fact, Mullah Zakir was assessed as a medium risk--these guys
are all high risk--a medium risk, and he was released, and he's
now leading the Taliban forces fighting the U.S. Marines in the
Helmand Province.
So we do our best in these situations, but as a prior
prosecutor the best predictor of future behavior is usually
prior behavior, and these guys aren't good. So I appreciate
your looking at this certification very carefully.
Thank you all for being here today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. I'm sure you'd rather spend
Valentine's Day with any group other than the Senate Armed
Services Committee, so thanks for being here.
It's apparent that the fiscal challenges that DOD faces are
those that we face across the Federal budget. We've had a
respite given, the end of the war in Iraq. But unfortunately,
more broadly--and I'm not speaking to DOD, but I'm speaking
more broadly--we've mismanaged our finances across the board,
and we've put ourselves in a pretty tough, I would say even
unacceptable, financial position.
If you look at our history, we've leveraged our economic
and military strength to accomplish our goals, and we can't
effectively project our power abroad if we're weak at home.
Then we've also undercut our domestic and strategic goals by
managing our finances so poorly.
You both know in spades that we have to carefully strike a
balance between fiscal responsibility and strategic capability.
We can't hollow out the force, we can't eat our seed corn. We
have to get this right.
Fortunately, I think we have a lot of history to guide us,
and we have to make sure that we incorporate the lessons
learned from our successes and both our failures. As a mountain
climber, I always learned more when I was on the mountains I
didn't climb as the ones I was successfully summitting.
But, General, in that spirit I wanted to turn to the
summary that I've heard that DOD has affirmed its commitment to
Department-wide research and development programs and the
continued development of alternative energy technologies. DOD's
always been an innovator and military research has created a
number of products that we now consider essential to everyday
civilian life.
At the same time, there are concerns that there are
operational needs that need to be addressed now. Can you
discuss the thinking behind this focus on the future and how
that decision affects current operations and those that might
be just over the horizon?
General Dempsey. On the issue of energy, operational
energy, I can.
Senator Udall. Certainly on energy, but then even more
broadly, too--medical advances. I know you have a long list.
General Dempsey. We do, sir. In terms of looking out to
Joint Force 2020, that's exactly why we want to project
ourselves out and then look back and find our way forward. This
budget is the first step in that.
I will use operational energy as an example. We lose
soldiers, marines, notably airmen and soldiers, on the roads of
Afghanistan going from forward operating base (FOB) to FOB, on
resupply missions and so forth. So to the extent we can create
autonomous or semi-autonomous in terms of energy consumption,
power and energy, organizations, net zero in terms of their
consumption of power and energy, we'll actually save lives and
become a lot more agile because we won't be as tied to some
kind of traditional linear line of communications.
So we're all in. The Army has five installations--one of
them is Fort Carson, CO, by the way--where we're trying to
receive a net zero energy situation. But that's kind of the
garrison environment.
Operationally, we're trying to do the same thing with our
tactical units. Every Service, frankly, is working on this
diligently and I think this budget reflects that.
Senator Udall. There have been some compelling stories
about what the marines are doing in theater, on the front lines
at the FOBs. As your predecessor put it well, saving energy
saves lives. So I commend you for what you're doing. I look
forward to working with you in this important area as we move
forward.
Mr. Secretary, if I could turn to you. Congress, as I think
you're aware, worked with DOD to establish an Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) Office within the Air Force to rapidly
field small responsive satellites that are tactical in nature
and tasked by the combat commanders in the field. That's in
comparison to the large national systems that take somewhere 6
to 8 years and literally billions of dollars to field.
As I understand it, in fiscal year 2013 DOD is proposing to
abolish the ORS Office, zero its budget from $111 million last
year, and integrate whatever capability is left into the Space
and Missile System Center. Can you explain DOD's thinking here,
when the first satellite they launched was judged by U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) to be successful? ORS-1 started
sending images back to them in the fall of 2011, almost 3 years
to the day after the program was started.
One additional question. Is there a possibility that this
decision puts the cart before the horse? I assume the budget
was probably put together before CENTCOM started using the
system. Can you explain the reasoning here?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, let me have Bob Hale talk to
that.
Senator Udall. Great.
Mr. Hale. Senator, what we've done, as you said, is
terminate the program office, but not the commitment to ORS
initiatives. It'll be put into Space Command, where it can be
looked at in the broader context. We think that's the right
decision, as opposed to focusing on one particular approach,
but to look more broadly at this initiative. There are a lot of
ways to do it. We need to find a cost effective way. So I think
that's our approach.
Senator Udall. I look forward to working with you to make
sure we continue to get this right. We talked about smaller,
agile forces on the front lines and this is in a way a form of
doing that, but in space.
Let me turn to Iraq and Afghanistan. We've ended our
mission in Iraq. We're drawing down our surge forces in
Afghanistan. We've proposed reducing end strength in all four
Service branches, substantially reducing the number of
aircraft, ships, and Army BCTs. After all that and more, when
adjusted for inflation, the DOD budget for 2017 will still be
at almost exactly the same level as it was in 1986. That's the
height of the Reagan-era buildup against the Soviets.
Can you talk about the major reasons why we're spending the
same amount of money for a smaller force?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, what we have here is that $487
billion was in the planned DOD budget over the next 10 years,
and that included, obviously, a lot of what we've had to reduce
in terms of the budget looking forward. So overall, make no
mistake about it, even though the defense budget shows a slight
increase between now and 2017, the bottom line when you add
what we had proposed in our budget plus the amount that would
be involved in terms of the war costs, we're going to be going
down pretty dramatically, by about 20 percent, which is
comparable to what we've seen in past drawdowns.
So this budget bites. But at the same time, by virtue of
what we've done we've made it much tighter. Obviously, we've
had to take down the force structure. We've had to make cuts in
ships and planes and in other areas, space, as you said. But
the bottom line is we think we have a sustainable budget that
will take us to the kind of force we're going to need in order
to meet the threats that are out there in the world.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General
Dempsey, for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sure at this point in the hearing, Secretary Panetta,
that you're contemplating what Danny Akaka said to you and
wondering about your career choice. But we do appreciate your
service and indeed the service of all of you.
General Dempsey, I want to bring up with you an issue that
really troubles me. Since May 2007, Afghan security forces have
killed 70 American and allied troops and wounded many more,
over 100 more, in 45 separate attacks. One of those killed was
a Maine soldier, Private First Class Buddy McLain.
I'm so disturbed by the frequency of these attacks. It
raises questions about our vetting process. It raises concerns
among our troops when here they're risking their lives to train
and assist these Afghan troops, only to have some of them turn
on them and kill them.
It's my understanding that a CENTCOM red team report
concluded that there was a crisis of distrust that permeated
both the Afghan national security troops that we're training
and our own troops as well. So here they're being sent out on
joint missions, they're training side by side, but they don't
trust each other.
Unless steps are taken to stop these attacks on our troops
by the Afghan security personnel, that level of trust that is
so necessary for a successful strategy is going to be
extraordinarily difficult to achieve. After all, these are the
very security forces that we're depending on to take over from
us so that we can come back home.
So I would ask you, what is being done to address this very
serious and destructive problem?
General Dempsey. Thanks, Senator. Yes, I'm well aware of
this issue. In fact, I just recently briefed the President on
it, who shares your concern. As you say, it's actually 47
instances. About 11 of them were related to infiltration or
self-radicalization. The remainder were issues of personnel.
It's stress, it's tribal. It's not related to Taliban influence
or ideological issues. That's an important point. It doesn't
make it any better, but it makes it more understandable.
The other thing I want to mention is, it's not just what we
call--it's not just them attacking us. They're attacking each
other, and probably at a rate of about three times. So we are
interested in this. We have an eight-step vetting process that
includes--I don't have the entire thing memorized, but it
includes things like letters from tribal elders, biometrics,
training, indoctrination, and then the embedding of
counterintelligence agents, both United States and coalition,
but also Afghans themselves.
Recently, because of this recent issue with the French you
may recall, President Karzai and the Ministry of Interior,
Bismillah Khan, agreed to embed some counterintelligence agents
in throughout the Afghan National Army in order to try to get
after this.
So we're seized with it. It is tragic and we are taking
steps to improve it. We are not going to get it to zero. It's
the nature of this kind of conflict.
Senator Collins. It's one thing to tell a family that's
lost a loved one that they did so in support of the Afghan
people to help them have a secure country and to make our
national security better. But it's so different to try to
console a family that has lost a son or daughter as a result of
Afghan security force members killing them. I just think it's a
terrible problem, and the seeming frequency of it is really
disturbing.
I realize we're never going to get to zero, but there are
too many incidents.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, if I could, I share your
concern deeply. I just returned from the NATO ministerial,
where obviously the French were very concerned, having lost
some of their troops to this situation. What we did at the NATO
ministerial was to task General Allen to report back on the
steps that are being taken. Before this, he had actually taken
some of the steps that General Dempsey recommended. They are
moving aggressively to try to do a better review of those that
are going into the Afghan army, better checks, better
background checks, in order to ensure that these incidents are
cut back.
I would say that, even though no killings this way are in
any way justifiable, that it still remains not something that
is something that's endemic. It is sporadic, but nevertheless,
we have to address it and make sure it doesn't happen.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I would ask that your offices
keep me informed as you do try to improve the process.
Secretary Panetta, I share a lot of the concerns that my
colleagues have expressed about some of the cuts in the budget,
particularly those that affect shipbuilding and the size of our
fleet. It seems inconsistent to say that we're going to focus
on the Asia Pacific area and yet not seek to get to what for
years has been the absolute minimum goal of 313 ships.
I am pleased, however, that the budget request indicates
that DOD intends to seek a multi-year procurement plan for the
DDG-51 destroyers between now and 2017. First of all, do you
support that plan, and do you see that as helping to produce
the kinds of efficiencies that will lead to a lower cost per
unit?
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely. I think that's extremely
important. Two things are important. We want to maintain--we
have 285 ships now. We want to be at 285 ships in 2017. In the
next 5 years, our hope is to gradually move up to 300 ships by
2020. So we're clearly intent on having a Navy that is fully
capable to project that forward presence that we're interested
in.
Second, I think we have to do it in order to protect our
economic base. We have to have a strong industrial base here
that supports DOD, and for that reason my instructions are to
do everything possible, not only to obviously get better
competition and better savings, but to make sure that we keep
our industrial base busy serving our needs.
Senator Collins. That is so important, because once that
industrial base is gone, you never get it back. Once those
trained workers go into other fields, you've lost them forever,
and that would greatly weaken our capabilities. I agree.
Thank you for that response.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, Secretary Panetta, and Mr. Hale, thank you
for your service, and it is good afternoon now. Thank you for
your leadership, particularly during this time.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) proliferation is a key
concern of mine and it certainly has been for quite a while. I
support anything that we can do to counter IEDs and obviously
protect our troops, and I also support anything we can do to
improve the detection rates and interdict the flow of caches of
ammonium nitrate.
Reportedly, last year in Afghanistan IEDs caused over half
of U.S. military deaths, and IEDs will continue to pose an
enduring threat to our military men and women. I believe we
need an enduring capability to counter this threat. However, we
have to ensure that our countermeasures effectively deal with
the types of IEDs that we face now and in the future, along
with the environments that they'll likely be utilized in, and
our efforts must be geared toward countering IEDs in any
locale.
My figures show that we've spent approximately $17 billion
on various counter-IED initiatives and equipment, not counting
the $45 billion spent on mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP)
vehicles. I see these, our young soldiers, all the time with
loss of limbs. We host wounded warrior luncheons in my office.
I see them at the airports. I really want to do everything
possible we can to counterdict the IEDs.
But at the same time, we're spending billions of dollars to
fight a technology that currently is costing the enemy tens of
dollars. So I'm wondering, how do we figure out how to alter
this investment ratio? What investments will DOD make in
developing effective IED countermeasures in order to protect
our troops and at the same time avoid restricting their freedom
of movement?
General Dempsey. Senator, the IED challenge is the enemy's
asymmetric tool. I think you're correct in stating that it has
been the biggest killer on the battlefield and is likely to
remain so. That'll be true, I think, by the way, wherever we're
deployed. I think we are so capable that they will find ways to
attack us, and typically now that's through IEDs.
The next challenge, by the way, will be precision rockets
and missiles. But we'll get to that one.
To your point about IEDs, the way we're trying to address
the cost ratio is by expanding--and we have been doing this--
the aperture. So it's not just about trying to find
technological means to defeat the device. Defeating the device
is important--under-armor improvement kits, MRAP, as you say,
mine detection, deep penetration radars, or ground-penetrating
radars. But it's also training to identify signatures, and I'll
explain that briefly in a second, and then also attacking the
network.
So you have to do all three. You have to identify
signatures, and that is to say the components, the chemicals,
and then find ways to identify those components and attack the
supply chain. Then it's attacking the network. That includes
the financiers and includes those who emplace. Then finally,
it's defeating the device.
We've gotten actually quite good at it, but again this is
the enemy's principal munition that he uses against us and it
does continue to incur casualties. So we just have to stay with
it. I don't have any better answer than that.
Secretary Panetta. If I could, Senator, follow up a little
bit on that?
Senator Hagan. Okay, yes, please.
Secretary Panetta. Probably one of the best things that was
developed was the MRAP, and it has saved a lot of lives and it
was done on an expedited basis. So it's a good example,
frankly, of trying to produce something needed by our fighting
men and women on a fast basis. We're continuing to, obviously,
do that kind of research, to try to develop the best ways to
try to protect our young men and women.
I agree with you, anybody who's seen the results of an IED
has to shudder at the devastating wounds that result from that.
The other piece of this, though, relates to the supply
network for these IEDs. In some ways that relates to the safe
haven in Pakistan that continues to supply a lot of this. That
is an area that we believe we've urged the Pakistanis to
address it. We think that whole issue needs to be addressed if
we're going to be effective at trying to cut back on these.
Senator Hagan. That was actually my next question, and I
know we've discussed this before: What is DOD doing to put
pressure on Pakistan's network of the distribution of ammonium
nitrate?
Secretary Panetta. We have made very clear to them where
these threats emanate from. We've identified locations. We've
directed them to specific sites. We've urged them to take
steps. In some cases they have. In some cases they wind up
there too late. But we're continuing to impress upon them that
they have to be part of the answer to dealing with this issue.
Senator Hagan. I think that would help tremendously, and
hopefully lowering the number of the IEDs that are placed.
Secretary Panetta, I also wanted to thank you for lifting
the Marine Corps variant of the JSF off probation. The decision
I believe is essential for the Marine Corps to operate and to
move seamlessly from the sea ashore and in the air. It's also
key to preserving the strategic value of our amphibious
capabilities. Airlift capable of short takeoff and vertical
landing (STOVL), a great example is when the F-15 fighter pilot
crashed in Libya and these airplanes were able to, I believe
within about 90 minutes, take off from a large-deck amphibious
ship, rescue the pilot, and have him back on board. So
obviously there is a critical need.
I also understand that the original JSF procurement was
currently planned at 2,443 aircraft, and in light of the new
Defense Strategic Guidance and budget, the JSF program perhaps
is looking at being restructured, which may include fewer
aircraft spread out over a longer timeframe. According to
Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, DOD will slow its
approach to full rate production of aircraft.
Do we have a projected timeline to complete the necessary
testing and implementation of developmental changes in order to
start buying the aircraft in higher quantities, and how is DOD
conveying this to the defense industrial base, which Senator
Collins was just talking about?
Secretary Panetta. We think it's extremely important to get
these fifth generation fighters out there as soon as we can.
Obviously, it's taken time. There's been a lot of testing.
They've had to readjust. The STOVL is the best example of that.
There were five areas that were identified that put it on
probation. They dealt with all five areas. It's tested well.
Now, we're basically into software testing right now, and one
of the reasons we wanted to slow it is to make sure that we
knew what the problems were and we could get ahead of it,
rather than go ahead producing these things and costing even
more if we're catching up with some of the problems.
So we think we've set the right timeframe. I think our hope
is that by, what, 2017, we'll begin to produce these planes?
Mr. Hale. We're buying them now, some tests. But they will
be operational aircraft as well. We've just slowed the ramp, so
we don't buy so many and then have to fix them later, which is
very expensive. So we're buying them now. We'll buy 29 aircraft
in fiscal year 2013, and I don't have in my head the number in
2017, but it will be substantially higher than that. We've just
slowed down the ramp.
Senator Hagan. My time for questions is over, but I did
want to emphasize that I think it's critically important that
DOD continue to invest in S&T programs and the research and
development initiatives. These are the seeds that we need to
plant and nurture in order to ensure that our military remains
the best and most technologically advanced in the world,
especially when dealing with the emerging threats. I just don't
think we can emphasize enough the need for research and
development.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. You have my respect
and admiration.
You also have a very difficult job, which we've talked a
little about. But let me just start with a quote from the DNI,
James Clapper, who 2 weeks ago said: ``Never has there been in
my almost 49-year career in intelligence a more complex and
interdependent array of challenges than we face today.
Capabilities, technologies, know-how, communications, and
environmental forces aren't confined by borders and can trigger
transnational disruptions with astonishing speed, as we have
seen.''
I doubt you would disagree with his comments. I don't know
anybody who would.
But the challenge we're all struggling with--and Senator
Lieberman, among others, has expressed this--is our heartfelt
desire to have the mission determine the budget and not the
budget the mission. You are, of course, constrained by law that
Congress passes and that the President signs, so we realize
that this is our responsibility. Your responsibility is to try
to minimize risks and to maximize our national security, given
the money appropriated by Congress.
I appreciate, General Dempsey, your talking about looking
beyond the budget window to long-term risk. But let me talk
about a near-term risk and something that's already been
alluded to here. That is, Secretary Panetta, you and others,
have made statements that there are certain red lines with
regard to Iran--such as blockading the Straits of Hormuz,
building a nuclear weapon. Iran is important to us, it's
important to the region, but it's an existential threat to
Israel, our ally. I don't believe they're going to wait on
anyone else in determining what determines their right to
continue to exist and their people's security.
Of course, Iran's already been killing Americans in
Afghanistan and Iraq in a low-grade war against the United
States and other NATO allies. But if Iran is hit by Israel,
what sort of retaliation would you anticipate against not only
Israel, but other countries in the region and American
personnel in the Middle East?
Secretary Panetta. The General suggests that we ought to
look at a closed session to really address all the implications
of what that may or may not mean. Obviously, we're very
concerned about it. We're looking at all of the implications
and consequences that could result. But it really involves
intelligence and we should do that in closed session.
Senator Cornyn. I respect your judgment on that, Secretary
Panetta and General Dempsey, and I look forward to further
briefings on that.
But it strikes me that, we're not saying we're cashing the
peace dividend, but we are certainly making disproportionate
cuts to DOD and our national security expenditures. My view is
that this is the number one responsibility the Federal
Government has--a lot of other things that we do, we could put
off or do without. But this is it; this is the most important
thing that the Federal Government does. There are very real,
not long-term but near-term, potentialities that could embroil
not only the United States, but the Middle East and our allies,
in a full-fledged war that would have dire economic
consequences to our country and obviously to our allies. More
than economic, also matters of life and death and existence.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, without getting into the
particulars, let me just assure you that we have very strong
capabilities in place to deal with any circumstances that could
develop in that region. We feel fully prepared for whatever
might take place.
Senator Cornyn. I'm confident you've done everything that
you know how to do to prepare and our military and DOD has as
well. It will not be without cost. It will not be without
casualties. It will not be without serious consequences, is my
only point.
So it troubles me, at a time when our national security
apparatus is asked to do more with less, in a world that's
getting more dangerous, not less dangerous, that we have a
budget that unfortunately engages in--I guess the most
charitable words I can use is ``phantom savings''--phantom
savings. Some might call it budgetary gimmicks and the like.
For example, the so-called trillion dollars in savings from
a drawdown in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that are not
currently planned, which have been funded by borrowed money in
the past 10 years, and which really represent--here's one
headline in the National Journal, it says: ``Pentagon budget
revives war spending voodoo.'' Like I said, I think ``phantom
savings'' is the most charitable thing I've seen.
It just strikes me as extraordinarily dangerous at a time
when the risk is deadly serious to have a budget proposal which
makes a trillion dollars in savings on expenditures that we
never anticipated spending in the first place. At the same
time, I will grant you, we don't know what the risks will be in
the future.
Let me close on this item. It's a little more concrete. It
appears from my reading of the budget that there is a decrease
of about 50 percent in the budget for training and equipping of
Afghan security forces from 2012 to 2013.
I'd like first, a confirmation that my reading is correct;
and second--Mr. Hale is nodding that it's correct, so I will
just ask you, if our withdrawal from Afghanistan is conditioned
on the ability of the Afghans to defend themselves and maintain
stability there, how is a cutting of the budget by 50 percent
from 2012 to 2013 consistent with that?
General Dempsey. I'll take that one, Senator. The ANSF fund
was front-loaded when we had to develop a lot of their
infrastructure. We front-loaded the purchase of a lot of their
equipment. What you're seeing in this budget is that most of
the capital investments, in our terms, have been made in the
previous years.
So the reduction is a reflection that we have what we need,
and most of the fund now is for replenishment and training and
operations. But the simple answer to your question is we front-
loaded the investments, the capital investments.
Senator Cornyn. In terms of size of the force and
capability, do you see that getting larger or maintaining the
status quo?
General Dempsey. We are committed to building the Afghan
security forces out to 352,000, 195,000 of which is the army.
That will be completed here within the next 90 to 120 days. We
have not yet decided how long we'll keep it at that size, but
that's a question we're looking at as we determine how to get
from here to 2014 and deliver the Lisbon objectives.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Secretary Panetta. I might just add, Senator, to follow up
on that, one of the things that was important in 2011 was that
not only were we able to reduce the level of violence and
weaken the Taliban, but one of the important things that took
place is that the Afghan army really stepped up and started
taking over real responsibility in terms of security.
In the areas that we've transitioned so far--and we're in
the second tranche of those transitions--the Afghan army is
doing a very good job at taking over security. We just have to
make sure we continue to train them, we continue to make them
capable to be able to take that responsibility.
General Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, could I respond?
Chairman Levin. If you can do it quickly.
General Dempsey. I will, very quickly.
Chairman Levin. Very quickly.
General Dempsey. That National Journal article, I don't
ascribe to its conclusions because I've been so involved in the
process. Some of the changes we made definitely will have an
effect on our base budget. Some of those effects will be
mitigated in the near-term by OCO. That's what he's talking
about, that we've papered over the problem. But I don't accept
that.
The Army in particular has 10,000 to 12,000 non-deployable
soldiers directly resulting from the repeated deployments, and
we're going to pay that bill out of OCO because it is related
to OCO.
Senator Cornyn. We don't know what sort of unexpected
challenges and threats our country will face in the future, is
my point.
General Dempsey. We do not, sir, and I accept that. But
that's what contingency funds are for.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Gillibrand, to be followed by, according to my
list, Senator Shaheen, Senator Blumenthal, Senator Manchin.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General Dempsey. I
appreciate your service. Thank you, Mr. Comptroller, as well.
I understand you touched earlier today on the value of the
Guard and Reserves and how important their service has been,
serving shoulder to shoulder in both Afghanistan and Iraq. With
regard to your Air Force restructuring strategy, about half the
cuts have come out of the Guard, even though they only
represented about a third of the costs. I believe the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did a report talking about
managing budget issues, and actually made the point that Guard
and Reserves provide capabilities at a lower cost than would be
the case were the Nation to rely solely on full-time forces.
So I have a concern about the decisionmaking with regard to
the Air National Guard, and specifically because of the assets
that New York has. Obviously, we all have specific assets and
strategies and resources in our States that we think are
particularly important for our national security. But one thing
that a lot of our bases and assets have is this National Guard
and Reserve component that has been so effective in both Iraq
and Afghanistan.
So I would like to urge you to look at that restructuring
to see if there are cost savings by maintaining particularly
Air Force National Guard and Reserve components as they are,
whether it's Zebruski or whether it's in Niagara. Those are
important aspects.
The second issue that I want to highlight with regard to
New York specifically is the cyber mission that we do. We do
such an important mission for cyber security and cyber defense
in Rome, Rome Labs, that has been vital, I think, in being at
the cutting edge of both technology and research and
development.
One thing that I want to bring your attention to is what
makes New York so good at doing some of this is the public-
private partnerships that have developed with the private
sector. A lot of the DOD contracts are being done by private
developers, researchers, scientists, that have developed as a
hub in all these areas across New York. We have the nanotech
center in Albany, we have Rome Labs, we have throughout western
New York a lot of research and development that will very much
complement the work that the military is doing.
I understand that there will be interest in consolidations
and cutting, but you will lose that synergy, that effort
towards collaboration and clustering that is so important in
the high tech sector, and I don't want you to underestimate how
valuable that is for the military.
Then last, just to speak to these particular assets in New
York, we are 100 percent staffed. We have no environmental
issues. We have a workforce and communities that are so
dedicated to the mission that the armed services have placed on
these men and women, that you will lose some of that enormous
benefit to the extent you have to consolidate or restructure.
We would love to gain missions, particularly with the
National Guard and Reserve training, with unmanned aircraft and
with cyber. So I wanted to just give you that background.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, there are just a couple of
things and then I'll yield to the General. First of all, on
cyber, we are making increased investments there of about $3.4
billion and even more in the out-years, because we think cyber
is extremely important. So obviously partnering with the
private sector is extremely important, and being able to
develop the technological capability that we're going to need
to have for the future, so I think that's important to
remember.
Second, with regards to the Air Reserve, I understand the
concerns. The Air Force made the decisions. Some of these
planes in the past have come out of the Active-Duty Force and
that's one of the reasons they tried to look at where some of
the reductions could be made based on the age of these planes,
as well as their capabilities. But they are trying to do
whatever they can to mitigate against those impacts, because
again we do need to depend on the Reserves to be there. They've
responded in dramatic fashion over these last few years every
time we've called upon them to come forward and take their
place alongside other fighting men and women in the
battlefield, and they've done a great job.
We want to be able to maintain that for the future. But
that was the reason some of these cuts were made in those
areas.
General Dempsey. The only thing I'd add, you mentioned
cyber and I want to mention for the record that we strongly
support the Lieberman-Collins-Rockefeller legislation, to get
us in the proper place in dealing with the cyber threat, which
is significant and growing, as well as the Senator Feinstein
amendment to that legislation. So I'd like to say that.
Then I'd also say, I'm one of your constituents and how
about them Giants? [Laughter.]
Senator Gillibrand. Go Giants! [Laughter.]
Thank you all for your service.
I wanted to make sure that there's nothing else that you
need in the cyber bill as well, that you have reviewed it, and
that it is providing the assets and resources that you need to
enhance your mission.
Secretary Panetta. I think the General is correct, that the
bill that I know is being put together by Senator Lieberman and
others reflects all of the issues that we think are important
to address. So we'll continue to work, however, with the Senate
and with Congress to make sure that if a bill does emerge it
addresses our concerns about trying to make this country better
prepared to deal with the cyber issues that are growing every
day.
Senator Gillibrand. I would request that you look at the
legislation with an eye towards making sure you have all the
authorities that you need to support this growing mission, and
also the resources necessary to do adequate recruitment,
because obviously we want the strongest pipeline for cyber
defense that we could create and the flexibility to bring in
the talent that you're looking for. We want to make sure that,
whether it's civilian talent or through the normal course, we
want to make sure you have the flexibility and ability to
recruit, train, and keep the best and brightest to do that.
Last, if I have time, Mr. Chairman, it's a very separate
issue, but one I feel very strongly about, that I would like
your commitment. I've heard you already speak to the issue of
sexual assault in the military and the ability of the military
to respond effectively to those concerns, to allegations, and
to making sure we have the best fighting force we can have.
That means that we create the right protocols and the right
ability for women to be able to report such incidents and to be
heard on those issues.
I'd like your comments, your views on that, and I would
like to work with each of you on developing stronger
protections for our women who are serving.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, we look forward to working with
you on this issue.
You've provided great leadership on this issue, and it's an
area that concerns me greatly, that the incidents of sexual
assault have grown. Frankly, my concern is that we have to be
able to take action in these situations.
I announced a series of steps to try to improve our
response to sexual assault. One of the most important things is
to make sure that the command structure responds to these
situations, because the longer they take to respond, it
inhibits the ability to bring a case, and that's what has hurt
us in being able to move aggressively in most of these cases.
So we need to do a broad education effort to make sure that
the command structure understands how important it is to
respond in these situations. We also need a legislative package
and I would like to work with you in trying to address the
legislative needs that we're going to need in order to really
be able to get this problem in control.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and Mr.
Hale, for your commitment and your stamina. We appreciate it.
I want to begin actually where you began, Mr. Secretary,
that Congress must do everything possible to avoid
sequestration, because I certainly agree with that. I share the
concerns we've heard expressed from my colleagues. I'm not
going to ask you to respond to this, but I would certainly hope
that we in Congress would do what you have been willing to do,
and that is to put everything on the table and put aside our
posturing and come to some agreement that addresses the long-
term debt and deficits of this country.
It is inexcusable that we are in this position now with you
and all of the men and women who are serving in defense and in
our military and across the Federal Government not knowing what
we're going to do because we have been unable to act.
So I would like to start with where Senator Gillibrand left
off, and that is with the Guard and Reserve. I was very
pleased, Mr. Secretary, to see in your statement that you
talked about continuing a National Guard that is equipped and
ready. I know that the decision to transition our Guard and
Reserve units from a strategic reserve to an operational
reserve required a significant investment and a change in
strategy.
So, General Dempsey, I wonder if you could speak to the
original rationale for that transition?
General Dempsey. I think it's important to roll back the
tapes, maybe all the way back to 1973, when, coming out of the
Vietnam war, there were no Joint Chiefs at the time, but the
Service Chiefs all realized that one of the problems we had
during that conflict was we really never got the American
people involved because it was borne on the back of the Active
component, with very little reliance upon the Guard and
Reserve.
So we built a structure that not only allows for the
utilization of the Guard and Reserve, but it makes it
absolutely necessary. So the question is not will we use the
Guard and Reserve, because fully a third of the capabilities
necessary at any given time to do anything reside in the Guard
and Reserve.
So we are committed to it. What we've found in this
conflict as we went forward, we relearned a lot of those
lessons. We made some pretty significant investments and the
Guard and Reserve and the Active component have never been
closer.
Now, as we go forward, of course, and as the demand goes
down, that's going to put some--and the budget goes down--
strain on that relationship. You've seen some of that already.
But I can tell you that each Service has a plan in terms of
the rotational readiness of its formations, that they will
include the Guard and Reserve in that rotation. So the entire
Guard will never be operational, any more than the entire
Active component is always operational. But I think you can
feel secure in the knowledge that we understand and will work
toward this goal in a rotational readiness cycle.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. As we look forward this
year, I know that the Air Force is going to be making some
initial decisions on where to base the new KC-46 tankers, and I
would hope that the Air Force and DOD will take a look and
ensure that at least some of those aircraft are based at Guard
bases around the country. I have one particular in mind, but
I'll let you draw your own conclusions.
But can I ask you, is there a commitment on the part of DOD
to base some of those new tankers at Guard facilities?
Secretary Panetta. I think the Air Force is looking at a
whole set of options in order to make sure that we mitigate
whatever cuts have been made and make use of the facilities
that are out there with the National Guard and Reserve. I can
assure you that they'll be in consideration.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense will make use of the National Guard and
Reserve facilities, consistent with operational needs. Regarding where
to base the KC-46 tankers, I will reiterate that these facilities will
be in consideration.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I would also like to go back to BRAC, which a number of my
colleagues have addressed, and I share many of the concerns
that have been expressed. I know, Secretary Panetta, that
you've said you've seen just about every side of the BRAC
process. Can you commit to providing us with a comprehensive
assessment of the savings from the 2005 round, and I assume if
you're looking at 2013 and 2015, that you also have estimates
of savings in those two rounds, and that we would also see
those as we're looking at a decision about what to do about the
next BRAC round?
Secretary Panetta. I'll be happy to give you what
information we have with regards to the past BRAC rounds, and
obviously some ideas about what we would do in terms of future
rounds.
As I said, I've been through the process. Frankly, I don't
wish the process on anybody, having been through it, because it
is tough. 25 percent of my local economy was hit by virtue of a
BRAC closure. But we did use it as an opportunity to develop a
college-university campus there and it's proved very successful
as a reuse.
I think the issue is it did cost a lot more than anybody
anticipated, but the fact is, we are achieving in the long-run
significant savings as a result of that. That's number one.
Number two, I don't know of any other way to deal with the kind
of infrastructure savings we have to achieve here as a result
of reducing the force without going through that kind of
process. That's the problem I have. It's the most effective way
of trying to address that issue.
Senator Shaheen. Certainly in New Hampshire we've seen both
sides of the issue, because Pease Air Force Base was the first
base closed in the country. Fortunately, it's doing very well
now. The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which is on the border
between New Hampshire and Maine, was actually removed from the
last round by the commission because of their effectiveness.
One concern I have as we look going forward, particularly
with respect to our public shipyards, is that there's a real
backlog of projects that need to be done at those shipyards.
Obviously, the Portsmouth shipyard is not alone in that. They
have been producing, I think, very well despite that backlog.
They just delivered the USS San Juan attack submarine 8 days
ahead of schedule, despite some of the challenges with that.
Senator Collins and Senator Ayotte and I had a
modernization in last year's defense authorization bill that
asks DOD to produce a shipyard modernization plan to address
these shortfalls. I hope that DOD will take that very seriously
and produce that, because as we're looking at our security
going forward, those public shipyards are a critical part of
that.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, as I stated before and I'll say
again, we absolutely have to maintain the industrial base we
have, and the shipyards in your area, the other shipyards we
deal with, are extremely important to our ability to respond to
the needs that we have. So we're going to do everything
possible to work with you, not only to increase, obviously, the
competitive nature of trying to achieve savings, but also to
try to do what we can to provide those upgrades.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
A final question. Secretary Panetta, one of the concerns
that we've heard in a number of reports over recent years has
been the challenge of attracting people with the backgrounds
that we're going to need, with science, technology,
engineering, and math subjects, to be able to continue to do
the jobs that are critical to our defense establishment. I
wonder if either you or General Dempsey could address what
strategy we have for trying to attract those young
professionals when the private sector is offering them so many
more attractive monetary rewards.
Secretary Panetta. Initially I shared the same concern. I
know when I went out to the National Security Agency and when I
look at the people that are involved in that area, not only at
my past agency, but other agencies as well, I have to tell you
we are attracting some very bright, capable, young people to
those jobs. They're very interested, they're very capable, and
with the investment we're making in cyber, I'm absolutely
convinced we're going to be able to attract the talent to be
able to make that work.
Senator Shaheen. I think our challenge as a Nation is to
get enough young people engaged in those subjects, so we're
training the people we need.
General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. I think the Service Chiefs will have a
view on this as well, and it's actually exacerbated by the fact
that--and I think you and I have actually had this
conversation--only about one out of every four American young
men and women can qualify to get into the military, either
based on education or physical issues or issues of making
really stupid Facebook posts in their youth or something.
So we are all competing, as you say, academia, corporate
America, and the military, for the same 25 percent of the
population. So the answer has to be to get after education in
this country as well, it seems to me.
Senator Shaheen. I totally agree.
General Dempsey, I was very disappointed to hear you
mention the Giants. You're fortunate that all the other New
England members of this committee have gone. [Laughter.]
General Dempsey. My condolences, ma'am. [Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Just in fairness, General Dempsey, and
as a New Englander, I interpreted your remark more as an
expression of battlefield admiration than an endorsement. So I
think you're still on fair ground. [Laughter.]
I want to thank all of you for your extraordinarily
effective and persuasive explanation of the President's budget
and thank you for your patience in answering our questions so
effectively.
I want to begin with a subject that the President certainly
emphasized, which is undersea warfare capability, and note the
slipping, postponing, delaying, whatever the correct term is,
of a submarine construction, one submarine from 2014 to 2018. I
have heard from Electric Boat and indeed within the Navy about
the cost savings that can be realized if we stay on schedule
and build two submarines every year. I wonder if there is a
possibility for considering and perhaps your hearing our views
on that issue, Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. This is all about, obviously, having to
reduce the budget by half a trillion dollars. We have to look
really closely at affordability and cost efficiencies. If
anybody comes forward with a better idea as to how to save
money, I'm more than open to listen to it.
Senator Blumenthal. I think we may come forward if you'd be
willing to consider it.
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate it.
Let me go to what you have really very convincingly said is
the military's greatest asset, which is its people, and you've
been discussing it very movingly and inspiringly, most recently
to Senator Shaheen, talking about keeping faith and providing
many of the men and women, our warfighters who are going to be
coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan, with jobs and transition
assistance, which has been expanded under the most recent
legislation on veterans to be approved by this Congress, an
amendment that I offered in a separate bill.
I want to focus on what can be done to aid those veterans
before they leave the service to more effectively transition
into civilian employment, because as they come back if they
enter the Guard or Reserve, to have an unemployment rate which
is vastly higher, that is, right now in Connecticut, double the
general rate in Connecticut, 15.5 percent as compared to 8.2
percent, will simply be a profound deterrent to anyone going
into the Armed Forces. If that is going to be the kind of
hurdle they face coming out of the service, it will defeat your
best efforts to recruit the brightest and most capable.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, this is a problem that I worry
about a great deal. Frankly, it's one of the risks involved as
we reduce the budget by this level, is how to ensure that we
take care of those that are returning. We already have a
backlog and we're going to be pumping anywhere from 12,000 to
14,000 a year as we go through these drawdowns.
I think it is extremely important that we be able to
provide the services as these men and women come back to really
be able to counsel them, to gather them, to make sure they're
aware of the job opportunities, to make sure they're aware of
the education opportunities, to make sure they're aware of the
funds that are available to help them transition, to make sure
that their families are cared for as well, as we make that
transition.
This has to be a package approach. Each Service now does it
in their own way. They do it pretty effectively. But I think we
have to make very clear that nobody should fall through the
cracks.
Senator Blumenthal. I know the Marine Corps has been doing
it more effectively. I've talked to General Amos about----
Secretary Panetta. They do a great job.
Senator Blumenthal.--his very, very effective work. I
wonder if--and you may already be doing it--there's some
servicewide approach building on the best models and best
practices, would be appropriate.
Secretary Panetta. We are looking at that.
General Dempsey. If I could add, Senator, there are more
initiatives on this issue than we possibly have time to
discuss. As the Secretary mentioned earlier, we're trying to
team ever more closely with the VA to do this. We're starting
to take a view that transition begins when you enter a Service,
not in the last 6 weeks before you leave it.
But the other thing I want to mention here is some of this
can be legislated, some of this can be made a matter of policy,
but this is one of those issues that will be best solved from
the bottom up when corporate America reaches out to embrace the
returning veterans.
By the way, a lot of them are. I can't tell you how many
times I'll go to some conference or something and someone will
tell me that they have a new initiative to hire 10,000
veterans. So I think it's a matter of merging what can be done
at the governmental level, but also what needs to be done at
the grassroots level to help this out.
Senator Blumenthal. I would agree with you, General
Dempsey, that corporate America is stepping forward more often
and more effectively. But I don't believe I'm telling you
anything you haven't heard before in saying that there's still
a lot of employers who look at somebody who's in the National
Guard or the Reserves and who say, not explicitly, but think to
themselves: This person's going to be gone for a year or more
if he or she is deployed, and better to hire someone I know I
can count on to be on the job without interruption.
That is discrimination. It's illegal if it can be proved,
but it has to be surmounted as a matter of practice implicit in
some of the employers. I believe that we need more effective
measures for enforcement to counter that approach, because it
will undermine your best efforts, which I admire, to attract
the best and most capable to the Guard and the Reserve.
So I'm not asking for your comment, but I hope that perhaps
we can work together on the initiatives that we don't have time
to discuss here.
Just one last question. The IEDs that all too often are
maiming and killing our warfighters, I wonder whether there are
new initiatives there that perhaps we can discuss, if not here,
at some other point, because I've been interested in it and
appreciated Secretary Carter's very important work in
accelerating delivery of the so-called biker shorts and the
groin protective gear, and also the work that I hope is being
done to discourage the Pakistanis from permitting the
fertilizer and ammonium calcium nitrate from crossing the
border and going into these roadside bombs.
Secretary Panetta. Yes, Senator. I know that your time is
short on this round, but I'd just assure you that we are seized
with this. Our relations with Pakistan have been somewhat
challenged. They're improving, and this is one of the points of
friction between us that we have to get at.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much and I appreciate
your answers to my questions. I want to associate myself with
the remarks made by Senator Gillibrand and your remarks about
the problem of sexual assault within the military, but also the
issue of suicides, which we will not have time to discuss
today, perhaps I can follow up with you on.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. First of all, I want to commend the three
of you for your endurance. I know you've been through this
before, and a lot of the questions have probably been touched
on that I wanted to ask, but I wanted to go over a few things,
if I may.
First of all, the most defining moment in my short Senate
career was when Admiral Mullen sat there and the question was
asked to him, ``what's the greatest threat the United States of
America faces?'' I thought I would hear some type of a military
response, whether it was al Qaeda, whether it was North Africa,
or China building up their military. He didn't even hardly
hesitate. He came right back and said that ``the deficit and
debt of this Nation is the greatest security risk.'' I know you
all realize that and take it serious, too, and I know we've
talked about it, Mr. Secretary.
I'm looking everywhere I can to cross over the aisle in a
bipartisan way to find out how we can make this financial, the
wherewithals that we have financially, but also get our
financial house in order. I know that we talked about cutting
back, and everybody--I don't know of anybody in here, Democrat
or Republican, that does not support a strong military.
But everybody's afraid of the political ramification if
they say one thing. I can only say this to you, that with the
growth of the contractors in the military--when I looked at
just the period of time, maybe 10 years, and the support of
contractors--and I'm not talking about the manufacturing base
of contracting, and I wanted to maybe mention, if you would, as
I get done with this question, about Buy America and how we can
do more in America to make sure that we are supporting the
manufacturing base.
But with that being said, in a simplistic way I believe
that we could strengthen the military or men and women in
uniform by reducing the contractors who are doing the same. I
hear an awful lot of them that tell me that. I see them in the
airports, and I ask every one of them that are private
contractors that are going back to Afghanistan, and I stop and
I talk to them. I introduce myself. Were most of you previous
military? Yes. Would you have stayed in the military if not for
the large paychecks that you might be able to get from the
contractors? Yes, we would have if this option wasn't there.
So I can't figure this one out. Then it'll dovetail into
the whole thing I'm going to talk to, which I know everybody's
talked about, how do we best use our National Guard? We're all
extremely proud, but I can give you examples of how we say--but
first of all, the purpose of contracting. Can't we cut the
amount of contractors that we have that are doing the same jobs
as military without facing political ramifications of you're
cutting the military? I'm not going to vote to cut the
military, but I will cut the contractors, sir.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, this is an area that we're
paying attention to in the efficiencies that we're looking at,
which are going to be about $60 billion. This is one of the
areas that we are looking at, contract services, number of
contracts that are provided, in order to determine where we can
achieve savings.
Any ideas you have, recommendations along these lines,
we're more than happy to listen to. This is a big job, going
after $487 billion in savings. So I'm willing to look at any
area necessary.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Secretary, there was a report--I want
to make sure of this--that $12 million a day for the past 10
years in Iraq and Afghanistan has been wasted, misspent,
whatever, by contractors. I think that report was given to you,
too. So there's many areas.
But I'm just saying, wherever a uniformed person can do it,
why--I know we're cutting 100,000 troops. That concerns me. If
anything, I'd rather cut 200,000 contractors and keep the
100,000 uniforms and use the support of our National Guard.
I will say this, that they touched on the veterans, all of
us. To me, in the private sector you do the best job of
providing the training for a military person, their discipline,
their ability to come out and they can do it. Why is our
unemployment so high, and what are we doing wrong? We started a
caucus, I started it with Senator Kirk, and it's ``Hire a
Vet.'' I have two vets in my office and we're looking for more
good vets. We always do.
How do we do this to prepare to get them back in? I know
that the Senator from New York touched on that quickly.
Secretary Panetta. I think, and I'll let the General expand
upon this, but we really are--look, part of the problem is the
economy, the overall economy. These kids are coming back and
they go back home, and most of these local economies are having
tough economic times, and you suddenly pour some of these young
men and women back into their communities and there aren't jobs
for the people that are there, much less for these young people
that are coming back.
Having said that, we really have had some impressive
efforts by the private sector because of the reasons you
suggested. These are kids who are disciplined. They usually
have a capability and a talent that is extraordinary that can
be used. Most of the private sector people I talk to really
want to have these kinds of individuals as part of their
workforce.
More and more of these individuals are now coming forward.
We've set up a web site where we list the jobs that are
available in the private sector. More of these private sector
individuals are committing themselves to hire our vets as they
come back. So there is an important effort going forward, but a
lot of it obviously depends on an economy that has to recover
as well.
Senator Manchin. I think, first of all, I want to commend
all of you for working with our office so close on this new
caucus. As I just previously mentioned, we just started it,
``Hire a Vet.'' We would like to even expand on that with you.
If we would know who's cycling out and what skill sets, so we
could network better, we think there's ways that we could
improve on this and work together. So I appreciate that and
we'll be very close.
General Dempsey, my final question would be to you. I
talked about the National Guard. In West Virginia we've been
very blessed by having a highly rated National Guard, one of
the best in the Nation. A lot of people get a lot of good
training, and I'm so proud of them. We saved DOD $27 million
this year alone. If these small town facilities were fully
tasked, we could do that, we think DOD could save $250 million
a year.
We're talking about things that basically is refurbishing
generators, the Humvees, tents, tire assemblies, these are
things that we have been able to do at tremendous cost savings.
I'm sure other Guards are doing them also. Is there a way that
we can network more of that to use our Guard? We've proven that
the savings in just a couple of our little facilities were
quite substantial. I don't know how we can expand on that.
General Dempsey. I don't either, sitting here today with
you, Senator. But certainly we all, to include the Service
Chiefs, who really are the leaders of their particular Guard--
you're going to have General--I'm not throwing him under the
bus here, but you're going to have General Odierno here later
in the week, and I think he would be eager to understand that
and see if we can take advantage of it.
Clearly, anything we can do to in-source, and I mean
Active, Guard, and Reserve--is effort well spent.
Senator Manchin. Yes. The other thing, it gives the
training to the person we're trying to cycle back into the
private sector, so it has a twofold purpose.
I think you all realize the sensitivity of what we're
dealing with here, trying to make sure that we give you what is
needed to keep this safe and free. On the other hand, the
responsibility, when General Mullen said our greatest threat is
basically our own finances, so we're taking all that serious.
We need your help, and we think contracting--if we can downsize
the contracting, reinforce the military and people in uniform,
I think you'll have us all on both sides. You might be able to
bridge the gap that we can't bridge.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, if I could just comment. Look,
I think DOD has stepped up to the plate. What we've proposed
here is real, it's well thought out. We've done a strategy to
back up our decisions, and all of that's contained in our
recommendations.
But I really would urge you and others to engage in the
broader discussion that has to take place with regards to how
we reduce the deficit. That has to include a number of areas
that, unfortunately, have not been on the table, that have to
be on the table if we're ever going to confront the debt crisis
that faces this country. This can't just fall on the backs of
defense. Other areas have to be considered if we're going to be
able to effectively reduce the deficit.
Senator Manchin. There's a group of us in a bipartisan
effort that are looking at ways that--and we know it takes
everything, getting the money that we're not receiving now that
should be paid in revenues, and also make sure we get fraud,
waste, and abuse, and run more efficiently. So I think you're
going to find quite a few of us on both sides willing to meet
with you, sir.
Thank you so much. I appreciate all your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin. As I mentioned
before, I hope all of us will take a look at the proposals in
the budget in front of us to raise an additional $3 trillion
for deficit reduction. It's in the budget that came in
yesterday, but it seems a lot of us are unaware of that. Half
of that is revenue increases. Upper income tax increases,
restoring their bracket, the millionaires tax, a number of
other revenue measures, are in this request. I was surprised by
so many of our colleagues here today talking about the need for
deficit reduction and the importance of avoiding
sequestration--which I think, by the way, is a bipartisan
goal--were unaware of the fact, because I don't think the
administration, frankly, has done a good job of focusing on
what's in their own budget in terms of deficit reduction. It
meets the $1.5 or $1.2 trillion goal.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, we've had this discussion
and we can raise the revenues without raising taxes, by closing
the loopholes----
Chairman Levin. Exactly right.
Senator Manchin.--changing our corporate laws, changing and
making sure there's a fairness. If the American people think
that we're putting fairness to the system, I'll guarantee you
they're behind us 1,000 percent.
Chairman Levin. They are. It's amazing, when you look at
public opinion polls they say that we have to include revenues
in deficit reduction. We can do it without raising taxes on
middle income Americans.
Senator Manchin. We can cut spending, too, sir.
Chairman Levin. We can cut spending, too. The balance in
this budget that has been given to us yesterday is about 50
percent additional cuts and about 50 percent additional
revenues. But frankly, I don't think the administration in its
rollout yesterday focused on the fact that this would avoid
sequestration. This budget, if we adopted it, avoids
sequestration. It does it because finally they're talking about
additional revenues.
Now, they've talked about it in the administration, but now
they've put it in their budget. We had Republican colleagues
today talking about avoiding sequestration, and when I pointed
out this budget that was given to us avoids sequestration
because there's additional revenues in it, what they were
saying is, well, they hope they can vote on it. Well, my answer
to that is we also ought to have a Republican alternative, if
there is one, so we can see exactly what the options are in
that regard.
So we've had silence on the revenue side from our
Republican colleagues, and it's that silence which needs to be
corrected by the administration, frankly. I would hope that
there would be greater focus on what's in the budget relative
to the revenues which will help us avoid sequestration. We all
want to avoid sequestration.
I think that you are interested in having a bite to eat. We
thank you very, very much, and we thank your staffs.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

NONSTANDARD EQUIPMENT

1. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has acquired millions of dollars in
tactical nonstandard equipment to address the evolving threat in
Afghanistan (and previously in Iraq), including the enemy's use of
improvised explosive devices (IED). To what extent are you considering
this nonstandard equipment purchased by Joint IED Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) and others to meet urgent warfighter needs as equipment that
should be added as standard equipment to unit requirements?
Secretary Panetta. DOD has established and utilized processes, such
as Army G-3 Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition and Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Transition, Transfer,
Terminate Process, to review and transfer equipment and capabilities
for service sustainment. A significant amount of equipment (e.g., body
armor, CREW, Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar, radios, et cetera)
is already transitioning to the Services and the standardized equipment
list. Supporting these efforts, DOD is conducting two separate but
related studies to identify and review counter-improvised explosive
capabilities, including nonstandard equipment that are appropriate to
sustain. The studies will also serve to identify a plan to transition
the necessary capabilities funded by overseas contingency operations
(OCO) to programs of record. These ongoing studies will inform DOD's
development of the President's budget for fiscal year 2014.
General Dempsey. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Joint Staff, and the JIEDDO work closely with the Services to identify
which of the nonstandard equipment purchased to meet urgent warfighter
needs should be added as standard equipment. JIEDDO assists in the
process by conducting monthly meetings with the Services and Joint
Staff to identify if a JIEDDO-funded program should be transitioned,
transferred, or terminated based on Service and Joint Staff
requirements. This year-long process culminates in direction to the
Services from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to assume responsibility
for JIEDDO initiatives identified for transfer or transition.

2. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent has DOD identified future maintenance and other sustainment
costs for these items that will have to be funded in future base
budgets?
Secretary Panetta. The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
Under Secretary (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer to study enduring
activities funded through the OCO portion of DOD's budget. This study,
co-led by the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, is in
process. The study is to inform DOD's decisions regarding, among other
items, the approach to fund enduring equipment needs.
General Dempsey. The Deputy Secretary of Defense directs the
Services to assume responsibility for JIEDDO funded programs and
equipment in one of two categories: transferred or transitioned. A
transferred program is a proven counter-improvised explosive device (C-
IED) capability that is not assessed to be an enduring capability for
the Joint Force, but one that requires sustainment for the current
conflict. Maintenance and sustainment costs are shifted from JIEDDO to
the appropriate Service to be funded using OCO funds. A transitioned
program is assessed as an enduring capability for the Joint Force and
ownership, management, funding, and future development becomes a base
capability of the appropriate Service and is requested in the
President's budget.
As part of a larger effort by the DOD, the Joint Staff has
initiated a review of the C-IED portfolio to identify enduring
requirements. This review will be used to inform Services as they
prepare future budgets in the context of DOD's new Defense Strategic
Guidance.

3. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what are
the plans for placing these estimated requirements into the Services'
budgets for fiscal year 2013 and beyond?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The Joint Staff, Services,
and JIEDDO are conducting a comprehensive C-IED portfolio review to
determine which of the nonstandard equipment programs established by
JIEDDO are enduring and should become Programs of Record. This review
will inform the Services as they incorporate C-IED capabilities into
their respective budgets for fiscal year 2014 and beyond.

AFGHANISTAN DISTRIBUTION CHALLENGES

4. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in a 2011
report to Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that although U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has established
some processes for oversight, it does not have full oversight of the
distribution of supplies and equipment to the warfighter in
Afghanistan. In addition, DOD has taken some steps to mitigate
challenges in distributing materiel to forces operating in Afghanistan,
however DOD continues to face challenges in distributing materiel to
forces operating in Afghanistan including: (1) a lack of adequate
radio-frequency identification information to track all cargo
movements; (2) no common operating picture for distribution data and
integrated transportation systems; (3) complex customs clearance
processes in Afghanistan and Pakistan that delay shipments; (4) limited
information on incidents of pilferage and damage of cargo; and (5)
ineffective tracking and management of cargo containers. To what extent
has DOD assessed the impact of supply challenges on unit and equipment
readiness?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. While DOD acknowledges that
challenges remain in the distribution of supplies and equipment, these
challenges have not led to any degradation with respect to supplies or
equipment readiness. As GAO's report indicates, DOD has made great
strides in improving distribution operations in Afghanistan. It is
important to note that GAO's audit occurred during the recent surge of
30,000 additional U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Remarkably, U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan was simultaneously able to increase ration stocks from 30
to more than 60 days and fuel stocks from 30 to 45 days of supply on
hand. This unprecedented growth reflects a robust supply network, not
hampered by delivery timelines. Further evidence of DOD's logistics
resiliency is demonstrated by the fact that in spite of our main supply
route (Pakistan road networks) being closed since November 26, 2011,
our flexible system has allowed us to actually increase on-hand stocks
and sustain our troops at a very high rate of readiness. DOD is
striving to ensure that we meet these distribution challenges in the
most timely, efficient, and effective manner in order to ensure the
best possible support to all of our U.S. Armed Forces personnel.

5. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent has DOD improved its visibility over equipment and supplies in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD is engaged in ongoing
efforts to improve visibility over equipment and supplies in
Afghanistan. Steps we have taken in the last 18 months include:

1. Leveraging the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
tags for tracking cargo and providing In Transit Visibility (ITV) and
Asset Visibility (AV). RFID remains the backbone of our tracking
capability.
2. Developed, refined, and fielded tools, such as the Integrated
Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence, Battle
Command Sustainment Support System-Nodal Management, and the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) Logistics Common Operating Picture, to
provide commanders down to the tactical level with a comprehensive ITV
picture.
3. TRANSCOM is developing a contractual means to implement the use
of commercial Active Tracking and Intrusion Detection (ATID) devices on
Pakistan and Afghanistan road networks. The ATID devices will provide
near-real-time tracking of containerized unit cargo and equipment
thereby improving ITV and AV on containerized shipments transiting to
and from Afghanistan via Pakistan.
4. Improved pre-deployment training on the proper methods for
preparing and installing RFID tags.
5. Developed procedures to identify non-compliance with RFID
policy/directives so that the responsible commanders can be notified
and corrective action initiated.

As a result of these steps, the visibility that we have over our
equipment and supplies in Afghanistan has improved.

6. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent has DOD developed a common operating picture to improve its
processes for tracking equipment and supplies in Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta. DOD has improved its capability to track
equipment and supplies by developing, refining, and fielding tools such
as CENTCOM's Logistics Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP), the BCS3-NM,
and other automated information technologies (i.e., RFID/Active
Tracking Intrusion Detection). These improved tools provide
comprehensive ITV of critical DOD assets to commanders and staffs at
all levels of command.
General Dempsey. We have reemphasized to commanders at all levels
the importance of maintaining visibility over equipment and supplies
transiting Afghanistan. We have improved their capability to track
equipment and supplies by developing, refining, and fielding tools such
as CENTCOM's LOGCOP and the BCS3-NM. These improved tools provide a
comprehensive ITV and AV picture to commanders and staffs at all levels
of command.

7. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent is DOD anticipating throughput challenges in Pakistan that would
limit DOD's ability to remove equipment from Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Although loss of access to
the Pakistan ground transportation routes has not adversely affected
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan to date, sole reliance on the
Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and air/multi-modal cargo
operations would affect DOD's ability to efficiently drawdown equipment
and significantly increase costs. Increased NDN usage would maximize
its capacity and, although cargo would continue to move, transit times
would increase. Reliance on the NDN and air/multi-modal movement also
places U.S. Forces and objectives in Afghanistan at significant risk
due to the uncertainties associated with the nations that U.S. cargo
transits. Politically, any one or a combination of countries that
comprises the NDN could halt or impede cargo movement for any reason.
The physically fragile critical infrastructure and weather-dependent
routing along the NDN can create chokepoints, causing congestion and
disruptions and further limiting NDN capacity. Finally, delays in
retrograde can create labor and space problems in terms of securing,
storing, and maintaining equipment in Afghanistan that would otherwise
move out of the theater. Multiple transit routes would provide DOD the
most flexibility and save money and time.

8. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent has DOD developed alternatives to the Pakistan routes to be able
to remove equipment from Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD began to move U.S. cargo
to Afghanistan on the NDN in 2009, with established routes utilizing
existing commercial infrastructure through Russia and the Baltic,
Caucasus, and Central Asian states. Current efforts to expand the NDN
include obtaining permission and agreements as necessary to conduct
reverse transit and movement of wheeled armored vehicles. The first
proofs of principle executing retrograde transit began in early 2012.
Additional multi-modal routes have been added to relieve pressure on
the ground distribution system and further increase the velocity of
cargo departing Afghanistan.

9. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
challenges remain in developing these alternatives?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Cost and operational
requirements to achieve retrograde velocity to support the projected
2014 drawdown timeline are key factors in considering the alternatives
to the Pakistan ground transportation routes (i.e., NDN and air/multi-
modal). The monthly overall transportation cost to distribute
sustainment cargo, redeploy combat forces, and retrograde materiel is
expected to increase by more than two-thirds due to the Pakistan ground
transportation routes closure. In addition to higher costs, the NDN's
operational drawbacks include longer transit times due to longer
distances and lower cargo velocity due to transit restrictions.

CHANGES IN EQUIPMENT RESET FUNDING

10. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, Congress
has aggressively supported DOD's equipment reset funding requests
throughout our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has recently
announced plans to reduce the Army and Marines Corps force structure by
100,000 troops. While the proposed budget does not specifically call
for any offsetting reduction in equipment reset funding, it would seem
logical that with a smaller force we might not have as large a
requirement to reset equipment. To what extent is it important to
maintain current funding level for the reset of equipment, despite the
planned reduction of 100,000 Army and Marine Corps troops?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The level of reset funding
is set by aligning the required Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTOE) to the programmed force structure and by the type and
condition of equipment returning from operations in a given year. As
the Services reduce Active Duty end strength by 103,000 personnel,
units will be identified for deactivation. The deactivated unit's MTOE
equipment will be redistributed throughout the Services. This should
reduce the number of items needed to be reset. However, if we fail to
fully fund the reset required for the programmed force structure, we
would face serious equipment shortfalls as current inventories are used
up, expended, damaged, or worn out, and not replaced and repaired in a
timely manner. These shortfalls would have a direct impact on unit
readiness levels.
Precise reset requirements are dependent on many variables,
including equipment condition upon return; we cannot predict exactly
what total reset costs will be at this point. However, we do know that
the high operating tempo and harsh environments of Afghanistan and Iraq
have a substantial deteriorating effect on equipment.

11. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, if DOD
believes it necessary to retain the same level of reset funding, what
is the rationale for this decision?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Precise reset requirements
are dependent on many variables, including equipment condition upon
return; we cannot predict exactly what total reset costs will be at
this point. However, we do know that the high operating tempo and harsh
environments of Afghanistan and Iraq have a substantial deteriorating
effect on equipment.
The level of reset funding is set by aligning the required MTOE to
the programmed force structure and by the type and condition of
equipment returning from operations in a given year. As the Services
reduce Active Duty end strength by 103,000 personnel, units will be
identified for deactivation. The deactivated unit's MTOE equipment will
be redistributed throughout the Services. This should reduce the number
of items needed to be reset. However, if we fail to fully fund the
reset required for the programmed force structure, we would face
serious equipment shortfalls as current inventories are used up,
expended, damaged, or worn out, and not replaced and repaired in a
timely manner. These shortfalls would have a direct impact on unit
readiness levels.

12. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, GAO has
previously reported that the Military Services tend to build their
reset budget requirements simply on the basis of the equipment it
anticipates will actually return to the United States in the next year,
rather prioritizing or targeting its reset requirements to address
equipment shortages or other needs. To what extent do you believe
opportunities exist to better focus the requirements for equipment
reset, so that reset dollars go farther to meet equipment shortages,
and better address our home stationed unit readiness rates?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. To better focus the
requirement for equipment reset, DOD considered the MTOE required for
the programmed force structure and the type and condition of equipment
returning from operations in a given year.
The Services also fully consider the future requirement for the
equipment before DOD makes the reset funding request. Equipment reset
is integrated with equipment modernization objectives, long-term
support, and strategic investment plans.

13. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
administration has called for renewed attention on the Pacific region
and the emerging threats there. To what extent do the reset
requirements in this budget recognize and take into account this shift
and perhaps the different numbers and types of equipment we should be
resetting to improve our readiness to address conflicts in that region?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD's budget request aligned
the programmed force structure to the new Defense Strategic Guidance,
which addresses the Pacific region focus. Reset requirements were then
aligned to MTOE requirements for that force structure and the type and
condition of equipment returning from operations in a given year, while
accounting for a wide spectrum of potential future challenges, many of
which are anticipated in the Pacific area of operations.

14. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, last year
Congress gave the Army $20 million to begin the competition process for
the Humvee capitalization effort known as the Medium Expanded Capacity
Vehicle program. However, DOD's fiscal year 2013 budget request plans
to terminate that program and commit to the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV) program with the Marine Corps. Without pushing the
merits of either program, to what extent do we need to lock into some
strategy on our future equipment needs to effectively plan and
economically budget to meet defense strategic equipping goals?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Given the current fiscal
environment, this was one of many situations where limited resources
drove the need to prioritize areas of overlapping capabilities. The
commitment to the JLTV was based on an analysis of alternatives and
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) deliberation, which
included consideration of the Medium Expanded Capacity Vehicle program
and other modernization options. The JROC reviewed tactical wheeled
vehicles from a holistic portfolio perspective to ensure that the
correct programs were being pursued to support the national strategy.

OVERALL READINESS

15. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, DOD's new
Defense Strategic Guidance, released in January 2012, as well as the
accompanying document, ``Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,'' make
a number of statements which have implications for the readiness of the
force. For example, the strategic guidance states that, ``it (the
guidance) is intended as a blueprint for the Joint Force that will help
guide decisions about force size and shape over subsequent program and
budget cycles.'' It also notes that, ``DOD will manage the force in
ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be
needed to meet future, unforeseen demands.'' What are the specific
capabilities that DOD believes it will be able to regenerate?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Since September 11, our
forces have developed many specialized skills and capabilities--
language and culture, rule of law, security force assistance. DOD
invested heavily in developing and expanding the supply of these skills
and intends to make sure that those investments aren't inadvertently
lost as we downsize. Also, the current and anticipated security
environment indicates that the demand for this mission set will persist
at some level, further emphasizing the need to ensure that ground force
capabilities developed over the last decade for counterinsurgency,
irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and security force assistance, and
partnership engagement remain viable.
The recent strategic review made clear that a smaller, ready, and
agile force is preferable to a larger force that is poorly trained and
ill-equipped. Therefore, we put a premium on retaining capabilities
that provide flexibility across a range of missions and that require a
long time to generate--in terms of training, equipping, et cetera.
Additionally, other specialized capabilities, often associated with
ground forces, stability operations, counterinsurgency (COIN), security
force assistance (SFA), building partnership capacity (BPC), et cetera,
and most gained over the last decade of conflict, must be carefully
managed. We may reduce our capacity in skill sets where we expect a
reduced demand and experience indicates retraining can occur quickly.
These kinds of skills will need to be retained (the Services are
analyzing), although at lower capacity, by keeping the right number of
experienced people balanced between the Active component and Reserve
component, and the right training curricula and infrastructure to
rebuild these capabilities in a timely manner when needed.

16. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, given
DOD's plans to reduce force structure and decisions to terminate
certain weapons systems, platforms, et cetera, or delay procurement,
how does it expect to be able to regenerate these capabilities and does
it have specific plans that project how long it would take to achieve
such regeneration?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The Services are shaping
their future force structure in ways that protect their ability to
maintain and regenerate capabilities when needed to meet future,
unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure
that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force. For
those critical skill sets, there will be a need to keep on hand some of
the specialized infrastructure (people, facilities, training
curricula), or seed corn, that will enable a new capability to be
developed in a timely manner. Keeping experienced mid-grade officers
and noncommissioned officers (NCO) will also be key. The seed corn and
the experience will need to be properly balanced between the Active and
the Reserve components.

17. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in
particular, given the current state of personnel readiness,
particularly in the Army, how does DOD propose that it will be able to
regenerate Active component end strength and in what timeframes?
Secretary Panetta. Regenerating Active component end strength is
generally a function of the particular forces being requested and the
time in which the forces are needed. As the Services draw down, each
will analyze their missions--considering the likelihood of need for
various capabilities and the time required to regenerate while taking
into account industrial base and the Reserve component availability--
and make decisions accordingly.
Specifically, it is vital that the Army maintain a strong cadre of
noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of new
formations when needed. We are also making investments in Army Special
Operations Forces (SOF) to increase their capabilities and provide more
options to the President. It will also require a strong, ready, and
accessible Army National Guard and Army Reserve Forces.
General Dempsey. The new Defense Strategic Guidance released in
January 2012, notes that since we cannot predict how the strategic
environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we need to manage the
force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities
should they be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands. The strategy
also notes that we need to retain intellectual capital and rank
structure that can be utilized to expand key elements of the force. The
Army is examining strategies, policies, and investments that would
posture the Army to slow down and reverse drawdowns of Army end
strength and formations, and regenerate end strength over the course of
a number of years in response to a future crisis.
This will involve reexamining the mix of elements in the Active and
Reserve components, maintaining a strong National Guard and Army
Reserve, retaining a healthy cadre of experienced noncommissioned and
midgrade officers, and preserving the health and viability of the
Nation's defense industrial base.

REBUILDING READINESS

18. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in the
past, this committee, GAO, and others have called for DOD to develop a
plan for rebuilding readiness that clearly identifies requirements,
prioritizes these requirements, and ties them to resources. DOD has
typically pointed to its budget request to reflect such a plan. Given
the current readiness levels of each of the Services and plans to
reduce the force structure and end strength, to what extent has DOD and
the Services developed plans and established priorities for rebuilding
readiness?
Secretary Panetta. DOD is committed to helping the Services
maintain adequate readiness to fight the current fight and respond to
contingencies across a broad spectrum of conflict. The Services have
worked to achieve a balance among their manpower, training, and
equipment requirements given anticipated force structure changes,
evolving military strategies, and emerging resource constraints. Those
decisions on the future force will be reflected to the extent possible
in the President's budget fiscal year 2014 submission. Achieving that
balance will require ongoing evaluation over the next several budget
cycles.
We have addressed full-spectrum training requirements in the
current budget. However, as we implement the new Strategic Defense
Guidance, the processes we have established will closely monitor
whether our current training strategies are sufficient to meet these
requirements and adjust as necessary. For example, as we decrease pre-
deployment training for the current fight, COIN, we will increase the
use of time, ranges, and resources to train for full-spectrum
operations.
General Dempsey. OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services continue
working on programs focused on maintaining and rebuilding readiness.
The Services are reviewing priorities in the context of the new Defense
Strategic Guidance to ensure their resources are focused on the most
critical readiness issues. Key aspects of this planning include
resetting and reconstituting the force, refining force generation
models, prioritizing resources, and determining capabilities gaps and
associated mitigation options. A key component to the viability of
these planning efforts is predictability in resourcing which is
directly affected by the passage of appropriation legislation.

19. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
specifically, has DOD assessed the manning, equipping, and training
priorities for a smaller force, and are these priorities reflected in
its fiscal year 2013 funding request?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. The budget decisions represented in the
fiscal year 2013 funding request aligns our investments to the five
major tenets of our strategy:

Rebalance force structure and investments toward the
Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East region while sustaining
key alliances and partnerships in other regions.
Plan and size forces to be able to defeat a major
adversary in one theater while denying aggression elsewhere or
imposing unacceptable costs
Protect key investments in the technologically advance
capabilities most needed for the future, including countering
anti-access threats.
No longer size Active Forces to conduct large and
protracted stability operations while retaining the expertise
of a decade of war.
To the extent possible, structure major adjustments in
a way that best allows for their reversal or for regeneration
of capabilities in the future if circumstances change.

There are many examples in the request, and listed in the Defense
Budget Priorities and Choices document that accompanies the new Defense
Strategic Guidance: maintaining current bomber and aircraft carriers
fleet; retiring some of our oldest aircraft; protecting SOF and
Unmanned Aerial Systems; COCOM Engagement and Exercises; Global
Security Contingency Funding; protecting Reserve component readiness;
sustaining critical segments of the industrial base; and funding for
wounded warriors and transitioning veterans.
General Dempsey. Yes. The new Defense Strategic Guidance set
priorities for assessing our programs, force structure, and spending in
the context of the current and forecast security environment. With
those priorities in mind, the budget proposal strikes an appropriate
and necessary balance between succeeding in today's conflicts and
preparing for tomorrow's challenges. It accounts for real risks and
real fiscal constraints, and begins the process of rebalancing and
aligning our force structure and modernization efforts with our new
strategy.

20. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the new
Defense Strategic Guidance and related defense priorities call for
rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region and puts heavy reliance on
unmanned systems and SOF. Given that DOD plans to reduce the size of
the Army and the Marine Corps, does the new strategy require more
reliance on the Air Force and Navy? If so, how will this shift in focus
be reflected in the fiscal year 2013 and future budget requests?
Secretary Panetta. All Services will play integral roles in
addressing future U.S. security challenges across all domains. The Army
and Marine Corps grew in order to better meet the demands of operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those conflicts wind down, some reductions
in ground forces are appropriate.
The nature of the future strategic environment will require even
greater flexibility and agility in projecting power to accomplish the
Nation's security objectives. Increasing operational focus on enhanced
presence, power projection, freedom of action, and deterrence in the
Pacific and Middle East, will require a range of mutually reinforcing
joint activities in these regions to accomplish priority missions.
To this end, over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), DOD will
fund the next-generation bomber and aerial refueling aircraft.
Additionally, the Navy will invest in a design for Virginia-class
submarines that will allow them to carry significantly more cruise
missiles and potentially provide an undersea conventional prompt strike
capability. The future years budgets also invest resources in
increasing stocks of our most capable cruise missiles, purchasing
advanced maritime patrol aircraft, upgrading avionics and
communications systems in our current bomber fleet, and enhancing
capabilities in space, cyber, electronic warfare, missile defense, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems that will
be particularly well-suited to operations in the Middle East and Asia-
Pacific regions.
General Dempsey. The end strength for ground forces has grown over
the past 10 years due to high operating tempo and extended contingency
operations. As these operations draw down, we are adjusting the size
and composition of the Joint Force to meet the anticipated threat in
the new strategy.
As we rebalance our global posture to emphasize the Asia-Pacific
region and the Middle East, we are adjusting our operating constructs
and the systems we employ. The new strategy requires increased emphasis
on improving joint operational access capabilities as well as programs
that address the proliferation of technology that threatens our access
to global commons. Similarly, cyber threats have evolved faster than
many could have imagined, so this budget request has an added focus on
our military's cyber capabilities. The sourcing of these increasingly
important capabilities spans all components.

21. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, more
specifically, how will resources be divided among the Services?
Secretary Panetta. DOD undertook a comprehensive review to develop
a revised defense strategy and accompanying investment priorities over
the coming decade. We made disciplined decisions based on our
assessment of future global challenges, key missions that we must be
ready to execute, and essential capabilities that we need to perform
those missions. The development of the fiscal year 2013 budget was
truly a strategy-driven process.
The fiscal year 2013 DOD budget reflects tough decisions that will
preserve the strongest military in the world. We made appropriate and
selective cuts in overall capacity and force structure while sustaining
or increasing investments in key capability areas, including SOF, ISR,
long-range strike assets, as well as space and cyber systems, among
others, to preserve a ready, agile, flexible, and capable force.
Decisions on allocating resources are grounded in a careful
assessment of operational needs of the Joint Force working as an
integrated whole to ensure that we have the necessary capabilities to
accomplish assigned missions.
General Dempsey. This budget must be viewed in the context of a
broader strategy to achieve the Joint Force of 2020 and represents an
integrated, carefully devised package of decisions that should not be
viewed as individual, isolated measures.
Excluding OCO funding, there are no major shifts expected in
resources among the Services--the emphasis will be on shifting the
priority of the resources to capabilities such as cyber and anti-
access/area denial, not on individual Services.

22. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, given
current readiness of the Air Force and the Navy, has DOD assessed their
ability to support this shift in focus?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. In the future, our Services will generally
be smaller, but each will develop future force structure that maintains
the agility, flexibility, and readiness to engage a full range of
contingencies and threats. And, as described in DOD's recently released
strategic guidance, we are adjusting missions, posture, and
organizational structure in order to adapt to ever evolving challenges
and threats.
One way in which the Air Force is posturing itself for the future
in light of the strategic guidance is through pursuit of the Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) concept in partnership with its sister Services. The ASB
concept will guide the Services as they work together to maintain a
continued advantage against the global proliferation of advanced
military technologies and capabilities. ASB will leverage military and
technological capabilities and is guiding us to develop a more
permanent and better institutionalized relationship between the
Military Departments that will ultimately shape our Service
organizations, inform our operational concepts, and guide our materiel
acquisitions.
Providing the Nation offshore options to deter, influence, and win
in an era of uncertainty is one of the primary contributions of the
U.S. Navy. We keep the Fleet forward through a combination of
rotational deployments, Forward Deployed Naval Forces, and forward
stationing. We will rely on these basing constructs and strategic
partnerships overseas that provide places for rest, repair, refuel, and
resupply which enable forward presence without increases to the Fleet's
size.
General Dempsey. Yes. DOD continues to meet global demands while
simultaneously conducting a thorough analysis of future force
requirements to successfully implement the new strategy. The Services
are updating their programs and metrics to evaluate current and future
force structure requirements, modernization efforts, force generation
capacity, and the resources required to maximize capabilities in
support of the strategic priorities. DOD has established a forum that
will consider any cross-cutting department management decisions to
ensure DOD actions are substantive, synchronized, and coordinated
across the defense enterprise.

23. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, does DOD
plan to reassess its current operational plans and the types of
scenarios that it will plan for in the future? If so, did DOD take into
account the current readiness levels of the Services?
Secretary Panetta. The President approves the Contingency Planning
Guidance every 2 years, per statutory requirements. DOD frequently
assesses its operational plans to ensure that they are realistic and
that they cover the range of plausible challenges DOD may face. Those
plans on which we place highest priority undergo a detailed review
process to examine force availability and readiness against the
combatant commanders' intent for phasing a specific contingency, the
capability of DOD to project the required force, and competing demands
across the globe. Both General Dempsey and I are involved deeply in
this critical review process.
General Dempsey. The Joint Staff is working with OSD to reassess
the operational and contingency plans directed in the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan. Our shift to rebalance priorities to the Asia-
Pacific region may require the Services and combatant commands refine
or develop plans to meet the new guidance. We are accounting for the
Services' current and projected readiness as we review planning
requirements and potential scenarios.

24. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what kind
of risk assessment did DOD perform, including in terms of the current
force's ability to support the shift in strategic direction?
Secretary Panetta. The new Defense Strategic Guidance and the
decisions in the fiscal years 2013 to 2017 FYDP were informed by risk
considerations. Although there are inherent risks in any defense
strategy, I believe the risks associated with the new Defense Strategic
Guidance are manageable and acceptable.
DOD took several steps to assess and mitigate risk. Preliminary
insights from the 2012 Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) were
instrumental in the development of DOD's strategic guidance. More
broadly, during the strategic review, we addressed risk through
wargaming, scenarios, trends analysis, and other processes. DOD's risk
mitigation plan (submitted March 2012) underscores active mitigation
efforts for the specific risks identified in the CRA.
Spending reductions of the magnitude directed by the 2011 Budget
Control Act (BCA) require difficult choices that result in additional
risk in some areas. For example, by reducing overall end strength and
aggregate force structure, we are accepting greater risk in undertaking
future prolonged large-scale conventional or stability operations.
But we will mitigate that risk by protecting our ability to
regenerate capabilities as needed--the reversibility principle. This
includes maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could
be called on to expand key elements of the force, ensuring our Reserve
component is well-equipped and well-trained, and preserving the health
and viability of the Nation's defense industrial base.
The Joint Force we are shaping, although smaller and leaner, will
be agile, flexible, and ready to confront and defeat aggression
anywhere in the world. It will have the capability to surge, mobilize,
and regenerate forces and capabilities, enabling us to balance risk
appropriately across the full range of military missions and to counter
any future threats.
General Dempsey. The 2011 CRA which provided the initial baseline
assessment for the Comprehensive Defense Review (CDR) and the analysis
for the 2012 CRA were executed in parallel. During that review, we
conducted an assessment of the nature and magnitude of the strategic
and military risks associated with successfully executing the missions
called for under the current National Military Strategy as required by
Title 10. This assessment leveraged both combatant command and Service
perspectives, as well as independent Joint Staff analysis. Multiple
risk perspectives provided an opportunity to balance the ongoing
operational risks with the force's ability to address future
challenges. Accordingly, the risk assessment provided a reasoned basis
for our enduring emphasis on the broader Middle East and the increased
strategic emphasis on Asia and the Pacific while helping us to focus
additional effort on specific future capabilities like cyber and Joint
Operational Access.

25. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
analysis did DOD do to support the notion of slowing the pace of
building new ships and accelerating the retirement of some existing
ships, including examining various cost-benefit alternatives?
Secretary Panetta. The underlying analysis that informs the
President's budget for fiscal year 2013 force structure was the
strategic review conducted by DOD in the summer and fall of 2011.
During this review, DOD evaluated, among other things, the Joint
Forces' presence, surge, and shaping demands. For the Navy, the review
identified the number of ships and aircraft required to sustain a
forward presence capable of deterring potential adversaries and
providing options for immediate crisis response while also ensuring
sufficient capacity to execute combatant commanders' plans.
The analysis used to inform the decision to accelerate the
retirement of older cruisers and amphibious ships was predicated on the
need to balance the cost to upgrade and repair less capable older ships
with the cost to procure newer more capable ships. Over the past 10
years, the Fleet has deployed more frequently and sometimes for longer
than planned. Consequently, maintenance and repair have sometimes been
deferred. The life cycle costs of maintaining and repairing ships to
achieve expected service life is normally less expensive than buying
new ships. However, the average age of the Fleet is increasing due to
the high annual procurement rates of the 1980s and 1990s. With an eye
toward sustaining the Fleet's readiness and its capacity and capability
to fight and win at sea, DOD decided to decommission some older, less
capable ships in advance of their expected service life in order to
invest in newer, more capable ships.
General Dempsey. Specific resourcing decisions were made through a
comprehensive strategic review that included detailed analysis by the
Joint Staff, the Services, and OSD. Cost reductions from the early
retirement of some ships will allow DOD to invest in new technology and
ships that specifically address the threats targeted by the
administration's new strategy.

OPERATIONAL ENERGY

26. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in 2009,
to address congressional concerns over DOD's heavy reliance on
petroleum-based fuels to sustain operations on the battlefield in
locations such as Afghanistan, GAO recommended that the combatant
commanders and the Military Services establish requirements and
guidelines for fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations
within their areas of responsibility (AOR). Also, GAO recommended that
DOD's operational energy strategy should establish incentives for
commanders of forward deployed locations to promote fuel demand
reduction at their locations, as well as identify a viable funding
mechanism for pursuing fuel reduction initiatives. While we are aware
that the combatant commands are documenting operational energy
capability gaps, what is the status of combatant commands including
CENTCOM formally incorporating requirements related to fuel demand
management at forward-deployed locations into policy and guidance?
Secretary Panetta. The combatant commands, including CENTCOM, are
establishing requirements related to fuel demand management at forward-
deployed locations into their policy and guidance. On June 7, 2011,
Commander, International Security Assistance Forces (COMISAF) issued
policy guidance directing commanders to take ownership of unit fuel
demand and make energy-informed decisions in their operations. In
October 2011, CENTCOM revised its Contingency Base Camp Development
Standard Regulation 415-1 to integrate fuel demand management best
practices. On December 11, 2011, the new COMISAF issued a policy
memorandum that built upon existing guidance and stated that
``operational energy equates exactly to operational capability.''
This policy and guidance has produced tangible fuel demand
management improvements while capturing critical lessons learned for
application in other combatant commands. The June 2011 COMISAF
requirements memorandum resulted in several power generation and
distribution improvements across Afghanistan. For example, the Army's
Logistical Contract Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Program Management
Office established an Energy Savings Initiative Policy to engage
contractors in fuel demand reduction efforts. This effort has reduced
the fuel requirement in Afghanistan by one million gallons per year.
General Dempsey. The combatant commands, including CENTCOM, are
establishing policy and guidance related to fuel demand management at
forward-deployed locations. In June 2011, COMISAF, issued policy
guidance directing commanders to take ownership of unit fuel demand and
make energy-informed decisions in their operations.
The June 2011 COMISAF requirements memorandum resulted in several
power generation and distribution improvements across the Combined
Joint Operating Area in Afghanistan. Also, in June 2011, the Army's
LOGCAP Program Management Office released its Energy Savings Initiative
Policy to engage contractors in fuel demand reduction efforts.

27. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what has
DOD done to incentivize commanders and units that effectively reduce
fuel consumption?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's primary incentives to reduce fuel
consumption are mitigating operational risk and enhancing combat
capability. These fundamental incentives have led the Army and Marine
Corps to achieve substantial reductions in fuel consumption by deployed
units. DOD also oversees targeted incentive programs such as the Navy's
Incentivized Energy Conservation Program, which recognizes naval
vessels that reduce shipboard fuel consumption. The Navy also has a
similar program for its aviation units called the Navy Air-Energy
Conservation Program. In addition, the Air Force's Air Mobility Command
aviation fuel efficiency incentives program provides high-performing
Mobility Air Force wings financial awards for demonstrating the largest
gains in energy efficiency.
General Dempsey. Incentives in fuel consumption reduction are
mitigating operational risk, thereby enhancing combat capability. DOD
oversees targeted incentive programs such as the Navy's Incentivized
Energy Conservation Program awards to naval vessels that best apply the
program's training to reduce shipboard fuel consumption. The Navy has a
similar program for its aviation units, the Navy Air-Energy
Conservation Program. In addition, The Air Force's Air Mobility Command
aviation fuel efficiency incentives program recognizes high-performing
Mobility Air Force wings that demonstrate the largest gains in energy
efficiency.

28. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how does
DOD plan to track fuel consumption at its forward-deployed locations?
Secretary Panetta. The primary fuel management goal at forward-
deployed locations is to ensure our forces have a reliable, steady
supply of fuel. The Defense Logistics Agency-Energy tracks fuel
supplies to forward operations for that purpose, taking into account
the full range of incidents and factors, including seasonal and
cultural, that can affect fuel availability.
In addition, DOD is taking steps to improve data on fuel
consumption at forward locations for the purposes of managing demand.
The Defense Operational Energy Board, co-chaired by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs and the
Joint Staff Director for Logistics, has chartered a task group to
develop a baseline of operational energy consumption to inform energy
performance metrics. DOD will apply these metrics to measure and manage
improvements in energy security for the warfighter. Each of the
Military Services has taken steps to improve their data collection on
fuel consumption in military operations as well.
General Dempsey. The Defense Operational Energy Board, co-chaired
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs and the Joint Staff Director for Logistics, chartered a task
group to develop a baseline of operational energy consumption to inform
energy performance metrics. DOD will apply these metrics to measure and
manage improvements in energy security for the warfighter.
DOD is working to employ new systems to automate data collection
down to the tactical level. The Army is undergoing limited fielding of
the Tactical Fuel Manager Defense (TFMD) program at several Afghanistan
bases. TFMD tracks fuel consumption by the individual piece of
equipment to improve fuel efficiency.

29. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, this
committee put into law that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
shall designate a senior official to be responsible for operational
energy plans and programs and be responsible for coordinating with the
Assistant Secretary to implement initiatives. What progress has been
made to date to establish this operational energy element within the
Joint Staff, and how do you anticipate the Joint Staff will assist the
Services on decreasing their reliance on fuel in current and future
military operations?
Secretary Panetta. In August 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff designated the Director for Logistics (DJ-4) as Joint Staff
point of contact for operational energy plans and programs.
I also recently signed DOD's Operational Energy Strategy
Implementation Plan, which established the Defense Operational Energy
Board, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational
Energy Plans and Programs (ASD(OEPP)) and DJ-4. I chartered the board
to reduce energy demand, expand supply, and balance requirements. The
board provides a mechanism for reviewing, synchronizing, and supporting
department-wide operational energy policies, plans, and programs.
General Dempsey. In August 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff designated the Director for Logistics, DJ-4, as Joint Staff
point of contact for operational energy plans and programs.
The Defense Operational Energy Board, co-chaired by the ASD(OEPP)
and DJ-4, recently published their implementation plan to reduce energy
demand, expand supply, and adapt the future force. The board provides a
mechanism for reviewing, synchronizing, and supporting department-wide
operational energy policies, plans, and programs.

30. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, with the
additional leadership provided by the Joint Staff on operational energy
efforts, what significant changes should we expect regarding how DOD
plans and currently manages fuel demand and energy challenges in
current and future war time scenarios?
Secretary Panetta. DOD is following through on the changes to DOD
force planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes
Congress directed in the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009. My
expectation is that the work of the new Defense Operational Energy
Board and DOD's Operational Strategy Implementation Plan will drive
significant changes in how DOD plans and programs. We see operational
energy, particularly demand reduction, becoming an increasingly
important requirement for our forces because of the inherent
vulnerability of fuel storage and logistics lines of communication and
the growth of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to threaten
them. The recent Joint Operational Access Concept states that DOD
should ``decrease the logistical appetite of joint forces in all
classes of supply, but especially in fossil fuels,'' to decrease the
risk of these A2/AD threats.
General Dempsey. DOD is following through on the changes to DOD
force planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes
directed by Congress in the 2009 NDAA. We believe operational energy
demand reduction is becoming an increasingly important requirement for
our forces due to the inherent vulnerability of fuel storage and
logistics lines of communication, and the growth of A2/AD capabilities
that threaten them.

31. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, have
there been discussions on including specific energy efficiency
strategies into strategic planning documents?
Secretary Panetta. The recently signed Operational Energy Strategy
Implementation Plan includes specific targets that direct changes to
policy, doctrine, and combatant command activities. The Defense
Operational Energy Board established a task group to review relevant
DOD policies and develop a prioritized roadmap for including strategies
to reduce operational demand, assure supply, and adapt the future
force. As overarching strategic planning documents are reviewed, the
board will provide a focal point for coordinating across the defense
components.
General Dempsey. The recently signed Operational Energy Strategy
Implementation Plan includes specific targets that direct changes to
policy, doctrine, and combatant command activities. The Defense
Operational Energy Board established a task group to review relevant
DOD policies and develop a prioritized roadmap for including strategies
to reduce operational demand, assure supply, and adapt the future
force.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

32. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, the new Defense Strategic
Guidance stated that DOD will ``make every effort to maintain an
adequate industrial base and our investment in science and technology
(S&T).'' DOD's budget for S&T activities decreased from $12.3 billion
in fiscal year 2012 to $11.9 billion in this year's request. While it
appears S&T was spared draconian cuts in an attempt to make a
commitment in our seed corn for the future, I'd like to better
understand what explicit steps DOD is taking. Are there specific areas
DOD is increasing its S&T investments in?
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2013 President's budget request
for DOD S&T is $11.861 billion, which represents a modest decline of
$386 million compared to the fiscal year 2012 President's budget
request of $12.247 billion. This is a decline of 4.73 percent, when
adjusted for inflation. Within this budget request, DOD decided to
strongly support sustainment of Basic Research. While a decline of just
under 5 percent in the S&T program does have an impact, it is
manageable and reasonable when taken in the context of the overall DOD
budget decline of 7.01 percent, adjusted for inflation. Specific areas
where DOD is increasing its S&T investments include promising
technologies to counter other nations' development of A2/AD
capabilities, cyber operations, autonomy, human systems, electronic
warfare, and counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). S&T funds have
also been aligned with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
Office of Science and Technology policy priorities in advanced
manufacturing, Army medical research, advanced robotics capabilities,
advanced training technologies, and clean energy programs. Across the
FYDP (fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017), DOD has increased funding
for high speed kinetic strike ($353 million), electronic warfare/cyber
($195 million), offensive cyber operations ($400 million) and cyber
communications ($382 million). We believe this budget represents a
reasonable reprioritization of the DOD S&T program.

33. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, are there areas that are
facing reductions?
Secretary Panetta. S&T funding declined 4.73 percent against
inflation in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request, with
reductions occurring in all components. While the funding went down, we
believe we are able to manage the risk. Specific technical areas with
greater risk in the Army include: military engineering technology
development for installations and field operations; applied
topographical research for geospatial products; and weapons, munitions,
missile, and rocket technology development for small precision
munitions, such as mortars. Navy reductions were smaller than the other
Military Departments and included technology development to improve
logistics operations and sustainment. Within the Air Force, additional
risk was accepted in the following areas: laser protection for anti-
access standoff munitions and for aircraft pilot visors; novel
navigation techniques for non-permissive environments; space precision
navigation and timing; trusted systems for avionics devices; and
advanced airborne networked and wide-band communications. Funding
reductions also occurred in the following Defense-wide technology
areas: National Defense Education Program; human, social, cultural,
behavior modeling; Joint Experimentation; Joint Capability Technology
Demonstrations; biomaterials technologies; machine intelligence;
cognitive computing; command, control and communication systems; and
advanced electronics. Although the reductions are numerous, most are
below $20 million in magnitude, and funding for DOD's highest priority
technology programs was protected.

34. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, is the DOD laboratory
enterprise facing any potential base realignment and closure (BRAC)
facility and workforce reductions?
Secretary Panetta. BRAC enables DOD to reconfigure its
infrastructure to match the demands of leaner, more flexible forces to
accommodate our changing strategic emphasis. It is an important tool
for DOD to use to make the tough fiscal choices necessitated by current
budget challenges. If Congress does authorize the requested BRAC
rounds, DOD will undertake the BRAC rounds in accordance with the
statutory directive to consider all installations equally and make
decisions based on 20-year force structure plan and statutory selection
criteria, which give primary consideration to military value. In this
context, DOD will examine all its missions and functions, including the
laboratory enterprise.

35. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, what specifically is DOD
doing to maintain an adequate industrial base?
Secretary Panetta. DOD is taking responsible steps to ensure that
the defense industry can support our warfighters' needs, now and in the
future. DOD's primary mechanism for supporting the industrial base is
through the programs that buy the defense industry's products. DOD
chooses what to purchase based on warfighter requirements, but DOD can
sometimes adjust program schedules or capitalize on synergies across
programs to sustain critical industrial base capabilities. In
exceptional cases, in certain niches, when current programs will not
support the minimum sustaining rate that a niche supplier needs to
provide a critical product or service, DOD also uses its industrial
base investment resources like the Defense Production Act Title III
authority and the Manufacturing Technology Program to ensure the
continued health of the selected parts of the defense industry. These
rare interventions should only occur in areas where DOD is highly
likely to need a product in the future, where the product would be hard
and expensive to obtain after a hiatus, and where affordable and
innovative approaches are available to use to retain the producers in
the interim. Additionally, DOD is doing a continuous, systematic, fact-
based review of the defense industrial base, led by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, called the
Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) project. The S2T2 process, which
is still ongoing, will identify critical and fragile niches in the
industrial base that need additional monitoring. Combined, all of these
efforts help to preserve the dynamic qualities of the industrial base
that supply our warfighters with their technological edge.

36. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, what is the definition of
adequate?
Secretary Panetta. In the context of the defense industrial base,
``adequate'' means sufficient to provide the capabilities that our
warfighters need, including maintaining our technological edge. An
adequate industrial base has the capability to produce top-class
equipment at reasonable cost today, and an adequate industrial base
constantly adapts and invests in future capability.

37. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, according to DOD's statement
of defense budget priorities, ``some domestic manufacturers have key
skills in the design and manufacture of military systems that cannot be
duplicated elsewhere in the economy or regenerated quickly. In support
of the strategic guidance's tenet of reversibility, this budget plan
sustains, where possible, these segments of the industrial base.
However, the industrial base will require careful monitoring in the
future.'' What defense-unique industrial skills in design and
manufacture are at greatest risk of loss given the administration's
budget?
Secretary Panetta. The defense industrial base is very diverse, and
some sectors and tiers of the industrial base are in stronger positions
financially and technically than others. DOD cannot support all parts
of the industrial base equally. Some areas that DOD currently views as
``at risk'' may appropriately decline as new technologies and the
evolving strategic situation change our acquisition requirements. Even
in the areas that DOD does need to sustain, we will take advantage of
competition whenever we can, and we will invest in forward-leaning,
pro-innovation efforts rather than preserving a static, backward-
looking industrial base.
DOD is expanding its systematic investigation to identify critical
and fragile niches that require especially close monitoring, but we
already know of some areas of emphasis. For example, production in the
aircraft sector is fairly robust, but for the first time in decades DOD
does not have an ongoing tactical aircraft design effort, so we are
examining creative and efficient ways to stimulate design capabilities
there. In the production realm, demand for some strategic systems and
space launch is relatively low at present, but we know that it will
return in the future, so we are closely monitoring and investing to
sustain and enhance production capability in solid rocket motors. Over
time, DOD will make responsible choices with our industrial base
efforts, we will rarely single out specific products or suppliers for
support, and we will continuously update and adapt the list of niches
that we monitor to reflect the changing industrial and strategic
environments.

38. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, which acquisition programs
will be given the highest priority in ensuring reversibility?
Secretary Panetta. DOD continues to apply ``reversibility'' to
ensure DOD maintains the ability to regenerate, mobilize, and adapt our
capabilities to ensure options for an uncertain future. The concept
applies to our people, our Active-Reserve component balance, our
posture, our partnerships, and our industrial base. As we establish
priorities for acquisition programs, we aim to preserve select
capabilities and critical skills within the industrial base to ensure
we maintain skill sets vital to our ability to regenerate and adapt to
changing threats. DOD's S2T2 initiative is assisting the Military
Services in identifying critical industrial capabilities and skill sets
that are at risk. Our decision calculus will be based upon a
combination of many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the
strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres.
______

Questions Submitted to Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

39. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, I am
skeptical of DOD's apparent optimism that it will no longer be called
on to conduct large-scale stability operations and worried about the
consequences of declaring that we do not need to prepare for them. I
believe it is important to note that DOD never actually sized the
ground forces for large-scale stability operations, resulting in the
severe dwell-to-boots-on-the-ground ratios that our soldiers have faced
in recent years. It is in light of this skepticism that I am deeply
concerned about the speed and depth of the reductions in ground force
end strength envisioned in this budget request. Could you describe the
specific risks you envision as a result of this decision and how you
will mitigate them?
Secretary Panetta. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that
our forces will retain the expertise, operational lessons learned,
institutional knowledge, and specialized capabilities required for
stability operations.
In any defense strategy there are inherent risks; we believe the
ones in this strategic guidance are manageable and acceptable. While
U.S. forces will retain the capacity to undertake stability and
counterinsurgency operations on a more limited scale, we are accepting
greater risk in undertaking prolonged, large-scale stability
operations. To mitigate that risk we will retain expertise, operational
lessons learned, institutional knowledge, and specialized capabilities
required for stability operations. Further, we will ensure that we have
the ability to mobilize and regenerate forces should our assessments of
the future scale of stability operations prove inaccurate.
General Dempsey. You are correct that the Active component was not
sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations in the
past; this will carry over to the future. If a large scale force is
needed, risk will exist, as it has in the past, to the Active component
until Reserve Forces can be recalled and trained to accomplish the
mission. To help mitigate the risk, we will continue to rely on the
battle-tested Reserve and Guard components of the Joint Force to
provide the strategic and rotational depth should the Nation require us
to execute a large-scale prolonged stability operation. We further
mitigate operational risk to this mission by ensuring that we size the
Active component to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other
stability operations if required. Institutionally, we will mitigate
risk by retaining the hard-won knowledge and experience in our force
through retention of key leaders and emphasis on full-spectrum
training. We mitigate risk with regard to future challenges by
maintaining the right pace of reductions. If we go too fast, experience
shows we will not do a good job of retaining key people and skills.
Finally, the most comprehensive risk mitigation activity is a
deliberate, comprehensive reset of the Joint Force. If we have fully
trained and ready forces, and we do not exceed the current pace of
reductions, I am confident that we can maintain military risk to that
mission at an acceptable level.

40. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, while
the new Defense Strategic Guidance states that ground forces will not
be sized for large-scale stability operations, it also lists
``stability and counterinsurgency operations'' as one of the ``primary
missions'' of the U.S. military. Why won't the ground force be sized to
conduct one of its ``primary missions?''
Secretary Panetta. Stability and counterinsurgency operations are
primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces. With the transition of
security responsibility in Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) in 2014, and with sufficient time for U.S. forces to
reset, we can reduce some capacity in the force for prolonged, large-
scale stability operations. U.S. forces will still retain expertise,
operational lessons learned, institutional knowledge, and specialized
capabilities required for stability operations, as well as the capacity
to undertake stability and counterinsurgency operations on a more
limited scale. Further, we will ensure that we have the ability to
mobilize and regenerate forces if necessary.
General Dempsey. It is important to note that stability operations
and counterinsurgency will continue to be primary missions for the
Joint Force. Mission sets are rarely binary--``high end'' or ``low
end''. Missions are generally multi-faceted and tend to cross the full
spectrum of operations. While we will increase emphasis on projecting
power we are not forsaking our hard-won proficiencies in stability
operations and counterinsurgency. The total ground force will be sized
to conduct its primary mission, and we will rely on the battle tested
Reserve and Guard components of the Joint Force to provide the
strategic and rotational depth for all missions.

41. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how
can the force be prepared to conduct this particular ``primary
mission'' without the necessary manpower?
Secretary Panetta. U.S. forces will retain sufficient capacity to
undertake limited counterinsurgency and stability operations, if
required. We will also seek to operate alongside coalition forces,
whenever possible. Recognizing the uncertainties of the international
environment, we will ensure that we have the ability to mobilize and
regenerate forces if a larger-scale stability operation becomes
necessary in the future.
General Dempsey. The force will have the necessary manpower
resident in the total Joint Force--Active and Reserve.

42. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
new Defense Strategic Guidance and fiscal year 2013 budget request
emphasize investments in SOF. However, SOF personnel are drawn from
general-purpose forces that are slated for reductions, and SOF units
rely heavily on general-purpose forces for support. As General Dempsey
has previously stated, ``The SOF can only be special if there's a
conventional force that allows them to conduct their operations and
shape the environment.'' What are the risks to SOF that will result
from decisions to shrink general-purpose forces so significantly? For
example, the fiscal year 2013 budget request calls for SOF by 3,000
personnel, while cutting general-purpose ground force end strength.
This reduction will impact the pool of personnel SOF can draw from. How
can SOF grow without sacrificing standards with a smaller pool of
manpower to draw from?
Secretary Panetta. The remaining programmed growth for SOF is
primarily focused on enhancing the organic combat support/combat
service support capability in SOF units to provide increased
capabilities in those areas, reducing the requirement for General
Purpose Force (GPF) support to conduct forecasted operations. For long-
duration and large-scale operations, GPF support is necessary, and the
Department is currently undertaking a range of different analyses to
identify GPF support requirements for SOF, such as logistics and
intelligence personnel, and to mitigate potential risks to SOF
operations associated with reductions in the GPF.
There is no requirement or expectation to change SOF's exacting
selection standards, even if the pool from which to draw those
individuals is reduced. GPF reductions will mean that a greater
percentage of the overall force is actually resident in the special
operations community and that we manage our force carefully in order to
maintain the requisite talent pool. We must continue efforts to sustain
the SOF that we already have most effectively. The Service component's
continued support of robust, SOF-focused retention initiatives will
have a positive impact on the retention behavior and readiness of our
SOF personnel. The Department is working closely with U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) to analyze force preservation challenges
carefully.
General Dempsey. Recently, the annual SOF manpower growth of 3-5
percent we have sustained has not diluted the force or outpaced the
required training and support structure. SOCOM has done a magnificent
job of adjusting their processes to maintain the quality of SOF
operators and support personnel during this current era of SOF growth.
As an example, Special Forces soldiers (officers and enlisted) are
drawn from the ranks of the Army's GPF; with the exception of
relatively small number of 18Xs recruited ``off the street.'' Any
future growth of SF will occur during a general reduction in Army end
strength. SF will be recruiting from a smaller pool of candidates, just
as all SOCOM components do. SOCOM will not compromise standards in
selecting and training future SOF operators. It is vital to maintain
the high standards that have been adopted by SOCOM's components since
we have asked and continue to ask SOF operators to conduct National
Level Missions in strategically sensitive environments. the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict
(ASD(SO/LIC)) will work with the Service Secretaries (through OSD) to
ensure that Commander, SOCOMs Special Operations Forces manpower needs
are represented.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY

43. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, DOD has taken a number of
positive steps to address the very serious issue of sexual assault in
our military. Over the holidays, you announced two new policies that
provide greater support for the victims of sexual assault. What action
is DOD taking to protect the men and women who so bravely protect us?
Secretary Panetta. We are committed to doing everything we can to
prevent sexual assault in the first place, provide all necessary care
and services to victims of sexual assault, and ensure our commanders
hold offenders appropriately accountable. Our new Expedited Transfer
policy gives servicemembers who file unrestricted reports of a sexual
assault an option to request quick transfer from their unit or
installation to avoid harassment and separate them from the alleged
perpetrator. For victims who made an unrestricted report we now require
sexual assault documentation be retained for up to 50 years, making it
easier for veterans to file a claim with the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA). For victims who file restricted reports, certain
documentation must be retained for 5 years. In addition, we believe we
have developed a set of initiatives that fundamentally change the way
DOD deals with this problem. Some of the steps that we will work with
Congress in trying to include in our legislative package are: enhancing
training programs for sexual assault prevention, including training for
new military commanders in handling sexual assault matters;
establishing a ``Special Victim's Unit'' capability within each of the
Services; allowing Reserve and National Guard personnel who have been
sexually assaulted while on Active Duty to remain in their Active Duty
status in order to obtain treatment and support; requiring a record of
the outcome of disciplinary and administrative proceedings be centrally
retained; and requiring commanders to conduct annual organizational
climate assessments. Further, in July 2011, we assigned a general
officer to lead our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office. Some
of our other accomplishments are highlighted below:

a. In April 2011, we activated the anonymous and confidential DOD
Safe Helpline which is a sexual assault crisis support and resources
service for adult servicemembers of the DOD community. Users may call,
click or text anytime, from anywhere for assistance and/or referrals
regarding a sexual assault. Our most recent data confirm that this is a
valuable tool being used by our servicemembers to facilitate care and
reporting.
b. In January 2012, we reissued our DOD Directive that sets policy
for the Department on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR).
The directive expanded support services to military spouses and adult
military dependents, who will now be able to file confidential
restricted reports and receive the services of a sexual assault
response coordinator and victim advocate.
c. This Directive also ensures DOD civilian employees and their
family dependents 18 years of age and older when they are stationed or
performing duties outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) are
eligible for treatment in the military healthcare system at military
installations or facilities OCONUS. Additionally, U.S. citizen DOD
contractor personnel when they are authorized to accompany the Armed
Forces in a contingency operation OCONUS and their U.S. citizen
employees are also eligible for the same emergency care and the help of
a sexual assault response coordinator and a victim advocate, during
that emergency care.
d. We have established the DOD Sexual Assault Advocate
Certification Program which will require our sexual assault response
coordinators and victim advocates obtain a credential aligned with
national standards. This will ensure our victims of sexual assault
receive the best care from a professional who can provide crucial
assistance from the moment an assault is reported through case
conclusion.
e. Sexual assault cases are some of the toughest cases to
investigate and to prosecute and we must increase the number of subject
matter experts in this area. To that end I have increased funding for
military criminal investigators and judge advocates to receive
specialized training. We are also ensuring that eligible victims have
the opportunity to receive expanded legal assistance early in the
process of their case.
f. We now have one integrated data system to track sexual assaults
throughout the Department. The Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database
(DSAID) achieved initial operational capability 30 March 2012, with the
U.S. Air Force and the National Guard Bureau as the first users. By 31
August 2012, it will be fully operational with the integration of the
rest of the military Services. This data base will ensure the
transparency of sexual assault-related data and enhance support
services
g. Furthermore, because commanders are responsible to maintain
good order and discipline of their people, as well as hold offenders
appropriately accountable, I have directed an assessment of how we
prepare and train our commanding officers and senior enlisted leaders
to prevent and respond to sexual assault.
h. We are collaborating with the Departments of Labor and Veterans
Affairs to develop a ``continuum of care'' for sexual assault victims
transitioning out of military service. By leveraging our DOD Safe
Helpline infrastructure, the Department is able to present clear and
easily accessible information on how to get help with counseling,
benefits determinations, transitions and employment. By bridging the
gap from DOD to the VA for sexual assault victims, we provide a
continuum of care from Active Duty to veteran status.
i. I recently introduced a new initiative that will elevate the
disposition authority for the most serious sexual assault offenses to
the ``Special Court Martial Convening Authority'' level. This reviewing
officer is at the colonel or Navy captain level and will ensure these
cases receive a high level of command attention.

These initiatives are just a start. The Department is focused on
building a safe environment for our men and women--I have no more
important mission than to protect the people who protect this country.

MENTAL HEALTH IN THE MILITARY

44. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, ending the stigma associated
with seeking mental health care is critical for the well-being of our
men and women who serve in our military. I applaud the Department's
success in increasing the percentage of those who seek help when
needed. As we go forward, what do you see as the remaining challenges
to further reducing the stigma associated with seeking mental health
care?
Secretary Panetta. Emphasis on the well-being and fitness of the
Force, and the prevention of adverse outcomes for servicemembers, is a
national priority. Early intervention through self-referral for issues
of concern to servicemembers, and the reduction of stigma that may be
associated with self-identification of the need for assistance for
mental health conditions, are of paramount importance to leadership
throughout DOD. To address these aims, a policy was issued in August
2011, Command Notification Requirements to Dispel Stigma in Providing
Mental Health Care to Servicemembers, which emphasizes that mental
health providers are generally not required to notify Command when
servicemembers voluntarily seek alcohol education or mental health
services. This policy is part of the Department's effort to encourage
servicemembers to come forward for evaluation and treatment before
symptoms are serious enough to result in an alcohol related incident or
in situations that might provoke command-directed action.
All of these steps, and monitoring compliance with these measures
at commands, should help reduce the stigma associated with seeking
mental health care. The Deparment recognizes that more needs to be done
to end that stigma, and we will continue to work toward that end. It is
imperative for commanders to reinforce the value of help-seeking
behavior within the military healthcare system. This can be done by
fostering open discussion of mental health problems, making information
regarding the means to access care readily available, and assisting
servicemembers with their return to full duty following treatment.

GUARD AND RESERVE

45. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, as this budget submission
looks to re-shape the military to be more agile, quick, and flexible--
and incorporate the lessons learned in 10 years of war--I appreciate
the attention you give the Guard and Reserve components. Our Guard and
Reserve Forces have been a crucial asset to this Nation and have served
us well. The budget proposes force structure adjustments for our Active
and Reserve Forces. How do you think the changes will impact the
readiness of the Total Force?
Secretary Panetta. Our goal is to develop a versatile mix of
scalable organizations operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a
sustained flow of trained and ready forces for the full range of
military operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies at a
sustainable tempo for our All-Volunteer Force. At the same time,
ensuring access to the Reserve component which is essential to
providing the operational depth and flexibility combatant commanders
require.
As we have stated, our forces will get smaller; this will emphasize
the importance of the Reserve component as an operational reserve. The
Reserve component will also become more important as a steward for
specialized skill sets to maintain expertise critical to regenerating
capabilities when greater capacity is required.

46. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, upon completing deployments
and returning to the civilian world, many in the Guard and Reserve
continue to experience problems which may not have been diagnosed upon
their return. I understand that sometimes post traumatic stress and
other invisible wounds of war do not surface right away. In your
opinion, what can be done to better assess and treat these returning
Guard and Reserve soldiers?
Secretary Panetta. DOD has revised its deployment mental health
assessment process to provide comprehensive person-to-person mental
health assessments before deployment and at 6 months, 1 year, and 2
years after return from deployment. This process applies to Guard and
Reserve soldiers who deploy, as well as to members of the Active
component who deploy. These procedures comply with requirements in the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (Section 702). The three post-deployment
mental health assessments are performed by licensed mental health
professionals or designated personnel trained and certified in
performance of the assessments. These mental health assessments include
an analysis of self-reported responses to mental health questions
regarding symptoms of depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
and alcohol misuse, detailed follow-up of positive responses regarding
previous mental health diagnoses and medication use, and exploration of
other reported emotional, life stress, or mental health concerns.
During these assessment sessions, providers weigh risks for suicide
or violence, offer education on relevant mental health topics,
administer brief interventions, and, as indicated, make recommendations
for follow-up assessment and care.
After returning home from deployment, help for any mental health
issues, including depression and PTSD, is available through the
Military Health System for Active Duty and retired servicemembers, or
through the VA for all veterans. Active Duty, National Guard, and
Reserve servicemembers who separate and who served in support of a
contingency operation are eligible for TRICARE's Transitional
Assistance Management Program (TAMP), which provides health benefits
for 180 days to assist servicemembers and their families with the
transition to civilian life. For those who may be separating from the
Service due to medical disability, VA Federal Recovery Coordinators and
Service Recovery Care Coordinators assist with servicemember transition
from DOD to VA care, treatment, and rehabilitation. The DOD
inTransition program is a free, voluntary, and confidential coaching
and assistance program that also provides a bridge of support for
servicemembers while they are transitioning between healthcare systems
or providers.
Each Service has a comprehensive program to address the
reintegration needs of wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers,
including the Army Wounded Warrior Program, the Marine Wounded Warrior
Regiment, Navy's Safe Harbor Program, and the Air Force Wounded Warrior
Program. Across DOD, the Military Family Life Consultants address
family distress by providing education and information on family
dynamics, parent education, available support services, and the effects
of stress and positive coping mechanisms. Military OneSource has
counselors standing ready 24/7 by phone and email and are available for
face-to-face counseling. The DOD Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program
was established to address the needs of National Guard and Reserve
servicemembers and their families by facilitating access to support and
reintegration services. The Defense Centers of Excellence for
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE) has a number of
education and outreach programs, including DCoE's Outreach Center,
``24/7 Help,'' which provides information and resources on
psychological health and traumatic brain injury, and the
Afterdeployment.org Web site, which assists servicemembers and their
families in managing post-deployment challenges.
The Military Services have developed training programs to mitigate
the effects of combat-related stress. The Army implemented the
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program Army-wide; the Air Force uses the
Landing Gear program; the Navy has an Operational Stress Control
program; and the Marine Corps uses a program called Operational Stress
Control and Readiness. Each of these programs seeks to prepare
servicemembers to better cope with combat and deployment stress before,
during, and after deployment. On a more holistic level, the Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has promoted the Total Force
Fitness model to address the need for a synchronized, DOD-wide approach
to strengthen resilience and maintain optimal military force readiness.
This model fosters leadership interventions throughout DOD that
strengthen the comprehensive health of servicemembers across many
domains: Behavioral, Social, Physical, Environmental, Medical,
Spiritual, Nutritional, and Psychological.

FEMALES IN THE MILITARY

47. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, last week DOD announced that
it would open about 14,000 combat-related positions to female troops.
You also recently announced the President's nomination of the first
female four-star general for the Air Force. These are both positive
steps. Can you give me a sense of where you think DOD is with respect
to diversity initiatives--such as fostering a diverse base of officers
from which to select our future senior leaders?
Secretary Panetta. DOD agrees the future military must be comprised
not only of men and women of different racial and ethnic backgrounds,
but also of individuals with a wide range of talents, experience, and
skill sets. Because the military operates as a closed personnel system,
the demographic diversity of accessions and those retained over the
course of a career directly influences the potential demographic
diversity of future senior leaders; on average it takes 25 years to
``grow'' a General or Flag Officer. As such, given a limited pool of
eligible candidates, outreach, recruiting, and retention strategies
play a critical role in attracting and retaining qualified personnel to
military service.
DOD has committed a significant amount of resources to expand
outreach efforts with affinity groups to strengthen the qualifications
of potential candidates. For example, DOD hosts a number of training
events particularly in the area of Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Math (STEM) to strengthen shortcomings in an area critical to
national security. Currently, a DOD pilot program with an East Los
Angeles school-age population of roughly 20,000 includes programs to
train parents and influencers on how to support STEM education in the
home. The program begins in Kindergarten and ties into the California
university system. The program is in its fourth year and surveys find
that 100 percent of program participants have been positively
influenced by the program. Additionally, DOD supports the STARBASE
Program, a youth outreach program designed to increase student interest
in STEM that will help build and enlarge the talent pool of potential
military and civilian personnel needed by DOD. The DOD STARBASE Program
operates at 60 locations in 34 States, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico. Military Commanders (Active, Guard, and Reserve) have
collaborated with 1,086 schools from 387 school districts, serving
approximately 64,000 students. Since 1993 more than 609,000 students
have participated in the STARBASE Program.
Cooperation and support of affinity groups also positively enhances
diversity ``in-reach'' efforts to enhance career development,
mentoring, and networking resources for those currently in uniform. DOD
continues to work with components' leadership to address integration of
talent management programs process and practices, mentorship, and
succession planning to optimize the ability of all servicemembers to
make informed career choices from accession to retirement.

NORTH KOREA

48. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, in 2011, the United States
and North Korea agreed to restart efforts to search for and repatriate
the remains of U.S. soldiers missing from the Korean War. Please
provide an update on this program.
Secretary Panetta. The United States and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an arrangement on October 20, 2011, to
resume joint remains recovery operations in the DPRK. The U.S.
Government has worked diligently to comply with the arrangement and as
of this hearing date we are on schedule to resume remains recovery
operations in April.

DON'T ASK DON'T TELL POLICY

49. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, on December 22, 2010,
President Obama signed the law which repealed the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy. After required certifications were made, the repeal occurred on
September 20, 2011. Have you encountered any difficulties in
implementing the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell?
Secretary Panetta. The Services and combatant commands continue to
provide monthly progress reports on the implementation of repeal. To
date, and based on these reports, repeal is going smoothly and we have
had no significant repeal-related issues. We attribute this success to
our strong and dedicated leadership, comprehensive pre-repeal training
programs, continued close monitoring and enforcement of standards by
our military leaders, and servicemembers' adherence to core values that
include professionalism, dignity, and respect for all.

50. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, have any new issues or
concerns surfaced since the repeal went into effect?
Secretary Panetta. No. DOD continues to closely monitor
implementation across the Services and combatant commands. Through our
monthly progress reports, we have found that the most common concern
from the field is about benefits-specifically, whether or not benefits
will be extended to same-sex partners.
With regard to benefits, DOD is engaged in a comprehensive review
of the possibility of extending eligibility for additional benefits,
when legally permitted, to same-sex partners of military members.

READINESS CHALLENGES

51. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, some defense experts believe
that, with the withdrawal from Iraq last year and considering our plans
to leave Afghanistan by 2014, the U.S. military will enter a ``post-
counterinsurgency'' era. This view was reinforced by the
administration's January 26 announcement of a strategic shift to the
Asia-Pacific and Middle East region. Can you describe what readiness
challenges U.S. forces will face as we transition to a new era where
engagement and ensuring freedom of access will likely be the strategic
norm?
Secretary Panetta. Our future environment will present an
increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to include:

Transition in Afghanistan
Violent extremism (destabilizing threats)
Building partner security capacity
Addressing challenges to U.S. power projection and
operational access

For the last decade, the United States has been involved in
extensive global operations to secure important national interests. The
focus of these operations has overwhelmingly been counterinsurgency and
stability operations, and we have focused on preparing ground combat
forces for those operations, which means there has been less focus on
training for conventional warfare.
As these operations draw down and returning ground forces reset,
our strategic approach will transition toward an increased emphasis on
meeting future challenges. As it does, our forces will remain ready and
able to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability
operations. We are rebalancing training and equipment and maintaining a
broad portfolio of capabilities that will ensure versatility to deal
with this environment, to include increasing capacity in language,
regional expertise, and associated culture. During this transition, our
people and equipment, having endured maximum stress for extended
periods, must be reset and sustained. To deter and defeat aggression,
we must provide ready forces for current operations as well as prepare
for unforeseen crisis and contingency response.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS

52. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, in July 2009, DOD testified
before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia on its foreign
language capabilities. Concerning foreign languages, DOD testified that
it ``is a priority for the Department of Defense.'' Please discuss how
the DOD's fiscal year 2013 budget request ensures that the men and
women in uniform and civilian workforce have the language skills
necessary to meet DOD's mission.
Secretary Panetta. DOD will continue to focus on expanding,
improving, and strengthening language efforts that began in 2005 as a
result of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. The current
budget request ensures that the Defense Language Institute Foreign
Language Center provides the men and women in uniform and the civilian
workforce the language skills necessary to meet DOD's mission for the
21st century. Our budget request will continue to support our Language
Training Detachments located across the United States for GPF and
Special Operations Forces training. We plan to continue funding
initiatives such as the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program, which
create a cadre of professionals with language and regional knowledge
equipped to work in regions of U.S. engagement. My staff is working to
improve and diversify the career paths of our language professionals
and to improve retention and overall linguistic capabilities. At the
same time, we are working to improve the process of identifying
language requirements to better meet the needs of the Services and
combatant commands. On the national level, we will continue to support
the ROTC Project GO Programs and the National Security Education
Program's Boren and Language Flagship programs, which collectively
improve the school and university pipeline for language-enabled
civilian and military personnel.

53. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, the National Language Service
Corps is a pilot program that provides surge language capacity to DOD
and the Federal Government during times of emergency and national need.
Please explain how the National Language Service Corps contributes to
the DOD's mission and provide specific examples.
Secretary Panetta. The National Language Service Corps contributes
to DOD's mission by bringing together 3,300 members who collectively
speak more than 240 foreign languages in addition to professional level
English proficiency. These patriotic individuals can be activated to
meet short-term emergency and surge requirements. The National Language
Service Corps complements the DOD's organic and contracted capabilities
by providing a full range of language services to include
interpretation, translation, participation as subject matter experts in
standard setting for language assessment tools, and delivery of
culturally-attuned language training. The members have supported DOD
operational missions off the Coast of Senegal, critical exercises and
training events in Indonesia, Thailand, Jordan and Germany, and have
filled gaps in language support for the intelligence and law
enforcement communities. We support the National Language Service Corps
and consider it a key component of our strategy to mitigate uncertainty
in current and future national security language needs.

54. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, what key lessons has DOD
learned from implementing the National Language Service Corps pilot
program?
Secretary Panetta. DOD learned through this proof of concept (PoC)
that there is a great deal of interest and need across the Federal
Government for short-term foreign language skills that the National
Language Service Corps (NLSC) provides. NLSC requests have more than
doubled in the last few months and feedback on performance is
excellent. We realize there is a great deal of willingness among the
large number of U.S. citizens who speak more than one language to offer
their skills in service to our Nation in times of need. Without a
doubt, the vast majority of individuals who participate in the NLSC are
professionals and offer more to the Nation than just their high level
of language capability. The program is win-win.
We also know now that proactively engaging in cross-agency
partnerships through the NLSC can lead to increased collaboration and
efficiencies. For example, the Defense Language and National Security
Education Office has leveraged DOD efforts through a relationship with
the Department of Justice and have shared best practices at a recent
interagency working group.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

55. Senator McCaskill. General Dempsey, the National Guard and
Reserves have played a major role in combat operations over the past
decade. National Guard and Reserve Forces have served faithfully in the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars and there is no doubt that our Nation would
not have been successful without the contribution of these citizen
servicemembers. National Guard and Reserve servicemembers are unique in
that they hold full-time civilian positions and jobs in communities
across America outside of their military service. This makes the
National Guard and Reserves an even more precious resource as our
Nation transitions to a new defense strategy.
I have concerns on how this transition will affect our National
Guard and Reserve servicemembers and families. The new Defense
Strategic Guidance calls for a drawdown of Active Duty servicemembers,
which will put more emphasis on the readiness of the National Guard and
Reserves. With a smaller Active Duty military, it is imperative that
National Guard and Reserve Forces are well-maintained, trained, and
adequately equipped to meet the Nation's challenges as they arise. In
our current security environment, we must ensure that the National
Guard and Reserves are postured for success on and off the battlefield.
Over the past decade, servicemembers serving in the Guard and
Reserves have become accustomed to deploying in support of our Nation.
As these deployments become less frequent due to the drawdown in
Afghanistan, how does DOD plan to retain the institutional and
operational knowledge the Guard and Reserves have gained over the past
decade?
General Dempsey. As we implement the new Defense Strategic
Guidance, we must avoid a hollow force and maintain the strongest
military in the world. Although smaller and leaner, our military will
remain flexible and ready to deploy quickly--an integral part of this
agility rests on our ability to mobilize the National Guard and
Reserves expeditiously. A properly trained and equipped Reserve
component makes for a strong, capable, and ready National Guard and
Reserves which is a prudent objective, both operationally and fiscally.
Because of the investments made and operational experiences gained over
the last decade, the Reserve component is well-postured to contribute
valued capacity and capabilities to the Joint Force in the short-term.
To sustain this over the long-term, we will continue rotational
deployments, more extensively integrate Active and Reserve Forces, and
enhance innovative readiness training.
Each Service continues to reassess the rotational deployment plan
of its unit formations, including National Guard and Reserves, to
optimize total force readiness while being responsive to the combatant
commanders' needs. This ongoing evaluation seeks to find the right
balance to ensure readiness without overburdening either component
against the anticipated demand signal. Keeping the Reserve component
ready through periodic, predictable deployments adds value to the Total
Force, distributes stress more evenly on all components, and provides
force structure options in a resource constrained environment.
The Services plan to retain appropriate levels of Reserve component
readiness through continued Active and Reserve component integration of
personnel and equipment. This Total Force integration will provide the
most efficient training opportunities to all personnel, allow for
shared use of resources, and maximize operational benefit and mission
capability.
We are reviewing Total Force training structure and strategies
looking for ways to improve efficiencies and effectiveness. As
deployment opportunities decline, our reliance on training must
necessarily substitute to a greater degree for actual operational
experience. We will continue to explore innovative ways to leverage
technology and our human component as we build and maintain the
readiness of the current and future Total Force.

56. Senator McCaskill. General Dempsey, as we wind down combat
operations in Afghanistan, the Guard and Reserves will transition to a
posture that involves fewer combat operations overseas. As we plan to
maintain the strongest force possible in the coming years, has DOD
identified any problems in future recruitment, as many young men and
women were drawn to service in a Guard and Reserve Force that was
highly likely to deploy because of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
If so, how does DOD plan to address these recruitment challenges?
General Dempsey. In the short-term (3 to 5 years), we expect to
continue to recruit and train some of our Nation's most talented men
and women in numbers sufficient to ensure combat capability. For the
past several years, all of our Military Services met, or exceeded,
their Reserve component recruiting and retention goals with the
exception of the Air National Guard. Today's reservists and guardsmen
expect to deploy and be more operationally engaged than their
counterparts of the 1990s. While the level of combat and other
deployment operations is reduced from a few years ago, opportunities
for Reserve component mobilization still exist. These opportunities
will be on a more periodic and predictable schedule, which is more
conducive to the needs of the Reserve component servicemembers, their
families, and their employers. Programs such as the Post-9/11 GI Bill,
the reduced retirement program, and stressed career field bonuses are a
few examples of how we will be able to continue to maintain a strong
and effective Reserve component.
In the long-term (5 years and beyond), we may face challenges
depending on the state of the economy and changing social norms.
Although we seek only the best to join the Profession of Arms, fewer
than one in four 17- to 24-year-olds are fully qualified for service,
and we must attract over 15 percent of those. Today, only about a third
of that percentage show a propensity to join, and that number may
decrease as our Nation's economic conditions improve. Additionally,
although the Reserve and National Guard bring in accessions directly
from the Active component, not enough Active Duty personnel may be
available. This will be due to several factors, such as reduced
military end strength and the requirement that separation bonuses be
repaid upon entry into the Reserve component. As it has in the past,
DOD will need to count on congressional support to ensure our military
remains the best the world has known.

F-35 PROGRAM

57. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, for the third year in a
row, DOD has been forced to delay plans for full production of the F-
35. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has stated that the delay is
not a budget issue, but rather a fundamental problem with the F-35
program. Frank Kendall, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has stated: ``putting the F-35
into production years before the first test flight was acquisition
malpractice.''
While much attention has been given to the problems plaguing the
Marine Corps F-35B variant, the F-35A and F-35C both suffer from
significant design issues. For example, the F-35C has encountered a
problem with its tailhook, a real and significant problem for an
aircraft designed to land on an aircraft carrier deck. Last year, the
Navy requested additional Super Hornets in order to mitigate delays in
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) procurement schedule. Fiscal year 2013
marks the third delay in 3 years for the JSF program, but, under
current plans, the F/A-18 production line will end in fiscal year 2014,
well before the F-35C is projected to be combat ready. Ending a viable
aircraft production line before the JSF program will be able to meet
full combat capability inevitably assumes a level of risk to the Navy
and to the U.S. military.
Does the DOD find that risk acceptable to our warfighters and our
national security capabilities?
Secretary Panetta. DOD remains committed to the F-35 program. The
Department of the Navy does not currently plan to keep the F/A-18
production line open beyond the final procurement of EA-18G aircraft in
fiscal year 2013 and F/A-18E/F in fiscal year 2014; however, if further
delays or significant development or design issues are discovered
beyond the current F-35 program, as presented in the fiscal year 2013
President's budget request, then DOD may consider all options,
including procuring additional F/A-18 Super Hornets. Currently, the F/
A-18 production line shutdown begins with the key long-lead suppliers
this summer. Regarding EA-18G unique parts, the final orders to support
the final fiscal year 2013 procurement are also being placed this
summer. From a force structure perspective, the Navy projects a
manageable strike fighter shortfall of less than 65 aircraft in the
2020s. DOD finds this risk acceptable to the Navy, and we are confident
that we will have sufficient naval strike fighter capability to meet
our national security requirements.

58. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, does DOD have plans to
mitigate that risk?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, DOD is mitigating that risk through a
number of means. The Navy is conducting a Service Life Assessment
Program of the F/A-18E/F to define the necessary inspection and
modifications required to extend the currently defined life limits of
the aircraft.
We have mitigated risk to the F-35 program by ensuring that the
completion of the development program is adequately resourced and
supported by realistic planning factors. The production ramp has been
reduced to mitigate cost risk due to concurrency. This allows us to buy
fewer aircraft in the near term that will require modifications while
the design matures through continued testing and discovery.
We believe that this risk is acceptable as we strive to shape a
joint force for the future that is smaller and leaner but will be
agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.

59. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, given the uncertainty
that continues to plague the F-35 program, is DOD or the Navy
considering options for keeping the F/A-18 line running beyond fiscal
year 2014?
Secretary Panetta. DOD plans to procure the final F/A-18E/F in
fiscal year 2014. When those aircraft deliver in fiscal year 2016, DOD
will have completed the program of record of 565 F/A-18E/F aircraft.
However, if further delays or significant development or design issues
are discovered beyond the current F-35 program as presented in the
fiscal year 2013 President's budget request, DOD may consider all
options, including procuring additional F/A-18 Super Hornets.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ISSUES

60. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the Air
Force is proposing to relocate the F-16 Fighter Squadron at Eielson Air
Force Base (AFB) to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in fiscal year 2013
to achieve savings in base support costs. The F-16 squadron is the only
Active Duty mission at Eielson. The Air Force intends to put Eielson in
warm status by 2015. This proposal is the same one put forth by the Air
Force in BRAC 2005 and it was rejected by the BRAC Commission due to
overestimated cost savings and underestimation of the military value of
Eielson AFB. Last week, the Alaska delegation wrote you a letter
expressing concern about the proposal, mainly the fact this proposal is
outside of the formal BRAC Commission process and may be in violation
of statute as a significant number of military and civilian personnel
will be impacted. What is your understanding of this proposal?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The Air Force must achieve
spending reductions in the current budget cycle regardless of whether
additional BRAC rounds may ultimately be authorized. The Air Force is
therefore making adjustments to its force structure, and the transfer
of the Aggressor squadron from Eielson AFB to Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson is among them. The transfer in fiscal year 2013 garners
manpower and efficiency savings by consolidating operations/maintenance
supervision overhead and base support functions. The Air Force
estimates resultant cost savings to be $3.5 million for fiscal year
2013 and $169.5 million across the FYDP. These estimates are based on
eliminating approximately 640 manpower authorizations that
Headquarters-Pacific Air Forces determined were no longer needed at
Eielson once the Aggressor squadron relocates. Sufficient capability,
however, will remain in place at Eielson to support the remaining Air
Refueling Wing and joint partners at Fort Wainwright. Additionally, the
base will continue to provide critical training through the Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex.
DOD has the authority to close and realign military installations
outside of a traditional BRAC round, provided that action does not
trigger the thresholds established in 10 U.S.C. 2687. Section 2687
specifies that DOD cannot take any action to effect or implement the
closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian
personnel are authorized to be employed, or the realignment of any such
installation involving a reduction of more than 1,000 or by more than
50 percent of the number of civilian personnel, whichever is less,
unless and until certain requirements set out in the statute are met.
The actions at Eielson do not trigger the thresholds specified in
section 2687. Specifically, Eielson AFB is not being closed, and the
realignment will not relocate either 1,000 or 50 percent of the
permanent DOD civilian positions at Eielson to Elmendorf AFB. Were the
triggering thresholds of the statute to be exceeded, the Air Force
would have to report on the proposal, provide certain specified
analyses, and wait a prescribed period of time before implementing the
action.
Finally, if Congress does authorize the requested BRAC rounds, the
Air Force's currently proposed force structure changes do not
presuppose what will happen to a particular installation during the
BRAC analysis. DOD will consider all installations equally with
military value as the primary consideration.

61. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, both of
you have repeatedly stated the formal BRAC Commission process is the
most objective, thorough, and non-partisan route to pursue with respect
to real property management. In fact, during the 2005 BRAC round, below
BRAC threshold actions were included in the formal process in
recognition of the fact a comprehensive approach allowed DOD to make
better use of real property and make better decisions. Would you agree
with this statement? If so, do you support the Air Force's proposal?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The statutory BRAC process
is a fair, objective, and proven process for closing and realigning
bases in the United States. I agree that ``below BRAC threshold actions
were included in the formal process in recognition of the fact a
comprehensive approach allowed DOD to make better use of real property
and make better decisions.'' But strategic and fiscal imperatives leave
DOD no alternative but to seek efficiencies at military bases here in
the United States. While the President has asked Congress for BRAC
authority, it is not clear how Congress will act on that request, and
we cannot afford to delay in achieving efficiencies. DOD must use every
tool at its disposal to address strategic and fiscal imperatives--
including acting within its existing authorities pending congressional
action on BRAC authorization. The Secretary of Defense has the
authority to close and realign military installations outside of a
traditional BRAC round, provided that action does not trigger the
thresholds established in section 2687 of title 10, U.S.C. Section 2687
specifies that DOD cannot take any action to effect or implement the
closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian
personnel are authorized to be employed, or the realignment of any such
installation involving a reduction of more than 1,000 or by more than
50 percent of the number of civilian personnel, whichever is less,
unless and until satisfying certain study and congressional reporting
requirements and waiting the specified period of time.
The Air Force must achieve spending reductions in the current
budget cycle regardless of whether additional BRAC rounds may
ultimately be authorized. The Air Force is therefore making adjustments
to its force structure. It is important to note, however, that if
Congress does authorize the requested BRAC rounds, the Air Force's
currently proposed force structure changes do not pre-suppose what will
happen to a particular installation during the BRAC analysis. DOD will
consider all installations equally, with military value as the primary
consideration.

62. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how is
the proposal in line with your goal of using the formal BRAC Commission
process?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's force structure changes drove both this
proposal and the request for BRAC authorization. They are consistent.
However, this proposal does not presuppose what will happen to a
particular installation during the BRAC analysis. DOD will consider all
installations equally with military value as the primary consideration.
General Dempsey. DOD's force structure changes are one of the
reasons why the President is requesting BRAC authorization. Simply
stated, the cuts in force structure that we are implementing must be
accompanied by cuts in supporting infrastructure, including military
bases. Absent a process for closing and realigning bases, DOD will be
locked in a status quo configuration that does not match its evolving
force structure, doctrine, and technology. Moreover, given the expense
of our installation infrastructure, if we retain bases that are excess
to strategic and mission requirements, we will be forced to cut
spending on forces, training, and modernization. That said, recently
announced force structure changes do not pre-suppose what will happen
to a particular installation during the BRAC analysis. DOD will
consider all installations equally with military value as the primary
consideration.

63. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, was the
Air Force's proposal to realign the F-16 squadron at Eielson reviewed
by DOD Legal Counsel to ensure it is in compliance with BRAC law in
title 10, U.S.C., section 2687, which mandates a notice and hold period
when closing or realigning installations?
Secretary Panetta. The Air Force's proposal was reviewed by the Air
Force Office of the General Counsel, in consultation with the DOD
Office of the General Counsel.
General Dempsey. The Air Force's proposal was reviewed by the Air
Force Office of the General Counsel in consultation with the DOD Office
of the General Counsel.
DOD has the authority to close and realign military installations
outside of a traditional BRAC round provided that action does not
trigger the thresholds established in title 10 U.S.C., section 2687.
Section 2687 specifies that DOD cannot take any action to effect or
implement the closure of any military installation at which at least
300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed, or the
realignment of any such installation involving a reduction of more than
1,000, or by more than 50 percent of the number of civilian personnel,
whichever is less, unless and until certain requirements set out in the
statute are met.
The actions at Eielson AFB do not trigger the thresholds specified
in section 2687. Specifically, Eielson AFB is not being closed, and the
realignment will not relocate either 1,000 or 50 percent of the
permanent DOD civilian positions at Eielson to Elmendorf AFB. Were the
triggering thresholds of the statute to be exceeded, the Air Force
would have to report on the proposal, provide certain specified
analyses, and wait a prescribed period of time before implementing the
action.

64. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, last
week, Admiral Locklear, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) commander
nominee, recognized Alaska's strategic location, calling the State and
its installations critical and significant to his mission. Yet, the Air
Force is proposing to place one of the most strategically located bases
in warm status. How is placing Eielson in warm status conducive to
DOD's strategic goals?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The right-sizing of Eielson
AFB is tied to DOD's strategic goal of reducing the ``cost of doing
business.'' This entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs,
finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, and business
practices. Eielson AFB hosts the only single squadron wing in the
Active Duty Air Force. The Air Force proposes moving the 18th Aggressor
Squadron and associated maintenance support to Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson in fiscal year 2013. The movement of the Aggressor squadron
will garner efficiencies by reducing maintenance supervision overhead
and support base functions. Units, such as flightline and backshop
maintenance, will relocate to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson with the
18th Aggressor Squadron. There is sufficient capacity at Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson (hangars, flightline parking, and administrative
space) to beddown the 18th Aggressor Squadron. Further manpower
reductions will be assessed in fiscal year 2014 for fiscal year 2015
and tied to installation restructuring and right-sizing, with remaining
manpower/infrastructure supporting surge/war readiness materiel
requirements, Alaska Air National Guard's 168th Air Refueling Wing, the
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, and exercises (e.g., Red Flag and
Northern Edge).
The proposal to retain the 168 Air Refueling Wing at Eielson AFB
and maintain the base and runway operating capability while moving the
training-coded F-16s to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson is directly
tied to the strategic importance of this base and this location. The
robust training capability for Red Flag Alaska exercises will remain at
Eielson, a testament to the quality and capacity for unparalleled,
world-class training and readiness emphasis, which is of particular
importance to the Pacific theater. While the training-coded Aggressor
F-16s are slated to relocate to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, they
will still participate in and support these large force, joint and
combined exercises, the same way the combat-coded units at Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson have done for years. The current training and
readiness focus of effort will remain under the current proposal while
affording the Air Force the opportunity to expand operations, if
necessary, in the future specifically to meet the strategic goals in
the Pacific.

65. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, please provide more details
regarding DOD's intent to seek authority for BRAC. You have indicated
if Congress authorizes BRAC, DOD wants to move quickly on the process
and implementation. The last BRAC took 5 years to complete; in fact,
DOD sought waivers to extend the deadline for more than five BRAC
actions. DOD will be responsible for environmental remediation at sites
and community redevelopment which takes years and cannot be
circumvented. How does DOD envision completing and implementing BRAC
immediately?
Secretary Panetta. Asking for a 2013 round is aggressive; but given
the magnitude of the cuts we are making in force structure, we cannot
afford to wait. Moving forward quickly will enable DOD to reap savings
quickly and adjust to force structure changes in an effective manner.
With this aggressive timeline in mind, we have started the initial
preparatory work regarding internal governance for a BRAC process--
inventorying our property and evaluating the extent to which we need to
update our analytical tools. These efforts will enable us to proceed
expeditiously once Congress authorizes BRAC. We will be ready to use
the authority effectively and therefore urge Congress to authorize
BRAC.
Additionally, in light of the accelerated timeline, our legislative
proposal provides us additional time to submit the required Force
Structure Plan and Installation Inventory not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of the legislation for the fiscal year 2013
round.

66. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, BRAC 2005 cost DOD $35
billion to implement. GAO estimated savings from the BRAC 2005 round
will not be realized for at least a decade. DOD has to find savings
now. How did DOD conclude BRAC is a financially sound decision in the
near-term?
Secretary Panetta. Of all the efficiency measures that DOD has
undertaken over the years, BRAC is perhaps the most successful and
significant. The first four rounds of BRAC generated $8 billion in
annual recurring savings, which now total $100 billion. The comparable
figure for BRAC 2005 is $4 billion. The annual recurring savings for
all five rounds ($12 billion) represents the additional costs that DOD
would incur every year for base operating support, personnel, and
leasing costs without BRAC. Enough money to buy 300 Apache attack
helicopters, 124 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, or four Virginia-class
submarines.
Because BRAC is a key priority, DOD will apply the resources
necessary to support both a robust and thorough BRAC analysis and an
efficient and effective implementation process. BRAC begins generating
savings almost immediately, and those savings will partially offset its
initial costs. BRAC will generate recurring savings far in excess of
the upfront investment.
The 2005 round took place during a period of growth in the
military, and it reflected the needs and goals of that time--aligning
our infrastructure with our military strategy so as to maximize
warfighting capacity and efficiency. These efforts contributed
significantly to DOD's effectiveness; but they necessarily required
substantial investments. Because the focus of the BRAC 2005 round was
not on saving money and space, it is a poor gauge of the savings that
DOD can achieve through another BRAC round. The prior BRAC rounds--
which reduced capacity and paid off in 2 to 3 years--represent a better
gauge of such costs and savings. In those rounds, one-time costs
ranging from $2.7 billion to $6.6 billion resulted in annual recurring
savings of $1 billion to $2.7 billion.

67. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, what is DOD's estimated cost
of another BRAC?
Secretary Panetta. The costs of a potential BRAC round will not be
known until after DOD has developed its recommendations, they have been
reviewed by the independent BRAC Commission and forwarded by the
President to Congress, and, finally, Congress has failed to enact a
joint resolution disapproving the recommendations. It is only at the
end of this process that DOD can develop budget quality estimates of
the costs.

68. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, the budget is decreasing;
how will DOD pay for BRAC?
Secretary Panetta. Because BRAC is a key priority, DOD will apply
the resources necessary to support both a robust and thorough BRAC
analysis and an efficient and effective implementation process. As a
legal obligation of DOD, the normal internal budget deliberation
process will determine the source of the BRAC implementation costs.

69. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the Air
Force has been the only Service to vocalize strong support for BRAC.
The Army has not made necessary decisions regarding end strength
decrease force structure impacts. The last BRAC Commission determined
another BRAC round would not be required until 2015 at the earliest.
The request for BRAC appears to be preemptive and driven by budget
constraints, not by national security needs. Was an assessment
conducted which determined another BRAC round was required at this
time?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. We have not conducted an
assessment for a future round; however, parametric techniques used to
analyze various capacity measures in 2004 indicated that DOD had 24
percent excess capacity overall relative to the fiscal year 2009 force
structure-based requirements. Because BRAC 2005 eliminated only about 3
percent of DOD's capacity, we believe we have significant excess
capacity, and force structure reductions will only exacerbate this
condition. In accordance with its request for authority to conduct two
new rounds of BRAC, DOD will undertake a similar analysis used in BRAC
2005 to give a sense of its current excess capacity.

70. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, once
infrastructure is lost in the United States, the capacity may never be
gained back. What risk is assumed by more base closures?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. As it has done in prior BRAC
rounds, DOD will develop closure and realignment recommendations that
provide it with the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances,
particularly surge requirements that can arise from contingencies,
mobilizations, or extended changes in force levels. Specifically, DOD
uses a 20-year force structure plan and has specific selection criteria
\1\ that capture the concept of surge capacity. Criterion one requires
DOD to consider ``current and future'' mission capabilities, and
criterion three assesses the ``ability to accommodate contingency,
mobilization, surge and future total force requirements.'' Furthermore,
through execution of prior BRAC rounds, and as verified in a 1999
study, DOD has demonstrated that it will retain within the U.S.
installation infrastructure sufficient difficult-to-reconstitute assets
to respond to surge, accommodate a significant reconstitution of the
force, and support all forces, including those currently based outside
the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Congress specified the following criteria for use in the 2005
BRAC round, and DOD has proposed to use the same criteria for the
requested rounds in 2013 and 2015.

Military Value Criteria:
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on
operational readiness of the total force of DOD, including the impact
on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and
associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by
ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and
terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in
Homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving
locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge,
and future total force requirements at both existing and potential
receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other Criteria:
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings,
including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of
the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of
military installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and
potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and
personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs
related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and
environmental compliance activities.

71. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
according to DOD's Base Structure Report for 2011, DOD has 611 military
sites overseas. Why is DOD not pursuing a more aggressive effort to
identify sites overseas for closure and realignment?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD continuously assesses
U.S. defense posture overseas. The President and Secretary of Defense
led DOD's civilian and military leadership through extensive
deliberations to develop the most recent Defense Strategic Guidance,
which was issued on January 5, 2012. This strategy requires DOD to
sustain a global presence, with a rebalancing of our forces toward the
Asia-Pacific region and a sustainment of our presence in the Middle
East. In Europe, we are sustaining a presence that will meet defense
commitments, deter aggression, and place greater reliance on rotational
presence and partnership.
Over the last several years, we have made significant reductions in
our overseas infrastructure and personnel. Since 2003, DOD has returned
more than 100 sites in Europe to our host nations and reduced our
personnel by one third. Between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2015,
the Army alone will execute 23 additional site closures that were
previously approved and announced for return to the host nation. But
more can and should be done in light of upcoming force structure
changes.
Our European footprint today consists of more than 300 discrete
sites, ranging from small communications sites to robust Main Operating
Bases. Given the shift in strategic focus to the Pacific, coupled with
force reductions in Europe and decreases in required support to
CENTCOM, the legacy footprint in Europe is a prime focus. To that end,
we are embarking on a European capacity analysis that will seek to
reduce long-term expenses through footprint consolidations, while
ensuring our infrastructure properly supports operational requirements
and strategic commitments.
Our examination will review opportunities across the theater for
more extensive joint and coalition utilization of facilities. We will
gauge the extent to which our installations can shed excess capacity or
absorb new functions from other installations of lesser military value
which, in turn, could be reduced or closed. In doing this, we will be
careful to assess the cost and savings of each action and prioritize
for implementation those initiatives with the highest payback. We
expect to identify some preliminary options later this year.

72. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, did DOD or OMB assess the
impact of a BRAC in the next few years on the economy and unemployment
rates?
Secretary Panetta. No. DOD did not assess the impact of a BRAC in
the next few years on the economy and unemployment rates. If Congress
authorizes BRAC, DOD will develop recommendations for closures and
realignments based on 20-year force structure plan and statutory
selection criteria \2\ that place priority on military value. Economic
impact is also one of the criteria. Specifically, criteria 6 is ``The
economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military
installations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Congress specified the following criteria for use in the 2005
BRAC round, and DOD has proposed to use the same criteria for the
requested rounds in 2013 and 2015.

Military Value Criteria:
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on
operational readiness of the total force of DOD, including the impact
on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and
associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by
ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and
terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in
homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving
locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge
and future total force requirements at both existing and potential
receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other Criteria:
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings,
including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of
the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of
military installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and
potential receiving communities to support forces, missions and
personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs
related to potential environmental restoration, waste management and
environmental compliance activities.

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

73. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, with our
defense posture shifting to the Asia-Pacific, shouldn't we ensure the
military's global footprint is aligned with our strategy?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, DOD is ensuring that U.S. global defense
posture is aligned with our strategy. We will have a Joint Force with
global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle
East, while still ensuring the ability to maintain defense commitments
to Europe and elsewhere. Wherever possible, we will develop innovative,
low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve U.S. security
objectives.
In the Asia-Pacific region, DOD is pursuing a defense posture that
is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically
sustainable. U.S. defense posture and presence in East Asia, Oceania,
and Southeast Asia demonstrates the fact that the United States is a
resident power in the region. The budget request for fiscal year 2013
funds enhancements to our presence in Southeast Asia, such as the
rotational deployment of U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force units in
Australia, and of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. The Navy will
also rebalance the fleet to establish a greater presence in the Pacific
and all the Services will continue to maintain significant force
structure in the region as we work to increase interaction with
partners and allies.
We are sustaining and, in some cases, enhancing elements of our
defense posture in the Middle East. We will maintain an operationally
responsive posture in this critical region to deter threats, as well as
assure allies and partners in the face of growing security challenges.
We are also evolving our posture in Europe. Although we plan to
withdraw two Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) over the next 2 years, we will
maintain a steady state presence of two BCTs in Europe and allocate a
U.S.-based BCT to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Response Force, including periodic rotation of a battalion task force
and brigade headquarters staff support to Europe for training and
exercises to improve interoperability and coalition operations.
Reflecting the resource-constrained environment, we will also work with
NATO allies to develop a ``smart defense'' approach to pool, share, and
specialize capabilities that address future challenges in Europe and
beyond.
General Dempsey. Absolutely. Global posture actions are
continuously adjusted against requirements to support combatant
commanders, and are designed to position U.S. forces to better conduct
OCO, ease the burden of a high operational tempo on members of the
Armed Forces and their families, and improve the ability of the United
States to meet its commitments, while making these commitments more
affordable and sustainable.

74. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, why not
utilize U.S. locations, like Alaska, as we shift our focus to the Asia-
Pacific region to simultaneously promote economic development and
readiness?
Secretary Panetta. We currently leverage a variety of forces and
capabilities stationed in Alaska to support PACOM assigned missions,
and will continue to do so as we rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
region. Increasing the utilization of capabilities already stationed in
Alaska, or increasing number of the forces stationed there for
employment in PACOM-assigned missions, must be assessed against the
ability of those forces to provide timely response to crises.
As we implement our strategy, we continually assess the way our
forces are arrayed and their effectiveness in providing the appropriate
range of political, security, and economic benefits to the United
States.
General Dempsey. As we continue to adapt our existing military
force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, we are examining a number of
potential options to ensure that we enhance the Joint Force's ability
to surge and regenerate forces and capabilities to confront and defeat
aggression anywhere in the world.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM

75. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, funding
for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) was protected. How does
the fiscal year 2013 request compare to last year's request of $1.2
billion? Please describe the importance of this system in defending the
Homeland and the threat environment.
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2012 appropriated amount, $1.159
billion, included a general congressional reduction of $1.5 million.
Program execution includes Control Test Vehicle-1 (CTV-01) and Flight
Test Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) (FTG)-06b, completion of the Fort
Greeley, AK, power plant, completion of Missile Field 2, delivery of a
second fire direction center node at Fort Greeley, and initiate
manufacturing for GBIs 48 to 52. During fiscal year 2012, GMD will
build up two GBIs to support the return to intercept (RTI) flight tests
in fiscal year 2013. To increase GMD system reliability for Homeland
defense, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will activate the hardened
power plant at Fort Greeley this year and increase firepower of the
fielded GBIs by continuing to test and upgrade the reliability of GBI
components. Of note, on December 2011, GMD awarded the development and
sustainment contract to Boeing, which gained efficiencies and savings
across the Future Years Development Program.
During fiscal year 2013, GMD plans to complete the RTI testing with
CTV-01 and FTG-06b and to restart interceptor manufacturing,
incorporating the corrective actions into the GBIs yet to be delivered.
GMD will continue manufacturing GBIs 48 to 52 and start manufacturing
GBIs 53 to 57. As part of improving Homeland defense, GMD will continue
construction on an east coast in-flight interceptor communications
system data terminal at Fort Drum, NY, planning for FTG-08 in fiscal
year 2014, including the build-up of the second 2-Stage GBI, planning
for the FTG-11 first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and
salvo test in fiscal year 2015, and continuing software development for
both the GBI and ground systems products. The fiscal year 2013 GMD
budget request is $903.2 million. Reductions in fiscal year 2013
include transferring $5.8 million for Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) to the Command and Control, Battle Management and
Communications Program and transfer $20.7 million to the MDA Program
Wide Support account for facilities and environmental support at
multiple MDA locations. Completing Missile Field 2 and deploying the
Fort Greeley power plant in fiscal year 2012 resulted in lower funding
requirements.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request continues to support the GMD
system as the primary element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) that provides combatant commanders to defend the U.S. Homeland
against limited attack by intermediate- and long-range ballistic
missiles. The primary components of the GMD system are the GBIs and the
ground systems. The GBI is a solid-fuel boost vehicle integrated with a
single non-explosive exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). There are
currently 30 GBIs emplaced in two missile complexes, at Fort Greeley,
AK, and Vandenberg AFB, CA. The system can negate attacks from the
current and projected threat from Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia.
General Dempsey. DOD requested $903.2 million in fiscal year 2013
for GMD RDT&E funding to buy an additional 5 GBIs for delivery in
fiscal year 2018 and upgrade our current operational fleet of 30 GBIs.
This will complete the total purchase of 57 GBIs.
Today, GMD's operational GBIs protect the United States against a
limited ICBM raid launched from current regional threats. The ballistic
missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and
is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global
trends indicate the ballistic missile systems are becoming more
flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also
increasing in range. Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran
continue to develop long range missiles that will threaten the United
States, but it is not clear exactly when and how this type of ICBM
threat to the U.S. Homeland will mature.

76. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the Sea-
Based X-Band (SBX) radar is critical to GMD system performance and
warfighter confidence in the system. Yet, DOD is proposing to make it a
test asset only. What risk is assumed to GMD system performance by
making the SBX radar a test asset only?
Secretary Panetta. SBX's primary mission is discrimination and it
is not necessary for tracking. Therefore, SBX is not required to be
part of 24/7 operational kill chain today because there is no evidence
of sophisticated countermeasures that require discrimination. With
indications and warnings, SBX could return to full time status.
In the Limited Test Support Status, the SBX radar will retain its
unique contingency operations capabilities and will continue to support
testing. Maintaining SBX in Limited Support Status does not add risk to
GMD performance.
Its technical performance capability will continue, including
connectivity to the GMD Fire Control System. SBX will maintain its
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and Coast Guard certifications, and
will be staffed to maintain the vessel, X-band radar (XBR) and other
critical systems for support to both testing and contingency
activation.
SBX will continue to participate in BMDS ground and flight testing,
while being available to support contingency operations as directed by
OSD and the Joint Staff. The MDA is working with Joint Staff and the
U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) Joint Functional Component Command
for Integrated Missile Defense to determine the appropriate response
time for contingencies. During contingency operations an unfunded
requirement reimbursement will be requested.
Under the direction of OSD and the Joint Staff, SBX deployed from
Pearl Harbor in less than 72 hours to provide contingency support
during the North Korean space launch. This was the first operation of
the SBX under U.S. Pacific Fleet tactical control and with Navy
ownership and operation of the SBX vessel.
General Dempsey. DOD intends to place SBX radar in a limited test
operations status due to affordability reasons, but we will be prepared
to activate the SBX if indications and warnings of an advanced threat
from Northeast Asia become evident. MDA is working with the Joint Staff
and STRATCOM's Joint Functional Component for Integrated Missile
Defense to determine the appropriate timeline for activation
contingencies.
DOD will begin upgrading the Clear Early Warning Radar in Alaska
for full missile defense capability by 2016. We are requesting $347.0
million in fiscal year 2013 for BMDS sensors development for Homeland
defense, including support of the Cobra Dane Radar and the Upgraded
Early Warning Radars (UEWR) at Beale AFB (California), Fylingdales
(United Kingdom), and Thule (Greenland). We are requesting $192.1
million to operate and sustain these radars and $227.7 million to
procure additional radars and radar spares in fiscal year 2013.
Based on DOD's robust support of current fielded and future
sensors, the ability to reactivate SBX, if the threat warrants,
minimizes the risks to the overall GMD performance.

MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

77. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2012 limited availability of Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS) funds to 25 percent until DOD submitted a plan
to use the funds as final obligations for a restructured program or
termination costs. So why is DOD seeking another $400.9 million in
fiscal year 2013 for this program, a program the United States does not
intend to buy?
Secretary Panetta. The administration has requested funding in the
fiscal year 2013 budget to complete the MEADS Design and Development
(D&D) PoC effort with Germany and Italy. DOD is seeking $400.9 million
in fiscal year 2013 funds to honor the final year of our MEADS D&D
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) commitment that will enable
completion of the MEADS development phase as it is currently planned.
The PoC effort enables all three nations to obtain benefit from our
collective program investment to date and will bring the development
program to an orderly conclusion. Failure to fund our fiscal year 2013
commitment will be viewed by our allies as reneging on our promises.
During the Chicago NATO Summit on May 20, 2012, NATO allies
achieved a major breakthrough on missile defense--10 years in the
making--by declaring an interim ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capability as an initial step toward establishing a NATO missile
defense system. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) will be a
major contributor to NATO missile defense and is designed to protect
the U.S. Homeland, U.S. deployed forces, and our allies against the
increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
Where BMD was once a controversial subject within the alliance, we have
reached consensus to operationalize this capability and have the allies
share the burden of deterring and defending against those who could
threaten us with ballistic missiles. This is a major achievement of
U.S. policy; a decision by Congress to prohibit any additional funding
for MEADS at this late date would diminish the consensus reached in
Chicago.
The United States relies on allies to share the burden of
peacekeeping and defense in coalition activities and the development of
effective defense capabilities that are of direct benefit to the United
States. In this context, I believe it is important to live up to our
commitments to our allies. We made a commitment to two of our closest
allies--Germany and Italy--to develop MEADS cooperatively to achieve
those objectives. Failure to meet our MEADS MOU fiscal year 2013
funding obligations could negatively affect the willingness of our
allies to join future cooperative endeavors, bilaterally or through
NATO, that have been strongly supported by the administration and
Congress at a time when cooperation through concepts, such as Smart
Defense, is critical to ensuring NATO and its members are developing
needed capabilities for the future. In addition, failure of the United
States to provide funding for fiscal year 2013 would likely lead to a
dispute with Germany and Italy, both of which have indicated that they
would assert that the United States has unilaterally withdrawn from the
MOU. On the other hand, full funding of the final year of the MEADS PoC
would ensure that the United States receives a return on its 8-year
investment in the form of a data archival package for future potential
use on other U.S. air and missile defense improvements. We must act now
to avoid a situation that would cause harm to our relationships with
two of our closest allies.
General Dempsey. In accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012,
DOD has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our
international partners, Germany and Italy, regarding development of a
plan to further restructure the program in the event that Congress does
not authorize or appropriate fiscal year 2013 funding to complete our
MEADS D&D MOU obligations.
DOD believes that completing the MEADS PoC and securing the benefit
of the development program is the correct course of action under the
current constraints. The MEADS elements (advanced 360 degree radars, a
lightweight launcher with the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE)
missile, and a battle management system), if fully realized and
validated by PoC, would add to the capabilities available to advance
U.S. air and cruise/terminal BMD architectures.
While DOD understands the need to make difficult choices in the
current fiscal environment concerning funding for all of our
activities, we also note that failure to meet our MEADS MOU funding
obligations for fiscal year 2013 could negatively affect our allies'
implementation of current transatlantic projects and multinational
cooperation--as well as their willingness to join future cooperative
endeavors with the United States--that are strongly supported by the
administration and Congress.

78. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
efforts did both of you personally engage in to terminate or
restructure the program to ensure last year's appropriation was the
final obligation in accordance with the law?
Secretary Panetta. In accordance with the requirements of section
235 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, DOD has consulted with the German
and Italian participants regarding development of a plan to restructure
the program further in the event that Congress does not authorize or
appropriate fiscal year 2013 funding for these purposes. We have
informed the German and Italian participants that there is significant
risk that fiscal year 2013 funding may not be made available by
Congress. In response to our attempts to engage in discussions, the
German and Italian participants have consistently stated that they
remain fully committed to their MOU obligations and expect that all
three participants will provide funding in 2013 to complete the PoC
effort. Although we have engaged with the German and Italian
participants to seek to complete MEADS MOU efforts using only fiscal
year 2012 funding, we cannot force them to agree to this course of
action.
During his recent visit to the United States, I personally
discussed this matter with the German Minister of Defense (MoD). I will
continue to engage my German and Italian counterparts on this issue.
General Dempsey. In accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012,
DOD has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our
international partners, Germany and Italy, regarding development of a
plan to further restructure the program in the event that Congress does
not authorize or appropriate fiscal year 2013 funding to complete our
MOU obligations. Secretary Panetta met with the German MoD in February
where the German MoD reiterated his unequivocal support for completing
the MEADS PoC.
We have advised Germany and Italy that there is significant risk
that fiscal year 2013 funding may not be made available. In response,
our partners have made clear to DOD, and Germany has advised Senator
Levin directly, that they remain fully committed to their MOU
obligations and expect that all partner nations will provide their 2013
funding to complete the PoC effort. They have also made clear that we
are too late in the development effort to change course again and that
we jeopardize our ability to realize the benefits of the program if we
withdraw from our 9-year agreement near the end of the eighth year.

79. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in these
austere budget times, how can DOD justify a half a billion dollar
investment in a program the warfighters will not use, and justify a
request in violation of law?
Secretary Panetta. The administration has requested funding in the
fiscal year 2013 budget to complete the MEADS D&D PoC effort with
Germany and Italy. DOD is seeking $400.9 million in fiscal year 2013
funds to honor the final year of our MEADS D&D MOU commitment that will
enable completion of the MEADS development phase as it is currently
planned. The PoC effort enables all three nations to obtain benefit
from our collective program investment to date and will bring the
development program to an orderly conclusion. Failure to fund our
fiscal year 2013 commitment will be viewed by our allies as reneging on
our promises.
During the Chicago NATO Summit on May 20, 2012, NATO allies
achieved a major breakthrough on missile defense--10 years in the
making--by declaring an interim BMD capability as an initial step
toward establishing a NATO missile defense system. The EPAA will be a
major contributor to NATO missile defense and is designed to protect
the U.S. Homeland, U.S. deployed forces, and our allies against the
increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
Where BMD was once a controversial subject within the alliance, we have
reached consensus to operationalize this capability and have the allies
share the burden of deterring and defending against those who could
threaten us with ballistic missiles. This is a major achievement of
U.S. policy; a decision by Congress to prohibit any additional funding
for MEADS at this late date would diminish the consensus reached in
Chicago.
The United States relies on allies to share the burden of
peacekeeping and defense in coalition activities and the development of
effective defense capabilities that are of direct benefit to the United
States. In this context, I believe it is important to live up to our
commitments to our allies. We made a commitment to two of our closest
allies--Germany and Italy--to develop MEADS cooperatively to achieve
those objectives. Failure to meet our MEADS MOU fiscal year 2013
funding obligations could negatively affect the willingness of our
allies to join future cooperative endeavors, bilaterally or through
NATO, that have been strongly supported by the administration and
Congress at a time when cooperation through concepts, such as Smart
Defense, is critical to ensuring NATO and its members are developing
needed capabilities for the future.
In addition, failure of the United States to provide funding for
fiscal year 2013 would likely lead to a dispute with Germany and Italy,
both of which have indicated that they would assert that the United
States has unilaterally withdrawn from the MOU. On the other hand, full
funding of the final year of the MEADS PoC would ensure that the United
States receives a return on its 8-year investment in the form of a data
archival package for future potential use on other U.S. air and missile
defense improvements. We must act now to avoid a situation that would
cause harm to our relationships with two of our closest allies.
General Dempsey. In accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012,
DOD has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our
international partners, Germany and Italy, regarding development of a
plan to further restructure the program in the event that Congress does
not authorize or appropriate fiscal year 2013 funding to complete our
MEADS D&D MOU obligations.
DOD believes that completing the MEADS PoC and securing the benefit
of the development program is the correct course of action. The MEADS
elements (advanced 360 degree radars, a lightweight launcher with the
PAC-3 MSE missile, and a battle management system), if fully realized
and validated by PoC, would add to the capabilities available to
advance U.S. air and cruise/terminal BMD architectures.
Failure to meet our MEADS MOU funding obligations for fiscal year
2013 could negatively affect our allies' implementation of current
transatlantic projects and multinational cooperation--as well as their
willingness to join future cooperative endeavors with the United
States--that are strongly supported by the administration and Congress.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT MISSIONS

80. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, Congress
has vocalized concerns about DOD resourcing domestic support missions
repeatedly for the last several years. For fiscal year 2013, the Air
Force is proposing to retire the Joint Cargo Aircraft and the Army will
proceed with divestiture of the Sherpa. These actions leave the
National Guard in many States without needed capability and resources
to fulfill domestic support missions. How is DOD ensuring domestic
support missions are not undermined?
Secretary Panetta. Although the C-27 divestiture and subsequent
Army C-23 divestiture will reduce National Guard airlift, sufficient
airlift capacity remains (over 1,000 rotary-wing and over 400 fixed-
wing aircraft) and is spread across the 10 Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regions that States may leverage in response to an
emergency. In situations where State resources are overwhelmed, the Air
Force will provide assistance to civil authorities in accordance with
the Stafford Act or as directed by the President. As such, the analysis
which formed the rationale for the force structure adjustment included
supporting civil authorities when requested as part of a larger FEMA-
led Federal response.
The 2013 presidential budget request reduced the C-130 fleet size
to 318 aircraft to meet the requirement that was outlined in the newly-
articulated strategy presented by the President and the Secretary of
Defense. When determining the number of airlift aircraft required to
meet the new strategy, forces are being sized to meet one large-scale
campaign internationally, as well as support two domestic missions, a
major regional disaster, and a Homeland defense event. As a follow-on
measure, the 2012 NDAA-directed airlift study, due at the end of 2012,
will further refine plans to support domestic missions without the C-23
Sherpa.
General Dempsey. Defending the Homeland and providing support of
civil authorities is a primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces. As
such, DOD carefully considered domestic support missions in our
analysis of requirements for the fiscal year 2013 budget submission.
Although not every State will retain organic airlift capability, the
DOD Total Force remains fully capable of meeting our domestic
requirements while at the same time deterring and defeating aggression
by any potential adversary. When called upon, we will leverage existing
National Guard capabilities along with additional Active and Reserve
Forces needed to ensure the safety and security of our citizens.

81. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how did
domestic support missions factor in to decisionmaking?
Secretary Panetta. One of the primary missions of the U.S. Armed
Forces is to defend the Homeland and provide support to civil
authorities. With regard to airlift, the Air Force routinely conducts
defense support of civil authorities and assists at all levels in
preventing, protecting against, mitigating the effects of, and
responding to manmade or natural disasters when directed by the
President or approved by DOD.
DOD conducted the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016
and Case 3 (270 C-130s) of the study is consistent with the new Defense
Strategic Guidance. This analysis includes airlift to support two
domestic missions, a major regional disaster, and a Homeland defense
event to form the 270 intra-theater aircraft requirements. In support
of the Homeland defense mission, the Air Force continues to meet
mission requirements/taskings through the joint Global Force Management
process that prioritizes all combatant commanders (i.e., Northern
Command, CENTCOM, PACOM, et cetera) requirements.
General Dempsey. In last year's Comprehensive Review of the Future
Role of the Reserve Component, DOD examined Reserve component support
for Homeland defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).
This report concluded that, although Homeland defense and DSCA are
Total Force responsibilities, ``the Nation needs to focus particular
attention on better using the competencies of National Guard and
Reserve component organizations. The National Guard is particularly
well-suited for DSCA missions.'' The report added that ``except in rare
circumstances, the National Guard can be expected to support civil
authorities at the direction of State Governors.''
DOD's response to the BCA was to provide a balanced force that best
protects the Nation, both at home and abroad. Although we necessarily
reduced National Guard forces along with those of Active Duty and
Reserve, we did so in a manner which allows us to provide capabilities
adequate for our domestic support mission. Because many domestic
missions emerge in response to unforeseen crises, when called upon we
can leverage other State capabilities with the consent of those States'
Governors on an as-needed basis. Should a national emergency arise, we
will augment the National Guard using capabilities found within the
Active component as permitted by Title 10 and, as a last resort, the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet.

U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

82. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, do you
support the Law of the Sea Treaty?
Secretary Panetta. I strongly support the United States' accession
to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). DOD's
civilian and military senior leadership have been strong proponents in
favor of U.S. accession for more than a decade.
General Dempsey. I strongly support the United States' accession to
the 1982 UNCLOS.

83. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how will
accession to the UNCLOS enhance our strategic interests and national
security?
Secretary Panetta. Accession to the 1982 UNCLOS would enhance the
United States' strategic interests and national security in several
ways. These include the following:

As a treaty party, the United States can best protect
the navigational freedoms enshrined in the 1982 UNCLOS that are
key to U.S. global force presence and power projection
capability. The current status of the United States requires us
to assert our rights through customary international law,
subject to change based on state practice.
The United States would have access to the benefits
afforded to treaty parties, which importantly include the
UNCLOS's institutions and meetings. The United States would no
longer be relegated to observer status and could fully
participate in the ongoing development and interpretation of
the 1982 UNCLOS. In fact, nearly every maritime power, our NATO
allies, and the other permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council are already treaty parties. Being a party would allow
the United States to exert a level of influence that is
reflective of its status as the world's foremost maritime
power.
Accession would solidify a truly massive increase in
the United States' resource and economic jurisdiction, not only
to 200 nautical miles off our coasts, but to a broad
continental margin beyond that.
Accession would ensure the United States' ability to
take advantage of the opening of the Arctic, including the
enormous natural resource potential of the Arctic.
China continues to flex its muscles in the South China
Sea at a time when the United States is rebalancing toward the
Asia-Pacific region. Lack of accession continues to put the
United States in a weaker position in critical bilateral and
multilateral discussions--whereas China seeks to use its status
as a treaty party to its advantage. Accession would strengthen
the United States' hand in regional discussions as we seek to
build upon the depth and breadth of regional partnerships and
access.

General Dempsey. Becoming a Party to the UNCLOS would enhance our
strategic interests and national security by preserving our strategic
influence as the world's foremost maritime power and strengthening our
ability to lead developments in global maritime security. The United
States would also be able to reinforce the UNCLOS's freedoms of
navigation and overflight, and the other lawful uses of the sea related
to those freedoms, that are essential to the global presence and
mobility of our Armed Forces. This includes movement of forces and
materiel through strategic international straits such as the Straits of
Gibraltar, Malacca, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb. In addition, becoming a
party would strengthen combined operations with coalition partners that
are treaty parties and advance important national security initiatives
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. Accession would also
allow the United States to take better advantage of emerging
opportunities in the Arctic related to navigation, resources, and other
activities, as well as enhance our credibility in a large number of
Asia-focused multilateral venues where we are seeking to diffuse
tensions and encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South
China Sea.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS

84. Senator Manchin. Secretary Panetta, how many contractors does
DOD employ?
Secretary Panetta. DOD provides this data to Congress annually in
the Inventory of Contracts for Services required by section 2330a,
title 10, U.S.C., as amended by section 807 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2008. On August 28, 2011, DOD submitted the Fiscal Year 2010 Inventory,
reporting 622,722 contractor full-time equivalents for the fiscal year.

85. Senator Manchin. Secretary Panetta, what is the average salary
of a DOD contractor?
Secretary Panetta. DOD awards contracts for a wide range of goods
and services. The salaries of DOD contractor employees similarly span a
wide range. Contractor salaries are affected by a number of factors,
including an individual's experience, training, expertise, and the
location of performance. DOD endeavors to maximize use of competitive
procurements. In competitive procurements, the contract award amount is
generally a function of the market price and therefore contractor
salaries are influenced by competitive market pressures. Except in
limited circumstances, such as contracts subject to the Service
Contract Act or the Davis-Bacon Act, DOD does not dictate private
sector salaries. Although DOD does not maintain a database of
contractor employee salaries, our contracting officers use Defense
Contract Management Agency negotiated labor and overhead rate
agreements with DOD contractors as a basis for negotiating contracts at
a fair and reasonable price.

FORCE STRUCTURE

86. Senator Manchin. General Dempsey, having served as a governor,
I have seen firsthand the value of the Total Force Policy and the cost-
effective value of a multi-missioned force such as the National Guard
that is rooted in our Nation's communities where we need support. Have
you effectively evaluated the cost efficiencies of the Army and Air
National Guard?
General Dempsey. Yes, and DOD continues to evaluate the cost
effectiveness of not only the Army and Air National Guard, but all
Active and Reserve components from all Services. While this task is
accomplished primarily within the Services themselves, the Joint Staff
and OSD monitor and provide oversight of the evaluation process, and
frequently coordinate and/or sponsor their own studies to validate the
work performed by the Services.

87. Senator Manchin. General Dempsey, wouldn't it be advisable to
wait on the data from these reports before making any force structure
changes?
General Dempsey. Both OSD and the Joint Staff conducted assessments
of the Joint Force prior to submitting the current budget. The
programmed force structure for 2017, which includes force structure
changes, was assessed against our strategy and we determined that the
resultant military forces would be sufficient to meet the needs of our
Nation.

AIR FORCE BUDGET--GUARD AND RESERVES

88. Senator Manchin. Secretary Panetta, the fiscal year 2013 Air
Force budget disproportionately cuts the Guard and will necessitate
losing the expertise gained by pilots and capabilities over a decade of
war. Are you confident that this budget meets the requirements to
``surge and regenerate forces and capabilities'' that the President
spelled out in your Priorities for the 21st Century Defense?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. The new Defense Strategic Guidance for DOD
articulates priorities for a 21st century defense that sustains U.S.
global leadership. The Air Force approached this challenging task
guided by the following principles: ensure the Total Force can fulfill
surge requirements; maintain a balance between components that allows
us to fulfill continuing rotational requirements at sustainable rates;
retain the recruiting, training, and operational seasoning base
required to sustain the Total Force's needs into the future; and ensure
the Reserve component remains relevant and engaged in both enduring and
evolving missions. Maintaining the appropriate mix of forces between
the Active and Reserve components is critical to sustaining Air Force
capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate
rotational demands within a smaller overall force. The Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve are integrated into all major Air Force
mission areas, train to the same high standards as the Active
component, and are invaluable partners in helping meet the Air Force's
many and varied commitments.

89. Senator Manchin. Secretary Panetta, the Air Force leadership
has called this an effort to balance the size of the Active and Reserve
components. But this seems to work contrary to your plan to ``maintain
a strong National Guard'' to provide the ``concept of reversibility.''
Did the Air Force consider alternative plans that you have said
``reduce the cost of doing business,'' such as relying more heavily on
the National Guard and Reserves?
Secretary Panetta. The Air Force developed a force structure based
on several important objectives, most importantly ensuring the Air
Force can provide the capability to accomplish the missions outlined in
the new Defense Strategic Guidance with a risk-balanced force in the
context of fiscal reductions. It would be ill-advised to make
``proportional'' cuts to the Active component and Reserve component for
the sake of being ``fair'' or return to some Active component/Reserve
component ratio from days gone by. It is important that we build the
force with an Active component/Reserve component ratio that sustains
the symbiotic relationship between the Active component/Reserve
component and is based on maximizing our capabilities and balancing the
risk across the assigned missions in the new Defense Strategic Guidance
with the given funding. This is what the Air Force did in its budget
request. Relying more heavily on the National Guard and Reserves does
not necessarily reduce costs if either the demand cannot be met or the
symbiotic balance to sustain the Total Force cannot be maintained.
The Air Force rigorously evaluated the mix of Active and Reserve
component forces to sustain the symbiotic relationship of the
components while ensuring the Total Force is postured to meet both
surge and post-surge demands in the new strategy as well as the current
and near-term demand for forces from the combatant commanders. This
deliberate and considerable effort provides the best way to set the
conditions for success in the new strategy through a properly sized
Total Force, to include maintaining a strong National Guard, Reserve,
and Active Force.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

DON'T ASK DON'T TELL

90. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Panetta, you may be aware, despite
the repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell, a number of policies and programs
within DOD continue to exclude same-sex couples. I understand the
limitations imposed by the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), however
there are a number of DOD policies that could be modified immediately
to alleviate many of the lingering inequalities. The Servicemember's
Legal Defense Network (SLDN) has identified 11 of these discriminatory
policies, which I have included here. Please provide DOD's feedback on
the feasibility of altering these policies in a manner consistent with
the spirit of the repeal of Don't Ask/Don't Tell.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Secretary Panetta. Following the effective date of repeal,
September 20, 2011, DOD began a deliberative and comprehensive review
of the possibility of extending eligibility for benefits, when legally
permitted, to same-sex partners. The joint team responsible for this
review is examining the benefits, including those on the SLDN list,
from a policy, fiscal, legal, and feasibility perspective. This review
is ongoing, and the team will report its findings and recommendations
to me once the review is completed.

FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND EUROPE

91. Senator Shaheen. Senator Panetta, though I understand DOD's
assessment of the geo-political landscape and the need to rebalance our
forces toward the Pacific, I remain committed to working with our
allies to ensure the strength of the NATO alliance and collective
European defense. To that end, I believe the upcoming NATO summit in
Chicago will provide an excellent opportunity to reassure our allies
that despite the realignment of our forces, the United States remains
committed to both NATO and Europe. Will you make that a priority for
the upcoming summit?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. The United States remains committed to both
NATO and Europe.
NATO remains of vital importance, and is a net provider of global
security. As President Obama has said, ``Europe remains the cornerstone
of our engagement with the world,'' and NATO is ``the most capable
alliance in history.'' Our NATO allies are our most reliable and
capable partners for advancing our shared international security
objectives. The transatlantic relationship is critical to confronting
the challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. The
President, Secretary Clinton, and I have been emphasizing this to
allies since we announced our new Defense Strategic Guidance in January
and will continue to do so during the NATO summit in Chicago.

92. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Panetta, in your view, what can
Congress to do help achieve that objective?
Secretary Panetta. DOD appreciates Congress' support for the United
States' commitment to Europe and to working with allies to ensure the
strength of the NATO alliance. The U.S. defense strategy reaffirms the
enduring importance of NATO. We appreciate congressional support for
the upcoming NATO summit in Chicago, including support for achieving
our objectives in the next phase of transition in Afghanistan,
reforming NATO so that it has the capabilities it needs, and
strengthening partnerships beyond NATO's borders.

FORCE FLEXIBILITY

93. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Panetta, obviously, our strategic
shift toward the Asia-Pacific region prioritizes assets in that AOR.
However, as recent operations in Libya highlighted, we must maintain
the capability to quickly respond to contingencies on the Atlantic side
of the country as well. Considering the uncertain and complex world of
threats we face today, how important is it to maintain flexibility and
balance in making sure a renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region does
not leave us vulnerable on the Atlantic side of the country?
Secretary Panetta. U.S. forces will continue to be capable of
protecting the Homeland--from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts--and
U.S. security interests in every region of the world.
As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have said, we
are at a strategic turning point. DOD conducted an intensive, strategy-
driven review to guide defense priorities and spending over the coming
decade. One result of this review is that the United States will
emphasize the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. Yet, even in a
resource-constrained era, we remain committed to the strength and
security of our allies and partners across Europe. One example of this
is the increased missile defense capabilities we are implementing in
Europe.
We will maintain a military presence that meets our enduring NATO
Article 5 security commitment, deters aggression, and promotes enhanced
capacity and interoperability. The real measure of U.S. commitment to
Europe is the ability and will to work together to promote shared
regional and global interests, and to build and employ collective
capabilities as an alliance, as we did in Libya.
Additionally, building partnership capacity globally remains
important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global
leadership. We will seek to be the security partner of choice by
strengthening existing alliances and partnerships and pursuing new
partnerships with a growing number of nations--including those in
Africa and Latin America.

94. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Panetta, what are your priorities
and objective capabilities for U.S. forces remaining in Europe?
Secretary Panetta. Even in this resource-constrained era, we remain
committed to the strength and security of our allies and partners
across Europe. The peace and prosperity of Europe are critically
important to the United States, and Europe remains our security partner
of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the world. Our
priorities include promoting regional security and Euro-Atlantic
integration, strengthening NATO, maintaining our Article 5 commitments
to allied security, and promoting enhanced capacity and
interoperability for coalition operations. The evolving inventory of
U.S. forces in Europe will provide the Commander of U.S. European
Command with the needed capability to meet operational and training
requirements, including activities to ensure that European allies and
partners have the capability to conduct expeditionary operations in
defense of our common interests. The allocation of a U.S.-based brigade
to the NATO Response Force to bolster the training and exercises we
conduct with allies is an example of this. Our focus on the evolving
security environment includes investing in BMD capability for Europe in
response to the emerging threats.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand

RAPID INNOVATION FUND

95. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, Congress has been very
supportive of the Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF), which is intended to
increase research and development of new innovative technologies
important for our military. This is such a great program. It is my hope
that it fosters more U.S.-made nano and other chip-related technologies
to address the very serious insecurity in our IT procurement. Yet DOD
has been very slow to roll out contracting for this funding, putting
only about $100 million out, out of $600 million. And this year's
budget has no additional funding. Please explain why DOD does not seem
to support this program to foster American innovation in cutting edge
military technologies.
Secretary Panetta. Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to
establish the RIF in section 1073 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2011, Public Law 111-383, and identified $520 million ($460
million research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); and $60
million in procurement) for the RIF in DOD and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, which was signed into law on April 15, 2011.
Section 1073 establishes a funding limitation of $3 million and 24-
month completion per award.
In response to section 1073, DOD issued guidelines in August 2011
for implementation of the RIF, directing the use of open, competitive,
and merit-based processes. DOD subsequently published 4 Broad Area
Announcements (BAA) during the period September to November 2011 to
solicit proposals; more than 3,500 responses were received.
Given the large number of responses, the source selection period
has been justifiably longer than anticipated. Each proposal received a
fair and thorough evaluation using source selection criteria included
in the four public solicitations. However, DOD intends to obligate all
of the fiscal year 2011 $460 million RDT&E funds prior to October 2012.
We anticipate approximately 160 to 180 contract awards. None of the
proposals received in response to the four BAAs met the criteria to use
the $60 million procurement funds, and DOD is assessing plans to
obligate these funds before they expire in September 2013.
Congress identified another $200 million for the RIF in the
Division A-DOD Appropriations, the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012. DOD intends to issue solicitations this summer to use these
funds.
DOD worked to structure the RIF for success, but it is too early at
this time to determine the overall effectiveness of the program in
meeting the goals outlined in section 1073. Contract awards are a
necessary but insufficient metric; we will also need to assess the
number of RIF-funded projects that are successfully completed and
transitioned to a DOD acquisition program. Early next year, DOD will
assess the performance and transition potential of the contracts
awarded via the fiscal year 2011 funds. At that time, DOD will
determine whether it should program funds for the RIF in future budget
requests.

BARRIERS TO SERVICEWOMEN

96. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, on February 9, 2012, DOD
announced a change in the combat exclusion policy that bars women from
formally serving in combat roles. The change was in part due to
recommendations made by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission in
their March 2011 report. Women are now able to formally serve in roles
such as intelligence officer and medic at the battalion level, and
receive credit for this service toward promotions; however, women are
still barred from serving in the infantry, armor, and special
operations forces. This new policy has the most direct impact on women
serving in the Army and Marine Corps, as the Navy and Air Force have
already opened up almost all positions to women. As stated in DOD's
report to Congress ``the Department of Defense is committed to removing
all barriers that would prevent servicemembers from rising to the
highest level of responsibility that their talents and capabilities
warrant.'' With this new step forward, what are DOD's future plans for
eliminating all of the barriers to our servicewomen?
Secretary Panetta. The Direct Ground Combat Assignment policy
prohibits the assignment of women to certain units and occupational
specialties. As documented in the Military Leadership Diversity
Commission findings, changes to DOD policies will require time to
implement fully. There are serious practical barriers, which if not
approached in a deliberate manner, could adversely impact the health of
our servicemembers and degrade mission accomplishment. Based on opening
of the new positions to women, DOD will assess the direct ground combat
unit assignment prohibition to inform future policy decisions.
Additionally, DOD will review development of gender-neutral physical
standards for occupational specialties.
I have directed the Services to report back to me on their
assessment of these newly opened positions in 6 months with an
assessment of additional positions that can be opened and barriers to
opening additional positions to qualified women.

97. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, the Coast Guard
currently allows women to serve in all career fields. Could this be a
model for the other branches of Service?
Secretary Panetta. As the mission of each of the Services is
significantly different, so are the elements of their specific position
restrictions. Additionally, there is a wide variance among the Services
in the number of occupations closed to women. Given the unique
environment of military service, DOD is working to eliminate barriers
with the goal of allowing all servicemembers to serve in any capacity,
based on their ability and qualifications, and not constrained by
gender restrictive policies.

HAZING IN THE MILITARY

98. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, over the last year,
there have been several high-profile cases of hazing in the military,
including those of Marine Lance Corporal Harry Lew, Army Private Danny
Chen, and allegedly Marine Private Hamson McPherson, Jr. In the cases I
highlighted, the hazing victim committed suicide immediately following
a hazing incident. In the past month, both the Army and Marine Corps
issued statements reinforcing their policy against hazing in their
respective Service. Additionally, last week the Navy discharged eight
sailors after video surfaced of a hazing incident aboard a Navy ship.
What steps has DOD as a whole taken to address this issue and ensure
that all types of hazing cease to occur in our military?
Secretary Panetta. DOD takes hazing very seriously. As a result, we
are examining responsive courses of action in three areas: (1) a
reiteration of existing policy prohibitions of hazing across the chain
of command; (2) increased emphasis in training; and (3) new reporting
options. These proposed actions are all designed to improve our ability
to prevent, identify, and take immediate action to address hazing
before it leads to serious consequences.
DOD's policy prohibiting hazing is unambiguous, and Service leaders
have clearly stated that they take incidents of hazing very seriously.
The following recent leadership statements reiterate that hazing is
contrary to good order and discipline and is unacceptable behavior: the
Secretary of Defense's message of December 2011, the Secretary of the
Army's tri-signed message of January 2012, and the Marine
Administrative Messages and the revised Marine Corps Order 1700.28A of
February 2012. Leadership at all levels will continue to emphasize to
subordinates that such behavior will not be tolerated.
Second, DOD is examining methods of improving training to prevent,
identify, and provide direction on how to respond to possible incidents
of hazing. We are evaluating options including: raising awareness of
both existing hazing policy and the associated offenses under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), training to identify leading
indicators and to prevent or stop incidents from escalating, training
resiliency, training peer groups, and emphasizing this issue at
training courses administered by the Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute (DEOMI).
Third, DOD is considering options to identify hazing distinctly in
surveys and reporting mechanisms. Potential courses of action in this
area include: adding hazing to the Services' Serious Incident Report
thresholds, adding hazing to law enforcement reporting codes,
identifying reported incidents of hazing in UCMJ cases, Inspector
General hotlines and databases, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office's Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, the DEOMI
Organizational Climate Survey, Defense Manpower Data Center Status of
Forces Survey, and Services' peer programs.

99. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, given the remote
locations of two aforementioned hazing cases, what systems are in place
to protect a victim of hazing when their chain of command is either the
perpetrator of the hazing or implicit to the acts of hazing?
Secretary Panetta. The military chain of command is designed to
function in remote locations.
A fundamental function of the military chain of command is
communication. Just as the command channel transmits orders from higher
to lower levels, the command channel also extends upward to communicate
official matters from subordinate to senior. If a servicemember
believes he or she has been wronged by his or her superior, then the
servicemember has a right to communicate the problem, or grievance,
through formal or informal processes.
Each Service has formal complaint procedures to bring issues to the
attention of commander. The Services train their members in complaint
and problem solving procedures as part of Initial Entry Training. For
example, Article 138 (the right to request redress of grievances from a
superior) procedures are explained to an Active Duty servicemember
within 14 days after the member's initial entrance on Active Duty,
again after completing 6 months of Active Duty, and again at the time
when the member reenlists.
Protecting servicemembers is also a fundamental function of the
chain of command. If the chain of command believes that a servicemember
may be at risk of retaliation, the chain of command may immediately
apply administrative or operational procedures, including reassignment
or removal of the victim to a safer location.
In less isolated locations, servicemembers have several avenues to
highlight complaints to personnel and offices other than their chain of
command. These include: the Office of the Inspector General hotlines,
legal assistance attorney, or law enforcement.

100. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, since the repeal of
Don't Ask Don't Tell almost 6 months ago, gay and lesbian
servicemembers have been serving openly without fear of discharge. This
was a wonderful achievement for our military, and I commend DOD for
continually reiterating its commitment that gay and lesbian
servicemembers will be treated with respect and dignity. Are there
plans for DOD to formally add sexual orientation to the DOD Human Goals
Charter?
Secretary Panetta. All servicemembers, regardless of sexual
orientation, are entitled to an environment free from personal, social,
or institutional barriers that prevent them from rising to the highest
level of responsibility possible, dependent only on individual talent
and diligence. Harassment or abuse based on sexual orientation is
unacceptable and will be dealt with through command or Inspector
General channels. Therefore, there are no plans to add sexual
orientation as a class under the Military Equal Opportunity program,
nor to the DOD's Human Goals Charter. Servicemembers will continue to
be treated equally, regardless of sexual orientation.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

IRAQ INSTABILITY

101. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in your opinion, is al Qaeda
a significant military threat in Iraq?
General Dempsey. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) does not have the capacity
to overthrow the Government of Iraq, but the group has significant
capabilities to strike Iraqi Government targets, including Iraqi
Security Forces, as well as Shia civilians. AQI claims daily small-
scale assassination attacks, primarily using small arms and
magnetically-attached bombs. These attacks suggest an increase in
attack capability following U.S. force withdrawal. We anticipate AQI
will maintain a heightened operational tempo in 2012, absent sustained
increase in Iraqi counterterrorism pressure. Since the conclusion of
Operation New Dawn in late 2011, AQI has claimed responsibility for
multiple coordinated suicide and vehicle-borne IED attacks, including
December attacks across Baghdad and January and March attacks
throughout multiple Iraqi provinces.

102. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, can you assess the threat
posed by AQI, and whether that threat is growing or diminishing?
General Dempsey. The threat from AQI has increased since the
conclusion of Operation New Dawn in late 2011 and is growing. The
absence of sustained effective counterterrorism pressure has allowed
AQI to maintain an increased operational tempo inside Iraq. Although
AQI primarily focuses attacks against the Iraqi Government, the group
remains an active member of the broader al Qaeda associated movement
and is committed to projecting its influence outside Iraq as part of
its long-term strategy. The United States and Europe are standing
targets for potential AQI attacks and are a recurring theme in its
public statements. On 25 January, AQI indicated publicly it would
strike the United States abroad now that U.S. forces have departed
Iraq--an allusion similarly made in AQI's August 2011 video eulogy for
al Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin.

U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN

103. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, the administration's
announcement to end combat operations in Afghanistan in 2013 sends
exactly the wrong signal to our friends and enemies in this conflict.
It continues the administration's policy of publicly telegraphing exit
plans in a way that fundamentally undermines our overall strategy and
our determination to succeed. What incentive can the Taliban possibly
have to negotiate meaningfully with the Afghanistan Government or with
us when they know that the United States is leaving regardless?
Secretary Panetta. In 2013, coalition forces will continue to
transition security responsibilities to the ANSF, and will assume a
supporting role as part of the Security Force Assistance strategy.
Coalition forces will continue to operate side-by-side with their ANSF
counterparts while providing key enabler support to combat insurgent
threats. Coalition forces' transition to a supporting role in
Afghanistan is a critical and necessary step toward mission
accomplishment. Doing this with less coalition combat power on the
ground will increase ANSF confidence and lead to their success while
reducing insurgent capacity. As the ANSF grows in capacity, capability,
and confidence, fewer coalition forces will be required.
At the end of 2014, U.S. forces will complete their drawdown and
end combat operations; however the U.S. Government will continue to
support the ANSF. The Strategic Partnership Agreement, which is
currently under negotiation, will specify the U.S. role in Afghanistan
after 2014, and outline the U.S. Government's long-term commitment to
Afghanistan.

104. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, reportedly, the top
military commander in Afghanistan privately recommended holding off new
U.S. troop reductions until 2014. Is this true and, if so, why did you
decide to announce a plan that does not take the views of our military
commanders into account?
Secretary Panetta. I know of no such private recommendation
concerning U.S. forces reductions. The force reductions that have
occurred and will occur are part of the recovery of the U.S. surge
forces, first ordered into Afghanistan at the time of the President's
2009 West Point speech. DOD's recommendations concerning these
reductions as well as future force reductions will be made in full
cooperation with the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. His
recommendations will be key to any decision regarding U.S. force
strength.

105. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, exactly what conditions on
the ground will be assessed to determine the pace of combat force
reductions?
Secretary Panetta. The campaign plan calls for several conditions
to be met before completion of the transition in Afghanistan. The
ability of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide
suitable and sustainable security for a given area will be a key factor
in determining U.S. and coalition forces presence.

106. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in your opinion, what is the
military value of announcing a U.S. combat force withdrawal schedule as
it pertains to the operations of the Taliban?
General Dempsey. The administration stated we will reduce 23,000
additional troops by October 2012, thereby fully recovering the surge
force ordered by the President at his December 2009 West Point speech.
Beyond the surge force, we have not specifically laid out the timeline
of further reductions as these will be based on conditions on the
ground. We believe the reductions that have been planned support our
goal of transitioning lead for security to ANSF. Transitioning security
lead will be an orderly process and will ensure the ANSF can retain the
hard fought security gains even in the most contested areas of the
country. The transition must signal to the Taliban that there will be a
capable, indigenous force that will maintain security for the long-
term.

107. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, wouldn't quickly cutting U.S.
troop levels below 68,000 make it harder to clear and hold insurgent
havens and complicate efforts to protect supply lines and bases ahead
of the scheduled 2014 handover?
General Dempsey. General Allen presented the plan to recover the
33,000 member surge force to the President, which will bring the number
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 68,000. The plan for further
reductions will be based on conditions on the ground. There are several
initiatives in place that will serve to counter insurgent havens and
protect supply lines. Developing a capable and sustainable ANSF will
provide long-term security for Afghanistan. Pursuing programs such as
the Afghan Local Police will serve to maintain security gains, and
building the Afghan Public Protection Force will provide security at
bases and along supply routes.

108. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, is there a risk of a troop
withdrawal below 68,000 before 2014 negatively affecting the rapid-
response capabilities that now allow the military to evacuate wounded
soldiers to combat hospitals within 1 hour of their injuries?
General Dempsey. We currently plan on drawing down to 68,000 with
no further plans to go below 68,000 until conditions on the ground
allow. Regardless of the number of boots-on-the-ground, enablers such
as medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) will be of key importance not only to
U.S. troops, but our coalition partners as well. In February, MEDEVAC
response times were well below 1 hour in 90 percent of operations.

SEQUESTRATION

109. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, as you may know, the
President's proposal to address sequestration with an alternative of
tax increases and entitlement adjustments may not make it through
Congress. Other than this proposal, this budget proposal does not
account for the current spending cap imposed by sequestration for
defense programs in fiscal year 2013. You have described the
consequences of sequestration as catastrophic. Exactly how would these
consequences be catastrophic? Please be specific.
Secretary Panetta. DOD is concerned that the sequestration process
would have significant consequences due to the uncertainty surrounding
the process and the rigid formula which Congress has prescribed for its
application. Assuming the fiscal year 2013 Defense Appropriations Act
Conference Report contains language similar to the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference accompanying Division A-DOD
Appropriations Act, 2012, DOD would be forced to reduce each line item
within each procurement appropriation by the same percentage and each
program element within each research and development appropriation by
the same percentage. This percentage would be calculated based on the
total budgetary resources, primarily the enacted fiscal year 2013
appropriation and any unobligated balances carried forward at the end
of fiscal year 2012. Some obvious examples of the problems this method
would cause are found in line items such as those for a ship, where it
is not feasible to buy a fraction of a ship, or in a line item funding
a multiyear contract where a fraction of the funding would not be
sufficient to pay the negotiated cost of the multiyear contract. With
over 1,500 individual line items in these accounts, DOD could not fix
all of these issues with the transfer authority that Congress typically
provides; this would leave broken programs across DOD. Additionally,
sequestration would force an immediate reduction in our operation and
maintenance accounts which could damage readiness. Funding provided for
OCO is also not excluded from sequestration.

110. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, will you exempt military
personnel from sequestration?
Secretary Panetta. The President's budget makes the necessary
budget constrictions to avoid devastating DOD through sequestration. If
sequestration becomes an inevitability, DOD will evaluate all options
available to comply with the law.

111. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, when will you provide to
Congress a detailed impact of sequester on the fiscal year 2013 budget?
Secretary Panetta. Congress should enact comprehensive, balanced
deficit reduction legislation that avoids sequestration. The
President's budget offers one path for doing so. If and when necessary,
the administration will address important technical questions
concerning sequestration. If there were to be a sequester, a detailed
impact of sequester could not be provided until we know what the actual
funding level would be for fiscal year 2013 by account and program.

112. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, when will the Military
Services be able to provide Congress with a list of programs and
accounts to be reduced or terminated as a result of imposing
sequestration caps for the fiscal year 2014 budget?
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2014 budget will be developed
using DOD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.
This process will be implemented in coordination with the White House
and OMB. Any changes to our budget required by revised caps on the
defense budget will be developed through this process and delivered to
Congress in February 2013.

113. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in your opinion, what impact
will the cuts have on our ability to carry out operational plans in
support of national security interests around the world?
General Dempsey. The across-the-board cuts called for by
sequestration would pose unacceptable risk in the execution of
operational plans. These cuts would significantly reduce military
readiness, investment, and force structure, hollowing the force and
degrading U.S. military power.

114. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, will you provide the
President with an operational risk assessment on the impact of
sequestration before the end of the fiscal year?
General Dempsey. All strategies and their associated budgets carry
some risk, but sequestration goes beyond the level of acceptable risk.
Sequestration would likely result in a smaller force structure that is
ill-equipped, ill-trained, and ill-prepared to meet future challenges.
Because of its wide-ranging impact on the health of the force,
sequestration would require a complete reevaluation of our defense
strategy and priorities to determine the true operational risks
involved.

115. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, will you also provide this
assessment to Congress so that it will be available to inform debate on
the issue?
General Dempsey. All strategies and their associated budgets carry
some risk, but sequestration goes beyond the level of acceptable risk.
Sequestration would likely result in a smaller force structure that is
ill-equipped, ill-trained, and ill-prepared to meet future challenges.
Because of its wide-ranging impact on the health of the force,
sequestration would require a complete reevaluation of our defense
strategy and priorities to determine the true operational risks
involved.

116. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, the President has indicated
that he will veto any legislation that undoes sequestration without tax
increases. Have you raised your concerns on this matter to the
President?
General Dempsey. The administration and the military and civilian
leadership of DOD are united behind the strategy and budget that we
have presented. Sequestration, however, would subject DOD to roughly
another $500 billion in cuts across all accounts and would hollow out
the force, driving unacceptable risk to national defense.

117. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, do you support proposed
congressional legislation to protect defense accounts from being
affected by sequestration?
General Dempsey. The administration and the military and civilian
leadership of DOD are united behind the strategy and budget that we
have presented. Sequestration, however, would clearly pose unacceptable
risk by significantly reducing U.S. military readiness, investment, and
force structure, hollowing the force and degrading U.S. military power.
We will continue to work with OMB and Congress to properly resource the
capability to defend our Nation and our allies.

118. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, the BCA in August 2011 did
not actually mandate a specific reduction to defense budgets of $487
billion over 10 years. The administration stated on July 31, 2011,
that: ``The deal puts us on track to cut $350 billion from the defense
budget over 10 years. These reductions will be implemented based on the
outcome of a review of our missions, roles, and capabilities that will
reflect the President's commitment to protecting our national
security.'' The reduction of $487 billion in defense budgets was
provided to you by OMB in November 2011 after imposing an arbitrary 10
percent reduction to all Federal agencies. The administration's goal
was for more than half of the first tranche of reductions in total
discretionary spending ($917 billion) imposed by the BCA caps to come
from the national security accounts. Given the significant increase to
the risk to our national security from the cuts to military personnel
end strength and force structure, why do you believe a $487 billion
reduction is acceptable to incur?
Secretary Panetta. The defense budget cuts we are absorbing are
difficult but manageable. Specific reductions were guided by a
comprehensive DOD strategic review which identified missions and
capabilities essential to safeguarding U.S. and allied security
interests in light of the most likely challenges posed by the future
global environment. While U.S. Armed Forces will be smaller in number,
we will ensure that they are ready, agile, flexible, and capable
forces, with a forward presence that positions them to respond quickly
in the event of threats or contingencies. The budget also preserves or
enhances investments in key areas of continuing urgency, such as
counterterrorism efforts and counter WMD, and areas that will grow in
prominence in coming years, such as space, cyber, and missile defense.

119. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, did you have an opportunity
to advocate to the OMB or the President for a smaller reduction than
$487 billion in cuts over 10 years?
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2013 budget reflects the results
of a comprehensive DOD strategic review which identified missions and
capabilities essential to safeguarding U.S. and allied security
interests in light of the most likely challenges posed by the future
global environment. This strategic shift would have occurred regardless
of the Nation's fical situation. DOD's most senior leaders led the
review, which included extensive engagement by the National Security
Staff and the President. Given the size and mandatory missions of the
other national security agencies, the President was limited in making
significant funding allocations among agencies within the security
category cap imposed by the BCA. DOD employed a strategy-based process
in formulating its fiscal year 2013 budget request. OMB and the White
House were represented throughout the process. The budget resulting
from this process is adequate to meet our current requirements.

120. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, aside from the issue of
sequestration, do you anticipate that DOD will be asked by this
administration to cut defense budgets even deeper than you have
proposed in the fiscal year 2013 FYDP or deeper than the $487 billion
in cuts you have proposed over the next 10 years?
Secretary Panetta. We currently do not anticipate a further
reduction in defense spending in future budgets, provided Congress
enacts a deficit reduction package and avoids sequestration and the
further impact of the BCA. If no action is taken to change the
provisions of the BCA, DOD's 2014 budget would be required to be
reduced further to meet the revised security limit provided in the Act.
The fiscal year 2013 President's budget reflects the administration's
national defense plan for the next 10 years. The plan calls for DOD's
base budget to grow, albeit slowly, over that period.

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

121. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, on February 8, 2012, the
Governments of the United States and Japan issued a joint statement on
the U.S. strategic review of its defense posture in Asia. The two
governments have officially started discussions to change the terms the
2006 agreement. What is the new plan and timeline for the relocation of
marines from Okinawa?
Secretary Panetta. Since February, we have been engaged in
intensive discussions with the Government of Japan regarding U.S. plans
to relocate some U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam. The size of the
U.S. Marine Corps force we establish on Guam will be smaller than
previously planned, and this change will be made in the context of our
overall laydown of Marine Corps forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The
new plan and timeline is pending the outcome of our current discussions
with the Government of Japan and the completion of necessary
environmental studies.

122. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, what are DOD's estimates
for costs to build facilities at new locations?
Secretary Panetta. The Navy has provided the response via a
classified briefing to Senate Armed Services Committee staff.

123. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, are all of these costs
included in the current budget or the FYDP?
Secretary Panetta. No. The Marine Corps continues to generate,
revise, and analyze projected costs associated with Marine Corps force
posture revision and bilateral negotiations. As outlined in section
2207 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, we will present a master plan
for construction once completed.

124. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, how is the President's
strategic direction to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region
actually reflected in the budget proposal for fiscal year 2013?
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2013 budget request protects
and, in some cases, increases investments that are critical to our
ability to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, to include our
ability to project power. For instance, this budget funds the
development of next-generation bomber and new aerial refueling
aircraft. Additionally, the Navy will invest in a design for Virginia-
class submarines that will allow these submarines to carry
significantly more cruise missiles, and potentially provide an undersea
conventional prompt strike capability. This budget also invests
resources in increasing stocks of our most capable cruise missiles;
purchasing advanced maritime patrol aircraft; upgrading avionics and
communications systems in our current bomber fleet; and enhancing
capabilities in space, cyber, electronic warfare, missile defense, and
ISR systems.
The strategy envisions more elements of the Joint Force postured
forward in the Asia-Pacific region--reinforcing our stabilizing and
deterrence presence in the region, as well as increasing potential
combat power. The budget request funds the rotational deployment of
marines and U.S. Air Force aircraft to Australia and the potential for
rotational deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. The Navy
will also rebalance its fleet so that a greater percentage is in the
Pacific, and all the Services will continue to maintain significant
force structure in the region as they look to increase interaction with
allies and partners.

125. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, since announced plans call
for Marine Corps forces to rotate to Australia or Guam, 8,700 marines
and their families will be leaving Okinawa to be stationed somewhere
else--where will they go?
Secretary Panetta. Many of the marines based in Okinawa are
rotational. These marines deploy to Okinawa unaccompanied under the
Unit Deployment Program (UDP). Their family members remain behind at
the unit's home base, either in Hawaii or CONUS. Under DOD's current
plan, some of these UDP units will continue to deploy to Okinawa, some
will deploy to Guam, and others will rotate through Australia. These
rotational forces will be supported by small headquarters and logistics
elements that will be permanently stationed at these locations and may
be accompanied by their families. The planned numbers of marines and
their family members at each location is currently under review and has
not been finalized.

126. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, since the U.S. Government
has signaled its intent to delink tangible progress on the construction
of a replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma
on Okinawa from other actions to relocate marines from bases in the
southern part of Okinawa, what is DOD's plan for the future of the MCAS
Futenma?
Secretary Panetta. The February 8, 2012, U.S.-Japan Joint Statement
confirmed the continued mutual support for the current Futenma
Replacement Facility (FRF) plan as the only viable alternative to
continued operation of MCAS Futenma. Recognizing that even under the
best scenario, the realization of that plan is several years away, we
are currently discussing with the Government of Japan conditions under
which they can contribute to the sustainment of operations at MCAS
Futenma until the FRF is complete.

127. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, will DOD abide by the
requirements in section 2207 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012?
Secretary Panetta. We will abide by the requirements in section
2207 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. I look forward to the
opportunity to update the committee on our progress for these
requirements later in the year.

NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS

128. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
although DOD's new Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes a rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific region--predominantly a maritime theater--the
administration's plan calls for the Navy to retire seven cruisers and
two other major amphibious ships needed by the Marine Corps earlier
than planned. In addition, the administration plans to delay buying a
large-deck amphibious ship, a Virginia-class attack submarine, two
Littoral Combat Ships, and eight high-speed transport vessels. What
effect will fewer cruisers, submarines, and amphibious ships have in
responding to crises in the Asia-Pacific theater--especially a large-
scale one, with an equal or near-equal peer?
Secretary Panetta. While the fleet size will fall slightly in the
next few years, it will return to its current level by the end of the
FYDP and even grow slightly into the early 2020s. The Navy will
continue to prioritize readiness, and our fiscal year 2013 budget
submission fully funds ship maintenance and midlife modernization
periods. We are also investing in shipbuilding and aircraft
construction to ensure that the Navy will evolve to remain the world's
preeminent maritime force in the face of emerging threats and our
shipbuilding and aircraft construction investments form the foundation
of the future fleet. In developing our aircraft and ship procurement
plans, we focused on three approaches: sustaining serial production of
today's proven platforms, rapidly fielding new platforms in
development, and improving the capability of today's platforms through
new payloads of weapons, sensors, and unmanned vehicles.
The Navy can meet the Defense Strategic Guidance with the current
and projected force structure provided in the Navy's President's budget
submission for 2013. Consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance,
the Navy will posture continuous, credible combat power in the Western
Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital
interests, assure friends and allies, and deter potential adversaries.
Naval forces remain flexible and agile, able to swing rapidly in
response to emergent high priority requirements in other theaters, as
well as to surge from U.S. homeports in the event of crises. The Navy
can meet these challenges under our current operational tempo and
deployment lengths.
General Dempsey. Specific resourcing decisions were made through a
comprehensive strategic review that included detailed analysis by the
Joint Staff, the Services, and OSD. These decisions were made with
serious consideration of the risk and our ability to mitigate the risk
by balancing fleet forces across the globe.
Planned naval force structure maintains the ability to conduct a
large-scale naval campaign in one region while denying the objectives
of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. The strategic review
and long-range shipbuilding plan accepted risk in generating the 30
operationally available ships necessary to conduct a two-Marine
Expeditionary Brigade forcible entry operation, but lowered risk by
building to an average active inventory of 32 amphibious ships in the
long-range shipbuilding plan. The 21st Century Battle Force will be
informed by the completion of a formal Force Structure Assessment and
the ongoing DOD review of operational plans for potential regional
contingencies.

129. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
Marine Corps has a standing requirement for 38 amphibious ships to
support its amphibious assault mission, which has not changed as a
result of the new Defense Strategic Guidance. The Marine Corps and the
Navy have accepted risk by allowing the number of amphibious ships to
remain at 33. Further reductions below 33 amphibious ships is
inconsistent with the Marine Corps mission to maintain a viable
amphibious assault capability and is particularly unjustified with a
renewed focus on a rotational presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Please describe how decommissioning ships early and delays in buying
new ships--as proposed in the proposed budget request--is consistent
with: (1) the President's new Defense Strategic Guidance; and (2) the
maritime mobility needs of the Pacific and the forces needed to oppose
anti-access area denial strategies in the Asia-Pacific region,
including China.
Secretary Panetta. The decision to decommission seven Ticonderoga-
class cruisers and two amphibious ships was made to ensure sufficient
resources were available for readiness while maintaining the proper mix
of capability in the battle force in a fiscally constrained
environment. The Navy selected ships for decommissioning based on an
analysis of the costs required to sustain their material condition and
update their combat capability. The selected ships had little or no
previous modernization completed, were the oldest ships in their class
and would become increasingly expensive to maintain, operate, and
upgrade to remain relevant to evolving threats.
The Navy has certified to the Secretary of Defense that we will
meet the fiscal year 2013 Global Force Management Allocation Plan and
requirements in the Defense Strategic Guidance. From fiscal year 2013
through fiscal year 2020, the Navy ship inventory and extrapolated
force presence will increase in the Asia-Pacific and Arabian Gulf
regions.
General Dempsey. Resourcing decisions were made through a
comprehensive strategic review that was aligned to the President's
strategic guidance. The review included detailed analysis by the Joint
Staff, the Services, and OSD.
The strategic review focused primarily on sustaining Amphibious
Readiness Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units forward in the Western
Pacific and Arabian Gulf in a crisis response role. It took risk in
generating the 30 operationally available ships necessary to conduct a
two-Marine Expeditionary Brigade forcible entry operation. To lower
risk, the long-range shipbuilding plan strives to maintain an average
active inventory of 32 amphibious ships.

EARMARKS IN THE DEFENSE BILL

130. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, the Fiscal Year 2012
Defense Appropriations Bill contained approximately 100 items and slush
funds that were neither requested by DOD nor authorized in the NDAA.
These programs, earmarked by the Appropriations Committees, totaled
over $3.5 billion. The proposed reductions of $487 billion over 10
years does not include rolling back the earmarks that were not top DOD
priorities. Since you are restricted from reprogramming earmarked funds
to higher DOD priorities by provisions in Defense Appropriations bills
that require you to carry out the earmark at the exact levels of
funding provided, and given the fiscal constraints you are under, will
you work with me to remove these provisions from future appropriations
bills in order to provide the flexibility to spend funds on urgent,
unforeseen requirements actually validated by DOD?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's position is that the President's budget
requests what is required to meet our mission requirements each year.
Upon enactment of an appropriations act, DOD executes the enacted
programs, complying with reprogramming and transfer authorities.

131. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, if you are presented a
request for a formal position on a particular spending item of this
nature, can I expect a firm and unequivocal position from you stating
why you either oppose or support the spending?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, DOD leaders and I are always prepared to
state opposition to unrequested changes to the President's budget
because these changes divert funding from DOD's most pressing
requirements, as detailed in the budget.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

132. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, how well the JSF program
does under its contract for the fourth block of low-rate initial
production (LRIP-4) aircraft by the end of the year was supposed to
indicate how much the program is on track. But, with only about 50
percent of that work completed to date, we are already expecting a
total overrun (including concurrency costs) of almost $500 million. In
addition, on November 29, 2011, DOD's F-35 JSF Concurrency Quick Look
Report called for serious reconsideration of procurement and production
planning. And, just a few weeks ago, DOD's Chief Operational Tester
reported that a team consisting of the Services' operational test
agencies found that the F-35 program is not on track to meeting
operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements. I
know we don't pay for all of the projected overrun on Lot 4, but with
that estimate and the assessments I just described, how can taxpayers
be confident that we're headed in the right direction?
Secretary Panetta. The strategic and budget reviews carried out
last fall reaffirmed the importance of the JSF program to the future
joint force. A number of steps were taken to align the program with the
outcomes of the these reviews of the Quick Look Report, including the
decision to slow the production ramp rate and align it with advances in
program maturity. Control of production costs is being achieved in part
by movement from cost-plus to fixed-price-type contracts and
developmental maturity progress. The F-35 program team achieved a
number of accomplishments over the past year, including the delivery of
13 aircraft and completion of initial F-35B sea trials on the USS Wasp.
The program completed F-35C static structural testing and improved the
schedule and cost performance of assembled wings and forward fuselage
deliveries to the production line mate station. Production F-35A and F-
35B have started Local Area Flights at Eglin AFB.
The F-35 LRIP Lot 4 contracts were negotiated as fixed-price
incentive-fee (firm target)-type contracts. The prime contractor,
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company (LM Aero), is projected to overrun
LRIP 4 costs by approximately 7 percent. This overrun percentage is
approximately half the overrun experienced on the F-35 LRIP Lots 1 to 3
cost-reimbursement-type contracts. On the LRIP Lot 4 contracts, overrun
costs on the aircraft and engines are shared equally between the
Government and the contractor until the overrun exceeds 20 percent of
the target cost, at which point the contractor is responsible for all
additional overrun costs.
Overall, there is much work ahead, but, through the multiple
successful reviews and corresponding adjustments in the past year, I
believe DOD has put the program on sound footing for the future. DOD's
assessments over the past year give me reason to believe the basic
aircraft designs are sound and will deliver. The remaining development
is focused on testing and integration. Schedule and resource
adjustments made to the remaining development program underpin a
realistic plan to deliver the required capability. While there is still
risk in the program, I have confidence in the resilience of the plan to
absorb expected further learning and discovery and stay on track as
long as it remains sufficiently resourced.

133. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, why, given these recent
developments, did you believe that lifting the F-35B from probation 1
year early was appropriate?
Secretary Panetta. In January 2011, Secretary Gates placed the F-
35B on what he referred to as probationary status because it was
experiencing significant technical issues. F-35B testing was decoupled
from the other two variants, allowing the program to increase focus on
F-35B-specific issues while testing on the other variants progressed.
Of the five specific technical issues identified by Secretary Gates in
2011, two have been resolved and three have temporary fixes in place
while efforts to develop permanent solutions are ongoing. All three
variants improved their testing performance in 2011. In particular, the
F-35B successfully completed more flights (333 completed/293 planned)
and more test points (2,636 completed/2,272 planned) than planned.
I made the decision to lift probation of the F-35B because it is
now demonstrating development, test, and production maturity comparable
to and not substantively different from the other variants. As with the
other variants, some additional technical issues have been identified
on the F-35B since probation began; however, these are consistent with
the kinds of issues to be expected in a development program.

134. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, is there a Plan B for the
F-35 JSF if both procurement and sustainment costs are not controlled
and if so, what could those options be?
Secretary Panetta. Currently, we are focused on reducing
procurement and sustainment costs. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) has directed
procurement affordability targets that will help ensure that, as the F-
35 program reaches the point that it is ready for full-rate production,
DOD will be able to afford to procure the quantities it needs.
Similarly, the USD(AT&L) established sustainment affordability targets
that will allow us to communicate expectations to the contractor so we
can control the cost to operate each aircraft, the annual costs to the
Services, and how much investment will be required over the total life
cycle of the F-35 program.
These affordability targets, and more importantly the actual costs
that we realize over the coming years, will provide us a better
understanding of whether we can afford to buy, fly, and sustain the
current total requirement.
If we are unable to reach affordable F-35 procurement and
sustainment costs, our first option would be to reduce the total
planned procurement quantities. Currently, the total planned
procurement for DOD is 2,443 F-35 aircraft. If the Services and DOD
determine that this plan is unaffordable, we would have to look at a
reduction to the total buy that is affordable. A reduction in the total
procurement quantity would also reduce total sustainment costs. Any
review of the total quantity would be conducted by assessing
affordability projections and capability requirements.
From a capability perspective, there is no alternative to the F-35.
The fifth generation capabilities that the F-35 will provide are
essential to accomplishing many of the primary missions identified in
the National Security Strategy. An affordable F-35 program will allow
DOD to replace legacy aircraft with fewer, more capable multi-role
strike fighter aircraft well-suited to meet the leaner requirements of
the new Defense Strategic Guidance.

HEALTH CARE

135. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
budget proposes further TRICARE reforms which have been endorsed by
senior military leaders. What are the risks to DOD--in budget and
readiness terms--if Congress fails to enact the administration's
proposed health care reforms?
Secretary Panetta. If Congress does not provide us with needed
support, DOD's new Defense Strategy Guidance will be at risk. Without
the needed authority to implement these reforms, DOD will face further
cuts in forces and investment to be consistent with the BCA. DOD's
budget proposal already makes substantial reductions in the investment
accounts, so further cuts might fall mostly on forces. This could mean
cutting additional Active Duty and Reserve Forces by fiscal year 2017
to such an extent that DOD's ability to carry out the new Defense
Strategic Guidance could be jeopardized.
General Dempsey. If Congress fails to enact the proposed health
care reforms, DOD will be forced to shoulder the increasing cost of
military health care, likely at the expense of force structure and in
modernization. DOD's budget proposal already makes substantial
reductions in the investment accounts so further cuts could mean
cutting additional Active Duty and Reserve Forces, which would impact
DOD's ability to pursue the new Defense Strategic Guidance.

136. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
additional reforms are necessary to better manage the current and
future costs of military health care benefits?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD will continue to
aggressively pursue all possible avenues to better manage the current
and future costs of military health care. Changes in beneficiary cost-
sharing represent only one of the key steps that we are taking to
improve health care and reduce the rate of growth in health care costs.
We are also employing other approaches, including: (1) Moving from
healthcare to health, investing in initiatives that keep our people
well while promoting healthy lifestyle; (2) maximizing internal
efficiencies that reduce the administrative overhead of our military
health system; and (3) reforming provider payments by responsibly
paying private care providers and aligning with Medicare reimbursement
levels, as required by law.

CARE MANAGEMENT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

137. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, 5 years have passed since
revelations by the press of substandard care management for wounded
warriors at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which brought disgrace
on our Nation and our Government. Since that time, many reforms have
been instituted, and yet, according to recent testimony by the GAO,
implementation of reforms intended to streamline the care management
for the wounded, especially those transitioning to civilian life,
continue to be plagued by bureaucratic turf battles between DOD and the
VA, such that, according to GAO `` . . . the intended purpose of these
programs--to better manage and facilitate care and services--may
actually have the opposite effect . . . .'' What steps has DOD taken to
respond to the recommendations of GAO, as well as the Wounded Warrior
Care Coordination Summit, and numerous other studies to improve care
management for the wounded?
Secretary Panetta. First, in response to GAO's findings and
recommendations in the March 2011 Report titled ``Federal Recovery
Program Continues to Expand, but Faces Significant Challenges,'' a
majority of them pertained to implementation and oversight of the VA's
Federal Recovery Coordination Program. There are, however, two areas of
the report that directly involve DOD:

Duplication of case management efforts between VA and
DOD
Lack of access to equipment at installations
Duplication of Case Management Efforts between VA and DOD
DOD policy is that recovering servicemembers have the service of a
Recovery Care Coordinator (RCC), and that some may have a Federal
Recovery Coordinator (FRC) closer to when it is known that the
servicemember will transition out of the military and become a veteran.
The Service Wounded Warrior programs, in coordination with the Federal
Recovery Coordination Program, have drafted policy to implement a
referral process that is consistent with the Services desire to retain
responsibility for their recovering servicemembers.
Lack of Access to Equipment at Installations
Currently, there are 11 FRCs located at 5 major military medical
treatment facilities. These FRCs have designated workspaces and
equipment access.
Second, the Wounded Warrior Care Coordination Summit consisted of
four chartered working groups, each focused on a key area:

1. Education and Employment
2. FRC/RCC Collaboration
3. In Pursuit of Excellence--Documenting Best Practices
4. Wounded Warrior Family Resilience

Working group participants included multiple Federal agencies (VA,
Department of Labor, DOD's Offices of Wounded Warrior Care and
Transition Policy (WWCTP), and Military Community and Family Policy
(MCFP)), as well as representatives from each of the Military Services.
Several recommendations are currently being carried out by the
Recovery Coordination Program or its component programs. Additional
recommendations are being carried out by other participating agencies.
The outcomes of the Education and Employment Work Group were
expected to be: the achievement of a comprehensive strategy to provide
recovering servicemembers career-focused transition support early in
their rehabilitation; development of policy and guidance, including the
provision of resources when necessary; and establishment of outcome
measures and synchronization and leveraging of existing efforts to
ensure a consistent experience by all recovering servicemembers who
seek education or employment opportunities.
FRC/RCC collaboration resulted in five recommendations for better
integration and synchronization across these two programs. All have
been implemented as well as better communication among program
leadership and participation in each other's program training venues.
Recommendations of the Best Practices working group are being
implemented with the goal of achieving a consistent experience for all
recovering servicemembers across the continuum of care, including equal
access to resources; and the adaptation of support services to meet the
potential changing needs of servicemembers and families.
The Wounded Warrior Family Resiliency Working Group came up with
several recommendations, most of which are actively being implemented
by the combined efforts of the two DOD offices, MCFP and WWCTP, charged
with coordinating and executing these programs.

138. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, do you have confidence that
the Senior Oversight Committee of DOD and VA is capable of
strengthening and improving these systems of care for our wounded or is
there a more efficient mechanism that should be established in its
place?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, there is a more efficient mechanism that
has replaced the Senior Oversight Committee. On January 19, 2012, the
Joint Executive Committee Co-Chairs, who are the DOD Under Secretary of
Defense (Personnel & Readiness) and VA Deputy Secretary, agreed to
consolidate the SOC and JEC forums based on the recommendation from the
DOD Recovering Warrior Task Force. The new consolidated Joint Executive
Committee was given the guidance to:

Clearly articulate wounded, ill, and injured
servicemember issues
Include the appropriate level of senior leadership
Maintain former Senior Oversight Committee Wounded,
Ill, and Injured programs

In order to maintain a high level of visibility, the membership of
the new Joint Executive Committee now includes the Services Under
Secretaries and Vice Chiefs, Special Operations Command, the DOD
Comptroller, the ASDs for Health Affairs, and Reserve Affairs, and from
the VA the Under Secretaries for Health and Benefits, Principal Deputy
Under Secretary for Benefits, VA Assistant Secretaries for Information
Technology, and Policy and Planning, among other senior level members.
To ensure that systems of care for our wounded, ill, and injured
are maintained, strengthened, and improved:

All ongoing Senior Oversight Committee issues,
programs, and initiatives have been identified and
appropriately handed off to the Joint Executive Committee for
continued oversight and support.
In order to ensure any new and emerging recovery
warrior issues are quickly and adequately addressed, a new
joint Wounded, Ill, and Injured Subcommittee has been created
under the Joint Executive Committee to oversee these matters.
Emerging Wounded Warrior issues are now addressed
bimonthly at Joint Executive Committee meeting and quarterly
with DOD and VA Secretaries.

The integration of DOD and VA into a single team under the Joint
Executive Committee allows a world class continuum of care for our
wounded, ill, and injured warriors in such areas as:

Integrated Disability Evaluation System
Caregivers
Environmental/Toxic Exposures
Integrated Mental Health Strategy
Suicide Prevention
Electronic Health Record
Benefits

Some of the accomplishments to date include:

Increased sharing of health information between DOD
and VA
Implementation of new approaches to support patients,
their families, and caregivers
Development of new approaches to address suicide,
Traumatic Brain Injury, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Developed and implemented a Disability Evaluation
System pilot aimed toward one disability rating system
administered by both DOD and VA
Coordinated health care, rehabilitation, and delivery
of services that resulted in facilitating the highest level of
support ever to the wounded, ill, and injured
Comprehensive legislative and public affairs efforts
to keep servicemembers, veterans, family members, the public,
DOD/VA leadership, and Congress informed of new developments in
care

non-competitive health care contracts
139. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, DOD is required by law to
enter into sole source, non-competitive contracts with six commercial
health plans, known as the Uniformed Services Family Health Plan
(USFHP) that provide health care services to a small portion of DOD
family members and retirees at a cost of approximately $1.2 billion per
year. Do the contracts in effect today comply with the statutory
requirement for cost neutrality? If not, why not?
Secretary Panetta. Based on the most current data available to DOD
(fiscal year 2011), the negotiated rates provided to the USFHP plans
currently exceed the amounts mandated under Sec 726(b) of Public Law
104-201.
Beneficiaries Under Age 65--For beneficiaries under the age 65, DOD
estimates that the average cost per USFHP Prime enrollee was about 13
percent higher than the average cost per non-USFHP Prime enrollee, even
after adjusting for both geography and age/gender mix differences. This
cost difference is due to the fact that the fiscal year 2011 USFHP
rates were based on fiscal year 2009 costs trended to fiscal year 2011.
During the fiscal years 2009 to 2011 period, TRICARE Management
Activity introduced the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS)
rates which decreased non-USFHP Prime costs significantly. In addition,
TRICARE Management Activity started to receive significant retail
pharmacy rebates which also decreased the costs for Prime enrollees. As
a result, costs for non-USFHP Prime enrollees increased more slowly
from fiscal years 2009 to 2011 than projected. The USFHP rates
incorporate the impact of pharmacy changes like OPPS and policy rebates
on a lagged basis. As a result, the USFHP rates for future years will
reflect these policy changes.
Beneficiaries Age 65 and Over--For beneficiaries age 65 and over,
with adjustments for geography or the age/gender mix, the USFHP costs
per enrollee were about 29 percent higher than the costs of the average
TRICARE For Life (TFL) beneficiary. The key reason for this 29 percent
difference is that the fiscal year 2011 USFHP rates were based upon the
costs of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, rather than the costs
of TFL beneficiaries. Now that reliable and accurate TFL data are
available for both the DOD and Medicare portions of TFL beneficiary
costs, the government has proposed to use actual TFL experience rather
than non-DOD Medicare experience to calculate the fiscal year 2013
ceiling rates, which we expect will lead to a significant decrease in
rates for this cohort. A second factor is that the fiscal year 2011
USFHP rates were based upon TRICARE pharmacy costs in fiscal year 2009.
Since fiscal year 2009, DOD has started to receive large retail
pharmacy rebates. These rebates are incorporated into the USFHP rates
on a lagged basis.

140. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, please provide a comparison
of the per beneficiary costs for those enrolled to the USFHP with: (1)
those for whom DOD pays for comparable health benefits under TRICARE
Prime for under age 65 beneficiaries under its competitively awarded
TRICARE contracts; and (2) over 65 USFHP enrollees compared to
Medicare/TFL.
Secretary Panetta. After accounting for differences in both
geography and the age/gender mix, the average USFHP cost per enrollee,
both under and over 65, was higher than the average cost per non-USFHP
Prime enrollee in fiscal year 2011. Due to ongoing contract
negotiations, the exact differences are not provided above; however DOD
is willing to provide additional data for the committee's use in a non-
public forum.

141. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, if there is any further
postponement of transition of future Medicare eligible enrollees to
Medicare/TFL, what would be the impact on the DOD budget in fiscal year
2013 and over the FYDP?
Secretary Panetta. The impact on the DOD budget would depend on the
specific period of delayed transition, and whether a pattern of
changing this date is perceived. The Medicare Eligible Retiree Health
Care Fund (MERHCF) Board of Actuaries responsible for approving the
methods and assumptions used to calculate the budget impact must adhere
to professional standards, which requires consideration of
historically-enacted legislative changes and the past practice or
pattern of plan changes. If the Board determines a pattern of delay in
the transition date, it will decide to change assumptions regarding the
impact of the legislation that will result in a significant increase in
cost for the DOD budget in required contributions to the MERHCF.
Additionally, any delay in the effective date of the changes enacted
last year would increase mandatory spending from the MERHCF during the
period of delay.

COST NEUTRALITY OF THE TRICARE PRIME BENEFIT

142. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, under current law, the
TRICARE Prime benefit for retirees is required not to exceed the costs
of civilian care obtained under TRICARE Standard. Does the cost of
TRICARE Prime comply with current law for cost neutrality? If not, why
not?
Secretary Panetta. The Prime benefit is no longer cost neutral
compared to Standard/Extra plans. Under current law, the TRICARE Prime
is supposed to be cost neutral--that is, government costs for Prime
should not exceed the government costs for TRICARE Standard. Section
731(c) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994 required that the benefit that
became known as TRICARE Prime ``shall be administered so that the costs
incurred by the Secretary under the TRICARE program are no greater than
the costs that would otherwise be incurred to provide health care to
the members of the uniformed services and covered beneficiaries who
participate in the TRICARE program.''
When TRICARE was implemented in 1996, the Prime enrollment fee was
set at a level higher than the standard fee in order to: (1) offset the
substantially reduced out-of-pocket costs, including the elimination of
the Standard deductible, the near-total elimination of the 25 percent
Standard inpatient co-pay, and the substantial reduction of outpatient
co-pays; and (2) make Prime cost neutral to the government. Subsequent
enactments regarding TRICARE for Active Duty family members have
superseded the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994 requirement for Active Duty
family members, but not for Prime-eligible retirees.
Over the intervening years, a significant disparity in the cost to
government between Prime and Standard developed. This disparity was
recognized in 2005 and resulted in proposals to adjust cost shares to
both Prime and Standard/Extra. DOD was largely prohibited from changing
fees and co-pays until fiscal year 2012. The net result is that Prime
is not cost neutral in relation to the Standard/Extra plans. For a
working retiree family of three, the cost to DOD of providing health
care in fiscal year 2011: Prime--$13,442; Standard--$11,267. Prime
enrollment fees or other cost-sharing would need to be adjusted to make
Prime cost-neutral to Standard.

143. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, is cost neutrality an
appropriate test, and if so, what steps should be taken to restore it?
Secretary Panetta. Cost neutrality is a laudable goal and our
efforts should try to move in that direction. However, we cannot get to
complete cost neutrality without significantly increasing the cost
shares under Prime above the levels proposed in the President's budget.
The proposed increases in the Prime enrollment fee are one part. We
also believe that increases in utilization management envisioned under
the Patient Center Medical Home concept that we are implementing will
bring the cost of Prime closer to Standard.

FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

144. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, this budget requests a
precipitous and dangerous drop in military end strength which I believe
puts our Nation's security at risk. Why is there little or no reduction
planned for DOD's Federal civilian workforce?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's fiscal year 2013 budget reflects a
balanced workforce that decreases overall spending on military end
strength and DOD's Federal civilian workforce, as well as on contract
services. It reflects our best judgment today and represents a
carefully coordinated approach based on DOD's strategy and policy that
balances operational needs and fiscal reality without placing national
security and our overall defense posture at risk. Proposed reductions
in the military personnel levels reflect declines in our current
overseas commitments; revised strategy, posture, and operational
planning; and changes to our force structure. Additionally, the budget
request includes proposed civilian reductions that are proportional, as
a percentage of the overall civilian workforce, to proposed reductions
in the military's end strength. Reductions in civilian personnel are
predominantly associated with ongoing organizational assessments and
mission/function prioritization in an effort to reduce administrative
workload. It is important to note that DOD's civilian workforce
performs key enabling functions for the operating forces, such as
critical training and preparation to ensure readiness, equipment
modernization and reset, medical care, family support, and base
operating and infrastructure services--all vital services that support
our men and women in uniform and help meet the Nation's security needs.

145. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, what is the current policy
for hiring new employees?
Secretary Panetta. DOD fills its positions following Merit Systems
Principles and Regulations developed by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). Within these parameters, DOD strives to be a fair and
equitable employer offering equal employment opportunity to all
qualified citizens. Because of its size and the diversity of its
missions, DOD uses a wide range of authorities to fill positions in
both the Competitive and Excepted service in virtually every occupation
imaginable. Our agencies hire applicants from the public and private
sectors, and we place special emphasis on hiring veterans, military
spouses, students, and people with disabilities. We strive to be
innovative and responsive in our efforts to recruit and retain the best
talent available to meet our mission objectives in supporting our
warfighters, and appreciate the support we receive from Congress to
further this effort.

146. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, why is the administration
seeking a pay raise for Federal employees who, according to a January
30, 2012, report from the Congressional Budget Office, are compensated
16 percent higher than their private sector counterparts, and enjoy a
48 percent advantage in benefits?
Secretary Panetta. The pay raise for civilians included in the
budget request is not set by DOD, but rather is based on a government-
wide determination by OPM on behalf of the President. With the current
freeze on salary cost-of-living adjustments for Federal workers, the
Federal Government's benefits package is a necessary factor in
remaining competitive for a variety of occupations and locations. While
the Federal Government may lead the market in the area of benefits, it
still lags the market with regard to salaries for some occupations. It
is important to note that DOD's civilian workforce performs key
enabling functions for the operating forces, such as critical training
and preparation to ensure readiness, equipment modernization and reset,
medical care, family support, and base operating and infrastructure
services--all vital services that support our men and women in uniform
and help meet the Nation's security needs. Further salary freezes are
not in the best interest of DOD and will have an adverse impact on
readiness, mission capability, and could result in increased reliance
on contracted services and increased fiscal obligations.

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS DRAWDOWN

147. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, I am concerned that a rapid
reduction in the end strength of the Army and the Marine Corps will
degrade the readiness of the combat forces and break faith with an All-
Volunteer Force that defeated the insurgency in Iraq, that continues to
fight in Afghanistan, and may be called on again to defend this Nation
against its enemies. I would like you to explain--with specificity,
year-by-year--how you foresee the Army reducing its Active Duty
strength by 70,000 soldiers in 5 years?
General Dempsey. As part of the new Defense Strategic Guidance, the
Army will downsize approximately 79,000 soldiers to 490,000 in the
Active component, and will reduce its Reserve components by 9,000 from
358,200 to 350,200 in the Army National Guard and from 206,000 to
205,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve by the end of the FYDP. Temporary end
strength increase for the Active component was authorized by Congress
in 2009. By the end of September 2013, the Army will reduce the 22,000
temporary end strength increase and return back to a permanent Active
component end strength of 547,400. Generally, the Army will reduce an
average of 11,000 soldiers per year.

148. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how do you envision achieving
these cuts using the manpower management tools available to shape the
force with incentives and early retirements?
General Dempsey. The Army's preliminary strategy provides a high
quality, mission-capable force, using precision, care, and compassion
to achieve end strength reductions without jeopardizing readiness. A
key precept of planning is that the Army will make the choices, to the
greatest extent possible, on who will remain and who will separate from
service. Although DOD's force reduction objectives include guidance to
maximize the use of voluntary separations, the Army's intent is to
apply lessons learned from the 1990s drawdown when the magnitude of the
voluntary separations made it difficult for the Army to control the
quality of those servicemembers choosing to separate. To ensure a
quality force following the drawdown and maintain faith with soldiers,
the Army intends to meet DOD's force reduction objectives by
selectively offering voluntary incentives (such as Temporary Early
Retirement Act) to soldiers whom the Army deems fully qualified but do
not meet the highest standards for continued service.

149. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, do you have a plan to address
the nondeployable population of our combat forces, such as about 25,000
Active Duty Army soldiers?
General Dempsey. Over 10 years of persistent and protracted
conflict has placed stress on the Army. The strain has increased the
rate of nondeployers at latest arrival date or date of deployment in
our BCT from 10 percent to 16 percent between fiscal year 2007 to
fiscal year 2011. From a tactical perspective, commanders at all levels
are actively engaged in identifying non-deployable soldiers and, in the
case of temporary non-deployable conditions, linking the soldier with
the requisite resources necessary to resolve the non-deployable
condition. From a strategic perspective, the Army staff is focused on
policy and implementation decisions necessary to reduce the non-
deployer rates in our units and to gain better visibility on the health
of the force. The Army established a Non-Deployable Campaign Plan in
April 2011 to develop systemic and policy changes aimed at reducing
this population. While we are only half way through fiscal year 2012
and there remain challenges with the units yet to deploy, we have seen
a reduction to just fewer than 13 percent so far this year. Since
medical issues continue to be the greatest contributor to non-
deployables, we are focusing on the Disability Evaluation System to
enhance, standardize, and establish measures of performance.

150. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how do you envision Army
leaders will accomplish this without demoralizing the force and
breaking faith with soldiers who have sacrificed greatly?
General Dempsey. The Army is a values-based organization. The basic
values of dignity and respect were integral to its drawdown planning.
First, the Army intends to use reduced accessions and minimize the
number of currently serving soldiers being asked to leave the Service.
Second, the Army will use our proven centralized selection board
processes to identify both commissioned and NCOs with the greatest
potential for continued service as it shapes the force by grade and
specialty. Finally, commanders will be empowered to retain only the
highest quality soldiers. When feasible, fully qualified soldiers
identified as excess due to strength limitations will be afforded the
option to volunteer for reclassification into a shortage skill. In lieu
of involuntary separation, voluntary options (when applicable) will be
afforded to fully-qualified soldiers targeted to leave the Service.

REVERSIBILITY

151. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, I am concerned that returning
to pre-September 11 personnel levels within 5 years may damage
readiness and create structural problems within the Services, while
subjecting military members to an economy that hardly is in a position
to welcome them with open arms. You have indicated that ``the Army will
retain more mid-grade officers and NCOs even as their overall end
strength decreases to ensure we will have the structure and experienced
leaders necessary to regrow the force quickly.'' This has been referred
to as reversibility. I am concerned that at the basic infantry level,
this will degrade combat capability over time. Can you explain what
reversibility means and how it will be achieved?
General Dempsey. The new Defense Strategic Guidance released in
January 2012 notes that since we cannot predict how the strategic
environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we need to manage the
force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities
should they be needed to meet future unforeseen demands. The strategy
also notes that we need to retain intellectual capital and rank
structure that can be utilized to expand key elements of the force. The
Army is examining strategies, policies, and investments that would
posture the Army to slow down and reverse drawdowns of Army end
strength and formations, and regenerate end strength over the course of
a number of years in response to a future crisis.
This will involve reexamining the mix of elements in the Active and
Reserve components, maintaining a strong National Guard and Army
Reserve, retaining a healthy cadre of experienced noncommissioned and
midgrade officers, and preserving the health and viability of the
Nation's defense industrial base.

152. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how will you avoid the repeat
of the poorly executed drawdown of the 1990s, which slashed recruiting
and first-term soldier strength, thus creating gaps that hurt the
Army--in order to retain more mid-career personnel?
General Dempsey. The Army's intent is to meet the fiscal year 2017
end strength targets with precision (by grade and skill) while
maintaining a high level of readiness and capability with an All-
Volunteer Force. We will minimize induced losses by lowering accessions
without jeopardizing future Army requirements. We will not sacrifice
our investment in leader development and will continue to shape
policies to support the Army's leader development strategy. We will
promote best-qualified soldiers to meet requirements. We will empower
commanders with the ability to retain soldiers with the greatest
potential for continued contributions. We will treat soldiers and their
families (both those who stay and those who leave) fairly.
The Army will target select NCOs (by means of a centralized
selection process) for involuntary separation when their grade/skill is
either projected over-strength or when promotion stagnation jeopardizes
viable career development paths in select career fields. Drawdown of
the force begins in fiscal year 2014 and continues over a 4-year
period. To ensure we prevent talent loss and to retain those
individuals with the greatest potential for future contributions, the
Army will decide who stays and who leaves; offering voluntary
separation options in lieu of involuntary separation when such
authority exists.
We will sequentially apply the levers of reduced accessions,
selective retention, force shaping boards, and voluntary incentives to
ensure that we retain high quality personnel as we achieve mandated end
strengths. We will also pursue qualified soldiers for transition to the
U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard where they can continue to serve.

153. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, would it not make more sense
to plan for a 10-year, conditions-based plan or one that adheres to the
original plan to reduce end strength by 49,000 soldiers?
General Dempsey. As part of the new Defense Strategic Guidance, the
Army will downsize approximately 79,000 soldiers to 490,000 in the
Active component by the end of fiscal year 2017. Initial planning for
the reduction noted three assumptions that must be achieved: (1) the
drawdown in Iraq will continue and that it will be completed by
December 31, 2011, (accomplished); (2) forces in Afghanistan will be
drawn down in accordance with current administration policy (on track);
and (3) Army forces will not be involved in a protracted conflict in
the immediate future (not expected). The Army's deliberate and
responsible drawdown plans will take into consideration operational
demands and unit readiness. It will proceed at a pace necessary to
ensure mission success and retain the flexibility to respond to
unforeseen demands at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for
our All-Volunteer Force. After conducting extensive analysis, the Army
concluded that maintaining end strength at 490,000 will meet the
demands described in the new Defense Strategic Guidance.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX FUNDING

154. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, last October you told the
House Armed Services Committee that you opposed attempts by some to
reduce the funding necessary for achieving the President's nuclear
modernization plan. When asked about a possible cut by the
Appropriations Committee, you stated: ``I think it is tremendously
shortsighted if they reduce funds that are absolutely essential for
modernization . . . if we aren't staying ahead of it, we jeopardize the
security of this country. So, for that reason, I certainly would oppose
any reductions with regards to the funding.'' The fiscal year 2013
budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) makes a
number of significant changes to the President's nuclear weapons
complex modernization plan. I understand many within DOD, including
STRATCOM, are opposed to these cuts. Do you still agree that a failure
to honor the carefully crafted modernization plan risks, as you stated
just 3 months ago, jeopardizing the security of this country?
Secretary Panetta. Modernization efforts remain critical to
ensuring a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for the long-term; it
will take years of sustained funding and effort to achieve this goal.
Infrastructure modernization, in particular, will offer opportunities
to reduce the number of reserve warheads needed to hedge against a
potential technical failure of a warhead type. The Nuclear Posture
Review of 2010 and the reports to Congress, pursuant to section 1251 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 and section 1043 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2012, contain detailed and well-supported modernization plans.
Current fiscal realities, however, have driven DOD and NNSA to make
difficult decisions in prioritizing plans and funding for these
efforts, including the deferral or delay of programs and deliverables.
Such decisions were made to allow the two departments to shift
resources to certain projects and programs that meet the Nation's most
pressing nuclear weapons requirements. We are confident that these
decisions allow us to continue the necessary support to achieve the
goal of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent, while also
supporting the long-term commitment to modernization of the nuclear
weapons enterprise.

2-YEAR DELAY OF THE SSBN(X)

155. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, I understand the budget
proposes delaying the replacement ballistic missile submarine for 2
years and estimates doing so will save $4.3 billion. Given prior year
statements from the Navy claiming that the schedule for procuring the
12 follow-on ballistic missile submarines is ``inextricably linked to
legacy [i.e. Ohio-class] ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)
retirements'' and that there is ``no leeway in this plan to allow a
start or any delay in the procurement plan,'' I am interested in
understanding why you now believe that a delay is possible?
Secretary Panetta. To comply with the BCA, the 2-year delay defers
and extends design efforts, freeing up $4.3 billion in the FYDP, as
well as reduces the available SSBN force to 10 ships during the
transition from the Ohio-class to the Ohio replacement. The absence of
extended overhauls during this transition period (2029 to 2042) helps
mitigate this reduced force level, which will meet at-sea presence
requirements with moderate operational risk during the transition
period. Unforeseen issues with construction of the Ohio-replacement or
emergent material problems with the aging Ohio-class could present
challenges. Full funding for continued design and construction of Ohio-
replacement to ensure on-time delivery and on-time Strategic Patrol
(lead ship in 2029) and properly resourced maintenance of the Ohio-
class will be crucial to minimizing operational risk during the
transition (2029 to 2042).
With the 2-year delay (fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2021) to the
Ohio replacement SSBN, there is no margin for further delay. Additional
delay would prevent meeting current sea-based strategic deterrent
requirements. The Navy will be closely managing risk during the
transition period.

156. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, does a delay instill
additional risk in the Navy's ability to maintain the same at-sea
availability rates required under current nuclear force posture? If
not, please be specific as to why.
Secretary Panetta. There is some additional risk during the
transition from Ohio class to Ohio replacement. To comply with the BCA,
the 2-year delay defers and extends design efforts, freeing up $4.3
billion in the FYDP as well as reduces the available SSBN force to 10
ships during the transition from the Ohio-class to the Ohio
replacement. The absence of extended overhauls during this transition
period (2029 to 2042) helps mitigate this reduced force level, which
will meet at-sea presence requirements with moderate operational risk
during the transition period. Unforeseen issues with construction of
the Ohio replacement or emergent material problems with the aging Ohio-
class could present challenges. Full funding for continued design and
construction of Ohio replacement to ensure on-time delivery and on-time
strategic patrol (lead ship in 2029) and properly resourced maintenance
of the Ohio-class will be crucial to minimizing operational risk during
the transition (2029 to 2042).
With the 2-year delay (fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2021) to the
Ohio replacement SSBN, there is no margin for further delay. Additional
delay would prevent meeting current sea-based strategic deterrent
requirements. The Navy will be closely managing risk during the
transition period.

157. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, does the current strategy
include any margin for design or development challenges?
Secretary Panetta. The 2-year delay (fiscal year 2019 to fiscal
year 2021) allows some additional time to mature designs and address
the programmatic risks associated with designing new systems and
integrating existing technology. To control cost and risk, the Ohio
replacement SSBN is planned to maximize reuse of Virginia- and Ohio-
class components and designs where feasible. Overall design maturity at
construction start will be no less than originally planned,
commensurate with the funding provided. However, any further delay to
Ohio replacement would result in fewer operational ships than necessary
to meet today's at-sea deterrent requirements during the transition
(2029 to 2042) from Ohio-class to Ohio replacement. Full funding for
Ohio replacement design and construction to ensure on-time delivery and
on-time strategic patrol (lead ship in 2029) is essential to preventing
further delays.

158. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, does this delay in any way
infuse additional risk in our national ability to meet our current
strategic requirements in the future?
Secretary Panetta. There is some additional risk during the
transition from Ohio-class to Ohio replacement. To comply with the BCA,
the 2-year delay defers and extends design efforts, freeing up $4.3
billion in the FYDP, as well as reduces the available SSBN force to 10
ships during the transition from the Ohio-class to the Ohio
replacement. The absence of extended overhauls during this transition
period (2029 to 2042) helps mitigate this reduced force level, which
will meet at-sea presence requirements with moderate operational risk
during the transition period. Unforeseen issues with construction of
the Ohio replacement or emergent material problems with the aging Ohio-
class could present challenges. Full funding for continued design and
construction of Ohio replacement to ensure on-time delivery and on-time
strategic patrol (lead ship in 2029) and properly resourced maintenance
of the Ohio-class will be crucial to minimizing operational risk during
the transition (2029 to 2042).
With the 2-year delay (fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2021) to the
Ohio replacement SSBN, there is no margin for further delay. Additional
delay would prevent meeting current sea-based strategic deterrent
requirements. The Navy will be closely managing risk during the
transition period.

AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

159. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
are to draw down to around 68,000 by September of this year. Secretary
Panetta recently announced that the administration seeks to transition
lead combat responsibilities to the Afghan security forces in mid- to
late-2013--an enormous responsibility for a force that still faces
shortcomings in its ability to conduct operations. You have stated:
``Key to long-term stability in Afghanistan is the development of the
Afghan Security Forces.'' Yet, the budget request for the Afghan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF)--the primary tool for the training and
equipping of the Afghan Security Forces--is cut nearly in half from
what was enacted for fiscal year 2012. What is the reasoning behind
such a significant cut to the ASFF, particularly given the increased
role Afghan forces are to assume next year?
General Dempsey. The decrease in the fiscal year 2013 ASFF budget
is due to the fact that we are approaching the end of ANSF force
generation, equipment fielding, and facility construction. We are now
moving to a force development phase. The cost of training required in
the force development phase decreases for the following reasons: we are
no longer building a force from the ground up, so the number of
personnel that require training will decrease; and ANSF training
facilities are almost finished construction, so facility costs will
decrease. We are now beginning to transition ANSF training programs to
Afghan control. All of the ANSF's basic training courses, NCO, and
officer development courses are currently taught by ANSF personnel. The
number of Afghan Master Skill Instructors in the branch schools
continues to grow. The current projection is that the entire Afghan
training system will be under Afghan control with coalition monitoring
by the end of fiscal year 2013. This means that overall cost of
training will decrease dramatically as we move from contract to ANSF
instructors.

160. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, do you believe the Afghan
Security Forces will be capable of assuming lead responsibility for
combat operations in 2013?
General Dempsey. Yes. In 2013 when the ANSF assume the lead, we
will still be standing shoulder-to-shoulder with them. Our forces will
still be present to advise and assist the ANSF. This will allow the
ANSF to expand their capabilities and capacity without losing access to
the resources and enablers that U.S. and coalition forces provide.

161. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what capability gaps pose the
greatest risk to the ability of the Afghan Security Forces to assume
lead responsibility for combat operations in Afghanistan?
General Dempsey. The ANSF logistics system is our greatest
challenge at the moment. Improving their capability in this area is
critical to the long-term success of the ANSF as they assume lead for
security.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

SYRIA

162. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. Thousands of innocent
Syrians have been brutally murdered and countless have been wounded.
President Obama said in his State of the Union Address that in Syria,
he has ``no doubt that the Assad regime will soon discover that the
forces of change can't be reversed, and that human dignity can't be
denied.'' How do you judge the capabilities of the Free Syrian Army
(FSA)?
Secretary Panetta. (Deleted.]
General Dempsey. The capabilities of the FSA have steadily grown in
recent months; however, the organization remains beset by logistical
shortfalls and lack of unity among its leadership. Several of the FSA's
leaders have taken part in a public feud over the future leadership of
the movement, with some officers backing its founder, Colonel Riyad al-
As'ad, and others pledging loyalty to Brigadier General Mustapha al-
Shaykh. Both men have attempted to put aside their differences in
recent weeks by publicly announcing the unification of their efforts to
overthrow the Asad regime. FSA leadership unity continues to be
evaluated as a bellwether of the movement's capabilities.
The ability, or inability, of the FSA to exercise operational
control over the armed opposition bears continued monitoring. In recent
months, the FSA has issued several calls for the armed opposition
operating within Syria to unite under the FSA's banner, suggesting the
group has had difficulties exercising control over disparate armed
groups throughout Syria.
FSA members are actively seeking military aid from foreign
sponsors, including ammunition, small arms, and advanced weapons
systems.

163. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, members
of the administration have stated that we will exhaust all diplomatic
options in an effort to avoid any military confrontation though there
have been reports that the United States is beginning to rethink its
military strategy and support. What would this entail?
Secretary Panetta. The President has said that Assad must halt his
campaign of killing and crimes against his own people, step aside, and
allow a democratic transition to proceed immediately.
A political solution is the best means to achieve a stable,
democratic transition; military action should always be a last resort.
We are acting along several tracks. First, through the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, we are
providing humanitarian relief to the Syrian people. Thus far, we have
provided more than $25 million to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), and both local and international nongovernmental
organizations to provide assistance to those who need it most. Second,
the Department of State is leading diplomatic efforts to isolate and
weaken the regime by building international consensus through the U.N.
Security Council, the Arab League, and the Friends of Syria Group. The
Department of the Treasury is doing its part by cutting off the
regime's revenue through sanctions. Third, we are assisting the
political opposition to strengthen and unite under a clear democratic
transition plan that brings together Syrians of all creeds and
ethnicities.
Even as we continue to examine and revise military options, I would
like to underscore that there are no simple solutions to the situation
in Syria, and that military action is not advisable at this time.
General Dempsey. We remain committed to supporting the
administration's efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the
situation in Syria. The President has said that U.S. unilateral action
would be a mistake and we do not believe that military operations--such
as air strikes or other forms of intervention--are advisable at this
time. It is important that we continue to shape efforts within the U.N.
Security Council and with our regional partners in order to achieve a
positive outcome. The military, in conjunction with the U.S.
Interagency, continues to explore the provision of non-lethal
assistance to members of the peaceful opposition. We are reviewing all
possible additional steps, including military options, but this
planning does not equate to an intent or recommendation to execute a
particular plan.

164. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what is
the extent of the Syrian chemical stockpile?
Secretary Panetta. Syria's chemical warfare program is well-
established, with a stockpile of chemical warfare agents that can be
delivered by aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, and artillery rockets.
Syria has the facilities and expertise domestically to produce, store,
and deliver chemical agents, and we believe Syria is likely to continue
to seek to improve its chemical warfare capability for the foreseeable
future.
General Dempsey. Syria has a sophisticated chemical weapons program
that dates back several decades. Over that time, Syria acquired the
capability to develop and produce blister and nerve agents, including
mustard gas, sarin, and possibly VX nerve agent. Syria is still
dependent on foreign sources for some dual-use equipment and precursor
chemicals for agent production.

165. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
can be done to secure the chemical stockpile if the Assad regime loses
control?
Secretary Panetta. We remain very concerned about the security of
chemical and conventional weapons in Syria. We have developed options
to address those concerns, and we are consulting with allies and
regional partners about how to address this potential proliferation
challenge.
General Dempsey. The United States continues to work very closely
with the U.N. to support Kofi Annan's U.N. Six-Point Peace Plan. These
efforts combined with the Friends of Syria Group provide the proper
international context for stability in Syria should the Assad regime
lose control. We have plans in place that cover a wide range of
potential scenarios and options to address those scenarios. We also
continue to work with our allies and regional partners to share
information and coordinate activities as we closely watch the security
and disposition of Syria.

166. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, are we
working with the Israelis to ensure these weapons do not get into the
wrong hands?
Secretary Panetta. This issue is of the highest concern to us, the
Israelis, and the rest of the international community. We are
cooperating with allies and regional partners across a range of
potential options to prevent the proliferation of weapons, both
chemical and conventional weapons. In addition--and in the midst of
growing instability in the region--the United States has continued to
strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship in all aspects of cooperation.
General Dempsey. Ensuring Syrian chemical and biological warfare
does not fall into the wrong hands is clearly a shared security
interest with Israel. From past dialogues with Israeli leadership, I
know our understanding of the severity of the situation and possible
consequences of proliferation or use, whether inadvertent or
deliberate, is aligned. We are leveraging our longstanding and close
military-to-military cooperation with the Israeli Defense Forces to
make certain both of our militaries have an accurate assessment of
Syrian chemical and biological warfare capabilities and
vulnerabilities. I am confident that should the need to act arise, the
United States will be able to deconflict or to coordinate with the
Israeli Defense Forces as the situation demands.

167. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what,
if any, military options do you see for DOD?
Secretary Panetta. A core function of DOD is to conduct military
planning as crises evolve in order to provide options to the President.
In doing so, DOD looks into a variety of military options for various
contingencies. I cannot get into the specifics of these options in open
session, but I will reiterate that, although we continue to examine and
revise military options, there are no simple solutions to the situation
in Syria, and military action is not advisable at this time.
General Dempsey. U.S. unilateral action or military operations are
not advisable at this time. However, we continue to plan for a wide
range of potential scenarios and provide options to address those
scenarios. The Syrian crisis poses complex challenges ranging from
control of chemical and biological weapons to humanitarian assistance.
It is imperative that we continue to work with our allies and regional
partners to share information and coordinate activities within this
spectrum. The international community is closely monitoring the Syrian
situation and we support shaping any multilateral responses within U.S.
Government objectives.

TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

168. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, I do
not see any tactical or diplomatic sense in your recent announcement
about telling the enemy the date we are going to pull out troops. This
gives the enemy an advantage on the ground and also eliminates any
incentive for the Taliban to engage in substantive political
negotiations with the Afghan Government. Our strategy in Afghanistan
must be based solely on the conditions on the ground and not on the
politics of the 2012 election. How does DOD plan to execute this
announced withdrawal while not further endangering the lives of our
troops and while still meeting operational demands?
Secretary Panetta. The administration announced that the U.S.
forces surge recovery will be completed by October 2012. We are
currently working with commanders in the field to determine additional
force reductions after October 2012. Plans for further reductions are
developing and not ready for final decision at this time. However,
future reductions will be tied to conditions on the ground and the
ability of the ANSF to provide security as they assume the lead for
security. The safety of our forces and the success of our mission are
the primary concerns in our planning efforts.
General Dempsey. We announced completion of surge recovery by
October 2012. We are currently working with commanders in the field to
determine further troop reductions post October 2012. Further options
are being developed and not ready for final decision. Future reductions
will be tied to conditions on the ground and ANSF capability to provide
security as they assume lead for security. The safety of our troops and
success of our mission are the primary concern in our planning efforts.

ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS

169. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, I recently met with the
senior leadership of the VA to discuss the ongoing integration of the
VA database with the DOD database in order to reduce duplication of
efforts. What current delays is DOD facing on the integration of
electronic medical records with the VA and when do you anticipate this
merger will be completed?
Secretary Panetta. VA and DOD have agreed to an overarching
strategy for the integration of health record data. VA and DOD are
currently working on the specific implementation plan for execution of
the strategy.

TRANSITION OF TROOPS TO CIVILIAN LIFE

170. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, you propose a decrease of
forces by 22,000 in fiscal year 2013 and 102,000 in the fiscal year
2013 FYDP. This reduction will take place amidst an American economy
with a consistent 8 percent unemployment rate. As such, what
initiatives do you plan to initiate in order to ensure a smooth
transition for our servicemembers to civilian careers?
Secretary Panetta. Realizing the state of the economy, the
requirement to decrease the number of our forces, and the need to
ensure a smooth transition of our military members into the civilian
sector, DOD has launched several initiatives that will aid separating
servicemembers. The initiatives include the:

Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force: In August
2011, the President called for the creation of a Task Force led
by the DOD and VA, with the White House economic and domestic
policy teams and other agencies, including DOL, to develop
proposals to maximize the career readiness of all
servicemembers. In coordination with these partners, DOD's role
involves implementing and sustaining a comprehensive plan to
ensure all transitioning servicemembers have the support they
need and deserve when leaving the military. This includes
working with other agencies in developing a clear path to
civilian employment; admission into and success in an academic
or technical training program; and successful start-up of an
independent business entity or non-profit organization. This
effort is fully aligned with 10 U.S.C. Chapter 58 as amended by
the Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) to Hire Heroes Act of
2011 and is consistent with DOD's commitment to keeping faith
with all of our military members and their families, providing
them a comprehensive set of transition tools and support
mechanisms as they complete their service to our Nation.
New Transition Service Delivery Model: DOD's long-term
aim for a new transition service delivery model is to embed the
servicemembers' preparation for transition throughout their
Military Life Cycle--from accession through separation, from
Active Duty service and reintegration, back into civilian life.
This will require thoughtful goal setting and planning to apply
military experience to longer-term career goals in the civilian
sector, whether after a single enlistment or a 20-plus-year
military career. Servicemembers and military leadership will be
engaged in mapping and refining development plans to achieve
post-military service goals--a significant culture change.

POST-MILITARY COMMISSION--TRAINING COSTS AND SCHEDULE DELAYS

171. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, my staff has been working
with your staff on determining cost and schedule delays for newly
commissioned military officers. How much money is being spent across
the Services on personnel between their post-commission and pre-
specialty training?
Secretary Panetta. Assessment of a cost of handling the annual
accession surge is not readily available and difficult to calculate
because of the varied number of valid and meaningful assignments, the
large number of military training pipelines, and the number of
personnel within those pipelines who may be delayed due to various
reasons (medical, weather, et cetera) rather than pipeline
inefficiencies.
The wait time a new officer experiences before starting training
does not directly correlate to down time or poor use of the officers.
Each of the Services works to maximize the utilization of officers
awaiting training through meaningful assignments which provide the new
officer with valuable professional experiences. The following methods
are used across the Services to stagger input to training:

Stagger ROTC accessions--law and policy allow the
Services to commission ROTC Cadets/Midshipmen and delay their
Active Duty start for up to 12 months and serve in a non-
drilling status in their Services' Reserve component
Temporarily assign to vacant positions during the time
they are awaiting training
Temporarily assign to supplement recruiting programs
Temporarily assign to augment staffs and operations to
cover work load increases or manning shortages (caused by
deployments)
Assign to ultimate position awaiting training
Permit the use of extended leave (up to 90 days)
Complete administrative training courses required for
future assignment

172. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, additionally, what measures
has DOD implemented to reduce the amount of time and costs associated
with this down time?
Secretary Panetta. About two-thirds of DOD's annual officer
accessions graduate and are commissioned each year in May/June from the
Service Academies and Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs.
This presents a huge personnel/training logistical challenge--
sequencing over 8,000 initially accessed officers into constrained
specialty training pipelines without causing a training backlog or
pool. That sequencing execution is not simple and requires many
different methods to attempt to mitigate back-ups. However, the wait
time a new officer experiences before starting training does not
directly correlate to down time or poor use of the officer. The
Services strive to maximize the utilization of officers awaiting
training through meaningful assignments which provide the new officer
with valuable professional experiences. The following methods are used
across the Services to stagger input to training:

Training facilities are planned on steady state requirements. Over
the last few years, increases in end strength have caused some
unusually long backlogs in some training pipelines due to facility
limitations. These backlogs are being alleviated and have been reduced
by as much as 50 percent. The most common delay in specialty training
is caused by weather. For example, in aviation training, an unusually
wet season can produce a backlog that may take several months to clear.
Each pipeline and schoolhouse is encouraged to minimize time-to-train,
and each training commander is evaluated on his/her training
efficiency.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

MEADS PROGRAM

173. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, I understand USD(ATL)
Kendall is currently engaged in discussions with his German
counterparts to negotiate the termination of the MEADS program. When
can I expect a report from DOD on the program's reduced scope?
Secretary Panetta. On April 26, 2012, DOD provided to the
congressional defense committees the plan required by section 235 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 that describes DOD's use of fiscal year
2012 funds as the U.S. final financial contribution under the MEADS
program.

174. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, last year's NDAA fenced 25
percent of funds for MEADS until such a report was delivered. Roughly,
how much of the fiscal year 2012 funding has been spent to date?
Secretary Panetta. Prior to delivery of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012 section 235 report on MEADS, DOD provided $85 million to the NATO
MEADS program office, which is less than 25 percent of the $390 million
in fiscal year 2012 funding authorized and appropriated for MEADS. Upon
delivery of the report to the congressional defense committees in late
April, DOD provided an additional $250 million to the NATO MEADS
program office.

GLOBAL HAWK

175. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, with respect to DOD's
decision to terminate the Global Hawk Block 30 program, what were the
findings of sustainment cost comparisons between the U-2 and the Global
Hawk?
Secretary Panetta. When we initially invested in the Global Hawk
Block 30 program, it held the promise of providing essentially the same
capability as the U-2 manned aircraft for significantly less money to
both buy and operate. As the program has matured, these cost savings
have not materialized. In this 5-year budget, the cost of the Global
Hawk program was projected to exceed the cost of the U-2, so we
cancelled Global Hawk Block 30 and extended the U-2 program, avoiding
the cost to complete the Global Hawk Block 30 program and saving
roughly $2.5 billion over the 5 years.

176. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, can the U-2 alone provide
the ISR necessary in order to meet current and future operational
requirements?
Secretary Panetta. For high-altitude airborne ISR, the U-2 meets
current and future operational multi-intelligence requirements.

There are two different types of sensors on the U-2
and Global Hawk. When comparing sensors, the U-2 imagery sensor
suites are more capable than the Global Hawk sensors, whereas
the U-2 and Global Hawk Signals Intelligence sensors are
comparable.
High-altitude ISR is only one part of an aggregate
capability of space, airborne, and ground systems. These
systems operate together to sufficiently meet contingency and
enduring ISR needs.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES

177. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, what shortcomings do you
feel exist in our ground combat vehicle fleet to operate effectively on
future battlefields?
General Dempsey. Current legacy platforms are aging and were
originally designed within the construct of linear, force-on-force
battle against conventional threats. They do not possess a sufficient
combination of force protection, survivability, payload,
transportability, command and control (C2), and reliability,
availability, and maintainability (RAM) required to operate in the full
spectrum of potential conflicts against existing and emerging hybrid
threats. Current add-on protection systems reduce payload, RAM, and
mobility needed to meet future operational requirements and add-on C2,
intelligence, and sensor systems exceed the size, weight, power, and
cooling constraints of current vehicle platforms. Development programs
such as ground combat vehicle, JLTV, and amphibious combat vehicle will
address identified shortcomings.

178. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, based upon the development
of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems across the Joint Force,
do our GCVs possess the necessary capabilities to integrate into these
systems?
General Dempsey. The current design of ground combat platforms did
not envision the sophistication of today's C2 systems. Where feasible,
these legacy ground combat systems have been integrated into the C4ISR
network, but are often limited by size, weight, power, and cooling
constraints. With regard to new systems in development, the Joint Staff
has updated the Network Ready overarching Key Performance Parameters to
ensure programs in development are designed to be interoperable and
supportable with existing C2 programs and other programs under
development.

179. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, what risks are associated
with the reduction of Heavy BCTs from the Army?
General Dempsey. The Army is carefully managing the force structure
reduction, ensuring that the resultant force is capable of meeting the
anticipated future requirements. We have assessed the planned reduction
in Army BCTs against the strategic guidance for DOD, and the programmed
inventory of Heavy BCTs is sufficient to meet the demands of our
strategy.

INDUSTRIAL BASE CONCERNS

180. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, the reduced funding profiles
in the President's proposed budget along with proposed program
cancellations will put a strain on different parts of the defense
industrial base across the spectrum, from the largest prime contractors
all the way down to third-tier vendors. You stated in your Defense
Budget Priorities and Choices Guidance, that in support of the
President's strategic guidance tenet of reversibility, the budget
sustains segments of the industrial base to regenerate capability, if
necessary. What criteria did you use to determine which parts of the
industrial base were sustained?
General Dempsey. DOD used information from AT&L's S2T2 assessment
project and insights from other internal and external sources to
characterize industrial base niches according to their criticality
(characteristics that make a product or service difficult to replace,
if disrupted) and fragility (characteristics that make small deviations
in the status quo likely to have substantial effects on the industrial
niche).

181. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, where do you see the
vulnerabilities and what decisions did you make that were particularly
influenced by industrial base concerns?
General Dempsey. Key vulnerabilities that may hinder our global
posture rebalance are: (1) a potential for atrophy and loss of key D&D
capabilities in the aviation industrial base; (2) a potential lack of
engineering and manufacturing skills necessary to support long-range
missile development; (3) low volume production in our Nation's
shipyards making it difficult for U.S. shipyards to match improvements
in technology and productivity seen in international shipyards; and (4)
disruption to the space industrial base related to solid rocket motors
due to the retirement of the Space Shuttle.
The space industrial base is a good example of DOD's efforts to
mitigate industrial base concerns. Multiple DOD components participate
in the Space Industrial Base Council Critical Technology Working Group
(CTWG). The CTWG is an interagency organization tasked to assess
structural issues in key domestic space industrial base sectors and
coordinate mitigation activities in areas of shared concern across
multiple government space agencies. This coherent, systematic effort is
focused on ensuring continued and reliable access to critical cross-
cutting space technologies, including associated launch vehicles and
support systems for the U.S. Government space community. DOD has also
employed authorities of the Defense Production Act to co-finance
capital expenditures to mitigate technical and business risks
associated with niche government-unique capabilities, including certain
batteries, solar cells and arrays, traveling wave tube amplifiers,
focal plane arrays, and star trackers.

182. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, how do you intend to monitor
the health of the industrial base to ensure reversibility, if
necessary, can be implemented in the future?
General Dempsey. DOD has adopted an initiative focused on
developing a more complete understanding of the complexity of the
defense industrial base. This initiative, known as the S2T2 assessment,
is a multi-pronged and comprehensive approach for monitoring the health
of the defense industrial base. It seeks to identify areas of
criticality (characteristics that make a product or service difficult
to replace, if disrupted) and fragility (characteristics that make
small deviations in the status quo likely to have substantial effects
on the industrial niche) that might require DOD intervention and
mitigation.

183. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, as program decisions are
made over the next 5 years, how will the impacts to the industrial base
be taken into consideration and if so, how will the assessment be
incorporated into the overall program decision?
General Dempsey. DOD continuously considers industrial base impacts
and adjusts accordingly. For example, prior to eliminating a defense
contract bidder in our acquisition process, we evaluate the competitive
marketplace and the consequences to the competitors. At Milestones B
and C decisions, through the acquisition strategy, the program assesses
the industrial base's ability to produce, support, and improve/upgrade
products to meet the program's cost, schedule, and performance
requirements--including all key sub-tier suppliers, as well as the
prime contractor. When there is an indication that a necessary
industrial capability is endangered, DOD will determine if it needs to
take action to preserve that capability.

COMPETITION IN PROCUREMENT PRACTICES

184. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, the value of competition in
our procurement practices is critical to achieving the best-value for
our Government and its taxpayers. It has been noted, to achieve the
long-term savings of competition, occasionally near-term investments
are required, something that may be an easy target of the budget axe
with long-term implications. Your documents outline some strategies to
overcome these challenges, like dissimilar competition, self-
competition, competition for profit, and other alternatives to classic
head-to-head, and they also outline some shortcomings in 2011 from
achieving the goals: delays from the contractors; the award of several
major weapon system programs; and delays and greater fidelity in data.
Despite these issues in 2011, we had a high in 2008 of 64 percent of
contracts competitively awarded, with a multi-year trend down to 58.5
percent in 2011. You have some modest goals of increasing this number
by single digit percentages in the coming years. What are the causes of
this downward trend and how do you plan to keep programs to their
competition strategies in the face of budget challenges?
General Dempsey. Much of the drop in the overall competition rate
is due to an increase in non-competitive contract actions involving
requirements with only one responsible source for major systems, such
as the LPD-26, the DDG-1000 ships, the Virginia-class submarine, and
several aircraft programs such as the F-22, C-17, C5, JSF, and P-8.
While these contracts were competitively awarded initially, the
contract actions issued in 2011 were follow-on efforts that were
carefully reviewed and determined to be non-competitive, with approved
sole-source justifications. Despite the drop in the overall competition
rate, there were several high-dollar major-system contracts
competitively awarded in 2011 such as the Littoral Combat Ships and the
DDG 114-116 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
DOD is placing renewed emphasis on promoting real competition and
improving competition rates under the Better Buying Power Initiative.
In order to encourage competition at the prime and subcontract level, a
policy was recently put in place that requires program managers to
present a competition strategy at each program milestone. Senior
leadership in AT&L reviews each of these strategies for Major Defense
Acquisition Programs and requires the Component Acquisition Executives
to do the same for programs under their cognizance. These initiatives
will facilitate DOD's ability to meet the goals established for the
upcoming years.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

SEQUESTRATION

185. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
according to recent reports, DOD Comptroller Robert Hale has told
reporters that DOD is not planning for sequestration, explaining, ``I
know nobody believes us, but I'd know if we were.'' According to these
reports, this is due to the fact that OMB has not told DOD to do so.
Can you confirm that DOD has been so directed by the administration?
Secretary Panetta. Consistent with direction from OMB, DOD did not
reflect the effects of the sequestration in its fiscal year 2013 budget
submission. The President's budget proposes over $4 trillion in
balanced deficit reduction, which Congress could enact and avoid
sequestration. DOD is not currently planning for sequestration. OMB has
not directed agencies, including DOD, to initiate any plans for
sequestration.
General Dempsey. Per OMB's direction last fall, this budget
complies with the BCA caps established by Congress. We will continue to
work with OMB and Congress to properly resource the capability to
defend our Nation and our allies.

REVERSIBILITY OF DEFENSE CUTS

186. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in your
strategic guidance announcement last month, both of you highlighted the
need to build in reversibility as these significant cuts to our
Nation's defense budget are made. The strategic guidance document also
states, ``the concept of reversibility--including the vectors on which
we place our industrial base, our people, our Active/Reserve components
balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis--is a key part of
our decision calculus.'' Reversibility sounds like a euphemism for
``we're not totally sure that these cuts represent sound policy.'' Is
it realistic to think that, within a reasonable time frame, we could
reverse decisions as monumental as downsizing our ground forces by
nearly 100,000 troops (close to pre-September 11 levels), delaying or
cancelling major acquisition programs, and retiring significant numbers
of current aircraft and ships?
Secretary Panetta. Reversibility represents a recognition that the
security environment is continually changing. DOD will be responsible
for a range of missions and activities across the globe of varying
scope, duration, and strategic priority. This will place a premium on
flexible and adaptable forces that can respond quickly and effectively
to a variety of contingencies and potential adversaries. The Joint
Force of 2020 will be such a force and I am confident that we will have
the ability to mobilize and regenerate forces and capability as needed.
General Dempsey. Reversibility is intended to deal with evolutions
in the strategic environment. Implementing reversibility will certainly
require vigilance to provide sufficient time to adapt to changes. By
considering the need for flexibility and the mechanisms to execute
future adjustments, we will be better prepared to do what is necessary.
DOD is developing an analytical framework in support of the concept
of reversibility. We are beginning to apply this framework to
investment decisions now and in the future.

DOWNSIZING OF U.S. LAND FORCES

187. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
according to the Defense Strategic Guidance document, the new strategy
must ``protect key investments in the technologically advanced
capabilities most needed for the future . . . [and] no longer size
Active Forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations
while retaining the expertise of a decade of war.'' As a result, you
have proposed eliminating about 100,000 soldiers and marines from the
force. Although weapons development can usually be accelerated, there
is no real way to accelerate the development of quality military
leaders during times of crisis. Our force has such leaders in it today,
including many thousands of NCOs who learned the hard lessons of Iraq
and Afghanistan. But once they leave the force, in most cases they
cannot be replaced. Following every war since World War II, the United
States has significantly reduced Army and Marine Corps levels while
focusing on developing air and sea forces. In recent decades, when
confronted with the next crisis--including Korea, Vietnam, and the
Persian Gulf--we have been forced to try to regenerate sizeable land
forces. How do you plan to ensure that we retain the expertise and
experience garnered by our NCOs and other leaders over the past decade,
preserving it for the next conflict, while making such drastic
reductions to our Army and Marine Corps?
Secretary Panetta.
Army
The new Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012 notes
that since we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve
with absolute certainty, we need to manage the force in ways that
protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that may be needed to
meet future, unforeseen demands. The Strategy also notes that we need
to retain intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called
up to expand key elements of the force. The Army is examining
strategies, policies, and investments that would posture the Army to be
able to slow and reverse a planned drawdown of Army end strength and
formations, and rapidly expand over the course of a number of years in
response to a future crisis. To retain intellectual capital and rank
structure, the Army is identifying billets in its Generating Force that
can support such expansion.
Marine Corps
The planned reduction in the end strength of the Marine Corps
results in an increase in the percentage of staff noncommissioned
officers (SNCO), NCOs, and field grade officers. Additionally, we did
not reduce the size of our Reserve Force; this will provide an
opportunity for many to continue to serve and remain prepared for the
future.
These NCOs, SNCOs, field grade officers, and Reserve marines are
exactly the populations that have the expertise and experience garnered
from the last decade. Their expertise and professionalism will ensure
the next generation will receive the best training.
Perhaps as important as retaining the leaders is the plan to reduce
the force in a deliberate measured way that remains committed to
today's warriors. Maintaining the trust and confidence of today's
marines will go a long way to retain the confidence that is held by the
average American citizen. If and when the time comes for growth--
America's sons, daughters, mothers, and fathers will be eager to be
associated with the U.S. Marine Corps.
General Dempsey. Our NCO corps provides a great value to our Joint
Force and in winning our Nation's wars. On the heels of Afghanistan and
Iraq, reshaping our personnel across the Services will impact our
officers and junior enlisted community as well as our NCOs. Over the
next 5 years, as the Services implement their separation and retirement
processes to meet new authorized end strengths, we will ensure that we
maintain levels of experience and capacity in both our Active component
and operational reserve.
The Secretary made it perfectly clear during the budget rollout
strategy that the Services need to ensure mechanisms are in place to
retain our mid-grade NCOs and officers, so our pool of experience
remains balanced, relevant, and ready. My promise to the force in
keeping the faith is to ensure that our men and women are properly
trained and educated to meet any emerging requirements as may be
directed from our Commander in Chief.

188. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, given
that we are still fighting a land war in Afghanistan, coupled with our
historical inability to predict the next conflict, on what do you base
the conclusion that we will rely more heavily on air and sea
capabilities in the future?
Secretary Panetta. All Services will play integral roles in
addressing future U.S. security challenges across all domains.
The new Defense Strategic Guidance noted that, ``given that we
cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute
certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities
that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across a wide range of
missions.'' DOD's decision not to divest in the capability to conduct
any mission reflects this recognition that the future security
environment is uncertain. Given this unpredictability, the new Defense
Strategic Guidance commits to managing the force in ways that protect
its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet
future, unforeseen demands.
The abilities of our ground forces to ensure access, reassure
allies, deter adversaries, build security capacity and interoperability
with partners, and ultimately, respond to and succeed in crises and
contingencies, are indispensable and distinguishing features of U.S.
military capabilities. The nature of the future strategic environment
will require even greater flexibility and agility in projecting power
to accomplish the Nation's security objectives. As the U.S. Armed
Forces increase their operational focus on enhanced presence, power
projection, freedom of action, and deterrence in the Pacific--while
placing a premium on U.S. and allied military presence and support of
partner nations in the Middle East--air and sea forces offer distinct
strengths in accomplishing these global joint missions, alongside a
range of mutually-reinforcing U.S. ground forces' activities in these
regions. In other regions also, the complementary efforts of all the
Services across land, air, and sea, and increasingly, space and cyber
domains, are necessary to protect U.S. and allied security interests.
General Dempsey. As we draw down from the operation in Afghanistan,
and reduce our budget to help protect our Nation's economy, we have
assessed risks in keeping our Homeland safe and in our ability to
sustain leadership abroad. After weighing numerous options, an area
where we accept additional risk is in the size of our land forces--we
will not be sized to conduct long-term stability operations within the
Active component.
Any campaign we are likely to wage in the future will be fully
joint. After a decade of relying heavily on our ground forces, we must
ensure that we maintain our decisive edge in the air and maritime
domains against future challenges. Many of these sea and air
capabilities you speak of are not combat platforms; they are key
enablers and essential to power projection of the entire Joint Force,
to include ground forces--tankers, high-speed vessels, and ISR
platforms. Many of the air and sea combat systems that are being
fielded will enable cross-domain strike operations or in the case of
BMD, joint protection. In an unpredictable strategic environment, the
ability to project power anywhere on the globe is critical to rapidly
and effectively responding to emerging threats. Robust air and naval
capabilities are, and will continue to be, essential to maintaining
that ability.

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND CHINA

189. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, last
month you announced the U.S. military would pivot its focus to the
Asia-Pacific region. Yet, the significance of this announcement seems
to have been undermined by the cuts that were announced simultaneously.
Although the President has said that defense cuts ``will not come at
the expense of the Asia-Pacific,'' this promise seems hollow. These
deep and broad defense cuts will impact every aspect of our Nation's
defense capability and quantitatively reduce the overall capabilities
and forces that are available in the PACOM AOR. At the same time our
defense budget is bearing the brunt of our Nation's fiscal woes, China
is investing substantial funds in the modernization and build-up of its
military forces. According to DOD, China's official defense budget has
grown by an average of 12.1 percent each year since 2000. Analysts at
Jane's Defence have reported they expect China's defense spending to
accelerate substantially in the next 3 years, at a combined annual rate
of 18.7 percent per year. At the same time, Secretary Panetta's
prepared testimony notes that, ``when reduced war-related funding
requirements are included, we expect total U.S. defense spending to
drop by more than 20 percent over the next few years . . . '' What is
your assessment of the risk the United States assumes by making such
drastic cuts to our defense spending while China grows its defense
budget and continues its military modernization efforts at an
unprecedented rate?
Secretary Panetta. The United States is a resident power in the
Asia-Pacific region with enduring interests in the region. We will
maintain, and in some areas enhance, our military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region by making our posture more geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The United States
will retain the capacity to deter conflict and, if necessary, prevail
in any contingency. We are investing in those capabilities most
relevant to preserving the security, sovereignty, and freedom of the
United States and that of our allies and partners.
Despite reductions in the U.S. defense budget, we are improving
capabilities that maintain our military's technological edge and
freedom of action, in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. We are
increasing investments in both defensive and offensive cyber
capabilities. In terms of power projection, we increased or protected
investment in capabilities such as the development of a new bomber,
cruise missile capacity of Virginia-class submarines, a conventional
prompt strike option from submarines, and electronic warfare
capabilities. We have sustained Army and Marine Corps force structure
in the Pacific, and we are increasing our rotational presence--for
example, through the deployment of marines to Darwin, Australia.
At the whole-of-government level, reducing risk to U.S. interests
is a function of all elements of national power. As stated in the new
Defense Strategic Guidance, we will emphasize our existing alliances
and expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners
throughout the Asia-Pacific region to ensure collective capability and
capacity for securing common interests.
General Dempsey. Given our current economic and fiscal situation,
reduced defense budgets are and will be a fact of life not just for
DOD, but for the U.S. Government as a whole. The defense budget will of
necessity be reduced and everyone will be asked to do as much or more
with fewer available resources. Our military forces are not exempt from
this reality. However, we should also remain aware that managing risk
is not simply a matter of how much money we spend on defense.
Reducing risk to U.S. interests is a function of all elements of
national power, to include our diplomatic and cooperative efforts. Our
relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the
future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our
existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific
security. We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging
partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability
and capacity for securing common interests. It is primarily through
these efforts that we can best ensure long-term stability in the Asia-
Pacific region and protect U.S. national interests.
However, we are also continuing to make necessary capability
investments and adjustments to our force posture in the Asia-Pacific
region in order to preserve our ability to project power in denied
environments should the need arise. Additionally, we are also
protecting other key components of the Joint Force, including Special
Operations Forces; unmanned air systems; sea-based unmanned ISR
systems; advanced ISR with increased capabilities; and all three legs
of our nuclear deterrent. Our focus is to ensure the we are fully
prepared to meet any threats to the security of the United States, its
citizens, allies, and partners.

190. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
according to DOD's 2011 report, ``Military and Security Developments
Involving the People's Republic of China,'' China's long-term,
comprehensive military modernization improves China's capacity to
conduct high-intensity regional military operations, including anti-
access and area denial operations. What is your assessment of the
intent behind China's military modernization, both in the region and
globally?
Secretary Panetta. (Deleted.]
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]

191. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in
recent years, our Nation has experienced an increasing volley of cyber
attacks and cyber theft emanating from China, and this is of great
concern to many Senators. According to an October 2011 report by the
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, ``Chinese actors
are the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic
espionage.'' The report goes on to highlight that ``computer networks
of a broad array of U.S. Government agencies . . . were targeted by
cyber espionage; much of this activity appears to have originated in
China.'' What is your assessment of this growing threat?
Secretary Panetta. I agree with the findings of the Biennial Report
to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage,
2009-2010: ``Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in
Cyberspace,'' prepared by the Office of National Counterintelligence
Executive. The threats to our Nation in cyberspace continue to grow at
an alarming rate. In particular, the extensive cyber-enabled
exploitation of U.S. intellectual property and trade secrets is a
direct threat to vital U.S. economic and national security interests,
including DOD's ability to field the most technologically advanced
force. DOD is working closely with its interagency partners, including
the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and Commerce, to
facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from
China, but from others actors as well. We must develop options to
respond to and impose costs on cyber threat actors to deter future
exploitation and attack. The President stated in his International
Strategy for Cyberspace that the United States reserves the right to
use all necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic--as appropriate and consistent with applicable international
law--in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our
interests against hostile acts in cyberspace.
General Dempsey. The number of cyber intrusions appearing to
originate in China is extensive, and U.S. businesses and government
agencies will continue to see this type of activity in the coming
years. China is likely using its computer network exploitation
capability to support intelligence collection against the U.S.
diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support
U.S. national defense programs. The targeted information could
potentially be used to benefit China's defense industry, high
technology industries, foreign policy decisionmakers, and military
planners, who likely are building a picture of U.S. defense networks,
logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited
during a crisis. Observed intrusions have varied in sophistication and
Chinese cyber actors appear to have the capability to adapt their
methods depending on the cyber defenses of the target.

192. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, do you
agree that such aggression is unacceptable and does serious damage to
U.S.-China relations?
Secretary Panetta. I agree with the findings of the Biennial Report
to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage,
2009-2010: ``Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in
Cyberspace,'' prepared by the Office of National Counterintelligence
Executive. The threats to our Nation in cyberspace continue to grow at
an alarming rate. In particular, the extensive cyber-enabled
exploitation of U.S. intellectual property and trade secrets is a
direct threat to vital U.S. economic and national security interests,
including DOD's ability to field the most technologically advanced
force. DOD is working closely with its interagency partners including
the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and Commerce, to
facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from
China, but from others actors as well. We must develop options to
respond to and impose costs on cyber threat actors to deter future
exploitation and attack. The President stated in his International
Strategy for Cyberspace that the United States reserves the right to
use all necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic--as appropriate and consistent with applicable international
law--in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our
interests against hostile acts in cyberspace.
General Dempsey. As cyber events carry the potential to affect
civilian infrastructure and military readiness, it is important that we
communicate our concerns regarding the negative impacts of ongoing
cyber security risks. We are working to engage China on this issue to
strongly reinforce the potential benefit to our overall relationship by
improving efforts to curtail cyber attacks emanating from the mainland.

ISRAEL AND IRAN

193. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in terms of meeting the
Iran threat, the United States has certain military capabilities that
Israel and other allies do not. How are we working with Israel to
narrow the gaps between our respective capabilities and helping to
ensure that Israel is able to defend herself against potential threats
from Iran?
Secretary Panetta. The U.S.-Israel defense relationship is strong,
and we are working with Israel more closely than ever before in areas
such as missile defense technology, counterterrorism, and across a
range of military exercises--to ensure that Israel is always secure. We
are engaged in a regular dialogue with senior Israeli officials to
understand their security requirements and maintain Israel's
qualitative military edge. A critical element of this is providing
Israel with the most advanced technology in the region, including the
fifth generation JSF. Through a combination of providing Israel
technology like this, and our extensive work with Israel on missile
defense, we are ensuring that Israel can defend itself.

FUTURE OF EGYPT

194. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, just
over a year ago, the Egyptian people took to the street and overthrew
President Hosni Mubarak. Today, it appears that Islamist factions are
poised to take control of the Egyptian Government and the country's
future. What is your assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood?
Secretary Panetta. (Deleted.]
General Dempsey. (Deleted.]

195. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
impact will a Brotherhood-led government have on the longstanding
relationship between the U.S. military and the Egyptian military?
Secretary Panetta. DOD and the Egyptian military have been close
partners for many decades, and the United States is committed to a
robust bilateral relationship with Egypt today and following the July
transition to civilian rule. Through annual military exchanges, foreign
military assistance, combined exercises, and other engagement efforts,
we look forward to maintaining and strengthening this partnership for
decades to come. Regardless of political changes, DOD believes that the
fundamentals of this strategic relationship remain strong.
The United States expects that Egypt will maintain its
international security commitments, including its treaty obligations
with Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood has provided public assurances of
its commitment to the international obligations undertaken by the
Government of Egypt.
General Dempsey. This is a new Egypt and we will need to build new
partnerships, even as we sustain the old ones. We intend to engage in a
comprehensive review of how our assistance can best meet the needs of
the Egyptian people and advance our shared interests and aspirations.
This is best accomplished through broad-based consultations with all of
the institutions of the new government. The United States and Egyptian
militaries have been strong partners, and we expect that partnership to
continue.

196. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how are
we strategically adapting to the new role the military is taking within
the Egyptian Government?
Secretary Panetta. The United States is committed to a robust
bilateral relationship with Egypt today and following the July 2012
transition to civilian rule.
We will take steps both to strengthen old partnerships and build
new ones. DOD will engage in close dialogue with Egyptian military and
civilian officials on the wide range of security and defense issues of
mutual interest to our governments.
Events of the Arab Awakening have clearly demonstrated that
military-to-military partnerships are critical for protecting enduring
U.S. security interests, and also for providing a channel through which
U.S. defense officials can discuss the importance of reform. To this
end, we will use annual military exchanges, foreign military
assistance, combined exercises, and other engagement efforts, to
strengthen our partnership with the Egyptian military and promote
reform for years to come.
General Dempsey. The strength of our military relationship with
Egypt is a source of influence. We saw the importance of the
relationship in the early days of the revolution during which the
United States urged Egyptians to refrain from violence. The United
States now supports the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the new
parliament in the successful completion of the transition. We need a
strong, stable Egypt as our partner. From here, the only path to
sustainable stability in Egypt is a successful democratic transition.
Egypt has made important progress toward democracy over the past 12
months. For the first time in 60 years, Egyptians have elected a
representative parliament, which now exercises legislative authority,
and presidential elections are scheduled for May. These are important
milestones in Egypt's transition to civilian government. We look to
Egypt for everything from maintaining its peace treaty with Israel, to
joint counterterrorism and anti-weapons smuggling efforts, to
preferential access for U.S. ships transiting the Suez Canal. The
Egyptian military's role in Egypt will continue to change. As that
happens, we want to ensure that we protect our longstanding
relationships and build new ones.

197. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, there
has been a great deal of discussion in Congress that military
assistance to Egypt should be cut because of the Egyptian Government's
actions against American pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations
(NGO). In your opinion, should this be a factor when determining future
levels of aid to Egypt?
Secretary Panetta. The administration remains concerned about the
ongoing trial of NGO employees, as well as the ability of civil society
organizations to work in Egypt. Both publicly and in private
conversations with Egyptian officials, General Dempsey and I have
discussed the importance of allowing civil society organizations to
operate freely in Egypt.
Our strategic relationship with Egypt remains one of the most
important in the region. U.S. security assistance to Egypt is an
important demonstration of our commitment to supporting Egypt at this
moment of historic challenges and remains a cornerstone of our security
cooperation and partnership on regional security issues.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) plays a critical role in efforts
to professionalize the Egyptian military, so that the armed forces can
better serve the interests of the Egyptian people and jointly advance
our mutual security priorities. Notably, the decision by the Egyptian
military in January 2011 to avoid firing on peaceful demonstrators and
to side with protesters demanding the resignation of former president
Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, was a vital step in allowing Egypt's
democratic transition to take place.
U.S. bilateral assistance to Egypt is guided by the need to
safeguard our strategic interests in maintaining a critically important
bilateral partnership with Egypt and in supporting the success of a
democratic transition for Egypt that meets the aspirations of all
Egyptians.
General Dempsey. First and foremost, our security partnership with
Egypt, reinforced by FMF, remains critical to our interests across the
region. We look to Egypt for everything from maintaining its peace
treaty with Israel to joint counterterrorism and anti-weapons smuggling
efforts, to preferential access for U.S. ships transiting the Suez
Canal. Disrupting FMF right now could put these critical interests at
risk. We also have a powerful interest in a successful democratic
transition. We need a strong, stable Egypt as our partner. From here,
the only path to sustainable stability in Egypt is a successful
democratic transition.

198. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what is
the strategic thinking behind the continued provision of U.S. military
assistance to Egypt?
Secretary Panetta. Our strategic relationship with Egypt is one of
the most important in the region. U.S. military assistance to Egypt
remains an important demonstration of our commitment to supporting
Egypt at this moment of historic challenges, and reflects the vital
U.S. interest in continued security cooperation with Egypt, whose peace
with Israel is a cornerstone of regional stability.
U.S. bilateral assistance to Egypt is guided by the need to
safeguard our strategic interests in maintaining this important
bilateral partnership and in supporting the success of a democratic
transition for Egypt that meets the aspirations of all Egyptians.
General Dempsey. Continued U.S. military assistance allows us to
protect our core national security interests in Egypt. For over 30
years, Egypt's peace treaty with Israel has been a cornerstone of peace
and stability as well as security along the Egyptian-Israeli border.
FMF supports our critical partnership with Egypt on counterterrorism
and their efforts to stop arms smuggling. Lack of success in either
mission has the potential to destabilize the region. Issuing this
waiver allows Egypt's military to maintain its readiness and
interoperability with U.S. forces, which is essential for effective
cooperation on regional threats. The recent FMF waiver supports
America's force posture across the region which relies heavily on
overflight rights and priority access to the Suez Canal.

MILITARY VOTING

199. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, the Military and Overseas
Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act, enacted by Congress as part of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2010, requires DOD to create a motor voter-style voting
assistance office on every military installation, thereby providing
military servicemembers and their families with critical voting
assistance, regardless of how far they might be from their hometowns.
As the 2012 elections fast approach, I am concerned that the Military
Services have dragged their feet on fully implementing this
requirement. This provision was passed in order to provide
servicemembers the same level of assistance that civilians receive
under the Federal motor voter law--the National Voter Registration
Act--I know you agree that their service and sacrifice demand no less.
Why has DOD failed, to date, to fully comply with this requirement?
Secretary Panetta. The first Installation Voting Assistance (IVA)
Office was established in November 2009 and the final IVA Office was
established in August 2011. Before finalization of the IVA Office
regulations, DOD aggressively moved to support the Services with
training programs and assistance visits. Draft copies of these
regulations were provided to the Services throughout that regulatory
coordination process both for the Services' comment and for their IVA
Office establishment preparation.
DOD also promptly moved to support the Services before finalization
of the regulations with IVA Office-in-a-Box training programs, visiting
36 military concentration areas in August and September 2010, providing
complete IVA Office training packages, templates, and draft documents,
copies of which will be provided to this committee and your office. DOD
also initiated its biennial Voting Assistance Office Workshops this
spring, with a special training module for IVA Office personnel. During
those workshop visits, DOD personnel are also conducting assist-and-
assess visits at local IVA Offices to determine compliance with
departmental regulations and Federal laws, and to provide direct
assistance for IVA Office personnel. Forty assist-and-assess visits
have already been conducted this year, and approximately four more are
conducted every week. A list of those IVA Offices already visited and
to be visited will be provided to this committee and to your office.
Additionally, the Services are reporting quarterly on their IVA Office
utilization, those reports are posted on the FVAP.gov website, and
copies of those reports will be provided to this committee and to your
office.

200. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, are you willing to get
personally involved to ensure the Military Services comply with the
MOVE Act and the motor voter law on every military installation, as
required?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, and I share your desire to provide our
military voters timely and effective voting assistance. I welcome the
opportunity to work with you and this Committee to assess whether to
allow the Services to execute this voting assistance at the unit vice
installation level, increase voter assistance utilization, reducing
costs to the Services, and providing voters a seamless unit level
voting assistance process.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM

201. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, you have shown an
unprecedented commitment to making DOD audit-ready. It is my hope that
future Secretaries of Defense will share that impressive level of
commitment on this important issue. DOD was previously required by law
to be audit-ready for the first time in 2017. Last year, you raised the
bar and stated a more ambitious goal for DOD to achieve audit readiness
of the Statement of Budgetary Resources for general funds by the end of
2014. What progress has been made to date in achieving this goal?
Secretary Panetta. In October 2011, I directed DOD to accelerate
achievement of several goals in DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit
Readiness (FIAR) Plan and place greater emphasis on the overall effort.
In response to my October directive, each of the Services and Defense
Agencies has reviewed their FIAR Plans and adjusted them to speed
progress. They are now hard at work implementing their plans to achieve
the accelerated SBR audit readiness date.
The Service Secretary and Chief of Staff for each Military Service
have committed to achieving specific near-term goals in support of
their plans for achieving auditable financial statements. I have
reviewed these commitments and plans and am holding civilian and
military senior leaders from across DOD accountable for progress
against those plans. Senior executives, both inside and outside the
financial management community, now have audit goals in their
individual performance plans and we are working to include them in
General and Flag Officer performance plans as well. Actual performance
against these plans will be assessed each year during annual
performance appraisal cycles. This will ensure those under their
leadership are getting the message that better control over resources
has a big effect on mission success, and everyone has a part to play.
I'd offer some recent accomplishments as examples of both our
commitment and progress:

DISA achieved a clean opinion on its $6.6 billion
working capital fund operations for fiscal year 2011 and it is
moving forward with an audit of its fiscal year 2012 general
fund business.
Contract Resource Management of the TRICARE Management
Activity received an unqualified opinion on its fiscal year
2011 financial statements.
The Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund
received a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 2011 financial
statement.
In November 2011, an examination of five business
processes at the initial General Fund Enterprise Business
Systems Wave 1 sites rendered a qualified opinion, establishing
a benchmark for expanding the Army's audit readiness program.
In November 2011, a commercial audit examination
validated that the Air Force could successfully balance its
Treasury funds at the transaction level.
In January 2012, an examination validated the Navy's
existence and completeness audit readiness assertion for ships
and submarines, Trident missiles, and satellites.

Leadership commitment from the highest level is setting the tone
and priority for audit readiness. Auditability is a goal that every
commander, every manager, and every functional specialist must
understand and embrace to improve efficiency and accountability within
DOD.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE

202. Senator Vitter. General Dempsey, in your statement submitted
today, you say, ``We must retrain our personnel on skills used less
often over the last decade.'' I support this, and I also believe that
in line with this we must make cuts that do not negatively affect the
joint effort of our overall training system that has led the United
States to become the highly effective elite fighting force it is today.
Which brings me to the Air Force announcement to cut all 24 A-10s from
Barksdale AFB (21 eliminated, 3 transferred) according to Air Force
documents. It is my understanding that the Air Force plans to largely
reduce the total number of A-10s. I believe this hugely effects
fundamental joint operations. These aircraft were specifically moved to
Barksdale AFB to support joint training at the Joint Readiness Training
Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk. My concern is that the A-10s slated to be
cut entirely from Barksdale AFB are used to support the joint training
mission of the Army in Fort Polk. Have the joint operational training
aspects been considered in this decision?
General Dempsey. Yes, the Air Force continues to source requests
for close air support (CAS) training at Fort Polk, tasking specific
units to support various exercises, with the 47th Fighter Squadron
fulfilling the requirement once over the last 3 fiscal years. The Air
Force has coordinated with the Army and will continue to provide CAS
capability as required by our Joint Partners at the JRTC.
The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that U.S. forces will no
longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
Analysis based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance
resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft overall
and a greater utility for multi-role fighters to provide the most
flexible capability within each scenario. As a result, A-10 retirements
were selected in greater numbers than other combat aircraft and the Air
Force made the difficult choice to retire 5 A-10 squadrons comprised of
102 A-10 aircraft. Previous reductions in fighter force structure
shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve component forces, and Air
Force decisions in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request
rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable Total Force
structure over the long term.
To meet this end, our Reserve component used the following four
Capstone principles: (1) ensure aircraft reductions do not negatively
impact operational support to combatant commands; (2) ensure force
structure movements do not create any new Air Force bills; (3) ensure
risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected
increases in mission capability rates; and (4) consider locations that
continue to have an Air Force mission due to the presence of another
Air Force component. Thus, the Air Force opted to divest A-10s at
Barksdale versus the only other alternative; Whiteman AFB. The Air
Force Reserve maintains a B-52 training wing and classic association
with operational B-52s at Barksdale, and can therefore absorb some of
the A-10 personnel into the B-52 wing. Additionally, since the Air
Force Reserve can absorb personnel into the B-52 mission, it preserves
the potential to migrate them back should the Air Force decide it needs
additional A-10 Formal Training Unit support. At Whiteman AFB, the Air
Force Reserves' only presence is an A-10 wing and if the wing were to
be divested, the personnel assigned to this unit would have limited
possibilities to continue their service.

203. Senator Vitter. General Dempsey, additionally, I would like to
know if you are aware of any consultation between the Army and the Air
Force regarding the removal of this mission from Fort Polk? If so, I
would like to see the cost savings to DOD of bringing A-10s into
Louisiana for training when the nearest planes needed for Army training
would now be located in Georgia, Florida, Idaho, or Arizona.
General Dempsey. The Air Force has coordinated with the Army and
will continue to provide CAS capability as required by our Joint
Partners at the JRTC. The Air Force has not performed a specific cost
analysis of using aircraft outside of Louisiana. The Air Force
continues to source requests for CAS training at Fort Polk, tasking
specific units to support various exercises. Over the last 12 months,
the 47th Fighter Squadron has provided 14 percent of the CAS
requirements for nine JRTC exercises while other CAS was provided from
outside the State of Louisiana.

204. Senator Vitter. Secretary Panetta, as a follow-up on the joint
operations aspect in Fort Polk, this action would appear, instead of
reducing overall military spending, to oppose your own recent guidance
to reexamine our programs in pursuit of greater efficiencies and
affordability to defense operations. I fully understand and support
improving efficiencies within the U.S. Government. However, in your own
words you have stated, while not specifically addressing the A-10s,
that cuts of this nature would do serious damage to DOD's ability to
``protect this country for the future . . . and we must avoid a hollow
force, and maintain a military that will always be ready, agile,
deployable, and capable.'' It is my opinion that we cannot have it both
ways. We cannot strip away the A-10s from Barksdale while also
maintaining the force necessary at Fort Polk without increasing cost of
operations. I am aware there will be A-10s remaining in the inventory
should the Air Force retire the ones stationed at Barksdale AFB. But of
all the units to be disbanded, it appears to me that the A-10s located
at Barksdale AFB were strategically located there to satisfy a specific
requirement that is not going away. Is it fair to say that the A-10
training mission at Fort Polk is an existing requirement that is not
going away anytime in the near future?
Secretary Panetta. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that
U.S. Forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged
stability operations. Analysis based on scenarios consistent with the
Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical
combat aircraft and a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the
most flexible capability within each scenario. As a result, A-10
retirements were selected in lieu of other combat aircraft and the Air
Force made the difficult choice to retire 5 A-10 squadrons comprised of
102 A-10 aircraft. Previous reductions in fighter force structure
shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve component forces, and Air
Force decisions in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request (20
A-10s from Active Duty, 61 from the Air National Guard, and 21 from the
Air Force Reserves) rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable
force structure over the long term. In conjunction with Air Force
Reserve leadership, the Air Force made the difficult decision to select
Barksdale AFB as the sole Air Force Reserve A-10 unit closure.
The Air Force does not anticipate any impacts to support training
operations at the JRTC. We will continue to fill U.S. Army training
requests for air-to-ground support through the normal Global Force
Management Allocation process, matching requirements with available
CAS-capable units across the Air Force, versus a specific squadron and
type of aircraft.

205. Senator Vitter. Secretary Panetta, Global Strike Command at
Barksdale AFB was stood up in December 2009 to improve the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear-capable assets
following the 2007 nuclear weapons incident. As DOD reinvests in key
areas across the nuclear enterprise, I would imagine Global Strike
Command will have a prominent role, including in the development of the
new bomber program. What are your thoughts on the triad in general and
the Air Force's commitment to keeping Global Strike Command as an
independent command at Barksdale AFB, given some of the lessons we have
learned?
Secretary Panetta. Maintaining the nuclear triad is essential to
U.S. national security. Each leg of the triad provides characteristics
that, combined in a balanced manner, create a synergy producing a total
deterrent effect. Air Force Global Strike Command, as the major command
with operational responsibility for land-based ICBMs and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers, plays an essential role in providing the
deterrent effects contributing to strategic stability.
Since Air Force Global Strike Command falls under the Air Force's
Title X organize, train, and equip responsibilities, any decisions
regarding Air Force Global Strike Command as an independent command
would be an internal Air Force decision. With the stand-up of Air Force
Global Strike Command, the Air Force aligned its strategic operational
nuclear units under a single command to best carry out organize, train,
and equip functions. As the Air Force's newest major command, its
positive impact was confirmed by the April 2011 Defense Science Board's
independent assessment of the Air Force nuclear enterprise stating,
``The formation of Air Force Global Strike Command has produced a
nearly universally positive response in the nuclear operating forces.''

[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Webb, Hagan, Blumenthal, Inhofe, Chambliss, Wicker,
Brown, Ayotte, and Cornyn.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Jason W.
Maroney, counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member;
and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Paul C.
Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Brian F.
Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Brian Burton,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Patrick Hayes, assistant
to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator
Shaheen; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony
Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Clyde Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to
Senator Wicker; William Wright, assistant to Senator Brown;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Dave Hanke,
assistant to Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today we receive
testimony on the posture of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific and
the status of the U.S. military strategic global distribution
and deployment capabilities.
On behalf of the committee, I'd like to welcome Admiral
Robert F. Willard, Commander, USN, U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM), and General William M. Fraser III, USAF, Commander,
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The committee
appreciates your years of faithful service and the many
sacrifices that you and your families make for our Nation.
Likewise, we greatly appreciate the service of the men and
women, military and civilian, who serve with you in your
commands. Please convey to them our admiration and our
appreciation for their selfless dedication.
Admiral Willard, this will be, in all likelihood, your last
hearing before this committee after a full and productive tour
as commander of our forces in the Pacific. On behalf of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, I'd like to thank you for your
service and your leadership in this important assignment.
Before and beyond that, your decades of selfless and
devoted service to our Nation included assignments as Commander
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and Commanding Officer of
the air carrier USS Abraham Lincoln.
I note that your wife, Donna, is here this morning, as she
has been in past hearings. I'd also like to especially thank
her for her many contributions and sacrifices. We all know very
well the importance of our military families to the success of
our Armed Forces and we wish you and the entire Willard family
the very best in the future.
This is General Fraser's first hearing as Commander of
TRANSCOM. As we heard from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier this
month, the President's recently unveiled defense strategic
guidance includes a reemphasis on the Asia Pacific, a region
that is impacted by what has been called the tyranny of
distance, which puts a premium on the capabilities provided by
TRANSCOM. Capabilities that have been stressed and honed over
more than 10 years of military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. So we also look forward to General Fraser's
testimony on the status of TRANSCOM and its important global
mission.
Relative to the Asia Pacific, the United States has been,
and will continue to be, present and active in the region
because of our commitments to our allies and our partners, and
also because of the clear U.S. national interests there.
The leadership change in North Korea occasioned by the
recent death of long-time dictator Kim Jong Il opens new
questions about possible future threats from an oppressive
regime that has shown little interest in cooperating with the
international community and little concern for the well being
of its people. We are mindful that the security situation on
the Korean Peninsula remains tense and as of yet there are no
indications that the situation will improve under the new
regime. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs and, with its history of deadly
unprovoked military attacks on South Korea, there is little
reason for optimism for a prompt resolution of the tensions on
the peninsula. In fact, over the weekend North Korea issued its
usual threats in response to the military training exercises
conducted by the United States and South Korea every year at
this time.
China's rising global influence and rapid military growth,
coupled with the overbreadth of its claims in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea, and its increasing propensity for
challenging conflicting claims of its regional neighbors,
unsettles the region and raises concerns about the prospects of
miscalculation. There are also growing concerns about China's
exploration of cyber space for military and for nonmilitary
purposes, such as the use of the Internet by Chinese entities
to conduct corporate espionage. In the current National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), we acted against counterfeit
electronic parts in defense systems, most of which came from
China. Nonetheless, it is important that we continue efforts to
engage with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and to attempt
to find common ground and to address common concerns.
There are many other challenges facing PACOM, such as
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), countering violent extremism, providing humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, and protecting critical sea
lanes of communication.
Against the backdrop of these developments, the Department
of Defense (DOD) has been working to realign U.S. military
forces in countries like South Korea and Japan and also to
posture our forces further to the south in countries like
Australia, Singapore, and possibly the Philippines. As we
rebalance and realign our presence in the Asia Pacific, it is
important that we get it right, not only in terms of strategy,
but also in terms of sustainability.
With respect to the realignment of U.S. marines on Okinawa,
Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I have advocated changes to
the current plan in ways that support the strategic goals of
the U.S. military posture in the region, while also accounting
for the fiscal, political, and diplomatic realities associated
with long-term sustainability. The recent announcement that the
United States and Japan are reconsidering elements of the plan
is welcome news. But the new thinking is not yet adequate.
For instance, there is apparently no intention yet to
reconsider the plan to build the unaffordable Futenma
Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. Nor does it
appear that the Air Force bases in the region are being
considered as part of the solution. It is important that any
changes be jointly agreed upon and jointly announced, with the
goal of achieving a more viable and sustainable U.S. presence
in Japan and on Guam.
So, Admiral, we will look forward to your testimony on our
strategy in your area of responsibility (AOR) and how the
fiscal year 2013 budget request adequately addresses the
threats that you face and how it reflects the reemphasis on the
Asia Pacific.
General Fraser, we know that things have been busy for you
as well ever since you assumed your job at TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM
continues to play a vital role in transporting our military men
and women and the supplies and equipment that they need to
Afghanistan and other overseas contingency operations. In
carrying out this mission, TRANSCOM faces numerous challenges,
included among them,uncertain lines of supply due to the
disruption or closure of routes through Pakistan. TRANSCOM has
successfully shifted much of the delivery of non-lethal
supplies and equipment headed for Afghanistan to the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) through Eastern Europe, the
Caucasus, and Central Asia.
During the past year, TRANSCOM forces were involved in
supporting forces engaged in operations in Libya and
humanitarian relief efforts such as those supporting victims of
the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. We applaud all of these
efforts.
With the drawdown of U.S. surge forces and further
reductions of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through 2014, TRANSCOM
now faces the daunting task of managing the redeployment home
of these forces and their equipment. We know that TRANSCOM
performed commendably in managing the removal of millions of
pieces of equipment from Iraq by the December 31, 2011,
deadline, consistent with the U.S. obligations under the U.S.-
Iraq strategic agreement. We would be interested, General, in
learning how the lessons learned from the withdrawal from Iraq
inform TRANSCOM's planning and operations as U.S. forces are
drawn down in Afghanistan.
A number of other issues confront TRANSCOM. One is
modernizing the force. One acquisition program supporting
TRANSCOM has received a lot of visibility and that's the
Strategic Tanker Modernization Program. There have been
indications that the contractor may overrun the original
development contract price, which we will discuss with the Air
Force at the Air Force posture hearing later this month.
TRANSCOM has received congressional additions to the budget
to buy C-17 aircraft in excess of what DOD and TRANSCOM said
were needed to support wartime requirements. Last year, the Air
Force was granted authority to retire additional C-5A aircraft
as it was taking delivery of those added C-17s. This year, the
Air Force is seeking authorization to retire all remaining C-5A
aircraft because they believe that they do not need the extra
aircraft under the new DOD strategic planning assumptions and
that they cannot afford to operate them.
We need to be sure that the Air Force's planned retirements
do not leave us short of the strategic lift capability that we
need, and General Fraser, you can speak to that issue.
TRANSCOM is also facing other, less well-known
modernization challenges. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), a
group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime
Administration, is aging and will need to be modernized with
newer ships at some point in the not too distant future.
Sealift may not be quite as glamorous as airlift operations,
but sealift support is critical to our Nation's capabilities.
We have relied on sealift to deliver more than 90 percent of
the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is similar to
previous contingencies.
So, Admiral, General, it's a pleasure to have you with us
this morning. We look forward to your testimony on these and
other challenging topics; and I now call on Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral Willard and General Fraser, for your selfless service
for so many years and your willingness to cooperate and have
personal conversations. Thank you so much.
Admiral Willard, I agree with everything you wrote in your
final assessment of the strategic environment in the Asia-
Pacific region and its significance to the U.S. security.
However, I am concerned about what appears to me to be a shift
in focus to Asia and to the Pacific. The United States is a
global power. We have global threats out there and we need to
be on all fronts. History has taught this Nation that it can't
ignore its global responsibilities and threats.
I am deeply concerned about the proposed $487 billion cut
in defense in the next 10 years. When you stop and think about
it, the possibility of sequestration could double that amount.
It's very disturbing to me. I think these cuts jeopardize reset
of equipment and delay modification and maintenance of key
equipment, cut overall research and development (R&D), delay
modernization, and increase the burden on a shrinking military
force.
Our military must possess the ability to deter aggression
and, if required, aggressively defeat any threat against our
citizens at home and around the world. Both TRANSCOM and PACOM
are essential elements to our national defense strategy and
must be manned, equipped, and maintained to ensure our national
interests throughout the world.
In PACOM's AOR, I am increasingly concerned about North
Korea and the rising power in China, both economically and
militarily. North Korea has historically proved difficult for
the intelligence community to gather information. I will have
some specific questions about that, some of the things that
have happened in the past, and I want to get your assurance as
to where we're going to be going in the future. We're obligated
by law to support Taiwan. We all want to do that anyway. We
have to continue to sell advanced military equipment to them to
ensure their safety and security.
General Fraser, your statement portrays a very active
supporting commander role. TRANSCOM and its components--the Air
Mobility Command (AMC) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC)--
have accelerated the redeployment of over 60,000 troops from
Iraq and Afghanistan. It continues to provide logistical
support to Afghanistan forces and to deploy and redeploy troops
and cargo worldwide. It has supported military operations in
Libya and delivered relief support in response to natural
disasters at home and around the world. No other country could
provide such in-depth support anywhere.
While President Obama's 2013 budget submission represents a
snapshot of the Services' overall requirements, it also raises
several questions about our military airlift and sealift
programs. Is the Air Force taking appropriate action to
mitigate the potential gap in airlift and the operational
implications of that gap? What is the risk in TRANSCOM's
ability along with its maritime component, MSC, to provide
logistics around the globe in response to the combatant
commanders' requirements? How does the proposed force structure
cut fit with the findings of the mobility, capabilities, and
requirements study of 2016, written in 2009?
Given the current climate for fiscal austerity, we have to
do our part in executing our jobs more efficiently. It's very
disturbing to a lot of us that when we have the President's--
now that all the results are in on his budget, that he's
actually given us this $5.3 trillion deficit and the only area
that I can see where we've had reductions in capability and in
funding are in the area of military. So it's something that's
very disturbing to me. I know in these hearings it's hard to
get down to these things, but I do enjoy the personal
conversations and the concern that's been expressed by a lot of
our military that I run into here as well as abroad with what's
happening to our military right now.
So I'm looking forward to this hearing, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Willard. Thank you, Chairman Levin. Mr. Chairman,
in order to accommodate the committee's questions sooner, I'll
keep my remarks brief and ask that my full statement be
included for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be. All statements will be
included.
Admiral Willard. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe: Thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss PACOM and
the Asia-Pacific region. I'd like to begin by thanking you for
recognizing my wife, Donna, who's present here today and has
been by my side for nearly 38 years. She's an outstanding
ambassador for our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men
and women of our military and their families. Together we've
thoroughly enjoyed this experience with our counterpart foreign
friends and with all of you who advocate for our men and women
in uniform.
I'd like to acknowledge this committee's enduring support
for our joint forces and by your actions their contribution to
our Nation's security. Your visits to the region have been and
will continue to be an important reminder of U.S. interests
there.
President Obama and SECDEF Panetta recently reaffirmed the
strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region and our
Nation's future focus on its security challenges in the
document titled ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities
for the 21st Century Defense.'' It appropriately addressed the
opportunities and challenges that PACOM faces in a region
covering half the world and containing the majority of great
powers, economies, populations, and militaries.
Importantly, our five treaty allies, Australia, Japan,
South Korea, Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand,
together with many regional partners, represent the greatest
opportunities for the United States and PACOM to contribute to
a broad security association in the region. Of particular note,
we seek to advance our important relationship with India in
South Asia.
We're making progress in adjusting PACOM's force posture
towards Southeast Asia following overtures from Australia,
Singapore, and the Philippines to help enable an increased
rotational U.S. military presence in this important sub-region.
As was evidenced by U.S. support to Japan during their epic
triple disaster last March, close military cooperation,
frequent exercises, and interoperable systems merged to enable
rapid and effective combined military responses under the most
trying conditions.
In contrast, North Korea, the world's only remaining nation
divided by armistice, continues to threaten peace and security
in northeast Asia, now under the leadership of a 29-year-old
son of Kim Jong Il. We're observing closely for signs of
instability or evidence that the leadership transition is
faltering. As General Thurman will attest when he testifies, we
believe Kim Jong Eunto be tightly surrounded by Kim Jong Il
associates and for the time being the succession appears to be
on course. That said, we also believe Kim Jong Eun will
continue to pursue his father's course of strategy that
embraces nuclearization, missile development, WMD
proliferation, provocations, and totalitarian control over
North Korean society.
Management of the U.S.-China relationship continues to be a
challenge at many levels. Our military-to-military relationship
is not where it should be, although a strategic-level exchange
of views with DOD persisted during 2011. The PLA continues to
advance its military capabilities at an impressive rate. It's
growing bolder with regard to their expanded regional and
global presence, and China continues to challenge the United
States and our partners in the region in the maritime, cyber,
and space domains. Nonetheless, we remain committed to evolving
this security relationship, with the objective of coexisting
peacefully and both contributing constructively to regional
security.
Throughout the Asia Pacific, numerous transnational threats
such as violent extremist organizations, proliferation,
trafficking, piracy, and perpetual natural and manmade
disasters challenge our Nation and our allies and partners in
the region. Across this wide spectrum of current and potential
future threats, PACOM must provide persistent overwatch,
ensuring our Nation retains continued strategic access and
freedom of movement in the global commons there.
Amidst these challenges, every day our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and civilians devote their efforts to
contributing to Asia Pacific security. Their success has long
been enabled by this committee's enduring support, including
the resources and quality of life you provide them to
accomplish their important missions.
During the 2\1/2\ years that I've been in command, you've
allowed me and my commanders to share our perspectives with
you, sought to understand the dynamics of this complex region,
and traveled and met with our military families and foreign
partners. Yours has been a powerful message in demonstration of
United States commitment to the 36 nations within the PACOM
AOR. On behalf of the more than 330,000 men and women of PACOM,
thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify
one final time.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard follows:]

Prepared Statement by ADM Robert F. Willard, USN

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to present an update on U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM). I consider myself fortunate to have served as
its commander for the last 2\1/2\ years and look forward to providing
what will be my final assessment of the strategic environment in the
Asia-Pacific region. The President has directed his national security
team to make America's ``presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top
priority.'' The testimony that follows will highlight the opportunities
we seek to illuminate and address the challenges we must overcome to
sustain U.S. leadership in this critical area of the world.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

The security of the PACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is of vital
national interest to the United States--a fact underscored by the
President's hosting of last year's Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Leaders Meeting. The region contains the world's three largest
economies and supports over $10 trillion of annual bilateral
merchandise trade, including more than $1 trillion of U.S. commerce.
The Asia Pacific also hosts the world's largest populations,
largest militaries, and includes three nuclear armed states (excluding
the United States) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
which aspires to be a nuclear power. While the Asia Pacific has
remained relatively peaceful and stable for the past 6 decades, myriad
challenges to its future security will try U.S. resolve, raise the
magnitude of our relationships with five treaty allies and many
strategic partners, and test PACOM as a principle guarantor of security
in the region.
Seven major security challenges confront the United States across
this region, which encompasses half of the Earth's surface, including:

Defense of the Homeland, U.S. territories, and compact
states in the Pacific.
The need to continuously manage and optimize U.S.
alliances and strengthen regional partnerships, in particular,
advancing the relationship with India.
The threat posed by the DPRK's nuclear aspirations,
proliferation, provocations, and potential to cause regional
instability.
China's military modernization--in particular its
active development of capabilities in the cyber and space
domains--and the questions all these emerging military
capabilities raise among China's neighbors about its current
and long-term intentions.
Three nuclear armed states, including Russia, China,
and India, and North Korea's nuclear aspirations, together with
the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation.
Numerous transnational threats, ranging from
proliferation, trafficking of narcotics and persons, and
piracy, to persistent natural and manmade disasters.
Challenges to freedom of access to, and security
within, maritime and air domains, and space and cyberspace, by
both state and non-state actors.

By contrast, the Asia Pacific also affords immense opportunities,
particularly through strong ally and partner associations, that can
lead to a cooperative and constructive security environment for the
foreseeable future. In large measure, cooperative engagement activities
leveraging PACOM posture and presence contribute to advancing military
self-sufficiency and security contributions by our partners in the
region.

Force Posture Assessment
Generally, PACOM has been well served with regard to on-hand, ready
forces with the ability to respond to the demands in the Asia-Pacific
region. This has occurred despite a decade of wars in the Middle East,
to include the Command's continual contributions to those wars. As a
consequence of both history and the nature of challenges in Northeast
Asia, PACOM forward, permanently based forces are concentrated in Japan
and the Republic of Korea. While affording a strong deterrent against
challengers such as North Korea, this has placed a premium on PACOM's
ability to deploy and sustain forces elsewhere in order to maintain the
required presence in sub-regions such as Southeast Asia, South Asia,
and Oceania.
PACOM's input to the most recent Global Posture Review expressed a
need to redistribute postured forces closer to Southeast Asia and South
Asia, in order to more efficiently meet the force presence and response
demands of those Asia Pacific sub-regions. The recent decisions to
rotationally operate a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) from
Darwin, Australia and to operate U.S. air forces from Australia's
northern air bases were initial efforts to rebalance PACOM force
posture for the future.
While the Asia Pacific is often regarded as inherently maritime and
contains some of the world's most expansive archipelagos, strategic
chokepoints and largest seas and oceans, its militaries tend to be
army-focused. For PACOM, this generates posture and presence
considerations to both adapt forces to the maritime challenges of the
region and to account for the necessary and effective role that Army,
Marine Corps, and Special Forces play in engaging with the dominant
foreign services of our regional partners.

NORTHEAST ASIA

Northeast Asia (NEA) contains many of the most significant
economies and militaries in the Asia Pacific and the world, including
Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. U.S. forward presence, permanent
basing in Japan and South Korea, habitual accesses, and host nation
support in this important sub-region enable PACOM's front line of
homeland defense, extended deterrence for allies Japan and South Korea,
regional deterrence against actors such as North Korea, and rapid
response to natural disasters and other contingencies that occur in the
Asia Pacific.
The DPRK continues to pose one of the most likely and persistent
threats to the United States, its allies, and to peace and security in
Northeast Asia. North Korea's conventional military threat to the
Republic of Korea remains of serious concern and its nuclear program,
missile development, proliferation activities, and asymmetric military
provocations are destabilizing. Collectively, these threats demand that
PACOM Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
and capacities be sufficiently robust to view across the DPRK's
military apparatus and warn of unfavorable developments. North Korea's
continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons and advanced ballistic missile
systems places a premium on PACOM ballistic missile defenses and close
cooperation with allies. Japan and the Republic of Korea are strong
U.S. allies that host U.S. forces, benefit from U.S. extended
deterrence, and stand with the United States in containing DPRK
aggression in addition to meeting other regional and global security
challenges.

Japan
The 52-year-old alliance between the United States and Japan
remains a cornerstone of security in the Asia Pacific. As was evident
in U.S. support to the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) during the
epic triple disaster in eastern Honshu last year, the extremely close
association and inherent interoperability between tenant U.S. forward
forces and their Japanese hosts enable prompt and extremely effective
contingency responses under the most trying of circumstances.
Despite delays in implementing some elements of the Defense Policy
Review Initiative (DPRI), including the Futenma airfield replacement
facility in Okinawa, which has occupied policymakers for nearly 20
years, the alliance remains strong and is a powerful strategic
stabilizing force in the region. It is important to note that of the 19
separate elements contained in DPRI, the vast majority are on track and
progressing.
In the past year, Japan has increased its regional engagements and
association with partners such as Australia, India, Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, to name a few.

Republic of Korea
The U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance remains a strong and visible
deterrent to war on the peninsula. This alliance is also transforming
in a variety of ways to remain current and relevant in the midst of an
ever-evolving Asia-Pacific region, changing leadership in North Korea
and as a consequence of lessons learned following the deadly
provocations by the DPRK in 2010.
Current alliance initiatives are underpinned by the planned
transition of wartime operational control from the Combined Forces
Command to the Republic of Korea in December 2015. Ongoing
transformation also includes the repositioning of on-peninsula U.S.
forces, headquarters, and bases.
Like the JSDF, Republic of Korea military forces are engaging
throughout the Asia Pacific at an increasing rate, and contributing to
international security initiatives, such as peacekeeping,
counterpiracy, and counterproliferation efforts.

Trilateral Cooperation
While modest in scope, trilateral cooperation between the United
States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea continues to progress. This
important initiative seeks to strengthen the natural synergy among
three powerful and interoperable Northeast Asia allies. While the
countries will have to overcome longstanding historical, cultural, and
political dynamics to fully realize the potential of trilateral
cooperation, policy advances and increasingly frank dialogue among the
three allies are encouraging.

Russia
Russia's Pacific armed forces are very gradually emerging from
their diminishment following the end of the Cold War. Increased naval
and strategic air force operations, cyberspace activities, and arms
sales throughout the Asia Pacific are signaling Russia's emphasis on
improved posture in the region. PACOM enjoys a generally positive
military-to-military relationship with Russia, particularly between
respective Pacific fleets. In coordination with U.S. European Command
and in accordance with the bilateral Military Cooperation Work Plan,
PACOM seeks improved engagement with Russia's Pacific forces in areas
such as counterterrorism (CT), peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue
operations.

Mongolia
Mongolia is a small but important partner in Northeast Asia. Its
active military pursues close engagement with PACOM through our annual
Khan Quest exercise series and contributes effectively to coalition
efforts in Afghanistan as well as global peacekeeping operations. With
Russia to the north and China to the south, Mongolia must finesse its
relationships in NEA with its broader security interests. As a
consequence of its experience as part of the Soviet bloc in the 20th
century, the Mongolian armed forces continue to maintain ties to
European nations such as Germany and even the DPRK, making them a PACOM
partner with unique and insightful perspectives.

The People's Republic of China
China's growing presence and influence in Asia, and the
opportunities and uncertainties that have resulted from it pose the
greatest test for PACOM among its seven challenge areas.
In January 2011, President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao
agreed to ``build a cooperative partnership based on mutual interest
and mutual respect,'' which also included a commitment to develop
``continuous, stable, and reliable military-to-military relations.'' To
meet this mandate, PACOM is effectively positioned to contribute to
advancing military engagement with the PRC. However, military-to-
military relations continue to lag well behind other U.S.-China
engagements for three main reasons: differences in philosophy regarding
the purpose of military-to-military relations in which China emphasizes
strategic dialogue and the United States seeks comprehensive military
contact from the strategic to tactical levels as a way to build
confidence; China's tendency to suspend military-to-military following
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and, more generally, its linkage between
certain U.S. defense policies and continuous bilateral military
relations; and inherent Chinese distrust of U.S. regional intentions
resulting in demands that perceived impediments to the relationship be
conceded before military relations can advance.
Despite these challenges, China's increasing participation in
regional and international security activities and forums such as
multi-lateral exercises, counter piracy operations, and peacekeeping
can foster informal, but useful U.S.-China military engagement.
Improvements in China's military capabilities and the regional
uncertainties this has created also test PACOM's ability to manage the
evolving security dynamics in the Asia Pacific. Areas in which U.S.
national interests or those of U.S. allies and partners are being
challenged include cyberspace and space as well as maritime security in
the international waters around China. China's anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) capabilities extend well into the South China Sea. China
asserts these military developments are purely defensive in nature and
that it poses no threat to neighbors in the region. Yet, combined with
broad maritime and sovereignty claims and incidents with lawful
operators in the South China Sea and East China Sea, there is ongoing
international concern regarding China's activities in the South China
Sea.

Taiwan
Following Taiwan's recent Presidential and Legislative Yuan
elections in January 2011, many analysts are hopeful that improvements
in cross-Strait relations will continue, with a focus on building
economic and cultural ties. This is in the security interests of the
United States and of Asia. It is important to note, however, that
Taiwan remains the most acute sovereignty issue for China and the main
driver of its military modernization programs. The military balance
across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in favor of China. PACOM
engages regularly with Taiwan's military within policy guidelines and
in accordance with tenets of the Taiwan Relations Act and three
communiques.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia (SEA) is an extremely diverse sub-region, rich in
natural resources, and strategically located at the crossroads of the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is host to a mix of democratic and
authoritarian governments, varied economies, contrasting military
capabilities, and mixed cultures. Prospects for continued economic
growth are promising, mainly due to China's substantial economic
influence, steady U.S. regional investment and trade, and universal
global interest, by the European Union and others, in capitalizing on
Asia's rise. Many advancing U.S. partnerships and two U.S. treaty
allies, the Republic of the Philippines and the Royal Kingdom of
Thailand, are concentrated in this sub-region. Further, the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its numerous forums, together
with the East Asian Summit (EAS) and APEC, have advanced to become the
most effective Asia Pacific multilateral organizations.
That said, SEA is not without its challenges. Disputed islands and
features in the South China Sea, including territorial disputes with
China, have generated broad unease in SEA, and maritime security has
become a regular theme in multilateral forums. Transnational threats,
including violent extremist organizations (VEOs) such as Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI); trafficking in narcotics and
humans; piracy; proliferation; and natural and manmade disasters
regularly combine to challenge PACOM, U.S. allies and partners in this
sub-region. Resources such as water, food and energy are being
pressurized across the region, as illustrated by the Mekong River Delta
crisis. Geography is also a factor as SEA contains some of the most
extensive archipelagos in the world, including Indonesia and the
Philippines, and some of the world's most strategic choke points, such
as the Strait of Malacca. Despite this vast maritime domain where naval
capabilities and capacities are called for, most SEA militaries are
army-centric and assigned internal security responsibilities.
Consequently, few nations are self-sufficient militarily. PACOM's has
focused its engagement on advancing the self-sufficiency of the partner
militaries in the region. Programs such as International Military
Education and Training (IMET) are vital to enhancing the education
level of military leaders and promoting a network of military-to-
military relations that contribute to broader security cooperation in
SEA.

Philippines
Underpinned by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S.-Philippines
alliance is an important strategic icon in SEA. Adjoining the South
China Sea, this vast island nation straddles several strategic sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) and chokepoints, claims a number of
disputed islands and features in the South China Sea, and contends with
several internal insurgent movements and VEOs, such as JI and ASG, with
assistance from U.S. forces. Possessing an army-centric military as a
result of its internal security challenges, the Philippines has
recently begun to focus on improving the ability of its navy and air
forces to secure the vast maritime area defined by the Philippine
archipelago. As a consequence, PACOM security assistance is focused
primarily on supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in CT
efforts in southern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, and advancing
AFP naval and air capabilities. Improving maritime domain awareness is
another primary focus of U.S. security assistance, and we hope to
provide a second Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to the Philippines
this year.
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines has operated in a
strictly non-combat role in support of the AFP for the past 8 years in
the largely successful efforts to contain ASG and JI VEOs.
Additionally, PACOM engages with the Philippines through the Joint
Staff-sponsored exercise Balikatan, as well as through annual military-
to-military consultations, periodic Pacific Partnership missions, and
numerous Service component-led exercises.
We welcome recent U.S.-Philippine discussions regarding
opportunities to increase joint training with our AFP counterparts,
possibly supported by enhanced rotational access to AFP facilities by
PACOM forces.

Thailand
I would begin by offering my personal condolences to the Thai
people for the losses they suffered in 2011 during the most devastating
flood their country has experienced in 50 years. Their response to this
disaster, particularly with regard to containment of potential
infectious diseases, was a testament to Thailand's resilience and self
sufficiency.
Thailand is an enduring U.S. ally in SEA and a valuable security
partner. They are co-host (with PACOM) to the largest multilateral
exercise series in SEA, Cobra Gold, and provide liberal access and
logistics support for transiting PACOM aircraft and ships at their
military facilities. The United States and Thailand have twice
partnered to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa, deploying Thai naval
vessels with U.S. Navy personnel onboard to Combined Task Force-151,
which Thailand will take command of in the coming year. Additionally,
the Royal Thai Army assisted U.N. humanitarian relief operations in
Darfur with a battalion of peacekeepers.
Despite facing challenges such as land and maritime border disputes
with neighboring, Cambodia, refugee incursions from Burma, a
longstanding ethnic insurgency in the south, and transnational
challenges such as narcotics and human trafficking, the Thai armed
forces are capable and generally self-sufficient.

Singapore
Our bilateral relationship with Singapore continues to strengthen
and broaden. Singapore armed forces comprise a small, but extremely
capable military. Their main focus continues to be security within the
Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait and they cooperate with
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in conducting security patrols within
the Straits against piracy and other illicit activities. Singapore's
armed forces are also deployed to Afghanistan, working alongside
coalition partners to develop the Afghan National Security Forces.
Within the context of the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, both
militaries are seeking to increase engagement across all PACOM Service
components. Singapore's offer to host U.S. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)
at Changi naval station will enhance PACOM's SEA posture.

Indonesia
As the relationship between the United States and Indonesia--the
world's fourth most populous nation, third largest democracy, and
largest Muslim-majority country--continues to advance, the PACOM-TNI
relationship is progressing, as well. Following a decade of political,
economic, and military reform, Indonesia has surfaced as a vibrant
democracy, an emerging economy, and a competent military power. In
areas such as disaster risk reduction, CT, Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and peacekeeping operations, Indonesia is
increasingly recognized for its leadership role. Indonesia and the
United States were recently designated co-chairs of the Experts Working
Group on Counterterrorism for the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus.
This initiative seeks to encourage greater regional CT cooperation,
build capacity, and collectively address regional security issues in an
open consultative forum.
Following a 12-year hiatus, PACOM has reestablished security
cooperation activities with the Indonesian Kopassus army special
forces. The measured pace with which this engagement has advanced has
included key leader dialogues and small-scale subject matter experts
exchanges in areas such as military decisionmaking, medical planning
and law of war/human rights. More activities of this type are planned
for 2012 and will gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the
demonstrated progress in Indonesian Armed Force transparency and
institutional reform.

Vietnam
Military relations with Vietnam continue to grow in areas such as
disaster management, search and rescue, conflict resolution, personnel
recovery and medical operations. Vietnam is modernizing its military
and looks to the United States as a partner in maintaining security and
stability in SEA, particularly in the South China Sea. Vietnam's
successful chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010 affirmed its emerging role as
a leader and spokesman among SEA nations, as has been evidenced by
their current role in lower Mekong River delta HA/DR initiatives.
Vietnam and China have a long history of competition in the South China
Sea. Both nations' disputes over islands and features, as well as
natural resources, have led to confrontations in the past. Vietnam's
continued leadership among SEA nations will be a critical component of
eventual conflict resolution in this highly important and strategic
area. PACOM will carry on working closely with Vietnam to advance our
military relationship and cooperation in providing security across the
Asia Pacific while remaining mindful of concerns about human rights.

Malaysia
Malaysia's vibrant economy, advanced military, strategic position
near Malacca and the Singapore Straits, bordering both the South China
Sea and Indian Oceans, and regional leadership combine to define it as
an important partner for the United States and PACOM, and a key actor
within SEA. Malaysia contributes to Strait of Malacca patrols, maritime
security in the South China Sea, and efforts to contain transnational
threats, such as piracy, and VEOs, such as ASG and JI. Its direct
action against pirates in the Gulf of Aden was evidence of increased
confidence and capability. In 2011, Malaysia conducted its second
deployment of medical support units to Afghanistan and remains
committed to supporting coalition efforts there until 2014. U.S. naval
vessels frequently call in Malaysian ports, and military-to-military
exchanges and joint training have expanded over recent years.

Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Timor-Leste
The United States has extensive interests across the rest of SEA,
and PACOM seeks to continue advancing military relations with Cambodia,
Laos, Brunei, and Timor-Leste. Cambodia has been a strong supporter of
U.S. military engagement in recent years and demonstrates a strong
desire to increase military-to-military activities with PACOM. Military
engagements with Brunei, Laos and Timor-Leste have expanded, albeit
modestly, over the past year with particular emphasis on relationship-
building and enhanced regional cooperation.

Burma
To the extent that any military-to-military relationship exists
with Burma, it is extremely limited due to U.S. policies and sanctions
directed at the former junta and its actions. However, the Burmese
Government steps towards credible political and economic reform and
working toward ceasefires with armed ethnic groups in the past several
months together have improved U.S.-Burma ties, resulting in several
initiatives announced during Secretary Clinton's December trip to
Burma. Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) recovery
operations, is the first opportunity for military-related engagement
with Burma since 2004. It is estimated that the WWII remains of as many
as 730 Americans may be present there. Burma's assimilation into the
broader Asia-Pacific regional security order would be a positive event.

SOUTH ASIA

South Asia as a whole is of major strategic importance to the
United States. Anchored by India and containing major SLOCs for the
transport of energy and other commerce to Asia and the Americas from
the Middle East and Europe, South Asia security partnerships are
increasingly vital to PACOM's mission.
South Asia is home to a confluence of challenges, including nuclear
armed rivals India and Pakistan, numerous transnational VEOs such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), piracy, trafficking in narcotics and persons,
disputed borders, and insurgent movements that have plagued India,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. South Asia is particularly prone to natural
disasters, including cyclones, tsunamis, and earthquakes. Bangladesh
has long suffered from annual cyclones and flooding and Nepal is
expected to suffer a major earthquake in the coming years. PACOM
engages throughout South Asia, assisting its militaries to counter and
contain VEOs such as LeT, cooperating in maritime security activities
such as counter piracy, conducting disaster response planning and
training, and exercising extensively, service-to-service.

India
Pursuing a U.S.-India strategic partnership through a close
alignment of respective regional security interests is a priority for
the U.S. Department of Defense and PACOM. Our security relationship
involves strategic to tactical-level dialogues, increasingly robust
military exercises, security assistance, and personnel exchanges. The
United States and India have made steady progress in military-to-
military cooperation over the past decade.
It is important that the leaderships and staffs of PACOM and U.S.
Central Command continue to coordinate our respective military
activities in this sub-region, especially as they concern India and
Pakistan.

Bangladesh
Bangladesh has emerged as a particularly effective partner in the
fight against terror, cooperating with India as well as the United
States to counter VEO activity by actors such as LeT. Further,
Bangladesh's military is advancing its capabilities and contributes
broadly to U.N.peacekeeping operations. Also, the Bangladesh army is
primarily responsible for and has achieved major advancements in the
protection of its citizens during the annual cyclone season and the
inevitable flooding and related disasters with which Bangladesh
repeatedly contends.

Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka
Although South Asian nations share similar concerns and challenges,
they are uniquely individual.
Due to its proximity to major commercial sea lanes, the Maldives is
concerned with piracy and other illicit activity in its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). For that reason, it is striving to advance its
maritime security capabilities by reshaping its coast guard, marine and
special operations forces. Further, curbing recruitment of its youth
into VEOs and narcotics trafficking and addiction are Maldives' areas
of focus.
Nepal has emerged from a lengthy Maoist insurgency in 2006 and is
seeking to integrate some of the former insurgents into the Nepal Army.
In partnership with PACOM, Nepal's armed forces are preparing to
respond to a future earthquake.
Sri Lanka, too, is focused on developing its maritime security
capabilities while preventing a resurgence of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Elam. Sri Lanka's military forces continue to assist in de-mining
and other recovery operations following 25 years of civil war. PACOM's
engagement with Sri Lanka will continue to be limited, until the
Government of Sri Lanka demonstrates progress in addressing human
rights allegations.
Each of these nations' militaries partner with PACOM at varying
levels, including leadership exchanges, exercise series, PACOM Assist
Team CT capacity building actions and activities, and security
assistance.

LeT
While several VEOs conduct facilitation, recruitment, and seek safe
havens throughout South Asia, LeT presents a particularly acute
problem. Responsible for many attacks in India, including the horrific
attacks into Mumbai, LeT is headquartered in Pakistan, affiliated with
al Qaeda and other VEOs, and contributes to terrorist operations in
Afghanistan and aspires to operate against Asia, Europe, and North
America. PACOM's fiscal year 2011 Indian Engagement Initiative that
resourced and hosted Mumbai CT specialists for training, exercises, and
exchanges throughout the United States, together with capacity-building
activities with South Asian partners are mainly focused on containing
LeT and contributing to CT self-sufficiency of the sub-region's
militaries.

OCEANIA

The U.S. alliance with Australia anchors PACOM's strategy in
Oceania. Australia, with additional contributions from New Zealand,
invests extensively in security and assistance efforts in this sub-
region. The Australian continent notwithstanding, most of Oceania is
comprised of Pacific Island nations spread across the vast expanse of
the South Pacific Ocean. Security challenges associated with natural
resources in this sub-region tend to predominate. In particular,
illegal fishing, resource damage attributed to climate change and
global warming, and the susceptibility of low lying island nations to
typhoons and tsunamis define PACOM and U.S. Coast Guard approaches to
engagement in Oceania, often in concert with Australian and New Zealand
actions. Two new Shiprider Agreements with the Pacific Island nations
of Nauru and Tuvalu together with those already in place with the
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Tonga, and Kiribati enable
transiting U.S. ships to assist in characterizing the maritime domains
and providing a mechanism for shiprider-nation responses to
irregularities within these island nations' territories.
Oceania is also home to the Compact of Free Association nations of
the Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, each of which PACOM is obligated to
defend as part of Compact arrangements putting their territory off
limits to all armed forces except those of the United States (and other
countries we have invited). Compact agreements with these three nations
provide PACOM a strategic buffer along the southern flank of the highly
strategic U.S. territory of Guam. PACOM is increasing its collaboration
with the Department of the
Interior which administers Federal policy in U.S. territories in
Oceania and administers assistance funds to the Compact Nations. We
soon expect to have a liaison officer from Interior join the PACOM
staff.

Australia
The U.S.-Australia alliance, our most significant partnership in
Oceania, benefits from two new force posture initiatives, the
rotational deployment of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to
Darwin and enhanced access to airfields in northern Australia. These
initiatives will enable deeper interoperability of our respective
forces, expand training opportunities with third countries in the
region, and improve access to SEA and Oceania. Australia is also the
largest non-NATO contributor of forces to the coalition efforts in
Afghanistan.
A trilateral relationship between Australia, Japan, and the United
States continues to advance and has the potential to enable
multilateral approaches to the region's challenges. Bilaterally, the
U.S. and Australian militaries collaborate extensively in areas such as
information sharing; ISR; HA/DR; combined arms training in exercise
Talisman Saber; and space and cyber security.

New Zealand
New Zealand is also a recognized leader in Oceania. It is a strong
partner of the United States, and in accordance with the forward-
looking spirit of the 2010 Wellington Declaration, PACOM will continue
to look for ways to further strengthen the relationship despite
differences over nuclear policy. The United States and New Zealand
share many security concerns and are cooperative partners in areas such
as intelligence sharing, HA/DR and maritime security. In the interest
of advancing the partnership, New Zealand is participating fully in the
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise for the first time in 2012.
We value New Zealand's contributions to Afghanistan. New Zealand
also supports stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon
Islands, Armistice enforcement in Korea, and UN peacekeeping efforts
globally.

EXERCISE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Exercises
In order to maintain ready forces and to plan, train, and exercise
to accomplish the full range of military contingencies, PACOM requires
annual congressional support for the Combatant Command Exercise and
Engagement (CE2) program. PACOM's portion of this essential program
consists of 18 major exercises involving joint military forces,
interagency activities, and 27 of 36 PACOM partner nations. CE2
directly impacts PACOM's ability to conduct Joint training exercises
and theater security engagement events across the Asia Pacific, and
therefore plays a vital role in contributing to security of the AOR.

Engagement Programs
Two very significant engagement programs are Pacific Partnership
and Pacific Angel. In 2011, the USS Cleveland, with personnel from 11
nations, conducted a 4-month deployment to Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New
Guinea, Timor Leste, and Federated States of Micronesia. Combining
medical, dental, and engineering support, the mission treated over
38,000 patients, conducted scores of community relations projects, and
completed much needed engineering and infrastructure repairs. Likewise,
Pacific Angel 2011, utilizing C-17 aircraft, cared for thousands of
patients and completed numerous civic action projects in Mongolia,
Cambodia, Timor Leste, and Indonesia.
Both of these engagement programs serve to improve regional
partnerships, while enhancing the resiliency of object nations to deal
more effectively with their own humanitarian crises due to natural
disasters or other causes. Moreover, the experience that our Service
components gain by working alongside nongovernmental organizations and
other participating militaries in these controlled conditions improves
their abilities to conduct disaster response when time is of the
essence and lives are on the line. PACOM considers Pacific Partnership
and Pacific Angel to be high payoff engagements in the Asia-Pacific
region.

GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND

The Global Security Contingency Fund is a new tool available for
PACOM and country teams to develop and deliver security sector
assistance in a coordinated fashion, enhancing the capabilities of
military forces, other security forces, and relevant government
agencies. The fund also supports the justice sector (including law
enforcement and prisons), rule of law programs, and stabilization
efforts.

PACOM ORGANIZATIONS

The following direct-reporting units uniquely contribute to the
PACOM mission:

Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) fills a unique
role in multi-national security cooperation and capacity-building
efforts by equipping and empowering APCSS fellows and alumni to make
substantive changes to their countries' security architectures. APCSS
brings together communities of interest and influence, comprised of
presidents, vice presidents, ministers of defense and foreign affairs,
chiefs of defense, and ambassadors, to enable collaborative solutions
to critical regional security challenges. Because the APCSS engages
regularly and often concurrently with Chinese on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, as well as Hong Kong, it is uniquely positioned to
assist in moving the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship
towards a ``sustained and reliable'' level of contact.

Joint Intelligence Operations Center
The PACOM and the U.S. Forces Korea-Combined Forces Command (USFK-
CFC) Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) deliver
strategically-focused, operationally-relevant, and predictive
intelligence products to support Commander PACOM and our subordinate
commands. The JIOCs operate within a larger PACOM intelligence
federation that capitalizes on national intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities as well as two-way information sharing
activities with allies and partners. The JIOCs serve as a focal point
of intelligence collaboration in close coordination with PACOM
Component Commands; National, Defense, and Service agencies; other
combatant commands; subunified commands; and allies and partners. This
federated approach to intelligence provides for invaluable theater
situational awareness and advanced threat warning to enable
decisionmaking.

Joint Interagency Task Force West
Through the execution of PACOM's counternarcotics program, Joint
Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West) has significantly affected
illicit methamphetamine precursor chemical trafficking originating in
Asia ultimately bound for the Western Hemisphere by focusing its
efforts on Asian, Iranian, Eurasian, and other transnational criminal
organizations in the PACOM AOR. In fiscal year 2011, JIATF West's
support to U.S. and partner nation law enforcement agencies resulted in
the seizure of over 1,000 metric tons of illicit chemicals used in meth
production. The seizures were critical in interrupting distribution
within the United States and contributed to the disruption of Asian and
Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) successfully accomplished
58 investigation and recovery operations globally last year and is
projected to execute 78 investigation and recovery operations in 2012.
Expanded operations begin in fiscal year 2012 as JPAC resumes
investigation and recovery operations in the DPRK. JPAC is also
preparing to resume discussions with the government of Burma to renew
personnel accounting efforts there during fiscal year 2013. JPAC
accounting operations are ongoing in the People's Republic of China,
while discussions between JPAC and the governments of India and the
Philippines continue in an effort to resume investigation and recovery
operations in those countries.

CONCLUSION

As characterized by the President, the United States ``face[s] an
inflection point.'' The evolving geopolitical climate and shifting
fiscal environment, which are significant factors in this change, point
toward the Asia Pacific and emphasize the ever increasing consequence
of this theater. The preceding testimony highlights the importance of
optimizing U.S. posture in this region and underscores the specific
challenges PACOM faces, as well as the opportunities PACOM seeks. I
have spent the majority of my career in the Asia Pacific and have never
been more convinced of its remarkable nature, partnership capacity, and
criticality to U.S. security.
In closing, your assistance has enabled the more than 300,000
members of PACOM to accomplish their mission. Further, your personal
interest in, and visits to the Asia Pacific have sent a strong signal
to this region regarding U.S. national interests and staying power. On
behalf of every PACOM member, thank you for your enduring support for
our Armed Forces and for this unique and important part of the world.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral. Thanks for your
statement and again for all you and your family have done for
this Nation.
General Fraser.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General Fraser. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and
distinguished members of this committee: It is indeed my
distinct privilege to be here with you today representing
TRANSCOM. We are a total force team of approximately 150,000
men and women, military and civilian, dedicated to deploying,
sustaining, and then returning home our Nation's most precious
resource, our men and women in uniform. TRANSCOM is a lean,
dynamic organization which plays a critical role in supporting
our joint force around the world.
Today I am privileged to be here with my good friend,
Admiral Bob Willard, Commander, PACOM, whom I've had the honor
of partnering with closely over many years. As already
mentioned, I know Admiral Willard will be retiring in the near
future and I would publicly like to personally thank him for
his many years of dedicated service to our Nation and his
wife's continued sacrifices and dedication. Sir, it has been
indeed an honor and a privilege to serve with you.
During 2011, TRANSCOM added a new command, the Joint
Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), led by Rear Admiral Scott
Stearney, to our component command leadership team, which is
comprised of AMC, led by General Ray Johns, MSC, led by Rear
Admiral Mark Buzby, and the Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC), led by Major General Kevin Leonard.
Over the last month I have witnessed firsthand the spirit
and ingenuity of our subordinate commands during my travels
throughout the United States, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the
Pacific, and Antarctica, just to name a few. This past year has
been particularly challenging as our team of Active Duty,
Guard, Reserve, civil servants, merchant mariners, and
commercial partners maintain an unusually high operations
tempo, supporting combat operations, sustainment efforts,
humanitarian relief, and crisis action responses both at home
and abroad.
These efforts from the evacuation in Japan following the
devastating earthquake and tsunami, to supporting the
warfighter in Afghanistan, to our withdrawal from Iraq at the
end of 2011, were made possible by the amazing TRANSCOM
professionals, who are committed to ensuring our joint force
maintains global logistics dominance.
As we now enter a very challenging fiscal environment
focusing on capabilities needed for the 21st century, as
defined in the President's defense strategy, our challenge is
to continue to find fiscally responsible efficiencies to
deliver the required capability. TRANSCOM strongly supports
this transition and will remain focused on supporting our
forces around the world. This will not be an easy task. The new
strategic guidance requires a military that is smaller and
leaner, while at the same time being more agile, flexible, and
ready.
Having an integrated distribution system will be important
to our Nation, and TRANSCOM will meet the challenges of this
new environment. We will continue to build our relationships
with the interagency, our other nongovernmental organizations,
commercial, and international partners. Together we will ensure
our Nation's ability to project national military power and be
able to confront other national challenges any time and
anywhere.
Since taking command last fall, I've been amazed to see the
unique capabilities that are inherent in the command. I could
not be prouder of the TRANSCOM team and our partners. No one in
the world can match our Nation's deployment and distribution
capability. The foundation of this enterprise is the
enthusiasm, the dedication, and efficiency of the TRANSCOM
team.
Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and all the members of this
committee, I want to thank you for your continued superb
support of TRANSCOM and of all of our men and women in uniform.
I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this
committee today and I ask that my written statement be
submitted for the record. I now look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. William Fraser, USAF

MISSION/ORGANIZATION

It is my privilege as the Commander of the U.S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) to present you my posture statement for 2012. Our
Total Force team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, commercial
partners, and contractors leads a world-class Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) that provides unfailing support to our
warfighters and their families around the globe. Through efficient and
effective execution of our transportation and supply chain distribution
mission, the TRANSCOM team is revolutionizing military logistics to
meet the challenges of the 21st century, while adapting to the
President's Defense Strategy. Our team of dedicated and trained
professionals working in unison with our joint, commercial, and
international partners is ready to meet those challenges today and in
the future.

SUPPORTING GLOBAL OPERATIONS

Our Nation's greatest asymmetric advantage is our ability to
project and sustain our forces across the globe supported by the
political, military, and business relationships that enable this
expansive network. To maintain this advantage, the President assigned
TRANSCOM the Global Distribution Synchronizer responsibility to
synchronize planning for global distribution operations. This new
responsibility enables the Department of Defense (DOD) to shape the
distribution environment to meet growing access challenges and ensure
sufficient distribution lanes across multiple theaters to underwrite
our Nation's ability to successfully project and sustain forces
globally. Collaboratively, we will ``knit the distribution seams''
among multiple Combatant Commands (COCOM) to ensure support for their
theater campaign and contingency plans. To this effort, our vision is
to achieve a global network that anticipates demands, maximizes
strategic flexibility, mitigates potential risks, and provides
resilient end-to-end distribution.
While TRANSCOM leads the enterprise, our component commands execute
the mission. In 2011, Air Mobility Command (AMC) and its Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard partners maintained a high operations
tempo supporting Operations Unified Protector (OUP), New Dawn (OND),
Enduring Freedom (OEF), and other crises around the world. At the peak
of global air mobility operations in 2011, AMC deployed a rotational
force of over 60 C-130 tactical airlift aircraft, plus 120 KC-135 and
KC-10 aerial refueling aircraft. AMC also employed an additional 21 C-
17s in dedicated support of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
Additionally, across all COCOMs on a daily basis, at least one third of
AMC's air mobility fleet was utilized in support of global operations.
On the surface, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) moved over 19.9
million tons of cargo worldwide. MSC's tankers delivered 1.6 billion
gallons of fuel to support global operations. SDDC expanded into
multimodal operations by moving over 3,500 pieces of mission essential
cargo by commercial liner sealift with follow-on airlift into
Afghanistan.
Our newest subordinate command, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
(JECC), deployed more than 750 personnel to support four Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations and seven contingency
operations worldwide. The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and U.S.
Special Operations Command employed the JECC's expertise for a variety
of real-world missions including Odyssey Dawn, Tomodachi, Pacific
Passage, Continuing Promise, Odyssey Guard, OUP, OEF, and OND. Though
the missions were of varying size, scope, and complexity, in each
instance the JECC provided immediate, short-duration support to
increase the effectiveness of joint command and control at the
operational level.

SUPPORT TO U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

In 2011, the President directed the final drawdown in Iraq by 31
December 2011 and the start of the Afghanistan surge recovery. Through
partnership with CENTCOM and aggressive scheduling, TRANSCOM and its
component AMC accelerated the redeployment of over 60,000 troops (over
50,000 from Iraq and 10,000 from Afghanistan) returning 99 percent home
by 24 December and 100 percent by the New Year.
Equipment retrograde was highlighted by the aggressive push to
redeploy over one million pieces of equipment from Iraq in calendar
year 2011. In addition, TRANSCOM and our interagency partners have
received permissions from some governments of European, Central Asian,
and Baltic countries to start retrograding materials from Afghanistan
through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN).
The Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOC) provide
logistical support through the movement of cargo to Afghanistan. In
2011 more than 35,000 containers were delivered on the PAK GLOC by
surface transportation. When open, the PAK GLOC remains the quickest
and most cost-effective route.
The NDN provides an additional route for cargo to Afghanistan. Over
the past year, we moved an average of 40 percent of all cargo in
support of OEF through the NDN's multiple truck, water, rail, and air
routes in an expanding distribution network. In 2011 a total of 27,000
containers were delivered by surface transportation on the NDN, an
increase of 15 percent from 2010. TRANSCOM will continue to work with
the interagency and governments of the NDN countries to expand NDN
routes and permissions. This expansion will increase velocity and the
number of new routes into and out of Afghanistan.

SUPPORT TO OTHER GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS

TRANSCOM supported all GCCs, responding to their unique
requirements, often testing the ingenuity of the team to develop new
and complex transportation solutions. In March 2011, TRANSCOM provided
a top priority movement to all six GCCs--a TRANSCOM first.
In U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility (AOR), TRANSCOM
continues to support the transport and security of detainees during
detainee movement operations (DMO). Since 2002, TRANSCOM in
coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of
the Secretary of State, Joint Staff, and supported COCOMs has
successfully completed 88 DMO missions, transporting 1,206 detainees
without incident.
In U.S. European Command's (EUCOM) AOR, TRANSCOM deployed and
redeployed more than 3,500 troops and 1,400 tons of cargo in support of
the Kosovo Balkan force, providing a safe and secure environment in the
region.
In U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) AOR, TRANSCOM deployed and
redeployed 2,491 troops and 1,340 short tons of cargo in support of
Commander Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.
Supporting both AFRICOM and EUCOM and in response to the United
Nations Security Council resolution to end Libya's military advance on
its civilian population, TRANSCOM provided tankers and other lift
assets to support Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector.
U.S. tankers flew 435 sorties delivering 23 million pounds of fuel
to coalition strike aircraft. TRANSCOM also directed 63 time-critical
airlift missions delivering 886 passengers and 2,220 short tons of
cargo.
In U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR, TRANSCOM responded within
hours to the immediate needs of the Japanese people, who were
devastated from the earthquake and tsunami and follow-on nuclear
crisis, with Operation Tomodachi. TRANSCOM delivered relief supplies,
nuclear response equipment, a 50-person JECC team, search and rescue
teams, and disaster response experts totaling over 3,400 short tons and
over 6,700 passengers as part of that operation. TRANSCOM
simultaneously supported Operation Pacific Passage, the voluntary
authorized departure of DOD dependents from Japan, by evacuating more
than 7,800 passengers on over 25 missions.
Each year, TRANSCOM provides airlift and sealift assets to
transport personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of the National
Science Foundation's (NSF) research in Antarctica as part of Operation
Deep Freeze. Using unique capabilities such as the Air National Guard's
ski-equipped LC-130s, TRANSCOM delivered more than 3,250 passengers,
10,000 short tons of cargo, and five million gallons of fuel to McMurdo
Station, Antarctica. In 2011, TRANSCOM assets airlifted the King of
Malaysia and the Prime Minister of Norway to Antarctica in recognition
of the 100 year anniversary of man's first expedition to the South
Pole.
In U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) AOR, TRANSCOM supported
training exercises that provided realistic homeland defense and defense
support to civil authorities training for joint and interagency
partners. TRANSCOM also deployed the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting
System (MAFFS) equipped C-130 aircraft to fight fires in Texas, New
Mexico, Arizona, and Mexico in support of the National Interagency Fire
Center. The MAFFS aircraft flew 396 sorties and released more than 9.7
million pounds of fire-retardant during their 74 days of deployment.
TRANSCOM's WC-130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft flew 129 sorties into
30 storms to collect valuable hurricane data for the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration during the 2011 hurricane season. In
addition to collecting storm data, TRANSCOM airlifted the Federal
Emergency Management Agency Region II Defense Coordination Officer
emergency response vehicle to Puerto Rico to assist with monitoring
Tropical Storm Emily.

IMPROVING BUSINESS PRACTICES

To reduce transportation costs, TRANSCOM continues to pursue both
military and commercial multimodal transportation solutions. Multimodal
transportation solutions use both surface and air assets, e.g., moving
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by ship to a major port
and using cargo airplanes for the final delivery to the warfighter. By
embracing multimodal transportation solutions, TRANSCOM manages the
supply chain, controls cost, and creates efficiencies.
In 2011, commercial multimodal operations began in the CENTCOM AOR.
Multimodal operations into theater included contracted sealift carriers
and airlift services through the commercial seaports and airports in
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Aqaba, Jordan. Commercial multimodal
transportation routes maximize the use of commercial carrier
capabilities from origin to destination while ``freeing up'' vital
military capabilities. Multimodal hubs proved invaluable when the PAK
GLOC routes were no longer available for use in late November. Several
hundred containers from 39 different ships bound for forces in
Afghanistan were diverted to Dubai and Aqaba where they were stored and
then airlifted as needed into Afghanistan to ensure sustained support
to combat operations.
Afghanistan's mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure require
an increased reliance on aerial delivery. In 2011, over 80 million
pounds of cargo were airdropped, up 20 million from 2010, making 2011 a
record year. We continue to add new capabilities like Low-Cost, Low-
Altitude Delivery and to explore an extracted container delivery system
capability to improve aircraft survivability and aerial delivery
accuracy.
Piracy continues to threaten our commercial partners, predominantly
in the Horn of Africa region. TRANSCOM and its component, MSC, continue
to be active participants in interagency and industry efforts to reduce
the vulnerability of the U.S. commercial fleet. TRANSCOM is a strong
advocate for the use of private security teams aboard commercial
vessels.

PRESERVING THE JOINT DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS

The DOD supply chain is a vast, interdependent enterprise reliant
on infrastructure availability across the globe. To safeguard this
infrastructure, we work closely with entities across the DOD and
Intelligence Community to stay apprised of threats to our
transportation and distribution assets and to provide global strategic
force protection oversight for these assets. Our relationships and
planning efforts with GCCs facilitate threat mitigation and risk
reduction of vulnerabilities and hostile/criminal activities.
Preserving and improving our strategic en route infrastructure
system remains a critical requirement. A relatively small number of en
route airfields and seaports are available to support global mobility
operations, so we must champion these ``enduring bases'' that enable
seamless movement across the various areas of responsibility. TRANSCOM
advocates for military construction projects that maintain and improve
the capabilities and capacities of the military's deployment and
distribution infrastructure. Using analytical data, TRANSCOM's En Route
Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) identifies construction projects
that will improve the military's global routes. Adequate infrastructure
and access agreements allow the United States to maintain the ability
to project forces globally.
With the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), TRANSCOM continues to lead
DOD supply chain transformation efforts through a series of
Distribution Process Owner Strategic Opportunities (DSO) initiatives.
Since 2009, five focused process improvement initiatives generated $400
million in cost savings and cost avoidance. The initiatives enhanced
readiness, improved velocity, and reduced costs, while delivering
higher levels of service to the warfighter.

BUILDING TOWARD THE FUTURE

As TRANSCOM continues to improve our processes across the
deployment and distribution enterprise, we stand ready to support the
President's Defense Strategy that maintains a full spectrum force ready
to deter conflict, project power, and win wars anywhere on the globe.
In the Pacific, Guam is critical to U.S. national defense as a
strategic security and stability location providing TRANSCOM access to
global lines of communications. Guam is a key multimodal logistics node
to mobility success in the region and has been analytically validated
in the Global Access and Infrastructure Assessment, TRANSCOM's ERIMP,
and AMC's En Route Strategy White Paper. TRANSCOM supports
infrastructure improvements on Guam to ensure successful distribution
operations in East Asia and Oceania. We have partnered with the DLA
and, with congressional approval, invested $101.3 million in the
recapitalization of the fuel hydrant infrastructure and $61 million in
a JP-8 pipeline between Apra Harbor and Andersen Air Force Base.
A key element of the President's Defense Strategy is to strengthen
defense cyber capabilities to operate effectively in cyberspace and to
counter cyber attacks. Because of TRANSCOM's strong reliance on
commercial partners, over 90 percent of the distribution and deployment
transactions are handled in cyberspace. TRANSCOM strives to ensure both
the integrity of our data and availability for our users and
essentially serves as an information broker for deployment and
distribution operations across the globe.
TRANSCOM is partnering with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM),
industry, and educational institutions to introduce innovative new
technologies and methodologies to protect our essential command and
control systems and information from attack. Collaborating with
military and commercial partners to define standards for the process
and handling of data allows us to improve the security of our
information and its accuracy. Implementation of these standards will
streamline our information flow, improve transparency to authorized
users, and leverage new technologies. The result is trusted and timely
information supporting a more responsive transportation enterprise
while reducing costs.
TRANSCOM's Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT21)
initiative will use industry best practices plus government and
commercial off-the-shelf optimization and scheduling tools to deliver
best value, end-to-end deployment and distribution. Business process
reengineering will improve transportation planning, forecast accuracy,
and on-time delivery of forces and sustainment to COCOMs at a lower
cost. Corporate Services Vision will align IT systems with reengineered
business processes to create a one-stop IT shop.
TRANSCOM is DOD's lead proponent for In-Transit Visibility (ITV) of
cargo, equipment, and personnel during deployment and distribution
options. ITV enables a more effective and efficient supply chain by
tracking the total volume of supplies moving through the logistics
pipeline. Active Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) remains the
primary automatic identification technology for large consolidated
shipments in the defense transportation system while incorporation of
passive RFID tags provides great benefits in warehousing,
prepositioning, and tracking of DOD materiel. We continue to expand
capabilities with our ITV systems/portfolio.

REALIGNING ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

The disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command reassigned the
JECC to TRANSCOM on July 1, 2011. The JECC's Joint Planning Support
Element (JPSE), Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), and the
Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) provide mission tailored
joint capability packages to COCOMs. These units facilitate rapid
establishment of Joint Force Headquarters enabling Global Response
Force execution and the bridging of joint operational requirements.
The JECC employs a Total Force mix to deliver scalable mission
tailored packages providing immediate, short duration support
establishing and organizing a joint force headquarters. The JPSE is an
employment package composed of experienced personnel in the planning
and execution of joint military operations. The JCSE delivers secure
command, control, communications, and computer capabilities. The JPASE
provides an early entry capability enabling the Joint Force Commander
to gain and maintain the initiative in the information domain.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES

TRANSCOM Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement (CE2) program
directly supports U.S. national security interests by increasing
military capabilities, strengthening alliances, and retaining strategic
access around the globe. CE2 enables joint force readiness by enhancing
interoperability of the JDDE. The CE2 program has maintained strategic
access for the DOD in an era where many forward deployed capabilities
are becoming CONUS based. The program allows Combatant Commanders to
exercise quick deploying contingency capabilities in response to real
world crises like contingencies and HA/DR operations and allows DOD's
strategic reserve fleet to remain ready, while saving resources by
reserving operating capabilities.
TRANSCOM participated and supported COCOMs in 20 top priority
command post and field training exercises, including 147 secondary
training events in 2011. During the exercises, TRANSCOM provided
command and control, deployed strategic mobility personnel and assets,
and provided ITV, including patient movement tracking systems and
global air transport. TRANSCOM also partnered with NORTHCOM, Federal
agencies, and State and local emergency planners in the development and
execution of a staff and patient movement exercise as part of the
National Level Exercise.

AIR MOBILITY READINESS

The President's Defense Strategy relies on rapid global reach and
rapid global response to deter aggression and deliver worldwide
capability. An important linchpin to U.S. military dominance in any
conflict is maintaining the airlift and air-refueling capability
required for rapid delivery of the Joint Force Team over long
distances, guaranteeing access to any location in the world. Our
initial analysis shows the planned air mobility force structure meets
the strategic airlift and air-refueling requirements for a single large
scale operation, while maintaining the flexibility and adaptability to
support the Joint Force in another region.
C-17s will continue to meet TRANSCOM's future requirements through
currently funded purchases, upgrade programs, and fleet rotation. The
newest C-17s arrive with the latest capability and reliability
improvements installed, while the older aircraft enter into the Global
Reach Improvement Program to increase their capability and
sustainability. Aircraft are monitored and analyzed for stress and
rotated to maintain structural integrity of the fleet.
The C-5 fleet is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo
capability and management of the fleet focuses on retirement of some of
the oldest aircraft and increased reliability for the remainder. The
Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) increases the C-
5 fleet mission capable rate (MCR) from 55 to 75 percent. All C-5 Bs
and Cs and 1 C-5A will undergo RERP for a total of 52 C-5Ms. The Air
Force's new programmed depot maintenance process changed from a
``failure of major components'' to a preventative replacement process.
C-5A retirements will improve aircraft availability by removing
maintenance intensive jets from the fleet.
Last year the Air Force awarded a contract for the engineering and
manufacturing development phase of the KC-46A program. The KC-46A will
replace a portion of the Air Force's aging fleet of KC-135
Stratotankers and will provide the DOD and allied nation coalition
aircraft with more aerial refueling capacity, improved efficiency, and
increased capabilities for cargo, passengers, and aeromedical
evacuation. These 179 KC-46A tankers are the first increment of a
three-phased tanker recapitalization approach driven by fleet size and
fiscal constraints.
The C-130 continues as an in-theater workhorse supporting
humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and combat operations.
TRANSCOM supports DOD and Air Force plans to size the tactical airlift
fleet to align with the President's Defense Strategy and to meet the
warfighter's demand for intratheater and Direct Support airlift
missions. Our initial analysis of the planned total purchase of 134 C-
130Js, plus 184 modernized C-130Hs, shows the Air Force fleet of 318 C-
130s will be sufficient to support the warfighter's demands.
To operate our mobility aircraft safely in threat environments, I
strongly support continued defensive systems such as the Large Aircraft
Infrared Countermeasures system and continued development of the
Advanced Situational Awareness and Countermeasures capability for
operations in low to medium threat environments.
The Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) develops and
implements CONUS Operational Support Airlift (OSA) solutions to provide
movement visibility for the DOD. The small passenger aircraft provide
quick, cost-effective transportation for senior officials and special
cargo. Recently, the JOSAC assumed the responsibility of scheduling OSA
aircraft in support of the NORTHCOM AOR, including parts of Alaska,
Canada, and Mexico.
Operational Support Airlift and Executive Airlift (OSA/EA) is a key
component of our Global Air Mobility Enterprise. From the President to
senior civilian and military leaders, immediate airlift is required to
carry out diplomatic and military missions across the spectrum of
activities supporting our National Security, National Defense, and the
National Military Strategies. While we continue to modernize the OSA/EA
fleet, we plan to develop a single scheduling and management system
with a common multiservice database and operational picture. The goal
is to achieve total and real-time asset visibility of worldwide senior
leader and OSA/EA movements to enable all stakeholders, including key
leadership to exercise command and control of their fleet assets within
their area of responsibility.
TRANSCOM's Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a force enabler,
providing us the ability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment in
response to global events. The institution of incentives for commercial
carriers directed in the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act have
proven successful in transitioning the CRAF to a more modern fleet that
increases reliability, improves fuel efficiency, and lowers contract
rates. TRANSCOM continues to incentivize the use of modern CRAF
aircraft while eliminating the aging, less efficient aircraft. The CRAF
Executive Working Group (EWG) of TRANSCOM, AMC and commercial aviation
leaders has been a continuing success by allowing open discussion of
fleet modernization, Federal Aviation Administration flightcrew duty
and rest requirements, fleet reliability, and supporting operations.
Routing mobility airlift over the polar ice cap opens an additional
corridor to the CENTCOM AOR mitigating the threat to single lines of
communication and saves time, fuel, maintenance, and personnel costs.
West coast bases' routing KC-135 swap outs over the North Pole saves 20
percent in time and costs over the traditional European-Caucasus
routing, while long-range cargo aircraft routed over the polar ice caps
save up to 14 percent. In 2011, TRANSCOM directed AMC and its
commercial partners to utilize polar routing in order to improve
operational experience and capability.
Air Force Contingency Response (CR) forces provide an essential
capability to support rapidly evolving contingencies throughout the
world. AMC maintains four Contingency Response Groups and additional
expeditionary Global Mobility forces to support the airbase opening and
Joint Task Force-Port Opening missions. These forces directly support
TRANSCOM and Joint Force Commanders' expeditionary mobility
requirements by expanding options for early entry force application and
sustainment. Rapid response capability along with opening and operating
from distant and austere bases with a small footprint and minimum
support requirements is a tremendous force enabler. CR forces can
deploy within 12-hours notice to quickly assess airbase capabilities
and begin the base opening process to achieve full mission capability
in the shortest possible time. CR forces provide combatant commanders
with initial air base opening and global air mobility support
capability during wartime, contingency or humanitarian assistance/
disaster response operations.
In 2011, TRANSCOM performed 24,410 safe and rapid aeromedical
global patient movements, transporting 14,678 patients to definitive
care. In the days after the liberation of Libya, TRANSCOM, through the
Global Patient Movement Requirements Center, supported a Department of
State request and transported wounded Libyan personnel by military
airlift to medical facilities in Europe and the United States.
TRANSCOM continues to increase its ability to meet the DOD's
expanding patient movement mission requirements. We have matched
advanced in-flight medical care teams to the specific medical needs of
our Wounded Warriors, forged and field tested unique DOD Health and
Human Services deployable air evacuation staging facilities, and
standardized and integrated theater patient movement regulating
centers. These improvements will build a safer, more agile, and
efficient world-wide patient movement system.

SEALIFT READINESS

Sealift is the primary means for delivering the preponderance of
equipment and sustainment for ground forces, and is essential to
building up combat power and seizing the initiative during major combat
operations. In a typical operation, over 90 percent of all cargo is
delivered by sealift. As one of the largest single shippers of ocean
cargo worldwide, DOD spent approximately $2 billion in fiscal year 2011
on commercial transportation through our Universal Services Contract.
By partnering with commercial carriers, we gain beneficial access to
their global infrastructure. In return, they benefit from our long-term
commitment to their ships and networks. When necessary, we activate our
government-owned vessels from the Maritime Administration's (MARAD)
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and MSC's Surge Fleet.
TRANSCOM's partnership with the U.S. commercial sealift industry
and the Department of Transportation (DOT) has been vital in developing
new routes for conveying cargo around the globe, particularly to
regions with undeveloped infrastructure. Through formal programs such
as the Maritime Security Program (MSP), Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA), DOD gains
critical access to U.S. commercial capabilities, while ensuring the
availability of a viable U.S. flag maritime industry and U.S. citizen
mariner pool in times of national emergency.
The MSP was recently extended an additional 10 years to 2025.
TRANSCOM looks forward to working with members of Congress to continue
to refine the program between now and its implementation date in 2015.
The most critical vessels in our fleets are the Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO)
vessels. TRANSCOM also looks forward to working with our partners in
developing a joint approach to recapitalize our organic fleet through
the purchase of vessels available at minimal cost due to the declining
worldwide markets. Doing so keeps U.S. citizens operating these
vessels, thereby strengthening our maritime base and generating
business for U.S. shipyards to complete all conversion and life-cycle
maintenance work on these ships. Additionally, preserving DOD's organic
fleet of nine Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSRs) and 48 Ready
Reserve Force ships is vital to having the surge sealift capacity
necessary to meet future contingencies.
TRANSCOM works closely with DLA Energy to meet DOD's fuel
requirements. Early in 2011, MSC assumed operational control of the
second of two U.S. built, U.S. flagged State Class tanker vessels.
These new double hulled 331,000 barrel ships replaced four older T-5
tankers that have served us well for the past 25 years. The Motor
Vessel (MV) Empire State and her sister ship, MV Evergreen State, will
carry refined petroleum products primarily between commercial
refineries and DOD storage and distribution facilities worldwide.
Additionally, I support MARAD's proposed Tank Vessel Security Fleet
which, if approved, would replace the VTA and provide incentives for
U.S.-flagged tankers to operate in U.S. foreign commerce in return for
assured access to DOD in support of worldwide operations.
Finally, I urge continued congressional support of the National
Defense Sealift Fund and the MSP. TRANSCOM is working diligently with
Navy, MSC, and MARAD to instill efficiencies and cost savings in the
way these critical assets are managed. Support of the MSP, in addition
to supporting a U.S. flagged commercial fleet, is critical to
maintaining the U.S. merchant mariner base which provides the manpower
needed for surge operations.
The delivery of fuel to combat forces is an absolutely critical
component to any modern combat operation. As we plan for contingencies
we must always consider the possibility that the normal fuel
infrastructure may not be in place or may be unusable. The Offshore
Petroleum Discharge System on MV Wheeler is one unique way to ensure
fuel support. This system provides up to 1.7 million gallons of fuel
from up to 8 miles offshore. This one of a kind vessel is programmed
for purchase in August 2012, and will become part of the organic fleet
to ensure continued support to the warfighter.

SURFACE READINESS

The declining condition and operation of our highway infrastructure
between military installations and ports is a concern for the DOD.
TRANSCOM will continue to work with DOT to identify DOD's rail,
highway, and port requirements so they are thoroughly integrated into
the civil sector planning cycle and maintained for the JDDE.
In addition to maintaining the infrastructure, DOD must also
maintain railcar capacity to meet military transportation requirements.
We are working closely with industry to ensure contracted railcar
capacity is available to augment government-owned railcar capacity in
the event of any contingency lift requirements.
Infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean
Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, CA, are essential to TRANSCOM's
support of PACOM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in
the Pacific theater. Due to the nature and size of this military
mission, no suitable alternatives to MOTCO exist on the West Coast. We
continue to work within DOD to find necessary resources to alleviate
any ammunition throughput issues in the Pacific Theater.
TRANSCOM also manages the Defense Personal Property System (DPS).
DPS is a next generation web-based system designed to manage personal
property shipments and help improve the move experience for
servicemembers through procurement of best value transportation
services. In addition, DPS achieves other key Defense Personal Property
Program objectives to include: Full Replacement Value protection,
streamlined direct claims settlement between the customer and the
Transportation Service provider (TSP), faster automated payments to
TSP, 24/7 self-counseling, on-line status tracking, and reduced storage
costs. In fiscal year 2011, DPS executed more than 532,000 shipments
and can now accommodate approximately 90 percent of all household goods
shipments for DOD military and civilian personnel and their families.

DEVELOPING NEW CAPABILITIES

TRANSCOM is overcoming deployment challenges to enhance our global
response capabilities. Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) represent a
transformational sealift capability by offering an enhanced logistics
response to military and civil contingencies around the globe. These
vessels close the gap between high-speed low-capacity airlift and low-
speed high-capacity sealift. Forward deployment of JHSVs in combination
with warehoused stocks of equipment and supplies will leverage their
speed and capacity into quick delivery of needed cargos for Service,
joint, and interagency efforts. We are analyzing ways to further
capitalize on this capability with the Services and other COCOMs.
With delivery by airdrop nearly doubling yearly since 2005,
TRANSCOM's investment in a High Speed Container Delivery System (HSCDS)
will increase airdrop accuracy and payload weights supporting forward
deployed warfighters. This capability also enhances threat avoidance
and tactical maneuverability to aircraft and aircrews. HSCDS has
successfully completed technology demonstrations with a summer
operational assessment planned.

FISCAL STEWARDSHIP

The JDDE generated $786.9 million in cost avoidance predominately
through the use of multimodal operations (the cost-effectiveness of
ships and the flexibility of the C-17s) and forward based warehousing
in fiscal year 2011. A continuing example of multimodal operations is
the movement of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicles
(MATVs) to Afghanistan. The vehicles were shipped to seaports in
theater then airlifted five at a time aboard C-17s into country.
TRANSCOM delivered the majority of the 850 MATVs from October 2010
through September 2011 using multimodal operations.
TRANSCOM is committed to being part of the DOD solution to long-
term deficit-reduction challenges by continuing to lead the
certification effort for alternative fuels. AMC C-17s underwent flight
tests and certification on cutting-edge renewable bio-jet fuel blended
with JP-8 in August 2011. Additionally, all aircraft in AMC's fleet are
approved to fly on a synthetic blend of coal or natural gas-based fuel
and regular jet fuel.
Additional efficiency efforts include the Mission Index Flying
Tool, the Next Generation Cargo Capability Program, and other mission
area enhancements. The Mission Index Flying Tool has allowed AMC to
reduce aviation fuel consumption beyond expectations. The Next
Generation Cargo Capability program standardizes air cargo build-up
from depot suppliers and AMC aerial ports to maximize volume/weight
utilization, increasing operational effectiveness, and reducing fuel
costs while meeting the end customer's delivery requirements.
Collaboration with our supported customers has moved more materiel via
surface modes to our CONUS strategic aerial ports, thus minimizing
aircraft costs while effectively meeting warfighter requirements.
Finally, to optimize over-ocean shipments and reduce enterprise
operating costs, we continue to identify opportunities to aggregate
cargo at appropriate locations.

FINAL THOUGHTS

While the Nation and TRANSCOM face significant challenges at home
and abroad, we recognize there are great opportunities for positive
change. Such changes will improve effectiveness and efficiency for the
warfighters and for the citizens who have entrusted us with the
responsible use of our Nation's resources. The dedicated men and women
of the TRANSCOM team take enormous pride in providing the world's best
deployment and distribution support to our great Nation. ``Together, we
deliver.''

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
Let's try a first round of 7 minutes. We have pretty good
attendance, so we probably won't have time for a second round.
Admiral, let me start with you. The United States and Japan
are reconsidering certain terms of the 2006 roadmap agreement
to move U.S. marines off of Okinawa. Specifically, we
apparently now have agreed to de-link the movement of 8,000
marines off Okinawa from the development of a Futenma
Replacement Facility. However, the plan to build the
replacement facility at Camp Schwab apparently still remains
unchanged.
Senators McCain and Webb and I believe that the plan to
build that replacement facility at Camp Schwab is unrealistic
and is unworkable and unaffordable. Earlier this week the
Japanese Prime Minister met with the Governor of Okinawa and
the Governor apparently has reiterated his opposition to that
replacement facility plan and has repeated his call for the
airfield to be located outside of Okinawa.
So it seems clear that we need an alternative to the plan
to build a replacement facility at Camp Schwab. Otherwise, the
current Futenma Air Station is going to stay open and
operational for the foreseeable future.
Now, in the NDAA we have a number of requirements relative
to this issue that will need to be met before any funds,
including funds that are provided by the Government of Japan,
may be obligated or expended to implement realignment. There is
the Marine Corps Commandant's submission of a report of his
preferred force laydown. There's a requirement that we see a
master plan for the construction of the facilities and
infrastructure necessary to implement the Commandant's
preferred force laydown. We need a certification by the SECDEF
that tangible progress has been made on the replacement
facility, and a number of other requirements.
Are you participating or have you participated in meeting
those requirements that are laid out in our defense
authorization bill?
Admiral Willard. We are participating, yes.
Chairman Levin. In each of them?
Admiral Willard. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you know how far along they are? When do
we expect that that will be filed with us?
Admiral Willard. I don't have a date for you, Senator. I
can tell you that the deliberations have been continuous. In
fact, before those conditions were laid down to DOD we were
offering a variety of options to the SECDEF as events in the
Okinawa area were stalled over the past couple of years. So
PACOM has been involved in sharing about 25 options with DOD
over time and the preferred laydown that you refer to is one of
those. So we are very much engaged and will continue to assist
in determining the final answers to your questions. Obviously,
the Japanese get a vote in this in terms of progress.
Chairman Levin. Right. Whatever we do, we intend to do it
jointly with the Japanese, and that's an important part of our
intent.
Relative to China, you've testified a bit on the growth of
the Chinese military. What do you expect the effect of the
administration's refocus on Asia to be on China's military
growth and posture in the region?
Admiral Willard. We've not seen China's military growth
affected by the announcement, nor do we expect it to be. It has
continued relatively unabated. The Chinese are obviously very
interested in the statement that the United States intends to
focus on the Asia-Pacific region. I think they see themselves
in that statement, perception or not, and will continue to
observe very closely the actions that the United States takes
to back up those words.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, you've made reference to the
strategic guidance that was released by the administration
recently. Do you support that new strategy?
Admiral Willard. I do.
Chairman Levin. Are you satisfied that the fiscal year 2013
budget supports that new strategy?
Admiral Willard. I am. As we look at the budget submission,
the strategy establishes global priorities. The budget
establishes force structure in terms of acquisitions across the
Services. How that acquisition strategy is applied to the
strategic priorities globally will, in effect, answer the
strategy or not. So this is about the application of what we
buy, I think, more than anything.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, you have, I believe, indicated
that you support the United States becoming a party to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). I
would like to press you, because this is your last hearing
before us, a bit more on that. Can you tell us whether, in your
judgment, joining this treaty, this convention, will support
our military operations in the Asia Pacific and whether not
being a party to that convention disadvantages the United
States?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's a
great question and timely. I do think that not being a signator
disadvantages the United States in a particular way. I would
offer that since 1994 the U.S. Armed Forces have been adhering
to the legal framework that is consistent with the UNCLOS, and
we continue to, and we continue to share UNCLOS issues and
debate UNCLOS legal definitions with our counterparts
throughout the Asia Pacific.
Chairman Levin. ``UNCLOS'' is Law of the Sea?
Admiral Willard. Law of the Sea.
What the United States doesn't have as a non-signator is a
seat at the table when the convention is debated or as the
convention evolves by the various countries that have ratified
it. I think it's important that the United States have a seat
at that table. At the end of the day we believe that the
elements that caused the convention to be set aside in the
1980s, generally in the area of the commercial-related articles
within it, have all been corrected and should at this point be
candidate for ratification. We, again because UNCLOS is so
important as a framework for determining the actions that all
nations take in the maritime domain around the world, believe
strongly that the United States must have a voice in this and a
seat at the table when we debate UNCLOS in the future.
Chairman Levin. Does China have a seat at the table?
Admiral Willard. They do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me just respond to the last line of questioning.
I want to make sure our witnesses know that I'm probably not
the only one on this side of the table here who disagrees with
the administration's position on UNCLOS. In fact, I'd like to
make a formal request, and I will do so in writing, Mr.
Chairman, that we actually have a hearing on this treaty. I
think that would be very appropriate to have.
I know that about 10 years ago we had two hearings, one by
this committee and the other by the Environment and Public
Works Committee that I was chairing at that time. But I won't
get into that now.
I would like to have you send me something for the record,
Admiral Willard, as to what specific things have changed since
the 1980s, actually in two shifts, since the 1980s and the
1990s, that should change our position on UNCLOS, if you would
do that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The legal regime reflected in United Nations Convention for Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) promotes two fundamental tenets of the U.S. strategic
perspective on security and stability in the world: (1) preservation of
freedom of access and use of the seas, and (2) the rule of law.

The Convention preserves freedom by codifying the
rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea for all nations,
including the United States. This, in turn, promotes our
economic and security interests.
The Convention upholds the rule of law by effectively
balancing the interests of coastal states and user states,
through precise terminology and concise legal rules. As a
coastal state and user state, the United States benefits from a
stable legal regime, immune to easy manipulation by others.

U.S. accession to the Convention would send a strong message to the
world that we are serious about preserving maritime freedoms and
upholding the rule of law.

In the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of
responsibility (AOR), nations with longstanding excessive
maritime claims (e.g., Philippines and Vietnam) are modifying
those claims, consistent with UNCLOS.
These member-states cite upholding the rules-based
approach of the Convention to resolving the South China Sea
disputes as a reason for their efforts.
Throughout the PACOM AOR, my staff, my component
commanders, and I are often asked, ``will the United States
ever join UNCLOS?'' We interpret this question as a call by our
allies and partners to support efforts to uphold the Convention
against those who seek to manipulate it and the underlying
customary international law.
U.S. accession would send a strong message to the
nations of the Asia-Pacific region that the rule of law
reflected in the Convention is worth upholding and preserving.
U.S. accession could encourage other nations in the
region to reform their excessive maritime claims as Vietnam and
the Philippines have begun to do.

Continuing to operate as an outsider to the legal regime
significantly undermines our credibility when we attempt, on a
recurring basis, to challenge and protest the failure of other nations
to adhere to international rules governing uses of the oceans.

We routinely cite the rules contained in UNCLOS,
regarding maritime navigation, maritime safety, sovereignty,
and jurisdiction, among others as being universally applicable.
We rely on the rules in UNCLOS when criticizing
nations for various actions that we find inconsistent with
international law in the maritime domain.
The effectiveness of our challenges to violations of
international law regarding uses of the oceans, are handicapped
by the fact that members of UNCLOS respond ``How can you
lecture us about failing to comply with UNCLOS when you are not
even a party to it?''
Consequently, U.S. objections are often ignored or
dismissed.
Becoming a party to UNCLOS would significantly
strengthen our standing and credibility when demanding
adherence to international law in the uses of the oceans.

The United States faces a different world today in which some
rising nations seek to challenge the existing rules-based international
order.

When UNCLOS was negotiated, the United States shared a
converging interest with its leading competitor (i.e., the
Soviet Union) in preserving the rights, freedoms and uses of
the sea.
Today, there are rising nations (e.g., China) that do
not share this converging interest in preserving these
freedoms. Moreover, those nations also do not fully respect the
concepts behind adherence to the rule of law. Instead, they
view the law as a tool to be used when useful and ignored when
necessary. China refers to this concept as ``Legal Warfare.''
In our view, the best way to prevent that manipulation
of the law is to guard it closely from within the system.
So long as the United States remains outside the
established rule-set of the Convention as a non-party, we face
an unnecessary impediment to our ability as a nation,
diplomatically and militarily to preserve the rules embodied in
the Convention.

The United States cannot preserve freedoms and uphold the rule of
law by our military presence or activities alone.

Unlike conventional law, customary law is constantly
subject to change and evolution over time through state
practice of all nations.
Critics of U.S. accession who argue that U.S. military
superiority alone can uphold the legal regime reflected in
UNCLOS as customary law ignore the reality that the United
States cannot depend solely on one element of national power to
protect national interests.
Relying on the U.S. military as the sole means to
protect U.S. interests sends the wrong message to rising
nations, such as China, that they too should rely upon their
militaries to resolve international disputes, such as those in
the South China Sea.
To maximize the likelihood of achieving our strategic
objectives, the United States should leverage all elements of
national power, including diplomatic, informational, and legal.

The primary concern of President Reagan with the final text of the
Convention involved the issue of deep sea-bed mining. According to
President Clinton, and as agreed to by Presidents Bush and Obama, those
concerns were effectively mitigated between the time that President
Reagan decided not to sign the Convention in 1982 and 1994 when changes
to the Convention were agreed.

President Clinton submitted the revised Convention to
the Senate for ratification in 1994, stating that the changes
addressed President Reagan's concerns.
Presidents Bush and Obama implicitly agreed with
President Clinton when they supported Senate ratification.

According to Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, all of our
national security interests were preserved in the final text of the
Convention.

When the Convention was negotiated in the 1970s and
early 1980s, the United States was a leading nation at the
table throughout.
Three successive Presidents, from both parties and
leaders of the U.S. military have consistently supported U.S.
accession to the Convention.

As described above, U.S. accession would bolster, not impede,
global U.S. military activities.

Codifies rights, freedoms and uses of the sea critical
to the global mobility of our military forces, including the
rights of innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea
lanes passage, the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and
``other internationally lawful uses of the sea'' (e.g.,
military activities, operations, and exercises).
The U.S. military will not be subject to compulsory
dispute settlement procedures (i.e., international courts or
arbitration).

The Convention expressly permits member-states
to opt out of those procedures for ``disputes
concerning military activities.''

The Convention expressly exempts foreign ``warships,
naval auxiliaries, and other vessels or aircraft owned or
operated'' by a member-state from coastal state regulations of
the marine environment.

Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, I have always been
concerned about the quality of our intelligence on North Korea.
There have always been a lot of surprises there. I won't repeat
the details: my observation back in August 24, 1998, when we
asked the question how long it would be until North Korea would
pose an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile threat and they were
talking about around 3 to 5 years, and it was 7 days later, on
August 31, 1998, that they actually did fire one. It was a
Taepodong 1.
I'm concerned about their progress now and the three-stage
rocket that they actually were able to launch in 2009. So I
guess I'd just ask you, are you satisfied with the quality of
the intelligence we're getting on North Korea?
Admiral Willard. Senator, we know a great deal about the
various structures in North Korea, including the efforts
they're making to nuclearize and develop ballistic missile
delivery capabilities. That said, there is never perfect
information with regard to North Korea in virtually any area.
I'm also satisfied with the emphasis that's being placed on
North Korea, given the importance of what you've suggested, and
the efforts specifically by the entire intelligence federation
to provide me the kind of information that we require to track
North Korean developments day to day.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, I think that's significant.
In terms of the 29-year-old replacement for Kim Jong Il, my
impression is that it's just more of the same and perhaps not
really going to be a major change in terms of decisionmaking.
What is your opinion of Kim Jong Eun?
Admiral Willard. We think that in general he's a Kim and
he's surrounded by----
Senator Inhofe. He's a Kim, yes.
Admiral Willard. He's surrounded by an uncle and Kim Jong
Il's sister and others that I think are guiding his actions. So
in that sense we would expect, as you suggest, more of the
same. The strategy has been successful through two generations.
It wouldn't surprise us to see an effort to make the strategy
work for a third.
That said, he's a young man and relatively untested and
those around him may have some differences of opinion regarding
the direction that North Korea heads. So we are interested in
seeing the influence of a treaty ally like China or the
direction that they take in various security areas, including
proliferation and nuclearization.
Senator Inhofe. All right, I appreciate it. I'm going to
ask you something about what you said on China, but first I
want to ask General Fraser.
I've had a particular interest in Africa and U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM) for quite some period of time. I'd like to
ask you, what type of support is TRANSCOM able to give AFRICOM
in their AOR today?
General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. As we look to AFRICOM,
we've managed to meet all their requests and their
requirements. That has come in the form of support to the
Libyan operations, where we were able to provide both lift and
tanker support. They had follow-on requests for Libya, which we
provided some support for. We sailed in some ships to provide
equipment into Libya. That's one form. We still provide support
also to the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa,
meeting those requirements.
But also our new command, the JECC, has had several
requests for our planners. So Admiral Stearney and his folks
have moved forward to help out General Hamm in some of the
planning that he's been doing. So we have not failed to meet
any of the requests from AFRICOM.
Senator Inhofe. Is it your opinion that AFRICOM is getting
adequate resources to carry out the mission?
General Fraser. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Inhofe. If you find that it's not, if you'd let us
know it would be very helpful.
Getting back to something that maybe I misunderstood, in
terms of China's military buildup, we know that it's been an
average of what, 18.75 percent a year now. I remember back
during the Clinton administration when they were even more
aggressive than that. Did I understand you to say that you
don't witness the growth in their capabilities or you do? Would
you clarify your statement as to your observation of China's
threat and capabilities?
Admiral Willard. I think I tried to characterize it as
growth unabated, so they continue to advance their capabilities
and capacities in virtually all areas.
Senator Inhofe. In all areas. That's something significant
because it's conventional forces, and then they seem to be
having it all. I look at that as a great threat. I remember
early on when I was first elected. Actually, that was over on
the House side. There was a book by Anthony Kubek called,
``Modernizing China.'' I don't know whether you've ever read it
or not, but I think for anyone who is dealing with China and
Taiwan, it would be worthwhile reading that.
Let me ask you, do you still feel the same way about my
favorite programs, 1206, 1207, 1208, International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and these programs?
Admiral Willard. We do, very strongly, Senator. 1206 in
particular because of the work that we're doing with the
Philippines and others in counterterror has been very helpful,
and we continue to rely very heavily on those funds.
I would just comment that we think IMET is a most powerful
tool in terms of exposing our foreign counterparts not only to
U.S. education, military education, and standards and values,
but also in bringing the nations, the allies, and partners
together in the region as alumni. So these are very, very
important programs as it relates to strengthening our allies.
Senator Inhofe. The IMET program has been so successful in
our change in focus that we recognize we're not doing them the
favor, really they're doing us the favor. Once an allegiance, a
close relationship, is established, it stays forever.
Admiral Willard. I agree.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, Admiral Willard and General Fraser, for your
service.
Admiral, thanks for all your years of service, and to your
wife also. You've really given great service to our country and
great leadership in the years I've come to know you through my
membership on this committee. I must say that I've been
impressed over the years that you've not only proven yourself
to be an exceptional military leader, but I think you've always
had an ability, while carrying out the details of your military
responsibilities, to see the larger picture in which you and
the United States have been operating, and I've always found my
conversations with you to be very instructive.
So I appreciate that very much and wish you the best in
your next chapter.
Admiral Willard. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. So let me begin, having said that, with
a larger picture statement and question, which is that in the
travels over the last year that I've been able to do in the
PACOM AOR, and meeting people here as they come from the
region, it strikes me that this rebalancing of our foreign and
military policy toward the Asia Pacific is not just an
initiative on our part in pursuit of our economic and security
interests, but it is really a reaction to a kind of demand from
within the region that we be more involved.
It's striking, I think, and perhaps not appreciated enough
by people around the country, at a time when there's a lot of
concern about America being in decline, America the unpopular,
that not only among the more traditional allies has our
relationship grown stronger, but that there are whole new
groups of countries that are seeking stronger relations with
us, such as Vietnam and Myanmar, for instance.
So I wanted to ask you at the beginning if you agree that
that's the case and, if so, why? Is it just about fear of China
and the hope that we will balance China as part of our
rebalancing? Or is there more to it than that?
Admiral Willard. Thank you. I do agree with your statement,
and I think I've testified in the past, the amount of
encouragement that has come from the region, from virtually all
the actors in the region, with regard to their desire for U.S.
staying power and influence in the region and increased
engagement.
There was a perception over the course of the last decade
of warfare that our presence in the Asia-Pacific region was
diminished, and, in fact, our ground force presence was
decremented by about 10 percent as we in PACOM rotated forces
in and out of the theater of wars over the past 10 years. But
our ship presence, and our aircraft presence, remained
relatively steady, albeit working the ships and airplanes hard
to do it. So we've maintained a presence, but there was a sense
in the region that the U.S. commitment to the region had been
somewhat diminished for a variety of reasons.
I think that refrain has not stopped. I don't think it's
just about China. I do think that the fact that China has
advanced its military capacities to the extent that it has
certainly is one element of that. But I think there has been a
desire, a strong desire in the Asia-Pacific region,
continuously for U.S. engagement economically and otherwise.I
think they regard a U.S. presence there as unquestionably
contributing to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific
region.
It's not lost on anyone that for nearly the past 6 decades
we've enjoyed relative security and growing prosperity.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Willard. So I think there's a desire for U.S.
engagement regardless, and certainly there is, I think, a great
deal of optimism in the region as a consequence of the recent
announcements that have been made.
Senator Lieberman. That, in fact, the role that America has
played in providing stability and security in the Asia-Pacific
region over the last 6 decades, as you've said, has been one of
the preconditions of the enormous growth and prosperity in the
region over that time.
Admiral Willard. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to also say that part of what
draws a lot of people and countries in the Asia Pacific toward
us may well be our form of government, that during this period
of time not only has there been an economic prosperity growing
in the Asia Pacific, but democracy has expanded as well?
Admiral Willard. It has. I think when you look at countries
like India and the engagement that's ongoing between the United
States and India; Indonesia, which has a relatively nascent
democracy, that has been very successful, and its desire for
increased engagement with the United States, and others, that
you are right. There are a lot of U.S. values that are highly
regarded in the region and I think our form of governance is
one of them.
Senator Lieberman. So in the midst of all that, I worry
that as we get this move toward us and urging us to be more
involved for mutual economic security, even political
governance interests, that we're sending a message out by the
cuts in defense that are part of the Budget Control Act (BCA),
leaving aside sequestration, that maybe we're not going to be
able really to deliver on our promise of increased involvement
or, at worst, that people in the region and countries will
think it's rhetoric.
So I wonder how you feel about whether the cuts required
under the BCA of last year, not the potential sequestration,
could impose risks on our strategy in the PACOM AOR, and
whether you've heard any of those concerns from political or
military leaders in the region.
Admiral Willard. I think the region broadly recognizes two
things: one, that post-two wars a decade long that, as the
United States has in the past, a reduction in the defense
budget following those wars has generally always occurred and
is occurring once again. I think when you combine that fact
with the fiscal circumstances and challenges that our country
faces in debt and deficit, it does raise questions in the
region regarding what the true extent of cuts to the defense
budget could be.
I think the second dimension to this issue is how in a
reduced budget environment the Asia Pacific will be attended to
with regard to force structure and readiness in the future. So
I think on the one hand it's not particularly surprising to
anyone in the region that our defense budget is being reduced,
sequestration aside, but I think that it has raised questions
and we're asked to clarify how in the reduced budget
environment that's being widely publicized that we will meet
our requirements in the Asia-Pacific region. Again, I would
offer that the answer to that is, regardless of the adjustments
in force structure that take place, how we emplace that force
structure, bias that force structure into regions of the world
that matter most, is I think in the end, what will answer the
mail.
Senator Lieberman. Well, to me that's a significant answer,
and it's one that I hope we will keep in mind as we go forward
with our work on the defense authorization bill and our
colleagues in the Appropriations Committee do the same on the
DOD budget. I hope we can find ways to add on to what the
administration has requested pursuant to the BCA.
I thank you very much again for your service, your
leadership, and your testimony today.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, to you, let me just echo what others have said
with respect to thanking you for your service to our country.
You have certainly served in multiple roles of leadership
during the time that you have served America and you're to be
congratulated for that. Thanks also to your wife for her
commitment. I'm just pleased to hear you've made the wise
decision of retiring to the Atlanta area. I look forward to
continuing to take advantage of you and your expertise since
you'll be close by.
Let me talk to you for a minute about China. You discussed
in your statement the continuing growth of China and their
increasing military power, obviously. Specifically, you comment
that China's military modernization, and in particular its
active development of capabilities in cyber and space domains,
and the question all these emerging military capabilities raise
among China's neighbors about its current and long-term
intentions, is one of the main security challenges confronting
the United States across the region.
China is developing anti-access and area denial
capabilities that may shift the balance of power in the region.
The types of platforms and capabilities that China is
developing have been interpreted by some to limit freedom of
movement by potential adversaries and also to require potential
adversaries to conduct military operations at increasing
distances.
Can you comment on what you believe needs to be done in the
Pacific theater to preserve the United States' and our allies'
freedom of movement and access across the region?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. I think first of all
it needs to be understood that in terms of U.S. military
presence, we remain present throughout the region and in all
areas wherefreedom of action is required. So whether we're
talking the South China Sea, East China Sea regions, Philippine
Sea, or elsewhere in the Asia Pacific, the United States
remains present.
In terms of operations in what could be a potentially
denied environment, I think it's very important that the United
States make the necessary investments to ensure its military
access to those regions. I would just offer that in the South
China Sea alone the sea lines of communication carry $5.3
trillion of regional commerce, of which $1.2 trillion is U.S.
commerce, and the U.S. military must be present there to ensure
the security of those sea lines of communication and that
important economic commerce for the United States and for our
regional allies and partners.
So we will be present, and it's important that we make the
necessary investments to assure that presence even in a denied
area scenario.
Senator Chambliss. In that same vein, part of the assets
that you have in the inventory there now are a limited number
of F-22s, limited by the fact that we only have a limited
number that have been produced. We've maintained air
superiority and air dominance in that region since the Korean
War and it's a vital part of our defensive mechanisms and
posture there. Now, with those limited number of F-22s and it
looks like potentially a slowdown of the production of F-35s,
are you concerned long-term? I realize short-term maybe not,
but long-term do you foresee this as a problem when it comes to
maintaining air dominance and air superiority?
Admiral Willard. Sir, I'm satisfied with, as you suggest,
short-term, the number of F-22s that are on hand and available
to us. I think we're all somewhat concerned long-term to see
that the F-35, in its development, provides the kind of
capabilities to our Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps that it
was designed to. So very interested to see that program remain
healthy and deliver the capabilities that we require out there.
Senator Chambliss. Would you consider that weapons system
imperative for the long-term capability of air dominance and
air superiority?
Admiral Willard. I would. I think fifth generation
capability is mandated. We have others in the world that are
developing those capabilities and, as you suggest, if we
requiredominance in the air in the event of a contingency, then
certainly the fifth generation fighter capability is part of
that equation.
Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, the President's 2013
budget plans to cut strategic airlift and retire over 200
aircraft in fiscal year 2013 and nearly 300 aircraft over the
Future Years Defense Program. The President's budget will
reduce mobility capacity by retiring all C-5As, retiring or
cancelling procurement of all planned C-27Js, and retiring 65
C-130s. After these retirements there will be a fleet of 275
strategic airlifters and 318 C-130s. In addition, the Air Force
will retire 20 KC-135s and maintain a fleet of 453 air
refueling aircraft.
With such a reduction of strategic mobility and airlift and
the cancellation of a whole airplane program, how do you plan
to maintain supply, personnel transport, and logistics chains
that require significant airlift capabilities? What additional
airlift requirements do you foresee in the future for the
various theaters in which TRANSCOM operates, and how confident
are you that you're going to have the airlift capabilities that
you need?
General Fraser. Senator, thank you very much. First off, I
would start by saying that we have a new strategy. The force
structure that is put forth supports that strategy and it is
also backed by some analysis that we have actually completed in
looking at that strategy, and also in working with the
combatant commanders.
With respect to specific platforms that you talked about
there, I would comment first on the tankers. You mentioned a
20-tanker reduction. I certainly support that. What we have
seen that isactually enabling more capability and capacity with
respect to tankers is that depots have gotten better. So as we
look to the future and they have streamlined their processes,
we're seeing fewer aircraft in the depot, which certainly
allows us to take out some of the more costly aircraft there
and therefore the reduction with respect to those tankers.
Historically, as I recall, they've always planned on about
19 percent of the force being in depot and we're seeing
something more along the lines of 10 percent in the future. So
that's added capability, coupled with the contract, the KC-46,
which is key to the future, and bringing that system online,
will give us both air refueling and some lift capability as we
transition that aircraft into the Active Duty and are able to
support the various theaters around the world. So the KC-46 is
a part of that movement to the future and modernizing that
fleet.
There's also a modernization effort on the KC-135s that we
need to continue, which enables them to continue to perform in
the future. They're going to have to bridge to the future
tanker assets as they come aboard.
As I look at the 130s, the numbers that they're talking
about are supportable. When I look at the 318, that also
includes approximately 50 C-130s to continue to provide direct
support to the Army, which is something that the Air Force has
moved in over time and has shown that we can do that in the
theater. I think, based on my discussions with the commanders
in the field, they are very pleased with the support that they
are getting with the assets that are there.
The C-27, I had the opportunity recently to be in the
theater. I talked to the folks there. It's performing well and
I'm very proud of the service and what those men and women are
doing. But I'd also comment that it's a costly platform. It's a
niche platform. So as we look at the strategy and we look to
move into the future in a multi-capable aircraft, something
like the C-130, a modernized C-130J as we look to the future,
something that's going to give us more capability at reduced
cost, which is something that is certainly worth considering.
So when I look at that from a holistic standpoint, it's
certainly supportable. The C-130Hs are going to be modernized.
That's a program that is ongoing and the Air Force needs to do
that as they enter into some items that are on that aircraft
that are going to time out and give them access. So as they
optimize that fleet of the future, it will be a very capable
force, a modernized force of 318 C-130 aircraft.
To the strategic lift, looking at that, I am supportive of
the strategy that's put forth, and as we evaluated those
numbers and looking at the positive things that are happening
with the C-5M, for instance, it has a higher mission capability
rate, which gives us greater capacity and capability. It's
currently the only aircraft that we can actually fly the polar
routes on. You can't do that with the C-5As, for instance, and
load much on it. So there's great capacity in these Ms as we
move to the future.
So modernizing the C-5s and going to 52 C-5Ms in the future
gives us greater capacity and capability, with increased
mission capable rates, from what we're seeing currently on the
As now, around 55 percent, to about 75 percent. So there's
greater capacity there, and so that's very positive with
respect to the strategic airlift.
Also along the same lines, the C-17s continue to perform
magnificently in the theater. Every time we have turned to the
C-17, it has always been there. So as we move to the future
with the C-17s that we have, there will be plenty of them, and
so that's how we're able to come up with the strategic airlift
to be able to support the theaters in the future.
It will support the strategy as I mentioned, and the two-
war construct remains in effect. We just have to manage those
forces, it's what we'll have to do, and that's what you were
talking about there. We in TRANSCOM will ensure that we do that
to support the combatant commanders' requirements.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First let me begin by thanking and commending Admiral
Willard and Mrs. Willard for their extraordinary service to the
Navy and to the Nation. Thank you, sir, for what you've done.
Ma'am, thank you too, and your personal kindness also.
Let me just quickly follow on the point that Senator
Chambliss made, General Fraser, about strategic airlift. I
think it should be noted that Senator Ayotte played a very
critical role last year in addressing this issue of C-5As, and
we lowered the threshold to 301. Now your proposal, as you
indicated, is 275 strategic airlifters.
Just to follow on the points you made, which I thought were
excellent, it is not just a question of supporting current
operations, but also the obligation to reconstitute quickly, if
necessary. Are you prepared to reconstitute and increase
efforts if called upon, given the proposed 275?
General Fraser. Sir, we are postured well to support any of
the requirements that we have. As you are aware, we have had
pop-up requirements, and with the flexibility that we have
within our system as the distribution process owner and
synchronizer we're able to reach in and get assets when we need
them. I could give examples of where we're able to do that,
reaching in with the ability to pull in-service or in-transit
aircraft to do a different mission.
A case in point would be support for aeromedical airlift
that we were asked to do out of Libya. After Libya operations,
we were asked to find the necessary assets and, using those in-
service assets, diverted and utilized a C-17 to actually pick
up some critically injured individuals and bring them back to
the United States with a critical care team. The other thing
that we were able to do was work with U.S. European Command,
utilize some of their assets that they actually had for C-130s,
to bring other injured back.
We have a very flexible, a very resilient system and
process to be able to respond to these pop-ups.
Senator Reed. Is it fair to say that, rather than just the
number of platforms, it's the capability of individual
platforms and the system you use that that gives you advantages
and gives you the comfort that you can reduce the number of
platforms?
General Fraser. It is, sir. It's also the support, the
tremendous support that we actually get through the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. The CRAF and our commercial
partners play a big role. An example of that is how they were
able to turn and support us when we were asked to bring the
troops out of Iraq before the holidays. That's a very busy time
of the year, and with the accelerated timeline that we were
given, we were able to get 99 percent of the troops back to the
United States before the holiday period. That last 1 percent
came home before the end of the year as they were turning in
some final equipment.
So that's the flexibility that we have within the system
for both organic and our commercial aircraft.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me change topics. General Fraser, the NDN is
increasingly key to our operations in Afghanistan. Primarily at
this point it's a one-way system, but you and your colleagues
are trying to make it a two-way system, not only delivering
material into the country, but also planning to withdraw
material out. Can you comment on the status and the potential
importance and growth of the NDN through Kyrgyzstan and other
countries?
General Fraser. Sir, thank you very much. We have had
tremendous support through the NDN. Currently, with the border
closed in Pakistan, we're able to continue to support ongoing
operations in Afghanistan and we can continue to do that
because of the NDN, which is allowing us to bring goods in.
But I would also comment along the same lines, it's not
just the NDN that's allowing us to do that. It's the other
aspects that we have with multi-modal. Multi-modal is allowing
us to move our assets to the theater via surface and then fly
them in there at the end. So we have a resilient system that
gives us more than one way to support the theater, which is not
allowing us to have a single point of failure.
Along the lines of the retrograde, it's a daunting task, I
will admit that. But I'll also say that one of the first trips
that I made was to Central Asia back in December, a very
positive trip, and had a very good outcome from that trip. We
now have two-way approval to move non-lethal equipment back out
of Afghanistan. In fact, we have already set ourselves up for a
proof of principle and have received approval from the
countries to do this through what we call the KKT route, which
is through Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Also, Russia
has approved this and Uzbekistan recently approved this. Not
only have Russia, et cetera, approved the non-lethal, but we
also have approval to do wheeled armored vehicles. This is
something that we didn't have before.
We continue to develop these relationships, and so that was
a very profitable visit going over there. So now we'll run this
proof of principle to check the processes, to check the
procedures, but also check the velocity of what could be in the
future.
I will also comment, though, that with the amount of
equipment, and working with the folks on the ground there, we
need the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOC) open
because of the large numbers that we're talking about that we
need to bring out in a timely manner. We're tasked this year to
bring another 23,000 troops out by the 1st of October. We're
already identifying excess equipment now with the commanders on
the ground. We have approval to set up a materiel recovery
element team that's in theater, which is going to help
facilitate this.
The other thing I would comment on is, we're also setting
up some multi-modal operations, where we are now being more
flexible with all aircraft that are flying in the theater. As
every aircraft goes in, if it has pallet positions and it has
capacity on it, then we are making sure that we put something
on that aircraft and bring it back out, in order to maximize
that lift and try to get ahead of it as best we can.
We have a number of things that are going on, two-way
flows, all those other things that I mentioned.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Willard, if I may, you have many challenges in the
Pacific and you can categorize them in general terms in many
different ways. But one is basically access. One impression I
have is that for surface ships access is more problematic
because of the ability to detect ships and engage with
precision weapons, and that as a result submarines in the
Pacific have a greater capability to access places. Is that a
fair generalization?
Admiral Willard. It is.
Senator Reed. So that makes, in your view, the submarine a
key aspect of your strategy and your ability to gain access in
contested areas?
Admiral Willard. It does.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, General Fraser, is it true that we're having difficulty
going through Pakistan to provide transport.Is it more
difficult now?
General Fraser. Sir, the PAK GLOC is shut down at this
time.
Senator Brown. Right. We give them billions of dollars in
aid. That's why, Mr. Chairman, I'm floored that we're giving a
country billions of dollars in aid and they can't accommodate
us to allow for the safe transport of goods through their
country. So that's something I hope, Mr. Chairman, we try to
address. That's not for you, but it's more for us, sir.
I just want to take it a little step further. What level of
risk do we assume by reducing the C-5 fleet, particularly in
the area of oversized air cargo capability?
General Fraser. Sir, backed by analysis and against the new
strategy that has been put forward, we think that any increased
risk is manageable as we look to the future. Oversized/outsized
cargo, when we look at the scenarios that we run, we can meet
the mission.
Senator Brown. Do you believe that having a robust
strategic airlift capability on the east coast is part of that
overall strategy?
General Fraser. Sir, the inherent flexibility that we have
with air is, of course, we can shift and we can swing it to
where we need it. It is not uncommon for us to take forces from
one theater to another dependent upon the operations that are
needed, whether it's supporting a Haiti operation where we have
support of aircraft out of the Pacific, or whether it's in
support of a Libyan operation, where we engaged the total
force, we have a number of volunteers to support the tanker
bridge.
These types of things, the flexibility of our air fleet we
can position it where we need it.
Senator Brown. But in particular with regard to the east
coast of the United States, do you think that it's important to
have a strategic airlift capability in this part of the
country?
General Fraser. Sir, again it's not about where it is
located; it's the inherent flexibility that I have that I'm
able to position it where I need it, and where it comes from is
not something that I focus on.
Senator Brown. Well, it's something that I focus on as a
Senator, and especially when we have a base like Westover, that
has incredible airlift capability, has a long and historic
relationship providing those services, not only with great
honor, but with great capability. So I was wondering if you
could comment on how TRANSCOM's mission is affected if that
capability is degraded?
General Fraser. Sir, we'll still get the support as we work
with AMC no matter where the assets are located. They've always
stepped up and provided what we need.
Senator Brown. Admiral Willard, the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS), how important is that ship with respect to meeting the
regional threats?
Admiral Willard. I think it will be very important. I think
the ship has attributes that certainly we favor out there,
including its speed, capacity, and shallow draft. So if the
mission modules are properly adapted, I think it will have a
wide range of capabilities that can be used in contingency or
peacetime.
Senator Brown. So do you think your mission will be
affected by going below the acquisition program of 55 ships? If
so, how?
Admiral Willard. Capacity is a capability in and unto
itself. I think it's important that we maintain the capacities
of force structure where we need them. I think the total
acquisition program is less important to PACOM than the number
of LCSs that ultimately wind up in that AOR. So however we bias
those ships, I think it's important that the LCS is there to
meet the needs that PACOM has.
Senator Brown. General Fraser, back to you. How does the
reversibility plan factor into the overall strategy? In other
words, do you feel comfortable that with 275 strategic
airlifters we'd be prepared to transport troops and equipment
to the region in response to unforeseen contingencies? If so,
what sort of risks are involved in that decision?
General Fraser. Sir, I am confident in the number 275. We
also have to understand that we are backed by a tremendous
commercial partnership that we have through the CRAF program
and the ability to move both passengers and cargo. They have
been instrumental in continuing to provide support to the
theater, whether it's direct or actually through multi-modal
operations.
Senator Brown. Admiral, do you agree with that? Do you
think that we need only 275 airlift mobility assets to meet the
mission requirements?
Admiral Willard. I agree with General Fraser's assessment
of how we will make that number work, yes.
Senator Brown. I'm deeply concerned about the Air Guard and
Air Force Reserves, General Fraser. I know it's a big part of
your operations, and as the Air Force begins to downsize some
of the things I've heard from a lot of the Air Guard,
especially concerns about the gutting of that asset--I'm
wondering if you could maybe talk about that and how it
affects, it factors into TRANSCOM's overall strategy, because I
have always felt that that's where the best bang for the buck
is, and I'd just like to get your thoughts on that.
General Fraser. Sir, our Total Force--the Guard, Reserve,
and Active Duty--have always come together to meet the mission.
We very much value the contributions that our Guard and Resere
continue to provide us. They have always been there when the
call went out. I would use the operation in Libya again as an
example, in that when we needed to set up the tanker bridge we
turned to AMC, who then reached out to our Guard and Reserve.
They looked for volunteers. They were ready, they raised their
hand, and they went forward. So they've always been there and
volunteered to support the mission.
Senator Brown. Are you getting a handle on the container
detention fees that resulted in millions of dollars in
penalties, and can you comment on what has been done to
mitigate these fees?
General Fraser. Sir, we're taking a number of different
actions with respect to the container detention fees. We
continue to monitor it very closely. A couple of things that we
have done recently, I have personally engaged the commanders
not only at U.S. Central Command, but also I talked to General
Allen about this when I was in the theater, as well as other
commanders that are in the field in Afghanistan.
We have learned some lessons from the past in Iraq with
respect to our containers and how we manage them. A couple of
things that we're doing is to try and make sure that when we're
in Afghanistan, we try to use as many government-owned
containers as we can and then return those that belong to our
commercial carriers back into the system as rapidly as we can.
There's an accountability process that we're also going
through to make sure that we have a container management system
that more accurately tracks where these containers are.
We're actually going to address it in our next universal
services contract (USC) as we move from what we call USC 6 to
USC 7. So there are some actions that we're taking within that
contracting vehicle to, one, give us more flexibility, in other
words increasing the days of ``free-time'' before detention
charges start accruing. Also, the fact that we'll go from a
minimum of 90 days to 60 days before we can buy the container,
which drives the container purchase price down. So these are
things that we're working with commanders, with education on
how important it is for commanders to get the containers back
into the system. It's a holistic approach.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Brown.
Senator Inhofe. Just a unanimous consent request, if I
could, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Go right ahead.
Senator Inhofe. Regarding my opposition to the UNCLOS, I
ask unanimous consent that an article written by John Bolton
that appeared in the Wall Street Journal on September 29, 2011,
be made a part of the record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

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Senator Lieberman. Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to express my deep appreciation and thanks
for your service, Admiral Willard and General Fraser, and
particularly, Donna Willard, thank you for all of your
commitment, hard work, and service to our country, too.
Admiral Willard, China continues to assert its claim to the
South and East China seas at the expense of its neighbors.
Would you expand on the excessive maritime claims the Chinese
are making in these waters, to include increases in aggressive
behavior?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, ma'am. I will, although I would
offer that China is not the only claimant in those waters whose
claims are regarded as excessive. So there are, as you'll
recall, six claimants in the South China Sea: Taiwan and China,
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. All lay claim to
features and/or islands in the South China Sea region. Some
have submitted to UNCLOS their continental shelf claims and so
on, and in many cases they're disputed.
What makes China unique is that they've laid claim to
virtually all of it. The assertion that the South China Sea
writ large is China's historical water and that all the
features and islands and consequent resources that are located
there should be regarded as Chinese I think is the contentious
issue within the region and among those contiguous nations that
also claim many of those features.
We've seen fewer confrontations in 2012 than we did in
previous years. 2010 was quite a landmark in terms of the
confrontations that were ongoing. That's not to say they're not
occurring now.
So China continues to challenge any vessels that are
conducting resource surveys, oil and gas surveys for example,
that are within their claimed space. They continue to often
shadow military ships and activities that are occurring within
that claimed space, and they're making continuouslegal
assertions and demarches to reinforce their claims.
So they remain aggressive. I would offer, Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is carrying out discussions
with China and has been effective as a multinational forum in
keeping maritime security and issues with regard to excessive
claims in the South China Sea on the table, and they are in
discussions with China.
Senator Hagan. Why do you think the conflict has been less
in 2012 versus 2010?
Admiral Willard. I think that the reaction by the ASEAN
members, the reaction by the United States in Secretary Clinton
and Secretary Gates' very strong statements at the ASEAN
regional forum and Shangri-La dialogues, combined with many
ASEAN members protesting strongly, and the fact that it was
made somewhat public I think took China aback and has caused
them to reconsider that particular approach to their South
China Sea claims, such that they are endeavoring to continue to
pursue it, but in a more thoughtful manner.
Senator Hagan. Let me follow up on China's impact in
Southeast Asia. Their impact will only grow as its economy and
drive for energy, raw materials, and markets expands. It's
precisely this behavior that challenges various countries in
Southeast Asia to debate their policies and look for regional
and extra-regional allies. In effect, countries in the region
are playing several strategic games at once, with each move
requiring consideration of relationships that they have with
China, the United States, and other regional actors.
How can the United States maneuver in this environment to
develop deeper ties and ensure a positive and organically
integrated presence in the region to contribute to long-term
stability?
Admiral Willard. Thank you. I don't disagree with your
summary statement in terms of the situation in Southeast Asia,
although I would add that China's economic growth has benefited
the entire region and has certainly benefited the United States
and our economic ties to China. So I think it would be unfair
to imply that China's influence in Southeast Asia should only
be regarded from the standpoint of the challenge that it poses.
I think Southeast Asian nations, most of whom now regard
China as their number one trading partner, are benefiting
greatly from that association, as is the United States. So from
a standpoint of regional prosperity, I think China's rise has
benefited us all, and we should continue to promote that rise
and the advance of the Asia region for what it connotes.
That said, the nations, as it relates to security and even
as it relates, I think, to their economic reliance on any
single partner, do desire to strike a balance between China,
the United States, the European Union, and others, rising
economies like India and established economies like Japan and
South Korea.
So there is a balance that has to be struck and the United
States, I think, is accomplished in maneuvering in that space,
where we're attempting to either sustain or obtain a greater
share of market in areas where the United States can affect
trade in either direction. Trans-Pacific Partnership is a
fairly recent initiative to try and advance some of this, and
we have as a consequence of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation and the East Asia Summit I think advances that have
occurred there.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
General Fraser, in your written statement you speak to a
wide variety of missions, everything from humanitarian response
to obviously supporting our warfighter. Would you highlight
some of these missions and speak to how you are able to
accomplish them, given a very constrained environment?
General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. The mission that we
have is indeed a global mission, and it is one that I am
continually amazed at the flexibility that we have within the
system to respond in many different areas. One area that we
were most proud of was with the accelerated withdrawal out of
Iraq and the ability to be able to partner together with our
commercial partners, with our organic assets, to then
accomplish the mission before the holidays was tremendous.
We've also been able to continue to partner to support
other organizations. I would highlight the National Science
Foundation (NSF) recently. I made mention in my opening remarks
about Antarctica. Something that a lot of people don't realize
is the support that TRANSCOM gives to NSF.
Recently, there were issues with the ice pier at the
McMurdo Station and it was going to put NSF and their
experiments at risk for next year, as well as the winter-over
force that stays both at the South Pole and at McMurdo. Our
people were asked to be innovative and so together we worked
with the Army for a modular causeway system that had not been
used like this before, in such a harsh environment, which we
then used our Surface Deployment Distribution Command, who
worked to move it from the east coast to the west coast. We
worked with MSC to then get on contract with a contractor to
load this onto a ship that also had the containers to take the
supplies and NSF equipment to McMurdo.
We then sailed down, NSF got the icebreaker in there, and
we were able to then deploy the causeway system, offload the
containers, and so we got mission success. That's another
agency that we wind up supporting. So that's one end of the
spectrum.
We talked earlier about other support to operations, but
I'd highlight the support that we give our commercial partners
through piracy operations. This actually goes back to AFRICOM
and support we give there. Working with our commercial
partners, we work to ensure where we have military cargo headed
towards the theater and transiting that area, that we put
security teams aboard.
Since we have been doing that, we have not had one of our
ships pirated, and we are very supportive of the initiative in
the international community to protect the ships. Normally
those that are what they call high-board, above 25 feet, and
moving at high speeds, above 20 knots, are not as much at risk,
but recently we had one hijacked from another country just
within the past week or so. So it's a dangerous environment. So
these are other types of things that we do, not only just
supporting our troops that are engaged in the theater, but a
couple of quick examples of other operations that we're very
proud of, of what we do, all while still supporting the
warfighter, still doing the things that we're asked to do in
the theater. They're not wanting for anything with respect to
the current closure of the PAK GLOC, either. I'm very proud of
them.
Thank you.
Senator Hagan. So supporting the private containers, and
that's only when DOD supplies are on board?
General Fraser. That's correct.
Senator Hagan. As far as security forces on board?
General Fraser. That's correct.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. I really appreciate your help
with the NSF. I think R&D goes a long way in everything we do,
and your support in that area is outstanding.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen. We appreciate the service that both of you have
provided and are providing.
Let me begin with Admiral Willard. You were correct in your
oral testimony to go quickly to the issue of Korea and North
Korea, to mention the transition there and the uncertainty that
it brings. Our allies in the Republic of Korea, South Korea,
have a fleet of F-16s, which is known as the KF-16 in Korean
service. They're eager to replace their mechanically scanned
array radar with active electronically scanned array (AESA)
radar, and you can't blame them for wanting to do that.
Admiral, in case something broke out that involved a
conflict, do you agree that air dominance will be a key
differentiator for allied forces during the first 24 hours of
any potential conflict, including the Korean Peninsula? If you
do, do you then agree that cooperating with the Koreans and
supporting their desire for expeditious Korean procurement of
existing defense technology is a good idea so that they can
meet their operational requirements?
Admiral Willard. I do agree, particularly on the Korean
Peninsula, on the importance of air dominance early in any
particular conflict that would occur. I also agree that we
should strive to maximize the level of cooperation between
ourselves and our Republic of Korea allies with regard to the
acquisitions they require to continue to advance their
capabilities.
Senator Wicker. So you agree that the U.S. Government
should fully support the Republic of Korea's air force
requirements and their acquisition timeline in acquiring United
States export-compliant AESA?
Admiral Willard. I support the level of cooperation that is
required to advance the Republic of Korea's military
capabilities, including their aviation capabilities. With
regard to that, to whether AESA radar and the exchange of that
particular technology is appropriate on Korea's timeline, I
think that should continue to be subject to discussions between
the two countries. There are certainly compliance requirements
on the part of the Republic of Korea, as well as the
releasability requirements on the part of the United States.
This is not the first country we've had this discussion
with. But in general, sir, to your assertion, I truly believe
that we should strive to maximize the potential of our Republic
of Korea ally, including their military capabilities. In fact,
more important now perhaps than in the past, as we strive to
reach December 2015 and operational control transition to the
South Koreans.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Let me ask you then,
staying with North Korea: U.S. and North Korean envoys met last
week for talks on dismantling North Korea's nuclear
programs;included in that will be discussions of food aid,
economic help, diplomatic concessions from the United States of
America.
What is your current assessment of the humanitarian food
situation in North Korea, and do you believe North Korea is
being sincere and truthful and forthcoming in entering these
negotiations with the United States?
Admiral Willard. I think the food situation in North Korea
is always an issue of global interest. World Food was in there
conducting an assessment early last year, as I recall, trying
to ascertain just what the extent of crop success was in North
Korea. There is always a level of food shortage that exists
there, and always humanitarian need, as we've witnessed it
there.
In terms of the negotiations that have been ongoing, I have
been supportive of them with regard to the United States'
proposals for conditional food aid into North Korea and the
preconditions that have come with it, which now include
discussions of cessation of nuclearization and ballistic
missile testing and the allowance of the International Atomic
Energy Association perhaps back into Yongbyon. So there are
conditions that are going along with the negotiations with
regard to the extent of food aid. They've received food aid
from many other countries this year, and I remain supportive of
the progress that we're making in the talks with North Korea to
the extent that they occur.
Senator Wicker. You don't blame some of us on this side of
the panel for having a healthy degree of skepticism with regard
to North Korea's intentions?
Admiral Willard. I have a healthy degree of skepticism with
regard to North Korea's intentions, and I think we need to
observe both their actions and requests with a great deal of
scrutiny. Certainly we've been through the cycle many times in
the past, and I know, Senator, you're aware that these requests
for concessions often lead into a breakdown and a resulting
next provocation.
So we are skeptical as well. But with regard to the extent
of these current negotiations, I think particularly when
there's a new regime or a new leader in place in North Korea,
it will be important to ascertain any degree of success that we
might obtain through these diplomatic channels.
Senator Wicker. I suppose it's worth a try, but I'm not
holding out much hope and remain very troubled, as I'm sure you
are.
Quickly, let me ask about the 30-year shipbuilding plan and
the minimum sustaining rates contained therein. Many observe
this could pose challenges to fulfilling the force requirements
and possibly give rise to a sealift capability gap and an
aviation lift gap in 2015. With the pivot to this vast Asia-
Pacific region and your AOR and the Navy's inability to meet
its own requirement for 313 ships, how will this minimum
sustaining rate affect your ability to protect American
security interests?
Did you support this in discussions with your superiors,
and are you satisfied that you can fulfill the mission with
this 30-year shipbuilding plan?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. I would fall back on
the statement that I made earlier. The total acquisition
program that the Navy has put down to try and sustain itself
and the capacities of our fleet and eventually grow those
capacities over time is important and certainly as a naval
officer something that I've observed with great interest over
many years.
But as the PACOM commander, it's more important with regard
to how we bias those ships globally and whether or not the AOR
that, as you suggest, is a vast maritime one in the Asia
Pacific, is being adequately serviced. To date, I am well
serviced with regard to the Navy. I think Navy capacities are
very important. Our industrial base capacity is very important
that they be sustained.
These minimum sustained production rates that you're
talking about are intended to maintain our minimum acceptable
industrial base. All of these things are important for our
Nation, certainly.
In terms of PACOM, I think it's important that the right
number of ships and the right type of ships be present there.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say aloha to the two military leaders before us
today. It's good to see you.
Gentlemen, first I want to say thank you so much for your
dedicated service to our country and also to the communities
that you've served. We have really gained from your
responsibilities and your actions.
Admiral Willard, I would like to add my appreciation to you
and congratulations on your upcoming retirement, which is soon.
I want to tell you that I agree 100 percent with your
UNCLOSposition for our country. It's about time that we become
serious about that. Also, I want to commend you for the balance
which you've brought during your time as PACOM commander, and I
would tell you, you've made a huge difference in the Pacific,
so thank you for that, and to tell you that your departure will
be a significant loss to the Navy and to our country.
I want you to know, and Donna to know, that it has been a
pleasure to work with you in Hawaii and for our country. You've
served Hawaii and you've been there on multiple assignments. I
think you know, I don't have to tell you, that you have a deep
relationship and connection with the community in Hawaii. I
want to congratulate you and wish you well in your future with
Donna and the family.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Willard, it is impossible to
overstate the importance of our military engagement in the
Asia-Pacific region. As I said, I commend you for your
nurturing of balance there in the entire area. If you look at
continuing developments in the Pacific, our conventional
adversaries are improving their capabilities, too, as we work
together on this balance.
My question to you, Admiral, is, given this rebalance to
the Pacific and the responsibilities we have in the theater,
how would you assess our force structure plans in relation to
military and diplomatic goals for the region as we look to the
future?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Before I answer
your question, I would offer that the State of Hawaii and the
City of Honolulu have been great supporters of the military
families and members that are stationed there. Thank you for
your continued support for us in the region.
I think as we look at force structure there is the issue of
the type of forces that are present in the Asia-Pacific region
and there is the issue of posture and where they're present in
order that we can maintain the continuous presence in the
region that's so important to its security and long-term
stability.
The initiatives, such as the nation of Australia, the
nation-state or city-state of Singapore, and now in discussions
with the Philippines, that are occurring are going to assist us
in the posture-related issue, which is getting the force
structure where it can do the most good in terms of providing a
mechanism to maintain the presence that we need in the region.
As we view the acquisition programs and force structure of
the future in this budgetary environment, we, like every other
combatant, remain focused and guarded as we watch these defense
reductions occur, to ensure that we don't cut into the kind of
forces and the quantity of forces that our strategic priorities
call for.
We spent time very recently walking through a global
laydown of forces and looking at the forces that this current
program will deliver and our ability to meet the strategic
needs of our Nation, including in the Asia Pacific, and I think
collectively as combatant commanders and Service Chiefs we felt
we could do that. I think it's an important study to maintain
ongoing and there are two additional events that are presently
scheduled. But I have been well-served in the Asia-Pacific
region and I'm confident that the force structure that is
envisioned can continue to serve PACOM well.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
General Fraser, the recently announced rebalancing calls
for a shift in focus to the Asia-Pacific region, a vast
geographic area encompassing 9,000 square miles, 36 nations,
and 16 time zones, all of which I'm sure Admiral Willard knows
really well. My question to you, General Fraser, is, while the
details of this strategic balancing, rebalancing, have yet to
be finalized, do you have any preliminary thoughts on how a
refocus to the Asia-Pacific region could impact TRANSCOM?
General Fraser. Senator, thank you very much. As we look at
this shift, we've already seen a lot of engagement in the PACOM
theater of operations as we have continued to support ongoing
exercises, as we've continued to support other types of
engagements within the theater. I think as we come back out or
have come back out of Iraq already, but as we further reduce
the force out of Afghanistan, we'll free up some other assets
maybe for other opportunities for engagement, and then we'll
have the opportunity to do that.
It is one that's going to take balance and it's going to
take a lot of good planning on our part to make sure that we
properly support each of our ground combatant commanders in
their various theaters of operations. They all have theater
engagement plans. We're taking a look at them to ensure that we
provide the necessary support.
One of the things that we are able to do in our command is
not just with our organic assets; it's our commercial partners,
both sea and air, that will allow us that flexibility in
utilizing their networks and their connections to also continue
to provide support. So as those forces are available for
various engagements, it does not have to be just organic. So in
peacetime versus wartime, we're able to utilize those assets,
which is good for the economy, which keeps that industrial base
alive, too, both across the sea and the air side of the
business.
So we're confident that we'll be able to provide that
support.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Admiral Willard, with the new strategy rebalancing our
forces with a focus in the Pacific, the need for strategically
located maintenance facilities, like the Pearl Harbor Shipyard,
appears critical to the readiness of our fleet. Can you discuss
the role you see Pearl Harbor Shipyard playing with this
rebalancing, as well as the importance of continuing the
modernization efforts at the shipyard in order to support the
fleet in the future?
Admiral Willard. I can, thank you, Senator. You know as
well as I do not only the strategic importance of Pearl Harbor
Naval Shipyard, but also the other aircraft depots and
shipyards throughout the Asia-Pacific region that we rely on,
from the west coast of the United States to our ability to
conduct voyage repairs in foreign ports such as Singapore.
But I have stated for the past 5 years and I will continue
to state the vital strategic importance of the Pearl Harbor
Shipyard and what it provides. It's unique in the sense that it
not only conducts the overhauls of our surface ships and our
submarines, but it also conducts day-to-day maintenance and
voyage repairs for the ships that are positioned forward.
It's located, as we all know, in the middle of the Pacific
Ocean, which is the largest ocean in the world, and provides
ready access into the Asia Pacific. The three submarines that
we have homeported in Guam utilize the Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard for their maintenance and overhaul activities and
rotate back, and don't have to go all the way back to the west
coast of the United States to obtain that maintenance.
So it is a vital and pivotal strategic asset for us. The
need to keep it continually modernized is as important as any
shipyard that we have in our Nation. It is, I think, a very
important partner. When we talk about the industrial base, not
just production but maintenance, it's a vital part of that
industrial base.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
General Fraser, I wanted to ask you, the Air Force is
finalizing its KC-46A basing criteria for the Air Force. One of
the concerns that I have, and I'm hopeful that the Air Force
will do this, is that the criteria that comes out for the
basing of the KC-46A will be objective and transparent, in
terms of what criteria you're using in deciding who will
receive the KC-46A first. I wanted to ask you about that
process, where it was at, in particular what the balance will
be between the Active Duty and the Guard bases, and whether it
will be taking into account what I think is very, very
important, which is some of our Guard units already have an
existing partnership with the Active Duty, including my own,
that I've been quite impressed with, and I think that will be
important in terms of utilization. So can you help us with
that?
General Fraser. Senator, thank you very much. As you've
stated, it's an Air Force process, which we are not a part of
in TRANSCOM. But, having been in the Air Force when we were
doing this, I think you accurately stated that it is an
objective process, it's open, it's transparent, it's
repeatable. The fact that they are very open about that and
establishing the criteria as to what is going to be needed in
those discussions that go on in a very open manner with a
number of different locations, I think, is something that you
can look forward to as they go through that process.
You asked where the process is. I don't know where the
process is right now. I know they are actively engaged in
working with AMC discussing who will be the lead command for
the KC-46.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I had to raise the issue because
when we were home I went up with our 157th Air Refueling Wing
and had a chance to see them do their work up there, and have
been incredibly impressed. We actually had the highest
utilization rate in the entire Air National Guard at Pease Air
National Guard Base last year for the KC-135, and we already
have an Active Duty partnership established.
So it's one of those situations where, I think, if we do
this in an objective and transparent way to speak to the
accomplishments of our own unit in New Hampshire, they have
quite the objective accomplishments and close proximity to the
refueling track. So I hope that you'll convey, obviously, to
the Chief of Staff and to your commander how important it is
that this be an open and objective process.
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Thanks so much, I appreciate that.
I wanted to ask about, Admiral Willard, an issue that I was
concerned about last year in the National Defense Authorization
Request. It's something that I learned about that was of deep
concern to me, and that's the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(MPF). As I understand it, and this may be a better question
for General Fraser, whichever of you it is the better question
for, but last year the Navy announced plans to place 6 of its
16 ships from the 3-squadron MPFs for the Marine Corps into
reduced operating status beginning in fiscal year 2013.
When I learned about this, I was concerned about what this
would mean in terms of our readiness. I asked the Marine Corps
about it and the Commandant of the Marine Corps felt that it
needed additional analysis. So, in last year's NDAA, there is
actually a requirement that the Marine Corps, as well as the
Navy, submit an analysis about the readiness implications of
reducing our MPFs. As I understand it, there may be further
reductions there in the proposed 2013 budget.
So I just wanted to ask both of you if you were aware of
that portion of the Defense Authorization in 2012 and where
that readiness assessment was and if you can share anything
with respect to where we are with the MPFs?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. From PACOM's
perspective, yes, we're aware of the proposal to put one of the
three squadrons in a reduced readiness status. Of importance,
the two most active squadrons, one located in Guam and one
located in Diego Garcia, are not candidates for that. So those
that are there to respond to the major contingencies in the
Asia-Pacific region remain intact and are, frankly, utilized
frequently and exercised on a periodic basis in order to ensure
their readiness.
So from the standpoint of readiness in terms of Asia
Pacific contingencies and the contingencies in the Middle East
that these prepositioned ships service, we remain in pretty
good shape.
I can't answer to the tasker that the Services come
together on their assessment of how this could impact longer-
term readiness as that third squadron is placed in a limited
readiness status.
Senator Ayotte. I certainly appreciated your answer and I'm
hoping that we'll have a follow-up, which I will obviously
pursue with the Navy, because the NDAA from 2012 requires
thatthe Commandant of the Marine Corps provides a report
assessing the impact of the move on military readiness, and the
SECDEF has to certify that the risks to readiness from such a
move are acceptable. So I think you'll be consulted, I would
think, in that analysis.
My concern is, particularly with what we see happening
around the world right now, having those MPFs becomes very
important because, unfortunately, we've been noticeably bad at
predicting where the next conflict is going to come, and those
MPFs become very, very critical in terms of our readiness
posture.
Admiral Willard. I think we agree with you that the MPFs
are vital to us.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you so much for that.
I just wanted to follow up. I believe at your confirmation,
Admiral Willard, I'd asked you about the fiscal year 2013
budget, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had said last
spring that in order for us to meet all of our needs around the
world that we needed a ship force of 313, and this budget
really maintains us at 285. One of the concerns that I have is
it delays, for example, production of one Virginia-class
submarine, as well as some LCSs and some others in terms of
where we are in production.
One of the concerns I have is what the strategic analysis
or strategic thinking was for not meeting the 313 and
maintaining us at 285 and really delaying production of some of
our important assets; and I just would like to follow up on
that and ask you whether you have an answer to that,
particularly with our shift now to the Asia Pacific?
Admiral Willard. As you well know, the Navy surface force
has maintained itself, pretty much sustained itself, at that
280 to 285 number now for numerous years. In fact, for about
the last decade we've been struggling to get above that and
reach the 313 floor, or however it is currently being termed by
our Navy, in terms of what we aspire to have, to meet all the
global requirements that the Navy maritime strategy has
determined we need.
It's important that over time we recognize where we are
decremented in comparison to the overall strategic design for
the Nation as a Navy, as a military. The strategic priorities
that have been established are intended, I think, to guide us
in terms of where the maritime commitment should be and will
pay off the greatest for the United States. The Asia-Pacific
region has been called out as one of those areas, where it's
not only vast and inherently maritime, but as a consequence of
its economic importance to the United States and our allies and
partners and many of the challenges associated there, it places
a particular demand on maritime assets.
So provided that within that body of 285 ships we're able
to bias those forces properly into the right areas of the world
where the payoff is great, then I'm satisfied. I think the CNO
would tell you that in his longer-term view of shipbuilding
that, while the 2013 budget and the programs that it represents
doesn't show the 285 on the increase toward the Navy's goals,
if you look at more than one program, if you look at this long-
term, that he does eventually begin to make some progress as a
Navy in terms of shipbuilding.
So I think it's important to recognize that we've been in
this situation for a while. There is the cost of doing our
business, of acquiring ships, that continually needs attention
and gets great help from this committee. We need to reduce ship
costs and other acquisition costs as we can. But I think what's
most important is that we put the ships where they'll do the
most good, and we think that the Asia-Pacific region is one of
those areas of the world where that will happen. The Middle
East is obviously going to continue to require our attention,
too.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you very much, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral and General, thank you both for being here today.
I want to follow up, General Fraser, with Senator Ayotte's
question about the basing criteria for the KC-46. We share an
interest in that since we both represent New Hampshire. We
don't often get the opportunity to double-team you all in quite
the same way we are this morning, so I have to take advantage
of that.
In New Hampshire we believe that under any objective
criteria our strategic location in the Northeast, our proximity
to operational and training air refueling tracks, our current
tanker task force mission, and our Active Duty association,
that we would be a unique choice and would result in a very
cost-effective utilization of the placement of the KC-46s. So
we hope that it is a very transparent and open process. I won't
ask you to comment on that since you've said you can't.
Senator Ayotte talked about New Hampshire National Guard's
157th Air Refueling Wing, which has been providing continuous
operations since September 11th, both for Homeland defense and
in support of overseas conflicts. Like other Air National Guard
units, they've done so at a fraction of the cost of Active
bases around the country. In fact, the Air National Guard
represents only 6 percent of the Air Force budget, and yet it
provides nearly 35 percent of its capabilities.
We've seen in the last couple of days, concern expressed by
49 Governors about the cuts to the Air Guard as part of the
proposed budget from the Air Force. Again, I know you can't
comment on that, but I wonder if you could comment on the role
that our Air National Guard has played in providing critical
transport for our operations around the world?
General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. I do appreciate that. I
can't tell you how much I do appreciate all that our Guard are
doing. They've always been there when the call came, not only
when they were mobilized, but when they were asked to volunteer
and willing to support any mission that may arise.
As you know and you commented on, we have been heavily
tasked in a number of different areas. That's where I think the
great strength comes, the balance that we have within the total
force and the ability to use the Active Duty, the Guard, and
the Reserve in this manner to meet the mission. Therefore, our
commanders have not had to want for something else and not be
supported.
It's that total team effort to get this done. But you have
to have the right balance. The Guard has been heavily tasked.
They are also doing a lot more with respect to their boots-on-
the-ground (BOG)/dwell, as we call it, the BOG and the dwell
time they get back at home, and it's not at the desired rate.
So, hopefully, if we have the right balance and as we make
some of these necessary adjustments, we'll then be able to get
to the desired rates for both the Active Duty as well as the
Guard and the Reserve. This is something that we're all
striving to do as we look forward to the future. But we very
much value and appreciate all the contributions they've made.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. I
think your point about the total force is an important one. I
do share the concerns of the Governors in looking at the total
budget reductions that would have the Air Guard absorbing 59
percent of those aircraft budget reductions and about six times
the per capita personnel reductions. So again, I know you can't
comment on that, but I'm interested to hear the rationale at
the appropriate time.
Admiral Willard, India has become a much more prominent
partner of the United States and potential ally on military-to-
military issues in the last several years. Last year, the
United States cleared the way for the resumption of high
technology defense and aerospace exports to India. However, it
does seem that there is still room for growth in our
relationship. I wonder if you could talk about what PACOM's
priorities are for the U.S.-India security relationship and how
those are affected by both China and Pakistan, recognizing that
Pakistan isn't part of your purview, but critical, obviously,
to what happens with India?
Admiral Willard. Thank you very much, and thank you for
raising India. It's a very important partner in the region and
one that, as you suggest, there remains room for growth and
advancement in our partnership. It has advanced in the past
2\1/2\ years that I've been at PACOM, and in the previous 2\1/
2\ years as Pacific Fleet Commander we were very much engaged
with India and attempting to advance the relationship then.
If you range back to our history with India, we are in a
fairly nascent stage of engagement nation-to-nation, given that
this is the largest democracy in the world, like-minded in many
ways, and in a troubled region of the world in South Asia, but
a very important partnership.
From a security standpoint, we are engaging across all our
Services with India at an increasing rate every year. There are
challenges in the relationship. We overcome still the trust
deficit as it relates to having departed South Asia years ago
and having terminated relationships with both India and
Pakistan following nuclear tests in the late 1990s. But I think
that the current dialogue that is from the President on down
and certainly at a military level is very robust in overcoming
all of this. There is certainly a China factor in India. They
have a long-term border dispute that continues to be a
challenge for both countries, and they fought a war over it in
1962.
China is a very strong partner of Pakistan and Pakistan-
India have the relationship that we're all aware of, both
nuclear-armed and with a long-term history of animosity between
the two of them.
To India's credit, they're maintaining ministerial-level
dialogue with Pakistan and have for the past nearly 2 years,
even post-Mumbai and all of the tension that that created.
So, I think your emphasis on India and its importance is
exactly the right one. From a security standpoint and a
security assistance standpoint, they remain very important and
a partner of focus for PACOM.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you for being here. Thank you for
your service.
I want to tell Senator Shaheen I appreciate her questions
about the U.S.-India relationship, as one of the co-founders of
the U.S.-India Caucus in the Senate, which has a strong and
robust membership and a lot of interaction. I appreciate your
acknowledgment and statement about the importance of that
relationship from a security standpoint, an economic
standpoint, and across the board.
My questions, you'll have to forgive me, General, I'm going
to ask Admiral Willard some questions about China and
particularly Taiwan.
Admiral, you say in your prepared testimony that: ``Taiwan
remains the most acute sovereignty issue for China and the main
driver for military modernization programs. The military
balance across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in China's
favor.''
Would you agree that were China to launch some sort of
military offensive against Taiwan that such a scenario would
have the potential to draw the United States into a dangerous
large-scale conflict in the region?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. Certainly the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) and three communiques combined, but the TRA
in particular, establishes the position the United States would
take on such coercion were it to be launched against Taiwan,
and it then becomes a decision by our President and by Congress
to decide what the U.S. reaction to that would be.
But does it have the potential? We regard the defense of
Taiwan as a PACOM responsibility. So, yes, it would have the
potential to draw the United States into conflict.
Senator Cornyn. According to DOD, China's official defense
budget has grown by an average of 12.1 percent since 2001. So
it seems as we are talking about scaling back our defense
budget, China has continued to grow by leaps and bounds.
Would you agree that the likelihood of Chinese aggression
against Taiwan becomes more likely as Taiwan's ability to
defend itself deteriorates?
Admiral Willard. I'm not sure that I would contend that. I
think it's important and we've established the importance
through policy for a long time that Taiwan should have a self-
defense capability, and our responsibility in working with DOD
and in working with you is to ensure that the defense articles
and services that we assist Taiwan with provide for that self-
defense.
As we've seen the administrations change on Taiwan and the
reelection of President Ma and his administration just this
year, we would offer that the tensions across the Strait have,
in fact, relaxed during his administration and that
advancements in relations between the People's Republic of
China (PRC) and Taiwan have occurred. So, I think it would be
presumptive to assume that simply that imbalance in combat
power would necessarily encourage conflict. That said, there's
no question that the balance of combat power resides with the
PRC.
Senator Cornyn. I recently wrote a letter to President
Obama--actually it was last November 18, 2011--and received a
response on February 15, 2012, from James N. Miller, Acting
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Mr. Chairman, I'd like
to ask unanimous consent to have both letters made part of the
record.
Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

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Senator Cornyn. Let me just quote a couple of sentences
from this letter. Mr. Miller says: ``A key conclusion in the
Report to Congress on Taiwan's Air Defense Force is that
Taiwan's approach to defense cannot match the Mainland one-for-
one. Taiwan defense spending cannot match the Mainland's, nor
can it develop the same type of military the Mainland is
developing. The report concludes that Taiwan needs to focus its
planning and procurement efforts on nontraditional, innovative
and asymmetric approaches, and we are working with Taiwan to do
so.''
That was not a very encouraging letter I received from
Secretary Miller. But let me just get down to some of the
specifics with regard to operational combat aircraft. According
to DOD, the PRC has 2,300 operational aircraft and the
Government of Taiwan has only 490 operational aircraft. The
administration recently notified Congress of its intent to
upgrade some of the existing F-16 A and B versions, 145 of
those, and I support the retrofit for these older F-16s.
But it does nothing to replace the growing obsolescence of
Taiwan's fighter jets. By 2020 it's estimated that virtually
all of Taiwan's fighter jets will have to be retired except for
the 145 F-16 As and Bs that we sold Taiwan during the George
Herbert Walker Bush administration, and which are now the
subject of this upgrade.
Can you give me a little more confidence that we are
meeting our obligations under the TRA and the three communiques
you mentioned? Because it seems to me that China is growing its
military capability while Taiwan is losing its military
capability, and the United States, which is legally obligated
to provide defensive material to Taiwan, is not meeting its
full obligations to equip them with what they need to defend
themselves against the potential of a Chinese attack.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. I've been on the
record in the past acknowledging that eventually Taiwan's
aviation capability will have to be recapitalized. I too was
encouraged when the F-16A-B upgrade was approved. I think that
is the right thing to do. I think it does, in fact, enhance the
reduction of their air forces. It was an upgrade much needed
and it will improve their capabilities.
I'm not sure that a comparison of combat capability or
capacity with the PRC and Taiwan is a fair one to make. Nor do
I believe that there is any reasonable desire for or ability to
achieve parity between the two. China is as big as the United
States, maintains a fighter fleet, as you suggest, of over
2,000 aircraft, but has a lot of territory to cover. Taiwan's
an island 200 miles long, maintains a fighter force of about
450 aircraft.
So an apples-to-apples comparison, I don't think, is
necessarily the argument in this particular instance. The
argument is whether or not Taiwan is sufficiently defensible in
the context of the TRA and what was intended from a policy
standpoint. We contribute to some of that at PACOM in our
engagement with the Taiwanese military and trying to understand
their needs. But we look more broadly than just their aviation
needs and try to look across their armed forces and in all
domains how well they are equipped and manned to defend
themselves.
I think that balance is important for us to recognize and
also sufficiency in that regard across all of those various
areas. So, I see the recapitalization needs having been in the
near-term met. As you suggest, I'm not sure that in the
longest-term it's going to meet all their needs in the aviation
area. But in their other services, they have needs as well, and
I think the defense budget of Taiwan needs to be reflective of
a balanced approach to achieving a sufficient amount of
defense.
Senator Cornyn. If I can conclude, Mr. Chairman, just with
this one comment.
Thank you for your answer, but I'm concerned as I see China
continuing to grow its military, Taiwan's military capability
continues to recede in comparison, that that will cause perhaps
a greater potential that the United States would be required to
come to the aid of our ally under the TRA and the three
communiques you mentioned.
It strikes me that the more capable that Taiwan is to
defend itself, the less the likelihoodthat the United States
might be called upon to share in that defense in the event of
an attack.
Thank you both, gentlemen.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
I just have a few questions for the second round. First, I
was also glad, Admiral, to hear your answers relative to our
relations with India, our security and military relations. It's
a very significant partner in the region. The growing and
robust relationship, I believe, is good news and the right way
to go, and your answer is very reassuring to me, as it was to
other members of the committee.
Admiral, relative to North Korea, has the change in
leadership of North Korea impacted the agreement which was
reached in October 2011 with North Korea to allow U.S.
personnel back in North Korea to resume the recovery of remains
of U.S. servicemembers missing from the Korean War?
Admiral Willard. Senator, there was a pause in discussions,
but no pause in terms of initiative on our part to proceed with
what was agreed to in terms of Joint Personnel Accounting
Command (JPAC) returning to North Korea to seek additional
remains. We currently have a ship in Nampo that has been
offloading a first wave of equipment to support that.
My concern is for the security of the personnel from JPAC
that would execute these missions, and so I continue to view
into North Korea carefully to assure DOD and myself that these
individuals will be treated in accord with the agreement that
we struck in 2011.
Chairman Levin. Is there a timetable for that effort to
take the next step?
Admiral Willard. There is. This particular offload is
occurring. We have another one scheduled. There are a series of
steps that we have planned, and I'd be happy to provide those
to you if that would be helpful.
Chairman Levin. That would be good, if you would do that
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The attached slide lists Joint Personnel Accounting Command (JPAC)
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) critical milestones.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman Levin. Relative to the record, General, if you
could for the record, give us some detail about the critical
needs of TRANSCOM for cyber security. You made a comment in the
press about TRANSCOM being the most cyber-attacked command in
DOD, and if you could for the record, give us a list of your
critical needs and whether those needs are being met, and
whatever you can tell us in an unclassified way about attacks
on your systems and progress that you might be making in
defending those systems.
It's a large question. It's an important one that we're
grappling with in a major way here in Congress. So if you could
give us kind of a whole review for the record, it would be
helpful.
General Fraser. Sir, thank you very much. I have stated
that we are aggressively attacked. In fact, as we were looking
at the numbers just this last year as it was wrapping up, from
2010 to 2011, we have seen an increase of about 30 percent of
the number of attempts to get within our systems.
As this committee also knows, though, the majority of our
business is done on the unclassified net. We are working very
aggressively on a number of different fronts, though, and it's
not only within TRANSCOM, but also with our commercial
partners. Because of 90 percent of that business being done on
the unclassified net, which is where our commercial partners
are, we need to partner with them to strengthen our defenses.
We're working that through contracting actions and looking
forward to continuing to partner with industry.
Within TRANSCOM, we aggressively have a program whereby we
train all of our individuals. Before they get in and on, they
have to go through initial training. Then there's annual
training. In fact, I just finished completing it. It takes over
an hour and you're not going to get out of it, because once
you're into it you're going to go through the whole thing. It's
very thorough.
So we have to work that aspect of it. So there's a training
piece to this as we harden our people and make them aware of
what's going on.
There's also another piece to this with respect to our
systems. So with a corporate services vision for the future, we
have a number of systems out there that we're trying to bring
into our net so that we can collapse the net and not have as
broad a base so that the bad guys will be able to attack us.
It'll be easier to defend if we're able to collapse the net,
have less hardware out there, and actually be able to control
that.
The other thing is that we're very aggressively certifying
our net defenders. Over 99 percent of our net defenders that we
have within TRANSCOM now have professional certification. So
this is helping us.
So I go back to the 30 percent increase. We do not know of
any known successful attack into our systems this last year. We
are working with our people and with the hardware piece to our
system. There's some business practices out there that we're
also bringing in. We continue to partner with the Defense
Information Systems Agency. We partner with U.S. Cyber Command
and also with U.S. Strategic Command, as well as the National
Security Agency, as we try to strengthen the net as best we
can.
As the distribution process owner, looking forward to what
we call a secure enclave, too. As we partner with these other
organizations, they're very encouraged by what they're seeing
and the initiatives that we're taking. We're working it from a
holistic standpoint and we are properly funded within TRANSCOM
right now.
Chairman Levin. If you could keep this committee informed,
we would appreciate it.
General Fraser. Yes, sir, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]

Sir, during my earlier testimony you had asked for a list of U.S.
Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) critical needs and whether those
needs were being met, and attacks on TRANSCOM systems and progress that
we are making in defending those systems.
I previously addressed the latter aspect and mentioned that we
noted a 30 percent increase overall from 2010 to 2011 in attempts to
penetrate our network. I had also briefly addressed our approach in
defending against those threats by training and certifying our cyber
defenders and overall workforce. I also mentioned another important
part of our cyber strategy is regular engagement with our commercial
transportation partners to make them aware of the common threat we
face, as well as common solutions.
Regarding your request for a list of TRANSCOM's critical needs and
whether those needs were being met, we are holding the line today, but
are working to improve cyber defense capabilities to ensure we remain
adequately postured for the future. First, we need to ensure our
commercial partners have the tools and business practices necessary to
protect TRANSCOM information residing in their environments. We are
continuing to reduce this vulnerability in partnership with our
commercial partners, our internal cyber defense staff, Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers, and other partner agencies.
Additionally, we need to enhance protection of our high value command
and control systems, and also provide a secure development environment
in which our cleared defense contractors can develop software
supporting our deployment and distribution functions.
We also need to improve the capability to distinguish adversarial
actions from authorized users actions within systems and networks. If
the adversaries are successful in gaining entry to our networks, we
will need more effective mechanisms not only to detect them, but also
to contain and limit their potential damage to our information, and
rapidly rebuild any damage done to our networks or information so we
can continue to execute our mission.
A holistic and unified response to threats across the Department of
Defense and the U.S. Government remains one of our greatest challenges,
and is planned to be a major area of discussion at our upcoming cyber
summit. Cyber security will remain a top priority for TRANSCOM in all
of our engagements with partners, whether they are commercial
companies, the U.S. Government, or DOD entities.

Chairman Levin. This is really a major subject for all
Members of Congress.
Admiral, you were asked, I believe, by Senator Inhofe to
give us for the record in writing, how some of the objections
which were raised to UNCLOS some time ago have been met, and
that is important for all of us. If you can do that, if
possible before you leave, it would be something, another item
on your agenda to complete, I hope that's not too burdensome,
but it would be very helpful.
Admiral Willard. I'll get right on it.
Chairman Levin. Also, you made a comment, Admiral, that I
just want to see if you might wish to clarify. In response to a
question of Senator Inhofe, and this had to do with North
Korea, you indicated that their strategy has been successful
for two generations. I assume that what you meant by that was
that their strategy is to stay in power, essentially, and
that's basically what they care about, and that strategy has
succeeded, but not in terms of any success for their country?
Admiral Willard. That's exactly what I intended. This is a
coercive strategy that has about five dimensions to it, all of
which are bad news for the region and a challenge for our
Nation.
Chairman Levin. Bad news for their own people.
Admiral Willard. Very bad news for their own people.
Chairman Levin. We thank you both, and it's been a very,
very useful hearing. Best of luck to you and your family,
Admiral, again as you take on new responsibilities, new
challenges, new wonders.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Chairman Levin. General, thanks so much.
General Fraser. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. This hearing will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

OPERATIONAL RESPONSIVE SPACE-1 SATELLITE

1. Senator Levin. Admiral Willard, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
recently brought on line a small tactically responsive satellite,
Operational Responsive Space-1 (ORS-1), based on an urgent needs
statement it issued. The satellite was assembled, launched, and brought
on line in less than 32 months for cost below $225 million. My
understanding is that CENTCOM has been very pleased with the capability
of the satellite, which it directly controls with Air Force Space
Command, to satisfy tactical reconnaissance needs in denied access
regions. My understanding is that other combatant commands have tasked
CENTCOM to use this satellite for urgent needs in their area of
responsibility (AOR), offering for the first time the use of a small
satellite outside the normal tasking sequence for space assets with
direct control by the combatant command. Given the success, cost, and
innovation of ORS-1, does U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) believe that a
similar system dedicated to PACOM would have a positive impact on
reducing PACOM's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
collection gaps?
Admiral Willard. PACOM has been working closely with the
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program on a satellite of our own.
ORS-2 is in development and is scheduled to be launched in 2015. While
it has a different payload than ORS-1, the capability will definitely
have a positive impact on PACOM ISR collection gaps.
CENTCOM has shared feedback with us on the utility and quality of
ORS-1 collection. Based on CENTCOM's success with that system, we've
had recent discussions with the ORS program on developing an ORS-1
system for PACOM as well.
These systems will be particularly useful in enhancing PACOM's
ability to collect in denied areas that we cannot reach with airborne
systems.

2. Senator Levin. Admiral Willard, in addition, given the extremely
large denied airspaces in PACOM's theater and widely dispersed land
masses surrounded by large bodies of water, how would a tactical ISR
satellite system dedicated to PACOM compare to a series of airborne ISR
assets?
Admiral Willard. A tactical satellite system dedicated to PACOM
would be very useful, particularly with regards to collection in denied
areas that airborne sensors cannot reach. However, there are
limitations that make a straight comparison to airborne assets very
difficult. Sensor quality, orbit, data throughput, and timeliness of
collection can constrain our ability to answer many intelligence
requirements. Airborne platforms often provide the persistence,
flexibility, and fidelity that cannot be matched by tactical ISR
satellite systems. Airborne ISR also provides a visible presence in the
theater that creates a deterrent effect against potential adversaries
and strengthens our commitment to our partners and allies.
Used together, overhead and airborne systems complement each other
extremely well and serve to mitigate our collection gaps.

3. Senator Levin. Admiral Willard, given the recent statements by
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director, General Burgess,
regarding the counterspace capabilities being developed in the PACOM
theater, could a system of ORS-class satellites help in increasing the
resiliency and responsiveness of PACOM's space capabilities?
Admiral Willard. Yes. The future potential for rapid reconstitution
of overhead systems in the face of adversary counterspace capabilities
is very important to increasing the resiliency and responsiveness of
PACOM's space capabilities. PACOM is a strong proponent of ORS-class
satellites.

4. Senator Levin. Admiral Willard, could ORS-class satellites be
beneficial in reconstituting a thin line, good enough to win, space
layer to support PACOM operations in a campaign in which space was a
contested domain?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

CONTAINER MANAGEMENT

5. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, the Department of Defense
(DOD) is spending nearly $720 million in late fees for leased shipping
containers used for delivery of parts, supplies, and other items for
overseas contingency operations. At times the late fees have even been
more costly than if the containers were bought outright. I realize that
using leased containers makes sense in a number of situations. However,
wasting millions of dollars on late fees is inexcusable. What has U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) done to address this issue?
General Fraser. As mentioned in your question, there are instances
when keeping carrier-owned containers longer than the anticipated time
period to meet operational requirements makes fiscal sense. Whether
containers are required to enhance the force protection of our
warfigthers or required for critical temporary storage capability in an
austere environment, we keep a mindful eye on the fiscal impact of
these decisions. TRANSCOM, in coordination with the Surface Deployment
and Distribution Command (SDDC), is actively working several measures
to mitigate container detention in the CENTCOM AOR. We are taking the
following actions to reduce detention costs: making improvements in
contract provisions in the forthcoming Universal Services Contract-7
(USC-7); transloading from individual carriers to U.S. Government-owned
containers where practical; accomplishing container buyouts earlier
when carrier-owned containers are required to meet mission objectives;
expanding container management training and support for Mobile
Container Assessment Teams; aggressively enhancing key leader
engagement on adherence to established policies and procedures; and
developing a single container management system capability.

6. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, how can the cost of late fees
be reduced in the future?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM, in coordination with SDDC and other Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise stakeholders, are taking several
proactive steps to mitigate container detention. First, we have
included improvements to container-related provisions in the USC-7
tentatively set for an effective date of 15 August 12. Based on
analysis of detention for containers delivered to Afghanistan over the
last 2 years, the additional 5 days of free time in USC-7 would have
represented a 22 percent reduction in detention costs for an annual
$12.6 million in cost avoidance. Second, we continue to implement
successful lessons learned from our experiences supporting operations
in Iraq, most notably increased usage of government-owned containers
where practical. Third, we continue to work with theater leadership to
enhance their cargo reception capability and infrastructure support to
return carrier-owned containers within the prescribed timelines. Last,
we continue to leverage technology to improve our intransit visibility
of cargo and management of our critical distribution assets.

7. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, have steps been taken to
renegotiate container contracts and the leases currently in place?
General Fraser. Yes, TRANSCOM negotiated more favorable container
detention and purchase terms for the USC-7. The contract is due to
start this summer. The terms include lower purchase prices for the
containers, more ``free-time'' before detention charges start to
accrue, and allowing purchase of containers 30 days sooner. The
enclosed fact sheet (in response to previous Senate questions on
container costs) provides the estimated cost impact of the new terms.
More importantly, in addition to the contract terms, TRANSCOM,
through its component, the Military SDDC, is actively engaging the
Military Departments and Government agencies to improve container
management procedures and contractual terms and conditions that will
reduce container detention costs. As DOD's Global Container Manager,
SDDC has decreased container detention charges by instituting improved
processes, such as standing up sites to transload from commercial to
Government containers in theater. SDDC is also working to prioritize
cargo in the carrier holding yards, improve procedures for receipt and
release of containers, and enforce accuracy standards and completion of
monthly inventories. Another significant effort is the development of a
single container management system that will enable better container
tracking and reporting to further decrease detention charges.

Proposed Universal Services Contract (USC)-7 Container Detention and
Purchase Fact Sheet

The following information is provided in response to questions the
Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) received
from Senator Tom Carper's and Senator Scott Brown's staffs during a
December 14, 2011, teleconference.

1. Free time \1\ cost comparison between the current requirements
in USC-6 and the proposed changes for USC-7, which are tentatively
scheduled to take effect June 1, 2012:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Container detention charges are imposed by shipping lines for
containers kept beyond the assigned ``free time'' and not made
available for pickup within that period.

Under USC-6, the U.S. Government is currently
authorized 15 days of free time before detention fees begin for
containers delivered in Afghanistan.
Under USC-7's proposed language, an additional 5 days
would be added, for a total of 20 days free time before
detention charges begin on containers in Afghanistan.
Based on analysis of detention for containers
delivered to Afghanistan over the last 2 years, the additional
5 days of free time would have represented a 22 percent
reduction in detention costs for an annual $12.6 million in
cost avoidance.

2. Containers are often used for storage, force protection, and
other purposes, given the lack of infrastructure in theater. The
Department can purchase containers to mitigate detention costs in one
of two ways.

Deliberate container purchase cost comparison using
the current requirements in USC-6 and the proposed changes for
USC-7:

Currently with USC-6, in order to purchase a
container, 90 days worth of detention costs must be
paid. To purchase a container under the proposed USC-7,
the number of days' worth of mandatory detention costs
drops to 60 days.
On a per container basis, purchase of a 40-
foot dry container under USC-6 at the earliest possible
time (Day 91) would cost $5,100 to purchase the
container plus 90 days of mandatory detention ($35/day)
$3,150, for a total of $8,250.
Purchase of a 40-foot dry container under the
proposed USC-7 at the earliest possible time (Day 61)
would cost $4,590 to purchase the container plus 60
days of mandatory detention ($35/day) $2,100, for a
total of $6,690.
USC-7 proposed changes would have resulted in
a cost avoidance of $1,560 per purchased container
(18.9 percent reduction).
These purchase cost reductions are due to
lowering mandatory detention payment from 90 to 60
days, earlier commencement of credit on day 61 versus
day 91, and the reduced container purchase prices
negotiated by U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
under the proposed USC-7.

Container purchase in the event containers are
indefinitely retained by the U.S. Government (cumulative Credit
Against Purchase (CAP)), using the current requirements in USC-
6 and the proposed changes for USC-7:

Currently with USC-6, daily detention costs
are capped at day 358 for a 40-foot dry container and
day 1,090 for a 40-foot refrigerated container, at
which time credit paid through detention costs equals
the purchase price of the container and the container
becomes the property of the DOD. For example, under
USC-6 the CAP cost of a 40-foot dry container is
$12,530 ($35/day 358).
Under USC-7, daily detention costs are capped
at day 350 for 40-foot dry containers and day 700 for
40-foot refrigerated containers, at which time credit
paid through detention costs equals the purchase price
of the container and the container becomes the property
of the DOD.For example, under USC-7 the CAP cost of a
40-foot dry container is $12,250 ($35/day
350).
This reduction in detention days would have
resulted in a 9 percent reduction in detention costs
for an annual $3.2 million in cost avoidance.

3. SDDC is also actively engaged in reducing commercial container
detention costs through the increased use of U.S. Government-owned
containers, where cost effective. As this business practice proved
extremely successful in Iraq, we continue to look for opportunities to
implement it in Afghanistan, when appropriate.

PAKISTAN GROUND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

8. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, TRANSCOM and our interagency
partners have received permission from governments of some European,
Central Asian, and Baltic countries to start retrograding materials
from Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). As we
begin the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan in the next few years, the
retrograde of materials and equipment from Afghanistan will
increasingly become more important. The Pakistan Ground Lines of
Communication (PAK GLOC) provides logistical support through the
movement of cargo to Afghanistan. When open, the PAK GLOC remains the
quickest and most cost-effective route. If the PAK GLOC is not open for
retrograde operations, what additional cost will the United States
incur in order to move equipment out of Afghanistan?
General Fraser. The financial impact of the PAK GLOC closure
continues to be analyzed as TRANSCOM gains more fidelity on the factors
related to costing. At this time it is difficult to determine with any
degree of confidence what that additional cost will be. TRANSCOM
continues to explore and develop multiple retrograde options in order
to meet warfighter operational requirements in the most cost effective
manner.

9. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, has TRANSCOM conducted an
analysis of what will be necessary to ensure the PAK GLOC is open?
General Fraser. No. TRANSCOM does not control the conditions on the
ground that would be necessary to conduct such an analysis on the PAK
GLOC. However, CENTCOM states Pakistan leadership has made it clear to
us that reopening the PAK GLOC, as well as all other issues related to
Pakistan's relationship with the United States, must go through a
process which begins with recommendations produced by their parliament.
The administration plans to send a negotiating team to Pakistan to
discuss the steps required to reopen the PAK GLOC, consistent with
parliament's recommendations and U.S. laws and interests.

NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

10. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, the NDN provides an
additional route for cargo to Afghanistan. Over the past year, around
40 percent of all cargo in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
was moved through the NDN's multiple truck, water, rail, and air routes
in an expanding distribution network. TRANSCOM continues to work with
the interagency and governments of the NDN countries to expand NDN
routes. However, many of the NDN countries do not want materials from
Afghanistan to retrograde back through their countries. If the NDN is
not open or partially open for retrograde operations, how will this
affect the retrograding of materials and equipment from Afghanistan?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM currently has two-way permissions on all
our NDN routes for commercial-type items. Additionally, one of the NDN
routes (the Russian route) is authorized to move wheeled armored
vehicles. At this time, TRANSCOM is executing multiple proofs of
principle to exercise these permissions. The lessons learned will be
used to determine the best way to employ each route in the overall
retrograde operation. Any additional permissions from countries
supporting the NDN would further enhance retrograde flexibility,
capacity, and redundancy with potential cost savings.

11. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, what additional costs will
the United States incur in order to move equipment out of Afghanistan
if the NDN route is closed?
General Fraser. Assuming the PAK GLOC remains closed and the NDN
closes, the cost to move all equipment out of Afghanistan would be
significantly higher. The only option remaining would be airlift
equipment and supplies direct air back to the States or to multi-modal
locations. While this option is feasible it will not meet the current
departure timelines. TRANSCOM has been working Proof of Principles to
test using the NDNfor limited cargo coming out of Afghanistan, but this
is still in the very early stages and the costs associated with cargo
leaving Afghanistan has not been determined.

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

12. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, our defense strategy relies
on rapid global reach and rapid global response to deter aggression and
deliver worldwide capability. An important component of maintaining
U.S. military dominance is maintaining the airlift and air-refueling
capability required for rapid delivery of our forces and equipment over
long distances. C-17s will continue to be the workhorse for strategic
airlift. Even though TRANSCOM is currently funding purchases, upgrade
programs, and fleet rotation, I still have concerns that the stress of
supporting two wars over the past decades will cause our current C-17
fleet to age faster than expected. What is being done to ensure that we
do not have any gaps in our strategic airlift capabilities as the
current C-17 fleet begins to age?
General Fraser. The C-17 fleet averages more than the planned 1,000
actual flight hours per year, but the life-limiting effects felt by the
fleet are within limits. The C-17 fleet will meet its service life of
30 years, and based on historic usage severity, should be available
much longer. Targeted fleet service life extension programs (SLEP) are
being utilized to refresh specific aging aircraft drivers (wing upper
cover, landing gear) as appropriate to enable continued safe/reliable/
economic C-17 operations. A requirement for an overall aircraft SLEP
has not been established.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEW OF ALASKAN COMMAND

13. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, I understand at your direction
PACOM has been conducting an organizational review of Alaskan Command.
Although I am cognizant the renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region is
driving a need to shift PACOM resources, I firmly believe Alaskan
Command is and will remain an integral component of enabling PACOM to
carry out its mission. As you may know, Alaskan Command was founded due
to a lack of unity of forces in Alaska during World War II. With more
than 22,000 Active Duty personnel in Alaska, Alaskan Command provides
PACOM mission assurance in the State, ensures a ready force, and
expedites the deployment of forces in support of contingencies. I am
aware that after the creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), some
of the missions in Alaska are now under that combatant command, and
organizational challenges have surfaced. Resolution of these
organizational challenges will require coordination between PACOM and
NORTHCOM. Could you please describe the scope of the PACOM
organizational review of Alaskan Command?
Admiral Willard. In accordance with the 2010 Secretary of Defense
efficiencies tasking, PACOM performed a review of all PACOM missions
and associated manpower requirements to identify potential savings and
internal efficiencies. The scope of the Alaskan Command study included
a determination of requirements for manpower support to gain a better
understanding of the roles, missions, and responsibilities that impact
Alaskan Command. The scope of the study also included mission analysis
and functional capabilities analysis as related to wartime requirements
and a review of level of support provided to PACOM missions assigned to
Alaskan Command.
To date, no final decision has been made. PACOM will ensure that
any course of action is fully coordinated with all stakeholders prior
to a final decision being reached.

14. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, what is the desired outcome?
Admiral Willard. PACOM began looking at Alaskan Command as part of
the Secretary of Defense Efficiency Review in late 2010. During a
detailed examination of Alaskan Command, it was determined that the
operations performed for PACOM in Alaska do not require a permanent
Joint Headquarters and the potential operations performed for NORTHCOM
can be handled by Joint Task Force-Alaska. Based on joint doctrine,
there is no reason to maintain a permanent subordinate unified command
in Alaska. Subsequently, Operation Tomodachi validated an identified
need to operationalize U.S. Forces-Japan (USFJ) to increase the
capacity/capability of USFJ as an operational headquarters to support
the defense of Japan from increasing threats.
This need coupled with the direction in the recently released
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense,'' PACOM intends to shift some of its joint staff positions to
strengthen relationships with Asian allies and key partners
specifically Japan through a more robust USFJ capability. This
relationship is critical to the future stability and growth in the
Asia-Pacific region. Shifting these joint staff positions from Alaskan
Command to other, more critical priorities is one step in strengthening
these relationships in a period of constrained resources.
PACOM does not intend to move any units, exercises, or activities
out of Alaska, as these are critical to maintaining forces that are
able to respond in a crisis in Alaska or throughout the Asia Pacific.

15. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, would you please describe
coordination with NORTHCOM to reach an organizational solution mutually
beneficial to both combatant commands?
Admiral Willard. In November 2011, I directed the PACOM staff to
develop a way ahead for achieving the desired end-state of shifting
joint staff billets and civilian positions from Alaskan Command to
higher priorities in the theater. The PACOM staff formed a planning
team which consisted of representatives from the staff directorates,
the Service components (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps),
Alaskan Command, and NORTHCOM. The purpose of the planning team was to
examine the situation and offer recommendations based on competing
priorities.
In February 2012, the planning team offered their recommendation to
retain Alaskan Command as a Subordinate Unified Command to PACOM and
shift 45-50 joint staff billets and civilian positions to higher
priorities with critical allies. Both the Commander of Alaskan Command
and the Chief of Staff for NORTHCOM offered dissenting recommendations
to transfer Alaskan Command and the majority of its 65 joint staff
billets and civilian positions from PACOM to NORTHCOM. I directed my
staff to examine the question of whether Alaskan Command still fits the
criteria of a Subordinate Unified Command and deferred making a final
decision.

ALASKAN COMMAND MANPOWER SUMMARIES

16. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, would you please provide
manpower summaries (military, contractor, and civilian billets) for
Alaskan Command for fiscal year 2012, and projected for fiscal years
2013 through 2017?
Admiral Willard. The manpower authorizations for fiscal year 2012
are as follows:

Military - 42 (Joint Table Distribution (JTD) shows 43, one
position identified as billpayer for DOS)
Civilian - 23
Total - 65

Fiscal year 2013 through 2017 may or may not be the same as fiscal
year 2012, depending on the outcome of PACOM's Alaskan Command review.

NORTHERN EDGE FUNDING LEVELS

17. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, Northern Edge is a critical
exercise to prepare forces for contingencies in the PACOM AOR. Would
you please provide funding levels for the exercise for fiscal year 2012
and projected for fiscal years 2013 through 2017?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

MILITARY QUALITY-OF-LIFE CONCERNS

18. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, please identify the top
quality-of-life concerns for military families assigned within PACOM.
Admiral Willard. America's All-Volunteer Force is our greatest
strategic asset and we commit our full support for the 300,000 PACOM
servicemembers and their families. We know quality-of-life for Active
Duty soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their dependents continues
to be a key enabler and retention factor for these Americans serving in
the PACOM AOR.
We must ensure that the needs of our servicemembers and their
families continue to be met, even during this time of fiscal
constraint. We must sustain critical quality of life programs and make
improvements where needed in the quality-of-life of assigned personnel.
Current key focus areas include:

Military Pay and Compensation

With the numerous challenges that come with
military life, pay and financial difficulties should
not be added stressors. We need to ensure that our
servicemembers and their families are provided with a
comfortable life which includes fair pay and
compensation. The National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 provides an increase of 1.6
percent for military basic pay. This raise is equal to
the Employment Cost Index as of 30 September 2010, as
prescribed by law, and will keep military pay increases
in line with those in the private sector. In addition,
the NDAA funds bonuses and other incentives to meet
recruiting and retention quality and quantity goals--
especially for our most critical skills and experience
levels.

Care for Wounded, Ill, and Injured Military Members

We continue our intense focus on the care of
our wounded, ill, and injured military members--those
who sacrificed so much in defense of our Nation. We are
working to achieve the highest level of care and
management to ensure quality care and as smooth a
transition back to normalcy as medically possible.
Recent key initiatives include:

Achieving a seamless transition to
veteran status for members leaving the military
and superlative cooperation between DOD and the
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA).
Ensuring a high standard for
facilities caring for wounded warriors, i.e.,
first rate hospitals and trained staff.
Enhancing case management of
individuals needing care and transition to
civilian life.
Establishing an Integrated Disability
Evaluation System--to create a simpler, faster,
more consistent process for determining which
members may continue their military service and
helping them become as independent and self-
supporting as possible.
Working with the DVA to create Virtual
Lifetime Electronic Records--critical to
improve veteran care and services.
Continuing investments to modernize
the Electronic Health Record--to improve
provider satisfaction, system speed,
reliability, and to record all healthcare
encounters from the battlefield through each
phase of treatment.

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 provides $2.3
billion for enduring wounded, ill, and injured military
member programs. Of this amount, $415 million provides
for the continued support of cutting edge wounded, ill,
and injured medical research. This research is highly
focused on psychological health/post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injuries (TBI), but
also includes prosthetics, vision loss, hearing loss,
and other conditions directly relevant to the injuries
our soldiers are currently receiving on the
battlefield.

Prevention of Sexual Assault

Sexual assault is criminal conduct punishable
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and will not
be tolerated. Our commitment is zero tolerance of
sexual assault or related behaviors within the PACOM
AOR. We will not allow sexual assault to injure our
personnel, our friends, our families, destroy our
professional values, or compromise readiness.
Requirements included in the recently released
DOD instruction 6495.02, Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Program Procedures, are:

Policies and procedures for all
commanders, at all levels, to take action to
prevent sexual assault, protect and support
victims, hold offenders accountable, and to
ensure a safe and healthy environment.
All uniformed members, spouses,
civilians, and contractors are afforded victim
services.
Victim advocates will be well-trained
and credentialed.
Funding will be provided for training
investigators and lawyers.
All commanding officers and senior
enlisted leaders will be fully trained, and
committed to eradicating sexual assault.
Ensure the length of time sexual
assault records are kept is standardized for
all Services.
Victims filing unrestricted cases will
now have the option to request an expedited
transfer from their unit or installation.

Suicide Prevention

The suicide rate among our servicemembers and
their families is at a record high. We have an
obligation and responsibility to take care of the men
and women who volunteer to sacrifice for our country.
Our military servicemembers and their families are
resilient and strong, but we want them to know that
they should not needlessly suffer through depression
and anxiety. Suicide prevention is a leadership
responsibility from the most senior leaders down to
front-line supervisors.
Marine Corps (Marine Forces Pacific
(MARFORPAC)): Improving the Family Readiness in the
Marine Corps has been accomplished by implementing
Behavioral Health programs to protect and strengthen
the health and well-being of Marines and their
families. Behavior Health programs consist of Combat
and Operational Stress Control, Suicide Prevention,
Family Advocacy, Sexual Assault Response and
Prevention, and Substance Abuse Prevention.

Spouse Employment

Maintaining a career in the face of frequent
moves is an issue that has plagued military spouses for
years. Job availability and employer willingness to
hire transient spouses is always a concern. With one in
three working spouses holding jobs that require
licenses or certifications, transferability of
professional credentials from one State to another
complicates the employment issue. In many overseas
locations, availability of these professional jobs can
be limited, resulting in unemployment or under-
employment. Many young spouses don't have the requisite
background for the civil service jobs offered and the
status of forces agreements or other foreign assignment
areas prevent military exchanges and commissaries from
opening all positions to U.S. candidates.

Education

K-12 Education (Hawaii): Data is being
collected at PACOM to interpret if there is a
recruiting or retention issue for military families
with school-aged children stationed in Hawaii.
K-12 Education (DODEA): The Department of
Defense Education Activity (DODEA) Pacific oversees 49
schools in 3 countries and 1 Territory, with a
population of 23,500 students. DODEA is currently
unable to support varied educational options desired by
families, e.g., providing universal preschool within
all DOD overseas schools and home school families'
access to the DODEA Virtual School.

Child Care and Youth Programs

Sufficient, reliable, yet affordable child
care is a key readiness issue for servicemembers and
their families. Our highest priority is ensuring 100
percent availability of child care, especially in
overseas locations. Additional unmet child care needs
include access to care during nontraditional hours to
accommodate servicemembers' work schedules, limited
availability of child care slots for lower priority
families requiring care (i.e., not Single Parent and
Dual Military), and drop-in and respite care for
families with a deployed servicemember.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): Army Child
Development Centers (CDCs) are available on post with a
full day, part day, and hourly care for children. The
Youth Services are designed specifically for middle
school youth and teens and ensures services such as
sports, fitness and health, life skills, leadership
opportunities, academic, and intervention support and
services are available. Transportation to and from
school to the center is available in various locations.
The Army Family Child Care (FCC) home is another child
care choice for military family members, DOD civilians,
and DOD contractors in which family members work as
independent contractors in individual housing units
located on a military installation. Special services
may include 24-hour and long-term care during
mobilization and training exercises, evening and
weekend care, and care for special needs children and
mildly ill children. Parents can expect to receive the
same quality of care in an Army FCC home as in an Army
CDC or School-Age Program. FCC providers receive the
same training and support as facility-based staff.
An additional program available is the Armed Services
YMCA (ASYMCA), which provides military families, Active
Duty personnel, the National Guard, and military
reservists with access to youth development, family
strengthening, and health and well-being programs. The
Boys and Girls Clubs of America inspires young people
to become responsible citizens. The Clubs create a safe
place for kids to grow, provide mentoring by a
professionally-trained staff and caring volunteers,
nurture character development and life-enhancing
skills, and provide hope and opportunity.

Housing

Housing availability and affordability is a
recurring readiness issue for servicemembers and their
families. Waiting lists for base housing can vary from
immediate occupancy to waits exceeding 24 months,
depending on rank, installation, and required housing
unit size. Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) or Basic
Allowance for Housing (BAH) is paid to servicemembers
stationed in overseas locations (OHA) or in Hawaii and
Alaska (BAH) and is designed to provide equitable
housing compensation when government quarters are not
provided. However, servicemembers still report
significant out-of-pocket expenses while living off-
base when on-base housing is not available.
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPH-H):
Public-Private Venture (PPV) housing has improved the
quality of our homes for our servicemembers over the
last few years. There is high demand for PPV homes as
their quality exceeds most of what is available in the
community. PPV only satisfies a portion of our housing
requirement, as we are expected to rely on the local
community. In some instances, we are not keeping up
with the demand for housing for several pay grades,
specifically Senior Enlisted and Field Grade Officers
who are experiencing wait list times of 6 to 12 months.
Navy (Navy Region Hawaii (NRH)): PPV housing
has improved the quality of our homes for our
servicemembers over the last few years. There is high
demand for PPV homes as their quality exceeds most of
what is available in the community. PPV only satisfies
a portion of our housing requirement (4,451 homes), as
we are expected to rely on the local community. NRH
continues to meet the requirements for housing.
However, we are not keeping up with the demand for
housing for several pay grades, specifically Senior
Enlisted and Field Grade Officers who are experiencing
wait list times of 6 to 12 months.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): Availability of
housing for servicemembers is another top quality of
life concern. Servicemembers pay several hundred
dollars more a month in rent living in the same quality
home off-post when on-post housing is not available
upon their arrival. Additionally, when on-post housing
is subsequently available, some to all costs associated
to the move is the responsibility of the servicemember,
resulting in additional out-of-pocket costs affecting
many of our new military families and creating
financial hardship.

19. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, what progress has been made in
those areas, especially spouse employment opportunities, child care,
and education programs and facilities for DOD dependent school-aged
children?
Admiral Willard.

Spouse Employment

Navy (NRH): The Navy manages the Joint
Employment Management System (JEMS), an online job bank
dedicated to military spouses, dependents, and retirees
of all services. JEMS was first established in
September 1985 to serve as a single point of contact
for the business community to offer employment
opportunities to job seekers from the military
community. JEMS averages 2,000 job openings at any
given time. In fiscal year 2011, over 4,800 spouses,
dependents, and retirees registered in JEMS and were
seeking employment. JEMS holds one job fair per year at
JBPH-H, averaging over 800 attendees and 100 companies.
JEMS also holds one job fair at Marine Corps Base
Hawaii averaging just over 300 attendees with 40
companies.
Navy (Navy Region Singapore): For those
spouses who want to work outside the home, there are
jobs available locally and on base primarily with
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR), the Navy
Exchange (NEX), and Navy Federal Credit Union. Spouses
have also found employment at the American Embassy and
Singapore American School. All civil service jobs are
open for overseas spouses and dependents as local. The
Family Services Office has provided assistance to many
spouses seeking employment.
Navy (Navy Region Marianas): Spouses who meet
the minimum qualifications are always given first
priority when it comes to NAF employment.
Navy (Navy Region Japan): To support
successful job searching, installation Fleet and Family
Service Centers (FFSC) provide Job Search Strategies
and Federal Employment and Resume Writing classes on a
regular basis. On average, more than 3,000 spouses
participate in these one-on-one and group seminar
programs annually. To further enhance spouse employment
opportunity, Navy Region Japan worked with the Navy
Civilian Human Resource chain of command to permit
foreign spouses of uniformed military personnel to
receive special appointment hiring authority to non-
sensitive civil service positions.
Air Force (Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)):
Priority Placement is approved by DOD for employment of
spouses already employed by the U.S. Government prior
to arrival at overseas bases. The DOD Military Spouse
Employment Partnership (MSEP) website and job fair
support programs are now accessible to all PACAF bases.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): MSEP has helped
military spouses access career resources and connects
with corporations who are ready to help spouses explore
career options for their mobile lifestyles. MSEP has
partnered with numerous companies such as H&R Block,
Army Career and Alumni Program, Army Air Force Exchange
Service, Wal-Mart, Verizon, Dell, et cetera, to smaller
community-based, local companies together working to
aid military spouses in finding and identifying
portable jobs, as well as reducing the wage gap between
military and civilian spouses. In addition, MSEP has
increased the U.S. partnerships by collaborating with
the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC) to assist
spouses of military members stationed in South Korea
find local positions, gain awareness/education on home
based business options, and awareness of local job
fairs.

Child Care and Youth Programs

Marine Corps (Marine Forces Pacific): To
alleviate the childcare challenge, the Marine Corps
established numerous CDCs over the past several years
and have more planned. Adequate funding will ensure CDC
Military Construction (MILCON) will take place as
planned.
JBPH-H: JBPH-H has made significant progress
in the area of child and youth programs.

CDCs: Peltier CDC reopened on 08 Mar
2012. The Peltier CDC renovation and expansion
enabled the consolidation of children from two
older CDCs and netted 16 additional spaces
bringing the net total to 130. Three additional
CDCs are scheduled to open across JBPH-H. The
Wahiawa CDC (replaces older CDC at Wahiawa) is
scheduled to open on 26 April 2012, increasing
capacity from 46 to 70 spaces. The new Center
Drive CDC opens the end of May this year with a
capacity of 304 spaces.
The new Ford Island CDC is scheduled
to open mid-July this year with a capacity of
304 spaces. When all 4 are opened, JBPH-H will
have a total of 9 CDCs operating on Oahu with a
total capacity of 1,306, including one 24/7 CDC
accommodating 10 children day and night. This
unit is designated for use by swing shift
personnel and has the capacity to expand if
need is identified. Anticipate reducing the
overall wait list by at least 50 percent. There
are no additional projects to increase CDC
capacity on Oahu. Pacific Missile Range
Facility (PMRF) continues to be able to
accommodate all CDC requirements in its 34
space CDC. The new CDCs will result in 230 new
jobs.
School Age Care: JBPH-H has two School
Age Care centers that accommodate 290 children.
The PMRF on Kauai has seven children enrolled
in their School Age Care program. Neither
location has a waiting list.

Navy (Navy Region Singapore): There is no
Child and Youth Program in the region to assist
families with young children. Residents in Family
housing are allowed to hire foreign domestic workers or
live-in-aides. This currently alleviates the need for a
CDC. For parents who would rather have their children
supervised at a facility, they can choose to pay for
care on the economy. Many of these facilities are
within walking distance from the base. For children 5
years and under, the region offer a ``Little Tykes''
program that is provided 3 days a week. The program
offers interactive socialization, crafts, and story
hours. Navy Region Singapore currently does not have
the population to justify a CDC. Funding is another
obstacle if the population increases.
Navy (Navy Region Marianas): Child care is
available for youth of all ages as well as before and
after school care, Child Development Homes, youth
sports, and youth leisure/recreation classes on both
bases.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): Army CDCs are
available on post with a full day, part day, and hourly
care for children. The Youth Services are designed
specifically for middle school youth and teens and
ensure services such as sports, fitness and health,
life skills, leadership opportunities, academic and
intervention support and services are available.
Transportation to and from school to the center is
available in various locations. The Army Family Child
Care (FCC) home is another child care choice for
military family members, DOD civilians, and DOD
contractors in which family members work as independent
contractors in individual housing units located on a
military installation. Special services may include 24-
hour and long-term care during mobilization and
training exercises, evening and weekend care, and care
for special needs children and mildly ill children.
Parents can expect to receive the same quality of care
in an Army FCC home as in an Army CDC or School-Age
Program. FCC providers receive the same training and
support as facility-based staff.
An additional program available is the ASYMCA, which
provides military families, Active Duty personnel, the
National Guard, and military reservists with access to
youth development, family strengthening, and health and
well-being programs. The Boys and Girls Clubs of
America inspires young people to become responsible
citizens. The Clubs create a safe place for kids to
grow, provide mentoring by a professionally-trained
staff and caring volunteers, nurture character
development and life-enhancing skills, and provide hope
and opportunity.

Education

PACOM's Education Branch is dedicated to
promoting quality education for all military students
in the Pacific. PACOM's goal is to work in conjunction
with the civilian education community to offer a
comprehensive array of high quality educational
opportunities that allow parents to select the option
that matches the needs of each child to include public,
public charter, private, religious, DOD, and home
schools or on-line/virtual schools. PACOM's goal is to
ensure families receive support with their school
choice. For parents with certain school issues that
cannot be resolved by other means, the Interstate
Compact for Educational Opportunities for Military
Children may enlist their military representative.
PACOM has designated representatives for many
educational related boards and committees within the
PACOM theater and specifically, Hawaii. PACOM and all
combatant commands are represented on the DODEA
Dependents Education Council--a forum for the Services
to elevate the matters relating to facilities,
logistics, and administrative support provided to
DODschools. PACOM is also represented on the Pacific
Theater Education Council which identifies educational
concerns of parents, students, military leaders, and
educators within the PACOM AOR.
PACOM has a seat on the Advisory Council on Dependents
Education which recommends programs and practices,
ensuring a quality education system to the Secretary of
Defense and the DODEA Director.
In 2012, the DODEA started virtual courses for
students in Hawaii with a vision to prepare students to
live, learn, work, and serve the public good in a
digital, global society through engaging, synchronous
and asynchronous instruction. DODEA enacted the
Bullying Awareness and Prevention Program, a new
mathematics curriculum for all grades to include more
math unit coursework for graduation, a new attendance
policy providing specific guidance on attendance and
absences, identifies support services for students at
risk for not fulfilling the grade or course
requirements, and established the use of Gradespeed
which is a full-featured web-based grade book for both
parents and teachers. DODEA also utilizes Facebook as a
means to connect with administrators, teachers,
parents, and students.
In Hawaii, the Joint Venture Education Forum
is a partnership that has existed since 1999 between
the military community, business community, and Hawaii
Department of Education. It addresses education
concerns and provides support for children of military
families stationed in Hawaii. It also promotes good
will between the military and public schools.
To continue supporting military families with
school age children in Hawaii, PACOM partnered with
Johns Hopkins University to conduct a 3-year
longitudinal study to understand family members'
preconceptions prior to arrival in Hawaii and how
attitudes and beliefs are impacted and change during
their tour of duty. At the conclusion of the study,
information will be provided to PACOM, the Services,
and civic agencies to improve policy, programming, and
services for children and youth.
Continuous progress was made to Hawaii schools
in 2011 when the National Math and Science Initiative
began which brought advanced placement (AP) courses in
math, science, and English in schools serving a high
concentration of students from military families.
Courses are designed to increase students' potential
for success in college. Schools profit from training
for their APteachers and assistance with building their
AP programs.
Navy (Navy Region Hawaii): Navy in Hawaii will
continue to move toward strengthening relationships
with our military impacted schools, improving our
partnership with our educators and our students. Navy
children attend 59 public schools in Hawaii. We
currently have 35 active school partnerships with
military impacted schools where Navy children are
predominate and are working on establishing
partnerships at 5 schools with Navy children that do
not currently have a partnership. A partnership has
been established for all schools expressing interest.
Our School Liaisons foster relationships between
parents, educators, and the military families. They
also facilitate permanent change of station
transitions. The Commander Navy Region Hawaii (CNRH)
meets frequently with local education leaders to
discuss ways the Navy can assist with educational
improvements. CNRH will continue our robust school
partnership program. K-12 Education will remain a key
focus of the Navy in Hawaii.
Navy (Navy Region Marianas): Three issues were
prepared by Commander Navy Region Japan (CNRJ) at the
2011 PACOM area Dependents Education Council (DEC)
meeting. Specifically:

Need for additional gifted student
services. An evaluation of school offerings in
Japan is being conducted by DODEA and will
provide the DEC with an update at its next
meeting.
Universal Pre-K. The DOD Education
Review has examined the current state of
education for military children and, based on
this analysis, has provided strategies for
improving the quality of DOD's early childhood
programs. When the results of the study are
released, they will be reviewed and discussed
in order to plan the next steps for improving
access to early childhood education for
military associated children.
The effect of DODEA staffing template
use at small DODEA schools. DODEA is currently
examining program offerings and instructional
modalities, based upon student needs and
interests and fiscal guidance. The review is
ongoing and DEC will be given periodic updates.

Marine Corps (Marine Forces Pacific
(MARFORPAC)): DODEA has an extensive MILCON program
planned through fiscal year 2017 that will fund
renovating or replacing DODEA schools in the MARFORPAC
AOR; however, they are not scheduled to begin before
fiscal year 2013. In addition to DODEA schools, the
Office of Economic Adjustment has reviewed and ranked
over 150 public schools located on military
installations by facility quality and capacity issues.
To date (Mar 2012), the funding to improve schools
ranked in the MARFORPAC AOR has not been distributed.
Air Force (Pacific Air Forces): Approximately
$493 million funded for new school construction on Air
Force installations in the PACOM AOR between fiscal
years 2012-2016.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): Army families in
Hawaii benefit from a strong School Support Program
which is tasked with coordinating and assisting Army
school-age youth with educational opportunities and
assistance, and providing them the information
necessary to achieve success. Tutorial programs offered
to Army students include:

Online tutoring/homework help through
the ``Study Strong'' program (via the Tutor.com
website) available in school-age and middle
school/teen programs, and at home 24-hours-a-
day, 7-days-a-week.
March2Success, an Army-sponsored site
providing free educational content to help
students improve knowledge and test scores.
Army Family Covenant-authorized buses
and vans provide transportation to after-school
care and programs.
School Liaison Officers serve as
installation subject matter experts for youth
education and school transition issues,
championing and working toward achievement of a
``level playing field'' for Army youth
transitioning among installations and school
systems.

20. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, how many command-sponsored
dependents reside within PACOM, by Service, including official
civilians?
Admiral Willard.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Other
Hawaii Guam Japan Korea Locations Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army.......................................... 30,823 120 2,029 6,542 435 39,949
Navy.......................................... 15,456 2,445 11,979 224 546 30,650
Air Force..................................... 7,460 3,289 13,168 1,175 314 25,406
Marine Corps.................................. 6,722 10 12,076 125 24 18,957
Civilian...................................... * 290 5,179 4,568 6 10,043
----------
125,005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* No data collected for DOD Civilian Dependents inside the United States.
Note: Japan numbers provided by U.S. Forces Japan. Korea numbers provided by U.S. Forces Korea. Guam numbers
provided by Joint Region Marianas. All other data provided by Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

21. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, what do you see as the
greatest challenges to the military command structure regarding
assignment of families within PACOM?
Admiral Willard.
Facilities (Housing)
Hawaii. Housing has improved significantly. Military
Housing has transformed through a privatization initiative. The
housing is now leased to a private managing entity. The company
is responsible for maintenance and renovation. They have since
built hundreds of new houses within Mainland housing standards.
Family and Unaccompanied Housing are expected to meet the OSD
goal for housing by the end of fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year
2017 respectively (90 percent rated Q1/Q2).
AOR. Construction and renovation of inadequate
buildings is ongoing in order to meet OSD housing goals. Family
and Unaccompanied Housing are expected to meet the OSD goal for
housing by the end of fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2017
respectively (90 percent rated Q1/Q2). The current ratings are
as follows:

Navy

Japan, Guam, and Korea: 75 percent of
Family Housing is rated Q1/Q2.
Guam: 40 percent of Unaccompanied
Housing is rated Q1/Q2.
Japan and Korea: 47 percent of
Unaccompanied Housing is rated Q1/Q2.

Marines

Iwakuni: 98 percent of Family Housing
is rated Q1/Q2.
Camp Butler, Iwakuni, and Korea: 60
percent of Unaccompanied Housing is rated Q1/
Q2.

Army. Korea is the point of interest within
the AOR. The number of inadequate government owned
houses remains higher than what is expected due to the
ongoing relocation plans. Delays to the relocation have
only worsened the condition of the houses. The greatest
concern is the impact continued delay of the Yongsan
relocation plan will have on the existing inventory of
houses on Yongsan Garrison. At USAG Humphreys, the Army
is pursuing a privatization strategy that delivers
apartment style homes using servicemembers OHA as rent.
The private partner will own, operate, maintain, and
recapitalize the units. This transformation effort will
provide quality of life for the families. This strategy
is in lieu of MILCON and leasing, both of which have
been unsuccessful in funding Family Housing in Korea.

Medical Support
We see no medical issues with family assignments to
the AOR. EFMP is in place and works through the Services with
no identifiable issues or negative trends.
There are limitations to the specialized care that is
available in certain areas of the AOR but there are systems in
place to either get the patient to the care or the care to the
patient. This can be done through host nation support, movement
to a U.S. location where the care is available, et cetera. We
will never be able to afford having specialized care at every
location but we are committed to providing the care to our
beneficiaries.

Family Separation
Being assigned to a location far from family creates challenges as
well as financial stress. Service and family members are frequently
reluctant to accept orders in the PACOM AOR due to the distance from
family support systems. Personnel assigned to Guam are a good example
of such challenges.

Personnel living in Guam find airline costs
prohibitive to travel to/from U.S. Mainland, especially for
larger families. Airline tickets range from $1,900 to $2,500
per person, depending on peak seasons. A typical family of four
pays approximately $10,000 for one roundtrip. As a result, many
families cannot afford to travel home during a 3-year tour.
Space-A. Travel is limited and difficult as the member
would need to obtain space availability to a larger hub, such
as Japan or Korea, and obtain further flight availability from
there to get home.
Patriot Express. Patriot Express is a U.S. Government
contract flight which provides support to U.S. military members
and their families. This potential opportunity has been
researched for service to and from Guam. Due to the low
population of military members in the area, the use of Patriot
Express was determined to be cost prohibitive.

Spouse Careers
Maintaining a career in the face of frequent moves, in particular
to overseas areas, is an issue that continues to plague military
spouses. Job availability and employer willingness to hire transient
spouses is always a concern. With one in three working spouses holding
jobs that require licenses or certifications, transferability of
professional credentials from one State to another complicates the
employment issue. In many overseas locations, availability of these
professional jobs can be limited, resulting in unemployment or under-
employment. Many young spouses don't have the requisite background for
civil service jobs offered and the status of forces agreements or other
foreign assignment areas prevent military exchanges and commissaries
from opening all positions to U.S. candidates.
Education
PACOM's goal is to work in conjunction with the
civilian education community to offer a comprehensive array of
high quality educational opportunities that allow parents to
select the option that matches the needs of each child to
include public, public charter, private, religious, DOD, and
home schools or on-line/virtual schools. PACOM's goal is to
ensure families receive support with their school choice. For
parents with certain school issues that cannot be resolved by
other means, the Interstate Compact for Educational
Opportunities for Military Children may enlist their military
representative.
To continue supporting military families with school
age children in Hawaii, PACOM partnered with Johns Hopkins
University to conduct a 3-year longitudinal study to understand
family members' preconceptions prior to arrival in Hawaii and
how attitudes and beliefs are impacted and change during their
tour of duty. At the conclusion of the study, information will
be provided to PACOM, the Services, and civic agencies to
improve policy, programming, and services for children and
youth.

22. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, are resources to support
quality-of-life activities affected by the reduction in the defense
budget in fiscal year 2013 and beyond? If so, what programs are
impacted and will they degrade or enhance support for quality of life?
Admiral Willard. It is too soon to identify the full impact of
budget constraints on our quality-of-life activities as the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Services continue to develop guidance
and plan for military family programs.
We know quality of life for Active Duty soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and their dependents continues to be a key enabler and
retention factor for these Americans serving in the PACOM AOR, far from
family and loved ones. Our continued focus has to be to ensure adequate
support for these men, women, and their families, even during this time
of fiscal austerity: our force must have our full support.
Undoubtedly, however, budget cuts will have some impact on our
programs, and some impact has already been felt. Services have
indicated that any significant resource cuts to quality-of-life
programs this fiscal year and beyond will significantly impair the
quality-of-life enterprise. The following are some examples provided by
the commands within the PACOM AOR:

PACAF personnel report that manpower reductions,
including a drawdown of Service Staffs at major commands, will
impact the ability to effectively manage and support quality-
of-life programs at their bases. In addition, a major services
transformation is underway to completely reevaluate which base
quality-of-life programs and activities will be provided at Air
Force installations. A part of the transformation is to
establish which quality-of-life programs will remain;
currently, only seven ``core'' functions have been approved:
appropriated fund (APF) Dining, Fitness, Outdoor Recreation,
Child Care/School Age Care, Library, Youth Programs, and Airmen
and Family Readiness Centers. All other programs are being
evaluated by installation leadership for submission to their
major commands for approval to continue to operate, based on
financial solvency and customer and base support.
The drawdown in the Middle East and longer soldier
dwell time, coupled with Army budget cuts to family programs,
play a role in the quality of life in the Pacific. For example,
as of January 2012, Army Community Service (ACS) centers in the
Pacific Region were staffed at 67 percent of requirements
because of budget reductions and the resulting hiring freeze.
Statistically, when soldiers return from combat the need for
all support services increases significantly. The fiscal
constraints have a critical impact on the capability of
garrisons to provide essential services to soldiers and their
families. The ACS centers at highly impacted garrisons, e.g.
Fort Wainwright and U.S. Army Garrison-Hawaii are carrying an
increasingly heavy workload due to high risk behaviors
including domestic violence, child abuse/neglect, and sexual
assault. The impending redeployment of the 1/25 Brigade Combat
Team at Fort Wainwright and the 3/25 Brigade Combat Team at
Schofield Barracks will add additional stress on an already
taxed support system.
Due to the budget reduction and resulting Installation
Management Command (IMCOM) hiring freeze, hiring new Department
of the Army Civilian Victim Advocates, and New Parent Support
Program Home Visitors has been delayed. These positions were
scheduled to be hired in fiscal year 2012 because of the
planned end to temporary contracts. There is the likelihood of
a gap in Victim Advocate support when the Army central contract
ends and the positions have not been hired. Emergency Hire
actions have allowed for short-term relief along with support
provided by the Medical Treatment Facility Social Workers and
ACS Family Advocacy staff in the interim. However, the
Emergency Hire personnel will only be available for two 30-day
periods, which may not be adequate time to complete permanent
hiring actions once approval to hire these positions is
granted. Region and Headquarters IMCOM leadership are actively
pursuing resolution to this problem.
Programs hit hardest may likely be highly regulated
and labor intensive programs. For example, Marine Corps CDC
monthly fees and labor requirements are regulated and beyond
local control. As costs rise, CDCs will incur greater losses,
staffs will be stretched, maintenance deferred, and services
likely compromised.
In our overseas schools, DODEA MILCON funds and
programs reductions will delay health and safety improvements.
Further direct impact to children and families can be
seen in the elimination of an Exceptional Family Member Program
(EFMP) position at JBPH-H and School Liaison Officer (SLO)
positions in three of four Air Force overseas installations.
The responsibilities from the full time SLO positions will be
divided between the Deputy Mission Support Group and Airman and
Family Readiness Center personnel.
The ACS EFMP support and the Respite Care program have
been severely affected by the reduction in the defense budget.
The EFMP program manager reports diminished availability of
programs that cater to children with Special Needs. Recent
modifications to the Respite Care program, which offers
temporary relief to family members caring for other family
members with severe chronic medical conditions, resulted in a
loss of services for several families due to revised criteria
regarding severity of chronic medical conditions.
Spouse employment is the single biggest quality of
life issue in Korea according to the ACS Directors and senior
leadership. It is a recurring Army Family Action Plan (AFAP)
issue and is raised at every town hall meeting. The cost of
living is high and financially challenging if a spouse is not
employed to supplement the family's income. An added limitation
is the requirement for professional degrees/licenses and the
ability to speak Korean.
In many overseas locations, family members rely on
employment in base exchanges and morale, welfare, and
recreation facilities. Navy Region Center Singapore indicates
that with budget cuts, manpower reductions may occur and
employment opportunities jeopardized.
Cutbacks are already apparent in some non-appropriated
fund programs, a critical component of the ``non-financial
compensation'' provided to our servicemembers. At Joint Region
Marianas, for example, Category ``C'' facilities (such as the
auto hobby shop) have closed. Reduction of gym and pool hours
is under consideration; golf course renovations have been
placed on hold. Higher costs for goods, fuel, and
transportation have made it increasingly difficult to offer
lower prices on goods and activities for servicemembers and
families; personnel are looking off base for more affordable
options.
U.S. Army Pacific (ARPAC) families worry that morale,
welfare, and recreation facilities, such as the bowling alley
and auto center, may close due to funding cutbacks. The
reduction of resources to support these quality of life
activities may lead to fee increases, with Army Families forced
to share more of the cost of providing child and youth
programs.
Servicemembers and their families are generous
volunteers, but even volunteering has been affected by
cutbacks. Volunteers with organizations such as Army Community
Service, Survivor Outreach Service, and the Army Family Action
Plan have noted that provision of/funding for child care while
volunteering is no longer available.

Our quality-of-life programs are critical to ensuring the well-
being of our troops. We realize that we have much to do to minimize
negative impacts to our families resulting from budget cuts. We will
work to streamline programs and further encourage sharing among the
Services, eliminate redundancies and avoid duplication of effort; we
must keep our quality-of-life focus relevant while making programs more
efficient. Leaders in the PACOM area play a critical role now and in
the future to ensure that our increasingly scarce defense dollars are
wisely allocated and our Services continue to work together to maximize
family support programming.

23. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, what lessons were learned
following the triple disasters in March 2011--earthquake, tsunami, and
nuclear crisis--regarding communication with and accountability for
military families, evacuation warning, access to DOD quality of life
support programs, including health and mental health care, access to
schools for dependent school aged children, and the potential health
effects of exposure to radiation?
Admiral Willard.
Communication
Previously established base and operational commanders'
communication and family support plans as well as townhall meetings,
Family Support Centers, and the MilitaryOne Source website proved very
effective in disseminating timely and critical information to military
families and helped ease concerns. Within the first couple of days, the
full spectrum of media products (Facebook, email, base broadcasts,
Armed Forces Network) were focused on providing the most up-to-date and
pertinent information. One lesson learned, especially in the opening
days, was the importance of quickly ensuring a common message across
the Services.
Accountability
100 percent accountability of servicemembers and dependents was
reported quickly from the Services after the event. Fortunately, our
force concentrations were outside of the areas of major damage and we
experienced no casualties. What we learned as the harder part of
accountability was maintaining the 100 percent accountability and
support as family members left Japan on their own or as part of the
voluntary departure. We called this the challenge of ``the last
tactical mile'' and found improvements are needed in the repatriation
process as well as ensuring support for the displaced military families
once they have arrived at their safe haven.
Evacuation Warning
In areas where there is a large DOD dependent presence (Japan,
Korea), we must sustain close coordination between the Department of
State and PACOM to ensure departure guidance is clearly disseminated
and executed.
DOD Quality of Life Programs
There was no degradation to quality-of-life programs on the bases
during the event. Family Service Centers remained open and manned
throughout the crisis and continued to provide support to affected
family members.
Education
All DODEAs remained open in Japan throughout the crisis. Some
degradation was noticed due to departing teachers who were also
military dependents. This was offset by the number of students who also
departed. Official DODEA teachers remained on station throughout the
event and maintained a quality education curriculum for the students.
For the students who departed Japan during the crisis, the
Interstate Compact for Military School Age Children, which addresses
issues such as eligibility, enrollment, placement, and graduation
requirements, eased enrollment challenges in safe haven locations. We
also found the most effective lever for the displaced students was
asking the schools to apply the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act
provision to their enrollment. This allowed for further flexibility and
support for these displaced families. Ease of student enrollment in
these situations is critical.
Medical
The medical community experienced challenges initially in regard to
effective communication of the potential health effects of radiation
exposure to military members and their families--particularly when
trying to reassure the population given the minimal levels present in
most areas. An initial barrier was keeping the message and
responsibility strictly within medical circles. This was quickly
addressed by coordinating with leadership to deliver a consistent
health risk message derived in a centralized manner and promulgated
through various media outlets across all identified audiences.
During Tomodachi, there were no identified degradations to military
health services in Japan. In fact, there was an increase in capability
in some areas due to the large number of specialty skill sets arriving
to support operations.
With respect to medical accountability, where applicable, all
service and family members' medical records have been annotated to
document their activities during Tomodachi to support any future
unforeseen health concerns.

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION FUTENMA

24. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, the administration's recent
announcement to adjust our current posture plans set forth in the
Realignment Roadmap, in particular delinking both the movement of
marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base
from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, puts the future of
the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma in limbo. In your opinion,
what do you see as the future of maintaining a base for Marine Corps
aviation on Okinawa over the long term?
Admiral Willard. Both the United States and Japan agree that a
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) is necessary and, after
comprehensive study, conclude that constructing that facility in the
waters off Camp Schwab in Okinawa is the best way forward. Both
countries remain committed to the FRF plan agreed to in the Realignment
Roadmap in 2006. We consider it to be an operationally feasible plan.
If for some reason the FRF is not constructed, MCAS Futenma will remain
the U.S. Marine Corps' aviation base in Okinawa.

25. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, what risks are incurred
continuing to operate from the existing MCAS Futenma?
Admiral Willard. The United States and Japan agree that Futenma
replacement is necessary and that the urbanization that has developed
around the airfield is problematic and will remain so if we continue to
operate from Futenma. Additionally, over the past several years we have
made little or no investment in Futenma's infrastructure, so if the FRF
were to be delayed further, I think Futenma will require some
infrastructure investment to keep it a viable facility for our marines.
The longer we delay the FRF, this shortfall in necessary infrastructure
investments will have a greater impact.

RELOCATION OF MARINES TO GUAM

26. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, the administration's recent
announcement to adjust our current posture plans set forth in the
Realignment Roadmap with the Government of Japan indicated that the two
governments will be reviewing the unit composition and the number of
marines who will relocate to Guam. What composition and status of
forces (permanent or rotational) do you recommend on Guam and other
locations in your AOR?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

27. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, can you describe your ideal
force composition?
Admiral Willard. An ideal force composition is one-sized,
sustained, and positioned to react in a timely manner to address likely
contingencies. While we currently have the appropriate Marine Corps
force size to execute contingency operations in our AOR, we are lacking
in the Amphibious Lift and Combat Logistics Force (CLF) vessels to
support and sustain these forces. Additionally, relocation of existing
forces further from likely conflict areas exasperates the situation. As
we rebalance to the Asia Pacific, we need to be cognizant of the
tyranny of time and distance on the ability of our forces to adequately
react to crisis contingencies and engagement opportunities.
Although we are discussing politically and fiscally-influenced
force adjustments with our allies, we need to maintain the most optimal
aspects of current operational agreements which directly support the
warfighter.

28. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, why does Guam make sense from
an operational perspective as opposed to locating U.S. military forces
in other of your AORs?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

STATUS OF FUNDS FOR HOUSING ON OKINAWA

29. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, I note that the budget request
for fiscal year 2013 includes $32 million to improve military housing
infrastructure on Okinawa, which is the latest installment of hundreds
of millions over the past 5 years. Despite our continued investment of
U.S. taxpayers' funds, over $1 billion for upgrades to housing at Camp
Foster on Okinawa has been tied up by the Japanese Government for 3
years pending the outcome of land issues. Would you please provide a
plan to release these funds and to complete the renovations?
Admiral Willard. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)
bilateral agreement of 1995, which reduces the U.S. military footprint
on Okinawa, has an 8-phase program that will improve 1,770 units using
more than $1 billion in Japanese funding. Phases 1-4 are nearly
finished with 670 units completed and cultural asset surveys to be
conducted on the site of another 56 within the next 2-3 years.
Investments to the remaining homes remain on hold pending the outcome
of U.S.-Japanese negotiations regarding the Defense Policy Review
Initiative. Similarly, a request for replacement through the Japanese
Facility Improvement Program (JFIP) of another 1,275 homes on Kadena
Air Base, an effort valued at $764 million, remains on hold for the
same reasons.

QUALITY OF HOUSING

30. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, please provide your general
assessment of the quality of unaccompanied and family housing in your
AOR. Are there particular areas of concern?
Admiral Willard. Overall, the condition of unaccompanied and family
is good and continues to improve. A few locations in the AOR have
further than others to go to meet the mandated goals. For example, the
number of inadequate government owned houses in Korea remains higher
than what is expected due to the ongoing relocation plans. Delays to
the relocation have only worsened the condition of the houses. The
greatest concern is the impact that the continued delay of the Yongsan
Relocation Plan will have on the existing inventory of houses on the
Yongsan Garrison.

31. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, what are the Military
Services' plans to address those concerns?
Admiral Willard. The Services continue to invest in unaccompanied
and family housing based on a deliberate planning process to meet these
goals through new construction, renovation, and demolition of outdated
facilities. For Korea, the Army is pursuing a privatization strategy
that delivers apartment style homes using servicemembers OHA as rent at
Camp Humphreys. The private partner will own, operate, maintain, and
recapitalize the units. The Army provides no occupancy guarantees.
Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program is a critical element to the
transformation efforts in Korea that will provide quality of life for
these families. This strategy is in lieu of MILCON and leasing both of
which have been unsuccessful in funding family housing in Korea.

INVESTMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC REVIEW

32. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, the President announced that a
strategic review was used to guide development of the budget request
for fiscal year 2013 which resulted in a delicate balance of
capabilities and risks. But yet, the costs for most of the initiatives
presented to rebalance forces in the Asia Pacific are not known, nor
are they represented in the budget. How does this budget support your
plans for rebalancing forces in the Asia-Pacific region?
Admiral Willard. The force structure envisioned can continue to
serve PACOM well. It is important, however, that we bias the force
structure into the regions of the world that are most important to our
national security, regardless of the adjustments in force structure
that take place as a result of the fiscal environment.

33. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, do you have a rough idea what
costs will be incurred from establishing a rotational presence in
Australia or Guam as well as enhancing capabilities in Singapore, South
Asia, and the Philippines?
Admiral Willard. The costs of the Marine Corps lay-down in Guam
will be the result of ongoing discussions with Japan on Marine Corps
force lay-down and adjustments to our agreements with Japan.
With an emphasis on rotational force presence in Singapore and
Australia, costs are not expected to be large. The majority of the
forces rotationally deployed to Singapore and Australia will be
deployed without families, much as the Services already deploy units
worldwide.
Depending on the facilities available for our use in each country,
there may be some facility construction requirement, but that
requirement will be negotiated with the host country. We do not
anticipate that the United States will cover all costs of the
initiatives in Singapore and Australia.

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR FORCE REALIGNMENTS

34. Senator McCain. General Fraser, the proposed realignment of
U.S. military forces in Europe and dispersal of forces in the Pacific
theater with an emphasis on rotational force will inevitably change
strategic lift requirements for TRANSCOM. As an example--moving up to
5,000 marines to Guam will drive a significant new requirement to get
them from Guam during contingencies. Have you been able to determine
what these new requirements will be?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM is actively working with the geographic
combatant commanders on their proposed realignments and drawdown plans.
Throughout this process TRANSCOM has identified its requirements within
geographic combatant commanders theater campaign plans, theater posture
plans and theater distribution plans, and will incorporate them into
our global campaign plan for distribution. With reference to the
projected move of marines to Guam; once PACOM and the Marine Corps
determine their concept of operations, TRANSCOM will conduct analysis
to determine the capability required to project the force. TRANSCOM is
supporting projects on Guam that will increase the velocity and
capability to project these forces (e.g. fiscal year 2012 Air Freight
Terminal Complex, $37 million; fiscal year 2014 X-Ray Wharf $55.6
million; and fiscal year 2014 Joint Military Deployment Center, $28
million). Continued funding support for these projects and others
within the en route system will further enable TRANSCOM's force
projection.

35. Senator McCain. General Fraser, can these requirements be
supported with the current en route infrastructure?
General Fraser. Yes, the current requirements identified by the
combatant commanders can be supported by the current en route
infrastructure. TRANSCOM validated this requirement within the Mobility
Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) and more recently
within the Global Access and Infrastructure Assessment. TRANSCOM's
annual En Route Mobility Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP), recently
released in February 2012, provides the locations, capabilities, and
shortfalls to the en route network, and proposes solution sets for
eliminating identified capability gaps. Through the ERIMP, the
combatant commanders are able to determine TRANSCOM's requirements and
account for them within their Theater Posture Plans.

36. Senator McCain. General Fraser, are you confident that plans
are in place to mitigate limiting factors so that TRANSCOM will be able
to meet combatant command requirements?
General Fraser. Yes. Following release of the President's and
Secretary of Defense's new strategic guidance, we conducted a
comparison of its principles to those requirements outlined in MCRS-16.
The comparison validated 275 aircraft (223 C-17s and 52 C-5Ms) and our
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) partners can support a large scale
operation in one region, with a capability to deny the objectives of an
opportunistic aggressor in a second region, while defending the
Homeland and providing support to civil authorities.

PATRIOT EXPRESS

37. Senator McCain. General Fraser, TRANSCOM has operated the
Patriot Express charter flight program to offer cost effective travel
options for servicemembers and their families assigned overseas. This
program has been an important quality of life benefit for military
families assigned far away from home. What is the current status of the
Patriot Express charter flight system?
General Fraser. The Patriot Express program continues to provide a
valuable quality of life travel benefit to military families. With duty
travelers paying prices equal to the GSA City Pair rate, results
exceeded expectations. While achieving 80 percent seat utilization, 95
percent on-time performance and 102 percent recovery of costs, the
fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2011 ridership increased 5 percent.
Approximately 200,000 official duty and 100,000 military family
passengers enjoyed the benefits of economic, reliable travel on modern,
newer aircraft during fiscal year 2011.

38. Senator McCain. General Fraser, how many flights are operated
and where are they operated?
General Fraser. 10 weekly routes depart from three CONUS gateways
at Baltimore, Norfolk, and Seattle to 16 international destinations:
Germany, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Bahrain, Crete, Diego Garcia,
Cuba, Djibouti, Kuwait, Qatar, Kyrgyzstan, Japan, Okinawa, and Korea.

39. Senator McCain. General Fraser, is this program operated on a
cost neutral basis? If not, why not?
General Fraser. In accordance with Title 10 of the U.S.C., Section
2208--Working Capital Funds, the Patriot Express program is operating
on a cost neutral basis.

40. Senator McCain. General Fraser, what is your projection for
continuation and further improvements to this system in fiscal year
2013 and beyond?
General Fraser. To execute continued operations flying modern fuel
efficient aircraft with significant savings to ensure long-term
readiness, identify options to expand worldwide Patriot Express
passenger capacity and retain enterprise ability to respond to
contingency operations while maintaining CRAF passenger carrier
viability.

SPACE AVAILABLE TRAVEL ELIGIBILITY

41. Senator McCain. General Fraser, recent legislative proposals
seek to expand eligibility for Space-Available Travel (Space-A) on
military aircraft. Specifically, these proposals would open Space-A to
members of the Reserve components, a member or former member of a
Reserve component who is eligible for retired pay but has not reached
age 60, and widows and widowers of retired members and their
dependents. Please assume that this legislation is enacted and made
effective no later than January 2013. Could you explain with
specificity what the impact will be on current eligible personnel and
on the Air Mobility Command's (AMC) air passenger operations?
General Fraser. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) promulgates policy for the DOD Space
Available Program and publishes Department-wide Space-Available policy.
The Space-A travel system's primary purpose of Space-A travel is to
provide Active Duty members and their dependents respite from the
rigors of military service and the primary objective is to enhance the
morale and welfare of our Active-Duty Force.
Our sense is the potential for expanding the eligibility pool
cannot be accommodated without having a detrimental impact to our
Active Duty members. Under the current wartime situation, DOD does not
have the global ability to support this expansion. The expansion would
increase support costs for security identification, administration,
processing, baggage handling, safety equipment, training, personnel,
and facilities and would undermine the current policy that execution of
the Space-A travel is at no cost to the DOD.
Members of our Reserve component, as well as former members of a
Reserve component who are eligible for retired pay but have not reached
age 60 (known as ``Gray Area'' retirees) are authorized Space-A
transportation although on a limited basis. In the current resource-
constrained environment, an expansion of the program to widows and
widowers of retired members and their dependents would diminish the
value of the limited benefit currently available to Active Duty
personnel and their dependents.
In terms of quantifiable impact, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 has
levied a congressional report requirement concerning space-available
travel. Specifically, the Comptroller General of the United States is
tasked to conduct a review of the DOD system for space-available
travel. The review shall determine the capacity of the system presently
and as projected in the future and shall examine the efficiency and
usage of space-available travel.

JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL

42. Senator McCain. General Fraser, the Joint High Speed Vessels
(JHSV) represents a transformational sealift capability by offering an
enhanced logistics response to military and civil contingencies around
the globe. In your statement, you mention that JHSVs are critical, ``in
closing the gap between high-speed, low-capacity airlift and low-speed,
high-capacity sealift.'' In the proposed 2013 defense budget, the Obama
administration proposes to cut the buy of JHSVs in half from the
requirement stated just a year ago. What is the risk in your ability to
provide logistics response to military and civil contingencies around
the globe in response to combatant command requirements?
General Fraser. The reduction of the Program of Record for JHSVs to
10 incurs no additional risk to TRANSCOM's ability to meet combatant
command requirements.

AFGHANISTAN

43. Senator McCain. General Fraser, PAK GLOC remains the quickest
and most cost-effective route to move cargo, Afghanistan Security Force
Fund material, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and unit cargo and
equipment to Afghanistan. Multi-modal hubs in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and Aqaba, Jordan, proved invaluable when PAK GLOC routes
were no longer available for use in November of last year. Based on
recent and potential future closures of the PAK GLOC, how is TRANSCOM
postured to support the future sustainment, deployments, and
redeployment of forces in Afghanistan?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM has benefited from previous efforts to
develop additional routes and capacities in order to mitigate potential
supply disruptions such as the PAK GLOC closure. Routes such as the NDN
and the multi-modal operations have proven invaluable to weather the
current situation.
TRANSCOM continues to seek, explore, and develop additional
opportunities to strengthen the redundancy, capacity, and support we
provide to the warfighter. For example, TRANSCOM currently is
evaluating two-way flow on the NDN and through multi-modal ports. Once
validated and implemented, this will be an important addition to
retrograde capacity and redundancy.

44. Senator McCain. General Fraser, with the proposed cuts in
President Obama's 2013 defense budget to large cargo aircraft (i.e., C-
5As) and smaller cargo airplanes (i.e., C-130s and C-27s), does
TRANSCOM and its component, AMC, have the capacity to support combat
operations in Afghanistan and respond to all geographic combatant
command requests worldwide? Please explain your answer fully.
General Fraser. With respect to strategic lift, President Obama's
2013 defense budget provides for 223 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 318 C-130s.
TRANSCOM through its component, AMC, has sufficient capacity to support
combat operations in Afghanistan and respond to all geographic
combatant command requests worldwide. The 2013 defense budget retires
the remainder of the older and less reliable C-5A fleet. The remaining
fleet of C-17s and modernized C-5s will provide 30.4 MTM/D of capacity.
Recent Department assessments indicate that this capacity is sufficient
to meet the airlift demand for the revised defense guidance with
respect to theater operational lift. The budget also eliminates the C-
27J from the airlift fleet. The C-27J aircraft was designed to perform
the direct support mission for the Army. The C-130 is capable of
performing that mission and the Air Force is committed to performing
the Army direct support mission using its fleet of 318 C-130s with no
adverse affect to its intratheater airlift mission.

PIRACY

45. Senator McCain. General Fraser, piracy continues to threaten
commercial shipping of U.S.- and foreign-flagged ships predominantly in
the Horn of Africa region. What are TRANSCOM and its component,
Military Sealift Command (MSC), doing to reduce the vulnerability of
the U.S. commercial fleet from piracy?
General Fraser. Since 2009, TRANSCOM has reimbursed our commercial
maritime partners for the cost of deploying Privately-Contracted Armed
Security (PCAS) teams aboard ships carrying DOD cargo through seas
designated by the U.S. Coast Guard as ``High Risk'' for piracy. PCAS
teams have proven to be a 100 percent-effective deterrent to piracy,
ensuring the safety of U.S. mariners, DOD cargo, and enabling the
success of our mission. The United Nation's International Maritime
Organization (IMO) has recently published recommended guidance for all
nations to employ these teams, in a manner very similar to our
standards.
TRANSCOM has reimbursed our commercial maritime partners
approximately $9 million to cover the cost of PCAS teams and we
continue to work in concert with MSC, our interagency partners, and the
Maritime Industry to incorporate industry Best Management Practices
(BMP) and enhance the security posture of U.S.-flagged vessels moving
DOD cargo.
In view of the unquestionable success of PCAS teams in deterring
piracy, TRANSCOM will continue to encourage the employment of PCAS
teams. In addition, continued U.S. support for multi-national counter-
piracy efforts pays significant dividends. Thus, we will continue our
engagement with other DOD agencies and combatant commands, our
interagency partners, our foreign partners, and commercial industry
partners to stay abreast of the latest threats and BMP.

MOBILITY CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS STUDY 2016

46. Senator McCain. General Fraser, is the MCRS-16 requirement
still operative with the current budget reductions proposed by the
Obama administration and DOD's new strategic guidance? Please explain
your answer fully.
General Fraser. MCRS-16 is the current study of record, however, it
does not reflect current strategic guidance and the new defense
strategy. DOD's new strategy is not reflected in the basic scenarios
used in MCRS-16 and some specific cases no longer capture the necessary
mobility capabilities for the future. That said, MCRS-16 is still
useful as a baseline analysis of mobility capabilities to understand
what has changed and why.
DOD analyzed the airlift and tanker adjustments in the President's
budget, and I agree with those decisions. However, the new strategy
warrants another comprehensive study of future mobility capabilities to
provide the Department and Congress with additional insight on future
mobility needs.
The analysis done by the Office of Secretary of Defense and Joint
Staff shows that under certain circumstances I may have to manage
operational air mobility risk when confronted with competing demands
and ask our warfighters to prioritize or phase their force movements.
However, the strategic airlift fleet is more capable today than 2001
and our ability to swing capabilities rapidly to meet global demands is
a significant capability that gives me confidence we can meet future
airlift requirements. Our strategic sealift capabilities are also
consequential and can move massive amounts of equipment and cargo when
time permits.
For air refueling, we can meet the daily demands experienced in the
high OPTEMPO environment over the last 10 years with a smaller fleet of
453 tanker aircraft. But, there is no excess in the tanker fleet. The
new strategy does not significantly change the continued need for a
fleet of tankers which is why we must have the KC-46 delivered on
schedule.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

QUALITY OF LIFE

47. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, I understand there may be
significant issues in the enlisted quarters at Osan Air Base. Issues
may include plumbing, lead concerns, and mold issues at Building 746,
Building 708, and Building 475. Does the PACOM and Air Force-requested
dormitory for Osan Air Base in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission
address enlisted quarters that are below standards?
Admiral Willard. Yes, the recently awarded fiscal year 2012 MILCON
project (156-person dormitory) at Osan Air Base replaces four
inadequate enlisted dormitories at Osan and provides for their
demolition. In reference to the dormitories you specifically ask about
(buildings 746, 708, and 475), I offer the following.

- Building 746: Over the years, this dormitory has experienced
problems with lead. The Air Force fixed the problem by
installing filters and routinely flushing the lines. The water
is routinely tested by biological and environmental health
professionals and continues to remain well within health
standards. The facility is in compliance with the EPA lead and
copper rule. The Air Force also replaced the heating,
ventilating, and air conditioning system in fiscal year 2008.
- Building 708: This dormitory was renovated in fiscal year
2010; bringing the dormitory into compliance and up to
standards. The renovation included the installation of new hot
and cold water lines and replacing the heating, ventilating,
and air conditioning boiler and controls. The repairs fixed the
health concerns, and provide quality housing for our joint
forces.
- Building 475: The Air Force continues to make significant
investments in its dormitories in accordance with the 2010
Dormitory Master Plan. Building 475 is planned to receive a
$3.1 million renovation, to include replacing the hot and cold
water lines and the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
boiler and controls, similar to Building 708.

48. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, are there other dormitories
outside of this proposed dormitory that are not addressed?
Admiral Willard. Yes, Osan Air Base, in accordance with its
dormitory master plan, will demolish three additional dormitories.
These three dormitories are being replaced by a single dormitory using
Host Nation Funding. The dormitory is currently under design and
scheduled to be completed by January 2015. The Air Force continues to
invest to sustain and modernize its dormitories in accordance with the
2010 Dormitory Master Plan to maintain the quality of life for our
joint forces.

49. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, what is the wing commander's
assessment of the enlisted dormitory situation at Osan Air Base (active
mission assigned personnel as well as support/tenant units)?
Admiral Willard. Osan Air Base has a large inventory of dormitories
with a range of age, condition, and adequacy. For instance, the level
or existence of modern amenities in all of the dormitories is not
consistent due to the relative newness of the different dormitories.
According to DOD standards, all of the occupied dormitories at Osan are
considered adequate. According to the personal assessment of the Wing
Commander, however, there are three dormitories at Osan that are not
adequate.
One of the dormitories, 475, was mentioned in a previous question.
The other two dormitories, like 475, have had no recent improvements in
accordance with the dormitory master plan and base master plan that
supported tour normalization. To mitigate the conditions in these
dorms, the Wing Commander is looking at a couple of options. The first
is to actively seek programming for an additional major renovation for
one dormitory using operations and maintenance funds, including
demolition of another and a fiscal year 2015 MILCON request for a 127-
person noncommissioned officer dormitory. The second is to conduct a
review of options to potentially move the next projected occupants of
those facilities into off-base housing. The Wing Commander will
continue to advocate for renovation of existing facilities along with
the continued replacement of dormitories approaching or already past
their useful life in accordance with the Air Force's current programmed
dormitory master plan.

50. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, are there any plans to correct
the substandard rooms remaining?
Admiral Willard. The 2010 Dormitory Master Plan provides a detailed
investment strategy, to include sustainment of substandard rooms, to
provide adequate and quality housing for our joint forces. Based on
this master plan, the Air Force continues to make significant
investments to sustain its facilities in order to provide safe,
adequate housing and work environments for our joint forces.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FLEET

51. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, many studies have examined
the proper size of the strategic airlift fleet. Two years ago, 316
strategic airlifters were described as the sweet spot. Last year the
Air Force requested a reduction of the strategic fleet to 301, based on
analysis of the most stressing scenarios, and Congress approved. Now
suddenly, the Air Force proposes 275. As the combatant commander
responsible for air, land, and sea transportation for DOD, would you
please share and describe the objective studies TRANSCOM has done to
ensure we have the fleet size correct this time, as opposed to the
extensive analysis that supported a minimum floor of 301?
General Fraser. The current mobility study of record is MCRS-16,
however, it does not reflect current strategic guidance and the new
defense strategy. The DOD analysis supporting the reductions of the
President's budget for 2013 indicates that the President's budget for
2013 level will meet daily demands for strategic airlift. However, if
certain circumstances occur in which we have concurrent demands and/or
elevated defense levels in the Homeland, I am confident that we can
manage the operational risk.

RETIRING C-5A FLEET

52. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, the Air Force proposes to
retire the entire C-5A fleet, yet DOD has a long history of contracting
former Soviet-bloc AN-124s to meet its needs. Retiring C-5s should be
offered to the CRAF to establish the first ever U.S.-flagged outsized
cargo carrier and stop outsourcing these missions to the Russians, at
the cost of billions of dollars to U.S. taxpayers. C-5s are national
assets, have decades of service life remaining, and have operationally
demonstrated exceptional reliability and performance when upgraded to
the C-5M Super Galaxy configuration. Would TRANSCOM be willing to take
a serious look at offering some of these aircraft to its CRAF partners
or even international allies who cannot afford new aircraft? This seems
to be a win-win opportunity and something I believe members of this
committee could help enable.
General Fraser. The C-5As that are being retired under the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2012 and prior years are being put into storage for
reclamation and can be used for spare parts. The Air Force delivered
the ``Report on Retirements of C-5A Aircraft'' to four congressional
defense committees in October 2010 which pointed out that the transfer
of these aircraft to the commercial fleet creates a capacity increase
that's not required and there is a high cost to demilitarize the C-5As.
The C-5As proposed for retirement under the fiscal year 2013
presidential budget will be put into Type 1000 storage for use at a
future time, if needed. This provides the enterprise options for the
future.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

TRANSCOM SEALIFT

53. Senator Wicker. General Fraser, I understand that in any
typical operation, over 90 percent of all cargo is delivered by
sealift, is that correct?
General Fraser. It truly depends upon the operation, but in
general, and especially for sustainment cargo once an operation is
underway, yes, approximately 90 percent is carried by sealift. Through
a combination of our government-owned strategic sealift fleet and the
maritime security program vessels owned and operated by our commercial
maritime partners, well over 90 percent of the deployment, sustainment,
and redeployment cargo can be delivered. When restricted timelines or
the sensitive nature of certain cargo requires it, we have the option
to have it delivered via airlift.

54. Senator Wicker. General Fraser, I understand from your prepared
testimony that DOD spent approximately $2 billion on sealift through
United Services Contract. How do you exploit your current commercial
relationships as we pivot to Asia and the Pacific?
General Fraser. We maintain longstanding partnerships with numerous
U.S. flag carriers. Most of these companies are integrated into their
parent companies' global intermodal networks, providing TRANSCOM
instant access to their existing infrastructure around the world. Some
of these U.S. flag carriers concentrate their ocean services in the
Asia and Pacific region; therefore, transitioning to that geographic
area should not be challenging. Our current global ocean services
contract already covers locations in Asia and the Pacific.
Additionally, our large global carriers have historically collaborated
with us and created or altered routings and repositioned vessels when
our cargo flows shifted due to mission requirements. Finally, we
maintain the ability to charter commercial vessels when necessary to
support requirements in Asia and the Pacific.

55. Senator Wicker. General Fraser, is a 60-ship program adequate
for what this nation needs to accomplish?
General Fraser. In short, yes, with acceptable risk.
The 60-ship Maritime Security Program provides 1 of 3 primary
components of our total Strategic Sealift force; the other 2 being our
organic fleet under the MSC and the Maritime Administration and the
forward deployed Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF). Our analysis
completed in MCRS-16 showed adequate sealift capacity available to
close our forces in the most demanding scenarios with acceptable risk.
A 60-ship fleet also employs a significant number of U.S. citizen
mariners and maintains a U.S. flag fleet operating in international
trade, providing DOD assured access to established international
intermodal infrastructure.

AIR FORCE BUDGET CUTS

56. Senator Wicker. General Fraser, on January 26, the Secretary
and Chief of Staff of the Air Force held a press conference to discuss
the aircraft force structure overview. The budget proposes retiring 286
aircraft in the Future Years Defense Plan, including 227 in fiscal year
2013 alone. Some of these cuts include the divestiture of some C-130J
aircraft (eliminating 10 aircraft from Keesler Air Force Base in fiscal
year 2014) and divestiture of all C-27 aircraft (eliminating all 6
aircraft from the Meridian fiscal year 2013) and 20 KC-135s. How is
TRANSCOM adversely affected by the Air Force's proposal?
General Fraser. The overall number of aircraft is based on
established studies of record providing a balanced fleet of modern and
sustainable aircraft and does not adversely affect TRANSCOM's
capability to meet wartime requirements. MCRS-16 Case III provides a
requirement for 270 intratheater (C-130H/J) aircraft. The RAND Direct
Support Study identified a minimum requirement of 50 intra-theater
aircraft to maintain moderate risk or lower. The study also stated C-
130s and C-27Js are equally effective in the direct support mission.
Therefore, the recent President's budget for 2013 airlift assessment
recommends a reduction of intra-theater aircraft.

57. Senator Wicker. General Fraser, Air Force leadership has stated
that one method in which will help them deal with budget cuts is to
remission bases and assets. What impacts will this have on your
operational readiness and responsiveness?
General Fraser. We are confident the proposed fiscal year 2013 Air
Force force structure adjustments will have no impact on our ability to
support combatant commanders' requirements based on the new 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance.

foreign language training and retention of qualified personnel
58. Senator Wicker. Admiral Willard, I am a strong proponent of
foreign language and cultural training at the military academies,
Reserve Officers' Training Corps cadets and midshipmen, as well as
similar training and incentives for college students interested in the
intelligence community. These initiatives include the Center for
Intelligence and Security Studies at the University of Mississippi. I
am quite proud to be associated with this program which trains
undergraduate students for careers in intelligence analysis. To what
extent do you believe education and training in foreign languages and
cultures are important in preparing the next generations of military
officers and civilian analysts?
Admiral Willard. I believe it is easier to promote U.S. interests
when you can engage leadership in their native language and demonstrate
an understanding of cultural sensitivities. When a U.S. senior officer
speaks to his or her peer in a native language, it tells the foreign
officer their country is valued as an ally and creates an immediate
connection on multiple levels. In those many instances where our
leaders may not speak a specific language, is it critical that they are
prepared for their interactions by experts with language and cultural
depth.
Investment in foreign languages and understanding cultural
differences permits military and civilian professionals to connect to
the global environment. Acquisition of these skills takes years,
however, and requires periodic refreshment and dedicated concentration.
Training must begin at the beginning of military careers with programs
like the one in Mississippi and others. U.S. national security relies
upon our intelligence analysts' capabilities to stay proficient not
only in the traditional languages such as Arabic, Mandarin, Japanese,
and Russian, but in the hundreds of languages and dialects in the PACOM
AOR that are less commonly learned.

59. Senator Wicker. Admiral Willard, can you elaborate on PACOM's
ongoing efforts to recruit and retain qualified and capable Active Duty
and civilian analysts and operators?
Admiral Willard. Recruiting and retaining a high-quality analytic
workforce is a top priority. Realizing that state universities train
students in languages; we reach out to provide internship and entry
analyst opportunities to students with an interest in a career in
national security. The National Security Education Program's Language
Flagship Program graduates a variety of language-capable professionals
including Chinese and Korean scholars. The only Korean flagship program
is at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.
The retention of both military and civilian personnel is an ongoing
effort with a focus on professional development opportunities. Analysts
with language expertise can take advantage of immersion opportunities
to enhance their skills. Another development tool aiding retention is
taking advantages of opportunities to travel within the theater, which
improves cultural and language skills to add context analysis.

60. Senator Wicker. Admiral Willard, what challenges do you face?
Admiral Willard. One of the biggest challenges we face is the sheer
number of languages spoken in our AOR. There are over 1,000 languages/
dialects in PACOM and most of them are less commonly taught languages.
It is nearly impossible to have the readily available capability in
these languages that is needed to handle military-to-military
engagement and deal with emerging contingencies, such as humanitarian
assistance and counterterrorism. In a large crisis, we also face the
problem with having insufficient analysts in more commonly taught
languages like Mandarin, Korean, and Bahasa Indonesia to handle the
array of military tasks that require these abilities.
Another challenge we have is the process of hiring proficient
linguists for classified work. It can take over a year for some
linguists to obtain a security clearance; by then short-term
contingencies or mission requirements are often complete. We need to
find a way to streamline this process without sacrificing quality
background checks in order to translate classified documents.
Finally, we face the continual challenge of maintaining high
proficiency levels for our military and civilian force. Language
fluency requires dedicated self study and recurring attendance in
immersion programs to maintain the requisite language proficiency.
Continued funding for these programs, as well as additional incentives
for critical skill sets, should be explored.

U.S. IMAGE IN OKINAWA

61. Senator Wicker. Admiral Willard, members of this committee
continue to be concerned about the tremendous MILCON costs of
relocating U.S. troops from Okinawa to Guam. I am concurrently
concerned about the public diplomacy ramifications of any changes to
our proposed relocation of troops from Okinawa. What is your current
assessment of the image of U.S. forces in the eyes of the Okinawans and
the Japanese Government?
Admiral Willard. I believe that our servicemembers who live and
work in Okinawa enjoy a very positive relationship with the Okinawan
people on the personal and local level. Significantly, this impression
has endured through the long-term, despite crises and controversies
regarding U.S. facilities in Okinawa. I think we can attribute this to
both the Okinawans' character as courteous and welcoming people and to
the excellent training of our servicemembers, who are very much aware
that they are guests and diplomats in Japan. More broadly, the Japanese
people have consistently viewed America favorably. Recently, this good
will has sharply increased; the December 2011 Japanese Cabinet Office
report showed a record 82 percent of Japanese polled have a friendly
view toward the United States. Similarly, the 2011 Pew Global Attitudes
survey showed 85 percent of Japanese respondents see the United States
favorably.
Our interactions with the Japanese Government also reflect a
favorable view of U.S. forces. From senior staff level relations with
ministry officials to local commanders' close work with municipal
governments our servicemembers meet a positive attitude from our
Japanese colleagues. Even in Okinawa, despite the politically charged
challenges regarding U.S. facilities there, we find that local
officials seem to hold U.S. servicemembers in high regard.

JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL

62. Senator Wicker. General Fraser, JHSVs represent a
transformational sealift capability by offering an enhanced logistics
response to military and civil contingencies around the globe. In your
statement, you mention that JHSVs are critical, ``in closing the gap
between high-speed, low-capacity airlift and low-speed, high-capacity
sealift.'' In the proposed 2013 defense budget, the Obama
administration proposes to cut the buy of JHSVs in half from the
requirement stated just a year ago. What is the risk in your ability to
provide logistics response to military and civil contingencies around
the globe in response to combatant command requirements?
General Fraser. The reduction of the Program of Record for JHSVs to
10 incurs no additional risk to TRANSCOM's ability to meet combatant
command requirements.

PIRACY

63. Senator Wicker. General Fraser, piracy continues to threaten
commercial shipping of U.S.- and foreign-flagged ships predominantly in
the Horn of Africa region. What are TRANSCOM and its component, MSC,
doing to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. commercial fleet from
piracy?
General Fraser. Since 2009, TRANSCOM has reimbursed our commercial
maritime partners for the cost of deploying PCAS teams aboard ships
carrying DOD cargo through seas designated by the U.S. Coast Guard as
``High Risk'' for piracy. PCAS teams have proven to be a 100 percent-
effective deterrent to piracy, ensuring the safety of U.S. mariners,
DOD cargo, and enabling the success of our mission. The United Nation's
IMO has recently published recommended guidance for all nations to
employ these teams, in a manner very similar to our standards.
TRANSCOM has reimbursed our commercial maritime partners
approximately $9 million to cover the cost of PCAS teams and we
continue to work in concert with MSC, our interagency partners, and the
Maritime Industry to incorporate industry BMP and enhance the security
posture of U.S.-flagged vessels moving DOD cargo.
In view of the unquestionable success of PCAS teams in deterring
piracy, TRANSCOM will continue to encourage the employment of PCAS
teams. In addition, continued U.S. support for multi-national counter-
piracy efforts pays significant dividends. Thus, we will continue our
engagement with other DOD agencies and combatant commands, our
interagency partners, our foreign partners, and commercial industry
partners to stay abreast of the latest threats and BMP.

64. Senator Wicker. General Fraser, are you a strong advocate for
the use of private security teams aboard commercial vessels?
General Fraser. Absolutely. The effectiveness of PCAS teams is
unquestionable. No ship that has employed a PCAS team has been
hijacked. Since 2009, we have reimbursed our commercial maritime
partners for the cost of employing PCAS teams aboard their ships when
they carry DOD cargo through ``High Risk Waters'' as designated by the
U.S. Coast Guard.
To date, TRANSCOM has paid approximately $9 million for these
teams. We consider their 100percent success rate in ensuring the safety
of U.S.-citizen mariners, DOD cargo, and the preservation of our
mission capabilities to justify our investment. We will continue to
work in concert with our naval component MSC, our interagency partners,
and the maritime industry to incorporate industry's BMPs and enhance
the security posture of U.S.-flagged vessels moving DOD cargo. We must
continue to encourage the employment of private security teams as our
most viable deterrent.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly A. Ayotte

COMMERCIAL VARIANT OF C-17

65. Senator Ayotte. General Fraser, setting aside current strategic
airlift requirements, would it be advantageous for military readiness
to have the additional capability in the CRAF--at no cost to
taxpayers--that a commercial variant of the C-17 would provide?
General Fraser. The C-17 is a strategic airlift aircraft
categorized to carry DOD outsized and oversized cargo requirements.
Based upon our wartime requirements, DOD does not require civil
aircraft to support outsized and oversized cargo requirements. However,
when not operating at full wartime capacity and utilization rates, the
use of commercial contracts with our CRAF carriers and their partners
to move outsize cargo reduces wear-and-tear on our organic assets when
not mobilized for warfighting efforts, increasing their service life.

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING

66. Senator Ayotte. General Fraser, in the fiscal year 2013
proposed budget, the Navy announced a plan to reduce the number of
Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSRON) from 3 to 2 and the number
of prepositioning ships to 12. How will this decision slow response
times to potential contingencies?
General Fraser. This decision was made by the Department of Navy
and they are currently developing a risk assessment which the CNO and
Commandant will be providing as required by theNDAA for Fiscal Year
2012.
We have completed limited analysis on the impacts of this force
reduction, using the DOD's current planning scenarios. Two MPSRONs meet
the requirements of all combatant command approved operation plans. In
the limited instances where global contingency requirements call for a
third MPSRON, reconstituting and deploying an equivalent cargo set from
CONUS to the Mediterranean could be delayed by 30 days.

67. Senator Ayotte. General Fraser, what are the readiness risks
associated with these slower response times?
General Fraser. The Department of Navy is currently developing a
risk assessment which the CNO and Commandant will be providing as
required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.
That said, we have identified a potential response time risk of up
to 30 days in the event of having to respond with a third MPSRON. The
readiness and response time risks, as a result of reducing from three
to two MPSRONs, will be examined in greater detail using the most up-
to-date scenarios during the next mobility study.

68. Senator Ayotte. General Fraser, was this proposed change
developed in full collaboration with the Marine Corps?
General Fraser. This proposed change was developed by the Marine
Corps, in partnership with Navy, as part of their budget proposal for
fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014. The change was fully
collaborated with the Marines Corps, Navy, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands.
We concur with the proposal because the ships still remain a part
of our total force meeting necessary sealift capacity requirements.

69. Senator Ayotte. General Fraser, were these readiness risks
associated with this proposed MPF reduction included in the DOD risk
assessment that is being finalized?
General Fraser. I believe they are. Although MPSRON reset
conditions are just now being finalized, the approximate end-state was
known during DOD's Program Review process last summer. The Department
of Navy and the Marine Corps are currently developing an updated risk
assessment which the CNO and Commandant will be providing as required
by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.

70. Senator Ayotte. General Fraser, what is the strategic rationale
for no longer having a MPSRON in the Mediterranean?
General Fraser. This was a decision made by Navy and Marine Corps
and would be better addressed by the Service Chiefs, however I can
offer TRANSCOM's perspective. Neither U.S. European Command (EUCOM) nor
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) have an approved operation plan which
requires a MPSRON and the new strategic guidance has shifted our focus
to PACOM and CENTCOM, while assuming risk to the EUCOM and AFRICOM AOR.
Combatant commanders' contingency requirements can be satisfied by
two MPSRONs. Requirements for a third MPSRON to support a notional
EUCOM or AFRICOM contingency scenario can be met with an approximate
30-day delay.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

71. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Willard, Secretary Panetta and the
Service Chiefs have reaffirmed DOD's commitment to the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program. In light of the Chinese development of their own
advanced fighter, DOD has certified that there are no suitable
alternatives to the F-35 JSF. How critical is the JSF to protecting
U.S. interests and maintaining U.S. air dominance around the world but
more specifically in the Asia-Pacific region?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

NORTH KOREAN MISSILE THREAT

72. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Willard, do you agree with the
assessment that North Korea is becoming a direct threat to the United
States and that North Korea will likely possess an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of targeting the continental United
States within the next 5 years?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

DEFENSE AGAINST NORTH KOREA THREAT

73. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Willard, does the United States
currently possess enough ground based interceptors (GBIs) to counter
this emerging North Korean ICBM threat to the continental United
States?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

74. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Willard, can North Korea currently
target Hawaii will ballistic missiles? If yes, how confident are you of
our ability to protect the citizens of Hawaii and our military
facilities in Hawaii from North Korean missile attack?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

75. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Willard, what more should be done to
ensure the people of the United States are protected now and in the
future from a North Korean missile attack?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

TAIWAN'S DETERIORATING AIR FORCE

76. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, sadly, Taiwan's air defense
capabilities are nearly obsolete, while China's military capabilities
are growing at an alarming rate. According to DOD, the People's
Republic of China (PRC) has 2,300 operational combat aircraft, while
the Government of Taiwan has only 490 operational combat aircraft.
Taiwan's air force is clearly deteriorating. Its problems can be
separated into two categories--qualitative and quantitative. In terms
of quality, there are certainly serious deficiencies. According to the
DIA in an unclassified 2010 report: ``Many of Taiwan's fighter aircraft
are close to or beyond service life, and many require extensive
maintenance support.'' In September, the Obama administration notified
Congress of a $5.9 billion upgrade package for Taiwan's existing fleet
of 145 F-16 A/Bs. I support this so-called retrofit package as a step
to qualitatively improve Taiwan's air force. But, the upgrades do
absolutely nothing to address what I see as a much bigger problem for
Taiwan's air force--the quantitative one. Essentially, Taiwan is about
to experience a massive shortfall in fighter aircraft. By 2020,
virtually all of Taiwan's fighter jets will have to be retired, except
for those 145 F-16A/Bs that we sold Taiwan during the George H.W. Bush
administration. How many viable fighter aircraft do you believe Taiwan
would need to patrol its own airspace and deter a potential Chinese
attack and is 145 aircraft enough or do they need more?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

77. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, in my opinion, there now
exists a serious airpower imbalance between China and Taiwan. Do you
disagree?
Admiral Willard. I do not disagree, however airpower parity across
the Strait is not achievable given that PRC military modernization far
outpaces Taiwan's ability to modernize its own military, and Taiwan
cannot afford to go one-for-one with the PRC. The Taiwan military must
look more broadly across its armed forces in all domains to determine
what capabilities are best to ensure a sufficient self-defense.

78. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, what is your assessment of the
risk to both Taiwanese and U.S. interests as a result of this growing
cross-Strait imbalance in airpower?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

79. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, for years, DOD has documented
a steady increase in advanced Chinese weaponry and aircraft positioned
opposite Taiwan. It is consensus belief among security and military
experts that Taiwan has lost its technological edge in defense
weaponry. What is the tipping point, in terms of Chinese force buildup,
that would necessitate the sale of additional U.S. fighter aircraft to
Taiwan?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

80. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, the United States is currently
facing a serious fiscal crisis and, as a result, DOD is staring down
the barrel at sweeping budget cuts. Do you agree that a capable
Taiwanese air force would lessen the burden on U.S. forces in the
region?
Admiral Willard. Taiwan's self defense capability across the board,
not just the air force, enhances stability across the Strait and
enables its dialogue with the PRC. This contributes to stability in the
region.

SALE OF F-16 TO TAIWAN

81. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, although Taiwan has attempted
to submit a Letter of Request for the purchase of these 66 new F-16 C/D
aircraft, to date, the United States has not accepted it. Shortly after
the administration announced the F-16 A/B upgrade package, I wrote to
President Ma to ask him for clarification on Taiwan's military
requirement for new F-16C/Ds. On October 14, I received an unequivocal
response, stating that Taiwan needs both the upgraded F-16A/Bs and the
new F-16C/D purchase to fulfill its ``self-defense needs in qualitative
and quantitative terms.'' If we fail to sell additional F-16s to
Taiwan, the Taiwanese air force will continue to shrink in size. By
2020, it is likely that Taiwan's fleet of combat aircraft will be half
the size it is today. How would that impact Taiwan's capacity to defend
itself?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

82. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, in your opinion, would 66 new
F-16 C/Ds for Taiwan serve as a deterrent to China?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

83. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, DOD, in a letter to me dated
February 15, 2012, characterized its 2010 report to Congress on
Taiwan's Air Defense Force as concluding that ``Taiwan needs to focus
its planning and procurement efforts on non-traditional, innovative,
and asymmetric approaches.'' Yet at the same time, ``the report's
findings also indicate that a capable air force is important--indeed
critical--in a variety of scenarios and to maintain peacetime
deterrence.'' Do you agree that F-16 C/Ds would have a deterrent effect
that no nontraditional, innovative, or asymmetric approach could match?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

84. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, the F-16 production line may
shut down before the administration authorizes additional F-16 sales to
Taiwan. If that is allowed to happen, would you be in favor of selling
the highly innovative F-35B Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL)
aircraft to Taiwan to ensure that Taiwan can deter threats from China?
Admiral Willard. Though I have not seen studies analyzing
specifically the utility of the F-35B STOVL variant to Taiwan,
airframes that are STOVL-capable could be beneficial because of their
ability to take off from damaged runways. Any such capability would
still need to be part of a truly integrated air and missile defense
system that is mobile and redundant, and an air force protection plan
that promotes airbase hardening.

85. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, DOD's new strategic guidance,
released in January, highlights the importance of building partner
nation capacity, committing to expanding ``our networks of cooperation
with emerging partners throughout the Asia Pacific to ensure collective
capability and capacity for securing common interests.'' The document
goes on to state that ``building partnership capacity elsewhere in the
world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities
of global leadership''--an important point at a time when our Nation
faces a fiscal crisis and DOD is attempting to absorb drastic cuts to
the defense budget. Does this goal of building partner capacity not
also apply to Taiwan?
Admiral Willard. I believe that Taiwan's self-defense capability
contributes to stability across the Strait and enables its dialogue
with the Mainland, which in turn enhances stability in the region.

86. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, what message do you think the
administration's de facto denial of Taiwan's request for new F-16 C/Ds
has sent to other U.S. allies, both in the region and around the world?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

AIR-SEA BATTLE CONCEPT

87. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, the Air-Sea Battle concept has
been described by some as a new way for the Navy and Air Force to work
together to fight future wars against major powers. As I understand it,
the Air-Sea Battle concept is aimed at maintaining U.S. dominance of
the air and sea domains and to overpower any nation-state that might
try to defeat our military forces through the use of advanced missiles,
stealth aircraft, and/or a blue-water naval fleet of its own. China is
currently pursuing advanced missiles, stealth aircraft, and a blue-
water naval fleet. Does the implementation of the Air-Sea Battle
concept represent the U.S. policy response to a rising military threat
from China?
Admiral Willard. Air-Sea Battle is an evolutionary concept, a
natural development in joint military doctrine and capability. It
represents a suite of capabilities which, when coupled with a military
strategy, will enhance our military options in the Asia Pacific
theater. China is developing a range of capabilities which threaten to
hold at risk our continued access and freedom of navigation to the
Asia-Pacific region in support of normal operations or contingencies.
However, China is not the only country that is developing these
capabilities. Air-Sea Battle is not directed at China, but it does
offer one solution to the type of challenge that China could represent.

88. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, why is it important that the
U.S. military have a strategy to deal with China?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

89. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, in your opinion, does China
pose a threat to the United States?
Admiral Willard. We welcome a strong, prosperous, and successful
China that reinforces international rules and norms and enhances
security and peace both regionally and globally. However, China is
developing capabilities that seem intended to counter our own forces
and they are not always clear in communicating their intentions. We see
China's development as a positive trend and do not view them as a
threat today, but we are concerned about the lack of transparency and
clarity of their long-term aspirations.

ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL

90. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, in your opinion, what kinds of
investments should we be making to counter anti-access/area-denial
activities?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

F-35 PROGRAM

91. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, how important is the F-35 to
preserving our interests and freedom of action in the Asia-Pacific
region?
Admiral Willard. Adversaries are fielding anti-access/area-denial
capabilities designed to deny U.S. forces freedom of action in the
global commons and threaten U.S. sanctuaries/rear areas. Failure to
field and demonstrate concepts, capabilities, and capacity to defeat
anti-access/area-denial threats can undermine confidence in the commons
and American security, unravel U.S. alliances around the world, along
with associated agreements on trade, economic integration, and
diplomatic alignment, cause the United States to lose the ability to
threaten or conduct proportional military responses to aggression, and
add to international instability by making U.S. deterrence less
credible and U.S. responses more escalatory. Developing 5th generation
fighters like the F-35 will enable the United States and its allies the
ability to stay abreast of developing threats allowing for U.S. ground,
air and naval forces to maintain freedom of action to follow-on
operations. The JSF's sensor fusion capacity, electronic attack
capabilities, and stealth will enhance the U.S. supremacy across the
Range of Military Operations in the Asia-Pacific region.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

92. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, U.S. forces will begin flying
the F-35 in the PACOM AOR by the end of this decade. Australia is one
of the original international partners in the F-35 program, having
committed to buying 100 aircraft. Singapore has signaled its intent to
purchase the F-35 in the not so distant future, while in December,
Japan announced its decision that the F-35, which will give Japan the
ability to integrate seamlessly with U.S. air forces in the region,
best met its requirements. As you survey the region, what value do you
see in ensuring the viability of the F-35 for our partner nations who
have made commitments and other friends who have expressed interest in
the program?
Admiral Willard. It is critical to ensure the viability of the F-35
for our partner nations. The F-35 fills a critical part of Australia's
current military overhaul. With their plans to purchase up to 100,
Australia Defense Forces will replace all existing F-18 Classic Hornets
as they move towards an almost completely JSF force.
Singapore has programmed in the F-35 as their next generation
multi-role fighter to replace their aging F-5 fleet (19 a/c). The JSF
will serve as a key platform to execute Singapore's strategy of
deterrence and maintain regional stability. Singapore has historically
been a strong supporter of U.S.-led coalition operations, and promoting
interoperability is an important objective of the strategic
partnership.
F-35 will provide Japan with an improved air defense platform, well
into the future and will maximize interoperability with U.S. forces.
With schedule delays and cost issues continuing to creep up, it is
vitally important we provide reassurance that the JSF is important to
the U.S. military, PACOM, and our allies.

93. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, what is your assessment of the
benefits of key allies modernizing their fighter fleets with fifth-
generation aircraft such as the F-35?
Admiral Willard. From a regional perspective, failure to make the
F-35 available for purchase to key allies and partners undermines the
U.S. position as partner of choice and fuels the perception our role in
the region is in decline. In addition, it will force our allies and
partners to look to competitors and potential adversaries to fulfill
their next generation fighter aircraft requirements. The United States
will not only lose out economically, but will also lose out in the
ability to influence and build partner nation capabilities for
integration into future coalitions. This significant loss in
credibility will also negatively impact FMS across the board, as
nations will be hesitant to buy American if the United States is seen
as unreliable.

CHINA AND CYBER WARFARE

94. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, according to an October 2011
report by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive,
``Chinese actors are the world's most active and persistent
perpetrators of economic espionage,'' the report goes on to highlight
that ``computer networks of a broad array of U.S. Government agencies .
. . were targeted by cyber espionage; much of this activity appears to
have originated in China.'' In your opinion, is China engaging in
state-sponsored cyber attacks and cyber theft against the United
States?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

95. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, what is your assessment of the
threat of cyber attacks that originate in China?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

96. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, the 2011 DOD report also
stated that China continues to leverage ``state-sponsored industrial/
technical espionage to increase the levels of technologies and
expertise available to support military research, development, and
acquisition.'' I view this as a serious risk to our long-term national
security. Are you concerned about this?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

97. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, do you think more needs to be
done in this area?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

98. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, Given DOD's report stating
that China continues to leverage state-sponsored industrial/technical
espionage, and the fact that China is a suspect whenever a major cyber
attack against U.S. defense networks occurs, how should the United
States respond to the growing threat of Chinese cyber warfare?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

UNITED STATES AS A PACIFIC POWER

99. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Willard, Secretary Panetta said during
his trip to Asia last fall that the purpose of his visit was ``to make
very clear to this region and to our allies in the Pacific that . . .
the Pacific will remain a key priority for the United States, that we
will maintain our force projection in this area, that we will maintain
a presence in this area, that we will remain a Pacific power.'' In
light of China's aggressive military buildup, how do you believe the
United States can best project itself as a Pacific power in the coming
years?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain,
Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Brown, Ayotte, and Graham.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Jason
W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Russell L.
Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff
member
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton
IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional
staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member;
and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd, Mariah K.
McNamara, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Bryon Manna,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Ryan Ehly, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey Howard, assistant to
Senator Udall; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator Manchin;
Patrick Day, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Chad Kreikemeier,
assistant to Senator Shaheen; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles
Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to
Senator Ayotte; and Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator
Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. This morning's
hearing continues the committee's review of the fiscal year
2013 defense budget request of the administration and the
Future Years Defense Program. Today, we receive testimony from
Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, Commander, U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; and
General Carter F. Ham, USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM). They are here to discuss the defense and security
challenges in their areas of responsibility (AOR) and how their
combatant commands are postured to meet those challenges.
We thank you both for your fine service. Please extend on
behalf of this committee our gratitude to the military men and
women who serve in the EUCOM and AFRICOM AORs. They and their
families deserve and have this Nation's support and our thanks.
This will likely be Admiral Stavridis' final posture
statement before the committee. Admiral, this committee has
benefitted in so many ways and on so many occasions from your
testimony and your advice, first as the Commander of the U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and most recently as EUCOM
Commander and Supreme Allied Commander Europe. We thank you for
your many decades of great service. We all wish you and your
family our very best in your retirement.
The Strategic Guidance that the Department of Defense (DOD)
issued in January reaffirmed that Europe is our principal
partner in seeking global and economic security for now and for
the foreseeable future. DOD's guidance also stressed the
central role that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
alliance serves for the security of Europe and beyond.
This transatlantic security partnership is clearly
demonstrated in the NATO-led International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan where NATO and other European
countries contribute more than 30 percent of the total
coalition forces and nearly 80 percent of the non-U.S. foreign
forces in Afghanistan. The role of ISAF forces is transitioning
from being in the combat lead to assuming a support, advise,
and assist role as Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) step
forward and assume the lead for security. This transition is
underway, and consistent with President Obama's decision last
June, the United States has begun the drawdown of the 33,000
U.S. surge force from Afghanistan, to be completed by the end
of this summer.
The success of transition will depend in large part on the
success of the international coalition in training and
supporting the ANSF through 2014 when the transition to an
Afghan security lead is planned to be completed. That is a
major agenda item for the NATO Summit in Chicago in May.
Another top agenda item for that Summit will be defining NATO's
strategic partnership with the Government of Afghanistan beyond
2014, including arrangements for sustaining the ANSF.
Successful transition will also heavily depend on the
commitment of the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan
people to increasing security throughout the country. The
recent violence in response to the unintentional burning of
Korans at the Parwan detention facility, including the killing
of U.S. and coalition troops--and that includes two more
American soldiers yesterday--is deeply disturbing. Admiral
Stavridis, the committee would be interested in your views on
the implications of these events for the success of transition
and the success of our mission in Afghanistan.
DOD's Strategic Guidance issued in January also notes that
changes in the strategic landscape, including the end of the
Iraq conflict and the drawdown in Afghanistan, create an
opportunity to ``rebalance the U.S. military investment in
Europe.'' I welcome DOD's announcement last month that two of
the four Army brigades stationed in Europe will be inactivated.
This change, along with the removal of an Air Force A-10
squadron from Germany, will decrease the number of U.S.
military personnel stationed in Europe, currently around 80,000
personnel, by about 10,000 and will result in the closure of a
number of facilities. I encourage DOD to continue to review its
force posture in Europe across the Services to see if
additional force reductions and base closures might be in
order, consistent with EUCOM's missions and our NATO
commitments. We need to consider those before we consider
another domestic base realignment and closure (BRAC) round.
The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the means of delivering those weapons is a
central security challenge. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO
recognized the growing threat to Europe from ballistic missiles
from the Middle East, and NATO decided to establish a missile
defense of NATO's population and territory. The United States
will provide the core of that defense with its Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) on ballistic missile defense (BMD), the first
phase of which is now deployed. This system is designed to
protect our deployed forces, our allies, and our partners from
Iran's increasing missile inventory. NATO is seeking Russia's
cooperation with this regional system. Such cooperation would
send a powerful signal to Iran of world unity against their
developing long-range missiles or their having nuclear weapons.
We look forward to Admiral Stavridis' views on the progress and
the impact of missile defense.
Nearly a year ago, AFRICOM initiated Operation Odyssey Dawn
in Libya. NATO, with the support of forces from EUCOM,
conducted and completed Operation Unified Protector. These
successful civilian protection and mass atrocity prevention
operations saved untold Libyans from being slaughtered at the
hands of Qadhafi's forces and helped end decades of tyranny and
oppression at the hands of the Qadhafi regime. Our witnesses
are to be commended on the successful outcome of these
operations. In my view, it was the right call for our NATO
allies to lead with U.S. forces playing a unique and enabling
role, particularly given the endorsement of the Arab League,
the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the United Nations (U.N.).
Today, Libya's new political leadership has begun the
difficult process of building consensus. AFRICOM is presented
with an opportunity that has not existed for more than 4
decades: the establishment of a military-to-military
relationship with the Libyan armed forces. The committee looks
forward to learning of General Ham's efforts in Libya and his
assessment of the Libya security forces as a potential security
partner.
Libya is but one of many of General Ham's security
challenges. The fall of the Qadhafi regime has created a
security vacuum and a market for surplus small arms and other
man-portable weapons in the region that al Qaeda affiliates and
other transnational actors are seeking to use to their
advantage. This development is a cause of great concern.
General Ham's efforts to train, assist, and support regional
militaries in North Africa will be a key factor as to whether
these violent extremist and criminal organizations are able to
create safe havens through which they can further destabilize
the region and its governments and potentially plan external
attacks against our interests.
In East Africa, Somalia continues to threaten regional
security and serve as a burgeoning safe haven for al Qaeda
affiliates to train for and plot external operations. The
efforts of AFRICOM since its inception to train and equip the
regional militaries, as well as international efforts to
maintain and bolster the presence of the African Union mission
in Somalia, has shown progress in recent months. Last week in
London, Secretary Clinton, in word and in deed, demonstrated
that the United States remains committed to helping create a
more stable and unified era for the Somali people. AFRICOM's
efforts to build the capacity of regional governments, most
notably Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, will be a key determinant
of whether recent progress can be consolidated. Last year's
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided General Ham
with new authorities in this area, and we would be interested
to learn from General Ham whether they have assisted him in his
efforts.
General Ham and Admiral Stavridis, I have just touched the
wave tops of the issues facing you and your commands. We look
forward to hearing your testimony and continuing to help
AFRICOM and EUCOM accomplish their security objectives.
I want both of you to know that we very much appreciate the
very positive way in which you have worked with this committee
and the relationships that you have fostered with our members.
I will put the balance of my statement in the record.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Levin follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

This morning's hearing continues the committee's review of the
fiscal year 2013 defense budget request and the Future Years Defense
Program. Today we receive testimony from Admiral James Stavridis,
Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe; and General Carter Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM). They are here to discuss the defense and security challenges
in their areas of responsibility, and how their combatant commands are
postured to meet those challenges. Thank you both for your fine
service. Please extend on behalf of this committee our gratitude to the
military men and women who serve in the European and African areas of
responsibility. They and their families deserve and have this Nation's
support and our thanks.
This will likely be Admiral Stavridis' final posture statement
before the committee. Admiral, this committee has benefited on so many
occasions from your testimony, first as the Commander of U.S. Southern
Command and most recently as EUCOM Commander and Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe. Thank you for your many decades of great service to
our Nation. We all wish you and your family the very best in your
retirement.
The Strategic Guidance that the Department of Defense (DOD) issued
in January reaffirmed that Europe is ``our principal partner in seeking
global and economic security'' for now and the foreseeable future.
DOD's guidance also stressed the central role that the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance serves for the security of Europe
and beyond.
This transatlantic security partnership is clearly demonstrated in
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan, where NATO and other European countries contribute more
than 30 percent of total coalition forces and nearly 80 percent of the
non-U.S. foreign forces in Afghanistan. The role of ISAF is
transitioning from being in the combat lead to assuming a support,
advise, and assist role as Afghan security forces step forward and
assume the lead for security. This transition is underway, and
consistent with President Obama's decision last June, the United States
has begun the drawdown of the 33,000 U.S. surge force from Afghanistan,
to be completed by the end of this summer.
The success of transition will depend in large part on the success
of the international coalition in training and supporting the Afghan
security forces through 2014, when the transition to an Afghan security
lead is planned to be completed. That is a major agenda item for the
NATO Summit in Chicago in May. Another top agenda item for the NATO
Summit will be defining NATO's strategic partnership with the
Government of Afghanistan beyond 2014, including arrangements for
sustaining the Afghan security forces.
Successful transition will also heavily depend on the commitment of
the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan people to increasing
security throughout the country. The recent violence in response to the
unintentional burning of Korans at the Parwan detention facility,
including the killing of U.S. and coalition troops, including two more
American soldiers yesterday, is deeply disturbing. Admiral Stavridis,
the committee would be interested in your views on the implications of
these events for the success of transition and the success of our
mission in Afghanistan.
DOD's Strategic Guidance issued in January also notes that changes
in the strategic landscape, including the end of the Iraq conflict and
the drawdown in Afghanistan, create an opportunity to ``rebalance the
U.S. military investment in Europe.'' I welcome DOD's announcement last
month that two of the four Army brigades stationed in Europe will be
inactivated. This change, along with the removal of an Air Force A-10
Squadron from Germany, will decrease the number of U.S. military
personnel stationed in Europe, currently around 80,000 personnel, by
about 10,000, and will result in the closure of a number of facilities.
I encourage the Department to continue to review its force posture in
Europe across the Services to see if additional force reductions and
base closures might be in order, consistent with EUCOM's missions and
our NATO commitments. We need to consider those before we consider
another domestic Base Realignment and Closure round.
Even as these reductions go forward, our allies should rest assured
that the United States remains committed to its defense obligations
under the North Atlantic Treaty. A key challenge for EUCOM is to
continue engagements with our European allies to promote the
interoperability of U.S. and allied forces and to build the capacity of
our European partners to contribute to and participate in coalition
operations. At the same time, I and other members of this committee are
concerned that, as Secretary Gates stated last year, NATO is at risk of
becoming a ``two-tiered alliance,'' where some members have the
commitment and capacity to support the range of NATO missions, while
others enjoy the benefits of the alliance while not sharing equally in
the risks or the costs of making the necessary defense investments to
contribute to coalition operations. We would be interested in hearing
today about what is being done to address capability shortfalls of our
European allies and partners.
The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the means of delivering those weapons is a central security challenge.
At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO recognized the growing threat to Europe
from ballistic missiles from the Middle East, and NATO decided to
establish a missile defense of NATO's population and territory. The
United States will provide the core of that defense with its Phased
Adaptive Approach on ballistic missile defense, the first phase of
which is now deployed. This system is designed to protect our deployed
forces, our allies, and our partners from Iran's increasing missile
inventory. NATO is seeking Russia's cooperation with this regional
system. Such cooperation would send a powerful signal to Iran of world
unity against their developing long-range missiles or having nuclear
weapons. We look forward to Admiral Stavridis' views on the progress
and impact of missile defense.
Nearly a year ago, AFRICOM initiated Operation Odyssey Dawn in
Libya. NATO--with the support of forces from EUCOM--conducted and
completed Operation Unified Protector. These successful civilian
protection and mass atrocity prevention operations saved untold Libyans
from being slaughtered at the hands of Qadhafi's forces and helped end
decades of tyranny and oppression at the hands of the Qadhafi regime.
Our witnesses are to be commended on the successful outcome of those
operations. In my view, it was the right call for our NATO allies to
lead, with U.S. forces playing a unique and enabling role, particularly
given the endorsement of the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, and
United Nations.
Today, Libya's new political leadership has begun the difficult
process of building consensus. AFRICOM is presented with an opportunity
that has not existed for more than four decades--the establishment of a
military-to-military relationship with the Libyan armed forces. The
committee looks forward to learning of General Ham's efforts in Libya
and his assessment of the Libya security services as a potential
security partner.
Libya is but one of many of General Ham's security challenges. The
fallout of the Qadhafi regime has created a security vacuum and a
market for surplus small arms and other man portable weapons in a
region that al Qaeda affiliates and other transnational actors are
seeking to use to their advantage. This development is a cause of great
concern. General Ham's efforts to train, assist, and support regional
militaries in North Africa will be a key factor as to whether these
violent extremist and criminal organizations are able to create safe
havens through which they can further destabilize the region and its
governments and--potentially--plan external attacks against our
interests.
In East Africa, Somalia continues to threaten regional security and
serve as a burgeoning safe haven for al Qaeda affiliates to train for
and plot external operations. The efforts of AFRICOM since its
inception to train and equip the regional militaries, as well as
international efforts to maintain and bolster the presence of the
African Union Mission in Somalia, has shown progress in recent months.
Last week in London, Secretary Clinton--in word and deed--demonstrated
that the United States remains committed to helping create a more
stable and unified era for the Somali people. AFRICOM's efforts to
build the capacity of regional governments, most notably Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Uganda, will be a key determinant of whether recent
progress can be consolidated. Last year's National Defense
Authorization Act provided General Ham with new authorities in this
area and we are interested to learn from General Ham whether they have
assisted in his efforts.
General Ham is also supporting, with the deployment of U.S. Special
Operations Forces, the ongoing regional effort to counter the Lord's
Resistance Army. This effort stretches across a vast portion of central
Africa that includes at least four countries. The committee looks
forward to General Ham's testimony on these advise and assist
operations.
AFRICOM is also home to the newest nation in the world--South
Sudan. Many had hoped South Sudan's creation would bring an end to the
decades-long conflict in the former Sudan, but this region continues to
suffer from territorial conflicts over natural resources which create
further instability and displacement in a region already struggling
with significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced peoples.
General Ham and Admiral Stavridis, I have just touched the wave
tops of the issues facing you and your commands. We look forward to
hearing your testimony and continuing to help AFRICOM and EUCOM
accomplish their security objectives.
I want both of you to know that we very much appreciate the
positive way you have worked with this committee and the relationships
you have fostered with our members.

Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in
welcoming Admiral Stavridis and General Ham, thanking them for
their distinguished service. I especially want to acknowledge
Admiral Stavridis, as this will be his final appearance before
this committee in uniform, and I know he is grateful for that.
Thank you, Admiral, for your service and dedication to our
Nation. I wish you fair winds and following seas.
What is clear from our commanders' prepared testimonies,
and what will become clearer today, is that the work of our
Armed Forces, both in Europe and Africa, is not decreasing. It
is increasing. It is becoming more complex, and it is becoming
more important to our national security. I think we should bear
all this in mind as we in this committee and we in Congress
more broadly debate whether and how to reduce our defense
spending, including the catastrophic effects of sequestration.
Our European allies remain our preeminent security
partners. Today, EUCOM and NATO are being called upon to bear
an ever greater responsibility for diverse international
security challenges, from Afghanistan and Libya, to cyber
threats and transnational terrorism, to BMD and the strategic
balance of forces on the continent. We must be mindful of the
enduring value and impact of our European alliances as we
evaluate change to our force posture.
In its recently released defense strategy, DOD has proposed
the withdrawal of an additional brigade combat team from
Europe. At the same time, this drawdown of forces is
complemented by new U.S. military commitments to Europe,
including a brigade-sized contribution to the NATO response
force, new rotations of troops for joint exercises and
operations, the installation of a ground-based radar in Turkey,
and the stationing of four BMD-capable Aegis ships in Spain.
Overall, this seems like a prudent realignment of our forces
and commitment in Europe.
Amid the growing global focus of EUCOM, we must remember
that the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace will
remain unfulfilled so long as the country of Georgia remains
forcibly divided and occupied by Russian forces. Georgia is an
aspiring member of NATO and one of the largest contributors of
forces to the Afghan mission. Yet, our bilateral defense
relationship remains mired in the past. As a bipartisan report
led by two members of this committee, Senators Jeanne Shaheen
and Lindsey Graham, concluded last year, the United States
needs to build a more normal defense relationship with Georgia,
including defensive arms sales in coordination with our NATO
allies.
At a time of uncertainty in Russia, when lashing out at
manufactured foreign enemies remains a tempting way to garner
domestic legitimacy, it is not in America's interest to leave
Georgia without adequate means to defend itself. It is for this
reason that Congress included a provision in the NDAA last year
that requires DOD to provide Congress with a strategy for the
normalization of the U.S.-Georgia defense relationship,
including the sales of defensive arms. We look forward to
Admiral Stavridis updating us on the development of that
strategy.
One area where we and our European allies are increasingly
working together is Africa. But while EUCOM has 68,000 forces
assigned to it, AFRICOM has none. The increasing threats in
Africa make it hard to justify this disparity.
As General Ham notes in his prepared statement, the danger
of transnational terrorism across Africa is growing and
troubling. As al Qaeda's senior leadership continues to be
degraded through sustained military pressure, al Qaeda's
franchise groups, especially those in Africa, are expanding
their ambitions and capabilities. Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko
Haram in Nigeria, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
are all increasingly making common cause with each other and
exploiting weak governments in Africa to facilitate their
operations. That is why AFRICOM's efforts to build the capacity
of our African partners to disrupt these terrorist groups and
deny them safe haven and freedom of movement is so critical.
Two of the best emerging partners we have in this regard are
Libya and Tunisia, which was reaffirmed once again for me last
week when I traveled to both these countries with a few of my
colleagues from this committee.
In Tunisia, the operational tempo of their armed forces has
increased substantially due to the conflict next door in Libya.
More than 10,000 Libyan refugees are now living in Tunisia. The
Tunisian Government is seeking additional military assistance
to enable them to sustain their security operations along their
border with Libya, as well as to combat al Qaeda franchise
groups that seek to destabilize the country. The Tunisians are
seeking spare parts for the sustainment of their force, wheeled
vehicles, aircraft, and better capacity to monitor their
maritime domain and borders. We look forward to General Ham's
assessment of how AFRICOM can better assist Tunisia in these
ways. It is critical that we do so.
Finally, it is essential that AFRICOM remain actively
engaged with the National Transitional Council in Libya and
with the elected government that will eventually succeed it.
The most urgent and important area where we can assist the
Libyans is the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
of the many militias that remain in the country. It is critical
that we support Libya in training and equipping a security
force that can be a source of national unity and internal
stability, as well as a capable partner for our Armed Forces.
This effort goes hand-in-hand with our continued assistance to
the Libyans to help secure loose weapons inside the country,
especially the Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), to
keep them out of the hands of terrorists.
At the same time, we must do far more to assist the many
Libyans who have been wounded in this conflict. Our military is
the best organization in the world when it comes to medical
treatment for wounded warriors, especially in prosthetics and
rehabilitation. This remains one of the most emotionally
resonant issues among the people of Libya, and it would only
increase the enormous good will and influence that we enjoy in
the country if we could expand our assistance for these wounded
Libyans, especially in our military medical facilities in
Europe. Such assistance would not require much of us but it
would honor the sacrifice that so many in Libya have made to
free their country and thereby stand as a firm pillar of mutual
respect and solidarity on which to build our partnership with
the new Libya.
Again, I thank the witnesses. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Admiral Stavridis.

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND/SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

Admiral Stavridis. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain,
distinguished members of the committee, as always, thank you
for a very gracious welcome.
I will comment about my final appearance here. Just to
recall, the first time I testified--and I am not sure anyone
would remember. It was in 1994 when I was a young commander in
command of a destroyer and we had a panel on readiness with a
representative from each of the Services here at the 05 level
in command. All I remember about that hearing is that the other
three Services sent individuals who were all about 6,3,, and
had great hair. I was clearly the outlier in that particular
group and I think I remain that way today. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. You have not changed in all those years.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Stavridis. Exactly, unfortunately. [Laughter.]
It has been a terrific 3 years here at EUCOM and in the
NATO world. I would highlight over the last year, since I
appeared in front of the committee, the work in Libya. We do
feel good about that. I think we are making progress in
Afghanistan despite all the challenges that Chairman Levin and
Ranking Member McCain correctly alluded to. We have kept
stability in the Balkans. We have done very well, I think, in
engaging with our partners in Europe. We are pushing on missile
defense, cyber, interagency, private-public, a lot of different
initiatives, and we will continue to work on all those things.
Our fundamental job at EUCOM is to defend this country
forward. We try and do that by being ready for the unexpected.
If we look back on last year at this time, as Libya was
bursting onto the scene, it is a good example of how we do not
know what will happen next. We try to be ready. We try to work
with partners and allies, as we have talked about, and we try
to continue to strengthen this NATO alliance which I do believe
is a cornerstone for all of us.
I am working now on the adjustment to the force posture in
Europe, and I will be glad to talk a bit about that. The
removal of the two heavy combat brigades, but the addition of a
rotational one, and the adjustments we are making over there--I
think they are sensible and balanced.
We are making progress on the missile defense piece, and I
will be glad to talk in more depth about that.
One thing I would like to mention--often I get a question
from people, constituents of yours, as well as from the
members, about why? Why is it important to remain engaged in
Europe? I would just like to very quickly say I think it does
matter that we continue to have Europe as our partner of first
resort and a cornerstone of our engagement in the world, and I
think that is for several different reasons, including the
economy. Although somewhat diminished of late, it still remains
about 25 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP).
The geography is extremely important. Europe is a strategic
platform that allows us to go to Africa to support General Ham,
to go to the Middle East, to operate really in the global South
Asian and Central Asian world.
Then the NATO alliance itself, I think, is as we have
mentioned several times, very key to all of this. In practice,
that translates into addition to our ability to operate in the
world. That is why we have 40,000 non-U.S. troops in
Afghanistan. That is why our allies did such, I think, strong
work in Libya. That is why they do the bulk of the work in the
Balkans. They are taking the lead in counterpiracy. So I think
we get very real benefit from all of that.
I will simply close by thanking the committee, as always,
for the great support to EUCOM. I will, with great enthusiasm,
relay your wonderful words about the men and women who are in
the command. It means a lot. I encourage you all to come and
visit, as some of you have had the opportunity to do. Your
presence to our troops matters and your engagement with senior
leaders in other nations matters as well.
Thank you for hearing our testimony today.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]

Prepared Statement by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
For nearly 3 years now, I've had the privilege to command the
exceptional men and women of the U.S. European Command and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Allied Command Operations. It has
been a busy year for these commands, for the NATO Alliance, and for our
international and interagency partners who are such a vital part of our
mission, our many initiatives, and our team.
Working together, we have accomplished some important objectives
since I saw you last: saving tens of thousands of lives from a despotic
and unstable regime in Libya; supporting continued progress and
transition in Afghanistan; maintaining a safe environment in the
Balkans; sustaining vital relationships with our key allies and
emerging partners in the region; and developing the necessary
capabilities to meet the rising--and, in many cases, different--
security challenges of the 21st century.
I am happy to report that we continue to make sound and efficient
progress, in concert with our allies and partners, toward ensuring
continued security and stability across our theater and, in so doing,
are providing for the forward defense of the United States.
But before reporting our progress and achievements over the past
year, I want to take a moment to examine a fundamental question on many
minds here in Washington and abroad: How does the U.S. military
presence in the European theater contribute to the national security of
the United States? This is a question especially relevant during times
of significant economic challenge; a challenge that represents a
formidable threat to our national security as well as our national
well-being.
First, economics matter. U.S. engagement and European stability
have been intertwined since the first American soldier stepped foot
onto the continent in 1917. Since then, American periods of engagement
and support have helped underwrite security to prevent the far wider
costs of war. Sadly, the converse has also proven true, when episodes
of postwar U.S. disengagement, notably in the 1930s and 1990s, led to
renewed European instability, conflict, and bloodshed, ultimately
requiring significant U.S. military action.
Yet, for the past 63 years, the security and stability delivered by
this transatlantic alliance have provided conditions for economic
vibrancy, sustained investment, and growth; conditions that have
substantially benefitted the United States. Indeed, it is not a
coincidence that the 28 countries which comprise NATO constitute over
50 percent of the globe's Gross Domestic Product. This association,
rooted in security, continues to enable the largest and most complex
economic relationship in the world, with activity supporting 15 million
transatlantic jobs and generating trade in goods and services of more
than $2.4 billion daily.\1\ This advantage provides the United States
and Europe, acting together, tremendous economic influence moving into
the future.
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\1\ European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, report on
European trade with the United States, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/
index--en.htm.
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Second, the European Theater, located in or adjacent to three
continents--Europe, Asia, and Africa--represents critical geostrategic
terrain. Existing U.S. posture in Europe provides ready, proven, mature
basing infrastructure for rapid response to crises in the world's most
likely hot spots including North Africa, as we witnessed first-hand
last year, the Levant, and elsewhere in the Middle East. U.S. basing in
Europe, though 75 percent reduced from the height of the Cold War,
continues to provide that irreplaceable combination of location and
services at the nexus of these three continents essential in responding
to contingencies, both foreseeable and unforeseeable, in today's highly
dynamic security environment. These bases also support the global reach
missions of four U.S. combatant commanders and numerous U.S. Government
agencies. Currently, that reach includes support to the Northern
Distribution Network, which provides a vital logistical lifeline to our
forces in Afghanistan and is increasingly important today given the
precarious nature of our other lines of supply. Preserving this
theater's vital strategic access to meet our enduring national security
needs requires relationships with our European partners, relationships
based on presence and commitment.
Additionally, European Command's outreach and engagement with
nations inside our theater across the Caucasus, Black Sea, and Balkan
regions also strive to mitigate the potential for conflict in areas
important to U.S. foreign policy, inviting these nations into the
community of international cooperation and partnership, and benefitting
from their willingness to conduct expeditionary operations, including
support to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan.
Third, the NATO Alliance, which the President has called ``the most
successful alliance in human history,'' and NATO's continued
transformation matter tremendously to the future viability of coalition
warfare, and our ability to meet the security challenges of the 21st
century. These challenges include missile defense, assurance,
deterrence, cyberspace, terrorism, and transnational illicit
trafficking, to name just a few. In squarely meeting these challenges,
sustained American leadership, commitment, and support will remain an
important cornerstone to ensure, in concert with our allies, that
history's most successful alliance remains strong and, as the President
has also said, ``as relevant in this century as it was in the last.''
Fourth, the fundamental values we share with our European allies
and partners cement our Nations' common commitment to the bedrock
principles of democratic government, the rule of law, free markets, and
enduring human rights. Communicating and reinforcing these shared
values throughout our theater-wide engagements and personal
interactions--through what we say and, more importantly, what we do--
helps to clarify our common goals and identify common threats as we
work together to achieve the former and combat the latter, firmly and
confidently, in step with the new century's unremitting pace, change,
and challenge.
Fifth, through our longstanding presence, leadership, cooperation,
and engagement with the Europeans, we have developed our best and most
willing pool of partners to stand with the United States in our ongoing
commitment to security, stability, and peace. In Afghanistan, roughly
90 percent of the 40,000 non-U.S. troops serving there come from
Europe. In Libya, NATO aggressively stepped up to lead that mission
just 3 weeks after military operations commenced, conducting 75 percent
of all sorties and 100 percent of the maritime operations. In the
Balkans, Europe provides 90 percent of all forces for peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Operating together, whether on modern
battlefields in Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans, or in emerging and
ironically ``new'' missions like counter-piracy, Europeans continue to
stand shoulder-to-shoulder with us to face the many complex challenges
of the 21st century. In the years ahead, even as our Nation shifts its
strategic focus to the `Asia-Pacific,' the reality remains that our
most willing, effective, credible, and enduring strategic military
partners reside in Europe.
To summarize, in all of my appearances before you, I have sought to
emphasize and illustrate, through tangible progress and concrete
examples, the strategy that we have pursued for several years now: a
strategy of active security and forward defense focused on preserving
our strategic partnerships in Europe; building interoperability with
the NATO Alliance; deterring would-be adversaries; sustaining progress
and transition in Afghanistan; when directed, conducting decisive
military and counterterrorism operations to fight and win; and thinking
creatively, acting efficiently, and working collaboratively to confront
the rising security challenges of the modern era--an era that continues
to be characterized by the power of unprecedented information
connectivity, the tensions and opportunities of global economic
interdependence, and accelerating change.
Like any strategy, this strategy has served as a framework to
organize the relationship of ends, ways, and means necessary to
accomplish our mission. But at the core of this strategy is the
fundamental realization and revalidation of the strategic linkage
between Europe and the United States. America's European allies remain
our Nation's most reliable and enduring strategic partners.
As we consider the complexity of the modern security environment,
as well as the need to align fiscal realities with enduring security
requirements, I believe that our European partnerships and engagements
continue to be wise and sound national security investments. As
Secretary Panetta said last October in Brussels: ``We live in a world
of growing danger and uncertainty, where we face threats from violent
extremism, nuclear proliferation, rising powers, and cyber attack. We
cannot predict where the next crisis will occur. But we know we are
stronger when we confront these threats together. The benefits that our
countries derive from working together to defend common interests and
protect our security and prosperity are obvious and enduring. It is
precisely because of the growing security challenges and growing fiscal
constraints that we need to work more closely than ever as partners.''
As I have said many times throughout the years, and believe now more
firmly than ever, we are stronger together with our European partners.

MISSION, VISION, OBJECTIVES, PRIORITIES

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Over the past year, U.S. European Command has made significant
contributions to coalition combat operations in Afghanistan and Libya,
while pursuing an aggressive schedule of major theater exercises and
sustained engagement with our allies and partners. We have achieved
progress along multiple lines of operation to assure our friends and
deter potential adversaries.
Support to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
European Command continues to conduct a wide range of activities
supporting the ISAF in Afghanistan, as well as the President's strategy
to transfer the security lead to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
by 2014. As mentioned, 90 percent of forces from non-U.S. troop
contributing nations come from the European theater. This translates to
a third of the force on the ground, relieving the strain this gap would
pose as a U.S. force generation requirement. European nations are, by
far, our strongest supporters in Afghanistan.
European Command actively supports our allies and partners in their
preparations for deployment to Afghanistan. We help these countries
identify pre-deployment training and equipment requirements, and then
leverage a number of available programs and authorities to assist in
meeting those requirements. Through these programs, our allies and
partners have received training in critical combat skills, including:
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) procedures; the operation of
mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles and up-armored high
mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs); counterinsurgency
intelligence analysis, tailored to the complex Afghan environment; and
battalion-level full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations. European
Command has also provided partner nations with essential equipment for
operations in Afghanistan, including night vision devices,
communications systems, robots, and other counter-IED systems.

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Some quantitative examples illustrate the scope of European
Command's efforts to support the fight in Afghanistan. In fiscal year
2011, European Command conducted 3 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams
(OMLT) and 3 Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (POMLT)
training rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in
Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, ultimately preparing 50 OMLTs, 25
POMLTs, and almost 2,000 personnel from 15 countries for deployment.
Additionally, European Command conducted 21 Expeditionary Intelligence
Training Program courses, providing fundamental counterinsurgency
intelligence and operational skill sets for 628 personnel from 25
countries, and trained 2,135 soldiers from 18 countries in lifesaving
counter-IED skills. Finally, in 2011, European Command trained two
Polish Brigades, two Romanian battalions, and two Georgian battalions
for deployment to Afghanistan. All of these activities provide crucial
linkages, personally and professionally, between the U.S. military and
these deploying coalition forces. Without these relationships,
contributions, and training conducted to a common standard, the
challenges we face deployed side-by-side with these partners would be
far more difficult, and the requirements placed on U.S. forces heavier.

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European Command also provides critical logistical support to
operations in Afghanistan. Our mature basing footprint and theater
relationships are a vital part of U.S. Transportation Command's enroute
strategy, and have enabled us to develop and expand the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) to provide important additional supply
routes to Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2011, European Command's
Deployment and Distribution Operations Center moved 21,574 containers
and 232,206 tons of equipment through Europe to Afghanistan over the
NDN. Additionally, for the first time since 2003, U.S. forces conducted
transloading operations at the multimodal facilities located at Mihail
Kogalniceanu Airbase in Romania. This effort fulfilled U.S. Central
Command's requirement to establish alternative lines of communication
to mitigate any potential loss of supply routes through Pakistan.
European Command also provides logistical capacity to assist our
allies and partners move their forces and equipment to and from
Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2011, European Command coordinated the use
of the Department of Defense (DOD) Lift and Sustain Program to
transport 16,344 servicemembers and 2,734 tons of cargo from 19
contributing nations, who otherwise would have been unable to make
these contributions. In addition, European Command increases efficiency
by leveraging our active involvement in two European military
transportation consortiums, as well as the U.S. allocation of 1,000
flight hours in the Heavy Airlift Wing (comprised of three
cooperatively shared Hungarian-registered C-17 aircraft), to support
U.S. and partner logistical movements into and across the theater.
Support to Operations in Libya
Last year's operations in Libya validated the critical importance
of maintaining strong relationships across Europe for basing, access,
and force contributions. These relationships, as well as infrastructure
investments already made, particularly along the Mediterranean Sea in
France, Italy, Spain, and Greece, allowed us to obtain rapid basing and
access for U.S. and coalition military assets participating in
Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector.
This support made it possible to develop a holistic basing plan
that maximized the air assets of all participating nations, and
provided the aircraft support, logistics, ordnance, communications, and
resupply to ensure rapid and sustained actions throughout the
operation.

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In one example, only days after U.N. Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1973 was passed, Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy, opened its
doors, with Italian support and approval, to become a critical
multinational coalition launching pad, hosting air assets from nine
countries flying sorties in direct support of NATO mission
requirements.
In addition to basing, sustainment, and logistical support,
European Command provided significant intelligence, command and
control, and communications support to coalition and NATO operations
over and around Libya. Without strategic access and forces postured in
Europe, it is safe to say that the coalition response to UNSCR 1973
would have been significantly longer in developing, less effective in
execution, and less likely to have achieved its objective. This
reinforces the criticality of our strategic partners and position in
Europe, highlighting that we truly are stronger together when we act
collectively in areas where our national interests overlap.

Multinational, Joint, and Interagency Exercises
European Command's rigorous theater exercise schedule formed a
vital foundation for the effective execution of the combat operations
described above, and remains an essential venue for intensive, steady-
state interaction and engagement with our allies and partners. European
Command maintained an intensive bilateral and multilateral exercise
program last year, executing 22 major exercises involving nearly 50,000
U.S., allied, and partner nation personnel from 42 contributing
nations. Exercises in 2011 focused on preparing partner nations for
ongoing coalition operations, primarily in support of the ISAF in
Afghanistan, as described in the previous section, as well enhancing
NATO interoperability for present and future coalition operations, and
improving our military coordination and interoperability with Israel.
Highlights of the latter include:

Austere Challenge/Juniper Cobra
In its seventh year as European Command's premier joint force
headquarters exercise, Austere Challenge 11 ventured back into the
arena of full spectrum major combat operations, incorporating a
significant focus on cyberspace. Austere Challenge 11 made significant
progress addressing the ongoing challenge of coalition communications
interoperability, implementing a first-of-its-kind information sharing
network over the existing U.S. Battlefield Information Collection and
Exploitation System (BICES). This arrangement provided rapid network
development and expansion, as well as important lessons for integration
into future coalition communication plans.
This year, Austere Challenge 12 will continue to provide world-
class, large-scale training opportunities for U.S. European Command
Headquarters, our Service Component Commands, and the Israel Defense
Force General Staff. A five-phased, eight part exercise, Austere
Challenge 12 will examine two existing U.S. European Command concept
plans exercising theater operations organized under two different Joint
Task Force Commanders. Exercising real-world air and maritime missions,
the first Joint Task Force (JTF) will be commanded by U.S. Air Forces
in Europe/Third Air Force, while the second JTF will be led by the
Commander of Naval Forces Europe/Africa/SIXTH Fleet. As part of the
broader Austere Challenge event, European Command will also conduct the
largest of our combined exercises and engagements with Israel, Exercise
Juniper Cobra. Juniper Cobra supports the U.S.-Israeli political-
military relationship and exercises important theater capabilities,
providing a further demonstration of U.S. commitment to the security of
Israel.

Balkan Exercises
In the Balkans, Exercise Immediate Response brought together forces
from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Serbia in an effort to build relationships, strengthen capabilities,
and foster multinational cooperation through counter-IED training.
Additionally, Macedonia hosted the popular Medical Central Europe
(MEDCEUR) Exercise last year, sharing valuable medical skills among 340
medical professionals from the United States, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.

Baltic Exercises
U.S. Naval Forces Europe led the 26th annual Baltic Operations
(BALTOPS) exercise, assembling 13 nations in the region's largest
multinational maritime training event focused on maritime interdiction,
amphibious skills, and interoperability. Shifting landward to Exercise
Saber Strike, European Command, the Baltic nations, and Poland
sharpened the counterinsurgency skills--at the platoon, company and
brigade levels--of over 1,600 Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish forces
preparing for deployment to Afghanistan.

Black Sea Exercises
Focusing on partnerships and interoperability in the Black Sea
region, Rapid Trident assembled 1,600 forces from 13 countries to
conduct the first-ever multinational airborne drop into Ukraine,
developing important land warfare skills and camaraderie among key NATO
and non-NATO partners in a critical area of the world. Jackal Stone 11,
Special Operations Command Europe's annual capstone exercise, involved
8 nations and over 1,500 partner nation Special Operations Forces (SOF)
sharpening theater SOF capabilities in all mission sets from
counterterrorism to high-intensity conflict. Exercise Sea Breeze joined
naval and marine forces from 14 countries in the Black Sea to exercise
maritime interdiction, counter-piracy, non-combatant evacuation
operations, and actions to counter the flow of illicit transnational
trafficking, all rising challenges in the 21st century.

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Israeli Engagement
European Command's sustained engagement with Israel, in numerous
annual theater security cooperation and military-to-military engagement
activities, continues to strengthen our relationship with this key
regional ally. European Command chairs four bilateral, semiannual
conferences with Israel addressing planning, logistics, exercises, and
interoperability. The United States/Israeli exercise portfolio also
includes eight major recurring exercises to strengthen our Nations'
ties and military cooperation. Through these engagements, European
Command leaders and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring,
personal, and direct relationships with their counterparts in the
Israeli Defense Forces.
Additionally, our comprehensive engagement strategy with Israel
complements other U.S. Government security cooperation initiatives, to
include the efforts of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the
Palestinian Authority (USSC). The USSC's mission is to help the
Palestinian Authority transform and professionalize its security
sector, and support U.S. and international whole-of-government
engagement with the Israelis and Palestinians through security
initiatives designed to build mutual trust and confidence. European
Command is working actively and collectively with our Israeli partners
to address common security challenges and counter threats to regional
stability.

Flexible Leader
Exercise Flexible Leader opens the aperture, expanding awareness
and exploring the efficiencies of interagency capacity to meet ``whole-
of-society'' challenges raised by Foreign Consequence Management and
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. This year's exercise, set in the
Balkans, focuses on the response to a major earthquake and a rail yard
collision leading to the accidental spill of nuclear power plant fuel.
These exercises provide valuable opportunities to vet European
Command's contingency plans, examine internal and interagency command
and control protocols, and improve coordination with regional and
international response organizations.

Combined Endeavor
The largest communications and electronics interoperability
exercise in the world, European Command's Combined Endeavor 11 brought
together delegates from 40 nations (25 NATO and 15 Partnership for
Peace countries) seeking to strengthen partner communications
capabilities,pursue joint training and professional development
objectives, develop critical interoperability standards, and prepare
command and control, communications, and computer forces for
deployment. Combined Endeavor continues to bridge important partners
from across the theater to identify future coalition communication
needs in support of regional and global military operations.

Cyber Endeavor
European Command's flagship cyber security engagement, Cyber
Endeavor continues to reach out to NATO allies, partner nations,
industry, and academia to strengthen cyber defense capabilities through
multiple exercise events. Cyber Endeavor 11 included representatives
from NATO Headquarters, 19 NATO nations, and 13 Partnership for Peace
nations. The exercise explored and developed secure information system
core competencies, technical defense capabilities, and best-practice
network security measures. Cyber Endeavor participation continues to
grow each year, another indication of the rising relevance and theater-
wide interest in the effects and impact of cyberspace.

Arctic Zephyr
The Arctic Zephyr series, which started in 2010, seeks to expand
understanding and awareness of the legal, security, commercial, and
political ramifications of the changing Arctic environment, while
strengthening relationships with other Arctic nations. The Arctic
Zephyr exercise series will culminate in 2013, and remains one of the
areas where we seek to find common ground and zones of cooperation with
Russia.

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National Guard State Partnership Program
We are very proud of this low-cost, high payoff program. One of
European Command's most unique, cost effective, and essential
international engagement tools, the State Partnership Program partners
U.S. National Guardsmen from 21 participating states with 22 countries
across the theater to engage in mutually beneficial training,
interactions, and exercise engagements that support key Theater
Security Cooperation objectives and preserve and develop these
important strategic partnerships. The program capitalizes on the
National Guard's unique state and Federal military characteristics. The
program has achieved mutually beneficial security goals and developed
long-term productive relationships that continue to benefit ongoing
military activities.

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EUCOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

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Except when assigned to a joint task force for military operations
or participating in joint exercises, European Command forces are
managed, trained, and equipped by our Service component headquarters:
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR); U.S. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR); U.S.
Naval Forces Europe/Africa/COMSIXTHFLT (NAVEUR); U.S. Air Forces in
Europe (USAFE); and U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR).
These organizations provide forces for our military-to-military
engagements, serve an assurance and deterrence function in the region,
deploy units for contingency operations, and, when necessary, provide a
full-spectrum Joint Task Force headquarters. Understanding our Service
component commands is the key to understanding European Command, as
they conduct the majority of our steady-state activities.

U.S. ARMY EUROPE--HEIDELBERG, GERMANY

Introduction & Overview
U.S. Army Europe provides forward-based forces to execute national
security objectives, prevail in today's wars, and prepare to defeat
future threats. U.S. Army Europe leverages its forward presence to
conduct and facilitate essential theater multinational interoperability
training. These activities assure our allies and partners, and deter
potential aggressors. Today in Afghanistan, the ISAF executes complex
multinational coalition operations to defeat terrorism and protect the
U.S. Homeland forward. U.S. Army Europe provides a vital linkage
between the U.S. Army and our European allies and partners
participating in ISAF through our longstanding relationships, frequent
military-to-military engagements, and the interoperability training so
instrumental to current and future coalition operations. U.S. Army
Europe provided essential logistical support to NATO operations in
Libya in 2011, and continues to provide training and intelligence
support to Israel as well as critical logistical support in Kosovo.
Additionally, United States Army Europe's Forces form the cornerstone
of the U.S. Article V commitment to NATO.

Major Accomplishments
U.S. Army Europe focused on providing trained and culturally aware
units and enabling forces, capable of conducting full-spectrum
operations, in support of ISAF and other current and future contingency
operations. Until recently, Army Europe's V Corps provided the primary
command and control headquarters for ISAF in Afghanistan. Today, V
Corps is reorganizing and preparing for future deployments. U.S. Army
Europe's leadership and support were also crucial in establishing the
first ground-based radar site in Turkey, as European Command implements
the President's European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense.
Additionally, while U.S. Army Europe forces maintained a 30-40 percent
deployment rate to Iraq and Afghanistan last year, increased dwell time
has significantly improved the quantity and quality of our
multinational training events and engagements. These events are focused
on improving our European partners' capabilities, capacity, and
interoperability for deployment to ISAF or other future contingency
operations.
In 2011, U.S. Army Europe staff officers, intelligence specialists,
and logisticians provided direct mission support to U.S. Africa Command
and Operation Odyssey Dawn, including critical ground targeting
capability from the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade. Throughout the
continent of Europe, the 21st Theater Support Command provided U.S
Africa Command, and their Special Operations component, with key
logistics and sustainment support, enabling the execution of vital
missions across this theater of operations. Additionally, U.S. Army
Europe played a crucial role in U.S. Transportation Command's proof-of-
principle test in Romania to develop alternatives for transiting
critical cargo to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations.

Theater Security Cooperation
In one of European Command's most important Theater Security
Cooperation initiatives, U.S. Army Europe forces prepared two Polish
brigades, two Romanian battalions, and, in concert with the Marine
Corps, two Georgian battalions for deployment to ISAF.

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Leveraging the personal relationships and consistent presence of our
forward-deployed brigades, we use these brigades to conduct vital
training and mentorship with similar multinational forces. These `unit
partnership' programs have dramatically enhanced the capabilities of
our coalition partners, preparing them to conduct operations across the
globe and receiving considerable praise from ISAF commanders.
Additionally, U.S. Army Europe has provided deploying units with
critical lifesaving courses in the use of MRAP vehicles, Uparmored
HMMWVs, and counter-IED procedures. Finally, in fiscal year 2011, U.S.
Army Europe trainers prepared 50 OMLTs and 25 POMLTs for deployment to
Afghanistan, supporting ISAF's high priority mission to train ANSFs.
The Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) is the linchpin to
achieving these vital theater objectives, and meeting our comprehensive
security cooperation mission. JMTC is a national strategic asset,
providing world-class training and support that enables a broad range
of multinational soldier training events ensuring U.S. and partner
nation forces are well-prepared for ISAF operations and future global
contingencies.

Exercises
Exercises remain critical to the pre-deployment training of U.S.
and coalition forces supporting ISAF operations, and they serve to
prepare these same forces for future coalition operations across U.S.
European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Central Command. In
2011, U.S. Army Europe participated in 21 major joint and Army
exercises, including 3 major mission rehearsals, conducted in 13
countries with 44 participating nations. Highlights include:

Saber Strike 11, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-
directed brigade level command post exercise conducted in
Latvia involving over 1,700 soldiers from Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, Ukraine, and Poland. Saber Strike enhanced combat
readiness and interoperability in the Baltic region, while
assuring NATO partners of the United States' Article V
commitment.

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Dragon 11, a live-fire exercise conducted in Poland
with Polish, Canadian, and British ground forces to enhance
partner capacity and increase interoperability. The exercise
incorporated ISAF lessons learned, through the participation of
NATO Multinational Corps Northeast personnel and the 173rd
Airborne Brigade Combat Team.
Immediate Response 11, a JCS-directed multilateral
joint and combined exercise in the Balkans, with participation
from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, and Serbia, which provided an important venue for
continued Balkan interaction and prepared ISAF-contributing
nations to serve in Afghanistan's complex counterinsurgency
environment alongside coalition forces.

Way Ahead
U.S. Army Europe will provide forces for global combat operations,
continue to conduct and facilitate world-class training with our allies
and partners, and meet all theater missions to defend the homeland
forward. Looking beyond ISAF, we have begun to establish new standards
for multinational training to strengthen U.S. and partner nation
participation in future coalition warfare. Recently, the 173rd ABCT
Full Spectrum Training Event exercised critical Command capabilities to
prepare full-spectrum forces ready for global employment, and to
improve our allies' and partners' survivability and combat
effectiveness during deployment. These engagements provide vital
assurances to our allies and partners, reinforce U.S. leadership in
NATO, enhance interoperability, and strengthen our key theater
relationships.

U.S. MARINE FORCES EUROPE--STUTTGART, GERMANY

Introduction & Overview
In 2011, Marine Forces Europe focused on strengthening and
sustaining our allied and partner capabilities, as well as utilizing
U.S. Marine expeditionary forces to reassure allies, deter potential
adversaries, and remain ready to respond rapidly to crises across the
region. The U.S. Marine Corps' expeditionary nature focuses Marine
Forces Europe's primary orientation on security cooperation activities
with our newest NATO allies and partners, particularly in the Caucasus,
Black Sea, Balkan, and Baltic regions.

Major Accomplishments
In response to the Libya operation last year, Marine Forces Europe
coordinated the provision of a battalion-sized augmentation to afloat
expeditionary forces supporting U.S. Africa Command during Operation
Odyssey Dawn, and facilitated the rapid deployment of electronic
warfare assets to Italy in support of NATO Operation Unified Protector.
In response to Turkey's devastating October 2011 earthquake, Marine
Forces Europe provided essential humanitarian assistance, rapidly
deploying transportable shelters and heating equipment to ease human
suffering and support this important NATO ally in its time of need.
While maintaining only a small Service component headquarters, Marine
Forces Europe also effectively leveraged our capabilities to support
key European Command objectives--focused on engagement in the Caucasus,
Black Sea, and Balkans--in order to enable our partners to contribute
to collective security in European and out-of-area operations. Marine
Forces Europe continued to provide reassurance in the Baltics last
year, while continuing to sharpen crisis response skills through
training and operations.

Georgia Deployment Program--International Security Assistance Force
In support of nationally directed theater strategic end states,
Marine Forces Europe leads European Command's joint mission to train
the Georgian Armed Forces. Executing this mission since 2010, Marine
Forces Europe has developed and implemented a program that has trained
and deployed a total of four Georgian battalions to conduct full-
spectrum counterinsurgency operations in support of ISAF. This program,
the first of its kind in scale and scope, increased the Georgian Armed
Forces' capacity to train and prepare their own forces for coalition
operations, gradually decreasing U.S. Marine Corps instructor
requirements by 60 percent. After working closely and building trust
with the Marines through pre-deployment training and exercises--many
conducted at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany--
Georgia has extended its commitment to support U.S. Marine Corps
operations in Regional Command-Southwest for another 2 years and,
notably, expanded its ISAF contribution from one to two battalion
rotations every 6 months, deploying a total of nine battalions during
these 2 years for continued full-spectrum support to ISAF operations.
In light of this program's success and efficiency in moving toward
partner self-sufficiency, the United States has accepted Georgia's
offer. The Joint Staff has directed European Command to expand and
extend the program to 2014. This spring, Marine Forces Europe is
leading the simultaneous training of two Georgian battalions for
deployment to ISAF.

U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force
The U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force is a multi-year
program rotating Marine air and ground units, based in the United
States, on deployment to bases in the Black Sea region in order to
strengthen military capabilities, provide regional stability, and
develop lasting partnerships with nations in this important region. In
2011, the Black Sea Rotational Force trained Romanian, Bulgarian, and
Macedonian units, as well as forces from eight other contributing
nations, for deployment to ISAF.

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Exercises
Marine Forces Europe participated in 15 joint, bilateral, and
multilateral exercises in 2011, reassuring theater allies and deterring
potential adversaries by demonstrating rapid assembly, deployment, and
maritime expeditionary capabilities. Of note, European Command's
Exercise Austere Challenge 11 provided an outstanding opportunity to
train the Marine Forces Europe staff in its Service component role
during crisis response, revitalizing important amphibious and maritime
pre-positioning objectives. Through participation in these exercises,
Marine Forces Europe sustained critical warfighting skills,
strengthened important theater relationships, and conducted vital
interaction with European Command and NATO.

Way Ahead
Marine Forces Europe will continue to pursue renewed Amphibious
Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit presence in theater to meet the
need for bilateral combined arms and amphibious training with key
partners, including Israel, Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom,
training that has been largely absent since 2003. Resuming this
amphibious presence supports important theater reassurance and
deterrence objectives. Marine Forces Europe will also stay engaged with
Service-led efforts to transform our current pre-positioning posture in
Norway, able to provide augmentation for employment of up to a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade-sized force while maintaining our commitment to
the reinforcement of Norway. Additionally, coordination continues to
develop a limited crisis response capability for Black Sea Rotational
Force 12, addressing areas that include Non-combatant Evacuation
Operations and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief missions.

U.S. NAVAL FORCES EUROPE/U.S. NAVAL FORCES AFRICA/SIXTH FLEET--NAPLES,
ITALY

Introduction & Overview
U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/Commander Sixth Fleet (C6F),
conducts the full range of maritime operations and Theater Security
Cooperation in concert with NATO, coalition, joint, interagency, and
other partners in Europe and Africa. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F
continues to perform Navy Component Commander functions supporting
daily Fleet operations and Joint Maritime Commander/Joint Task Force
Commander missions, thereby strengthening relationships with enduring
allies and developing maritime capabilities with emerging partners,
particularly in the theater's southern and eastern regions.

Major Accomplishments Supporting European Command
Naval Forces Europe/Africa/ C6F met all mission requirements in
2011 and maintained its certification as Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander. The command engaged in numerous Theater Security Cooperation
activities, enhancing vital skills in Maritime Domain Awareness,
security, and sea control. Always poised for crisis response, Naval
Forces Europe/Africa/C6F contributed to numerous global security
efforts in 2011, including: Operation Enduring Freedom; anti-piracy
operations off the African coast; and coalition and NATO operations
against pro-Gaddafi forces in Libya, consisting of Operation Odyssey
Dawn, Operation Odyssey Guard, and NATO's Operation Unified Protector.

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Libya Operations
Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F's posture and readiness were ideally
suited to support Libya operations, wherein its forward naval bases--
including Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy and Naval Support Activity
Souda Bay, Greece--played a vital role in coalition asset placement and
logistical support. Rapid crisis response and containment activities
could not have occurred without Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F's bases
and forward-stationed assets supporting and executing these operations.
Additionally, USS Mount Whitney, operating from international waters
with the Joint Task Force Commander and Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander embarked, provided vital command and control, planning, and
strike coordination capabilities during the initial days of Operation
Odyssey Dawn.

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Ballistic Missile Defense
Last year, USS Monterey and USS The Sullivans deployed to the
European Command Theater to serve as the first Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) ships supporting the European Phased Adaptive Approach to
Missile Defense. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F also increased support
to the theater BMD mission by conducting 24-hour operations at its
Maritime Operations Center in Naples, Italy.

Forward Deployed Naval Forces, Spain
The decision to station four Aegis destroyers at Naval Station Rota
will place these ships in a position to maximize their operational
flexibility for theater missions and crisis response in the Atlantic
Ocean and across the Mediterranean Sea. These versatile, multi-mission
platforms will perform a myriad of tasks, including BMD, maritime
security operations, humanitarian missions, and bilateral and
multilateral exercises. Spain's commitment reaffirms our Nations'
longstanding friendship and mutual security cooperation.

Theater Submarine Operations
U.S. submarine forces provide assurance, deterrence, and valuable
contributions to the forward defense of the United States. U.S.
submariners expand European Command's intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capacity, and stand ready to conduct anti-
submarine and anti-surface warfare operations, ensure undersea
dominance, deliver close proximity strike, and provide high-value unit
protection, thereby ensuring our Nation retains unfettered access to
the sea lines of communication. Naval Forces Europe executed a vigorous
series of theater-wide exercises in 2011, bringing U.S. submarines and
partner navies together to strengthen maritime warfighting proficiency
and interoperability. These capabilities are increasingly important as
the Russian Federation Navy increases the pace, scope, and
sophistication of its submarine fleet. Four new classes of Russian
submarines are in development or near delivery. This focus on submarine
recapitalization, incorporating improved platform capabilities,
indicates that Russia continues to place a high priority on undersea
warfare.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
In addition to the surface and submarine fleet, Naval Forces
Europe/Africa/C6F contributed to theater ISR capabilities and capacity
by way of P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft and EP-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft
operating from bases in Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, as well as
ship-based Unmanned Aerial Vehicle missions. Employing these
capabilities, Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F provided vital ISR support
to both Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, as well as ISR
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and in support of the NATO-led
Kosovo Force.

Theater Security Cooperation
Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F led Eurasia Partnership Capstone, a
flagship initiative designed to integrate various maritime efforts
across the region into a comprehensive partnership. Training with naval
forces from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F
enhanced capabilities in Maritime Interdiction Operations; Visit,
Board, Search, and Seizure; search and rescue; maritime law
enforcement; and environmental protection. In the Partnership of
Adriatic Mariners program, U.S. naval forces joined with countries
along the Adriatic Sea to increase proficiency in Maritime Domain
Awareness and counter-illicit trafficking operations. As part of this
effort, sailors from Croatia, Montenegro, and Albania embarked in USS
Mitscher and USS Monterey, spending 2 weeks gaining experience in these
important skills.

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Exercises
Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F participated in six JCS-directed
exercises and 14 NATO and European Command exercises in 2011. Baltops
11, discussed earlier, involved 13 European nations--including Russia--
23 ships, 1 submarine, and 31 aircraft conducting maritime operations
and interoperability training. Sea Breeze 11 involved 20 ships and over
2,000 personnel from 14 nations training in and around the Black Sea.
Neptune Response, conducted last November, exercised vital consequence
management skills, preparing our forces and installations for terrorist
attacks, natural disasters, and major oil spills.

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Way Ahead
Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F will remain focused on ensuring
maritime safety, security cooperation, and crisis response in the
defense of our Nation and interests across the region. The command will
support, develop, and expand ballistic missile defense capabilities,
afloat and ashore, in synchronization with other European Command
Service components. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F will also focus on
sustaining allied and partner maritime capabilities in a cost-effective
manner.

U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE--RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, GERMANY

Introduction & Overview
U.S. Air Forces in Europe provides forward-based, full-spectrum
airpower and support to global U.S., NATO, and coalition operations.
Air Forces in Europe provides mobility, access, communications,
logistical support, contingency bed-down, command and control, and
capable, responsive forces prepared to defend the homeland forward and
respond at any time to crises across the theater or the world. This
posture supports partnerships that enhance the NATO alliance and
existing coalitions, ultimately increasing the security of the United
States and reducing the burden on U.S. forces.

Major Accomplishments
Air Forces in Europe flew over 26,000 combat hours to support
ongoing contingency operations in 2011, working daily with our NATO
allies and partners to provide security across the European Theater and
the globe. Of special note, forward-based air forces were essential to
the United States' ability to rapidly respond to emerging operational
requirements in Libya. Air Forces in Europe played a major role,
providing seasoned leadership, expert command and control across the
full spectrum of air operations, and the initial strategic and tactical
level personnel and forces that led to the overwhelming success of
Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector.

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Air Forces in Europe also made major contributions to operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The command deployed a variety of aircraft to
support combat operations, including fighter aircraft that provided
multi-role and ground attack support as well as refueling aircraft,
combat search and rescue, and operational support aircraft. In
addition, personnel from across the command deployed in support of
Operations Enduring Freedom and New Dawn. Additionally, as a major
mobility hub, Air Forces in Europe supported the deployment and
redeployment of forces and equipment into and out of the U.S. Central
Command Theater.

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An instrumental global communications hub, Air Forces in Europe
provides vital data links for worldwide communications, unmanned aerial
system command and control, intelligence collection, and space
operations. Poised to provide rapid humanitarian assistance, Air Forces
in Europe delivered 9 tons of aid last year to Tunisia less than 48
hours after notification, in direct support of U.S. Africa Command and
the U.S. Agency for International Development. The command also
provided essential aid to Turkey in the wake of last October's
earthquake, supporting this vital ally. Finally, Air Forces in Europe
continues to ensure the availability of the basing and infrastructure
that underpins the mobility en route system, directly supporting
numerous combatant commands and critical air mobility missions.

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Operational Support
As mentioned, Air Forces in Europe supports the operations of U.S.
European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S.
Southern Command, and NATO, while conducting combat deployments at the
same or higher rate than U.S. based air forces and supporting the
throughput of over 60 percent of global air mobility missions. Air
Forces in Europe maintains Combat Air Patrols supporting the NATO
Icelandic and Baltic Air Policing missions, and conducts intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions across the greater Levant.
Additionally, Air Forces in Europe coordinated the theater stationing
and operation of permanent and expeditionary Air Force RQ-4B Global
Hawk and MQ-1 Predator deployed in support of Operations Odyssey Dawn
and Unified Protector.

Ballistic Missile Defense
Supporting the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense
(BMD), Air Forces in Europe performs command and control for U.S. BMD
forces, and is coordinating with the NATO Air Component Headquarters to
develop capabilities and procedures to transition the European
territorial missile defense command and control mission to NATO. In
support of this effort, Air Forces in Europe is establishing a joint
and combined European Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center in
Einsiedlerhof, Germany, designed to educate, develop, and refine U.S.,
partner, and allied missile defense capabilities and expertise.
Finally, we continue leading the effort to enable NATO to meet its goal
of declaring an interim NATO Ballistic Missile Defense capability by
May 2012.

Theater Security Cooperation
When not supporting combat operations, Air Forces in Europe
accomplished over 1,800 partnership events, including senior leader
outreach, military-to-military engagement, and other training
activities supporting three combatant commands. Robust senior leader
engagement with 22 allied and partner nations sustained relationships
across U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Central
Command. Pursuing interoperability with newer NATO allies, Air Forces
in Europe conducted thorough engagement strategy studies with Romania
and Croatia to assess air capabilities and identify mutually beneficial
engagement opportunities. Recently, the C-17 Heavy Airlift Wing passed
the noteworthy 4,000 flight-hour mark while redeploying Hungarian
allies from operations in Afghanistan. Air Forces in Europe also
continues to conduct the Tactical Leadership Program with eight of our
allies, developing the next generation of combat air leaders capable of
worldwide operations to augment, or in some cases reduce, the need for
U.S. airmen. Finally, Air Forces in Europe continues to develop a
strong cadre of future noncommissioned officers through engagement with
partner nation Senior Enlisted Leaders from across Europe and Africa.

Exercises
Air Forces in Europe participated in 12 JCS-directed exercises in
fiscal year 2011. Anatolian Eagle provided realistic, scenario-based
training to test combined aerial combat skills with Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Spain, and Turkey. In Screaming Eagle, Ramstein Air Base
personnel interacted with Polish forces to increase interoperability
with this increasingly important theater partner. In Medceur 2011, Air
Forces in Europe developed expeditionary medical support capabilities
and participated in a Macedonian interagency humanitarian assistance
exercise to train personnel and agencies from the U.S. and five Balkan
nations.

Way Ahead
Recognizing the need for sustained effectiveness and increased
efficiency, Air Forces in Europe continues to implement Secretary of
Defense-directed budget efficiencies. Accordingly, Air Forces in Europe
will consolidate its subordinate numbered air forces and their
associated Air and Space Operations Centers, creating an extremely
lean, agile, and flexible headquarters with leadership and staff
supporting U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command while
maintaining essential service support to forces in theater. As we look
to the near term, Air Forces in Europe will continue to aggressively
implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense, and
continue supporting global U.S. national and military objectives
through our forward-based forces and infrastructure. Europe's strategic
location and our strong relationships remain critical enablers for
unilateral and joint mobility, and rapid response to contingencies
across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND EUROPE--STUTTGART, GERMANY

Introduction and Overview
Special Operations Command Europe operates from two main forward-
deployed locations in Stuttgart, Germany, and the Royal Air Force (RAF)
station at Mildenhall, England. The Command is comprised of three
assigned components: 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group
(Airborne); Naval Special Warfare Unit-2; and the 352d Special
Operations Group (Air Force Special Operations Command). Special
Operations Command Europe continues to expand theater-wide special
operations forces (SOF) capabilities, mainly by developing and enabling
our allied and partner nation SOF to deploy to Afghanistan in support
of ISAF. In developing our allied and partner SOF skills, we seek to
enable niche capabilities which, taken together, can translate into
unified SOF actions that support NATO, U.S. national security
objectives, and our shared security interests.

Operations
While predominately focused on allied and partner development for
ISAF employment, Special Operations Command Europe also supported
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through the deployments of
U.S. Army Special Forces, U.S. Navy SEALs, and U.S. Air Force Special
Operations MC-130 Combat Talon and Combat Shadow aircraft and air
commandos. Additionally, Special Operations Command Europe conducted
planning and provided forces to support U.S. Africa Command's Operation
Odyssey Dawn and NATO's Operation Unified Protector. Supporting this
Alliance operation, Special Operations Command Europe's 352d Special
Operations Group provided command and control for the first-ever AC-130
and EC-130J Compass Call combat operations over Libya, neutralizing 14
regime targets and conducting Military Information Support Operations,
respectively, to help protect the Libyan people. Through these and
other combat operations, Special Operations Command Europe continues to
validate its strategic posture and value by projecting U.S., allied,
and partner SOF into two adjacent geographic combatant commands, while
supporting steady-state transatlantic security and maintaining our
ability to rapidly respond to unforeseen contingencies against emerging
threats from state and non-state actors.

Major Accomplishments
Special Operations Command Europe focused its efforts and delivered
results across four areas in 2011:
First, we maintained emphasis on engagement activities with allied
and partner SOF, in order to prepare them for deployment to
Afghanistan. Special Operations Command Europe conducted 21 Joint
Combined Exchange Training events, 14 bilateral training activities, 51
Partnership Development Program events, 2 bilateral counter-
narcoterrorism training events, an intelligence conference on Iranian
activities in Europe, and numerous key leader engagements and staff
visits to sustain partner SOF development. Additionally, Special
Operations Command Europe conducted the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed
Exercise Jackal Stone 11, bringing together over 1,400 international
SOF participants from 9 countries for the invaluable opportunities to
train together, build mutual respect, share SOF doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures, and ultimately increase our
interoperability using NATO procedures.
Second, Special Operations Command Europe led European Command's
efforts to support U.S. Central Command's efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In Stuttgart, Special Operations Command Europe chaired
the Stuttgart Effects Group, a multi-headquarters interagency forum to
increase understanding of transnational threats and de-conflict
associated efforts across the combatant commands and among our U.S.
interagency partners. In Iraq, our deployed forces participated in
numerous counterterrorism operations in direct support of U.S. Central
Command, conducting more than 115 successful high-risk offensive
missions that targeted 113 high-value individuals. One such mission
captured the leader of an al Qaeda-affiliated organization, dealing a
huge blow to this Sunni extremist group. Additionally, 17 Special
Tactics Airmen from the 352d Special Operations Group provided direct
support to 120 combat operations in support of Operations New Dawn and
Enduring Freedom. Naval Special Warfare provided personnel to serve on
Joint Planning and Advisory Teams (JPAT) for one Lithuanian and two
Polish Special Operations Task Groups in support of ISAF. For the fifth
year in a row, Special Operations Command Europe continued to provide
direct support to ISAF through the deployment of Special Operations
Task Force 10, providing essential military assistance to five Afghan
Provincial Reaction Companies. These efforts made key contributions to
the Government of Afghanistan and mentored ANSFs, reinforcing their
progress into a self-run, confident force capable of making significant
contributions to security operations across sizable Afghan population
centers.
Third, Special Operations Command Europe continued to prepare for
contingency missions through an intense exercise schedule, while
responding to actual contingency tasking. During our annual Jackal
Stone Part 1 certification exercise, the command validated critical
command and control and crisis response functions, while also
exercising important capabilities during European Command's annual
Austere Challenge exercise and executing mission support to Operation
Unified Protector.

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Fourth, Special Operations Command Europe continued to refine and
adapt strategic special operations forces requirements across European
Command's area of focus, while also taking care of our people. We broke
new ground, through the development of operational concepts like the
Distributed Special Operations Forces Network, and by coordinating the
work of U.S. Country Team SOF liaison elements with allied and partner
SOF. After a decade of sustained combat operations, Special Operations
Command Europe renewed efforts to focus on additional ways to take care
of our warriors and their families. We have instituted greater command-
sponsored family events, increased servicemember awareness regarding
health and comprehensive well-being, and provided command-sponsored
apartments near the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center to support
wounded SOF Warriors and their families.

Way Ahead
Special Operations Command Europe will continue to focus our
efforts on contributing to ISAF Special Operations Forces, moving from
development of allied and partner tactical skills to the development of
operational-level capabilities. Within the theater, Special Operations
Command Europe will increasingly focus on supporting our interagency
partners' counter-terrorist efforts and continue our engagement with
allied and partner counterterrorism forces. Special Operations Command
Europe will continue to support European Command, U.S., and NATO
objectives, maintain our combat edge, further develop our allied and
partner Special Operations Forces, and always be ready to respond
quickly to crisis--a vanguard force for the forward defense of the
United States.
CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES

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Many challenges converge across a theater as large and complex as
U.S. European Command. From the Arctic circle to the Caspian basin;
from the strategic corridor of the North Atlantic to the strategic
chokepoints of Gibraltar and the Bosporus; in an area of focus
encompassing 51 very different countries spanning Europe, Asia, and the
Levant; and in environments that alternate from the ocean depths to the
Eurasian steppes to the ever-expanding horizons of cyberspace, European
Command is presented with important opportunities to initiate positive
change across a wide array of 21st century security fronts. While
maintaining vigilance for signs of regression or instability that may
pose a threat to U.S. national interests, European Command approaches
all of these challenges as opportunities for sustaining engagement,
fostering cooperation, and establishing mutual security.

Afghanistan
At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the United States and its
NATO allies announced the beginning of a process to transition
leadership of security operations from ISAF to the Government of
Afghanistan. Since then, the Afghan government has designated for
transition part or all of 25 provinces and districts, comprising some
50 percent of the Afghan population. The Afghan population is
responding. In a poll conducted by the Asian Foundation \2\ last fall,
87 percent of respondents--from a diverse cross-section consisting of
6,500 Afghan men and women from rural and urban areas across
Afghanistan's 34 provinces--stated that the Afghan National Army was
improving the security situation across the country. The survey
confirmed that many Afghans see affirmative progress in the quality of
their lives, appreciate the services provided by the government, and
support equal rights regardless of gender, ethnicity, or religion.
Significantly, 85 percent of Afghans polled supported educational
opportunities for women.
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\2\ The Asia Foundation, ``Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the
Afghan People,'' http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2011-
poll.php.
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Maintaining this momentum depends on the continued development and
expansion of the ANSFs. The key to sustaining this progress and
achieving the 2014 transition is training the Afghan National Army and
Afghan National Police to a level that permits them to fully assume
these responsibilities. In addition, we and our NATO allies are
committed to an enduring partnership with Afghanistan, requiring
sustained support to Afghan security institutions in order to solidify
their capabilities against threats to the security, stability, and
integrity of Afghanistan.

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By providing army and police trainers, as well as other forces, our
European allies and partners have played an essential role in
supporting this transition and maintaining the enduring partnership
that follows. Europeans currently contribute approximately 25 percent
of the mentoring teams required to train ANSFs in the field, as well as
gendarmerie and other instructor personnel serving at regional police
training centers. Our European allies and partners understand the vital
importance of this mission. They remain willing to send their sons and
daughters into harm's way alongside the United States to bring peace,
security, and prosperity to the people of Afghanistan. Their commitment
also comes at a precious price, with nearly 1,000 forces killed in
action and non battle-related deaths since 2001. In fact, many of these
nations, making particularly large force contributions relative to
their populations, are suffering proportionally higher casualties than
the United States.
We need the continued efforts of our European allies and partners
to complete the transition of responsibility to the Afghan government,
and to consolidate security and stability in Afghanistan following the
transition. For this reason, supporting European deployments to
Afghanistan remains a European Command priority. This support includes
assistance with predeployment training, equipment, personnel
augmentation, and movement to and from Afghanistan. We also seek to
sustain the expeditionary, counterinsurgency, and other important
military capabilities that our allies and partners have built through
years of deployment to Afghanistan, in many cases with equipment and
training that the United States has provided. Our efforts to sustain
these capabilities and maintain interoperability with U.S. forces will
assist NATO in its commitment to an enduring partnership with
Afghanistan, and will also help our allies and partners retain and
refine the military capabilities called for in the NATO Strategic
Concept, defining the path forward for the Alliance in the fast-moving
and turbulent 21st century.

Israel
As Israel is inside European Command's area of focus, we continue
to support the United States' commitment to this longstanding and
important partner through numerous bilateral military engagement
events, increased interagency activities, robust exercises, and
continuous senior military leader consultation. Israel's strategic
location in the Levant, and our close working relationship with U.S.
Central Command, enables European Command leaders and planners to
remain regionally orientated and constantly updated on threats
emanating from Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, Syria, and other regional actors
of concern. Additionally, the impact and pace of political change
generated by the `Arab Spring' dynamic continues to increase the need
for a careful watch of rapidly unfolding events. This political-
military environment remains volatile, and could erupt with little
warning through instigation or miscalculation, posing serious security
challenges to the region, the United States, and our allies and
partners.
European Command's security cooperation activities remain focused
on strengthening our relationship with Israel and enhancing regional
stability and security. Our recently revised and released 2012 Theater
Strategy emphasizes that stability in the Levant remains one of our
most pressing Command concerns and highest Command priorities. As
mentioned earlier, we chair four bilateral, semi-annual conferences to
address planning, logistics, exercises, and interoperability with
Israel. We also conduct multiple headquarters and component-level
security cooperation events annually, including eight major recurring
exercises focused on cooperation, interoperability, and mutual
understanding. This year, Austere Challenge 12 will provide a multi-
phased large-scale exercise opportunity to train key leaders and joint
forces from U.S. European Command Headquarters, our U.S. Service
components, the Israel Defense Forces General Staff, and Israel's
Service components as we continue to build, maintain, and strengthen
our unique partnership.

Turkey
A NATO ally since 1952,Turkey continues to be a critical
geopolitical contributor to U.S. national security objectives,
particularly in its support of U.S. and coalition antiterrorism
operations. Turkey is also an indispensable partner in addressing the
increasingly complex challenges in the Levant and across the greater
Middle East.
Last year, as an important step in implementation of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense, the United States gained
Turkey's approval to establish a Ballistic Missile Defense Early
Warning Radar System (AN-TPY 2) in Kurecik, Turkey, as part of a NATO
missile defense system. In another key theater initiative, the United
States continues to provide Turkey with critical support in their
ongoing fight against terrorism.
Pursuing important interoperability goals with Turkey, European
Command has acquired approval to provide secure communications for
three Turkish AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters, enhancing Turkey's ability
to contribute to mutual security interests, including counterterrorism,
border security, Operation Enduring Freedom, and NATO and U.N.
operations. Lastly, European Command's Joint Interagency Counter
Trafficking Center (JICTC), an organization chartered to synchronize
theater military support to activities that combat illicit
transnational trafficking and terrorism, supports the U.S. Interagency
and U.S. Embassy's strong collaborative efforts with Turkey to disrupt
illicit trafficking through Turkey's historic crossroads linking Europe
and Asia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
For over 16 years, the United States has made a substantial
investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recently, political difficulties
and the country's delay in forming a central government until 15 months
after the general elections illustrate that the long-term effect of our
collective efforts and historic progress remain tenuous, requiring
sustained vigilance and attention in order to keep regional stability
on track. Unfortunately, 2011 did not see notable changes in either the
political or defense reform processes, though these reforms are
necessary for eventual membership into the European Union (EU) and
NATO. The road to EU and NATO accession may also meet with resistance
when some elements of the political elite realize that further Euro-
Atlantic integration will require enhancements in the rule of law and
democratization. Continued U.S. and EU engagement is required to
reinvigorate the reform process. Ultimately, this renewed focus,
facilitating the Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
will cost far less than responding to renewed conflict years from now
should reforms be allowed to stagnate or fail.
In spite of these difficulties, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made
contributions to the fight in Afghanistan, sending a troop rotation to
support ISAF operations in Helmand Province and donating excess
military equipment to support ANSFs. Bosnia and Herzegovina will also
host and participate in European Command's first iteration of Exercise
Shared Resilience this June, an international civil-military event
including NATO members and Southeastern European countries focused on
humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

Kosovo
In Kosovo, ethnic tensions flared last summer and fall along the
northern border with Serbia, demonstrating that the hard-earned peace
and security achieved in this region over the past decade still remains
fragile. These events serve to remind us that our commitment to
sustaining the dialogue between parties and our national contributions
to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) remain important safeguards to Kosovo's
security and stability. Currently, there are approximately 800 U.S.
forces assigned to KFOR, only about 10 percent of the total NATO
mission, a percentage that reveals the extensive commitment of our
allies to this critical stability operation. European Command also
maintains the U.S. National Intelligence Cell located in Pristina,
Kosovo, providing mission-essential support to KFOR leadership.
U.S. engagement in Kosovo remains focused on the objectives
outlined in the NATO-endorsed Ahtisaari Plan, calling for development
of Kosovo Security Force (KSF) capacity in specialized skill sets
including Explosive Ordnance Disposal, hazardous material response,
firefighting, search and rescue, and other supporting functions. The
recent pairing of Iowa and Kosovo through the National Guard State
Partnership Program will strengthen U.S. bilateral engagement with
Kosovo Security Forces. U.S. military-to-military engagements also
continue to focus on strengthening and professionalizing the Kosovo
Security Force with a special emphasis on the noncommissioned officer
corps. These initiatives are important transition and legacy objectives
designed to develop a viable force able to provide security once the
KFOR mission ultimately draws to a close.

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Russia
European Command continues to evolve in our military-to-military
partnership role with Russia, and we actively continue to seek out
zones of cooperation. This remains a complex and challenging
assignment. The United States maintains an open and honest dialogue
about all aspects of our relationship, including our disagreements.
Over the past year, we have increased our military-to-military dialogue
and activities, both bilaterally and within the NATO-Russia
architecture, while at the same time reassuring our allies and other
partners that this intensification does not come at their expense.
With respect to military engagement, in September 2010, the
Secretary of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense
Cooperation to establish the Defense Relations Working Group (DRWG)
under the Bilateral Presidential Commission. Dialogue has started
within specific issues of mutual concern, including missile defense,
human resources, education and training, defense technical cooperation,
and regional and global security. Within the Military Cooperation
Working Group, discussion has intensified between the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Russian General Staff on
combating terrorism; Afghanistan/Pakistan; and other key regional and
operational issues. In May 2011, the Chairman and Chief of the General
Staff signed a Memorandum on Counter-terrorism Cooperation to outline
mutual goals and activities for greater interaction in this area.
European Command plays a key role in operationalizing this
strategic guidance to shape our military-to-military cooperation with
Russia. We lead the development of the annual bilateral Military
Cooperation Work Plan with U.S. stakeholders, including the Joint
Staff, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern
Command, the Services, select U.S. Defense Agencies, and their
respective Russian counterparts. Despite continued disagreements at
political levels over missile defense, the amount and scope of other
cooperative activities continues to increase, in areas that include
combating terrorism, counter-piracy, crisis response, and maritime
operations. The number and quality of these bilateral events increased
consistently in 2010 and 2011. We are coordinating for new and more
substantive counterterrorism and peacekeeping exercises in 2012, and
working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff
to develop mechanisms for reciprocal logistics support and information
exchanges to ensure the bilateral relationship develops in an equal,
pragmatic, transparent, and mutually beneficial manner.
Conducting counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa,
Russian ships continue to patrol alongside NATO vessels and ships from
the European Union, Gulf States, China, and India. While piracy
challenges persist--by some estimates costing the shipping industry
more than $9 billion a year \3\--Russian cooperation and coordination
have been very helpful. We continue to work with Russia to improve
these efforts. Cooperation between our navies is one of the most active
areas in the bilateral Work Plan and continues to enable the overall
effort.
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\3\ Nirmala George, ``Piracy Costs World Shipping Industry $9
Billion a Year,'' Insurance Journal, October 4, 2011, http://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2011/10/04/218532.htm.
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Outside the military-to-military framework, European Command seeks
to support wider interagency initiatives to engage Russia in areas of
mutual concern and potential benefit. We seek to build on previous
experience, such as European Command's effort to assist Russia respond
to its 2010 wildfires, ongoing U.S. Coast Guard cooperation with the
Russian Border Service, and earlier engagement between the Iowa
National Guard and Russia's Emergency Situation Ministry (within a
bilateral Federal Emergency Management Agency-led framework), in order
to pursue opportunities in areas such as disaster response and
counternarcotics.
In 2009, European Command authored a framework document to resume
military-to-military cooperation with Russia, as mentioned, in an
equal, pragmatic, transparent, and mutually beneficial manner. The
framework not only addresses crisis response and consequence management
operations, but also seeks to promote interaction and ensure mutual
support in areas that include counterterrorism and counter-piracy
operations; peacekeeping; missile, space, and ballistic missile
defense; and search and rescue operations.
This framework document, signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Russian Chief of Defense at the 2009 Presidential
Summit in Moscow, has begun to rebuild a structure for our bilateral
defense relationship that allows wide-ranging and candid engagement on
all issues of concern. European Command continues to support this
effort by leading the development of the annual military-to-military
work plan, defining the events and activities that we aim to accomplish
together over the next year. Again, while enhancing our bilateral
military-to-military relationship with Russia, European Command will
work with NATO and other partners to implement an integrated and
inclusive security cooperation architecture beneficial to all
participants that does not come at the expense of our allies and
partners.

Poland
Poland is a staunch supporter of U.S. strategic interests, theater
operational initiatives, and NATO coalition operations, and serves as a
critical leader of the newly acceded NATO nations. We welcome their
engagement and deeply appreciate their expanded contributions to ISAF's
mission in Afghanistan. In another area of critical importance,
Poland's commitment to host regional ballistic missile defense assets
is not only valuable to the United States; it contributes to our
security relationships with other NATO allies and regional partners,
and identifies Poland as a leader within the alliance. We remain
committed to furthering this highly beneficial relationship and
assisting Poland develop the capabilities and interoperability needed
to continue supporting NATO and coalition operations.
Building on this cooperation, European Command is proceeding with
plans to establish a small aviation detachment in Poland to support
rotational deployments of F-16 and C-130 units designed to strengthen
interoperability between our air forces. In addition, U.S. support for
the development of Poland's fourth generation (F-16) fighter capability
and European Command's pre-deployment training for Polish brigades
slated to deploy to Afghanistan continue to underpin and strengthen our
military relationship. Finally, in fulfillment of the Declaration of
Strategic Cooperation between our two nations, European Command
continues to support PAC-3 Patriot battery rotations to Poland on a
quarterly basis to familiarize Polish Armed Forces with the Patriot
Missile System and enhance U.S.-Poland Air and Missile Defense
cooperation. There have been eight rotations in 2010 and 2011 for
training and exercise purposes. The final four rotations are scheduled
this year. I am greatly encouraged by the promising partnership we have
with this pivotal European nation, and expect that Poland will continue
to make strong contributions to our shared security interests in the
years ahead.

The Caucasus
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea present important
strategic issues in our theater, including logistical access to
Afghanistan, participation in coalition stability operations,
hydrocarbon infrastructure security, and rising humanitarian concerns.
The region also possesses a high degree of potential instability due to
the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and the Russia-Georgia clash over Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. European Command's engagement with these nations seeks to
promote security and stability in a sensitive region, promote maritime
security cooperation in the Caspian, and improve partner nation
interoperability with U.S. forces.

Georgia
Georgia remains a dedicated and capable partner, maintaining a
thriving military engagement program with the United States and
providing robust ISAF support. The Georgian Government is committed to
defense reform, seeks to inculcate a Western approach to civil-military
relations, and is diligently working to achieve NATO standardization.
Through this partnership, European Command buttresses U.S. policy
supporting Georgian territorial integrity, and works to find peaceful
resolutions to the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Armenia
The United States continues to pursue a wide-ranging program of
security engagement with the Republic of Armenia. Current emphasis is
focused on defense reform, professional military education,
international and NATO peacekeeping operations, expeditionary medical
capabilities, and humanitarian de-mining as Armenia strives to become a
security provider, rather than a security consumer, in the
international community.

Azerbaijan
The U.S. relationship with the Republic of Azerbaijan remains
strong. Azerbaijan continues to support ISAF through the Northern
Distribution Network's logistical air and ground corridors, and with
fuel supplies and a troop contribution. Additionally, U.S.-Azerbaijani
efforts continue to improve critical energy infrastructure protection,
enhance maritime security, increase NATO interoperability, develop
strategic defense reform, and work toward the goal of regional
stability and security.

The Caspian
The Caspian Sea is both an extension of the South Caucasus and a
bridge to Central Asia. European Command continues its close
cooperation with U.S. Central Command in order to coordinate security
cooperation across the Caspian to develop regional capabilities and
respond to maritime transnational threats. Maritime security
cooperation helps our partners bolster their independence and
contributes to regional stability.

Terrorism in Europe
The threat of terrorist attack and the presence of both Sunni and
Shia terrorist support networks within our area of focus remain
serious, with several hundred kinetic terror attacks in the European
Command's region last year, including the death of two U.S. airman at
the Frankfurt airport in Germany. Although these attacks from multiple
Europe-based extremists were not conducted by al Qaeda, Europe
continues to represent an area of high interest for al Qaeda and its
affiliated terrorist groups, seeking potential targets and especially
for their use as a support base. Violent-minded extremists exploit the
relatively permissive European legal environment to radicalize local
populations and to seek material and financial support for jihadist
efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.
Radicalized fighters returning home to Europe from conflict zones
pose a real threat given their experience, contacts, and ability to
move across the continent. The threat these extremists pose, using
Europe as a base or corridor for operations elsewhere in the world
including the United States, cannot be discounted.
Though al Qaeda and affiliated extremists possess significant
ability to conduct mass casualty attacks against U.S. allied personnel
and facilities in Europe, self-motivated terrorists with little or no
guidance from any parent organization pose an additional unpredictable
threat, as they remain largely unknown to European security services.
The aforementioned attack last year, killing two U.S. airmen at the
Frankfurt airport, highlights the unpredictable dangers that exist from
extremist-inspired solitary terrorist assailants. As shown by the
attacks in Norway last year--both in the devastating downtown bombing
that killed eight and the horrific youth camp massacre that took the
lives of 69 young people--uncoordinated acts of murderous terrorism
across the continent may also proceed from other fanatical and
inscrutable ideologies representative of the long history of terrorism
in Europe, including nationalism, separatism, anarchism, and various
kinds of political extremism.
We are also seeing increased Iranian activity in Europe from the
Qods Force, the external operational arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guard
Corps. Similarly, we are seeing an increase in the capabilities of
Lebanese Hizballah. Both of these elements operate against U.S. and
allied interests.
European countries continue to improve their counterterrorism
capacity by strengthening counterterrorism legislation, expanding
international counterterrorism cooperation, and successfully
prosecuting and jailing terrorist actors. European Command's
contribution to this evolving fight focuses on intelligence,
information sharing, and support to our partners' capabilities. Current
European Command information-sharing and coordination with the
International Criminal Police Organization has assisted investigations
in more than 80 countries to date. European Command also works with our
European partners, the Intelligence Community, and our counterparts at
U.S. Central Command and U.S. Northern Command to identify and counter
threats to the United States and U.S. forces originating from Europe,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These efforts help close the seams exploited
by terrorist networks, strengthening the broad global counterterrorism
dragnet that reduces the Homeland's vulnerability to terrorism
emanating from Europe.

Illicit Trafficking
Located at the historic crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and
Asia, the European Command area of focus remains both a key global
transit zone and destination for illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons,
humans beings held against their will, and a host of other illicit
commodities. The effects of globalization--expanded international
trade, increased border porosity, and a widened potential for
corruption among nascent governments--has created vulnerabilities which
sophisticated criminal networks continue to exploit across the Black
Sea, Caucasus, Balkans, and Eastern and Southern Europe. The proceeds
from transnational illicit trafficking enable organized criminals,
terrorists, and insurgents to evade law enforcement, conduct training
and operations, penetrate legitimate economic structures, and challenge
the authority of national governments. Drug trafficking through Europe
has also had a significant impact on security in Afghanistan. A 2011
U.N. estimate indicated that the Taliban made more than $150 million in
2009 through the sale of opium.\4\ That same year, the U.N. estimated
that 75-80 metric tons of Afghan heroin reached Central and Western
Europe, while another 90 metric tons of Afghan heroin are estimated to
have transited through Central Asia to Russia, compounding a growing
heroin epidemic among the Russian people, particularly Russian youth.
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\4\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug
Report 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/
World--Drug--Report--2011--ebook.pdf.
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While human and drug trafficking may not seem like purely military
issues, their corrupting influence on governance and security
structures, and their tragic human toll, elevate their relevance in the
multi-faceted security arena of the 21st century. The U.S. Secretary of
State has estimated that as many as 23 million people worldwide are
victims of human trafficking, for despicable use in forced labor,
prostitution, debt bondage as migrant laborers, involuntary domestic
servitude, forced child labor, and as child soldiers. These tragic
activities, along trafficking routes that run through Europe, make this
dark side of globalization a signal security issue for European
Command.
Accordingly, European Command has realigned existing resources to
stand up the Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC).
JICTC is focused on counter-trafficking and counterterrorism, providing
support to the U.S. Interagency and U.S. Country Teams in Europe, and
establishing relationships with similar international organizations in
Europe in order to disrupt and eliminate the intersecting networks that
terrorists and organized criminals use to generate revenue, move
illicit commodities, support operations, and destabilize partner
nations and emerging governments across our theater.

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the hands of terrorists or a
rogue state represent a grave threat to the United States and our
allies. In the high-stakes fight to combat WMD, several factors
intersect across the European Command area of focus: the bulk of the
world's WMD reside here; European population centers and U.S. military
installations present numerous targets for terrorist organizations; and
European ports and terminals are the last line of defense for much of
the commercial traffic that enters the U.S. port system. Fortunately,
we have several close allies and partners who share these WMD concerns.
Our goal is to leverage the capability of theater
counterproliferation stakeholders and facilitate collaborative efforts
to reduce the potential for successful WMD trafficking. In order to do
this, we must continue to increase our preparedness through military-
to-military engagements, joint training events, and interagency
interaction and partnering to strengthen our collective capabilities in
this critical mission area.

Cyberspace
Today, economies, information, communications, transportation,
essential services, critical infrastructure,and governance all hinge on
cyberspace. Governments, corporations, and organizations of all kinds
are increasingly reliant on network security, information assurance,
and cyber defenses to keep modern society functioning. Meanwhile,
hackers, spies, and terrorists can reach through cyberspace to conduct
damaging, even devastating, attacks. Modern militaries continue to view
cyberspace as an increasingly inviting and effective battleground for
21st century conflict. Indeed, a glimpse of this future was seen in our
own theater, during cyber attacks occurring in Estonia in 2007 and
Georgia in 2008.
While the costs of cyber defense for governments, militaries, and
other organizations are high, the risks and potential loss of critical
national, military, and proprietary information are alarmingly higher.
There is a clear and compelling need for greater cooperation among
governments, militaries, and the private sector to protect critical
networks and national infrastructures from cyber-related threats.
Recognizing this challenge, European Command views cyberspace as a
tremendous opportunity for theater outreach to engage, learn, and forge
our cyber defenses stronger together. Recently, the United States
became a full member in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of
Excellence, located in Tallinn, Estonia. Its focus on collaboratively
building NATO members' cyber defenses stronger together is a
tremendously positive step in the right direction. European Command has
also included cyber defense as a priority area for our military-to-
military engagements. These engagements include focus areas that
examine cyber defense capabilities, capacity required to build and
sustain a cyber defense program, and the development of a capable cyber
defense workforce. To date, 37 European Command country cooperation
plans support these cyber-focused objectives.

Arctic
Climate change in the Arctic makes it one of the world's most
rapidly changing environments. As the volume of Arctic sea ice
decreases, access continues to increase permitting maritime traffic
into areas previously impassable without specialized vessels. This new
access is creating opportunities for transit, development, and natural
resource extraction. While some see these changes as a potential
breeding ground for conflict, we see the risk of armed conflict as low,
and continue to approach the Arctic as an area of cooperation among
Arctic nations.
Though significant cooperation exists among Arctic nations,
continued cooperation should be based on a clear legal framework for
determining the status of each nation's claims. To this end, I continue
to support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. The
Convention provides access to a procedure that maximizes legal
certainty and international recognition of the continental shelf beyond
200 miles from shore. Establishing a clear, internationally recognized,
continental shelf will enhance Arctic regional security and promote
development.
European Command continues to work multilaterally with Arctic
partners to build a comprehensive and sustainable approach that
benefits all stakeholders, and pursues mutual interests in safe
navigation, scientific exploration, and environmental protection. In
one example of our support to these efforts, European Command co-hosted
with Norway the first Arctic Roundtable,a forum for Arctic nations'
militaries to discuss cooperative solutions to shared challenges,
enhancing the Arctic dialogue and increasing mutual trust and
confidence. We are working with Norway to build upon this success with
the 2012 Arctic Roundtable. We are also encouraged by the work done
with the international search and rescue agreement and the
international oil spill response initiative. As we look to the future,
we must balance fiscal constraints with the need to provide safety and
sustained access to this important region. As the Arctic continues to
change, it is important that we plan and resource the necessary
capabilities to meet our strategic interests there, ensuring our
readiness to operate in the Arctic in the years ahead.

Energy Security
Reliable access to affordable energy remains a core issue for
countries across the European Command Theater, whether they are energy
exporters, importers, or transit states. Dependence on natural gas from
Russia will continue for many of our European partners, especially in
light of its continued substitution for coal in electricity generation
and questions regarding the future of nuclear power in Europe raised by
the Fukushima nuclear incident. We continue to monitor changes to the
energy status quo in Europe, including the large-scale development of
shale gas and the increased utilization of liquefied natural gas.

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In this area, European Command recognizes its role is a supporting
one. We are working with our interagency partners, regional allies, and
the private sector to explore whole-of-government solutions. Through
our J9 Interagency Partnering Directorate, which includes experts from
the Departments of Energy and State, we are assisting efforts to
identify and protect critical energy infrastructure. Additionally, we
have lent support to the nascent Energy Security Center in Lithuania,
focused on operational energy security issues with potential NATO
applicability. We are also working with our adjacent geographic
combatant commands to address energy issues that transect theater
seams, including North Africa and the Caspian Sea. Finally, in energy
security areas with clear military utility, such as installations and
deployed forces, we are exploring energy security as a topic for joint
concept development focused on energy access and protection.
When it comes to energy, European Command supports conservation,
fiscal stewardship, energy source diversification, as well as the
potentially game-changing transition to renewable and sustainable
energy options. By examining our own energy dependencies and working
with partners to address the strategic energy environment, European
Command can maximize our freedom of action and mitigate our dependence
on access to energy resources in the years ahead.

INITIATIVES

Effective and efficient pursuit of U.S., allied, and partner
interests, particularly in a fiscally constrained environment,
ultimately depends on our ability to innovate, steward resources, and
find new and better ways of achieving our objectives.

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Efficiencies
For well over 2 years now, European Command has been streamlining
operations to build a leaner, more efficient, and more effective
organization in support of the Secretary of Defense Efficiencies
Initiative and the current fiscal environment. As we continue to adjust
our organization, we are learning to function with more than 200 fewer
billets in the management headquarters and nearly 150 fewer billets in
our intelligence directorate. Seeking even greater efficiencies,
European Command Headquarters has bundled together similar contracts to
save on overhead costs, and has implemented Contract Management Boards
to review all manpower contracts for possible in-sourcing or reduction.
Additionally, we hold Manpower Governance Boards to validate authorized
billets, and have willingly accepted greater risk in our Program
Objective Memorandum in order to fund our most important missions and
functions.
At European Command Headquarters, we have executed an internal
staff rebalance that has incurred no new growth and achieved a 15
percent decrease in manning and budget, while increasing emphasis and
focusing expertise on emerging 21st century mission sets, including
ballistic missile defense, military partnering, counter-trafficking,
and cyberspace. Finally, in an effort to measure and evaluate our
performance, a refocused J7 directorate provides independent
assessments and analyses of European Command activities and operations.
We recognize the difficulties of the current fiscal environment, and
are taking a number of steps to inculcate a culture of cost
consciousness in everything we do. At the same time, it is important
that we proceed with caution and a balanced approach in order to
identify risks, assess alternatives, and meet our fundamental
responsibilities to our mission and our people.

NATO Operations & Engagement
In addition to the outstanding support provided by our Service
Component Commands, European Command has also participated in several
key NATO initiatives. The Libyan operation demonstrated, once again,
the vital importance of maintaining secure communications among NATO
members. European Command's aggressive expansion of the U.S.
Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES)
network proved absolutely essential to the execution of effective
targeting, intelligence sharing, and air tasking operations during
Operation Unified Protector. European Command also deployed Global
Broadcast System (GBS) suites to provide full-motion video
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection and
dissemination capabilities to NATO command elements.
Supporting NATO's continued transformation and evolving
capabilities, European Command also contributed to U.S. accession as a
fully participating member in three NATO Centers of Excellence: the
Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Center of Excellence; the Joint
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Center of
Excellence; and the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.
Through the collaborative efforts of these vital centers and their
initiatives, the U.S. shares important skills, lessons, and subject
matter expertise with our NATO allies to meet the emerging and evolving
threats of the 21st century, help prepare them for deployment and
participation in NATO exercises, and develop common defense doctrine
and standards enhancing overall Alliance capabilities and
interoperability. In turn, our Nation gains access to these centers,
increasing our insight, synergy, and effectiveness through education,
interaction, research, and concept development with our allies.

European Ballistic Missile Defense
Adversarial regimes continue to procure illicit ballistic missile
technology, develop increasingly sophisticated missiles, and refine
their abilities to employ these weapons against our forces, families,
allies, and partners in Europe. Accordingly, European Command continues
to plan and implement, in concert with our allies and partners, the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to Missile Defense. Together
with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Missile Defense
Agency, and others, European Command is actively implementing the
President's direction to defend Europe and America against the threat
of ballistic missile attack.

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Last spring, USS Monterey became the first ballistic missile
defense ship to deploy to theater as part of EPAA. Additionally, in
September 2011, Turkey announced it will host an AN/ TPY-2 missile
defense land-based radar installation in Kurecik, Turkey, which is now
operational. Taken together, these actions have achieved EPAA Phase
One. Additionally, last October, to solidify EPAA Phase One
capabilities, Spain agreed to base four U.S. Navy Aegis ballistic
missile defense ships at Naval Station Rota. Also last fall, in support
of EPAA Phase Two, the U.S. successfully concluded an agreement with
Romania to host an Aegis Ashore facility, which will be operational by
2015. Currently, European Command is working closely with the Polish
Ministry of Defense to implement the U.S.-Poland Ballistic Missile
Defense Agreement in support of important EPAA Phase Three
capabilities.
At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO declared its commitment to
develop a missile defense capability for the protection of NATO's
European populations, territory, and forces. Supporting that effort,
European Command has already fielded workstations employing the NATO-
compatible U.S. BICES network throughout our headquarters and our
Service Components' headquarters in order to provide a communication
system able to support NATO's ballistic missile defense mission. This
spring, European Command will add U.S. ships to the U.S. BICES
architecture, further integrating our theater sensors, shooters, and
platforms. There has also been a remarkable increase in the willingness
of NATO nations to support the NATO ballistic missile defense mission
through national contributions, such as protection (i.e. ``riding
shotgun'') for Aegis Missile Defense platforms. European governments,
including Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark,
Italy, and France are examining ways to procure capabilities in order
to complement EPAA and support this NATO mission.

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Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center
As mentioned, European Command's response to the rising threat
posed by global illicit trafficking is the JICTC. JICTC's mission is to
support U.S. Interagency and Country Team efforts and collaborate with
similar international organizations to effectively and efficiently
counter transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism across our
theater. JICTC's focus areas include narcotics trafficking, terrorism,
weapons trafficking (to include weapons of mass destruction),
trafficking in persons, and illicit finance. JICTC's aim is to assist
our partner nations develop and refine their counter-trafficking and
counterterrorism skills, competencies, and capacity in order to keep
these threats as far as possible from American shores. This year, JICTC
outreach includes primary engagement with Turkey, as well as outreach
to other nations in Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region.

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Embracing a whole-of-government design, JICTC is maturing steadily
as a robust interagency team that includes representatives from the
Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy; Customs and Border
Protection; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement; and the Drug Enforcement Administration. JICTC's
work--in conjunction with our interagency partners and the other
combatant commands, including U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central
Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command--helps to close the seams
that traffickers exploit, and to synchronize Department of Defense
support to U.S. interagency and regional actions supporting the
National Strategy for Counterterrorism and the Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime. With the support of our interagency and
international partners, JICTC is poised to bring all elements of
national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--to
bear in the fight against transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Organizing in Cyberspace
Recognizing the rising threats and vulnerabilities present in
cyberspace, European Command has established a Joint Cyber Center (JCC)
as the headquarters organization chartered to organize, coordinate,
integrate, and direct cyberspace activities in, through, and across the
European Command. Initially formed in January 2011 for experimentation
during Exercise Austere Challenge 11, this compelling concept, sourced
internally from existing headquarters personnel, continues to mature,
providing important insights on how to conduct command and control in
the cyber domain.

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Organizationally, the JCC Director serves as the subject matter
expert and principal advisor to the combatant commander to address the
full spectrum of cyberspace operations, and integrate cyber effects
with actions in the conventional warfighting domains. The JCC and staff
are also actively engaged with our partner nations to strengthen our
collective Information Assurance and Cyber Defense postures. To that
end, European Command is the Executive Agent for five Departmental
Information Assurance and Cyber Defense Information Sharing Agreements
critical to supporting the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating
in Cyberspace. These agreements allow us to work closely with our
allies and partners to share information and build the relationships
necessary to provide for our collective cyber defense.
Additionally, European Command is involved in numerous NATO and
U.S. cyber-based exercises with the Interagency, Services, and other
combatant commands--to include the new and urgently needed U.S. Cyber
Command--in order to coordinate, synchronize and integrate cyber
activities with ongoing military activities. Working together, we are
developing coordinated contingency plans, supporting execution orders,
and building strong cooperative relationships across the defense
enterprise to provide a solid foundation for operations and progress in
cyberspace. We also continue to work with the Department of State to
issue demarches that restrict adversarial use of cyberspace in Europe.
In short, we are moving in the right direction. We need to keep moving
in this direction and pick up speed in order to prevail in what is
rapidly becoming a primary battlefield of the 21st century.

``Our Nation sits at a crucial moment, where cyber attacks
are common but have not yet significantly impacted or
endangered the American way of life. We have the opportunity to
improve prevention and response to cybersecurity threats, but
we must take action now.''--Congressman James R. Langevin (D-
RI), House Armed Services Committee

Interagency Coordination
At European Command, we believe that `no one of us is as smart as
all of us, thinking and working together.' Nowhere is that maxim more
applicable than in the realm of interagency coordination, particularly
in an environment of constrained resources. The diversity and
complexity of the modern security environment exceeds the capacity of
any single government organization. It demands `whole-of-government'
solutions that draw strength and effectiveness from the collective
judgment, training, and experience of the many dedicated public
servants in government who, working together, can effectively
synchronize the elements of national power. To that end, our
Interagency Partnering Directorate continues to tap the strength of the
U.S. interagency through in-house experts and outreach efforts that
synchronize our efforts across the U.S. Government, partner nation
governments, international and nongovernmental organizations, the
private sector, think tanks, and academia.
We believe strongly in the value--and the efficiencies--that exist
in these `whole-of-government' and `whole-of-society' solutions, if
only we have the ability and patience to seek them out and put them
into practice. To that end, European Command benefits tremendously from
our Civilian Deputy to the Commander position, occupied by career
Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador Larry Butler. His diplomatic
credentials and savvy are indispensable to theater operations.
Additionally, our Interagency Partnering Directorate adds the knowledge
and capabilities of several interagency experts from the Departments of
State, Justice, Energy, and Treasury; the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Customs and Border
Protection; the Drug Enforcement Administration; U.S. Agency for
International Development; Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; and
the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program. These outstanding professionals each bring a vital
depth and breadth to our Command, its operations, and our outreach
across the continent that is adding tremendous value to our mission,
effectiveness, and ability to speak and act across a multitude of
organizational cultures.
In addition, over the last 2 years, we have partnered with the U.S.
Interagency and with international and nongovernmental organizations--
from the Department of State to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs to volunteer technical communities--to explore
continuing innovations in cloud computing and real-time information
sharing. Through these efforts and partnerships, European Command seeks
to leverage crowd-sourcing, crisis mapping, social media, and other
unclassified information sharing venues to establish situational
awareness and share critical information quickly during natural
disasters, humanitarian assistance efforts, and other response
activities. So far, this unparalleled outreach has achieved measurable
success in crisis collaboration and communication. It is paving the way
in an exciting and groundbreaking area that will significantly enhance
our effectiveness and capacity in future operations.

Public-Private Cooperation
European Command continues to leverage expertise found in the
private sector to find greater efficiencies, achieve important theater
objectives, and support priority NATO efforts. One initiative is
European Command's partnership with the Business Executives for
National Security (BENS), a group of volunteer business executives with
an interest in national security, who travel to theater at their own
expense to understand and offer ideas about the complex challenges of
the 21st century security environment. Last year, BENS provided
concrete recommendations on strengthening cyber security in the
Baltics, one of the best public-private exchanges I've seen in a
decade. On another important front, BENS is examining how to work with
European Command and the U.S. Embassies in Ukraine and Moldova to
address the growing problem of illicit trafficking in and through those
countries.
Supporting the partners who fight side-by-side with us in
Afghanistan, European Command has teamed up with `Project Hope,'
sending some of the foremost experts in traumatic brain injury to the
Baltics to work with our allies there and improve assistance programs
for returning veterans injured in combat. European Command also
continues to support the State Department's ``New Silk Road''
initiative, seeking to promote and broaden economic development
opportunities across Afghanistan in support of vital NATO objectives
and the U.S. transition strategy.
We are working with the U.S. Agency for International Development
to develop and strengthen humanitarian programs designed to enhance and
sustain U.S. engagement in the Balkans which are, as mentioned,
increasingly important today. Finally, in an initiative European
Command spearheaded with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Defense Business Board plans to
examine current departmental public-private collaboration with the goal
of focusing these activities into a genuine `whole-of-society' effort,
continuing progress toward a more efficient, effective, and fiscally
responsible Department of Defense.

Innovation
Increasingly, the key to unlocking greater productivity and
efficiency lies in innovation. European Command continues to advance
innovative ideas, concepts, and technologies to further our mission,
support our partners, and improve our own capabilities and capacity.
Innovation collaboration is a two-way street, requiring outreach and
reciprocation with our international, interagency, and public-private
partners. Since standing up an Innovation Cell 2 years ago, a culture
of innovation and creativity has become engrained across the Command.
Our Science and Technology Office has initiated numerous Joint
Capability Technology Demonstrations to speed the learning cycle in
support of cyberspace, environment sensing, force protection,
consequence management and counter trafficking initiatives. Our
Intelligence directorate has launched efforts using complex modeling to
better understand today's dynamic and adaptive strategic and
operational environments. Evaluating theater throughput, we are looking
at innovative ways to build smarter logistics and improve the
logistical capacity of our allies and partners. Our Public Affairs
directorate has taken the lead in incorporating rapidly expanding
social media technologies to help us understand, incorporate, and
operate in the world of Facebook and Twitter. Numerous other
innovations are being explored across the enterprise.
None of these ideas would be possible without our ability to
engage, exchange, and cross-pollinate innovative ideas with our
international, governmental and private partners. Ideas emerge and grow
from connection and collaboration, and are improved and strengthened
when they are combined in creative and surprising ways. We will
continue to foster a robust and inclusive culture of innovation at
European Command that relies on our ability to share and test ideas
across the public and private spectrum. We know that future
efficiencies and success will increasingly rely on new ideas and
innovations. European Command stands ready to contribute to that
national endeavor.

POSTURE: FORCES, FOOTPRINT, AND RELATIONSHIPS

European Command's posture is comprised of three interdependent
elements--forces, footprint, and relationships--supporting the military
operations, international military engagement, and interagency
partnering that enhance transatlantic security and provide for the
forward defense of the United States. Our posture facilitates U.S.
global operations, assures allies and partners, deters aggression,
maintains strategic access, enhances partnerships, and sustains our
allies' and partners' capabilities and capacity to achieve shared
security objectives.

Forces
Forward-stationed active duty servicemembers, forward-deployed
rotational units, and Reserve Forces in European Command remain our
primary tool for maintaining U.S. influence across the theater and--
when called upon--projecting power within and beyond it. These forces
are a visible and incontestable manifestation of U.S. commitment to the
region. They provide for frequent engagement at all levels, build
habitual relationships and trust, ensure interoperability with our
allies and partners, and help facilitate transformation within European
militaries. They assure access when and where it is needed, fulfill our
NATO alliance commitments, including our Article V commitment, and
preserve U.S. leadership in NATO.
There are approximately 78,000 active duty military forces within
the European Theater. Of these, approximately 68,000 personnel are
assigned to European Command and its Service components. It is
important to note that over 10,000 forces in Europe are assigned
outside European Command, to other DOD organizations and U.S.
Government activities in theater, a testament to the important role
European Command plays in supporting NATO, other U.S. combatant
commands, and agencies across our theater.

Footprint
The nation relies on a network of Main Operating Bases, Forward
Operating Sites, and Cooperative Security Locations located inside the
European Command area of focus that provide superb training and power
projection facilities supporting coalition operations and contingency
missions in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In addition to
meeting our mission, this mature, well-established, and highly capable
network supports and enables the activities of U.S. Transportation
Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Strategic
Command, U.S. Southern Command, and NATO. This basing network,
providing unparalleled proximity and access to three continents, stands
ready to support U.S. and NATO contingency operations on very short
notice. Indeed, we witnessed last year how rapidly the installations
along the Mediterranean--Moron Air Base, Spain; Aviano Air Base, Italy;
Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy; and Naval Support Activity Souda
Bay, Greece--were able to provide critical basing and logistical
support to support NATO operations over Libya.
Thanks to strong and continued Congressional support, previous
annual military construction authorizations and appropriations have
enabled European Command to address a balanced mix of our most pressing
mission, mission support, quality of life, and housing requirements.
The goal of our fiscal year 2013 military construction program is to
support our posture initiatives, consolidation efforts, and
infrastructure recapitalization projects, including the Medical
Facility Consolidation and Recapitalization Project at the Rhine
Ordnance Barracks, Germany.
The Rhine Ordnance Barracks Medical Center Replacement project is
one of European Command's highest priority military constructions
projects, providing for the consolidation of duplicative medical
facilities in the Kaiserslautern Military Community (adjacent to
Ramstein Air Base), and providing a vitally important replacement for
the aged and failing infrastructure at the Landstuhl Regional Medical
Center (LRMC). LRMC, a strategic national asset for nearly 60 years--
which has saved the lives of thousands of U.S. warfighters, driven the
U.S. combat fatality rate to historic lows over the past 10 years of
conflict, and provided outstanding medical care to our overseas
servicemembers and their families--is reaching the end of its service
life. LRMC's accelerating structural failure and our enduring need to
preserve a critical surge-capable overseas medical platform, able to
support current and future U.S. combat operations at this medically
significant half-way point between the United States and conflict areas
spanning half the globe, reinforce the need for this project.
Importantly, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 and fiscal year 2012 appropriation provided essential
authorization and funding to continue this vital project's forward
progress. Sustained congressional support in fiscal year 2013 and
beyond is necessary to meet this pressing requirement.

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At enduring theater locations, we will preserve past investments
through the responsible use of both the Sustainment, Restoration, and
Modernization program and the military construction program, even as we
continue our long-term and highly successful efforts to reduce overall
facility inventory. It is important to note that, over the past 22
years, European Command has reduced inventory by approximately 75
percent. Over the past 8 years, we have closed or consolidated over 200
sites of various sizes across the theater. Our remaining footprint is
primarily comprised of approximately 25 major bases with supporting
smaller sites.
At other locations, we are optimizing the use of all available
resources to ensure that these installations remain mission effective
until they are removed from the inventory. Additional efforts to reduce
inventory will be driven by future strategic force structure decisions.
Though, in some cases, continued reductions and consolidations in the
pursuit of increased efficiencies may require additional military
construction in order to succeed.
As always, when it comes to military construction, we will continue
to leverage NATO common funded investments and, where required,
prefinance our projects to reserve a future opportunity to recapture
part of this investment through the NATO Security Investment Program.
When it comes to our overseas footprint, European Command will
continue to review requirements across our mission, quality of life,
and agency portfolios in order to work towards joint solutions and
achieve infrastructure efficiencies, particularly as Departmental
leadership, in accordance with the new strategic guidance, considers
the appropriate size and composition of U.S. forces in Europe. As we
continue these consolidation and recapitalization efforts, we will
convey our requirements in our Theater Posture Plan and military
construction requests.

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Relationships
Our experience in operating as part of multinational coalitions has
demonstrated the importance of developing and sustaining long-term
relationships with our allies and partners. These relationships are
critical to maintaining the theater access and freedom of movement we
both need and rely upon in crises. These relationships also build the
trust essential for us to work and train together, develop needed
capabilities and interoperability, and build the willingness among our
partners to contribute to regional security and out-of-area operations.
We recognize that today's fiscal environment requires difficult
decisions regarding overseas force structure. In order to achieve
efficiencies and cost savings, European Command continuously evaluates
opportunities for recapitalization, consolidation, or closure of
facilities, balanced with the need to preserve the appropriate level of
current and planned mission support for our command as well as the
other U.S. combatant commanders, Services, agencies, and activities
that we support. Uncoordinated or expedited posture reductions risk
permanent loss of access with important host nations. Once
relinquished, access is often fiscally and politically prohibitive to
reestablish, or the terms are less advantageous to the United States.
Our ongoing planning efforts seek to find the right balance between
strategic access, operational effectiveness, fiscal efficiency, and
diplomatic consistency.

Initiatives
Currently, European Command is implementing a number of critical
posture initiatives to accomplish our mission, strengthen
interoperability with our strategic partners, support our Service
components and other U.S. combatant commands, and achieve basing
efficiencies. Those initiatives include:

Stationing four U.S. Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
destroyers in Rota, Spain
This effort directly supports the President's European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to Missile Defense. EPAA outlines the phased
implementation of U.S. contributions to an allied missile defense
capability for Europe that protects U.S. forces stationed in Europe,
our allies and partners, and the U.S. Homeland. In terms of this
mission, forward-based forces provide considerable efficiency when
compared to the force generation required to meet the same requirement
with rotational U.S. forces. The Navy estimates that it would take 20
ships based in the United States to supply the presence provided by
these 4 forward-deployed ships.
Establishing a small aviation detachment in Poland
As mentioned earlier, this detachment is designed to support a
periodic rotational aircraft presence to strengthen interoperability
between the U.S. and Polish air forces. The first detachment is
scheduled to arrive in early 2013 for a 2-week rotation.
Continuing Army consolidation actions in theater
First, the U.S. Army's V Corps relocated to Wiesbaden following the
departure of 1st Armored Division Headquarters, which moved to Fort
Bliss, TX. Second, U.S. Army Europe Headquarters will begin its move to
Wiesbaden later this year. Third, scheduled in the near future, the
Army will move the majority of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team
to Vincenza, Italy.
Multi-modal logistical support to U.S.Transportation Command
Also as mentioned, European Command is supporting U.S.
Transportation Command's requirement to develop and enhance its multi-
modal distribution capabilities available at MK Airbase in Romania, an
important capacity initiative for ongoing theater and global logistical
missions.

Strategic Presence
U.S. posture in Europe provides a deterrent effect against would-be
adversaries or aggressors reluctant to face forward-based U.S. forces
or withstand a U.S.-supported coalition response. That deterrent
effect, in proximity to some of the world's most dangerous places
including the Levant, Africa, and the Middle East, is contingent on
U.S. forces retaining our decisive edge in combat capabilities, agility
and flexibility in providing rapid crisis response, and physical
presence as a constant reminder of the costs of aggression and
miscalculation. A credible combination of forward-based and rotational
forces, in proximity to these hot spots, is essential to maintaining
deterrence against future aggressors, preserving stability, and
reassuring our allies and partners. U.S. posture in Europe is also
important because it provides irreplaceable basing and other support to
global U.S. operations, helps to sustain critical partnerships and
partner capabilities, demonstrates U.S. leadership in NATO, and
reaffirms our Nation's strong and enduring commitment to the NATO
Alliance.

OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE

None of these activities would be possible without the
extraordinary people that make up U.S. European Command and NATO Allied
Command Operations. We are committed to providing the best possible
support to these brave and dedicated men and women, and their families.
We are devoted to sustaining their readiness, health, and quality of
life support.

Deployment, Behavioral Health, and Compassionate Fatigue and Family
Support
While maintaining our focus on mission readiness, we must also seek
avenues to respond to the significant stress placed on our forces and
families due to protracted combat operations and cyclical deployments.
Several organizations and studies within the Department of Defense have
identified an urgent need for sustained behavioral health services to
support our warriors and families, especially in an overseas
environment with few private sector options. Within adaptive and
flexible care systems, the members of our All-Volunteer Force and their
families must continue receiving quality care and responsive support in
a stigma-free environment. A system-wide, recurring 360-degree review
of these programs, focused on the connection between at-risk indicators
and catalysts, is needed to eliminate gaps in support. The goal is
alignment of focused caregiver teams with corresponding data to provide
needed care in a timely and responsive manner.We will continue our work
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a working definition for
resilience, and determine initial measures for baseline assessments to
address at-risk indicators and servicemember needs. Additionally, we
have partnered with the First Family's Initiative to `Join Forces,' and
are implementing elements of that campaign within the European Command
enterprise. We continue to support ongoing efforts to improve complex
care management and the medical portion of the disability evaluation
process, which will result in improvement of wounded, ill, and injured
warrior benefits.

Investment in Our Schools
We are pleased that the Department of Defense Education Activity
(DODEA) continues to make needed investments in DODEA's overseas school
infrastructure. Many of our schools are converted 1950s-era barracks.
These investments directly support the children of our service men and
women, who will benefit tremendously from this investment. At the end
of this 7-year program, all failed or failing infrastructure will be
recapitalized, providing concrete proof of our promised commitment to
take care of the military families who also serve, and have made many
sacrifices in recent years. Additionally, we will continue to address
and pursue improvements to our military family housing and barracks in
the 2013 military construction program to improve living conditions for
our servicemembers and their families.

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Sustaining Quality of Life
Potential changes to overseas force structure require a renewed
effort to ensure the appropriate balance between force levels and
quality of life support. European Command is closely examining how to
increase effectiveness and efficiency in applying regionally
distributed service support, through a hub and spoke model, from our
main operating bases to those locations experiencing change.
Increasingly, our smaller force locations require a fresh look at
scalable facilities and contracts, increased reliance on host nation
support, and greater public-private cooperation. These geographically
separated units require tailored support standards that are palatable
to service providers, within appropriate guidelines. We must ensure the
availability of mainstay support functions--health care, education,
child care, morale, post office, and internet access--prior to making
assignments to these remote locations. We are also cognizant of the
need to ensure safe, accompanied tour parity with our partner nations
in locations that support and enhance our theater objectives.

NATO & ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS

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NATO: An Active Alliance
As an anchor of transatlantic security for more than 60 years, the
NATO alliance remains essential to the security of the United States
and its allies, ensuring peace and stability throughout Europe, and
countering threats across the globe. Although much has changed since
its founding in 1949, the Alliance remains an essential and unique
source of stability in an unpredictable geopolitical environment. NATO
members now confront a far broader spectrum of security challenges than
in the past. Threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile technologies, cyber attacks,
and terrorism know no borders. NATO has also found itself called upon
to help protect civilian populations from government repression. NATO
today leads seven major operations and missions--up from almost none in
the early 1990s--including NATO's largest mission ever in Afghanistan
and last year's highly successful Operation Unified Protector. During
that same period, NATO has cut personnel assigned to its operational
headquarters by 67 percent, while expanding its partnerships. NATO's
2010 New Strategic Concept entitled, ``Active Engagement, Modern
Defense,'' provides a 10-year roadmap that reconfirms the allies'
commitment to defend one another against attack, as the bedrock
foundation of Euro-Atlantic security, and lays out a vision for an
evolving and increasingly agile, capable, and effective Alliance ready
to defend its members against the threats of the 21st century.

Strategic Concept and Command Structure Reform
The Strategic Concept announced at the 2010 Lisbon Summit reaffirms
the fundamental purpose of NATO and defines three core Alliance tasks:
collective defense; security through crisis management; and cooperative
security through partnership. In June 2011, NATO Defense Ministers
received a detailed review of capabilities, and approved a set of
concrete reforms in support of the new Strategic Concept and the 2010
Lisbon Summit Declaration. These reforms will make NATO leaner,more
flexible,and more cost effective, sustain the current level of
operational ambition, and enable command and control for two major
joint operations and six smaller joint operations. The new military
command structure will have fewer headquarters organized under two
Strategic Commands, (Operations and Transformation), and will include
two deployable Joint Force Headquarters. Additionally, the U.S.-led
NATO organization, STRIKEFORNATO (led by a dual-hatted commander also
responsible for the U.S. 6th Fleet and Naval Forces Europe/Africa), is
in the process of relocating from Naples, Italy, to Lisbon, Portugal;
one of the first major moves in the implementation of NATO's new
command structure. Once fully implemented, this restructuring will lead
to a 30 percent reduction in personnel (13,000 to 8,800), and will
consolidate 11 major headquarters to only 6.

Major Operations
Over the past year, NATO and Allied Command Operations have
executed multiple major operations, demonstrating an impressive array
of Alliance capabilities. Today, roughly 150,000 military personnel are
engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing
complex ground, air, and naval operations in all types of environments.
These forces are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, the
Mediterranean, in the seas off the Horn of Africa, and, until recently,
in support of operations over Libya. During the Libyan operation, NATO
had a total of nearly 170,000 troops engaged in worldwide operations.

Afghanistan
NATO's operation in Afghanistan remains the Alliance's most
significant operational commitment to date. Our allies and partners
continue to share the risks, costs, and burdens of ISAF. They have
contributed troops, funding, and equipment, and have made significant
non-military contributions to ISAF. ISAF forces include over 130,000
troops from 49 contributing nations. Three of the 6 regional commands
in Afghanistan are led by allied or partner nations, and 13 of the 29
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are led by nations other
than the United States.

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As mentioned earlier, the successful transition of security to
Afghan authority will continue to rely upon increased ANSF
capabilities. Over the past year, ANSF has achieved their growth target
of 305,000. In June 2011, the Security Standing Committee of the Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board agreed to an increase of the ANSF to
over 350,000 by November 2012. The nascent Afghan Air Force currently
numbers nearly 4,700 personnel and 59 aircraft, and is on its way to
becoming a professional, operationally capable, and sustainable force.
There are now over 200,000 ANSF members either completed with or in
literacy training, which may well have the most far-reaching and long-
term impact, not only on the ANSF as a capable and professional force,
but, importantly, on Afghan society as well.
These improvements in Afghan capabilities, along with improved
security conditions, have allowed us to begin transitioning security
responsibilities from coalition forces to Afghan authorities. Since the
summer of 2011, NATO has started handing over primary security
responsibility to the Afghan Government and the ANSF. Thousands of
police and military personnel have been trained as part of this
enduring partnership and transition process. Following the November
announcement by President Hamid Karzai that 18 more areas will soon
transition to Afghan security control, over half the Afghan population
will be protected by their national security forces.
The increased professionalism and capabilities of the ANSF support
these transition objectives by enabling the Afghan capability to secure
their own territory, facilitate civilian efforts to establish
governance, and prevent future threats to stability. While there is
tremendous progress occurring, key challenges and areas that still must
be addressed by the international community include corruption, cross
border sanctuaries, and strategic communications outreach.
The recent Bonn Conference set out how far we have come in 10 years
since the first Bonn Conference in 2001, while reaffirming the mutual
commitment between Afghanistan and the international community to
deepen and broaden their historic partnership from Transition to the
Transformation Decade of 2015-2024. This effort supports further
transformation in the areas of governance, security, the peace process,
economic and social development, and regional cooperation. The lasting
commitment of the international community--including funding to sustain
the ANSF; training and operational support for niche capabilities;
Quick Reaction Forces; and assistance to Special Operations Forces--
will be essential to ensure that gains made in stability become
irreversible.

Libya
From March 24 to October 31, 2011, NATO Allies led an unprecedented
coalition of contributors in Operation Unified Protector supporting UN
Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. The coalition enforced an
arms embargo by air and sea across Libya's maritime flank, maintained a
no-fly-zone, and undertook specific operations to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas. NATO air assets conducted over 26,500
sorties, including over 9,700 strike sorties to protect the people of
Libya from attack or the threat of attack. A total of 49 ships from 12
nations, along with surveillance assets provided by submarines and
maritime aircraft, supported the operation in the Mediterranean Sea.
Ships conducted more than 3,000 intercepts for hailings, 311 boardings,
and 11 denials. The NATO Alliance worked as it was designed to do, with
our allies and partners sharing the burdens and responsibilities of
these operational missions.

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Shortly following initial coalition efforts by the United States,
United Kingdom, and France to reduce the threat of Libyan air defenses,
NATO assumed the lead for Operation Unified Protector. The United
States continued to contribute as a combat enabler, focusing largely on
aerial refueling and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
support. These crucial and irreplaceable U.S. contributions to the
overall effort enabled our allies and partners to fully contribute to
the operation. In all, 14 NATO members and 4 partner countries provided
naval and air forces for NATO's 3 missions. Together, these 18
countries bore the brunt of the Alliance effort. Additionally, the
longstanding political-military relationships developed through
Alliance operations, exercises, and partnerships permitted and
facilitated the coordinated and rapid commencement of operations within
an unprecedented timeline. Furthermore, Operation Unified Protector
proved the value of a comprehensive approach involving civilian
advisors and coordination with nongovernmental organizations. In sum,
the Libya operation demonstrated the synergistic effects of Alliance
capabilities, and manifested the continued success and evolution of the
NATO Alliance in the 21st century.

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Kosovo
While Afghanistan remains NATO's primary operational theater, the
Alliance has not faltered in its other commitments, particularly in the
Balkans. Today, approximately 6,000 allied and partner nation troops
operate in the Balkans as part of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) to help
maintain a safe and secure environment, and enable freedom of movement
for all citizens irrespective of their ethnic origin. The United States
provides only around 10 percent of forces currently deployed. Despite
great progress made towards peace and stability in Kosovo, continued
tensions at the border crossings with Serbia have reinforced the need
for vigilance and careful analysis before further adjusting the KFOR
posture toward a minimal presence.

Other Major NATO Operations
The Alliance has been active in a number of operations and missions
to counter terrorism and maritime piracy, and to enhance stability in
troubled regions. Operation Ocean Shield is focusing on at-sea counter-
piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, contributing to international
efforts to combat piracy in this area. It is also offering, to regional
states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to
combat piracy activities. NATO naval forces continue to lead Operation
Active Endeavour, focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity
in the Mediterranean and safeguarding this strategic maritime region.
The experience and partnerships developed through Operation Active
Endeavour considerably enhanced NATO's capabilities and contributed
directly to the rapid integration of assets for Operation Unified
Protector.
Additionally, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq recently was
successfully concluded. It delivered training, advice, and mentoring
(with all NATO member countries contributing to the training effort
either in or outside of Iraq) through financial contributions or
donations of equipment. Over the 7 years of the mission, nearly 20,000
Iraqi security forces received training.
NATO members and partners also conduct an important joint and
collective air-policing mission to preserve the integrity of NATO
airspace through the NATO Integrated Air Defence System, a system
comprised of sensors, command and control facilities, and weapons
systems such as ground-based air defense and fighter jets.

Major Exercises
NATO exercises are key enablers for core missions and focus areas,
and contribute to the value of U.S.-led training and exercises. As an
example, in 2011, exercises and resources were synchronized with a
large U.S. based Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) program, Unified
Endeavor, enabling two NATO pre-deployment exercises in order for the
ISAF Joint Command Headquarters and Regional Command South to prepare
forces and headquarters for the mission in Afghanistan. The exercises
provided training for the U.S. First Corps, 82nd Airborne Division,
NATO's HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, and individual augmentees from
troop-contributing nations, increasing the level of coalition training
not only for U.S. forces, but also for coalition members.
Additional exercises provide an opportunity for allies to work with
other partner nations, building collective capabilities for mutual
security interests. In 2011, NATO carried out a number of exercises
with Russia supporting the Lisbon Summit pledge, seeking to enhance the
strategic partnership with Russia and other new partners. Russia
participated in allied Exercise Bold Monarch, demonstrating submarine
rescue operations, as well as Exercise Vigilant Skies, the first live
NATO-Russia counterterrorism exercise in the skies, where Polish,
Russian, and Turkish fighter jets intervened in response to the
simulated terrorist hijacking of a passenger aircraft.We are doing some
mission defense exercises with Russia this spring as we seek
cooperative relations in this complex area.

NATO Special Operations Forces
The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ) is a U.S.-
led framework organization within the NATO structure that has achieved
significant multinational Special Operations synergy over the past 4
years. This is perhaps best illustrated by the active presence of over
2,000 ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel on the ground,
actively partnering with Afghan Security Forces. As NATO looks to
broaden such engagements and partnering in an effort to apply
comprehensive solutions to security challenges, NSHQ has already begun
integrating Partnership-for-Peace SOF members from Sweden and Austria
into the NSHQ, where they interact habitually with Irish, New Zealand,
Finnish, Swiss, and Australian SOF.
Fostering SOF capability and interoperability among 28 allies, and
a wide range of other actors who leverage the Alliance, is an economy
of force effort and force multiplier that epitomizes the concept of
`Smart Defence,' with an associated impact that extends beyond the
Alliance and the transatlantic security relationship. Whether in areas
of intelligence sharing, training and education, communications, or
biometrics and exploitation, the NATO SOF community is driving
significant change and innovation within NATO. As an effective agent of
21st century change, NSHQ continues to capitalize on knowledge,
experience, and capabilities returning from Afghanistan, and apply them
to future challenges in order to take NATO's SOF transformation to the
next level.

Chicago Summit
Clearly, NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and
security on the international stage. This May, the 25th NATO Summit
will take place in Chicago. Ministerial meetings since December 2011
continue to develop the summit agenda. In Chicago, NATO Heads of State
and Government will further develop and approve strategic guidance for
Alliance activities supporting the enduring partnership with
Afghanistan beyond 2014, other partnership strategies, NATO's Missile
Defense Capability, Multinational Capabilities, and a review of the
Alliance's Deterrence and Defense Posture.

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CONCLUSION

The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of U.S.
European Command and NATO Allied Command Operations are making vital
contributions to our national security and forward defense every day
through their engagement, support, and brilliant execution of combined
operations with our allies and partners across the theater. As we look
to future success, I ask for your continued support of these
extraordinary men and women, and their families, to ensure they receive
the care and benefits they have earned and so rightly deserve.
Our work continues to make a difference. As the Secretary of
Defense has stated, the United States depends on NATO ``every day to
provide capacity that we cannot find anyplace else.'' Given the
continuous change we face in the current security and fiscal
environments, sustaining this vital, historic, and effective Alliance,
and preserving our critical theater strategic partnerships, is even
more essential to protecting the security interests we share as we
continue moving forward in the 21st century.
European Command remains focused on sustaining these partnerships
to meet the demands of ongoing operations. We continue to leverage the
authorities and funding that Congress has provided to support the
allies and partners who have made their own vital contributions to
these operations. Congressional support for these programs has enabled
us to assist these allies and partners as they have conducted
operations in Afghanistan and taken a leadership role in last year's
Libya operation. These allied and partner contributions remain critical
to meeting our goal to transition security responsibility in
Afghanistan by 2014. Accordingly, we ask for your continued support of
the funding and authorities so essential in preparing our allies and
partners to make these contributions to our common defense.
Even as we focus on present needs, we must also consider the future
of the transatlantic partnership. Through years of deployment to
Afghanistan, and in recent operations over Libya, we have made great
strides toward developing the military capabilities called for in the
November 2010 NATO Strategic Concept. Looking ahead, we seek to
consolidate and sustain these gains, keeping our skills sharp for
future expeditionary and stabilization operations while retaining our
ability to train foreign military forces to support future contingency
operations. I agree with Secretary Panetta: it would be a tremendous
loss if, for any reason, the Alliance did not retain, develop, and
institutionalize the hard-earned capabilities that have allowed it to
conduct these operations with such skill and success. Given the
economic constraints facing Europe and the United States, this risk is
real. However, we believe this outcome can be avoided as long as our
allies and partners properly resource and transform their armed forces,
and the United States continues to support these vital strategic
partnerships, focusing in areas that allow us to train, deploy, and
operate together safely and effectively. We respectfully request your
continued assistance in this endeavor, one essential to the security of
the United States.
As we look to the future of the historic transatlantic security
partnership, one that proved so valuable and served us so well in the
last century, we must continue to focus its evolution and capabilities
on the common strategic interests and challenges that we face in the
21st century. Those challenges include the threat of ballistic missile
attack, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats in
cyberspace, and transnational illicit trafficking. The danger of
underestimating the value of this partnership is also real,
particularly as the generation that contributed and received so much
from it passes from the scene. As former Defense Secretary Robert Gates
recently said, ``The policymakers who will follow us . . . will not
have the same historical, personal and, indeed, emotional ties to
Europe, and may not consider the return on America's investment in
Europe's defense worth the cost . . . and that will be a tragedy.''
Working together with our historic partners on these critical security
challenges of the 21st century to wisely leverage the significant
investments that America has made for over half a century will be more
important than ever in light of the fiscal constraints that we all
face. Your continued support will ensure that we are prepared, working
in concert with these enduring allies and partners, to meet those
challenges head-on and prevail.
So supported, European Command and Allied Command Operations will
continue to serve as a vital part of the transatlantic bridge that
provides our countries continued security in a new--and still
unfolding--era. For, as Secretary Panetta said in Brussels last year,
``Security in the 21st century will not be achieved by each nation
marching to its own drummer. It can only be achieved by a willingness
to fight together to defend our common security interests. That is the
world we must shape today, to build a stronger world for tomorrow.''
Every day, the men and women of European Command and Allied Command
Operations are working through history's most successful alliance,
alongside our allies and partners across a dynamic theater, to build
and sustain that indispensable ``willingness'' in the pursuit of our
common security interests and the forward defense of the United States.
With every action, they are shaping the rapidly changing world we live
in today in order to provide the enduring capabilities, security
structures, and trust we need for a stronger world tomorrow. It is a
world in which we are--and will continue to be--Stronger Together.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
General Ham.

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND

General Ham. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of
the committee, thanks very much for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I am truly honored to be here with Admiral
Stavridis, a very respected colleague and a longtime friend.
Operations in Libya truly brought EUCOM and AFRICOM to a
higher level of collaboration, and this year we will continue
to work closely together to more effectively address security
challenges in our respective AORs.
The last year, as Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain
have indicated, has been a year of significant change that has
swept across the African continent. The broad wave of
democratic movements that began in Tunisia have spread faster
and more broadly than many had forecasted. The Republic of
South Sudan became the world's newest nation. In Nigeria, Boko
Haram emerged as an increasingly violent extremist group and a
threat to western interests. In the Horn of Africa, al Shabaab
and al Qaeda's publicly formalized merger made evident what we
have long suspected. Throughout the past year, we have seen
that security in Africa continues to be influenced by external
actors, by rapid economic developments, population growth, and
the overall size and diversity of the continent itself.
In line with the new DOD Strategic Guidance, we have
prioritized our efforts, focusing on the greatest threats to
America, Americans, and American interests. Countering the
threats posed by al Qaeda affiliates in East and Northwest
Africa remains my number one priority. Strengthening the
defense capabilities of our African partners to responsibly
address security challenges remains an integral part of what we
do. Strengthening regional capabilities in peacekeeping and
maritime security also remain important areas of focus. Our
engagements are designed to be innovative, low-cost, and have a
small footprint. Indeed, in Africa a small investment can go a
long way.
As I traveled across the continent, I have been encouraged
by the optimism of African leaders in confronting the
challenges and embracing the opportunities ahead. I sincerely
believe that in the long run it is Africans who are best able
to address African security challenges. Because of this and
because a safe, secure, and stable Africa is in the United
States' national interest, we at AFRICOM will continue to
strive to be the security partner of choice on the continent.
Everything AFRICOM has accomplished is the result of the
professionalism and dedication of the uniformed and civilian
women and men of the command, our strong partnerships in
Africa, and our teammates from across the U.S. Government.
I appreciate the tools that you have given us to execute
our missions, including new authorities under sections 1206 and
1207 of the NDAA. Meeting our intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) requirements continues to be a challenge,
and I am working with DOD to gain additional capabilities to
monitor the activities of al Qaeda affiliates in East, North,
and West Africa.
ISR is also essential to AFRICOM's ongoing efforts to
assist the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central
African Republic, and the Republic of South Sudan to defeat the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa.
I thank the committee for its enduring support, without
which AFRICOM would simply be unable to accomplish its
missions. We welcome you to visit us at our headquarters or
preferably in Africa where you can see firsthand what we are
doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain. I welcome your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Ham follows:]

Prepared Statement by GEN Carter Ham, USA

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INTRODUCTION

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the accomplishments and
future efforts of the men and women of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
During the past year, we worked closely with U.S. Government agencies
and many international partners to address emerging and ongoing threats
to security and stability in Africa. Our operations, exercises, and
security cooperation programs continue to support U.S. policy
objectives in Africa, strengthen partnerships and reduce threats to
America, Americans, and American interests emanating from Africa.
This year, with the continued support of Congress, we will strive
to build upon existing relationships and develop new partnerships in
Africa in order to strengthen the defense capabilities of partner
nations to better enable them to provide for their own security while
increasingly contributing to regional security and stability. Guided by
the Defense Strategic Guidance, we will continue to sharpen our focus,
particularly in the realm of countering violent extremist
organizations. We will seek new ways to work with and through the
African Union (AU) and its regional organizations and to support their
leadership in preventing and responding to African security challenges.
We will continue to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint
approaches consistent with the blueprint for the Joint Force of 2020.
Throughout Africa, small teams of soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coastguardsmen, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians and
contractors, along with teammates from many other U.S. Government
agencies, conduct a wide range of engagements in support of U.S.
security interests. I believe that with a comparatively small resource
investment, we can continue to achieve tangible results in Africa.
In order to realize success in our mission we must: PREPARE, in
cooperation with our partners and allies, to respond to future crises
and contingencies; PREVENT future conflicts by continuing to strengthen
our partners' defense capabilities; and PREVAIL in current and future
operations.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Despite numerous challenges, Africa is a continent where
significant progress can be found and great potential exists. The
United States is increasingly connected to African states and regional
organizations through shared economic, political, and security
interests, including commitments to consolidating democratic and
economic progress achieved in recent years. AFRICOM supports these
efforts through our operations, exercises, and security cooperation
activities. In the past year we have seen considerable progress in the
capabilities and cooperation of regional partners in addressing threats
to regional security, including the operational gains made by African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces working alongside Somali,
Kenyan, and Ethiopian troops against al Shabaab, and the cooperative
efforts of Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania in combating al Qaeda in
the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
With six of the world's fastest growing economies in the past
decade, combined with democratic gains made in a number of African
nations in 2011, Africa's strategic importance to the United States
will continue to grow. This year will almost certainly be yet another
dynamic year for Africa, with 20 national elections scheduled to occur
across the continent, including five elections prompted by peace
facilitation, post-conflict, and presidential successions. Some
elections may result in new political and security dynamics in Africa.
Through all of these changes, AFRICOM will remain flexible as we move
forward with our engagements in order to accomplish our strategic
objectives.
The Defense Strategic Guidance notes the need for adaptable and
strategically targeted approaches to meet the increasing complexity of
the 21st century global security environment. Africa's sheer size,
diverse population, and many fragile states are emblematic of this
complexity. Africa accounts for 14 of the world's 20 weakest states in
Foreign Policy's 2011 ``Failed States Index.'' Many of its fragile
states lack the capacity or political will to effectively address
demographic, political, social, and economic challenges, including
population growth, rapid urbanization, persistent internal conflicts,
widening income inequality, burgeoning political demands, widespread
disease, and increasing demands for essential resources.

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Key security challenges of concern to AFRICOM and our partners
include the activities of al Qaeda and its affiliates in East Africa,
the Maghreb, and the Sahel. Across the continent, illicit trafficking
and its nexus with violent extremist organizations (VEOs) pose
significant threats to regional stability and U.S. national interests.
Illicit trafficking across the spectrum, from weapons proliferation to
trafficking in narcotics and humans, contributes to instability by
eroding governance and development. Many Manportable Air Defense
Systems disappeared from unsecured storage sites in Libya during the
conflict last year and could potentially be trafficked to extremist
groups. Also of concern are the Qadhafi regime's stock of chemical
weapons and precursor chemicals, the destruction of which was
interrupted by the conflict. The Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons verified the presence of previously undisclosed
chemical weapons in a visit to Libya in January 2012, and will continue
to coordinate with the Government of Libya on the destruction of all
chemical weapons.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND STRATEGY

AFRICOM's strategy is fully in line with key elements of U.S.
foreign policy and the recent Defense Strategic Guidance. Applying
resources in a thoughtful and effective manner to strengthen the
defense capabilities of our partners in Africa also remains a critical
element of DOD's new Strategic Guidance. For the foreseeable future,
the United States will continue to take an active approach to
countering the threat posed by al Qaeda. Monitoring threats, working
with African nations to establish control over undergoverned spaces,
and taking an active approach to disrupting al Qaeda, are key elements
of our efforts in Africa.

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Chart: Africa Regions as according to the African Union

Due to the vast challenges and opportunities on the continent, as
well as current fiscal realities, we have prioritized regions in Africa
to better focus our exercises, operations and security cooperation
activities. The Command's regional alignment corresponds with the AU's
regional approach. Our highest priority is the East Africa region which
is the nexus for transnational threats to our Nation's security. These
threats include violent extremist organizations, illicit trafficking
and piracy. In prioritizing engagement with individual partners,
AFRICOM considers our common interests, compelling U.S. national
security interests, and each nation's role on the continent.
All of our efforts are guided by two principles; first that a safe,
secure, and stable Africa is in our national interest, and second that
Africans are best suited to address African security challenges. The
United States can best address the security challenges and
opportunities of the African continent by employing all of the elements
of national power in cooperation with our African partners. Our
strategy synchronizes our activities with those of our U.S. Government,
allied, and African partners. It also details our focus areas,
prioritizes regions, and ensures our activities produce sustainable
effects.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND PRIORITIES

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations
Our national defense strategy stresses countering terrorism by
transnational VEOs as a critical mission. We conduct operations,
exercises, and theater security cooperation programs to prevent attacks
against the U.S. Homeland or its personnel and facilities abroad and to
reduce the threat to our partners and allies.
In Somalia, al Shabaab represents both a terrorist threat to U.S.
and regional interests and an insurgent problem to the Somali
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as well as Somali regional
administrations. In a video released on 9 February 2012, al Qaeda and
al Shabaab jointly announced their formal merger.

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Al Shabaab continues its attempts to overthrow the TFG and gain
control of Somali territory. The TFG remains dependent on international
support and the presence of AMISOM peacekeepers for its survival.
AMISOM successes in Mogadishu, as well as TFG, Kenyan, and Ethiopian
operations in south-central Somalia, have the potential to consolidate
gains against al Shabaab and foreign fighters. Somalia faces a
significant transition point in August 2012 when the TFG's mandate will
expire. Current military operations provide the security necessary for
progress in the political process.

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Of concern in North and West Africa is the terrorist organization
AQIM, which uses the undergoverned spaces of the Maghreb and Sahel as a
safe haven. Originally focused on overthrowing the Government of
Algeria, AQIM evolved and now has a stated intent to attack western
targets. AQIM continues to increase its activities in North and West
Africa, including collecting large sums of money through kidnapping for
ransom. In August 2011, AQIM claimed responsibility for the bombing of
an Algerian military school that killed 18 people. There are clear
indications that AQIM is now involved in trafficking arms from Libya.
In addition, the upheavals in Libya and Tunisia have created
opportunities for AQIM to establish new safe havens.
Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation and the source of 8-11
percent of U.S. oil imports, has very recently experienced a
significant decline in security, including a steep increase in the
number of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram. Historically, Boko Haram
focused on Nigerian government targets but in August 2011, it bombed
the United Nations mission in Abuja, killing 25 and injuring more than
80 individuals. Violence has escalated in the last several months with
40 killed in Christmas 2011 attacks and over 180 killed in January 2012
in Kano in a series of coordinated attacks against government and
police facilities.

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In response to these attacks, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan
declared a state of emergency in some areas and sent additional
military forces to northern Nigeria. We seek to work with our Nigerian
partners to strengthen their capability in civil-military affairs to
facilitate interaction between military forces and civilians in
northern Nigeria and to improve their ability to counter improvised
explosive devices. These tailored efforts will enhance Nigerian
capabilities to effectively provide security to the Nigerian people and
to address conditions conducive to the growth of Boko Haram. The
insecurity in northern Nigeria will not be solved solely by military
action. An enduring solution will require addressing the underlying
conditions which lead individuals to support Boko Haram.
We actively counter these threats through a mix of security force
assistance, assisting African states to establish control over
undergoverned territories and, in some instances, direct military
activity. Our programs and activities support and complement the
Department of State's Partnership for Regional East African
Countererrorism (PREACT) and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP). Our engagements focus on border security,
intelligence, and tactical training. We also assist in properly
equipping partner nation forces as well as encourage regional
cooperation and intelligence sharing as methods to increase
effectiveness.
I believe our strategy for countering-VEOs and emphasis on regional
cooperation are having positive effects. In June 2011, the Nations of
Mauritania and Mali, whose forces have both trained in a variety of
ways including in our annual Flintlock exercise designed to help build
counterterrorism capacity, collaborated to destroy an AQIM camp in
northern Mali. The nations of Niger and Algeria are both aware of the
threat of weapons trafficking from Libya, and are now cooperating to
secure their borders. In January 2012, Algeria stopped a 4 vehicle
convoy which was carrying over 100 assault rifles, 2 rocket propelled
grenades (RPG), and ammunition suspected of being of Libyan origin.
Furthermore, our sustained support for the troop contributing countries
to the AMISOM has resulted in that organization being increasingly
capable of countering al Shabaab's influence.
The potential for support and strengthening of ties between these
three groups (al Shabaab, AQIM and Boko Haram) with al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula and al Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan, is of
particular concern and requires continued monitoring.
Countering Piracy and Illicit Trafficking
Instability on land contributes to the growth of both VEOs and
other criminal activity. The free flow of commerce through the global
commons is essential to U.S. economic and security interests. Piracy
and other maritime crimes negatively impact the security and freedom of
access for all nations to critical waterways and continue to threaten
U.S. security in the waters off the east and west coast of Africa. The
international community, including the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union, is actively combating
piracy in the waters off of the African continent. However, many
African partners presently lack the maritime capability and capacity to
effectively address piracy. Our goal is to help partner nations build
their capacity to increase maritime domain awareness and security in
Africa as part of the broader U.S. Government and international effort.
In the waters off the Horn of Africa and into the Indian Ocean,
Somali-based piracy is a persistent threat. Pirates have demonstrated
the ability to operate small watercraft at distances greater than 100
nautical miles from the coast. As the pirates move further east into
the Indian Ocean and south into the Mozambique Channel, the challenges
and cost associated with interdicting pirate vessels will grow due to a
larger area to patrol, making vessels more vulnerable. According the
Office of Naval Intelligence, the number of attempted pirate attacks
decreased from 186 in 2010 to 166 in 2011; similarly, the number of
successful attacks in 2010 dropped from 51 to 27 in 2011. This decline
is attributed primarily to the presence of armed security teams on
commercial vessels and increasing pressure from the international
community in the form of naval patrols.

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Somali pirates enjoy sanctuary and freedom of movement on land
relatively unimpeded by regional forces. The emergence of armed
security teams on commercial vessels, which is reducing the number of
successful attacks, may be forcing Somali pirates to adopt new tactics
to earn ransoms. A growing concern regarding Somali clan based criminal
networks is land-based kidnapping for ransom.
Piracy and armed robbery at sea are also a persistent and growing
threat in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea. The International Maritime
Bureau statistics document an increase in reported attacks from 28 in
2010 to 39 in 2011. Unlike piracy in the waters off East Africa,
attacks in the Gulf of Guinea tend to focus on theft of cargo and
kidnapping of individuals crewmembers for ransom, and more frequently
result in the injury or death of crewmembers.
Our objectives for maritime security include developing maritime
domain awareness, increasing response capabilities, and fostering
regional integration and cooperation. Our activities are carried out
pursuant to a variety of DOD (title 10) and State (title 22)
authorities. Some of these are military-to-military authorities like 10
U.S.C. 1051 and 2010. While others are carried out in cooperation and
coordination with Department of State pursuant to authorities such as
International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Sales
and Financing, and Peace Keeping Operations. Our flagship maritime
security engagement program is Africa Partnership Station (APS). APS
provides sustained engagement using mobile training teams, interagency,
and international trainers, working from U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard
and international partner nations' vessels. Beginning this year, APS
will have a construct of ``training African trainers'' to enable
African maritime forces to provide the same level of instruction
without U.S. personnel. To date, APS engagements have involved 21
nations and trained more than 7,700 maritime security professionals.
AFRICOM also works closely with African regional organizations to
promote and facilitate enhanced regional dialogue and cooperation on
maritime security issues. In July 2011, AFRICOM along with the African
Center for Strategic Studies sponsored the Maritime Safety and Security
Seminar with subject matter experts from the Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). The seminar provided a venue for the two
groups to discuss the wide range of maritime security threats and to
align their strategies to confront maritime threats. AFRICOM was able
to provide a neutral venue and foster the development of a draft
agreement between the two organizations that delineates legal roles and
promotes interregional cooperation.
Increasingly, African states are taking ownership of security
challenges and are working together to combat shared threats. In
response to the piracy threat in the Gulf of Guinea, Benin and Nigeria
are conducting joint maritime patrols. The nations of Togo and Ghana
are expected to join in these patrols as well. ECCAS is also conducting
joint patrols in the Gulf of Guinea, with Cameroon, Sao Tome and
Principe, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. In November 2011, ECOWAS
conducted a conference to discuss further regional cooperation to
combat piracy in the region. Activities conducted to increase maritime
security, also contribute to reducing the potential exploitation of
undergoverned maritime space by violent extremists or criminal
organizations.
Many of the same conditions conducive to VEOs and maritime crime
are also exploited by criminal elements for illicit trafficking across
the spectrum, from sales of weapons to potential trafficking in
narcotics and humans. The emergence of complex networks of
transnational criminals, narcotics traffickers, VEOs, and other actors
necessitates a greater emphasis on countering illicit trafficking (CIT)
on land and at sea. The primary objective of our CIT efforts is the
development of legitimate, effective, and accountable security forces
capable of combating narcotics, weapons trafficking, and other forms of
illicit trafficking. We prioritize support to partner nations whose
efforts prevent or disrupt the convergence of illicit trafficking and
VEOs.
Last year we conducted 71 CIT training events with 24 African
partner nations using both section 1033 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
1998 (support to counter-drug activities of certain foreign
governments) and section 1004 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991 (support
to counter-drug activities of other government agencies). We supported
bases of operation in Ghana and Liberia used to enhance maritime
security operations in the Gulf of Guinea. Additionally, we implemented
five projects to facilitate information sharing with our partner
nations. Through increased information sharing, Cape Verde successfully
executed its largest drug seizure valued at $100 million. These modest
efforts relative to demand are paying dividends in increased
cooperation and effectiveness against illicit trafficking capabilities.
Partnering to Strengthen Defense Capabilities
AFRICOM assists African partners to develop the capabilities
required to combat VEOs, piracy, illicit trafficking, and prevent
conflict. Increasing the ability of Africans to prevent, mitigate, and
resolve conflicts leads to increases in stability and can create the
conditions conducive to development. Building partner capacity is also
important because it promotes the sharing of costs and responsibility
for security on the African continent.
Our capacity building activities complement Department of State
programs and are planned with the embassy country team and the partner
nation. We focus on the development of professional militaries which
are disciplined, capable, and responsible to civilian authorities and
committed to the well being of their citizens and protecting human
rights. Our efforts focus on increasing the capability and capacity of
African partner nations to serve as trained, equipped agents of
stability and security on the African continent.
The majority of our engagements are conducted by small teams led by
our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operations Components at
a low cost and with a small footprint. African militaries are very
receptive to this approach which allows us to cultivate the personal
relationships that are so important to our efforts to deepen
institutional relationships and build capacity. Given the imperative to
reduce costs, we have focused our exercise program on multilateral
exercises to make judicious use of resources. An added benefit of
multilateral exercises is they develop relationships between nations
and contribute to regional cooperation.
One of our primary foci is support to African nations who are
willing and able to provide forces to the AMISOM and other peacekeeping
operations. In support of the Department of State's Global Peace
Operations Initiatives (GPOI) and the African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programs, we provide military mentors
to support pre-deployment training. We work extensively with the
Nations of Uganda and Burundi as they provide the majority of forces to
AMISOM to date. Last year we assisted the forces of Djibouti in
preparing for their deployment to support AMISOM. Despite some
challenges, Djibouti deployed a 100-man advance element of its pledged
infantry battalion of over 800 troops. This year we look forward to
assisting Sierra Leone as it prepares peacekeeping forces for
deployment to Somalia, and we would also look for ways to assist Kenyan
forces, consistent with our prior trainings and as appropriate, given
AMISOM plans to incorporate Kenyans into the mission.
In the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the United States is engaged
in a number of efforts to help address violent armed groups and to
promote security. For several years, the people and Governments of
Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan have worked to eliminate the threat posed by the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), one of Africa's most violent and
persistent armed groups, which has brutalized civilians in the region
for a quarter-century.

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Consistent with the bipartisan legislation on the LRA passed by
Congress in 2010 and signed into law by the President, the United
States continues to pursue a comprehensive, multi-year strategy to help
our regional partners mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the
LRA. As part of that strategy, President Obama reported to Congress in
October that he had authorized a small number of U.S. forces to deploy
to the LRA-affected region and to act as advisors to the militaries
that are pursuing the LRA. About 100 U.S. personnel deployed to support
the regional effort. These U.S. forces do not have an operational role
and are focused on assisting and advising host nation forces. An
important aspect of their mission is to enhance the capacity of our
partners to coordinate and fuse intelligence with effective operational
planning so they are better able to plan and conduct operations with
the goal of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other senior
leadership of the LRA.
Our military advisors are sensitive to the challenges of civilian
protection and are incorporating protection considerations into
training and operational planning support. AFRICOM is also implementing
a rewards program intended to enhance information-gathering efforts
throughout LRA-affected areas. Our support to addressing the LRA threat
is embedded within a broader strategy and complemented by civilian
efforts to include encouraging members of the LRA to defect and
peacefully surrender, and we are working closely with the Department of
State and USAID as a result. Ultimately, success in countering the LRA
will depend upon the continued resolve and partnership of the affected
countries as they work together to remove the LRA's top leaders from
the battlefield and seek to encourage the defection and disarmament of
others.
In East Africa, the Republic of South Sudan continues efforts to
improve its capabilities addressing immediate security and humanitarian
concerns. Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan have been and remain a
source of regional instability. Disagreements between the two nations
remain over the contentious issues of border demarcation, wealth
sharing primarily related to oil revenue, and debt forgiveness. Ongoing
violence remains a challenge to both governments and the United Nations
Mission in South Sudan. As of February 2012, the two Sudans are engaged
in difficult negotiations related to transit fees for oil. The two
sides remain deeply divided over these issues but the future of both
nations will depend on their ability to peacefully address this and
other post-referendum issues.
Our activities in South Sudan will focus on assisting with the
development of the Ministry of Defense and the transformation of their
military. We will concentrate on developing the institutional processes
of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) general headquarters and
mission critical forces focused on command and control, discipline of
the force, and mobility. Our efforts in security force assistance are
expected to begin in 3rd quarter fiscal year 2012.
In our efforts to strengthen defense capabilities of African
partners, the National Guard State Partnership Program is an incredibly
important component. Currently, there are eight partnerships in Africa
(Botswana and North Carolina, Ghana and North Dakota, Liberia and
Michigan, Morocco and Utah, Nigeria and California, Senegal and
Vermont, South Africa and New York, Tunisia and Wyoming). The Michigan
National Guard is providing 24 personnel in support of Operation Onward
Liberty to conduct training in defense sector reform. I have asked
General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to consider
adding two State Partnerships this year and to continue to explore
future growth.
Our component commands bring valuable assets and tailored
experience necessary for successful capacity building efforts. One
example of this is the United States Marine Corps Special Purpose
Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) which established a rotational
presence in Sigonella, Italy, in October 2011 to support the command.
Managed and tasked by U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa, the SPMAGTF is
tailored to conduct theater security cooperation engagements. The
SPMAGTF consists of just under 200 marines, organized in 5-14 man
teams, with 2 KC-130 aircraft. These teams will deploy in support of
PREACT and ACOTA missions. The SPMAGTF is an invaluable asset for the
command and increases our ability to engage on the continent. In
addition, the SPMAGTF provides the command a limited crisis response
capability for natural disasters, evacuations, and other crises.
Beginning this year, we will begin Africa Partnership Flight (APF).
Modeled after the Navy's successful APS, APF features low footprint,
short duration, high-impact, sustainable and predictable engagement
with our African partners. APF will become the primary Air Force
program for conducting building partnership capacity and will enable
committed African states to enhance their aviation capabilities, foster
greater regional cooperation, and increase air domain safety and
security in Africa. The first event under APF is scheduled for March
2012, in Ghana.
Finally, the Department of the Army has selected U.S. Army Africa
to conduct the pilot Regionally-Aligned Brigade rotation in fiscal year
2013. This brigade, a tailored Army General Purpose Force, is designed
to help support AFRICOM's validated requirements for security
cooperation activities throughout Africa.
Preparing and Responding to Crisis
AFRICOM is always prepared to conduct humanitarian, disaster
relief, and other operations as directed. The dynamic security
environment on the continent requires the command headquarters and our
components to be trained and ready to plan and conduct responses for a
wide range of contingencies. Our operating locations on the continent
support our operations and provide the ability to rapidly respond if
required.
We demonstrated our ability to respond to a crisis in the spring of
2011 when the command directed coalition military operations in Libya,
which prevented the Qadhafi regime from committing mass atrocities
against the citizens of Benghazi. After the end of NATO Operation
Unified Protector on 31 October 2011, we established a joint task force
to command and control post conflict U.S. operations related to Libya.
Joint Task Force Odyssey Guard, commanded by U.S. Army Africa, was
instrumental in providing support to the Department of State as it
reopened the U.S. embassy in Tripoli. Joint Task Force Odyssey Guard
also provided explosive ordnance disposal assistance and monitored the
security of the chemical weapons in the Waddan storage complex.
Critical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
assets based in Sigonella, Italy, and Souda Bay, Greece, were used in
Operation Odyssey Dawn and NATO Operation Unified Protector and
continue to be used today to monitor illegal trafficking and violent
extremist organizations.
ISR assets are a key enabler for many of our operations and
engagements. The information provided by these assets is used to
develop a full picture of the activities of VEOs and other activities
of interest. Without operating locations on the continent, ISR
capabilities would be curtailed, potentially endangering U.S. security.
We currently operate ISR assets from various locations and continue to
explore additional operating locations in order to improve access and
on-station times for our ISR missions. Given the vast geographic space
and diversity in threats, the command requires increased ISR assets to
adequately address the security challenges on the continent.
On the African continent, we have strategic locations that provide
a hub and spoke operational reach that covers the continent with C-130
aircraft operational capability. Our only enduring presence on the
continent is Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, which provides an essential
command and control and logistics hub for Combined Joint Task Force
Horn of Africa to plan and support operations, exercises and security
cooperation activities throughout East Africa. Camp Lemonnier is also
an essential regional power projection base that enables the operations
of multiple combatant commands; U.S. Transportation Command, U.S.
Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command and AFRICOM. The
requirements for Camp Lemonnier as a key location for national security
and power projection are enduring.
New mission requirements at Camp Lemonnier necessitate new
facilities and upgrades. We will take measured steps to move from
expeditionary and temporary facilities which have been cobbled together
over time to an enduring austere footprint. Additionally, we will
prudently evolve to improve force protection, safety, and energy
standards. We continue to work with the Department of the Navy to
update the existing master plan. I very much appreciate the continued
support the Congress has provided for military construction projects at
Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.
In addition to Camp Lemonnier, the command leverages support from
U.S. European Command's and Defense Logistics Agency's military
infrastructure to support operations in a time of crisis. U.S. bases in
Europe provide geographic proximity, infrastructure, maintenance
support and flexibility. European based forces were absolutely critical
to Operation Odyssey Dawn; simply stated, we could not have responded
on the timelines required for operations in Libya had air and maritime
forces not been forward-stationed in Europe.
The value of our operating locations on the continent and the
readiness of the command's headquarters and its components were further
demonstrated in January 2012 when the command, at the request of the
Department of Justice, planned and conducted the successful hostage
rescue of an American citizen and a Danish citizen who were held
captive in Somalia.
Our headquarters location in Stuttgart, Germany, has been a topic
of discussion since the command was established. The final decision on
location was deferred until 2012 by then Secretary of Defense Gates.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense is leading a comprehensive study
of the factors involved in the headquarters basing, and we are
providing complete data and information to support their analysis of
the comparative costs, benefits, and risks of various basing options.
Until a final decision is made, we will continue to accomplish our
missions from Stuttgart, where our proximity to Africa, both
geographically and in terms of time zones, facilitates our ability to
build relationships with our African partners, and provides a location
where our servicemembers, civilians, and their families are well
supported.

Fiscal Responsibility
AFRICOM recognizes the national security imperative of deficit
reduction and continues to seek innovative, low-cost concepts for
activities and functions across the command. I have directed the staff
to look beyond the assigned reductions with a goal of further
efficiencies in the command's budget requirements. We conducted a study
of the headquarters functions to seek further efficiencies and improve
effectiveness. Through this study, we found areas where we believe we
can combine functions and reduce manpower requirements with a minimum
of risk.
To reduce fuel costs at Camp Lemonnier, the containerized living
units (CLU) will be renovated through a $1 million project funded by
the DOD Operational Energy Plans and Programs Office. The CLUs will be
redesigned incorporating energy efficient air conditioning units,
increased insulation, and reflective exterior coatings. As part of the
project, a highly energy efficient SuperCLU will be developed. The
projected energy saving are 54 percent for CLUs and 82 percent for
SuperCLUs thus reducing fuel costs for the camp.
We recognize our security cooperation engagements must be
innovative, low-cost, and if sustained, yield more than immediate
budgetary savings. The outcomes of our security cooperation programs
are twofold, first as African partners become increasingly capable of
addressing their own security and countering violent extremist
organizations, the burden of addressing those threats is shared,
reducing budgetary and personnel costs to the United States. Second,
while it is difficult to prove that we have prevented a crisis by
working with partners in peacetime, we know that the cost of
intervention far exceeds that of prevention.

How Congress Can Help
The African continent has many challenges which require
collaboration and support of all the agencies of government and the
support of Congress. At this time, the command is properly resourced;
however, ISR continues to be a challenge to satisfy mission
requirements. We are working with DOD to gain additional ISR to monitor
the activities of al Qaeda affiliates in East Africa, the Maghreb, and
the Sahel and the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa.
In order to conduct many of our programs we use a mix of Department
of State and DOD authorities. One example of this is the APS program
where DOD title 10 authorities pay for the movement of ships and
personnel while State Department's PKO funding pays for the actual
training activities of African personnel. An example of how
Congressional support provided critical authority at an appropriate
time is the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), approved in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012. This
was a first step in streamlining State and DOD authorities for security
assistance and the two departments are working closely to utilize the
GSCF in the coming year.
The Department of State's ability, through security assistance
funding, to work on the same problem set from a different angle is
beneficial and would suffer if its funding were reduced, weakening
overall U.S. Government abilities to advance U.S. objectives on the
continent. We will work with our interagency partners to ensure the
resources you provide are appropriately tied to our highest defense and
foreign policy priorities. I thank this committee and Congress for its
continued support of our team and our mission.
Another example of how congressional support provided critical
authority at an appropriate time is the new authority of section
1207(n) in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. Pursuant to that authority,
we are working with the Department of State to plan our support to
build the capacity of the counterterrorism forces of Ethiopia and those
countries engaged in AMISOM. This is an opportune time to exercise this
authority as al Shabaab in Somalia is facing a fight on three fronts
with forces from AMISOM and the Somali TFG, Kenya, and Ethiopia
actively engaged. We appreciate the additional authority and believe it
will enable AMISOM forces to continue their progress against al
Shabaab.
We also appreciate the new authority under section 1206 of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2012 to provide logistics support, supplies, and
services for countries participating in counter-LRA operations. We feel
this authority will enable continued steady progress by our regional
partners toward our mutual goal of defeating the LRA and bringing
Joseph Kony to justice.
Finally, we welcome visits by you and by your staffs. The members
and staff who have had the opportunity to travel in Africa gain a
deeper appreciation for both the challenges and the many opportunities
that are presented in this large and diverse continent.

CONCLUSION

AFRICOM will continue its operations, exercises, and security
cooperation in order to protect America, Americans, and American
interests from threats emanating from the African continent and advance
U.S. policy goals. We will prioritize and focus our engagements to
counter the most significant threats to U.S. security. We look forward
to being the security partner of choice for African nations by building
lasting, beneficial partnerships. Our success is dependent upon close
collaboration with our interagency partners, embassy country teams,
African regional organizations, and African nations.
We believe that over the long run, it is Africans who should
address African security challenges and that we most effectively
advance U.S. security interests through focused and sustained
engagement. In strengthening African defense capabilities and
capacities, we enable African states to take ownership of their
challenges and strengthen their leadership roles. We believe that for a
relatively low resource cost, our programs are making a positive
difference.
Our past successes would not have been possible without the
dedication of the entire AFRICOM team--soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coastguardsmen, civilians, contractors, and our interagency
teammates--and their families.
During my travels throughout my first year with AFRICOM, I have
heard many great African proverbs, however, I have learned one which I
think is particularly applicable to AFRICOM:

``If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far,
go together.''

We, at AFRICOM, choose to go far. We choose to go together, with
our Africa partners as well as together with our many interagency
partners, to better meet their security interests and to advance the
security interests of the United States.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Ham.
Let us try 7 minutes for our first round. We have a vote at
11 a.m. but apparently it is now 11:30 a.m., but assuming that
we are still asking questions, which I presume will be the
case, we will try to work right through that vote, and if
necessary, we will also have a second round.
Admiral and General, first, about the fiscal year 2013
budget. We have had an administration strategy which has been
laid out recently. My question is, does the 2013 budget request
from the administration reflect the administration's strategy
for your AOR, and do you support that budget? Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, to both questions.
Chairman Levin. General?
General Ham. I do, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, relative to Afghanistan, Admiral, let
me ask you a number of questions about the events that are
going on in Afghanistan following the violence over the Koran
burning. Question number one, should we, because of this
violence, modify our strategy in Afghanistan in your judgment?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir. I think at the moment, although
as you say it has been a very challenging week, as I look at
the broad sweep of our progress there, I am convinced that we
should continue with the current strategy of transitioning to
the ANSF.
Chairman Levin. Do our NATO allies and the other ISAF
participating countries also remain committed to the strategy
following this violence?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. In my conversations--as you
can imagine, I have had many over the last week or so with
senior leaders within the alliance. You have also seen the
Secretary General of the alliance, Secretary General Rasmussen,
address this specifically. I think there is solid support on
the European side of this to continue with the current
strategy.
Chairman Levin. What is your assessment of the response of
the ANSF to the violence over the recent days?
Admiral Stavridis. It has been reasonably good. We have had
about 150 demonstrations around the country, about 30 people
killed, about 150 people wounded. So this has been a
significant level of activity, but it has been very diffuse
around the country. I think General Allen would tell you and
will probably have a chance to tell you directly in a few weeks
that he has been generally pleased with the response, both of
the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army
(ANA), in containing these demonstrations and holding violence
to a minimum.
Chairman Levin. Last June when the President announced the
plans for the drawdown of U.S. surge forces by the end of this
summer, he also said that after that occurred, that U.S. troop
reductions would continue, in his words, ``at a steady pace as
ANSF move into the lead.'' Can you give us your view regarding
the pace of troop reductions in Afghanistan after the end of
this summer when the surge forces are out of Afghanistan
between then and 2014 when we would be turning over the
principal security responsibility throughout Afghanistan to the
Afghans?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, as you would expect, we are
starting to think about that holistically from, as you say, the
end of the fighting season at the end of this summer and
looking forward. But I think it is too soon to lay out a
definitive track. General Allen will be coming in, I would
guess, by mid-summer with some ideas about that, and they will
have to be vetted on the U.S. side through General Mattis up
the NATO chain with me. I would not anticipate having
granularity on that until later on this year. I think it has to
be conditions-based as we go forward. So I think that is a
sensible approach.
Chairman Levin. Do you have any current views about that
pace?
Admiral Stavridis. I do not, sir. I want to see how things
go for the rest of the year.
Chairman Levin. Next, do you anticipate that one of the
major outcomes from the NATO Summit in Chicago in May would be
an agreement between NATO and the Government of Afghanistan on
a long-term strategic partnership for promoting security and
stability in Afghanistan?
Admiral Stavridis. I believe it will be. That is a very
high-level goal for Secretary General Rasmussen. Everything I
can see around the circuit on the NATO side indicates a strong
willingness to go forward, and I believe we will have an
enduring partnership between NATO and the Republic of
Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. You expect that could be accomplished by
that Summit?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. Now, discussions between us and Afghanistan
on a long-term strategic partnership agreement have allegedly
slowed down reportedly over the issues of night raids and
detention operations. Is it your expectation that those issues
would need to be resolved within the U.S.-Afghanistan strategic
partnership negotiations before an Afghanistan-NATO strategic
partnership agreement could be finalized?
Admiral Stavridis. First of all, those particular
discussions are in the U.S. chain. So it would be General
Mattis who would be focused on that, obviously. My sense is
that on the NATO side, we are going to move forward
independently of national bilateral agreements. Some European
nations have already concluded strategic partnership
agreements. Some are in discussions. There is a NATO path
forward on this that I am confident will be done by the Summit.
Chairman Levin. Now, on the question of our forces in
Europe, after the inactivation of two Army brigades and the one
A-10 squadron in Germany, I assume that this is going to affect
bases or sites that we have in Europe. I am wondering if you
would provide us for the record a list of the impact of those
changes on our locations in Europe.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I will be glad to.
[The information referred to follows:]

The inactivation of the two Army brigades will allow us to close
the communities of Bamberg and Schweinfurt, Germany (a total of 11
distinct sites), in addition to the communities of Mannheim and
Heidelberg, whose closure was announced in 2010. While the inactivation
of the A-10 squadron will reduce our presence in Spangdahlem, Germany,
it will remain an enduring location because of the presence of other
U.S. forces. Similarly, the divestiture of the Air Control Squadron at
Aviano Air Base, Italy, will reduce our presence but Aviano will remain
an enduring location. The Army will also reduce combat enablers by
2,500 personnel in Europe, coming from a variety of locations across
Germany. Finally, there are other ongoing basing efficiency initiatives
which may result in other site modifications that will be announced and
executed as soon as we've completed consultations with the affected
host nations.

Chairman Levin. Do you believe it is in our security
interest to pursue cooperation with Russia on missile defense?
Admiral Stavridis. I do.
Chairman Levin. Can you tell us why?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that as a general proposition,
the missile defense system that we are putting in place is not
in any way directed against Russia. It is directed against
ballistic missiles that could come from a variety of nations.
Chairman Levin. Including Iran?
Admiral Stavridis. Including Iran, of course. Clearly,
Russia's geopolitical position where they exist in the world,
their geography, would make it advantageous to have a means of
sharing information. Now, that is distinct from a fully
integrated system, and of course, we have to protect our
classified information and so forth. But I think there is
advantage in a tactical sense to this, and from a political
perspective, I think seeking zones of cooperation with Russia
where we can find them is a useful thing to do, recognizing
there are going to be areas that we are going to disagree with
the Russian Federation upon.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, you recently visited Libya, I believe, and had
discussions with military leaders in Libya. Can you give us
your reaction to those meetings?
General Ham. Sir, I have visited Tripoli, a first visit,
first of what I hope will be many visits to that country. Early
in February, we hosted the military chiefs of the Libyan armed
forces at our headquarters in Germany. All of this focused on
establishing what I will call a normalized military-to-military
engagement process.
I am encouraged by the willingness of the Libyans to want
to have that kind of relationship. To that end, we have stood
up an Office of Security Cooperation. That is the mechanism
that we would have to facilitate things such as foreign
military sales and international military education and
training (IMET) programs.
So I think we are off to a good start. The challenge for us
will be to sustain that and make sure we are addressing the
security concerns that are of mutual interest to Libya and the
United States.
Chairman Levin. Thank you both.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I am sure in your experience you remember that we
intervened in Kosovo and Bosnia because ethnic cleansing and an
unacceptable situation prevailed that caused us to intervene
and stop the massacre that was going on, right?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Yesterday the Secretary General of NATO,
Mr. Rasmussen, told The Cable, ``we haven't had any discussions
about a NATO role in Syria, and I don't envision such a role
for the alliance.'' Is it true that NATO is doing no
contingency planning of any kind with respect to Syria,
including for the provision of humanitarian and medical
assistance?
Admiral Stavridis. We are not doing any detailed
contingency planning at this point, Senator, and there is a
reason for that. Within the NATO command structure, there has
to be an authorization from the North Atlantic Council before
we can conduct detailed planning.
Senator McCain. Before you can do any planning?
Admiral Stavridis. Before we do detailed contingency
planning.
Senator McCain. I asked if there is any planning going on.
Admiral Stavridis. There is always a close monitoring of a
situation like that, but there is nothing that I would
categorize as detailed planning.
Senator McCain. Would you characterize the crisis in Syria
as an armed conflict between Assad's forces and opposition
forces?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I would.
Senator McCain. Would the provision of arms, communication
equipment, and tactical intelligence help the Syrian opposition
to better organize itself and push Assad from power?
Admiral Stavridis. I would think it would, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. So here we are with a NATO that was willing
to engage and intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo, but we will not
even make any contingency plans for the massacre that is going
on in Syria. I guess I will not have to ask a comment on that.
It speaks for itself as to the role of NATO.
General Ham, have you seen evidence of al Qaeda attempting
to exploit unrest in Libya and Tunisia? If so, have they had
any success?
General Ham. Sir, we have seen indications that al Qaeda
seeks to take advantage of the situation in Libya. It is less
clear to me that they have the same intent in Tunisia, but
Libya to be sure.
Senator McCain. In your prepared remarks, you say there are
clear indications that AQIM is now involved in trafficking arms
from Libya. Could you tell us a little bit about the
indications, what kind of weapons they are trafficking, and has
al Qaeda acquired MANPADS from Libya?
General Ham. Senator, if you allow me, it would be best, I
think, to give you the details in a classified response to your
question. But more generally, we certainly have seen the
transit of small arms, some heavy weapons, and munitions from
stockpiles in Libya through the border area between Niger and
Algeria, and we assume that that is intended to resupply AQIM
principally operating in northern Mali.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator McCain. This whole issue the Tunisians have with
their border problems lends itself to making the situation
worse because they do not have control of their borders, right?
General Ham. Sir, that is true for most of the nations in
that neighborhood.
Senator McCain. So it would be in our interest to help the
Tunisians, as I mentioned in my prepared statement, with some
ability to better control their own borders.
General Ham. I agree with that, Senator.
Senator McCain. Admiral, in the NDAA, we put in language
about Georgia and the sale of defensive arms. Have we had any
advice and counsel from you on that as to how we can carry out
that mission of helping them with defensive weapons?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we are moving very fast on that and
I anticipate that coming back to the committee, to Congress, at
the end of this month. I want to assure you it is getting a
great deal of attention and we are leaning forward on it very
much.
I also want to just mention--and you picked up on this, but
Georgia's contributions in Afghanistan are almost beyond
noteworthy. They have a full battalion there. They have just
agreed to add a second battalion. They will then become the
largest troop-contributing nation on a per capita basis of the
50 nations who are there. We are also looking at bringing them
into the NATO Special Operations Headquarters to do some work
in that regard too. So overall, as you indicated, it is a
nation that we are working with very closely, and I look
forward to delivering the section 1242 data you asked for at
the end of the month.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
General Ham, on a recent visit that we paid to both Tunisia
and Libya, I got the distinct impression that al Qaeda is a
threat and radical Islamist elements are a threat, but overall,
more so in Tunisia than Libya because they are further along.
There does not seem to be a fear, at least amongst the people
of these countries, about those extreme elements having an
undue influence. But at the same time, this issue, particularly
in Libya, of all these weapons lying around, including perhaps
MANPADS--I have heard figures as much as 20,000. The militias
that are still not under government control should give us
pause.
What is your assessment, because you hear a lot of
different opinions in the United States, of the real threat
that these countries might fall under the sway or influence or
takeover by al Qaeda, Salafis, or other extreme Islamist
organizations that might not be in the United States' national
security interest?
General Ham. Senator, from the reporting that I have seen
and my interaction with leaders in both countries, I do not
think there is great likelihood that an extremist organization
will be able to extend control of the government of either
country. It is rather the network and the cells of extremist
organizations that are seeking to take advantage of the current
unrest particularly in Libya that would undermine the efforts
of the legitimate government of those countries. I think that
is the real threat rather than taking over the country.
Senator McCain. So a lot of it will be gauged by the
progress that they make towards forming up a government,
getting the militias under control. In other words, nation-
building from scratch.
General Ham. Good governance and establishment of
legitimate security institutions are absolutely key to the
success in both countries.
Senator McCain. I found, much to my dismay, that both the
prime minister and the deputy prime minister were professors at
the University of Alabama, and that brings an extreme element
into the government----[Laughter.]
--that should be of significant concern, I believe. Do you
agree, General?
General Ham. Sir, I do not. Having met the prime minister,
I think he is--and he will be here in this city next week.
Senator McCain. I hope all of our colleagues have the
chance to meet him.
Admiral Stavridis. I would just add ``Roll Tide.''
[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I was going to thank Senator McCain for his
questions until that last one. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, Admiral and General, for your service.
I must admit that I never thought that of all the things I
have had the honor to experience in my time as a Senator, that
I would ever be sitting in Tripoli with the leadership of the
country, could say the two words that you said, ``Roll Tide,''
and receive thunderous applause in response. [Laughter.]
Admiral, let me join those who are thanking you for your
service, extraordinary service to our country. It has been a
great honor and really a pleasure to get to know you. You
obviously have been a great military leader but you also have a
tremendous sense of history which I think has contributed to
your service to our country. May I say I know you referred with
your characteristic humility a while ago to your height. You
join a rather proud list of great military leaders over history
who have not been tall except in the quality and effect of
their leadership. I thank you very much for that. Obviously, I
have no bias against people who are not tall. [Laughter.]
Admiral Stavridis. You look pretty tall to me, Senator.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. Now, let me begin with you. I do want to
say for the record that I share the consternation that Senator
McCain expressed about the excess of rhetoric and deficiency of
any real action to assist the opposition in Syria. This does
remind me of experiences we had in Bosnia and Kosovo in the
1990s. It actually took quite a while for us to build the
political will both here and in Europe to get involved there.
While we were doing that, a lot of people got killed. The same
is happening in Syria now. I hope it does not take us so long.
In both of those cases, when we got involved, we were able to
stop it--NATO, our coalition of the willing--and brought about
a much better situation than existed before. I hope before long
we will be able to do that there as well.
I also want to touch on another matter that Senator McCain
raised and that is our relations with Georgia. As you well
know, Admiral, there will be a NATO Summit in Chicago this
spring. It does not appear to me, from what I hear, that there
will be anything on the agenda about further NATO enlargement.
I hope we can find a way to make clear in Chicago that the door
to NATO has not been closed to other nations, particularly I am
thinking of Georgia, but there are others as well.
Do you have any sense of that? I presume it will not be on
the agenda, but can we find a way to let countries like Georgia
know that the door is still open to them to NATO?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I do not know if it will be on the
agenda. But as you surmise, I doubt that it will be formally
placed on the agenda. There are nations in various stages of
moving toward membership including, among others, Macedonia and
Montenegro. Georgia is in a national plan that continues to
make progress.
The treaty is very clear. The treaty is very simple in
terms of an open door is defined, democratic ideals, position
to contribute, unanimous consent of the members. I think that
the United States continuing to use its voice within the
councils of NATO can move this position very effectively, and
that is how I would approach it.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I hope that is, in fact, the case.
Let me ask you one follow-on question about the really
tragic events in Afghanistan in the last week or so. Do we have
a judgment about whether the unrest that followed the
regrettable, to put it mildly, burning of the Koran is
spontaneous or whether our enemies there, the Taliban, for
instance, are basically jumping on an unfortunate event and
trying to turn it to their advantage?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I will provide some classified
data on that. As you can imagine, we do have a sense of it. I
would say it is somewhat both, and we will provide you some
more detail on that.
Senator Lieberman. That is good enough for now.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Lieberman. General Ham, I wanted to come back to
the LRA. I know the President a while back deployed about 100
of our special forces into Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of Congo, et cetera, in response to the LRA. Can you give us a
status report on that operation this morning?
General Ham. Senator, I would be glad to.
The force is deployed. We have liaisons in each of the
national capitals that work with the military forces of the
four countries. More importantly, they are deployed in the
operating areas particularly in the Central African Republic
and the Republic of South Sudan, as well as members who operate
in a joint intelligence operation center in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. They are mostly special forces. Personnel
are advisors and trainers. They are facilitating the flow of
intelligence. They are helping with logistics planning so that
the African forces can sustain themselves for longer periods in
what is a very large and austere operating area and also
assisting with long-range communications.
So I think we are off to a pretty good start. The next
steps for us are, in concert particularly with Uganda and South
Sudan, to use a South Sudanese base from which we can fly an
ISR aircraft to extend the range into what we think is the most
likely operating area of the LRA in the Central African
Republic and the northern portion of the Republic of South
Sudan. So far, so good.
A concern is the rainy season is coming. That will impede
intelligence collection and certainly tactical movement. So we
have a bit of a sense of urgency to try to get done everything
we can before the rains hit.
Senator Lieberman. How would you describe what the goal of
our presence there is?
General Ham. Sir, we are an enabling force to facilitate
and advance the capabilities of the African forces, to increase
their ability to sustain their operations for longer periods of
time. They have much better human intelligence. Their field-
craft is quite good. They need mostly communications, a little
bit of sustaining capability, a little bit of planning effort.
But it will be the Africans who bring this mission to a
successful conclusion.
Senator Lieberman. Of course, the goal of their efforts is
to defeat the LRA and to presumably capture or kill its leader.
Is that correct?
General Ham. Yes, sir, that is.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Let me go back to Tunisia and just invite you to say a
little more, General Ham. As others who have been there, I have
been really impressed by the transition they made. They had a
good interim government. They held open, free, and fair
elections. They have elected a government which the majority of
the elected representatives to the parliament were members of a
party called Inyatta, which is Islamist, but has really, I
think, helped a lot of us have a different vision or a fair
vision of what is possible for a party that calls themselves
Islamists in terms of respect for law, women's rights,
democracy.
But they have some really big challenges, and I think
perhaps of all the Arab Spring uprisings, this is the one that
has the greatest prospect to succeed, but they need our help to
do so. I know immediately they need financial assistance, which
a lot of countries are talking about doing, including our own.
But what about military-to-military? I was surprised at how
little we were giving them before this uprising certainly as
compared to Egypt but really other countries in the region as
well. I wanted to invite you to talk a little bit about what
your plans are, if you have any--I hope you do--to work with
the Tunisian military to build their capabilities in the year
ahead.
General Ham. Senator, during the transitional period, the
interim government period, we had dialogue with the Tunisian
Ministry of Defense and their armed forces, but there was some
reluctance to commit to longer-term arrangements. Now that the
government has been seated and the government is certainly more
permanent, we had just 2 weeks ago a bi-national commission
meeting with the Tunisians in Tunis, again to map out the
military-to-military engagement and security assistance plan
between the two countries.
What the Tunisians have asked us for at the top of their
list is assistance with border security, both land and in the
maritime domain. So we are seeking opportunities to do that.
Second, they have asked us to make sure that we can at
least sustain and preferably increase the number of Tunisian
officers who are afforded the opportunity to train in U.S.
military educational institutions.
So again, a good basis for an enduring relationship, I
think, is formed, and we just have to sustain that now well
into the future.
Senator Lieberman. Good. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis. Can I add just one thing, sir, on this,
on Tunisia? It is a NATO organization called the Mediterranean
Dialogue which brings together non-NATO Mediterranean
countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Israel, and
is a mechanism that we are going to employ to bring Libya
closer as well. So there are alliance mechanisms as well as the
good points that General Ham made.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Again, Godspeed in the
chapters ahead, Admiral.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think when we talked about the force structure in EUCOM
being reduced and if you go back--it is my understanding--
through the 1990s, that reduction has gone up as high as 75
percent even before the more current reductions. You have
answered the question in terms of meeting the contingencies
there, but I did not hear anything, General Ham, in terms of
this reduction and the fact that we need a rapid response
sometimes to things that are happening in Africa that you and I
have talked about. How is this impeding your looking down the
road?
General Ham. Senator, I think we will be okay. The air and
maritime forces that have been forward-stationed in Europe were
absolutely essential to operations in Libya. Those forces will
largely remain in Europe, and I think we will be in good shape.
The special forces that are stationed in Europe are going to be
enhanced in the future with some special operations aviation
that will, I think, again give us increased capability. One of
the Army brigades that is retained is the Airborne Brigade
based in Italy. That is the most likely Army force that we
would require in a contingency. So I am pretty satisfied,
Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Vicenza?
General Ham. Yes, sir.
Then lastly, sir, as Admiral Stavridis laid out in Europe
where there will be a rotational presence, we are actually very
fortunate that the very first of what are called regionally-
aligned brigades or regionally-aligned forces will come to U.S.
Army Africa, our Army component, in fiscal year 2013. We think
that is a very good initiative. It gives some predictability
and will enhance our ability not only to respond to emergent
contingencies but, more importantly, to continue exercises and
partnership activities on a predictable basis on the continent.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral, I was pretty much involved in the
Vicenza, back when we had to use them to overfly Turkey, and
helping them. Fortunately, we had weather that was cooperating
at that time, but we now have--I think it is all complete now.
The staging area in Aviano, is that operating to your
satisfaction?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I visited it about 8 months
ago. It is a terrific facility.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, it is, it is. Yes, I was there also.
Just for a minute, going back--and I appreciate the fact
that Senator Lieberman was asking questions about the LRA. It
was actually my legislation back in 2009 and we called it the
LRA Disarmament in Northern Uganda. At that time, Northern
Uganda was pretty much it, up there around Gulu. My first
exposure to that was some 16 years ago. Now moving all around
as far south as you mentioned, Eastern Congo--and I had
occasion to be in South Sudan, one of the first visitors there
under that new country. That was one of their major concerns up
there. So I do know that it has expanded to the point where I
always felt we should be considering that a major terrorist
activity, even though they say Joseph Koni is one man, he has a
few close lieutenants, but they are spreading around. They have
mobility.
The question I would ask you about this is, do you feel you
have the assets necessary--we will start with just the LRA--to
handle what you need to handle and then emphasize the fact that
even though we have some combat troops there, it is not a
combat mission that we have. There has been a lot of criticism
that people thought that it was. Would you elaborate on that?
General Ham. Senator, I would be glad to. First of all,
with regard to the role of the forces, we are a train, advise,
and assist role. We are not those who are out on operational
missions. However, because of the area in which our forces
operate, they are combat-equipped. There are dangerous areas in
which they are operating, and they are certainly based
alongside the forces of the nations involved.
With regard to assets, I have the assets I need with one
exception, that if you will allow me to do so, to answer in a
classified forum.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

General Ham. The challenge for us right now, particularly
with reconnaissance, is the ability to reach all of the areas
we need to reach to be able to observe or try to collect and
identify where the leaders of the LRA are operating. That is
why this base in South Sudan, which General James Hoth Mai,
Chief of Staff of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),
who you have met, has offered to us, is so important because it
will allow us to extend and have the reconnaissance aircraft
operate for longer periods of time in the areas in which we
think the LRA is operating, again particularly in the Central
African Republic and the northern regions of the Republic of
South Sudan.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate it. I know what you are doing
and you are doing a great job. We do get classified briefings
on a regular basis, and I would just like to make sure that
anything that comes up that changes what you are doing now or
progress you are making that you share that with me personally.
[The information referred to follows:]

We continue to make steady progress toward enabling our African
partners to defeat the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and remove Joseph
Kony and his senior commanders from Central Africa. Cooperation,
coordination, and communication between the forces of Uganda, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic
(CAR), the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS), and the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in the DRC are improving steadily. I believe this
cooperation will result in increased effectiveness against the LRA in
the months ahead.
Our near-term efforts focus now on developing better intelligence,
operations integration, logistics support, command and control, and
communications with our regional partners. Special Operations Forces
(SOF) advisors are now postured at forward operating locations in Obo
and Djema, CAR; Nzara, RoSS; and at Dungu, DRC. We have also
established C-LRA Operations Fusion Centers in the CAR at Djema and
Obo; and in RoSS at Nzara. These centers enable our partners to better
synchronize operations and integrate the efforts of local civic
leaders. Additionally, we are in coordination with Kinshasa and our
counterparts, Forces Armees de la Republic Democratic du Congo, to
advance our partnering efforts in the DRC.
The progress of our African partners is encouraging. The Ugandan
military is conducting patrols while our forces continue to train
Ugandan C-LRA units. The CAR Government has supported regional C-LRA
efforts by providing U.S. and Ugandan forces continued access to its
territory. RoSS has granted permission for Ugandan presence in South
Sudan and has agreed in principle to host a regional African Union C-
LRA Task Force Headquarters. DRC military responsiveness to LRA
sightings is a positive development and could indicate increased
commitment to C-LRA operations.
I anticipate continuing progress in C-LRA operations. U.S. forces
have established operating bases and sustainment mechanisms to support
regional C-LRA operations. They have developed solid relationships with
regional forces, helped refine intelligence-sharing, and intelligence-
driven planning. We are working together with the U.S. Embassy country
teams to implement a DOD rewards program that will provide incentives
to communities as well as individuals to support elimination of the
LRA.

Senator Inhofe. Getting into the Boko Haram, I think that
has been there. They say that it only came by that name since
2001. However, I can remember being with Sani Abacha as long
ago as 16 years ago, and while it was not called that at the
time, it was the genesis of what has become Boko Haram.
I just would ask if you think that the capability of the
Nigerian forces--how are they--how would you assess them and
their capability of handling that because I consider that to be
a major problem in that part of Africa.
General Ham. Sir, we have been engaged with the Nigerians
to seek opportunities, if they would like us to, to seek to
increase the capabilities specifically of their tailored
counterterrorist forces. Their general purpose forces are
pretty good, but they are not really designed for this kind of
a mission. We think, just as we have found, having some
specialized training, equipping, small forces that are very
specifically focused on a counterterrorist role, would probably
be beneficial to Nigeria. If they would like some help, we
would like to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. You think maybe the 1206 and 1207
programs have a very good application there?
General Ham. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I was going to say that I want to include
IMET throughout the continent down there and how beneficial
that has been. When I am down there, I can see the results of
that. You see the people that we have trained and they have
gone back to these areas. It has been a very successful
program, and I would assume that you agree with that.
Admiral Stavridis. If I could just say a word on 1206. In
the EUCOM dimension, we use that to prepare our allies to go
forward into Afghanistan with us, and it absolutely underpins
the contribution of 40,000 European troops. So 1206 has been a
terrific initiative from the EUCOM perspective as well, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. My time has expired, but I would like
to have you make one comment about an area that really
impresses me is in Kabul, the military training center there.
We have watched this. I know the Oklahoma 45th was actually
over there in the very early stages long before that center was
developed. But is that progressing and are you getting the
results that you were looking in ANA and the quality of
training?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, absolutely. Just to give you a
number, we now have 80 percent of the instructors there are
Afghans.
Senator Inhofe. It is 80 percent now?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. That is quite an improvement. I was there
over New Year's and it was about half of that, I thought, at
that time. So it has really been improving quite a bit. Good.
Good work.
Let me also get on record and say the same thing that the
other Senators have said about your service, about our personal
relationship, and how much you will be missed. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, let me thank you for your service. In
our little discussion before, what you are doing is you are
avoiding being disintermediated, and that is an important point
that we discussed earlier.
Your testimony notes that we have completed phase one of
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile
defense. It is designed and intended to defend against the
existing growing threat from Iranian ballistic missiles to
Europe and other possibilities as well. You also note that our
NATO allies are making efforts to contribute to NATO's new
missile defense mission.
Can you in layman's terms, as much as possible, describe
why you believe this EPAA and the planned capabilities of it
are important to defending Europe against Iran's growing
missile capabilities, particularly phase two in Romania and
phase three in Poland?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. You correctly categorized the
threat as coming from that region of the world and it is only
growing. Therefore, we have an obligation, an alliance
obligation, here and, of course, ultimately that threat will
probably be intercontinental in nature. So all the more reason
at that point to be defending the Homeland. So as we build up
from the current phase one, which is a couple of Aegis ships, a
static radar system, a command and control system up in
Germany, we put all that together. We are going to combine that
with the NATO command and control system.
By 2015, we will have a land-based interceptor set that
will be ashore in Deveselu, Romania. We will upgrade the
missiles at that point. We will upgrade the command and
control. We will lash in more overhead sensors, and then the
next step will be 2018 when we will add another set of ground
interceptors in Poland.
As we build this, I am confident the NATO allies will step
up and contribute as well. For example, the Dutch are buying
ships that are capable now of plugging into this architecture
like our four DDGs, our destroyers that will be going to Rota.
So it is a progression. It is phased and it is adaptive to
the threat in that we can plug in at any step along the way to
continue to improve it to pace the threat that we see.
Senator Nelson. It is adequately named. Because it is
phased adaptive, it can be adapted to what the changes would
require, but it is also called the defense. It is not intended
to be an offense approach. It is defense. So I think that is
important for people to understand.
You noted and Senator McCain noted about the Aegis
ballistic defense ships that are going to be based. Can you
explain the benefit of homeporting for the four ships at Rota
as compared to having the ships transit the Atlantic as an
alternative?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. The advantage of having them
forward, if you will, in Rota is partly the multi-capability of
the ships. In other words, these are not just ballistic missile
ships. They are air defense ships. They are anti-submarine
ships. They are anti-surface ships. They can be used as
intelligence gatherers. They have very sophisticated aircraft
attached to them. So the capability that you bring forward into
this theater is frankly profound, and it also helps my fellow
combatant commander here because Rota is uniquely positioned
essentially directly between EUCOM and AFRICOM. These ships
could be 1 day working down off the Gulf of Guinea addressing
threats from a Boko Haram scenario. In the next few weeks, they
could transit through the Suez and be doing counterpiracy
missions. The next week, they could be doing their traditional
missions in the ballistic missile sense in the eastern
Mediterranean.
The advantage to having them forward and not transiting the
Atlantic is simply one of time/distance. For every ship that is
forward-deployed, it is really the equivalent of the effort of
three or four ships back in the United States because of that
transit time it has to eat up.
Then lastly, the political benefit of having them there to
engage with our allies, I think, speaks for itself within the
alliance, sir.
Senator Nelson. In addition to the Dutch, are other NATO
allies working on comparable ships or comparable warfighting
opportunities?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. The Spanish are looking at
this. The Germans and Italians have air defense systems that
they are looking to lash into this. All the nations contribute
in the command and control arena and certainly in the staffing
and the command structure. So over time, my intention is to
continue to encourage our European allies to shoulder their
rightful part of this, and I think over time we should continue
to press that hard.
Senator Nelson. We have been frustrated in the past because
it felt like NATO was the United States pulling a lot of our
friends along but they were not pulling their weight in terms
of the financial cost or the capability to be supportive as we
have been. Do you see that as developing in parity?
Admiral Stavridis. I think we have to continue to press on
our allies to spend more on defense as a general proposition.
The Europeans set a goal of 2 percent of the GDP, and they are
not meeting that. In the aggregate, they spend about 1.5
percent of GDP. They are not meeting their own standards for
doing that, and I think the United States should continue to
press this very hard. I do at every opportunity and I welcome
the chance to address it in a public forum like this as well.
Senator Nelson. I think it is important, and I appreciate
the fact you are stating that so publicly because it seems at
times as though our allies would sacrifice until our last
penny. What we need to do is be sure that there is a parity
here among all the nations that gain from this security
apparatus that we have.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I agree we need to continue to
press hard.
Senator Nelson. General Ham, one of the broad questions
that always comes to mind is what in your command keeps you
awake at night from time to time, the threat that perhaps is
the hardest to quantify, the hardest to identify, the hardest
to deal with.
General Ham. Senator, very clearly at the top of my list is
the threat of a terrorist attack that would emanate from Africa
but be conducted here in the Homeland. It is not too hard to
imagine how that might happen. For example, a Somalia American
citizen disaffected finds his way--probably a young man finds
his way to Somalia to a training camp, because he is a U.S.
passport holder, perhaps finds a way to negotiate the various
security systems, and then conducts an attack here in the
Homeland. That is mission failure for us, Senator, and that is
what keeps me awake.
Senator Nelson. Obviously, that is one of the hardest
things, if not the hardest thing, to defend against.
General Ham. It is, sir, but again, with our emphasis on
working by, with, and through host nation forces, seeking ways
to have stable institutions in Africa, the likelihood that an
attack like that could occur lessens. That is really what we
are focused on.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To both of you, thank you for your service, obviously, and
your leadership.
I would like to follow up on my colleagues' comments on
Syria. I certainly share their concerns and agree that we
should empower our partners who are in the best position to
exert pressure on the Assad regime. So I just want to note that
for the record.
Admiral, I would like to just switch gears a little bit.
You have mentioned how proud you are of the National Guard
partnership program. I have actually had the honor of
participating with Massachusetts going over to Paraguay and
serving and learning. I can tell you firsthand that program is
unbelievable. The work I have done also over at DOD in
understanding the larger role of that program has been eye-
opening as well.
I am assuming that you agree that that program is unique,
cost-effective, and a necessary international engagement tool.
Is that a fair statement?
Admiral Stavridis. Oh, I would go beyond that, Senator.
First, thank you for your service as well.
Let me say that I think the State Partnership Program (SPP)
dollar-for-dollar may be one of the most efficient and
effective programs that we have at our disposal as combatant
commanders. I have 22 of these programs in the European
theater. When I was the Commander of SOUTHCOM, I had the SPP
you allude to. Down there I had about 20 of those programs. So
I have seen about 40 to 45 of these over the last 6 years, and
the bang for the buck is terrific because in the end we can do
all kinds of messaging and strategic communication but personal
contact trumps everything. When we put fine young American
National Guardsmen and women in and around their partners, the
return on investment, especially over time, is very powerful.
I will conclude by saying the other thing about the Guard
is they bring this unique basket of civilian skills along with
their military skills, and that has real application,
particularly in many of these less-developed countries.
Senator Brown. You are right. The bang for the dollar--I
was actually shocked as to how little it actually is and the
value we get out of it. I am concerned that the Department of
State (DOS) is trying to wrestle the program from us, and I
would encourage you and others to advocate for it because of
its effectiveness.
I am wondering if we reduce our military presence in
Europe, how do you think the partnership program will be
affected, if at all?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it becomes more valuable in that
scenario because it is relatively low cost. If we are going to
have less static forces assigned in Europe, the ability to have
those State partnership folks rolling in and out becomes even
more valuable.
Senator Brown. Can you comment on the ongoing discussions
between DOD and our German and Italian allies with respect to
the termination of the Medium Extended Air Defense System
(MEADS) program? Are these discussions progressing?
Admiral Stavridis. They are progressing. Congress has
helped us by sharpening the amount of funding that we can spend
on this. We are in the process of discussing this. This is
really done on a policy level in DOD, but I track it because I
talk all the time to the senior German and Italian military
folks. I would categorize it as a discussion that is ongoing
that will, I think, conclude successfully in a mutually agreed
way this spring.
Senator Brown. General, if I could, the Guard currently are
partners with eight countries in Africa, and I understand you
believe there is some room for growth there. Can you comment,
how might those plans for an Army regionally aligned brigade
and Air Force Africa Partnership Flight in supporting those
programs? Is there any option to expand or maintain those types
of programs?
General Ham. Senator, I believe there is. First, with
regard to the SPP, like Admiral Stavridis, I am a big fan of
that. It is the enduring relationships that are developed in
the SPP that are so valuable to that effort.
I have asked General McKinley if we could add two more
State partners this year. I think we should look for some new
and innovative ways to apply the SPP. For example, in a place
like Libya where we have a newly forming relationship rather
than a longstanding relationship, that might be a place where
we could apply the SPP to great effect. So we will continue to
look for opportunities such as that.
The regionally aligned forces, the African Partnership
Flight like African Partnership Station, the maritime component
of that, what I think we will see in the years coming is an
increased degree of predictability as the U.S. force presence
is now out of Iraq and beginning to decline in Afghanistan,
more predictable forces to be available for engagement, for
exercises, and again, all with an eye toward increasing the
capacity and the capability of the key African states that we
interact with so that they can do more, contribute more to
their own stability and to regional stability.
Senator Brown. That is interesting you say that. I noted
just from firsthand commentary that the rule of law training
that the Judge Advocates Generals and others provide these new
relationships in countries where they really do not have a rule
of law, they do not have an understanding as to how we are able
to balance the civilian and military especially in places like
Paraguay and other countries as well. That is very important,
and I appreciate both of your support of that program.
I was wondering--General, I might as well stay with you. In
your opinion, who should be the folks that will teach the
Libyans how to safely store all of the unserviceable weaponry
floating around Libya? Who do you think should be running that
train?
General Ham. At present, it is a DOS-led activity to try to
help the Libyans, along with the neighboring states, first, to
gain control, find out what weapons were in existence and then
try to claim them under central government control, and then
following that, do an assessment of the serviceability, what
are the needs. I am very comfortable with that process to have
the DOS lead. We help. We are part of that process, but I think
it is okay, and as it is a government-to-government activity, I
think, that works okay.
Senator Brown. I might as well just wrap up with you on the
no-fly ban with seven Americans working in Egypt. I know it is
not your AOR. But I was wondering if there is any impact on
AFRICOM's approach to other countries in the region potentially
having similar types of problems. Are there any issues there?
General Ham. None noted, sir, but it is not a question I
have asked but we can.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Admiral, I have one final question and then I will wrap it
up with my inquiring. Our relationship with Pakistan has
obviously a direct impact on your ability to maintain lines of
communications through their country. Our combat footprint in
Afghanistan, as it evolves, we obviously have a huge logistical
tail that follows. How will this affect EUCOM's relationship
with U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to facilitate an
adequate flow of equipment along the Northern Distribution
Network?
Admiral Stavridis. It is a terrific question that we are
wrestling with because, as you correctly say, in order to get
all of our equipment out of Afghanistan over the next 2 or 3
years will be a significant logistical task. I am in contact
constantly with General Fraser, TRANSCOM, to ensure that we can
move it through that Northern Distribution Network, and that
gets into a lot of complex politics along that route, to say
the least.
On Pakistan, I think we are moving in a somewhat better
direction than we were, say, 6 months ago, 5 months ago. So
hopefully we will have access both to those southern and the
northern routes. But, I think, hope for the best, plan for the
worst, and we are doing that.
Senator Brown. Thank you, both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Admiral. Good morning, General. Thank you for
taking the time to be here with us today.
General Ham, if I might, I would like to turn to you. You
may remember that during your confirmation hearing last year, I
noted that your predecessor had cosponsored a study by the
Defense Science Board (DSB), on the trends and implications of
climate change for national and international security. The
study has special emphasis on Africa. The report was published
last October and is in my view a detailed and thoughtful
analysis of ``observable, measurable, and real'' impacts of
climate change. The report also contains assessments of the
consequences of climate change that ``will continue to have
major consequences for the political, economic, and geographic
world.''
So the basic conclusion of the DSB was that changes in
climate patterns present new challenges to regional security
and stability. The report goes on to warn that failure to
anticipate and mitigate the impacts increases the likelihood of
more failed states and the potential for conflict.
I was also really interested in the specific
recommendations of the report regarding the role of DOD and
combatant commands as a part of whole-of-government effort to
help avoid such humanitarian and security crises. In my view,
those conflicts could pose a serious threat to U.S. national
security interests in Africa and elsewhere.
Could you comment on your personal views on the overall
findings and recommendations of the DSB, and would you agree
that resource scarcity and the impacts of climate change have
the potential to cause or aggravate conflicts in your AOR?
General Ham. I believe, Senator, there is no question but
that environmental security can have a dramatic effect on
overall security both in individual states and more regionally.
I would tell you my frank assessment is that we are having
better success in response to environmental security challenges
than we are finding traction for preventive or predictive
actions that could be taken. On the good side, we have
incorporated in a number of regional exercises, which we
conduct over the course of this fiscal year, 16 exercises
involving as many as 30 different African states that will have
as a component of that exercise response to an environmental
disaster of some sort, mostly water-related either flood or
drought.
We are finding that the African nations are very accepting
and understanding of the security impacts of such issues. As I
indicated, though, we are finding--and perhaps because it is
more difficult, less traction on the preventive steps than we
are on response.
Senator Udall. That makes complete sense.
There were specific recommendations in the report regarding
the role of combatant commands, including AFRICOM. I know you
have just spoken to those in a general way. Are there any
additional comments you would want to make on specific
recommendations that are in the DSB?
General Ham. Senator, one is the presence of some subject-
matter experts, specifically water experts, on the staff, again
leading to the interagency nature of the command. So we have
had in the past representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and from the U.S. Geological Survey present on the
staff to help us with those issues. We are currently gapped
right now. We do not have folks present, but both those
organizations are sending people to us we hope will join us
this summer.
Senator Udall. I think you anticipated my next question
which was it strikes me that we need to develop the data and
systems to help identify the actions necessary to avoid or at
least mitigate the effects of climate. Is that what you were
just speaking to?
General Ham. I would agree with that, sir, and again, it is
not just defense. It is working with the USAID, with others,
and in many cases, USAID partnered with nongovernmental
organizations to assist African countries in planning and
preparing for the impacts of environmental change.
Senator Udall. Finally, on this subject--and thank you for
your attention and interest in this--could you provide your
views concerning whether actions to address the humanitarian
and security effects of climate change should be an integral
part of a whole-of-government conflict avoidance strategy?
Perhaps it could be addressed within the newly established
Global Security Contingency Fund framework or other multi-
agency efforts focused on avoiding conflict.
General Ham. Sir, necessarily it must be a whole-of-
government approach. No one element of the government has all
the resources, authorities, or capabilities to address the
impacts on security of environmental change. To that end, I
think we have a responsibility at AFRICOM to work very closely
not only with the Chiefs of Mission in Africa who have the
responsibility to pull together that whole-of-government
effort, but also with the various bureaus in DOS, with USAID
central, and with others to make sure that we are, first of
all, aware of one another's capabilities and finding increased
opportunities to synchronize our efforts, again with an end
toward assisting the African countries to deal with what is an
increasingly serious security matter that ultimately
contributes to our security by them being more secure.
Senator Udall. So we deploy all of our influence, our
power, our smart power, our kinetic power, any combinations.
Thank you for that insight.
Let me turn to the concept of strategic communication. Can
you define what you mean by strategic communication, Admiral,
and why you think it is so important for the military?
Admiral Stavridis. I can. I think that in the 21st century,
as we seek to deliver security--and it ties to this whole-of-
government idea, and it is really a whole-of-society idea. At
the end of the day, we need to communicate on motives. We need
to communicate our actions. We need to be in a position to
convince others that we are a force for good--we, the military;
we, the United States of America; we, the larger society as a
whole. To do that effectively, you have to use all the modern
tools. You have to use Facebook and Twitter, Linkedin, all of
those kinds of things. But as I said to Senator Brown a moment
ago, in the end, personal contact trumps everything. So a
combination of all those things, crafting a strategic approach,
that is strategic communications.
Senator Udall. General, do you have a point of view as
well?
General Ham. I am seated next to the master. So I have
learned from him.
But I would echo that. Of course, in many parts of Africa,
it is less developed than Europe. So the extension of mass
media and other social networking is really starting to grow,
and what we are finding is that it is growing exponentially. It
is not the incremental approach that we saw as we have been
growing up with the military over the past several years, but
they leap ahead in various places in Africa. So part of our
role, I think, is not only understanding that ourselves and how
do we leverage that to our advantage, but encouraging it and
helping Africa militaries that we are partnered with for them
to take advantage of this as well, and some have done so quite
effectively.
Senator Udall. I know the Hart-Rudman Commission Report,
which was issued shortly before September 11 and still, I
think, has some very salient recommendations, talked about
military-to-military relationships and the importance of
expanding those to prepare for a coming 21st century
asymmetrical environment. There was also, Admiral, talk of more
people-to-people versus embassy-to-embassy kinds of contacts
and you are both describing those opportunities.
So thank you for your time. Thank you for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Ham, Admiral Stavridis. I want to say to
Admiral Stavridis, thank you for your distinguished service to
our country and we wish you all the best in the future. It will
certainly be a loss around here. We will miss you.
I wanted to just follow up briefly with what Senator Brown
had said and also lend my support to the SPP of the National
Guard. I think it has been a very effective and not only cost-
effective but a very strong way for us to represent our
interests in a collaborative way around the world. I appreciate
that.
I also wanted to follow up on Senator Brown's question
about the MEADS program. In the 2012 NDAA, we essentially said
that this committee wanted to cut off funding for MEADS. As I
understand it, in the 2013 budget, there is still $400 million
allocated for the MEADS program. With $15 trillion in debt,
that is a really hard sell to my constituents, that we should
allocate $400 million for a system that we will never procure
or use, particularly at a time when there is a need to upgrade
some of our Patriot systems that we will be using.
So I guess I would ask you to pursue that process very
rigorously because I do not think there is going to be a lot of
sympathy around here to allocate money for a weapons system
that we will never procure. I appreciate your efforts in that
regard, and I would like to see that happen sooner. Thank you.
The question I had also is in looking at the 2013 budget,
last year in the Defense Authorization Request (DAR), I had
concerns about the maritime prepositioning systems (MPS). In
particular, in the 2012 proposal, the Navy announced plans to
place 6 of the 16 ships from the 3 squadrons of the MPS into
reduced operating status. In particular, it was the forces in
the Mediterranean. As a result of that, I introduced to the
NDAA an amendment that was adopted that would require--because
we heard concerns from the Marine Corps, General Panter, about
what that would do. General Panter said it would translate to
potentially a slower response time in support of combatant
commands.
This is a very critical part of the world when you think
about our ability to respond in the Mediterranean with what we
see happening right now. In that area of the world, you have
Syria, Israel, and Egypt, all in that area. As I look at the
2013 budget, to my knowledge, we have not yet received that
certification from the Secretary of Defense in terms of the
impact of readiness on a reduced operating status. Now in the
2013 budget, we are actually eliminating the squadron in the
Mediterranean even though the unrest in that area--you think
about Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Libya. Certainly even from when
it was an initial recommendation in 2012, really the
circumstances have actually changed. Now we are going to
eliminate that prepositioned force.
I wanted to know what the strategic rationale was for that
and also what your view is in terms of an impact on readiness.
This is a real concern. I understand we are in a constrained
budgetary time, but we certainly, when you think about the
critical area of the world that we are talking about, do not
want to put ourselves in a position where we are not able to
respond promptly in those areas, particularly with our ally,
Israel.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Senator. I will also see if
General Ham might want to comment here because those forces, as
you correctly point out, the MPS capability would be at my
disposal or his disposal.
Senator Ayotte. Right.
Admiral Stavridis. Certainly the budget is part of this. We
are always looking within DOD to try and rationalize resources.
As you say, there are 16 total of these ships. By reducing the
number globally, in effect we take more risk in the theater
where you do not have the ship available. Part of the decision
is that we have additional stocks of prepositioned equipment in
Norway in a static setting up there. I can provide you for the
record some information on that. It gets into some
classification issues.
So we, all of us globally, combatant commanders, looked at
how can we try and find the best mix of maritime prepositioning
assets. So I am comfortable, although I recognize that it
includes additional risk in this area. I will be glad also to
follow up on the Norway piece and to give you a little fuller
explanation of that for the record and also give you the full
status of the process of moving the ships. They will actually
be there at least through this summer. They will be operating
in exercises in the Baltic for us, and I will get you the
details on that timeline.
[The information referred to follows:]

There are eight storage facilities in central Norway for Marine
Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N). The Norwegian Defense
Logistics Organization/Marine Expeditionary Brigade maintains this
equipment and their headquarters is located in the Trondhiem suburb of
Lade. The equipment is stored in six cave sites, bored into the sides
of mountains of solid rock, as well as in two airfield locations. Three
of the cave sites hold ground equipment that includes vehicles,
engineer assets, and supply items. The other three caves contain only
ammunition. The airfield locations hold equipment to support Marine
Corps aviation, but this does not include prepositioned storage of
Marine Corps aircraft. The MCPP-N is actively employed for exercises to
include Exercise African Lion, Cold Response (Norway), Baltops and
Saber Strike (Baltics), and Agile Spirit (Georgia), in addition to
enabling the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Black Sea
Rotational Force. In addition, MCPP-N is actively employed in
contingencies across the EUCOM AOR and elsewhere, to include
humanitarian assistance to Georgia, Russian wildfires, the earthquake
in Turkey, and support to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom.

Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that, Admiral.
I do not know if you have anything to add, General Ham?
General Ham. Senator, I would simply say that I agree with
that. The ability to move the land-based prepositioned
equipment very quickly throughout the region remains a very
important capability. So cooperative security locations and
other basing, I think, helps to offset the risk of the loss of
the MPS. Again, it is a tough, tough decision and we did
wrestle with this--the combatant commanders and the OSD staff.
I am okay with it, but I would tell you, just barely okay with
it.
Senator Ayotte. Yes. We are certainly taking on additional
risk with this.
One of the concerns that I have, as I have articulated, is
the original reduction that prompted my amendment to the NDAA
was actually recommended at a time prior to our involvement in
the conflict in Libya, prior to much of what is happening in
Syria right now and the Arab Spring, really when the initial
recommendation came out.
So one thing I would appreciate is pursuant to the 2012
NDAA, I had an amendment in that that said even to go to
reduced operating status, that the Commandant of the Marine
Corps would do an assessment on the impact on readiness and
that also the Secretary of Defense would submit to us an impact
on readiness and what risks we are taking on in that area of
the world. So, I would appreciate your follow-up on that.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate your testimony on this today.
I would say, General Ham, I do have a follow-up based on
last year when you appeared before our committee, and I
certainly appreciate it. As I understand your written
testimony, you have certainly expressed concern about the
collaboration between terrorist groups in Somalia, North
Africa, Nigeria, coordination of al Qaeda, and also the
coordination of al Shabaab and al Qaeda, the merger on February
9 of those two groups, which had worked together before but
clearly more of a merger.
Last year I asked you if we detained a member of al Qaeda
that was planning an attack on us or our allies, where would we
detain and interrogate that individual. You told me last year
that you would need some lawyerly help answering that one.
Has anything changed in 10 months? Do we now have a
detention facility if we capture someone under your command who
is a member of al Qaeda who is planning an attack on our
country where we will detain them to interrogate them?
General Ham. Senator, we do not have a detention facility
in the AFRICOM AOR. There have been some instances where such
individuals have been held aboard a U.S. ship awaiting final
determination as to where that individual would then be
transferred. Again, each case is a little bit different
depending on the nationality of the individuals involved, but
that is probably in the near-term about the best solution that
we have at present, is aboard a U.S. ship until such time as a
longer-term detention decision is made.
Senator Ayotte. But you would agree with me that on a ship,
we can only hold them for so long, and if we have to do a
longer interrogation of someone, that is not a permanent
solution to how we can detain and interrogate these individuals
and have the sufficient time if we need a longer interrogation.
General Ham. Absolutely, ma'am. A U.S. Navy ship is not a
good long-term solution.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Reed, I believe, is next. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me join my colleagues, Admiral Stavridis, and commend
you for your extraordinary service to the Navy and the Nation.
I know you will continue to serve in many different capacities.
Welcome, General Ham.
One of the key actors in your region is Russia. There is an
election. Can you give us your estimate of post-election--I
think we can assume who is going to win--how effective they
will be in terms of dealing with two of the critical issues we
face which is the Iranian and Syrian situation since they do
have some great leverage in both areas?
Admiral Stavridis. I think, as I look at Russia, I see,
first and foremost, an election, and I think we all know that
elections in any country bring their own set of dynamics that
play up to the point of the election and then there is a period
of time after an election when there is room for maneuver and
potentially some change. So I will make a general comment to
that effect.
When I look at Russia today, I see a mixed picture of some
areas of good cooperation. They are very helpful to us, for
example, in Afghanistan with the Northern Distribution Network,
with their assistance to the ANA, with helicopter sales. They
have donated weapons and ammunition to the ANSF. They have
every reason to want us to succeed. They talk about it
frequently. So in Afghanistan, we see a zone of cooperation.
I think in counterterrorism we see zones of cooperation. I
think in counternarcotics--they have a particular problem,
heroin addiction--we see areas of cooperation. They are a very
strong partner in piracy operations at sea.
So on the plus side, I see a number of areas of
cooperation.
On the other hand, we have areas where we disagree
fundamentally with the Russian Federation; over Georgia, for
example.
At the moment, in the middle is missile defense, which is
an area that we would hope to move over to the cooperative
side, assuming we can do it in a way that protects classified
information and makes sense. But at the moment, that is an area
of contention between the two nations.
You mentioned Iran and Syria. I will leave it to the senior
cabinet officials to talk to positions here, but I think
Secretary Clinton recently has spoken to a sense that Russia
has not been helpful, for example, in Syria. Will that change
after the election? I think it will depend on events on the
ground in Syria as well as on the election itself. So we will
have to wait and see.
On Iran, Russia has been helpful at times, but could they
do more and exert more leverage? I think they could, and I
would say the same answer pertains. I think after an election
is the time you start to see where things really go.
This will come to a head from a NATO perspective as we find
out whether or not the newly elected president of Russia
chooses to come to the NATO Summit. NATO's hand is out to have
a NATO-Russia Summit meeting as part of that May Summit. It is
here in the United States in Chicago. I think we will know more
after the election when we see that. So I would say, sir, that
is an indicator to watch.
Senator Reed. One follow-up with respect to Iran, and that
is there is the political leadership in Russia which is mingled
with their national security leadership, et cetera. Do those
audiences appreciate the potential threat to Russia alone if,
in fact, Iranians were to have nuclear materials and their
close relationship with other elements, some of which the
Russians have been jousting with for years now?
Admiral Stavridis. In my conversations with my
interlocutors in Russia, I would answer that question by saying
yes. They are aware of those concerns. They are concerned about
it.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Another question, Admiral Stavridis, and that is you have
conducted Austere Challenge exercises. You have a program with
our cybersecurity. Can you generally comment about how the NATO
allies are doing in terms of their cybersecurity, their
cooperation with us, are they moving ahead, are they falling
behind, et cetera?
Admiral Stavridis. Sure. The good news is our partners in
NATO are among the most sophisticated actors in the world of
cyber. So there is a lot of capability there. They are moving
forward with some encouragement from us to create a Center of
Cybersecurity and Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, which makes
sense because that was a nation that has undergone a
cyberattack. We have enhanced within the alliance command
structure our ability to defend ourselves much like U.S. Cyber
Command here in the United States is working.
In terms of: could they be doing more, absolutely. So I am
pushing them very hard in this direction. The Secretary General
is pushing the allies very hard. I would say cyber and the
special forces are two areas of real growth and emphasis that
we are going to have going forward in the alliance, sir.
Senator Reed. Just quickly is this another potential point
of contention with the Russians? As you all get better, do they
get more nervous?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that as in everything with
Russia, there is potential for cooperation and there is
potential for conflict. I would say cyber offers both of those
opportunities, frankly.
Senator Reed. General Ham, again, thank you for your
leadership in AFRICOM.
Going forward, one of the initial impressions from our
experience over the last several years in Iraq and Afghanistan
is partnering with local security forces and developing their
capacity, and partnering with governments to develop their
capacity will be a key aspect of our national security and also
a cost-effective way to be there before the shooting starts and
perhaps prevent it.
Can you comment about what you are doing in Africa, and
particularly in the Horn of Africa, with this kind of
mentoring? Are you vetting our forces with their forces or
developing a cadre of experts who understand culture and the
local mores?
General Ham. Senator, thanks. I think that is one of the
capabilities that the general purpose forces across the U.S.
military now are comfortable with this idea of security force
assistance. That does not mean that every soldier, sailor,
airman, and marine is a cultural expert. We still require those
with great in-depth capability to lead some of these efforts.
But as an example, the support that the United States has
provided particularly to Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti--they
have contributed forces to the AMISOM in Somalia--has, I think,
been one example of where U.S. assistance can really make a
difference. We do not accompany those forces in the operational
area, but we are intimately involved in a DOS-led, usually
contractor-executed, and augmented by uniformed U.S. military
programs in their home countries to prepare them for this
mission. I think this is a pretty good model for how we can
operate effectively in Africa.
Lastly, I would say, Senator, that we do not have in Africa
the scale of the missions that were required in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and that allows us to have a much more tailored
approach that is specifically designed for the circumstance in
each individual country.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. It is great to be back with Senator
Graham after being in Libya together and meeting the University
of Alabama professors that now run the Government of Libya.
[Laughter.]
Senator Graham. I want to be on the record denouncing
Senator McCain's attack on the University of Alabama. Even
though I am into SEC and you all beat us routinely, I am still
standing by you. [Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. I guess I would say that it was
encouraging that they have had a revolution, a long-term
dictator is gone, and you wonder what will happen. Will it be
better or worse? These were two Ph.D.s in electrical
engineering. The Deputy Prime Minister got his degree at Cal
Tech, and Dr. El-Keib got his at North Carolina State, and 17-
and 20-year professors, and able to go back home to a country
they had to leave because of oppressive leadership.
General Ham, with regard to Egypt--and it is not your
command. I think that is CENTCOM. But Egypt, Libya, Tunisia--on
a scale from hopeful to concerned about their future, where
would you put the needle there?
General Ham. Senator, for Libya and Tunisia, the two
countries in the AFRICOM AOR, I am hopeful. Tunisia is a little
more further along than Libya is, having had elections now and
forming a government that I very much appreciate your spending
some time with them and getting to know them. There is a real
sense of optimism and forward progress in Tunisia. We are
looking for opportunities that we can assist in the security
realm to keep that momentum moving forward.
While I am hopeful, there are more hurdles to be overcome,
I think, in Libya at present, but it seems to me that the
National Transitional Council, the interim government, is
really striving to map out a good way ahead to deal with the
many challenges that they must confront not only in the
security realm, but in economic development, humanitarian
issues, economic trade, and establishment of writing a
constitution. The challenges are immense. It seems to me that
they are taking a very good, methodical approach. They will
need a lot of help, but I remain optimistic.
Senator Sessions. You are correct that the Prime Minister
and Deputy that I just referred to and the others are interim.
There will be an election. It remains to be seen what may
develop after that.
Egypt, I think, is likewise. We will have to see how that
government develops, but we felt that there were some positive
signs. I certainly felt that.
Admiral Stavridis, congratulations on your service. Thank
you for your service.
I would just say I am personally somewhat pleased that we
will draw down that second brigade out of Europe because we
have a financial crisis in America. We had Secretary Panetta
before the Senate Budget Committee yesterday, and there was a
pretty grim discussion. Senator Conrad--he is not running for
reelection. He loves this country. He thinks that there will
have to be more cuts than what we are already looking at.
I believe the $489 billion in cuts that we are not looking
at is enough, and I believe we need to alter the sequester. But
I do not believe the sequester will be eliminated. I am not
going to vote to eliminate the sequester because that is the
minimum cut, $2 trillion over 10 years out of expected
expenditures of $47 trillion. So we are reducing it from only
$47 trillion to $45 trillion in projected expenditures over the
next decade. So it worries me.
Admiral Stavridis, I am concerned. I know Europe has
financial problems, but you might not know that per capita the
United States with $44,000 in debt for every man, woman, and
child is greater than every country in Europe, including
Greece. So we are at a point where the Europeans cannot just
depend on the United States for their security, and we are at 4
percent GDP on defense. They are at 2 percent, really happily
living under our umbrella.
What could you tell us about the prospects that Europe
would maintain that 2 percent, increase it, or is there a
danger that it would go even below that?
Admiral Stavridis. I am going to start with the bad news,
which is they are not even spending 2 percent, Senator.
Unfortunately, they are running right about 1.6 percent, and
the goal that they have agreed to in a NATO context is a
minimum of 2 percent. Of the 28 nations in NATO, only between 5
and 8, out of 28, depending on how you measure it, are even
hitting that 2 percent goal. So they are not stepping up to the
bar that they have set for themselves.
I think that the United States should continue to
forcefully make that point in as many fora as possible, and I
am glad you bring it up so I can address it publicly. I speak
frequently to leaders in Europe about this, and it is not
sustainable over time that Europe, which has roughly a $15
trillion a year GDP, roughly the same as the United States. So
these are two economies that very much have great, robust
capability, although both are facing, as you correctly point
out, a lot of stress from debt and a variety of other
overhangs. So I think we need to continue to make this point
forcefully with the Europeans.
As to the prospects over time, if the European economy does
recover--and I think it will over time. These are capable
people. It is an extremely advanced part of the world, high
education. I think over time we will be able to get this to 2
percent and hopefully a little above that, which would be, I
think, a much more balanced place for it to be.
Senator Sessions. I just feel like our allies and friends
have to understand that that is an awfully small price to pay
for freedom.
Mr. Chairman, I will just note that over the last 3 years,
DOD's base budget has increased 10 percent, averaging about 3
percent a year, whereas over the last 3 years, Medicaid has
increased 37 percent. Spending on the Department of Education
over a 3-year period compared to the previous 3-year period has
increased 70 percent. Food stamps have increased 300 percent
since 2001. That is about $80 billion now. It is a very large
item in our budget.
So I guess I would tell you that the myth is that defense
is the great, fastest growing item in the budget is not true.
The myth is that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have
caused our deficit is not accurate. The wars as of last year
had cost about $1.3 trillion over 10 years, whereas the single
deficit last year was $1.3 trillion. So the wars are costly.
They have been very much a costly item, but it is not driving
our deficit.
So I would just say that I do not think we need to go
forward with this second part of the cuts, the sequester. I
believe the remaining five-sixths of the U.S. Government needs
to be scrutinized and about half of the Government receive no
cuts whatsoever. In real dollars, over a 10-year period of
time, if the sequester were to take place, DOD would take a 20
percent cut. So the remaining five-sixths in the same
adjustment factor would have a 50 percent increase.
I know that this is an issue that Senator Graham and I
talked about on the trip. Defense is going to have to tighten
its belt. There is no doubt about it, but we need an overall
belt-tightening in our Government, not just on DOD.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your outstanding service.
If I may start with Admiral Stavridis. West Virginia is a
very patriotic State. We have a high percentage of all of our
people that have served and are still serving. With that being
said, the question I get most asked when I go back home is do
we still need the presence or basically the presence of our
European theaters. I know that you are planning on drawing down
from the 70,000 to 60,000. It is in that neighborhood. There
are still 25 major bases.
During the last BRAC, it was basically the American bases
that got cut, nothing overseas that I know of. But I am told
now that that would be the direction they would go. There would
have to be overseas before there would be any more American
bases cut.
I think the question is as we draw down the forces, can we
consider strengthening relationships in other ways so that we
can decrease our force presence even further in Europe? Is
there a need to have the presence of the European theater?
Admiral Stavridis. Let me answer it in two ways very
quickly to say why Europe, and I think that is a fundamental
question. A lot of people ask me all the time--I am the U.S.
European Commander and people say, why do we have about 80,000
troops there so many years after the Cold War? I would argue
that even as we continue to bring it down--and I will come to
that in a minute--I think there is still good value in a
presence in Europe because of the geographic importance. It is
not just Europe. It supports General Ham in Africa. It supports
General Mattis in CENTCOM. It is a strategic platform that
allows us access in and around the region. We do have an
alliance and a commitment. That is part of the answer.
Then finally, the bang-for-the-buck, the reason we have
40,000 allies in Afghanistan with us is, at least in part,
because of those longstanding relationships that are built in
Europe.
Now, having said all that, having hopefully at least given
part of the answer, why are we there, I will make the point
that we are continuing to decrease that presence. Since the end
of the Cold War 20 years ago, we have come down 75 percent. So
back in the Cold War, we had almost 400,000 DOD personnel
there. We had 1,200 bases, and we needed them at that time
because of the Russian threat and so forth. But that trajectory
down has taken us down 75 percent. We are now coming down
another 15 percent with this round, which is acceptable, in my
view.
I would conclude by saying that I would anticipate over
time, over the decade, we will continue to drive that down
because our allies are capable and they can take this on.
Senator Manchin. Strategically, we will always have some
sort of a presence or platform in Europe.
Admiral Stavridis. I think so. Right, right. But it is a
matter of finding that balance and where is the bottom of that
curve. I think over time we will continue drawing down.
Senator Manchin. General Ham, if I may. Last month the
terrorist groups, al Shabaab and al Qaeda, have merged or we
were told they merged. What does that merger mean for us in the
United States?
General Ham. Senator, they did. Al Qaeda senior leaders and
al Shabaab formally announced on the 9th of February that they
have aligned. This confirms a longstanding suspicion. There
have certainly been indications of that for several years, but
this formalized it.
The question we ask ourselves is: why now? Why did they
make this announcement public now? Some have postulated--and I
tend to agree with this--that perhaps one of the motivations
for such a public announcement is because al Shabaab is under
duress by the African forces which are operating in Somalia,
and this may have been an opportunity or perceived to be an
opportunity by al Shabaab to garner some support for their
effort. So, I think, actually while it does formalize something
we suspected, it may actually indicate weakness.
Senator Manchin. I know that we are running out of time
here. I am not going to take all of my time because my dear
friend, Senator Graham, has some questions to ask. So I will
come back at a later time, and then we are going to have to be
voting here pretty soon. So with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you,
and I will ask later.
Chairman Levin. Yes, thank you very much, Senator Manchin,
for that courtesy.
Here is the situation. The vote has begun. Senator Graham
is now going to be recognized, and when his time is up, if
there is nobody else here, then we will recess until someone
does get back here, which will happen because Senator
Blumenthal is coming back. I believe Senator Shaheen was coming
back. So there will be additional Senators.
So Senator Graham, when you are done, if you could turn it
over to whoever is back. If not, just recess it. Thanks.
Senator Graham. I'll do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service.
We are going to try to get through all of the world in 7
minutes, if possible.
Let us start with the concept of al Shabaab and al Qaeda
forming an alliance, General Ham. Under the authorization to
use military force, do we have the legal authority to have a
drone attack against al Shabaab members?
General Ham. In selected cases, yes, sir. If an individual
is determined through a review process to be authorized to
use----
Senator Graham. Do you think that Congress should look at
granting greater authority or--we will just get back to that
later because I very much want to make sure that the executive
branch has the blessing of Congress because I think what they
are doing with drones has been very, very helpful.
Admiral, do you believe it is important strategically that
Afghanistan end well for us?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Graham. Winning to me would be withdrawing our
forces in a fashion that we could leave where Afghanistan has
security forces sufficient to defeat the threats they face, al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and that over time, governance will take
off.
The Strategic Partnership Agreement that we are negotiating
with the Afghans--do you think that is vitally important as to
the outcome of this conflict?
Admiral Stavridis. I am not the expert on it because I am
the NATO Commander looking at Afghanistan. But I will give you
an opinion, which is that it is extremely important because it
protects the long-term viability of this process.
Senator Graham. Is there a common view on the ground in
Afghanistan that people are at the best-case-scenario confused
about whether or not we are going to stay or leave, and the
enemy is using that against us?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that we have a strategic
communications challenge to convince the people of Afghanistan
that we are going to stay.
Senator Graham. The theory is if we did a Strategic
Partnership Agreement with the Afghans where we have an
enduring relationship past 2014 in the areas of the economy,
political alliances, and a post-2014 military presence, that
would send the right signal to Pakistan, Iran, and the Taliban
that we are not abandoning Afghanistan. We are going to have a
relationship, and the Taliban will never come back militarily.
Is that not the goal of the Strategic Partnership Agreement?
Admiral Stavridis. As I understand that U.S. one, I would
add, Senator, that NATO is trying to work out a post-2014
relationship, and I would say it sounds very much like you
described.
Senator Graham. Would you agree that if we do not get this
right, in case President Karzai may be watching C-SPAN today,
that if we do not get a Strategic Partnership Agreement before
May where the United States is committed to an enduring
relationship, it is going to be very hard to convince NATO as
an organization to do it? Do you agree with that?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it would be very helpful to
NATO's moving forward to have its primary member have concluded
that.
Senator Graham. Do you agree that the home run for us as a
Nation and the world-at-large regarding Afghanistan is before
the NATO conference, have a Strategic Partnership Agreement
between the United States and Afghanistan, that in May NATO
commits past 2014 to at least a training presence, and that
NATO nations contribute to funding the ANSF? Those three things
would be a great outcome. Do you agree with that?
Admiral Stavridis. I do.
Senator Graham. I would just say to our Afghan partners and
friends that if you do not get the Strategic Partnership
Agreement, then the other things are not going to happen, and
if President Karzai continues to insist on us turning over
3,044 law-of-war prisoners that we hold at Parwan prison
humanely, a great center of intelligence gathering, if he
insists turning those prisoners over to an Afghan legal system
that does not have the capacity or the maturity to deal with
them, then he is making a grave mistake because I, a big
believer in the outcome in Afghanistan, cannot go home to South
Carolina and tell the people in my State that if we let these
prisoners go over to the Afghan system, they will not be out in
a matter of days or weeks, going back to killing Americans and
coalition forces. So that is not really a question as much as
it is a statement.
Now, the Koran burning incident was upsetting to Americans.
I know it was upsetting to the Afghan people, and I am sure
some of this was spontaneous, but to the Afghan people, you are
not advancing your nation in the eyes of the world when you
kill Americans who left their families to go and help your
families. The young men and women who have been killed as a
result of this, Americans, left their families, the security of
their Nation to help Afghanistan develop. This was unfortunate,
inadvertent, and we are all sorry, but we need to understand
the big picture here. So on behalf of the American people who
are upset about what has happened to their loved ones and the
people we care about, I stand behind that sentiment and would
urge the Afghans to control this.
The good news, after talking to General Allen, is that the
ANSF have stood between their people and our people and have
done a very good job from what I can tell trying to protect our
interests the best they can.
I just hope that the Afghan religious community will
understand that we are there to help and we do make mistakes
because we are human beings. But nothing justifies this kind of
behavior.
Now, are you understanding of why General Allen felt a need
to apologize as a military commander of forces in the field?
Admiral Stavridis. I did not have a conversation with him.
Senator Graham. I feel like what he did was in the best
interest of our troops, and I talked to him today about that.
He said he felt that he needed to set the record straight and
man-up to this and let the Afghan people know that this was
inadvertent and we apologize because we made a mistake. I hope
the Afghan people will understand that this is a two-way
street.
When it comes to the President of the United States'
statement, I understand too that President Bush, when we made
mistakes on his watch, General Allen told me that he thought
the apology by the President was helpful to the cause. So all I
can tell Republican and Democratic Members of Congress is that
I do not like the way the world is, but it is the way it is,
and we have people in harm's way over there and we need to
understand what is best for them.
Now, when it comes to Africa, General Ham, the effort to
help Libya and Tunisia--this moment is going to pass if we are
not quick about it. Do you agree that the militias have to be
controlled in Libya?
General Ham. I agree with that, sir.
Senator Graham. That we have a window of time here to
engage both countries, and it is in our national security
interest to provide the assistance that Libya and Tunisia need
on the security front because this window will close.
General Ham. I agree.
Senator Graham. Thank you both for your service.
We will be in recess, since no one is here and we will come
back after the vote. [Recess.]
Chairman Levin. The committee will come back to order. We
appreciate your understanding, gentlemen.
We will call on Senator Blumenthal, I believe he comes
next.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join all of my colleagues in thanking both of you
for your very distinguished and dedicated service. I was very
privileged and grateful to join Senator McCain, Senator Graham,
Senator Sessions, and also Senator Hagan on the trip that has
been referenced earlier, although I am not quite as alarmed
about the subversive influence of the University of Alabama in
Libya, but it is worth watching. [Laughter.]
I want to begin my questioning by making a reference to
some of the trends that were mentioned by Senator McCain, most
particularly in Tunisia, the threats across the border and the
apparent infiltration of al Qaeda in that area. I think,
General Ham, you referred to it in some of your remarks and
mentioned that you were concerned about it. I wonder if you
could elaborate somewhat on the threats that are posed in
Tunisia and in Libya by the porous borders that both of them
have and perhaps what we can do about them.
General Ham. Senator, first of all, thanks for joining on
the trip. It is a pretty fascinating region of the world and
certainly a fascinating time to be there.
What I am concerned about in both Tunisia and Libya is the
negative influence that the presence of violent extremist
organizations (VEO) will have in those two countries as they
seek what I believe to be a very positive way forward in
establishing representative governments and governments that
are legitimately serving the people. It is very clear that
extremists organizations, notably al Qaeda with some direction
from al Qaeda's senior leaders, seek to undermine that good
governance that the Tunisians and the Libyans seek. So I think
that is the real threat that is posed.
It is clear that in the mid-2000s there were many North
Africans who sought to go fight against the United States and
its coalition partners in Iraq, and Libya was a transit point
for the flow of those foreign fighters. It seems to me that al
Qaeda is seeking perhaps to reestablish some of those networks.
So, I think we need to partner very closely with the
security forces, the armed forces of Tunisia and Libya, to
prevent the reestablishment of those networks, to prevent those
VEOs from undermining the progress that both countries are
seeking.
Senator Blumenthal. Is there anything that we can enable or
anything specifically that DOD is doing to enable that
cooperation to become more robust?
General Ham. Senator, they are. We are expecting within the
very near future a specific request from the Government of
Tunisia to our ambassador in Tunis with some specific
requirements, and we certainly are anticipating that some of
those requirements will be for security assistance. We had a
very good bi-national commission conference in Tunis a few
weeks ago to start to work out those details. I am very
satisfied with the progress of the military-to-military
relationship that is developing with the new government. We
need to sustain that.
Similarly with the Libyans, we are forming a good
relationship. We now do have an Office of Security Cooperation,
the organization that can orchestrate security assistance,
IMET, and training and the like. So we are moving in the right
direction, but we need to sustain that effort.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Admiral, I want to just briefly note your testimony that
``submarine forces provide assurance, deterrence, and valuable
contributions to the forward defense of the United States.''
That is a quote from your testimony. I take that to mean that
you are a strong proponent of continuing and enhancing our
undersea warfare capability.
Admiral Stavridis. I am, and in the context of EUCOM, the
range of missions that our submarine force performed for me as
a combatant commander go from the very highest end when they
operate in under-ice missions in the high north, they operate
in conjunction with other very sophisticated forces. So they
are very capable at the high end, but I continue to be
impressed with their abilities in the lower end of conflict and
security.
Two examples: First would be piracy. Surprisingly, perhaps,
we find submarines are effective as ISR platforms that are very
helpful in that regard. Second, then in our mutual work
together in Libya, we were fortunate to have U.S. submarines
capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles, for example, in
a very effective and immediate way. So the submarine force
really does operate across the spectrum, not just at that high
end of anti-submarine warfare that we traditionally think of.
Senator Blumenthal. They perform a very versatile mission.
Admiral Stavridis. Exactly, yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. I want to briefly ask whether you are
satisfied that there is sufficient support for the
extraordinary work that is done at Landstuhl and other medical
facilities for our wounded warfighters when they come back. I
have been so impressed by the kind of care that you have
provided to troops coming back to Connecticut and elsewhere,
young men who have lost limbs and who have been saved from
battle, but are given real hope of restoring normal lives
because of the tremendous care that is provided there.
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I will tell you of all of the
things that I do in EUCOM, in many ways I am most proud of the
work of our folks at Landstuhl. They are just extraordinary and
I know many members of the committee, as you say, have been
through and seen that.
If I could highlight something, one of the, if you will,
signature injuries of this conflict is emerging to be traumatic
brain injury (TBI). Now, we have a very capable unit that does
that, over 30 people dedicated to it. We have what we call the
SyNAPSE Program. We tailor the TBI treatment to each one of
these young men and women. We have exceptional physical
therapists that we have gone out and hired. So we do the whole
spectrum of care there. I am very proud of our work in TBI.
Lastly, I want to just say thank you to the committee for
the support for the follow-on hospital which is up in front of
the committee now, and we have received good support on that
and we appreciate it.
Senator Blumenthal. The SyNAPSE Program is really one of
the most promising medical activities in the world today, I can
say without too much exaggeration. So I really thank you for
it.
Just to follow on one of the points that Senator McCain
raised, in our visit to Libya, we were told about the numbers,
huge numbers, of freedom fighters there who have, I think, been
taken to other countries with wounds very similar to those that
are suffered by our warfighters in Afghanistan. I wonder
whether there is any possibility that we could provide more
care for them there.
Admiral Stavridis. I am willing to explore that, and I will
work with General Ham who would handle the departure end of
that, and I will take a look at it. We do have, for example,
troops from Georgia, who I mentioned earlier, our very staunch
allies, with us in Afghanistan. So there is some precedent for
that, but it is a very specific process and I will take a look
at that, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Just to finish with one quick question
about the cooperation with Israel in the event of an attack on
Iran's nuclear armaments or capabilities. Could you give us
your assessment on the cooperative missile defense programs
that we have with Israel, if you could in this setting, either
the Arrow missile defense or the David's Sling, as to how
successful our joint missile exercise has been?
Admiral Stavridis. I think to do justice to that, I need to
move that into a classified setting. But I will say that our
cooperation with Israel across every element of military
activity is robust and is capable and is serious. I will
provide you a detailed answer on the missile defense.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Again, thank you to you both
for your excellent testimony today and your tremendous service
to our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you for your service as well in
the Marine Corps, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully we are
almost finished.
I want to thank both of you, General Ham and Admiral
Stavridis, for your service to the country. Admiral, I
particularly appreciate your willingness to work with me over
the last 3 years in my position as chair of the European
Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
We will certainly miss you as you go on to another post.
Mr. Chairman, I have a brief statement that I would like to
submit for the record on the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago. I
know that you have addressed this a little bit, Admiral.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

I want to thank Chairman Levin and Senator McCain for convening
this important hearing today to receive testimony on U.S. European
Command and U.S. Africa Command in review of the National Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses about the challenges and opportunities before the
U.S. military in these two critical regions of the world.
As the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
European Affairs, I would like to take a brief moment to discuss the
upcoming North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago
and its significance for the United States and our transatlantic
allies.
The importance of the U.S.-European security relationship cannot be
overstated, nor can America's commitment to our allies across the
Atlantic. Europe is a critical partner of the United States, and our
European allies remain America's go-to partners when security
challenges arise around the world. Even as we refocus on the Asia-
Pacific region and rebalance our footprint in Europe, we will continue
to work closely with Europe across the spectrum of critical threats we
face--on Iranian nuclear matters, proliferation, and international
economic issues, as well as in Syria, Afghanistan, and other regions of
the world.
This May, Chicago will host the NATO Summit--the first on American
soil since 1999. This meeting presents a unique and timely opportunity
to reiterate that the NATO alliance continues to wield unprecedented
influence in our world and remains a critical element of U.S. and
European security. We have our problems, and we should address those,
but the Chicago Summit is a chance to remind the world that NATO still
represents the most capable military alliance the world has ever seen.
This year's Summit will need to address a few critical issues.
Afghanistan, of course, will be at the top of the agenda, and the
recent protests there underscore the volatile and dangerous situation
that our alliance continues to face on the ground. Other--perhaps less
profile--issues will need to be addressed at this year's Summit as
well.
The first of these is NATO's Smart Defense initiative. In a time of
declining budgets, it is important that we work together to generate
maximum returns on our investments while maintaining overall capability
and interoperability. We need to pool and share resources where
necessary to ensure that we get the most out of our limited defense
dollars.
However, Smart Defense cannot be an excuse for continued under-
investment by our European allies. According to the NATO Secretary-
General's 2011 Annual Report, only three countries are spending at or
above 2 percent of their gross domestic product, the recommended level
of defense spending agreed upon by the alliance. We need to see more
investment from our European counterparts to ensure that we can bring
the full spectrum of capabilities to the table when needed.
From the organization's experience in Libya, we should identify
capability gaps and lessons learned to improve our alliance's strengths
and weaknesses. There were certainly problems in Libya--namely, a
shortage of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,
refueling capabilities and ammunition--and the operation should not be
viewed as a perfect model for future efforts. However, NATO acted
quickly when others would not and could not, and we were ultimately
successful in protecting the people of Libya from a brutal dictator. We
should build on our successes in Libya and begin to address any
shortfalls in Chicago.
Another important issue to be addressed at Chicago is the continued
allied support for NATO's ``Open Door'' policy. Understanding that the
prospects for enlargement at this Summit are slim due to outstanding
political matters, it is important that we make our commitment credible
by advancing aspiring countries, including Georgia, down the path of
future NATO membership.
Finally, NATO's relationship with Russia will no doubt draw
additional headlines in the lead-up to the Chicago Summit. The Russian
presidential election and possible disagreements on missile defense
could complicate any possible progress between NATO and Russia in
Chicago.
It is important to recognize that we do share a wide range of
interests with Russia outside of missile defense, including security in
Afghanistan, counterterrorism, and proliferation. We should engage
Russia on issues where our interests overlap while recognizing that
Russian participation in Chicago (or lack thereof) should not
overshadow other critical issues that the Summit must address this
year.
As we approach this year's Summit, we should address these crucial
issues to continue building on past progress. To maintain NATO's
relevance for the future, we must also find a way to introduce the
organization to the next generation of citizens and leaders who are not
yet familiar with this alliance's many past successes and its future
potential. A NATO that is relevant for the 21st century is flexible,
adaptable, and able to transform itself--and is postured to make smart
defense investments, grow in membership where appropriate, and take on
new missions whenever necessary.
I look forward to working with the White House, the Pentagon,
European Command, and the Department of State to make Chicago a
successful outcome that reinforces the critical role NATO plays in the
world both today and in the future.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
As we all know, this is really the first Summit on U.S.
soil since 1999. It is an opportunity for us to both highlight
the successes at NATO and also to address some of the upcoming
challenges.
I know, or at least I understand, that you talked a little
bit about the Smart Defense Initiative, and I am sure that is
something that will be discussed in Chicago. I do have some
concerns. While I understand that it is an important initiative
and it makes sense to better pool and coordinate our resources,
I do have some concerns that it not be used as an excuse to
further reduce defense spending among our NATO allies. I wonder
if you could comment on that.
Admiral Stavridis. I would be glad to.
We, as in the military committee, all the chiefs of
defense, General Dempsey and his 27 colleagues, myself as the
Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, and the Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation, General Stephane Abrial, have all
addressed very specifically this point that we are recommending
constantly and strongly to our political leadership that Smart
Defense not be used as an excuse to lower, particularly in the
case of European partners, already too low budgets. So we are
in complete agreement with you and we will continue to press
that at the political level. I think the United States in its
role as a significant actor in the alliance should continue to
press that as well.
Senator Shaheen. What kind of response are we getting?
Admiral Stavridis. At this point, I would say that we are
getting a respectful hearing on that viewpoint, but the proof
will be in the defense budgets as they roll out after the
Summit. We need to continue to monitor that and put real
pressure on it.
The initiatives that are part of Smart Defense I wholly
subscribe to, everything from Baltic air policing to missile
defense, the alliance ground surveillance system, pooling of
helicopters, marine patrol aircraft, and so forth. But I think
this has to be done in a way that does not permit a reduction
at least below the 2 percent goal, which we are not meeting now
on the European side of the equation. So I am in full agreement
with you, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Libya has afforded, as everyone has said,
an excellent example of the success of NATO, and it is
undoubtedly the most successful cooperative military effort of
its kind in history. It seems to me that one of our challenges
is to better--I do not want to say ``message''--but better
educate some of the new emerging leaders about NATO's--not only
its history and current successes, but its importance for the
future. I wonder if you could talk about that as well.
Admiral Stavridis. I would be glad to.
First of all, I agree that the Libyan campaign was a very
successful one, began with a U.S.-led coalition under General
Ham, did excellent work for, I think, 2 weeks--Carter,
roughly--and then NATO came in for the last 7 months of the
operation. It showed the ability to move from a coalition
setting into an alliance command structure operation. It showed
all of the positives that you alluded to.
It showed us areas we need to do better in. We need better
alliance ISR. We need better alliance refueling capability. We
need better alliance intelligence and targeting. We need to be
better at strategic communications. We are addressing all of
those areas as a result of what we have learned.
In terms of telling the story of Libya, I agree completely
with that. I have an article actually in the Foreign Affairs
Magazine this month that I co-wrote with Ambassador Ivo H.
Daalder, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, titled ``NATO's Victory in
Libya,'' dated February 2, 2012. We are, at every level in
NATO, working hard to get the story out. It is challenging
because the news cycle moves on and we are on to the next
challenge in the international security world. But I do believe
that the Libyan campaign is one that--for all of the lessons
learned on it, I think on balance it has been very positive. We
will draw those lessons. We will continue to push them forward,
and I think the Summit will be another opportunity to do so.
Senator Shaheen. I think that is true. I had the
opportunity to meet with Ambassador Daalder yesterday to talk
about some of these same issues.
I am not going to ask you to comment on this. I know
Senator McCain raised the issue of Georgia, and I understand
that that will be coming up in Chicago. I would hope that even
though enlargement is on hold for the Chicago Summit, that
there will be an effort to make sure that countries like
Georgia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and those countries who are
interested in being part of NATO, have some reason to continue
to be supportive and to be encouraged about the efforts that
they are engaging in.
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I agree. On Georgia, as I said
to Senator McCain, of the 50 countries that are operating with
us in Afghanistan, Georgia today is the second largest troop-
contributing nation on a per capita basis. As they contribute a
second battalion, they will become the highest on a troop-
contributing basis. It is very real. They are in the fight. I
was visiting with a Georgian lieutenant colonel, a triple
amputee, at Landstuhl. These are brave--a brave nation and
brave soldiers who stand with NATO, and we need to be mindful
of that as we go forward.
Senator Shaheen. I agree with that. I think they are very
proud of their contribution. I know that we all appreciate it
very much.
There was some good news this week about the Balkans.
Serbia's candidacy to the European Union (EU) was formally
accepted. I think that is very positive. But as you know too
well, even though some of the border issues between Kosovo and
Serbia have calmed down somewhat, it seems to be only one
incident away from having that break out into conflict again. I
wonder if you could talk about what progress you are seeing and
what Serbia's EU candidacy means for helping to calm the
situation between Kosovo and Serbia.
Admiral Stavridis. I can. As always, to put a context on
this, we should remember that in 1999 NATO was dropping bombs
in Belgrade. We were actually attacking Belgrade. We had, at
one time, 50,000 troops in Kosovo as part of a large mission
there. So the good news is we have come a long way in a decade
and a bit. Today we are down to around 5,000 troops. When I
took the watch as SACEUR, we had 15,000 troops there. So we
have brought them down and we have maintained a safe and secure
environment. So I think the trajectory is good.
In terms of where we are at this moment, we are at a bit of
a plateau as we wait, as you said, for the EU candidacy to
settle, and now the next big muscle movement will be the
election, which I believe will be in May. After that point in
time, we will reassess the security situation. I am hopeful
that the EU-led talks between Serbia and Kosovo will continue
very slowly, painfully, and incrementally to bear fruit and
that by the summer I can make a recommendation to further
withdraw the troops. That is my hope at the moment. However,
again, I think we are on a bit of a plateau in a holding state
while we let the dust clear from the latest good news that you
started out with and see if it has a longer manifestation in
country.
Senator Shaheen. Again, thank you both very much.
My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
Let me just ask a question following up on Senator
Blumenthal's questions relative to Israel. I am only going to
ask you about things that are in the public domain.
My understanding is that in 2010 that there was a large
joint military exercise with Israel involving missile defenses.
Is that correct?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. That that was the largest U.S.-Israel
military exercise of any kind up to that point.
Admiral Stavridis. I would guess that is correct.
Chairman Levin. One of the things that we are able to
contribute to that missile defense and have contributed,
because there have been test missiles fired by Iran and I
believe maybe by Syria as well, is that--and this is public
information--missile launch data from satellites in real time
is shared with Israel.
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I would really prefer to give
you a classified answer to that.
Chairman Levin. Okay. I am pretty sure that is
unclassified, but let us know if it is or not.
Admiral Stavridis. Okay, sir.
Chairman Levin. If it is unclassified, make sure you
confirm that.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman Levin. It is also my understanding that it is in
the unclassified world that we share information on missile
tracks with our X-band radar with Israel. You can give us the
same answer. You can confirm if that is in the public domain.
Admiral Stavridis. I will.
Chairman Levin. But that is my understanding.
Now, we were going to have an exercise that was scheduled
with Israel I believe a few months ago, which was then delayed
by their defense minister's request. Is that correct?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we mutually arrived at a decision
to postpone the exercise--it is called Austere Challenge--until
the fall. We are now actively pushing forward on conducting
that exercise.
Chairman Levin. You will be able to confirm what it is that
we contribute to that exercise, but whatever it is, does that
add significant capability to Israel's missile defense?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. You alluded earlier to the
Juniper Cobra exercise of several years ago. This is continuing
that very robust level of cooperation across a variety of
activities to include missile defense. I am happy to provide
great detail on this at a classified level for you, sir.
Chairman Levin. That involvement of our--whatever our
involvement is--and you will confirm that it is as described by
me as in the public realm. That involvement does add
significant capability to Israel's missile defense?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Shaheen, it is you and me between
them and lunch.
Senator Shaheen. I just wanted to hear what you had to say.
Chairman Levin. In that case, we began with our gratitude
and I hope universally expressed up here to both of you, but
since this is your last appearance, Admiral Stavridis, we
single you out for special thanks today and good luck to you
and your family.
Admiral Stavridis. Thanks a lot, sir.
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

SOCIAL MEDIA

1. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis and General Ham, one of the key
observations from the Arab Spring was the significant role that social
media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and other internet tools and sites)
played in mobilizing social movements. As a result, there has been
significant research and development (R&D) activity to build tools to
better understand public sentiment, opinion, and activity as expressed
via social media. To what extent does social media help understand
trends and activity in the your area of responsibility (AOR) compared
to more traditional open source media channels?
Admiral Stavridis. Social media provides U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) with a level of situational awareness that is not always
available through traditional media and other open source channels.
What makes social media unique is that it allows operators and
intelligence analysts the opportunity to observe an operational picture
in real time, based on first-hand accounts of individual activists,
special interest groups, and individuals seeking information without
the filter of traditional media outlets.
Given the critical importance of understanding our audiences to
success in strategic communication efforts, social media provides
further opportunities to better understand the issues and narratives
that drive the people well before the information surfaces in the
mainstream media. It also provides opportunities to observe and assess
the effects of our engagement efforts.
Social media has the potential to better forecast trends, because
it allows for direct two-way communication with the people on the
ground. However, robust automated tools and capabilities must be
developed and employed by the command to visualize social media
activity and trends. EUCOM is already working with the U.S. Government
Interagency, academia, and public-private partners on this effort.
General Ham. In our AOR, the internet is not as prevalent as in
most parts of the world and traditional media is still the way a
majority of the population receives their news. When collecting
information to understand public opinion, we use social media as one
source which, when combined with more traditional sources such as print
media and polling, provides a more complete understanding. For breaking
events and incidents, we use the real-time data available on social
media sites as a valuable source as we develop our assessment.

2. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis and General Ham, to what extent
is your combatant command involved in developing a monitoring and
analysis capability in this arena?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM is currently in the process of an
initiative to establish an Unclassified Information Sharing Cell to
develop, monitor, and employ information available in social media
channels. The cell will utilize existing command resources within
intelligence, planning, operations, strategic communication, public
affairs, and communications directorates to integrate the use of social
media and crowd-sourcing in the planning and conduct of operations.
General Ham. We are currently working with the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on a funded
project to develop a tool for predictive analysis based on data mined
from all sources including social media. The tool will locate and sort
the vast amount of data available on the web allowing accurate and
actionable information to support decision making, improve real-time
situational awareness, and support long-term analysis for strategic
planning and messaging. The tool and accompanying dashboard will enable
the identification of a baseline of media behavior before a significant
event and the analysis of the significance of elevated post event media
activity. It will also detect trends using pattern recognition based on
web source data.

3. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis and General Ham, to what extent
has your combatant command interacted with the Department of Defense's
(DOD) Human, Social, Cultural, and Behavioral (HSCB) Program for help
on this front?
Admiral Stavridis. We have not interacted with that program.
General Ham. We conducted informal discussions with the leadership
of the HSCB Program for several years. In the last year, the HSCB
briefed members of our Intelligence Directorate Social Science Research
Branch on their current research agenda. We also discussed areas of
mutual interest suitable for future collaboration.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

CONTRACTORS

4. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Stavridis, our European allies and
partners have played a major role in supporting the planned transition
of operations to the Afghan Government by providing army and police
trainers, as well as other forces to support our efforts in
Afghanistan. Currently, our European allies contribute approximately 25
percent of the mentoring teams required to train Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) in the field and are deeply involved in the
Afghan National Police (ANP) training program. Non-U.S. Government
coalition personnel are involved in the ANP training program at the
Afghan Ministry of Interior, at training sites, and in the field.
Currently, non-U.S. Government coalition personnel comprise
approximately 66 percent of the 778 trainers and mentors at the 24
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led ANP training sites in
Afghanistan, 16 of which are led by NATO countries other than the
United States. The U.S. training mission in Afghanistan relies heavily
on contractors to train and mentor police forces in Afghanistan. In
their capacity within the ANP training program, do our European allies
rely on contractors hired by DOD to support their roles mentoring and
training Afghan police forces?
Admiral Stavridis. NATO has long-recognized the potential benefits
of improving the sharing of contract information among member nations
deployed on operations. Since 2010, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) has solicited support from the allies aimed at improving
contract visibility within NATO, but has made little progress as each
ally has individual caveats on contract information-sharing. While in
theory the ability to share contract data between NATO and
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) member nations and the
NATO Command Structure is an excellent idea, the actual practice has
not yet come to fruition.
Because contracting information for operations in Afghanistan is
held at the national level, this question may be better answered by
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

5. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Stavridis, do our allies share in any
of the financial burden of using these contractors?
Admiral Stavridis. We do note that many multinational ISAF forces
rely on DOD contractors for support. We also acknowledge that SHAPE
does not have visibility into national requirements and the sharing of
the cost burden of using these contracts.
Because contracting information for operations in Afghanistan is
held at the national level, this question might be better answered by
CENTCOM.

6. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Stavridis, EUCOM is responsible for
conducting major joint training exercises with our European allies. In
support of the ISAF in Afghanistan, EUCOM trains military units of our
European allies that are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. Are
contractors involved in training exercises and the pre-deployment
training of our European allies, and if so, what role do contractors
play in this training?
Admiral Stavridis. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) conducts a
significant portion of the predeployment training for ally and partner
nation forces deploying to Afghanistan. USAREUR employs contractors for
a variety of missions: specifically, Up-Armored High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicles; and Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED) training.

7. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Stavridis, are contractors being used
to provide training that could be done by DOD military or civilian
personnel?
Admiral Stavridis. Contractors provide joint training in lieu of
military or civilian personnel that have been reduced by billet cuts.
However, and more importantly, they possess the skills that are
essential to implementing the joint training system at EUCOM and across
the joint enterprise.

FOOTPRINT

8. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Stavridis, according to your posture
statement, over the past 22 years, EUCOM has reduced inventory by
approximately 75 percent, and over the past 8 years, EUCOM has closed
or consolidated over 200 sites of various sizes across the theater.
However, DOD has called for two rounds of Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC), one in 2013 and another in 2015. Before we consider such a
measure, it is imperative that we look at the necessity of overseas
bases first. Current plans call for pulling down an additional two
brigades from Europe. Has EUCOM conducted any analysis on how bases and
other sites can be consolidated or closed after this move occurs?
Admiral Stavridis. As you indicate, EUCOM has just announced the
inactivation of two heavy brigades in Europe that allows the closure of
11 sites comprising the Bamberg and Schweinfurt communities in Germany.
We routinely evaluate our European basing requirements, as we are doing
now, and this work will contribute to the ongoing study, being
conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) on basing capacity as well as the overseas
basing study directed by section 347 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA, CPL 112-81J).

CAMP LEMONNIER CONTAINERIZED LIVING UNITS RENOVATION

9. Senator McCaskill. General Ham, according to your testimony, in
order to reduce fuel costs at Camp Lemonnier, the containerized living
units (CLU) will be renovated through a $1 million project funded by
the DOD Operational Energy Plans and Programs Office. The CLUs will be
redesigned incorporating energy efficient air conditioning units,
increased insulation, and reflective exterior coatings. As part of the
project, a highly energy efficient SuperCLU will be developed. The
projected energy savings are 54 percent for CLUs and 82 percent for
SuperCLUs, thus reducing fuel costs for Camp Lemonnier. How long will
it take for the fuel savings to offset the cost for the $1 million
renovation project?
General Ham. Assuming a fuel cost of $3 per gallon, it will take
approximately 2 years for the energy savings to offset the cost of
renovating the 72 CLUs.

10. Senator McCaskill. General Ham, have you conducted any analysis
as to whether it would be less expensive to forgo the renovation of
older CLUs and instead replace them with SuperCLUs once development is
complete?
General Ham. We have not conducted such an analysis since R&D of
the SuperCLUs is still ongoing.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

11. Senator Manchin. Admiral Stavridis, you've been a leading
proponent of effective strategic communications throughout your career.
I think that all of us would agree that what's going on in Afghanistan
right now is a strategic-level challenge. You may have summed it up
correctly in an article that you wrote for the National Defense
University: ``There will be moments when no matter how effective the
plan, the message is not going to have any effect.'' Since our
strategic communication has real consequences on the men and women in
combat, could you give me your perspective on why strategic
communication is so important for the military?
Admiral Stavridis. Strategic communication is a critical component
of military effectiveness. It is reflected in Sun Tzu's ancient Chinese
military treatise, The Art of War: ``Supreme excellence consists in
breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.'' Strategic
communication also has real consequences on the men and women in
combat, as a successful campaign may reduce, or in the best case
eliminate, the need for combat.
Strategic communication is an enduring process aimed at more
perfectly aligning military activities and diplomatic efforts to
achieve long-term national strategic objectives. I consider strategic
communication as an enabler for our policy and planning decisions and
actions; it is the vital process that provides truthful information
about those decisions and actions to key stakeholders; communicates it
in a culturally sensible fashion; uses messengers who are likely to be
well-received; measures the results of our efforts diligently; and
adjusts both message and method of delivery accordingly.
Importantly to our troops on the ground, effective strategic
communication leverages and elevates their efforts to ensure they are
seen and understood as we intend, and helps them achieve the important
national goals we are fighting for. As failed strategic communication
can deeply undermine our efforts, it is critical that we continue to
invest in strengthening our ability to comprehensively employ this
methodology.

12. Senator Manchin. Admiral Stavridis, what are some of your best
practices of strategic communication?
Admiral Stavridis. Effective strategic communication is an enduring
process that shapes how we are understood and seen as a military and as
a Nation. It is best applied over the long-term with steady pressure,
tightly linked to achieving our national strategic objectives. It must
be leader-driven, and kept at the strategic level. The leader's
emphasis is critical to get members throughout the command to do their
part to achieve our strategic objectives. This massing of a broad range
of activities, enacted at multiple echelons, aimed at achieving
strategic objectives, provides the power of strategic communication.
Understanding our audiences is the golden rule of strategic
communication, and one that is often missed. A solid, deep
understanding of the cultures and narratives of the people we address
is central to gaining their understanding. We need to invest the
necessary time and resources here, or we risk misunderstanding by our
friends and opponents with real and significant consequences.
Involving the whole-of-government, if not whole-of-society, greatly
enhances our effectiveness as we communicate our motives through our
actions and words. We need to convince others that we are a force for
good--we, the military, the United States of America, and our society
as a whole. Good coordination with the Department of State (DOS) and
other agencies is vital to making our messages synchronize and
resonate. We then need to use modern social media tools, employ
personal contact, and leverage traditional means of outreach to
effectively execute our strategic communication plans.
Lastly, we need to continue to seek ways to measure and assess our
effectiveness in order to see if we are truly reaching our audiences
and having the intended effects, and then adjust as needed. Strategic
communication is a powerful military tool that we must employ with the
type of professionalism, thought, and planning that we put into other
endeavors.

KOSOVO

13. Senator Manchin. Admiral Stavridis, I'm very proud of what our
Active Military and our National Guard have done in Kosovo. Last year,
a Guard unit from Wheeling, WV, helped defuse clashes between ethnic
Serbs and Albanians in northern Kosovo. Last year, you also announced
force reductions in Kosovo. We started at about 50,000 peacekeepers in
1999 and now we have about 6,000. Does that mean you're comfortable
with the progress being made there?
Admiral Stavridis. Kosovo remains a delicate and potentially
challenging situation, but it is an excellent example of how military
peacekeepers support and facilitate the political dialogue and progress
necessary for a sustainable peace. Belgrade and Pristina struggled, but
eventually succeeded in reaching initial agreements that should
ultimately set the stage for a political agreement. These new
agreements will change the Rule of Law situation in northern Kosovo
over the long-term. However, in the short-term, the agreements will
likely lead to more ethnic turbulence that requires peacekeepers,
perhaps for longer than desired but still only across the foreseeable
horizon. The Kosovo police and security forces are developing well,
with significant support and oversight from NATO, the European Union
(EU), and the United States. Their capacity to deal with situations
internally continues to improve, and they will eventually be prepared
to replace NATO and EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in the
provision of security for Kosovo.

14. Senator Manchin. Admiral Stavridis, I've read reports of
friction at some of the border crossings recently. Can you give me an
update?
Admiral Stavridis. Kosovo Serb hardliners in northern Kosovo
(including politicians, members of the Serbian Orthodox Church,
students, organized crime figures, and ordinary citizens), backed by
illegal Serbian parallel structures, resist integration efforts by the
Government of Kosovo or attempts by the international community to
expand Pristina's sovereignty. Serbian hardline groups will likely
continue using roadblocks to impede international Freedom of Movement
(FOM) in northern Kosovo, while potentially employing violence to
counter any Kosovo Force (KFOR) or EULEX efforts to remove them. Any
KFOR or EULEX operations in north Kosovo that appear to support
Government of Kosovo institutions will likely be met with hostility by
Kosovo Serbs, who are postured to maintain robust resistance. Patience,
coupled with political pressure and dialogue backed by the continued
presence of KFOR and EULEX, will be required to work through this set
of challenges.

15. Senator Manchin. Admiral Stavridis, the new defense strategy
lays out a plan to reduce the use of large contingency operations with
smaller specialized forces. Do you think the force structure used to
secure Kosovo can be applied to other peacekeeping operations in the
future?
Admiral Stavridis. To a degree, yes. The unique aspect of the NATO
operation in Kosovo was that it was a U.S.-led operation only during
the initial kinetic phase in 1999. The NATO peacekeeping mission has
been under European leadership, with the U.S. contribution almost
always less than 20 percent. I consider this a European security
challenge where our allies have done most of the heavy lifting,
allowing our contribution to remain smaller and more focused on key
tasks. To duplicate this success in future operations would require
coalition partners that are trained, equipped, and enabled with
political support from their governments. Germany, Austria, and Italy
consistently provide the Kosovo Force with the largest contributions
and key leadership. About one third of the NATO mission in Kosovo comes
from current recipients of ongoing U.S. security cooperation programs
and activities. Croatia, for example, provides utility lift
helicopters, while Poland, Ukraine, and several other Eastern European
nations provide ground forces, staff officers, and community liaison
teams vital to maintaining a safe and secure environment.

RELOCATION OF U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

16. Senator Manchin. General Ham, the decision to relocate the U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) headquarters from Germany was postponed to
2012. Since EUCOM and AFRICOM are the only two geographic combatant
commands located outside of the United States, I'm very concerned that
U.S. taxpayers are not reaping the economic benefits that a military
base brings. I'd rather have American dollars spent in West Virginia
than in Germany. Have you done an assessment on how much it would cost
to move AFRICOM?
General Ham. AFRICOM has not done an assessment on the cost of
moving our headquarters, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) is currently leading a comprehensive, congressionally-mandated,
Basing Alternatives Study, which will assess the cost-benefit with
moving the headquarters from its current location to the United States.
We provided the requisite operational data to support the analysis of
the comparative costs, benefits, and risks.

17. Senator Manchin. General Ham, if you have done an assessment on
the cost of moving AFRICOM, did you include the economic benefits to
the local economy in your assessment?
General Ham. We have not done an assessment on the cost of moving
our headquarters.

PIRACY

18. Senator Manchin. General Ham, by some estimates, the annual
cost of piracy to the global economy ranges from $7 billion to $12
billion. In 2012 alone, Somali pirates attacked 26 vessels, hijacked 4,
and took 64 people hostage. Have U.S. and NATO forces made any progress
in reducing piracy off the Horn of Africa?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

19. Senator Manchin. General Ham, how effective are these
counterpiracy operations and what can we do differently?
General Ham. The international response to Somali piracy is
achieving some success. Although pirate attack rates have not declined,
the rate of successful attacks has dropped by nearly 50 percent. The
increased use of industry-accepted best practices, such as embarked
armed security teams, has played a role in reducing attack success
rates; to date, not a single vessel with an embarked security team has
been successfully hijacked. Increased interdictions by coalition and
international forces may also be contributing to the lower number of
successful pirate attacks. However, due to the continuing trend of
higher ransom payments, piracy-generated revenue has remained steady.
A sustainable solution to piracy requires addressing conditions on
land. Stability and economic development are necessary to provide
viable economic alternatives to pirate activity. Counterpiracy
operations at sea must be complemented by improvements to governance in
Somalia to include strengthening of law enforcement and judicial
systems. Disrupting the financial networks which sustain Somali piracy
must also be an area of focus. The recent London Conference on Somalia
reinforced the international community's commitment to working with the
Somali people to support the political and economic progress needed to
consolidate recent security gain and is, I believe, a positive step
toward developing alternatives to piracy.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

CAMP LEMONNIER

20. Senator McCain. General Ham, you note in your written testimony
that new mission requirements necessitate new facilities and upgrades
at your only enduring base in Africa at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. I
know that the Department of the Navy has been working on a master plan
for over a year to construct an austere base for thousands of U.S.
military personnel with an emphasis on anti-terrorism force protection
and safety. This committee has raised concerns in the past that the
small footprint of 500 acres at Camp Lemonnier will result in
significant force protection vulnerabilities. Are you confident that
the plan for construction of the base will provide adequate safety and
security for our forces deployed there?
General Ham. Force protection is a primary consideration during the
updating of the Camp Lemonnier master plan. My force protection and
safety concerns were provided and discussed with the Department of the
Navy along with the long-term vision and requirements. All planned
construction projects are being sited and designed in accordance with
the Unified Facilities Criteria for DOD overseas construction. The
ongoing master plan incorporates applicable anti-terrorism force
protection standards. The master plan will incorporate best practices
and designs to meet both force protection and Unified Facilities
Criteria guidance. I will continue to be engaged with the development
of the master plan and ensure we have taken the necessary steps to
ensure the safety and protection of all tenants.

21. Senator McCain. General Ham, what can be done to mitigate force
protection risks, such as expanding the footprint of the installation?
General Ham. Expanding the footprint of Camp Lemonnier is not a
U.S. Government option at this time. While we are in discussions with
the Government of Djibouti regarding a possible runway expansion over
ground that is not included in the current implementing arrangement,
enlarging the Camp runs counter to our desire to diversify operating
locations in the region. I envision moving towards a smaller steady
state population at Camp Lemonnier to best employ the space we have and
allow three-vice six-story barracks. Routine and random force
protection drills are conducted in concert with our Djiboutian hosts as
well as French and Japanese neighbors at the Camp. We are in compliance
with all governing force protection requirements.

22. Senator McCain. General Ham, when do you expect to approve the
master plan?
General Ham. The master plan for Camp Lemonnier is being developed
by the Department of the Navy. We continue to coordinate with the
Department of the Navy as they complete the plan. As part of this
process, we provided our operational requirements, long-term vision,
and concern for force protection and safety. I expect the master plan
will be released by the Department of the Navy in the summer of 2012.

23. Senator McCain. General Ham, will you share the plan and the
total costs with this committee?
General Ham. Yes, I look forward to sharing the master plan for
Camp Lemonnier once it has been released through the Department of the
Navy and OSD.

RHINE ORDNANCE BARRACKS REPLACEMENT MEDICAL CENTER

24. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, replacement of the Landstuhl
Regional Medical Center has been a priority for DOD due to its
deteriorating condition, and the critical role that the hospital and
its staff played in savings lives over the last decade of conflict in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you concur with the Army's position that
rebuilding the hospital capacity at the Rhine Ordnance Barracks remains
a top priority, even as U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan
decline and the United States reduces its presence in Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. The Rhine Ordnance Barracks Replacement Medical
Center remains one of my highest priority military construction
projects. The critical mission the hospital plays in saving lives does
not end with any individual conflict. The mission is ever present to
ensure sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines have the best chance of
survival when the Nation calls for the use of military forces. I am
committed to providing this capability, which services the EUCOM,
CENTCOM, and AFRICOM theaters and beyond, as required.

25. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, given the fact that DOD is
still assessing the exact number of personnel to be restationed from
Europe and the number and location of bases to be closed, does DOD
still need a $1.2 billion hospital, and if not, what do you estimate
should be the size and cost of the new hospital?
Admiral Stavridis. The Rhine Ordnance Barracks Replacement Medical
Center's mission is two-fold. Although the hospital serves the military
and dependant populations of Europe, and Germany in particular, its
most critical mission is to save the lives of America's warfighters.
This requirement is not impacted by announced posture movements within
the EUCOM area of focus; the requirement is based upon EUCOM, CENTCOM,
and AFRICOM plans. EUCOM is working with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), the Tricare Management Activity,
and the European Regional Medical Command to review the size of the
medical facility and the scope of medical services to be provided in
order to ensure we ask the American people to pay only for what is
needed. It is estimated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Health Affairs) will provide, via the Secretary of Defense, a report
to Congress addressing the size and scope of the medical center before
the end of the summer.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

NATO PARTNER CONTRIBUTIONS

26. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Stavridis, the NATO agreement requires
NATO partners provide at least 2 percent of their GDP for their
defense, yet many NATO members are failing to meet this goal. In your
opinion, how does the failure of NATO members to meet their
contribution requirements impact the capabilities of NATO as an
organization and the national security of the United States?
Admiral Stavridis. The recommended level of defense expenditures,
agreed by NATO nations, remains at 2 percent of GDP. While some nations
meet this goal, many do not.
The challenges of balancing defense investment and budgetary
pressures, with an equitable burdensharing among sovereign nations, is
neither a new problem nor one easily resolved.
While encouraging nations to meet agreed spending goals, we should
remember that NATO continues to successfully operate at unprecedented
levels in operations far beyond its borders--to NATO and partner forces
serving in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and in counterpiracy operations off the
coast of Somalia.
As a military commander, my concern remains that the alliance
maintains sufficient forces and capabilities to meet the demanding
commitments of these current operations as well as the resources
necessary to address the broad range of future risks and potential
security challenges.
Continuing economic pressures in many of the allied nations makes
it imperative that the allies utilize the available resources wisely.
The NATO Secretary General's Smart Defense Initiative is intended to
meet our collective defense needs more efficiently through greater
collaboration and coherence of effort among nations, with a
prioritization of capabilities to meet the most urgent needs while
seeking multinational solutions where possible. Smart Defense will
develop common capabilities between NATO nations so that individual
nations, who may not be able to afford the desired capabilities on
their own, are able to develop them jointly. Nations are working toward
a number of substantive, multinational projects, the first of which
will be highlighted at the Chicago 2012 Summit with a view to making
the resulting capabilities available to NATO.
Despite its members' fiscal challenges, NATO is making required
adjustments to ensure it paces the future security environment.
Discussions in Lisbon in 2010 and anticipated discussion in Chicago in
May 2012 continue to realistically address the most challenging issues
facing the United States and the alliance, and they do so in the
context of the current fiscal environment. That said, we will continue
to watch this closely over the near- and mid-term.

27. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Stavridis, do you believe the United
States has sufficient leverage to urge greater contributions by NATO
member nations at the same time we are facing cuts to our own defense
budget close to $1 trillion in the next decade?
Admiral Stavridis. U.S. leadership is critically important, and
U.S. leadership is constructively shaping the continued investment by
European allies into NATO interoperable capabilities--shared, pooled,
or separate--even in these current financial and economic
circumstances.
NATO as an organization plays a critical role in the development of
military capabilities by its members, the trajectory and orientation of
national defense goals, and the common building of interoperable forces
and equipment. This is a vital function, one that has proven essential
to the successful execution of NATO-led missions since the end of the
Cold War as well as other non-NATO military operations that involved
allied forces. This role of NATO in shaping the contours of overall
alliance capability and the content of specific capabilities will
remain especially important for the future. We will continue to develop
the capabilities needed to execute the missions and tasks assigned to
the alliance.
In this context, the United States is a leader amongst allies, even
as NATO as a whole faces defense budget pressure. Allies continue to
seek strong defense investments oriented toward the future, and
oriented toward supporting operations at home and at strategic
distance. Interoperability in equipment, forces, and training with the
United States through the diverse set of NATO mechanisms is a top
priority for allies and partners. The economic and financial conditions
have impacted all NATO nations and defense spending has decreased as a
result. However, as we approach the Chicago Summit, and look beyond the
immediate horizon to the next 10 years, I am confident the alliance
will build on the successful business practices of the past, implement
with allies effective defense concepts and defense capabilities
currently under development, and develop new initiatives that address
the security environment today and tomorrow. Led by the United States,
the alliance will continue to develop smart, connected forces that
mutually strengthen and reinforce the security of nations on both sides
of the Atlantic.

ANSF TRAINING FROM NATO FORCES

28. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Stavridis, in your prepared testimony,
you cite a poll conducted by the Asia Foundation last fall that found
87 percent of respondents from the Afghan population stated that ``the
Afghan National Army (ANA) was improving the security situation across
the country.'' In recent testimony, Secretary of Defense Panetta and
Director of National Intelligence Clapper cited concerns about
corruption, leadership, and the ability of the ANA and ANSF to provide
security, specifically following the departure of U.S. forces. Please
expand on your assessment of the ability of the Afghan forces.
Admiral Stavridis. Afghan forces continue to improve, as measured
by their progress, in training reported through our ISAF and Afghan
instructors and in the field where operational results tell their own
story. The Asia Foundation report which I cited, ``Afghanistan in 2011,
A Survey of the Afghan People,'' is based on a survey conducted in July
2011 which polled 6,500 Afghans across the country, with 78 percent of
respondents in rural areas and 22 percent in urban areas. This is a
credible report from an organization with years of polling experience
in Afghanistan which provides information corroborating a conclusion of
steady ANSF progress. At the same time, I acknowledge the challenges of
corruption and the ability of ANSF to sustain security after the
termination of the ISAF mission. Yet, ANSF is making steady progress;
and we must continue to work diligently with them to ensure a
successful transition by directly addressing problem areas.
As recently as this January, my ISAF trainers report positive
results in recruiting and retention. Both ANA and ANP remain on track
to meet their October 2012 growth targets of 195,000 and 157,000,
respectively. This goal may be reached even before the summer. In
January, attrition rates for the ANA fell to 1.9 percent, and for the
ANP they fell below 1 percent. While this does not mean the problem of
desertion is solved, it is a positive indication and we will watch it
closely as the fighting season begins in earnest.
Regarding the leadership issue, ANSF continues to address a
shortage of noncommissioned officers (NCO). These individuals perform a
crucial role in troop leadership, and will be vital to a strong ANSF as
we move through transition and into a post-ISAF environment. Based on
the current recruiting and training programs, we expect ANSF to
continue to suffer from a shortage of NCOs through 2012. This is a work
in progress, and our instructors are providing ANSF with valuable
mentoring in their leadership training and education programs.
I would like to offer some additional highlights from the 2011 Asia
Foundation report which I shared with the ISAF Chiefs of Defense
earlier this year. I think you will agree that the information paints a
picture which supports both the progress ANSF is making, and highlights
some of the challenges which remain to be dealt with. Those highlights
are: Respondents indicating the ANA was ``unprofessional and poorly
trained'' dropped from 62 percent in 2007 to 44 percent this year.
Similarly, respondents saying the ANA needed the support of foreign
troops and could not operate alone decreased from 77 percent in 2007 to
60 percent in 2011. Over 50 percent of respondents reported that
corruption is a major problem. Of those, 56 percent stated it was a
problem in their daily lives, 64 percent said it is a problem in
provincial government, and 76 percent indicated that corruption is a
problem for the nation as a whole.
I see in these results strong indications that our focus on
improving security in Afghanistan can only be sustained in the long-
term by effective ANSF. While I am heartened by the steady progress
highlighted by the Asia Foundation 2011 report, I acknowledge the
complexity and difficulties facing ANSF as we approach the end of the
ISAF mission.

29. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Stavridis, given your recent assessment
that NATO is likely to continue its partnership with Afghanistan well
past the end of combat operations, please provide an assessment of the
training Afghan forces are receiving from NATO trainers.
Admiral Stavridis. The growth and professionalization of the ANSF
form a strategic priority for transition. Overall ANSF generation is on
track to support transition to an ANSF security lead. NATO continues to
support ANSF training by providing trainers, mentors, and advisors.
This training is producing steady improvements in ANSF capabilities.
Some illustrative examples follow: Both the ANA and ANP are on
track to meet their October 12 growth targets (ANA 195,000, ANP
157,000; 352,000 total) several months early.
ANSF effectiveness is steadily improving: 71.3 percent of the ANA
Kandaks and 58 percent of ANP Units are rated as either ``effective
with advisors'' or ``effective with assistance;'' 5.2 percent of the
ANA Kandaks and 23.9 percent of the ANP Units are rated as
``independent with advisors.''
The ANSF is demonstrating an improved ability to plan and execute
operations independently or with minimal ISAF support. Beginning in
late March 2012, Operation Naweed will become effective, putting the
ANSF in the lead to defend the sovereignty of Afghanistan.
Literacy training programs are making gains throughout the force.
Over 58 percent of the ANSF has had some level (1st, 2nd, or 3rd grade)
of literacy training. There are over 3,000 literacy instructors
providing almost 4,000 classes.
The ANSF continued to increase the quality and quantity of its
instructors through Train the Instructor (T2I) and Master Skills
Instructor Courses (MSIC).
The goals for training the ANSF remain on track through the initial
entry courses. Course enrolment remains consistent, while fill rates
exceed course capacities. There still remains a chronic shortfall in
the growth of the desired number of NCOs who provide key unit level
leadership, especially in training and in combat. To address this
shortfall, the ANP continues to focus efforts on recruiting direct-
entry NCOs and training and promoting patrolmen in order to increase
their NCO ranks, while ANA is aiming to promote experienced and
qualified soldiers from within their ranks over time.

FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

30. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Stavridis, you state in your prepared
testimony that the core of EUCOM's strategy is the ``realization and
revalidation of the strategic linkage between Europe and the United
States. America's European allies remain our Nation's most reliable and
enduring strategic partners.'' In your opinion, if we lessen our
footprint in Europe by two Army brigade combat teams (BCT), replacing
them with rotational forces, how will this impact the strategic link
and cooperation with our European allies?
Admiral Stavridis. The initiative to reinvigorate the U.S.
commitment to the NATO Response Force (NRF) is key to ensuring that our
strategic link with our European allies remains strong. This concept
includes a U.S.-NRF commitment bolstered by the allocation of a CONUS-
based BCT, with predictable battalion-sized rotations to Europe to
participate in significant NRF training activities. These rotations
will reinforce our commitment to Europe, exercise our capability to
deploy ground forces, and afford the opportunity to sustain our
interoperability with NATO.

31. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Stavridis, according to the DOD's new
strategic guidance, a ``strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S.
military investment in Europe'' has been created and ``in keeping with
this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also
evolve'' toward ``innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint
approaches.'' The Army is implementing this guidance by decreasing its
European presence by two heavy brigades, but the Air Force's European
footprint will not change much. Do you believe there are also
opportunities for the Air Force footprint in Europe to evolve toward
more use of rotational forces, instead of permanently stationed units?
If so, please elaborate.
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM's Air Force footprint has continuously
evolved to meet the strategic needs of the Nation. In the past, this
has translated to a significant drawdown of forces and infrastructure,
including the reduction of multiple fighter squadrons and ancillary
units in theater. During the past several years, EUCOM's air forces
have reduced manpower by approximately 4,000 personnel (11 percent),
realigned 17 units, returned an F-16 squadron and part of an F-15
squadron, and closed 2 installations and 44 sites. Additionally, we
recently announced the inactivation of the 81st Fighter Squadron (A-10)
currently stationed at Spangdahlem, Germany, and the 603rd Air Control
Squadron currently stationed at Aviano, Italy. These reductions will
drive the need for rotational presence to support operational
requirements.
The remaining permanently stationed Air Force units in theater,
along with traditional Air Force enabler units and installations,
provide critical forward-based strategic capability to meet global
national security objectives in addition to executing EUCOM's Theater
Campaign Plan, supporting other combatant command requirements, and
helping to represent the U.S. commitment to our European allies,
including our Article 5 commitment to the NATO alliance. For example,
forward-based fighters and support assets were absolutely essential to
the ability of the Nation to respond quickly to, and sustain operations
in, Libya. Also, logistics, mobility, communications, and intelligence
operations (among others) executed or supported by installations in
theater are critical to, and directly enable, operations in the CENTCOM
and AFRICOM AORs.
We will continue to assess our force structure via the Global
Posture Executive Council to ensure to the extent possible that
recommendations related to forces, footprint, and relationships within
the EUCOM AOR are aligned to support operational needs while, at the
same time, maximizing resource efficiency. These forward assigned
forces and associated footprint are the fundamental enablers of U.S.
defense activities overseas. They are central to defining and
communicating U.S. strategic interests to allies, partners, rivals, and
adversaries.

MISSILE DEFENSE

32. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Stavridis, you mentioned in your
prepared testimony that ``despite continued disagreements at political
levels over missile defense . . . cooperative activity continues to
increase'' with Russia. What is your assessment of the way ahead for
discussions regarding missile defense in your AOR?
Admiral Stavridis. Although Russia does not currently appear ready
to have a military-to-military Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
dialogue, EUCOM continues to support Joint Staff and OSD attempts to
restart stalled BMD discussions within their respective bilateral
policy- and technically-focused working groups with the Russian General
Staff and Ministry of Defense. While Russia has declined to participate
in direct U.S.-Russian military-to-military or BMD discussions since
mid-2011, ostensibly pending resolution of its political-level
concerns, I see progress in the forum of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC),
in which the United States has a voice in the process. For instance,
the Russian Federation recently agreed to participate in a NRC-led
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX).
Additionally, Russia has been invited and is expected to observe the
Capstone Event in Suffolk, VA, from 18-19 April 2012, for Nimble Titan
12--a global BMD policy and strategy wargame including participants
from 12 NATO states and NATO as an organization.

33. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Stavridis, do you feel that the Russian
presidential election will help or hinder further discussions?
Admiral Stavridis. To a degree it may help, as both sides know each
other already and the internal pressure in Russia to beat the anti-NATO
drum during the election has lessened. However, over the last several
years, we have repeatedly made clear to Russia that NATO missile
defense in Europe poses no threat to Russia's strategic nuclear
deterrent. As Ambassador McFaul has said regarding the Russian
presidential election: ``No matter who is the President, we're going to
stick to our policy.'' Therefore, we will continue to engage Russia to
seek pragmatic solutions to mitigate the threat posed by the
proliferation of ballistic missiles.

AFRICOM HEADQUARTERS

34. Senator Cornyn. General Ham, as you note, AFRICOM's only
enduring presence on the continent is Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, which
``provides an essential command and control and logistics hub for
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.'' You go on to acknowledge
that your current headquarters location in Stuttgart, Germany, has been
a topic of discussion since AFRICOM's establishment. I understand that
OSD is leading a comprehensive study of the factors involved in the
AFRICOM headquarters basing, but in your opinion, would it
detrimentally affect AFRICOM's mission and capabilities to locate the
AFRICOM headquarters in the United States rather than in Europe?
General Ham. The OSD is currently leading a comprehensive,
congressionally-mandated, Basing Alternatives Study which will assess
the cost-benefit with moving the headquarters from its current location
to the United States. We provided the requisite operational data to
support their analysis of the comparative costs, benefits, and risks.
Strategically and operationally, our current location provides for
effective command, control, and coordination of operations. We
demonstrated this during Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) in Libya. A key
factor in OOD's successful execution was that the headquarters lies in
the same time zone (3 hours) of the entire African
continent, including Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, the
command's Service components, EUCOM and our European allies and
partners active in Africa.
Cost is also a consideration. Alternative options must account for
the expense associated with a move from Stuttgart, including the
infrastructure costs related to any new headquarters facility. Travel
to the African continent to meet face to face with our partners, where
strong personal relationships are valued and critical for working
effectively together to address threats, is essential and will be a
recurring obligation regardless of headquarters location.
Until a final decision is made, we will continue to accomplish our
mission from Stuttgart, where our proximity to Africa, both
geographically and in terms of time zones, facilitates our ability to
build relationships with our African partners, and where our
servicemembers, civilians, and their families can serve from a safe and
well-supported location. Once the study is complete, we will comply
with the guidance and decision of the Secretary of Defense.

FAILED STATES AND TERRORIST GROUPS

35. Senator Cornyn. General Ham, as you note, Africa accounts for
14 of the world's 20 weakest states, according to Foreign Policy's 2011
``Failed States Index.'' Failed states make fertile breeding grounds
for extremist and terrorist organizations to grow and thrive. I am
particularly concerned by your testimony of the potential for
strengthening of ties between al Shabaab, al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, and Boko Haram with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al
Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan. What is your assessment of the
intention of these groups to pose threats to U.S. troops in theater,
U.S. allies, and the U.S. Homeland?
General Ham. [Deleted.]

LIBYAN WEAPONS

36. Senator Cornyn. General Ham, you note that many Manportable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS) ``disappeared from unsecured storage sites in
Libya during the conflict last year and could potentially be trafficked
to extremist groups.'' MANPADS in the hands of terrorists could pose
serious threats to civil aviation worldwide, to U.S. deployed forces,
and to our Homeland security. Please provide an update on the
inspection teams' efforts to account for and secure these missiles.
General Ham. The U.S. Interagency MANPADS Task Force is led by DOS
which is best positioned to provide a current update on the inspection
teams' efforts.
DOD is a member of this Task Force. AFRICOM personnel work closely
with the Task Force, contribute key military input to coordination with
our African partner nations, and have participated in several of the
visits by the Task Force to the African continent. We also conduct
exercises and theater security cooperation engagements with nations
bordering Libya focused on strengthening their capability to
counterillicit trafficking.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Webb, McCaskill, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain,
Chambliss, Brown, Ayotte, Graham, and Cornyn.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; and Roy F. Phillips, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton
IV, professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Mariah K.
McNamara, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Ryan Ehly, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey Howard, assistant to
Senator Udall; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen;
Jordan Baugh, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Matthew Rimkunas,
assistant to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. This morning we
continue the committee's review of the posture of our combatant
commanders to meet the security challenges and operational
requirements in their areas of responsibility (AOR) in light of
the President's budget request for fiscal year 2013.
Our witnesses are General James N. Mattis, USMC, Commander,
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and Admiral William H. McRaven,
USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Thank
you both for your dedicated and distinguished service to our
Nation. Also, on behalf of the committee, please extend our
heartfelt gratitude to the military men and women serving with
you. Many have served multiple deployments, often directly in
harm's way. We thank them for their dedication and courage, and
we thank their families, whose support is so essential.
As reflected in the President's budget request of $88
billion for overseas contingency operations in fiscal year
2013, the conflict in Afghanistan remains our military's
foremost security challenge. The Afghanistan mission is
entering a critical phase of transition. The drawdown of the
33,000 U.S. surge force is scheduled to be completed by the end
of this summer and the remaining 68,000 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan are to continue to be reduced at a steady pace
thereafter through 2014, according to President Obama.
U.S. and coalition forces have begun to move from the
combat lead to an advise-and-assist role in support of the
Afghan Security Forces (ASF) as those forces increasingly
assume the lead for providing security. This transition is to
be completed by 2014, when the ASF will have assumed the
security lead throughout the country.
As the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan winds down, our
Special Operations Forces (SOF) will assume greater and greater
responsibility for the Afghanistan mission and for advising and
supporting the ASF. Even after 2014, our U.S. military plans on
having an ongoing presence in Afghanistan to train the Afghan
forces, conduct counterterrorism operations, and provide key
enablers, such as logistics, airlift, and intelligence support.
The recent violence in Afghanistan following the
unintentional and regrettable burning of Korans at a U.S.
military base is deeply troubling. President Obama has
expressed his regret, and I would hope that President Karzai
would condemn the killing of six American soldiers as part of
that violence.
While these events could weaken the level of trust between
the United States and ASF, Secretary Panetta has reaffirmed
that the United States remains committed to the current
approach in Afghanistan, saying that the recent attacks on our
troops ``will not alter our commitment to get this job done.''
The success of the Afghanistan mission will depend on
building the capabilities of the ASF. At the end of the day,
the conflict in Afghanistan is an Afghan war and it will be up
to the ASF to win it. For this reason, I am concerned by news
accounts that the United States is circulating within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a proposal to reduce the
ASF by as much as one third. According to the Wall Street
Journal, under this proposal the size of the Afghan army and
police would be reduced from 352,000 personnel this year to
230,000 after 2014. Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger, the head
of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, is cited as saying
this proposal is based on ``what the international community
will provide financially and what the Afghans can provide for
themselves.''
I am surprised and I am disappointed to hear our military
commanders are focusing on Afghan force size based on what they
think might be affordable instead of what number of ASF they
believe will be needed to maintain security. It strikes me as
unwise to base decisions on the future size of the Afghan army
and police exclusively on projections of future affordability,
instead of military requirements to secure the gains that have
been made at great cost and to prevent a Taliban return to
power.
The sustainability of the progress on security in
Afghanistan will also be affected by a number of issues,
including the progress of reconciliation talks with the
Taliban, whether Pakistan chooses to play a constructive role
in those talks, eliminating the threat from insurgent safe
havens in Pakistan, the establishment of a long-term strategic
partnership between Afghanistan and the United States, and the
Karzai Government's efforts to improve governance, deliver
services, increase government revenues, fight corruption, and
promote inclusive and transparent elections. General Mattis,
the committee is going to be interested in your assessment of
the progress on security in Afghanistan and the sustainability
of security gains through 2014 and beyond.
There is a strong determination on this committee and in
this Congress to do all we can to counter the threat posed by
Iran, and in particular, to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included
breakthrough sanctions with respect to Iran by requiring
foreign financial institutions to choose between maintaining
ties with the U.S. financial system or doing business with the
Central Bank of Iran, especially relative to the purchase of
Iranian petroleum and related products. President Obama has
appropriately focused considerable and determined diplomatic
effort ``to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon,'' and
he has repeatedly said that there are ``no options off the
table'' to achieve that goal.
General Mattis has the task of conducting the prudent
planning and assembling the military options for the President
relative to Iran in case they are needed.
I'm going to put the balance of my statement in the record,
except for the following: The new strategic guidance and
priorities emphasize the importance of special operations
personnel for counterterrorism operations, capacity-building,
and other theater security cooperation activities in support of
the geographic combatant commanders. Admiral McRaven, recent
published reports indicate that you are seeking new authorities
that you believe would help SOCOM be more responsive to the
geographic combatant commanders' requests for special
operations personnel and the unique capabilities that they
provide. The committee looks forward to your comments on these
reports and learning more about any authorities that you
believe may be necessary to fulfill SOCOM's global missions.
Finally, General, we would appreciate your comments
relative to the events in Syria, as to what you believe the
options might be to end that slaughter of Syrian civilians by
the Government of Syria. We are all determined that we want to
end it. The question is what are the military options that
might be available in the case that they were seized upon as
being one of the ways to do that, and we would very much
appreciate your comments on that.
Gentlemen, again, our thanks to both you and the men and
women who serve with you for your great work.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

This morning we continue the committee's review of the posture of
our combatant commanders to meet the security challenges and
operational requirements in their areas of responsibility, in light of
the President's budget request for fiscal year 2013. Our witnesses are
General James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and
Admiral Bill McRaven, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), who is making his first posture statement since taking command
last summer.
Thank you both for your dedicated and distinguished service to this
Nation. Also, on behalf of this committee, please extend our heartfelt
gratitude to the military men and women serving under CENTCOM and
SOCOM. Many have served multiple deployments, often directly in harm's
way. We thank them for their dedication and courage, and we thank their
families, whose support is so essential.
As reflected in the President's budget request of $88.4 billion for
Overseas Contingency Operations in fiscal year 2013, the conflict in
Afghanistan remains our military's foremost security challenge. The
Afghanistan mission is entering a crucial phase of transition. The
drawdown of the 33,000 U.S. surge force is scheduled to be completed by
the end of this summer, and the remaining 68,000 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan are to continue to be reduced ``at a steady pace''
thereafter through 2014, according to President Obama. U.S. and
coalition forces have begun to move from the combat lead to an advise-
and-assist role in support of the Afghan National Security Forces as
those forces increasingly assume the lead for providing security. This
transition is to be completed by 2014 when Afghan security forces will
have assumed the security lead throughout the country. As the U.S.
troop presence in Afghanistan winds down, our Special Operations Forces
will assume greater and greater responsibility for the Afghanistan
mission and for advising and supporting the Afghan security forces.
Even after 2014, our U.S. military plans on having an ongoing presence
in Afghanistan to train the Afghan forces, conduct counterterrorism
operations, and provide key enablers such as logistics, airlift, and
intelligence support.
The recent violence in Afghanistan, following the unintentional and
regrettable burning of Korans at a U.S. military base, is deeply
troubling. President Obama has expressed his regret. I would hope
President Karzai would condemn the killing of six American soldiers as
part of this violence. These violent incidents have the effect of
weakening the level of trust between U.S. and Afghan forces, but
Secretary Panetta has reaffirmed that the United States remains
committed to the current approach in Afghanistan, saying that the
recent attacks on our troops ``will not alter our commitment to get
this job done.''
The success of the Afghanistan mission will depend on building the
capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces. At the end of the
day, the conflict in Afghanistan is an Afghan war, and it will be up to
the Afghan forces to win it.
For this reason, I am concerned by news accounts that the United
States is circulating within NATO a proposal to reduce the Afghan
security forces by as much as one third. According to the Wall Street
Journal, under this proposal the size of the Afghan army and police
would be reduced from 352,000 personnel this year to 230,000 after
2014. Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger, the head of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Training Mission in Afghanistan, is cited as saying
this proposal, which is estimated to cost $4.1 billion annually, is
based on ``what the international community will provide and what the
Afghans can provide for themselves.'' I am surprised and disappointed
to hear our military commanders are focusing on Afghan force size based
on what they think might be affordable instead of what number of Afghan
security forces are needed to maintain security. Decisions on the size
of the Afghan army and police 2 years from now need to take into
account conditions at that time. It strikes me as extremely unwise to
base decisions on the future size of the Afghan army and police
exclusively on projections of affordability instead of military
requirements to secure the gains that have been made at great cost and
to prevent a Taliban return to power.
The sustainability of the progress on security in Afghanistan will
also be affected by a number of issues, including: the progress of
reconciliation talks with the Taliban; whether Pakistan chooses to play
a constructive role in those talks; eliminating the threat from
insurgent safe havens in Pakistan; the establishment of a long-term
strategic partnership between the Government of Afghanistan and the
United States; and the Karzai Government's efforts to improve
governance, deliver services, increase government revenues, fight
corruption, and promote inclusive and transparent elections. General
Mattis, the committee will be interested in your assessment of the
progress on security in Afghanistan and the sustainability of security
gains through 2014 and beyond.
Iran
There is a strong determination on this committee and in this
Congress to do all we can to counter the threat posed by Iran and, in
particular, to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The National
Defense Authorization Act included breakthrough sanctions with respect
to Iran by requiring foreign financial institutions to choose between
maintaining ties with the U.S. financial system or doing business with
the Central Bank of Iran, especially relative to the purchase of
Iranian petroleum and related products. President Obama has
appropriately focused considerable and determined diplomatic effort
``to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon,'' and he has
repeatedly said there are ``no options off the table to achieve that
goal.'' General Mattis has the task of conducting the prudent planning
and assembling the military options for the President on Iran, in case
they are needed.
Terrorism
The U.S. campaign against the global jihadist movement had a number
of significant successes in the last year--most notably operations
against Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. These successes struck
major blows to al Qaeda's senior leadership and one of its most active
affiliates, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As a result of these
operations and sustained pressure in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and
North Africa, al Qaeda and its affiliates are showing strain. However,
al Qaeda is nothing if not resilient. Secretary Panetta and others have
highlighted that al Qaeda continues to become more decentralized.
Recent reports indicate that elements of the al Qaeda in Iraq are
migrating to Syria to take up the fight of the opposition in the hope
of establishing a hub for its violent ambitions.
Continuing to pressure the network of al Qaeda operatives is
critical to our security and our Special Operations Forces will
continue to lead these efforts. While the preponderance of deployed
Special Operations Forces are in the CENTCOM area of responsibility,
special operators are also deployed to dozens of countries around the
world, working to counter the influence of al Qaeda and its affiliates
and helping to build the capacity of our partner nations to confront
the common threats we face. Admiral McRaven, I hope you will update the
committee on the progress of these efforts to counter these groups
globally.
Syria
Over the past year, the international community has acted to
prevent a mass atrocity in Libya and is currently bearing witness to
the Syrian army waging war against its own citizens. This committee
will be hearing from Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey on Syria
tomorrow, but we are also interested in General Mattis' view on the
situation and its impact across his area of responsibility.
U.S. Special Operations Command
The new Defense Strategic Guidance and Priorities emphasize the
importance of special operations personnel for counterterrorism
operations, capacity building, and other theater security cooperation
activities in support of the geographic combatant commanders. Admiral
McRaven, recent published reports indicate that you are seeking new
authorities that you believe would help SOCOM be more responsive to the
geographic combatant commanders' requests for special operations
personnel and the unique capabilities they provide. The committee looks
forward to your comments on these reports and learning more about any
authorities you believe may be necessary to fulfill SOCOM's global
missions.
At last year's posture hearing, the previous SOCOM Commander,
Admiral Olson, stated his concern that the Special Operations Force was
``beginning to fray around the edges'' after 10 years of war. To
address this concern, Admiral Olson established a ``Pressure on the
Force'' Task Force to look for new ways to reduce the strain on these
forces. The committee looks forward to hearing more about your efforts
to implement the recommendations of this task force and other
initiatives that provide support to special operations personnel and
their families.

Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank
our distinguished witnesses, who are two of the most impressive
military leaders currently serving our Nation. We're all
grateful for their many years of dedicated service. We're also
grateful for the men and women they lead in CENTCOM and SOCOM,
amazing Americans of every Service who carry on the fight after
a decade of war.
Admiral McRaven, this is your first time testifying before
this committee as the Commander of SOCOM, and it's fitting that
you do so alongside General Mattis, a seasoned veteran of this
committee's hearings who has the scars to prove it.
Nowhere is the work of America's special operators more
persistent and important than in CENTCOM's AOR. These forces
play an instrumental role in ongoing counterterrorism
operations both in the region and around the globe.
While al Qaeda's senior leadership has been diminished by
sustained pressure against them in Pakistan, al Qaeda's global
operations have become increasingly decentralized and no less
deadly. Regional affiliates seek safe haven in countries beset
by weak governments and internal instability, particularly in
places like Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Trans-Sahel.
This is why SOCOM's ongoing efforts to build the capacity
of partner nations in troubled regions remain a vital component
of our strategy to disrupt and defeat these terrorist
organizations. I'm concerned, however, that as the
administration seeks to decrease the size of our military's
conventional ground forces, many people are already coming to
see SOF as a fix-all to the myriad security challenges that our
country faces.
I look forward to your thoughts, Admiral, as to the proper
role of special operations in the total force and what more can
be done to ensure that these operators are not stretched at the
expense of their unique core responsibilities.
General Mattis, all of us have the utmost respect for you,
but we do not envy you. Few of our military leaders have more
on their plate, from supporting our friends in Jordan, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, to keeping a
watchful eye on the fragile but very different situations in
Bahrain, Yemen, and Lebanon.
In Afghanistan, despite the progress that our troops are
making on the ground, we are at an impasse with President
Karzai on the negotiation of a strategic partnership agreement,
which is critical to sustaining our goals and locking in
lasting success. In Pakistan, our relationship remains fraught
by a series of setbacks and a lack of trust, largely arising
from the fact that the country's intelligence service continues
to support terrorist groups such as the Haqqani network that
are killing Americans.
In Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki continues to centralize
power at the expense of the other political blocs, while the
threat posed by al Qaeda appears to be growing, along with the
kinds of horrific, spectacular attacks like the one we saw
yesterday.
The Iranian regime continues working to subvert Iraq and
many other countries in the region. Its recent attempt to
assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, as well as
Israeli officials in Southeast Asia and the Caucasus, suggest a
growing and increasingly reckless threat, a threat that would
expand exponentially if the Iranian regime were to acquire the
nuclear weapons that it clearly seeks. Unfortunately, the
impressive international effort to impose crippling sanctions
appears to have done nothing to dissuade Iran from its military
nuclear pursuits.
Then there is Syria. After a year of bloodshed, the crisis
has reached a decisive moment. It is estimated that nearly
7,500 lives have been lost. Syria today is the scene of some of
the worst state-sponsored violence since the Balkans. Bashar
Al-Assad and his top lieutenants appear to be accelerating
their fight to the finish, and they're doing so with the full
support of Russia, China, and Iran. A steady supply of weapons,
ammunition, and other assistance is flowing to Assad from
Moscow and Teheran and, as the Washington Post reported on
Sunday, Iranian military and intelligence operatives are likely
working in Syria to support Assad.
The President has made it the objective of the United
States that the killing in Syria must stop and that Assad must
go. He has committed the prestige and credibility of our Nation
to that goal, and it is the right goal. The United States has a
clear national security interest in stopping the slaughter in
Syria and forcing Assad to leave power.
The end of the Assad regime would sever Hezbollah's
lifeline to Iran, eliminate a longstanding threat to Israel,
bolster Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, and remove a
committed state sponsor of terrorism that is engaged in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It would be a
geopolitical success of the first order and a strategic defeat
for the Iranian regime.
However, it is not clear that the present policy will be
able to achieve our goals in Syria. In recent testimony to this
committee, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated
that if the status quo persists, Assad could hang on for the
foreseeable future. That was before the city of Homs fell. With
each passing day, the international response to Assad's
atrocities is being overtaken by events on the ground in Syria.
What opposition groups in Syria need most urgently is
relief from Assad's tank and artillery sieges in the many
cities that are still contested. But time is running out.
Assad's forces are on the march. Providing military assistance
to the Free Syrian Army and other opposition groups is
necessary, but at this late hour, that alone will not be
sufficient to stop the slaughter and save innocent lives. The
only realistic way to do so is with foreign air power, and the
time has come for it.
Air strikes would help to establish and defend safe havens
in Syria, especially in the north, in which opposition forces
can organize and plan their political and military activities
against Assad. These safe havens could allow for the delivery
of humanitarian and military assistance, including weapons and
ammunition, body armor, tactical intelligence, secure
communications equipment, food and water, and medical supplies.
These safe havens could also help the Free Syrian Army and
other armed groups in Syria to train and organize themselves
into more cohesive and effective military forces, likely with
the assistance of foreign partners.
Rather than closing off the prospects for some kind of a
negotiated transition that is acceptable to Syria's opposition,
military intervention is now needed to preserve this option as
credible. Assad needs to know that he will not win. But right
now, unfortunately, Assad seems to think he can win, and for
good reason, I'm afraid.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' advice about how
we can change the balance of power against Assad so as to
finally end his bloodshed and brutal rule in Syria.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Let me call on you, General Mattis.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND

General Mattis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
and members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to
discuss the CENTCOM region. I have submitted a written
statement and request it be accepted into the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
General Mattis. It's my privilege to appear today alongside
an admired leader and good friend, Admiral Bill McRaven. No two
commands work more closely together than SOCOM and CENTCOM.
Let me begin with what I see today in the region. The Arab
Awakening is manifesting differently in each country. While we
may hope for and certainly we firmly support all efforts for
more democratic governments in the region, the Awakening's
origins are not necessarily a rush for democracy. Rather, this
Awakening stems from a breakdown in the social contract between
governments and their people. Unjust or unresponsive regimes
have fallen or are in the throes of falling, as is the case in
Syria. However, the transition to a democratic government is
never easy, as we see in Egypt. Further, it is not clear what
the resulting governments will look like.
Challenges remain beyond the promise of the Arab Awakening.
Iran and its surrogates continue to orchestrate violence
worldwide, as evidenced by its plot to kill the Saudi
Ambassador here in Washington, DC. Iran presents the most
significant regional threat to stability and security. Its
reckless behavior and bellicose rhetoric have created a high
potential for miscalculation.
While we've made security gains in the fight against
terrorists, the threat remains. Al Qaeda and associated groups
continue to kill innocents from the Levant to Yemen and are
adapting in the face of U.S. pressure. While we maintain our
pressure on this enemy, we are nesting our military efforts
inside four broad U.S. diplomatic objectives: first, support
for each country's political reform to adapt at their own pace;
second, support for economic modernization that provides the
people ownership of the future; third, a renewed pursuit of
Middle East peace, recognizing the status quo is not
sustainable; and finally, we stand firmly with our friends in
supporting regional security, territorial integrity of the
sovereign nations, and the free flow of commerce.
As the military commander for the CENTCOM AOR, my
overarching goal is to prevent further conflict. We seek to
deter those with hostile intent and, should deterrence prove
unsuccessful, we provide military options to the President. As
our President has said, our strong presence in the Middle East
endures and the United States will never waver in defense of
our allies, our partners, or our interests.
The military challenge will be determining how we retain a
sustainable presence and operational flexibility in a fiscally
constrained environment. Although we are withdrawing some
ground forces from the region, we are not withdrawing our
support for long-time allies and partners, nor are we pulling
back our commitment from a region that too many times has taken
a commitment of American blood and treasure to restore
stability.
Through persistent military-to-military engagement, our
troops reassure our friends and temper adversary intentions.
Security cooperation activities, such as foreign military
sales, international military education, security force
training, and multinational exercises, are cost-effective means
for building our friends' defensive capabilities, allowing us
to operate in concert with allies and friends, and to rapidly
respond in times of need.
A sustained joint presence with a pronounced naval
character, supported by embarked troops, agile SOF, strong
aviation elements, and an expeditionary Army ready,
demonstrates our commitment to allies, underwrites regional
stability, familiarizes our forces with the theater, and builds
partners' abilities to protect themselves, all while we're
providing timely response to crises.
There are some other key needed capabilities that we have:
improved counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) efforts to
protect our troops from a pervasive threat that extends well
beyond Afghanistan; information operations and voice programs
to counter adversary information and recruiting on the
Internet; improved intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets that enable us to locate an elusive
enemy; and intelligence expertise to support our deployed
elements.
We also need specific resources that are vital to the
Afghanistan campaign. Coalition support funds, the Commanders'
Emergency Response Program (CERP), Afghan Infrastructure Fund,
and reintegration authority enable us to meet urgent
humanitarian and infrastructure needs of a population that is
increasingly secured by its own forces, forces we have been
building and training through the Afghan Security Forces Fund.
In conclusion, I appreciate the essential resources you
provide, which enable us to carry out the strategy assigned to
us. We ask only for what we need and what we request is
critical as we carry out the transition in Afghanistan and
continue on course to achieve our desired strategic end-state
there by December 2014, as laid out at the NATO conference in
Lisbon.
Thanks to congressional support and to the sacrifices of
our military families, our forces represent America's awesome
determination to stand by our friends and maintain regional
stability in defense of our values and interests.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC

I. INTRODUCTION

In over 30 years of supporting U.S. Forces in the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), I have never witnessed
it so tumultuous. Change is the only constant and surprise continues to
be the dominant force in the region. Across the AOR at large, both
opportunities and challenges exist. The CENTCOM AOR encompasses the
world's largest energy Reserves, yet also some of the most crucial and
vulnerable chokepoints. It is home to a rich array of cultures,
religions and confessions; but also tainted by radicals, violent
extremists, malign networks and state-sponsored agents and
unconventional proxies who seek to violently exploit those differences.
These problems are coupled with systemic challenges of poor governance,
a large youth demographic bulge and insufficient economic opportunity,
and the social construct between governments and their people breaking
down in numerous places.
CENTCOM is postured to address these challenges, while working
closely with the Department of State and other agencies to promote
peace and stability. The CENTCOM AOR remains of great strategic
importance to other world powers and is vital to many of America's most
enduring national interests. The historic transformation underway
throughout the region requires extensive U.S. engagement. We must see
this Awakening for what it is, not for what we wish it to be: the
Awakening reflects a breakdown in the social contract; it may or may
not embrace democracy as a result of the understandable unrest.
The defense of our interests in the AOR comes at a grim cost. Over
10 years of war in this theater have cost us precious casualties,
including more than 612 killed and 8,251 wounded since I took command
in August 2010. At the same time, it has also brought out the best of
our All-Volunteer Force and produced a generation of elite leaders as
your troops proved themselves the equals of previous generations of
combat veterans who answered their country's call.

II. STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

Arab Awakening
While the Arab Awakening will manifest differently in each country,
it is important that we see what is happening in its true context:
while we may hope and support efforts for more democratic governments,
its origins lie in the breakdown of that social contract between
governments and their people. Unjust or unresponsive regimes have
fallen or are in the throes of falling as is the case in Syria. Of all
the uncertainties associated with this ongoing movement, one thing is
certain--the region is never going back to what it was. The Arab
Awakening continues to impact countries across the region and the world
with an uncertain future and redefined political landscape. Popular
calls for more responsive government continue to move at different
paces and it is too early to discern its final stage. Our ability to
respond demands unprecedented flexibility and balancing of national
interests.
Though coalition efforts succeeded in supporting the rise of a new
Libya, Syria is unraveling in disarray. Additionally, working closely
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the United States contributed
to the ongoing transition of power in Yemen; however, violence
continues to plague that country, some of it fomented by Iran and much
of it fomented by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While
transformation is underway across the region as a result of the Arab
Awakening, malign efforts by other regional actors--particularly Iran--
to influence the ultimate outcome represent perhaps the greatest
immediate- and long-term threat to regional stability. As Egypt
continues its transition to a fully-functioning democracy, our
bilateral relationship is likely to face challenges along the way, as
evidenced by the tension that has resulted from the nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) raids and their aftermath. We must adapt our
military approach and stay steadfast to our values as we remain engaged
in the region. We will be pragmatic, principled and proactive. We must
be prepared for all contingencies in case of crisis, but there is
reason for optimism despite some pessimistic forecasts.
Middle East Peace
It should come as no surprise that the lack of a sustainable
solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a preeminent flame that
keeps the pot boiling in the Middle East, particularly as the Arab
Awakening causes Arab governments to be more responsive to the
sentiments of their populations. The inability to resolve tensions
between the state of Israel and the Palestinians imposes a heavy cost
on our activities in the AOR, and is raised in almost every meeting I
have with key leaders in the region, particularly in the Arabian
Peninsula and Levant. A peace agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians would facilitate more public, robust support by regional
partners for U.S. initiatives, bolster regional collaboration and
remove fertile ground for extremism and resentment to flourish. We owe
it to the next generation to do everything possible to solve this
vexing issue that gives so much fuel to extremist ideology.
Non-State Threats in Undergoverned Areas
Our terrorist adversaries are networked and globalized, not bounded
by geography, rules or specific organizational or hierarchical lines.
They operate in the shadows of undergoverned spaces and safe havens,
and remain ever determined to harm us, our allies and innocent
civilians around the world. The successful targeting of al Qaeda
leadership has weakened the organization from a morale perspective as
well as a command and control standpoint. Yet there is a resiliency as
the threat morphs and other franchises arise that must be met by more
than military power alone. We must focus on undercutting ideological
extremism in order to reduce its attractiveness to disappointed
peoples.
Although we have achieved substantial success against the terrorist
threats we face in the AOR, the global threat is not stabilized, and is
in fact evolving. Years of activity have allowed al Qaeda to syndicate
relationships with other violent extremist organizations as, for
example, we have just witnessed with respect to al Shabaab. There are
strong indications of resilient and possibly stronger al Qaeda elements
emerging in locations outside of Iraq and the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Iraq, too, will be challenged to hold al
Qaeda at bay. These same organizations also seek to exploit the turmoil
and foment regional tensions amidst the Arab Awakening. We must remain
vigilant as al Qaeda attempts to reconstitute and consolidate in areas
more hospitable to their pernicious activities. In short, this fight is
not over.
At the same time, Iran poses the single greatest threat to U.S.
interests and to our friends and stability in the region, and poses a
global threat through its world-wide proxy network as recent attacks
have demonstrated.
Naval Presence
With the withdrawal of our last troop units from Iraq, excluding
our men and women in the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I),
and as we continue to draw down in Afghanistan and transition
operational lead to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF),
our ground-based troop presence across the region is decreasing.
However, as the President has stated, ``our strong presence in the
Middle East endures . . . and the United States will never waver in
defense of our allies, our partners, or our interests.'' The question
then becomes, how do we maintain our presence with a light footprint?
To accomplish this, the CENTCOM AOR will assume an increasingly
maritime character with Special Operations Forces and strong air
enablers. Naval forces--with embarked troops--provide presence and a
cost efficient means of rapidly projecting power in a crisis to execute
contingency operations. Sustained naval presence and response forces
provide a lighter ``footprint'' on the ground, and are vital for
reassuring our partners, deterring those with malign intent and
tempering destructive actors from fermenting trouble in our region.
The maritime environment also permits freedom of action unfettered
by international boundaries and agreements. However, the stacked
Iranian threats in our AOR of ballistic missiles, long range rockets,
mines, small boats, cruise missiles and submarines demand stronger
naval presence and capability to protect vital sea lines of
communication. I view with concern efforts to decrease our naval
presence and capability when our volatile AOR and the threats of the
future are increasingly maritime. Demands on our naval forces will only
grow in the future; I anticipate that we will need more maritime
missile defense, anti-fast attack craft capabilities, amphibious ships
and mine-countermeasure capability, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets. Maintaining a credible naval force covered by
sufficient aviation combat power is essential for demonstrating our
enduring commitment to regional partners, building trust and
relationships and rapid projection of power in a crisis. We are working
to address our near-term capabilities and I am grateful for the
committee's strong support.

III. FISCAL REALITIES

We are entering a period of increased national fiscal austerity.
This reality may force us to do less in the region; however, we will
not do it less well and the quality of our performance will remain the
best in the world. Our strategy starts with what we determine the Armed
Forces must be capable of doing, bounded by a clear articulation of the
objectives--or ``ends''--we seek to achieve in the region. Our approach
and posture are predicated upon several national-level documents, chief
among them the National Security Strategy and the newly published
Defense Strategic Guidance. We seek to match our regional ends with our
methods--or ``ways''--and our resources--or ``means''--and determine
how to mitigate risk. Key to our success is making grounded projections
into the future rooted in hard-learned lessons from our current
conflicts and which provide an operational shock absorber when the
inevitable surprises present themselves--and to do so while ensuring we
are responsible stewards of every dollar allocated.
Specific to CENTCOM and its components, we operate austerely
according to our needs, not our wants. We prioritize our efforts to
leverage the expertise and capabilities of others. My headquarters
structure is expected to decrease 30 percent over the next 5 years. We
are rigorously reviewing every contract and we intend to increase our
effectiveness while we excel in meeting efficiency goals. General Allen
and his team are doing detailed, commendatory work in scrubbing
requirements to pursue an Afghan-right approach and provide cost-
savings back to the Department as demonstrated by the return of $1.6
billion in the fiscal year 2012 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
request last fall.
While new Strategic guidance prioritizes the Pacific region, we
remain committed to our strategic interests in the Middle East. We will
stand by our friends and partners in the region and that is not going
to change. Our military approach will necessarily evolve and adapt and
our partners will become even more important as we work to ensure
regional security and stability. Our efforts in the Middle East reflect
a multilateral coalition-building approach with traditional allies in
the region and we fight alongside the largest wartime coalition in
recent history in Afghanistan. We have forged key partnerships
throughout the Gulf region both bilaterally and through the GCC. These
efforts promote cost-sharing, and in fact, directly contribute to U.S.
economic interests through security assistance purchases.
As we work to maintain the cohesion of the coalition and our
momentum in security operations in Afghanistan, it will be necessary to
include those critical and unwavering partners who stand by us but who
would not be able to participate without some training, sustainment and
reimbursement support from the United States. These efforts would not
be possible without the resources and funding you provide. To that end,
your support for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program and
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund provides key tools we need to build
capacity for a successful transition. I also appreciate your attention
to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and reintegration authority--
key, flexible tools in accomplishing this part of our mission.

IV. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES, VISION AND APPROACH

The 2011 National Security Strategy identifies four broad, enduring
American interests as:

The security of the United States, its citizens, and
U.S. allies and partners
A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an
open international economic system that promotes opportunity
and prosperity
Respect for universal values at home and around the
world
An international order advanced by U.S. leadership
that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger
cooperation to meet global challenges.

Our overarching goal is to support U.S. objectives through peaceful
means and to prevent conflict. However, in the case of impending
conflict, my job is to provide the President feasible military options.
Throughout history, not being militarily prepared for operations and
contingencies has never proven a reliable path to keep the peace.
Therefore, we are and will remain prepared to respond to crises, deter
and prevent war and ensure military readiness and flexibility.
CENTCOM's vision for the AOR is a region where improved security leads
to greater stability and where regional cooperation helps to isolate
and counter those who would use violence in pursuit of their goals.
CENTCOM's strategic approach is to build and maintain a robust and
flexible force posture that promotes regional stability through
relationships with key allies and partners. We will accomplish this by
consistently conducting military-to-military engagements--which builds
trust--and by promoting security cooperation with partners, while
retaining the right to self-defense and force protection. Additionally,
events do not occur according to the neat lines and areas of
responsibility we draw on the map of the world. Security challenges
posed by piracy, violent extremist organizations and criminal elements
based in the Horn of Africa impact operations in the CENTCOM AOR.
Broadly, the challenges in our AOR are not isolated, and most solutions
require extensive collaboration with our allies within and beyond
CENTCOM's boundaries. In the future, it will become increasingly
important to invest in building relationships and the capacity and
capability of our partners to respond to emerging challenges.
The United States has the power to both inspire and intimidate.
Going forward, we will emphasize the power to inspire. A major
component of inspiring is building relationships through a diplomatic
approach. Strengthening our relationships with allies, forging greater
collaboration with international partners and ensuring effective
coordination within our own government will continue to hallmark our
approach. Exceptional U.S. civil-military partnerships among U.S.
Government interagency actors like those forged these last 10 years are
the gold standard that must be sustained in all our endeavors. In that
regard, I applaud Secretary Clinton's Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review initiative, which is strengthening in unprecedented
ways interagency collaboration to achieve U.S. Government objectives.
CENTCOM military efforts will continue to firmly nest with and
buttress diplomatic efforts. A good start point is four principles of
our foreign policy in the Middle East. Support for peaceful democratic
change; at their own pace: for every nation must ultimately incorporate
the will of their people that we are watching unfold across the region
with the Arab Awakening. Support for economic modernization to bring
the benefits of economic progress to the wider population: so more
people have a sense of hope and ownership. Renewed pursuit of a
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace to achieve a two-state solution:
because the status quo is not sustainable. As Harvard professor C.H.
McIlwain said in 1937, ``the preservation of the status quo is a
solution that can satisfy none but the contented and just now most men
are not contented''. Our own enduring stake in regional security and
territorial integrity: to check mischief of malign actors and reduce
terrorist threat to all nations.
Using these four principles as our guideposts, CENTCOM will work
toward five broad strategic objectives in the AOR. We will promote
common interests in order to enhance stability and security as we
defeat violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that threaten the U.S.
Homeland, our overseas interests, or U.S. allies. Importantly, we will
counter the proliferation, acquisition, and use of weapons of mass
destruction. We will support Department of State's broader diplomatic
objectives by assisting in setting the conditions that will enable
representative government and prosperity. Lastly, we will prepare U.S.
and partner forces to respond to emerging challenges.
Through persistent military engagement, CENTCOM will maintain a
presence in the region to protect vital interests, prevent future
conflict, ensure access in the event of a crisis and invest in future
regional security. Acknowledging each country's unique circumstances,
we will advance our strategic objectives through a tailored approach by
seeking a nexus of common interests and identifying common ground with
partners that puts us on a trajectory for shared, long-term benefit.
Trust and harmony of effort among partners are what counts when the
inevitable crises strike: Our fundamental premise is every country has
something to contribute through strong regional relationships to
strengthen our collaborative efforts. Numerous nations in the region
trust us--making our presence and pursuit in building enduring military
relationships all the more paramount.
Military-to-military engagements serve as vital connective tissue
in our relationships with partners and allies as the United States
seeks to respond effectively to the Arab Awakening, while continuing to
pursue regional stability and security. CENTCOM seeks to build partner
capacity and competencies--developed through training, professional
military education, foreign military sales, bilateral and multi-lateral
agreements and exercises. Building partner capacity is the long-term
solution to reduce costs on the United States and to defend our
interests in a fiscally constrained environment. The result is
competent partners--technically and tactically capable of taking lead
on issues of mutual interest--having as much at stake as we do. Years
of nurturing our military-to-military relationship with Jordan and
United Arab Emirates contributed to the mutual trust and
interoperability necessary for their support of Libyan operations. The
Egyptian military, while not perfect in its leading of the transition,
has performed more responsibly than anyone would have presumed. Without
years of assistance and partnership with the United States, this would
not have been the case. When you compare the Egyptian military's
actions with the events continuing to unfold in Syria as the Syrian
military continues to ruthlessly use lethal force with impunity against
the Syrian people--the value of properly constructed, ethical military-
to-military engagement is clear.

IV. REVIEW OF THE AOR

The primary threats to these interests from those with hostile
intent are: state-based aggression; non-state actors/VEOs; weapons of
mass destruction; and some combination thereof. Each of these threats
is in play across this dynamic AOR.
There is only one state in our AOR actively seeking to destabilize
the region and actively fomenting violence--Iran. The combination of
Iran's potential nuclear weapons aspirations, defiance of international
obligations and norms, employment of proxies to attack others around
the world to include U.S. Forces, and regional hegemonic goals make
Iran the single greatest threat to regional stability--and to the
security of the United States--in the Central region. Iran and its
surrogates foment much of the malign activity across the AOR. From
active attempts to exploit the Arab Awakening, to working to undermine
and subordinate the democracy in Iraq, to supporting the Assad regime
in Syria, to heightening Shiite-Sunni tensions, to active support for
Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran's activities are motivated by its hegemonic
ambitions, despite its growing regional and international isolation. An
Iranian decision to develop nuclear weapons will have a destabilizing
effect on the region and could motivate its neighbors to proceed with
their own nuclear development programs. Iran's well-established pattern
of deceit and reckless behavior has progressively increased the
potential for miscalculation, and is the primary catalyst pushing the
region toward an arms race or armed conflict.
While the fight against violent extremism continues in Afghanistan,
military progress is undeniable. The ISAF Campaign Plan is succeeding;
even while progress and violence coexist. While significant risks
remain and development of the Government of Afghanistan's economic and
governance capacity is a persistent challenge, we continue the effort
to neutralize the enemy in Afghanistan while transferring the lead for
security to ANSF which has made great strides in growth, quality and
effectiveness. The Afghans are proving themselves on the battlefield
and I am optimistic that the 2014 date, established in Lisbon by NATO,
is achievable for the Afghans to be in the lead across the entire
country.
The insurgency is less capable, physically and psychologically,
than in previous years. The ISAF Coalition has broadly arrested
insurgent momentum--limiting insurgent freedom of movement, killing or
capturing leaders and fighters, and in many areas effectively
separating the insurgents from the population. The enemy's reliance on
high-profile attacks and assassinations of Afghan senior leaders
illustrates our enemy's limited military options against ISAF and the
ANSF, and diminished capacity to influence events on the ground.
Violence is down in Helmand and Kandahar and enemy efforts to sustain
attacks in Kabul have failed. Yet, the insurgency remains both
resilient and capable, so we must remain vigilant and resolved as our
gains are reversible.
Execution of the major elements of this complex campaign--
transition, surge recovery, ANSF growth, evolution to security force
assistance, reconciliation and establishing an enduring force--must be
comprehensive, maintain hard-fought momentum, and preserve coalition
unity. I appreciate your continued support of the Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund and reintegration authority, which are key to building on
our successes. General Allen and his team, in partnership with the
Department of State and GIRoA, are carefully examining plans to train,
equip and sustain the ANSF and have revised our approach to be
appropriate to the situation. Additionally, as U.S. drawdown proceeds,
preservation of enablers in terms of logistics, medical evacuation,
communications and air support (among others), will be essential for
our partners, many of whom have expressed concern over potential loss
of these capabilities. As these major efforts proceed, increasingly
integrating Coalition and partner-nation plans and insights will be
critical to maintaining Coalition support in the lead up to the NATO
summit in Chicago in May and through 2014. This, the largest coalition
in recent military history, validates the common interest of our
international and regional partners, and we must sustain our ``in
together out together'' approach in our mutually supporting efforts.
Continued support of the Coalition Support authorities, to include lift
and sustainment, will enable key partners to maintain their active
engagement in support of security transition and in training and
advising the Afghans to build on the momentum in establishing
independent operations.
In Pakistan, the threats we face come together in a potentially
dangerous nexus. The unstable environment in Pakistan is exacerbated by
terrorist attacks and tenuous government control in parts of the
country, economic distress, radicalization of segments of the
population, a military over-stretched, strained relations with India,
repeat natural disasters and more. The United States has a vested
interest in Pakistan and, despite challenges to the bilateral U.S.-
Pakistan relationship, Pakistan remains a regional partner and must
play a constructive role if Afghanistan is to achieve long-term
security.
Although 2011's challenges were numerous--from fall-out over Wiki-
leaks and the Ray Davis incident to significant tensions following the
raid that killed Osama bin Laden, Haqqani Network attacks on our
Embassy in Kabul, and the tragic Salala incident in which 24 Pakistani
troops were killed in a cross-border friendly-fire incident--our focus
must remain on shared strategic interests. A candid, constructive
military-to-military partnership can help establish common ground from
which to act against our common enemy. Pakistani intelligence support
has been critical to neutralization efforts against al Qaeda senior
leadership even while some aspects of its security policy appear self-
defeating. Cross-border coordination is improving between ISAF and
Pakistan's military. Continued support for the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, Foreign Military Financing,
International Military Education and Training, and the Coalition
Support Fund for Pakistan provides the tools to enable this military-
to-military partnership and pursue what are truly shared interests.
Our successful military drawdown from Iraq puts the need to develop
a new strategic relationship with the Iraqi government at the forefront
of our regional policy. The OSC-I has been established and testifies to
our respect for Iraqi sovereignty. Our relationship going forward will
be based on mutual respect between two sovereign nations. CENTCOM will
work to expand security cooperation activities and deepen our military-
to-military ties with Iraq while helping to expand its military
engagement with key regional partners. Simultaneously, we remain clear-
eyed, recognizing Iran's access to and efforts to subordinate Iraq and
work to counter that malign influence. OSC-I--working under Chief of
Mission authority and with the full support of CENTCOM--is the lead
proponent for executing the military component of our intent. Thank you
for your fast action in support of our special authority for OSC-I and
for your continued patience as we work through a successful transition.
The danger from al Qaeda in Iraq is still serious and it remains
capable of spectacular attacks against the people and the government
there even as it takes advantage next door in Syria to mount attacks
there.
We witnessed last year the benefit of mature military-to-military
relationships as the Arab Awakening unfolded in Egypt unlike how it's
unfolding in Syria. Although there have been challenges--including the
ongoing NGO issue--the Egyptian military continues to facilitate the
transition to democracy and civilian rule. As Egypt makes progress in
its democratic transition, CENTCOM will remain committed to our
longstanding relationship with the Egyptian military. Field Marshal
Tantawi is enabling the democratic process to unfold, presidential
elections are upcoming, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
will transition to a freely-elected, civilian government by the end of
June. Transition periods are difficult, but this situation presents
unique opportunities to reaffirm and enhance U.S. relations with the
Egyptian military and emergent civilian government via sustained
diplomatic and military-to-military engagements. In a democratic
system, everyone is free to share their views, and those views may not
always be compatible with our own. But I believe the prospects for a
continued close and positive relationship with Egypt--even if it is
more complicated than it has been in the past--are better because of
the long standing ties between our two nations.
Jordan remains one of our staunchest regional allies, ready to
stand by us when we need them and one that has deployed side by side
with U.S. Forces. Jordan has shared interests with the United States--
and other responsible Middle East nations--in regional stability and
reform. We remain grateful for King Abdullah's leadership in hosting
direct discussions between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. The
Jordanian Armed Forces leadership is committed to its partnership with
the United States and understands that in order to stay relevant, they
must adapt their forces. To that end, they are conducting a Strategic
Defense Review aimed at transforming the military to a lighter, more
adaptable force capable of operating against today's threats.
As the sole multi-confessional institution providing stability in
Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is the principal governmental
organization viewed with respect by Lebanese from across their society.
We support the LAF through a variety of programs as they perform a
balancing role in maintaining peace and addressing Lebanon's
territorial integrity. Over the years, our efforts with the LAF have
been crucial in building the capability and capacity to serve as a
counterbalance to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH). In that sense, these
programs have served security in the country and region, and warrant
our continued support. Our shared goal is to offset the influence of LH
and malign Iranian influence--which are very strong.
Events in Syria will have strategic repercussions throughout the
region. The Syrian regime has a substantial chemical-biological weapons
capability, a significant integrated air defense system, thousands of
shoulder-launched anti-air missiles and a wholly unsustainable
political hierarchy. The tumultuous security situation continues to
deteriorate as the Assad regime escalates the level of lethal force
employed upon its own people. As a result, the regime is battling for
its survival against a popular uprising, raising the prospect of a
civil war. The bravery of the Syrian people is laudable but the options
available to address the situation are extremely challenging.
We continue to see growing signs of GCC unity and cohesion, and a
growing appetite for U.S.-GCC multilateral exercises, air, sea, and
land. The Gulf states have demonstrated a strengthened willingness to
work with one another, and with international partners, to counter
malign influence in the region. Our State Department is working with
the GCC to formalize our security policy coordination among and with
GCC member states. GCC member states are stalwart partners and we
continue our close collaboration with them, both bi-laterally and
multi-laterally.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been a valued partner in
operations in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia,
Afghanistan, and Libya and we continue to deepen our military
relationship. The Emirates recently completed their very successful
participation on Operation Unified Protector in Libya and continue
their support to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In an
effort to strengthen its air and missile defense capability, the UAE
recently signed a Foreign Military Sales case for their purchase of the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense system, valued at approximately $3.5
billion. The UAE was the first foreign government to purchase this
system. The UAE's many contributions today and close military ties over
many years marks this partner among our strongest friends.
The deep U.S.--Bahrain security relationship is the cornerstone for
our collective security in the Gulf region. Home to our sole main
operating base in the Mid-East, Bahrain provides key support for U.S.
interests by hosting U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet and providing facilities for
other U.S. Forces engaged in regional security. Bahrain faces a
challenge balancing the demands for greater political participation by
its citizens and the maintenance of security and stability as it
continues needed political reform. In this regard, the small island
nation is a microcosm of the tensions sweeping through the region.
After the unrest a year ago, the government invited in a group of
internationally respected human rights and legal experts to lead the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The government gave
full support to its investigation. The BICI findings and
recommendations were received by the King on live television and the
government's positive response to the recommendations is encouraging.
While implementing the recommendations is not an easy task, the
Government of Bahrain has taken encouraging steps on reform, and it is
important we support the efforts they've undertaken to date. Dialogue
between the government and opposition groups is essential. One of the
greatest bulwarks against Iranian influence is a strong and stable
Bahrain that is inclusive and respects the rights of all its people.
Bahrain is an important partner, and has been a reliable friend through
good times and bad. It is showing now, by learning from its mistakes,
that it is equally committed to this important relationship.
Qatar hosts significant U.S. military capabilities and has taken an
increasing role in pursuit of regional stability, supporting operations
in Libya with both military and humanitarian aid. Qatar will continue
to pursue an assertive and independent foreign policy and is playing an
important role in an effort to stop Syrian brutality, including through
an Arab League resolution suspending Syria's membership. Qatar has also
placed wide-ranging sanctions on Syria in response to the Assad
regime's violence against its own citizens.
Oman is strategically located along the Strait of Hormuz and the
Indian Ocean and has played a steadying role and voice of moderation in
the region for many years. Internally the Sultan remains admired and he
addressed demonstrators' concerns in early 2011 in positive ways. We
have shared appreciation of the situation in the Gulf and Oman provides
valued military advice for maintaining stability.
Kuwait remains a steadfast friend of the United States and has been
indispensable in facilitating U.S. troop and equipment flow in and out
of the AOR. Kuwait's foreign policy will continue to be grounded in its
long-standing strategic alliance with the United States. We maintain a
robust security cooperation program with the Kuwaitis and their support
for U.S. Forces is essential for maintaining collective regional
security.
For decades, security cooperation has been a cornerstone of our
relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As we face ever more
sophisticated regional challenges in the Middle East, upgrading Saudi
Arabia's defense capabilities sustains our strong military-to-military
relations, continues operational interoperability, and helps the
Kingdom prepare to meet regional threats. In difficult times, the
Kingdom has demonstrated its willingness and capability to use its
military capabilities to fight as part of a coalition against regional
hegemony. Modernizing the Saudi military and allowing the Kingdom more
prompt access to equipment deters hostile actors and ensures the
security and stability of the Kingdom coupled with our longstanding
military ties.
Following the signing of a GCC-backed plan under which President
Saleh handed over his executive powers to the Vice President, a
national unity government was formed and a presidential election took
place on February 21, 2012. Yemen has a new leader after over three
decades of rule by President Saleh. Following an extended period of
internal strife, Yemen is poised for effective political transition.
The GCC plans also provided for the creation of a Military/Security
Committee which has played a key role in de-escalating the security
situation and will be instrumental in reorganizing the military and
security structure in Yemen. The new Yemeni government will need
assistance in order to reorganize its military under civilian control
and build capacity to deal with critical national security threats. We
are supporting military professionalization and look to continue our
relationship in the fight against AQAP in accordance with our national
policy. We expect increased Iranian malfeasance in an attempt to
undercut Yemen's efforts to create a peaceful path to the future.
The Central Asian States are key to our Afghanistan campaign
because the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is a critical part of
ISAF's resupply and retrograde efforts. Over the past 2 years, the
expansion of the NDN for transportation to and from Afghanistan has
been one of the most significant areas of cooperation with our Central
Asian partners. Central Asia shares similar threats from the Afghan
border regions and CENTCOM military assistance focuses on building the
capacity to fight against violent extremists. We are committed to
preventing violent extremist organizations from using Central Asia as a
base for terrorist operations and strengthening relationships based on
shared understanding of the terrorist, criminal and narco-trafficking
threats. Military assistance is focused on building counterterrorism
capacity.
Our relationship with Kazakhstan continues to mature. We have
recently signed new agreements for 5 years of defense cooperation and
Kazakhstan continues to contribute to the Afghanistan mission. In 2012,
Kazakhstan desires to expand the number of nations participating in
Exercise Steppe Eagle, a peacekeeping exercise co-sponsored by
Kazakhstan and the United States.
Kyrgyzstan continues to be a key partner for U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan and the region. The peaceful transition of power to
President Atambayev demonstrated the Kyrgyz Republic's effort to
sustain democratic reforms. Our military relationship continues to
improve, particularly in the areas of regional security and military
security cooperation. Additionally, the Kyrgyz Republic aims to deploy
a U.S.-trained peacekeeping mission within the next 2 years.
For Tajikistan building and maintaining counterterrorism, border
security and counternarcotics capability to protect our mutual
interests from the threat of violent extremist organizations are
paramount to regional stability. In concert with our counterterrorism
efforts, we are working with Tajikistan to improve disaster response.
Tajikistan is committed to deploying their U.S.-trained peacekeeping
battalion on a United Nations peacekeeping mission in 2012. We continue
to explore options to facilitate the transit of goods and services in
support of ISAF with this important partner.
Our security cooperation with Turkmenistan continues to develop
along lines consistent with our mutual objectives of countering violent
extremists and improving border security to counter narcotics
trafficking.
Our relationship with Uzbekistan continues to improve in a
deliberate, balanced way driven by regional security considerations,
expansion of the NDN and mutual benefit. Security cooperation serves to
provide increased U.S. access and influence in cultivating engagement
for humanitarian and democratization efforts. We recently signed new
agreements providing important new capabilities in support of
Afghanistan and expect cooperation to continue to progress in a
methodical step-by-step manner that addresses security threats of our
mutual concern.

VI. CRITICAL NEEDS AND CONCERNS

The improvised explosive device (IED) remains one of the greatest
threats to our men and women serving in harm's way. The ubiquitous
nature of the IED threat networks, operating in an environment
characterized by the easy flow of dual use components through
legitimate businesses with access to readily available explosive
materials, presents an ominous threat to our Nation's security
interests at home and abroad well beyond the end of mission in
Afghanistan.
An effective counter-IED (C-IED) effort requires specific and
focused capabilities to address both the threat networks and their
devices. It is critical that DOD maintain an ability to continually
identify likely capability gaps and focus our supporting communities of
interest to develop viable solutions. The Joint IED Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) has been instrumental in coordinating the research and
development (R&D) community to provide material solutions, rapidly
harnessing the latest technologies and concepts in order to field
effective and timely C-IED requirements to the warfighter. The
synchronization of JIEDDO's three lines of operation--Attack the
Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force--builds on the
experience amassed over the past decade enabling the combatant
commanders a capability to defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic
influence. Expanding the community of practice to academia and industry
in focused pursuit of pre-detonation detection measures is the next
step in this important effort.
ISR capabilities remain vital to our ability to operate in denied
areas and support multi-intelligence collection across all domains. We
must sustain our capabilities and continue enhancements that keep us
ahead of threats while supporting all plans and operations. In addition
to communications and hardware assets we rely upon, the imbedded
Intelligence Community personnel and liaisons at CENTCOM provides
continuous expert support to the command and all deployed elements.
Sustaining this effort is critical to CENTCOM's ability to stay abreast
of regional dynamics and the changing threats.
Information operations provide CENTCOM a key non-lethal,
traditional military tool to counter all threats and ``win'' in the
strategic messaging campaign. As an example, we conduct Regional Web
Interaction Program (RWIP) activities online to degrade violent
extremist organizations' recruiting and fund raising. RWIP activities
are coordinated with a number of U.S. Government departments and
agencies, focus solely on undermining extra-governmental violent
extremist organizations that pose a potentially lethal threat in our
region, and do not address the American public nor are they a Public
Diplomacy tool to increase popular support for any U.S. policy.

VII. CONCLUSION

I appreciate your support for CENTCOM as you fulfill your role as
the responsible overseers of the American people's tax dollars. To that
end, I would like to extend my personal gratitude for your continued
support to our men and women in uniform. We intend to earn your respect
by being the best possible stewards of resources allocated in this
challenging time: we will continue to challenge assumptions with cost-
saving measures in mind.

Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.
Admiral McRaven.

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral McRaven. Good morning. Chairman Levin, Ranking
Member McCain, and distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and to
represent the extraordinary men and women of SOCOM. It is an
honor to command the world's finest SOF, a force serving side-
by-side with our broader military and interagency teammates. I
am proud to appear today with my good friend and next-door
neighbor, Jim Mattis. Admittedly, though, Jim is rarely there,
but when he's there, he's a great neighbor.
With your permission, I'll submit my written posture
statement for the record and open with some brief remarks.
This morning I'd like to provide you an overview of SOF's
role in addressing our Nation's ongoing and emerging security
challenges. Secretary Panetta recently outlined how he viewed
the future joint force. He called for low-cost, lean,
technologically-advanced, agile, responsive, innovative,
efficient, and effective forces able to address a variety of
challenges and adversaries. As I read those characteristics, I
am struck at how accurately they describe your SOF and what we
bring to our Nation's arsenal.
SOF have had a tremendous impact on our Nation's security
and never more so than during the last 10 years of war. Since
September 11, our forces have doubled in size, now at 66,000,
our budget has tripled, and the number of deployed SOF has
quadrupled to meet the emerging demands. However, even with
that growth, our $10.4 billion budget in fiscal year 2013 still
comprises only 1.7 percent of the total Department of Defense
(DOD) budget. Simply put, SOF remains relevant, in high demand,
and offers an unparalleled return on the Nation's investment.
As we evaluate today's rapidly evolving strategic
landscape, it is clear that the demand for SOF capabilities
will remain high. Our near-term focus is on winning the current
fight against violent extremism. First and foremost, we will
sustain our efforts in Afghanistan in support of International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by continuing the application
of SOF's direct and indirect approach.
The direct approach, lethal and precise, continues to
degrade extremist leadership and their facilitation networks.
The indirect approach, which I believe offers the greatest
opportunity for victory, builds security and governance through
efforts such as village stability operations (VSO) and
development of ASF. Both the direct and indirect approaches
continue to have daily positive impacts on ISAF strategy.
Our sacrifice and effort in Afghanistan has been
tremendous, and we continue to make this our highest priority.
In addition to our efforts in Afghanistan, we also strive to
maintain persistent presence globally. Today, U.S. SOF are in
78 countries around the world supporting U.S. policy
objectives. In the Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and
other regions, SOF's unique skills, cultural knowledge, and the
ability to work with partners create effects far above our
relatively small numbers. All of these international
engagements are done with the complete support and approval of
the respective geographic combatant commanders and the chiefs
of mission.
In addition to our focus on winning the current fight, I am
committed to strengthening our support to the geographic
combatant commanders by reinforcing and enabling their theater
SOCOMs. The theater SOCOMs are sub-unified commands of the
geographic combatant commanders and provide the regional
commander his special operations capability. As the force
provider for those SOF capabilities, SOCOM will ensure theater
SOCOMs have the human capital, the capability, and the SOF
expertise to meet the geographic combatant commanders'
requirements.
Another important aspect of SOFs' utility to the geographic
combatant commanders is our ability to partner with other
national SOF units. Since the establishment of service SOF in
the 1960s and then SOCOM in 1987, our relationship with our
allied partner force around the world has strengthened each
nation's SOF and each nation's ability to deal with their own
security problems. We must continue to build these
relationships wherever possible.
To win the current fight and strengthen our support for the
geographic combatant commanders, it will be necessary to ensure
our force and their families remain strong. My predecessor,
Admiral Eric Olson, established a task force to examine the
fraying around the edges in our SOF community. We confirmed
that a decade of war, coupled with a consistently high demand
for SOF, has exerted a physical and emotional stress on our
force and families.
I am committed to taking care of our people with the best
support we can provide. I have put a general officer and my
command sergeant major in charge of the preservation of the
force and families. They are empowered to implement innovative
solutions across the SOCOM enterprise, to improve the wellbeing
of our warriors and their families.
In conclusion, the demands on SOF will not end in the
foreseeable future. With your strong advocacy, we will continue
to sustain a world-class special operations capability, thereby
providing the Nation a decisive edge in addressing the
challenges that affect us today and will undoubtedly emerge
tomorrow.
It is an honor to appear before you today as the Commander
of SOCOM. You can take pride in what the men and women of SOCOM
are accomplishing around the world each and every day. Thank
you for your continued support. I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven follows:]

Preapred Statement by ADM William H. McRaven, USN

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to address the committee in my first posture
statement as the 9th commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM). As always, we deeply appreciate your continued commitment and
support of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) around the world.
In response to a rapidly evolving strategic landscape and an
increasingly constrained fiscal environment our leadership has recently
issued new strategic guidance to focus the efforts of the Department of
Defense (DOD). My intent today is to provide a brief review of how SOF
will support this guidance while also highlighting SOCOM's
responsibilities, authorities, structure and major programs and
initiatives.

SOCOM ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITIES, AUTHORITIES, AND STRUCTURE

As the only Unified Combatant Command legislated into being by
Congress, SOCOM has a distinct appreciation for the advocacy and unique
authorities given to us since 1986. We are one of nine Unified
Combatant Commands and similar to others in many regards, yet SOCOM is
distinct in that we exercise numerous Service, military department, and
defense agency-like responsibilities under guidance provided by the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS),
the Unified Command Plan, and Title 10, Section 167 of the U.S. Code.
Unlike combatant commands with specific geographic areas of
responsibility, SOCOM is a functional combatant command with global
responsibilities. We are the lead Combatant Command tasked with
synchronizing the planning of global operations against terrorist
networks. SOCOM is also responsible for providing, training, and
recommending sourcing solutions for combat-ready SOF forces supporting
the Geographic Combatant Commands' (GCC) requirements. While these
forces normally deploy under the control of the GCCs' Theater Special
Operations Commands, SOCOM can execute global operations against
terrorist networks when directed to do so by the President or SECDEF.
SOCOM is also the lead component with executive agent-like
responsibilities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOF
Headquarters (NSHQ) responsible for strengthening the role of NSHQ in
fostering special operations capabilities within NATO. This includes
advocacy for resources, personnel, and funding within DOD; sharing best
practices and lessons learned; and providing the latest releasable U.S.
policy, strategy, operations, tactics, and training for NSHQ-supported
SOF. This advances a worldwide network of SOF professionals conducting
operations to increase, return, or develop peace and stability in
support of U.S. national interests.
Through the foresight of Congress, SOCOM is empowered by unique
legislated budget and acquisition authorities in Major Force Program-11
(MFP-11). MFP-11 allows rapid and flexible acquisition of ``SOF-
peculiar'' equipment and modification of service common systems to meet
special operations requirements. MPF-11 funding supports SOF's
persistent global presence meeting the SECDEF's guidance for forces
``agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies and
threats.'' We appreciate the Committee's authorization of $10.5 billion
for fiscal year 2012. In fiscal year 2013, the command is requesting a
total of $10.4 billion; $7.8 billion of baseline and $2.6 billion of
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This includes beginning the
transition of funds from OCO to the base SOCOM budget in recognition of
the enduring nature of many of our global requirements.
The total fiscal year 2013 SOCOM budget request is 1.7 percent of
the overall proposed DOD budget. When combined with the Service-
provided capabilities necessary to enable our operations we still
represent less than 4 percent of the DOD total.
Unique to Special Operations, our 1208 authority remains critical
to funding SOF's work with indigenous forces in support of
counterterrorism operations around the world. We appreciate the
committee's extension of this funding through 2015 and its approval of
increasing the annual cap to $50 million in 2012. Your continued
support with 1208 has provided us the flexibility to support current
operations today and rapidly address emerging operations tomorrow.
Collectively these funds support a force with a current strength of
approximately 66,100 personnel (growing to near 71,100 by fiscal year
2015), spread across 5 subordinate component commands: the U.S. Army
SOCOM, Air Force SOCOM, Naval Special Warfare Command, Marine Corps
Forces SOCOM, and the Joint SOCOM.

SOF SUPPORT FOR 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE

As articulated in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense, the global security environment presents an
increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities. By their very
nature, SOF are particularly well-suited to respond to this rapidly
changing environment, and I fully expect the operational demands placed
upon SOF to increase across the next decade, and beyond.
As the current CJCS General Martin Dempsey recently noted, ``We're
at a strategic inflection point, where we find a different geopolitical
challenge, different economic challenges, shifting of economic and
military power.'' Strategic trends and challenges are producing a
distinct change in the character of conflict. Insurgents, transnational
terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies
exploit gaps in policy developed for the more predictable world of
yesterday. Increasingly these threats are networked, adaptable, and
empowered by cyberspace to find new ways to recruit, train, finance,
and operate. In short, the strategic environment is changing--quickly
and constantly.
The decade of war after September 11 has proffered many lessons;
among them, specific to SOF, is the complementary nature of our direct
and indirect approaches and how these SOF approaches are aligned to
this changing strategic environment. The direct approach is
characterized by technologically-enabled small-unit precision
lethality, focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation integrated
on a digitally-networked battlefield. In today's global
counterterrorism fight, U.S. SOF continues to directly degrade al Qaeda
and its affiliates' leadership around the world, greatly reducing their
ability to effectively plan and conduct operations. Extreme in risk,
precise in execution and able to deliver a high payoff, the impacts of
the direct approach are immediate, visible to public and have had
tremendous effects on our enemies' networks throughout the decade.
As al Qaeda and other extremist organizations attempt to franchise
their ideology and violence globally, we will likely remain engaged
against violent extremist networks for the foreseeable future. As
Secretary Panetta recently stated, ``We need to continue to put
pressure on them, whether they're in Pakistan, whether they're in
Yemen, whether they're in Somalia, whether they're in North Africa.''
The direct approach will remain a hallmark capability for SOF in order
to provide the necessary means to disrupt this threat. However, the
direct approach alone is not the solution to the challenges our Nation
faces today as it ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect
approach and broader governmental elements to take effect. Less well
known but decisive in importance, the indirect approach is the
complementary element that can counter the systemic components of the
threat.
The indirect approach includes empowering host nation forces,
providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging
key populations. These long-term efforts increase partner capabilities
to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address local needs,
and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of violent
extremism.
While both approaches build trust and confidence with our partners
and assure them of our support and reliability, the indirect approach
values local-led efforts to buy down our partners' security threats.
Here, SOF amplifies our partners' capabilities, epitomizing the
SECDEF's assertion that ``building capacity elsewhere in the world also
remains important for sharing the cost and responsibilities of global
leadership.''
As for the future, the indirect approach will be critical in the
fight to deter, disrupt and deny sanctuary to our enemies. Therefore,
we must use this approach to strengthen and foster a network of
mutually supporting partnerships that are based on shared security
interests. Through this network of relationships, SOF can provide a
hedge against strategic surprise by identifying and working
preemptively to address problems before they become conflicts.
One way SOF achieves this goal through the indirect approach is
through forward and persistent engagement of key countries. Small in
scale by design, this engagement directly supports the Country Teams'
and GCCs' theater plans to counter threats to stability. This approach
directly supports the SECDEF's direction that, ``Whenever possible, we
will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to
achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational
presence, and advisory capabilities.'' Throughout the year, SOF
conducts engagements in more than 100 countries worldwide. At the heart
of this presence is the operational context and access it provides.
Operational context is the thorough understanding of the
environment gained through the knowledge and experience built in
personal relationships from multiple visits to the same locations. This
includes understanding the local culture and society, language,
economy, history, politics and leadership, physical and virtual terrain
as well as the enemy. It provides insight into the society's beliefs,
values, and motivations. The addition of Cultural Support Teams (U.S.
females attached to SOF units in Afghanistan) furthers this cause,
enabling dialogue and routine interaction with the Afghan females
normally isolated from exposure to male SOF personnel. This depth of
context makes SOF more precise in enabling early action to maximize
desired effects and minimize unintended consequences.
The successful application of the indirect approach is evident in
the ongoing relationship between SOF and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). This effort originally began when SOF deployed to
the terrorist safe haven of Basilan Island in 2002 to assist the AFP in
operations against the insurgent group Abu Sayyaf. Immediately upon
arrival, SOF personnel conducted a series of engagements with the local
residents to learn their basic needs and grievances as a precursor to
severing their ties with the insurgents. As SOF trained and advised the
AFP personnel leading the security efforts, they coordinated a
comprehensive interagency and multinational program to address water,
security, medical care, transportation, and education needs. As a
result, people in the area continue to support AFP and SOF's presence
today facilitating the return of economic prosperity and stability to
the region.
Other examples of the indirect approach are SOF's contributions
supporting interagency diplomacy and development efforts. Currently, 22
Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) and 4 Regional Information
Support Teams (RISTs) support the Department of State by augmenting and
broadening their public diplomacy efforts. MIST elements are requested
by U.S. Chiefs of Mission and work under their direction to blend the
embassy's Mission Strategic Plan and the GCC's Theater Campaign Plan.
SOCOM also supports interagency development efforts by deploying
civil-military support elements (CMSEs) to address refugees, displaced
persons, populations at risk, and humanitarian or disaster assistance.
CMSEs are engaged in 17 countries today and are forecasted to expand to
20 countries in fiscal year 2013 and 30+ countries by fiscal year 2017.
Today, SOF Civil Affairs (CA) elements are integral to Joint Special
Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) in Afghanistan, the Trans-Sahel, and
the Philippines to support population-focused indirect approaches to
combat violent extremism. To support these increasing demands, SOCOM
added a fifth SOF CA battalion in fiscal year 2012 to ensure
regionally-oriented CA support is available to each GCC.
These underreported, yet vital, contributions are designed and
prioritized to create long-term effects beyond the direct, kinetic
actions that are essential for winning the current fight. In the end,
it will be such continuous indirect operations that will prove decisive
in the global security arena. Of course, both direct and indirect
approaches will continue to be necessary and mutually supportive
elements of effective SOF employment. Nowhere is this more true than in
the emerging SOF requirements for SOF in Afghanistan.
As total forces start to draw down in Afghanistan, SOF's unique
ability to simultaneously blend direct and indirect approaches will
likely drive increasing requirements for SOF. While the aggregate
number of total personnel in Afghanistan will decrease as we approach
2014, the SOF contribution may increase by some small amount.
Currently, SOF constitute 8 percent of the forces in Afghanistan, but
has the lead for two major elements of operations; Village Stability
Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) initiatives and the ongoing CT
mission. In conjunction with other ISAF elements, SOF have recruited
and trained nearly 11,000 ALP who are vetted by our Afghan partners.
There are now VSO in 57 districts increasing stability and enabling
local governance, development, and security at the village level.
Additionally, our Afghan Commando partners are making significant
progress in CT operations. Virtually all CT operations are now
partnered with the Afghans and an increasing number are led by Afghan
elements with SOF fulfilling an advisory and supporting role. To
command and control these efforts, SOCOM currently provides an
operational SOF headquarters and the requisite planning capabilities
which directly support the ISAF commander.
While supporting U.S. Central Command efforts in Afghanistan
remains our top priority, we also recognize that providing SOF
capabilities to the other GCCs is critical to mitigating regional
threats to stability. Even with the conclusion of operations in
Afghanistan, historical deployment data reveals a constant demand for a
``steady state'' deployed force of nearly 12,000 SOF to support the
GCCs' requirements. Continuation of the QDR-directed SOF growth is
essential to meeting this current and projected demand for SOF. By
fiscal year 2017, we assess our programmed growth will provide adequate
capacity to meet contingency demands without having to accept undue
risk in global CT operations. Because SOF are uniquely recruited,
assessed, selected, and trained to perform these difficult missions,
the projected 3-5 percent growth rate through fiscal year 2017 is the
maximum rate of growth that is sustainable.
In the 25 years since SOCOM's creation, the global environment has
undergone, and continues to experience major change; established powers
falling, new ones rising, and the number and scope of threats
increasing exponentially. The attacks of September 11 forced the United
States to confront the growing danger posed by ideologically-driven
non-state actors. As a result, we have been involved in a decade long
war that has been costly not only in terms of our fallen and injured,
but also financially. These costs, combined with today's constrained
fiscal environment, are forcing us to be more innovative and inclusive
in the development of solutions to our global security challenges. To
effectively address these problems, we must work closely with our
allies and partners to effectively build partner nation capacity,
integrate forces where appropriate, and improve information sharing.
Europe's NSHQ serves as an example of how SOF has adapted to the
realities of today as it typifies the potential of an integrated
multinational approach. Secretary Panetta's recent comment that, ``most
European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers
of it'' helps to validate the success of NSHQ and recognizes the
contribution that our NATO partners have made to the current fight.
Consequently, SOCOM will continue to bolster and strengthen the
vitality of U.S. SOF's contribution to NATO through our increasing role
as the NSHQ lead component and advocate to the Joint Staff and Office
of SECDEF.
Another example of how SOCOM and the SOF community are adapting to
the current environment is exemplified in how we are preserving our
force's capabilities to meet the enduring nature of war. My predecessor
Admiral Eric Olson initiated a Pressure on the Force and Families
(POTFF) study to examine the effects of a decade of continuous combat
operations on the SOF community. The study identified core problems,
their underlying factors, and captured best practices of Service and
SOF support programs. The research included more than 400 non-
attribution focus groups, consisting of more than 7,000 servicemembers
and more than 1,000 spouses from 55 different SOF units located at home
and overseas. The results of the study illustrated two primary sources
of ongoing stress. First is the lack of predictability resulting from a
demanding operational tempo, exacerbated by significant time spent away
from home for training. Second is an increased difficulty for our force
when reconnecting and reintegrating into family activities.
Armed with these findings, I have appointed a Brigadier General and
my Command Sergeant Major to transition the Pressure on the Force and
Families Task Force to the Preservation of the Force and Families Task
Force. More than simply a name change, this inter-disciplinary team is
empowered to build and implement innovative solutions across the SOCOM
enterprise to improve the well-being of our force and families. While
we understand that this begins with increasing predictability, the
holistic approach will also ensure we provide responsive counseling,
medical, psychological, and rehabilitative care to our SOF warriors and
their families.
Many SOF-specific support programs and organizations do exist and
are addressing portions of the challenges we face. Resiliency programs
are facilitating early identification of underlying SOF issues relating
to physical, mental, and spiritual well-being. Programs such as Naval
Special Warfare Command's Third Location Decompression Program and the
Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning
Program (THOR3) are noteworthy. The Third Location Decompression
program allows operators time to stop and stand down at an enroute
location easing the transition from combat to domestic life. During
this time, evaluations are conducted to assess members' well-being and
identify early areas of concern. THOR3 is designed to train, educate,
and evaluate SOF on human performance, rehabilitation, and nutrition to
optimize battlefield effectiveness. THOR3 has improved recovery time
and increased return-to-duty rates from acute and chronic injuries.
Additionally, the SOCOM Care Coalition program provides outstanding
support to SOF warriors and their families and is a model advocacy
effort within DOD. For the life of a wounded, ill or injured SOF
warrior, the Care Coalition tracks and supports the member through the
rehabilitation and reintegration process whether returning to duty or
transitioning to civilian life.
But the required solutions go beyond these care programs and
rehabilitative services. Based on our findings, we are also focused on
improving how our PERSTEMPO (to include time away from home) is used to
track and report individual and unit readiness. Ultimately, this will
be incorporated into the force generation process to provide us a more
accurate picture regarding the health of our force, units' availability
for deployment, and predictability as a key element of long-term
performance and resiliency.
Additionally, SOCOM will continue to work with the Services to
secure priority access to local ranges and training areas reducing
SOF's need to ``travel to train.'' Increasing this priority and access
for deploying SOF units will further improve predictability and
PERSTEMPO. I have spent much of the last few months visiting each of my
component commands to listen and talk with the force and families and
address POTFF-related issues ensuring we are on the right track.
We have a resilient force and it remains steadfast in its mission.
While SOF capabilities are not in danger of degradation now, we must
and will continue to look for ways to mitigate potential problems in
the future. We will continue to work with the Services and this
committee to develop solutions to this problem. We recognize and
appreciate your long-standing advocacy and funding of support programs
for our warriors.
Finally, in order to drive and sustain change within our
formations, SOCOM is forging a comprehensive leadership development
program designed to train, educate, and manage the career paths of
future SOF leaders. We will develop tailored SOF professional military
education to provide the tools required for today's complex
environment, and we will work with the Services to more effectively
manage career progression of SOF leaders including key combined, joint,
and interagency assignments.

FUNDING AND EQUIPPING THE FORCE

SOCOM has a solemn obligation to appropriately fund and equip the
warriors from whom we ask so much sacrifice. We also recognize the
increasingly austere fiscal environment for the Department. To that
end, SOCOM is in compliance with the Department's Savings and
Efficiencies guidance and that model has been incorporated into SOF
business practices. SOCOM is in a fiscally sound position, but the
force requires continued support. The President's budget request for
fiscal year 2013, if approved, is an essential step towards meeting the
growing demand on our force by providing SOCOM the resources required
to sustain our programs and initiatives.
SOCOM's funding request for fiscal year 2013 totals $10.4 billion
of which $7.8 billion is baseline and $2.6 billion is OCO funding.
Fiscal year 2013 begins the directed migration of requirements
previously funded with OCO resources into the baseline appropriation.
Nearly $960 million will migrate to the baseline from OCO, supporting
approximately 37 percent of fiscal year 2013 global SOF operations and
sustainment costs.
Last year, SOCOM made a significant investment in Military
Construction (MILCON) to better support SOF operations, training,
maintenance, and storage facility requirements. This effort was
targeted at addressing MILCON shortfalls attributable to new
capabilities and missions, force structure growth disconnects, and
primarily, inherited antiquated infrastructure. SOCOM is committed to
sustaining a consistent level of funding to satisfy our critical
infrastructure needs. As such, the fiscal year 2013 MILCON request of
$536 million equates to 6.8 percent of SOCOM's baseline MFP-11 funds
and is in line with the command's new Strategic Planning and
Programming Guidance of a 6 percent minimum funding level for MILCON.
The fiscal year 2013 budget includes 21 construction projects in 9
States, 1 overseas, and 1 at a classified location.
Also critical to meeting the demand for SOF capabilities worldwide
is SOCOM's ability to execute rapid acquisition of its material and
service programs. SOCOM's acquisition enterprise remains at the
forefront of DOD, continuing to meet the high demand to deliver and
field critical material requirements and new technologies. Key to
success is our major recapitalization and modernization effort to
incorporate enhanced capabilities in our rotary, fixed-wing, and
maritime mobility platforms. We are grateful for strong congressional
support in fiscal year 2012 enabling us to continue with these efforts.
The need for SOF Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support
(CSS) has increased due to programmed operator growth over the past
decade. By design, SOF are inherently lean and we have not attempted to
grow organic ``enablers'' that duplicate Service-provided capabilities
at the same rate as our operational elements. Therefore, leveraging the
logistical support of the Services continues to be important.
The heavy-lift rotary wing MH-47G Chinook has completed the Service
Life Extension Program with 61 MH-47Gs delivered. The upgrade of MH-
47Gs to a Block 2 configuration is underway and a new program to build
eight additional monolithic hull MH-47Gs was initiated to bring the
total number to 69 by fiscal year 2015. The MH-60 recapitalization
effort to replace the MH-60L/K with the MH-60M delivered 6 new MH-60M
aircraft, bringing the total number delivered to 12.
The vertical mobility of the tilt-rotor CV-22 continues to deliver
unmatched speed and range to SOF battlefield commanders. Twenty-three
of the planned 50 aircraft are fielded to date. We completed
modification of 12 MC-130Ws with a Precision Strike Package (PSP) which
continues to perform superbly in combat. SOCOM has started the AC-130J
recapitalization effort, using the MC-130W PSP as a key risk reducing
capability. The MC-130J program is on track to replace our aging MC-
130Es and MC-130Ps, with core HC/MC-130J aircraft having successfully
completed developmental testing in June 2011.
Our Non-Standard Aviation Program continues to demonstrate great
success in operations around the world. Looking forward, we have
several initiatives to more efficiently meet demand.
The modernization of our maritime mobility systems is underway with
significant developments occurring this year. Competitive prototype
contracts for the Combatant Craft-Medium (CCM), as a replacement for
the Naval Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat and Mk V fleets,
were awarded this fall with development of test articles expected in
September 2012. Thanks to congressional support, the purchase and
fielding of 24 High Speed Assault Craft will provide a critical
``bridge'' capability to SOF until the CCM is complete.
As the land contingent of SOF mobility, the SOF Family of Special
Operations Vehicles provides a variety of specialized combat wheeled
vehicles for SOF missions. These vehicles are modified to achieve
required performance for global deployments across a wide range of
environments and threats. These SOF-unique vehicles provide enhanced
tactical mobility and force protection, as well as platforms to support
command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Two specific programs underway are
the Non-Standard Commercial Vehicles (NSCV) and the Ground Mobility
Vehicle (GMV 1.1). The NSCV provides low profile commercial vehicles
modified with ballistic protection and communications equipment
enabling SOF to operate non-obtrusively supporting a multitude of SOF
missions. The GMV 1.1 is the next variant of medium vehicles designated
to replace the SOF-modified, service-common High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle. This vehicle satisfies the critical need to deploy
from the CH-47 aircraft internally.
Protection and casualty care improvements for our SOF warriors
continues with research, development, testing, and acquisition of
personal protective equipment. Recent Office of the Secretary of
Defense ballistic test initiatives have been integrated into the SOCOM
acquisition process and several mission-specific protective systems are
now available. Optimization of signature management and camouflage
initiatives provide multi-spectral protection for SOF operators.
Continued progress in information communications and networking
capabilities with our SOF Deployable Node (SDN) family of Wide Band
SATCOM systems is providing increased access to the SOF Information
Environment (SIE) voice, data, and video services for our deployed
headquarters and operational elements worldwide. In fiscal year 2013
our command focus areas are providing greater access to the SIE for SOF
operators by downsizing system profiles, engineering common and
scalable components, extending access through SDN to wireless users,
and providing SIE access to maritime and ground mobility platforms.
SOCOM continues to advance our technical surveillance and
intelligence collection programs through evolutionary technology
insertions, while making SOF ISR data more discoverable and external
information more accessible with our Defense Common Ground/Surface
System. Our other investments include a mix of manned and unmanned
airborne ISR systems as well as the accompanying Processing,
Exploitation, and Dissemination capabilities and supporting
communications architectures. Although we continue to pursue
investments in airborne ISR capability, including High-Definition ISR
technology, we also rely heavily on the Services to expand their
capabilities and capacity that benefit DOD across the board.
Our effort to identify key emerging technologies beneficial to SOF
ensures our forces are equipped with the right capabilities to detect
and engage our adversaries. This includes conducting collaborative
technology discovery, coordinating research and development activities,
and rapidly integrating and inserting new technology developments for
equipment and techniques across the force. This process will align SOF
capability gaps with technology enablers to focus ongoing efforts
across the Science and Technology enterprise as well as identify
additional innovation that is required to address these gaps.

CONCLUSION

During 2011, we saw significant emphasis on the employment of SOF.
SOF operators, to a degree greater than ever before, performed missions
that they were selected, trained, and equipped to do.
SOF are a source of deep national pride. Their ingenuity,
perseverance, spirit, and skill are unprecedented. In significant ways,
our forces are creating visible and dramatic effects of the greatest
magnitude across the globe. I consider it a profound honor to lead such
an extraordinary group of professionals--it is a privilege to represent
them before this committee.
As always, our success is only possible because of your continued
advocacy for SOF and our assigned missions. Your support for the
President's budget will ensure our continued ability to successfully
address the most challenging security demands of our Nation. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you so much.
We'll try a 7-minute round for our first round.
General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, first let me ask you
about the fiscal year 2013 budget and the administration's
recently revised strategy. Does the 2013 budget request reflect
the recently revised strategy, General?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, it does.
Chairman Levin. Admiral?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir, it does.
Chairman Levin. General, do you support that budget
request?
General Mattis. I do, completely.
Admiral McRaven. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. In the wake of the violence following the
burning of Korans in Afghanistan, including the killing of at
least six American soldiers, Secretary Panetta has said that,
``this violence is not going to alter our commitment to get
this job done'' in Afghanistan. He added that, ``our goal is
that by the end of 2014 the Afghans will have the
responsibility to govern and secure themselves.''
General, following the violence over the Koran-burning
incident, should we modify our strategy in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. No, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe so. I'm
delighted to defend our strategy. I believe it is working. We
should not allow a few criminals and malcontents to define the
ASF. Even their performance during these last 2 weeks--
disciplined, restrained, standing by us--is an indication that
this is a force that's come a long ways.
Right now, the ASF is nearly at the 352,000 personnel mark
that we had set up. It shows that the Afghans are willing to
fight for their country. We want it to be at 352,000 by
October. We should be there within 60 days. We're on track, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. How do the events which occurred, where we
had some Afghans killing Americans and other coalition forces
and their own people, strike you? Is that a significant shift
in terms of either the Afghans' willingness to take on the
Taliban or the reliability of the Afghan army?
General Mattis. Sir, treachery has existed as long as
there's been warfare, and there have always been a few people
that you couldn't trust. I'm one of those who has slept
peacefully under Afghan boys guarding me back in 2001. No force
is perfect. I would just remind everyone that even Jesus of
Nazareth had 1 out of 12 go to mud on him.
My point is that no matter what selection process you use,
you're going to have somebody who doesn't make the standard. In
this case, the overwhelmingly positive response by the ASF,
even in the face of what was a very disappointing and
unintentional mistake by the U.S. Forces, did not shake their
confidence in us, it did not shake the teamwork.
I think that right now it does not cause us any question
about the overwhelming reliability. At the same time, prudent
measures, taken with the full support of the Afghan chain of
command--unprecedented, I might add, absolutely unstinting
support--means that we're on the right track to address what is
a bona fide insider threat concern.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
According to the Wall Street Journal the United States has
proposed reducing the size of the ASF from the 352,000 end
strength goal for this year to 230,000 after 2014 as a way of
reducing the cost of sustaining the ASF. First of all, what's
your reaction to that? Is this something which we have decided
upon and, if so, why are we projecting the need for Afghan
troops 2 years in advance, as the security force needs of
Afghanistan?
General Mattis. I understand your question, Mr. Chairman. I
completely support General Allen's recommendation that we hold
at 352,000 ASF through 2015. While there can be any number of
varying levels of maturity of planning or thinking going on,
the conditions on the ground will have to determine the size of
that force. But between now and 2015, I think, to sustain the
gains we've made, especially after 2014 when our troops will
have been largely withdrawn other than advisers, the 352,000 is
a prudent measure.
Chairman Levin. As far as you know, has a decision been
made relative to that?
General Mattis. I am confident there has not been a
decision made on that.
Chairman Levin. I want to change the subject a bit to VSO.
Some have accused Afghan local police units of serious abuses
against the populations that they're tasked to protect. I'm
wondering whether or not you have a response to that. I ask you
both because you're both very much involved in the Afghan local
police and their support by our SOF and general purpose forces.
First, General, what is your response to the criticisms
that we've read of the Afghan local police program? Then,
Admiral, I'd like to ask you the same question.
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, that program is under the
provincial governors' command. They're not on their own out
there. They have U.S. SOF as advisers living alongside them. It
is interesting that during all these months of difficulty with
this insider threat, as we called it, where we've had some of
our troops attacked, not one of these troops living out on the
very edges of the battlefield, in small groups, has been
attacked.
We find that those forces are ethical. We keep a close
watch on them. If we get any indication of unethical behavior,
violent behavior, or taking advantage of their position, it's
investigated immediately, and we keep a very close watch on it.
Chairman Levin. Admiral?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. General Allen investigated some
of these allegations, had a joint investigation with the
Afghans, and they found the allegations to be false.
As General Mattis mentioned, the VSO program and the Afghan
local police, in particular, are, in fact, part of the Ministry
of the Interior. So that chain of command goes right back to
the central government and gives it some credibility from the
tribal level, the village level, up to the central government.
We think this is very important.
There are currently about 11,000 Afghan local police and we
are growing to about 30,000 over the next couple of years. We
think this is an exceedingly important program for the
stability of Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. Thank you both very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. General Mattis, after all the sanctions
have been imposed on the Iranian regime, do you believe the
regime has been at all dissuaded from pursuing a nuclear
weapons capability?
General Mattis. No, sir, I have not seen that.
Senator McCain. General Mattis, are there strong
indications that al Qaeda is making a comeback in Iraq?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, notably in the western Iraq area,
but the threat is extending into Baghdad.
Senator McCain. General Mattis, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, General Burgess, testified last month that
the Assad regime and its military remain ``a viable, cohesive,
and effective force.'' In the same hearing, the DNI, James
Clapper, testified that, absent some kind of external
intervention, Assad will ``hang in there and continue to do as
he's done.''
Do you agree with General Burgess' and Director Clapper's
assessments?
General Mattis. Sir, Assad has chosen violence. I think his
military is under more pressure every day. Their desertion rate
is going up. But in aggregate, I agree with General Burgess'
assessment.
Senator McCain. If current conditions persist, absent
external intervention, how long do you think Assad could remain
in power? Indefinitely?
General Mattis. I don't think indefinitely, sir. But I
would be very slow to put a time horizon on it. I think he's
going to be there for some time because I think he will
continue to employ heavier and heavier weapons on his people. I
think it will get worse before it gets better.
Senator McCain. Recent reports of increased Iranian
involvement, as well as Russian arms supplies, make it worse.
Would you say that Assad's crackdown, especially in recent
events in Homs, is gaining or losing momentum?
General Mattis. He's gaining physical momentum, sir, on the
battlefield. I think he's creating more enemies. I think he's
creating more international pressure against him. But on the
tactical battlefield, he is clearly achieving what he wants to
achieve.
Senator McCain. I think we would agree that Syria out of
the hands of Assad and a chance to be free and democratic would
be one of the greatest blows to Iran. Would it be in America's
strategic interest to see Assad go?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, it'll be the biggest strategy
setback for Iran in 20 years when Assad falls; not if, but
when. He's going to go.
Senator McCain. Fundamentally, we went to the Balkans
because ethnic cleansing and genocide were taking place in
Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Do you see a difference between
the kind of slaughter that's going on in Syria now and the kind
that was going on in Kosovo and in Bosnia? There may be a
difference in scale, but do you see the same sort of actions
being taken by the government?
General Mattis. Certainly each situation is unique, but as
far as the trend, I would not disagree with your
characterization.
Senator McCain. Under current conditions, would simply
providing arms to the opposition be sufficient to help them end
the violence and to force Assad to leave power?
General Mattis. Sir, providing arms would be a policy
option. I think we'd have to do our best to determine who we're
providing the arms to and follow the physician's oath of
``First, do no harm,'' to make certain what we're doing is
actually going to reduce the scale of violence ultimately. It
may go up for a short time, but I think you'd have to look at
it very closely, because the longer this goes on the more
potential there is for al Qaeda and for basically a full-scale
civil war.
Senator McCain. Have you seen any evidence that al Qaeda
has had any significant role in the Syrian opposition today?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, we have, in terms of the rather
spectacular improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.
Senator McCain. Every time I've seen one of these crises,
the first question is: We don't know who these people are, and
it could be al Qaeda. I heard that in Egypt; I heard that in
Tunisia; and I heard it in Libya: We don't know who these
people are and they're probably al Qaeda.
You know what that flies in the face of, General? People
who yearn for liberty and not being under the rule of an
oppressive, brutal dictatorship. So all of a sudden now we will
again assume: Well, it's al Qaeda. I've just returned from a
trip to Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and there's always the
threat of extremism. But there's no doubt the people that made
the revolution were not al Qaeda. In fact, they were in direct
repudiation of al Qaeda.
Frankly, one grows a little weary of this: We don't know
who they are and they're probably al Qaeda.
Admiral, do you think we can find out who they are?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think it's always prudent to find
out who your allies are and who your enemy is.
Senator McCain. Is it prudent to stand on the side of
freedom and democracy against one of the most oppressive
dictators in the world?
Admiral McRaven. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Is that prudent?
Admiral McRaven. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Isn't that what the United States has been
standing for for a couple of hundred years at least? Isn't that
why we fought wars?
So frankly, I grow irritated and I grow angry when I see
and meet these people who have sacrificed their very lives and
their family and are wounded, when I visit a hospital in
Benghazi where a whole shipload of wounded young men have just
returned. I didn't see a single one of them that was al Qaeda,
not a single one. I didn't see a single one of them that died
before my eyes that was al Qaeda.
So I suggest we find out who these people are. I guarantee
you that you will find out that it's not al Qaeda; it's people
who have the same yearnings that are universal, and that's
freedom, democracy, and our God-given rights.
I would hope we would spend some time with your unique
capabilities in finding out who these people are. I'm surprised
you haven't tried to do that before. You should do it, because
this conflict is going to go on and a whole lot of people are
going to die if we allow the status quo to prevail and the
slaughter to continue because ``we don't know who they are.''
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator McCain.
General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, thanks very much for being
here. Thanks for your leadership. Honestly, as I consider the
records both of you have had and what you're doing now, I don't
think we could have two better people in the positions that
you're in, and we ought to be very grateful to you for that.
General Mattis, I always look forward to your testimony
because in some sense I feel when I read your stuff or I listen
to it that I'm back in the classroom, because you do have a
very developed sense of history. I just want to read in the
context from your submitted testimony: ``In over 30 years of
supporting U.S. Forces in the CENTCOM AOR, I have never
witnessed it so tumultuous. Change is the only constant and
surprise continues to be the dominant force in the region.
While transformation is underway across the region as a result
of the Arab Awakening, malign efforts by other regional actors,
particularly Iran, to influence the ultimate outcome represent
perhaps the greatest immediate and long-term threat to regional
stability.''
Then I'm skipping here, but again I thought this is an
interesting perspective, which maybe we miss in all the tumult
in the region: ``There is only one state in our AOR actively
seeking to destabilize the region and actively foment violence,
and that is Iran.'' I think that helps us put things in
context.
Let me go back to something that Senator McCain touched on,
but I want to ask you if you could go into it in a little more
detail; it's about Syria. Can you describe in more detail, what
is the extent of both Iranian and Russian military assistance
to the Assad government at this time?
General Mattis. Senator, the Russians have provided very
advanced integrated air defense capabilities, missiles, radars,
that sort of thing, that would make imposition of any no-fly
zone challenging if we were to go in that direction. In terms
of Iran, they are working earnestly to keep Assad in power.
They have flown in experts. They are flying in weapons. It is a
full-throated effort by Iran to keep Assad there and oppressing
his own people.
Senator Lieberman. So the Iranians, to the best of your
knowledge, have some expert or high-ranking personnel that have
come from Teheran to Damascus to assist the Syrian forces?
General Mattis. They have, sir, yes.
Senator Lieberman. Generally speaking, what kinds of
hardware, military assistance, and systems are they providing
to the Syrian army?
General Mattis. They're providing the kinds of weapons that
are being used right now to suppress the opposition. They're
providing eavesdropping capability to try and pick up where the
opposition networks are at. They're providing experts who I
could only say are experts in oppressing. They're pretty well-
schooled. They know how to oppress their own people in Teheran.
They've flown them into Damascus to help Assad do the same
thing.
Senator Lieberman. I'm generally sympathetic to the
argument that Senator McCain just described, that the
international community, for reasons that are both humanitarian
and strategic, really just can't sit back any longer and watch
Assad do what he's doing. My own sentiment is that eventually
he'll fall, but when there's such a disproportion of military
power between the government and the opposition, he can really,
as you suggested earlier, hang on for a long time and the
killing can go on for a long time.
We actually saw this in the Balkans in some sense in the
1990s before we finally got involved and stopped it.
I don't minimize the difficulty of getting involved here,
but I do want to say that your answer to the last question,
which I appreciate, does lead me to say this. Some people say
if we, our Arab allies, or the European Union, get involved and
provide weapons to the opposition army, that we will be
militarizing the conflict. But the conflict is already
militarized in one sense. It's only militarized adequately on
one side. The Iranians and Russians are providing a lot of
military support to the Assad government and the opposition
doesn't have much of that at all.
Has the White House asked you as head of CENTCOM to prepare
any contingency plans for possible assistance to the Syrian
opposition?
General Mattis. Senator, I'd prefer to answer that question
in a closed hearing, if I could, sir.
Senator Lieberman. The chairman had to go away to another
meeting, but I hope we will have the opportunity to have a
closed hearing before this is over. I note for the record that
I don't believe that Senator McCain believes that we should do
this on our own. I hope we can help organize something, but I
gather that the Saudis and Qataris are now actively thinking
about at least supplying some weapons to the Syrian opposition.
Let me move to another area. This also goes to Iran. I have
heard reports that the Iranian regime is now involved more
actively in malign activities in other countries in the region
in a way that poses some threat to our forces in the region. I
want to ask you to talk about that. I'm thinking particularly
of Yemen, but if beyond Syria there are other areas in your AOR
where you feel Iran is beginning to threaten our forces, I
would like to hear about it.
General Mattis. Sir, they're fighting basically a shadow
war every day. They're moving weapons into Sudan. They're
sending them into Yemen. They are trying to make inroads there
by passing out money and ordnance to various factions in Yemen
as they take their first steps towards some kind of a democracy
in their future, having come out of a very good election.
We see what they're doing in Damascus. They recognized that
their link to Lebanese Hezbollah will be cut if, in fact,
Bashar Assad falls. We see this throughout the region. The
Iranians have never gotten along that well with the Taliban,
and yet they're willing to help the Taliban to some degree to
fight us in Afghanistan. We also see their mischief all around
the world, of course, right down here to Washington, DC, where
they attempted to kill an Arab ambassador.
So this is an ongoing effort, I think, with this regime,
it's something we simply have to accept as part of their modus
operandi, and we certainly take a lot of prudent steps to
maintain our own force protection. But we also see them trying
to find their way in and take advantage of any of these Arab
Awakening causes that come up. They've tried it in Cairo. I
think they were pretty well rebuffed there. The Iranian
revolution is not being seen as an example for any of the Arab
nations in their awakening.
So it's not completely successful, but at the same time
it's highly concerning.
Senator Lieberman. Is all this activity in the region by
Iran evidence that they really have hegemonic ambitions, that
they want to stretch out across the region, or can we not
conclude that?
General Mattis. Sir, I think that is one of the reasons
we're seeing the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council right
now and the way the Arab League is banding together and
becoming a force for initiating operations, whether it be in
Libya or in other areas. There are concerns about Damascus. I
think what we're seeing is the whole region is becoming aware
of this effort on Iran's part and it's causing a more unified
opposition to them, almost akin to 1948 in Western Europe, when
NATO was formed out of a fear of the Soviet Union and their
forces.
Senator Lieberman. It's a very significant parallel.
Thank you very much, General.
Senator Brown is next.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service. Admiral, thank you for
taking the time to come in. I think it was Senator Levin who
actually referenced the Afghan local police program, which I
had an opportunity and honor to observe as a soldier this
summer. I have to go out and visit with the Special Forces and
see that program at work and visit many of the villages and
speak with the tribal leaders and also the soldiers that were
there.
To me, it's the program we should have implemented from day
one. The value for the dollar is incredible. The amount of
cooperation between the tribal leaders and people of the
villages and the Special Forces is unheard of. It's never
happened like it's happening now, that check-and-balance, when
one village is actually coming to the aid of another village
when they're being attacked or harassed. It's never happened,
and that's obviously because of the advent of just a simple
road connecting those villages.
That's why it's very important to continue with the
infrastructure in that region, so they can get from point A to
point B and see what the other village is doing, create trade
with that village, come there and be the safety and security
for that village, and vice versa.
Is that your observation, that those types of positive
activities are a result of our involvement in the Afghan local
police program?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, it absolutely is. The Afghan local
police program is one component of VSO, which really looks at
security, governance, and then economic development. The Afghan
local police are part of that security aspect at the village
level, linking the village to the district, and then the
district to the province, and then the province eventually to
the central government. We think the program is working
exceedingly well.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
General, I also had the opportunity as a result of my
military duty to actually go to the detainee facility and
participate in a board to determine whether that detainee
should be released. It was not dissimilar to our drug boards
and other types of boards that seem to be in concert with
everything that I've been taught as a Judge Advocate General.
I found it fascinating. I also found it a little bit
troubling because the Strategic Partnership Agreement with the
Afghan Government is absolutely important. It's something we
need to get signed and implemented right away, because it puts
to bed the notion that we're packing our bags and leaving.
However, accelerating the transfer of detainees to Afghan
custody presents real concerns for me.
I don't think they have the capacity at this point, based
on my personal observations, to assume the security of these
detention facilities. I found it was one of the best run
facilities I have ever seen. I've been down to Guantanamo Bay
(GTMO). In my old senate district back home in Massachusetts, I
was responsible and participated in getting funding for three
or four prisons.
General, is that your understanding as well? Are you
concerned about that transfer and whether they can handle that?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, we are. We're in negotiations
with them now. Ambassador Crocker is leading those negotiations
with General Allen right alongside him. I think the most
important thing is that we figure these things out and not go
into an agreement. What we want is the right agreement and, as
you point out, we want to make certain we're not turning people
over before the Afghans are ready to take care of them and then
we end up with abuse or some failure in terms of how we take
care of these prisoners.
Senator Brown. It's a top-notch facility. I know they're
expanding it. I've seen the caliber of Afghan corrections
officers or soldiers who would be manning it. I have to be
honest with you. I have deep concerns. This is something I want
to, probably with Senator Graham, monitor very, very closely,
along with you. I know Ambassador Crocker and General Allen are
obviously working that through.
Regarding Iraq, I am concerned, as others are, about the
vacuum that's been created. Al Qaeda in Iraq has carried out
more attacks this year alone than it did in the entire second
half of last year. Do you think there's a security vacuum there
now since we've left?
General Mattis. It's not a security vacuum, Senator Brown.
But it is a less capable Iraqi security force without our
capabilities there. They're scrambling to try and fill in those
gaps. We are working with our small footprint there to help
them fill in those gaps. But it's a concern, I know, for the
Iraqi Government and it's a concern for Ambassador Jeffries.
Senator Brown. Do you think al Qaeda is making a comeback
in Iraq?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, they are. It's not significant.
It won't threaten the government. It will kill a lot of
innocent people.
Senator Brown. What about the favoritism in the Iraqi
Government for the majority Shia political party? Do you think
that's fueling another insurgency potentially, and does this
play right into al Qaeda's hands to create that instability?
General Mattis. It's not playing into al Qaeda's hands yet,
and I think that there has been some progress back into a
political dialogue here in the last couple of weeks, that I
think is back on the right track. So I give you a cautious,
optimistic view of this, but it's very, very cautious at this
point.
Senator Brown. Regarding Syria, do you see that Iraqi al
Qaeda are moving over to Syria to fight against the Syrian
regime? How do you think this affects our understanding of the
Assad opposition?
General Mattis. Al Qaeda is just trying to increase the
chaos because they like ungoverned spaces. I don't think they
have a moral bone in their body. They're simply opportunistic.
I don't think that they characterize or represent or define the
opposition to Assad. That they would try to take advantage of
it I have no doubt. It's in their genes. But they do not define
the opposition to Assad.
Senator Brown. Admiral, can you comment on the
contributions of the Guard and Reserve elements in SOCOM? How
do you view their role now and how do you view the role in the
future?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you. The Guard and Reserve have
been absolutely essential to SOCOM's capability and their fight
here in the last 10 years and really since the establishment of
SOCOM back in 1987. We have two Reserve units, the 19th and the
20th Special Forces Groups, that do phenomenal work for us in
Afghanistan. We have the 193rd Special Operations Wing, which
flies some of our unique Guard and Reserve assets.
So we are very strongly enabled by the Guard and Reserve
across all Service components of special operations. We expect
that they will continue to be well-resourced in the years to
come and play a vital role in U.S. special operations.
Senator Brown. You welcome that role?
Admiral McRaven. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Brown.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your extraordinary service to the
Nation and to the men and women that you lead with such
distinction and their contributions also.
General Mattis, you indicated that the most significant
threat in your region is Iran. Given the issue of strategy
focus, where if you have limited resources you have to keep
maximum pressure on the key threat, can you comment about what
could happen if we either coordinated, supported, encouraged,
or even participated in military operations in Syria with
respect to the Iranians? Would this be neutral in terms of our
efforts? Would this disrupt international collaboration? Would
this create unanticipated and unwarranted advantages to the
Iranians?
General Mattis. Sir, I think that if we went into providing
options, whatever they are, to hasten the fall of Assad, as
long as those were put together in a coalition international
form it would cause a great deal of concern and discontent in
Teheran.
Senator Reed. But the one area that would be problematic
would be something that was perceived as unilateral or so
dominated by the United States that this lack of international
collaboration could undermine our intentions and our motives;
is that true?
General Mattis. I think international collaboration would
be essential to the successful outcome.
Senator Reed. So in effect we're working on, as we speak,
pulling together that international context for efforts that
are directed to the ultimate demise of the Assad regime; is
that a fair characterization?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Let me just take it one step further, because
there's been discussion of establishing safe areas and safe
havens. Operationally on the ground, let's assume that could be
done. It would seem to pose some problems. First, the Syrian
military forces are very well-organized and robust and fairly
proficient. I don't know how long they would tolerate those
safe havens.
But second, given safe havens, I think it would imply that
someone would have to go in and organize training and organize,
literally, an army. That could take months, if not years. Are
those considerations being thought through carefully and what
it would mean in terms of commitment and resources, and again
deflecting efforts away from other more serious threats?
General Mattis. Sir, I have not been directed to do
detailed planning on these. I would prefer to take some of this
in the closed session. But it would require regional or
surrounding state support to do something like this. I've
looked at the maps and there are no terrain-delimiting features
where we could create those safe havens. In other words, you
would have to create them using military forces. It's not like
the mountains of northern Iraq, where the Kurds could be up in
that area against Saddam Hussein.
It would be a significant commitment of resources. Of
course, the international aspect could reduce our commitment if
we got sufficient participation from others.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, one of the difficult
points negotiating a strategy framework with the Afghans is the
persistence of President Karzai to resist operations of our
forces at night, even his own forces. Can you, Admiral McRaven,
comment on how critical this is to us, and is there a way to
somehow ameliorate his concerns but to continue to be
tactically effective?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we think the night raids are
essential for our task force to go after high-value
individuals. The high-value individuals that we pursue during
the course of a 24-hour period or days or weeks generally bed
down at night. They are much more targetable at night, and, in
fact, I think if you look at it tactically, what you find is
the Afghans are actually much safer if we target an individual
at night because there aren't so many people out and about in
the little villages.
What we have done to reduce the Afghans' anxiety on this is
the Afghan special forces are in the lead on all of our night
operations. I think this is an important point. I know it is an
important point that General Allen and General Mattis have
made, as well as Ambassador Crocker, to President Karzai, is
that these are his forces that are, in fact, surrounding a
particular compound, trying to call out the specific
individual, and the first forces through the door. We think
that is the best way to reduce the Afghans' concerns.
But it is a critical tactical component of what we do every
day in Afghanistan.
Senator Reed. General Mattis, do you have any comments?
General Mattis. I would emphasize, Senator Reed, that there
is less chance of collateral damage, of innocent people being
killed. I think that on a moral level, besides the military
efficiency aspect, dictates that we continue these operations
so long as the enemy keeps an active force in the field.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
One of the principal assumptions going forward is that we
will be able to operate with the Afghan National Forces (ANF),
their police forces, their special forces, and their army
forces, at small unit levels, which means essentially small
groups of U.S. and NATO personnel embedded with larger units.
This is in particular something that your Special Forces
soldiers and other operators do.
The recent attacks by Afghan military forces against
American forces, literally the one-on-one violence, to what
extent has that caused you to reevaluate that approach and that
assumption, Admiral McRaven?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, as General Mattis mentioned earlier,
we have not had any what we refer to as green-on-blue incidents
with respect to our partner relationships from SOF with the
Afghans. But that's not to say, as General Mattis mentioned,
that there couldn't be treachery in the ranks. I think we are
always cognizant of that.
Having said that, we have built these partnerships over
many years. They're very strong partnerships. We have great
respect for our Afghan partners. We think that this strategy of
partnering with the Afghans is absolutely essential to victory
in Afghanistan.
Senator Reed. General Mattis, any comments about the Afghan
National Army (ANA) less so than the special operations
community?
General Mattis. Sir, the ANA is definitely defined by the
tens of thousands of boys who fight loyally alongside us. Their
casualties are routinely significantly higher than ours.
They're doing much of the fighting now, and there's an
increasing need for us to have mentors among them as they take
the lead.
This will be something where we'll take every prudent
measure, but at the same time it eventually comes down to the
trust between young men fighting alongside each other. This is
characterized by a high degree of trust overwhelmingly,
although these tragic incidents become understandably what we
hear about.
Senator Reed. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, thank you for your
distinguished service to our country.
General Mattis, I wanted to ask you about the recidivism
rate from Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). The Associated Press ran a
story yesterday which I believe is misleading, and the headline
was: ``Not so many Guantanamo reoffenders.'' The story said
that: ``Far fewer detainees released from GTMO have rejoined
terrorist activities than previously reported.''
However, before this committee this is an issue that I've
questioned many individuals about. Last year, Director Clapper
said that the reengagement rates from former GTMO detainees who
were confirmed or suspected of reengaging was 27 percent. In
fact, just 3 weeks ago he was before our committee again and he
actually said that the reengagement rate of those who had
reengaged, who we've confirmed are in the fight or suspected to
be reengaging, was actually increased, close to 28 percent. I
believe it's 27.9 percent.
Of course, we've heard the same testimony from Secretary
Gates as well as Secretary Vickers, that the way that we
calculate the recidivism rate is not just those who have
returned, but those who are suspected of returning to the
fight.
One of the big issues we have, of course, is that it's
difficult to determine who has reengaged because we're so poor
at confirming once they have reengaged. We can't always
reconfirm who's out there, who's back fighting us again. Often
we find them when we encounter them in the battlefield or
elsewhere.
In my view, one terrorist reengaging us is one too many.
The reason we've tracked both those who have reengaged and
those we suspected reengaged is because that is a more accurate
reflection of where we are with reengagement rates. There are
two individuals I'd like to ask you about, General Mattis, who
have reengaged in the fight. They are Said Al-Shihri and Abdul
Zahir, two former GTMO detainees who've been released. One
became a leader in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the
other became a leader in the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both of
these former GTMO detainees have been actively involved against
us and our allies.
Can you update the committee on the status of these two
former illustrious GTMO detainees and what types of activities
they're engaging in against us and our allies?
General Mattis. Yes, thank you, Senator. On Shihri, he is
the number two man in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. That's
in Yemen. He is their number two military commander right now.
He is engaged in active operations and we can confirm that.
On Zahir, he is a Taliban commander in Afghanistan and
again engaged with us. I could get back to you with more
specifics on what we've picked up in a classified setting.
Senator Ayotte. I look forward to having more detail on
that.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Ayotte. But just to put it in perspective, both of
these individuals are engaged in activities to kill Americans
or our allies, are they not?
General Mattis. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. I can't imagine how frustrating it must be
for our troops to reencounter someone we've had already in
detention. One of the concerns I have had is what do we do if
tomorrow we recapture them, in terms of where do we detain them
to interrogate them?
Admiral McRaven, you testified before the committee last
year that, for example, if we got Ayman Al-Zawahiri that we
couldn't hold him in Afghanistan, that we needed a long-term
detention facility, that that would be helpful.
Where are we on that? What would we do if we captured, for
example, the two individuals we just talked about again
tomorrow in terms of interrogating them? Where would we hold
them under the law of war? Have we solved this problem? Have we
moved forward at all on it?
General Mattis. Senator, I am confident that we would be
able to hold them. Each case is looked at individually, so I
cannot tell you in advance how we would do it. But if they're
listening, I'd suggest they don't sleep well at night, because
we're after them and we will hang onto them if we get them. I'm
not quite certain where we'll put them, but we will be
interrogating them if they're alive, and we will do our best
not to see them on the battlefield again.
Senator Ayotte. But we don't have a designated facility,
because we're essentially not taking anyone else in GTMO, as
far as I understand it, pursuant to the administration's
policy?
General Mattis. There is not a designated facility, no,
ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. One of the concerns I have is we certainly
can't hold everyone on a ship, particularly if we have to hold
them in long-term detention. Would you both agree with me on
that principle?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am.
Admiral McRaven. Completely.
Senator Ayotte. So it's not clear where we would put them
if we captured them tomorrow?
General Mattis. No, ma'am. We have captured some people and
we have been able to facilitate their transfer to a detention
facility.
Senator Ayotte. I would hope that we would not bring those
two individuals to the United States, because I'd have a hard
time explaining that to my constituents when we have the
availability of the GTMO detention facility. I would hope that
wouldn't be an option, given how dangerous both of those
individuals are. Do you think that's a good option, bringing
them to the United States?
General Mattis. That's a policy decision, ma'am. It's
certainly an option for the President to consider.
Senator Ayotte. Why wouldn't we just use the facility
that's secure at GTMO?
General Mattis. Ma'am, I'm probably not the right person to
ask the question. It's a policy decision and I have no
reservations as long as we have a facility to put them.
Senator Ayotte. Admiral, is there anything you'd like to
add on this?
Admiral McRaven. Ma'am, in the case of Shihri and Zakir, if
they are captured in Yemen and Afghanistan respectively, then
obviously we have agreements with both the Yemenis and the
Afghans that they could be held in their country of origin. So
right now, for those two individuals, I think that would be the
likely solution.
Senator Ayotte. Admiral, I just wanted to follow up
briefly. When you were before the committee last year for your
confirmation hearing, I had asked you about Ayman Al-Zawahiri
and I asked you the scenario if we caught him tonight in
Pakistan where would we place him for long-term detention. Last
year you said you weren't sure what we would do in that
circumstance.
Has anything changed since then?
Admiral McRaven. No, ma'am, nothing has changed since then.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Certainly we couldn't put him in
Afghanistan. We can't take individuals who we've captured
outside of Afghanistan, for example in Pakistan or Yemen, and
bring them to Afghanistan for detention?
General Mattis. That's our practice now, is not to do that,
that's correct. It would take a government-to-government
agreement to do something like that.
Senator Ayotte. Where we already have existing issues we're
trying to resolve with the Afghans on the secure way to deal
with the detainees that they have now.
So thank you, both of you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Ayotte.
Next is Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my appreciation for your service as well. Thank
you.
I have a number of concerns about our presence in Iraq at
the current time. I don't think that I have a clear
understanding of what our mission is there. It's further
complicated by the fact that we have questions about the new
embassy, which is a significant building in terms of size, with
a significant number of security contractors located there,
perhaps not even functioning in a security role outside of the
embassy. The embassy continues to be expanded, and I understand
perhaps the Department of State (DOS) now is in charge of
establishing what our mission in Iraq is.
Can either of you help enlighten me about what our mission
truly is in Iraq today and how that might relate to the
providing of security by contractors and the continuing
expansion of a building that seems to be gargantuan in size
already? General Mattis?
General Mattis. Sir, as far as our mission in Iraq, it's
going from a military-led effort in Iraq over the last 8 years
to a DOS-led mission under the ambassador. I do have a
lieutenant general with a small footprint on the ground, part
of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, and they are
engaged in everything from the sale of certain military
equipment, providing contractor-led training, to organizing the
Iraqis who want to go to military schools in the United States
so we maintain those relationships. That's what they're doing.
As far as the security contractors who actually protect the
embassy, those come under DOS. But, having been there recently,
they're simply doing the guard duty you would expect in a high-
threat area.
As far as the size of the building, Senator, I'm really not
competent to respond on that question, sir.
Senator Nelson. But it is big, isn't it?
General Mattis. It's big, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I'm trying to understand the role of the contractors there
in providing security. In other embassies in other countries do
we require ourselves to provide security or do we look to the
host nation to provide security?
General Mattis. Sir, the host nation provides the external
security outside the grounds. Inside the grounds, it's
sovereign territory and we do that. We do it generally with
contract guards. Many of them are long-serving guards there.
Inside the embassy building itself, you have Marine Corps
security guards.
Senator Nelson. Is that the way it works in Baghdad?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Nelson. The Iraqis provide the external security?
General Mattis. They do, sir.
Senator Nelson. If our personnel are moving from one place
to another, who provides the security?
General Mattis. That security is provided by our own
contract guards.
Senator Nelson. What level of security would the Iraqis
provide externally to the embassy?
General Mattis. In that zone, when you go there, sir, you
see their checkpoints are set up some blocks away. They have
patrols that go by. It's not just for our embassy; it's for
other embassies in town as well, as they provide the kind of
diplomatic security that's expected around the world. Here in
Washington, DC, some policemen can provide it because the
threat is very low. In a place like Baghdad, prudent measures
require Iraqi army and Iraqi police to do the external security
in a much more visual, obvious way.
Senator Nelson. Turning back to Iran, as we all know, the
threat in Iran is real. You've discussed the relationship of
Iran to Syria, to Hezbollah. On the television show, 60
Minutes, Secretary Panetta said that there was a red line for
us. I know in the discussions between Mr. Netanyahu and the
President in the last several days there seemed to be some
closing of the gap on our different ideas about dealing with
Iran and the growing concern.
What actions, military or otherwise, should we be
considering in connection with Iran? I don't mean to put you in
a classified position, but just generally could you give us
your idea?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. The Iranian threat is basically
along four lines. There's their nuclear program, where they're
enriching more uranium than they need for any peaceful purpose,
and through denial and deception, they have tried to keep that
program going. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
has tried its best to monitor it. They've had an unfortunate
visit there recently.
The second threat is the long-range rocket and ballistic
missile threat. That one has the attention of all of our
friends in the region as far as how they protect against that.
The third threat is the maritime threat, and so we're going
to have to be prepared to keep the sea lanes open.
The fourth threat is the Quds Force, the Iranian Ministry
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), their secret service,
their surrogates, proxies like Lebanese Hezbollah, and other
terrorists that they fund. On that one, it's largely a police
and intelligence-driven effort as we try to contain that, but
also our SOF work that issue very, very closely.
So there are four basic threats and we look to how we can
check each one of those, working alongside some of the most
enduring long-term partnerships we've had with some of the
countries out there.
Senator Nelson. Since this is a budget hearing, in your
opinion, does the current budget proposal deal sufficiently
with the kinds of threats and the responses that we are now
providing to those threats?
General Mattis. It absolutely does, Senator Nelson. I can
say this, though, because I'm first among equals when it comes
to the combatant commanders. Basically, if I need something, I
go to Secretary Panetta and I get it. So I'll just tell you
that I'm well-resourced, sir.
Senator Nelson. Admiral McRaven, from your perspective?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I'm also exceedingly well-resourced.
Senator Nelson. You don't think that the budget was
prepared under different assumptions and the circumstances have
now changed with regard to that?
Admiral McRaven. No, sir.
Senator Nelson. General?
General Mattis. We will always have to adapt, sir. But
right now I think the strategy is well-supported by the budget.
Senator Nelson. If circumstances were to change to where
military action was required, would we be having to change
circumstances then as well?
General Mattis. Senator, active operations along those
lines would be very expensive. Obviously, that's one of the
characteristics of war. We're doing everything we can to try
and deter war, to try to keep the stability, the peace, or what
passes for peace, in the Middle East 1 more year, 1 more month,
1 more week, 1 more day, to allow Secretary Clinton and the
diplomats to convince Iran this is not in their best interest,
to go the way they're going now.
Senator Nelson. Would that apply in any engagement that we
might have in Syria as well? Very expensive, and probably not
provided for in the budget?
General Mattis. I'm absolutely certain it would apply, sir.
Senator Nelson. Admiral?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, thank you for your service
to our country.
I want to focus a little bit on Iran, not surprisingly, in
light of your testimony, General Mattis, where you say that
their reckless behavior and bellicose rhetoric create a high
potential for miscalculation in the region. In another area of
your testimony, you say it represents perhaps the greatest
immediate and long-term threat to regional stability.
I wonder if you would agree with the characterization of a
think tank here in Washington, the Center for Strategy and
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), when they define Iran's strategy
as anti-access/anti-denial (A2AD) strategy, designed to take
advantage of the unique geographic attributes of the Persian
Gulf? Rather than confront U.S. Forces generally directly, Iran
could attempt to use ballistic missiles or terrorist proxies to
coerce Gulf states to deny U.S. Forces permission to operate
from their sovereign territory.
Without going on to describe that further, I wonder if you
would agree with that characterization of Iran's strategy or if
you have a different way you would characterize it?
General Mattis. Senator, I would agree that A2AD is their
modus operandi as they look toward active operations if it
comes to that. But I would also add to the two threats they
outlined, I would add the ballistic missile, long-range rocket
capability they have.
Senator Cornyn. If the United States had a reliable source
of oil from a friendly source, would we be as concerned about
Iran's threat to block the Strait of Hormuz?
General Mattis. I believe we would be, Senator, because of
the vital interest to the world economy, which would have
immediate and significant impact on our own economy and our own
way of life if one nation, Iran, the only nation that's
threatened to close the Strait, did so.
Senator Cornyn. Just to list the areas in the Middle East
where Iran has its very clear fingerprints, I think it's
helpful to remind ourselves from time to time just how they
operate in Lebanon, through Hezbollah, a terrorist
organization. In the West Bank and Gaza, we know that Hamas has
received funding from Iran. We know that in Iraq, that Iran was
the source of many of the explosively-formed penetrators that
killed U.S. servicemembers. Of course, in Afghanistan and now
in Syria.
Is there any other place that I've left off the list that
Iran's fingerprints are most obvious?
General Mattis. Absolutely, sir. I would add Yemen. I would
add they've tried to get involved in the internal aspects in
Bahrain of the shaking out there of the opposition to the
government and the efforts by the government to engage that
opposition. We believe Iran is probably trying to undercut that
because they would not want to see those elements get together
and come up with a Bahraini solution.
In Kuwait, they've had their spies captured. They've gone
all over the place, sir. They enjoy this sort of thing. I would
add that in Gaza, however, Hamas' pulling out on Assad, I don't
know what the effect is going to be on Iran continuing to fund
them since they've just pulled out support from Assad when,
obviously, Tehran wanted them to continue supporting Assad. So
we'll have to watch and see what happens there.
Senator Cornyn. What do you think Iran's reaction would be
if there was a coalition of forces that intervened in Syria to
stop the bloodshed there and the Assad regime? Would they sit
quietly on the sidelines?
General Mattis. No, sir. They'd try through their proxies
and their surrogates to do some mischief there. I don't think
you would see anything overt. I think they would try to keep
their fingerprints off it, especially seeing that it would get
them cross-wired with an international coalition of some kind.
Senator Cornyn. I know you've alluded to al Qaeda activity
as opportunistic in the region. Part of their activity is to
create sectarian strife and conflict. But it strikes me that,
although al Qaeda is a non-state actor, its goals share a lot
in common with that of Iran in terms of creating instability
and conflict in the region, which then provides space for them
to grow in power and influence.
Do you agree with that or do you have a different view?
General Mattis. Coming from two different directions,
obviously, al Qaeda would prefer to see Shias killed, as
they're doing in Iraq, killing innocent Shias there. Iran, on
the other hand, heightens the tensions between Sunni and Shia
from a Shia perspective. Frankly, I don't know what the
advantage they see accruing to themselves for it, but it goes
to your point: They're both doing the same thing; they just
come from a different direction on it.
Senator Cornyn. Admiral McRaven, do you have any views on
that?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think General Mattis'
characterization captured it well.
Senator Cornyn. I guess the challenge that the United
States has is that Israel has said they will do whatever they
need to do in their national self-interest to prevent Iran from
gaining a nuclear capability that would threaten their
existence. Secretary Panetta has said that gaining a nuclear
capability would be a red line that Iran would not be able to
cross. The President of the United States said yesterday that
his policy was not one of containment; it was to stop Iran.
You've talked, I think eloquently, about delay for a day or
a week or months. But, having said that, nothing that we have
attempted so far by way of sanctions has appeared to deter Iran
on this pathway toward a nuclear weapon, where do you see this
headed?
General Mattis. Sir, I hate to speculate on something like
this because in public I cannot make any casual statement.
However, Iran has obviously missed several opportunities to
engage positively with the IAEA, to respond to the U.N.
Security Council resolutions. They're very much a problem and I
don't see this going in the right direction until the full
effect of the sanctions can accrue. I say ``until'' because
even now as we see inflation and unemployment going up, the
internal frictions have to start telling. At some point I think
the Iranian people are going to question, is this the right
direction?
So if we can keep this in a diplomatic, economic track and
get full advantage of what these sanctions and the
international isolation are doing; this country basically lacks
any significant strategy ally. There are some that have blocked
for their own reasons resolutions in the U.N., regrettably. But
I don't see them having allies, and I don't count that little
fellow down in Venezuela as a very significant ally.
Senator Cornyn. If I can just conclude on this, Mr.
Chairman.
It sounds to me like we have a race, one to see if
sanctions are successful in causing the regime to implode and
thus deny their aspirations for a nuclear weapon; but if that
doesn't occur fast enough, there's another parallel track where
they are on a pathway to achieve a nuclear capability. The
question is, for us and for the world, who's going to win that
race, sanctions or a nuclear weapon?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I'm not sure that Iran needs to
implode. I think that they can come to the realization that
this organization that's running the country right now with
these cosmetic elections they're running--they're not real free
and fair elections--that this leadership is not what those
people deserve. At some point, I hope they would say, we want
to stop this program, and somehow those voices would be heard
in a way that convinced them that they had to. The best we can
do otherwise, sir, is delay them. Only the Iranian people can
stop this program.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin the same place I began last year with you,
General Mattis. This comment extends to Admiral McRaven as
well. If you look at these two gentlemen's records of service
in the military, the ultimate reward of competent leadership is
command. If you look at the number of times that command shows
up on both of these leaders' military files, there's no two
better people we could have in the positions that you are in,
and you have my thanks for the contributions that you're making
on behalf of our country.
I'd like to clarify something just as a result of the
discussion that has occurred during this hearing. I don't think
it's accurate for those who are pushing for a faster pace move
toward military involvement in Syria to characterize those,
including myself, who have been asking for us to be very
careful in terms of how we define the opposition movements as
simply some reductionist statement about al Qaeda.
I have put the question to General Dempsey, I put it to the
DNI, James Clapper, my concern that we move forward in a
careful way to define how much of this opposition is domestic,
how much of it is regional, and indeed whether or not al Qaeda
has been a player in it. In all of these situations we've seen
over the last year, it's really important to stay on an
examination of those realities.
General Mattis, as you pointed out in your opening
statement, a good deal of what has been going on has been, for
lack of a better term, the rupture of a social contract, such
as it was, in this region. Again as you said, it's not
predictable that there's going to be a democratic movement or a
democratic result in some of these countries. In fact, the
implications of what has been happening are going to play out
over years. We're just not going to see a quick resolution in a
way that we can say if it's a democracy or something else.
So it's very important to be careful in terms of what sort
of military assistance would take place, if it were to take
place, and with whom. I think I'm hearing that today and I'm
glad that I am.
One of the pieces that I think has been missing from this
discussion, not just here but in other hearings, is how we
should be approaching China and what we should be expecting and
asking from China in terms of asking for their assistance in
terms of increasing the stability in the entire region. I think
this is a good opportunity to get some feedback from you,
General Mattis, on this.
We've been talking about Iran. We've been talking about
Russia. There was a resolution proposed in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that originally did not even mention
China's participation. There was also the veto of the U.N.
Security Council resolution.
In the region, I think we should be expecting more out of
China in terms of stepping forward to attempt to resolve some
of these issues. Pakistan calls on their most important friend.
We have the sanctions that we've been attempting to move on
Iran and we're not seeing clear assistance there.
With respect to the situation in Syria, I've been asking,
why would they, why would China not support the type of
resolution that went before the Security Council? Let's be
honest here. This is a system of government that has not been
afraid to repress its own people. Probably the most glaring
example of a repressive regime that survived over the past 23
years is the Chinese regime that sent tanks and troops onto its
own people at Tiananmen Square in 1989.
We hope that their system has evolved beyond that by now,
but perhaps that does play into these situations.
General, can you give us an idea of what it's been like to
interact with the Chinese in the region in which you're
responsible?
General Mattis. I can't give you too much on that, Senator.
I'll tell you, on counterpiracy efforts, there's a pretty fair
collaborative effort, at the low tactical level, ship-
commander-to-ship-commander, there have been no problems
between us out there on the station in the Gulf of Aden. I
notice that on Iran that China did come out with a rather
strong statement that Iran getting a nuclear weapon was not in
their interests and they did not support that effort.
I don't have very much contact with the Chinese in my
region, though, sir. It's very, very limited. I would suggest
it's probably more in the DOS realm; relations are pretty
absent as far as military-to-military.
Senator Webb. I would venture that in terms of cooperation
on antipiracy there is a clear benefit, even on a tactical
level, to the Chinese because now they're operating their navy
in an area that they weren't operating in before. We welcome
collaborative efforts, but I don't think we should look at that
as some statement of national intent here.
I know this is principally a diplomatic question, but I
hope that we might be able to pursue ways to encourage China to
help us resolve these larger issues, whether it's Korea,
whether it's Burma, but particularly in this region, where they
clearly have geographic and strategic reasons to be further
involved, even in a place like Afghanistan, where they know
that they've now started moving economically. But we need to
hear more from China.
Admiral, I think my time is going to run out. I have a
question and I'd just like in a general sense to hear your
policy with respect to officers who handle classified
information that might, even on a temporary basis, end up in
the hands of foreign nationals. Is there a policy if that were
to occur?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir, absolutely. Anybody that
transfers classified information without the approval of the
U.S. Government with that process falls under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) with a violation of the UCMJ.
Senator Webb. What about just through negligence? They left
something laying around?
Admiral McRaven. Same thing, sir.
Senator Webb. Okay, thank you very much, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator McCaskill, I really apologize. I've seen you
sitting there, but I think Senator Blumenthal in terms of
original arrival is on the list first.
Senator McCaskill. Okay, no problem. I'll wait.
Senator Blumenthal. If Senator McCaskill has another
commitment, I'd be happy to----
Senator McCaskill. Absolutely not. Go ahead.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my thanks to both of you and the men and
women under your leadership for your really extraordinary
service, which I had the privilege to see a bit firsthand
during my second trip to Afghanistan last February with Senator
McCain and Senator Graham and others of my colleagues. As I
mentioned to you, Admiral McRaven, I was particularly impressed
by the really remarkable achievements of our special operators
there. The numbers tell a powerful story, but so do the more
anecdotal information, particularly about turning over a lot of
this work and training to the Afghans themselves, which I think
is a really unprecedented achievement in our military history
in terms of special operations.
I hope that we all keep sight of that work and also,
General, the work that all of our men and women there are
doing, despite the incidents that may sometimes cloud the
clearer picture that we should have and the appreciation that
we should always maintain of the service and sacrifice and the
achievements, a real success there.
I want to begin by asking, Admiral, whether you are
satisfied with the work that is being done in terms of turning
over that function to the Afghans themselves, of the night
raids, the SOF, and what we can do, if anything, to help you in
that very critical part of your mission?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. I've actually been very pleased
with the progress. We have a number of efforts ongoing and have
for quite some time in our partnership with the Afghans. U.S.
SOF have had a collaborative effort with the Afghan commandos.
They have built an Afghan special forces element. Some of our
other special forces have partnered with all the Afghan partner
units, and these are the forces that predominantly do the
direct action raids and are leading on those direct action
raids.
We also have our NATO SOF brethren that are partnered with
a number of Afghan forces as well. So across the SOF spectrum,
it is all about partnership and it is all about the Afghans
leading in that partnership. Our progress certainly over the
last year has accelerated dramatically and I'm very pleased
with the glide slope we're on right now.
Senator Blumenthal. One of the impediments, I think, to
understanding generally in the American public about how
successful we've been, not just in targeting and taking out
those elements of the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, but also
with the very, very small number of civilian casualties that
have occurred, is that the numbers are classified. But they are
powerfully impressive. So I would just put a pitch to you that
if we can declassify some of this information, it would really
enhance the appreciation and understanding of the American
public in general.
I want to move to a topic that has concerned me for a long
time, the continued flow of IED bomb-making material from
Pakistan, which is the source of the vast predominant part of
the components that go into the roadside bombs, and of course
the roadside bombs themselves cause the majority of casualties
to our troops.
We had testimony recently from James Clapper, the DNI, and
from Lieutenant General Burgess, and Director Clapper very
specifically said that his view is that Pakistan is not making
a significant effort to stop the flow of those bomb-making
components. I wonder if either of you have any views on that
topic?
General Mattis. Senator, it has been an area of
frustration. It has been a serious topic of dialogue with us.
They have passed laws now that will enable them to make arrests
that they could not make before in this regard. They have also
put together their C-IED strategy here in the last few months,
and I need to get back into Pakistan and talk with them more
about it. There is some reason for more optimism today than if
I was testifying last year, but I need to do more homework
before I can give you a complete answer.
At the same time, Pakistan, as you know, it's called the
Federally Administered Tribal Area for a reason up in the north
there. It's a very unique status that it's had since Pakistan
became a country, and their level of sovereignty over
everything that goes on there has also been at times nebulous.
So there are a number of factors that come to bear and I
hope to give you a better report on this within about a month
or 2, 3 at most, about where I really think they're at, are we
seeing real progress or not.
Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate your care and caution in
commenting on the work that the Afghans and the Pakistani
forces are doing in this area. My view is that they have not
yet made a significant effort to stop the flow of ammonium
calcium nitrate and other bombmaking components, based on
everything that I have seen and heard. So I would appreciate
any additional update you can give me at an appropriate time.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Blumenthal. In the time I have left, I'd like to
turn to a subject that really concerns all of our men and women
in uniform, the proposals for changes in the retirement and
health care systems. You in particular, General Mattis and
Admiral McRaven, work with some of the most dedicated career
professionals in our military. I am greatly concerned by the
potential impact that some of these proposals could have on the
ability of our military to attract the quality of people, and
they are people of truly extraordinary quality, as you know
better than I. But I have been very powerfully impressed by the
kinds of people we are attracting.
Could you give me any concerns you have about these
proposals and the ability of our military forces to attract and
keep the kind of career professionals we have now?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I'll start on this and then turn it
over to General Mattis. We see right now our recruiting goals
in terms of SOF are up from previous years. I think if you
polled a lot of those young men and women coming in, they
probably wouldn't cite the health care and the retirement
benefits as the reasons that they are joining. However, it
could very well be the reason that they stay after a certain
point in time.
I think as we move forward we need to do some very prudent
and careful looking at the retirement and the health care
system, so that we keep those experienced noncommissioned
officers (NCO) and officers in and take care of them for the
services that they have rendered over the life of their
careers.
General Mattis. Senator, I would agree with Admiral
McRaven. I've been on recruiting duty. Very few people come in
and ask a lot about health benefits, unless they're quite old,
and in the Marine Corps we didn't let them in, as you know from
your service.
But on retention, I think it's something we have to look at
very carefully. The point I make to our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines out in the field when I'm asked about it
is: You will still have one of the best retirement systems, no
matter what, because I'm confident that the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will only bring
forward those proposals that keep us able to attract the high-
quality young men and women who look beyond the political
rhetoric that goes on every day and sign up to defend this
country.
So I'm optimistic that we'll find the right way forward on
this, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. I think it is so
profoundly important that we find the right way forward,
because our greatest asset is the people, the men and women who
serve and sacrifice for us. As much as we may talk about the
hardware and the weapons systems and all the rest of it, our
people are our greatest asset.
Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator McCaskill, patience is once again rewarded.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that the last time I
checked the gross domestic product (GDP) in Afghanistan without
us is around $2 billion, and the GDP with us is around $16
billion. Does that sound about right? Am I off there, General
Mattis?
General Mattis. I'd hate to say it's right, but it sounds
about right.
Senator McCaskill. By the way, thank you both for all of
your service and your leadership. I have said repeatedly I am
supportive of what we are trying to do in Afghanistan. But I
have become increasingly skeptical about the infrastructure
projects that we are spending money on. I have followed the
saga of CERP from my first days on this committee. I have
watched it have successes and, frankly, one of the things I've
noticed is that, while everyone thinks the idea is good, we are
yet to have an objective study that shows the value of a lot of
the CERP money.
Now we have what I am affectionately calling the Son of
CERP, which is the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), which
is part DOS money and part DOD money, which, while not
unprecedented in our history, is very unusual for our military
to be building major infrastructure while we're engaged in a
fight on the ground.
There's a reason for that, because I think typically the
military would say the security needs are a problem and the
sustainment is a problem. It seems like we've blown over some
of those considerations as we have engaged in some of this
infrastructure building. I can give you anecdotally disasters
in Iraq. In fact, I am trying to compile all of the
infrastructure we built in Iraq and what the status is of it
today.
But I think everyone knows it's not a pretty picture: how
much got blown up; how much was never utilized; and how much
sits crumbling. That's an incredible amount of resources of our
country that we've invested.
Which brings me to the request for fiscal year 2013 for
CERP and AIF. The projects that are being funded in fiscal year
2012 with this new AIF that DOD has requested, are three power
projects, three transportation projects, and three water
projects. According to the briefing that my office has
received, you will finish these projects with fiscal year 2012
money, but some of them are not going to be finished until
2014.
Juxtaposition this with what we're envisioning in terms of
drawing down. We have requests for 2013, and my question to
you, General Mattis, would be what are those for? What is the
almost billion dollars that we're requesting in CERP and AIF
for? What major projects are we going to build beyond the ones
that the fiscal year 2012 money is going to finish? How many
years forward are we going to be working on those, and how many
contractors will we leave on the ground as we try to manage our
transition out of Afghanistan? Then I'll get to sustainment.
General Mattis. Senator, I need to go back and take part of
that question for the record so what I give you is absolutely
accurate. I will tell you, ma'am, that we would not disagree
that we've had significant problems in the midst of a war
trying to do something that, as you point out, we've not done
before.
However, we've also gone through a very rigorous scrub year
by year now to try to reduce it to what is actually necessary,
not what is good to have, but what is absolutely necessary to
the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. It's a different kind of
war that we fight today. The enemy has identified our strengths
and has decided to fight us in a way that does not lend itself
to us using our strengths--our mechanized divisions, our
aircraft carriers--as the tool to win. They are enablers, but
what we have to do is reach the people, and the reason we're in
Afghanistan--and I know that you've supported us over the years
on this--is to keep it from becoming again a terrorist safe
haven for attacks on us.
Part of what we're trying to do here is take a society that
was turned upside-down 30 years ago and bring it back into a
way forward that at least provides the most basic services.
We're not talking about things that perhaps at one time some
more idealistic people were coming in with, a much broader idea
about what we could do there.
So let me get back to you on this, what the major projects
are, and I'll give it to you in great detail. I would tell you
that the AIF was an attempt to break out of CERP, to give more
fidelity to you for your oversight. I have no reservations
about providing this, and if it can't stand the scrutiny that
you give it, then we'll change it.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) serves as a key force
multiplier for Department of Defense and Department of State
activities. AIF supports the overall counterinsurgency strategy and
fuels economic growth while improving credibility of the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) with its own people. AIF is
the economic cornerstone and is vital to the transition plan for
redeploying U.S. Forces. It provides the average Afghan citizen visible
improvements to the quality of life under GIRoA and these improvements
serve to discredit the influences of the insurgency. Specifically, AIF
provides the long-term power distribution solution for a significant
sector of the Afghan population and improves agricultural irrigation in
the Helmand Valley region, a former enemy stronghold.

Senator McCaskill. I understand. Maybe I'm being a little
cynical here. But I think part of this happened because it's
very hard to get the funds for major infrastructure through the
DOS budget.
Speaking of sustainment, we have big projects that were
funded through DOS, that have not been sustained even in
Afghanistan, and particularly as you look at the power plant.
You look at the power plant in Kabul and it is hundreds of
millions of dollars, and it's sitting there idle for most of
the time, used for just overload situations. They're still
buying electricity from the Stans. I don't think they have the
capacity or the resources to operate what we've built for them.
That brings me to sustainment. On the highway funds, I
looked at some of the materials that you provided my office on
sustainment on the roads. Right now we have hundreds of
millions of dollars we're putting into road and bridge projects
which, by the way, as an aside, I will say we desperately need
in this country. They're not going to get built while we build
them, and we're not going to have to pay off the bad guys to
create the security in order to build them.
There is no revenue in place right now to maintain or
support these roads after we leave. In fact, there's not even a
government road authority to focus on the networking operation.
There was talk in the briefing that we received that we think
they could.
To me, it has a lot more credibility that the government is
delivering these services, which is ultimately the theory
behind COIN, that we're trying to make the Afghanistan
Government look like it's a real government to the people of
Afghanistan, so they like them better than the Taliban.
Why aren't we requiring that the government do that first,
that the government provide some kind of gas taxes or some kind
of revenue that would maintain these roads, or at least a
government-wide authority that would allow them to operate a
system of roads and bridges in Afghanistan, before we put
hundreds of millions of dollars of American taxpayers' money
into these projects?
General Mattis. Senator, they're very good questions. I
won't tell you I have all the answers, but we are consistent
with your view right now in everything we're doing. If they
cannot sustain it, we're not going to build it. If it can't be
sustained by the Afghans themselves then it's not going to be
part of the program.
But I think we have to remember where we started there, and
even finding educated people is difficult. There's not a big
bench of people that we draw from. But I'm simply outlining the
problem. We owe you a solution and I will get back to you with
more specifics about the way ahead here.
[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) uses the Commander's Emergency
Response Program (CERP) to, among other things, fund transportation
improvement projects to provide the Afghanistan populace security,
development, and governance by increasing freedom of movement. Proposed
CERP projects must include a signed agreement with local ministry
entities to provide sustainment for the completed project. USFOR-A
identified the need to partner with the U.S. embassy personnel and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance
to ensure those sustainment estimates are included in their budgeting/
spending plans. The U.S. Congress created the Afghanistan
Infrastructure Fund (AIF) to eliminate the large infrastructure
requirements levied upon CERP and yet provide a means to address large-
scale infrastructure construction and repairs to support the
Afghanistan Government's ability to provide for basic needs of its
populace, like reliable power, water, and transportation
infrastructure. There is a need to improve Ministry of Finance support
for funding and training for Ministry of Public Works personnel to
ensure highway projects funded with AIF are sustained.

Senator McCaskill. I don't want anyone to misinterpret my
willingness to pull some of this money out and put it in the
highway trust fund in this country as not supporting what our
military is trying to do there. But as we are transitioning
out, it's almost like the two views are not matching up here.
You know what the problem is, General, honestly; we can do this
stuff, and Afghanistan can't. Let me give you all credit as
leaders of an amazing organization. You tell the people under
you that we want to do something, you know what? They're going
to do it.
So we can build these roads. We can build this power grid.
We can contract, we can do all of this, and it is a can-do
attitude that is so part of our culture that I think sometimes
there is a sense of denial about whether or not we can do it,
but how this ends up at the end. I want to tell you, I believe
with every intellectual capacity I have that this is not going
to end up well on these infrastructure projects, that it's not
going to be a good ending, that there are not going to be roads
and bridges and cars, and that the Afghanistan Government is
not going to have a good handle on this, especially in light of
the time that you face in terms of us drawing down.
So I want these things to match up and I want to be
realistic. I do think this part of the COIN strategy needs even
more examination because I listened to Israeli Prime Minister
Bejamin Netanyahu talk about it talking like a duck, quacking
like a duck, looking like a duck, and it being a duck last
night. This really looks like nation-building in every essence
of the word, and I think there is more nation-building here
than there really is COIN. That's my bias at this point, but I
am certainly willing to be talked out of that bias with good
objective proof points.
General Mattis. Let me try, Senator. If I can't then we'll
have to change something.
Senator McCaskill [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you very
much, General.
Thank you, Admiral.
I will call on Senator Hagan. She's the only one left.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator McCaskill. I was looking around, seeing who else I
could call on. But I guess it's just you.
Senator Hagan. Last but not least.
General Mattis and Admiral McRaven, thank you so much for
your testimony today and even more so for your service to our
country. I agree with Senator McCaskill, we certainly do have a
can-do attitude and you can do great things, and I really do
appreciate it.
Admiral McRaven, thank you for coming by my office
yesterday. I did want to go over a question that we talked
about. Several public reports have indicated that you are
seeking several new authorities to give you more control over
the deployment and utilization of SOF. For example, the New
York Times recently reported that you want authority to deploy
SOF without going through the traditional force generation
process managed by the Joint Chiefs.
I know we've discussed this, but if you could also go over
again: Are you seeking authorities that would provide SOCOM
with additional control over the deployment and utilization of
SOF?
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, Senator Hagan. First, I
appreciate the question. I appreciate the opportunity to set
the record straight. As you said, there's been a lot in the
news about this lately.
Every 2 years the Joint Staff goes through a staffing drill
to look at the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which defines the
roles, responsibilities, and the missions of the combatant
commanders. Every year we go through a review of the forces
which talks about the assignment of forces to those commanders.
What we at SOCOM have done is we are participating in that
staffing process. Right now it is an internal process. My
recommendations have not even gotten to the Chairman, much less
the Secretary or the Commander in Chief yet. So I think it's
premature to talk about what my recommendations are in an open
forum.
However, having said that, what I would like to set the
record straight on is that we will never deploy forces to a
geographic combatant command without that commander's approval.
We never go into another country without getting country
clearance from the Chief of Mission, and the Chief of Mission
always has a vote in whether or not U.S. Forces arrive in the
nation that he or she is sitting in.
So there is nothing in my recommendations now, nor will
there ever be, that talks about circumventing either the
geographic combatant commander or the Chief of Mission.
Senator Hagan. I think it's important to set that record
straight, so thank you.
General Mattis, the Jordanians and the Turks share the
longest border with Syria and they stand to bear the brunt of
any refugee flows out of Syria. Senior officials from both
governments have publicly stated that President Assad must go
and they have indicated a willingness to receive the Syrians
fleeing from the conflict.
But there's been little discussion about what the
Jordanians and the Turks are willing to do to support Arab or
western efforts to aid or arm the opposition in Syria. What is
your understanding of the Jordanian and Turkish views on the
situation in Syria, and would they support the provision of
non-lethal and/or lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition?
General Mattis. Thanks, Senator. I don't want to speak for
them. I'll give you my view of it. I don't think they want to
see the opposition armed right now. I think they want to see a
more defined end-state. They want to know better who it is
they're arming. But again, I don't want to speak for them. I
think that the refugee flows would be very destabilizing in
either country, but especially so in Jordan, if they came in,
because of the internal dynamics in the country there and our
inability to get the Middle East peace process reenergized that
might give some view of a Palestinian state, that would take
some of that pressure off the country and leave only the
refugees for them to consider.
As it stands now, I don't think they want the refugees
inside Jordan. I think they want to set up the camps inside
southern Syria and help them there. I know the King would do
that.
Senator Hagan. Is anything like that going on?
General Mattis. There are humanitarian efforts under the
Red Cross and the Red Crescent. Certainly both governments are
looking toward what they can do for refugees, yes, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven, concerns have been raised in the past that
the heavy concentration of SOF in the CENTCOM AOR is degrading
the cultural and language expertise of special operations
personnel who have been traditionally focused on other parts of
the world. You told the committee last year that one of the
command's top challenges is to better understand the people and
conditions in the places that we go.
How are you addressing the tension between the demand for
SOF in CENTCOM and the need to maintain regionally aligned
expertise elsewhere? It's a big world.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am, it is. As I mentioned earlier
today, we're in about 78 countries globally. So as we develop
particularly our SOF officers and NCOs, part of their career
path is to get language and cultural training. As you well
know, at Fort Bragg this really is the center of excellence in
terms of our throughput for those NCOs and officers.
Right now we have a pretty robust program that looks across
the globe at our cultural and language requirements. I'm pretty
satisfied with where we are. The issue is, as General Mattis
well knows, about 80 percent of my forces are in CENTCOM.
Having said that, that doesn't diminish the effort we are
putting into the cultural training or the language training
with respect to those other folks that are deployed globally.
It will be a function of balancing and probably
reemphasizing some languages and some cultures as we move from
a CENTCOM-centric environment to a more globally balanced
environment over time.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
From time to time there are reports of Iranian support to
the Houthis in northern Yemen. Given the ongoing surge by al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the matter of Iran's
involvement in Yemen has been getting less press. General
Mattis, can you update me on Iran's activities in north Yemen
and are they continuing to provide material support to the
Houthis?
General Mattis. They are providing material support.
Compared to last year at this time, they're providing more, to
include weapons, not just money. But, interestingly, they are
also trying to influence now the non-Houthi tribes and invite
their political leadership to Tehran on expense-paid vacations
basically, to meet with certain leaders there. So it's very
interesting. What you and I have seen over the years with the
Houthis is now expanding in Yemen.
Frankly, I think Tehran sees the Lebanese Hezbollah kind of
mental model for where they want to go down there.
Senator Hagan. Have the Saudis raised concern with you
about Iranian involvement in Yemen?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. What's your assessment of the new government
in Yemen? Are they interested in continuing to cooperate on
counterterrorism matters?
General Mattis. I believe they are, yes.
Senator Hagan. What's the current status of DOD's security
assistance programs with respect to Yemen, particularly the
assistance program authorized under the most recent NDAA?
General Mattis. Senator, the long delay in President Saleh
leaving basically derailed some of our programs. During the
internal frictions that were going on, we didn't want our
people engaged in what was really something the Yemenis had to
sort out on their own. So we're going to have to get with
President Hadi and his organization now and start working this
forward again.
We've taken a little bit of a lull, frankly, in what we
were doing, but not across the board, not in all areas. I can
speak more in private with you on some of that.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, thank you both for being
here this morning and for your service to the country.
General Mattis, I'd like to begin asking you about what's
happening with Pakistan. I had the opportunity to travel in
August with Chairman Levin actually to Afghanistan and to see
firsthand what was happening at that time in Afghanistan. One
of the things that we did was fly over the Khyber Pass, and it
was surprising to me because, obviously, I hadn't been there
before, to see just the extent of trucks and vehicles and
people lined up to cross at the Khyber Pass. Obviously, that
was before the decision to close the Pass in November.
I wonder if you could talk about how important it will be
to reopen the Khyber Pass? Last week General Fraser said that
being able to get through the Pass would be important if we're
going to withdraw personnel and equipment on the timetable
that's been proposed. So please talk about where we are in
negotiating reopening of the Khyber Pass and how important that
will be.
General Mattis. It is important to us. We have proven that
we can sustain the campaign through the Northern Distribution
Network and through what we call our multi-modal, which is
basically part by air and part by sea, resupply of our effort
there.
However, we do need the ground lines of communications
through Pakistan. As far as the status of that discussion, I
will fly to Pakistan here in about 10 days and we'll reopen the
discussion. I think the parliamentary process as far as the new
relationship with the United States will be reported out by
that point. I think their military will be able to engage with
us. They've been waiting for the parliamentary process to be
done and that's why there's been a bit of a delay.
Senator Shaheen. When you say they've been waiting for the
parliamentary process to be done, does that mean they're
looking for civilian blessing of reopening the Khyber Pass, or
are they waiting for General Kayani and the military to support
that effort?
General Mattis. I think what happened was the parliament
took up the issue about the relationship with the United
States. There's been disappointments on both sides. That
parliamentary committee has reported out to the parliament, as
I understand it, or will very shortly, and I anticipate General
Kayani will then have the parliament's framework for how this
relationship will move forward, and will do what two different
countries do, some with shared interests and some of our
interests are not shared, and we'll try to work a way forward.
Senator Shaheen. But you're optimistic that we will see
some progress on that?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am, I am.
Senator Shaheen. One of the other things we heard about on
that trip was the importance of the cooperation that had gone
on in the past on the border between Afghan, Pakistan, and ISAF
troops in avoiding border incidents. Obviously, that situation
seems to have deteriorated since that time. Can you talk about
where we are in those relationships and whether there's hope to
get them back on track to restore the kind of communication
that would allow us to avoid those border incidents?
General Mattis. Senator, even in our worst days here in the
last several months when we were unable to talk about reopening
the ground lines of communication and there was a lot of
friction and statements in the press on both sides, even in
those worst days our brigadiers and our colonels and our majors
were meeting as we tried to coordinate better to avoid the
tragedy that happened in late November.
It's actually been the one area where I can tell you we
have not been hobbled. It's actually gotten better under this
crisis that we've been through and the tragedy of those
Pakistani soldiers that were killed by friendly fire, our fire.
So it's going better now in the effort to preclude this from
happening ever again.
Senator Shaheen. We're actually seeing that on the ground?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. It's not just at the negotiation level?
General Mattis. There are border coordination meetings
going on now at different levels, and as soon as we get hit
from the other side of the border we're calling the Pakistani
military. In other words, the communication channels now are
more mature. It's not perfect. I don't want to make this look
like it's all okay. We have a lot of frictions along a badly
demarcated border in some areas. But at the same time, it's the
one area that held in there when everything else kind of came
off the track, and it's the one area we're making progress on.
We've exchanged standard operating procedures (SOP) for near-
border operations. So when we're operating near the border, we
have a shared SOP for how we will communicate.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. That's encouraging.
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Admiral McRaven, I want to also say, while
I'm talking about our visit to Afghanistan, we visited one of
the special operations efforts in one of the villages along the
Pakistani border, and it was very impressive. Talking to some
of the young men who were serving and hearing their enthusiasm
for the work that they were doing was really inspirational. So
thank you very much for that.
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. I'm pleased to see that the Navy is
considering enhancements to the Virginia-class subs. In New
Hampshire we pay a lot of attention to what's going on with the
Virginia-class subs because they're worked on at the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard.
Can you talk about the work that's being done there and
whether you're confident that the investment in that submarine
technology is going to be what's needed and what additional
capacity that will allow us to be able to do that is important?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. So I don't lead you astray,
I'd prefer to take that kind of question for the record and
then get back to you. What I can tell you, though, is that when
it comes to special operations engagement with the Navy and
particularly as the Navy begins to build or refurbish
submarines, we are always part of that discussion. So whether
it's the Virginia-class or other classes, the Navy has been
exceptionally helpful in making sure that new special
operations capabilities are incorporated into the submarines,
because Navy SEALs and some of the Marine Corps SOF work off
submarines quite often.
[The information referred to follows:]

The work accomplished at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNS) is managed
and executed by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) has no direct efforts with the Shipyard;
however, through our partnership with the Navy and NAVSEA, we
coordinate several projects. One of the more important efforts for Navy
Special Operations Forces (SOF) is the management and planning of yard
activities for the Dry Deck Shelter (DDS).
The DDS is a unique and highly valued national asset, in service
for nearly 30 years. There are currently six DDSs, the first one built
in 1982 by Electric Boat, and fielded on the USS Georgia (SSGN 729).
The remaining five were built between 1987 and 1991 by Newport News
Shipbuilding. The DDS service life has been extended to 40 years. With
the first DDS reaching end of service life in 2022, significant efforts
must be performed to determine an adequate replacement for the DDS to
ensure a seamless, operational transition. The urgency to identify a
replacement DDS is due to the increased reliance on this system by SOF
and the Naval Submarine Force as the dynamics of missions change
frequently, and a recognition that an interruption in availability
could severely affect national security. Accordingly, the Navy and
SOCOM have initiated efforts to develop the next generation DDS
capability to continue support for current and future SOF and Navy
undersea operations. Several new designs for the next generation DDS
have been proposed, but the final solution is yet to be identified.
Navy identification of an investment in a next generation DDS should be
seriously considered in fiscal year 2013 in order to optimize the
design, minimize the cost, and ensure a smooth transition.
The Ohio-class SSGNs are a highly valued host platform for SOF, due
to their unique capabilities and expansive capacity; SSGNs are the only
platform capable of deploying with dual DDSs, supporting the capability
to sustain a large contingent of SOF operators capable of conducting
multiple mission sorties, over an extended period of time, to the level
of a special operations undersea campaign. This enduring SOF
requirement for dual DDS operations can be traced back to the USS Sam
Houston (SSBN 609) and USS John Marshall (SSBN 611), and cannot be
fulfilled by any other submarine platform in the Navy inventory.
SOCOM and the Navy are exploring alternatives to sustain similar
undersea platform capabilities in anticipation of SSGN retirement from
the fleet in the mid-2020s; the Navy is not considering construction of
a new SSGN submarine. An alternative proposed by the Navy is to extend
the length of the Virginia-class SSNs by approximately 90 feet
[Virginia Payload Module (VPM)]. Although not the primary requirement
for design of the VPM, the concept could include enhanced SOF
capabilities as compared to legacy Virginia capabilities. While the
class was designed from the beginning to support SOF, the added hull
section will allow the submarine force to support a wider range of
missions than currently possible with SSNs. However, VPM-equipped SSNs
will not be able to provide SSGN-level SOF support given their smaller
size.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, and let me just say to both of
you, as an American and a West Virginian, I appreciate your
service and I'm very, very proud of what you do for our
country.
With that being said, I'd like to go on to a few things. I
have problems with the presence that we have and the direction
that we've gone in Afghanistan. I've been very open about that.
But with that, what you all do is unbelievable.
General Mattis, we now reportedly have 150,000 contractors,
compared to 94,000 men and women in uniform, in Afghanistan. To
me that is troubling. Do you know the percentage of the
contractors that are ex-military?
General Mattis. I wouldn't even hazard a guess, but I'll
take the question, Senator, and try to get an answer for you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Although we do not collect this information, we recognize that many
of the types of people who would gravitate to these private contractor
jobs in combat areas are the same people who would have prior military
service. While we cannot give a specific numerical answer to the
question, of the total contractor population working in Afghanistan, 22
percent (or approximately 25,300) are U.S. citizens and a smaller
number yet are doing military skill-set-type work.
I understand that our reliance on contractors could be competing
with those who might otherwise reenlist. However, at our current and
projected end strength, the military cannot retain all of the fine
junior noncommissioned officers who wish to remain on Active Duty as we
simply haven't the room to retain all of them. That said, we cannot
identify any direct negative impact on readiness or our combat
capability by those who leave Active Duty for service as a contractor.
According to a Congressional Research Service report dated May 13,
2011: ``Using contractors to perform non-combat activities augments the
total force and can free up uniformed personnel for combat missions.
Since contractors can be hired faster than the Department of Defense
(DOD) can develop an internal capability, contractors can be quickly
deployed to provide critical support capabilities when necessary. Using
contractors can also save DOD money. Contractors can be hired when a
particular need arises and be let go when their services are no longer
needed. Hiring contractors only as needed can be cheaper in the long
run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability.''
I offer this point because we are doing everything possible to
reduce the costs of this war while retaining full military
effectiveness and keeping faith with our troops.

Senator Manchin. Here's what I run into, sir. In the
airports I stop the so-called soldiers of fortune, if you will,
and I ask them where they're going? They're going to the front
line, Afghanistan.
I ask them also how many of you are ex-military? Almost to
a tee, it's 100 percent.
I ask this follow-up question: If it had not been for the
contracting that attracted you with the higher salaries, would
you still be in the military? Almost unequivocally, yes.
That tells me something's wrong. Then when I hear people
say that we're going to be cutting back DOD and we'll be
weakening, and they want to play political football with this.
To me, we could cut back on contractors and basically put a
certain amount of that towards our men and women in uniform.
General Mattis, your budget, and Admiral McRaven, your request,
we waste more money with contracting a year than you have asked
almost for half of your budget.
To me, we could strengthen our men and women in uniform,
strengthen our military, by basically drawing down what we do
and the amount of money we spend on contractors. I don't think
that should be a political football. That's just common sense
in West Virginia. We say we're going to take care and
strengthen the people that basically are on the front lines and
not continue to spend so much money in attracting our best and
brightest when they get their 10 years and, boom, they're
dropping over.
I don't know if you can speak on this or not. But to me,
when I go home people ask me: What are we doing? Why are we
spending so much money trying to rebuild a nation in
Afghanistan that doesn't care for us that much and doesn't want
us there? We had more of our so-called allies killing Americans
since February than we do al Qaeda and all the terrorists.
I don't know. General, please comment on this, and then,
Admiral, what do you believe? How could we better strengthen
your budget to do the job that we're allowing contractors to do
now, but do it much more economically? Is that doable?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I will tell you that the budget I
have right now meets all the needs for U.S. SOF for fiscal year
2013.
Senator Manchin. Would that be saying as long as you have
the contracting support? If you didn't have that contractor
support and we asked you to do the job that they're doing,
could we do it more effectively and efficiently?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I will tell you, the contractors play
a very vital role and no one should diminish the role that they
play. It is expensive, but there are places and times where
having a contract force works well for us, as opposed to
putting uniformed military to use, whether it's a training
mission, a security guard mission, et cetera. There are some
places where you would rather have uniformed military than
contractors.
So while I don't want to speak to the total size of the
U.S. Government's contracting force, what I will tell you is
that I think there is an appropriate balance between uniformed
personnel and contractors, and the contractors do a good
service.
Senator Manchin. As a civilian, what I found disturbing is
that when I was over there--I've been there twice now--and I
talked to the different servicemembers and I asked, when are
you getting out; when you're getting out, are you going to
reenlist? No, I'm not; I'm going to go over here and make three
times more. Sir, that's disturbing. As a civilian, a taxpayer,
and a lawmaker, it's disturbing. You go home to West Virginia
and explain that our best and brightest are going out because
they're going to go right back and do the same job in a
civilian uniform, making two to three times the pay that they
were in the military.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we had some of this problem early on
within the special operations community after September 11,
where we saw a number of our senior NCOs who looked over the
fence, at what the contractors were providing and decided to
make that leap at the time.
However, I will tell you our experience within special
operations is most of those folks regretted that move. While it
is only anecdotal in terms of their service, I can tell you the
few that did get out regretted it. While we had a trend, we
were able to correct that trend through appropriate bonuses and
pays, but the fact of the matter is when we were able to
correct that trend and we talked to some of those soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines, a lot of them said, hey, we
preferred to serve.
By the way, when you look at it from a cost-benefit
analysis, you're much better off staying in the military over
the long haul, because the retirement package is very sound, it
is very good. A lot of these young fellows really just didn't
do the basic calculation early on.
Senator Manchin. I'm troubled by this. But also, with our
presence now with the turn of events in Afghanistan, I'm
understanding we have slowed, or basically stopped, the
withdrawal of our troops because of the violent unstable
situation we have there. Is that slowing down or are we still
on course to draw down, General Mattis?
General Mattis. No, Senator, we have not stopped it. We
have pulled the first 10,000 troops out. We have the plan
coming, I think I'll have it on April 1, for the next 23,000 to
come out.
Senator Manchin. You're talking about just people, just our
men and women in uniform, correct?
General Mattis. That's correct.
Senator Manchin. Not contractors?
General Mattis. That's correct.
Senator Manchin. So contractors, we could even keep the
same or beef up?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, or reduce.
Senator Manchin. Yes, I would hope that. But I'm saying
that's not been the case.
General, how many contractors do we still have in Iraq?
General Mattis. Under the U.S. military, sir, I need to
take it for the record, but I think it's probably around 500.
They're doing training, they're people who can teach Iraqis how
to use the new artillery piece or the new tank they bought from
the United States. There are people who do that kind of
training.
[The information referred to follows:]

As of the first quarter of fiscal year 2012 manual census there are
113,491 contractors in Afghanistan. Department of State (DOS) projects
14,000 contractors in Iraq, but currently 8,500 work under Department
of Defense (DOD) contracts supporting both DOS and DOD missions.

Senator Manchin. We've pulled out of Iraq, correct?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. But we still have contractors doing the
job that military would have been doing if we let military in
there, correct?
General Mattis. I have about 200 military personnel there,
sir, under the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq. That is a
lieutenant general who is under the ambassador. They do the
transfer of the actual equipment when it comes in. He then has
several hundreds of instructors, and I'd prefer not to take
them out of our ranks. I need them in the serving units.
Senator Manchin. I know my time is up, but if I could just
finish up. As a West Virginian, and the people in West Virginia
support the military as strong as any State that I know of, we
believe that we can strengthen the military's position by being
responsible with the budget, but it would come off the backs of
the contractors that we've built up. I want to make that very
clear. We do not, nor would I ever vote to weaken our military.
I would strengthen our military. But I would deplete the
contracting and the amount of money we spend on contracting to
do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
Senator Shaheen or Senator Manchin, do you have any
additional questions?
Senator Shaheen. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Senator Shaheen. It's not quite 12:00, so come on. We have
a minute.
Chairman Levin. No, we have more than a minute if you need
it.
Senator Shaheen. I know. I'm just kidding.
General Mattis, I would like to turn to Syria for a minute.
I understand there have been a number of questions this morning
about the opposition in Syria and who they are. But I'd like to
raise a question about the weapons and the stockpiles that are
there. Earlier last month, Senators Gillibrand, Collins, and I
sent a letter to the administration to raise specific concerns
about the threat of what happens to those conventional and
chemical weapons.
According to a recent report, Syria probably has one of the
largest chemical weapons programs in the world. So there are
two concerns. First, what happens if those weapons are left
unsecured? Could they potentially disappear and be used
throughout the region? Second, obviously, is there any
suggestion that Assad might actually use these weapons against
the people of Syria? I wonder if you could comment on both of
those questions.
General Mattis. Yes, Senator, I can. In the conventional
weapons, the large stockpiles there are certainly a concern.
Out of the conventional weapons, the biggest concern I have are
the shoulder-launched anti-air missiles, and you understand the
danger.
On the chemical weapons, you're right to characterize it as
one of the largest stockpiles in the world. If left unsecured,
it would be potentially a very serious threat in the hands of,
I will just say Lebanese Hezbollah for example, because they're
in close proximity.
At the same time, they're not easily handled. Obviously, it
takes highly trained troops to do that. I'm not saying it's a
fait accompli that if they're left unsecured automatically
someone can grab them and use them. They may end up frying
themselves.
But I think that it's going to take an international effort
when Assad falls--and he will fall--in order to secure these
weapons. I don't think he will use them on his own people, but
that is speculation. We have not seen any effort to use it yet,
but we're watching very closely. I think that what would stop
him would be the international condemnation and probably the
call to arms it would bring if he used chemical weapons. But
right now that's purely speculation, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Given our experience in Libya with the
Man-Portable Air Defense System, should we be more comfortable
that in Syria those are likely to be better secured than they
were in Libya?
General Mattis. I think perhaps better secured until Assad
falls, and then we'll have to see if the forces guarding those
retain control or not.
Senator Shaheen. Is there any planning under way to look at
how the international community might address those weapons
when Assad falls, in terms of coming in and making sure they
are secure?
General Mattis. I'm sure that would be part of the planning
if the international community moves towards taking action. It
would probably be a key part of the planning.
Senator Shaheen. But there's nothing under way right now
that you're aware of?
General Mattis. I'd prefer to speak privately with you
about that, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Senator Manchin. If I could just follow up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Sure, Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
To both of you, I will just say that you probably have more
responsibility with your men's and women's boots-on-the-ground
defending this country than any other branch right now. With
that being said, where do you see the greatest threat we have
as the United States?
General Mattis. In the near-term, sir, and I'm CENTCOM-
focused, but I look at North Korea, I look at China, you pay me
to be a little broader than just CENTCOM. But my biggest
concern is Iran. That is the nation with four different
threats: first, its nuclear program, where it's enriching more
uranium than it needs for peaceful purposes, and has rebuffed
the U.N. efforts to try to monitor it. Second, they have the
long-range rockets and the ballistic missiles that they can use
and hold other nations at risk from the Mediterranean down into
the Gulf Cooperation States. Third, they have their maritime
threat, which they've been bellicose about closing the Straits.
Then fourth, they have their MOIS, their secret service, their
Quds Force, surrogates like Lebanese Hezbollah, that sort of
thing, that they have going on as they fight this shadow war.
I think Iran is the biggest threat, Senator.
Senator Manchin. Admiral?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I would agree with General Mattis
that Iran is probably the biggest threat. But I don't think we
should take our eye off the ball in terms of al Qaeda or the
violent extremist networks that are out there. As you look at
al Qaeda's senior leadership, most of which still remains in
the federally Administered Tribal Areas, but you begin to see
the franchises in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, East
African al Qaeda in terms of Al Shabab, al Qaeda in the Islamic
Lands of the Maghreb, and what they are doing in terms of North
Africa, and the other al Qaeda franchise movements, these are
something we need to continue to pay particular attention to
because that cancer continues to grow, albeit at a slower rate.
Senator Manchin. If there's support that we should be
giving you and the resources that you're going to be needing to
meet these threats and keeping America safe, I would hope that
you would be forthcoming. Probably in a private setting, we
could sit down and see how we could best make sure that
happens.
But again, thank you for your service. I appreciate it very
much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Manchin.
In terms of the risk from Iran, I had to leave here for
about an hour so I could be with the Israeli Prime Minister and
a number of Senators, and that's what the main focus was of
that meeting, as I think it is of much of our concern these
days. So your identification of Iran as the number one greatest
threat we face, I think, is well-placed.
With that, we will stand adjourned, again with our thanks
to both of you for your testimony, and our thanks to you and
the men and women with whom you serve. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

1. Senator Lieberman. General Mattis, as you assess your need for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), what role does Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) play in meeting those requirements?
Specifically, could you perform your indications and warning and wide
area surveillance missions without it?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

2. Senator Lieberman. General Mattis, are there specific
capabilities that should be added to JSTARS in order to enhance
interoperability with ground forces or improve performance in relation
to the specific threats in your area of responsibility (AOR)?
General Mattis. JSTARS aircraft and crews continue to provide
excellent support to ground and maritime forces in response to many
different threats, both in a counterinsurgency environment like
Afghanistan and increasingly in a maritime role. I welcome and endorse
Air Force efforts to rapidly integrate the new Enhanced Land/Maritime
Mode (ELMM) capability onto the JSTARS platform. It will greatly
amplify JSTARS effectiveness in the maritime environment by increasing
the sensitivity to small boat targets, even in the presence of radar
clutter due to high sea states and by improving the geolocation
accuracy for maritime targets. ELMM should be present on all JSTARS
platforms deploying to the AOR.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal

MILITARY RETIREMENT

3. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral McRaven, under the President's
fiscal year 2013 budget proposal, there is a request for Congress to
``establish a commission with Base Realignment and Closure-like
authority to conduct a comprehensive review of military retirement in
the context of total military compensation.'' Please provide the number
and percentage of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel that do
not reach the 20-years-of-service mark, the number and percentage of
SOF personnel who reach the 20-years-of-service mark, and the number
and percentage of SOF personnel who reach the 25-years-of-service mark
for the last 10 years.
Admiral McRaven. That is a very complex question, and varies for
each SOF specialty and for officers and enlisted. Part of the problem
is that each of the Services is responsible for the maintenance of the
records for each one of the military servicemembers within U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). Once the servicemember leaves SOCOM or the
SOF components for new units or to retire, their records fall under the
control of the Service that they are from. Unfortunately, at this time,
SOCOM does not maintain this data.

4. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral McRaven, please provide any concerns
you may have regarding the retention of SOF past the 20-years-of-
service mark, and the retention of SOF personnel if the military
retirement system were to be reformed as outlined in the President's
fiscal year 2013 budget proposal.
Admiral McRaven. Retention of SOF personnel is acceptable, and each
Service's retention model supports long-term SOF retention and force
structure sustainment. While a struggling economy has led to some of
the highest overall retention rates in years, many highly trained,
skilled, and mature SOF members remain aggressively recruited in the
civilian market, placing them at a greater risk of loss to lucrative
opportunities in the private sector and/or with other government
agencies. The Services' continued support of robust, SOF-focused
retention initiatives will have a positive impact on the retention
behavior and readiness of our SOF personnel.
The President's fiscal year 2013 budget proposal to establish a
Military Retirement Modernization Commission, which, if enacted, will
recommend improvements to the military retirement system, should
contain provisions that any major military retirement reforms include
grandfathering for those currently serving in the military.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

MANAGEMENT OF CONCUSSION/MILD TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN DEPLOYED
SETTING

5. Senator McCain. General Mattis, in June 2010, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense issued DTM 09-033, ``Policy Guidance for
Management of Concussion/Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) in the
Deployed Setting,'' setting forth specific policies and procedures for
protection of servicemembers exposed to blast or other concussive
events, to include medical evaluation, 24-hour rest for exposed
personnel, and reports and procedures for evaluation of recurrent
concussions sustained by U.S. servicemembers. How has this policy been
implemented within the CENTCOM AOR?
General Mattis. CENTCOM Fragmentary Order 09-1656, originally
published July 2010, directs that leaders at all levels, as well as
medical personnel: (1) are trained in recognition of potentially
concussive events and protection of servicemembers involved; (2) track
personnel involved in events and use available tools to record these
events tactically and in the medical record; and (3) screen, medically
evaluate, and begin treatment immediately after an event. Commanders
support implementing mandatory rest periods since they now see 97
percent of their concussed troopers returned to duty compared to 50
percent 2 years ago.

6. Senator McCain. General Mattis, what is your assessment of the
impact of this policy on operational readiness of units in a deployed
setting?
General Mattis. My commanders on the ground have found that the
policy assists in operational readiness for a number of reasons. First,
it is clear and provides specific guidance for commanders to execute.
Second, since most concussion care centers report a greater than 95
percent return to duty ratio, loss of manpower is minimal. And third,
front line leaders see good, effective results in returning
servicemembers. The policy has increased operational readiness of units
that experience high rates of blast exposure.

7. Senator McCain. General Mattis, would you recommend that this
policy be extended beyond its current expiration date of July 1, 2012?
General Mattis. Yes. The policy is currently under review for
publication as an enduring Department of Defense (DOD) issuance. I
support this policy as it unquestionably standardizes and improves the
training, tracking, and treatment regarding mild TBI for our
servicemembers.

U.S. NAVAL ASSETS IN THE GULF REGION

8. Senator McCain. General Mattis, your statement notes that the
Bahrain security relationship is the cornerstone for our collective
security in the Gulf region. There has been some discussion about
adding ships to the Fifth Fleet stationed at Naval Air Station (NAS)
Bahrain. What additional ships are being assessed?
General Mattis. The presence of U.S. naval assets in the Gulf
region varies based on articulated requirements of the combatant
commander and as coordinated by the Joint Staff and approved by the
Secretary of Defense. As part of a CENTCOM request for forces, four
mine countermeasure (MCM) ships will soon deploy from San Diego to
Bahrain: USS Sentry (MCM 3), USS Devastator (MCM 6), USS Pioneer (MCM
9), and USS Warrior (MCM 10). This deployment will bring a total of
eight MCM ships in theater for a short period of time.
The Austin-class amphibious transport dock ship, USS Ponce (LPD
15), delayed its scheduled decommissioning to serve as an interim
afloat forward staging base (AFSB) in support of MCMs, aircraft, and
patrol craft (PC) ships at sea with refueling, resupply, and
maintenance. Basing for USS Ponce has not been determined. Additional
ships being considered include five coastal PC to be home-ported within
the CENTCOM AOR. However, these PC are in preliminary stages of
assessment and no decision has been reached regarding their deployment.

9. Senator McCain. General Mattis, will these ships require any
upgrades to waterfront facilities or piers?
General Mattis. Upgrades to waterfront facilities and piers are
necessary. Quay wall repair, pier replacement, ship service utilities,
ship maintenance shops, and warehouse space are all needed to support
ship loading. Ship berthing is constrained at Naval Support Activity
(NSA) Bahrain and the existing pier and quay wall are in poor condition
and require significant repairs to keep them viable in the future.
Although the Navy routinely requires up to 2,000 linear feet (LF), the
Navy has a lease that provides priority use of 540 LF of pier space and
anticipates a need for more space. Waterfront development under
construction at NSA Bahrain will provide the Navy exclusive use of
2,000 LF of required quay wall. Current warehouse space demand exceeds
capacity by 30 percent and no ship maintenance space exists. The
Waterfront Development Phase IV project that was programmed by the Navy
for fiscal year 2012 but not authorized includes a warehouse that would
meet warehouse requirements.

INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT FORCES AT ISA AIR BASE

10. Senator McCain. General Mattis, the United States also operates
at Isa Air Base south of Manama. What is your plan for the transition
of this base from tents to a more robust set of facilities and
infrastructure?
General Mattis. We are coordinating with the Bahraini Defense Force
on the infrastructure required to support our forces at Isa Air Base.
We are planning for limited construction at this location but may
improve living quarters to relocatable and arch-span buildings.
Infrastructure planned for storage of munitions and aircraft parking at
Isa are required to support current and future operations. The
facilities improvements at Isa are to be U.S.-funded and the ammunition
magazines ($87 million) and aircraft parking area ($37 million) are
fiscal year 2011 authorized projects. We will upgrade the living
conditions through the purchase and installation of containerized,
relocatable buildings ($15 million).

U.S. FORCES IN KUWAIT

11. Senator McCain. General Mattis, with the withdrawal of U.S.
Forces from Iraq, we have repositioned significant forces in Kuwait and
are in the process of redefining their roles and missions. Can you
describe your long-term plans for U.S. Forces in Kuwait?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

12. Senator McCain. General Mattis, will your plan propose an
enduring base, and if so, where?
General Mattis. We have proposed enduring access to five specific
Kuwaiti bases to support efforts focused on the defense of Kuwait and
support for regional stability. In our Theater Posture Plan we note
those locations where we desire enduring access and capability to meet
current and future mission requirements. The Kuwait locations are also
noted in the Global Defense Posture Report to Congress submitted
annually by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). There are no
plans to expand or develop new bases and there is no change to our
previous requests for access to select Kuwaiti bases. We regularly
adjust our requirements at each base to meet the mission requirements.
In fact, by the end of 2013, we intend to return Camp Virginia back to
Kuwait.
Our basing approach is to share existing host-nation bases where
possible to sustain our force presence and provide the capability to
meet our directed operational requirements. We have a long history and
partnership between our countries before, during, and after Operation
Desert Storm that fosters a cooperative relationship at Kuwaiti bases
to establish an enduring footprint to support our forces and mission
requirements. These improvements ensure the required capability is
maintained at appropriate levels of readiness and to adjust to the
Kuwaiti plans for base development. Additionally, we have periodic
meetings (monthly to biannually) at different levels in accordance with
our Defense Cooperation Agreement where we discuss posture proposals
and develop a cooperative action plan for posture development that
supports our common security interests in the region.

13. Senator McCain. General Mattis, will your plan involve the need
for investments in facilities, ranges, and infrastructure, and if so,
please provide a description of those investments.
General Mattis. We are developing joint plans with the Kuwait
Ministry of Defense that may require additional infrastructure.
Potential infrastructure under consideration includes joint training
ranges, airfield improvements, and equipment storage facilities. We are
pursuing host-nation funding for this infrastructure since it is our
policy to do so in Kuwait. Negotiations for the training facility
improvements are not complete; therefore, we anticipate there will be
shared cost for these facilities. These infrastructure plans reflect
our military-to-mililtary relationship and are normally less expensive
than other combatant commands.

AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

14. Senator McCain. General Mattis, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, recently stated that the ``key to
long-term stability in Afghanistan is the development of the Afghan
Security Forces (ASF).'' Yet, the budget request for the Afghan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF)--a fund that resources the training and
equipping of the very Afghan forces that will soon be in the lead--is
cut nearly in half from last year. What is the reasoning behind such a
significant cut to the ASFF, particularly given the increased role ASF
are to assume next year?
General Mattis. The budget request for fiscal year 2013 does not
represent a cut but a transition to the next, less expensive, phase of
the program. Our assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) is comprised of a build phase and a sustainment phase. The ANSF
has been steadily growing in capability for several years and will
achieve their planned end-strengths in fiscal year 2012. Fiscal year
2013 represents the transition to sustaining these force levels.
Whereas the build phase was characterized by large expenditures to
construct infrastructure, procure equipment, and establish the training
curriculum, the sustainment phase will focus on continuing training and
operations and maintenance sustainment spending, which is much less
costly.

15. Senator McCain. General Mattis, what do you view as the most
significant challenges to the ASF becoming an effective and sustainable
entity?
General Mattis. The greatest challenge for the ANSF is its
development of a national sustainment network that integrates national-
to-tactical levels of logistics. The logistics network must procure,
prioritize, and distribute supplies and equipment to the regional nodes
for issue to tactical formations. Additionally, ANSF leadership must
understand how to see and manage the process, adjusting controls and
inputs to influence negative readiness indicators. Other challenges
include developing a wide range of enablers to support the ANSF and the
international financial commitment beyond 2014.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

FIFTH-GENERATION AIRCRAFT

16. Senator Chambliss. General Mattis, you note in your written
statement that ``through persistent military engagement, CENTCOM will
maintain a presence in the region to protect vital interests, prevent
future conflict, ensure access in the event of a crisis, and invest in
future regional security.'' Regarding ensuring access, there are
numerous countries in the CENTCOM AOR--some of which classify as
adversaries of the United States--that have advanced surface-to-air
missiles (SAM) that constitute a robust defense of their airspace and
key potential targets. Traditional 4th-generation fighters would
generally not be capable of penetrating this airspace or striking these
targets. Yet CENTCOM does not have any permanently-based 5th-generation
stealth fighter aircraft or bombers which you could rely on for short
notice or emergency operations.
Given this lack of 5th-generation or stealth capability permanently
stationed in CENTCOM's AOR, at the unclassified level, can you share
what options the United States might have if we required the ability to
quickly penetrate denied airspace on short notice, and how confident
are you that the United States would be able to attain the access we
need in a short-notice or emergency situation?
General Mattis. CENTCOM maintains a robust force posture within the
AOR, and can rapidly deploy personnel and assets on alert from outside
the AOR. If required to quickly penetrate denied airspace, we could do
so with a variety of land, air, and sea-based systems, to include long-
range standoff weapons. I am confident in our abilities to hold any
adversary at risk and gain access in support of our mission goals.
Additionally, I would be pleased to provide more details to you at the
classified level.

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

17. Senator Chambliss. Admiral McRaven, I understand you are
recapitalizing the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) fleet
with C-130J SOF variants. Would a faster annual procurement rate of
aircraft be beneficial in order for SOCOM to better fulfill its
requirements?
Admiral McRaven. Securing a common airframe as the basis for my AC-
130J gunship and MC-130J mobility fleets greatly reduces my logistics,
maintenance, and aircrew training issues. It also improves my
operational flexibility to shift the force to respond, as needed, with
equally capable assets. The Air Force procures the basic MC-130J
aircraft with Major Force Program (MFP)-4 funding on our behalf,
therefore I defer to them to determine the most efficient procurement
strategy; however, we believe the optimal quantity for SOCOM's AC/MC-
130 recapitalization rate is eight aircraft per year. Less than eight
aircraft per year extends our reliance on the aging legacy fleet, thus
forcing higher sustainment, modernization, and flying-hour costs. All
of these factors hamper our ability to deliver timely, effective
combat-ready aircraft.

18. Senator Chambliss. Admiral McRaven, at the current buy rate it
appears that some of your AFSOC squadrons will be in transition for
several years. What is the readiness impact of an extended transition
from older aircraft to newer aircraft within a squadron?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM is in the process of recapitalizing its
fleet of legacy mobility MC-130s and AC-130 gunships, many of which are
approaching 50 years old, and have been continuously deployed since 9/
11. The current 94-aircraft fleet of six disparate versions will be
recapitalized into two fleets of 57 MC-130Js and 37 AC-130Js with
significant commonality between them. A fully-recapitalized fleet will
greatly simplify sustainment and training, while significantly
increasing operational flexibility and combat capability. AC/MC-130Js
will be more capable than the legacy aircraft, will have smaller crew
compliments, and will have significantly lower costs per flying hour
and substantially higher mission capable rates.
Today, AFSOC has all six versions of legacy AC/MC-130s either
deployed to the current fight or training SOF units. The current
recapitalization plan, though extending out until 2025, is executed
sequentially by platform and by squadron at a manageable risk level. As
we build up MC-130Js we are retiring MC-130Es. Next will be the MC-
130Ps and then the MC-130Hs. In a few years we will begin recapping the
AC-130H, followed by the AC-130W, and lastly the AC-130U. Sequencing
the platforms allows us to sustain a manageable training pipeline, both
operations and maintenance, while building up and modifying the
supporting infrastructure. Any further negative adjustments to the
recapitalization rate will have severe impacts to our combat readiness
as we continue to shed the legacy support infrastructure and manage our
personnel to match the growth in new capability. Additional disconnects
in the programmatics will increase costs and threaten the executability
of the overall effort.

19. Senator Chambliss. Admiral McRaven, would the stability of a
multiyear contract with larger annual aircraft buys improve your
ability to respond to multiple low-intensity conflicts?
Admiral McRaven. Having a common airframe as the basis for my AC-
130J gunship and MC-130J mobility fleets greatly reduces my logistics,
maintenance, and aircrew training issues. It also improves my
operational flexibility to shift the force to respond as needed with
equally capable assets. As far as a multiyear contract is concerned,
the Air Force procures the basic MC-130J aircraft with MFP-4 funding on
our behalf, therefore I defer to them to determine the most efficient
procurement strategy. My MFP-11 funding only adds the unique
capabilities that bring the aircraft up to a required SOF standard.
Therefore, if we increase the number of aircraft purchased through the
Air Force program, we need to ensure the MFP-11 costs are aligned as
well for any post production modifications we will have to do. That
said, the optimal quantity for SOCOM's AC/MC-130 recapitalization rate
is eight aircraft per year. Any fewer extends our reliance on the aging
legacy fleet at a much higher rate of sustainment, while any more
stresses our capacity to deliver timely combat-ready aircraft. This
optimal rate also addresses the problems we anticipate with changes to
the National Air Space and in the global air traffic management system,
since there is a clear path for avionics upgrades on the J model that
does not exist for the legacy platforms.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

TRAINING OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

20. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, since fiscal year 2005, annual
funding to train the ASF has grown rapidly from $1.3 billion to $7.4
billion in fiscal year 2007. In 2008, DOD announced plans to double the
size of the ASF over the next 4 years at a cost of about $20 billion.
Building the capacity of the ASF is a key element of the
administration's Afghanistan policy. Beyond measuring the number of
graduates of ASF training programs, it is difficult to gauge the
capacity and effectiveness of these troops. How capable are graduates
of our training programs in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. In Afghanistan, capability is relative to the
maturity of our programs. Some graduates, such as those from the
National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), are perhaps the most
capable of graduates from any training/education program in
Afghanistan, producing graduates who meet required standards. Those
graduates with previous military experience tend to be well above the
standard. They are all literate, educated, and have been exposed to
military, physical, and ethical education programs.
Measuring the capacity and effectiveness of the Afghan National
Police (ANP) is difficult. There is only anecdotal data to date. NATO
Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) is developing the training
development process within the ANP-Training General Command, a process
that includes validation and assessment of training.
Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) Commando
and Special Forces soldiers must meet minimum qualifications for entry
into the force which far exceed that of the average Afghan National
Army (ANA) recruit. Most ANASOC soldiers are minimally literate; with
Special Forces soldiers having at a minimum a seventh grade level
ability. Additional courses taught by the ANASOC School of Excellence
(SOE) further propel their already advanced soldiers to a higher level.
Also, SOE Programs of Instruction (POI) have been adjusted to support
special operations requirements and incorporate values-based
instruction with the ultimate goal of producing an ethically based,
professional force.
The optimism regarding the capabilities of ANSF graduates is
evident across a broad spectrum of operations and security. This is
evident as graduates are providing security in Kabul and better control
of border operations resulting in increased revenues. The maturity of
the recruiting program and the increased literacy rates are also very
encouraging.

21. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, how are we screening applicants
for our training programs?
General Mattis. ANSF applicants are screened using an eight-step
vetting process. Recruiters work closely with village elders and
mullahs to validate the authenticity of each candidate's application,
which includes personal identifying information, photos, Tazkera
(Afghan ID card provided by the regional Population Registration
Department), and two recommendation letters from village elders or
guarantors. Recruits are then interviewed at local recruiting centers
and undergo criminal background investigations. Following these initial
steps, the recruits are transported to their respective training center
for medical/drug screening and biometric enrollment/collection. The
biometric data is used as an extension of a recruit's criminal
background investigation, which prevents disqualified candidates from
returning or absent without leave personnel from joining another branch
of the ANSF. This eight-step vetting process has proven very successful
in identifying previous bad actors from joining the ANSF ranks and has
aided in criminal prosecution of those linked to previous crimes. For
example, in 2010 the Afghan Air Force had approximately 3,600 airman
enrolled of which 17 had criminal matches and were referred to the
Ministry of Defense for further investigation.

22. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, what tools do you utilize to
ensure that prospective applicants are not members of the Taliban?
General Mattis. In addition to the eight-step vetting process, U.S.
Forces are collecting biometrics data on prospective applicants through
three principal biometrics collection devices. Biometric data collected
is matched against Afghan watchlists and databases and then transmitted
to the DOD authoritative database, the Automated Biometric
Identification System (ABIS) in West Virginia where all data is
retained for future reference. This has proven very successful in
linking applicants to prior incidents such as a Herat applicant that
was linked to recent improvised explosive device attacks in Kandahar.

23. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, are applicants literate and
willing to learn?
General Mattis. The exact literacy rate in Afghanistan is difficult
to pinpoint, although data extracted from other sources United Nations/
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization puts
the literacy rate of the ANSF at approximately 14 percent. Currently,
the literacy program has more than 118,000 personnel in training. To
date, more than 26,000 ANSF personnel have graduated from the program,
achieving a level of functional literacy that will enable them to make
meaningful contributions. On the average, 9 out of 10 recruits are
illiterate and innumerate. All recruits who cannot prove they are
literate upon enlistment take a placement test to check competency and
placement at the appropriate level of training. Of these recruits, only
5 percent demonstrate functional literacy. Qualitative evidence from
the program demonstrates a high level of motivation among recruits. The
importance of literacy is reiterated to recruits by their ANA or ANP
chain of command. The recruits' achievement rate (almost 100 percent)
in the basic literacy program reflects this motivation. The program not
only builds military and policing capability, but is the largest adult
literacy program in the country and is having a positive impact on the
overall rate of literacy in Afghanistan. This will require time and a
deliberate effort to make literacy an enduring program.

24. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, are graduates of our training
programs able to comprehend American military values of respect for
civilian authority, rule of law, et cetera?
General Mattis. Yes, more and more every day. NTM-A continues to
increase its focus on professionalization of the ANSF as it reaches its
growth targets. The ANA Company Commander's Legal Course focuses on the
ANA's military justice system and the law of armed conflict. ANP
training includes Afghan Law, Constitution of Afghanistan, Afghan
Statutory Law, Sharia Law, Code of Conduct, and the Inherent Law of
Officers and Noncommissioned Officers (NCO). Human rights are woven
into all ANP training.
The Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior continue to improve
and increase leadership development by focusing on increasing the
quality and the capacity of officer and NCO training. Both ministries
have approved a respective Core Values Statement, a one-page document
that identifies their core values under ``God, Country, and Duty.''
Planning and initial steps to incorporate the six values
(Integrity, Honor, Service, Respect, Courage, and Loyalty) into all ANA
training curricula is ongoing. Moreover, all NMAA graduates are able to
comprehend American military values and have been exposed to respect
for civil authorities, rule of law, and ethics classes. However, though
graduates might be well-versed in such values, their practical and
intellectual application is questionable, especially if it conflicts
with cultural norms.
The ANASOC has its own comprehensive values campaign aimed
precisely at professionalizing its force. Many of the topics covered in
the Law of Land Warfare and Humans Rights already exist as core values
within its campaign. Values such as Respect, Integrity, and Duty are
principal components of it. ANASOC fully embraced the ANA's six core
values and also expanded upon them to address the challenge of
developing a professionalized SOF. ANA leadership fully embraces
ANASOC's values campaign and may institute it force-wide.

25. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, are these graduates able to
effectively lead their own forces and pass on knowledge obtained from
their American trainers?
General Mattis. One of NTM-A's top priorities is the development of
effective leaders and trainers. There are very capable senior leaders
within the ANA, and together, we are focused on improving the officer
and NCO corps for the future. Graduates of the ANA leadership training
programs are able to help train future ANA leaders.
The overall effectiveness of training the force and future leaders
of the ANP continues to improve. Recruitment campaigns targeting NCOs
are already paying significant dividends to close the leadership gap
quickly, which is expected to be completely resolved by early 2013.
These NCOs are better educated, more capable, and ready to assume
leadership roles sooner due to their literacy levels and motivation to
serve. Leadership programs have been instituted within the Ministry of
the Interior to ensure longevity of the force. The ANP has a robust
train-the-trainer program that has resulted in over 95 percent of
training in the field being handled by Afghans.

26. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, I am particularly concerned
that local political considerations on the ground in Afghanistan may
override the practical need for U.S. combat troops to help maintain a
stable and secure environment. Would an expedited withdrawal from
Afghanistan that is not conditions-based be irresponsible, given our
expenditure of American blood and taxpayers' dollars?
General Mattis. An expedited withdrawal or change of mission from
Afghanistan that is not conditions-based invites potential risks to
surge recovery, future shaping of U.S. Forces, and setting the enduring
coalition force to enable a successful transition to the Government of
Afghanistan. The Lisbon Declaration of 2010 sets the goal for an
enduring presence and long-term partnership which will complement the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) security mission and
continues well beyond. As the ANSF surge force reaches its goal of
352,000 by October 2012, coalition forces are required to set
conditions so ANSF transition can occur responsibly. A withdrawal that
is not conditions-based will destabilize progress and incur risks to
ISAF, the coalition, and the Afghan Government.
An early withdrawal by the United States, especially given a
financially-constrained environment, would also provide reasons for our
partners to question U.S. commitment and curtail, or even prematurely
end, their support to the coalition.

REGIONAL UNREST

27. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, last year's protests throughout
the Middle East demanded reform and a shift to free and open
democracies in numerous countries that are traditionally ruled under
authoritarian regimes. Do you believe American action in Libya had an
impact on America's image in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. It's problematic to compare actions in Libya with
the conflict in Afghanistan; they were and are fundamentally different
conflicts. Our objectives in Libya were to protect civilians from
violence caused by their own government and hold the Qaddafi regime
accountable to an U.N.-mandated cease fire. In Afghanistan, our
objective is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and their
extremist allies while simultaneously preventing their capacity to
threaten America and our allies in the future. One mission was about
supporting a universal right to self-determination, the other is about
preventing a loosely-governed country from being exploited by foreign
terrorists and used as a safe haven from which to plan and carry out
terror attacks today and in the future.
What matters most to the Afghan people is that our actions are
commensurate with our words. The Afghan people have endured decades of
violence and sacrifice and deserve our commitment. We must: transition
security responsibly so that Afghans can determine their own future;
continue to be sensitive to civilian casualties and collateral damage;
support the Afghan Government and its security forces with advice,
training, and equipment; and lead the international community to
encourage future economic support.

28. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, if American forces were engaged
directly in Syria, would that fuel anti-American sentiment in the
region?
General Mattis. Unilateral American military action in Syria would
be a volatile anti-American stimulant, both in the region and
internationally. The Syrian problem is best resolved by maximizing
international efforts supporting the involvement of regional partners.
I support the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab
League in their efforts as they look to bring another resolution to the
U.N. Security Council. I think the United States must support regional
solutions developed in concert with leaders from nations across the
region such as Jordan, UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

29. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, has unrest in Bahrain, Qatar,
or other partner-nations had an impact on our operations and force
projection in the region?
General Mattis. Regional unrest in Bahrain and other partner
nations has not significantly impacted CENTCOM operations or force
projection. We continually assess regional stability and, when
appropriate, increase force protection measures to cope with unrest and
mitigate risk to force and risk to mission.

PIRACY

30. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, piracy continues to threaten
commercial shipping of U.S. and foreign-flagged ships in virtually the
entire CENTCOM AOR. What are CENTCOM and Naval Forces Central Command
(NAVCENT) doing to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. commercial
fleet from piracy?
General Mattis. Piracy is a challenge to the international maritime
community, both commercial and military. The sum of efforts by the
Combined Maritime Forces, European Union (EU) Naval Forces, and the
NATO Counter Piracy Task Force have placed up to 30 military vessels at
any given time in key locations to deter piracy attacks. In his
capacity as the Commander of Combined Maritime Forces, the NAVCENT
Commander hosts a quarterly shared awareness and deconfliction
conference in Bahrain to ensure multi-national cooperation of
counterpiracy activities in the region. The conference also includes
civilian international maritime organizations and delegates from non-
affiliated countries such as China, Russia, Japan, and India. CENTCOM
continues to communicate to the maritime industry the importance of
adherence to established best management practices, such as utilizing
well-trained security teams to deter piracy. Military coalition efforts
combined with increased adherence to best management practices has
lowered the success rate of hijackings in 2011 to 15 percent from 28
percent in 2010.

31. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, are you a strong advocate of
the use of private security teams aboard commercial vessels?
General Mattis. Like terrorism, acts of piracy pose a transnational
security threat that emanates from areas plagued by conflict, weak
governance, and economic insecurity. While attempted attacks have
risen, their success level has declined due to the use of best
management practices which includes the use of highly trained security
teams and sustained naval presence. Statistically, vessels that have
embarked credible private-armed security teams have had a 100 percent
success rate of preventing pirate takeover. The private security teams
can make a contribution, however their employment can become complex
for a variety of legal reasons. Two years ago the U.S. commercial
shipping industry was largely opposed to using private-armed security
teams. Over the past year, their use was endorsed by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and some insurance companies. Many shipping
companies have begun to employ them and support appears to be growing.

BLUE DEVIL PROGRAM

32. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, I understand the Blue Devil 1
integrated ISR program is resulting in spectacular results in
Afghanistan, according to recent testimony from Air Force leadership. I
also understand that the Blue Devil 2 program is designed to increase
this ISR capability dramatically, and that former Secretary of Defense
Gates stated that the Blue Devil 2 program is urgently needed to
eliminate combat capability deficiencies that have resulted in combat
fatalities. Combatant commanders have routinely stated that persistent
ISR is a capability that needs additional capacity. Does CENTCOM
continue to maintain a requirement for the integrated high-definition
optical and signals intelligence sensor-to-sensor cueing capability
which is the purpose of the Blue Devil 2?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

33. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, do you agree, given DOD's
determination, that this initiative was urgently needed in Afghanistan
to address combat deficiencies?
General Mattis. CENTCOM has a standing requirement for persistent
surveillance that has not substantially changed since the Blue Devil 2
initiative was first proposed by the U.S. Air Force in the fall of
2010. What has changed is Blue Devil 2's potential to meet that
requirement. Schedule delays, system integration challenges, and severe
under-performance in weight and endurance objectives drove the Air
Force decision to de-scope the program, with CENTCOM concurrence.

34. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, would it be a significant
mistake to stop work and not deploy this much-needed aircraft to
Afghanistan?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

35. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, do you agree that combat troops
in Afghanistan would immensely benefit from the Blue Devil 2's
capabilities if the Air Force removed mission creep from the program
and went back to the original requirements?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

IRANIAN THREATS

36. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, Iran has threatened to shut the
Strait of Hormuz, a transit point for a fifth of oil traded worldwide,
if sanctions are imposed on its crude exports. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, has stated that Iran has
the ability to block the Strait of Hormuz for a period of time. What is
your definition of ``a period of time''?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

37. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, Vice Admiral Mark Fox
acknowledged that Iran's military is capable of striking a blow against
U.S. Forces in the Persian Gulf. What is your assessment on how much
damage Iran could inflict on U.S. interests and assets?
General Mattis. Iran has numerous ways to strike U.S. interests and
inflict damage to both U.S. and partner-nation forces in the region.
Iran has ballistic missiles which can reach U.S. Forces in the region,
our partner nations in the Gulf, Israel, and Turkey in the broader
Middle East, and NATO partners in southeastern Europe. Iran has
extensive maritime threats such as submarines, small attack and PC
armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, suicide boats packed with
explosives, shore-based coastal defense cruise missiles, maritime SOF,
and thousands of naval mines. Iran's navy can inflict economic damage
by threatening vital Gulf shipping lanes and approaches to major Gulf
Cooperation Council commercial port facilities. They can use advanced
cruise missiles to reach the entire Strait of Hormuz and majority of
the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf. Iran can also employ unconventional
capabilities (such as special forces, surrogates, and proxies) to
strike U.S. and partner interests globally, as illustrated in last
year's Quds Force attempt to assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador to
the United States.

38. Senator Wicker. General Mattis, the United States has four
Avenger-class mine-sweeping ships in the Gulf--USS Ardent, USS
Dextrous, USS Gladiator, and USS Scout. The U.K.'s Royal Navy has
another four vessels--the HMS Pembroke, HMS Middleton, HMS Quorn, and
HMS Ramsey. Due to recent rhetoric from Iranian leadership regarding
closing the straits and along with thousands of mines the Iranians
possess, is there a need to reposition additional mine-hunting/mine-
sweeping assets to the Gulf?
General Mattis. The presence of U.S. naval assets in the Gulf
fluctuates based on the needs and requirements of the combatant
commander and as approved by the Joint Staff and the Secretary of
Defense. As part of a CENTCOM request for forces, four additional MCM
ships will deploy from San Diego to Bahrain: USS Sentry (MCM 3), USS
Devastator (MCM 6), USS Pioneer (MCM 9), and USS Warrior (MCM 10), and
are scheduled to arrive in the CENTCOM AOR in June. The addition of
these MCM ships will bring the total in theater to eight, thus meeting
the established requirement. Four MH-53 helicopters have also deployed
to the CENTCOM AOR to increase mission capabilities. The USS Ponce is
en route to act as an afloat staging base for said operations, and
efforts are underway to build a task force comprised of U.S. and
partner-nation mine-hunting/mine-sweeping assets.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

C-27J PROGRAM

39. Senator Portman. General Mattis, was your estimate for Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for operations in Afghanistan in
fiscal year 2013 informed by the Air Force decision to divest the C-27J
program by September 2012?
General Mattis. Our OCO request was not informed by the Air Force's
decision to divest the C-27J program, since our request was only for
our headquarters portion of funding, not for operations. Since Services
ultimately bear the costs, they work together with OSD to generate OCO
estimates for operations in Afghanistan. The Air Force could best
explain how their decision to divest the C-27J program impacted their
OCO request for operations.

40. Senator Portman. General Mattis, based upon the missions
supported to date by the C-27J, what combination of CH-47s, C-130s, or
contractor airlift will be required to fill the mission of two or four
C-27Js, as originally planned?
General Mattis. One C-130H or C-130J will meet the current and
projected cargo and passenger movements of two C-27Js. Limitations on
CH-47 blade hours and airfield security requirements make both the CH-
47 and contracted air undesirable.

41. Senator Portman. General Mattis, what is your estimate of the
cost for fiscal year 2013 for two or four C-27Js fulfilling resupply
missions in Afghanistan, as opposed to those missions supported by a
combination of CH-47s, C-130s, or contractor airlift?
General Mattis. Following the present course of action to mitigate
the reduction of two C-27Js for direct-support airlift in Afghanistan,
mobility specialists have determined that one additional C-130 can meet
the requirement. Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) Operations
Directorate, Plans, and Joint Matters (A3-X) determined the following
costs based on a range of hourly usage rates: at $9,000 per hour and
projected to fly 1,943.5 hours per year, the C-27J will cost
approximately $17,491,500.00; at $10,400 per hour, with a projected
1,050.1 hours annual equivalent, the C-130H will cost approximately
$10,921,400.00; and finally, at $9,100 per hour, with a projected 790.2
hours annual equivalent, the C-130J will cost approximately
$9,556,200.00 per year. CH-47s are not a suitable replacement and
contract airlift was not considered in the analysis due to current
threat levels severely limiting--even prohibiting--service to C-27J
transited locations in Afghanistan.

42. Senator Portman. General Mattis, what is your estimate of fuel
required for fiscal year 2013 for two or four C-27Js fulfilling
resupply missions in Afghanistan as opposed to those missions supported
by a combination of CH-47s, C-130s, or contractor airlift?
General Mattis. The current course of action to continue the direct
support airlift in Afghanistan provided by two C-27Js without
interruption is to replace them with one C-130. The cargo capacity of
the C-130 is approximately twice that of the C-27. AFCENT Operations
Directorate, Plans, and Joint Matters (A3-X) determined the following
comparative fuel projections for fiscal year 2013 for each air frame
and based on the load capacity for each:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Flight
Airframe Number of Aircraft Pallet Positions Hours per Airframe Gallons of Fuel Total Fiscal Year
Type Usage per Hour 2013 Fuel Estimate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-27J............................................... 2 3 1,943.5 367 713,263
C-130H.............................................. 1 6 1,050.1 735 771,846
C-130J.............................................. 1 8 790.2 735 580,806
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Limitations on CH-47 blade hours and airfield security constraints
make both the CH-47 and contracted air undesirable.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

JOINT LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE ELEVATED NETTED SENSOR SYSTEM

43. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, you specifically cite the
threat that Iranian small boats and cruise missiles represent. A
February 25th story in the Wall Street Journal reported that ``American
forces are modifying weapons systems on warships so they could be used
against Iranian fast-attack boats, as well as shore-launched cruise
missiles.'' You have been outspoken on the need for equipment upgrades
to fill in gaps in U.S. defense capabilities and military preparedness
in the region, and the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) program is designed to fill such
gaps. Does CENTCOM still have a valid, unmet requirement for JLENS?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

44. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, last year the committee
supported a reprogramming request to deploy the JLENS program to
address these threats. When will JLENS begin this urgently-needed
mission of protecting our forces in the Middle East?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

45. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, what is the cause of the
current delay?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

46. Senator Ayotte. General Mattis, how can this committee help
expedite the deployment of JLENS to protect our troops?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]

VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINES

47. Senator Ayotte. Admiral McRaven, as area-denial and anti-access
threats are increasing, the need for Virginia-class submarines, which
are ideal for these environments, grows. The President has talked about
an increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific--an area of operations that
is overwhelmingly maritime in character. We are also told that by 2030,
according to the fiscal year 2011 program of record, that we will be
confronting a 30 percent reduction in the size of our attack submarine
fleet and a 60 percent reduction in the undersea strike volume. Yet,
the President's fiscal year 2013 budget delays the procurement of one
Virginia-class submarine. Is it accurate to say that the Virginia-class
submarine provides a critical platform for our special operators,
especially in anti-access and area-denial environments?
Admiral McRaven. The Virginia-class submarine platform does provide
a world-wide SOF insertion platform that can be used for short-duration
tasking in operational areas that employ anti-access, area-denial
systems.

48. Senator Ayotte. Admiral McRaven, would it be accurate to
describe the Persian Gulf and the seas adjacent to Iran as an
increasingly anti-access and area-denial environment?
Admiral McRaven. Iran possesses approximately 2,440 km of coastline
in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Iran currently focuses on anti-
surface warfare, but has recently strengthened capabilities for anti-
surface warfare. A comprehensive layering effect of the following
tactics would be most effective in denying areas to the Persian Gulf
and seas adjacent to Iran; however, anti-access and area denial in this
region has yet to be demonstrated:

- Mine threat: Iran exercised and refined mine-laying
capabilities in the Strait of Hormuz in recent training events
and may be able to impede maritime traffic;
- Surface threat: Iran's ability to posture subsurface assets
effectively remains to be seen; however, the addition of the
Yono submarines coupled with Iran's Kilos is possibly the most
significant change to Iran's undersea potential; and
- Surface threat: Iranian small boats using swarm tactics,
surface vessels, and increased defenses pose a surface maritime
access to the Persian Gulf.

49. Senator Ayotte. Admiral McRaven, looking well into the future,
are you concerned about the projected 60 percent reduction in undersea
strike volume?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, I am concerned with the projected reduction
in undersea strike volume, primarily because our Large Volume Host
Submarine (LVHS), SSGN, will reach their end of service life during the
timeframe of the reduction in strike volume. SOCOM will lose the dual
submersible capability and the endurance to support SOF missions that
the SSGN provides. However, SOCOM and Naval Special Warfare are working
closely with the Navy to integrate SOF requirements into the next
generation of undersea platforms to mitigate that impact. Cooperation
with Navy to integrate SOF requirements during the design phase of the
follow-on version of Virginia-class will help mitigate the physical
limitations of the Virginia-class as compared to the SSGNs.

50. Senator Ayotte. Admiral McRaven, how important will the
Virginia payload module be in addressing at least a portion of this
looming gap in undersea strike capabilities?
Admiral McRaven. The Virginia payload module will replace some of
the important strike capability that will go away when the four SSGNs
are retired from the fleet in 2024 through 2026. The Virginia payload
module will only replace 50 percent of the SOF dual Dry Deck Shelter
(DDS) capability that has been within the submarine force since 1985.
The Virginia class submarine can only accommodate one DDS, as currently
configured, and the Navy is not currently considering modifying it to
accommodate two DDSs for a dual capability due to the Virginia-class
being much smaller than the SSGNs. Several conceptual renderings have
been presented to the Navy and SOCOM for a next-generation shelter
system on a Virginia-class; however, we will not know the exact
implication of these concepts until after an Analysis of Alternatives
is completed.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Portman,
Ayotte, Cornyn, and Vitter.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
Jason W. Maroney, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member;
Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Mariah K.
McNamara, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ryan
Ehly, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant
to Senator Webb; Brittany Keates, assistant to Senator Begich;
Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Manchin; Kevin Fink,
assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to
Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to
Senator Brown; Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Charles
Brittingham, assistant to Senator Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to welcome the Secretary of the Army, John M.
McHugh, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T.
Odierno, USA, for our hearing on the Army's 2013 budget request
and current posture.
Secretary McHugh, thank you for your continued outstanding
service as the Army's civilian leader. Although General Odierno
is well known to the committee, this hearing I believe marks
your first appearance before us as the Army's 38th Chief of
Staff. As always, General, we thank you for your remarkable
service and we look forward to hearing your assessment and plan
to meet the challenges facing the Army.
Over the last 10 years, the Army has learned from the hard
lessons of continuous combat. It has grown and adapted its
organization and operations. It has rapidly developed and
fielded new weapons and technologies. It has acted with great
compassion to meet its responsibilities for easing the often-
painful human cost of war for our troops and their families.
After 10 years, the Army is combat-tested and proven. For all
of this, the Nation is proud and deeply grateful.
Two recent changes make the defense budget situation
challenging for the Army. I should have said probably at least
two recent changes, but here are the two: One, the Budget
Control Act passed by Congress last summer, with the
limitations that it places on funding for our national
security. The Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 2013
budget request meets the requirements of the Budget Control
Act.
Second, adapting to its changing role in the new strategic
guidance announced by the President last January. This request
that they've made in the budget appears to reflect the
Department's year-long comprehensive strategic assessment and a
corresponding new strategic guidance oriented on reshaping our
defense establishment for the challenges of the future.
The essential features of this new strategic guidance
maintains focus on success in the current conflict in
Afghanistan, but also reorients DOD on other strategic
challenges around the world and developing the forces most
relevant to those challenges. The new guidance deemphasizes
ground forces for stability and counterinsurgency operations
and increases emphasis on air and sea forces for global power
projection. Under this strategic guidance, Army and Marine
Corps ground forces are reduced, with the corresponding risk
mitigated by greater reliance on the readiness and availability
of the Reserve components and preservation of an ability to
regenerate Active Forces.
The Army's fiscal year 2013 budget request reflects these
changes, but questions naturally arise about the Army's plans
to adapt and manage risks in its size, structure, readiness,
and modernization while at the same time preserving the quality
of life for our soldiers and their families, which is so
important to sustaining an All-Volunteer Force.
For example, the new DOD strategic guidance includes an
increased emphasis on our interests in the Asia Pacific, for
which DOD is taking steps to reshape U.S. forces relative to
the air and maritime demands of that region. We'd be interested
to hear from our witnesses about the broad purpose of land
power and the role of ground forces in an Asia Pacific-oriented
strategy.
The new DOD strategic guidance expressly states that the
Nation will avoid large-scale stability operations requiring
significant ground forces. Accordingly, the Army's size and
force structure can be reduced, the strategic guidance
suggests, and that would save money and still meet acceptable
levels of strategic risk. Over the next 5 years, the Active
Army will cut its end strength by approximately 72,000
soldiers, ending with a force of 490,000 by the end of fiscal
year 2017, and would still be approximately 10,000 soldiers
above its pre-Iraq War size.
We'd be interested to hear from our witnesses on the Army's
plans to implement these reductions and to manage risk to its
mission and to the health of the All-Volunteer Force. We're
particularly concerned about the manner in which the Army will
draw down and the plan for providing transition assistance and
support for soldiers and their families. We simply cannot
forget that for every 10,000 soldiers in the Army today there
are approximately 16,000 family members as well. The added
stress of troop reductions on an Army still at war will be
significant and we expect the Army to manage this very
carefully.
The new strategic guidance also reduces the Army's force
structure by eight combat brigades, with two of these brigades
de-activating out of Germany. We'd be interested to hear from
our witnesses their plans for reorganization of the Army to
meet this requirement and whether other force changes will
require further reductions in the total number of combat
brigades. Also we're interested to hear from our witnesses
their assessment of the Army's global posture and where savings
might be realized by moving foreign-based units back to the
United States.
The Army continues to meet the demand for trained and ready
forces in support of operations in Afghanistan. Hard fighting
will continue even as we and our allies continue to build the
Afghan security forces (ASF) so that they may take more and
more responsibility for their own security. We know that our
troops deploying to Afghanistan have the highest priority for
resources to ensure that they are trained and ready before they
go and to make sure that they have what they need when they get
there. However, reductions in the size and structure of the
Army, if not well managed, increase the risk of allowing the
nondeployed force to become hollow, that is too many units with
too few soldiers to accomplish the units' missions.
This increases the risk for the Nation that those
nondeployed forces may be hollow and unprepared to deploy or
accomplish their missions if needed for an unforeseen
contingency. We'd be interested to hear from our witnesses how
the Army will manage the complexity of providing trained and
ready forces for operations in Afghanistan, reduce and
strengthen force structure, and at the same time avoid
hollowing the nondeployed force.
Army equipment modernization has struggled over the last 10
years, but recent efforts by senior Army leadership have been
aimed at rationalizing and stabilizing an achievable and
affordable strategy. In general, the fiscal year 2013 budget
request protects the Army's priorities for development and
fielding of a tactical communications and data network,
development of a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), as well as upgrading and
expanding its helicopter force.
But the Army has restructured, slowed, cut, or cancelled
most of its ground vehicle programs, with significant risk
implications for the health of the military vehicle industrial
base. We'd be interested to hear from our witnesses their
assessment of the current and future risks to the Army's combat
and tactical vehicle industrial base and how they intend to
manage that risk.
The Army continues to work on reducing the cost and size of
its operational energy footprint at home and when deployed.
We'd be interested to hear an update on Army operational energy
innovations that reduce the demand for energy as well as reduce
the cost and size of the energy sources. More importantly, how
are these innovative technologies being used by our deployed
forces around the world?
Finally, the Army has shown a great determination to deal
effectively with the human cost to soldiers and their families
of the pressures and consequences of continuous combat for 10
years. Over these years, the Army has created many new programs
and budgeted billions of dollars to improve the care of our
wounded soldiers, to prevent suicides, and to support families
before, during, and after the deployment of their loved ones.
The American people are grateful for all that care and concern.
The committee is interested to hear Secretary McHugh's and
General Odierno's updates and assessments of the Army's efforts
in these areas and their thoughts on how these programs will
evolve in the foreseeable future.
The Nation could not be more proud of our Army, its
soldiers, and their families. We will with confidence depend on
the leadership of Secretary McHugh and General Odierno through
the tough times ahead to ensure that the Nation will always
have the Army that it needs.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, I commend you both
for your distinguished careers and your leadership of an Army
in the midst of organizational change. Of course, on behalf of
all of us, we would like to express our deep gratitude for the
service and sacrifice of our soldiers who are today risking
themselves on our behalf.
I believe that your mission is more challenging today than
it has been since the late 1970s. Twenty-three Army brigades
are currently conducting combat and training operations in
Afghanistan. Thousands more soldiers are deployed around the
globe. At home the Army is beginning to execute a plan to
decrease end strength, realign force structure to meet new
threats, sustain recently developed capabilities, and
regenerate skill sets that have been necessarily idle since the
invasion of Iraq.
Your job is to do all these things simultaneously and with
fewer resources. Against that backdrop, the Army must find ways
to operate more efficiently and effectively. To respond to
current requirements in Afghanistan, the Army is modifying
brigades to create and deploy specialized training teams. To
address future challenges, the Army has proposed aligning
brigades with the combatant commands. The committee will be
interested to know the Army's plans for both.
When we look across the globe today at the various
challenges we are confronting, what is most clear is that the
world continues to surprise us. Al Qaeda has become
increasingly decentralized, but no less deadly, with affiliates
seeking safe haven in places like Yemen, the Horn of Africa,
and the trans-Sahel. In Afghanistan, despite the progress that
our troops are making, we are at an impasse with President
Karzai on the negotiation of a strategic partnership agreement.
Our relationship with Pakistan remains fraught by a series
of setbacks arising from their continued support of the Haqqani
network. In Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki continues to centralize
power, while the threat posed by al Qaeda appears to be
growing. The Iranian regime continues working to subvert Iraq
and other countries in the region. Its threat to regional
stability would expand exponentially if the Iranian regime were
to acquire nuclear weapons capability.
Finally, in Syria, after a year of bloodshed, the crisis
has reached a decisive moment. Bashar Al-Assad appears to be
accelerating his fight and doing so with the full support of
Russia, China, and Iran.
In view of instability in these strategically important
regions and admitting our historically poor track record of
forecasting the need for large conventional force, I reiterate
my concerns about the scope and speed of our end strength
drawdown. Limiting our strategic flexibility is unwise,
especially in the current environment.
General Odierno, I look forward to hearing your views on
the strategic implications of drawing down to an Active-Duty
Force of 490,000 and your vision for an Army that does not
become merely a smaller version of its previous self, but
reorganizes for future threats.
Secretary McHugh, inside the DC Beltway we sometimes lose
sight of the reality that how we fight may be more important
than what we fight with. It's vital that the Army maximize its
operations and maintenance funding to support training,
especially now that more soldiers are returning to the garrison
environment. The hollow force that followed past conflicts can
only be avoided if training is fully resourced in conjunction
with the personnel and equipment accounts.
In the area of acquisition management, we are all aware of
the Army's past challenges. As you finalize equipping and
modernization strategies, I urge you to look carefully at
recent history. Over the last decade, the Army embarked on a
series of developmental programs that, because of unrealistic
requirements, unanticipated costs, or poor contracting
strategy, had to be descoped, rebaselined, or cancelled
outright. Our estimates are that around $300 billion were spent
that never became operational equipment.
Mr. Secretary, implementing the recommendations of your
recent Army-wide acquisition review is a good start to
addressing these issues. We're interested to learn what further
actions you'll take to improve the Army's procurement track
record and requirement process.
The committee will also be attentive to large programs
still in the earliest phases of development to ensure they
conform to the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA)
and avoid mistakes of the past.
Despite the challenges of budget constraints and the
ongoing contingency operations that stress the force, our
soldiers continue to perform magnificently around the globe.
They and their families are a credit to our Nation. I thank the
witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Secretary McHugh.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished ranking member Senator McCain, and members of
this very august body and very important committee.
Let me begin by saying how honored I am to be here again
today. I'm particularly honored and, frankly, relieved to be
joined by the 38th Chief of Staff of the Army, the gentleman on
my left, General Ray Odierno. As you said, Mr. Chairman, many
of us have had the opportunity to watch this gentleman in
action on the front, making such a difference in places like
Iraq. The opportunity to serve next to him for me is very, very
exciting. He is clearly the right man for the right times.
Most importantly, I want to thank all of you. You've both
been, Mr. Ranking Member and Mr. Chairman, very gracious in
your comments about the service and sacrifice of our men and
women in uniform, and certainly they deserve all of that. But
clearly this committee has been so responsible for much of the
good that we have been able to help those 1.1 million soldiers,
those 270,000 civilians, and their families achieve,
particularly over the last 10 years. They would want me to tell
you how much we recognize that and how important it is to us.
As all of you know, today perhaps more than quite some time
our demanding fiscal environment requires an even stronger
partnership with Congress, with this committee, to make sure
that we have the right resources to defeat our enemies, support
our allies, and protect our homeland, and do so responsibly,
decisively, and, yes, affordably.
We believe this budget that's been placed before you
supports these goals by laying the foundation for a gradual
reduction of our military and civilian end strength, while at
the same time supporting the vital modernization, training,
soldier programs, and family support initiatives so necessary
for the Army; an Army, though smaller, that will remain the
strongest and most capable land force in the world as it is
today.
As we implement what I think can be fairly described as a
bold new security strategy, I want to be very clear. The Army's
combat expertise, adaptability, and strategic reach will be
more vital than ever before. Over the last year, over the last
decade, the Army has continued to be the decisive hand of
American foreign policy and the helping hand of Americans
facing the devastation of natural disasters.
With soldiers deployed in 6 of 7 continents and in more
than 150 nations around the world, your Army has become the
face of American concern and the fist of military might. In the
Pacific, we continued our long-term presence in the region with
some 75,000 Army civilian and uniformed personnel participating
in over 160 exercises, engagements, and operations in support
of our allies in that vital region. In Korea, our soldiers
provided a strong deterrent to North Korean aggression. In
Japan and in the Philippines, we maintained our decades-old
security relationships, training and supporting those allied
armies.
At the same time, in Europe our soldiers fulfilled vital
training, stability, and peacekeeping roles in Bosnia and
Kosovo. Then in Africa, your Army supported counterterrorism
operations throughout the Horn and beyond.
But foreign threats and operations were not all that we
faced. As so many of you know so painfully firsthand, in 2011
this Nation experienced some of the worst national disasters in
our history. From responding to wildfires and floods to
hurricanes and tornadoes, our soldiers and civilians from all
components were there to help, there to rescue, and there to
rebuild.
Simply put, our soldiers, civilians, and their families
have once again proven why the U.S. Army is the most capable,
versatile, and successful land force on Earth. It is this
ability to adapt to a myriad of unpredictable threats both at
home and abroad that we will maintain as we move forward in
this new security and fiscal environment.
This budget portrays an Army fully embracing change by
making the hard decisions now to lay the right foundation for
the future. First, we are implementing a sweeping new defense
strategy which emphasizes even greater engagement in the Asia-
Pacific region and the development of smaller, more agile land
forces. Under this new framework, which was developed
collaboratively with the top military and civilian officials in
our Department, the Army clearly remains the decisive arm of
U.S. combat power. Our balanced and transformed force will
continue to be the most capable and effective land force in the
world. That is our standard. That is what the strategy requires
and that is what this budget supports.
Second, we are implementing this new paradigm under the
significant cuts, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, directed by the
Budget Control Act, and in so doing we made many tough
decisions, but we were always guided by certain key principles:
First, we will fully support the current fight by providing
operational commanders in Afghanistan and other theaters with
the best trained and ready land forces in the world. This is
today and will remain our top priority.
Second, we will not sacrifice readiness for force
structure. We must responsibly reduce our end strength in a
manner, as the distinguished ranking member noted, that fully
supports the new strategy, but also provides sufficient time
and resources to properly balance our training, equipment,
infrastructure, and soldier and family support programs within
our mission requirements.
Third, we will be able to build force structure and
capabilities to handle unforeseen changes to global security.
The Army must be able to hedge risks through an efficient and
effective force generation process and access to a strong
operationalized Reserve component.
Fourth, we will maintain and enhance the Army's extensive
commitments in the Pacific.
Lastly, we will not let the Budget Control Act cuts be
taken on the backs of our soldiers or their families. Although
we have and will continue to examine where appropriate and
realign where necessary all of our programs, we will fully fund
those support systems that work, with special emphasis on
wounded warrior, suicide prevention, behavioral health, and
sexual assault programs.
Based on these principles, we believe our budget minimizes
end strength reductions in 2013 and 2014 to support the current
fight in the most responsible way. We believe as well the
budget emphasizes continued investments in vital modernization
programs, such as the network, the GCV, and the JLTV, while at
the same time delaying or eliminating programs which no longer
meet urgent needs in support of our new strategy or
transforming force. Yes, we defer certain military construction
programs.
The Army at its core is not programs and systems; it is
people. Each time I appear before you I'm honored not to come
just as the Secretary, but as a representative of our soldiers,
civilians, and their families. These brave men and women, as
this committee knows so very well, who have endured so much
over the past decade, depend upon a variety of programs,
policies, and facilities to cope with the stress, injuries, and
family separation caused by war.
Tragically, our suicide and substance abuse rates remain
unacceptably high and we're aggressively pursuing multiple
avenues to provide our personnel with the best medical and
behavioral health support available. We must never forget that
both our success in Iraq and Afghanistan come at a heavy price
to our Army family. Providing the means and resources for
whatever challenges they now face is in my opinion the very
least we can, we must, do.
As a final note regarding our Army family, I'd be remiss if
I didn't mention the devastating impact that sequestration
would have, not just on the Army's programs, systems, and
readiness, but also on our soldiers, civilians, and their
families. Sadly, they too would bear the cost of that inaction.
To use an ax to cut an additional half trillion dollars
from defense spending would be perilous enough. But to do so
without providing DOD with any means of managing those
reductions would be beyond risky.
In conclusion, on behalf of the men and women of your Army,
let me thank you again for your thoughtful oversight,
unwavering support, and proud partnership. Today your Army has
succeeded in Iraq, is making progress in Afghanistan, and, as
this budget demonstrates, is poised to transform into a new,
smaller, more balanced force, ready to meet the needs of the
Nation.
Thank you for your great support and leadership, and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary McHugh.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and
General Odierno follows:]

Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. John M. McHugh and GEN Raymond T.
Odierno, USA

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Our Nation has weathered difficult circumstances since the attacks
on September 11, yet we have met every challenge. The mission in Iraq
has ended responsibly, continued progress in Afghanistan is enabling a
transition to Afghan security responsibility and targeted
counterterrorism efforts have significantly weakened al Qaeda and
degraded its leadership. In all these endeavors, the Army has played a
leading role.
As President Barack Obama stated in introducing his new national
defense priorities, the country is at a turning point after a decade of
war and considerable increases in defense spending. Even as large-scale
military campaigns recede, the Nation will still face a growing array
of security challenges. These new priorities focus on the continuing
threat of violent extremism, the proliferation of lethal weapons and
materials, the destabilizing behavior of Iran and North Korea, the rise
of new powers across Asia and an era of uncertainty in the Middle East.
On top of that, our Nation confronts a serious deficit and debt
problem (in itself a national security risk) that will squeeze future
Army budgets. However, declining defense budgets do not nullify our
obligation to provide enough capacity and maintain a highly ready force
that is sufficiently modernized to provide a leaner, adaptive,
flexible, and integrated force that offers the President a significant
number of options along the spectrum of conflict.
Today the U.S. Army is the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-
led combat-tested force in the world. Today's soldiers have achieved a
level of professionalism, combat experience and civil and military
expertise that is an invaluable national asset. Our warriors have
accomplished every assigned task they have been given. But all we have
accomplished in building this magnificent force can be squandered if we
are not careful. We are an Army in transition, and we look to Congress
to assist us in the difficult work to build the Army of 2020.
America's Army--The Nation's Force of Decisive Action
Every day, America's Army is making a positive difference in the
world during one of the most challenging times in our history. Although
stressed and stretched, the U.S. Army remains the most agile, adaptable
and capable force in the world. Ours is an Army that reflects America's
diversity and represents the time-honored values that built our Nation:
hard work, duty, selflessness, determination, honor, and compassion.
Today, less than one-half of 1 percent of Americans serve in the
Army. As members of one of our Nation's oldest and most enduring
institutions, these volunteers play an indispensible role in guarding
U.S. national interests at home and abroad. Young men and women who
want to make a difference in this world want to be part of our Army,
which is why even after a decade of conflict, we continue to fill our
ranks with the best the Nation has to offer. They have earned the
gratitude, trust and admiration of an appreciative people for their
extraordinary accomplishments.

2011--The Army in Transition
Over the past year, the Army has concluded its mission in Iraq and
commenced the drawdown of surge forces in Afghanistan while
transferring responsibility to Afghan forces. We are beginning
reductions in end-strength to face budgetary realities. We are also
undertaking efforts to rebalance force structure and make investment
decisions that will shape the Army of 2020--all during a time of war.
These transformational efforts are both significant and unprecedented.
As the President's new national defense priorities are implemented, the
Army will continue its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully
prepared to conduct the full range of operations worldwide.
Operation Enduring Freedom
A decade into the war in Afghanistan, the Army continues to play a
leading role in defending our national security interests in this vital
theater. At the start of the war, following the attacks on September
11, elements of Army Special Operations Forces led efforts on the
ground to bring al Qaeda members to justice and remove the Taliban from
power, thereby denying a safe haven to terrorists. With more than
70,000 soldiers in Afghanistan at peak strength in 2011, the Army's
brigade combat teams conducted operations ranging from stability to
counterinsurgency.
Today, over 63,000 Army soldiers in both general purpose and
special operations units continue to conduct a wide range of missions
across Afghanistan country to help Afghan citizens lay the foundation
for lasting security. Simultaneously, the Army provided essential
logistics capabilities to sustain the land-locked Afghan theater. In
fact, only America's Army could provide the necessary theater
logistics, transportation, medical and communications infrastructure
capable of supporting joint and combined forces for an operation of
this size and complexity.
Since the beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan, soldiers
have earned 5,437 valor awards, including 241 Silver Stars and 8
Distinguished Service Crosses. Four soldiers have been awarded the
Medal of Honor for their heroic actions: Sergeant First Class Jared C.
Monti, Staff Sergeant Salvatore A. Giunta, Staff Sergeant Robert J.
Miller, and Staff Sergeant Leroy A. Petry. They exemplify the courage,
commitment and sacrifice of all the men and women who have served in
this conflict.
Operation New Dawn
In December 2011, the Army concluded more than 8 years of combat
and stability operations in Iraq. Initially, powerful and agile forces
liberated Iraq and then adapted to the new demand of suppressing the
post-invasion insurgencies. Indeed, when the Nation needed a sustained
effort to achieve its strategic objectives, the Army answered the call,
adjusting its deployment tours from 12 to 15 months to enable a
decisive surge in forces. Army units trained and equipped Iraq Security
Forces, and when the mission changed, the Army executed the extremely
difficult tasks of redeploying people and retrograding equipment to
ensure future readiness.
Over 1 million soldiers and Department of the Army civilians served
courageously in Iraq. They were essential to freeing more than 25
million Iraqi people from the tyranny of a brutal dictator, putting
Iraq's future in the hands of its people and removing a national
security threat to the United States.
Success came at a great cost in blood and treasure. But even during
the most dire times, our soldiers never wavered. Their heroic actions
earned 8,238 awards for valor, including 408 Silver Stars and 16
Distinguished Service Crosses. Two Medals of Honor were awarded
posthumously to Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith and Private First
Class Ross A. McGinnis.
Other Global Commitments
In addition to the Army's unprecedented contributions in
Afghanistan and Iraq, we have continued to conduct operations across
the globe to prevent conflict, shape the environment and win
decisively. Nearly 20,000 soldiers remain stationed on the Korean
peninsula, providing a credible deterrent and investing in our
partnership with the Republic of Korea Army. Simultaneously, Army
Special Operations soldiers in the Pacific region continue to provide
advice and support to the Philippine Armed Forces, enhancing our robust
alliance. Both are examples of strategic investments in a region that
is home to 7 of the world's 10 largest armies. (In fact, in most
countries around the world, the army is the dominant defense force.)
U.S. soldiers continue to serve in places such as the Sinai, Guantanamo
Bay, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Horn of Africa, developing and maintaining
relationships on six of the world's seven continents.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Over the past year, the Army has continued to provide instrumental
support to civil authorities. The Army's Reserve component proved to be
one of our great strengths for these missions, giving the force depth
and flexibility. The National Guard provides a distinctive capability
for the Nation. When floods, wildfires and tornados struck from the
Midwest to the South over the span of a few days in spring 2011, more
than 900 National Guard soldiers supplied a coordinated response to
address citizens' needs across the affected region. Similarly, when
Hurricane Irene knocked out power and flooded towns across the
Northeast in the summer of 2011, nearly 10,000 National Guard soldiers
and airmen across 13 States delivered critical services to sustain the
region through the crisis.
In addition to ongoing counterdrug operations, approximately 1,200
National Guard soldiers and airmen supported the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security in 4 States along the southwest U.S. border by
providing entry identification and analysis to disrupt criminal
networks and activities.
Army Special Operations Forces
To conduct unified land operations, the U.S. Army fields a suite of
Special Operations capabilities that range from the world's finest
precision strike and special warfare forces to the world's most lethal
combined arms maneuver formations. The Army draws from across its broad
set of capabilities to provide the Joint commander the blend of Army
assets required to ensure mission accomplishment. True in Afghanistan
today, Army Special Operations Forces are also providing assistance in
the Philippines, Yemen, the Arabian Gulf, Lebanon, Colombia, the
African Trans-Sahel, and across the Caribbean and Central America. As
Army regular forces become available, they will increasingly integrate
with Army Special Operations Forces to promote trust and
interoperability with allies and build partner nation capacity where
mutual interests are at risk from internal or external enemies.

FISCAL ENVIRONMENT

Challenges of Reduced Budget
Today's global fiscal environment is driving defense budgets down
for our partners and allies, as well as our Nation. Historically,
defense spending has been cyclic with significant reductions following
the end of major conflicts. The Army understands it cannot be immune to
these fiscal realities and must be part of the solution. Our focus
areas for the fiscal year 2013 budget demonstrate our concerted effort
to establish clear priorities that give the Nation a ready and capable
Army while being good stewards of all our resources.

Challenges of Continuing Resolutions
Timely and predictable funding enables the Army to plan, resource
and manage the programs that produce a trained and ready force. The
Army very much appreciates that Congress approved the fiscal year 2012
budget earlier than had been the case in recent years when we were
forced to operate for long stretches under continuing resolutions.
Long-term continuing resolutions force the Army to slow its spending,
freeze production rates and delay the start of new programs. Such
delays pose a risk to the Army's operational readiness and investment
strategy. We stand ready to help Congress once again pass defense bills
in a timely manner.

Security Environment
A series of powerful global trends continue to shape the current
and future strategic environment: increased demand for dwindling
resources, persistent regional conflict, empowered non-state actors,
the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed
states. We anticipate a myriad of hybrid threats that incorporate
regular and irregular warfare, terrorism and criminality. We also face
cyber-threats to an increasingly critical and vulnerable information
technology infrastructure and the destabilizing effect of global
economic downturns. Together, these trends create a complex and
unpredictable environment in all of the Army's operational domains:
land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA'S ARMY

Role of the Army: Prevent, Shape, Win
In the uncertain environment our country faces, the Army remains
central to our Nation's defense as part of the Joint Force. No major
conflict has been won without boots-on-the-ground. Listed below are the
three essential roles the Army must play.
First, our Army must prevent conflict just as we did during the
Cold War. Prevention is most effective when adversaries are convinced
that conflict with your force would be imprudent. The Army's ability to
win any fight across the full range of operations as part of a Joint
Force must never be open to challenge. It must be clear that we will
fight and win, which requires a force with sufficient capacity,
readiness and modernization. That means quality soldiers; agile,
adaptive leaders; versatile units; realistic training and modern
equipment. Prevention is achieved through credible readiness, sometimes
requiring decisive action. Our Army must continue to be a credible
force around the globe to prevent miscalculations by those who would
test us.
Second, our Army must help shape the international environment to
enable our combatant commanders to assure our friends and contain our
enemies. We do that by engaging with our partners, fostering mutual
understanding through military-to-military contacts and helping them
build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are an
investment in the future that the Nation cannot afford to forego. We
must cultivate positive relationships before they are needed and be a
reliable, consistent and respectful partner to others.
Finally, the Army must be ready to win decisively and dominantly.
Nothing else approaches what is achieved by winning, and the
consequences of losing at war are usually catastrophic. With so much at
stake, the American people will expect what they have always expected
of us--decisive victory. The Army must never enter into a terrible
endeavor such as war unprepared. Although we may still win, it will be
more expensive, cost more lives and require more time.
In addition to being trained, sized, and equipped to win decisively
in the more traditional operational domains, the Army also will require
robust capability in cyberspace. As the past decade of conflict has
demonstrated, the information environment has changed the way we fight.
Military and cyberspace operations have converged, and protecting
information in cyberspace is more essential than ever to how our Army
fights. The advantage will go to those able to maintain the freedom to
operate and able to gain, protect and exploit information in the
contested cyberspace domain. The Army must be dominant in both the land
and cyberspace domains.

Smaller but Reversible
As our new national defense priorities drives us to a smaller Army,
we must avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too fast or risk
losing leadership and capabilities, making it much harder to expand
again when needed. It is critical that the Army be able to rapidly
expand to meet large unexpected contingencies, and four components are
key to that ability. First, the Army must maintain a strong cadre of
noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of new
formations when needed. Second, we will make significant investments in
Army Special Operations Forces to increase their capabilities and
provide the President with more options. Third, it will require ready
and accessible Army National Guard and Army Reserve Forces. The Army's
Reserve component has proven essential in contingency operations around
the world. From Kosovo, the Sinai and Horn of Africa to Afghanistan and
Iraq, homeland defense along America's southwest border, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad, the Army National
Guard and Army Reserve have evolved into indispensible parts of our
operational force and we will continue to rely on them to provide depth
and versatility to meet the complex demands of the future. The fourth
critical component of the Army's ability to expand is the Nation's
industrial base. We rely on the industrial base to perform research and
development and to design, produce and maintain our weapons systems,
components and parts. It must be capable of rapidly expanding to meet a
large demand. Reversibility is the sine qua non to ensuring that the
Army can rapidly grow when our Nation calls.

THE ARMY'S FOCUS AREAS

Support to Operations in Afghanistan
Our immediate focus remains on providing the best trained and most
ready land forces in the world to win the current fight while
maintaining responsiveness for unforeseen contingencies. The support of
the American people is paramount to our success. We must fulfill our
responsibilities to them without draining their goodwill and treasure.
Despite continued challenges and tough conditions, our forces are
making measureable progress against an adaptive enemy. Army Security
Force Assistance Teams continue to train both Afghan National Army
forces (now almost 180,000 strong) and Afghan National Police forces
(made up of nearly 144,000 men and women in uniform). The increased
capability of Afghan Security Forces is allowing security of the region
to be turned back over to the Government of Afghanistan district by
district. During the coming year we must continue to provide trained
and ready forces equipped to support operations. We remain focused on
doing everything we can to ensure that we meet our national objectives
and provide what our brave men and women in the field need to succeed.
In Afghanistan, the commitment and performance of our soldiers and
civilians continues to be nothing short of extraordinary. Not only have
they taken the fight to our enemies, but they have proven equally
effective as emissaries. Our investment in leader development prepared
them to operate in this demanding environment.
In the coming year, we will continue to increase the Afghan lead of
security responsibilities, target key insurgent leaders, retain and
expand secure areas and help Afghan National Security Forces earn the
support of the people through improved security capacity and
capability. Because of its geography, distance, infrastructure, and
harsh environment, the difficulty and complexity of the drawdown in
Afghanistan will exceed that in Iraq. The U.S. Army is the only
organization in the world with the capability to plan and execute a
logistical operation this complex and difficult.
The Army places great emphasis on properly maintaining its
equipment to restore readiness to the force and ensure it is prepared
to meet combatant commander requirements. The Army reset program
reverses the effects of combat stress and restores equipment to a high
level of combat capability to conduct future operations. Reset is a
lengthy process, and even after the drawdown from Afghanistan is
complete, the Army will require funding for 2 to 3 years to reset our
equipment from the harsh demands of war.

Responsible Stewardship
Institutional Army Transformation
The drive to reform the Institutional Army is about doing things
better, smarter and faster while taking advantage of available
technology, knowledge and experience. Our Institutional Army--the part
of the Army that trains, educates and supports Army forces worldwide--
will become more flexible by improving our ability to quickly adapt to
changing environments, missions and priorities. The Institutional Army
is also working to rapidly address the demands placed on the
organization by the current and future operational environments. It
performed magnificently to produce trained and ready forces, even while
seeking to adapt institutional business processes.
Further, the Army is working to provide ``readiness at best value''
to help us live within the constraints imposed by the national and
global economic situation. In short, the need to reform the Army's
institutional management processes and develop an integrated management
system has never been more urgent. To enhance organizational adaptive
capacity while shepherding our resources, the Army initiated a number
of efforts, such as the Army Financial Improvement Plan, which will
enable the Army to achieve full auditability by fiscal year 2017.
Acquisition reform as a result of uncertain funding, insufficient
contract oversight and an ineffective requirement determination
process, the Army has initiated a significant reform of the way we
develop and acquire our products and weapons. As part of this
initiative, we have taken steps toward improvement through a series of
capability portfolio reviews. These platforms serve to revalidate,
modify or terminate programs based on the Army's need and the
affordability of the program. We have also started to fix an
inefficient procurement system that too often wastes precious resources
and fails to provide needed systems in a timely manner. For example,
the Army commissioned a comprehensive review of our acquisition system
that, based on the findings and recommendations, produced a blueprint
for acquisition reform. These changes fall into four broad areas:

realignment of acquisition requirements combined with
a sharper focus on the needed competencies of acquisition
professionals;
expansion of stakeholder (acquisition professional and
soldier end-user) participation in developing requirements,
planning and acquisition solicitation;
reappraisal and streamlining of acquisition strategies
and the attendant risk in such streamlining; and
improvement in the selection, development, and
accountability of the people involved in the acquisition
process.

We are implementing these recommendations as part of our broader
effort to reform the Institutional Army.
Army Energy Security
Supplying energy to our Army around the world is increasingly
challenging, expensive and dangerous. The Army must consider energy in
all activities to reduce demand, increase efficiency, obtain
alternative sources and create a culture of energy accountability.
Energy security is an imperative that can be described in two
categories, operational and garrison.
Operational energy is the energy and associated systems,
information and processes required to train, move and sustain forces
and systems for military operations. The Army is developing new
doctrine, policies, plans, and technologies that will improve the
management and use of operational energy to better support soldiers'
needs. Less energy efficient systems in an operational environment
require more fuel, increasing the number of fuel convoys and thus
risking more lives and limiting our flexibility.
Garrison energy is the energy required to power Army bases and
conduct soldier training. Dependence on fossil fuels and a vulnerable
electric power grid jeopardize the security of Army operating bases and
mission capabilities. The impact of increasing energy prices is a
decrease in the quantity and quality of training the Army can conduct.
Initiatives such as cool roofs, solar power, stormwater management
and water efficiency are positive steps toward addressing the
challenges of energy security in the operational and garrison
environments. Innovative and adaptive leaders, seeking ways to increase
energy efficiency and implement renewable and alternate sources of
energy, are key to saving lives and increasing the Army's flexibility
by reducing costs.
A Leaner Army
The Army is committed to providing combatant commanders with the
capabilities, capacity and diversity needed to be successful across a
wide range of operations. With a leaner Army, we have to prioritize and
also remain capable of meeting a wide range of security requirements.
We will reduce in a manner that preserves our readiness and avoids any
hollowing of the force. To satisfy this enduring requirement, we have
three rheostats that must be continuously assessed and adjusted: end
strength/force structure, readiness and modernization. We will balance
these three foundational imperatives throughout the next several years
to provide combatant commanders trained and ready forces in support of
Joint Force 2020.
Force Structure and Force Design
The Army will maintain a versatile mix of tailorable and networked
organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to continue providing a
sustained flow of trained and ready forces for the full range of
military operations. This will give combatant commanders a hedge
against unexpected contingencies and enable a sustainable tempo for our
All-Volunteer Force. Over the next 5 years, the Army will decrease its
end strength from a peak authorized strength of about 570,000 to
490,000 Active Army, 358,000 to 353,500 Army National Guard and 206,000
to 205,000 Army Reserve soldiers as directed. Reducing our end strength
over a deliberate ramp through the end of fiscal year 2017 allows the
Army to take care of soldiers, families, and civilians; to continue
meeting our commitments in Afghanistan; and to facilitate reversibility
in an uncertain strategic environment.
An unpredictable and dynamic global security environment requires
the Army, as a force in transition, to adjust and reduce its size while
remaining flexible, capable and ready to meet the Nation's requirements
and maintaining an ability to reverse course to readily expand if
necessary. In accordance with the new defense priorities, the Army of
2020 must have a versatile mix of capabilities, formations and
equipment that is lethal, agile, adaptable and responsive. As the Army
transitions from the current force to a leaner force, it will do so
while remaining engaged in the current conflicts. The Army will
prioritize force structure and committed assets in the Pacific Region
and the Middle East, and will shape the future force to support the
Army's requirements as part of the Joint Force to fulfill the Nation's
strategic and operational commitments. The Army will optimize force
structure to maintain reversibility, and achieve maximum operational
strategic flexibility. Today we plan on reducing at least 8 Active
component Brigade Combat Teams, however, we continue to assess the
design and mix of these modular formations based upon the lessons from
the last 10 years of combat. This analysis may lead to a decision to
reorganize BCTs into more capable and robust formations, requiring
further BCT reductions in order to increase overall versatility and
agility for tomorrow's security challenges.
As the Army's Active component reduces in size, the composition of
combat support and combat service support enablers in the Active and
Reserve components will be adjusted to give the Army the ability to
conduct sustained operations, and to mitigate risk. The Army will
continue to rely on the Reserve components to provide key enablers and
operational depth. An Operational Reserve comprised of a discrete set
of capabilities with an enhanced level of readiness will be essential.
This force will consist of three elements: select combat formations
prepared to respond to crisis; combat support and combat service
support enablers employed early in support of operational plans; and
forces aligned to support steady-state combatant commander
requirements. Ensured access to the Reserve component is essential to
providing the operational depth and flexibility combatant commanders
require. During the transition, we must manage our people carefully to
neither compromise readiness nor break faith with those who have served
the Nation so well.
Readiness
Army unit readiness is measured by the level of its manning,
training and equipping. The current Army force generation model
(ARFORGEN) has served us well in meeting the requirements for Iraq and
Afghanistan; however, we will adapt it to ensure we meet future
combatant commander requirements in the uncertain, complex strategic
environment. We envision a progressive readiness model for most Active
and Reserve component early deploying units which will align forces for
combatant commanders. Because of their unique capabilities, our low
density, high demand units do not lend themselves to a rotational pool
like ARFORGEN. These units must be sustained in a constant readiness
model.
The Strength of Our Army is Our Soldiers
Soldiers and families form the foundation of unit readiness. People
are the Army, and our enduring priority is to preserve the high-
quality, All-Volunteer Force--the essential element of our strength.
The Army has gained the trust of the American public more than at any
other time in recent history while developing a force that is very
different from what it was a few short years ago. Our Army must
maintain the public's trust while our Nation fulfills its
responsibilities toward soldiers and their families. The U.S. Army is
unique from other professions because our core attributes are derived
from American values, the Constitution and law. Today's Army is
building on a successful foundation with the trust, respect and support
of the American people. This foundation, and our enduring commitment to
strengthening our Army Profession, will improve our force as it adapts
to meet the Nation's evolving needs.
The Army is the Nation's preeminent leadership experience. The All-
Volunteer Force is our greatest strategic asset, providing depth,
versatility and unmatched experience to the Joint Force. We must
continue to train, develop and retain adaptive leaders and maintain
this combat-seasoned, All-Volunteer Force of professionals. We will
continue to adjust in order to prepare our leaders for more dynamic and
complex future environments. Our leader development model is an
adaptive, continuous and progressive process grounded in Army values.
We grow soldiers and Army civilians into competent and confident
leaders capable of decisive action. We must give our leaders broadening
opportunities to better prepare them for the myriad challenges they
will encounter. In addition, we must reinvigorate unit training,
training management skills and leader development to build versatile
units. By providing our leaders with the professional challenges they
expect, we will retain them and nurture their adaptive spirit.
Our challenge in the coming years is not just about attracting and
selecting the best available candidates to be Army professionals. We
must also engage and develop our quality, combat experienced leaders so
that we keep them, and they, in turn, train the next generation of Army
professionals. During the last decade of war, we have given our young
leaders unprecedented flexibility and authority to operate effectively
on the battlefield. We will prepare for tomorrow by building on that
investment and ensuring that opportunities for creativity, leadership
and advancement exist throughout the Army.
We must draw down wisely to avoid stifling the health of the force
or breaking faith with our soldiers, civilians, and families. Excessive
cuts would create high risk in our ability to sustain readiness. We
must avoid our historical pattern of drawing down too much or too fast
and risk losing the leadership, technical skills and combat experience
that cannot be easily reclaimed. We must identify and safeguard key
programs in education, leader development, health care, quality of life
and retirement--programs critical to retaining our soldiers.
The Strength of Our Soldiers is Our Families
In order to ensure a relevant and ready All-Volunteer Force, the
Army will continue to invest heavily in our soldier and Family
programs. The Army Family Covenant expresses the Army's commitment to
care for soldiers and their families by providing a strong, supportive
environment that enhances their strength and resilience and helps them
to thrive. The Covenant focuses on programs, services, and initiatives
essential to preserving an All-Volunteer Force and institutionalizes
the Army's commitment to provide soldiers and their families a quality
of life commensurate with their service to the Nation. Through the
Covenant, the Army is improving the delivery of soldier and family
programs and services, sustaining accessibility to quality health care,
and promoting education and employment opportunities for Family
members. We are sustaining high-quality housing; ensuring excellence in
school support, youth services, and child care; and maintaining quality
recreation services for soldiers and family members as they serve on
the Nation's behalf around the world. We will not walk away from our
commitment to our families; however, a different fiscal reality
requires us to review our investments and eliminate redundant and poor
performing programs while sustaining those that are high performing and
most beneficial to our families.
Honoring Service
We must fulfill our moral obligation to the health, welfare, and
care of our soldiers, civilians, and families. The effects of more than
10 years of war and inadequate dwell time at home has resulted in a
cumulative stress on soldiers, families, and communities that has
significant implications for the Army and our Nation. We have
implemented an unprecedented number of personnel-focused programs,
including Comprehensive Soldier Fitness; Wounded Warrior Program; and
Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention, to ensure the
continued care, support and services that sustain the high quality of
our force.
Sexual harassment and sexual assault are inconsistent with the
Army's values and our profession. It is imperative that we foster a
climate where such misconduct is not tolerated and the dignity of our
soldiers, civilians, and family members is respected and protected.
Army Leaders are focused on the urgency of this issue and the level of
commitment required to affect cultural change and combat this crime. We
are aggressively implementing and expanding the Army's comprehensive
Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program. The
SHARP program is aimed at command prevention efforts at all levels,
educating all members of our Army family, training our first responder
professionals and supporting victims while reducing the stigma of
reporting. One incident of this type of unwarranted and abusive
behavior is one too many. The Army is committed to ensuring leadership
at all levels is engaged in preventing sexual assault and harassment,
and to appropriately holding offenders accountable.
The Army continues to invest heavily in better understanding
traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress, the invisible
signature wounds of our recent wars. We have developed and implemented
new prevention and treatment protocols, and we are in the third year of
our 5-year partnership with the National Institute of Mental Health to
identify the factors that help protect a soldier's mental health and
those that put it at risk.
We have also started to reduce the length of deployments to 9
months for many of our units at the division level and below, which we
believe will alleviate significant pressure on our soldiers and their
families. We are doubling our efforts to ensure that each of our more
than 18,000 soldiers currently enrolled in the Integrated Disability
Evaluation System is carefully examined to determine whether he or she
should return to civilian life or continue military service. A recent
initiative between the Department of Defense and U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs--the Integrated Disability Evaluation System
integrates formerly separate programs--resulting in a streamlined, more
efficient process for servicemembers, which will reduce the backlog of
soldiers awaiting benefits.
As we draw down the Army, we must honor our veterans with the very
best support, care and services they deserve as they make the
transition from military service to civilian life. We are committed to
our soldiers and their families, who are the strength of the Army. At
the same time, the Army is focused on wisely managing our resources in
the health care arena. The Army supports Defense Department proposals
to further reduce the rate of growth in health care costs--proposals
that are aligned with our priorities. TRICARE is a superb health
benefit--one of the best in the country and appropriately so. Just as
in all areas of the defense budget, we need to make decisions that
preserve a strong benefit yet reflect the fiscal realities of the
times. The proposals take care to exempt populations who have made the
greatest sacrifices--those who are medically retired and those families
who have lost their loved one while serving on active duty. The changes
proposed are also adjusted to reflect lower adjustments for those
retirees with lower retirement pay. Most importantly, the Department
continues to provide resources that improve the overall health system
for our soldiers and their families.
The Army is using the Health Promotion and Risk Reduction fiscal
year 2011 Campaign Plan to holistically promote health and reduce risk.
The Campaign Plan incorporates findings and recommendations from
Department of Defense and Army reports regarding health promotion, risk
reduction, and suicide prevention. Health promotion and risk reduction
activities are essential to sustain the force under the current
operational tempo and reset our Army.
Modernization
The Army has global responsibilities requiring large technological
advantages to prevail decisively in combat. Just as pilots and sailors
seek supremacy in the air and on the seas, soldiers must dominate their
enemies on land. Modernizing, especially as end strength is reduced, is
the key to ensuring that our dominance continues.
The Army is setting priorities and making prudent choices to
provide the best possible force for the Nation within the resources
available. We are developing and fielding a versatile and affordable
mix of equipment to enable us to succeed in the full range of missions
and maintain a decisive advantage over our enemies. To meet the
challenges of an evolving strategic and fiscal environment, our
strategy is based on three tenets: integrated capability portfolios,
incremental modernization and leveraging the Army Force Generation
cycle.

Integrated capability portfolios align stakeholders to
identify capability gaps and eliminate unnecessary
redundancies.
Incremental modernization enables us to deliver new
and improved capabilities by leveraging mature technologies,
shortening development times, planning growth potential, and
acquiring in quantities that give us the greatest advantage
while hedging against uncertainty.
Army Force Generation processes synchronize the
distribution of equipment to units providing increased
readiness over time and delivering a steady and predictable
supply of trained and ready modular forces. The Army has
consolidated its materiel management process under a single
command and designated U.S. Army Materiel Command as the Army's
Lead Materiel Integrator. Additionally, we consolidated all of
our materiel data into a single authoritative repository called
the Logistics Information Warehouse.

These emerging systems and processes represent a powerful new
approach for implementing the Army's equipping priorities, policies and
programs to the meet new security demands of the 21st century. The
equipment requested in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget strikes
a balance between current and future needs, provides the basis for an
affordable equipping strategy over time, and takes into account Army
requirements and priorities. In developing this request, the Army made
difficult decisions to shift funds previously programmed for future
capabilities to current needs. The decisions came at the expense of
promising and needed technologies with capabilities that did not fit
within resource limitations. The Army's top four modernization
priorities are the Network, Ground Combat Vehicle, Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle and Soldier Systems.
Network
Also known as LandWarNet, the Network remains the Army's top
investment priority. With expectations of tighter budgets and a still
very active threat environment, the Army will have to produce a force
that is smaller yet more capable. The Network is the core of that
smaller, capable Army.
The Army is conducting a series of semiannual field exercises known
as the Network Integration Evaluation to evaluate, integrate and mature
the Army's tactical network. The exercises will assess network and non-
network capabilities to determine implications across doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel
and facilities. The process aligns several key Army network programs
and advances the fusion of radio waveforms to form an integrated
network baseline to which industry can build.
The foundation of the modernized Network is a Joint, secure and
common architecture that will provide information from the cloud to
enable leaders, units and the Institutional Army to function more
effectively. The Army will extend this critical capability to its
installations around the world. This capability will increase force
effectiveness, facilitate transition for units and individuals from one
phase of the Army Force Generation cycle to another and greatly improve
network security.
The major programs that form the backbone of the tactical network
are:

the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, which
provides a real-time common operating picture down to the
company level by extending satellite and line-of-sight
communications, including telephone, data, and video;
the Joint Tactical Radio System, an advanced software-
defined family of radios that will carry data and voice for
dismounted troops and airborne and maritime platforms;
the Distributed Common Ground System--Army, which
provides intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data, as
well as access to the entire Defense Intelligence Information
Enterprise, to commanders from the company to Army service
component command level;
the Joint Battle Command Platform, which provides
situational awareness data enhancing mission command to Army
and Marine Corps tactical operations centers and combat
vehicles; and
Nett Warrior, which gives dismounted leaders
integrated situational awareness and information sharing,
helping them to avoid fratricide and increase combat
effectiveness.

The Army Network must be dynamic to give soldiers, civilians, and
partners information and services when and where needed. Investment
must be steady and wisely applied, while maintaining a strong
partnership with industry.
Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
The Infantry Fighting Vehicle is reaching the limit of its capacity
to receive technology upgrades proven critical for soldiers in combat
operations. The GCV is the Army's replacement program for the Infantry
Fighting Vehicle and the centerpiece of the Army's overall combat
vehicle investment strategy. It will be designed to deliver a full
nine-man squad with improved survivability, mobility and network
integration, considered crucial to our ability to conduct fire and
maneuver in close quarters fighting in complex terrain. The vehicle
will also provide the growth potential necessary to accommodate
advances in protection, networking and space, weight, power and cooling
technologies while reducing sustainment demands. No current vehicle can
sufficiently meet all these requirements.
The GCV acquisition strategy implements affordability measures
designed to ensure the long-term success of the program as the Army
faces constrained resources in the future. To develop this acquisition
strategy, the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted
a comprehensive review to make sure the program is both achievable and
affordable within a 7-year timeframe. The model adopted for the GCV
program incentivizes industry to use the best of mature technologies
that are both affordable and support the 7-year timeframe. The Army has
also paid close attention to risk reduction within the program by
requiring industry to identify potential cost schedule and performance
tradeoffs; provide cost targets throughout the GCV's life cycle; and
maximize competition to support innovation, cost containment and
schedule requirements.
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
As a Joint Service program between the Army and Marine Corps, the
JLTV will replace approximately one-third of the Army's oldest
unarmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). The JLTV
incorporates the strengths of the Mine-Resistant, Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles that the HMMWV family of vehicles does not provide. The
HMMWV was not designed to be used as an armored combat vehicle, but it
was often employed as one during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In
contrast, the JLTV will be designed for this role from the outset. It
will be capable of operating across the range of military operations
and physical environments providing, improved mobility and protection
for soldiers. The JLTV balances protection, payload, performance and
improved fuel efficiency in one affordable and sustainable vehicle. It
will also be fully integrated into the Network to enhance the
effectiveness of ground forces.
Soldier Systems
The squad is the foundation of the decisive force; it is the
cornerstone of all units. To ensure the success of combat operations in
the future, the Army will invest in systems that consider the squad as
a team rather than a collection of individuals. This approach will
guarantee that the squad will not be in a fair fight but will have
overmatch. The Army will continue to invest in soldier systems that
enable the lethality, protection, situational awareness and mobility of
the individual soldier in his or her squad. These systems include small
arms, night vision, soldier sensors, body armor, and individual
clothing and equipment.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Army has been, and will continue to be, a critical part of the
Joint Force because land power remains the politically decisive form of
warfare and is essential to America's national security strategy. No
major conflict has ever been won without ``boots-on-the-ground.'' By
being tasked to seize, occupy, and defend land areas, as well as to
defeat enemy land forces, the Army is unique because it must not only
deploy and defeat an adversary, but must be prepared to remain in the
region until the Nation's long-term strategic objectives are secured.
Indeed, the insertion of ground troops is the most tangible and durable
measure of America's commitment to defend our interests, protect our
friends, and defeat our enemies.
With global trends pointing to further instability, our Army
remains a key guardian of our national security. In the wake of the
Cold War, it was said that we had reached the ``end of history,'' and
that liberal democracy had won the ideological competition. However,
events since then make it clear that potential adversaries with
competing ideologies still exist and are extremely dangerous.
As a result, we find ourselves in an increasingly uncertain world,
with threats ranging from terrorist and cyberattacks to regional
instability to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For
our Army that means we will likely have to deal with near peer
competitors in niche areas and hybrid threats that mix regular,
irregular and criminal activity--all while still facing the possibility
of a conventional force-on-force conflict.
The danger extends from the homeland to the theater where combat
operations might occur. Conflict is the norm; a stable peace the
exception. In such a world, our adversaries will adapt to gain
advantage, especially in the land domain. It is on land, that our
challenges will be the most complex because of dynamic human
relationships and terrain variables.
While the Army's new end strength numbers allow it to support
current defense priorities, it is imperative that the Army draw down
end strength levels in a smart and responsible manner. We believe that
our new end strength provides us with the flexibility to retain the
hard-won expertise it has gained over the last decade. To be sure, the
Army has faced similar challenges before. After every major conflict
since the Revolutionary War, the Army has faced pressure to decrease
its end-strength. As recently as 2001 (pre-September 11), many believed
a strategic shift was needed and that the future of modern warfare
would be about missile defense, satellites and high-tech weaponry
because no adversary would dare challenge America's conventional
forces. But whenever we have rushed to radically diminish the position
of the Army, the result has always been the same: an excessive decline
in effectiveness at a cost of blood and treasure.
Decreases after World War I directly contributed to failures at
Kasserine Pass. Decreases after World War II led to Task Force Smith's
failure in Korea. More recently, the end of the Cold War demonstrated
our Nation's need for agile, adaptable and decisive ground forces to
conduct a wide range of operations. These numerous missions include
Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, Joint Task Force Andrew in Florida,
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti,
Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Operation Joint
Guardian in Kosovo. What they have in common is that they were
unforeseen, thus emphasizing our need to avoid the historical pattern
of drawing down too fast.
America's leaders face difficult choices as they chart the way
ahead for our Nation. Familiar external threats persist and complex new
challenges will emerge. Concurrently, fiscal limitations create
internal challenges for our leaders. America's Army is prepared to
fulfill its role in keeping the Nation secure. The Army will prevent
conflict by remaining a credible force with sufficient capacity to
dissuade adversaries from challenging American interests. The Army will
shape the environment, building positive relationships and capabilities
that enable nations to effectively protect and govern their citizenry.
Finally, when called, the Army will fight for the Nation and win
decisively. We understand these responsibilities and resolve not to
reduce the size of the Army in a manner that does not permit us to
reverse the process should demand for forces increase dramatically.
As we look ahead, the Army is focusing on three areas. Our first
priority remains supporting operations in Afghanistan. We will guard
against becoming distracted by the future at the risk of our men and
women who remain in harm's way.
Second, we will be the very best stewards we can, because America's
resources are too precious to waste. Transforming the Institutional
Army, reforming our acquisition process and ensuring energy security
are essential for us to protect the resources provided by Congress and
the American people.
Third, we will fight to incorporate principles and processes that
preserve readiness and capability while reducing the size of the Army.
We are adjusting our formations to build the right number of units with
the right capability to meet the needs of the Joint Force. The past 10
years have taught us that an Operational Reserve Force is essential to
accomplish our missions and expand rapidly when required. We will
invest deliberately and wisely in our soldiers, civilians, and families
to make sure they are prepared and supported. We will treat those who
have served in our ranks with respect and honor. Our wounded soldiers
will receive the very best care the Nation can provide, and our
soldiers who return to civilian life will be well prepared to do so.
Future threats will demand enhanced capabilities for our soldiers,
so we will modernize our equipment. The Army has identified four
programs to highlight. The Network gives sight, sound and awareness to
our soldiers, civilians, and leaders to defeat our adversaries. The
Ground Combat Vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle will incorporate
hard won lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide the mobility and
protection our soldiers require. Investments in soldier systems improve
our soldiers' ability to move, fight, and survive on the battlefield.
The Army has chosen its focus areas carefully and deliberately
because they will enable us to provide what the Nation needs. We owe it
to America and to the American soldier, the Nation's servant and
warrior--the Strength of the Nation!

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman Levin. General Odierno.

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMY

General Odierno. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. I
want to thank you first for your steadfast commitment to all
our soldiers and their families, especially over the last 10
years. The partnership that we formed in supporting them and
ensuring they have what they need has been part of our great
success and I thank you all for that.
I appreciate the vote of confidence from Secretary McHugh.
I believe in the Army today we have a great military-civilian
team that will help the Army navigate these very difficult
times that we have in the future, and it's an honor to work
with Secretary McHugh with his complete sense of support to our
soldiers and our families, as well as understanding where our
Army needs to go. I promise you that we'll work very closely as
we challenge many of these very, very difficult issues.
Together, it's a true honor to be here today representing
1.1 million soldiers, 278,000 Army civilians, and 1.4 million
family members. I'm extremely proud of the commitment,
professionalism, and resiliency of our soldiers and also their
sacrifices and accomplishments. Today they're in over 150
countries around the world. We are truly today, and will
continue to be, a globally engaged Army, with over 95,000
soldiers deployed and another 96,000 soldiers forward
stationed, conducting a broad range of missions and meeting our
national security requirements.
But our Army's primary purpose is steadfast and resolution
to fight and win our Nation's wars. As the Army continues its
transition, we will ensure the President's 2012 defense
strategic priorities are implemented, by first meeting our
current commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere, by ensuring a
highly trained, properly equipped, and well manned force.
Now that operations in Iraq are complete and we continue
surge recovery in Afghanistan, we will begin to shape the
regional environments in support of the combatant commanders as
well as the overall strategic environment. In the Asia Pacific,
which is home to 7 out of the 10 largest armies in the world,
we will provide an array of tools through rotational forces,
multilateral exercises, and other innovative engagements with
our allies and new partners. We currently have some 66,000
soldiers and almost 10,000 civilians in this region.
During a time of great uncertainty in the Middle East, we
remain committed and prepared to ensuring security and
stability across the spectrum of conflict through our
rotational presence and working with our close partners. In
Europe, as we inactivate two brigade combat teams (BCT), one in
2013 and one in 2014, we will compensate through a series of
engagement tools to build and sustain our strong relationships
with our European and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies and partners. I believe that this will serve as a model
of how I see us doing things in the future, a combination of
forward stationed and rotational forces, using a tailorable
approach by regionally aligned forces and prepositioned stocks.
As we move forward, we will build on the competency and
experience that has been gained over the past 10 years by our
National Guard and Army Reserves in Iraq and Afghanistan,
through the resourcing of a progressive readiness model.
As we look forward--and the Secretary already touched on
this a bit--there are several focus areas that will guide us
for the way ahead. Foremost, we will remain committed to our
67,000 warfighters currently in Afghanistan and continue to
provide trained, equipped, and ready soldiers to secure success
in that fight.
Next, as the Army becomes leaner we must continue to build
on the key characteristics of the future force: adaptability,
innovation, flexibility, agility, versatility, and lethality.
We have to prioritize our efforts as we integrate and
synchronize our activities as part of a larger joint
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational force effort.
By the end of fiscal year 2017, we will decrease our end
strength in the Active component from 570,000 to 490,000, from
358,000 to 353,500 in the National Guard, and from 206,000 to
205,000 in the Army Reserves. It is imperative for us to
sustain a gradual ramp over the next 6 years, to include this
year. That will allow us to take care of our soldiers and our
families, continue to provide forces for Afghanistan and
facilitate reversibility if necessary.
End strength above 490,000 is funded strictly through the
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account and must be
sustained to help mitigate the risk as we continue current
operations in Afghanistan and simultaneously reset for the
future. We will reduce our end strength by a minimum of eight
BCTs. This drawdown, based on the national strategic
objectives, will be done with deliberate consideration to the
impacts of combatant commander requirements, as well as
considerations on local communities and infrastructure.
We are also looking at reorganizing our BCTs. The Secretary
and I have not yet made a decision on that, but we are
reviewing that now to see if we can get more capability out of
a BCT. That might cause us to reduce some more BCTs, but
sustain more combat battalions in the force over time.
Finally, we will be responsible government stewards through
energy cost savings and institutional and acquisition reform.
We are now taking a fundamentally different approach to how we
do business with acquisition reform. I credit Secretary McHugh
for his diligent efforts with this. We have really made some
tremendous progress here. Through a new affordable and
incremental equipping strategy, we are making better business
deals and better contracts, emphasizing competition and saving
even more money as governmental stewards. Our expansion of
multi-year contracts, firm fixed price contracts, and cost-plus
incentive-fee contracts have proven substantive cost savings
already.
By more closely linking the development of requirements
with the acquisition cycle, we are building the flexibility to
integrate new technologies incrementally. Additionally, we are
looking to develop more efficient testing and evaluating
strategies by eliminating redundancies in our testing programs.
We will continue our equipment reset program to restore
unit equipment to a level of capability that's commensurate
with their future missions. There have been over 1.8 million
pieces of equipment reset to date, which equates to
approximately 31 brigade equivalents annually.
Much of what the Army needs to do and much of what we hope
to do will be relying upon sustained OCO funding through our
withdrawal in Afghanistan and for 2 to 3 years afterwards.
As we continue to transform our modernization practices
through a holistic, bottom-up approach, we have several
priorities. First is the network. It's critical to our ability
to manage information and command our forces at all levels,
both home and abroad. We have made significant progress on this
critical program due to the series of network integration
evaluation exercises that field tested equipment and integrated
the system using our soldiers.
Second, the GCV, a replacement for our Infantry Fighting
Vehicle that can accommodate an infantry squad, balance
mobility and survivability, and provide unmatched lethality on
the battlefield against current and future threats. We have
paid close attention to risk reduction in this developmental
program by maximizing competition to stimulate innovation,
support cost containment and schedule requirements, ensuring
industry identifies potential price and schedule versus
performance tradeoffs, and requiring industry to provide cost
targets throughout the GCV's life cycle.
Our third modernization priority is the more mobile,
survivable Network-Integrated JLTV, which both myself and
General Amos agree is necessary given the last 10 years of
fighting and what future operations may entail. We carefully
revised our acquisition strategy to reduce the schedule for the
next developmental phase from 48 to 33 months, while reducing
the projected cost of the program by $400 million.
Next is lightening the soldier's load. There must be
continued efforts to give our squads superiority on the
battlefield with advanced soldier systems, weapons,
communications, and protection. There has been tremendous
progress in the advancements to help lighten the load of our
individual soldiers. So now we must turn to look at how the
squad can carry the load smarter. We will continue to look at
decreasing the weight of our body armor while increasing
protection. But we can make more progress by studying how to
better distribute the load across the squad.
The budget request for aviation modernization will continue
to ensure our lift and close combat attack capabilities remain
effective. These aircraft provide critical support to our joint
ground forces, our special operations community, and our
international partners.
Finally, I'd like to point out that in order to achieve
these priorities within our strategy we will need the help of
this committee to ensure timely appropriations to reduce
production scheduling delays.
The Secretary and I will continue to assess and make
adjustments to the strategy, while addressing any potential
risks incurred as we adjust our force posture.
I'd like to leave you with one last thought. Sequestration
is not in the best interests of our national security. The
Army's share of the cut could be almost $134 billion. Actually,
it's a minimum of $134 billion through 2017. The impact to the
Army could cause up to 100,000 in cuts to end strength, on top
of the 87,000 we've already planned to reduce. This would
result in severe reductions in the National Guard, the Army
Reserve, and additional reductions in the Active component, and
will significantly decrease what the Army can do for our Joint
Force. In my estimation, sequestration would require us to
fundamentally relook at how we provide national security.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for
the opportunity to speak here today. This committee enables our
All-Volunteer Army to be the most decisive land force in the
world, and we could not do it without the support of Congress.
It's an honor to serve this great Nation and stand beside the
dedicated professionals of our Army. The strength of our Nation
is our Army. The strength of our Army is our soldiers, and the
strength of our soldiers is our families.
Thank you very much for allowing us to be here and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.
Let's have a 7-minute first round.
General, first let me ask you about the 2013 budget. Does
that budget reflect the administration's recently revised
strategic guidance for the Army?
General Odierno. It does, sir.
Chairman Levin. Does it provide the Army what it needs to
meet its missions and do you support this budget request?
General Odierno. It does and I do, sir.
Chairman Levin. On troop levels in Afghanistan, General,
let me just quickly ask you a question on a subject you and I
have talked about many times. Do you continue to support the
decision relative to the reduction and withdrawal of the surge
force by the end of September?
General Odierno. I do.
Chairman Levin. Does the recent violence relating to the
Koran-burning incident affect what your recommendation is or
might be relative to the pace of reductions?
General Odierno. I would say that we have to consider the
entire environment. However, I would argue that the overall
progress in Afghanistan continues along a solid path, and
putting the ASF out front.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, there's recently been a very
important report about females serving in the Armed Forces and
the issue of women in combat and being collocated with certain
ground combat units. According to the report, these changes are
going to result in over 14,000 positions being opened to women
that were previously denied. That's a small step in the right
direction, but there's still a long way to go.
Mr. Secretary, I think we all want to ensure that women who
serve in the military have the maximum opportunity to succeed.
Will you commit to continue to look for more ways to remove the
barriers to service by women, including an assessment of how
all the restrictions may some day be removed?
Secretary McHugh. I certainly do, and in fact that's
ongoing as we speak. DOD has provided the Army the opportunity
to run a pilot program that would open additional military
occupation specialties (MOS) to women in theater, that would
produce, if totally implemented, more than 60,000 new
opportunities. So that's something we continue to pursue.
I might add, based on my conversations with every theater
commander I've talked to personally, it's something they fully
support.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, the Seattle Times reported this morning that
285 soldiers who had been diagnosed as having post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) by their health care providers had those
diagnoses reversed by officials at the Madigan Medical Center
at Fort Lewis, WA, and this has, obviously, some significant
consequences for these soldiers and their families because they
would be entitled to a medical retirement based on their PTSD.
Would you give us a report on this incident, for the record
if you're not able to report on it right now?
Secretary McHugh. I'd like to do both. First of all, I
think the Surgeon General of the Army, General Patty Horoho,
has really taken this challenge on very aggressively. When the
first, I believe, 14 soldiers who were found to have those same
kinds of change of diagnosis came forward, she ordered a
complete reexamination of all the treatment and diagnostic
profiles of soldiers treated at Madigan. That's where those
additional nearly 300 cases came from.
The article focuses upon those. She went further than that,
though, and I think appropriately so. She's asked the Army
Inspector General (IG) to reexamine all similar cases across
the Army to determine if there is a need to reassess and reopen
other cases as well. She's also put out an All Army Activities
message to every soldier who feels that they may have had their
diagnosis inappropriately changed to come forward, and we'd put
them into that process as well.
So this is going to take some time, but it's absolutely
essential, and I think, at least for the moment, we're getting
on top of what for us is a very challenging and a very
troubling situation.
[The information referred to follows:]

My understanding is that certain behavioral health diagnoses and
disability ratings of soldiers processed through the disability
evaluation system may have been influenced by factors other than the
considered opinion of medical professionals applying the appropriate
diagnostic criteria. U.S. Army Medical Command announced it would offer
face-to-face re-evaluations to individuals it identified as requiring
re-evaluation.

Chairman Levin. It is important that you be on top of it.
This committee's had a very deep interest in this, the issue of
PTSD and the diagnoses. So if you would keep us informed on a
regular basis as to what that review shows.
Now, the two of you and I spoke in my office about the
energy use by the Army. In the budget request for fiscal year
2013, you're demonstrating a trend towards increasing the use
of rechargeable batteries for greater resiliency and lesser
weight over the nonrechargeable batteries, which not only weigh
more upfront in many cases, but also, obviously, you need more
of those.
You indicated you already are making some really good
progress in this area and that you were going to bring with you
some demonstration. I think we all really very much appreciate
this. We know what the price of energy is. Every American
family knows the price of energy. But what they're not as
familiar with is the cost of energy to our military, to our
budget, and to the safety of our troops that have to carry a
lot of weight on their backs, but also have to carry a lot of
energy that needs to be protected. We've had a lot of lost
service personnel because they're protecting energy sources.
I see you brought the equipment you thought you might be
able to bring in time. Do you want to take a minute or 2 and
tell us about what we're looking at?
Secretary McHugh. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, I was struck
when I found a data point that said for the average platoon to
go on a 72-hour patrol in Afghanistan they have to take with
them 400 pounds of batteries, which underscores the very points
that you made.
This small black box to my immediate right is called the
Modular Universal Battery Charger. It weighs six pounds. The
four larger units you see at the far end of the table weigh 85
pounds and collectively they do the work of this one 6-pound
generator.
The other unique difference is those four combined weight
85-pound rechargers are really limited in their application.
Obviously, you wouldn't put those on your back and hump them up
a mountainside. But they're also limited in their power
sources. You have to plug them into a wall. Otherwise they
don't work. This little 6-pound recharger is able to work off
just about any available source of energy.
What you see arrayed across the front of the table is a
solar blanket. It folds up much like a bath towel would, and
weighs about the same. If you unfurl that and plug this charger
into it, from the sun it can recharge those batteries. This
little 6-pound unit can run off vehicle power. It can use other
batteries' residual power to charge itself so it could charge
the other batteries. In short, from a battery perspective that
one 6-pound unit makes patrol limitations unlimited.
These are the kinds of things that provide operational
flexibility. But as you noted, Mr. Chairman, more importantly,
it takes enormous weight off the backs of our soldiers, and
provides them greater operational flexibility. When we are able
to reduce such things as convoys bringing in fuel, where every
44th convoy results in a casualty, these are important things
for soldier safety as well.
We're always trying to do better and I have no doubt there
are other things we can do, but we appreciate the opportunity
to show you one very important development.
Chairman Levin. We thank you very much for your initiatives
in the Army here. It really resonates with all of us. It's kind
of like a four-point success story. You have the safety of our
troops, you have the weight off their backs, you have the cost
issue, and you have the energy security issue as well. There
are so many plusses in what you're doing. I just want to
commend the Army for this initiative and for your request in
the budget to continue it.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'm
certainly glad to see this success story, Mr. Secretary.
General Odierno, you spent a significant portion of your
leadership role in the Army in Iraq and I'd like to get your
views, because we are hearing disturbing reports of a
resurgence of al Qaeda, increasing violence, and again
attempted consolidation or consolidation of power on the part
of Prime Minister Maliki.
I'm curious about your assessment of the situation in Iraq.
I know you still pay very close attention to it.
General Odierno. Senator, obviously I do watch it closely.
There is some concern as we watch what's going on in Iraq. The
key to Iraq will be, as we have said all along, ensuring that
all of the entities inside of Iraq continue to participate and
be part of the decision process within the government.
Senator McCain. Is that happening?
General Odierno. There's been some challenges to that in
most people's estimations, based on the prime minister's
attempt to consolidate a bit more power. I think with the
uncertainty in Syria, it's adding a difficult piece because of
al Qaeda and other groups who will try to exploit the room that
they see in this area. So I think that's some concern in the
rise in violence.
Senator McCain. Has there been an increase in al Qaeda
activity?
General Odierno. There are reports that there has been some
increase, especially in Anbar Province, of al Qaeda and also in
Baghdad. Though, I'm still very confident that the Iraqi
security forces can handle the violence. The issue becomes that
we need the people of Iraq to continue to reject al Qaeda and
not allow them to get back in and form groups. I think that's
the most important piece now.
Senator McCain. Isn't a very important piece also the
polarization and possible view on the part of the Sunni that
they are excluded from the government? The vice president, who
is Sunni, is now residing in Irbil, with a warrant out for his
arrest. It's not exactly, I think, the model that we had in
mind for the Iraqi democracy.
General Odierno. Senator, these are the type of seams that
I'm concerned about, because these are the type of seams that
other groups will attempt to exploit as we move forward. It's
important that we continue to work very closely with the Iraqi
Government, and they understand that, so they can close some of
these seams that are starting to develop.
Senator McCain. Thank you, General.
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General
Burgess, testified last month that the Assad regime and its
military remain ``a viable, cohesive, and effective force.'' In
the same hearing, James Clapper, Director of National
Intelligence, testified that, absent some kind of external
intervention, Assad will ``hang in there and continue to do as
he's done.'' Of course, a recent news report says that there's
been ethnic cleansing in Homs, a scene of devastation and
slaughter.
Do you agree with General Burgess and Director Clapper's
assessments?
General Odierno. I agree that the Syrian Government and
their military have significant capabilities that could be used
against the population.
Senator McCain. Could be or is being?
General Odierno. We're seeing parts of it used against the
population.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that if the current
conditions persist, Assad can remain in power nearly
indefinitely?
General Odierno. It's unclear. You never know how the
population will ultimately react once a leader uses force on
the population. But he certainly is attempting to stay in power
by using force.
Senator McCain. But you don't have any estimate as to how
long he could remain in power?
General Odierno. I think that he could remain in power for
some time.
Senator McCain. The Washington Post reported recently
there's been a ``spike in Iran's support for the Assad
regime.'' Do you know much about the nature of this support?
I'm sure that some of this is classified.
General Odierno. I will say I don't know specifically the
type of support. But as we have seen in and around the Middle
East, the use of the Quds Force, whether it be in Iraq, whether
it be in Lebanon, whether it be in Bahrain, and other places,
they are very active when they're supporting their own agenda,
and they clearly have an agenda in Syria. So I know that
they're active in Syria.
Senator McCain. Do you agree with General Mattis and
General Dempsey's assessment that if Assad fell it would be the
greatest blow to Iran in the last 25 years?
General Odierno. I think it would have a great impact on
Iran if Assad fell in Syria.
Senator McCain. Have you seen any deviation or effect of
the sanctions on Iranian actions towards developing nuclear
weapons?
General Odierno. My personal assessment is that sanctions
are having an impact inside of Iran.
Senator McCain. But have they changed any of the
activities?
General Odierno. No indications.
Senator McCain. No indication of that.
I want to congratulate you and Secretary McHugh on some of
the acquisition changes that you've made. I noted that there
was a report that had 70-some recommendations and you have
implemented a large number of them, 50-some. I think the
committee would like to hear from you those changes in the
acquisition process that need to be made by Congress, as a
result of the recommendations that you're making. Are there any
of those, Secretary McHugh?
Secretary McHugh. There certainly are, Senator. When this
body passed the acquisition reform amendments, the major
weapons procurement reforms, I was proud to have a little piece
of that when I was still on this side of the Hill. Frankly, it
was, I can tell you now from the other side of the Potomac
River, something that caused the Army to take a cold, hard look
at itself.
One of the reasons General Casey and I asked for this top
to bottom review of our acquisition processes were the
challenges resulting from the legislation that you and others
had so much impact upon. It provided us a blueprint that,
frankly, as you read it, is just common sense. If you had to
write a primer on what not to do in major acquisition programs,
you'd probably go to some of the Army initiatives in recent
years. That's not because people were uncaring or untracked,
but rather because we didn't know how to contain our
requirements spirals. We didn't understand that you have to
have reliance upon mature technologies, that sometimes good
enough is good enough.
As we implement those programs, the chief outlined, for
example, the GCV, that I think is a case study in trying to do
better, in learning that you need a fixed cost price plus
incentive program, instead of just tying people to percentage
increases regardless of what they spend, and in fact the more
they spend the more they make.
We retracted the first request for proposal that had over
900 must-have requirements appended to the GCV and re-issued it
with about 163, with all of those other nice-to-haves tradable
against cost.
The other big lesson we've taken from this is that
competition is good, and we will have at least two competitive
prototypes to compare. We're going to look at existing
nondevelopmental platforms as well.
We really learned a top-to-bottom lesson. I'm not
suggesting we don't have some ways to go. We hope to implement
all of the remaining suggestions of the Decker-Wagner report by
the end of this summer. But one of the big challenges and
another thing this Congress has directed us to do is to grow
the acquisition community within the Army. These are like O5s
and O6s. They just don't pop up overnight. We are reversing a
trend of some number of years whereby the acquisition workforce
was diminished, and now we want to bring those professionals in
so we don't go back to our bad habits.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Very briefly, General Odierno, how important is the
strategic partnership agreement between the United States and
Afghanistan in the grand scheme of things?
General Odierno. I think as we look to the future and what
we're trying to accomplish, it's key that we have a strategic
partnership agreement, I think similar to the one we developed
in Iraq. I think it's important for us to understand our
bilateral agreement and how we will continue to work with each
other as we move forward, in order to build on the success that
I expect to happen here and continue over the next 2 years in
Afghanistan.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you for your service and your leadership.
General Odierno, let me just ask you a few questions about
Iraq following on Senator McCain's questions. Just for the
record, at this point how many U.S. Army personnel are there in
Iraq?
General Odierno. We're changing it every day because we're
increasing, it's about 180 to 250 that are working in the
embassy in support of our actions.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Really, it's down that low now.
Am I right that a certain number of the troops that were in
Iraq have been repositioned to neighboring countries,
particularly Kuwait, and the numbers there?
General Odierno. We have a BCT that came out of Iraq and is
now inside of Kuwait. We have some aviation elements that are
also inside of Kuwait. We have people in Kuwait that also
support Afghanistan.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Odierno. The current number is somewhere between
12,000 and 15,000. It will come down over time, probably to
something less than 10,000 in Kuwait.
Senator Lieberman. Was one of the understandings or
foundations of that decision to leave some number of our troops
nearby Iraq in case of a crisis to go back in?
General Odierno. I think I would say it's first to sustain
some capability close by in the region. I would suggest General
Mattis could probably answer that question better than I, but I
think it's for us to sustain capacity in the region that allows
us to react with ground forces if necessary and if it was in
our best national interests.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Let me ask you to step back,
because of all you contributed to our effort in Iraq, and ask
you the question people ask me. Looking back, was it worth it?
General Odierno. First off, I always start out that there's
no longer a brutal dictator overseeing the Government of Iraq.
I think we forget about that sometimes, as we continue to
uncover the atrocities that were conducted under that regime. I
don't think we should ever, ever forget that.
We have bought them the time and space to work through a
democracy, to improve an economy that I believe in the long
term could add stability to the region. I still believe that.
We're going through a rough time now, as Senator McCain pointed
out, inside the Iraqi Government. But I still have confidence
that we can work our way through this.
What gives me confidence is we still have the parliament
working together, represented by Kurds, Sunni, Shia, trying to
solve problems inside Iraq. I think that's a positive
development and will continue to be. I think there's a lot of
opportunity for them to continue to develop economically as
they continue to increase their oil exports. So I think they
can have an impact on the region. I think they can be a
stabilizing factor in the long term. But we have to continue to
work very closely with them, treat them as a partner, continue
to help them, and help them understand the importance their
role can play in the region.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. I agree with that.
That's a transition, if I can, to the budget. I do want to
say first that when you think about what's happening in the
Middle East just in the last couple of weeks and the
possibilities we're looking forward to, I question the notion
of the rebalancing of our forces from the Middle East to Asia
Pacific. I understand why we'd want to focus on the Asia
Pacific because it's critically important, but I think we're
going to be engaged really in ways that we can't exactly
foresee in the Middle East.
Of course, we still have a presence there. Maybe I'll first
ask you to comment on that, and then I'll transition to my
concerns about the reductions in end strength as it affects our
ability to be involved in both theaters.
General Odierno. I don't see us necessarily rebalancing
from the Middle East to Asia Pacific. Based on the priorities
we have established, Asia Pacific is first, closely followed
behind by the Middle East. But I don't think that is causing us
to have less attention and capability available to use in the
Middle East.
I do think in some other parts of the world we are
diminishing our potential to influence, but it is not in the
Middle East. I have confidence that we will be able to do what
we need to do if necessary in the Middle East even though we
have now provided some focus into the Pacific region.
Senator Lieberman. Are those other parts of the world where
you think we may be diminishing our influence too much?
General Odierno. No, I think it's right on target, in
Europe and other places.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, I agree.
On the budget, I'm concerned, as I said when Secretary
Panetta and General Dempsey were here, that this budget takes
on an unacceptable degree of risk for our national security. I
say quickly that I understand that this is the budget that we
forced you, the Pentagon, to give to us through the Budget
Control Act.
But I hope that in this authorization process that our
committee is going through now and in the appropriations
process that we will take a second look at the implications of
the cuts that we are forcing on you, including the cut over the
next 5 years of 80,000 personnel in the Army.
Let me ask you first, because I don't believe we've heard
any details about the speed and depth of the reductions in the
ground force end strength that you're going to be compelled to
carry out, can you provide any further details on the expected
drawdown ramp?
General Odierno. Yes, I can. First, we're actually starting
in 2012. We started to reduce in 2012, so it's actually over a
6-year period. We have developed this ramp, which we believe
can be accomplished mostly through attrition. With the rate
that we're reducing the ramp, we believe that we can continue
to meet our commitments in Afghanistan and our other deployable
commitments with rotational forces.
So we feel confident that if it remains over a 5- or 6-year
period it will mitigate the risk associated with the downsizing
of our force. If we are forced to do it much quicker than that,
then the risk goes up exponentially in my mind, because first
of all it could have an impact on the soldiers and families of
our Army and also an impact on our ability to respond with
rotational forces if needed over the next several years,
specifically since we still have a large commitment in
Afghanistan.
If I could just talk, Senator, a little bit about the risk.
The risk that we're accepting is that we will not get into
long-term simultaneous operations again.
Senator Lieberman. As in Iraq and Afghanistan.
General Odierno. As in Iraq and Afghanistan; over a 10-year
period.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Odierno. Or a 7-year period, or a 6-year period,
with forces of 100,000 in one theater, and 150,000 in another.
That's where we are taking risk.
But we believe we mitigated that risk with our ability over
the next few years because of the ramp to reverse Active
component reductions if necessary, but also by utilizing our
Reserve component, which has gained, as everyone knows here,
great experience and capability. So we'd have to rely on them
in order to buy us time then to reverse the Active component.
We think that's how we mitigate that risk.
I would also say that we do have the capability to conduct
2 operations simultaneously at 490,000. Again, where the risk
comes in is if they get extended over a very long period of
time.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, my time is up. I would like to
talk to you at some point about the reversibility, because
obviously we just went through a period of time where we had to
reverse previous end strength reductions that left us, I think,
unprepared for what we had to face. But really, we got prepared
by putting tremendous stress on our forces, with a very high
boots-on-the-ground to dwell-time ratio. That's something I
know you want to avoid ever again having to put our people
through.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I have the highest respect for both of you. I
consider you to be personal friends, as well as certainly great
career guys in carrying out your mission. But I think it's
important to approach this budget thing a little bit
differently. We all know that you guys receive a budget and the
budget comes from the Commander in Chief, and you're going to
have to carry it out; you're both very, very competent to do
that.
However, the variable, as Senator Lieberman says, in this
is risk. I look at what's happening now. In this
administration's four budgets, we have a $5.3 trillion deficit,
more than all the deficits of every President in history. In
the fiscal year we're talking about now, it's $1.3 trillion.
The only real hits are defense. You could zero out the defense
budget and the OCO and that adds up to about $614 billion, and
still have a half trillion dollar deficit.
I look at that and I think, where is the money going?
Because it's not going to defense. Let me just put this into a
perspective that I think is significant. At our peak--that
would have been 2008 and 2009--we had approximately 188,000
troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. There also were over
100,000 servicemembers deployed within the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) in a supporting role.
During those years, the Secretary and the Chief of the Army
repeatedly briefed Army, us, right here in this room, about an
Army out of balance, that the demand for ground forces exceeded
the supply, that we needed to continue with the 15-month
rotations, and that constant conflict since September 11 had
stretched and stressed all of our volunteer force.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which was the
timeframe that we're talking about said, ``In the mid- to long-
range term, U.S. military forces must plan to prepare and
prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in
multiple theaters, in overlapping timeframes. This includes
maintaining the ability to prevail against two capable nation-
state aggressors.''
The new strategic policy, which I can actually read out of
here, talks about the objectives in one region by conducting a
combined arms campaign.
The first thing before I ask you were they wrong is to go
back and remember when you and I, Mr. Secretary, sat next to
each other in the House Armed Services Committee, and I
remember so well the last year before I came to the Senate we
had someone testifying that in 10 years we'd no longer need
ground forces. You remember that, too. We talked about it at
the time.
What I'm saying is we don't know how what we do today is
going to reflect where we're going to be in the future. So the
two statements that I read, do you think that Casey and Geren
were wrong at that time? Has something changed to change the
level of hostility out there?
Secretary McHugh. I don't think they were wrong. But things
have changed. First of all, when they appeared before both
Houses of Congress they were in two simultaneous wars. I don't
think they, on the ground, had the opportunity to totally get
the upper hand, and the pace of deployments was such growing to
try to sustain those two theaters.
Today, Senator, we're out of Iraq. We've already begun to
draw down forces in Afghanistan. As I understand the agreement
amongst the allied nations' coalition in Afghanistan, the plan
is to transition all control of combat operations to the
Afghanis by the end of 2014, which presumably will allow us to
draw down even more.
We've restored our boots-on-the-ground dwell times to 1 to
2 years.
I can tell you, if the Military Services had to write their
own budgets, I'm not sure any of us would have picked these
particular figures. But as you noted, that's not how it works.
We had the Budget Control Act, passed by both houses and signed
by the President, within which we had to do the best we could.
Senator Inhofe. Exactly, and I understand that. I know that
the situation has changed since that time. I still look at this
and look at the stress. We're the ones up here, and you used to
be in this position, where you'd be talking to your Reserve
components back home and you saw as their operational tempo
(OPTEMPO) went up. I would probably have a hard time, even
though we are drawing down right now, not knowing what's in the
future, that we can't consider the OPTEMPO for our Guard and
our Reserve to maintain the same thing.
My time's getting low here, so I want to cover two other
things quickly. First of all, on the adjustments in TRICARE,
the Obama budget calls for military families and retirees to
pay sharply more in their health care. Over 5 years, compared
to current fees, the fiscal year budget proposed would increase
the enrollment fees by 94 percent and up to 345 percent for
some retirees.
There's an article that you probably read by Bill Gertz
that was in just last week. He said, ``The administration
officials told Congress that one goal of the increased fees is
to force military retirees to reduce their involvement in
TRICARE and eventually opt out of the program in favor of
alternatives established by the 2010 Patient Protection,'' or
in other words, Obamacare.
Got any thoughts about that? Do you think it's an issue of
fairness in terms of the increase in the copays that are in
this budget?
Secretary McHugh. We think it's an action of necessity. The
facts are irrefutable. Over the last 10 years the cost of the
defense health programs has doubled and, like in the civilian
sector, painfully but undeniably, if we don't do something to
get that cost growth under control we're going to be in
jeopardy of losing the entire program.
We worked on this very meticulously. It was not something
we enjoyed doing, not something we wanted to do. But if you
look at the increases as proposed, I think at the end of the 5-
year period you'll still have an enormously generous benefit
that these men and women who served in uniform not only
deserve, but in our minds earned.
Senator Inhofe. I think I'm just out of time almost here,
Mr. Secretary. I agree with what you're saying, I agree.
General Odierno, I was one of them back when we were seated
next to each other in the House Armed Services Committee when
then-President Bush cancelled the Crusader program. We were
very distressed. In fact, one member actually retired--
Secretary McHugh, you remember our good friend from Oklahoma--
because of the way that happened. So I'm critical there of a
certain Republican administration.
Then we went through the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) cannon.
We went through the cancellation of the Future Combat Systems
(FCS). Now we're kind of left with the latest version of the
old Paladin technology. My concern is the Paladin Integrated
Management (PIM) program, I'm very much for it, and we have to
have that capability. I know that both of you understand and
appreciate that.
Is there any way to accelerate that? Right now you're
looking at 4 years out and it would seem to me we ought to be
able to get that capability prior to it, maybe in a 2-year
period of time. Have you thought about that?
Secretary McHugh. We have looked at all different courses
of action, Senator. We're trying to balance across the entire
modernization program how we do this. We believe in the PIM
program. It actually takes some of the technologies out of NLOS
and integrates it into the Paladin. So we're very excited about
that. We think it's something that we have to continue to
build.
But as we look at the adjustments we've made, it's
difficult for us to speed up programs right now as we try to
sustain a balanced modernization program across all of our
systems.
Senator Inhofe. With the limited resources. I agree with
that, and you have the GCV to consider and all of that. Well,
you're doing the very best you can with what you have, with the
hand that you're dealt, and we need to deal you a better hand.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Army and to
the Nation.
General Odierno and Secretary McHugh, you have a major
challenge in reshaping the force structure of the Army. You've
talked about eliminating brigades, reorienting the Army for
what might be termed more conventional type or a broader
spectrum of missions than you've seen. But you also have going
forward the responsibility to generate a cadre of advisers who
will be embedded, presumably, with Afghani forces going
forward, and even in a broader sense a cadre of mid-rank
professionals who can deploy to other forces around the world
and provide training, assistance, etcetera, which seems to be
something you have to do to complement the downsizing of our,
for want of a better term, conventional force.
Can you talk a moment about that challenge and how you
propose to meet it, General Odierno?
General Odierno. Senator, we just finished a training
exercise out at the Joint Readiness Training Center on a
brigade that's getting ready to send advisers over to
Afghanistan as we continue to shift our strategy in
Afghanistan. We've made the decision to center it around a BCT
because they're the ones who have the expertise that we need in
order to continue to exponentially improve the capability of
the Afghan forces.
So we'll take a brigade, we'll take the leaders out of it,
the noncommissioned officers, and then we will redistribute the
people of the brigades to other units so we can meet that
requirement. Then when they come back we will then regenerate
the BCT.
The reason we've done this is because it's about the
expertise. It's about having the right officers doing adviser
programs. I think we made some mistakes early on in Iraq in our
adviser programs because we had people that, frankly, weren't
qualified to be advisers, and we don't want to do that again.
We think the flexibility of our formations allows us to do
this, so we're very focused on doing this. I'm pleased so far
with the results. We'll see what happens when they deploy here
very shortly.
Senator Reed. I want to be sure I understand this. You take
out from that brigade the advisory element you need and send it
into Afghanistan. The remaining brigade, presumably the
soldiers and the personnel, the non-advisory personnel, are
then----
General Odierno. What happens is you have security elements
that go with them as well, which takes some soldiers, and other
things that will go in with them. It's a package that is built
out of the brigade. Then of course, on installations we have
more than one brigade. What we've done is we take those
soldiers, so they can continue to move forward and train on
other missions, into another brigade, and that's how we've
decided to do this.
That allows us to not only have the best expertise moving
forward, but what we were doing before is robbing other
institutions. That causes us to have weaknesses in other
institutions. We are now able to do this because of our reduced
commitments, for example not having brigades in Iraq now.
Senator Reed. One of the points you mentioned was the
security of these advisers. Given what's happened over the last
several weeks, how are you planning for, training for, or
what's your general reaction, to the ability to operate as we
thought we could do without some of the frictions we've seen
lately?
General Odierno. It's interesting, as we were out at the
training center we got some feedback from the brigade commander
getting ready to go. His assessment is the thing that we have
to do is, it's about being even closer, having the ability to
really be as close as you can to our allies, build a
relationship, so you completely understand the environment
you're operating in and you're able to identify the risks
associated with it.
That's one of the things we're concentrating on, that you
have to be aware, you have to identify the risks associated
with being advisers and understand, more importantly, the
personalities that you're working with. So we're focused on
that.
We're also focused on developing techniques to recognize
potential problems. I feel comfortable that we are addressing
this. It is still a very difficult threat to combat against.
But I would just say, Senator, to expand a little bit, we
cannot allow a few to derail what we're doing in Afghanistan;
99.9 percent of the ASF are working very hard, sacrificing
every day to move their country forward, and we have to
continue to support them. Even though we have a few who are
trying to take this mission down, we can't allow that to
happen. It's important we remain steadfast in this mission,
sir.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a final question on this line, as
we come out of Afghanistan, as you reconstitute the force for a
broader spectrum of missions, you'll still have this legacy
task. There has to be, and we've seen in the past, where the
proper recognition for service there in an advisory capacity is
not appreciated, that the incentive structure now is, that's in
the rear-view mirror, now you have to command a brigade, not an
advisory brigade but Active brigade under division format in
the United States, et cetera.
How are you going to ensure that these individuals are
given the kind of recognition they need in terms of promotions,
in terms of consideration, et cetera?
General Odierno. The Secretary and I get to write advice to
the board. We certainly will make sure we continue to give that
direction to the board.
I would argue it's another reason why we're centering it
around the BCT, because in reality they will still be brigade
commanders who are doing all of these missions. I think it's
not only about the quality, but it's also about the recognition
of what they're doing.
Senator Reed. Secretary McHugh, when last you were here we
talked about the study of the profession of arms, which you
initiated, which is a way to develop discussion on the spectrum
of the Army, including Army families--we talked about that--and
about the future of the Army. Can you just comment on the
perspectives that you've learned and how it's influenced you in
terms of these, not just budget deliberations, but all the
questions that we've spoken of today?
Secretary McHugh. Thank you very much. We're still engaged
in that discussion and, frankly, if one thinks about it, you
probably should be each and every day maintaining an Army. What
we have done upon that realization now is tried to embed into
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), into our
schools and classrooms, that kind of discussion, so we have a
continuous flow of information and try to keep those lessons
learned.
The thing that concerns me is the issue that we're hearing
more and more about the lack of discipline within the force.
This is particularly true amongst younger officers. They feel
as though the professional arms to them means more than just
going to combat; it means that you have to have discipline in
garrison, you have to have standards, both height and weight,
physical standards.
Amongst the cadres that I would have felt were the less
interested in those age-old kinds of things that made the Army
different, we find the most adherence. What we have to do, it
seems to me, is take those messages and broaden our definition
of what the profession of arms means. I don't think that's
going to happen overnight, and I think particularly as we
transition out of combat and come back, once more we're going
to have to take another look at that.
It's been an exciting intellectual experience, but I can't
tell you we're ready to write the book as yet. I know the Chief
has been very involved in this as well.
Senator Reed. There are standards, height, weight, and
physical fitness. Fortunately, there are waivers for height
standards. For both of us, I think.
General Odierno. For both of us, that's right, Senator.
[Laughter.]
Exactly what the Secretary said. As we grew in the 2000s,
there's a thought in the force that we've lowered our standards
as we were growing. It's very interesting. They want
competition, they want high standards. The profession also in
my mind moves towards sexual harassment and drug abuse. It's
all of these things; in our profession they are unacceptable.
Our moral and ethical values and our standards do not accept
things like this.
Bob Cone in TRADOC is institutionalizing a professional
program that will start when you're a Reserve Officer Training
Corps (ROTC) cadet or a West Point cadet and will take us all
the way through our institutional training. We're also now
developing training in the operational force to get at this.
It's absolutely essential to us as we move forward as an Army
and as we reduce the size of our Army, because the development
of our leaders will be what causes us to be successful, and
that our soldiers understand what they're doing and the
profession that they are in is special and requires special
traits and characteristics that we expect.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, and I want to thank
both of you for your service. I have a great deal of confidence
in both of you. I think our committee is well served, our
country is well served, and our national security interests are
well served by both of you. So thank you very, very much.
I want to talk about helicopters and cargo and then if we
have a moment maybe get back to the general budget questions.
General Odierno, there is an analysis being performed out there
on the options for the Armed Scout Helicopter, options ranging
from a new high-speed helicopter to a conventional helicopter
to modernization of the existing airframes. We submitted some
advance policy questions to you before your confirmation last
year and you stated that you agree the Army has an enduring
requirement for an armed aerial scout (AAS), that this was
reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter (ARH) program; and that requirement will be
validated by an ongoing AAS analysis of alternatives (AOA),
whose findings at that time were scheduled for release in the
third quarter of fiscal year 2011.
Has that slipped? I understand this analysis may have been
delivered to the Army leadership, but that no decision has been
reached. I also understand that the acting Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition has not yet been briefed on this
recommendation.
So tell us about this. When will this analysis be briefed
to the DOD Under Secretary and will this analysis be briefed to
us prior to a decision being made on which course of action is
taken?
General Odierno. Senator, first, we have not yet seen the
analysis. It's now due in second quarter of fiscal year 2012.
Senator Wicker. Why has it slipped?
General Odierno. I don't know. I'll get back to you on
that. I can't answer that question. I think probably some of
the companies involved asked us to slip that so they could get
a better analysis back to us. But I'll get you a more thorough
answer on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is
expected to be completed in the near future. The Army and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense are collaborating on the validation of the
sufficiency of the AAS AoA to determine whether additional market
research from a Request for Information (RFI) and results from
voluntary flight demonstrations will be required to complete the AoA.
The purpose of the RFI and voluntary flight demonstrations will be to
assess the current state of technology within industry. The Army will
not compare individual results, but rather assess their capability
against the gaps identified in the initial capabilities document.
The end state is to identify an affordable, achievable, moderate
risk materiel solution option based on the current state of technology
in the market. It is anticipated that the AAS decision and briefing to
Congress will occur during the second quarter of fiscal year 2013.

General Odierno. But we expect to have an answer back on
this AOA. We will take that analysis, we'll take a look at it,
and then we'll decide, is that better than modernizing Kiowa
Warriors or going with a new system? When we get that
information the Secretary and I will be more than happy to
provide that to the committee.
Senator Wicker. Do you have any estimate of when we might
see that?
General Odierno. Our determination will probably be made
either by the end of fiscal year 2012 or the beginning of
fiscal year 2013, when we finally make a decision on that. As
we move towards that decision we would bring it to you. It
would probably be somewhere in the beginning of fiscal year
2013 or the end of fiscal year 2012.
Senator Wicker. So it could be as early as October or
November of this year. Okay, thank you very much.
Let's move to cargo then, General. The Air Force has
decided to pursue the divestment of all C-27 aircraft in our
inventory. C-27s, a twin-engine turboprop, can carry up to 44
passengers, more than 23,000 pounds of cargo and fuel, and can
land on unimproved fields as short as 3,000 feet in areas such
as Afghanistan.
Were you consulted prior to this Air Force decision to
divest us of all C-27s?
General Odierno. I would say we had a discussion about it
as a joint group together once the decision was made, as we
looked at the budget and what the results of the cuts would be,
the Air Force recommended the reduction of the C-27.
Senator Wicker. So the decision had already been made
before you were brought in?
General Odierno. The Air Force made the decision.
Senator Wicker. Just tell us. You're part of the team, but,
all things being equal, are you disappointed that you're not
going to be able to have the benefit of these C-27s?
General Odierno. We need a capability that enables us to
provide intratheater lift, to provide support to our ground
forces, as we've seen in Afghanistan. The Air Force has assured
us that they will be able to do that with the current C-130
fleet, and we've developed a memorandum of understanding that
would tell us that they will provide that support to our units.
It's their responsibility to provide that intratheater airlift
to us. We need it because I think, Senator, the CH-47 fleet has
been used quite heavily there and they cannot bear the whole
load. We need help with fixed wing resupply.
Secretary McHugh. Senator, may I just?
Senator Wicker. Yes, sir.
Secretary McHugh. The Chief is absolutely right. Each of
the Services, as we went through our budgets, made their own
decisions. However, on this issue the Chief and I along with
the Air Force were provided an opportunity to discuss it, and
one of the outcomes of that was the agreement that the Chief
just mentioned.
I didn't want to make it sound as though we weren't given
some opportunity to discuss it with them, because that wouldn't
be totally accurate.
Senator Wicker. Let me just observe that this aircraft has,
it seems to me, the capability that we need in Afghanistan;
with the mountainous terrain we have there, the limited road
network, which is further constrained by the threat of roadside
bombs. It just seems to me the C-27 is equipped to help us, and
it makes no sense to me that we have this new aircraft and
we're going to get rid of a brand-new aircraft that provides
the capability.
Quickly, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the Budget Control
Act is the law. You might not have put it in place, but you're
constrained by it. It's also a fact that sequestration right
now is the law and may in fact kick in. There's a discussion
around here of trying to handle this during the lame duck. But
let me just ask you, Mr. Secretary, what contingency plans do
you have for dealing with sequestration? I hope it can be
avoided. I desperately hope it can be avoided and believe we
should have made the tough decisions with regard to the
explosion of entitlement spending. We've collectively been
unable to do that and now we're faced with the prospect of this
being taken out of the hides of the people that provide
national defense to us.
What do you think of the prospect of waiting until the lame
duck to answer the sequestration, and what would be the
consequences if we don't address it sooner?
Secretary McHugh. For the Army and all the Military
Services, in fact DOD writ large, the irony is we don't really
have to plan a lot because under the law we're not allowed to
make certain cuts in some areas and ameliorate cuts in others.
Rather, every appropriation line must be cut by an equal
amount.
Now, that makes our mathematical challenge pretty easy, but
it really highlights the incredibly difficult nature should
sequestration go forward. You can't buy 92 percent of a GCV or
an aircraft carrier. We would have to, I would imagine, declare
Nunn-McCurdy breaches on hundreds, if not thousands, of
contracts, for example.
But the real challenge, I think, is that the aura of
uncertainty probably focuses upon those with whom we do
business--our manufacturers, our suppliers--that have
stockholders, that have to answer to other authorities.
Senator Wicker. That have employees.
Secretary McHugh. Employees, exactly.
They have to begin to plan, it seems to me, and that's the
discussions we've heard from them, about acting sooner rather
than later. We worry about the industrial base. We worry about
those kinds of effects that sometimes we don't think a lot
about in government, but would be very real in terms of running
DOD.
Senator Wicker. My time is up, but my hat is off to you for
having to deal with a real tough budget in addition to
defending our country. I want to work on both sides of the
aisle to make your situation a little more doable.
Thank you very much to both of you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my appreciation for your service as well, and to
the men and women who serve under you in our military.
The new U.S. national strategy, as has been indicated,
calls for the increase in our presence and involvement, more
involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course, the threat
there, among others, is an unpredictable nuclear North Korea
and China using its military capability to reduce the freedom
of action of its neighbors. Now, a larger presence is necessary
to deter or repel aggression from these threats.
The three large developed democracies in the region--Japan,
South Korea, and Australia--collectively have an economy that
is 25 percent larger than China's and, of course, incalculably
larger than North Korea's. But as a percentage of the gross
domestic product, they spend less than half what the United
States does on defense.
I think all of us are getting concerned about
relationships, partnerships and associations with allies and
friends, but that our partnership is disproportionately more
expensive than theirs. We ought not to be looking at senior
partners-junior partners when it comes to the expenditures or
the requirements.
We've always had a large presence in South Korea since the
Korean conflict. What can we do to make certain that South
Korea, Japan, and others pay a larger proportion of the shared
expense because we share the threat? Mr. Secretary?
Secretary McHugh. It's something we're always discussing
with our allies, and there's no question some are more
forthcoming than others. As for the Australians, I have to tell
you--and the Chief could speak more directly to this than I
could--operationally it's hard to find a better ally.
Senator Nelson. I understand.
Secretary McHugh. They are on the front lines with us, and
on a population per capita basis have taken tremendous losses.
The Marine Corps is entering into a cooperative agreement where
we will have marines stationed around Darwin, Australia. So
they continue to participate.
The Koreans and the Japanese, particularly the Japanese,
are somewhat limited in what they can do militarily because of
their constitution arising out of World War II, but in terms of
financial support are very, very supportive. There are ongoing
discussions on Japan with respect to relocation on Okinawa and
such-and-such, but if all of our allies were as financially
supportive as those two nations I think we'd be in a much, much
different situation.
That does not mean we don't always ask them for more. We
do. We're engaged in discussions right now. J.D. Thurman, the
combatant commander in Korea, is talking about Yongson
relocation and tour normalization and all those things, and
we're trying to see what kind of support will be afforded
there. But it's always something we ask for.
Senator Nelson. Well, I hope we ask very aggressively and
assertively, because of the importance of appropriate
partnerships in terms of who contributes to the partnership.
The discussion earlier was interesting about trying to
compare deficits. The best way to avoid having a large deficit
is to have supplementals. We went through a significant period
of time where the wars were supported by supplementals as
opposed to by the budgeting process. I think it's always
interesting. Sometimes it's not comparing apples and apples,
but apples and watermelons, the difference in how the budgets
have occurred over the last 10 to 11 years for comparison
purposes.
We've been at war for over a decade. We've learned a lot
about the missions for our military and we've learned a lot
more about the relationship between the Active Duty, Guard, and
Reserve units for the future. Part of DOD's budget plan is to
leverage the operational experience of the National Guard and
Reserves and looking at a more agile and smaller force.
General Odierno, can you give us some idea of how you're
looking at the Operational Reserve in connection with the
future plans as it relates to the budget?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. I sure can. It is a
key part of our strategy as we move forward. A couple things I
just remind everybody of is, with the National Guard and
Reserve component the limiting factor is not necessarily money;
it's time. It's the time that they have available to train and
how we trade that time off with them with their employers and
other things as we go back to a more steady state. So we're
working very closely with the Reserve component to find that
sweet spot of the time available.
There are two things that we're doing. We've moved $400
million from the equipping accounts to the training program.
The reason we've done that is because the National Guard
equipment and Reserve component equipment is 87 percent, the
Active is at 86 percent right now. At the end of this year
they'll both be around 92 percent, and as equipment continues
to come out of Iraq and Afghanistan in reset we believe we will
solve almost all of our equipping problems in both the Guard
and the Active component.
What we're trying to do is increase the amount of money
spent in training in order to sustain a higher level of
readiness. We are going to develop a progressive readiness
model for both the Active and Reserve component that we can
use. It's a model we have used for Iraq and Afghanistan, but as
we come out of Iraq and Afghanistan we will adjust that model
in order to sustain a level of readiness in the Guard and
Reserve as they rotate through this progressive readiness
model. We'll do the same thing for the Active component.
We're working very closely with the other components to
develop this, so we can take advantage and not lose the
experiences that have been gained over the last several years.
Senator Nelson. I think that's obviously what you need to
do, and I appreciate the fact that you're focused on it.
Mr. Secretary, anything you would like to add?
Secretary McHugh. I think actually the Chief said that very
well. The challenge at the moment is we've used for the last 10
years the phrase ``Operationalized Reserve'' and when you're in
full combat in two theaters, it's pretty easy to know how that
works and what it means. The challenge for us now is to retain
the incredible skill that both the Guard and the Reserve have
accrued over the last 10 years and not squander it, and do it
in a way that makes them feel a part of the process as well.
We're all working, and I tip my hat to the Chief because
he's been very engaged with the Guard and Reserve leadership to
make sure we agree on the way forward.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
The Government Accountability Office noted that there has
been a lack of collaboration and commonality among the Services
that has led to some duplicate costs for designing and
manufacturing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) systems. Obviously, some level of competition is
important, but when it comes to this I think collaboration
probably is even more important than competition.
Can you give us some idea of how you might be moving toward
more cooperation on the development of ISR capabilities and
needs?
General Odierno. We work very closely within DOD and
through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process, also
through the requirements development process, and also with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, who plays a large
role in ISR. All the Services are working very closely in these
processes. First, the most important thing is to ensure we can
all download unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities to a
ground station that everyone can see, so we get maximum use out
of it. We've done that over the years, and we've gotten better.
We're now working through the capabilities that we need in
the future for intel, what do we need for our ground maneuver
components, and we're working our way through that.
One of the things that we are doing is we have put our UAVs
in the Army now in our aviation brigades. We just ran our first
training rotation at one of our training centers where we
actually teamed unmanned and manned aircraft together, and it
was incredibly successful. This is the future for the Army, so
we're making sure that people understand why we need this
capability and get it integrated into the DOD ISR process.
We're very aware of this and we're working very hard to
ensure we make the best use of the money available in this
area.
Senator Nelson. With tight budget times, it's obviously
more important. It's always important to do it, but it's even
more important right now.
Thank you both. I appreciate it very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both. It's good to see you again.
General, I appreciated your comments on the Guard and
Reserve and the role that they play. I have recognized it as
someone who's serving. I see it. I know the commitment for and
from the Guard and Reserve units. So I know the Army guy gets
it, but I'm a little concerned that the Air Force isn't getting
it because of the devastating cuts to the Air Guard. Whereas we
get a good value for the dollar with our Guard and Reserve
members, I'm hopeful that we can convince the Air Force to
reevaluate the draconian cuts they have made to the Air Guard
in particular.
That being said, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for
your comments on the role of women in combat. It's something I
have been very keen on for quite some time. Having served for
32 years, I have served with many women; the military fellow
that we had was a Kiowa pilot and commander. Both of you know
who she is, and she was in Afghanistan and Iraq, leading men in
battle.
That line, as far as I'm concerned, is really nonexistent,
and just escorting a lot of the convoys, delivering fuel and
supplies, that is the front line. If that isn't, I don't know
what is.
I wrote a letter to the chairman. I asked for a hearing on
that very issue. But I'm glad that you're moving along.
You mentioned the pilot program that would open up another
60,000 positions. Would that be in addition to the positions
that Secretary Panetta asked all the Services to look at?
Secretary McHugh. If I believe we're talking about the same
thing, we have taken two steps. The first is what you've said.
The Secretary has guided all the Services, in the Army's case,
to open up 6 more MOSs, which produced 13,000 openings. That's
done.
The pilot program which we intend to run approximately from
April to August will look at those other MOSs, which produce
closer to 66,000 new positions should they all be opened and
approved. We have to get that approval.
Senator Brown. Right, and subject to the qualifications of
the individual female soldier.
I spoke with Admiral McRaven about this and it's very
interesting as to the role they play in special operations and
what they're trying to do, and very, very instructive, and I
appreciated that frank conversation.
I also have the same concerns as Senator Inhofe regarding
TRICARE. As a Senator, my staff and others we're not affected.
But here we are, the military men and women that have served
and are getting that benefit are going to be cut or asked to
pay more of a burden. I feel it's a breach of the contract
between the soldiers and us, and it's something I know that
you're aware of and are going to try to work through. I'd be
happy to share my thoughts with you at another time on this.
On end strength, I guess I'll be blunt. Can the Army come
down by 80,000 soldiers in 5 or 6 years without telling some of
the folks, the 15-year sergeant, E7s, that have done three or
four tours and were begged to come back, and all of a sudden
say, ``we're done, we have to do a drawdown, and you're out''?
How do we handle that? Is that something you think we can
actually do?
Secretary McHugh. We're working as hard as we can to try to
manage both our discharges and our accessions in a way so that
we don't have to have forced outs. As you noted, they're not
something anyone likes to go through. But the reality is at the
end of the day we're probably going to have to ask some
soldiers who have served honorably and who meet at least
minimum criteria to perhaps think about a next challenge in
their lives.
We in the Army are faced with an inescapable reality that
48 cents currently of every dollar we spend has to go to
personnel. So when we have a budget that is reduced as dictated
under the Budget Control Act, one of the first places we have
to look is our end strength. We had to balance end strength
against all of those other needs; the modernization, the
equipping, the family programs, the things that if you don't
support them you're on a quick path to a hollow Army.
We were confined in some ways, but we're trying to manage
this as reasonably and as humanely as we can so we avoid the
circumstances you spoke of.
Senator Brown. Sure. I know that you're both on it. I know
General Odierno is on it as well, and I appreciate that. I
would suggest before we look at personnel we look at all the
fraud, waste, and abuse in contracting, procurement, and
obviously programs, and try to fix that first, instead of
looking at the soldiers and their livelihoods first.
General, the new post-September 11 Army total force policy
reinforces the need for the Operational Reserve that is fully
integrated in the Active component. I know we've talked about
this. Can you comment on the planning your staff is doing to
make this policy a reality when it comes to putting OCO funding
back in the base budget for Guard and Reserve operations?
General Odierno. What we are trying to do, first it's
putting funding in the base budget to conduct operations as a
whole, and then we choose whether it's Active, Reserve, or
National Guard who would accomplish that mission. It's
important about identifying steady-state missions that we might
have to accomplish, whether it be Bosnia or Kosovo, or whether
it be the Sinai. There are certain missions that we do think
fit the Reserve component better, such as the three I just
mentioned. If we believe they will be steady-state operations,
we will attempt to get those into the base budget and out of
OCO over time, and we'll work with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to do that.
Senator Brown. I know the State partnership, I'm presuming
you're supportive of it?
General Odierno. Very supportive of it.
Senator Brown. It's another way to get boots-on-the-ground
at a very, very low cost, and obviously provide valuable
training.
General Odierno. We'd like to expand that to the Pacific
and we're working very closely with the National Guard to do
that.
Senator Brown. I spoke to the head of that entity to make
sure that happens. I'm certainly supportive of it. The value
for the dollar is really amazing, especially trying to counter
a lot of what's happening with the Chinese and other entities
coming into those countries. It's a good buffer for short
money.
General, as part of the President's strategic guidance the
Army plans to enhance its activities in Asia, specifically the
Asia-Pacific region. What does that mean? Given that 7 of the
world's 10 largest armies are located in that region, what
level of ground forces do you anticipate will be necessary
throughout the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR to implement
this new strategic guidance? Have you and your Marine
counterparts worked through this?
General Odierno. We are currently working very closely with
U.S. Army Pacific and PACOM to identify their long-term
requirements in the Pacific. We've had several meetings. In
fact, in about a week or so the U.S. Army PACOM will be coming
back here to talk to us about their future requirements.
So the way we see this happening is we have 66,000 soldiers
currently assigned in the Pacific region, and we'll then go
through this progressive readiness model of both Active and
Reserve components. When they become available, we'll then
assign them specific missions. Some will be rotational training
missions, some will be exercises, and some will be other things
where we continue to shape and influence these key countries.
One of the things I talk about all the time is 22 out of
the 27 countries in the Pacific have chiefs of defense that are
army, and the army tends to dominate the political influence in
many of these nations. So the more that we can engage and gain
access, the more we'll be successful. We're working with PACOM
in order to provide us the opportunities where we will rotate
forces, both Active and Reserve components, to gain access and
build relationships that we will need later on if necessary.
Senator Brown. I think we saw that relationship in Egypt,
when we were able to pick up the phone and say, ``stand down
and let things develop a little bit.'' Otherwise it could have
been a lot different.
Thank you, sirs.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you for having this hearing.
I want to welcome Secretary McHugh and General Odierno.
Thank you both for your outstanding leadership you provide for
our Army. I also want to thank the men and women of the Army,
Active, Guard, Reserve, and civilians, as well as their
families, for their service and sacrifice.
General, I understand you had the opportunity to visit some
of our troops in Hawaii in January. I know these agendas are
packed, but I hope you found some time to enjoy our beautiful
State. I'm certain you also got a chance to experience
firsthand the wonderful bond between the local community and
the Army that we have there.
Mr. Secretary, the issue of sexual harassment and assaults
in the military is a very important topic and we must do all we
can to prevent it. Can you discuss what the Army is doing at
the entry level--that's Officer Candidate School, basic
training, and West Point--to educate soldiers on this very
important topic at the beginning of their service, to lay the
foundation that the Army has zero tolerance for this?
Secretary McHugh. Thank you very much, Senator. It is a
highly critical problem and one that, as I've said in the past,
could not be more contrary to what the Army values are and what
I think every man and woman in this country who puts on any of
the Service uniforms comes to serve for.
As you noted, we are trying to take a very holistic
approach to this, as is required in virtually any program.
We've tried to put sufficient funding against it. We've
increased in the last 5 years the budget allocated for the
entire sexual harassment and assault response program by 500
percent.
One of the key ways in which, as is true in any values
program in the military, we have to tackle this is ensure that
our emerging leaders understand both what the rules are and
what is expected of them to serve as leaders and imbuing those
kinds of values and those kinds of understandings into those
who serve under them. So whether it's West Point, where I had a
chance to talk to the Superintendent just a few weeks ago about
some of the things they're doing to change and to update some
of their programs, or into our basic officer leader courses, or
into our drill sergeant courses, into virtually every level and
unit of training, we're adding a component that teaches exactly
the expectations for sexual assault and how we will hold
soldiers accountable.
In our view this is not something you can just teach in a
day or 2. It is a day-by-day component of all of our
instructional activities, and we expect soldiers when they get
out of those classrooms to go back and to live the values that
we hope we're conveying upon them. Education is important, but
we're doing a lot of other things in terms of prosecution,
analysis, et cetera.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
General Odierno. Senator, would you mind if I added just a
little bit to that? I talk a lot about that. First of all,
sexual harassment is inconsistent with our values. This is
about our profession. It's important we foster a climate of
trust and respect among all soldiers, because when we go into
combat, we must have complete trust in each other, no matter
race, color, creed, or sex. It doesn't make a difference.
Sexual harassment in my mind challenges this, and that's
why we cannot put up with it within our Army. We are doing
everything we can to change the culture. We have leaders
involved in the institution, as the Secretary just walked you
through, at every level of training, and we are now increasing
our training in our operational force, that this simply cannot
be tolerated and that to be part of the Army you have to be
part of the Army culture, and being part of the Army culture
you must have the right values, and one of the most important
values is trust and respect for your fellow soldiers.
One of the things we're focusing on are the bystanders.
It's intolerable to me that there's people that see sexual
harassment and don't assist a soldier, don't report it, or
don't try to help a soldier as they are seeing sexual
harassment occur.
We're focused on this. We are spending a lot of time to
ensure everybody understands the importance of this, to include
our ability to investigate and prosecute as well.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Thank you so much for that response.
I want to applaud you for your efforts to give our
soldiers, and their families for that matter, a new deployment
model where they have more stability and predictability. Your
new model should increase dwell time in the Army deployment
structure.
General, can you discuss how this new model will impact our
troops, including the Guard and Reserve?
General Odierno. First of all, we've moved to 9-month
rotations, and we will continue that as we develop this new
model. You'll be through a reset phase, you'll go through a
training phase, you'll go through an available phase, and then
you'll be able to go back again and start and reset.
It's very predictable. People will understand when they're
gone and when they're not. In the Reserve component it'll be
done over a longer period of time. We're still negotiating over
that. I think it'll probably be a 60-month period, which is
more consistent with our deployment rates we expect out of the
Reserve component. But they would still have a reset phase, a
training phase, and an available phase. It would become very
predictable for our Reserve component soldiers and, just as
important, their employers as they continue to become our great
citizen soldiers.
We are designing that now. We're really studying this. I've
given our Forces Command the lead in developing this
capability, and we expect to have some solution here in the
next several months that we'll be able to bring forward in
detail.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much for your
responses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we're very fortunate to have you two leaders at a
challenging time for our Army. General Odierno, through your
distinction in combat you have a special connection with our
troops at a time we need that. To my former colleague and top
Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, whose got a
lot of respect on Capitol Hill, we're going to need that as we
work through some of these challenges, the biggest one being
sequestration.
It's been talked about a little bit this morning. I think
sometimes we don't focus enough on the big changes you're going
to have to make even prior to year end, when the sequestration
actually hits. Could you give me a better sense of the date
upon which the U.S. Army would have to make some of these
painful adjustments between now and the end of the year?
Secretary McHugh. We would have to take guidance from the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). As a former budget
chair, you know about those kinds of things. But clearly by the
end of the summer, according to what I've heard from the
Secretary of Defense and others, we're going to have to start
putting pencil to paper. There are some things that just
normally in a time of difficult challenges we would probably
look toward. But in reality I can't imagine what we would do in
any way that could adequately prepare us to deal with this.
If it were to come to pass, it would require an entire
reworking of our national defense strategy. For us to go in
prior to having the time to do that and to make substantial
changes I think would jeopardize any of the decision choices we
might be able to forge from that.
I think the core of your question, Senator, is a critical
one. This would touch virtually every aspect of our Army. We
would probably have to reduce the Army by another 100,000
personnel, probably 50-50 between the Active and the Reserve
component. We would probably have to come down an additional
four to six brigades. Whether you're talking about contracting,
whether you're talking about pays, or whether you're talking
about incentives, under the Budget Control Act we're not given
authority to control those. We have to take across-the-board
cuts, which makes it a relatively easy mathematical change, but
it makes it an administrative nightmare.
I would imagine as well we'd have several hundred, if not
several thousand, Nunn-McCurdy breaches simply because of our
inability to meet contract requirements. It would be
devastating.
Senator Portman. You just laid out some of the enormous
changes that would have to be made. They would be painful to
our personnel and to procurement and would be across the board,
they would affect all aspects of your budget. When do you
actually have to start making changes? In other words, when do
you have to start notifying some of our personnel, given that
under law this is scheduled to occur on January 1, 2013? Do you
have to start making those changes in the summer, when you said
you were going to put pencil to paper? Do you have to start
making them in September? How much time do we have here in
Congress to adjust this and to come up with a common sense
approach?
Secretary McHugh. I would have to defer to the guidance
from the Office of Personnel and Management and also OMB, but
clearly we are bound by law for certain notifications. We can't
just slam people out on day 1. It would take some time to bring
us to those particular levels.
As I mentioned, the current plan as I understand it from
OMB is to, if required, start to make those decisions probably
by the end of the summer, some time mid to late August.
Senator Portman. I think it would be helpful for the
committee to know even with more specificity. I've heard
September as a deadline. I think there needs to be a wakeup
call here that we need to act and act soon in order to avoid
that.
Both Senators Wicker and Brown talked about the next issue
I wanted to touch on and, General Odierno, I'd like to get your
thoughts on it. Senator Wicker talked about the C-27 and
Senator Brown talked about the Air Guard. I know the Air Force
has made a decision here to cancel the C-27 and divest of this
aircraft, including ones that are already deployed in
Afghanistan.
I had the opportunity yesterday to meet with the commander,
who was just back from Afghanistan, of the C-27 crews. My
understanding is you met with him in Afghanistan and thank you
for doing that. Our Ohio National Guard is there. We're really
proud of them.
Your soldiers are the ones that get impacted by this Air
Force decision. My understanding is the relationship between
your soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan and the Air National
Guard is terrific and that they are providing a necessary
service for you. Can you talk a little about that? What are
your thoughts about the performance of the C-27 and about this
very special relationship, not unique but special relationship,
between the Air National Guard and your soldiers on the ground
in Afghanistan?
General Odierno. Senator, as you said I went to see them in
December. I had a chance to spend some time with the crews and
the supporting elements. Also, I was with the 82nd Airborne
Division, who were providing the majority of the support to the
Regional Command-South and the 82nd Airborne Division. The
relationship that was built and the delivery of capability has
made a difference. The OR rates were extremely high. The
relationships built were very, very good, and it impacted very
positively on their ability to accomplish their mission.
So that's very clear. That's why I would say it's important
for us to sustain the capability to be able to have air assets
dedicated to ground forces. That's the most important point I
make.
The Air Force has made the decision that they think they
can do that with C-130s. If we get that same support, that's
what we need, that support. Though, I would say that it has
been provided very successfully by the C-27 over this last
deployment. I think they have just gone through a change and
now there's a new group on the ground as well now providing
that same support with C-27s.
Senator Portman. Yes, 179th Airlift Wing is very proud to
provide that support. As you say, the ratings have been very
impressive and the relationship seems to be working, that
you're getting what you need and you're getting it in a timely
fashion.
I would just ask, since your Service originated the
requirement that led to the procurement of the C-27, which is a
new plane, do you feel that that requirement is still valid? Do
you think the requirement still exists?
General Odierno. I do, Senator. We need it because we
cannot conduct all of those type of missions with rotary wing
aircraft. We do have that mission and the Air Force has decided
they can deliver that mission with the C-130.
Senator Portman. The C-27 does it for $2,100 an hour. The
CH-47 you talked about earlier does it at $11,000 an hour; the
C-130 between does it, for $100 and $7,100 an hour. So from a
taxpayer perspective, the C-27 is not only able to land on
small airstrips and provide unique performance, but it's saving
the taxpayer money.
I would hope that you would continue to make your points
internally, General and Mr. Secretary, to be sure that we're
not pulling a capacity out of theater that meets an urgent
requirement. I've never seen the military do this before, and I
look forward to working with you with regard to the need that
currently exists and to be sure that, if the memorandum of
agreement is something that we're going to have to live with,
that it does include the ability to provide that important
capability.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Mr. Secretary, welcome. Obviously, we have a lot
of work to do on this committee with you and the other Services
in terms of having to shape the authorization bill this year.
I'd like to spend a little bit of time today talking about
TRICARE. I chair the subcommittee where we're going to have
pretty extensive hearings on the proposal to increase the
payments. I just want to make sure that we're all proceeding
from the right premises here. The proposal is a difficult
tradeoff. I've heard questions asked of other witnesses as to
whether TRICARE fees are in fact eating away from hard programs
that are needed in the operational environment.
I say this as someone who grew up in a military family and
spent 5 years in the Pentagon, in addition to the time I was
privileged to serve as a marine; all of us have a lifetime of
stewardship. We owe people who have served in the military a
lifetime of stewardship in exchange for their decades of
service. General, I assume you would not disagree with that?
General Odierno. I do not disagree with that, Senator.
Senator Webb. I think when you were talking in your opening
statement how the Army boils down to the soldier, the soldier
boils down to the family, and all of this boils down to what a
soldier, marine, sailor, or airman can see happened to the
people who went before them, how they were treated after they
left the uniform.
I grew up in the Marine Corps tradition and no marine is
ever left behind. A great model of that was at Chosin
Reservoir, when the 1st Marine Division brought out not only
its wounded, but it strapped its dead onto the trucks. We will
not leave a marine behind.
I feel just as strongly about the commitment that we have
made to lifetime medical care to the people who have served.
They have relied on this. I know there's no written contract,
but they have relied on it as a moral contract. I have lived
that, I have observed it.
We know we have a problem with medical care. It's a
national problem. It's a huge challenge. We've been trying
different ways to get our arms around it. It's not simply a DOD
problem. I'm going to be very specific about this, I do not
believe that we should allow ourselves to characterize the
commitment that we have made as something that's a throw-away
matter as we try to balance out these other issues. How we take
care of these people is one of the great litmus tests that
people who are serving right now are going to be looking at.
We're going to have more time to discuss this in the
subcommittee hearings. But as a starting point, I think people
need to understand, I think my colleagues need to understand, I
think the American people need to understand, what this looks
like from the experiences of someone who has spent a career in
the military. I have a chart that I asked my staff to put
together. This is notional, but I think it's important.
[The chart referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Webb. We're talking about these proposed fees on
TRICARE as just a little bump from people who don't have to pay
that much. Obviously people know there are different kinds of
TRICARE: TRICARE Prime; TRICARE Standard; TRICARE Extra; and
TRICARE For Life once you hit age 65. But let's just say you
are a servicemember and a spouse. This is the line that you are
seeing right now before we make any changes.
When you're on Active Duty, your medical care is completely
taken care of. When you retire and up to the age of 65--and we
just picked TRICARE Standard here; there are other options--
it's about $300 a year. When you hit 65, you go on Medicare B.
You have no choice. If you want TRICARE for Life, you go on
Medicare B and we're going to put a fee on top of that.
Medicare B is something everybody in this country gets. If
they're going to pay into it, it's something you have to get if
you want to keep your TRICARE. It's not simply something that
was given to you because of your service.
What is Medicare B? It's broken down in fees based on your
income, but let's say if you're a retired E7 with a spouse,
you're going to go to almost $2,400 a year before we even start
talking about these other TRICARE fees. If you are someone who
is in the income level of people who are up here or
considerably less, you're going to go to $7,600 a year in your
Medicare B fees before we even start talking about TRICARE
fees.
Let's understand what's really happening. I think there's a
great misperception up here about what happens to people at the
time when their income is probably at the lowest in their
career, in the retirement years, and when their physical
medical vulnerabilities are probably at the highest.
We'll have more discussions on that as we move forward, but
let's all make sure we're talking off the same data.
General, I have one other question that I would like to
raise with you, and it goes to a number of incidents--and
Secretary McHugh is aware of these incidents--the Wynott
incident, another incident with a family, the Sharrot family,
they are constituents of ours, but also to the aftermath of the
Pat Tillman situation, where the command accountability in the
Army came under question.
I'm not going to go through and nitpick these three
incidents. But in all three cases there were people, sometimes
family members, in one case, a loyal career Army O6 whose son
had been killed--who became so frustrated with an inability to
get answers that they had to come over to us. Obviously I'm
going to help anybody who comes over here, but I don't think we
should be doing that. I think the Army should be doing that.
The question in all three of these, in many cases, boiled
around whether proper accountability was being put into place
for people who had taken certain actions during the incidents.
Do you think those incidents are unusual? Do you think there's
something you need to be doing? What's going on here?
General Odierno. First of all, Senator, I'm in agreement
with you that accountability is critical. One of the things
that I profess is empowering our subordinates, and as you
empower your subordinates to conduct actions, part of that is
also being accountable for the actions that we provide you in
terms of the command authority or other authorities we give
you. It's absolutely critical to have accountability for
actions.
What makes it difficult, and I know you're aware of this as
a marine or ex-marine, or marine rather; always a marine--is
that the motto.
Senator Webb. Lee Harvey Oswald is the only ex-marine.
General Odierno. What makes it difficult for us is in a
very complex tactical environment sometimes it takes time to
figure out exactly what did happen. Not all the time, but
sometimes. What we want to make sure is we do it right and we
find out what happened, and then once we do that it's
imperative that we hold those accountable.
One of the things I talk about all the time is ensuring
that we do this. We are having leadership discussions on the
importance of this as we continue to change our leader
development programs. I agonize with the families, I agonize
with anyone who's involved with this.
But as I've experienced personally the chaos that sometimes
characterizes the very tactical level when you're in the middle
of a significant fire fight or combat, it's very hard to figure
out exactly what happened. We just need the time to do that. I
know it's very, very frustrating for families who've lost a
loved one. We owe it to ourselves to do a detailed
investigation and provide them the right answers. If there is
misconduct or negligence, then we hold those people accountable
who've done that, and that's key for us as we move forward,
sir.
Senator Webb. I appreciate you saying that. Clearly, my
starting point on these types of situations is the experience
that I had as a rifle platoon company commander, and the first
question that I always raise is follow the war. I am very
reluctant to second-guess a lot of these findings, but when
they conflict or when you have revelations later, for instance
with the Pat Tillman situation, that people knew that this was
an accidental, friendly fire incident, and the family wasn't
notified, and there was considerable embarrassment. In the
Wynott situation, you had what we believe was a thorough
investigation by CENTCOM, signed off on by General Petraeus,
that when it came back into the Army was countermanded.
Those send very confusing signals out to people who have
suffered a lot with individual losses. At the same time, I want
to be very clear that when somebody steps forward to serve and
they are put in this type of situation, that any judgments that
are placed on them should be very carefully done.
It's something that's out there, and if nothing else I'm
glad to hear that you're putting this into your training
packages, the lessons learned and the discussions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Secretary McHugh and General Odierno for
being before the committee and for your distinguished service.
General Odierno, you made a statement about Afghanistan and
how we can't allow the actions of a few to derail what we are
doing in Afghanistan, and that we still had to make sure that
we were committed there. Can you just help everyone understand
why that's so important and what our interests are there, and
why it's so important that we follow through and have success
and stability there?
General Odierno. Senator, for a long time Afghanistan has
been a place of uncertainty. It has lacked leadership, where
many elements have tried to take over and use that as a
launching pad to conduct terrorist operations around the world.
We want to make sure Afghanistan never goes back that way
again.
The way to do that is to ensure that we have a viable
government and military that's able to protect the people of
Afghanistan. What I've seen in my most recent visits and as I
talk to others as they come back, there is true progress being
made in Afghanistan. There are noticeable differences on the
street, and noticeable differences in the capabilities of the
security forces. What's important to us is to have a government
in place and a governmental capability that will allow the
Afghan people to live, without allowing others to come in and
use Afghanistan as a point to conduct terrorist operations
around the world.
I think we're all committed to that, and it's important
that we continue on this path.
Senator Ayotte. Is it as important as you described in
terms of our own national security interests?
General Odierno. I absolutely believe it is.
Senator Ayotte. Let me ask you, with the strategic
partnership agreement in Afghanistan, one of the issues that
President Karzai has raised, which in my view is an issue
that's not a reasonable request of us, given what we need to
accomplish in Afghanistan, is to stop night raids. I know
that's one of the issues that need to be resolved with us and
the Afghan Government.
Can you tell us why it's important that we certainly not
concede this issue of night raids and why night raids are so
important to our operations there?
General Odierno. First off, it's about being able to go
after those who are attempting to derail the progress that's
been made in Afghanistan. It's almost like having a different
type of safe haven if you're not able to do night operations.
You want to be able to ensure that people understand that, no
matter what time of day it is or what day it is----
Senator Ayotte. Right, so we'd be basically saying that at
night you're completely free, no matter what type of nefarious
activities you engage in and how harmful your actions are. So
if people think about it that way, it's like half the day is
off limits, and at a time when we can conduct much more stealth
operations.
General Odierno. That's correct.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that. I think that's an
incredibly important issue to us. I hope that President Karzai
understands that's not an issue that we will waver on, nor can
we afford to waver on, if we're going to succeed there. Would
you agree with that?
General Odierno. I think it's an important issue for us to
work with him. There are many ways to do night raids, Afghans
conducting them and us assisting them, and I think there are
many ways for us. I think that's the way we're moving forward.
So I think there's lots of room to talk about this with them,
to ensure we can continue to do these types of operations.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I want to ascribe myself to the comments of Senator Webb. I
am concerned about what we're saying to our Active Duty
servicemembers and veterans in the proposed increases in health
care, particularly when you look at the President's budget and
there's no concurrent increases in those who are Federal
civilian employees, including Members of Congress. It's a
difficult message to send, and I think it's something we have
to have some very hard hearings on, given that we owe it to our
Active Duty servicemembers and to our veterans in my view. I
look forward to those hearings.
I also wanted to ask about end strength reductions. I share
Senator Lieberman's concerns about where we are, and I wanted
to ask General Odierno about a comment that you had made, just
so people understand how important it is in terms of our
strength. You were asked a question last month about Iran and
you said: What I'm worried about is if we get too small; it's a
very uncertain area and that concerns me.
Given your years of extraordinary service in Iraq, few if
any military leaders know more about the Middle East than you
do. Can you please tell me, how does the strength of our force
relate to how we are perceived, and how does it affect our
ability to carry out operations?
General Odierno. I was talking about preventing conflict,
and the way we prevent conflict is through a series of three
things. One is capacity, one is capabilities and readiness, and
the other is our modernization, so we sustain our overmatch.
It's important for us to make sure that we understand where
that fine line is between having the capacity, the
modernization, and readiness, so people do not miscalculate.
What I worry about is miscalculations by others that we do not
have the capability to respond.
I will say that I believe at the 490,000 level, I still
think we have the right capacity in order to respond to those
who might miscalculate.
Senator Ayotte. But let's not mistake this, it's still
going to be very difficult with the reductions you're
undertaking, is it not?
General Odierno. It is. Thank you for saying that. This is
not easy. These are very difficult choices that we have to
make.
Senator Ayotte. These are choices that we are certainly, we
know from even Secretary Panetta's testimony, taking on some
risk with. Thank you.
Let's talk briefly about sequestration. Senator Portman
asked you about sequestration. Secretary Panetta and Chairman
Dempsey have said that sequestration will hollow out our force.
General Odierno, what does it mean? Help people understand what
it means when we have a hollowed-out force, and what are the
risks? What risks are we asking our men and women to take if we
send them with a hollow force to battle?
General Odierno. We just talked about one of them, and it
has to do with our ability to prevent and deter. If we have to
go through sequestration, the reduction that we'd have to
further take in the Army specifically I think could give the
impression to some that maybe we no longer have the capacity to
respond if necessary.
It's also the fact that there's a potential that our
readiness levels will not be funded appropriately, so the
forces we have will not be able to be trained properly, and
that we would take more risk in their capabilities. We would
not be able to continue to provide enough money to modernize,
and in such a way it would have to either be extended or
eliminated in some cases, so we now lose our ability to sustain
overmatch in some of our key capabilities.
It's a combination of all three of those that cause great
concern.
Senator Ayotte. My time is up, but I do want to make one
point. One thing you didn't touch upon, but when we think about
a hollowed-out force don't we also put our soldiers at more
risk when we send them into conflict?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. Ultimately, when we
have to deploy them--and we've seen this in the Korean War and
with other examples--what it costs is American lives.
Senator Ayotte. Lives, people's lives.
I would add this. Secretary McHugh, you were asked
difficult questions in terms of planning for sequestration. I
would hope that on a bipartisan basis we would take actions
right away in this Congress so that you don't have to have this
hanging over your head all year. I don't think we can afford to
wait until December to put DOD and our men and women who have
served in uniform and continue to serve in uniform in this
position, because think about it. I can't imagine anyone on
this committee would ever stand for hollowing out our force. So
why put you in that position, because planning for this will
cause you to have to tell people, and I can't imagine what that
also does for morale in our military.
I hope that we act immediately on this on a bipartisan
basis. I'm sure you share those concerns.
Secretary McHugh. Absolutely, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, both of you for your service.
I know there have been a lot of questions asked today. I
wanted to direct my questions towards contracting. Over the
next 5 years, I think they're talking about cutting 80,000
soldiers out of our Army. With that being said, I know right
now we have about 130,000 contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq,
compared to about 90,000 men and women in uniform.
I have a hard time, especially in West Virginia we have a
hard time, understanding why we would be cutting back the
military men and women in uniform and not cutting back the
contractors, and why we would be in a position to where we're
attracting some of our best out of the military because of the
higher pay, let's say three times the military pay, and attract
them over and hire them right back to do the same job.
Then they still use the same services. They get the eating
and the medical. Everything's the same. I can't figure that
out. Senator Ayotte just talked about none of us want to hollow
out. But I believe that we could cut back drastically, even if
sequestration kicked in, from the contracting services and
still strengthen our military and give it the support it needs.
I'd like to hear your rationale on that.
Secretary McHugh. Contracting in theater is by and large
under CENTCOM, so it's not something the Army directly
controls. But I can tell you the intent in contracting in
combat theaters is to free up soldiers so that they can be in
the fight. For all of us that have been to either Iraq or
Afghanistan, you can see contracting in security, but by and
large you have contracting in support of logistics, contracting
in support of dining halls, et cetera, et cetera.
Senator Manchin. If I may interrupt you. I see them in the
airports, the contractors, and they're going to fight on the
front line. I ask each one of them when I see them: Have you
been in the military? Yes, we're military. If it had not been
for the large pay that attracted you to leave the military,
would you still be in the military? Unequivocally, yes.
So something's not jibing here with me.
Secretary McHugh. Again, I have no authority as to who is
sent to the front line in combatant command areas. But let me
speak to contracting with respect to the Army and the Army
budget. I fully agree with you. In fact, I think Secretary
Panetta were he here would fully agree as well. One of the
major initiatives we have is to diminish significantly the
number of contractors that we employ and bring, where it's
absolutely essential, those kinds of positions into Army
payrolls and into the Army personnel lines.
I don't think we'll ever be able to totally rid ourselves
of contractors. They provide a useful service and, where
required, it probably wouldn't make a lot of financial sense
for us to do that. But in terms of our taking essential
military activities and contracting out for them, I don't
support that. We're trying to work on that, and this budget is
a big step in ensuring our in-sourcing of those continue.
Senator Manchin. I just know that you have a pretty strong
voice and you could be a stronger voice as far as the direction
we may be going. I'm just concerned about people talking about
weakening the defense of this Nation when we could be
strengthening the men and women in uniform and taking a
different mission that I think is much more costly. I just have
a very, very tough position on that, and I'm having a hard time
getting a grasp of it.
No one can really tell me how many contractors we have.
I've not gotten an answer yet. I've been here a year and a
half.
Secretary McHugh. I'll do my best to get you an answer,
although it's not an Army----
Senator Manchin. I've asked everybody, so I'm down to you
now, sir.
Secretary McHugh. You've come a long way down. I'll do my
best.
[The information referred to follows:]

In fiscal year 2011, there were 247,000 contractor full-time
positions, of which 135,000 were in the generating force and the other
112,000 in the U.S. Central Command Theater of operations.

Senator Manchin. General, we have 80,000 personnel that
will be leaving and we have many of our veterans that are
unemployed right now. Senator Kirk and I put a bipartisan
caucus together, which is Hire a Vet. We wanted to practice
that and we want to practice what we preach in our own offices,
and I'm pleased to have veterans in my office.
But with that being said, is there any way we can tie up
with you through this caucus that will help, in a simplistic
way, knowing when people are getting out or are going to be
leaving, that we can start matching them up with the private
sector and have a web site or portal that we could use to start
networking?
General Odierno. There are several things we're trying to
do, and certainly we're more than willing to work with you on
this, Senator. It's a very important topic to us, as I know it
is to you.
We are in fact trying to establish a single portal that
links up jobs. I meet with Chief Executive Officers (CEO) and
others who are trying to develop thousands and thousands of
jobs for our veterans, that will link up those jobs with our
soldiers who are getting ready to leave the Army or have
already left the Army. So we're working that right now, to set
up this portal.
We are also increasing our emphasis on how we prepare
soldiers to leave the Army. One of the major things is how do
you translate what you do into a resume that civilians can
understand? Do you understand the benefits that are available
to you? Do you understand all of the outlets you can go to to
find jobs?
We're working this very hard at every one of our
installations. I'd be happy to work with you very closely on
this, because it's a very important issue to us.
Senator Manchin. We really want to, because what we're
doing is we're getting all of these different private citizens
and private companies from around the country, and they're
always saying, we're having a hard time finding qualified
people and the best people. You have the best people, I
believe. They're trained properly, they're disciplined, they
have good skill sets. Some of them want to go to the Midwest,
some of them want to come back to West Virginia hopefully or
wherever. We want to make sure they can go one-stop shopping.
You want to go back into the work force in the private sector?
We have a place for you. That's what we're trying to do.
If we can work with you to develop it, we'll tie in the
private sector, I think.
General Odierno. Will do.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Mr. Secretary, I hear from my constituents about the slow
disability rating system. That's in both DOD and the Department
of Veterans' Affairs (VA). I'm sure you've heard this. The
system puts the future plans on hold, creates unnecessary
stress, and most likely contributes to the high unemployment
rates that we're talking about.
We've been told that there are almost 20,000 soldiers in
the system and it takes an average of 400 days to get 1 through
the system to be evaluated.
Secretary McHugh. That's correct.
Senator Manchin. What can we do?
Secretary McHugh. It's one of the most frustrating things I
have experienced since I walked into the Pentagon about 2\1/2\
years ago. I can only imagine what the soldiers and their
families experience as well.
I want to give credit to both Secretary Shinseki at VA and
Secretary Panetta, who have really moved this to the top of
both Departments' priorities. We have a pilot program called
the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, which is an effort
to try to get the two disability systems more in sync, to make
sure that we're using where at all possible common systems of
evaluation, so a soldier doesn't have to go through 27
different physical exams.
Trying to do that sounds relatively easy. It certainly does
to me. But actually getting those two disparate systems to come
together in a rational way has been more difficult than I think
any of us would have imagined. The fact that, as you noted,
Senator, it's still 400-plus average days to get through pretty
well underscores the fact that we have a long ways to go.
Where we do have the pilots, we do see in most cases the
numbers starting to come down. But it's been a very slow
process.
Senator Manchin. Is this a concerted effort throughout all
of the military?
Secretary McHugh. Absolutely.
Senator Manchin. Because it's going to get worse, I
believe. General, I don't know. Now as we're winding down in
certain theaters, it has to get a lot worse than what we have.
General Odierno. It is. All the Services have the problem.
Of course, we have the biggest problem.
Senator Manchin. Right.
General Odierno. Because we have more people involved in
this, and we're going to continue to get people throughout this
system for years to come. With both traumatic brain injury and
other things, they're going to continue to be identified as we
go forward. So there's going to be more people coming into the
system.
We are working very hard. The problem we have is the
balance of making sure that they are getting the right
evaluations at the right times so they get the right benefits,
with rushing them through a system, although you would argue
400 days isn't rushing anybody through anything. That's why it
causes us to take that much time. We're trying to balance to
make sure they get taken care of versus trying to speed it up
as quickly as possible.
That's what we're trying to work our way through, and we're
working very closely with VA on this and trying to really match
up.
Senator Manchin. Just keep us informed on that.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
My understanding is, Mr. Secretary, that that is no longer
just a pilot program; it's now a permanent program and is DOD-
wide.
Secretary McHugh. If I used the word pilot, you're
absolutely right. It is not.
Chairman Levin. Senator Manchin should hear that as well,
that it's no longer a pilot program.
Secretary McHugh. It's moved to the full DOD, you're
absolutely right.
Chairman Levin. It's full DOD. One other point on this, we
made a change in the Wounded Warrior legislation, which also
integrated these two systems, so that during that 400-day
period, VA criteria of disability are the ones that are being
followed because they are the more generous historically to the
veteran or to the soldier.
Secretary McHugh. That's correct. We rate disability based
on military occurrences only. VA takes lifetime occurrences.
Chairman Levin. So that more generous approach is what is
in place now during that period. We've made some real progress
during that Wounded Warrior legislation. Senator Manchin is
right, though, in terms of the oversight which we need to do.
We very much would welcome your keeping us informed, as Senator
Manchin has suggested.
Thank you.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHugh, General Odierno, thank you for your
service. It's good to see you. I just have a couple of areas I
want to ask you about.
The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter is combat-proven and
has flown the highest OPTEMPO of any rotary-wing platform in
the Army. Previously the Army, back in 2004 and then in 2008,
looked at replacing the Kiowa helicopter. Both of those, I
might add not on your watch, failed dramatically. The Comanche
program was terminated in 2004 at a cost of nearly $7 billion
spent on the program, and then the ARH-70 Arapaho program was
terminated in 2008.
Referring to the anticipated AAS contract to look at
purchasing a new helicopter and the costs associated with that
and the uncertainties associated with that, why wouldn't the
Army want to utilize a successful modernization model to update
and modernize the Kiowa Warrior, as opposed to replacing it
with a new one, in light of this, I think we would all have to
agree, disturbing and unsatisfactory history with the Comanche
and the Arapaho?
General Odierno. Senator, we have not made any decision. In
fact, one of the alternatives on the table is to do exactly
what you said, to modernize Kiowa Warrior. What we're doing is
we're going through an AOA that will be delivered somewhere on
a new AAS, which will be delivered in fiscal year 2012. We'll
then do an assessment and then decide whether we can get there
and how long will it take, and how expensive it would be
compared to the capability we can add to the Kiowa Warrior.
Then that will be a decision that we make.
As you've pointed out, the Kiowa Warrior has been an
incredible, valuable capability. But there are ways for us to
improve it. They can gain more standoff, a bit more power, and
improve the cockpit. So there are things we can do.
That's a decision that the Secretary and I will make
probably some time in the next year, year and a half or so.
Secretary McHugh. I should note as well, Senator, the
upgrade program that you mention, the Cockpit and Sensor
Upgrade program, is funded in the President's budget for fiscal
year 2013. Should we make a decision to go to a different
platform, we'd ask that that money be switched over.
But the modernization program as we have been pursuing it
for the Kiowa, if brought to completion, would keep that
platform in the Army until 2025 under current estimates.
Senator Cornyn. I'm sure, and I'll just ask you for
confirmation, that as you reach a decision point you would
share with us not only your conclusion, but also the reasons
for your conclusion. It strikes me, at a time during budget
constraints, that the modernization program needs to be vetted
thoroughly, and I'm sure you'll do that.
Yesterday we had the Chief of Staff and Secretary Panetta
here and we talked about Syria. I don't know if you are aware
of the discussion we had, but let me be specific about it. This
has to do with Russia's role through its basically official
arms-dealing entity known as Rosoboronexport, that is selling
nearly $1 billion worth of arms to Syria, which Assad is using
to kill innocent Syrians during the uprising going on now,
reportedly as many as 750 people.
So it strikes me that it's pretty clear that Russia has
Syrian blood on its hands and is complicit in that effort. With
that predicate, you could understand why I was troubled to read
and learn that Rosoboronexport's customer list also included
the U.S. Army. It's my understanding the Army's Non-standard
Rotary Wing Aircraft Office out of Huntsville, Alabama, is
currently buying at least 21 dual-use Mi-17 helicopters for the
Afghan military from this same company.
I note that media reports from last year indicate the
contract for $375 million comes with an option which could
actually raise the size of that total value of the contract to
nearly $1 billion.
With so many alternatives here in the United States that
could satisfy this requirement for the Afghan army, that would
actually create jobs here and not in Russia, and which also
would not reward or certainly facilitate Russia's actions in
Syria, can you first of all tell me, are you aware of that
contract, Mr. Secretary, General Odierno? If you're not, I'm
not here to blind-side you. I would like to get any
observations you'd care to make and hear your commitment to get
to the bottom of this.
Secretary McHugh. I am aware of it. The newer development,
of course, is the alleged activity of Russian arms
manufacturers in Syria, and the clarity on that is not what I
think most of us would like at this point.
You mention options. I should note, the Army is blessed. It
has the opportunity time and time again to act as executive
agent on any number of programs. This is one of those. The
money is passed through. These are dollars that are given to
Army accounts so we can execute contracts, and in this case
follow the wishes and the requirements placed out of theater in
CENTCOM. The options are, frankly, in CENTCOM's estimation,
nonexistent. These are the platforms, apparently, that the
Afghans are familiar with. They're Russian platforms. Many of
the pilots that will be flying them were flying Russian
aircraft in their previous professional iterations, and we're
told they're absolutely essential to maintain the viability of
a still-emergent Afghan force.
I mentioned to another panel about 2 years ago that in my
mind I'm a buy-American kind of guy. As you noted, we certainly
could use all the business we can get. But the first need is
the operational requirement and we're told it's the Mi-17, and
as the executive agent we duly execute it.
Rosoboron under Federal law in Russia is the only one who
controls the export of those platforms. So we didn't have
options there, either, as I understand it.
General Odierno. I agree with what the Secretary said. We
did the same thing in Iraq, frankly. This is part of our
Foreign Military Sales program, and when they wanted to buy
rotary wing aircraft we offered at the time UH-60s and other
U.S.-made rotary wing aircraft. But because it was cheaper,
since it's easier to train their pilots, they chose to go with
an Mi-17 product.
We have been given the executive task to do the non-
standard helicopter capability. Of course, this is about trying
to get capability to the Iraqis at the time and now the Afghans
as quickly as possible. If they had bought an American
aircraft, it would have been much more expensive and it would
have taken much longer because of the training time for the
pilots necessary.
I'm not saying it's an excuse. I'm saying that's the
rationale for the decisions that were made at the time.
Senator Cornyn. My time is limited, but I would just note
and ask you to look at this, Mr. Secretary and General Odierno.
Apparently, in 2009 the Navy was able to use an alternative
acquisition route through a private broker, and so at least
back in 2009 there appeared to be an alternative source for the
Mi-17 variant helicopters and related toolkits for the Afghan
army.
I would conclude on this note. Previously, Rosoboronexport
has been sanctioned by the U.S. Government, and I would just
ask you, in the event that there was a sanction is there a plan
B for supplying the need for the Afghan army?
Secretary McHugh. Again, we don't decide suppliers. We
execute contracts. I would have to defer that question to
CENTCOM and to the State Department.
Senator Cornyn. I respect your answer and I just wanted to
highlight my concern, and I know I'm not the only one concerned
about this. Using U.S. taxpayers' dollars to supply the Afghan
military with these Russian helicopters through an arms dealer
which is an agent of the Russian Government, which is also
selling weapons to President Assad to kill innocent Syrians, is
a serious concern I know you share with me.
I hope that, working together, we can get to the bottom of
this and see if there are any other alternatives. It strikes me
that the 2009 alternative where the same helicopters were
purchased through a private broker by the Navy may provide an
option. But certainly I know you share my concerns, and I look
forward to working with you to get to the bottom of it and to
find out what alternatives might exist.
Thank you again.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and for your extraordinary
contribution to the defense of this country in the two wars
that we have fought.
I want to add my concerns that Senator Cornyn just
expressed, which both of us raised yesterday in the hearing
with Secretary Panetta and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Dempsey, as to the use of the Mi-17 and the
resort to Russian arms instead of our own. I respect that you
are a buy-American guy, as we all are, I think, in general, and
I would hope that we could pursue the possibility of using
American helicopters, rather than the Mi-17. For all the
reasons that we articulated yesterday and Senator Cornyn did
today, I have very strong concerns, and that is an
understatement, about the use of these Russian arms, sold by
the same company that's selling arms to Syria. So I would like
to explore that.
Speaking of helicopters, I would like to ask whether you
have a need for a greater quantity than is currently in the
budget for 2013?
Secretary McHugh. As we went across our entire fleet of
both fixed and rotary aircraft, we've tried to disperse our
buys, and for the Blackhawk the modernization is the Mike
model, in a way that sustains each to their needs as
effectively as we can. We are going to continuously reevaluate
the decisions we've made in this budget, particularly in
procurement, as we go forward.
Chairman Dempsey has repeatedly explained that the
President's budget for fiscal year 2013 is not the only step,
but the first step. I don't want to tell you that no
adjustments will ever come, but in terms of the budget as it
sits before you we think we made the best decisions we could.
Senator Blumenthal. I respect that decision. I'm concerned,
and my guess is you share that concern, about the reduction
from 72 to 59 in fiscal year 2012 going to 2013. I'm glad that
you are continuing to evaluate, if I can paraphrase what you
just said, that decision.
Secretary McHugh. We have shifted some of the procurement
lines to the right, but we think it's prudent, and we've used
the word risk rather frequently here today. It is an acceptable
risk.
Senator Blumenthal. I want to focus, if I may, on an area
that has greatly concerned me, the Improvised Explosive Devices
(IED) and the flow of material from Pakistan to Afghanistan in
ingredients that go into these bombs. The Pakistanis have been
asked to do more and we've had various witnesses testify to us
that they see no significant action on the part of the Pakistan
Government to stop the flow of bombmaking materials from their
country to sites where they are principally manufactured, to
Afghanistan, where they obviously do grave harm to our troops.
Do you differ with the assessment that the Pakistanis are
making no significant effort?
General Odierno. We have seen no significant change in the
ability to move this material across the border.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, General.
In the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) budget, I am delighted to see that the
JIEDDO fund was placed in the base budget, which I think is a
very good step forward. The IED usage by the enemy has
increased by 15 percent, I'm told. Do you have information
contrary to that number?
General Odierno. I don't, and I would just add that I
believe that in the future we will continue to face IED threats
as we conduct operations. So it's critical that we recognize
that and keep it as part of our sustainment programs over time.
Senator Blumenthal. From what I was told on my most recent
trip to Afghanistan by General Allen, it seems to be
increasingly the weapon of first resort by an enemy that is
degraded and finds that the principal way to do damage to us,
rather than any direct frontal assault; is that correct?
General Odierno. We've seen that both as we've had success
in Iraq and now that we have success in Afghanistan, they
resort to IEDs and then suicide bombs and things like that as
their capability gets diminished.
Senator Blumenthal. Overall, I see the funding request for
fiscal year 2013 for JIEDDO has been decreased by $540 million.
Would you agree with that cut based on the increase in attacks?
General Odierno. We've transferred some of the JIEDDO
programs to the Services. So I think we'd have to do a complete
assessment of what was transferred to the Services and what
remains in JIEDDO. I know that we had several hundred million
dollars worth of programs that were transitioned from JIEDDO to
the Army, that we've put in the base budget. I would have to do
a full analysis of that to understand if we've really had a
degradation of capability or if we've just adjusted the
responsibility in some areas, sir.
Secretary McHugh. The other thing I think is afoot,
Senator, is the judgment that you're out of Iraq, which the
gentlemen on my left knows more about than most people who walk
this planet, so that active IED threat is gone, but also we are
on a path to come down in Afghanistan, and so you can logically
assume the level of threat there.
The judgment is the sustained funds would be sufficient to
keep them a viable organization.
Senator Blumenthal. Overall, you're satisfied that there
are sufficient resources, even though they're not going
directly through JIEDDO, to confront this threat?
General Odierno. I think that the investment we continue to
make is quite significant and I think we continue to develop
what's necessary to ensure the safety of our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines forward.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Finally, I know questions have been asked about the C-27J.
I am concerned about the increased cost resulting from the
potential sacrifice or planned sacrifice of this valuable
asset. I think it's been called a valuable asset in
Afghanistan. Is there any possibility that this funding could
be restored?
General Odierno. Based on the discussions we've had, I
believe that the decision has been made that the funding will
not be restored.
Senator Blumenthal. Were you involved in that decision?
General Odierno. We were involved in the decision. We were
involved in the discussion. We were able to make the points we
thought were appropriate, and the decision was made to reduce
the program.
Senator Blumenthal. Without putting you on the spot, could
you express to us your view?
General Odierno. There's a requirement that we have a
ground force. The requirement of the ground force is that we
need intratheater lift in order to help support our soldiers.
That requirement has not changed. We need that. Whether you
choose to do it by an agreement to ensure we have C-130s or we
do it by the C-27, I will leave that decision up to the Air
Force.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much for your
testimony here today. My time has expired. Thank you very much
for being so helpful and informative.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you for your testimony and your
service. It's an honor to be here today.
New York represents many important Army installations. We
have Fort Drum, we have West Point. I am also pleased to let
you know that I have an Army fellow serving in my office this
year, Captain Aaron Schwengler has been doing extraordinary
work. I want to thank you for supporting that program.
First I want to talk about Fort Drum, then West Point, and
then some women in combat issues and some hazing issues. So I
have a big agenda, and short time.
Secretary McHugh, you and I have talked about how to
strengthen Fort Drum. Obviously, as we have Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) coming up and we have various decisions that
have to be made in the budget, I want to make sure that the
missions that we do do there continue and that if we can add to
those missions that would be very important. I think Fort Drum
is known to do extraordinary training in terms of terrain and
climate. We also have significant restricted air space, which
helps us often in training.
One mission that I thought might be worth considering is
allowing Fort Drum to be an unmanned aerial systems (UAS) test
range, and we could increase the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
training mission there. I just wanted to get your thoughts if
that might be something that's interesting, or just increasing
the amount of troops we train there?
Secretary McHugh. Anywhere we train troops we like to be
able to train more platforms rather than fewer. The National
Guard units down in Syracuse as a result of a previous BRAC
were scheduled at one point to receive some UAV platforms, and
the thoughts were to utilize training ranges at Fort Drum. So I
would say to any maneuver base when asked, if you can expand
your opportunities for training across the broad spectrum of
our operational activities, that's a plus.
As to the actual capability of Fort Drum, that's way above
my rung on the ladder.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you for considering it.
In terms of West Point, I just had a wonderful visit to
West Point with Holly Petraeus. Holly is working for the
Consumer Protection Agency to make sure our troops aren't
targeted by fraud and other criminals trying to harm them. I
was very impressed by the cadets. They were extraordinarily
articulate and had perfectly on-point questions for our forum.
One of the things that I am most excited about is the
possibility of increased training in cyber for the cadets at
West Point. I know that they've begun some. I wanted to know
your impressions if that is on track, and if that's something
we can continue to amplify. I think that would be a fantastic
opportunity for the military.
Secretary McHugh. I'm going to pass to the old West Point
grad because he's been there.
Senator Gillibrand. He knows.
General Odierno. Senator, we want to continue to use West
Point as our leader development launching point. Part of that
is to continue to develop the capabilities to train on what we
believe to be important issues of our future. That includes
cyber, it includes the Counterterrorism Center we have there,
and other things. We will continue to do that. It's key for us
to have that as a center to help our leaders of the future
learn about what challenges they'll face.
We are very supportive of keeping them on the leading edge
of moving forward with whatever it is we're trying to do and
what is important to our DOD and specifically the Army.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much.
I know that we've done some very important work with regard
to women in combat and women serving in the military. I know
that DOD reported just recently that it is committed to
removing all barriers that prevent servicemembers from rising
to the highest levels of responsibility that their talents and
capabilities warrant.
I also know that a similar report from the Military
Leadership Diversity Commission did conclude that combat
exclusion policies either prohibit or discourage women from
serving in the career fields that provide the great
opportunities to reach leadership ranks in the officer corps.
You testified earlier today that there's now 6,000 new
openings, which I think is fantastic; that's a great step in
the right direction. But I'd like to get your thoughts on what
is the step to reduce all impediments and actually, similar to
what we do with the U.S. Coast Guard where all positions are
available to women there, are there steps that we can take to
ultimately remove all those barriers?
General Odierno. Senator, this is a very important issue to
me personally, but also to the Army. I always qualify it by
saying it's about managing our best talent and making sure we
take advantage of the best talent available, which includes
obviously females, which provide an incredible capability.
We are doing this pilot, and we suspect by the end of the
year we will remove any impediments of putting females into
combat battalion headquarters, which they have not been able to
go to before, in current MOSs that they operate in. I think
that's a first step towards then conducting studies and
continuing to move forward, how we potentially look to
integrate them into every MOS.
I think our first thought is let's get them down to
battalion level in combat infantry and armor units, which
they're not allowed to go to today. We want to do that very
quickly, and then we will begin to study how we open up all
MOSs. I think that will help us to gain data for us to move
forward with that as we go on.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Obviously, a lot of these women have been attached to
battalions but not assigned to them. In your consideration
would there be any way to give some kind of retroactive
recognition that they performed these missions and were
subjected to those risks?
General Odierno. We'll take a look at it.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much.
Okay, last question. Do I have time, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. You do.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
Chairman Levin. Just take your time. If you go over, that's
fine.
Senator Gillibrand. This is an issue that has really
affected New York. We had some horrible examples of hazing
where New Yorkers who were serving committed suicide. It's
something that obviously we all worry about. We also worry
about violence against women in the military. We want to
protect all our troops.
In both examples, a lot of the personal stories I have
heard are how there's no way to report something being done to
you if your command structure is either part of it or ignoring
it. So whether it's violence against a woman or whether it's a
hazing operation, I'd like your guidance on how can we make it
easier in these instances for reporting to take place when your
command structure does not allow it, for either the reason of
they're part of it or they have allowed it or ignored it?
General Odierno. You're right, there's a fundamental
problem when they believe that the leadership that's above them
is part of the problem. There's two things that we have. First
is the Inspector General (IG). Anybody can call the IG at any
time, especially when there's a problem with their chain of
command, and then go to the highest level possible to do that.
Second, they can go to a higher level of chain of command.
Part of the problem here is us making sure that soldiers
understand that they can do this, that it's okay, and they know
how to do this if they're facing some difficult problem, such
as sexual harassment or hazing of some sort, that they're able
to report this. It's incumbent on us, to our newer soldiers
especially, that they understand that there are ways for them
to raise complaints outside of their own chain of command.
We'll continue to work very hard to emphasize that.
Senator Gillibrand. Because especially in the circumstances
I read, where they're serving in remote areas, they have no one
to turn to.
I know that hazing's more difficult because it's not its
own offense enumerated under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). Whether you can change the regulations to make
it easier for people to understand that it's not acceptable
might be one route. I don't know if there are similar measures
that can be made with regard to violence against women. I don't
know if training is the problem. But I would just urge you to
look at all courses of action.
General Odierno. I will just tell you, we get people from a
lot of different backgrounds. It's first about them
understanding that it's not part of our culture and we will not
accept it as part of the Army culture; as part of our ethical,
moral behavior. It's important for us to emphasize that as soon
as they come in to the Army, and throughout their time in the
Army. We will continue to do as much as we can to ensure that
they are constantly hearing this from their leadership.
Secretary McHugh. Senator, based on the case of Private
Danny Chen, a tragic instance, there are things we can do under
the UCMJ, and we intend to follow those. I think that will
serve as a very powerful reminder to others that this is
unacceptable.
The Sergeant Major of the Army, the Chief, and I not
shortly after that terrible case wrote to all command levels
and told them: This is your responsibility. Much like sexual
abuse, it is so contrary to who we'd like to think we are, and
we're not going to tolerate those who don't share that value in
our ranks.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you for your leadership. Thank
you both for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand, and we thank
you both. It's been a very, very helpful hearing and we
appreciate what you do for our country, for our troops, and
their families.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

COMBAT VEHICLE PRODUCTION

1. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, the Army understands that the
minimum sustaining M1 Abrams upgrade production rate at the Joint
Systems Manufacturing Center (JSMC), also known as the Lima (Ohio) Army
tank plant, is 70 tanks per year. What other tank or armored vehicle
workload, such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), is the Army trying to
direct to the plant and how much has been achieved or is achievable to
keep the production line open and available for the next series of
Abrams upgrades planned for fiscal year 2017?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is not ``shutting down'' the JSMC.
Rather, the Army is slowing the current production rate in the facility
by ending the Abrams M1A2SEP v2 production line. In 2011, there
appeared to be very little opportunity for additional manufacturing
work for the Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) and the JSMC. However, this has
changed with recent significant Foreign FMS interest in the Abrams
tank. As a result, the tank industrial base will benefit by new
manufacturing work as a result of several pending FMS cases that are
nearing approval and are likely to impact production beginning in the
2013 timeframe. This additional production will help mitigate most of
the vendor risks, and the Army is analyzing other mitigating activities
for vendor capabilities not addressed by the increased FMS sales.
The Army is confident current and pending Abrams Tank FMS
opportunities will help sustain the Abrams tank industrial base and
bring manufacturing work to ANAD, Anniston, AL, and the JSMC in Lima,
OH.

2. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, what is the Army's position on
the planned production breaks for the M1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley
upgrade programs?
Secretary McHugh. The Army's production of the Abrams M1A2 System
Enhancement Package (SEP) v2 tank will continue until June 2014 and by
that time, the Army will have produced the entire Abrams tank Modular
Force requirement. The Active component will be fully equipped with 17
Heavy Brigades of M1A2 SEPv2 tanks, the most capable and latest digital
version of the tank. The Army National Guard (ARNG) will be fully
equipped with one Heavy Brigade of M1A2 SEPv2 tanks and six Heavy
Brigades and three Combined Arms Battalions of M1A1 Situational
Awareness tanks, the latest analog version of the tank. The average
Abrams fleet age for both the Active and Reserve Force will only be 2
to 3 years old. Consequently, the next major recapitalization of the
Abrams tank fleet is not necessary until the 2017 timeframe.
The Army is currently evaluating a few technologies that could be
at risk when the M1A2SEP v2 production is complete in June 2014. For
example, the Army identified Frontal Armor production as a critical
item and has subsequently funded its continued manufacturing at the
minimum sustaining rate until the next version of the Abrams tank
enters production in fiscal year 2016 or fiscal year 2017. Pending FMS
cases may further mitigate this risk.
The Army completed M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) production
in September 2011. It will complete production of the M2A2 Operation
Desert Storm-Situational Awareness (ODS-SA) BFV in the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2013. This will equip the Active component with 17 Heavy
Brigades of M2A3 BFVs. The ARNG will be equipped with one Heavy Brigade
of M2A3s, and six Heavy Brigades and three Combined Arms Battalions of
M2A2 ODS-SAs. Both A3s and ODS-SAs have a digital framework, and
provide superior combat capability. There are no plans to produce more
BRVs after the Active and Reserve component requirements outlined above
are fulfilled.

3. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, what is your assessment of the
cost of breaking and then restarting the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley
production lines versus continuing production at minimum levels and
delivering upgraded vehicles to the force?
Secretary McHugh. The Abrams prime contractor, General Dynamics
Land Systems (GDLS) estimated cost of shutdown and restart to be $1.64
billion and stated that it would be less expensive to continue
producing tanks. The Army analysis in early 2011 determined that it
would cost more to continue building tanks at minimum sustaining rates
than it would to shut down and restart tank production during the gap
period. The Army's initial cost estimate to shut down and restart was
approximately $822 million. The cost to continue production at minimum
sustaining rates during that same timeframe was $2.8 billion.
The RAND Arroyo Center recently completed an independent analysis
concerning the costs and benefits of the planned Abrams tank production
slow down at the JSMC, Lima, OH, specifically addressing whether it
would be more beneficial from a cost perspective to stop or continue
U.S. Army tank production. RAND Arroyo's independent analysis found the
shut down/restart to be significantly less than the Army's estimate:
$342 million. They also estimate the cost of continued production to be
$1.5 billion to $1.6 billion (fiscal year 2013-2016).
In regards to the Bradley, British Aerospace Engineering (BAE)
produces BFVs at York, PA. Army analysis has determined that sustaining
minimum production at York over the upcoming production break window
fiscal year 2014-fiscal year 2016 will cost approximately $1.6 billion.
Stopping and restarting the Bradley line is anticipated to cost
approximately $500 million. With these two figures in mind, the Army
will realize approximately $1.1 billion in cost avoidance.

ARMY ROLE IN THE NEW STRATEGIC GUIDANCE'S SHIFT OF EMPHASIS TO ASIA
PACIFIC

4. Senator Levin. General Odierno, the new Department of Defense
(DOD) strategic guidance includes a new emphasis on U.S. security
interests and challenges in the Asia Pacific. While not neglecting the
enduring challenges in the Middle-East and South Asia, DOD is taking
steps to shape U.S. forces relative to the air and maritime demands of
the Far East. What is your understanding and assessment of the new
strategic guidance, the shift of emphasis to the Asia Pacific, and the
increase in dependence on air and sea power to meet the challenges
there?
General Odierno. The new strategic guidance essentially shifts
emphasis to a region where the Army has retained a robust posture since
World War II. This includes the U.S. Army's longstanding and important
commitment to the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance. To the extent that
the guidance increases attention to the challenges faced by air and sea
power--not least being the sheer distances involved when operating in
the region's vast geography--the Army can benefit from other Services'
increased capabilities to project and support land forces throughout
the region as a vital part of the Joint Force. Besides land forces'
ability to dominate and decisively win in combat, the Army plays a
unique role in gaining and maintaining access during times of conflict
as well as during peacetime in a region where armies enjoy the greatest
influence among services in the civil-military relations of most
countries. Seven out of the 10 largest land armies in the world are in
the Asia-Pacific region and 22 of 28 Chiefs of Defense in the region
are Army officers. Currently, there are 66,000 U.S. Army soldiers
assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility
(AOR). Due to our longstanding, joint, multinational training events
with regional allies and partners, the Army's access has been
exceptional and we will continue to build upon this success. The Army
will engage, build partner capacity and establish military to military
relationships to work our issues in Asia and the Pacific region. Our
Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships, forged during peace and war to
form the bedrock of regional security cooperation, provide a means to
leverage the wellspring of trust, confidence, access, and influence
accumulated through decades of Army engagement.

5. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what in your view are the
greatest risks, if any, relative to the potential need for ground
forces to meet needs in the Asia Pacific?
General Odierno. A key risk to meeting land force requirements in
the Asia Pacific is the Army's lack of permanent support infrastructure
in South and Southeast Asia. That increases the challenge of sustaining
land forces across the region's 8,000 mile expanse, as well as the
challenge of gaining timely access for a temporary footprint in a
crisis. We mitigate that risk and address both challenges with our
Security Cooperation programs. In order to be successful, those
programs must continue to credibly demonstrate the Army's commitment to
the region. Asia Pacific partners and allies must see an increase in
those programs commensurate with the increased emphasis of the new
strategic guidance.

6. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what, in your view, is the
Army's role in an Asia-Pacific-oriented strategy?
General Odierno. The Army's fundamental role in the Asia Pacific is
providing trained and ready forces to the Commander of PACOM in order
to ``Shape'' the strategic environment, ``Prevent'' crises, and ``Win''
if conflict arises. Most visibly the Army will provide a stabilizing
presence in peacetime both through forces permanently stationed in the
region and rotational forces from the global force pool. This will help
guarantee immediate access during crisis and positional advantage
during contingencies. These trained and ready forces provide the
bedrock of decisive action for any contingency and are a stabilizing
presence for our allies. The Army will provide agile Mission Command,
responsive and effective to the needs of the PACOM Commander across the
spectrum of crisis. We will focus on persistent engagement and
relationship building with the armies of our allies and partners,
usually the most dominant service within most partner nations, while
achieving the mutual goals of securing regional peace and prosperity.
In setting and maintaining the theater, the Army will sustain Joint and
Multinational partners through our logistics hubs, sustainment
capabilities, prepositioned stocks, and a variety of functional
capabilities (engineers, medical, Civil Military, Chemical, Biological
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE), as examples) uniquely
positioned in the Asia Pacific.
This will require the Army to sustain a progressive force
generation model to ensure we meet Joint Force Commanders' contingency
requirements in the Asia Pacific and elsewhere. Doing so requires
operational agility in Army formations and leaders to transition from
one mission or geographic focus to another as necessary. Finally, given
the potential scale of contingencies in the Asia Pacific, the Total
Army must provide depth to the Joint Force, and must maintain the
infrastructure in the Continental United States (CONUS) and the Asia
Pacific to mobilize, deploy, and sustain forces in theater.

7. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what changes, if any, in the
Army's manning, training, force structure, and equipment are necessary
to meet the requirements for general purpose ground forces in an Asia-
Pacific-oriented security strategy? For example, will the Army now
emphasize Asian culture and language training relative to potential
increases in demand for training and exercise partnering throughout the
region?
General Odierno. The Army is considering adding several
capabilities to the U.S. Army, Pacific, to better support PACOM,
including a regionally assigned Joint Task Force/Joint Force Land
Component Command headquarters, the ability to execute joint/
multinational Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief throughout the
theater, and an exportable, Combat Training Center-like joint/
multinational training and exercise capability along with pre-
positioned equipment sets in theater. More broadly, the Army continues
to develop the ability to respond to Geographic Combatant Commanders'
requirements, including PACOM, by providing Regionally Aligned Forces
through a rotational, progressive force generation model. Regional
training and Army exercises continue to evolve in support of PACOM's
Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan, and seek to more deeply
engage key partner Armies to pursue mutual interests in preserving
regional stability. As we develop the force structure for the Army of
2020, the training requirements (to include language and culture) for
General Purpose Forces will be further developed to support the combat
commander's emerging requirements. Over the course of 10 years, the
Army has developed a core of real experts in the Middle East and South
Asia region. The Army will develop a similar core of professionals for
whom Asia-Pacific expertise is a lifelong work.

REVERSIBILITY

8. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, the new strategic guidance
accepts increased risk with the reduction of several military
capabilities including Army end strength and force structure. This
increased risk is acceptable when mitigated by building into drawdown
plans the ability to replace, stop, and, if necessary, reverse the loss
of these capabilities. This is widely known as reversibility. Your
joint statement says that the key features of reversibility are
retention of a strong cadre of mid-career field grade officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCO), Special Operations Forces (SOF), access
to a Ready Reserve component, and a rapidly expandable industrial base.
Reversibility in the industrial base may be the concept's biggest
challenge. In order to reduce this risk, the Army must accurately,
reliably, and comprehensively identify those sectors of its industrial
base that cannot be reconstituted; reconstituted at great cost in money
or time; or may not need reconstitution at all. This is compounded by
the Army's budget reductions in fiscal year 2013 and beyond that cuts
workload and increases risk in the health of the ground combat and
tactical vehicle industrial base. How does the Army's fiscal year 2013
budget request ensure reversibility in the ground combat and tactical
vehicle industrial base?
Secretary McHugh. The Army's fiscal year 2013 budget request
ensures reversibility in the ground combat and tactical vehicle
industrial base as a result of the Army's careful planning in these
industrial base sectors. To build its fiscal year 2013 budget request,
the Army anticipated structuring and pacing reductions in its ground
forces to preserve its ability to make a course change to surge,
regenerate and mobilize the capabilities needed for any contingency.
Although the demand for ground combat and tactical vehicles will
decline, commercial market heavy-duty truck sales are expected to
continue their recovery from the past recession. The supply chains for
on-road commercial trucks and off-road equipment are important because
they provide vehicles and components to the Army as well. The Army's
fiscal year 2013 budget request anticipates that such supply chains in
the commercial sector will continue to provide vehicles and components
to the Army to strengthen the Army's reversibility.
The Army's fiscal year 2013 budget request supports reversibility
within its ground combat and tactical vehicles. The Army continues to
invest in Abrams and Bradley vehicles through Engineering Change
Proposal programs, and is also investing in the replacement of its
Bradley vehicles with the Ground Combat Vehicle and the replacement of
M113 Family of Vehicles with a more protected and capable Armored
Multi-Purpose Vehicle. The Army also sustains modernization efforts to
support the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) strategic priorities by
providing protected mobility for our soldiers and maintain an
appropriately-sized, high-quality TWV fleet. The fiscal year 2013
budget submission supports Army objectives to fund Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle RDT&E requirements, completes production of the Family of
Medium TWV fleet by end of fiscal year 2014, continues to modernize the
Heavy TWV fleet through the recapitalization program and modernizes the
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the Logistics Support
Vessels. The Mine Resistant Armor Protected vehicle will rely on
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds to upgrade until the
program transitions to sustainment.

9. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, how will the Army ensure that
industrial base reversibility cost and risk are carefully managed in
fiscal year 2014 and beyond?
Secretary McHugh. The Army will ensure that industrial base
reversibility cost and risk are carefully managed in fiscal year 2014
and beyond by: (1) continuing on-going efforts to determine the health
of Industrial Base sectors critical to support Army and Joint Services
programs; (2) identifying and assessing current status of organic and
commercial critical manufacturing and maintenance capabilities required
to meet future Army contingency Reversibility & Expansibility
requirements; (3) identifying supply chain issues in design,
manufacturing and sustainment that can present significant risk to
critical Army capabilities; and (4) partnering with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to implement appropriate mitigation efforts
to address critical risks.

10. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, what criteria or indications
in the industrial base will you monitor to alert you to potential loss
of capability or capacity to meet the needs for reversibility into the
future?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is continuously working with suppliers
in the commercial industrial base to assess and sustain essential
capabilities and to reduce the chances of single points of failure.
Related efforts to monitor potential loss of capability or capacity
include a DOD Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) effort. The S2T2
effort seeks: (1) to establish early warning indicators of risk,
particularly at lower-tiers; (2) to strengthen the supply chain and
mitigate potential points of failure; and (3) to perform joint agency
assessments providing the Army the ability to capture impacts on market
sectors, manufacturers, and the warfighter requirements across the U.S.
Services. Another effort is the Industrial Base Baseline Assessment
that seeks: (1) to conduct a sector/sub-sector assessment of programs
identified as critical by Program Executive Offices and Life Cycle
Management Commands; (2) to determine the impact of reductions in
funding to program requirements; and (3) to develop recommendations
which enable the industrial base to sustain current and future
warfighter requirements.

11. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, how will you respond to
evidence of an unacceptable increase in this risk or the imminent loss
of industrial capability or capacity?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is participating in the DOD's S2T2
effort, which seeks to identify critical areas that could constitute
single points of failure and develop strategies to mitigate the risks
identified. In addition, the Army is conducting an Industrial Base
Baseline Assessment that will: (1) conduct a sector/sub-sector
assessment of programs identified as critical by Program Executive
Offices and Life Cycle Management Commands; (2) determine the impact of
reductions in funding to program requirements; and (3) develop
recommendations which enable the industrial base to sustain current and
future warfighter requirements.

12. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how practically would a strong
cadre of officers and NCOs work?
General Odierno. By ``cadre,'' we mean those combat veteran
officers and NCOs who will now be leveraging their significant combat
and operational experience in the generating force. They will occupy
positions that already exist in our schoolhouses and support units that
the Army has been unable to fill for the past decade due to
exceptionally high OPTEMPO and mission demands. These officers and NCOs
will be experienced trainers, doctrine writers, platform instructors,
personnel developers, combat systems subject matter experts, all
lending their knowledge of emerging threats and operational techniques
to the institutional systems that will mold and temper our future Army
units. These officers and NCOs will also circulate into and out of
operational units as part of normal career assignment patterns. All
will be able to transition back to operational support of mission units
with a minimum of preparation.

13. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how would these leaders be
assigned and what duties would they perform if they are excess to
existing Army field unit (Table of Organization and Equipment) and
institutional (Table of Distribution and Allowances) requirements?
General Odierno. These military personnel are not excess; they will
be assigned to the Army's Generating Force (GF), performing necessary
institutional functions to fill capability gaps, support new and
emerging capabilities, and to reinvest in necessary unique military
skills and functions that have been under-manned due to operational
requirements. Additionally, the Army will reinvest an additional 1,000
personnel in the GF to rebalance the Active Component Generating Force
at 92,100 across the program. The Army will then identify up to 5,000
mid-grade officer and NCO military skill sets that can concomitantly
support reversibility.

14. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how will cadre officers and
NCOs remain competitive with their peers in units for critical
professional assignments and promotions?
General Odierno. These officers will pursue their career
professional development like every other officer or NCO, and will
compete for assignments on the strength of their demonstrated potential
and past experiences. The Army will not align our combat experienced
personnel against hypothetical future requirements. Instead we will
employ their experience to enhance the Army's processes and systems
wherever we assign them. The scope of possible assignments for these
officers and NCOs will support the Army's leader development strategy
that calls for development of leaders through a variety of broadening
experiences.

15. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what is
your assessment of the Reserve component as an operational Reserve
today and the future?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. As proven by the past decade,
the Reserve components function well as part of the Army's operational
force. Measured access to the Reserve components for future employment
will allow the Army to hedge against unforeseen changes to the global
security environment. In the future, our National Guard and Army
Reserves will be resourced and trained at appropriate levels to build
on the competencies and experiences that have been gained over the past
several years. We are committed to maintaining an appropriate balance
between the Active and Reserve components to meet our future security
requirements.

16. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what gaps
in Reserve component capability, if any, are important to address to
further reduce strategic risk?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Within its currently planned
reduced end strength, the Army continues to assess the best mix,
quantity, and organizational designs of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)
(Armor, Infantry, Stryker, and Airborne) required to provide the
necessary mix of combat power and capabilities for projected future
obligations. We are also examining the best balance between Active
component and Reserve component forces, between combat and support
forces, and between military, civilian, and contractors. The Army's
deliberate and responsible draw-down plans will take into consideration
operational demands and unit readiness, and will proceed at a pace
necessary to ensure mission success--all while retaining the
flexibility to respond to unforeseen demands at a tempo that is
predictable and sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.

COMMISSION ON MILITARY RETIREMENT

17. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, DOD will
propose that Congress establish a commission with ``Base Realignment
and Closure Commission (BRAC)-like authority to conduct a comprehensive
review of the military retirement benefit in the context of total
military compensation.'' Meanwhile, both Secretary Gates and Secretary
Panetta have said that everything must be on the table, and Gates noted
in his final days as Secretary that the current military compensation
system, which he described as ``one size fits all . . . left over from
last century,'' may no longer be appropriate today. Finally, we have
long viewed the military compensation system, to include retirement
benefits and health care benefits, to be part of a total military
compensation package that should be assessed as a whole rather than a
collection of individual parts.
Shouldn't the commission be empowered to review all elements of
military compensation to include the system of basic pay, the various
allowances and special pays, survivor benefits, and the tax status of
all of these?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. If Congress approves a
commission, it should holistically look at the entire compensation
system and understand the implications of any changes to pay and
benefits. The total military compensation package should be based on
all aspects of military service, including rigorous training, dangerous
duty, long work hours, and frequent moves and separations from families
and loved ones. It is important to have a comprehensive package that is
commensurate with the sacrifices of our soldiers and families.

PROPOSED TRICARE FEE INCREASES

18. Senator Levin. General Odierno, the administration is proposing
to substantially increase enrollment fees for military retirees who
enroll in the TRICARE Prime health care program, and to institute for
the first time enrollment fees for participation in the TRICARE
Standard and TRICARE Extra health care programs and for enrollment in
TRICARE for Life. Do you personally support these proposed increased
fees?
General Odierno. I support DOD efforts to mitigate escalating
healthcare costs in order to sustain the medical benefit. The Army, in
partnership with DOD, is committed to preserving and enhancing the
quality and range of care by rebalancing the share of costs incurred by
the Department and the beneficiary.

19. Senator Levin. General Odierno, will you express your support
for these changes to your soldiers, both those now on Active Duty and
to retirees?
General Odierno. Yes, I support DOD's efforts to identify solutions
to mitigate escalating healthcare costs through fiscally responsible
management for long-term sustainment of the highest quality care and
service to our current and future retirees.

END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

20. Senator Levin. General Odierno, the new DOD strategic guidance
expressly states that the Nation will avoid large-scale stability
operations requiring large ground forces. Accordingly, DOD has
determined the Army size and force structure can be reduced and still
meet acceptable levels of strategic risk and also save money. The
Active Army will make the largest end strength reductions over the next
5 years of 72,000 from their fiscal year 2012 authorization level of
562,000; the first 10,000 reduction is included in the 2013 budget
request. The end state for the Active Army is 490,000 by the end of
fiscal year 2017. Will the Army have to involuntarily separate soldiers
who have been deployed multiple times and who believed they would have
the opportunity to compete for career service?
General Odierno. The Army has been looking carefully at our
inventories and the rates at which we can affect their strength through
traditional vetting processes such as promotion and assignment, or
natural losses due to administrative shortcomings, medical
disqualifications, et cetera. As we reduce end strength, we intend to
retain personnel best suited for continued service and retain the
talent and capability required to meet emerging missions and
challenges. Although the majority of reductions will occur through
natural attrition, some that want to stay will be involuntarily
separated.
The Army is striving to minimize the hardship on the service
members who want to stay but cannot. To do that, we are evaluating our
over-strength year groups carefully and may offer Separation Pay
incentive to members who have been non-selected for promotion, or
separation under the Temporary Early Retirement Authority to those who
have between 15 and 20 years of active service and eligible to retire
under that authority.

21. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how will the Army minimize
involuntary separations?
General Odierno. The Army will conduct end strength reductions
using a gradual ramp over a 6-year period in order to allow natural
attrition to absorb a portion of the reductions, while still
maintaining our commitment to Afghanistan. The gradual reductions will
also allow the Secretary and I the flexibility to evaluate each year
whether we are moving at the right pace. This time-phased approach to
allow us to validate our assumptions regarding the effect of natural
losses on cohorts and adjust our separations as needed. We will employ
time tested and respected selection board processes to evaluate
potential for future service, and retain those best qualified to fill
the Army's requirements. Soldiers will have the opportunity to
demonstrate their strengths and potential in competition with their
peers, but the Army will decide who will stay and who we will help
transition to other work. The Army is evaluating its over-strength year
groups carefully and may offer Separation Pay incentive to members who
have been non-selected for promotion, or separation under the Temporary
Early Retirement Authority to those who have between 15 and 20 years of
active service and eligible to retire under that authority.

22. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, do you need any additional
force shaping tools to enable the Army to achieve these reductions in a
manner that recognizes the service and commitment we made to these
soldiers?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is studying the need for enhanced
separation authorities to be needed to allow us to bring down our end
strength in a fair and balanced manner. There are authorities in law
now for incentives to separate service members, but the Army budget
reductions leave no room to exercise those authorities without
seriously jeopardizing other critical capabilities through
reprogramming. The Army has requested additional funding to avail
itself of some of the voluntary measures that could soften the
disappointment of those who will not be selected to continue in
service.

23. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, what programs are available or
needed to help soldiers and their families ease the challenges of
transition from Active Duty to new jobs and civilian life?
Secretary McHugh. The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) is the
Transition Program that assists soldiers, family members, and DA
civilian's transition from their status within the Army back to the
civilian community. Involuntarily separated soldiers are
congressionally mandated to receive the same pre-separation counseling
as voluntarily separating soldiers. Additionally, soldiers, family
members, and DA civilians (involuntarily or voluntarily separated) are
entitled to participate in any of the transition assistance classes
offered by ACAP. All soldiers must begin ACAP not less than 12 months
prior to separation. However, soldiers may use an ACAP Center, the ACAP
Call Center, and virtual ACAP at anytime throughout their military
lifecycle to gather information and take classes. We are adjusting the
ACAP program to meet the goals of the recently passed VOW to Hire
Heroes Act and the recommendations of the Presidential Task Force.
Attendance may take place in person at an ACAP center, live or
cataloged classes online, or individually through the 24/7 ACAP Call
Center.
All classes are taught by Master's Degree Counselors or
professional-level instructors. These classes include, but are not
limited to:

Employment assistance
Job search skills
MOS Crosswalk (Military skills to civilian skills comparison)
Skills assessment
Professional interest evaluation
Resume and cover letter development and refinement
Interview skills
Dress for success
Salary negotiation
Relocation assistance
Legal referrals (Wills, Power of Attorney, Estate planning, et
cetera before separation)
Contact information for housing counseling assistance
Education/Training
Health/Life insurance
Financial planning/Budget development
Veteran benefits briefing
Veterans Administration Disabled Transition Assistance Program
(VA DTAP)
Department of Labor Employment Workshop
Physical and mental health well being

The Army is also utilizing the Hero 2 Hired (H2H) as its interim
employment application/tool www.H2H.jobs to provide one primary
location where soldiers of all components, veterans, and family members
can connect with private industry employment opportunities. This
application is web-based and able to translate military occupational
skills (MOS), provide career path exploration, upload resumes, allow
customized job searches, enable employers to also search for Veterans,
and provide performance metrics. H2H will eventually be included on
eBenefits, the single portal for transition benefits selected by the
DOD-VA Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force (www.eBenefits.va.gov)

OVERSEAS BASING

24. Senator Levin. General Odierno, Secretary Panetta announced in
January that DOD will withdraw two of the four Army BCTs currently
stationed in Europe. This will reduce the size of the U.S. Army force
posture in Europe by around 7,000 personnel, down from the current
level of about 38,000 Army personnel. Given the budget pressures under
which the Army will be operating for the foreseeable future, what are
your thoughts on restationing your forces back to the United States?
General Odierno. The Army, in concert with DOD, conducted a
reassessment of the U.S. global strategy and posture in the European
Command (EUCOM) AOR in light of the emerging defense strategy. The Army
recommended inactivating two of its four BCTs. The reduction of 7,000
personnel associated with the drawdown of 2 BCTs over the next 2 years,
and a reduction of approximately 2,500 personnel associated with
enabler units over the next 5 years, will still allow EUCOM to maintain
a flexible and easily deployable ground force to meet Article 5 and
other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments, to engage
effectively with allies and partners, and to satisfy other security
objectives. We believe the proposed posture in the EUCOM AOR is
adequate. At currently programmed force levels, we do not foresee
restationing any additional forces from the EUCOM AOR to the United
States.

25. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what is your assessment of the
reduction of Army force structure in Europe?
General Odierno. The Army, in concert with DOD, is conducting a
reassessment of the U.S. global strategy and posture in the European
Area of Operations in line with the current defense strategy. The Army
recommended inactivating two of its four BCTs. The drawdown to two BCTs
still allows EUCOM to maintain a flexible and easily deployable ground
force to meet Article 5 and other NATO commitments, to engage
effectively with allies and partners and to satisfy other security
objectives. The Army expects to allocate a BCT to support
interoperability with NATO and plans to rotate battalions to EUCOM to
train with our allies. The Army will continue to make adjustments in
coordination with DOD to ensure our posture remains in line with
current strategy and supportive of theater commitments.

26. Senator Levin. General Odierno, is a reduction of 7,000
personnel associated with the 2 BCTs correct or is it likely to be
more?
General Odierno. The reduction of 7,000 personnel is associated
with the reduction of 2 BCTs over the next 2 years. An additional
reduction of approximately 2,500 personnel associated with enabler
units is anticipated over the next 5 years.

27. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how much of the theater
supporting forces will also come out of Europe with the reduction of
two BCTs?
General Odierno. The Army will reduce approximately 7,000 soldiers
associated with the reduction of 2 BCTs over the next 2 years. An
additional reduction of approximately 2,500 soldiers associated with
enabler units is anticipated over the next 5 years.

28. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how many facilities does the
Army occupy in Europe now and how many facilities will close due to the
two brigade reduction of units and personnel?
General Odierno. The Army currently occupies 137 sites with a total
of 12,471 buildings in Europe.
Due to the reduction of two BCTs (the 170th and 172nd BCTs) in
Europe, the Army will close 33 sites, return 21,607 acres of land, and
2,550 buildings.

29. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what are the estimated savings
related to the two brigade reduction of personnel and facilities?
General Odierno. The Army will save approximately $150 million per
year per brigade by inactivating the brigades in Europe. The Army has
reallocated these resources to other priorities in the fiscal year 2013
President's budget and Program Objective Memorandum 13-17.

30. Senator Levin. General Odierno, is it feasible and do we save
more if the reduction occurs faster than currently planned? If not, why
not? If so, how much more can be saved?
General Odierno. The 172nd Brigade deployed in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and was not available to inactivate in fiscal
year 2013. When the unit returns from combat, it will conduct 6 months
of soldier and family re-integration and begin incremental battalion
level draw-downs and ultimately leave the force in early fiscal year
2014. Therefore, the savings from the deactivation of the 172nd Brigade
cannot be significantly accelerated and no additional savings can be
realized. The 170th Brigade is drawing down and deactivates in early
fiscal year 2013.

FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS

31. Senator Levin. General Odierno, the new strategic guidance
expressly reduces by eight the number of Army combat brigades. DOD has
already announced that two of the eight will be deactivated from
Germany. Additionally, the Army is on the threshold of announcing other
changes in the structure of armored brigades (formerly called heavy
combat brigades) and infantry brigades that would add a third maneuver
battalion to each. These type brigades currently have only two maneuver
battalions. What is the status of the Army's analysis and
decisionmaking regarding the identification of the type and location of
the remaining six of the announced eight brigade reduction?
General Odierno. The Army announced during the President's 2013
budget release that a minimum of 8 BCTs and other force structure
totaling 57,400 would have to be reduced over the course of the 2013-
2017 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to achieve the Active
component (AC) end state of 490,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017.
Additionally, the Army continues to assess the design and mix of BCTs
based upon the lessons from the last 10 years of war. This analysis
could lead to a decision to reorganize BCTs (within the 490,000 AC end
strength) into more capable and robust formations, requiring further
BCT reductions in order to increase overall versatility and agility for
tomorrow's security challenges. An announcement on specific force
structure actions is expected sometime before, or in conjunction with,
submission of the President's 2014 fiscal year budget in early February
2013.

32. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what criteria will the Army use
in determining whether and from where to deactivate brigades stationed
in the United States or overseas?
General Odierno. The Army considers a broad array of criteria when
assessing which forces and which installations will be impacted by in-
activations. Criteria will be based on strategic considerations,
operational effectiveness, geographic distribution, cost and the
ability to meet statutory requirements.

Strategic Considerations: Aligns Army Force Structure
to the new Defense Strategy and forthcoming Defense Planning
Guidance with a priority on the Pacific region.
Operational Considerations: Seeks to maximize training
facilities, deployment infrastructure and facilities to support
the well-being of soldiers and their families. Aligns
appropriate oversight/leadership by senior Army headquarters
for better command and control.
Geographic Distribution: Seeks to distribute units in
the United States to preserve a broad base of support and
linkage to the American people.
Cost: Considers the impacts of military personnel,
equipment, military construction, and transportation costs.
Statutory Requirements: Complies with the provisions
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as appropriate,
including an environmental and socio-economic analysis.

33. Senator Levin. General Odierno, will you give priority to
deactivating brigades currently stationed overseas?
General Odierno. The Army announced during the President's 2013
budget release that a minimum of 8 BCTs and other force structure
totaling 57,400 would have to be reduced over the course of the 2013-
2017 FYDP to achieve the Active component end state of 490,000 by the
end of fiscal year 2017. The first two brigades to be reduced are two
of the four currently stationed in the EUCOM AOR. The decision to
reduce these two brigades first was based on a joint Army and DOD
reassessment of the U.S. global strategy and posture in the EUCOM AOR
in light of the emerging defense strategy. An announcement on specific
force structure actions is expected sometime before, or in conjunction
with, submission of the President's fiscal year 2014 budget in early
February 2013.

REGIONAL ALIGNMENT AND ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF ARMY BRIGADES

34. Senator Levin. General Odierno, the Army plans to align general
purpose combat brigades stationed in the United States with regional
combatant commands, such as U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), to support
theater engagement and security force assistance missions and to make
those forces, and other supporting units, available on a rotational
basis for deployment to those regions for training and exercises. What
is your understanding and assessment of the Army's capability and
capacity to align brigades or other units with regional combatant
commands?
General Odierno. Because of the reduced commitments in other
theaters, the Army will have the capacity to align forces with
geographic combatant commands. This allows units to tailor their
training to specific areas of responsibility and provides combatant
commanders with ready forces to support their theater security
cooperation objectives. In fiscal year 2013, the Army will align a
brigade to AFRICOM. As our commitments continue to decrease, we will
align additional forces with geographic combatant commands for fiscal
years 2014 and 2015.

35. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how practically will this
work--for example, how would a unit's regional alignment determine the
assignment of personnel, selection of unit commanders, priority for
cultural and language training compared to core combat training, and
identification, acquisition, and issue of special equipment?
General Odierno. Headquarters, Brigades, and enabler forces are
sourced through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process to meet a
geographic combatant commander's requirements. Army support to the
combatant commanders is a Total Army effort, which means it's possible
for any unit from the Active Army, Army Reserve, or ARNG to potentially
be selected to support a geographic combatant commander. The Army
prepares forces for success in their assigned missions through unified
land operations training. In order to support the regionally aligned
forces concept, units will receive additional language, regional
expertise and cultural (LREC) training. LREC training will compliment
their unified land operations capabilities. Depending on the size,
length, and location of deployments, units will be provided theater-
specific equipment and training.

36. Senator Levin. General Odierno, have you done any analysis with
respect to the incremental increase or decrease in cost associated with
regional alignment? If so, with what result?
General Odierno. The initial unit that will be aligned with U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the primary focus of current cost analysis
efforts. As with all units that complete the ARFORGEN cycle, this unit
will attain decisive action skills. Costs for this training will not
differ from that of other Army units. Costs specifically associated
with regional alignment will include basic language, regional
orientation, and cultural training; train, advise, and assist training;
and theater specific training.
These requirements will be determined in conjunction with Army
Service Component Commands, and the Geographic Combatant Commands on a
case-by-case basis and integrated into the ARFORGEN training process as
we have done with units deploying to Afghanistan.
No final costs have yet been associated with this additional
training. The Army is working with its Service Component Commands and
the Geographic Combatant Commands to develop specific language
requirements and desired proficiency levels.

37. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what benefit, cost, and risk
analysis have you done, if any, that compares regionally based with
rotational forces in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness in
meeting combatant command engagement and security force assistance
requirements?
General Odierno. Our significantly sized, regionally-based Army
forces exist primarily in the European and the Pacific Theaters. The
Army recently began the process of flowing Europe-based soldiers back
to U.S. installations. Additional data will need to be captured
regarding the incremental increased costs of basing in Europe versus
the similar category of costs for U.S. basing. Interaction with our
foreign partners at U.S. administered facilities like Joint
Multinational Training Command in Germany become more expensive if we
use U.S.-based rotational forces, but we achieve savings by not having
permanently stationed forces that require costly Permanent Change of
Station moves, housing and schools for dependents and other additional
quality of life facilities. We now have an opportunity to collect
comparative costs against associated risks from the standpoint of
United States versus European basing, and by this time next year we
should have more well-developed information.

38. Senator Levin. General Odierno, in your view, is it feasible
and suitable to satisfy theater engagement and assistance strategies
completely with U.S.-based rotational forces? If not, why not?
General Odierno. Theater engagement becomes more expensive under a
system using only U.S.-based rotational forces because of the
incremental travel costs associated with sending U.S. forces overseas
to fulfill substantial commitments. Consider the size of our engagement
and assistance to our partners in South Korea; trying to fulfill such
commitments using purely rotational U.S. forces would be more
expensive, and may carry negative consequences for a very important
economic and military partner of our country. For engagements and
assistance of shorter duration and smaller scope, rotational forces may
be an efficient answer; but I think we should avoid a one-size-fits-all
approach to such a complicated issue.

39. Senator Levin. General Odierno, what is your understanding and
assessment of the performance criteria and metrics that are used to
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of combatant command theater
engagement strategies and how will you integrate the use of regionally
aligned Army brigades into the evaluation system?
General Odierno. Each combatant command evaluates their theater
engagement strategies according to criteria specific to their command
and areas of responsibility. In broad terms, the combatant commands
design measures of performance and measures of effectiveness that they
use to evaluate security cooperation activities aimed at meeting their
theater engagement strategies. They then evaluate the activities over
time and assess whether they are meeting their strategies across the
region, or with a specific partner nation. Each command uses some form
of the Theater Security Cooperation Management System for capturing of
this engagement data. The Army will continue to seek improvement at
meeting its Title 10 responsibilities to provide the most appropriately
trained and equipped Forces to meet the combatant commands needs
according to the specified requirements and requests of the commands we
support. The regionally aligned forces we provide to the combatant
commands have provided appropriate levels of military task, language
and culture training that will enhance their efficiency and
effectiveness at pursuing theater engagement strategies.

40. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how will the Army use these
evaluations over time to determine the alignment of brigades to
combatant commands?
General Odierno. Theater Engagement Strategy evaluations are a
critical demand signal for combatant commands that will guide the
planning of Army regional force alignment indirectly. The evaluations
will be used by the combatant command as it decides what forces it
requires to meet its objectives or conduct activities, and is not a
criteria used by the Army to determine alignment. The Army will provide
trained and equipped Forces that have been aligned based on
requirements provided to the Army in a Concept of Operations document
staffed through Forces Command and sourced through the global force
management process. This process prioritizes requests and directs the
sourcing of the aligned forces based on guidance from The Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is the
primary factor in determining the alignment of brigades to combatant
commands.

EQUIPMENT RESET

41. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, Congress has aggressively
supported DOD's equipment reset funding requests throughout our
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has recently announced plans to
reduce the Army and Marine Corps' force structure by 100,000 troops.
While the proposed budget does not specifically call for any offsetting
reduction in equipment reset funding, it would seem logical that with a
smaller force we might not have as large a requirement to reset
equipment. To what extent is it important to maintain current funding
level for the reset of equipment, despite the planned reduction of Army
end strength?
Secretary McHugh. The current level of funding must be maintained
to ensure the reset of equipment for 2-3 years after completing
operations in Afghanistan. With the closed ground LOC (Lines of
Communication) in Pakistan, the retrograde of equipment from
Afghanistan will be done in phases, taking years not months to
accomplish. Therefore, reset requirements will be impacted by equipment
returning from theater later than forecasted. As a result, Afghanistan
drawdown will require continued Congressional resourcing to retrograde
and reset equipment returning from Afghanistan.
We continue to provide the best and most capable equipment to our
deployed forces. Consequently, most of the deployed equipment will
require reset to support future contingencies. Equipment no longer
required, as a result of force structure reductions, will be disposed
of as needed. If there are opportunities to reduce reset requirements
as a result of these force reductions, we will leverage those
opportunities as appropriate.
Loss of a reset buffer for 2 to 3 years beyond the end of
hostilities would result in difficult choices. The Army would be forced
to reduce funding of essential equipment repair, training, soldier
services, and other Army readiness programs.

42. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, if continued levels of funding
are necessary, what is the detailed justification?
Secretary McHugh. In addition to the details in the Presidential
budget, the Army fiscal year 2013 reset OCO request is $5.4 billion,
which represents an increase of $1.1 billion over our fiscal year 2012
OCO funded levels. The increase is a result of a greater procurement
requirement to replace combat losses and recapitalize uparmored HMMWVs
and mine resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. Our fiscal year
2013 OMA funded reset requirement to repair equipment returning from
theater has declined by $655 million commensurate with the withdrawal
from Iraq and the transition from Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs)
that we employed in Iraq to predominately Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
(IBCTs) required in Afghanistan. In other words, we will be shifting
our efforts from heavy combat equipment, such as the Abrams Main Battle
Tank that is expensive to reset, to repair of equipment supporting of
lighter forces, such as TWVs, Strykers, and Individual Soldier
Equipment.

43. Senator Levin. Secretary McHugh, the Government Accountability
Office has previously reported that the Military Services tend to build
their reset budget requirements simply on the basis of the equipment it
anticipates will actually return to the United States in the next year,
rather than prioritizing or targeting its reset requirements to address
equipment shortages or other needs. To what extent do you believe
opportunities exist to better focus the requirements for equipment
reset, so that reset dollars go farther to meet equipment shortages,
and better address our home stationed unit readiness rates?
Secretary McHugh. The Army established a very deliberate
Retrograde, Reset, and Redistribution (R3) process for equipment that
is focused on transitioning from the needs of the current conflict to
full spectrum operations and training to better manage the entire reset
process, reduce costs and improve readiness. The R3 process
synchronizes retrograde, reset, and redistribution efforts across the
Army to restore readiness. The process identifies retrograde priorities
to assist Army Central (ARCENT) in retrograde planning, synchronizes
retrograde of equipment out of theater with its repair, and subsequent
redistribution to support training and equipment readiness (ARFORGEN)
requirements.
So I would say that our efforts are accomplishing exactly what we
need them to do--sustain our equipment operational readiness through
reset and improve our equipment on hand readiness.

44. Senator Levin. General Odierno, the administration has called
for renewed attention on the Pacific region and the emerging threats
that may arise. To what extent do the reset requirements in this budget
recognize and take into account this shift and perhaps the different
numbers and types of equipment and prepositioned stock we should be
resetting to improve our readiness to address conflicts in that region?
General Odierno. Army Prepositioned Stock (APS)-3 afloat (located
in Diego Garcia and Pusan) and APS-4 (located in Korea and Japan)
support the PACOM AOR and are at full operational capability. APS sets
located in PACOM consist of a HBCT, IBCT, two Sustainment Brigades,
Theater Opening/Port Opening Package, multiple Operational Projects,
Theater Sustainment Stocks (Major End Items), War Reserve Secondary
Items (Consumable and reparable items), and Munition Sustainment. Based
on current DOD/Department of the Army leadership focus, the Army will
assess APS Strategy in the context of Joint and Interagency cooperation
based on COCOM operation plan needs and key mission areas. A revised
APS Strategy 2020 will enable support to Theater Campaign Plans through
the re-validation of our forward positioned unit equipment sets, as
well as utilization of rotational training and small unit mobility sets
positioned in PACOM to support training, exercises, Humanitarian
Assistance, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Security Cooperation,
and Small Scale Stability Operations. Reset requirements in fiscal year
2013/fiscal year 2014 will be adjusted as we respond to the revised APS
2020 Strategy requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

ARMY GROUND FORCE END STRENGTH

45. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, while the Defense Strategic
Guidance states that ground forces ``will no longer be sized to conduct
large-scale, prolonged stability operations,'' it also describes
stability and counterinsurgency operations as one of the primary
missions of the U.S. military. Why won't the ground force be sized to
conduct one of its primary missions?
General Odierno. The Army has conducted extensive analysis and
concluded that the Army will maintain sufficient end strength at
490,000 to meet the potential future missions envisioned in the new
Defense Strategic Guidance, including the ability to conduct stability
operations on a modest scale for a short duration. If the scale of the
operation should increase, the Army will be prepared to expand and
regenerate end strength over the course of a number of years in
response to the crisis.

46. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, how can the force be
prepared to conduct this particular primary mission without the
necessary manpower?
General Odierno. The new strategic guidance directs the Army to
maintain its ability to conduct stability and counter-insurgency
operations, but does not envision large-scale, prolonged operations.
The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides access to
Reserve component (RC) forces to augment the Army's ability to conduct
stability operations. The Army's investment and regeneration concepts
ensure additional strategic depth within the Active component. The Army
is focused on providing trained forces in support of the Combatant
Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation strategies as a hedge against
the need for protracted stability or counter-insurgency operations.
These elements of the Army's current strategy mitigate the risk and
ensure strategic flexibility against the unforeseen.

47. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, I am concerned about the
speed and depth of the reductions in ground force end strength
envisioned in the fiscal year 2013 budget request. What are the Army's
annual end strength targets over fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017?
General Odierno. The overall strength reduction from fiscal year
2013 to fiscal year 2017 is 9.7 percent.
The end strength targets at the end of each fiscal year are
projected to be:

Fiscal Year 2013: 542,700
Fiscal Year 2014: 527,100
Fiscal Year 2015: 512,800
Fiscal Year 2016: 502,100
Fiscal Year 2017: 490,000

48. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, approximately what
proportion of the end strength reduction will come from reduced
accessions into the Army and natural attrition versus involuntary
downsizing of currently-serving soldiers?
General Odierno. If we are provided the flexibility to conduct a
gradual ramp in end strength reductions, we project, at a minimum, that
over 6 years a little over 60 percent, or 48,000, of the end-strength
reductions (from TESI end strength of 569.4K) can be achieved through
reduced accessions and natural attrition. This leaves about 30 percent,
or about 24,000, of the reductions that must come from involuntary
quality driven force shaping tools. Our intent is to complete our
drawdown to 490,000 with the highest quality force possible.

49. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, what types of BCTs or other
force structure elements will be targeted for reductions?
General Odierno. As part of the new DOD Strategic Guidance, the
Army will downsize approximately 79,000 soldiers to 490,000 in the
Active component, and will reduce its Reserve components by 9,000 from
358,200 to 350,200 in the ARNG, and from 206,000 to 205,000 in the U.S.
Army Reserve by the end of the FYDP. The Army's deliberate and
responsible draw-down plans will take into consideration operational
demands, unit readiness, and will proceed at a pace necessary to ensure
mission success and retain flexibility to respond to unforeseen demands
at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our All-Volunteer
Force. The Army announced the reduction of two BCTs in Europe as part
of the President's 2013 budget release. Currently, the Army is
conducting analysis on several options for reorganizing BCTs and
enablers to ensure the force contains the required capability,
capacity, and mix of skills to meet current and future operational
requirements within authorized end strength. This will require a range
of BCT reductions over the course of the FYDP. Currently, there are no
structure reductions being considered for the National Guard.

50. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, what bases or overseas
locations will be targeted for reductions?
General Odierno. Posturing overseas allows the United States to
maintain its strong leadership role throughout the world, secures our
vital national interests overseas, and is also the clearest and most
visible signal of our commitment to global security and peace to both
our allies and potential adversaries. We have targeted 2 heavy brigades
and approximately 2,500 additional personnel associated with enabler
forces in the EUCOM AOR for reduction. We continue to study if any
additional forces will be restationed to the United States. It will be
very minimal if it does occur.

REVERSIBILITY

51. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, the Army is emphasizing
that it is undertaking precautions to ensure that the reductions in end
strength are reversible. If the Army is to pursue the concept of
reversibility, it should establish some clear goals for what it must be
able to do. What are the Army's specific objectives with regard to
reversibility?
General Odierno. The Army is structuring and pacing reductions in a
way that preserves the ability to make a course change to surge,
regenerate, and mobilize the capabilities needed for any future
contingency. During and at the end of downsizing, the Army is postured
to: (1) Rapidly reorganize and mobilize; (2) Regenerate additional
required end strength and formations (as may be authorized and funded
by OCO funding); (3) Develop new capabilities required by unforeseen
threats and not present in the current force; (4) Maintain Combat
experienced officers and NCOs in the Generating Force; and (5) Review
the Army Prepositioned Equipment Sets.

52. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, how much of the force would
the Army be able to reconstitute, and in what amount of time?
General Odierno. The Army is assessing the ability to regenerate
three Active component BCTs at the rate of one per year and additional
AC enablers to support reversibility. This is consistent with the pace
used during the Grow the Army effort in the 2007-2010 timeframe. To
further support this effort, the Army will identify mid-grade officer
and noncommissioned officer (NCO) military skill sets that can
concomitantly support reversibility by providing experienced cadre to
man the new units.

53. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, I understand that the Army
hopes to facilitate reversibility by retaining more field-grade
officers and mid-grade NCOs than it would otherwise need. How will
these crucial leaders be occupied when they are not needed in command
positions?
General Odierno. The additional numbers of experienced officers and
NCOs we will retain in our personnel inventories will be assigned to
existing positions in the generating force. These additional personnel
will be combat veteran officers and NCOs who will leverage their
significant combat and operational experience in generating force
organizations. They will occupy positions that already exist in our
schoolhouses and support units that the Army has been unable to fill
for the past decade due to exceptionally high OPTEMPO and mission
demand. These officers and NCOs will be experienced trainers, doctrine
writers, platform instructors, personnel developers, combat systems
subject matter experts, all lending their hard earned knowledge of
emerging threats and operational techniques to the institutional
systems that will mold and temper our future Army units. These officers
and NCOs will also circulate into and out of operational units as part
of normal career assignment patterns.

54. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, where might they be
assigned and what would they be doing?
General Odierno. The additional numbers of experienced officers and
NCOs we will retain in our personnel inventories will be assigned to
existing positions in the generating force. These additional personnel
will be combat veteran officers and NCOs who will leverage their
significant combat and operational experience in generating force
organizations. They will occupy positions that already exist in our
schoolhouses and support units that the Army has been unable to fill
for the past decade due to exceptionally high OPTEMPO and mission
demand. These officers and NCOs will be experienced trainers, doctrine
writers, platform instructors, personnel developers, combat systems
subject matter experts, all lending their hard earned knowledge of
emerging threats and operational techniques to the institutional
systems that will mold and temper our future Army units. These officers
and NCOs will also circulate into and out of operational units as part
of normal career assignment patterns.

DWELL TIME RATIOS

55. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, General George Casey, the
former Chief of Staff of the Army, regularly testified to the
importance of attaining a predictable ratio of dwell time to deployment
time of 2-to-1 for the Active component and 5-to-1 for the Reserve
component. Do you believe attaining this ratio of dwell time to
deployment time is still important?
General Odierno. Yes, attaining consistent and sufficient dwell
time is critical to ensure the progressive readiness of a unit before
it is prepared to deploy again. To sustain the Army for a long period
of 10-12 months requires us to achieve BOG of 1:2 for active units and
1:4 for Reserve units by 2015. This is predicated upon a balanced
requirement to reduce the force while simultaneously withdrawing from
Afghanistan. Dwell time may increase, but readiness must remain a
constant. Army reductions beyond 490,000 would challenge the Army's
ability to meet timelines for current identified requirements and to
maintain necessary dwell for units and soldiers, thereby imposing a
significant readiness risk to the force and a strategic risk to the
Nation. The Army has recently achieved 1:2 across the Active Force, but
still lags in certain specialties such as aviation and Special
Operations Forces.

56. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, has the Army achieved this
ratio for both units and individual soldiers? If not, what types of
units or individual occupational specialties are still not getting
adequate dwell time?
General Odierno. The Army has achieved the 1:2 Boots-on-the-Ground
(BOG):Dwell ratio for active individual soldiers and we expect to reach
that same goal for units in fiscal year 2015. Low density, high demand
units and occupational specialties such as aviation, civil affairs,
intelligence, military police, psychological operations, engineers and
Special Forces remain just above the mandated 1:1 BOG:Dwell ratio. In
an attempt to relieve pressure on the inventory of low density, high
demand capabilities, the Army grew additional capabilities in the last
decade and mitigated shortages with in lieu of sourcing and
remissioning of units. However, the demand for these capabilities
remains too high to realize a 1:2 BOG:Dwell rotation prior to changes
in the operational climate.

57. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, will the planned end
strength reductions cause any difficulty in sustaining necessary dwell
time ratios?
General Odierno. Reduced commitments will allow the Army to achieve
a 1:2 BOG:Dwell ratio for Active units, and 1:4 BOG:Dwell ratio for
Reserve units. If force size and structure reduces in proportion with
reduction in demand for Army capabilities, increased dwell time should
be the result. However, as we transition to an Active Army of 490,000,
continued investment in readiness activities is required for this
leaner stance, given the strategic environment of uncertainty and
threat. Dwell time may increase, but readiness must remain a constant.
Reductions beyond 490,000 would challenge the Army's ability to meet
timelines for all currently identified requirements and its ability to
maintain necessary dwell for units and soldiers, thereby imposing a
significant readiness risk to the force and strategic risk to the
Nation.

ARMY IMPROVED TURBINE ENGINE PROGRAM

58. Senator Lieberman. General Odierno, the Army Improved Turbine
Engine Program (ITEP) envisions a significantly more fuel efficient and
powerful engine for the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache helicopter
fleet. It is important that the Army manages the ITEP program carefully
to ensure technical maturity and operational capability are proven
before making a final decision that will have a dramatic impact on the
current and future helicopter fleet. Please describe the Army's
acquisition strategy for ITEP. In particular, will there be sustained
competition for this program through the science and technology (S&T)
phase and into the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD)
phase?
General Odierno. The Army agrees that facilitating competition into
EMD will incentivize industry and provide the lowest cost and best
product to the warfighter in the timeliest manner. Therefore, the Army
ITEP acquisition strategy includes promoting competition throughout the
EMD. The acquisition strategy also includes a full and open competition
approach with the intent of selecting two vendors for initial engine
design and development, to include ground runs in engine test stands
and flight tests in Black Hawk and Apache aircraft. A final down select
is planned for Milestone C, Low Rate Initial Production. Provisions
will exist in the contract for a potential earlier down selection to
one vendor.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY

59. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno,
according to testimony, as our new national defense priorities drive us
to a smaller Army, we must avoid the historical pattern of drawing down
too fast or risk losing leadership and capabilities, making it much
harder to expand again when needed. It is critical that the Army be
able to rapidly expand to meet large unexpected contingencies. One of
the key components to retaining that ability is maintaining a strong
cadre of NCOs and mid-grade officers to form the core of new formations
when needed. How will sufficient NCOs and mid-grade officers be
retained in the rank structure as the Army draws down?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. For the past decade, the Army
has intentionally manned its warfighting units and support structures
at the expense of its generating forces to ensure success in our
operational missions. This was necessary to sustain the level of
commitment in two theaters of war as we grew into a more capable,
modular, flexible combat structure. As operational demand lessens, more
of our experienced and capable combat forces can be redirected to fill
the important positions as trainers, doctrine writers, platform
instructors, personnel developers, combat systems subject matter
experts across our generating force units and installations.

60. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what
are the risks associated with this strategy in terms of managing
personnel, providing forces for ongoing missions such as Afghanistan,
and responding to possible future threats quickly and decisively?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. To manage risk, the Army must
constantly balance three rheostats: End Strength, Readiness and
Modernization. If readiness and modernization are sacrificed to
maintain end strength levels, then the Army risks becoming a hollow
force with soldiers not properly trained and equipped for emergent
missions.
To manage the risk of drawing down end strength too quickly, the
Army designed a ramp to gradually reduce end strength over a 6 year
period. This will allow for the Army to take care of its soldiers,
maintain its commitment to Afghanistan and facilitate reversibility
over the next several years, if required. The ramp will also allow for
normal attrition to absorb a significant portion of the reductions.
To mitigate risk, the Army is relying on OCO funding. All end
strength over 490,000 is funded strictly through OCO. Additionally, the
Army will continue to rely on OCO funding years after units depart
Afghanistan to simultaneously reset forces and equipment for the
future.
The Army will continue to be agile and stands ready to respond to a
range of threats. We will respond, as part of the joint force, to any
contingency that threatens our Nation and our way of life. Under the
new defense strategy, the Army will be able to quickly and decisively
respond to any future threats. Where there is risk in the new strategy
is with our ability to sustain multiple long-term simultaneous
conflicts like those of the past decade.

61. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, another critical component
of the Army's ability to expand is the Nation's industrial base. We
rely on the industrial base to perform research and development and to
design, produce, and maintain our weapons systems, components, and
parts. It must be capable of rapidly expanding to meet a large demand.
Has the Army considered how reversibility will affect the defense
industrial base?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is considering how reversibility will
affect the defense industrial base and is taking many steps to
carefully address this issue. Reversibility requires the Army to make
and sustain selected investments and put policies in place to mitigate
risk and posture the force to respond quickly to unforeseen
requirements or changes in the National Defense Strategy. The Army is
aware that reversibility will require careful attention and focus on
sustainment of critical skills and manufacturing capabilities in the
industrial base. The Army is actively engaged in ongoing efforts to
determine the health of Industrial Base sectors critical to support
Army and Joint Services programs. The Army is currently identifying and
assessing status of organic and commercial critical manufacturing and
maintenance capabilities required to meet future contingency
reversibility requirements. In addition, the Army is also identifying
supply chain issues in design, manufacturing and sustainment that can
present risk to critical Army capabilities.

62. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, how will production lines
for defense items be kept warm as DOD scales back on purchasing over
the next few years?
Secretary McHugh. Army procurement decisions will be based on
warfighter requirements, best value acquisition strategies, and
affordability within the Army's budget. The health of the defense
industrial base--organic and commercial--remains a significant
consideration as these strategies are developed and executed.
In connection with this effort, the Army will continue to work
across DOD on the S2T2 effort. This effort aims to identify single
points of failure, over-reliance on foreign sourcing, and areas of
limited competition. In doing so, the Army will continue to survey the
commercial industrial base to obtain data for analysis. This
information will help the Army determine what essential skill sets and
production capabilities are needed to serve the needs of the
warfighter, including what production lines must be kept warm. The Army
will continue to work its internal efforts as well for the same
purpose, such as its Industrial Base Baseline Assessments, which
conduct a sector/sub-sector assessment of programs identified as
critical by Program Executive Offices and Life Cycle Management
Commands; determine the impact of reductions in funding to program
requirements; and develop recommendations which enable the industrial
base to sustain current and future warfighter needs.

63. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, does the Army have a
strategy for addressing the unique concerns of small businesses that
make up the defense industrial base supply chain?
Secretary McHugh. The Army works closely with the commercial
industrial base, including the small businesses within it, to assess
capabilities and capacities necessary to meet the needs of the
warfighter. The Army uses different tools to assess these capabilities
and capacities, including the DOD-led S2T2 effort. This effort aims to
identify single points of failure, over-reliance on foreign sourcing,
and areas of limited competition. In doing so, the Army will continue
to survey the commercial industrial base to obtain data for analysis.
This information will help the Army determine what essential skill sets
and production capabilities are needed to serve the needs of the
warfighter, including those within the commercial industrial base small
businesses. The Army will also continue to work its internal efforts as
well for the same purpose, to include the Industrial Base Baseline
Assessments, which conduct a sector/sub-sector assessment of programs
identified as critical by Program Executive Offices and Life Cycle
Management Commands. This information will help the Army determine the
impact of reductions in funding to program requirements; and develop
recommendations which enable the industrial base to sustain current and
future warfighter needs.

PERSONNEL END STRENGTH DECREASE

64. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, the Army is planning for
an aggressive draw down as it decreases end strength from a peak of
about 570,000 to 490,000 Active Army, 358,000 to 353,500 ARNG, and
206,000 to 205,000 Army Reserve soldiers over the next 5 years. I agree
that we must draw down wisely to avoid stifling the health of the force
or breaking faith with our soldiers, civilians, and families. Excessive
cuts would create high risk in our ability to sustain readiness. We
must avoid our historical pattern of drawing down too much or too fast
and risk losing the leadership, technical skills, and combat experience
that cannot be easily reclaimed. We must identify and safeguard key
programs in education, leader development, health care, quality of
life, and retirement--programs critical to retaining our soldiers. When
will the Army complete an analysis of how many soldiers will be
involuntarily separated from the Army?
Secretary McHugh. The Army analysis of specific inventory cohorts
is ongoing. We are finalizing near-term structure and will have the
policy decisions that will determine the target cohorts by this summer.
We will begin by late summer to frame our expectations for how many
soldiers by skill, grade and year group will be excess to the Army's
end strength requirements through fiscal year 2017. Our analysis will
drive planning for use of various force shaping authorities and that
plan will be complete in early fiscal year 2013.

65. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, when will these reports be
available to Congress?
Secretary McHugh. The Army's plan for drawdown execution will be
available to Congress members early in fiscal year 2013.

66. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, what are the specifics on
how the Army will take care of soldiers, families, and civilians
involuntarily separated during this aggressive draw down?
Secretary McHugh. The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) is the
Transition Program that assists soldiers, family members, and DA
civilian's transition from their status within the Army back to the
civilian community. Involuntarily separated soldiers are
congressionally mandated to receive the same pre-separation counseling
as voluntarily separating soldiers. Additionally, soldiers, family
members, and DA civilians (involuntarily or voluntarily) are entitled
to participate in any of the transition assistance classes offered by
ACAP. We are adjusting the ACAP program to meet the goals of the
recently passed VOW to Hire Heroes Act and the recommendations of the
Presidential Task Force. Attendance may take place in person at an ACAP
center, live or cataloged classes online, or individually through the
24/7 ACAP Call Center. ACAP Counselors also refer soldiers and their
family members to other agencies and organizations that assist with
Transition: The Department of Labor, The Veterans Affairs, Military
OneSource, The Small Business Administration, The Helmets to Hardhats,
and The Student Veterans of America to name a few.
These classes include, but are not limited to:

Employment assistance
Job search skills
MOS Crosswalk (Military skills to civilian skills comparison)
Skills assessment
Professional interest evaluation
Resume and cover letter development and refinement
Interview skills
Dress for success
Salary negotiation
Relocation assistance
Legal referrals (Wills, Power of Attorney, Estate planning, et
cetera before (separation)
Contact information for housing counseling assistance
Education/Training
Health/Life insurance
Financial planning/Budget development
Veteran benefits briefing
Veterans Administration Disabled Transition Assistance Program
(VA DTAP)
Department of Labor Employment Workshop
Physical and mental health well being

The Army is also, utilizing the H2H as its interim employment
application/tool www.H2H.jobs to provide one primary location where
soldiers of all components, veterans, and family members can connect
with private industry employment opportunities. This application is
web-based and able to translate military occupational skills (MOS),
provide career path exploration, upload resumes, allow customized job
searches, enable employers to also search for veterans, and provide
performance metrics. H2H will eventually be included on eBenefits, the
single portal for transition benefits selected by the DOD-VA Veterans
Employment Initiative Task Force (www.eBenefits.va.gov)

67. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, what effect will a smaller
Army have on training installations, like Fort Leonard Wood?
Secretary McHugh. Generally speaking, we will see a return to pre-
war training levels at our training installations (which have already
seen some consolidation as a result of BRAC 2005); a greater
opportunity for soldiers to attend institutionally-based professional
military education and training as a result of reduced deployments and
greater dwell time; and a move away from the temporary facilities we've
used in recent years to accommodate the training requirements for an
expanding Army.
Training soldiers and civilians, developing leaders, and delivering
the training products and enablers required to support the Army is a
labor intensive business. Over the past several years, the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command has maintained a delicate workforce
balance between military, civilians, and contractors to meet mission
requirements in an environment where military personnel have been
transferred out of TRADOC to the operating forces. As the Army begins
to withdraw from operations in Afghanistan and looks to shape the size
and structure of the Army of 2020, we see an opportunity to `re-invest'
military personnel in our training command, with the potential to
retain high quality civilians and divest some of the currently required
contractor support to training. The Army is currently conducting a
study to determine the right mix of military, civilian, and contractor
manning to train the Army of 2020.

68. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, as the Army seeks to
reduce forces, will reductions be taken evenly across specialties or
will certain specialties be prioritized and protected?
Secretary McHugh. The Army's plan will ensure that the force
contains the required capability, capacity, and mix of skills to meet
current and future operational requirements within authorized end
strength. In general, we will see an increase in Army Aviation, Special
Forces, Military Information Support Operations, Civil Affairs,
Infantry and Armor skills. We will see a decrease in Field Artillery,
Chemical and Signal skills. An announcement on specific force structure
actions is expected sometime before, or in conjunction with, submission
of the President's 2014 budget in early February 2013.

69. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, how will a reduction in
end strength affect civilian personnel currently working on Army
installations?
Secretary McHugh. Garrison Commanders, Senior Commanders and
partner commands are responsible for shaping their workforce within
their allocated budgets. Commands will use a variety of available
options to achieve their reduction objectives in order to mitigate
negative impacts on their workforce while continuing to focus on our
mission.
To minimize the possible negative effects on our civilian personnel
currently working on our Army installations, we have relied as much as
possible on voluntary departures of employees to achieve our manpower
reductions.
Voluntary Early Retirement Authority and Voluntary Separation
Incentive Payment are two options commanders have to reduce the number
of personnel they have in order to meet mission objectives. Some
commands have established internal placement programs to move
volunteers between activities across geographic regions to successfully
rebalance their internal workforce and minimize personnel impact.
If we do not achieve our directed Civilian personnel Full Time
Equivalent levels through use of these measures, then commanders may
recommend a Reduction in Force (RIF). However, I retain the authority
to approve a RIF within the Army. A RIF will be the last resort to meet
budgeted levels.

70. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, has the Army performed the
necessary analysis to ensure that bases will not be understaffed as a
result of personnel reductions?
Secretary McHugh. The Army's analysis of workload requirements
begins with the commanders at the installations to determine they have
the resources to perform their mission and necessary functions. This
ongoing review progresses through separate commands (Installation
Management Command, Medical Command, Army Materiel Command, et cetera)
for adjustments up to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).
After DOD resource decisions (as reflected in the fiscal year 2012
President's budget) were sent down, Army Commanders conducted an
analysis, assessed their projected future requirements and developed
plans on how to meet their mission requirements while shaping their
workforce within their allocated budget.
In some cases, tough decisions are being made to determine the most
critical and essential services; find and eliminate redundancies; and
then rebalance and retrain the workforce in order to accomplish the
mission.
At HQDA, we will use the midyear review to refine our plans and
provide guidance to the commands concerning prioritization of resources
and efforts to ensure that we do not break the trust and confidence of
soldiers, families, and civilians that make up our Army.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH-PROTECTED VEHICLES

71. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, the Army maintains a large
number of MRAP vehicles. These vehicles were purchased specifically to
protect soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. As U.S. forces have left Iraq
and as we continue to draw down in Afghanistan, it is unclear what role
these vehicles will play in future conflicts. Has the Army completed an
analysis of how and where these vehicles will be stored?
Secretary McHugh. The initial task was to build and field MRAPs as
fast as possible to address the Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)
threat. Logistics sustainment, while important, was a secondary
consideration. DOD continues to upgrade MRAP capability by bringing the
earlier variants to the latest configurations. This strategy will
reduce the number of variants from 26 to 8, and manufacturers from 6 to
4. The Army also plans to divest 1,200 MRAP vehicles that cannot be
economically repaired. As MRAPs are no longer required in theater, they
will be reset at Red River Army Depot to a 10/20 (fully mission
capable) Standard +4D (delayed desert damage and degradation).
Approximately 60 percent will be placed in Army Preposition Stocks
(APS) sets for use in future contingency operations, significantly
reducing the sustainment cost associated with parts and fuel. The
remaining 40 percent of the MRAPs will be included in Pre-deployment
Training Equipment sets at various Institutional Schools to train
unique skills and to permanent Army unit's Tables of Equipment.

72. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, how much will it cost to
store and maintain these vehicles?
Secretary McHugh. The Army continues to refine its long-term
utilization and sustainment strategy for enduring force MRAPs. Army
approved MRAP requirements are being reviewed in ongoing studies
including the Sustainment Readiness Review, Army TWV Strategy 2020,
relook of MRAP Study II, and Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration.
Once these reviews are complete, enduring force sustainment costs can
be accurately forecasted for activities including reset, storage
facilities, cyclic maintenance, and second-destination transportation.

73. Senator McCaskill. Secretary McHugh, are there any alternate
uses for these vehicles?
Secretary McHugh. The primary purpose of the MRAP is to transport
soldiers safely in a high threat IED environment. While there are
alternate uses for these vehicles, their principal use now and for the
future is to increase soldier survivability. The MRAPs have various
mission roles such as troop transport, route clearance, explosive
ordnance disposal, ambulance, and vehicle recovery. Once MRAPs are
reset they will be reallocated based on the Army's MRAP Distribution
Plan and used according to those mission roles. Approximately 60
percent will be placed in APS sets for use in future contingency
operations. The remaining 40 percent of the MRAPs will be allocated to
permanent Army unit's Tables of Equipment, and to various installations
for Predeployment Training Equipment sets.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

74. Senator McCaskill. General Odierno, I know the Army continues
to work on getting its arms around sexual assault throughout the Army,
but so much more needs to be done. Sex crimes in the Active Army have
trended upward with a 28 percent increase in the offense rate and an
increase of 20 percent in the offender rate from fiscal year 2006 to
fiscal year 2011. During this period there were a total of 11,774 sex
offenses committed by 8,215 offenders, which was generally comprised of
an increasing number of offenses in each year, ending in fiscal year
2011 with 2,290 sex offenses committed by 1,531 soldiers. Why do you
believe sexual assault rates in the Army have risen so dramatically
over the past 5 years?
General Odierno. The increased number of sexual assaults in the
Army over the last 6 years is simply unacceptable. Although the certain
cause is unknown, increased reporting due to awareness may have
contributed to the risk in the past 5 years.
Our research and efforts to combat sexual assault, as we have
communicated in the Army Gold Book and in previous briefings to
Congress, has identified several key victimization risk factors. For
example, we know that: (1) the majority of sexual assaults occur on
weekends in high-density housing and involve alcohol use; (2) most
victims of sexual assaults are generally younger female soldiers in
their first 18 months of service; and (3) 97 percent of the victims at
least casually knew their attackers.
Many of these risk factors can be mitigated through increased
command emphasis and a commitment to ensuring disciplinary
accountability in the barracks environment. For instance, we feel that
ensuring that young female soldiers are integrated into a formal chain
of command immediately upon arrival at a new unit will ensure that
leaders are affirmatively accountable for those soldiers. We also feel
that strengthening and enforcing barracks alcohol and visitation
policies will create an environment where these types of crime are less
likely to occur.
The Army continues to implement improved training to address sexual
assault prevention and response in the Army through its Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program. SHARP Life-
Cycle (institutional, operational, and self-study) training occurs at
every level of Professional Military Education (PME), facilitated
annually in every Army unit, during pre- and post-deployment training,
and via self-study distance learning. One of the primary goals of SHARP
training is to facilitate sexual assault prevention through awareness
and education about situations that may set the conditions for
incidents of sexual assault--including gender relations and alcohol
use/abuse.
In 2011, the Army fully implemented Initial Military Training (IMT)
revisions which introduced new sexual harassment and sexual assault
messaging targeted for new recruits in Basic Combat Training and Basic
Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) using a revised curriculum that
includes a two-person, audience interactive program that includes skits
dealing with dating, consent, rape and other associated topics such as
body language, gender relations, alcohol use and intervention.
The Army fielded new mandatory operational training in April 2011.
This facilitated training includes leader and soldier videos. The
training addresses alcohol risk management, high risk behaviors, and
models skill-sets to effective intervene to stop potential sexual
assaults.
The interactive, critical decisionmaking, self-study distance
learning training (``Team Bound'') provides scenario based training in
which soldiers become the lead character, making choices in situations
(including high risk and alcohol scenarios) dealing with sexual
harassment and sexual assault.
Additionally, the Army takes seriously its responsibility to
appropriately respond to sexual assaults when they do occur. The Army
continues to execute an 80-hour SHARP training curriculum conducted by
SHARP Mobile Training Teams (MTT). These MTTs train command-selected
personnel to execute the SHARP Program at every echelon of the Army
around the world. To date, MTTs have trained over 11,500 SHARP
personnel.
Within the investigative line of effort, all Military Police
soldiers attending IMT, Professional Military Education and select
functional courses receive training on sexual assault. Additionally,
the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) and the U.S.
Army Military Police School (USAMPS) have developed an 80-hour Special
Victim Unit (SVU) Course, which DOD recognized as the gold standard/
best practice for sexual assault investigator training. Used to train
special agents from all Services on the unique considerations and
techniques of sexual assault investigations, the SVU Course
incorporates a new technique (Forensic Experiential Trauma Interview,
or FETI) to more effectively interview sexual assault victims. The FETI
has proven to be a compelling paradigm shift in obtaining substantially
more information and forensic physiological evidence from sexual
assault victims. Further, USACIDC employs highly qualified experts and
civilian sexual assault investigators to train and mentor CID Special
Agents on the conduct of sexual assault investigations.
On the prosecution side, OTJAG has hired seven civilian highly
qualified experts to assist in the training of counsel and to support
individual prosecutions and expanded the Special Victim Prosecutor
program to appoint 23 hand-selected, specially trained counsel to
oversee the investigation, and if necessary, the prosecution of every
sexual assault allegation.
These are only some of the efforts that the Army is taking to
prevent and respond to sexual assaults. The Army is truly committed to
a coordinated, aggressive effort to prevent and respond to sexual
assaults, and will continue to make eliminating sexual assault a high
priority for the Army.

75. Senator McCaskill. General Odierno, legislation currently
before Congress would remove the reporting and investigation of
allegations of sexual trauma from the chain of command and place them
within an independent body. Do you believe such an independent body
would be a more appropriate entity for conducting investigations that,
at times, include individuals within a servicemember's chain of
command? If not, why?
General Odierno. The Army's efforts to prevent, investigate and
prosecute allegations of sexual assault are unprecedented. Four-plus
years of consistent focus and resourcing have made an enormous positive
impact in culture change, in the quality of investigations, and in the
way in which we hold offenders accountable. By any measure, our system
of military justice is responsive, responsible and effective in dealing
with this serious crime. An independent body would not be a more
appropriate entity for conducting investigations and disposing of
allegations. Jurisdiction for sexual assault offenses has been withheld
to Special Court Martial Convening Authority levels. This change
requires more senior Commanders to review each case. These commanders,
with the advice of Judge Advocates, are given the authority to dispose
of allegations against members of their command. Commanders are
appropriately trained, resourced and committed to reviewing all
allegations of misconduct and holding offenders appropriately
accountable. There is no evidence that removing the chain of command
from the disposition of sexual assault allegations will improve
decisionmaking or remove discretion from the process.
A commander is responsible and accountable for all that goes on in
a formation--health, welfare, safety, morale, discipline, and readiness
to execute the mission. The adjudication of alleged offenses inside the
unit must be efficient, visible, and just. Adjudication of sexual
assault offenses by local commanders promotes these ends. Commanders
are best-positioned to understand the impact of an offense on readiness
and morale on his or her unit and the aggravating and mitigating
factors of each unique offense. Transfer of the Commander's authority
to an outside, centralized source does not ensure efficiency, reduces
transparency, and undermines the credibility of dispositions of sexual
assault cases. The military justice system, which utilizes the chain of
command to adjudicate offenses, promotes loyalty to both superiors and
subordinates, and is perceived by commanders, soldiers, and the public
as a just system.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

BERRY AMENDMENT

76. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh, Senator Graham and I recently
wrote to you regarding the Army's program to supply uniforms and other
equipment to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
This project provides the Afghan National Army and the Afghan
National Police with uniforms and other individual equipment at U.S.
taxpayers' expense, and is unique in that it allows for the final
assembly of the garments to be completed in Afghanistan. However,
throughout the 3-year history of this program, solicitations have
stipulated that non-Afghanistan components, such as yarns and fabrics,
must be made in the United States and comply with standard Berry
Amendment requirements. The Army has reversed its position, in its
latest solicitation, by removing the stipulation that non-Afghan
component materials be made in the United States. These components can
now be exempt from the Berry Amendment requirements. This reversal
means that yarns and fabrics that are readily available from U.S.
manufacturers--including North Carolina--can now come from countries
like China under this program.
In a response to our letter, dated January 30, 2012, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Kim Denver explained that there were special
provisions that allowed for the final sewing and assembly of these
garments to take place in Afghanistan. However, she failed to address
our main question, which is why the various component parts, such as
yarns and fabrics, that are not available in Afghanistan, could be
sourced from non-U.S. producers. Waiving the Berry requirements under
this program will severely impact a number of domestic textile
producers and would likely result in the loss of critical U.S.
manufacturing jobs. At a time when the U.S. economy is struggling to
create and maintain jobs, it would be unwise to undermine U.S.
manufacturers and workers that are directly involved in this program.
Do you not agree that if a component textile material under this
program is not available from an Afghan supplier, that component should
then fall under the normal Berry Amendment requirements?
Secretary McHugh. The Berry Amendment states that DOD funds may not
be used for the procurement of certain items, including certain
clothing and textile materials, if the item is not grown, reprocessed,
reused, or produced in the United States. However, one of the
exceptions to the Berry Amendment allows for procurements outside of
the United States in support of combat operations.
Because the procurement of ANSF clothing and equipment was in
support of combat actions, this procurement was not held to the
requirements of the Berry Amendment. The decision to limit competition
to Afghan vendors was consistent with the U.S. strategic objectives in
Afghanistan: to help Afghans rebuild their country by providing
legitimate, sustainable business opportunities to Afghan companies and
jobs for Afghan citizens.
The Army has not reversed its policy of following the Berry
Amendment, which emphasizes procurement of DOD items in the United
States. In deciding from what sources to procure its items, the Army
closely follows the Berry Amendment for applicable items; however, the
Army is aware that the Berry Amendment allows for a number of
exceptions, such as the exception noted above for procurements outside
of the United States in support of combat operations. The Army will
continue to comply with the requirements of the Berry Amendment in the
procurement process and will continue to emphasize the procurement of
items in the United States.

77. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh, please explain the Army's
seeming reversal of Berry Amendment policy with respect to this
program.
Secretary McHugh. The Army has not reversed its policy of following
the Berry Amendment, which emphasizes procurement of DOD items in the
United States. The Berry Amendment states that DOD funds may not be
used for the procurement of certain items, including certain clothing
and textile materials, if the item is not grown, reprocessed, reused,
or produced in the United States. However, one of the exceptions to the
Berry Amendment allows for procurements outside of the United States in
support of combat operations.
Because the procurement of ANSF clothing and equipment was in
support of combat actions, this procurement was not held to the
requirements of the Berry Amendment. The decision to limit competition
to Afghan vendors was consistent with the U.S. strategic objectives in
Afghanistan: to help Afghans rebuild their country by providing
legitimate, sustainable business opportunities to Afghan companies and
jobs for Afghan citizens.
In deciding from what sources to procure its items, the Army
closely follows the Berry Amendment for applicable items; however, the
Army is aware that the Berry Amendment allows for a number of
exceptions, such as the exception noted above for procurements outside
of the United States in support of combat operations. The Army will
continue to follow the requirements of the Berry Amendment in the
procurement.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin

SHORT-RANGE AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

78. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, the Army has proposed
divestiture of the C-23 Sherpa, an aircraft that is used for critical
missions in combat and for Homeland security missions, especially by
the National Guard. I have talked with my Adjutant General and his
colleagues and they believe that the Guard can maintain this mission
with existing force structure. Does the Army need this short-range
airlift capability?
General Odierno. The Army has a capability requirement for intra-
theater lift to be provided to ground forces, as the Army currently has
in Afghanistan. CH-47s are used heavily and cannot bear the whole load.
To assist us with our requirement, the Air Force has agreed to provide
fixed wing aircraft for resupply. A Memorandum of Agreement signed by
the Air Force and Army on January 27, 2012, states: ``The Combatant
Commander/Joint Force Commander should TACON (Tactical Control) an
Expeditionary Airlift Squadron or Detachment to the Commander, Army
Forces who will exercise Tactical Control through the Senior Army
Aviation Authority. The dedicated Expeditionary Airlift Squadron may,
at the discretion of the Combatant Commander/Joint Force Commander,
collocate with an Army Combat Aviation Brigade or Task Force to provide
tactical airlift for transport of Army Forces time sensitive/mission
critical equipment, supplies and personnel.'' The Air Force assures the
Army it will be able to fulfill this requirement with their current C-
130 fleet. The Air Force commitment to meet the Army's intra-theater
lift requirement using C-130 aircraft to support Army ground forces
fulfills this requirement. The Army does not currently have or foresee
any gaps or shortfalls for intra-theater lift requirements or theater
logistical supply chain requirements based upon this agreement.

79. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, would you be willing to work
with the Guard on a cost-effective solution to maintain this
capability?
General Odierno. The current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
signed by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Air Force (USAF) has shifted the time/sensitive, mission/critical cargo
mission to the USAF. The divesture of the C-23 has begun and we expect
to be complete by December 2014. The states where the C-23s are
currently stationed will be offered first rights of refusal for the
transfer of the aircraft to their respective fleets.

RETIREMENT

80. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, you recently stated that the
rise in TRICARE fees, which could climb from $460 a year to $2,048 for
some working-age retirees, is still very generous compared with
programs offered by private employers. I know that some veterans are
starting to see a cost increase in prescription medication--some by as
much as 33 percent. What is your opinion on this topic?
Secretary McHugh. I laud the Army's efforts to promote filling
prescriptions at the military treatment facilities (MTFs).
Understanding the concern for the rising cost of medications to
beneficiaries and realizing that a continual rise in medication costs
to DOD jeopardizes the benefit for all, Army Medicine is developing a
plan to promote beneficiaries' return to the MTF for prescription fills
for no or low medication costs. Increasing formularies, improving
access to pharmacies, and providing pharmacists for medication
counseling are a few steps towards accomplishing this goal. For
beneficiaries living near MTFs, this is a no-cost option for
prescriptions. For beneficiaries living far from an MTF, Home Delivery
is a great alternative as it costs less than 1/3 of retail network
pharmacies while also being 25-30 percent less costly than retail to
the government.

81. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, do you think our veterans
who have already sacrificed for the safety of this country should be
asked to sacrifice more?
Secretary McHugh. The TRICARE fee increases proposed by DOD sustain
the medical benefit honorably earned by our veterans and their families
now and into the future. I support DOD's efforts to rebalance the share
of costs incurred by the Department and the beneficiary, while
preserving and enhancing the quality and range of care.

82. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, what can be done differently
to prevent this increase in costs or changes to benefits?
Secretary McHugh. Healthcare System costs have more than doubled
from fiscal year 2001 to present. However, costs incurred by
beneficiaries via enrollment fees, deductibles and cost shares have not
kept pace with these increased costs since the inception of TRICARE in
1996. The Secretary of Defense has stated that if the proposed TRICARE
fee increases, which seek to re-balance the share of costs incurred by
the Department and the beneficiary while preserving and enhancing the
quality and range of care, are not adopted, the funds to sustain the
healthcare benefit may be paid out of other areas such as readiness or
reductions in troop strength.

83. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, do you anticipate any issues
with recruiting and retention because of the potential changes to the
retirement system or cost shares?
Secretary McHugh. Retirement benefits are an important component in
motivating applicants to join the Army and to remain for a career.
However, the Army has no current research on the impact to recruiting
and retention that would result from a change to the current retirement
system or cost increases for benefits

AFGHANISTAN CASUALTY EVACUATION PROCEDURES

84. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, a constituent has contacted
me about an issue that I'd like some more information on. He states
that medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) procedures are causing unnecessary
casualties in Afghanistan. What are the survivability rates of
casualties in Afghanistan?
General Odierno. The survivability rate for our wounded service men
and women in Afghanistan is 92 percent; the highest in history because
of the integration of our MEDEVAC capability with the health service
support network.

85. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, as I understand it, Army
MEDEVAC helicopters are not armed, but if a landing zone is designated
hot, it must wait to fly with an armed escort, and that process causes
delays. Please describe this process.
General Odierno. All Army aircraft, regardless of type, require
escort, i.e., a wingman, chase or armed escort to improve mission
success and mitigate tactical risk. Aircraft do not fly single ship in
any circumstance. When the enemy situation dictates, as in the case of
a hot landing zone, the tactical commander can require the use of an
armed escort. This is true for troop transport as well as for MEDEVAC.
Ninety-three percent of the time, MEDEVAC delivers the patient to a
medical treatment facility within the 1 hour standard. When MEDEVAC
missions take longer than the 1 hour standard, we track the following
reasons: mission complexity (22 percent), distance (19 percent),
environment (17 percent), enemy action (16 percent), command and
control (10 percent), escort (9 percent), and other considerations (6
percent). MEDEVAC delays attributed to ``waiting for escort'' equate to
0.6 percent of all urgent point of injury missions, or six times out of
1,000 is a MEDEVAC mission delayed outside of the standard due to
escort related issues. Ninety-three percent of the time, the mission is
accomplished in less than an hour in the following manner. The decision
to launch MEDEVAC aircraft rests solely with the tactical Commander.
Missions accomplished within the 1 hour standard follow the following
general process: (1) receipt of air MEDEVAC mission request; (2)
commander makes an assessment, and balances the clinical risk to
patients against the tactical risk to aircrews; (3) commander decides
to launch MEDEVAC aircraft with a wingman, with a chase aircraft, or
with an armed escort. Commanders employ the escort aircraft to improve
mission success and mitigate tactical risk. If necessary, the Commander
may re-task airborne aircraft or launch additional aircraft to perform
escort for MEDEVAC aircraft. Armed escort and/or chase aircraft provide
a multitude of security related tasks to include identification of
optimal ingress and egress routes, coordination of ground and air
support, and engagement of the enemy from greater distances with
stronger firepower. The Army has employed tactics successfully in
support of air missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In February 2012,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that Central Command
(CENTCOM) conduct a review of its air MEDEVAC escort procedures. We
expect this report to be available in July 2012.

86. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, what are the differences
between Army MEDEVAC procedures and the procedures of the other
Services?
General Odierno. The Army is the only Service that provides
dedicated MEDEVAC support to the Joint Force for DOD. These units are
trained, manned, and equipped to exclusively perform that medical
mission. This enables a higher level of evacuation and enroute care
capability for the Joint Force commanders. The U.S. Air Force (USAF)
and the U.S. Navy (USN) have employed aircraft and crews, originally
organized, manned, trained, and equipped for other combat support
roles, such as personnel recovery, to augment the MEDEVAC mission.

87. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, are there any other alternate
configurations among the Services for MEDEVAC procedures?
General Odierno. The Army is the only Service that provides
dedicated MEDEVAC that are trained, manned, and equipped to exclusively
perform that medical mission. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the U.S.
Navy (USN) have employed aircraft and crews, originally organized,
manned, trained, and equipped for other combat support roles, such as
personnel recovery, to augment the MEDEVAC mission.

88. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, why are Army MEDEVAC
helicopters unarmed?
General Odierno. The Army does not arm MEDEVAC aircraft with crew-
served weapons because doing so would negatively impact their mission
focus. Army air ambulances must be unequivocally dedicated to the
mission of MEDEVAC in order to ensure the wounded are evacuated to the
nearest medical treatment facility within the ``golden hour''. To best
fulfill its Title X requirement to train and equip forces, the Army has
organized, manned, equipped and trained MEDEVAC units to perform only
this mission. This approach has resulted in a 92 percent survival rate
for those wounded in Afghanistan, which is the highest in history. Army
air ambulances also operate in compliance with the Law of War. Because
of the mission they perform, Army air ambulances are marked with the
internationally recognized Red Cross symbol. This identifies MEDEVAC
aircraft as a non-combatant asset performing a humanitarian mission;
therefore they are not armed with crew-served weapons. Arming MEDEVAC
aircraft and removing the Red Cross markings would significantly impact
their operational capability and jeopardize their mission of evacuating
the wounded from the battlefield.

89. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, what are the effects of
arming a MEDEVAC helicopter?
General Odierno. Arming MEDEVAC aircraft would impact the
capability of the aircraft. Crew-served weapons, related mounting
equipment, structural modifications, ammunition and gunners all add
weight to the aircraft. The added weight would hinder the aircraft's
ability to work at higher altitudes because of reduced lift capacity,
speed and range--all of which are critically important in OEF. More
importantly, arming MEDEVAC aircraft would not eliminate the need for
armed escort on missions to high risk landing zones. An armed attack
aircraft enables the MEDEVAC crew to focus on rapidly evacuating a
patient. The escort aircraft provides a multitude of security related
tasks to include identification of optimal ingress and egress routes,
coordination of ground and air support, and engagement of the enemy
from greater distances and with stronger firepower.

90. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, please describe why there is
a Red Cross on Army MEDEVAC helicopters.
General Odierno. The Army policy is to mark MEDEVAC aircraft with
red crosses, just as all the Services do with ground ambulances. This
policy affords protections and obligations under the Geneva
Conventions. It also sends a strategic message that these U.S. Military
assets are engaged in a humanitarian operation in accordance with
international law principles. The marking of Army MEDEVAC designates
these aircraft as non-combatants dedicated to the sole mission of
MEDEVAC. Marking the aircraft also contributes to the Army's ability to
provide this capability and assists the Joint Force commanders to
manage them as a dedicated medical capability, preserving them from
being expended for other non-medical missions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

REVERSIBILITY

91. Senator Chambliss. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in the
midst of the Army's downsizing, you make the point that the Army will
be smaller but reversible. I think this is a good objective and believe
that, at some level, the Army will be able to expand to meet future
challenges, in the event they arise. However, downsizing carries a risk
and I think it is a mistake to expect that the Army--or any branch of
Service--will be able to expand in time and in the way necessary to
effectively address the full scope of future challenges. The fact is,
we will expand as best as we can and as fast as we can, but I don't
think there is any guarantee that will be fast enough. Do you agree
that downsizing carries risks, and do you agree that, although
reversibility is an important objective, it may still require a good
deal of time and resources and that, for that reason, we need to be
very careful about how we downsize the Army?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army cannot foresee every
future challenge, so we must carefully balance capability and risk as
we size the force to ensure that we are able to take whatever initial
steps are required to ensure national security when challenges arise.
The Army's most valued and valuable asset is its people. If we make the
right choices on those we retain in service, based on experience,
talent and potential, and rely on our exceptional training systems and
technological base, we will be positioned to meet any emerging threat.

ARMY CYBER COMMAND

92. Senator Chambliss. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, Army
Cyber Command's mission today is more critical than ever. As China and
Russia continue to conduct cyber espionage against the United States,
Army Cyber Command's role is important in providing robust cyber
defense and offense capabilities for the United States. Can you comment
on what you believe needs to be done by the Army in fiscal year 2013
and across the FYDP to mitigate the risks and vulnerabilities to our
systems both inside and outside the CONUS?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Operationalizing the
Cyberspace domain remains a priority effort for the Army in fiscal year
2013 and over the next FYDP. While our cyber warriors have done a
valiant job defending our Army and DOD networks, the speed at which the
threat evolves requires us to continually adapt our defenses through
workforce development and technological advances. Our first line of
defense begins with a trained workforce of cyber professionals. Our
workforce must understand how our adversary operates, the technical
methods by which they compromise our systems and networks, as well as
how to counter those threats. As you can see, this requires our cyber
warriors to have a keen understanding of threat tactics and methods to
inform our cyber defense strategy. We also continue to develop
efficient partnerships with the Intelligence, Law Enforcement,
Counterintelligence and Signal Communities as cyberspace defense spans
multiple jurisdictions. As we work to transform the cyber workforce, to
defend our systems across the globe against a highly fluid threat we
must also have the ability and flexibility to rapidly develop and field
advanced cyberspace capabilities. The Army, led by the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology)
(ASA(ALT)), is working in parallel with the DOD CIO, as directed in the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011, section 933, to define a process
facilitating the rapid acquisition of capabilities that will allow us
to better defend our networks and conduct full spectrum operations when
directed. We are confident that in fiscal year 2013 and the FYDP, given
the priority you have placed on cyberspace defense, we will be much
better prepared to meet the challenges of training and equipping our
cyber workforce to protect our networks and systems inside and outside
of CONUS.

93. Senator Chambliss. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what,
if any, additional programs need to be set up within the Army or
jointly across DOD to increase U.S. cyber security and prevent nations
such as Russia and China from cyber espionage?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Department of the Army
recognizes the immediate and far-reaching impact of cyber espionage as
it represents the most significant threat to our longstanding
technological advantage. Our approach is coordinated among all relevant
entities to include the Cyber, Law Enforcement, Counterintelligence,
and Intelligence Communities. Investigations and responses to
espionage, including cyber espionage, fall under the purview of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and its Counterintelligence
program; however, comprehensive response and prevention of cyber
espionage requires close coordination across many functional areas. We
have truly begun to shift focus from traditional cyber defense
methodologies to an approach commensurate with expanding threats.
Through continuous collaboration with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and
the intelligence community, the Army is proactively pursuing advanced
defense concepts and capability focused specifically on finding and
mitigating cyber espionage activities. Continued investment into
ground-breaking concepts and technologies will ensure we retain the
technological edge critical to our national security. Additionally, the
Army remains committed to realizing the goals set forth in the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2011, section 933. Through partnerships across government,
we are developing efficient processes to facilitate the rapid
acquisition of capabilities needed to counter evolving threats. We are
confident that our coordinated approaches across the Army, DOD, and
government will continue to improve in an effort to mitigate the
impacts of cyber espionage.

94. Senator Chambliss. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, what
are your thoughts on the ultimate, permanent location for the Army
Cyber Command headquarters?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army reviewed a wide
range of options for the final location of Army Cyber. Our analysis
included costing, synergies with NSA and DOD's CYBERCOM, environmental
requirements, military construction, facilities and stationing criteria
that would best support the Army Cyber organization. At the top of our
list are two installations--Fort Gordon and Fort Meade. We are
preparing an Environmental Assessment to evaluate potential
environmental, cultural, transportation, and socioeconomic impacts
should the Command reside at Fort Gordon, GA or Fort Meade, MD. The
Army is working with OSD in finalizing the exact organizational
missions, subordinate commands, size and requirements through a
detailed and documented analysis (concept plan). The final stationing
decision and announcement remain pending until after approval of this
concept plan.

LOSS OF TWO BRIGADES IN EUROPE

95. Senator Chambliss. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, DOD
has announced that the Army will remove two brigades from Europe.
Please comment on how this will affect our training, exercises, and
potential operations with the NATO and European countries in general.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Forward-stationed forces in
Europe are a visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to European security
and the NATO Alliance, and enable the United States to maintain a
strong leadership role in NATO and provide assurances to our allies and
partners. The mix of capabilities offered by the two distinct types of
BCTs remaining in Europe (Stryker, and Airborne) enables EUCOM to meet
a wide array of engagement, building partner capacity, and
interoperability objectives while supporting the full range of military
operations needed for plausible European contingencies. The Army
expects to allocate a BCT to the NATO Response Force (NRF) to support
interoperability with NATO and plans to support two battalion task
force-sized rotations annually to EUCOM to train with our allies for up
to 2 months per rotation.

96. Senator Chambliss. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in
your view, will the Army's commitment to rotating a brigade from CONUS
to Europe ameliorate the negative effects of losing these two brigades?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Yes, it will provide a
broader opportunity for a number of units to work with NATO in a more
targeted and beneficial way. The United States is rebalancing
priorities and is seeking ways to improve U.S. presence in key regions
to both ensure access and assure our allies. The drawdown to two BCTs
will still allow EUCOM to maintain a flexible and easily deployable
ground force to meet Article 5 and other NATO commitments, to engage
effectively with allies and partners and to satisfy other security
objectives. To demonstrate our commitment, the Army expects to allocate
a BCT to the NATO Response Force (NRF) to support interoperability with
NATO and plans to support two battalion task force-sized rotations
annually to EUCOM to train with our allies for up to 2 months per
rotation.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

97. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, I do not
see any tactical or diplomatic sense in your recent announcement about
telling the enemy the date we are going to pull out troops. This gives
the enemy an advantage on the ground and also eliminates any incentive
for the Taliban to engage in substantive political negotiations with
the Afghan Government. Our strategy in Afghanistan must be based solely
on the conditions on the ground and not on the politics of the 2012
election. How does DOD plan to execute this announced withdrawal while
not further endangering the lives of our troops and while still meeting
operational demands?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Administration has
announced that the U.S. forces surge recovery will be completed by
October 2012. We are currently working with commanders in the field to
determine additional force reductions thereafter. Plans for further
reductions are being developed. However, future reductions will be tied
to conditions on the ground and the ability of the ANSF to provide
security as they assume the lead for security.
After 2014, when the Afghans have assumed security lead across the
country, the United States will continue to support the ANSF.

98. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno,
understanding that our force reduction in Afghanistan is conditions-
based, do you believe our reduction of 27,000 troops can be implemented
smoothly?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Yes, it can be done. However,
transitioning equipment will be difficult due to the recent closure of
the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC). The closure of
the PAKGLOC caused challenges in moving equipment and incurred
significant additional costs. Although the PAKGLOC recently reopened,
it will be several months before those lines return to pre-closed
levels.

99. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno,
understanding that transitioning from war and resetting the force takes
time and money, what is your estimate of the length and cost for the
Army to reset equipment and personnel?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Funding would be spread
proportionally over a period of 2-3 years after all equipment is
returned from Afghanistan as dictated by the volume of equipment
currently undergoing reset, the pace of retrograde from theater,
available capacity within the industrial base and the repair cycle
times of major systems.
There are many factors and assumptions affecting the total reset
liability; at the end of fiscal year 2013 our remaining reset liability
is approximately $10-$15 billion. There are three areas funded by this
reset liability: $6-$8 billion for Depot Level repairs within the
industrial base, $2-4 billion for field level repairs at units' home
stations, and $2-$3 billion for procurement of battle losses and
modification of select equipment in the course of reset.
The Army conducts annual assessments of reset liability in
coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE). The uncertainty in the
reset liability calculation results from the equipment in theater
today, retrograde to the CONUS and condition it will be in at the time
of retrograde. An example from Operation New Dawn in Iraq is the Army
transfer of a large quantity of M1114 HMMWVs to the Government of Iraq
(GOI) that were surplus to Army requirements. These HMMWVs were
refurbished in theater (not reset at CONUS facilities) and transferred
to the GOI. However in Afghanistan, the local government cannot absorb
comparable quantities of equipment, and it is more difficult and
expensive to retrograde equipment. Also, the wear-and-tear on equipment
in Afghanistan is greater than during the later years of operations in
Iraq, which causes a higher percentage of equipment requiring depot-
level reset and a higher wash-out rate.

FORCE STRUCTURE

100. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, I
continue to be concerned about the vitality of our NCO corps across all
of our Services. The total of Active component soldiers expected to
move up in the NCO ranks this year is 6 percent below last year. A
projected total of 44,141 Active component soldiers are to advance to
the ranks of sergeant through sergeant major in 2012. That is 6 percent
below last year's total of 47,129 soldiers. Among the Army's efficiency
plans is a force reduction of 27,000 troops beginning in 2015.
Considering the current state of the economy, other Services, such as
the Navy, have experienced record retention numbers. As a result, the
Navy has had to implement programs for involuntary separation. While
the Army currently has several incentive programs for voluntary early
separation, is the Army also pursuing involuntary separations of
soldiers to shape the force?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army will conduct end
strength reductions using a gradual ramp over a 6-year period in order
to allow natural attrition to absorb a majority of the reductions,
while still maintaining our commitment to Afghanistan. The gradual
reductions will also allow the Secretary and me the flexibility to
evaluate each year whether we are moving at the right pace. Even with
this gradual ramp, a key planning precept is that the Army will make
the choices, to the greatest extent possible, on who will remain and
who will separate. We will not sacrifice our investment in leader
development and we will continue to shape policies to support the
Army's leader development strategy. We will promote the best-qualified
soldiers to meet requirements. Preliminary assessments indicate NCO
requirements will decrease by 7.5 percent during the drawdown period
(fiscal year 2014-fiscal year 2017 timeframe). Accordingly, because NCO
promotions are a direct result of filling valid requirements, selection
rates are expected to simultaneously decrease; but history tells us
they will return to historical norms soon thereafter. Our preliminary
strategy is to meet the fiscal year 2017 enlisted end-strength with
precision (by grade and skill) while maintaining a high level of
readiness and capability with an All-Volunteer Force.

101. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, if such
involuntary separations are or become necessary, what is the Army doing
to ease the transition for those soldiers and their families?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army Career and Alumni
Program (ACAP) is the Transition Program that assists soldiers, family
members, and DA civilian's transition from their status within the Army
back to the civilian community. Involuntarily separated soldiers are
congressionally mandated to receive the same preparation counseling as
voluntarily separating soldiers. Additionally, soldiers, family
members, and DA civilians (involuntarily or voluntarily) are entitled
to participate in any of the transition assistance classes offered by
ACAP. We are adjusting the ACAP program to meet the goals of the
recently passed VOW to Hire Heroes Act and the recommendations of the
Presidential Task Force. Attendance may take place in person at an ACAP
center, live or cataloged classes online, or individually through the
24/7 ACAP Call Center. ACAP Counselors also refer soldiers and their
family members to other agencies and organizations that assist with
Transition: The Department of Labor, Veterans Affairs, Military
OneSource, The Small Business Administration, Helmets to Hardhats, and
Student Veterans of America to name a few.
These classes include, but are not limited to:

Employment assistance/Job search skills
MOS Crosswalk (Military skills to civilian skills comparison)
Skills assessment
Professional interest evaluation
Resume and cover letter development and refinement
Interview skills / Dress for success / Salary negotiation
Relocation assistance
Legal referrals (Wills, Power of Attorney, Estate planning, et
cetera before separation)
Contact information for housing counseling assistance
Education/Training
Health/Life insurance
Financial planning/Budget development
Veteran benefits briefing
Veterans Administration Disabled Transition Assistance Program
(VA DTAP)
Department of Labor Employment Workshop
Physical and mental health well being

The Army is also, utilizing the H2H as its interim employment
application/tool www.H2H.jobs to provide one primary location where
soldiers of all components, veterans, and family members can connect
with private industry employment opportunities. This application is
web-based and able to translate military occupational skills (MOS),
provide career path exploration, upload resumes, allow customized job
searches, enable employers to also search for Veterans, and provide
performance metrics. H2H will eventually be included on eBenefits, the
single portal for transition benefits selected by the DOD-VA Veterans
Employment Initiative Task Force (www.eBenefits.va.gov)

MILITARY EDUCATION

102. Senator Wicker. General Odierno, there is a growing trend
within DOD to conduct joint military education. However each military
department has its own military academy and own war college. I continue
to be concerned about the redundancy and lack of efficiency for our
troops' professional military education. What are the operating costs
for the Army War College and U.S. Military Academy (USMA)?
General Odierno. The operating costs for the Army War College were
$13.7 million for fiscal year 2011. These costs represent faculty and
staff salaries, student and faculty travel, contractual and supply
costs for teaching departments, registrar and library, supporting 1,073
students of the college's resident and distance education programs. The
operating cost for the USMA was $121 million for fiscal year 2011.

103. Senator Wicker. General Odierno, what measures are being
implemented to ensure efficiency and reduce redundancies among the
Services?
General Odierno. The overarching responsibility for ensuring
efficiency and reducing redundancy among the services rests with OSD
and the Joint Staff. The Army fully participates in a number of
different bodies that meet to ensure DOD is buying capabilities the
Joint Force needs to meet current and anticipated threats. Groups such
as the Deputy's Management Advisory Groups, chaired by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC), chaired by the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, review programs across the Department to ensure that
we have neither redundancies nor capability gaps. The Army leadership
is fully vested in these bodies. Within the Army, ongoing comprehensive
capability portfolio reviews have identified gaps and redundancies and
the Army has taken action to close the gaps and eliminate the
redundancies. Additionally, there are a number of groups that meet at
lower levels to identify and track efficiencies and cost savings
throughout the Department. For example, the OSD Chief Management
Officer (CMO) leads semi-annual reviews in January and July, during
which all Service Deputy CMOs and Assistant Secretaries for Financial
Management provide updates on the status of their Track 1 efficiencies,
taken during development of the fiscal year 2012 budget request.

POST-MILITARY COMMISSION

104. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, often the time between
receiving a commission to when the soldier reports for duty can be a
lengthy period of time, especially in the aviation community. My staff
has been working with the OSD staff on determining cost and schedule
delays for newly commissioned military officers. How much money is
being spent by the Army on personnel between their post-commission and
pre-specialty training?
Secretary McHugh. Little to no money is spent by the Army on
personnel between post-commission and pre-specialty training (BOLC-B).
Most officers receive their commissions in the late spring/early summer
as a result of USMA and/or college graduation. The Army's school houses
cannot accommodate the entire population at that time, but USMA and
Officer Candidate School (OCS) officers, who come on active duty orders
immediately upon commissioning, are given priority for the earliest
available branch training course. If there are delays, they are often a
result of school house capacity, and instructor and equipment
availability; some officers may elect to delay training due to various
reasons, such as extended leave (up to 90 days).
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) graduates typically have the
longest wait time between commissioning and branch training, but these
officers are not receiving pay and allowances while they wait, with a
few exceptions. A select number of ROTC graduates volunteer to come on
active duty prior to their branch training to serve as Gold Bar
Recruiters or to support cadet training programs such as the Leader
Training Course and the Leader Development Assessment Course; these
officers are filling an Army need. A handful of ROTC graduates qualify
for immediate accession through the Green-to-Gold Program but, like
USMA and Officer Candidate School, they are given priority for the
first available BOLC-B class.
The aviation community especially is affected by wait times due to
the complexity and length of the training required for aviation
officers. Even so, the Army has succeeded in getting the average wait
time for aviation officers below the Army average. The Army's average
is 112 days and the Aviation average is 103 days.
Assessment of a cost of handling the annual accession surge is
difficult to calculate because of the number of training pipelines, the
varied number of valid and meaningful assignments during the wait time,
and the number of personnel within those pipelines who may be delayed
for personal or Army needs (leave, recruiting and training support, et
cetera) rather than pipeline inefficiencies. The true ``cost'' of
lengthy periods of time between commissioning and the start of BOLC-B
is not money, but unit readiness in that the officer's report date to
an operational unit where he/she will lead soldiers is delayed by the
amount of time he/she has to wait for a BOLC-B class to start.

105. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, what measures has the Army
implemented to reduce the amount of time and costs associated with this
down time?
Secretary McHugh. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), and
Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), organize class
schedules to maximize the amount of training during the summer surge
period and reduce the wait time of newly commissioned officers who are
commissioned in that time period. All TRADOC schools make every effort
to schedule as many classes as possible to have these commissioned
officers report between the third weekend in May and the last day of
September. As directed by TRADOC, at least one BOLC-B class is
scheduled to report during the early to mid-July time period to support
USMA graduates. To accommodate December college graduates, a class in
January of each year is scheduled.
The HQDA staff, from the Personnel (G-1) and Training Directorates
(G-37), directs the allocation of seats during the yearly BOLC-B
scheduling conference and monthly BOLC-B seat usage teleconferences. In
fiscal year 2011, HQDA and TRADOC scheduled 48.1 percent (4,930 of
10,243 officers) of the yearly training load between the mid-May and
late-September summer surge. For fiscal year 2012, 48.9 percent (4,673
of 9,558 officers) of the yearly training load was scheduled in the May
to September window. In fiscal year 2012, the HQDA staff noted that
funding and/or end strength constraints may cause some BOLC-B seats to
go unfilled in the fiscal year 2012 summer period.
Three important notes to consider: one, TRADOC monitors attendance
at their BOLC-B branch schools and is working aggressively to fill any
of the unused Reserve component seats with Active Army lieutenants;
two, HQDA resources the training program to train the BOLC-B
requirement over 12 months; and three, TRADOC is limited by resources
in the amount of seats that can be scheduled in the summer surge window
of May through September.

PARACHUTE

106. Senator Wicker. General Odierno, what is the Army's capacity
requirement for personnel parachute systems?
General Odierno. Based on the current 2012 Army force structure,
the total Army requirement for personnel parachutes consists of
approximately 40,000 model T-11 static line parachute systems and
approximately 20,000 model MC-6 maneuverable canopy parachute systems.
This requirement will provide sufficient personnel parachute systems to
support airborne training, contingency, and combat operations for up to
six airborne brigades and appropriate Special Operations Force assets,
including U.S. Army Rangers and Special Operations Teams. There are
currently three manufacturers on contract to produce these T-11
parachutes and four manufacturers of the MC-6 parachutes. These
manufacturers will fulfill the Army requirements and have the capacity
to produce additional parachutes if needed.

107. Senator Wicker. General Odierno, does the FYDP contain any
specific plan by the Army to pursue competitive or sole-source
procurement of parachute systems or parachute items?
General Odierno. Yes, the Army plans to procure parachute systems
and items on competitive contracts to companies that have been
certified to manufacture parachutes for the U.S. Government within the
FYDP.
The Army will pursue competitive procurement of Joint Precision
Airdrop Systems 2,000 pound capability; 10,000 pound capability; and
personnel parachutes in fiscal year 2013 using Other Procurement, Army
funds. In the next 12 months, we will award several competitive
contracts for these Aerial Delivery items.
The Army has no specific plans for sole source contracts for
parachute systems.

EXTERNAL FUEL SYSTEM

108. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, ground platforms,
specifically the Army's BFV as part of the Bradley Urban Survivability
Kit III effort, have implemented enhancements to reduce injuries and
deaths due to fires. What measures or programs have been implemented to
improve survivability for other vehicles like MRAP vehicles and
Strykers?
Secretary McHugh.
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles:
The MRAP Joint Program Office has continually improved the
survivability of the MRAP vehicle fleet (to include the MRAP-All
Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)) to meet evolving threats. Examples of
capabilities integrated into MRAPs/M-ATVs to reduce injuries and deaths
due to fires include:

(1) Crew Automatic Fire Extinguisher System (AFES)
(2) Engine AFES
(3) Tire AFES
(4) Fuel Tank

a. Fuel Tank AFES - Most variants
b. Fuel Tank Fire Suppression Blanket - Some variants
c. Self-Sealing Fuel Tank - Some variants
d. Manual Fuel Cut-off Switch - Some variants

(5) Manual Backup Activation to the AFES
(6) Multiple Planes of Egress (Side, Rear, Top, Vehicle Emergency
Egress Windows)
(7) First Responder Universal Combat Lock Tool
(8) Egress Illumination Tape

Additionally, the following capabilities improve both force
protection and survivability by mitigating the effects of the threats
they are designed to address:

(1) MRAP V-Hull design and crew compartment standoff
(2) Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) Defeat Systems (Bar Armor or
RPG Net ``bird cage'' surrounding vehicle)
(3) Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) Armor Kits
(4) Multi-Threat EFP Armor Kits
(5) Thrown Object Protection System Kits
(6) M-ATV Underbody Improvement Kit-2
(7) Self-Protection Adaptive Roller Kit System (SPARKS) Bracket
that allows for integration of:

a. SPARKS/SPARKSII Mine Roller
b. Passive Infra-Red Defeat

(8) Various Electronic Warfare Components
(9) Boomerang Counter Sniper Detection System
(10) Various Route Clearance Capabilities (Interrogator Arm, Air
Digger, et cetera)
Stryker:
The most significant force protection upgrade for Stryker has been
the incorporation of the Stryker Double-V Hull. This improvement has
greatly reduced the vulnerability to soldier injury due to under-body
blast events. Stryker Reactive Armor II (SRAT II) is another
improvement intended to reduce vulnerabilities to RPG type threats.
Testing is projected to be completed, including final modeling and
simulation pending successful testing, SRAT II will then be available.
From a fire protection perspective, the initial Stryker design was
inherently survivable by integrating external fuel tanks, and ensuring
other flammable fluids were physically separated from the crew
compartment. Additionally, the following measures were implemented to
reduce fire hazards in other parts of the vehicle:

(1) Tire Fire Suppression Kit
(2) Manual Activation to the AFES
(3) Manual Fuel Cut-off Switch
(4) Internal Fuel Tank Shut-off

Additionally, the following enhancements improve both force
protection and survivability by mitigating the effects of the threats
they are designed to address:

(1) SLAT (steel ``bird cage'' surrounding vehicle)
(2) Stryker Reactive Armor Tiles
(3) Common Ballistic Shield
(4) Drivers Enhancement Kit
(5) Hull Protection Kit
(6) Mine Roller Adapter Kit
(7) Blast Mitigation Kit

109. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, how long before additional
measures can be implemented to improve the survivability of the
soldiers?
Secretary McHugh. The Army continually improves the survivability
of its vehicle fleet to meet evolving threats. For MRAPs, the Caiman
Multi-Terrain Vehicle will be fielded with external fuel protection in
the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. For Stryker's, one measure to
improve survivability currently in testing is the Stryker Reactive
Armor II (SRAT II). This improvement is intended to reduce
vulnerabilities to RPG type threats. The testing, to include live fire
and modeling and simulation is scheduled to be completed in May 2013.
Materiel release to support fielding is planned for November 2013, but
if there is an urgent requirement, SRAT II kits can be fielded as early
as May 2013 (after completion of testing).

SABOTED LIGHT ARMOR PENETRATOR

110. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, the fiscal year 2013 budget
request calls for the Army to stop production of 50 caliber Saboted
Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) ammunition. Previously, in the late
1990s, the Army stopped production of SLAP ammunition. In fact,
production stopped in 1998 and did not begin again until 2002 at low-
rate production and at full-rate production in 2003. With the Army
heading toward a similar stop and restart situation, please provide the
details on the costs incurred by the Army during the 1998 shutdown and
2002 restart.
Secretary McHugh. The SLAP cartridge is assembled in a linked
configuration; four M903 SLAP cartridges to one M962 SLAP tracer
cartridge, for use in the M2 Heavy Barrel machine gun. The Army
completed adoption of this configuration on November 12, 1996, with the
Marine Corps' collaboration. The SLAP was procured through a fixed
price contract with the Olin-Winchester Corporation. When production
was shutdown in fiscal year 1998, there were no additional costs
incurred by the Army.
When production of the SLAP was restarted, the unit cost was
commensurate with the previous contract, when accounting for inflation.
The Army incurred $75,000 in costs to recertify the production line
(first article test) in 2002.

111. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, what did these costs
include--for example, did this include rebuilding the production line,
recertification, and retraining?
Secretary McHugh. The Army's direct cost for restarting the SLAP
production in 2002 was $75,000. These funds supported a standard first
article test, which is used to determine whether the contractor is
ready to resume production. As part of this procedure the contractor
has to demonstrate through measurement and testing that their
production line and operators are ready to resume production.

112. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, from your experience with
the 1998 shutdown, how did this affect the second- and third-tier
subcontractors?
Secretary McHugh. Olin-Winchester had one key second-tier
subcontractor in 1998 which produced the SLAP. During that time period
the vendor was able to switch to other products to maintain their
viability. There were no third-tier impacts that could be identified.

ARMED AERIAL SCOUT

113. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, the expected requirement for
the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) is that the aircraft be capable of
operating at 6,000 feet and 95 degrees. This performance requirement
was validated by the August 17, 2011, Army study titled, ``An
Examination of Temperature and Altitude Design Point Criteria for Army
Helicopters.'' Do those requirements remain valid? If not, why?
Secretary McHugh. Yes, the 6,000 feet/95 degrees Fahrenheit (6K/95)
performance requirement remains valid as a desired capability for the
AAS. On 28 April 2012 the Army Aviation Program Executive Office
released an AAS Request for Information (RFI) that will assess
technology readiness and capabilities available in industry to inform
an achievable and affordable material solution. The RFI specifically
highlighted that the Army is seeking an aircraft that can operate at
6K/95 with a full combat load.

114. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, can the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
meet those requirements today?
Secretary McHugh. No, the current OH-58D cannot meet the 6,000
feet/95 degrees Fahrenheit (6K/95) requirement today. A Kiowa with a
basic combat load is only able to effectively operate with a 4,000
feet/95 degrees Fahrenheit (4K/95) capability. The ongoing Cockpit and
Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP) addresses technological gaps of the
Kiowa but it does not improve the performance of the Kiowa. To increase
performance, the Kiowa Warrior will require an extensive upgrade to the
engine, transmission and rotor systems.

115. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, will the Kiowa Warrior meet
those requirements under the upgrade programs currently provided for in
the President's budget request?
Secretary McHugh. No, the current programs for the Kiowa Warrior in
the President's budget will not improve the aircrafts performance to
achieve 6K/95. The Kiowa Warrior has two initiatives within the current
budget. The first is an approved program of record known as the CASUP.
CASUP addresses the technological gaps of the Kiowa Warrior; however it
does not include upgrades to the engine, transmission or rotor system
which are required to increase performance. The second initiative is
funding submitted in the fiscal year 2013-2017 Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) for a SLEP. The SLEP is designed to replace the 40
(plus) year old metal structure of the aircraft and replace it with new
metal to allow the Kiowa to remain in service for another 20-30 years.
The SLEP will not increase the performance of Kiowa as it also does not
upgrade the engine, transmission or rotor system.

116. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, unfortunately, the failures
of Comanche and ARH-70 Arapaho have forced the OH-58D to remain
operational far beyond the intended useful life. Concerned about the
limited capability of the OH-58D, Congress provided the Army with funds
to conduct an analysis of alternatives (AOA) needed to establish an
armed scout replacement program. At the Army's request, funds were also
provided to conduct an additional RFI and voluntary flight
demonstration (VFD) this year. Industry is making costly preparations
to participate in these activities with little guidance for how the
demonstration will be conducted or how aircraft will be objectively
judged, creating reservations about the fairness and value of this
evaluation. What are the timeline and schedule of the RFI and VFD?
Secretary McHugh. The Army released the AAS RFI on April 25, 2012.
Industry must respond to the RFI by July 2, 2012. The first VFD occurs
the week of June 25, 2012. The remaining flight demonstrations will
begin in August 2012 with a completion date of October 19, 2012. The
purpose of the RFI and VFDs is to assess the current state of
technology within industry. The Army will not compare individual
results but rather assess their capability against the capability gaps
identified in the initial capabilities document.

117. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, what are the operational
requirements the test aircraft have to meet?
Secretary McHugh. There are no operational requirements for the
VFD. The RFI and VFD will assess technology readiness and capabilities
available in industry to inform an achievable and affordable materiel
solution decision.

118. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, what are the key performance
parameters of the demonstration, including high/hot hover out-of-ground
effect, endurance, and payload requirements?
Secretary McHugh. There are no Key Performance Parameters (KPPs)
for the demonstration. The VFD and assessment of technology in industry
will help inform the requirements process. If the Army establishes an
AAS program of record, the RFI and VFD will inform future KPPs in the
Capabilities Development Document.

119. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, how will the test aircraft
be instrumented in order to measure and capture performance data to
allow for rigorous comparative analysis?
Secretary McHugh. The Army will not compare individual results but
rather assess their capability against the capability gaps identified
in the initial capabilities document. The purpose of the RFI and VFD is
to assess the current state of technology within industry. Results will
be captured according to each individual respondent's level of
participation and level of instrumentation. The Army will use
Experimental Test Pilots that are graduates of the Naval Test Pilot
School. The pilots will execute maneuvers that are voluntarily
agreeable to the industry participant as outlined in the RFI. These
maneuvers will be conducted in accordance with standard test techniques
and normalized to standard atmospheric conditions.

120. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, how will the results of the
VFD be captured and normalized so that all entrants are measured by the
same rules?
Secretary McHugh. The Army will not compare individual industry
responses against each other. Individual responses to the RFI and the
demonstrated capabilities will be analyzed to assess the performance,
cost and schedule attributes needed to procure an improved capability.
The methodology used to determine the capability tradeoffs is
consistent with the approved methodology used during the AAS Analysis
of Alternatives. The requested maneuvers will be executed in accordance
with standard test techniques and normalized to standard atmospheric
conditions. The Army will de-brief industry members at the conclusion
of their VFD and industry participants will have the opportunity to
update their RFI response.

121. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, how will the information
derived from the RFI and VFD be used to make an acquisition decision?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is conducting market research by
releasing a RFI, conducting discussions with industry, and giving
industry an opportunity to demonstrate potential solutions to help
determine what technologies are available from industry that may
contribute to a material solution option. The Army does not intend to
compare individual results from the VFD against each other, but, rather
assess their capability against the capability gaps identified in the
initial capabilities document. The end state is to identify an
affordable, achievable, moderate risk materiel solution option based on
the current state of technology in the market.

KIOWA WARRIOR

122. Senator Wicker. General Odierno, the Army states that the
Kiowa Warrior SLEP is the basis for comparison. However, I am not aware
that a SLEP has been established or approved and there is no SLEP in
the fiscal year 2013 budget request. Is a Kiowa Warrior SLEP the
baseline for comparison? If not, what will be the baseline for
comparison?
General Odierno. The Army will not compare individual results but
rather assess industry capabilities against the capability gaps
identified in the initial capabilities document. In the conduct of the
AAS Analysis of Alternatives, the program of record OH-58F CASUP
aircraft was utilized as the base case.
The Kiowa Warrior (KW) SLEP is referenced as Recapitalization
(RECAP) in the budget exhibits. The KW fiscal year 2013 budget request
contains funding to execute a SLEP/RECAP alternative if the Army
decides against a new material solution for AAS. The Army has not yet
approved a KW SLEP/RECAP or a specific detailed plan related to that
alternative.

123. Senator Wicker. General Odierno, what is the baseline
configuration, cost (acquisition and life-cycle), and schedule for a
Kiowa Warrior SLEP alternative for comparison?
General Odierno. The Army will not utilize the RFI and VFD to
conduct a comparison. The release of the RFI is intended to allow the
Army to conduct market research and assess the state of technology. The
configuration for a Kiowa Warrior SLEP/RECAP has not been defined, but
the concept includes recapitalization of the airframe and major
components. There is currently no formal or approved Army Life Cycle
Cost Estimate for an OH-58F SLEP/RECAP program. In the conduct of the
Analysis of Alternatives, the program of record OH-58F CASUP aircraft
was utilized as the base case. The CASUP program of record completes
fielding in fiscal year 2022 with an estimated program acquisition cost
(Research, Development, Test & Evaluation/Army Procurement Agency) of
$1,915.5 million (Base Year 2010 Dollars) and life-cycle cost of
$8,776.8 million (Base Year 2010 Dollars). An OH-58F SLEP/RECAP
alternative would be additive to these costs.

OH-58D

124. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, Congress continues to
support the development of necessary upgrades to the OH-58D. These
upgrades have become more complex and costly with each new budget
request. It is increasingly important that restraint is exercised to
prevent unnecessary investments in the legacy platform until the Army
determines the actual requirements for AAS and identifies the best
platform available to achieve those requirements. Can Congress expect a
final acquisition decision on the AAS program prior to any further
consideration of improvements to the program of record?
Secretary McHugh. A decision on a course of action for the AAS
requirement should be made by March 2013. Currently, the Army has a
defined requirement for the OH-58F CASUP and there are no intentions to
increase the scope of that program prior to an AAS decision. The OH-58D
fleet will continue to require sustainment efforts related to
obsolescence and weight reduction in order to maintain readiness safety
margins, and operational needs. Even with a decision to pursue an AAS
solution, the KW is anticipated to remain in the Army fleet for
approximately 20 more years.

125. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, will you prioritize the AAS
evaluation and provide the oversight required to make an acquisition
decision for AAS that is incorporated in the fiscal year 2014 budget
plan?
Secretary McHugh. The AAS RFI and VFDs are an Army priority. To
ensure proper oversight, the RFI and VFDs will be conducted consistent
with the DOD Acquisition Process. The data attained from the RFI and
demonstration will inform future budget decisions to include the fiscal
year 2014 budget plan.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

NETWORK

126. Senator Brown. Secretary McHugh, in terms of modernization, is
the network still the Army's top acquisition priority?
Secretary McHugh. The Network remains the Army's top acquisition
priority. With expectations of tighter budgets and a still very active
threat environment, the Army will have to produce a force that is
smaller yet more capable. The Network is the core of that smaller, more
capable Army.

127. Senator Brown. Secretary McHugh, how have the Network
Integration Evaluations (NIE) informed Army decisionmaking about
various systems like the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-
T) and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)?
Secretary McHugh. The NIEs allow the Army to reduce risk associated
with network programs by presenting a challenging environment that
provides a means to gain critical operational and technical insights
regarding the integration of new capabilities into the network. In the
case of WIN-T and JTRS programs, the NIE allowed the program managers,
test community, and the operational units to become very familiar with
operating the equipment or understanding the systems complexity by
identifying areas requiring emphasis, such as challenging operator-
level individual or collective training tasks. The NIE also provided
the ability to develop or modify Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTP), which enhance the execution of the actual Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) event. As a result of NIE 12.1, the unit's
ability to understand the overall network complexity, with the
additions of WIN-T and JTRS capabilities, was improved. This also
enhanced the unit's ability to rapidly install and maintain the
equipment, thus contributing to a successful IOTE as part of NIE 12.2.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

128. Senator Brown. General Odierno, as part of the President's
strategic guidance, the Army plans to enhance its activities in the
Asia-Pacific region. What does that mean?
General Odierno. The United States serves as a critical guarantor
of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and a robust joint military
presence is an important part of the broader regional strategy. The
Army has a critical role to play in the region not only as an essential
component of deterrence against aggression, but also in ensuring access
to, building capacity in, and enhancing our partners' resilience. Army
engagement enhances partner readiness for the disasters that impact the
Asia Pacific and plays a critical role in preparing our partners for
security challenges. Asia's militaries remain dominated by armies,
making the U.S. Army's relationships with its regional partners a vital
resource for a range of situations. Army engagement is also the
foundation of our commitments to our treaty allies in the region,
Australia, South Korea, Japan, Thailand and the Philippines. As we
enhance activities in the Asia-Pacific region, the army will build on
the strong foundation established with these allied partners, but also
seek opportunities to engage and cooperate our other partners like
Indonesia, India, and China.
The most visible change will come as an increase in the quantity
and quality of bilateral and multilateral Army-to-Army engagements in
the region. The Army will not only make the most of traditional
exercises and training to strengthen our partnerships by bringing new
capabilities and approaches to training, but also focus on enhancing
the resilience of our allies and partners for them to better respond to
the regrettably frequent natural disasters.
We plan to increase exchanges with other forces, better align our
foreign assistance programs with additional engagement opportunities,
and explore a range of other changes, from new command-and-control
structures that would enhance responsiveness to modifications in how
Army forces in the region are provisioned to increase their readiness.
The need for U.S. Armed Forces, and the Army in particular, to provide,
planning, logistical, command-and-control, and equipment support to
civil authorities in the event of natural disasters continues to be
demonstrated regularly and is unlikely to diminish. For example, the
Army Corps of Engineers represents indispensible expertise and an
invaluable resource relating to disaster response that the region
desperately needs. Of course, even as the army increases its activities
in the Asia-Pacific region, it will retain substantial responsibilities
elsewhere in the world. The posture of the U.S. military in the Middle
East is critical to maintaining regional stability there. To maintain
U.S. influence, particularly if additional U.S. naval assets will be
devoted to the Pacific, the army will continue to need some combination
of prepositioned equipment and a permanent and rotational presence
there throughout the next decade.

129. Senator Brown. General Odierno, given that 7 of the world's 10
largest armies are located in the region, what level of ground forces
do you anticipate will be necessary throughout PACOM AOR to implement
the President's new strategic guidance?
General Odierno. The Army currently has a robust force posture in
the PACOM AOR and a Total Army with the adaptability and depth to
``Prevent, Shape, and Win'' in the Asia Pacific. Our expeditionary Army
must remain capable of supporting the requirements of Joint Force
commanders around the globe, and our force generation model ensures
that capability, and at the same time ensures the Army's ability to
implement the new strategic guidance. The Army has committed to making
Mission Command and other capabilities available to PACOM that have for
nearly the past decade been focused on the Nation's priorities
elsewhere. These include a regionally assigned and available
Operational Joint Force Land Component Command headquarters capable of
meeting major operational plan requirements; assigned and available two
and three star Joint Task Force capable headquarters providing the
ability to execute missions from joint/multinational Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief through operational requirements; and an
exportable, Combat Training Center-like joint/multinational training
and exercise capability along with prepositioned equipment sets in
theater. The Army is investigating the establishment of an
expeditionary collective training capability that will enable
sustainment of a high state of readiness of regionally assigned and
forward stationed combat formations without enduring the cost of
sending them to CONUS Combat Training Centers. Such a capability will
keep Army units training in the Pacific and should significantly
advance the level of coalition training with key regional partners. The
Army is also reviewing how best to support PACOM's Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD) in protecting U.S. interests and partners. More
broadly, the Army continues to develop the ability to respond to
Geographic Combatant Commanders' requirements, including PACOM, by
providing Regionally Aligned Forces through a rotational, progressive
force generation model. Regional training and Army exercises continue
to evolve in support of PACOM's Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign
Plan, and seek to more deeply engage key partner armies to pursue
mutual interests in preserving regional stability.

130. Senator Brown. General Odierno, have you and your Marine Corps
counterparts worked through this?
General Odierno. We are in the early planning stages of determining
how to support the new strategy to enhance activities in the Asia-
Pacific region, home to 7 of the world's 10 largest armies. We are
working with the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and the other Services to
enhance ground force activities, not only in the Asia-Pacific region,
but globally. We have several forums to synchronize Army service-
specific and USMC-specific contributions to the Joint Fight. Service
Vices participate as members of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Committee. Service Chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
confer on how to manage defense activities and advise the President. In
addition, the Army and the USMC meet regularly in two other forums--an
Army-USMC Warfighter Talks program and an Army/USMC Board process--that
enable us to synchronize employment of Service/Corps specific
contributions to the Joint Fight.

RIFLEMAN RADIO

131. Senator Brown. General Odierno, can you explain the importance
of the Rifleman Radio and what drives its key requirements?
General Odierno. The Rifleman Radio enhances the ability of
dismounted leaders (Platoon and below) to synchronize small unit
maneuver and exercise command and control. This combat-proven radio
extends our mission command networks to the squad and team leader
level, allows leaders, for the first time, to view the locations of
their individual soldiers as part of the Common Operating Picture, and
provides a National Security Agency approved voice communication
capability. The Rifleman Radio leverages the JTRS developed Soldier
Radio Waveform, while providing a lightweight capability that addresses
the need for greater survivability/accountability and a reduction in
fratricide. Ultimately, the true value of the Rifleman Radio is its
ability to leverage a small size, lightweight and low power consumption
network capability to enable effective decision making at the tactical
edge.

132. Senator Brown. General Odierno, is the current program of
record achieving those requirements?
General Odierno. The Rifleman Radio (RR) is achieving the key
requirements of Intra-Squad Communication, Soldier Location, and Net
Readiness. The RR was employed in a desert environment, urban
environment and an environment with heavy vegetation during its Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation at NIE 12.1. The RR enhances small unit
operations by allowing leaders to issue voice commands, send text
messages, place way points on the position location map application and
share individual Position Location Information of team members using
the networking Soldier Radio Waveform, all of which increases
survivability, lethality and accountability while reducing fratricide.
Warfighters who used the RR in both Test and Operational environments
praised its ability because it allows them to communicate effectively
using a small, lightweight, and low power-consuming radio.

133. Senator Brown. General Odierno, when will the Army actually
field these radios to soldiers in the field?
General Odierno. To date, approximately 700 RR systems have been
fielded in small increments via Operational Needs Statements to the
75th Ranger Regiment/U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to
support combat operations, the 173rd Airborne BCT and the 1st BCT, 2nd
Armored Division supporting the NIE. In fiscal year 2013, the Army
expects to continue the fielding of this critical capability to BCTs,
as well as providing additional assets to USASOC.

EVIDENCE-BASED, ALTERNATIVE THERAPY INITIATIVES

134. Senator Brown. General Odierno, can you talk about the Army's
evidence-based, alternative therapy initiatives and how they are
integrated into the Army's resiliency training programs?
General Odierno. The Comprehensive Pain Management Campaign Plan
(CPMCP) includes non-traditional approaches. Interdisciplinary pain
teams are being developed at military medical treatment facilities to
provide holistic pain care that integrates the conventional medical
modalities with these complementary and alternative medicines the
therapies. As part of the Army's resiliency training program, the CPMCP
includes acupuncture, bio-feedback, massage therapy, yoga, chiropractic
care, and counseling.
The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) Program focuses on helping
soldiers stay healthy while they face the challenges that are common to
Army life. A preliminary evaluation completed by Army and civilian
scientists showed that soldiers who received CSF training reported
higher levels of resilience and psychological health over time than did
soldiers who did not receive the training. This training was more
effective for 18-24 year olds than for older soldiers.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

TANK INDUSTRIAL BASE

135. Senator Portman. General Odierno, please provide insight to
the current Abrams tank industrial base. Specifically, there has been
mention of an opportunity to bring more foreign work back to the United
States. If so, how much of the industrial base would this work sustain?
General Odierno. The Army is confident current and pending Abrams
Tank FMS opportunities will help sustain the Abrams tank industrial
base and bring manufacturing work to ANAD, Anniston, AL, and the JSMC,
Lima, OH. They include:

Country of Egypt: Increment 10 tank hardware (125 tank kits)
is under contract; two tank kits a month will be shipped to
Egypt through June 2013. Increment 11 tank hardware (125 tank
kits) is under contract; four tank kits a month will be shipped
to Egypt from September 2012 through April 2015.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) ARNG: KSA ARNG Light Armored
Vehicle (LAV) turret structures are under contract; 245 LAV
turrets are to be delivered through 2013.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA): The initial FMS case (Phase I)
will recapitalize approximately 143 Abrams M1A2 KSA tanks to
the M1A2S configuration. Manufacturing work will be conducted
at the ANAD and the JSMC. The production schedule is
anticipated to be June 2013 to March 2015. A follow-on effort
(Phase II) will provide an additional 130 KSA tank conversions
and is anticipated to be approved in early 2013. The production
schedule is anticipated to be March 2015 to September 2016.
Country of Greece: The potential FMS case is currently
working. The Army anticipates an approved FMS case in late
2013. This case would involve a co-production effort. We
anticipate the program to provide refurbished Abrams Tank kits
to the JSMC at seven a month beginning in early 2015 for
shipment to an assembly facility in Greece with schedule
running through 2021.
Country of Morocco: On 19 June 2012 Defense Security
Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the potential FMS. If
the FMS case is implemented by August 2013, the effort would
provide 200 Abrams M1A1 tanks to the FMS customer with
manufacturing work conducted at the ANAD and the JSMC with a
production schedule beginning in August 2014 through September
2017.
Country of Israel: An additional Foreign Military Funding
(FMF) case on contract between GDLS and Israel will help
sustain the JSMC, Lima, OH. Israel Namer Armored Personnel
Carrier is under contract; 275 vehicles will be delivered
through fiscal year 2017.

136. Senator Portman. General Odierno, are there Abrams tank
suppliers that provide U.S. specific content that we would be in danger
of losing if we did not produce any domestic tanks? If yes, what types
of technologies do they provide?
General Odierno. The Army is proactively working with the OSD S2T2
study effort to evaluate specific suppliers that could be at risk when
the M1A2SEP v2 production is complete in June 2014, irrespective of
potential benefits from pending FMS cases. The Army previously
identified special armor as a critical item and has subsequently funded
its continued production at the minimum sustaining rate through fiscal
year 2018. We are currently assessing supply chain impacts that will
lead to establishment of cost effective 2nd-4th tier mitigation
strategies that will target specific impacted suppliers. We anticipate
that our initial results will be available in September 2012.

137. Senator Portman. General Odierno, are you satisfied that you
and your leadership completely understand the risk associated with
shutting down the U.S. tank industrial base in 2014?
General Odierno. The Army is not ``shutting down'' the JSMC.
Rather, the Army is slowing the current production rate in the facility
by ending the Abrams M1A2SEP v2 production line in anticipation of
planned upgrades coming in fiscal year 2017. Work at JSMC will
continue, irrespective of the quantity of M1A2SEP v2 tanks produced
between fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2017. In 2011, there appeared
to be limited opportunities for additional manufacturing work for the
ANAD and the JSMC. However, this has changed with recent significant
FMS interest in the Abrams tank. As a result, the tank industrial base
will benefit by new manufacturing work as a result of several pending
FMS cases that are nearing approval and are likely to impact production
beginning in the 2013 timeframe. This additional production will help
mitigate most of the vendor risks, and the Army is analyzing other
mitigating activities for vendor capabilities not addressed by the
increased FMS sales.

138. Senator Portman. General Odierno, there is general agreement
that there is a cost associated with shutting down the U.S. tank
industrial base as well as a cost to restart the base later in the
decade. Are these costs funded in the Army budget request?
General Odierno. No, the shut down and startup costs are not in the
Army budget request. The Army is not ``shutting down'' the JSMC, Lima,
OH. Rather, the Army is slowing the current production rate in the
facility by ending the Abrams M1A2SEP v2 production line. With the
fiscal year 2012 congressional add of $255 million (42 Abrams M1A2
SEPv2s) in fiscal year 2012 and the recent significant FMS interest in
the Abrams tank, the Army is confident that opportunities exist to help
sustain the Abrams tank industrial base and bring manufacturing work to
ANAD, Anniston, AL, and the JSMC, Lima, OH. Any cost associated with
the slowdown of Army tank production will be addressed in future budget
requests.

STRYKER

139. Senator Portman. General Odierno, the Stryker vehicle has been
one of the Army's most successful acquisition programs and the vehicle
remains deployed today in Afghanistan, in a double-V hull configuration
proving extremely effective against the IED threat. Yet the fiscal year
2013 budget request has little funding for Stryker modernization and
essentially 1 more year of procurement. What is the Army's long-term
modernization strategy for Stryker?
General Odierno. Stryker Modernization will continue with a
limited-scope Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) effort. The Army will
conduct a Cost-Benefit Analysis to determine technology and variant
combinations to be included in the scope of the ECP. We are analyzing
the benefits of buying-back Space, Weight, Power, and Cooling (SWaP-C)
deficiencies, improving mobility and protection, and providing the
ability to accept future network and protection upgrades.

140. Senator Portman. General Odierno, given the success of the
double-V hull Stryker, why do you want to end procurement at 742
vehicles?
General Odierno. The Army is not ending procurement of the double-V
hull (DVH) Stryker at 742 vehicles-these 742 vehicles currently equip
the two operationally committed SBCTs supporting OEF in Afghanistan. We
are, in fact, procuring another 49 vehicles through a program that
exchanges flat-bottom Strykers to DVH. Of these, 47 will reconstitute
the DVH Stryker Ready to Fight fleet and two will replace battle
losses. This will give the Army a total of 789 DVH Strykers. Procuring
beyond 789 vehicles will depend on operational requirements, pending
force structure decisions and the prioritization of future resources.

141. Senator Portman. General Odierno, given the success of the DVH
Stryker program in saving countless lives, could we convert existing
flat bottom Stryker vehicles to double-V hulls? If so, what is the plan
to upgrade the flat-bottomed hull Strykers with double-V hulls?
General Odierno. The Army is conducting a pilot program to produce
DVH Strykers via an exchange program in which components and mission
equipment package will be removed from flat bottom hull (FBH) Strykers
currently in the inventory, inspected and refurbished as needed, and
then reassembled in a new DVH structure with the associated DVH unique
components. We are conducting this pilot program as a means to replace
two of our 742 authorized DVH Strykers that were complete battle losses
and are nonrepairable. The Army has validated a requirement for 47
additional DVH Strykers to reconstitute the DVH Ready to Fight (RTF) in
Afghanistan which was consumed when a second Stryker BCT was committed
to OEF. Procurement of the 47 additional DVH is pending approval of the
Defense Acquisition Executive. If approved, the 47 additional DVH will
also be procured via exchange. Based on the outcome of this pilot
program the Army will be positioned to make a more informed decision on
exchanging FBH Strykers for DVH Strykers in the future within the
affordability constraints of our Combat Vehicle Modernization Portfolio
and Strategy.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

CRISIS IN SYRIA AND THE ARMY'S BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH ROSOBORONEXPORT

142. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, Russia's
primary exporter of military weapons is a State-controlled firm called
Rosoboronexport, who the U.S. Government has sanctioned in the past and
who today continues to supply the Syrian military with the means to
commit these heinous acts against its own people. Rosoboronexport's
customer list also includes the U.S. Army. It is my understanding that
the Army's Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft office, out of Huntsville,
AL, is currently buying at least 21 dual-use Mi-17 helicopters for the
Afghan military from this same company. The Army's June 1, 2011,
contract award to Rosoboronexport is listed at over $375 million for
the purchase of these helicopters and spare parts to be completed by
2016. Media reports from last year indicate that the contract comes
with an option for $550 million in additional purchases, which would
raise the total value of the contract to nearly $1 billion. One can
reasonably conclude that the sizeable proceeds of this Army contract
are helping to finance a company that is essentially complicit in mass
atrocities in Syria, especially in light of Syria's history of actually
paying for these Russian weapons. As I understand it, the Army has the
ability to withdraw from the contract, and instead procure the same
dual-use civilian-military helicopters legally through other means,
such as private companies that can buy them directly from the
manufacturer. As the crisis in Syria intensifies, so grows the
potential the U.S. military might have to get involved. If that occurs,
it is likely that Russian-made weapons sold to Syria by Rosoboronexport
could be turned against the U.S. military. Do you see any cause for
concern here?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army's contract with
Rosoboronexport has a $550 million ceiling price for the entire
contract, including the 21 aircraft baseline and the 12-aircraft
option. The option line provides for up to 12 aircraft at a range of
pre-negotiated prices that depend on the desired delivery date. Two
aircraft with initial spares, tools, and technical publication support
were ordered in February to replace two aircraft destroyed in accidents
at $33.4 million. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) has
also identified the need for ten aircraft to replace Mi-17s that are
nearing their life limited flight hours. The DOD Afghanistan Resources
Oversight Council, established in compliance with Congressional
direction, has reviewed and approved NTM-A's request and funding
source. Exercise of the 10 aircraft option, including initial spares,
tools, and technical publications is planned for fourth quarter fiscal
year 2012 at a projected price of $184.3 million.
The Army always retains the right to terminate any of its
contracts. The relationship with Rosoboronexport can be severed;
however, the United States currently benefits from this relationship in
two ways. First, we are assured of proper Mi-17 delivery and support to
the Afghan Air Force that enables Partner Nation Capability and timely
U.S. withdrawal, and second, we obtain accurate engineering information
to ensure air-safe operations of these aircraft not only for the
Afghans, but also for U.S. pilots, aircrews, and passengers when they
are onboard these aircraft.
These same considerations influenced the Army's decision to enter
into a contract with Rosoboronexport subsequent to the lifting of the
sanctions against Rosoboronexport by the U.S. Government in May 2010.
Since the requirement is for aircraft that are military end-use only,
procuring civilian helicopters through a private company would
necessitate costly modifications. We also have confirmed, with
assistance from the diplomatic community that Russian law gives
Rosonboronexport exclusive control over exports of Mi-17 aircraft
intended for military purposes. While others may be able to purchase
Mi-17s, delivery from within the Russian Federation could be blocked by
Rosoboronexport. More importantly, the United States needs access to
the prime aircraft manufacturer, Kazan, for accurate engineering
support and data to ensure safe operations and maintenance and
airworthiness on behalf of Afghan and U.S. personnel that operate,
maintain, or are transported on these aircraft.

143. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, do you
agree that the Army's business relationship with Rosoboronexport
undermines our goals for national security?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. No. As the lead service for
all Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation procurements, which includes the
Mi-17, the Army is executing Afghan policy as established by the
Secretary of Defense. The United States currently benefits from this
relationship in two ways. First, we are assured of proper Mi-17
delivery and support to the Afghan Air Force that enables Partner
Nation Capability and timely U.S. withdrawal, and second, we obtain
accurate engineering information to ensure air-safe operations of these
aircraft not only for the Afghans, but also for U.S. pilots, aircrews,
and passengers when they are onboard these aircraft. These same
considerations influenced the Army's decision to enter into a contract
with Rosoboronexport subsequent to the lifting of the sanctions against
Rosoboronexport by the USG in May 2010. Since the requirement is for
aircraft that are military end-use only, procuring civilian helicopters
through a private company would necessitate costly modifications. We
also have confirmed, with assistance from the diplomatic community that
Russian law gives Rosonboronexport exclusive control over exports of
Mi-17 aircraft intended for military purposes. While others may be able
to purchase Mi-17s, delivery from within the Russian Federation could
be blocked by Rosoboronexport. More importantly, the U.S. needs access
to the prime aircraft manufacturer, Kazan, for accurate engineering
support and data to ensure safe operations and maintenance and
airworthiness on behalf of Afghan and U.S. personnel that operate,
maintain, or are transported on these aircraft.

144. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, please
outline all of the Army's business dealings with Rosoboronexport since
September 11, 2001.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The 26 May 2011 procurement
contract for 21 Mi-17 aircraft in support of the Afghan Air Force, is
the only business dealing that the Army has had with Rosoboronexport.

FRATRICIDE

145. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, our
military suffered a tragic 24 percent fratricide casualty rate in the
1991 Gulf war. In the 20 years since, Congress has provided substantial
research and development funding to DOD in an effort to reduce
fratricide casualties in present and future conflicts. Yet to date, no
dedicated combat identification (CID) technology has been fielded.
Please provide an update on the Army's CID Program.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Previous fratricide incidents
in U.S. Central Command's AOR highlight the continued need to sustain
the fielding of situational awareness and target identification
solutions that enable the CID process and prevent fratricide. The Army
is committed to providing our brave men and women in uniform with
materiel and non-materiel solutions to mitigate these tragic incidents.
On June 13, 2011, the Army Acquisition Executive convened an
Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) of general officer and
senior executive service principals from OSD, Joint Forces Command and
the Services. The OIPT participants reviewed Analysis of Alternatives
results, recommendations, and Service positions on whether a new Joint
Cooperative Target Identification-Ground (JCTI-G), interrogation-
response capability, would offer significant advantages over the
combination of already fielded and programmed alternatives in
preventing fires-on-dismounts and air-to-ground fratricide. The Army,
Marine Corps, Navy and the Air Force unanimously agreed to not proceed
with an additional JCTI-G program at this time, but to mature those
potential solutions, while pursuing fielded and programmed capability
improvements and non-materiel alternatives.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology &
Logistics) subsequently concurred with the Services' positions. He
directed them to coordinate with the DOD CID-Friendly Force Tracking
Executive Steering Committee on non-materiel CID capabilities, while
the Army provides an assessment of fires-on-dismount technologies
demonstrated at Bold Quest 2011, a CID exercise placing technologies in
the hands of warfighters. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Research and Technology) has the lead on staffing this written
assessment. The Joint CID Marking System is the Army's current program
of record to prevent fires-on-vehicle fratricide. Additionally, Force
XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below and its successor, Joint Battle
Command-Platform, will continue to provide advanced situational
awareness. Improved electro-optics, forward looking infrared and the
long range laser designator rangefinder are examples of the many target
identification systems that have been fielded. All of these initiatives
enhance combat effectiveness and help prevent fratricide.

146. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, please
elaborate on other steps the Army is taking to reduce the fratricide
casualty rate in Afghanistan.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army in Afghanistan has
provided its soldiers, leaders, other joint warfighters and coalition
partners significant capabilities that enhance ground-to-ground and
air-to-ground CID and, thereby, prevent fratricide. The Army also
continues to support joint and coalition initiatives to improve current
capabilities and develop new ones.
Army situational awareness systems in Afghanistan include: Force
XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2), a system that generates
and shares situational awareness (SA) information for both ground and
rotary wing joint platforms (including 10,000 for the MRAP vehicles);
Friendly Force Tracking System for SA with coalition partners; Movement
Tracking System for logistics operations; Special Operations Forces'
Mini-transmitter; and, SA generated by other systems and shared world-
wide by the CONUS National Operations Center.
Target identification/acquisition systems in Afghanistan include
improved electro-optics (thermal, image enhancement and hybrid sights
and viewers), and enhanced night vision devices for both ground-to-
ground and air-to-ground employment. The Joint CID Marking System,
which identifies friendly ground platforms, was fielded to forces in
Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF.
Visual identification training. The Army's CID visual training
capability, ``Recognition of Combatants'' (ROC), uses as-seen-through
Forward-Looking Infrared Radar imagery as the basis for interactive
software and simulations. ROC is broadly fielded to Army schools and
units, and embedded in fielded SA systems, such as FBCB2, in order to
train, rehearse and prepare units for combat. ROC is contained in an
Army Chief of Staff initiative that will provide the Army squad an
overmatch capability moving forward. Army live-fire ranges now use high
resolution and interactive targets to impart CID knowledge and skills.
Army contributions to new joint and coalition capabilities. The CID
Server air-to-ground SA system in Afghanistan helps coalition fixed
wing aircraft clear air-to-ground fires before engaging targets. Army
FBCB2 provides critical ground position location data into a ground
server, where it is continually updated and provided to aircraft on
demand.

REVERSIBILITY OF CUTS

147. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, in DOD's
strategic guidance announcement in January, both Secretary Panetta and
General Dempsey highlighted the need to build in reversibility as these
significant cuts to our Nation's defense budget are made. The strategic
guidance document also states, ``the concept of `reversibility'--
including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our
people, our Active-Reserve component balance, our posture, and our
partnership emphasis--is a key part of our decision calculus.''
Reversibility sounds like a euphemism for ``we're not totally sure that
these cuts represent sound policy.'' In your opinion, is it realistic
to think that, within a reasonable timeframe, we could reverse
decisions as monumental as downsizing our Army by nearly 80,000 troops
(close to pre-September 11 levels) and delaying or cancelling major
acquisition programs?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army will conduct end
strength reductions using a gradual ramp over a 6-year period. The
gradual reductions will also allow the Secretary and I the flexibility
to evaluate each year whether we are moving at the right pace. If
reversals are necessary, we are confident that the flexibility built
within the gradual ramp will allow us to regrow the Army in a
reasonable timeframe to address any unforseen contingencies.
The New Defense Strategy released in January 2012 notes that since
we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with
absolute certainty, we need to manage the force in ways that protect
its ability to regenerate capabilities should they be needed to meet
future, unforeseen demands. The Army will reverse and expand through
the adaptation of current manning, equipping, training, and acquisition
policies to support regeneration of additional BCTs and enablers in
response to any unforeseen requirements or changes in the defense
strategy. We are examining existing policies and procedures and will
make adjustments that would posture the Army to slow down and reverse a
planned drawdown.

DOWNSIZING OF U.S. LAND FORCES

148. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno,
according to the DOD strategic guidance document released in January,
the new strategy must ``protect key investments in the technologically-
advanced capabilities most needed for the future . . . [and] no longer
size Active Forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations
while retaining the expertise of a decade of war.'' As a result, DOD
has proposed eliminating about 80,000 soldiers from the Army. Although
weapons development can usually be accelerated, there is no real way to
accelerate the development of quality military leaders during times of
crisis. Our force has such leaders in it today, including many
thousands of NCOs who learned the hard lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.
But once they leave the force, in most cases they cannot be replaced.
Following every war since World War II, the United States has
significantly reduced Army and Marine Corps levels while focusing on
developing air and sea forces. In recent decades, when confronted with
the next crisis--including Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf--we
have been forced to try to regenerate sizeable land forces. In your
opinion, can the Army ensure that it retains the expertise and
experience garnered by our NCOs and other leaders over the past decade,
preserving it for the next conflict, while making such drastic
reductions to our Army end strength? If yes, how do you propose to do
this?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Yes, the Army intends to
minimize induced (forced) losses across the enlisted force by lowering
accessions without jeopardizing future Army requirements. This,
combined with natural attrition will mitigate forced losses and
preserve the maximum amount of experience across our NCO Corps. Because
personnel life-cycle policies and processes are designed to satisfy
structure requirements, this strategy also supports our ability to
expand to meet unexpected operational demands. A key planning precept
is that the Army will make the choices, to the greatest extent
possible, on who will remain and who will separate. We will not
sacrifice our investment in leader development and we will continue to
shape policies to support the Army's leader development strategy. The
resulting enlisted force, with execution of the Army's personnel life-
cycle policies/processes, will satisfy future requirements while
retaining experiences acquired following a decade of war.
The Army plans to retain a higher level of combat veteran officers
and NCOs with significant combat and operational experience in the
Generating Force. They will occupy positions that already exist in our
schoolhouses and support units that the Army has been unable to fill
for the past decade due to exceptionally high OPTEMPO and mission
demands. These officers and NCOs will be experienced trainers, doctrine
writers, platform instructors, personnel developers, combat systems
subject matter experts, all lending their knowledge of emerging threats
and operational techniques to the institutional systems that will mold
and temper our future Army units. These officers and NCOs will also
circulate into and out of operational units as part of normal career
assignment patterns. All will be able to transition back to operational
support of mission units with a minimum of preparation.

149. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, given
that we are still fighting a land war in Afghanistan, coupled with our
historical inability to predict the next conflict, what is your
assessment of the DOD strategic guidance conclusion that we will rely
more heavily on air and sea capabilities in the future?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The DOD Strategic Guidance
released in January 2012 does not make such a conclusion. While stating
the Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, it does state that we
will have a global presence emphasizing the Asia Pacific and the Middle
East while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense
commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships
across all regions. This global presence requires a Joint Force that is
prepared to confront and defeat aggression anywhere in the world.
Relying primarily on a narrow concept of air and sea capabilities is to
provide a focused vision on one part of the world, not a global
strategy.
The evolving challenges and opportunities in the Asia-Pacific
region are forcing us to rebalance toward that area of the world, but
we must also maintain our defense efforts in the Middle East and Europe
to defeat violent extremists and destabilizing threats as well as
upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. To meet these
and any other challenges, the Joint Force requires a ready and agile
Land Force Component. Land Forces provide the Nation with the
capability to react to those conflicts we have historically been unable
to predict. Land Forces build relationships with allies and partners
that develop and maintain interoperable military capabilities and
access to land areas.
Whenever military forces are committed to a conflict, the type of
force brought to bear is a function of the force requirements
determined and requested by the theater combatant commander based on
the context in which it takes place. In all cases, the response
requires a Joint Force that includes all Services, though each conflict
will require differing proportions of each. As our recent experience
and history teaches us, we are poor at predicting where, when, and how
we are required to use our military. One consistent theme, however, is
that ground forces are required to achieve decisive and lasting
results, particularly when our interests include ensuring stability in
a strategically important region.

PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION POLICIES

150. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, current
Army policy requires relatively frequent permanent change of station
(PCS) moves for most soldiers and their families. At a time when each
of the Military Services is being pressured to find ways to stretch
each and every dollar and improve its fiscal stewardship, a thoughtful
and sensible revision of the Army's PCS policies could potentially save
millions of dollars annually, which the Army could use to meet other
requirements. Requiring PCS moves every 5 or 6 years--instead of every
2 or 3 years--would also improve the quality of life of our soldiers
and reduce the strain on military families, certainly a worthy goal. In
so doing, you would enable many military spouses to pursue their own
careers without facing frequent relocations, and you would ease the
stress that frequent moves and school relocations put on military
children. Perhaps most importantly, you would ensure that units remain
intact after deployment, which would provide a better support system
for soldiers who are dealing with post-deployment issues such as post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or potential suicide. Do you see any
potential for the Army to rethink its current PCS policies to cut
unnecessary expenses and improve the quality of life for soldiers and
their families? If so, how would these policies have to be reformed to
accomplish this?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army has already
maximized the benefit to soldiers, their families, and the operational
Army by extending dwell time by 1 year in the ARFORGEN cycle. The
existing DOD's PCS program which the Army implements is essential to
providing the resources to sustain the Army's force, meet
congressionally mandated end strengths and directed missions through
the use of accession, training, operational, rotational, unit and
separation moves. Of these categories only Operational and Rotational
moves are considered discretionary.
Currently, DOD prescribes a minimum of 36 months Time on Station
constraint before we assign soldiers within or from the continental
United States. The Army has extended that constraint to 48 months.
While waivers are permitted, they are restricted to the Headquarters
that directs assignments for the Service. We have an active program to
encourage soldiers to extend their overseas tour to include permitting
a generous Assignment Incentive Pay program to encourage overseas tour
extensions. We have extended the prescribed tour lengths in Korea, in
some instances, to 36 months to permit more soldiers to serve in an
accompanied status.
Adopting an ARFORGEN focused manning system provides a platform to
increase stability and predictability for soldiers and Families and
facilitate improved unit rotational readiness. We are looking at
reducing our training costs through distance learning and education
permitting the soldier to remain assigned to their home stations. In
summary, under the All-Volunteer Force program, soldiers enter the Army
for a fixed period of time. Except for extraordinary circumstances,
soldiers are free to leave the Army at the end of their obligation.
These losses generate near-equal numbers of replacements and associated
training requirements. These three major elements of the PCS program
account for approximately two-thirds of the annual PCS move count. The
remaining moves are used to meet the day-to-day mission needs, defined
in PCS terms as rotational, operational and unit moves. Consequently a
big reduction of the remaining 25 percent would prevent the Army from
fulfilling their mandates to equip, train, and maintain the readiness
of the force.

C-27 DIVESTMENT

151. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, as you
know, the fiscal year 2013 budget request details the Air Force's plans
to eliminate the C-27 from their inventory. The Air Force took over the
C-27 program from the Army in 2009, although the C-27 was developed and
procured to provide a niche capability to directly support Army urgent
needs in difficult environments such as Afghanistan, where the C-130
might not be able to operate effectively. Do you support the Air
Force's decision to divest an entire fleet of brand new C-27s?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army has a capability
requirement for intra-theater lift to be provided to ground forces, as
the Army currently has in Afghanistan. CH-47s are used heavily and
cannot bear the whole load. To assist us with our requirement, the Air
Force has agreed to provide fixed wing aircraft for resupply. A
Memorandum of Agreement signed by the Air Force and Army on January 27,
2012, states ``The Combatant Commander/Joint Force Commander should
TACON (Tactical Control) an Expeditionary Airlift Squadron or
Detachment to the Commander, Army Forces who will exercise Tactical
Control through the Senior Army Aviation Authority. The dedicated
Expeditionary Airlift Squadron may, at the discretion of the Combatant
Commander/Joint Force Commander, collocate with an Army Combat Aviation
Brigade or Task Force to provide tactical airlift for transport of Army
Forces time sensitive/mission critical equipment, supplies and
personnel.'' The Air Force assures the Army it will be able to fulfill
this requirement with their current C-130 fleet. The Air Force
commitment to meet the Army's intra-theater lift requirement using C-
130 aircraft to support Army ground forces fulfills this requirement.
The Army does not currently have or foresee any gaps or shortfalls for
intra-theater lift requirements or theater logistical supply chain
requirements based upon this agreement.

152. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, do you
agree with their assessment that mission requirements can be fully met
with C-130s and C-17s?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army has a capability
requirement for intra-theater lift to be provided to ground forces, as
the Army currently has in Afghanistan. CH-47s are used heavily and
cannot bear the whole load. To assist us with our requirement, the Air
Force has agreed to provide fixed-wing aircraft for resupply. A
Memorandum of Agreement signed by the Air Force and Army on January 27,
2012, states ``The Combatant Commander/Joint Force Commander should
TACON (Tactical Control) an Expeditionary Airlift Squadron or
Detachment to the Commander, Army Forces who will exercise Tactical
Control through the Senior Army Aviation Authority. The dedicated
Expeditionary Airlift Squadron may, at the discretion of the Combatant
Commander/Joint Force Commander, collocate with an Army Combat Aviation
Brigade or Task Force to provide tactical airlift for transport of Army
Forces time sensitive/mission critical equipment, supplies and
personnel.'' The Air Force assures the Army it will be able to fulfill
this requirement with their current C-130 fleet. The Air Force
commitment to meet the Army's intra-theater lift requirement using C-
130 aircraft to support Army ground forces fulfills this requirement.
The Army does not currently have or foresee any gaps or shortfalls for
intra-theater lift requirements or theater logistical supply chain
requirements based upon this agreement.

153. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, could
you support a move by Congress to keep these new aircraft in the Air
Force inventory, instead of allowing them to be divested, as the Air
Force is requesting?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army has a capability
requirement for intra-theater lift to be provided to ground forces, as
the Army currently has in Afghanistan. CH-47s are used heavily and
cannot bear the whole load. To assist us with our requirement, the Air
Force has agreed to provide fixed wing aircraft for resupply. A
Memorandum of Agreement signed by the Air Force and Army on January 27,
2012, states ``The Combatant Commander/Joint Force Commander should
TACON (Tactical Control) an Expeditionary Airlift Squadron or
Detachment to the Commander, Army Forces who will exercise Tactical
Control through the Senior Army Aviation Authority. The dedicated
Expeditionary Airlift Squadron may, at the discretion of the Combatant
Commander/Joint Force Commander, collocate with an Army Combat Aviation
Brigade or Task Force to provide tactical airlift for transport of Army
Forces time sensitive/mission critical equipment, supplies and
personnel.'' The Air Force assures the Army it will be able to fulfill
this requirement with their current C-130 fleet. The Air Force
commitment to meet the Army's intra-theater lift requirement using C-
130 aircraft to support Army ground forces fulfills this requirement.
The Army does not currently have or foresee any gaps or shortfalls for
intra-theater lift requirements or theater logistical supply chain
requirements based upon this agreement.

MILITARY VOTING

154. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh, the Military and Overseas
Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act enacted by Congress as part of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2010, requires DOD to create a motor voter-style voting
assistance office on every military installation, thereby providing
military servicemembers and their families with critical voting
assistance, regardless of how far they might be from their hometowns.
As the 2012 elections fast approach, I am concerned that the Army and
the other Military Services have dragged their feet on fully
implementing this requirement. This provision was passed in order to
provide servicemembers the same level of assistance that civilians
receive under the Federal motor voter law--the National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA)--I know you agree that their service and
sacrifice demand no less. Please outline the Army's efforts, to date,
to comply with this requirement.
Secretary McHugh. The Army is committed to providing our
servicemembers, their family members, and our civilian employees
numerous opportunities to receive voting assistance--we take that
responsibility very seriously. We also take our role in ensuring that
each person has the opportunity to cast their ballots in general,
primary and special elections equally seriously.
Since enactment of the MOVE Act and the November 2010 release of
the DOD Directive-Type Memorandum that provided implementing
instructions, the Army has taken significant steps to ensure the Voting
Assistance Offices are established, manned, and resourced to accomplish
their role in compliance with the MOVE Act and fulfilling our
obligation to facilitate our personnel's right to vote wherever their
duties may take them.
Key steps the Army has taken include:

On December 9, 2010, the Army issued Military
Personnel Message 10-323--Guidance in Implementing Installation
Voting Assistance Offices Service-wide.
On June 3, 2011, The Adjutant General sent a
Memorandum to the Army's Installation Management Command
detailing the requirements for implementation of the Federal
Voting Assistance Program's (FVAP) revised Measures of Success
Reporting and Installation Voting Assistance Offices.
On September 3, 2011, the Army published the 2011 Army
Voting Action Plan which formalized the already-established
Installation Voting Assistance Office Requirement.
The Army's Voting Action Officer has established and
maintains a robust communications strategy with Installation
and Unit Voting Assistance Offices alike, using general and
specifically targeted communications to ensure voting
information is rapidly and effectively distributed.
The Army Budget request for fiscal years 2013-2017
includes a provision for $20 million specifically to fund the
sustainment and staffing of these offices.
In their 2010 DOD Inspector General Evaluation of the
DOD Federal Voting Assistance Program, dated March 22, 2011,
the Inspector General found the Army to have an effective and
compliant Voting Assistance Program.
Additionally, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command reports
the number of Voter Registration Forms handed out on a
quarterly basis, expanding our supported population well beyond
the Army's ranks.

As of June 1, 2011, the FVAP confirmed the Army is fully compliant
with the requirement of establishing Voting Assistance Offices to
supplement and seamlessly integrate with the already well-established
and extensive network of Unit Voting Assistance Officers.

155. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh, are you willing to get
personally involved to ensure the Army complies with the MOVE Act and
the motor voter law on every military installation, as required?
Secretary McHugh. I continue to be personally involved in the
Army's successful implementation of the MOVE ACT and the motor voter
law on all Army installations. I have taken a personal interest in the
program, ensuring that the offices have not only been established, but
that they are manned, resourced, and integrated into the total Army
Voting Assistance Program. I have also emphasized the importance of
sustaining our successes in compliance with the MOVE Act in the long
term and the full spectrum of the Army Voting Program from my office
down to individual unit voting officers.
The Army has established a close partnership with the FVAP and is
integrating an unprecedented level of absentee voter-related
communications to empower the individual voter and to further assist
the Voting Assistance Officers and the Absentee Voting Program in
general.

The Adjutant General of the Army and Sergeant Major of
the Army Chandler have each filmed two voting Public Service
Announcements that are being broadcast on the Armed Forces
Network worldwide as well as over Internet outlets.
We transmitted over 1.6 million emails to soldiers,
retirees, and family members and already have plans to send
another email broadcast as we approach the 2012 General
Elections.
Each soldier's Leave and Earnings Statement for
December 2011 included a message emphasizing the voting
program. A similar message will re-emphasize the program as we
draw closer to the general elections.
The Army Voting Program has made extensive use of
social media outlets such as Facebook to assist soldiers and
their family members with their voting needs.
The Army continues to use collaborative tools and
information sharing sites to push current and relevant voting
information to our Voting Assistance Officers and personnel.

156. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHugh, is it your assessment that
the Army is in full compliance with its full range of obligations under
the NVRA, as required by the MOVE Act?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is in full compliance with its
obligations under NVRA. I continue to be personally involved in the
Army's successful implementation of the MOVE ACT and the motor voter
law on all Army installations. I have taken a personal interest in the
program, ensuring that the offices have not only been established, but
that they are manned, resourced, and integrated into the total Army
Voting Assistance Program. I have also emphasized the importance of
sustaining our successes in compliance with the MOVE Act in the long
term and the full spectrum of the Army Voting Program from my office
down to individual unit voting officers.
The Army has established a close partnership with the FVAP and is
integrating an unprecedented level of absentee voter-related
communications to empower the individual voter and to further assist
the Voting Assistance Officers and the Absentee Voting Program in
general.

The Adjutant General of the Army and Sergeant Major of
the Army Chandler have each filmed two voting Public Service
Announcements that are being broadcast on the Armed Forces
Network worldwide as well as over Internet outlets.
We transmitted over 1.6 million emails to soldiers,
retirees, and family members and already have plans to send
another email broadcast as we approach the 2012 General
Elections.
Each soldier's Leave and Earnings Statement for
December 2011 included a message emphasizing the voting
program. A similar message will re-emphasize the program as we
draw closer to the general elections.
The Army Voting Program has made extensive use of
social media outlets such as Facebook to assist soldiers and
their Family Members with their voting needs.
The Army continues to use collaborative tools and
information sharing sites to push current and relevant voting
information to our Voting Assistance Officers and personnel.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

DEFENSE CUTS

157. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, you have stated that our
Nation and Army are at a strategic crossroads marked by significant
challenges. In your opinion, does the current budget do sufficient work
at targeting inefficiencies, redundancies, and to address unnecessary
waste, or does it put the primary weight of the cuts on the men and
women serving in uniform?
Secretary McHugh. We are always looking for opportunities to
maximize the value of every dollar that the taxpayer provides and
Congress appropriates. We built a fiscal year 2013 budget request that
funded the Army's requirements. The President's budget reflects $3.6
billion in Track 1 efficiencies that were taken during the development
of the fiscal year 2012-2016 program. Resultant savings enabled the
Army to fund our highest Readiness, Quality of Life, and the future
capabilities priorities and reaffirmed the compact we have with our men
and women in uniform and their families.

158. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, what are areas where, in
your opinion, the numbers could be maintained and the cuts redirected
to root out wasteful spending?
Secretary McHugh. I believe that the reductions and savings that
were taken when we prepared the fiscal year 2013 budget request results
in manageable risk to the Army. The Army has never supported wasteful
spending. We are fully engaged in implementing the Presidential
directive to cut spending from areas like travel, conferences,
printing, the proliferation of IT and communications devices, and the
size of our vehicle fleets. We will continue to identify ways to
maximize the value of the resources that you provide to the Army.

159. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, do you see energy as the
largest venue for the military to save?
Secretary McHugh. No. The Army is the largest facilities energy
consumer in the Federal Government, spending $1.3 billion on facility
energy in fiscal year 2011. We are making tremendous progress in saving
energy in our facilities. Reducing energy use across the Army is
mission critical, operationally necessary and financially prudent.
Energy is fundamental to Army capability and performance and the Army's
energy requirements are driven by the military mission. Since fiscal
year 2003, the Army's facilities energy consumption has dropped 13
percent although costs have increased by more than 50 percent due to
increases in cost from utility providers. Investments in energy
efficiency and renewable energy on our installations are vital to
maintaining mission capability and performance while serving to provide
some control over escalation in energy costs. Saving energy does not
directly result in reduced costs.

160. Senator Vitter. General Odierno, you have previously
highlighted the essential component that the Joint Force plays in
maintaining the Army's ability to combat across a full range of
operations as part of a Joint Force. On August 4, 2011, at the `Casing
the Colors of U.S. Joint Forces Command' you stated that, ``today's
complex operating environment requires a Joint Force that is flexible
and adaptive to the challenges of this new environment. We have
employed our land, air, and maritime forces in ways we didn't envision
a decade ago, but in ways which are now standard practice--in ways
which are essential to meet our current national strategy and
warfighting demands.'' I strongly support your statement, and our men
and women in uniform who are working to support core missions such as
joint training and joint integration. I also believe that in line with
this we must make cuts that do not negatively affect the joint effort
of our overall training system that has led the United States to become
the highly effective elite fighting force it is today.
I understand that the Air Force has recently announced in its
fiscal year 2013 budget to largely reduce the total number of A-10
fleet. While I understand the need for certain reductions, the Air
Force announcement to cut all 24 A-10s from Barksdale Air Force Base
(AFB)--21 eliminated, 3 transferred--according to Air Force documents,
appears to be in contradiction of joint operational preparation needed.
I believe the Air Force announcement to cut all 24 A-10s from Barksdale
AFB hugely effects fundamental joint operations. These aircraft were
strategically placed in Barksdale AFB to support joint training at the
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk.
My concern is that the A-10s slated to be cut entirely from
Barksdale AFB are used to support the joint training mission of the
Army in Fort Polk. In addition to the necessity for training, I do not
believe that it is possible to strip away the A-10s from Barksdale
while also maintaining the force necessary at Fort Polk without
increasing cost of operations.
Have the joint operational training aspects been considered in this
decision, and was the Army consulted on this decision?
General Odierno. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) did not consult with the
Army regarding moving the A-10 mission out of Barksdale. The Army will
continue to request joint assets through the Global Force Management
Allocation Process and does not foresee any gap in joint capability.
From the Army perspective, the stationing of the aircraft is not a
concern. The Army has expressed the importance of having platforms
available for Army training at the JRTC, the National Training Center
(NTC), and the Joint Multinational Training Center.

161. Senator Vitter. General Odierno, are you aware of any
consultation between the Army and the Air Force regarding the removal
of this mission from Fort Polk? If so, please provide the cost savings
to DOD of bringing A-10s into Louisiana for training when the nearest
planes needed for Army training would now be located in Georgia,
Florida, Idaho, or Arizona.
General Odierno. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) did not consult with the
Army regarding moving the A-10 mission out of Barksdale. The USAF is
best suited to provide any DOD cost savings based on aircraft locations
in relation to Army training support and Air Force missions.

162. Senator Vitter. General Odierno, please provide a cost
assessment of the JRTC usage of A-10 fighters based out of Barksdale
AFB, and what the Air Force reduction of the A-10 unit in Barksdale
will do to the JRTC training in Fort Polk.
General Odierno. There is no additional cost to the JRTC due to the
decision of A-10 basing by the USAF. JRTC and the USAF Green Flag East
(GFE) exercises run concurrently. The Close Air Support (CAS) for GFE
also supports JRTC training audiences. There is no distinction between
the two with regard to fixed-wing CAS sorties. The Army does not
anticipate any impacts to the JRTC joint opportunities. The Army will
fill training support through the Global Force Management Allocation
process. This process will match requirements with available assets.

163. Senator Vitter. General Odierno, the current Director of
National Intelligence recently testified before the Senate that ``The
next 2 to 3 years will be a critical transition phase for the terrorist
threat facing the United States.'' Do you believe that in keeping with
the current National Defense Strategy laid out earlier this year, the
Army is building our future force to meet the Nation's requirements as
you see what lies ahead of us?
General Odierno. While the future is uncertain and complex we can
be certain our Nation will continue to call on America's Army. The
characteristics of the future force are very similar to those of the
current force; a force with seasoned, innovative and adaptive leaders.
The Army will capitalize on the investments in our leaders,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities, Special
Operations (SOF) and Aviation as we move forward meeting the Nation's
requirements. Additionally, we will continue the strides we've made in
our SOF and conventional force integration over the past decade of war
by ensuring training opportunities at our Combat Training Centers.
Cyber will also shape the future environment, and in accordance
with the defense strategy, we will continue to participate in the DOD
effort to work with domestic and international allies and partners and
invest in advanced capabilities to defend our networks, operational
capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.
The Army will respond, as part of the joint force, to any
contingency that threatens our Nation and our way of life. Under the
new defense strategy, force reductions in the present budget-
constrained environment will challenge the Army's ability to project
land power. However, it's essential that we, the Army, do our part in
helping to get the budget right, to get our economy moving, and to
ensure that we reduce spending. As we reduce the force, we will need to
manage risk by balancing end strength, readiness, and modernization. We
must ramp down gradually, retain mid-grade officers and NCOs, and will
continue to rely on OCO funding.

[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Webb, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Blumenthal, McCain, Chambliss,
Brown, and Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; and Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; and Daniel A.
Lerner, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff; Bradley
S. Watson; and Maggie K. McNamara.
Committee members' assistants present: Bryon Manna,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey
Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Sergio Sarkany,
assistant to Senator Graham; and Joshua Hodges, assistant to
Senator Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to hear from two distinguished military
leaders to discuss security in our hemisphere: General Douglas
M. Fraser, USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM);
and General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, Commander, U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
This is General Jacoby's first appearance before the
committee as commander and we look forward to working with you,
General, in your new position.
General Fraser, this is likely to be your last posture
hearing before the committee and we've greatly appreciated your
testimony and advice over the past 3 years. Our Nation
appreciates your 37-plus years of service in the U.S. Air
Force. I understand that you and your wife, Rena, are planning
to enjoy some much-deserved down time after your change of
command and we truly wish you all the best.
In addition to thanking each of you for your long and
distinguished service to our Nation, we would also ask that you
express our heartfelt gratitude to the men and women who serve
with you for their exceptional service and for their many
contributions to our security. We offer our thanks to your
families and the families of all your personnel, since they
share in the sacrifices of their service and because their
support is so important to the success of your missions and
thus to our Nation's security.
NORTHCOM, which was established after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, is responsible for the defense of the Homeland
and for providing defense support to civil authorities in
response to natural or manmade disasters here at home. Its area
of responsibility (AOR) also includes all of North America,
including Canada and Mexico. General Jacoby also serves as
Commander of NORAD, the binational command with Canada that has
the mission to provide aerospace warning, aerospace control,
and maritime warning for North America. We'd be most interested
to learn, General, about how NORTHCOM and NORAD might
contribute to the emerging domain of cyber security in the
Homeland.
As part of the mission of providing defense support to
civil authorities NORTHCOM must work closely and cooperatively
with other Federal agencies, particularly the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and with all the States on plans and
coordination for the emergency response to domestic disasters.
This requires close coordination with the State Governors and
the National Guard Forces to improve their combined Federal and
State response capabilities to a wide variety of emergencies.
We made significant progress on this front last year with
several initiatives, including the new dual-status command
capability, which is intended to allow State and Federal
military forces to work together to support a Governor's needs
for disaster assistance. As part of this effort, Congress
authorized legislation to permit the callup of Federal military
Reserve Forces to support Governors responding to a natural
disaster. We would be interested to hear General Jacoby's views
on how these new initiatives are working and how they will
work.
As part of its Homeland defense mission, NORTHCOM is also
the combatant command responsible for the operation of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, to defend the
United States against the threat of a potential future
ballistic missile attack from nations such as Iran and North
Korea. The last two flight tests of the GMD system using the
latest model of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) resulted
in failures. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is taking steps
to ensure that the new EKVs work reliably and effectively
before we produce more, including adequate testing and system
enhancements, as this committee recommended in last year's
bill.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is also pursuing
improvements to the reliability of the GMD system that will
allow the use of fewer interceptors to defeat future
intercontinental ballistic missiles, thus effectively
increasing our inventory of interceptors over time. In
addition, as part of phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach to
missile defense, DOD is developing the Standard Missile 3 Block
IIB (SM-3 IIB), to defend against potential long-range Iranian
missiles that could reach our Homeland. This would augment our
GMD system and we look forward to hearing General Jacoby's
views on these and related programs.
Turning to the southern part of our hemisphere, in July
2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). This strategy is the first
of its kind, but the threat posed by transnational criminal
organizations (TCO) is not new to either of our witnesses.
Today, we hope our witnesses will provide their assessment of
the threat posed by these TCOs and help the committee
understand their respective commands' role in addressing this
threat.
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are the primary entities through
which DOD engages in the Western Hemisphere. The ability of
TCOs to outgun civilian law enforcement and to buy influence
has meant that militaries have been asked to take on internal
security responsibilities throughout the region. This expanded
role for our neighbors' militaries provides opportunities for
our military to improve its advise and assist activities and to
enhance our military-to-military relations.
The committee looks forward to learning of your continued
engagement in the hemisphere and the opportunities it presents
for our commands, including on matters such as respect for
civilian control of the military and respect for human rights.
Given the horrific level of violence in Mexico, especially
related to drug trafficking and the flow of money and guns from
our country into Mexico, we want to hear General Jacoby's
assessment of the current security situation along and below
our border and the cooperation between our two militaries to
help defeat TCOs.
The SOUTHCOM AOR includes the Caribbean and Central and
South America. General Fraser, as we discussed last week, while
there is no traditional military threat emanating from the
region, SOUTHCOM is contending with an increasingly powerful
and capable threat in the form of TOC. These criminal
organizations have grown to the point where they are a real
threat to national and international security. The committee is
deeply concerned about this matter and is prepared to consider
ways to enable DOD to provide its unique capabilities to
American law enforcement, as well as foreign law enforcement
and militaries where appropriate, to ensure that these
organizations are brought to justice.
Efforts to combat TCOs and other armed groups in the region
have seen some success. Over the past two decades, the United
States has invested heavily in building the capacity of the
Colombian military and police and the results of this
investment are becoming increasingly clear. The Colombian
Government is now in control of the vast majority of the
country and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are
largely on the run and operationally limited to fleeting
attacks against government installations in remote parts of the
country.
In Central America, the impact of TCOs is most acute. The
efforts of SOUTHCOM to detect and monitor aerial and maritime
trafficking in the eastern Pacific and the Caribbean have
driven these criminal organizations to more complex methods of
trafficking their drugs, money, and weapons, including semi-
and fully-submersible vessels.
TCOs have also begun to take advantage of nations that
either lack the capacity and/or the will to confront their
trafficking. These complex criminal networks require SOUTHCOM
to continue to adapt and expand its activities with willing
partners to confront the threat.
Further south, General Fraser, a different picture emerges.
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are developed nations with capable
militaries that help improve international security by
contributing to various multilateral operations around the
globe. These contributions are important and they should not go
unnoticed.
In Venezuela, the United States is confronted by a
government and a military that is a purveyor of instability.
President Chavez and his followers sow instability through
their support to TCOs which traffic drugs, money, and weapons
through the region. We look forward to your testimony on that
matter as well, General Fraser.
So, General Fraser, General Jacoby, I have just touched the
surface of the issues that face you in your commands. We look
forward to hearing your testimony and to continuing to do
everything we can to help SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM accomplish
their security objectives. We thank you both again for
appearing before the committee and for your service to our
Nation.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses today and thanking them for their many
years of distinguished service to our Nation. I also want to
extend my appreciation to the dedicated men and women serving
under their commands.
I especially want to recognize General Fraser as this will
be his final time testifying before this committee in uniform.
I imagine he'll be celebrating this occasion later today.
What is clear from the testimony this committee has
received over the last several weeks from our various regional
combatant commanders is that the threats confronting our
Nation, our interests, and our ideals are not diminishing.
Rather, they are increasing in scope and complexity. As a
result, the work of our Armed Forces remains vitally important
to our national security.
As the prepared testimony from our witnesses today
illustrates, this is particularly true of the situation in our
own hemisphere. The horrific violence attributed to TCOs and
cartels continues to threaten the United States and erode
governance and security across the region. These organizations
exploit weak security forces, bribe corrupted government
officials, and transit easily across undergoverned territory
and porous borders. Their distribution networks have grown in
scale and sophistication and we have seen a diversification in
what is being trafficked, which now includes not just drugs,
but also human beings, bulk cash, and military-grade weapons.
These groups maintain enormous cash reserves and in many
cases are better equipped and more capable of the government
forces who are trying to stop them. Of particular concern is
the deteriorating situation in Central America. As General
Fraser notes in his testimony, ``Central America has become the
key transshipment zone for illicit trafficking in the
hemisphere.'' Approximately 90 percent of cocaine destined for
the United States transits the sub-region. As a result,
violence has risen to alarming levels. Last year, the city of
San Pedro Sula in Honduras overtook Ciudad Juarez in Mexico as
the most dangerous city in the world.
The reach of these criminal organizations extends from
South and Central America directly into North America,
including the U.S. Homeland. In Mexico, we have witnessed an
escalation of the violence that continues to terrorize its
citizens. President Calderon and his administration have
demonstrated courageous leadership in their country's fight
against drug cartels and criminal gangs. But this fight has
come at great cost. Since 2006, nearly 50,000 Mexicans have
been killed as a result of drug-related violence, including
13,000 last year alone. Such tragic figures serve as a stark
reminder of the threat that these groups pose and underscore
the need for continued U.S. support to our partners in Mexico.
The threat from these groups does not end at the border,
however. According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment
released by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the cartels now
maintain a presence in over 1,000 U.S. cities.
General Jacoby, I look forward to your assessment on the
reach of these networks, what NORTHCOM is doing to assist its
U.S. law enforcement counterparts in combatting them, and what
can be done to improve and expand this partnership.
General Jacoby, as Commander of NORTHCOM, you're tasked
with one of our government's most fundamental responsibilities,
the defense of the Homeland. What this committee has learned
over the last several weeks of testimony is that the world is
complex and dangerous. This places significant responsibility
on you and NORTHCOM to properly posture itself to defend
against and respond to the myriad threats that confront us. I'm
interested in your assessment of what the greatest threats to
the Homeland are and what is being done by your command in
coordination with the interagency to address them.
Again, I thank you both for appearing before this committee
today and I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
General Fraser.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND

General Fraser. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you this morning and thank you for the kind
words, not only for me but, more importantly, for the men and
women who serve in SOUTHCOM. It really is my distinguished
honor to represent them here today.
I'm extremely pleased also this morning to join my good
friend and close partner, Chuck Jacoby, as we have a very clear
and close partnership between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM as we work
the topics and the criminal organizations transitting through
our two regions. Our routine cooperation and collaboration
means that the relationships between our staffs grow closer
every day.
With the continued support of Congress and the members of
this committee, SOUTHCOM will continue defending the southern
approaches to the United States, enhancing regional security,
and building enduring partnerships.
Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a full statement and
respectfully request that it be entered into the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
General Fraser. Mr. Chairman, I want to briefly discuss two
topics with you this morning, and both you and Senator McCain
briefly talked about them. That's countering TOC. My other
topic is building enduring partnerships.
As I have discussed with you in previous testimony, as you
mentioned this morning, SOUTHCOM has increasingly focused on a
concern that permeates the region--TOC. As Vice President Biden
discussed during his visit to Mexico and Honduras last week,
TOC is seriously impacting citizen safety in Central America,
especially Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. TCOs threaten
to overwhelm law enforcement capacities and, in an effort to
reduce violence and halt the spread of these criminal groups,
these countries have deployed their militaries in support of
law enforcement organizations.
To address this growing threat, last year the President
implemented a strategy to combat TOC. In support of this
strategy, SOUTHCOM developed and implemented Operation
Martillo, a focused plan to eliminate illicit maritime traffic
in the departure zones of South America and the arrival zones
in Central America. In Central America, we help train our
partner militaries to effectively support their law enforcement
organizations. SOUTHCOM supports U.S. interagency and
international efforts by providing network analysis of TCOs and
their operations.
In the Caribbean, under the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative, we are developing a regional maritime interdiction
plan to enhance the capabilities of our Caribbean partners. In
South America, we will sustain our support to Colombia and to
Peru as they fight narcoterrorist groups in these countries.
Success in combatting TOC will be enhanced by fostering
enduring partnerships with international and interagency
organizations. That's my second topic this morning. SOUTHCOM is
working to build such partnerships by enhancing cooperation and
promoting information-sharing with regional and interagency
organizations. In addition, we are strengthening our
partnerships through traditional military engagement programs
and activities with our counterparts across Latin America. We
work with them to strengthen humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief capacities and we remain ready to respond
should our assistance be requested.
Last year, we conducted hundreds of training and
educational events, 11 major multinational exercises with
partner nations in the hemisphere, and 57 medical readiness
training exercises in 14 different countries. This sustained
engagement is yielding important benefits. Last year, for the
first time Colombia assumed the land component commander role
during Panamax, our annual multinational exercise focused on
supporting the defense of the Panama Canal. This year Brazil
will also join Colombia and they will assume the role as the
maritime component commander, an important step in
strengthening and expanding our partnerships throughout the
hemisphere.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank Congress for
your years of support to Colombia. As you mentioned, I ask for
your continued support to help them achieve a lasting peace.
Finally, I want to thank you for your unwavering support to
the men and women of SOUTHCOM, who work diligently every day to
ensure our security. I look forward to our discussion, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, USAF

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
report on the posture, security concerns, and future direction of U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Within the context of modest funding, we
continue to accomplish our primary objective of defending the United
States while also promoting regional security and enduring
partnerships. The key to our defense-in-depth approach to Central
America, South America, and the Caribbean has been persistent,
sustained engagement, which supports the achievement of U.S. national
security objectives by strengthening the security capacities of our
partner nations. Militaries in our area of responsibility (AOR) are
increasingly capable, professionalized, and rank among the most trusted
institutions in many countries in the region.\1\
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\1\ Aravena, F. Confianza: base para la gobernabilidad y la
convivencia democratica en America Latina y el Caribe, 2010. (Trust:
Foundation of Governability and Democratic Coexistence in Latin America
and the Caribbean). Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales.
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Interagency coordination is the foundation of SOUTHCOM's approach.
Our relatively lean budget necessitates that we embrace innovative
techniques to accomplish our mission; we do so by leveraging the
capabilities and resources of our partners within the region, the U.S.
Government, and our command. Thirty-three interagency representatives
and foreign liaison officers from five countries are integrated into
our command, allowing us to capitalize on in-house expertise and align
our engagement activities within U.S. Government frameworks. We are
continuing to refine our organizational model, but the guiding
principle remains unchanged: we support a comprehensive interagency
approach that employs whole-of-government solutions to address the
complex challenges in the region.
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), our key component
in detection and monitoring of illicit traffic, exemplifies this unity
of effort. Considered the linchpin in U.S. counterdrug efforts, JIATF-
South capitalizes on the unique capabilities, authorities, and
strengths of interagency partners such as the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department
of Homeland Security. In 2011, JIATF-South operations resulted in the
disruption of 117 metric tons of cocaine, denying illicit traffickers
approximately $3 billion in revenue. Our return on investment is
substantial; in 2010, JIATF-South supported the interdiction of eight
times the amount of cocaine than was interdicted on the Southwest
border, at a third of the cost and in an operating area that covers 42
million square miles.\2\
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\2\ In fiscal year 2010, the U.S. Government expended a combined
$1.8 billion across 11 agencies on interdiction efforts on the 1,969-
mile long Southwest border (SWB); fiscal year 2010 total operating cost
for JIATF-South was $565.5 million. In fiscal year 2010, law
enforcement agencies seized 19 metric tons of cocaine at the SWB; in
comparison, JIATF-South operations resulted in the disruption 154
metric tons.
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None of our efforts would have been possible without the continued
support of Congress. Almost three decades ago, Congress recognized the
important role the Department of Defense (DOD) could play to counter
the threat of drug trafficking, particularly in support of civilian law
enforcement efforts. More recently, through the provision of
authorities commonly referred to as Sections 1206, 1207, and 1208, we
trained and equipped partner-nation forces to help the United States
combat terrorism and conduct stability operations. Congressional
approval to delink the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program from the American Servicemembers' Protection Act
sanctions has allowed us to educate and train hundreds of military
personnel in the region, a critical element in strengthening military-
to-military relations. We also appreciate the ongoing support Congress
provides to the Department of State's regional security initiatives
such as the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and the Colombia Strategic
Development Initiative, all of which provide direction and support to
our engagements in the region.
As we look to the future, we will continue to seek innovative ways
to support interagency coordination; streamline programs and
initiatives; and replicate the success of our highly effective, small-
footprint approach that bolsters the security capacity of regional
militaries and ensures the multi-layered defense of the United States.
We believe our approach will be increasingly important given
constrained resources and the complex challenges we face in our AOR.
While we do not see a traditional military threat emanating from the
region, nations throughout our hemisphere are contending with an
asymmetric threat to national and international security: Transnational
Organized Crime (TOC). In addition to this primary concern, SOUTHCOM
also remains watchful for the potential impact of natural disasters;
the activities of violent extremist organizations; and the implications
of the activities of nations such as Iran in our AOR.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Security Concerns
During the past decade, the international system underwent a
profound transformation as globalization irrevocably altered commerce,
culture, trade, and technology. With these developments, however, came
the parallel globalization of organized crime, violence, murder, and
kidnappings related to illicit trafficking. In many parts of our
hemisphere--but most acutely in Central America--TOC has evolved into a
volatile and potentially destabilizing threat to both citizen and
regional security. Fluid, agile, and complex, these sophisticated
networks conduct illicit operations that traverse the boundaries of the
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Illicit trafficking by
transnational criminal organizations is expanding between our AOR and
the AORs of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Africa Command, and
U.S. European Command, underscoring the truly global nature of this
networked threat.
Central America has become the key transshipment zone for illicit
trafficking in the hemisphere; approximately 90 percent of cocaine
destined for the United States now transits the sub-region. Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador are experiencing alarming increases in
murders and brutality. The rising wave of violence and illicit
trafficking, coupled with the expansive resources of TOC, is
challenging the law enforcement capacities of some Central American
governments. Accordingly, these countries view their militaries as the
only entities capable of responding to these threats. In 2011, El
Salvador extended the 2010 deployment of its military to support
domestic law enforcement, while Guatemala and Honduras repeatedly
relied on their armed forces to counter the spread of TOC. Guatemalan
law enforcement institutions struggled to bring violence under control
in 2011; after the massacre of 27 farm workers in Peten by operatives
of the Mexican-based Los Zetas organization, Guatemala declared a 60-
day military state-of-siege, the second in less than a year.
To Central America's north, the Government of Mexico has fully
committed to reducing the power and impunity of TOC and drug cartels.
Events in Mexico and in SOUTHCOM's AOR are inherently connected,
requiring an integrated effort across law enforcement, military, and
civilian agencies. Many countries in Central America face challenges in
addressing impunity, porous borders, and large areas of under-governed
territory, all of which underscore the imperative of a whole-of-
government approach. The emergence of a collective of compromised
states in Central America that is unable to counter transnational
threats would have enormous implications for the United States and the
hemisphere. The inability of one country to effectively respond to the
intertwined threats of TOC and illicit trafficking is troubling; the
inability of an entire sub-region has serious implications for regional
stability and the security of the United States.
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\3\ The U.S. interagency flow numbers use Documented Cocaine
Movement, which is drawn from analysis of the Consolidated Counterdrug
Database (CCDB) and augmented by law enforcement reporting. JIATF-
South's Projected Cocaine Movement is calculated based on demand-driven
methodology to project the amount of cocaine that must be leaving South
America to satisfy global demand. JIATF-South's methodology attempts to
capture the `unknowns' inherent to cocaine flow figures.
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Profile of transnational criminal organizations

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

In recent years, TCOs have diversified their portfolios beyond
cocaine, trafficking in precursor chemicals from India, China, and
Bangladesh; commercial weapons from the United States; people,
including the forced trafficking of humans and the smuggling of
migrants and special interest aliens; and drug proceeds in the form of
bulk cash from the United States. This cash is increasingly entered
into the global financial system through countries such as Panama,
Guatemala, Argentina, and Venezuela,\4\ often under the guise of
legitimate trade. The narcotics business model has also evolved. Many
criminal organizations operate with impressive acumen, employing an
interconnected network of operational enablers: brokers who negotiate
with coca growers in South America; transportistas who act as sub-
contractors to coordinate cocaine shipments through the transit zone;
specialists who construct sophisticated submersible vessels capable of
transporting 8-10 metric tons of cocaine in one trip; hitmen or
sicarios whose violent services ensure compliance and territorial
protection through 1coercion and intimidation; wholesalers and
retailers in the United States who distribute illicit products; and
attorneys, bankers, and accountants who help launder illicit proceeds
that can be used for corruption of police and border officials to
ensure freedom of movement.
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\4\ Department of State. 2011 International Narcotics Strategy and
Control Report, vol. II; Financial Action Task Force (FATF). List of
jurisdictions with AML/CTF deficiencies, October 28, 2011.
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While Mexican criminal organizations have expanded and consolidated
control over key illicit trafficking routes in Central America, they
are by no means the only illegal groups operating in the region.
Terrorist groups, like the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC) and Sendero Luminoso in Peru, fund their insurgencies through
illicit trafficking. Criminal activities extend into the Venezuelan
government; in September 2011, the Department of the Treasury
designated four Venezuelan officials under the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Act--identical to the 2008 designation of General Henry Rangel
Silva, the new Minister of Defense--for supporting the FARC's narcotics
and arms trafficking. The bandas criminales (BACRIM) in Colombia are
testament to the highly adaptive nature of TOC; these criminal networks
grew from the vestiges of disbanded paramilitary groups and are now
focused on illicit profits rather than territorial control. In Brazil,
criminal gangs control cocaine trafficking and many of the country's
favelas. Transnational gangs like Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and Calle
18 (M-18) have a long-established presence in Central America and
maintain active ties to U.S.-based affiliates, engaging in extortion,
kidnapping, and murder-for-hire in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and the United States. Increasingly, these gangs are collaborating with
larger trafficking organizations to provide a range of criminal
services.
TCOs possess a critical enabler that many states in Central America
lack: enormous financial reserves. The illicit financial flows
associated with TOC are staggering; the United Nations Office of Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) estimates annual global gross profits from cocaine
sales at $84 billion, $35 billion of which is generated in retail and
wholesale profits in North America alone.\5\
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\5\ UNODC. Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug
trafficking and other TOC, 2011. Similar estimates are provided by the
DEA; according to the 2011 National Drug Control Strategy, the DEA
estimates that Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers generate, remove,
and launder between $18 billion and $39 billion annually in wholesale
drug proceeds, which are largely smuggled in bulk out of the United
States via the Southwest Border.
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[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Illicit traffickers in South America, Central America, and the
Caribbean pocket an estimated $18 billion in gross cocaine profits per
year.\6\ Lucrative profits enable organized crime to increase
operational capacity at a rate that far outpaces that of regional law
enforcement and militaries, purchasing sophisticated, military-grade
weapons, investing in semi and fully submersible vessels to improve
transportation, corrupting and coercing government officials to ensure
freedom of movement, and recruiting and bankrolling highly trained
specialists, many with military backgrounds.
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\6\ UNODC, op. cit.
\7\ UNODC. 2011 Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Context, Data.
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Threat to Citizen Safety
In support of security initiatives led by the Department of State,
we focus our efforts on countering the impact of transnational criminal
activity on citizen security, which is currently most threatened in
Central America. Lack of rule of law and widespread impunity provide
fertile ground for illicit trafficking and unchecked criminal violence.
Present-day homicide rates in Central America have reached crisis
levels.\8\ Honduras posted a record-setting homicide rate not seen in
the hemisphere since Colombia in the 1980s; in 2011, San Pedro Sula
overtook Ciudad Juarez as the most violent city in the world, with 159
homicides per 100,000 residents.\9\ Although still low by regional
standards, Panama's rate represents a 140 percent increase over the
past five years. In Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, we have also
seen troubling instances of targeted murders of government officials,
community activists, journalists, and law enforcement personnel. In
2011, drug traffickers killed and dismembered an auxiliary prosecutor
in Coban, Guatemala, leaving his decapitated body in front of the
governor's house. In El Salvador, gangs have repeatedly attacked or
murdered local officials, police officers, and soldiers. In Honduras,
23 journalists have been assassinated in the past 5 years, 10 of whom
were specifically targeted for covering illicit trafficking and
corruption.
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\8\ Due to inconsistencies in data collection, it is difficult to
ascertain how much of this violence is directly caused by illicit
trafficking, organized crime, and gang activity, but the UNODC's 2011
Global Study on Homicide assesses that between 25 and 40 percent of
violence in the Americas is related to organized crime and gangs.
\9\ Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad, Justicia y Paz Penal A.C.
(Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice), Mexico,
2011.
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Threat to U.S. National Security
Of particular concern, TCOs operating in the region control the
smuggling routes that traverse the hemisphere, many of which lead into
the United States. These routes represent potential access points that
could be leveraged by other groups. South American-based Alien
Smuggling Organizations (ASOs) provide a critical link for
international trafficking networks and facilitate the illegal movement
of Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) through South and Central America for
attempted entry into the United States.\10\ While we have not yet seen
any attempts by international terrorist groups to leverage these
smuggling routes, we remain watchful for the potential threat of TCOs
collaborating to move terrorists through our AOR and into the United
States.
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\10\ The Department of Homeland Security defines SIAs as
individuals from ``Special Interest'' countries, or countries that have
some connection to international terrorism.
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Additionally, the global illicit economy is underpinned by vast and
intricate money laundering systems that are utilized by both criminals
and terrorists alike, albeit to different ends. Understanding the
complex financial flows of these networks can help the law enforcement,
intelligence, and defense communities focus our efforts on groups
engaging in activities that most directly threaten U.S. national
security. We do see evidence of international terrorist groups
benefitting from the intertwined systems of illicit trafficking and
money laundering in our AOR; in South America, funding for Hizballah is
raised through licit avenues, such as charitable donations, and illicit
means, including trafficking in drugs, counterfeit, and pirated goods.
In 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department identified the Lebanese Canadian
Bank as a ``primary money laundering concern'' for its role in
facilitating the money laundering activities of Ayman Joumaa and his
Lebanon-based drug trafficking network, which also channeled financial
support to Hizballah. Joumaa is also accused of smuggling U.S.-bound
cocaine through Central America and Mexico and providing money
laundering services to Los Zetas and numerous Colombian and Venezuelan
suppliers.\11\
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\11\ United States of America v. Ayman Joumaa. U.S. District Court
for the Eastern Division of Virginia, November 3, 2011.
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Finally, the pernicious reach of TOC is exemplified by one word:
transnational. The National Drug Intelligence Center assesses that
Mexican-based TCOs and their associates operate in upwards of 1,000
U.S. cities, working with domestic U.S. gangs to distribute and traffic
illicit drugs throughout the United States.\12\ Additionally,
transnational gang activity in the United States is a growing concern
for the FBI. MS-13 leaders in El Salvador manage five regional
``programs'' of cliques in cities such as Boston, Greensboro, Miami,
and Dallas, and have authorized retaliatory actions against U.S. law
enforcement personnel in the Virginia and Maryland areas, which
fortunately did not come to fruition. The deepening linkages between
illicit trafficking inside the United States and TOC in our AOR are
representative of the wide-reaching impact of this networked threat.
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\12\ National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011 National Drug Threat
Assessment.
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Regional Stability
In addition to the threat posed by TOC, the region is also
vulnerable to humanitarian crises, mass migrations, and natural
disasters. SOUTHCOM remains a committed and responsive partner in
foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. To enhance
partner-nation preparedness, we strengthen the humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief (HA/DR) capacities of regional militaries-through
our multinational training exercises and security cooperation
activities. Our efforts are yielding long-term dividends while also
promoting the shared responsibility and costs of regional leadership in
responding to catastrophes. Countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador,
Costa Rica, and Colombia have demonstrated an increased capacity to
respond to natural disasters without asking for U.S. or international
aid, a testament in part to the effectiveness of our programs.
SOUTHCOM is also watchful for potential geopolitical turbulence
that could impact U.S. citizens and military personnel in the region,
particularly in Cuba, Haiti, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Fidel Castro's
leadership transition to his brother Raul is complete, but the long-
term effects of the government's market reforms remain to be seen.
Haiti, while making slow but steady progress, remains vulnerable to
natural disasters and economic hardship. Public demonstrations in
Bolivia related to wages, food prices, and energy shortages are likely
to continue until the government addresses the underlying causes of
social turmoil. In Venezuela, uncertainties about President Chavez's
health, continued economic instability, and escalating levels of
violence are placing increasing demands on the Venezuelan Government.

Violent Extremist Organizations and Influence of Iran
In addition to Hizballah supporters throughout South America, the
region is home to a small number of violent extremist organizations. We
remain vigilant for the potential radicalization of homegrown
extremists. Sunni extremists, while small in number, are actively
involved in the radicalization of converts and other Muslims; these
efforts can be seen through the influence of public personalities like
Jamaica's Shaykh Abdullah al-Faisal, who was convicted in the United
Kingdom for inciting terrorism. Current al Qaeda senior operative Adnan
el-Shukrijumah has held valid passports for the United States as well
as Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, where he has family and associates.
Despite the recent convictions in the 2007 plot to attack the John F.
Kennedy International Airport, one alleged co-conspirator remains at
large in Guyana.
In an attempt to circumvent international sanctions, Iran continues
its overtures to the region and has succeeded in establishing modest
economic, cultural, and security ties, mostly with nations aligned with
the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of our Americas (ALBA), such as
Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Iran also propagates
its agenda through its 36 Shia cultural centers. The Fundacion Cultural
Oriente--an Iranian outreach center dedicated to strengthening Iranian
ties to Latin America--is run by the radical cleric Moshen Rabbani,
currently on the Interpol Red List for involvement in the 1994 bombings
of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. Rabbani oversees several
media outlets and has recruited students from the region to study in
Iran. We take Iranian activity in the hemisphere seriously and we
monitor its activities closely. The U.S. Government's successful
detection and thwarting of the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador
to the United States reinforces the importance of that monitoring and
the effectiveness of U.S. countermeasures.

Russia and China in the Region
Russia and China also factor into the strategic environment in the
region. Russia's outreach to the region is centered primarily on arms
sales and expanding military ties. Russian weapons provide a low-cost
alternative that is appealing to many nations in the region; in 2011,
Venezuela became the largest importer of Russian arms in the world.\13\
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru all have engaged in arms transfer
agreements with Russia over the past few years, and the Latin American
market represents a large and growing segment of global arms sales by
Russia. Historically, Russia's strongest partnerships have been with
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, but its engagement efforts are
expanding.
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\13\ According to the Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, in
2011 Venezuela purchased an unspecified number of T-72B1 tanks, BMP-3M
infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-80A armored personnel carriers, Msta-S
152-mm self-propelled howitzers, Nona-SVK 120-mm self-propelled
mortars, Grad multiple rocket launchers, and an assortment of other
weaponry, In 2012, the country will begin production of AK-103 assault
rifles.
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China's strategy vis-a-vis the region is based on expansion of
trade and investment in commodities. Beijing has also increased its
engagements in the military realm; Chinese arms sales to regional
militaries have more than quadrupled in the past 5 years, while the
frequency of high-level Chinese visits has also increased
substantially. Currently, 18 countries in Central America, South
America, and the Caribbean receive military training from China. In
September 2011, the Chinese hospital ship ``Peace Ark'' embarked on its
first-ever humanitarian mission to the Western Hemisphere, visiting
Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica and provided
bilateral medical exchanges and assistance in each port visit. This
type of endeavor is consistent with China's declared intent to expand
diplomatic, economic, and military relations in the region.\14\
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\14\ China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008.
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SOUTHCOM will continue to maintain and deepen our existing
partnerships, while exploring avenues for future cooperation with key
nations in the region. Throughout the world, U.S. military and defense
partnerships are essential to ensuring national security, but nowhere
more so than within our own hemisphere, which is comprised of nations
that share the same interest in promoting regional and global
stability, freedom, and prosperity. SOUTHCOM is committed to being the
security partner of choice for these nations. We demonstrate this
commitment through our multinational training exercises, security
cooperation activities, humanitarian assistance programs, and military-
to-military engagements, all of which build strong security
partnerships that help every nation meet the challenges of an uncertain
and complex security environment.

STRATEGIC APPROACH

Strengthening Our Partnerships
Building partnerships is the cornerstone of our strategic approach,
ensuring the forward defense of the United States by promoting capable
regional militaries that share in the responsibility of hemispheric
security and stability. Our efforts are designed to strengthen and
enhance the capacities of partner nations to respond to domestic and
regional threats, both individually and collectively. We envision a
hemisphere characterized by nations working together to address the
emerging security challenges of the coming decade. SOUTHCOM's modest
budget and small footprint have encouraged us to embrace innovative,
low-cost approaches to achieving our security objectives; annual
exercises, rotational presence, and advisory roles are integral to our
engagement with the region. Through our component commands, our efforts
focus on strengthening the security capacity of regional militaries in
support of civilian government-led efforts to counter TOC and illicit
trafficking; respond effectively to natural and humanitarian disasters;
contribute to global stability operations; and assist in our efforts to
ensure a safe, secure, and stable region.

Countering Transnational Organized Crime
Within our authorities, SOUTHCOM is supporting the efforts of
militaries throughout Central America that have been tasked by their
civilian governments to assist in countering TOC. Our component command
12th Air Force (U.S. Air Forces Southern) began implementation of its
successful Sovereign Skies Expansion Program with Air Forces in Belize,
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Working closely with NORTHCOM,
the State Department, and the U.S. Embassies in Guatemala, Belize, and
Mexico, we supported full implementation of our Border Security
Initiative, providing targeted counter-narcotics training, equipment,
and infrastructure to all three countries. Under this initiative, we
facilitated the establishment of an Interagency Border Security Unit in
Tecun Uman and a border checkpoint at El Carmen to increase land
interdiction capabilities along the Guatemala-Mexico border. Further
south on the Central American isthmus, we worked with the U.S. Embassy
in San Jose to conduct training and checkpoint infrastructure
improvements in Costa Rica to help address the flow of illicit traffic
along the Pan-American Highway.
Executed by our component command U.S. Naval Forces Southern
Command, our multinational naval training exercise Southern Seas
continues to yield positive results in increased maritime domain
surveillance and interdiction capabilities throughout our AOR. The 2011
Southern Seas included two multinational exercises conducted off the
eastern and western coasts of South America. Unitas Atlantic and Unitas
Pacific provided training on multinational naval interoperability,
maritime interdiction operations, and naval special warfare. Over 4,000
participants from navies in the region participated in the 2011 Unitas
exercises in Brazil and Chile. Thanks in part to participation in our
security cooperation activities, the Nicaraguan, Honduran, Salvadoran,
Panamanian, and Colombian navies are contributing important
interdiction capacities to JIATF-South's ongoing operations. Capable
militaries and security forces that help counter illicit trafficking
act as force multipliers to regional efforts and are indicative of the
long-term dividends of our training and exercise programs. Cocaine
seizures in Colombia, particularly by the Colombian Navy, are among the
highest in our AOR, while Brazil seized a record 115 tons of illegal
drugs on their borders this year.
Our annual multinational exercises are also designed to improve
interoperability and promote collaboration among participants, skills
that can be employed at the regional level and in multinational
operations. Held in El Salvador and executed by our component Special
Operations Command South, this year's Fuerzas Comando helped improve
the training, readiness, and capability of 250 Special Operations Force
(SOF) soldiers and special police units. During the 2011 Southern
Partnership Station exercise, U.S Naval Forces Southern Command
deployed a High Speed Vessel (HSV) SWIFT team, which conducted
engagements in five partner nations centered on medical, Naval Criminal
Investigative Service, and Maritime Civil Affairs discussions with
partner-nation counterparts.
Although we are focusing our current efforts in Central America, we
recognize the interconnectedness and adaptability of transnational
threats throughout the hemisphere. Colombia and Peru remain top
priorities; both countries are engaged in definitive campaigns to
defeat the weakened terrorist threats within their borders. U.S.
support to both nations remains important at this critical juncture.
Due to its proximity to the United States and former role as the
primary transit zone, the Caribbean remains vulnerable to exploitation
by TOC. In support of the CBSI, programs like Secure Seas and our
multinational training exercises are improving maritime interdiction in
the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and throughout the Eastern Caribbean,
providing an important preventative capacity each nation can use to
enhance their security. Led by our component U.S. Marine Corps Forces
South, over 1,000 military personnel from the Caribbean and the United
States participated in our 2011 Tradewinds exercise, which focused on
improving maritime interdiction and ground security skills at the
tactical and operational levels.

Promoting Regional Stability and HA/DR Capacity
As demonstrated by our support to the U.S. response effort after
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, SOUTHCOM possesses unique capabilities to
respond to natural disasters. These capabilities provide critical
support to lead Federal agencies in disaster response efforts and
ensure that we remain prepared to conduct non-combatant evacuation
operations for American citizens in Central America, South America, and
the Caribbean, if necessary. We also stand ready to bolster the efforts
of regional militaries to provide support to civilian authorities in
foreign HA/DR events. During 2011, we made significant progress
advancing a framework for military support to civilian-led disaster
relief operations, using the computer-networking tool All Partners
Access Network (APAN) as a potential standardized technology platform
to facilitate collaboration among regional militaries during disaster
response efforts. We also continued development on our Caribbean
Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) initiative, promoting
increased disaster resilience and response capability in the 18
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations.
In 2011, SOUTHCOM also engaged with our partners through several
complementary activities: our Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP),
disaster preparedness projects, and annual humanitarian assistance
exercises. This past year we completed 255 HAP projects in 28 countries
in our AOR, constructing disaster response warehouses, wells, potable
water systems, and emergency operations centers. We also executed 22
low-cost projects designed to increase disaster preparedness in
Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Dominica, Haiti, St. Kitts,
and Suriname. In conjunction with these projects, we provided training
to first responders and disaster response managers, imparting a
critical skill that can be employed long after our forces have left the
country. Held in Trinidad and Tobago and Guatemala and led by our
component U.S. Army South, the 2011 Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias
exercise brought together more than 480 participants from regional
militaries, civilian disaster management agencies, and first responders
to provide field training in disaster relief and recovery efforts. Of
note, our cost-effective HAP program has attracted funding from the
international community; the Inter-American Development Bank has
pledged to incorporate the sustainment of eight HAP schools being built
in 2012 into its $50 million grant package that supports public and
primary education in Haiti.
Our Continuing Promise humanitarian mission continues to foster
goodwill and demonstrate core U.S. values. In 2011, the USNS Comfort
visited nine countries in the region, providing invaluable training to
U.S. service men and women and partner-nation personnel while also
providing free medical care and civic assistance to communities
throughout our AOR. During the 2011 mission, the 850-person crew--
comprised of U.S. servicemembers, civilians, volunteers from
nongovernmental organizations, and members of partner-nation
militaries--treated approximately 70,000 patients, performed more than
1,000 surgeries, and conducted 16 engineering projects in Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru,
and Haiti.
Our component U.S Army South led the 2011 humanitarian civic
assistance exercises Beyond The Horizon and New Horizons in El
Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, while 12th Air Force (U.S
Air Forces South) executed the 2011 New Horizons in Suriname. An
integral part of these missions, our medical readiness training
exercises resulted in the treatment of 85,364 patients and provided
training opportunities to more than 6,000 U.S. Reserve component and
Active Forces and 250 partner-nation personnel, while also bolstering
partner-nation state presence in rural, often under-governed areas. As
our only forward operating location, Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B)
supports immediate response to HA/DR events and DEA-led counter-drug
operations. In 2011, U.S. medical forces stationed at JTF-B treated
20,257 patients throughout Central America and assisted with
transporting food and supplies to local schools and orphanages in
Honduras. Although small in force size, JTF-Bravo serves as a tangible
representation of U.S. values and of our steadfast commitment to the
region.

Promoting Shared Responsibility
Our security cooperation activities and military-to-military
engagements by SOUTHCOM and our components have helped increase
security across the entire region and helped promote shared
responsibility for hemispheric security. For example, during the
Sovereign Skies program, our component 12th Air Force (U.S. Air Forces
Southern) provided training and conducted interoperability exercises
with the Dominican Republic Air Force to increase illicit air
interdiction capacity in the Caribbean. This training--in conjunction
with the country's purchase of Brazilian A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and
Italian radars--helped reduce illicit air tracks into the Dominican
Republic from over one hundred per year to almost zero. Led by U.S.
Army South, PANAMAX focuses on the cooperative defense of the Panama
Canal. PANAMAX is one of our oldest multinational exercises, growing
from two participating nations in 2003 to over seventeen this year.
Colombia's participation culminated by leading the Combined Forces Land
Component Command in 2011. This remarkable achievement is a testament
to Colombia's success in regaining security and the importance of
ongoing U.S. engagement with Colombia, which is yielding enormous
dividends in other areas. Colombia is now a leading provider of
bilateral security assistance and a regional partner in security
operations throughout Central America, South America, and the
Caribbean.
Our engagement with regional militaries also includes training for
peacekeeping operations in support of multinational peace and stability
efforts. We execute the Department of State's Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI) to build the peacekeeping capacity of 11
participating partners. In support of this objective, our components
U.S. Marine Corps Forces South and U.S Army South conduct two annual
training exercises, Partnership of the Americas and Peacekeeping
Operations Americas (PKO-A). The GPOI program and our exercises provide
the opportunity for our partners to sustain capacity to support United
Nations peace support operations. Countries in our AOR contribute
nearly 8,000 personnel to peace support and stability operations
throughout the world, including critical and ongoing support to the
U.N. Missions in Haiti, Lebanon, and the Sudan. We are also seeing
GPOI-funded countries exporting their peace support training; in 2011,
a GPOI-funded Peruvian Military Mobile Training Team provided training
to the El Salvadoran military in support of its deployment to the U.N.
Mission in Lebanon.
We engage with regional militaries through our educational and
academic institutes: the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
Cooperation, the Inter-American Defense College, the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies. We also utilize the International Military
Education and Training program to achieve our objectives for regional
military engagement. I want to thank Congress for its continued support
for these important programs, which build enduring relationships
between future military leaders in the region and the United States and
promote positive relations between partner nations. We further expand
on these relationships through our engagements with senior defense
leaders throughout our AOR. Our component command U.S. Army South
supported the 2011 Central American Regional Army Leaders Conference,
bringing the Guatemalan, Honduran, Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan Army
Commanders together for the first time to discuss shared security
concerns related to TOC. U.S. Marine Corps Forces South's 2011 Marine
Leaders and Senior Enlisted Leaders Conferences helped enhance
relations between the Marine Corps and Naval Infantries in North,
Central, and South America, while 12th Air Force's (U.S. Air Forces
Southern) support to the 2011 System of Cooperation Among the American
Air Forces brought together representatives from 13 member nation Air
Forces in the Western Hemisphere to discuss opportunities for mutual
cooperation.
As we look to future engagements, SOUTHCOM is working with the
armed forces of other willing nations, such as Colombia, Chile, and
Brazil, to enhance security throughout the Western Hemisphere. Colombia
is providing training to military personnel in its Regional Training
Center \15\ and to over 2,000 police officers in Central America. In
2011, the Colombian Air Force began working with its Honduran
counterparts to interdict illicit air traffic and expand intelligence
sharing. In support of the 2011 Central American Integration
Secretariat's (SICA) Donors Conference, Chile offered to share its
naval expertise in securing its maritime domain with Central American
militaries and security forces. In 2011, Brazil played a pivotal role
in facilitating improved trilateral counterdrug efforts with Bolivia
and the United States, and we hope to expand and deepen this kind of
cooperation in the coming year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Under the U.S. OH-58 helicopter initiative, the Rotary Wing
Entry Training Center in Melgar, Colombia is currently training 24
Mexican pilots per year, enhancing efforts in the AORs of both SOUTHCOM
and NORTHCOM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our engagement efforts also extend to the private sector and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Many NGOs have their own active
programs in the region and can lend unique capabilities and expanded
resources to complement our engagement initiatives. SOUTHCOM championed
public-private cooperation during Operation Unified Response (OUR), and
this type of collaboration can yield enormous benefits for U.S.
departments and interagency, and our partner nations. In 2011 our
business engagement team facilitated support from a multinational
corporation to a local U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) project in Honduras and coordinated the donation of $20 million
worth of pharmaceuticals from NGOs to clinics and hospitals in
Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana, helping
strengthen partner-nation state presence in under-governed areas. The
cumulative result of this type of engagement--along with our ongoing
exercises and security cooperation activities--is a region comprised of
nations, militaries, and citizens that are willing and able to share in
the responsibility of ensuring hemispheric security and stability.

Ensuring the Safe, Humane, and Transparent Care and Custody of
Detainees
As part of our strategic objective to defend the United States,
SOUTHCOM also remains committed to providing a safe, humane, and
transparent detention center at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, for detainees and prisoners in U.S. military custody there. In
accordance with guidance from the Secretary of Defense, SOUTHCOM will
continue operations at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo until such time as
directed otherwise. We will also continue to support the transfer of
those detainees who are approved for transfer to their country of
origin for repatriation or third-countries for resettlement, consistent
with applicable U.S. laws and reporting requirements. Joint Task Force-
Guantanamo and SOUTHCOM routinely meet with International Committee of
the Red Cross representatives to discuss their observations following
regular visits to the detention facilities. Additionally, coverage of
the 2011 arraignment of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was broadcast via
closed circuit television in selected sites in Norfolk and the
Washington DC areas, enhancing the transparency of military commission
proceedings at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Strategic Priorities
In the immediate future, we will focus our efforts on strengthening
the security capacities of our partners in Central America. As the lead
U.S. agency responsible for directing illicit trafficking detection and
monitoring activities, we are undertaking operational and tactical
activity in support of whole-of-government efforts to counter TOC in
the maritime approaches to Central America. On January 15, within our
existing resources, we began Operation Martillo, a joint, interagency,
and combined operation led by SOUTHCOM and JIATF-South and coordinated
with partner-nation assets on patrol or alert. This persistent
operation aims to disrupt maritime illicit trafficking along the
Central American littorals. We recognize that the effects of Operation
Martillo can be amplified by aligning our air and maritime focus with
complementary land law enforcement activities conducted by partner
nations; as such, we have coordinated our activities with the Central
American Governments and international donors to maximize all possible
means for supporting this effort.
While we work to achieve our strategic objectives in the long-term,
the challenge for SOUTHCOM is to find creative ways to enhance
interagency, public-private, and partner-nation cooperation as we plan,
train, and operate with regional militaries to address the predominant
security concerns in the region. The intricately networked, globalized
nature of TOC signifies that no one country or agency can solve this
problem alone; collaboration with partner nations and across the U.S.
Government will be essential to successfully mitigate this threat. Our
goal is to support partner-nation and U.S. Government efforts to
improve citizen safety by reducing the threat of TOC from a national
and regional security threat to a public safety problem.
We expect militaries in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador will
continue to be called upon to play an important role in domestic
security matters in the coming years, given the increasing threat to
citizen security and the numerous challenges facing regional law
enforcement institutions, which are under-resourced, poorly trained and
equipped, and prone to corruption. While we recognize this is a
necessary initial step to help curb the rising tide of violence, we
also recognize that this approach is unsustainable in the long term;
strengthening civilian law enforcement institutions is critical, and we
will support the Department of State as the lead agency in this
endeavor. As militaries continue to take on internal security
responsibilities, our Human Rights Initiative will remain a critical
mission set. Through this program, we will continue to support partner-
nation military and security forces in instituting human rights
training; revising policies and regulations to include human rights
principles; strengthening internal control mechanisms; and improving
cooperation with civilian authorities and civil society.
To address the growing threat of TOC, SOUTHCOM has shifted its
approach towards a more holistic strategy that will help us prioritize
programs, streamline activities, and integrate our efforts across the
U.S. interagency. While our primary focus will remain strengthening
partnerships to enable effective regional security, we will also
support and contribute to the disruption of illicit trafficking; the
dismantling of TOC networks; and the fostering of alternatives to
criminal influence in under-governed areas. Our efforts complement both
the National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime and the
citizen safety goals of CARSI and CBSI. The key concept in our strategy
is support. With the exception of fulfilling our statutory
responsibility as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of
aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs, DOD plays a supporting
role in all counter-narcotics and related efforts.
Enhanced support is only one part of our refined approach; we are
also examining how to use our capacities in network analysis and
operational planning to maximize U.S. Government and partner-nation
efforts throughout the region. We are working with the U.S. interagency
to support a more effective integration of effort, improving the
alignment of our operations, exercises, and initiatives with those of
NORTHCOM, the Department of State, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Department of Homeland Security, USAID, and others. SOUTHCOM will
continue to support the Department of State as it leads the effort to
integrate U.S. security initiatives with SICA's regional security
strategy, which incorporates assistance offered by donor nations like
Canada, Spain, and Chile and organizations like the Inter-American
Development Bank and the World Bank. We will also sustain our support
to Colombia and Peru, countries that are fighting narco-terrorist
groups whose illicit trafficking activities extend throughout the
hemisphere. Finally, in close coordination with the Regional Security
System, CARICOM, and Caribbean nations, we will continue to play an
active role in developing a regional maritime interdiction plan in the
Caribbean.

Resources and Requirements
We recognize difficult adjustments will be required as we enter
into an era of fiscal austerity. The emerging security threats in our
AOR, however, necessitate that we remain engaged with militaries in the
region. Historical events in our AOR have demonstrated that investing
in early and routine engagement activities can avoid exponentially
larger expenditures in the future. We firmly believe that building,
maintaining, and sustaining capable security partners is a wise
investment to hedge against future security challenges and guarantee
the long-term stability of the Western Hemisphere. The new Defense
Strategic Guidance recognizes our approach as the model for the future.
As DOD prioritizes resources across the Joint Forces, we will look to
share the ``best practices'' of our agile, small-footprint approach to
building partner capacity and promoting the layered defense of the
United States.
As we look to the future, SOUTHCOM is exploring ways to improve our
flexibility to address the problems facing Central America, including
an examination of the authorities available to DOD; how we can better
support the U.S. interagency; and our engagement with the Guatemalan
military, which remains limited by restrictions on U.S. security
assistance. In 2011, Guatemala took important steps to address past
human rights violations through release of key documents pertaining to
the country's civil conflict and continues to make progress on
enforcing the rule of law and respecting human rights. SOUTHCOM
supports efforts by the Department of State and Congress to find a
constructive way forward to improve the human rights situation in
Guatemala and address the existing restrictions that prevent full
support to the Guatemalan military.

Budget Considerations
In 2011, SOUTHCOM took proactive steps to identify and enact cost-
saving measures. Having improved the command's organizational structure
during our 2010 reorganization, this year we conducted a manpower
analysis to further align resources and functions. As directed by the
Secretary of Defense, SOUTHCOM eliminated the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters and froze DOD civilian senior executives, general, and
flag officer positions at 2010 levels. We also applied reductions in
areas such as: reduction of support to Operation Southern Voice;
reduction or adjustments to annual foreign military interaction
exercises; and reduction in discretionary travel. We have also reduced
activities in certain lower-priority portfolios and revamped our
internal business practices to better manage resources.
While we are committed to enacting cost-saving mechanisms, reducing
duplication, and improving the accountability and cost-effectiveness of
our programs, we remain committed to our most important resource: our
people. As a joint command, SOUTHCOM supports the needs of our Army,
Marine, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard servicemembers, their
families, as well as our civilians. In 2011, we took measures to extend
our survivor outreach program to the families of the more than 100
servicemembers from South Florida who have died in the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of these survivors live hundreds of miles
away from the nearest long-term survivor program for their particular
supporting Service. SOUTHCOM is working with the Service Casualty
Chiefs to establish an agreement to allow our survivor outreach
coordinator to offer long-term support to all the families of fallen
heroes in South Florida, regardless of Service affiliation. I am proud
of this effort and I believe it embodies the truly joint nature of our
command.

CONCLUSION

This will very likely be my last opportunity to testify before you
in my current capacity. Over the last 3 years, it has been my great
honor to serve with the men and women of SOUTHCOM. It has also been a
distinct privilege to serve with the dedicated and capable leaders of
Central and South America and the Caribbean. My time at SOUTHCOM
brought me back to the region I left almost 41 years ago. Returning
reinforced my belief in the importance of the region: the role it plays
for the security of the United States and the critical need to remain
engaged with our military partners. I also believe strongly in the
importance of expanding interagency, regional, and multilateral efforts
to address transnational security concerns, and in the value of being
prepared to support disaster relief efforts.
As I finish my tenure at SOUTHCOM, I want to thank Congress and the
distinguished members of this committee, especially Senators Levin and
McCain, for your continued support to our men and women in uniform. Our
Armed Forces remain strong and capable because of your leadership, your
focus, and your commitment to ensuring they remain the best armed
forces in the world. My parting request to the Members of Congress is
to sustain the unmatched capability of our Armed Forces, continue to
support the incredibly dedicated, imaginative, flexible, and wonderful
men and women in our Armed Forces, and keep faith with our veterans and
their families. Thank you.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Fraser.
General Jacoby.

STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND

General Jacoby. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of
the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you this morning. It's an honor to be here. It's a pleasure to
join my fellow combatant commander and friend, General Doug
Fraser. Also with me today, I am happy to acknowledge my
Command Sergeant Major, Bob Winzenried. On behalf of the men
and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD, I appreciate this committee's
continuing support of our missions of Homeland defense,
including ballistic missile defense, defense support to civil
authorities, for which the highlight last year was the team
response to Hurricane Irene, and security cooperation,
including our expanded cooperation with the Mexican military as
they tackle the brutal TCO.
In the case of NORAD, our assigned missions for the United
States and Canada include aerospace warning and control through
our safe and successful Operation Noble Eagle, and maritime
warning, where we continue to grow capability through improved
interagency and international information-sharing. In addition
to cooperative defense with our ally Canada, we are steadily
improving our security cooperation with our good friends in
Mexico and the Bahamas at a pace determined by mutual agreement
and with constant respect for national sovereignty.
Our vision is that, with our trusted partners, we will
defend North America by outpacing all threats, maintaining
faith with our citizens, and supporting them in their times of
greatest need. We view our missions as a sacred trust by our
governments and our citizens. We appreciate that the American
people and their elected representatives in Congress and the
White House rightly have high expectations of our ability to
defend them here at home.
Consistent with the necessity for collaboration and with
many other organizations in a wide variety of challenging
situations that can threaten the citizens of our great Nation,
my priorities are:

to expand and strengthen our trusted
partnerships;
to advance and sustain the binational military
command, NORAD;
to gain and maintain all-domain situational
awareness, including air, space, cyberspace, land,
maritime, and the unique and fast-changing domain known
as the Arctic;
to advocate and develop the abilities in our
core mission areas to outpace all threats; and
to take care of our people as they are our
foundation.

I'm tremendously proud of the committed and selfless men
and women, military and civilian, Americans and Canadians, who
serve in our commands. When appropriate, in accordance with the
Stafford Act, the National Response Framework, and other laws
and guidance such as on the request of a Governor and upon
direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM
pulls together the unique capabilities and capacities of DOD to
multiply the impact of a primary Federal agency such as our
close partner the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Now, thanks to Congress and the President, the 2012
National Defense Authorization Act put into law initiatives
supported by the Council of Governors and the Secretary of
Defense concerning dual-status commanders and activation of
Reserves in domestic disaster response. I appreciate this
committee's support for these two important measures, which
surely will help save American lives.
It was my privilege to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq with
many superb members of the National Guard and Reserves. I
believe that in the crucible of over 10 years of continuous
conflict, with the support of Congress, we have developed the
finest Total Force that I've ever seen, and NORAD and NORTHCOM
depend on that Total Force every day.
This past year has been busy. We've synchronized our
activities with many partners and we've done our part to
realize efficiencies that we've worked through the budget
process for fiscal year 2012, trimming our workforce by 141
full-time equivalents and for fiscal year 2013 reducing our
operations and maintenance funding by about 6 percent. But with
the resources and authorities at hand and maintaining our
vigilance, we'll be able to continue to defend and support the
American people.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear today and I look
forward to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of General Jacoby follows:]

Prepared Statement by GEN Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, I appreciate this opportunity to report on the posture of
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). The men and women of NORTHCOM and NORAD are dedicated
to defending the U.S. and Canadian Homelands. We accept the obligation
to defend the homelands as the most fundamental and enduring of our
responsibilities. Consistent with the Department of Defense's
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,
January 2012, as directed by the President, our Nations depend on the
might of our militaries and the security of our Homeland to project and
sustain military power, ensure our economic vitality, and safeguard our
people and their will. This source of strength and resiliency must be
carefully guarded. As we rebalance our military to deal with the
challenges of the 21st century, we recognize that the security of our
citizens cannot be compromised. Earning and keeping the trust of the
American people drives our motto, ``We have the watch.''
I am honored to lead this exceptional command team made up of 1,725
full-time U.S. military and DOD civilians assigned to the command's
headquarters, including nearly 80 National Guardsmen from 33 States,
augmented by an additional 237 part-time Reserve component personnel.
In addition, 114 Canadian military members are fully integrated into
our NORAD headquarters and two Mexican liaison officers work alongside
our NORTHCOM staff. Rounding out our team are representatives from over
60 Federal mission partner organizations.
NORTHCOM and NORAD are two separate commands that are inextricably
linked. Neither command is subordinate to, nor a part of the other, but
most elements of our headquarters staffs are combined and we all work
very closely together. We hold the missions of NORTHCOM and NORAD as a
sacred trust.

NORTHCOM Mission: U.S. Northern Command partners to
conduct homeland defense, civil support, and security
cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its
interests.
NORAD Mission: North American Aerospace Defense
Command conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and
maritime warning in the defense of North America.

Our commands' missions are not only complementary, they are also
inseparable, as the missions of aerospace warning and control, maritime
warning, homeland defense, and civil support are more aligned than
ever. To ensure that NORTHCOM and NORAD are strong and ready, we
balance the day-to-day missions and operational concerns of the two
commands with planning and preparing for an uncertain future. In
support of these goals, these are my priorities:

Expand and strengthen our trusted partnerships--The
strength of NORTHCOM and NORAD is found in the partnerships
that we create and sustain across joint, interagency, and
multinational organizations. Accordingly, in the months ahead,
we will continue our efforts to integrate across and develop
trust among capable mission partners.
Advance and sustain the binational military command--
Over the last half-century, NORAD has been a mechanism for
collaboration between the United States and Canada in the
interest of security. As we look ahead to the next half-century
of this partnership, NORAD will remain a model for
international cooperation in defense planning, execution,
training, information management, and technological innovation.
Gain and maintain all-domain situational awareness--
Ensuring global reach and projection is a function of a secure
homeland. Our global reach is being challenged by both
symmetric and asymmetric threats in and across space,
cyberspace, land, sea, and air. Combining appropriate whole-of-
government and whole-of-society efforts, we will keep our
Homelands safe by giving priority to technologies and
collaborative interagency processes for anti-access/area denial
against potential adversaries, including those who attack from
the inside.
Advocate and develop capabilities in our core mission
areas to outpace threats--There is no doubt that both long-
understood threats and future asymmetric threats will look to
exploit seams and vulnerabilities in our technologies and
procedures. As Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD, I help mission
partners advocate for capabilities to close any seams, mitigate
any vulnerabilities, and enhance security to meet the evolving
challenges of an interconnected world.
Take care of people; they are our foundation--We will
always remember that the success of NORTHCOM and NORAD is due
to the professionalism, commitment, and tireless service of our
people. As we do our part during the next few years to reset
the force in the drawdown from two wars, we will do everything
we can to ensure our men and women in uniform have the tools
they need to keep our Nations safe and free.

With these priorities as our focus, we will continue to improve our
Homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation capabilities.
It is my privilege today to report on the actions we are taking in each
of these mission areas.

HOMELAND DEFENSE--A SACRED TRUST

North America faces an ever-changing world that presents many
challenges. Violent extremists, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, rogue states, traditional competitor states, transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs), insecurity in various domains, economic
distress, and the effects of climate change continually reshape our
strategic environment. Each of these challenges poses a potential
threat to the United States, Canada, and our regional partners, and
each is pertinent to the missions of NORTHCOM and NORAD. Continued
successful defense and security of the continent require flexible,
multi-domain, whole-of-government, multinational, and combined arms
approaches from our commands.
As such, the commands are integral parts of an active, layered
defense of the Homelands. We work closely with our interagency, private
sector, and international mission partners to sustain continuous
situational awareness and readiness to deter, prevent, and defeat a
range of threats in all domains when directed at our Homelands across
the spectrum of missions assigned to the commands.

Missile Defense
The American people have a deservedly high expectation of success
in our Homeland defense efforts. Every nation should pursue the right
to protect its population and critical infrastructure from the terror
of ballistic missiles. Accordingly, no homeland task is more important
than protecting the United States from a limited intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. NORTHCOM is responsible for directing
missile defense operations to protect the Homeland from hostile acts
while assisting the Missile Defense Agency in developing improved
capability. We work to balance development, testing, training, and
daily readiness for this complex mission. Indicative of the success of
the Total Force concept, the Army National Guard provides all of the
manning (over 300 people) at our Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) sites
in support of missile defense. It is due to the professionalism of
these dedicated warriors, coupled with the current capability of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), that I am confident of
NORTHCOM's ability to successfully defend the Homeland from the current
set of limited long-range ballistic missile threats. However, because
of the uncertainty of threat intentions and capabilities, we must
remain vigilant and continue to develop, refine, and adapt the system.
The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which is part of
the BMDS, was fielded using a spiral development acquisition approach
and, as system updates are delivered and new elements added to the
architecture, we continue to assess and refine our operational
procedures to maximize the effectiveness of the GMD system. As the
Nation develops and fields more robust regional BMDS capabilities using
the Phased Adaptive Approach, we will reevaluate our procedures and
adjust if needed to ensure synchronization of the entire missile
defense enterprise. The GMD system stands ready to defend against
limited ballistic missile threats to the Homeland; however, we are
continually monitoring the development and progress of regional
ballistic missile programs to ensure we stay ahead of any advances in
threat capability. We must not allow regional actors, such as North
Korea, to hold U.S. policy hostage by making our citizens vulnerable to
a nuclear ICBM attack. I cannot overemphasize the importance of
executing a robust testing program to validate current and future
capabilities that comprise the GMD system. I strongly support the
Missile Defense Agency's test cadence of conducting at least one GMD
flight test annually. We are making great strides to improve system
capability in partnership with the Missile Defense Agency. The Missile
Defense Agency completed major construction on Missile Field 2 at Fort
Greely, AK, this past year. This new missile field will provide
important flexibility to increase capability in the future, if needed.
The Missile Defense Agency is fielding new kill vehicle software this
fiscal year, which will improve not only the accuracy, but also the
reliability of our GBI fleet. The Missile Defense Agency will soon test
the fix for the problem that caused the failure of the last GMD flight
test and is well on its way to return to flight testing and production
of an improved kill vehicle.
In addition, we must be better prepared to respond to threats that
give us little to no advance warning, which places a tremendous burden
on the low-density, high-demand sensors we have available today to
detect these threats and places a greater emphasis on our requirements
for tracking through all phases of flight. This requires pursuing
future sensor capability, such as the Space-based Precision Tracking
Space System, ensuring we have the highest level of GMD for the
Homeland.

Aerospace Control Alert
Our Nation continues to face threats from the air because our
adversaries still view aircraft as potent weapons and a means to
covertly gain access to our Homeland. As a nation, with all our
partners, we have made it hard for air attacks to be successful and we
must continue to do so by improving our air domain awareness and
addressing gaps.
An effective air defense and a strong air sovereignty capability
are critical components of homeland defense. Since the September 11
attacks, NORAD has defended the airspace of the United States and
Canada through airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, air patrols,
and the National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System. This
mission was previously known as Air Sovereignty Alert. In 2011, we
expanded the term to Aerospace Control Alert because it captures the
totality of this mission, which includes the air defense mission, as
well as the air sovereignty mission.
For the air defense mission, armed fighters are positioned across
the United States and Canada on alert to intercept and identify suspect
aircraft, which allows NORAD to be postured to defend against strategic
airborne threats to the United States and Canada. Thanks to our Total
Force partners, the Air National Guard provides the majority of NORAD's
operational force for Aerospace Control Alert missions, while the Army
National Guard provides ground-based air defense capabilities
protecting our Nation's capital.
Providing our National Guard partners with capable equipment is key
to Aerospace Control Alert, which requires the modernization of NORAD
airframes. Legacy fighters are aging, but will be able to perform their
mission through the 2013-2025 timeframe. However, recapitalizing our
fighter, tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft will remain a
requirement. Another capability we are actively pursuing is our ability
to respond to low, slow airborne threats. We have submitted this
capability into the joint requirements process and have begun work on
an Analysis of Alternatives. Based on our initial timelines, we
anticipate having a way ahead by late summer.
The second part of the Aerospace Control Alert mission is air
sovereignty operations. NORAD safeguards the sovereign airspace of the
United States and Canada by responding to unknown, unwanted, and
unauthorized air activity approaching or operating within either
country's airspace. NORAD conducts Northern Sovereignty Operations to
detect and respond to long-range aviation conducted by the Russian
military in the vicinity of U.S. and Canadian airspace. This includes
monitoring all northern approaches to U.S. and Canadian airspace and
identifying all aircraft approaching it. In addition, we remain
vigilant and ready to conduct Southern Sovereignty Operations in the
event that North American air sovereignty is challenged by foreign
aircraft operating in the southern portion of our area of operations.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia conducted military long-
range aviation flights on a very limited basis; however, in the summer
of 2007, Russian officials publicly announced their intent to resume a
more robust schedule of long-range aviation activity. Since then,
Russian bomber aircraft have conducted northern patrols and training
activities on a regular basis. These flights are flown both northwest
of Russia, prompting responses from European nations, and northeast of
Russia approaching the United States and Canada. These flights
routinely enter the U.S. and/or Canadian Air Defense Identification
Zones.
If Russian aircraft have not provided prior notice via a flight
plan, or do not respond to air traffic control instructions, they are
detected and labeled as unknown aircraft. It is the responsibility of
NORAD to respond appropriately to any unknown aircraft. Our actions
demonstrate not just to Russia, but to all, our capability and
intention to defend North American air sovereignty.
This does not mean we view Russia as an enemy. In fact, in an
effort to increase cooperation with the Russian military, NORAD and the
Russian Federation Air Force conducted the second Vigilant Eagle
exercise in August 2011, where each side practiced tracking,
intercepting, and passing control for monitoring and escorting a live-
fly, simulated hijacked aircraft into the other's airspace. The
benefits we realize from this type of exercise are invaluable as they
are by nature complicated and require high levels of synchronization
between NORAD and the Russian Federation Air Force. As a result, this
process by itself opens up new avenues for discussion and cooperation,
establishes long-term contacts, and fosters better understanding among
our governments, and especially among our militaries. These open lines
of communication help our respective militaries avoid misunderstandings
that could result in heightened tensions and unintended consequences.
Vigilant Eagle is a symbol of what can be achieved using an
incremental, stepping-stone process--each event building on the success
of the prior year's effort--which we hope over time will lead to even
greater levels of openness and cooperation among our nations.

Maritime Domain
While most American and Canadian citizens are familiar with our air
defense capabilities, our less-publicized maritime operations remain a
strong deterrent capability for our nations. NORTHCOM and NORAD partner
with geographic combatant commanders, U.S. and Canadian Government
agencies, allied nations, and the commercial/private sector to maximize
maritime warning and maritime domain awareness for North America
through information sharing, plan development, and cooperative
training. Sixteen stakeholders now contribute to the common operating
picture with NORAD, to include the U.S. Coast Guard, the other
combatant commands, Fleet Forces Command, and Canada Command. NORAD
processes, assesses, and disseminates intelligence and information
related to the respective maritime areas and internal waterways of, and
the maritime approaches to, the United States and Canada. We leverage
maritime domain awareness to develop a comprehensive shared
understanding of the maritime operating environment and to issue
binational warnings of maritime threats or attacks against North
America.
As we look to the future, NORTHCOM and NORAD continue to refine and
report requirements, efficiencies, and deficiencies to the Joint Staff
and via the annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plan submission to the
Secretary of the Navy in his capacity as DOD Executive Agent for
Maritime Domain Awareness.

Cyber Events
Cyber security is a growing critical mission. Since NORTHCOM and
NORAD rely on data systems, the Internet, and inter-networked
commercial and military infrastructure, cyber attacks pose potentially
grave risks to our ability to accomplish our missions. To improve our
capability to fight in a degraded cyber environment, we are working
within the DOD to establish responsive policies, authorities, and
technologies and to develop a skilled cyber workforce to enhance
mission assurance and resiliency.
Outside of the DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in
partnership with other Federal Departments and Agencies; State, local,
tribal and territorial governments; the private sector; and
international partners, is improving its capability for a fully-
coordinated response to a significant cyber incident to minimize
impact, restore operations, and reduce the risk of a future occurrence.
Given that much of the critical infrastructure that the DOD and civil
authorities use is owned by the private sector, the continued
development of these partnerships, information sharing, and advancement
of defensive measures is an imperative. Therefore, NORTHCOM continues
its good relationships with DHS and U.S. Cyber Command to coordinate
and collaborate on cyber situational awareness, and to effectively
provide ``response and recovery'' support to civil authorities when
requested in the event of a serious domestic cyber attack with second-
and third-order physical effects.

Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection
Fundamental to homeland defense is the protection of our
servicemembers to ensure full mission capability. In executing our
Force Protection mission, NORTHCOM continues to improve information
sharing with our interagency partners and to streamline reporting
within the DOD to proactively detect emerging threats directed against
our Nation, our military personnel, and our critical capabilities. The
Intelligence Community and other interagency representatives in
NORTHCOM, including Federal and Service law enforcement investigative
agencies, meet on a daily basis with NORTHCOM Anti-Terrorism and Force
Protection experts to examine threat information and to implement
mitigation measures to achieve the best possible protective posture in
the most economical way. NORTHCOM also participates in the Fort Hood
Senior Steering Group and attendant sub-working groups to conduct a
comprehensive review of lessons learned, and to implement processes and
procedures that facilitate synchronization of our defensive strategy to
warn against and mitigate threats across geographic regions,
jurisdictions, and operational chains of command. We have had
significant success in this area and our partnership with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in this endeavor is a model for interagency
coordination.

CIVIL SUPPORT--RESPONDING TO OUR NATION'S NEEDS

NORTHCOM stands ready to support primary agencies in responding
quickly to natural and manmade disasters and to the effects of
terrorist attacks. The DOD has a long history of supporting civil
authorities with specialized skills, capabilities, and capacities that
can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation in the wake of
catastrophic events. All requested DOD support is provided at the
direction of the President or Secretary of Defense and in accordance
with the National Response Framework and applicable laws, including the
Stafford Act and the Economy Act.
In coordination with our DOD and interagency partners, NORTHCOM has
made significant improvements in Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA) and, therefore, our ability to respond quickly and more
effectively to manmade or natural disasters. These improvements
include: (1) implementation of a Dual-Status Commander Concept of
Operations through which we are able to achieve greater unity of effort
between Federal and State military forces during contingencies; and (2)
implementation of a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) Response Enterprise that is able to deliver more lifesaving
capability faster than ever before.
In accordance with the Joint Action Plan, which was a collaborative
effort of designated representatives of the Council of Governors, the
DOD, the DHS, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
NORTHCOM led the development and implementation of the Dual-Status
Commander Concept of Operations. This has allowed the DOD and the State
governors to jointly pre-identify, train, and certify senior military
officers to perform simultaneously as commanders of both National Guard
Forces in State status and Federal military forces in Title 10 status.
Prior to Hurricane Irene in 2011, the DOD employed Dual-Status
Commanders only for selected pre-planned events. Now that all States
have designated Dual-Status Commanders, this joint initiative postures
the DOD and the States to employ these officers for short- or no-notice
events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or other natural disasters.

Reserve Mobilization Authority
Since access to trained forces is vital to successful civil support
operations, we appreciate the Committee's action to include a provision
in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2012, supported by
the Council of Governors, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to
order Army, Air Force, Navy, and the Marine Corps Reserves
involuntarily to active duty for a major disaster or emergency. This
new authority makes the significant capabilities of the Army Reserve,
Air Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve Forces all
available to assist civil authorities in responses to major disasters
and emergencies, thus enabling a truly Total Force approach to DOD
disaster response.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response
As an important subset of DSCA, managing the aftermath of a CBRN
event will be exceptionally challenging due to the potential scope of
the event, the specialized skills and equipment required to respond,
and a general lack of knowledge among our Nation's population of the
hazards associated with such events. NORTHCOM has a key leadership role
in ensuring that our Government is prepared to succeed in this
important mission area.
Over the past 18 months, the DOD has taken significant steps to
improve its ability to support civil authorities in responding to
catastrophic incidents in major metropolitan areas, particularly
weapons of mass destruction attacks and major industrial accidents. The
CBRN Response Enterprise includes National Guard, Reserve, and Active
component forces prepared to rapidly respond to a CBRN incident within
the Homeland. Having already achieved initial operational capability,
the CBRN Response Enterprise will reach full operational capability on
1 October 2012 with over 18,000 Active component, Reserve component,
and National Guard servicemembers dedicated to this vital mission.
These forces are focused on lifesaving and are trained and equipped to
provide critical search and rescue, decontamination, emergency medical
care, and medical evacuation in support of the Primary Federal Agency,
the affected regions and States, and local incident commanders. Ever
vigilant, these forces maintain a graduated response posture and are
prepared to deploy within hours after an incident in order to save
lives and minimize human suffering within the critical first 72 hours.
Hurricane Response Operations
We continue to stand ready to provide robust military support
during hurricane response operations. We have incorporated lessons
learned into our operational planning, and we have conducted rigorous
exercises to hone our capabilities. These activities ensured that we
were prepared, in August 2011, when NORTHCOM coordinated support to the
FEMA, State and local response efforts throughout the Hurricane Irene
experience. In anticipation of the storm, the command quickly deployed
9 of our 10 Defense Coordinating Elements, each led by a Defense
Coordinating Officer, to join with FEMA Incident Management Teams
across the northeastern United States. In all, more than 6,500 active
duty servicemembers were ready to assist States affected by Hurricane
Irene. In New Jersey, nearly 100 troops provided command and control
for military forces supporting efforts in the northeast.
Hurricane Irene response activities marked the first time that
Dual-Status Commanders were in position for an unplanned event to
provide command and control over both Active Duty and Reserve component
(National Guard and Army Reserve) forces. Indicative of the success of
the program and continuing collaboration between NORTHCOM and the
States, Dual-Status Commanders for the response missions were appointed
in New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.

National Security Implications from Arctic Change
The progressive opening of the Arctic represents both challenges
and opportunities. Climate change in the Arctic is impacting the land
and seascape, creating opportunity for increased human activity and
presenting a new set of regional vulnerabilities and potential resource
competitions. Emerging Arctic challenges require deliberate preparation
to ensure economic access and freedom of maneuver, and to prevent
irresponsible actions. As the Arctic opens, there will be a marked
increase in human activity in a push for resources (e.g., fish,
diamonds, natural gas) and eco-tourism. Special capabilities will be
required to operate successfully in the Arctic. For instance,
icebreakers are an essential capability for the United States to
exercise our responsibilities. I believe the Nation should continue to
exercise freedom of navigation to assure access to this new dimension
of the maritime domain.
Regardless, the Arctic will remain an austere and formidable
environment that requires unique capabilities and skills. We are
looking ahead at how best to fulfill our responsibilities for DOD
military operations within the Arctic portion of our area of
responsibility to advocate for DOD capabilities in the Arctic region.
As Arctic nations, the United States and Canada have broad and
fundamental interests in the Arctic region where we seek to sustain our
national security equities, protect the environment, manage resources
responsibly, advance the social and economic development of indigenous
communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international
cooperation. In support of these interests, NORAD, NORTHCOM, and Canada
Command are working toward a Tri-Command Framework for Arctic
Cooperation, which synchronizes planning, operations, domain awareness,
information sharing, exercises, and capability development among the
commands in the Arctic region.
In addition to our partnership with Canada, NORTHCOM is also
committed to developing ``whole-of-nation'' solutions to Arctic
challenges through collaboration with our DOD, interagency, and
industry partners to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain
awareness, mass rescue, disaster response, and weather forecasting
capabilities.
Later this month, NORTHCOM will host an Arctic Collaborative
Workshop at the National Defense University in conjunction with these
partners to validate our near-term operating concepts and capability
development. The Workshop will also inform our series of exercises to
be conducted in the Arctic this summer. Lessons learned from these
events will drive our Theater Campaign Plan's evolution to better
support our partners in promoting security, safety, stability, and
economic growth in the region.
The foundation of our future success in the Arctic must be built
upon the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, the seminal agreement
that provides the international legal framework for use of the world's
seas and oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. I believe that joining the
Convention would protect and advance a broad range of U.S. interests,
including navigational mobility and offshore resources. In short,
joining the Convention would bolster our national security, secure U.S.
rights over extensive marine areas, and formalize the United States'
standing where our vital interests are at stake.

Exercise and Training
The Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement Program (CE2)
supports all aspects of the mission-critical NORAD and NORTHCOM
Exercise and Engagement program. This CE2 program helps us build
partner capacity and readiness across 54 States and territories,
Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas. We appreciate the committee's support
of this critical program that directly supports our readiness to defend
the Homeland and save lives during domestic crises.
security cooperation--cooperative defense through enduring partnerships
NORTHCOM and NORAD do not meet today's complex challenges alone,
and as such our allies and partner nations actively contribute to the
cooperative defense of North America. We support and enable other
agencies, advocate for complementary resources, and work toward common
objectives to improve interagency planning and coordination that
synchronize U.S. support for building our partners' capacities. These
partnerships allow us to defend the Nation in depth.

Countering Transnational Criminal Organizations
There has been a continued steady increase in the number of deaths
as a result of this ongoing conflict since 2006, although the rate of
increase slowed in 2011. TCOs represent a globally-networked national
security threat. This sophisticated network of networks includes
criminal organizations and street gangs, frequently serving as
enforcers and drug distributors for TCOs. The criminal organizations
have global reach that spans a diverse set of illicit activities that
includes, but is not limited to drug trafficking, kidnapping, human
trafficking, and extortion. According to the Department of Justice
National Drug Intelligence Center's 2011 National Drug Threat
Assessment, TCOs have links in over 1,000 U.S. cities. According to the
2009 National Drug Threat Assessment, our Nation's demand for illegal
drugs results in wholesale proceeds of up to $39 billion annually from
illicit drug trafficking via the Southwest Border. This transnational
problem needs to be approached in a holistic, interagency manner.
In support of the President's Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime, NORTHCOM coordinates with Mexico, Canada, The Bahamas,
U.S. Southern Command, and our other partners in the Caribbean, to
enhance mutual trust, increase collaboration, improve capacity against
TCOs and their activities, and to contribute to a cooperative defense
of North America. NORTHCOM is just one supporting organization in a
much larger interagency and international law enforcement effort to
counter the TCOs operating worldwide.
As requested by Mexico, NORTHCOM cooperates with the Mexican
military in support of their efforts to build capabilities and
capacities to employ against TCOs. Above all, we will continue to
respect Mexico's sovereignty and we stand ready to increase
coordination and collaboration to the extent that Mexico desires and in
accordance with U.S. Government policies. Under the courageous
leadership of Mexican civil authorities, the Mexican military is making
progress against TCO activity. At the invitation of our Mexican
partner, NORTHCOM provided assistance in several key areas.
In support of the Merida Initiative, we will improve our
collaboration with international and interagency partners to disrupt
and reduce transnational threats to North America and provide regional
security through a whole-of-government approach. We will encounter both
challenges and opportunities as our partners develop and improve their
capacities.
An important element of our efforts to combat TCOs is the Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). Late last
year, I participated in a WHINSEC Board of Visitors curriculum review
at Fort Benning, GA. This organization provides an effective mechanism
to build relationships with militaries throughout the hemisphere and to
influence a positive trajectory on human rights.

Security Cooperation with Mexico
The military-to-military relationship between the United States and
Mexico has advanced to unprecedented levels of coordination. Today,
Mexico and the United States are strategic partners, respecting the
laws and sovereignty of our individual nations, and at the same time
facing shared challenges and applying lessons learned. While our
Mexican colleagues share information about fighting TCOs, as well as
their expertise in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster
response, we share our experiences in asymmetric conflict, to include
intelligence-driven operations, law of land warfare, whole-of-
government solutions and rule of law challenges. In addition, we have
shared mutual perspectives on how to incorporate a whole-of-nation
approach.
We work closely with the Mexican military to enhance planning,
tactical skills, communication capabilities, and incorporation of human
rights principles, and meet frequently to build personal relationships
and coordination. As an example, we conduct combined planning and
exercises such as Quickdraw, a tactical-level exercise that tests the
capability of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican maritime forces in a joint
response against illicit activity threatening North American Maritime
Security. We have also incorporated bilateral and multilateral
arrangements such as the North American Maritime Security Initiative
(an information-sharing and cooperation arrangement among NORTHCOM,
Canada Command, the Mexican Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard), and have
conducted Subject Matter Expert Knowledge Exchanges, which allow us to
learn military best practices from each other. We conduct bilateral and
multilateral conferences for broader coordination in dealing with
issues such as natural disasters, pandemics, and search and rescue. The
United States also shares information in resource management and
logistics, operations development, and aviation training with the
Mexican military.
Additionally, for the past few years, NORTHCOM has had resident
Mexican Foreign Liaison Officers from both SEMAR (Mexican Navy and
Marines) and SEDENA (Mexican Army and Air Force) in our Headquarters,
which has helped tremendously to improve cooperation. For the first
time, in May 2012, NORTHCOM and the Mexican military will conduct
Ardent Sentry 12, a combined Defense Support of Civil Authorities
exercise designed around mutually-agreed objectives.
We are partnering with U.S. Southern Command and working with
security forces from Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize to strengthen ties
and promote a coordinated approach to enhancing security along the
Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border region. With our assistance, our
southern neighbors are fortifying this porous border region and slowing
the flow of illicit trafficking northward.

Support to Law Enforcement Agencies
DOD support to U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the Mexican
military ultimately contributes to a safe and more secure border and
supports the broader Counter-TCO fight. This is one fight against a
common enemy for the Mexican military and our Federal agency partners.
NORTHCOM's role in the border security mission is to provide DOD
support to U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies. Through our
subordinate unit, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), we provide mutually-
beneficial DOD support in a broad range of unique military categories.
Our vision is for JTF-N to be the most effective integrator of DOD
support to LEAs. Fostering our important relationships with LEAs, State
National Guard counterdrug task forces, and the Mexican military is
vital to securing our Nation's borders against drug traffickers and
their associated criminal activities.
In coordination with our DOD and interagency partners, NORTHCOM is
developing systematic improvements in our ability to provide more
effective and efficient LEA support. One improvement, coordinated by
JTF-N with our LEA partners, is the new DHS comprehensive campaign
planning process. This new planning cycle helps support the development
of DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) strategic guidance, increases
interagency planner cooperation, and ultimately improves unity of
effort and synchronization of resources for countering illegal drugs
and other transnational threats.
A second improvement is the military intelligence training support
provided to the DHS-led Border Intelligence Fusion Section within the
DOJ-led El Paso Intelligence Center. The Border Intelligence Fusion
Section, comprising of military intelligence analysts supporting
training and intelligence fusion, develops operational intelligence
products that we share with our interagency partners for their use in
early cueing, warning, and interdiction operations.
Operational support to LEA partners includes detection and
monitoring missions using a variety of multi-domain sensors and
platforms that are unique to the DOD, in order to improve a supported
LEA's ability to interdict transnational threats. Together we are
exploring our spectrum of authorities to determine where modifications
could enhance our ability to support our U.S. Government partners,
better defend our Homeland in depth, and enhance cooperation with our
Mexican partners.
In sum, I believe DOD support to law enforcement is a ``win-win''
cooperation effort for our Nation's homeland security and defense
missions. DOD units are afforded the opportunity to conduct operational
training in an interagency environment, and our LEA partners are
provided support through unique DOD capabilities to counter an adaptive
threat to our Nation.

Partnership with Canada
Canada is a trusted partner with whom we share the defense of the
continent. The military-to-military relationship between NORTHCOM and
Canada Command is strong, and has progressed to unprecedented levels of
cooperation. At the Permanent Joint Board on Defence this past January,
Lieutenant-General Walter Semianiw, Commander of Canada Command, and I
signed the Civil Assistance Plan and the Combined Defence Plan to
codify cooperative efforts among NORAD, NORTHCOM, and Canada Command to
advance continental security, safety, and stability.
Canada and the United States are allies and strategic partners in
the security cooperation arena, with NORTHCOM and Canada Command
working together as never before on emerging regional engagements such
as the North American Maritime Security Initiative.
Meanwhile, Canada Command is developing a plan for complementary
regional engagements along Mexico's southern border with Guatemala and
Belize, supporting the fight against TCOs as well as providing
expertise and training to the Mexican military and civil authorities as
they transition their legal system to a model better able to prosecute,
convict, and incarcerate TCO members.
NORTHCOM and Canada Command also closely coordinate security
cooperation activities with other partner nations, as well as refine a
common exercise schedule, to ensure that all activities provide the
most value for their cost and that no time is wasted on duplicating
efforts.
Additionally, for the past few years NORTHCOM has had a resident
Liaison Officer at Canada Command Headquarters, and Canada Command now
has a resident Liaison Officer at NORTHCOM and NORAD Headquarters,
further improving the already excellent coordination between our
commands and nations.

Theater Security Cooperation with the Bahamas
The United States and the Bahamas share a strong bilateral
relationship built on bolstering citizen security and promoting trade
and cultural exchange. These shared interests, including a common
belief in the rule of law and democratic values, and The Bahamas
geographic proximity to the United States, are the foundation upon
which we have built a longstanding partnership. The Bahamian Government
is committed to close cooperation with the United States on law
enforcement and maritime security concerns, as well as on counterdrug
efforts. This strong security cooperation relationship is highlighted
by Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, which is a trilateral
counternarcotics effort conducted by personnel of the Royal Bahamas
Police Force, Royal Bahamian Defense Force, and the Turks and Caicos
Islands police with counterparts from the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and the U.S. Coast Guard.
One of the key focus areas in The Bahamas is the Hawk's Nest
Forward Operating Base, a staging location for counterdrug operations.
Hawk's Nest is a centrally-located facility on Great Exuma used by
Bahamian and interagency counternarcotics partners. We are supporting
the U.S. Embassy-Nassau, in their effort to develop a cost-sharing
agreement with the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, DEA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Aviation
Administration, all of which have equities in either operating from
Hawk's Nest or retaining radars and other equipment located at the
site. The proximity of The Bahamas to the United States means that
relatively small sites like Hawk's Nest have strategic importance for
the Counter-TCO and Cooperative Defense mission areas.

THE NATIONAL GUARD--OUR VITAL PARTNER

NORTHCOM and NORAD rely on the support of National Guard soldiers
and airmen who work each day at the headquarters and within the NORAD
Regions and NORTHCOM's Service components and joint subordinate
commands. This includes one three-star, two two-star, and three one-
star National Guard officers who serve as my NORTHCOM Deputy Commander,
subordinate commanders, and direct advisors. I believe this allows the
commands to leverage National Guard expertise and experience bringing
the best mix of DOD assets to bear in executing the full spectrum of
homeland defense and civil support missions. The commands also benefit
from their understanding of National Guard policies and programs to
ensure the commands' planning and collaboration with the National Guard
are informed and effective. Through the National Guard Bureau, NORTHCOM
and NORAD coordinate with each State's Joint Force Headquarters for
planning purposes and to maintain situational awareness of National
Guard actions and commitments. I believe that no force is better suited
to help deter, prevent, and defeat many of the threats we face than
today's National Guard. Simply put, the National Guard is a natural
partner in all we do.

FUTURE CAPABILITIES

As we investigate existing technologies and capabilities for
innovative uses, we are also focusing on emerging technologies to meet
our requirements.
Aerospace Threats
One of the more pressing challenges that NORTHCOM and NORAD will
face in defense of the Homeland in the near future is from emerging air
threats, to include low, slow-flying General Aviation aircraft, cruise
missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles. Our Nation is developing a more responsive,
tailorable integrated air and missile defense capability to defend
against these threats. In the past year, NORTHCOM and NORAD have made
significant strides toward protecting the Homeland against these
threats through exercises, experiments, and tests with other
organizations within the DOD. As the threat of terrorism looms and the
proliferation of advanced asymmetric capabilities grows, it becomes
increasingly important to improve existing air and missile defense
systems-of-systems tailored to meet the unique needs of the Homeland.

Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and
Security
We are also investigating ways to reduce the risk of our military's
dependence on commercial power grids. We are currently partnering with
U.S. Pacific Command, the Department of Energy, DHS, and five of the
national labs (Sandia National Laboratories, Idaho National Laboratory,
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
and National Renewable Energy Laboratory) on a Joint Capabilities
Technology Demonstration known as Smart Power Infrastructure
Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security (SPIDERS). With
SPIDERS, we hope to create a cyber-secure smart microgrid that not only
will augment existing power sources, but will also enable a military
installation to remain operational when the commercial power grid is
disrupted. We are currently working with our partners to test an energy
control system at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii this summer.
Later this year, we will begin work to demonstrate a cyber-secure
microgrid at Fort Carson, CO, that will leverage previous electrical
upgrades, a 2-megawatt solar array, electric vehicle-to-grid energy
storage, and distributed backup generators to provide emergency power
to a portion of this Army post. In 2014, we expect to demonstrate the
first operational end-to-end SPIDERS cyber-secure microgrid at Camp
Smith, HI.

FINAL THOUGHTS

We are grateful for everything the members of this committee have
done to ensure our ability to defend the Homeland. We appreciate your
support to soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and to
their families for their efforts to defend our Nation at home and
abroad. With your help, North America will be even safer tomorrow than
it is today. I am honored to appear before you, and look forward to
your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Jacoby.
We'll have a 7-minute first round.
Let me ask both of you. DOD created a new defense strategy
to guide creation of the fiscal year 2013 defense budget
request. It's our understanding that the development of the
strategy was a highly-inclusive process, and that each of you
had the opportunity to provide input into the development of
the new strategy. In your view, does the budget request support
the strategy and do you support the budget? General Fraser?
General Fraser. Mr. Chairman, we were very much included in
the process and the development of the strategy through a
series of conversations with the Chairman and with the
Secretary of Defense. From where I sit, I'm very comfortable
that the budget supports the strategy and that I can perform my
mission within the allocated resources.
Chairman Levin. General Jacoby?
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do. I feel that the
strategy the Homeland appropriately considered, and I believe
the budget supports the execution of the strategy in the
Homeland. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Jacoby, as the executive branch works through the
roles and missions of various military and civilian agencies
for our Nation's cyber security, are you working with other
agencies to determine what roles and missions would be
appropriate for NORTHCOM and NORAD with regard to cyber
security?
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, yes, we're working very
closely, particularly with our good partners in DHS and DOD, of
course, with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM).
Chairman Levin. We face a number of malicious, many types
of malicious cyber activity, from hackers to criminals to
intrusions to steal our intellectual property and secrets, to
also the possibility at least of an attack which could disrupt
or damage or destroy our infrastructure, be it civilian or
military.
The Director of National Intelligence has told us that
among the most difficult strategic challenges that he faces are
the following: distinguishing between cyber espionage
intrusions and potentially disruptive attacks; and providing
timely warning of cyber threats and incidents. Now, are you
involved in an effort to distinguish between these various
types of cyber activity in order to determine whether and when
our Nation is under a cyber attack and to provide timely
warning of such an attack, and can you give us a status report
as to where those discussions are? How close are we to reaching
criteria to make that kind of distinction?
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, these are important subjects
you've raised with regard to cyber. My principal responsibility
in the cyber domain is consequence management. In the event of
a catastrophic cyber attack on this country, NORTHCOM could
certainly be called upon to provide support to civil
authorities in the recovery.
But we think our role is broader than that. As you
mentioned, we have some work to do in defining what's an attack
in the cyber domain. It's a very collaborative process that
we're doing as combatant commanders, along with STRATCOM and
the sub-unified command, CYBERCOM. That's a work in progress.
However, in the end, I believe it'll be a matter of policy to
clearly define what is an attack or what isn't an attack.
Until then, I continue to work closely, particularly with
General Alexander and CYBERCOM, to ensure that we have ample
warning to understand if there is a cyber attack or malicious
cyber activity that's taking place that could compromise the
defense of the Homeland. We have good cooperation across both
DOD and with our partners in DHS to achieve that end.
Chairman Levin. I think we all can understand why it has to
be a work in progress, given the complexity of the issue. Would
you say that we would have some way of bringing to a resolution
that issue so we can have some criteria to determine when the
Nation is under attack, military attack that needs a response,
or a military-like attack that requires a response? Do you
believe that we'll have that kind of sense or identification or
criteria, for instance, within a year? Is that a reasonable
expectation?
General Jacoby. Senator, I don't think that's an
unreasonable expectation. I wouldn't want to put an exact time
limit on it. But I think there is momentum. There is a momentum
across DOD and across the government, and we appreciate the
support of this committee and the Senate in helping us think
through this. I know you had a very successful tabletop
exercise, lots of good feedback from that. Continuing efforts
like that to inform, to educate, and to understand will help us
get more quickly to that end state where we can define better
the criteria which would determine whether we're under an
attack or not.
Chairman Levin. General Jacoby, as the combatant commander
responsible for the Arctic, do you support the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and, if so, why?
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do. It's DOD's
position that we support accession to the UNCLOS.
Chairman Levin. Is it your position as well?
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, that's correct, it is my
position. As the commander responsible for the Arctic, in my
AOR it would be very helpful to have a seat at the table as we
begin the lengthy and I'm sure long process of determining the
continental shelf and all of the attributes to the Arctic that
competing nations will be interested in.
Chairman Levin. General Jacoby, do you support the current
MDA plan to conduct two flight tests of the GMD system to
verify a fix to the EKV that failed in the last flight test,
before we resume production or refurbishment of the EKVs?
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree with General O'Reilly of the
MDA that it's essential to have operational production-quality
kill vehicle hardware on the intercept flight test plan to gain
confidence that the system will work properly and reliably in
the future?
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do. I support General
O'Reilly's test program.
Chairman Levin. There have been suggestions by some in
Congress that we should deploy a ground-based interceptor (GBI)
or interceptors on the east coast of the United States to
defend the Homeland against a possible future long-range
Iranian missile threat. You're the combatant commander who
establishes the requirements for Homeland missile defense
capability. Is there a requirement for deploying an east coast
GBI site and are you seeking to deploy such a site on the east
coast?
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, today's threats do not
require an east coast missile field and we do not have plans to
do so.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks again
to the witnesses.
General Jacoby, as you well know, nearly 50,000 Mexican
citizens have lost their lives as the result of drug-related
violence since 2006, nearly 13,000 last year alone, which shows
an increasing trend according to those numbers. I note that
recently the Department of State (DOS) issued a travel advisory
in literally every one of the northern states of Mexico.
What's your assessment of the current security situation in
Mexico?
General Jacoby. Senator, I concur with the numbers that you
mentioned. Violence went up again in 2011. It began to trail
off as the year concluded, but I don't think there's any
conclusions yet to be drawn from that. So the Mexicans are in a
tough fight with a brutal, adaptable enemy, and to my
estimation they haven't blinked. They're taking the fight to
the TCOs. But there's a lot of work to be done, and we are
eager to continue to provide support to them as they request in
that fight.
Senator McCain. Last year they had 13,000 deaths, which is
a very high number. Does that indicate--with the travel
advisory which has recently been issued, does that indicate to
you that we are winning or losing or at a stalemate? What is
the basic situation?
General Jacoby. Senator, I think it's too soon to make an
estimation on winning or losing. I know the Mexican Government
has made a courageous decision, an extraordinary decision, to
put its military on the street.
Senator McCain. I appreciate courageous decisions. I think
we ought to have an assessment as to whether we are succeeding
or failing and whether the Mexican Government is succeeding or
failing, because then we ought to look at what strategies we
are using. So I guess I'm asking, General, has the violence
gotten worse or has it gotten better? Do you think we are
succeeding or failing? I'd really appreciate that assessment.
General Jacoby. I think that the violence has continued to
increase. It wasn't a tremendous jump this year, but those are
unacceptable numbers. As evidenced in the decision in Nuevo
Laredo, where we issued a travel advisory, I think that's
indicative of the security problem along our border.
I also believe that the decapitation strategy, they've been
successful at that. 22 out of the top 37 trafficking figures
that the Mexican Government has gone after have been taken off
the board. But it has not had an appreciable effect, an
appreciable positive effect.
So I agree that there are other things that need to be
done, and the Mexican military is working on trying to
establish security by reducing the violence across the
communities, particularly in the northeast, and I think that's
the correct strategy to follow.
Senator McCain. What is your assessment of the situation
along the U.S.-Mexico border?
General Jacoby. The situation along the border, we see all
the bad things that can be attributed to a TCO appearing at the
border. We know from our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq
that at the border weak institutions are exploited by malicious
activity and illicit activity. So the illicit activity that is
really the heart and soul, the economic engine of the TCO,
expresses itself on the border, as you mentioned, in illicit
trafficking of human beings, weapons, cash, and drugs.
Senator McCain. As you are aware, a great portion of that
goes across the Arizona-Mexico border, including a large
percentage of the drugs which get up to Phoenix and then are
distributed nationwide; isn't that a correct assessment?
General Jacoby. Senator, that's correct.
Senator McCain. So is it your view that we still need to--
and we have improved border security, but we need to take
additional steps on the issue of border security?
General Jacoby. It's my view, Senator, that we need to
continue our efforts along the border.
Senator McCain. Additional steps.
General Jacoby. Senator, what we do on the border as DOD is
to provide support to the lead agencies, DHS primarily, DOJ's
organizations as well. We're eager to provide that support.
It's mutually beneficial to both the agencies and to the
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who are training, and we
look for every opportunity to meet their requirements.
Senator McCain. We have identified a lot of the cartels and
their leaders. Guzman's name and others are very familiar to
us. But according to the assessment released by the DOJ, the
cartels now have presence in over 1,000 U.S. cities. Why don't
we know those names? Maybe that's kind of an elementary
question, but maybe I could ask you and General Fraser. We know
the names of the cartel leaders, but we don't know the names of
the people who are running these drug rings in over 1,000
cities, or do we know them?
General Jacoby. Senator, my estimation would be that we
know to some level the members of the cartels that are
operating within the United States. I've spoken to several
agencies within the United States about this issue and I think
that we have loose connections with some of the cartels in
Mexico, but I believe that we have our own gang problem issues
within the United States. I think they are fed or feed off of
TCOs. So we recognize this as a problem and I know that our
Federal agencies and DOJ are working it.
Senator McCain. Guatemala has declared its second military
state of siege to try to deal with the increased violence from
Mexican drug cartels operating within its borders. How serious
is this problem in Guatemala, General Fraser, the Mexican
cartels extending their operations into not just Guatemala, but
into Central and South America?
General Fraser. Senator, it is an effort that we see that
is moving down through Central America. As Mexico increases
their pressure, we see that the networks from especially Los
Zetas and Sinaloa are moving into Central America. Guatemala is
obviously that first location, but we see their footprints
further down into Central America as well.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that in some cases the
cartels are better trained and equipped than the security
forces in some of these countries?
General Fraser. Senator, I think they have some better
equipment as you look at some of their armored SUVs and some of
the high-powered weapons that they have, and in cases, yes,
they are better-equipped than their military and law
enforcement counterparts.
Senator McCain. Obviously, with this much money washing
around, the issue of corruption remains a very, very serious
one?
General Fraser. Corruption is still very, very serious
throughout much of Central America.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you for your service. General Fraser, let
me join my colleagues in thanking you for a really remarkable
career of service to our country and to wish you godspeed in
the chapters ahead.
Obviously, this set of hearings that we hold in this
committee is all to inform us as we act on our authorization
bill. We're acting in the context of a new defense strategic
guidance which calls for a rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific,
although not ignoring the Middle East, which continues to be
very active and has a lot of threats to us there.
But it strikes me as your two commands come before us,
though you don't get as much attention publicly as the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), for instance, as the questions of
Chairman Levin and Senator McCain indicate, you're involved in
matters that are really important to the security of the United
States and to the people of the United States.
So I'm concerned about the extent to which the cuts in
funding in the defense budget or the pressure on the defense
budget is constricting your ability to do the job that we need
you to do.
General Fraser, I wanted to start with you. I noticed that
last week you told reporters that SOUTHCOM at this point can
only interdict about 33 percent of observed illicit traffic
transitting the region en route to the United States because of
what I take to be insufficient assets or personnel. I'm just
going to quote you: ``We intercept about 33 percent of what we
know is out there and that's just a limitation on a number of
assets. More is getting through.''
So I wanted to ask you just to amplify on that a little
bit. In a very specific way, if you would indicate to the
committee what specific assets would you like to see more of at
SOUTHCOM, which would help you and your successor fulfill the
mandate, the responsibility, that we've given you?
General Fraser. Senator, the figures you quote are correct,
and those are figures from the Joint Interagency Task Force-
South, which is our organization who conducts that operation.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Fraser. That is availability of not only DOD ships,
but it's the U.S. Coast Guard and other assets. What we are
working with the Navy on today is how they can make available
other capacities which are not necessarily the traditional
capacities that we've asked for: riverine vessels, offshore
patrol vessels, capacity of that type. So it really is a
maritime environment issue that we're focused on initially.
We're also working with our partner countries in the region
and providing them with interceptor capacity, because it's not
only the United States that has a role in this effort; it is
all the partner nations that we have. We're working with them
in providing some interceptor vessels all the way along Central
America, to provide them with the capacity to also intercept
these vessels. That is an ongoing effort as we speak.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. So my concern is--and you
illustrate it--that there's tremendous demand in a lot of
sections of the world for our maritime capabilities. Obviously,
now we're focused on the Iranian threat in the Middle East and
the Strait of Hormuz and we're moving more assets there. Of
course, some assets have been engaged in Afghanistan, for
instance.
So can you get a little more specific, for instance, on the
MC-12 aircraft and the needs that you think are there in your
AOR? I know that obviously a number of those have been occupied
in Afghanistan, and they're slated to come to Air National
Guard squadrons in not the coming year, but fiscal year 2014.
So tell me about the need for those aircraft, as you see it
in the SOUTHCOM?
General Fraser. Senator Lieberman, as those aircraft become
available we see a great opportunity for use of those airplanes
in support of our partners throughout the region. Many of our
partner nations take captured drug trafficking aircraft that
are very similar in form and they then transfer them with
equipment that they perform a role very similar. So we think
the MC-12 is a great companion to that effort.
I'm comfortable with the fact that the MC-12s are focused
in the place we need them right now as a Nation and that as
those become available we have opportunities that we can really
make use of them.
Senator Lieberman. Am I correct to assume that the command
is also being affected by the retirement of the Perry-class
frigates, which have been a real mainstay of those interdiction
efforts, before the replacement system, which is the littoral
combat ship (LCS), is available in sufficient numbers?
General Fraser. Senator, that is one of the issues we're
seeing with the availability of naval ships, is the retirement
of those frigates. This has been a gap that we have seen for a
few years now coming. So the LCS will have a great capacity to
also support our mission as well in the future.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I may file some questions for you
or have our folks talk to your folks, because I think we're not
giving the command the assets you need to get the job done that
we want you to do. That's not your fault; that's our fault, if
you will, or the budget's fault.
Can I ask you a very different kind of question, General. I
was really struck in your posture statement about what you had
to say about Iranian activity in the AOR of SOUTHCOM. We're all
aware of this really remarkable story just within the last year
of the Iranian connection to the Mexican TOC groups aimed at
sending somebody into the U.S. groups to kill the Saudi
ambassador here in Washington.
But I wanted to invite you and, if you want, General
Jacoby, to talk more broadly about, there's unfortunately a
natural coming together. It seems almost inevitable that if
somebody wants to do us damage in the United States, terrorist
group, extremist group, Islamist group, that they're going to
find their way to these TOC groups that have become quite adept
at getting into the United States and getting stuff into the
United States, people into the United States.
So I wanted to invite you both to talk more broadly about
that problem. Then, General, if you could just describe a
little bit for the record here some of what you say in your
posture statement about the quite methodical movement of
Iranian activities, personnel, particularly this man Rabbani,
into Latin America, which is obviously not good for us.
General Fraser. Senator, Iran is very engaged in the
region. They have doubled their number of embassies in the last
7 years. They now have 11 embassies. They have 40 cultural
centers in 17 different countries throughout the region. We see
their activity very much as trying to build cultural awareness
and awareness for Iran, trying to circumvent international
sanctions that are on their economy and on their activities.
They are seeing an opportunity with some of the anti-U.S.-
focused countries within the region as a method on being able
to do that.
Our concern remains their traditional connections with
Hezbollah and Hamas, who do have organizations in Latin
America. Those organizations are primarily focused on financial
support to organizations back in the Middle East, but they are
involved in illicit activity. So that is the connection that we
continue to look for as we watch in the future, that connection
between the illicit activity and the potential pathway into the
United States.
Senator Lieberman. General Jacoby, did you want to add
anything to that?
General Jacoby. Senator, there's an extraordinary amount of
vigilance across the interagency looking for that
counterterrorism nexus with the TCOs. So we have our eye on
that closely. It's a matter of great importance to the
Homeland. I think it also reflects what I believe today is an
intimate relationship between the home game and the away game.
So what General Mattis is doing in the Gulf is very important
to us, and so making that intelligence connective tissue with
the other commands is critical to us, and we've worked hard to
do that.
There's an extraordinary amount of money in the TCO
coffers. They're networks for hire, and so we'll be watching
that carefully and working with our very good Mexican partners
to that end.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you both very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thanks to both of you for your service. General
Fraser, you've been a good friend as well as providing great
leadership to the Air Force and that leadership is going to be
missed. But we certainly wish you the best.
General Jacoby, in your written statement you note that
``Legacy fighters are aging and recapitalizing our fighter,
tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft will remain a
requirement.'' Given the Air Force's planned delay now in the
F-35, are you confident that the Air Force will provide the
required aircraft and resources for the aerospace control alert
(ACA) mission over the next 10 years, and is there a risk that
we may not be able to provide that same level of air space
control coverage as before based on a reduced number of
tactical aircraft?
General Jacoby. No, I'm not concerned about the aircraft,
Senator. Whether it's F-16s, F-22s, or Canadian CF-18s, we go
through a rigorous process of inspections and tests and
exercises to ensure that all of our alert sites can meet the
standard required for the aerospace control mission. So I know
the Air Force has had to make some tough calls, but I have
great faith that they'll provide capable aircraft for us to use
in the future.
I know that it includes challenges for recapitalization and
fielding the F-35. I'm a big fan of the Air Force continuing
those efforts, but I have trust and confidence the Air Force is
going to give me what I need to get the job done.
Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, both you and General
Jacoby mentioned the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
Cooperation (WHINSEC) in your written statements and
acknowledge the importance of this program in building enduring
military-to-military relationships. I'm pleased to serve on
that board with both of you. General Fraser, you particularly,
since you've been there longer, you have been a real asset to
air and you've put a lot of time and provided great leadership
to that institution.
I'd appreciate any thoughts you have regarding how the
training with the Mexican and South American military personnel
receive at WHINSEC has allowed them to be better capable of
confronting these TCOs that are so active in the region. As we
continue to focus on strengthening the security capacities of
our partners in South and Central America, what additional role
can WHINSEC play to increase our cooperation? Also, as I have
done in the past, I'd appreciate your comment on the wisdom of
the United States releasing and making public the names of the
foreign military, civilian, and law enforcement personnel that
train at WHINSEC?
General Fraser. Senator Chambliss, thank you, and thank
you, Senator Levin, for your support and continued support to
WHINSEC. It remains a very useful organization for us. We've
had almost 14,000 people trained and educated in WHINSEC over
the last 11 years. I've talked with many of the graduates who
come through that institution. We find two lanes. One, it's not
only a partnership with the United States and an understanding
as we work through WHINSEC of the respect for civil authority,
as, Mr. Chairman, you asked that we address, respect for human
rights, respect for the rule of law, and other training
capacities. So it's that partnership with the United States and
our ability from a military standpoint to work with them.
But I also and they also mention that the partnerships that
they form with one another from this institution are very
important as well. As we look to the situation of TCOs and
impacting that into the future, as well as working with law
enforcement partners, those partnerships that they form with
one another as well as the international community are critical
to our success in the future.
Senator Chambliss. The release of the names issue?
General Fraser. That was a question that DOD studied,
Senator, and the Secretary determined that he did not intend to
release those names, and I support that position.
Senator Chambliss. General, last year we discussed the need
for improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) as a requirement for SOUTHCOM and you noted the need for
an imagery intelligence wide-area coverage sensor integration,
signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR
architecture and management tools, and biometrics. Do you
believe that since we spoke last year you're getting the kind
of support that you need from DOD and the Intelligence
Community in terms of prioritizing and acquiring those assets,
and has the need for those changed in any way?
General Fraser. Senator, it's a complex undertaking that we
work. I still have many of those same requirements as we look
into the future. I'm comfortable with the prioritization of all
our ISR assets as we approach the multitude of requests and
requirements there are on our ISR architecture.
We're continuing to take roads and pathways down
opportunities in the information that is available. There is a
lot of social media, blogs, a lot of information that's
available, and we're looking very deliberately into those
areas, as well as working with law enforcement and other
agencies to figure out how we can take advantage of all the
information that is there in a different way.
We will continue those efforts as well as continue to work
with the entire DOD and the interagency to continue to foster
and build our ISR requirements.
Senator Chambliss. General Jacoby, I want to go back to
this issue of cyber security and your comments in response to
Senator Levin. You note in your written statement that
``NORTHCOM and NORAD operate on data and networking systems
that rely on inter-networked commercial and military
infrastructure,'' and as such cyber attacks pose potentially
grave risks to our ability to accomplish your mission.
Now, we know that Russia and China are leveraging cyber
espionage to steal government and corporate secrets from the
United States. The areas of information and communications
technology and military technologies, including aerospace,
aeronautical technologies, are at the greatest risk right now
of cyber espionage.
Can you comment on what you believe NORTHCOM and NORAD need
to do to mitigate these risks and vulnerabilities to those
systems?
General Jacoby. Senator, we're focused very much on the
defense of the networks we need for mission accomplishment. I
feel that they are secure right now, but you have to stay
vigilant on this. So there is great capability in the hacking
world to put at risk points of vulnerability, especially where
we have interconnectedness among government, military, and
commercial systems. So we watch that closely and it is a great
area of concern.
We're working closely with CYBERCOM, coming up with unique
defense solutions. Part of what we're doing is including
receiving some expertise reinforcement in our cyber warriors at
NORTHCOM.
Senator Chambliss. Are you seeing any increase in the area
of cyber attacks?
General Jacoby. Not against NORTHCOM, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Fraser, General Jacoby, thank you for your
testimony. General Fraser, thank you and your family for your
great service to the Air Force and the Nation.
Senator Lieberman touched on a series of issues about
capacity, particularly maritime capacity in your AOR. One
aspect of this is the reports frequently of submarines or
submersibles being used to transport narcotics. Does that pose
an emerging problem which complicates further your ability to
interdict these vessels with maritime and in the air?
General Fraser. Senator, it remains a concern. For the
first time this year, we saw semi-submersible vessels in the
Caribbean, and we had not seen them prior to this year. So the
use of those vessels continues to expand within the TCOs.
As I look at the problem, it's not just a maritime problem,
because they're built in the jungles in Colombia, they acquire
those assets, and they're commercially available assets, and
they arrive somewhere off the coast of Central America and they
transfer their goods there. It's a very expensive proposition
to try and find them, follow them, detect them as they work
through the maritime environment. It requires a lot of assets
to be able to do that.
We're working the entire connection. Our focus is really on
where they're built and where they arrive to address the
problem with trying to detect them and then intercept them when
we do find them in the maritime environment.
Senator Reed. I presume this is a collaborative effort with
the host countries, if you will, they're not doing it with
their permission, but they're doing it in Colombia and other
places, and you're working closely with their intelligence
services to do that?
General Fraser. Yes, Senator. It's a great collaboration.
We rely primarily on law enforcement information and it is
really those countries and their law enforcement capacity who
really take action to address this issue within their
territory. Within our own interagency it's a very collaborative
effort as well.
Senator Reed. One of the consequences of our active
commitment in other theaters, particularly CENTCOM, is overhead
and other ISR factors. Do you think you have adequate support
in this area to pursue these construction projects in the
jungles and to pinpoint them early on, or is that a deficiency?
General Fraser. Senator, I think I have adequate assets. We
are continuing to look especially at capacity that can look
through triple-canopy jungles. That's a capacity that we're
testing and working on today. That will really help us a lot as
we look at that effort. There are test programs under way to
build that capacity. So I'm comfortable, Senator.
Senator Reed. General, can you comment on the soon-to-be
expansion of the Panama Canal in terms of your operations and
just in general? I think in 2014 they're scheduled to begin the
transit with the new canal, which would be a huge, huge change
to seaborne transportation, not just in your AOR, but
worldwide. Do you have any specific insights?
General Fraser. Senator, you're correct, 2014 is the
scheduled timeline and the Panama Canal Authority and the
Government of Panama are very focused on achieving that goal.
It will change the amount of commercial activity that comes
through the Panama Canal, maybe not the number of ships, but
the amount of commercial activity.
We on an annual basis conduct an exercise called Panamax,
which is an international exercise--17 nations participated
last year--that supports the Government of Panama in defense of
the Panama Canal. We will continue those efforts in the future
as we look at that expansion as it happens within Panama. I
don't see a direct change to the threat or to the concerns as
we look into the future, but our Panamax exercise will remain
critical to that effort.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Jacoby, there is another emerging corridor and
that's the Arctic Ocean. Given your requirements and your day-
to-day coordination with the Canadian authorities, the Navy is
predicting, I think, in some cases at least 1 or 2 months of
transit by 2020 of commercial ships through the Arctic, which
opens up questions of security, of search and rescue, of
environmental response.
Where are we in that endeavor?
General Jacoby. Thank you, Senator. The Arctic is a unique
domain and it's changing every day for us. We work closely with
the Canadians on how they think about the Arctic and how they
are planning for it. They really are working in three 5-year
blocks towards some of the same things we are considering.
Today, Admiral Papp and I are going to sign a white paper
that we've done, a capabilities gap assessment, principally in
the areas of communications, domain awareness, infrastructure,
and presence, and what we will recommend for the future that
might lead to prudent investments to position us for that
eventual opening of the Arctic.
Traffic has already increased over 61 percent in the Arctic
since 2008. There'll be drilling starting in the Beaufort Sea
prior to the close of the spring. So security interests follow
closely behind economic interests, and we will be participating
in a number of venues to help lead that for DOD.
Senator Reed. Many of my colleagues have touched on the
issue of cyber security. NORTHCOM has assets within your area
of operations--missile silos, I presume, bases, et cetera. You
have the NORAD system, your assets. Have you and SOUTHCOM
together or separately done a vulnerability analysis relative
to your dependence upon civilian utilities, civilian systems
that are less secure than the military systems?
General Jacoby. Senator, yes, we have, and we've also
exercised those extensively and red-teamed ourselves with that
regard.
Senator Reed. You're confident that you can continue to
respond to the National Command Authority in a situation, a
cyber attack or any other that would go after, not directly
your installations, but supporting utilities, supporting
civilian complexes?
General Jacoby. In particular, Senator, with regard to our
national military command participation, I believe our network
is secure.
Senator Reed. Can it operate if the civilian networks are
compromised and go down?
General Jacoby. I believe so, Senator. But as you know,
there's great interconnectedness across the country and across
from the energy system and the transportation system. So there
will inevitably be second- and third-order effects of any kind
of wholesale attack on the cyber system.
But in terms of our core mission area, I believe that we
are adequately defended. But once again, vigilance is going to
be required, because the enemy, the cyber enemies, continue to
advance in their capabilities and have demonstrated an intent
to conduct malicious activity on our nets.
Senator Reed. Just a final comment as my time has expired.
Can you operate in an environment in which the worst case
environment is that all of these civilian support or networks
have gone down and you have to go back to getting on the
telephone, if maybe that's still working, if it is, like a land
line, or sending a messenger? I don't want to be too facetious,
but I think sometimes we have become so dependent upon Global
Positioning Systems, cellphones, on automatic computer
technology, et cetera. Do you exercise to the point of truly
the worst case, where you might even have to rely upon old-
fashioned technologies like people driving a car and getting an
order out?
General Jacoby. Senator, it's a great question. That's
exactly what we exercised in November, and I will tell you that
it is very painful, but doable, and it takes a long time to
recover your network. We purposely took it down. It takes a
long time to put it back up.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Fraser and General Jacoby, for your
service. General Fraser, thank you for all that you've done for
our country. We certainly will miss having you around here and
testifying before our committee.
General Fraser, in your written testimony, you describe the
role of Russia in the SOUTHCOM region. In fact, you said that
Russia's outreach to the region is centered primarily on arms
sales; is that right?
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am, it is.
Senator Ayotte. As I understand it, their arms sales are
actually to Venezuela, is that right?
General Fraser. The principal purchaser of Russian
equipment is Venezuela, but they are also selling equipment to
other nations.
Senator Ayotte. Is it accurate that the Chavez regime in
Venezuela is the largest importer of Russian arms in the world?
General Fraser. For last year, yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. They're also, as I understand it, selling
arms to Castro's Cuba?
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Selling arms to Ortega's Nicaragua?
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Not exactly the most democratic and
enlightened rulers in that area of your jurisdiction, are they?
General Fraser. Ma'am, they've been putting the pressure on
the traditional checks-and-balances in democratic institutions.
Senator Ayotte. Unfortunately, this is part of the pattern
for Russia. This is something we had before the committee last
week, I'm deeply concerned about this--as are others on this
committee--as well as Russia's role in selling arms to Syria,
even as the bloodshed continues there. In fact, the state-
controlled Russian company Rosoboronexport continues to provide
the Syrian Government with weapons. I just want to take this
opportunity, if you look at the pattern here in addition with
Russian obstructionism with respect to our efforts of
sanctioning Iran, that this is a troubling, troubling pattern.
When it comes to Syria, I want to say this, that I was
proud to join my colleagues, Senator Cornyn, Senator Durbin,
and Senator Gillibrand, in writing a letter to Secretary
Panetta to express our outrage regarding the Russian arms
sales, in fact, to Syria. Yesterday our Secretary of State,
Secretary Clinton, sparred with a representative from the
Russian Government and she said, rightly so, and I stand by our
Secretary of State in saying this, that Russia was standing
silent as Assad kills his own people.
I'd go further. In my old profession when I was attorney
general of the State of New Hampshire, if you know someone is
killing someone and committing murder, like the Assad regime is
doing with their own people, and you knowingly provide them
with arms, you are not just standing silent; you are actually
an accomplice to those killings.
So I think this is a pattern we're seeing from Russia. I
want to take this opportunity, even though it's not in your
command, to express again my outrage that Russia is not only
providing arms to some of the most despotic regimes in the
world, but one right now that is killing its own people. I
would hope that the Russians would stop this and stop trying to
spar with Secretary Clinton over what is obvious, and that they
should come forward and be a member of the international
community to support sanctions against Syria.
So thank you for giving me the opportunity to do that.
Again, I would hope they would stop selling arms to people like
Chavez as well as their interactions with Cuba.
I wanted to ask you both about the National Guard and in
particular, our State Partnership Program (SPP). General
Fraser, the Guard in New Hampshire has had a very strong SPP in
SOUTHCOM with El Salvador. Can you let us know what you think
is the value of the SPP and also what your view is on, in
particular, the partnership between the Guard in New Hampshire
and the program in El Salvador? How does that help our national
interests?
General Fraser. Senator, I'm a strong supporter of the SPP.
One of the values the SPP brings is the fact that Guard members
stay in their units longer than Active Duty personnel do, and
that provides an opportunity to build an enduring relationship
with that country that they're working with.
We have SPP with 22 different countries within the region
and it is a critical long-term partnership-building capacity
that we see. New Hampshire, working with El Salvador, who is a
great partner of the United States also, is a very, very close
connection and really helps build their routine tactical
capacity, their budgeting capacity, just a good relationship
back and forth between the two partners.
Senator Ayotte. Is this an effective use of our resources
in terms of building partnerships in our own national security
interests?
General Fraser. Ma'am, I think it's a very effective tool.
The other benefit we gain from the State partners is
because of their civilian jobs they have some opportunities to
share experience that goes beyond military experience when that
can be authorized.
Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, did you want to add your
opinion to that?
General Jacoby. Senator, thank you. No, just from my career
experience it's tremendous, very effective, very efficient use
of resources. It's consistency over time. It helps us broaden
and deepen our military-to-military relationships around the
world.
Senator Ayotte. I was struck in your testimony, your
written testimony, General Jacoby, how you talked about that
the Guard, ``The National Guard is a natural partner in all
that we do'' is the language that you used. As we look at this
challenging time in terms of the prospect of, unfortunately,
not only the cuts that DOD is facing now, but on top of it
sequestration, how important is it that we not only maintain a
robust Active Duty and resources for that in terms of training,
but also for our Guard as well?
General Jacoby. Senator, the Guard is our natural partner,
and our most important partner. They function in all of my
mission sets.
Senator Ayotte. I should include the Reserves as I'm
talking about this.
General Jacoby. They function in all of our mission sets
and, thanks to Congress now, the Reserves can also function in
defense support of civil authorities. It makes sense. We saw
problems locally and the Guard is available, fast, and
efficient in that way. So from defending the Homeland to
supporting civil authorities to actually helping us with some
of our engagements with the countries in this AOR, the Guard is
an important partner to us.
Senator Ayotte. Did you want to add anything further,
General Fraser?
General Fraser. I think we're in violent agreement here
that SPP is a natural ally. We work and depend very heavily
upon the National Guard in our engagement, not only with our
partners, but as we work within our headquarters and within our
capacity to provide exercise support and other capacities. So
across the board we rely very heavily on the National Guard as
well as the Reserves to conduct our mission.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you both.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Fraser, General Jacoby, good to see you. I feel
like I'm in Alaska right now, as both of you were up there and
commanding operations. So thank you for being here. It's great
to be back in a forum where we're all three here. So thank you
very much.
Let me first start if I can, General Jacoby. We had a brief
meeting last week in regards to Alaska Command (ALCOM) and
what's going on up there, and I want to lead a little bit into
the Arctic. But first, before I do that, the general
description or discussion is: Can you tell me from your
perspective the value of ALCOM in regards to the connection
with NORTHCOM? Can you give me your sense of how that plays and
what the role and responsibility is?
General Jacoby. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Begich. Of course I'm biased, and I hope it's a
good answer. Please, go ahead.
General Jacoby. When I was Commander of U.S. Army Alaska,
of course, my Commander of ALCOM was Doug Fraser.
Senator Begich. That's right.
General Jacoby. He commanded brilliantly. So ALCOM was very
valuable.
Senator, Alaska is unique in strategic significance to the
country and now even more so as our gaze turns towards the
Arctic. I believe it requires a three-star command. I believe
it requires a joint command. So I think that ALCOM remains
relevant and important to the defense of the Homeland.
Many, many tasks that take place in Alaska are tasks that
support NORTHCOM and NORAD in our Homeland defense role, to
include defense support of civil authorities through JTF
Alaska. So very important to NORAD and NORTHCOM, and I think
you have the right command structure up there right now.
Senator Begich. Let me add a little bit more to that,
because not only NORTHCOM but U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),
too, it has another unique role in its operations. Either one
of you--I know, even though you're SOUTHCOM, General Fraser,
you've had a lot of experience up there. But, General Jacoby,
maybe you could respond.
General Jacoby. We've had a good working relationship with
PACOM and they have important equities in the strategic
significance of Alaska. However, as both the NORAD Commander
and the NORTHCOM Commander, I believe that I probably occupy--
--
Senator Begich. You want the assets.
General Jacoby.--80 to 85 percent of the ALCOM commander's
time.
Senator Begich. Excellent.
Let me ask you, from the Arctic perspective--and Senator
Reed was leading into that and you indicated that today you'll
be, I think you said today, that Admiral Papp and you are
signing a document indicating some of the gap analysis or
resources that may be needed. First of all, is the analysis--
I'm assuming it's a long-term analysis--of what really will be
needed there to make our presence known there, and my sense is
by your signing that agreement you believe--I'm putting these
words in your mouth, but you can correct me--that this kind of
agreement in the future of the Arctic is going to be another
piece of the equation to our military positioning? Is that a
fair statement?
General Jacoby. Senator, yes, it is. Admiral Papp and I
share great interests in the Arctic. Of course, we need to move
forward with some consensus of what are the capabilities that
will be required and the implications for what are the prudent
investments that should be made. So we have an opportunity
while we watch the Arctic begin to open up to get ahead of
potential security requirements. To that end, working closely
with the Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, other partners in DOD, and
the DHS, and also staying tied closely to the Canadians, is the
right strategic framework to begin working on now.
Senator Begich. One statistic I'll use, and I think it came
from the Coast Guard in Alaska, and that is a few years ago
you'd maybe see 50 ships moving through the Bering Sea; now
close to 1,000, to give you a sense. In the Arctic, I think it
was 7 last year; now 34 in 1 year alone. So it's moving in a
rapid pace of activity up there, and we know our friends from
China and Russia are very interested, China in our land, as I
would say, curious about their efforts.
So again, your gap analysis, will that also then be
utilized as you move forward in your long-term budget planning
of how will these pieces fit in and where you need to allocate
assets?
General Jacoby. Yes, Senator, I think that's an important
first step with our closest partners, to look at the gaps and
particularly in how you communicate, how you see and
understand, what infrastructure we may need, and what kind of
continued presence you might require in the Arctic. We come to
a consensus on that, and then we help inform our Integrated
Priority List and our Scientific Integrated Priority List so
that we can influence budgets over time through our components
to the Services.
So that's the start of the process. We received this
responsibility in the latest Unified Command Plan (UCP) update.
I'm happy to say we're moving out on it.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Let me if I can, General Fraser, first of all, thank you
for your long-term service in your career. I know you'll be
missed, but I know you have been an incredible asset for this
country.
Let me ask you a couple questions about SOUTHCOM. The first
is a general comment. As we move down the path with the Panama
Canal going into--out of our control to a certain extent and
predominantly out of total control, do we have any worry as we
worry about commercial lanes in Somalia with piracy? Do we have
any worry over the long haul what might happen in that region?
Give me your sense?
I know this is an odd question, but when you're from Alaska
and you deal with fisheries, we hate pirates. So when you're
thinking of Somalia, we hate pirates. So I'm thinking of
Panama; what's their ability to manage that?
General Fraser. The Government of Panama and the Panama
Canal Authority are doing a great job of managing the Panama
Canal. It's efficient, it's effective, and it's a big income
provider for the Government of Panama.
We don't see any indications right now of any piracy on
either end of the Panama Canal. It is an area that we continue
to watch.
Senator Begich. Also, we had great conversations when the
hurricane went through Haiti. I know we talked on the phone.
Tell me how SOUTHCOM is continuing to prepare and be ready for
those kinds of responses for natural disasters. Give me a sense
of--that was the first one that's pretty significant that I as
a Member of the Senate was seeing SOUTHCOM respond to. Give me
your thoughts on that and how we're prepared for other natural
disasters in the region?
General Fraser. We remain very deliberately prepared. The
hurricane season is obviously our number one concern because
that happens on an annual basis and we can predict that. We
have a deliberate plan that we've developed post-Haiti
exercise, revised our disaster response plan. It's a graduated
plan depending on what the needs of any request would be. We
continue to exercise that on an annual basis. As we look at the
hurricane season, we prepare for that, not only within our
headquarters, but with our partners in the region, and we work
directly associated with Haiti, with the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti, and the Government of Haiti, to
be able to respond should a hurricane impact them during the
hurricane season.
Senator Begich. This is my last comment because my time has
expired. You have designed, after going through that
experience, you've seen some areas of improvement and some
areas that were successful in trying to work off of that and
expanding the kind of preparation at different levels,
depending on the severity of the natural disaster. Is that a
fair statement?
General Fraser. Senator, it is a fair statement, to include
that normally we don't have the authority to spend DOD dollars
outside of a 72-hour emergency response capacity. Associated
with Haiti specifically, we have requested and received
authority from DOD for up to $3 million just so that we can
start that process and respond on a rapid basis.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you very much.
Thanks to both of you and, like I said, it's good to see--I
consider you Alaskans. So thank you both for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had the honor of meeting both of you. I appreciate your
taking the time to come to the office and address a lot of my
questions.
I just had a follow-up. Obviously, what Senator Ayotte said
about the SPP, I participated. We went to Paraguay and find,
not only with our relationship with Morocco, Paraguay, other
places where we don't have a lot of money, but through the SPP
we can get a good value for our dollar. It's something that I
know that the State has an interest in. I want to keep it right
where it is so we can continue to train and use it as an asset.
So thank you for that support.
Obviously, General Fraser, thank you for your service and
your support as well.
General Jacoby, I was wondering if you could expand for a
minute on your comments regarding defense support to civil
authorities, with respect to counterdrug operations network,
and with respect to natural and manmade disasters, could you
just expand on that just a touch?
General Jacoby. Thank you, Senator. We had a great
initiative last year with the dual-status commander. I
mentioned it in my opening statement. We had an opportunity to
test that in a way that we haven't done in the past this year
with Hurricane Irene. I'm really proud to report, as a team,
that the very first opportunity we had to employ dual-status
commanders we did, and put four dual-status commanders in
position with their Title 10 deputies, just as was the intent
of Congress and the Council of Governors.
So that program is alive and well. It made a lot of sense
and now we're going to continue to grow that and look at ways
to employ dual-status commanders in both the regional and the
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) event,
so big progress.
I'm also working with the Reserve Forces of both the Air
Force and the Army to take advantage of the authorization that
we now have for involuntary activation of the Reserves to
support civil authorities. It makes tremendous sense. There is
huge capacity in the Reserves distributed around the country
and that was a great move that we are continuing to work on.
Senator Brown. I know there was an instance where there was
a tornado or a hurricane and the Reserve unit was right there
and they couldn't respond, and it made really no sense
whatsoever.
General Jacoby. I think we fixed that one, Senator. Thank
you.
Senator Brown. Great. Then talking about the dual-status
commanders, how is that training going? So you're satisfied
we're on track, it's going to be something that's viable for
the future?
General Jacoby. Senator, with the April class, we will have
trained at least two dual-status commanders for every State,
and that's huge. So there's always one in the queue, and we'll
keep that training course going.
Senator Brown. How long is that course?
General Jacoby. It's about a 2-week course, but it
dovetails with another course, the Joint Task Force Commander's
Course. So that actually builds on previous programs. It gives
you not just a certified dual-status commander; it gives you a
team of guardsmen and NORTHCOM folks that have worked together
and studied the problem and have pushed out the horizons on how
we use dual-status commanders.
Senator Brown. It may not be a bad idea to put in command
and general staff and actually start it in the lower levels,
the lower ranks, as just something to keep their eye on as
we're going along, and integrate it earlier in the training
cycle.
General Fraser, foreign influence in your AOR and how this
affects your operation. I noted Senator Ayotte's comments on
Russia. What about the role of China? Can you comment on that
based on your experience?
General Fraser. Senator, China is very engaged in the
region as well. They're primarily from a diplomatic and a
commercial and economic standpoint is where they're very much
engaged. They're now the leading trade partner with Brazil,
with Chile, with Peru. They're also expanding into military-to-
military relations. They've had over the last 2 years over 20
high-level visits to various countries within the region. They
are selling some military equipment, from light aircraft to
medium transports to radar capacity. They also provide
education and training in China for military personnel.
Senator Brown. Very similar to what we do at the War
College and the like.
General Fraser. Very similar, yes, Senator.
Senator Brown. It was interesting, I remember and have had
personal experience with countries--when I was in Paraguay, for
example, they would say: ``Well, if you guys don't do it, China
will.'' That's what I think we're seeing around the region. If
you don't provide us with that X, then we'll get it from China.
If you don't, we'll get it from China. So we're seeing that
more and more just in the last 3, 4, 5 years. Is that an
accurate statement?
General Fraser. Senator, we see an increasing interest by
China in the region. I don't see it as a zero-sum game, though.
It's not China or the United States. I see both of us very much
engaged in the region. I would state that there's an
opportunity for both of us as we engage with our partners in
the region to help ensure the security and stability of the
region.
Senator Brown. That's another reason for the SPP, I
believe, in those smaller countries. You get that value for the
dollars, so they can see the interaction and basically hang out
with our soldiers and learn and grow and develop that
relationship, which is critically important. Is that a fair
statement?
General Fraser. The relationships we build through training
and education programs are critical to the future. We see it
all the time around the world. We don't know when a crisis is
coming. To have an awareness and an understanding and a shared
experience with one of our partners is critical to our success.
Senator Brown. I think we saw that in Egypt, actually, when
we were able to pick up the phone and say: ``Hey, stand down
and let this thing play out a little bit.'' General Jacoby, a
fair statement as well?
General Jacoby. Yes, Senator, very much so.
Senator Brown. General Jacoby, I'm deeply concerned about
the cuts in the Air National Guard and how it may affect the
mission. I think the Army's done it really well in terms of
trying to be very strategic with the cuts. I'm deeply
concerned, especially about the air sovereignty alert mission,
which we have one at Barnes Air National Guard Base, as you're
aware of.
Do you share those same concerns? Because I'm hearing from
my folks back home that they had no knowledge that any of these
cuts were coming. There was absolutely no communication
whatsoever and out of left field, here we go. I'm looking at
strategically Massachusetts and the eastern seaboard, the
ability to respond all over our part of the world. It doesn't
make any sense.
General Jacoby. Senator, thanks for the question. The Air
Force had some really tough choices to make, tough decisions.
The Secretary asked us to turn over every rock as we sought to
find the $487 billion that was mandated in the Budget Control
Act (BCA). I believe the Homeland was treated fairly and is
treated as job number one.
However, we really need to be vigilant and ensure that we
continue the programs necessary to defend the country, and that
includes the ACA mission. In terms of defense support of civil
authorities, the Guard, the Air Guard specifically, is very
good at that mission. I'm going to count on the U.S. Air Force,
the Total Air Force, to support our requirement. But all of us
had to make tough choices and hated to see some of these cuts
happen.
Senator Brown. They're not there yet, and I'm hopeful that
we'll be able to have a conversation, because when you're
talking about the best value for the dollar and the Air Guard
versus the regular Air Force, and the Reserves as well, the
Reserve component, it doesn't make sense when you're talking
about protecting the Homeland. We're not just talking about
protecting the Homeland. There's a One-Army, One-Military
concept now, and a lot of these folks are backfilling regular
Air Force and Army units.
Like I said, the Army seems to have kind of got it right.
They are being thoughtful, judicious. The Air Force, with all
due respect, it's not over. I haven't really seen evidence that
these cuts make sense. So I just wanted to bring that to your
attention. I appreciate your input on that.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here today.
General Jacoby, if I could follow up on Senator Brown's
question. So what I hear you saying is that the proposed
reduction to the Army and Air Guard will not affect your
mission, you believe you can deliver on that mission?
General Jacoby. Senator, that's correct.
Senator Udall. Let me turn to a specific element in the
change that's under way in this area. There has been a decision
to end the 24-hour-alert requirement at Duluth and Langley. Did
you have a say in that matter and what factors and assumptions
went into that decision, and again will it affect the ACA
mission?
General Jacoby. Thanks, Senator. A very tough decision; it
was part of the process across every combatant command, across
every Service, to find the savings required by the BCA. I
believe that we did adequately address the strategic
requirements of the Homeland. But in the analysis, as a team
effort, there was a decision taken to reduce by two.
The command took responsibility for identifying those two
bases. So we did two independent studies, one in my
headquarters and one in First Air Force, which is my Air Force
Component Command under Lieutenant General Sid Clarke. Both
commands came up with the same answer--Duluth and Langley.
Now, no bases are closed and this doesn't reflect on
numbers of fighter squadrons. I specifically felt that in the
case of those two bases that I had the authorities and the
capabilities already resident under my authority as the NORAD
commander to mitigate on short notice the loss of those two
bases. In fact, I can change on my own authority the alert
conditions and could in case of a threat, stand that back up.
Senator Udall. If that changes, I'm going to ask you to
take the time to notify the committee and notify me, if you
would.
General Jacoby. Senator, I'm passionate about the ACA
mission. There's a high standard, and high expectations of the
American public that we're going to defend the country's air
space, and I will make sure my views are known.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Let's turn to critical infrastructure, if we might, and the
vulnerability that our infrastructure has to either cyber or
physical attack. What do you see--and this is a series of
questions--as vulnerable pieces of our infrastructure? What
steps need to be taken to protect those valuable components?
What role does NORTHCOM have in facilitating those protective
measures?
General Fraser. Thanks, Senator. There's a number of
critical infrastructure protection requirements. Principally
those lie within other sectors of the government, and so
NORTHCOM's principal responsibility is to provide defense
support to civil authorities in the consequence management of
disasters within certain sectors, particularly a cyber attack,
as I mentioned earlier. We would roll in and, if requested,
provide defense support in recovering from that.
Critical infrastructure, though, we know we're more
concerned now about systems than we are places. So things like
the national energy grid, the transportation system, those are
being looked at hard, and we are in support of our partners,
particularly in DHS, in determining ways that we can help.
Senator Udall. Of course, we have a lot of work left to do,
and I'm optimistic we're going to work on the floor of the
Senate to put in place a cyber security policy. You know that
you'll play a key role in advising us, given your perspective
and your responsibilities in this area.
General Jacoby. Yes, Senator.
Senator Udall. General Fraser, if I could, I'd like to turn
to the reports that Islamist groups are recruiting in your AOR.
What are the conditions that are facilitating Islamist
recruiting and fundraising in the most troubling areas, and
what can we do, as well as our partners, to address these
conditions?
General Fraser. Senator, there are groups, violent
extremist groups, who are advocating and proselytizing in
largely Muslim communities within Latin America. The Muslim
community is fairly small within the region. It makes about 1
percent of the total inhabitants of the region. But they are
still very deliberately advocating.
The situations and the conditions that enable that are ones
that you see in many of the countries in the region, and that's
poverty rates, it's income inequality, it's the corruption
that's there. It is, in some of those cases, an anti-U.S.
perspective.
Senator Udall. It bears watching, obviously, and hopefully
the lessons we've learned in other parts of the world we can
apply. Thank you for drawing our attention to this.
South America, as I understand it, has certainly had its
violent intervals in its history, but it has very little
history of, of course, Islamist or terrorism of any kind. So it
just shows this is a worldwide phenomenon that we have to be
able to respond to wherever it may surface.
General Fraser. Senator, we're paying very close attention
to this issue. We're seeing measured success. We don't see
great success in their efforts along these lines.
Senator Udall. General Jacoby, if I could turn back to you,
our good friend, General Renuart, when he relinquished command
in 2010 he talked about his concerns about our aging air
defense systems. We know that he talked about temporary fixes
to take us forward. What's your current assessment of the
modernization efforts in this important area?
General Jacoby. Of course, we're very eager to have the F-
35 come on line. We're eager to continue the service life
extension programs for the F-16s. Senator, the most important
thing we do as a combatant commander, though, is we conduct
frequent periodic inspections of our ACA squadrons. They
continue to do well in these and we'll maintain vigilance. But
of course, we're a stakeholder in capable aircraft stretching
out into the future.
Senator Udall. If you had more resources, though, in this
area, you could put them to work, I assume?
General Jacoby. Senator, I think any combatant command that
you had before you would know what to do with additional
resources.
Senator Udall. General Fraser, before my time expires, talk
a little bit more about Iran's outreach efforts in South
America. We know that Chavez and Ahmadinejad have close ties,
but have the Iranians been making inroads with any other South
American countries?
General Fraser. President Ahmadinejad has made six visits
to the region in the last 7 years. This last trip that he took,
he visited Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. We saw it
largely as a diplomatic effort and the estimate that we have
and throughout the government is that he didn't really get the
reception or the support that he was looking for.
Senator Udall. We need to be vigilant there. It almost
feels like it's a throwback to the Cold War, when the Soviet
Union was traveling the world looking for allies. But this is
serious and thank you again for your leadership in this area.
My time has expired. I want to do two final things. I want
to thank General Fraser for your phenomenal service, and I know
you and General Jacoby go way back. You've worked together in a
series of commands. Senator Begich reminded me of your
connection to Alaska. So godspeed and thank you again for your
service.
General Jacoby, I did want to put on the record that the
flow of drugs into our country is significant and substantial
and worrisome, but it's a symptom of the demand that exists in
our country. I know you're going to go to the ends of the Earth
to cut off the flow, but we as a country have to have a
continued discussion about what we do to dampen that demand
down. I just want you to know that I'm a Senator that
understands that that's a real challenge that you face.
Thanks for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Fraser and General Jacoby, thanks very much for
your service. I couldn't agree more with what Senator Udall
just said about trying to ramp down the desire in our country
for narcotics.
I wanted to ask a question about Ecuador. The 2009 closing
of the cooperative security location at the Air Force Base in
Manta, Ecuador, and the ejection of the U.S. Ambassador in
April of last year, has really stressed the U.S.-Ecuadorian
bilateral ties. General Fraser, how would you characterize the
current status of the counternarcotics cooperation between the
United States and the Government of Ecuador? Then what needs to
be done to strengthen our cooperation with regard to both
counterterrorism and counternarcotics?
General Fraser. We continue to engage with the military in
Ecuador. We have good military-to-military relations with them.
They are working closely with their neighbors as well. We have
seen an impact, especially from the maritime traffic that now
is able and uses Ecuador to depart. So we have seen an increase
in that activity.
We continue to have discussions with them and work with
them to adjust and address this problem.
Senator Hagan. DOD support to the U.S. law enforcement
agencies and the Mexican military supports the broader counter-
TCO fight. NORTHCOM provides DOD support to both U.S. and
foreign law enforcement agencies against this common enemy.
General Jacoby, what type of mutually beneficial DOD support is
provided towards this end, and are we doing enough to foster
the important relationships with law enforcement agencies,
State, and the National Guard counterdrug task forces?
General Jacoby. Thank you, Senator. In NORTHCOM,
partnerships are our center of gravity. In the Homeland, we do
things in support of our partners across DHS and DOJ. So along
the border that's where you find our efforts, in support of
those lead agencies along the border.
What we do is we provide them operational support, analytic
support, technical support, all of it with the checkmark of
mutually beneficial. Mainly for us that means that it's a good
training opportunity for the military forces that are partnered
up, primarily with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
It is a great relationship. It's grown stronger and
stronger over time. Just this month, we've conducted OPNIMBUS 2
in the Tucson sector, where 1st Armored Division soldiers feel
they got better training than they've gotten prior to a
deployment at any time in the past 10 years. So it's a complex
environment with a thinking, noncooperative enemy, and it's a
great training experience. It also provides some good support
to CBP, which they are very happy with.
So I think we have a good relationship. I think it's
critical to continue to expand and strengthen our partnerships.
In the NORTHCOM headquarters we have over 32 agencies
represented there and 8 law enforcement agencies. We've never
had better sharing of information across the interagency. So
I'm pretty proud of that, and I appreciate the question.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. That's a lot of agencies to
coordinate together, so thank you.
I think it's very important for us to counter the TCOs and
their illicit trafficking activities. Central to that is
building the effective partnership capacity that I know that
you're working on each and every day with the key governments
and security establishments, to prevent them from operating in
these permissive environments.
I do chair a subcommittee of this committee, the Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, and I'm concerned that
Central America has become the preferred transit zone for the
TCOs, which seem to have diversified their portfolios to
include not only drugs, but also precursor chemicals from India
and China and Bangladesh, commercial weapons from the United
States, and then obviously the trafficking of people.
The limited capabilities of the Central American states
have allowed the Mexican transnational, the TCOs, to establish
points of entry for illegal drugs coming from South America,
and then the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border area is
particularly vulnerable. I understand that SOUTHCOM is working
with NORTHCOM and the interagency community to develop a
regional operations capability among these nations.
For both of you, what types of resources does this regional
operational capability require, and what are the objectives?
General Fraser. Senator, it's a broad, whole-of-government
effort, and international community, with a group of friends
and international donors who also support this effort. From a
DOD standpoint, we're a supporting organization because this is
criminal activity; it's not military activity. But we have a
role to support those militaries who have been asked by their
governments to support law enforcement to help address this
question.
So we're continuing training and equipping with our partner
militaries, working with them to help them work better with
their law enforcement partners. But the real solutions are in
the rest of our foreign affairs support. It is really in the
U.S. Agency for International Development programs, it is in
law enforcement programs, it is in judiciary programs. It is
all of us working together with those governments to solve this
problem.
Senator Hagan. General Jacoby?
General Jacoby. Yes, Senator, I concur with General Fraser.
I think truly we understand this as a whole-of-government
requirement. But the participation of the militaries from
Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico is very good and improving, and
there are efforts and a consciousness on the Mexican side of
the importance of that southern border, and I see them taking
action.
Senator Hagan. Together, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, I
understand produce most of the world's supply of cocaine. In
recent years progress in controlling cocaine production in
Colombia seems to have resulted in an increase in cocaine
production in Peru and in Bolivia. I don't know if you agree
with that, but I'd like to know, and what would be your plan to
prevent further cocaine production increases in Peru and
Bolivia without losing the progress made in Colombia?
General Fraser. Senator, I do agree with that effort. We
have seen a reduction in the cocaine production in Colombia. As
traffickers have worked other places, they've gone into Peru
and Bolivia. Most of the cocaine coming into the United States,
though, still comes from Colombia. That other cocaine heads to
other parts of the world.
We're working with the Colombians to support their effort,
and again this is an inter-governmental effort because really
the reduction and eradication of cocaine is other parts of our
government, DOS who really supports those efforts. But we are
working with the Government of Peru, their military, especially
when you look at the narcoterrorist group, the Sindero Luminosa
in Peru, to help reduce their impact in that country.
We're just seeing, as you watch, Brazil, the United States,
and Bolivia just signed a tripartite agreement to address TOC
in Bolivia, and that's an ongoing effort.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Before I recognize Senator Blumenthal and ask him to take
the gavel to wind up, because I'm going to have to leave, I
just had one additional question if I could of General Jacoby.
That has to do with the anti-terrorism joint exercise with
Russia that we conduct annually, I believe, called Vigilant
Eagle. You indicated, General, that the benefits that we
realized from this sort of exercise are invaluable. This is
what your prepared statement tells us, and that you hope over
time it will lead to even greater levels of openness and
cooperation among our nations, referring to us and Russia.
Are you hoping that we can enhance the cooperation
militarily? For instance, do you plan to have direct
interaction with your Russian counterpart as part of that
effort?
General Jacoby. Senator, yes, I do. Vigilant Eagle last
year was a very successful exercise among Russia, the United
States, and Canada. We exercised a counterterrorist scenario
where we shared an air picture that was required to deal with
the threat adequately. So I think it was an important step
forward in creating trust and confidence on all sides and to
ensure that there's transparency in what our military
activities are, particularly in the Alaska region.
So we're going to do Vigilant Eagle again this year. I'm
hoping to meet with my Russian counterpart to discuss the
tactics, techniques, and procedures that will help us do that
better. We have areas of cooperation with the Russians that I
think are important and should be sustained. I think, as we've
discussed earlier in the testimony, we have to keep our eyes
wide open, but I think there is good potential for cooperation
here.
Chairman Levin. Thank you both. Thank you for your great
service and leadership. General Fraser, again, all of us wish
you all the best as you take on other chapters and
responsibilities in your life. We wish you and your family all
the best.
General Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's been a great
honor.
Chairman Levin. Senator Blumenthal, thank you for taking
over here.
Senator Blumenthal [presiding]. Thank you.
I'm honored to take over from Chairman Levin for the final
questioning. I think that's the good news; and very honored to
be with you and thank you, as others have, for your
extraordinary service, both General Fraser and General Jacoby.
I will try to avoid repeating some of the questions. I think I
know about most of them. But I do have a number that may elicit
some of the same testimony.
I want to come back to the aircraft that are being drawn
down from the Air National Guard, a decision that affects
particularly Connecticut because we will lose the lift capacity
of the C-27J and 136 aircraft will be lost to the Air National
Guard, which I regard as important because Connecticut is one
of the 27 States that is affected by it. I wonder if you have
done an analysis of what the effects will be of that drawdown?
General Jacoby. Senator, thank you for the question. The
Air National Guard is an important partner of NORTHCOM and to
NORAD, so in both hats, they're important partners to us. The
Guard has done invaluable service, both in defending the
Homeland and support of civil authorities.
The Air Force had some really tough decisions to make,
tough choices that all the combatant commanders had and all of
the Services had in order to meet the significant budget
reduction. What I do as a combatant commander is I put
requirements on the table, and there is a requirement to
support civil authorities and there's a requirement to defend
the Homeland. I trust the Air Force to meet that requirement
with their total force, whether it's Active, Reserve, or Guard.
But the loss of Guard aircraft will, I'm sure, be felt, and
they're a tremendous asset. So it's part of the pain that all
the combatant commanders will feel as a result of this very
important round of budget decisions.
Senator Blumenthal. Can you be more precise about how it
will be felt, what the effects will be?
General Jacoby. I can only speak to the ACA mission. We
will be able to mitigate the loss. I felt the loss of the
standing alert on those two bases was a loss that within my
authorities and within the capability of the NORAD commander I
could mitigate that. It wasn't a loss of aircraft and it wasn't
a loss of bases, just sitting alert at those two locations 24/
7.
Senator Blumenthal. Any other effects that you've analyzed
or foreseen?
General Jacoby. Senator, no.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me go to cyber, if I may. You
answered one of the questions earlier about the task of
defining criteria that would constitute an act of war in case
of a cyber attack. My understanding is that those attacks are
ongoing even as we speak, not only against the defense
industrial base, certain private sector elements, but also our
actual defense capabilities.
I wonder if you could be somewhat more precise about where
you think we are in defining those criteria. You said there
was--and I'm using your word--``momentum'' toward that
definition.
General Jacoby. Yes, Senator. As recently as yesterday, I
had a conversation with General Alexander. He's walking point
with General Kehler in STRATCOM in terms of developing
criteria. We'll address that in a collaborative fashion, I
believe, in the very near future.
But part of the momentum is not just in DOD; it's within
the broader community of agencies and organizations that are
concerned about cyber security, both commercial and
specifically in the lead element for defending our Nation's
networks, the DHS.
So I would concur as a military professional. I know that
we are undergoing malicious activity on the net. The challenge
is how do we define that as an attack on our country. I think
this is a serious discussion that needs to be had, and it ends
up being really a policy question on where are the red lines,
because that's essentially what we're talking about. Where are
the red lines where malicious activity transitions into an
attack on the Homeland, and then what else could it be
connected to that might otherwise define previously considered
malicious activity now a serious threat or an attack on the
country?
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that part of the
defense against that attack and part of defining the criteria
has to be deciding what the offense should be, what the
deterrent should be?
General Jacoby. Senator, I believe that the country
requires and DOD requires full-spectrum computer network
operations, exploitation, defense, and attack.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I want to ask you a question that I don't believe has been
covered, and it may be a little beyond the normal purview of
what you do. But obviously over the time that you've been in
this job, over the time that we've been aware of conditions in
the Arctic, there have been changes to the topography and other
environmental aspects. I'm not going to go into detail because
you're much closer to it actually than we could be sitting
here. But I wonder whether those so-called climate change
issues, for lack of a better word, affect your strategic
thinking, your practical approach to that part of the world?
General Jacoby. Senator, the opening of the Arctic has
driven us to a new imperative within the Command to consider
the Arctic in a different way. So starting with the UCP's most
recent change, which gave us Arctic geographic
responsibilities, as well as directing that we become the
advocate for Arctic capabilities, we have opened our aperture
and now work differently at the Arctic.
I believe that it's not just a geographic location, but
it's a specific domain that requires special capabilities and
capacities to operate effectively. With the opening of the
Arctic, there are sure to be commercial and economic interests.
Historically those are followed closely by security interests,
and we will seek to stay ahead of the challenge and not behind
it and make sure that the Arctic is explored and the resources
exploited in a collaborative, peaceful way.
Senator Blumenthal. This is a burgeoning AOR.
General Jacoby. I believe so, Senator. We're working
closely with Canada. Canada has it as a top priority. I'm in a
unique position as the NORAD Commander with my relationship
with Canada, and so I can tell you that we're joined at the hip
with not just Canada, but all eight of the northern region
countries.
Senator Blumenthal. Do submarines play a part in that
thinking?
General Jacoby. Submarines are still active up there and I
know that our Navy operates in the Arctic region and will, I
presume, continue to do so.
Senator Blumenthal. They are important to both economic and
national security in that area?
General Jacoby. The Arctic will, as it opens up as a
domain, I'm sure we'll find all types of commercial, economic,
and military activity in the Arctic.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time has expired, which means that your time has
expired, thankfully, I'm sure from your standpoint. I want to
thank you again on behalf of the entire committee for your
service and for your sacrifice, your families' service and
sacrifice, and for being with us today. Thank you very much,
gentlemen.
This hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

GMD RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENTS

1. Senator Levin. General Jacoby, according to Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense Jim Miller, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
``an aggressive Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) reliability improvement
program in order to reduce the number of GBIs required per intercept,
which will increase the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM) that can be defeated by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system.'' As the operational combatant commander responsible for
determining the number of GBIs required per intercept, do you support
this reliability improvement program, and do you agree that it would be
operationally important if this program can ``increase the number of
ICBMs that can be defeated by the GMD system?''
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

SM-3 IIB TO AUGMENT HOMELAND DEFENSE

2. Senator Levin. General Jacoby, as you are aware, DOD is
developing the Standard Missile-3, Block IIB interceptor for Phase 4 of
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense. The SM-
3 Block IIB is designed to defeat a possible future Iranian long-range
missile capable of reaching the United States; so that system would
augment our existing Homeland defense capability provided by the GMD
system. Do you support development of the SM-3 IIB as a cost-effective,
mobile, and forward-based augmentation of our Homeland defense, in case
an Iranian ICBM threat develops?
General Jacoby. Yes. Though the SM-3 Block IIB is still a
conceptual program, it may contribute to the ability to defend the
Homeland from an Iranian ICBM. The forward-based nature of this system
may allow possible multiple engagement opportunities against these
threats, thus augmenting our Homeland defense by conserving GBIs.

RADAR IN TURKEY AUGMENTS HOMELAND DEFENSE

3. Senator Levin. General Jacoby, as part of Phase 1 of the
European PAA to missile defense, the United States has deployed an X-
band radar (designated AN/TPY-2) to Turkey, and the radar is now
operational. In addition to providing early and accurate tracking
information about Iranian missiles launched toward North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe, this radar also augments our GMD
system with respect to defense against potential future long-range
Iranian missiles that could be launched at the United States. Could you
please describe the contribution of the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey to the
capability of the GMD system?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

PRECISION TRACKING SPACE SYSTEM

4. Senator Levin. General Jacoby, your prepared statement describes
a number of planned improvements to our GMD system to stay ahead of
potential future missile threats to the Homeland from nations such as
Iran and North Korea. You noted that ``we must be better prepared to
respond to threats that give us little to no advance warning,'' and
conclude that this ``requires pursuing future sensor capability, such
as the space-based Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), ensuring we
have the highest level of GMD for the Homeland.'' Could you please
describe the benefit to Homeland missile defense that you see from
deploying the PTSS?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

MISSILE DEFENSE

5. Senator Lieberman. General Jacoby, you noted in response to
Senator Levin that today's threats do not require GBI sites on the east
coast of the United States. Understanding that there is no requirement,
would such a site on the east coast provide additional capability and
greater probability of successfully intercepting an ICBM launched from
the east?
General Jacoby. There is no current requirement. However, as we
better understand current and future threats that our GMD system may
have to account for, we should look at a full range of potential
solutions that could include additional missile fields to outpace the
threat.

JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE-SOUTH

6. Senator Lieberman. General Fraser, the Counter-Threat Finance
section at the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) has
recently begun several new initiatives related to bulk cash smuggling
in the Western Hemisphere. Is improved tracking of bulk cash smuggling
important to your command's efforts to interdict illegal trafficking?
General Fraser. The JIATF-South Counter-Threat Finance cell has
embarked on a concerted and multifaceted effort to document, track,
disrupt, and seize bulk cash being moved by narco-traffickers in the
Western Hemisphere. This holistic effort to enhance awareness and
disrupt this illicit financial activity is an important part of U.S.
Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) support to the overall strategy of
countering transnational organized crime (TOC). Over the past year, we
have seen several successes, working with and through our interagency
and international partners, to disrupt several million dollars in
smuggled bulk cash. Simultaneously, we have enhanced our understanding
of the networks engaged in this activity. Countering transnational bulk
cash smuggling presents many challenges, to include coordinating with a
myriad of interagency and international agencies and the difficulty of
effectively targeting a commodity which is easy to hide and inherently
legal. As with other aspects of the counter illicit trafficking
mission, SOUTHCOM will continue to support interagency efforts to
confront these problems. We will also do our part to enhance the
targeting of bulk cash smugglers as part of an integral U.S. and
international strategy to combat TOC.

7. Senator Lieberman. General Fraser, how valuable does your
command find regular analysis of bulk cash smuggling in the Western
Hemisphere?
General Fraser. With the standup of the JIATF-South Counter-Threat
Finance cell, involving interagency information and personnel, the
command analyzes bulk cash smuggling associated with narco-trafficking
in the Western Hemisphere. This analysis has been valuable in an
enhanced awareness of illicit financial activity in the JIATF-South
Joint Operating Area and contributed to the interagency and
international seizure and disruption of bulk currency shipments. It has
also enhanced our understanding of TOC networks. Bulk cash smuggling is
a critical part of TOC's ability to sustain their activities. Regular
analysis of bulk cash smuggling has emerged as a vital piece in the
holistic approach to confronting TOC.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

8. Senator McCaskill. General Jacoby, in your testimony you stated
that an effective air defense and a strong air sovereignty capability
are critical components of Homeland defense. Since the September 11
attacks, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has defended
the airspace of the United States and Canada through airspace
surveillance, a ready alert force, air patrols, and the National
Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System. For the air defense
mission, armed fighters are positioned across the United States and
Canada on alert to intercept and identify suspect aircraft, which
allows NORAD to be postured to defend against strategic airborne
threats to the United States and Canada. The Air National Guard
provides the majority of NORAD's operational force for Aerospace
Control Alert (ACA) missions. According to your testimony, providing
the National Guard with capable equipment is key to the ACA mission.
You also state that modernization of NORAD airframes is a requirement.
How does the Air Force's recent decision to significantly downsize the
Air National Guard in terms of equipment and personnel affect NORAD's
ACA missions?
General Jacoby. The Air National Guard is a key partner in
conducting NORAD operations. As such, NORAD will continue to advocate
for maintaining and increasing both NORAD and the Air National Guard
air defense capabilities wherever possible. Additionally, we are
working closely with our Joint Staff, Air Force, and Air National Guard
partners to ensure current and future requirements are met. Due to the
historically excellent stewardship NORAD has provided for air defense
assets and the firm commitment of the Air Force to support this
mission, I am confident that the Air Force will continue to support
NORAD with Total Force solutions we need to meet mission requirements.

9. Senator McCaskill. General Jacoby, what commitment has been made
by the Air Force to ensure that the aging airframes that support this
mission will be replaced in a timely manner in order to meet NORAD's
requirements?
General Jacoby. The Air Force is committed to the Service Life
Extension Program, which will allow NORAD assets to be effectively
utilized through the next decade while new airframes are added to the
Air Force inventory. We will continue to work closely with our Total
Force partners to ensure current and future mission requirements will
be met.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS

10. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, you stated in your testimony
that the routes controlled by transnational criminal organizations
(TCO) operating in the region represent potential access points that
could be leveraged by other groups, including international terrorist
groups. This is particularly concerning, as many of these routes lead
directly into the United States. The recently foiled attempt by Iran to
utilize unconventional resources in Central America to attempt an
attack on U.S. soil highlights a disturbing potential for further
terrorist activity in the region. Has U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
conducted an analysis of the vulnerabilities of these routes?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM continually conducts assessments of the
routes that TCOs use in our area of responsibility (AOR). We work with
the interagency and partner nations to determine vulnerabilities.
Identified vulnerabilities to date include porous borders and poorly
funded border control stations.

11. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, can you point to
characteristics of these routes that make them potentially attractive
assets to terrorist activities?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM studies the strengths and vulnerabilities
of illicit trafficking routes. The characteristics that make these
routes attractive to terrorist organizations are the same
characteristics that make them difficult to disrupt--they run through
undergoverned areas and across porous borders; they have illicitly
organized logistical support including refueling capacity at sea; they
are well-resourced, decentralized, and flexible, enabling traffickers
to adapt quickly to changes in the operational environment; and they
exploit our partner nations' lack of capabilities to develop
comprehensive land, air, and maritime awareness and conduct
intelligence-driven operations.

12. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, are you confident that our
intelligence is sufficient to identify potential attempts by
international terrorist groups to exploit the transnational drug
routes?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM is focused on this potential nexus.
However, identifying the intent and capability of terrorists and
illicit networks to cooperate presents a formidable challenge. We work
to mitigate this challenge by leveraging interagency capabilities and
through continued engagement with our partner nations.

13. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, has SOUTHCOM identified any
gaps in intelligence or resources needed to identify attempts by
international terrorist groups to utilize these routes?
General Fraser. Identification and monitoring of illicit
trafficking networks, which could be exploited by terrorist groups, is
a resource-intensive endeavor. Development of human intelligence
networks and enhanced signals intelligence capabilities are
particularly important in this effort, as well as collaborating with
our U.S. interagency partners, building partner-nation capabilities,
and sharing information.
SOUTHCOM relies on dozens of all-source intelligence collection
requirements to detect and monitor illicit trafficking routes. Most of
these requirements are shared by the intelligence and law enforcement
communities. Despite the submission of requirements, reporting on these
illegal networks remains inadequate.

14. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, are regional governments
engaged on this particular issue through specific SOUTHCOM programs and
operations?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM provides limited intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to support regional partners
faced with the threat of terrorist groups. In addition, SOUTHCOM has
several Memorandums of Understanding with select partner nations that
provide for information exchange in support of our partners' and
SOUTHCOM's regional objectives.
Outside of the intelligence realm, SOUTHCOM conducts various
training activities aimed at building partner-nation capacity to
control their maritime domain. These activities, although mostly aimed
at countering the illicit narcotics trade, are broadly applicable to
assist our partner nations in disrupting the maritime routes through
their sovereign territories.
Through our special operations component command, U.S. Special
Operations Command South, we are also training some of our partner-
nation tier-one forces in counterterrorism through Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET).

15. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, are there joint security
measures and programs in place to prevent terrorists from exploiting
these routes?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM works across the interagency and with our
partner nations every day in an effort to disrupt these routes and
disrupt illicit trafficking, whether it is by drug trafficking
organizations or international terrorist groups. JIATF-South is our key
component in detection and monitoring of illicit traffic, and it
exemplifies this unity of effort. Considered the linchpin in U.S.
counterdrug efforts, JIATF-South capitalizes on the unique
capabilities, authorities, and strengths of interagency partners such
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement
Administration, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
collaborative, interagency taskforce make-up allows for the quick
sharing and dissemination of any terrorism intelligence threads to
proper authorities. Operationally, JIATF-South's capital assets are
arrayed in the principal maritime and air trafficking routes through
the Caribbean and eastern Pacific and would, if intelligence suggested,
direct all its efforts to stopping a terrorist event.
We do see evidence of international terrorist groups benefitting
from the intertwined systems of illicit trafficking and money
laundering in our AOR; in South America, funding for Hizballah is
raised through licit avenues, such as charitable donations, and illicit
means, including trafficking in drugs, counterfeit, and pirated goods.
Understanding the complex financial flows of these networks can help
the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities focus our
efforts on groups engaging in activities that most directly threaten
U.S. national security. To this end, SOUTHCOM supports the U.S.
interagency through our network analysis and information sharing
capabilities.

16. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, which countries in the
region have been cooperative on counterterrorism planning and
prevention on a security cooperation level?
General Fraser. The following partner nations cooperate with DOD on
counterterrorism planning and prevention at the security cooperation
level: Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama,
Guyana, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago,
Belize, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, and Paraguay.
That said, most of the countries in the region do not share our
concern over international terrorism threats; instead, they are
concerned with criminal problems and frame their threats as such. The
main exceptions are the Governments of Colombia and Peru, which are
combating the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and Sendero
Luminoso, respectively. Regardless, law enforcement and
counterterrorism efforts are inextricably linked. In our AOR, these
duties are carried out by a combination of domestic law enforcement and
militaries. Therefore, we measure partner-nation cooperation through
the lenses of both our engagement efforts to counter TOC as well as
terrorism.
Our cooperation activities are guided by Title 10, U.S.C., and by
the counterdrug and counterterrorism sections of the National Defense
Authorization Act. Statutory requirements include detection and
monitoring of illicit narcotics trafficking (Sec. 124 U.S.C. 10); and
authorized activities include training, education, and resourcing host
nations' security forces; providing planning support to U.S. country
teams as they assist host-nation defense and security establishments;
and engaging key leaders in the region.

HEZBOLLAH

17. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, of particular concern to me
are reports of activity in South America by Hezbollah, including the
raising of funds through both licit and illicit means in the region.
Does SOUTHCOM have an assessment of how much funding has been raised by
Hezbollah in the region?
General Fraser. Determining exact amount of funds raised by
Hizballah in South America is difficult considering the permissive
environment and furtive manner in which funds are moved.
Notwithstanding, we assess Hizballah likely generates tens of millions
of dollars annually in South America.

18. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, how are these funds
logistically transferred back to finance Hezbollah's activities in the
Middle East?
General Fraser. Funds generated within the SOUTHCOM AOR in support
of Hizballah are transferred back to the Middle East in a variety of
ways. Specific transfer methods include bulk cash transfers via human
couriers, Hawaladars, electronic bank transfers, and the use of global
money laundering networks.

19. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, is there any evidence that a
portion of this funding is being used by Hezbollah for recruitment in
SOUTHCOM's AOR?
General Fraser. No. There is no evidence that this funding is used
to recruit in the region.

BRAZIL

20. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, the threats that fall under
SOUTHCOM's purview are particularly concerning because they are
transnational in nature. This increasingly complex security environment
will require invigorated partnerships that, likewise, span the region.
The U.S.-Brazil bilateral relationship is especially critical to
stability in the region and to the fight against the transnational
threats that the world faces today. As Brazil continues to grow as a
global leader, its role as a stabilizer in the region will become
increasingly important. What opportunities has SOUTHCOM identified for
enhanced security cooperation between the United States and Brazil?
General Fraser. Brazil is an increasingly developed country focused
on attaining regional and international leadership roles. With a robust
economy, the world's sixth largest, Brazil desires to be recognized as
a world leader. Their defense and security policies center on
maintaining a well-trained and professional military, and developing a
national defense industry base for foreign military sales and internal
use. A stable and capable Brazil promotes regional stability and is a
partner able to export and support military missions in response to
international crisis. SOUTHCOM continues to engage Brazil in mutually
beneficial areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
counter TOC, consequence management, counterproliferation, and science
and technology cooperation initiatives. SOUTHCOM also supports and
encourages Brazilian leadership and participation in regional and
global activities. This year, for the first time for any partner
military, Brazil has accepted the role as the Combined Force Maritime
Component Commander (CFMCC) for SOUTHCOM's Panamax 2012 exercise. The
Brazilian Government has also demonstrated willingness to deploy its
Armed Forces to conduct peacekeeping and stability operations in
support of the United Nations (U.N.) around the globe, including the
work they continue to do leading the U.N. Stabilization Mission in
Haiti.
Cybersecurity cooperation is another area that offers beneficial
engagement opportunities, especially with upcoming international
sporting events in Brazil (World Cup 2014, Olympics 2016). The
Brazilian Army, the strategic lead for cyber, has expressed mutual
interest in cyber engagements, particularly in the establishment of a
Joint Cyber Defense Center. Areas for cooperation include development
of joint cyber doctrine, joint cyber operations, and development of
cyber professionals.

21. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, in what ways is Brazil
uniquely positioned to increase security and stability in the region?
General Fraser. Brazil, the sixth largest economy in the world with
over 192 million people, increasingly focuses on attaining a regional
and international leadership role. Defense and security policies,
captured in their 2008 National Defense Strategy, provide strategic
guidance on maintaining a well-trained and professional military,
developing a national defense industrial base, and protecting natural
resources.
Brazilian Armed Forces are capable, well-funded, and willing to
export capacity to conduct regional and global peacekeeping and
stability operations. They have led the U.N. Stabilization Mission in
Haiti since 2004 and its significant contribution of Brazilian troops
reflects its global aspirations. They are also the leading maritime
component of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon's Maritime Task Force
with the deployment of a Brazilian Navy frigate.
Brazil's foreign policy emphasizes regional integration and
cooperation. They are members of Union of South American Nations and
its South American Defense Council; the participation of serious
partners such as Brazil in this organization can support our own
initiatives such as combating illicit trafficking, border security, et
cetera. They carry significant regional influence and their regional
strategic objectives usually align with U.S. interests.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

22. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, the rise of illicit
trafficking through Central America and the Caribbean coupled with the
vast resources available to traffickers have presented significant
challenges to the region. Some of the Caribbean and Central American
States' available resources are eclipsed by those available to
trafficking networks. SOUTHCOM has played an invaluable role in
partnering with these countries and acting as a capability multiplier
in the fight against these threats. Additionally, SOUTHCOM has worked
to bolster the capabilities of these governments by providing equipment
needed to counter trafficking. It is critical that this type of
assistance is sustainable and that the recipient governments have the
financial resources and the technical capabilities to use and maintain
these tools. What are you doing to ensure that governments that receive
assistance from SOUTHCOM are able to use and maintain equipment or
systems that we have provided to aid in the fight against trafficking?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM's focus is on developing specific partner-
nation operational capabilities that can contribute to a regional
strategy to counter TOC. The ability of individual partner nations to
maintain and sustain the capabilities the United States provides is a
critical consideration in the type and scope of support provided.
SOUTHCOM works diligently with our partner nations to ensure that they
are able to manage and maintain the equipment and systems they are
provided to build their capacity to execute counter TOC missions. To
facilitate both the near- and long-term maintenance and sustainment of
equipment purchased for our partner nations, we use a variety of
methods, such as: vendor contracted training, mobile training teams
(MTT), and individual Service specific training in the United States. A
specific example of contracted training is the Maintenance Operational
Support Teams that support a variety of programs such as the Harris
Radio sustainment for the interdiction boats provided to our partner
nations, the Jeep J8 vehicles provided to our partner nations to
support border security operations, and the Boston Whaler engine and
hull maintenance training which also support maritime interdiction
efforts. MTTs and individual training at U.S. Service schools also
serve to provide specific training for the use and maintenance of a
variety of equipment in the maritime, air, land, and border security
areas. The desired end state of our multifaceted training and
maintenance efforts is to provide our partner nations the ability to
operate independently against the threat, as an interoperable partner
in joint efforts with their regional neighbors, and as an integrated
element of the JIATF-South operational framework providing synergy to
United States/partner-nation regional counter TOC efforts.

23. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, in these cases, how has the
U.S. Government worked to help fill these capability gaps?
General Fraser. To fully implement our regional strategy to counter
TOC we are focused on multiple domains, to include maritime, air, land,
and border security/checkpoints. Our main focus is in the maritime
arena because that is the primary mode of transportation by which drugs
flow from the source zone to the United States. To develop capability
in the maritime domain, we are working closely with our partner nations
to emplace the basic infrastructure needed for sustainment of their
maritime assets, to establish an integrated command and control system,
and to provide the boats, spare parts, and trained crews needed.
Similarly, in the air domain, we are working with our partner nations
to provide a modest integrated Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)
capability through the procurement and installation of Forward Looking
Infrared Radars and surface search radars for their available aircraft.
Guatemala's MPA should be operational this fiscal year; and Honduras
and Belize are programmed for similar capability in the out-years. In
the land and border security areas, we are training and providing newly
formed border units with the mobility, infrastructure, and command and
control needed to better manage and control their border areas.
Additionally, we continue to cooperate with U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) to ensure synchronization and coordination of the efforts of
the Guatemalan, Belizean, and Mexican Governments along their shared
borders. We also continue to work with partner nations in and outside
of our AOR, such as Colombia, Chile, and Canada, to coordinate their
security cooperation efforts aimed at improving the counter TOC
capabilities of our Central American partner nations.

24. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, has the U.S. Government
provided services or funding in support of these systems when the host
government could not?
General Fraser. Yes, however, I must caveat my response with the
fact that in most instances it is not due to a lack of will or desire
from our partner nations to address what they have come to increasingly
accept as regional challenges. Resources are provided primarily to
those countries that demonstrate a willingness to execute operations to
counter TOC within their sovereign spaces, but may lack the ability to
maintain systems on their own. For example, Nicaragua is our most
responsive maritime partner in Central America. When JIATF-South
requests assistance against an intelligence-cued target, the Nicaraguan
Navy responds with what limited capability it has. Guatemala, at
significant cost, has refurbished the engines on a seized B-200
aircraft that, with U.S. assistance and additional equipment, will now
be employed as a MPA providing dedicated support to JIATF-South
requirements. Honduras is one of the poorest countries in the region,
yet continues to provide direct support to ongoing JIATF-South and JTF-
Bravo-led operations in their country. In cases like these, SOUTHCOM
attempts to capitalize on partner-nation willingness by supplementing
their limitations in order to maintain a viable regional counter TOC
strategy.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

MEXICO

25. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, over 50,000 people have been
killed since the start of the drug war in 2007. In 2010 alone 15,237
people have died and 2011 is reported to be another recordsetting year
in deaths. The United States contributes $1.4 billion through the
Merida Initiative, DHS is operating unmanned aerial vehicles over the
border to stop smugglers, the United States has sold Black Hawk
helicopters to help in the fight, and NORTHCOM has used their Avenger
systems to detect low-flying aircraft on the border. NORTHCOM is also
expanding military-to-military training, which has been nonexistent in
the past. On the U.S. side of the border, NORTHCOM works with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, and many others to secure the borders
and reduce criminal/terrorist activities. How would you gauge our
military-to-military training and what is your assessment of
capabilities of the Mexican military?
General Jacoby. In October 2002, NORTHCOM inherited a limited
existing military training program from SOUTHCOM that we have grown
considerably, given the expansion of the security challenge in Mexico
and the increase in requests for our training. To provide an
illustration of this growth, in 2003, NORTHCOM provided $2.75 million
in counternarcotics training, professional military education and
training, and technical training. In 2011, we provided $16.774 million
in training and the forecast for fiscal year 2012 is $24.087 million,
all at the request of the Mexican military. This includes a broad
spectrum of courses such as extensive flight training for aircrew and
maintenance personnel, attendance at our war colleges and staff
colleges, counterterrorism training for senior members, and training in
Human Rights, Rule of Law, Civil-Military Relations, Force Protection,
Counter Improvised Explosive Device, Counter Narcotics Planning,
Specialized Skills, Public Affairs, Military Operations in Urban
Terrain, English Language, Maritime Boarding Operations, Small Craft
Operations, Combat Life Saving, Search and Rescue, Command and Control,
and many other areas.
My assessment is that this training has greatly strengthened our
bilateral relationship by opening new doors in the areas of
information-sharing and exercise participation. It is also providing
the Mexican military with valuable tools that have significantly
contributed to record seizures of illicit narcotics, weapons,
contraband, and helped fortify the Mexican northern, southern, and
maritime border regions.

26. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, with the upcoming presidential
election in Mexico, do you foresee any changes to the way in which the
war on drugs is being waged?
General Jacoby. The political campaign season is currently underway
in Mexico, the outcome of which will be a new administration. I believe
any new Mexican Government will continue to partner with us in the
shared interest of countering threats posed by TCOs.

27. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, do you have adequate funding
for a layered defense or have we cut our capacity too far to secure our
Nation?
General Jacoby. NORAD and NORTHCOM are adequately funded to
successfully provide an active, layered defense of the Homeland. Our
Service partners have had to make some very tough decisions as DOD
sought to meet the $487 billion reduction in spending mandated by the
Budget Control Act. I believe the Homeland was treated fairly and
treated as job number one. However, an important aspect of defense in
depth is the strength of our key partners. We defend in depth in many
ways through our partnerships. DHS, the Department of State, and their
funding are also critical to providing the means by which our Homeland
is secured.

GROUND-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE

28. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, I remember during the Clinton
administration, the then-Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General Henry
Shelton, reaffirmed that U.S. intelligence would know at least 3 years
before North Korea posed an ICBM threat. Homeland defense is listed as
the first policy priority in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR). The GMD system in Alaska and California is currently the only
missile defense system that protects the U.S. Homeland from long-range
ballistic missile attacks. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a
three-stage Taepodong-2 missile. The missile travelled 3,200 km before
crashing in the Pacific Ocean. The TPD-2 is designed to have a range
over 4,000 miles which would be far enough to reach the United States.
One week later, North Korea surprised the world by testing a missile
with intercontinental range. Intelligence has estimated that North
Korea may have the capability to successfully launch a Taepodong-2
missile with a 200 kg warhead by 2015 with a range of 6,000 to 7,500
miles . . . putting a majority of the United States within range of
this missile. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted a second nuclear
test. North Korea is not only pursuing their own nuclear and ballistic
missile capabilities, but they also are potentially selling missiles,
material, and technology to other countries to include Iran. GBIs are
being refurbished currently at Fort Greely, AK. You have stated that as
North Korea and other states develop their missile technology, we
cannot sit idly by without improving our own systems. What is your
command doing to ensure that our missile defense can meet all future
threats?
General Jacoby. I'm closely assessing the evolving development of
regional threats and if ever I believe our efforts may be falling
behind those threats, I will strongly advocate for increased funding
and oppose cuts that would negatively impact my ability to protect the
Homeland. I continue to work closely with the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) and other partners across the ballistic missile community in
developing capabilities to outpace the threat. Furthermore, I continue
to advocate for a more robust testing program to validate both current
and future capabilities that comprise the GMD system and to baseline
models and simulations used in training and certification of our GMD
(operational) personnel.

29. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, how confident are you in the
GMD program to protect our east coast and intercept missiles
originating from the Middle East?
General Jacoby. Against current threats from the Middle East, I am
confident we are well-postured. As with North Korea, we must ensure we
have agile programs and good intelligence that allow us to stay ahead
of the threat.

30. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, can you discuss how your
command is testing our assets to ensure reliability?
General Jacoby. The MDA conducts the actual testing, though
NORTHCOM provides operational participation in the testing program,
from flight tests to ground tests. We also review and provide inputs
into MDA's test campaign plan. I am comfortable with the current
Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) schedule for testing of the GMD
system. A robust testing regime must be sustained.

31. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, do you have enough assets to
conduct this testing?
General Jacoby. I am confident there are sufficient GMD test assets
to support the latest IMTP.

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND NATURAL DISASTER RESPONSE

32. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, the integration of Active,
Reserve, Guard, and interagency elements into your headquarters and the
makeup of your subordinate units makes NORTHCOM one of the most diverse
agencies this government has. As we all know, without our Guard and
Reserve Forces, it would be impossible to conduct operations abroad
while ensuring that our Homeland is secure and safe. Like you, I am
also concerned about the impact the slip in the F-35 program and aging
F-16 fleet are going to have on our air sovereignty sites and our Air
National Guard. As we both know, seven of our air sovereignty alert
sites are flying F-16s which are currently scheduled to reach the end
of their service life between 2020 and 2023. The dual status commander
role was approved for a National Guard officer to be in command of both
National Guard and Reserve component forces when reacting to natural
disasters within the United States. Will we be able to maintain our air
sovereignty alert sites given the slip in the F-35 programs and
scheduled retirement of our oldest F-16s?
General Jacoby. Yes, we are working diligently with our Total Force
partners to ensure current and future mission requirements are met. In
addition to being an advocate for NORAD and Air National Guard air
defense capabilities, I am closely monitoring force provider programs
to make certain that NORAD has the assets we require to accomplish all
mission taskings. For example, 24/7 alert operations reductions at two
air sovereignty alert sites for fiscal year 2013 will not affect
aircraft retention at those sites. NORAD will retain the ability to
conduct operations at these sites as required, to include operations at
higher levels of readiness. Additionally, any future reduction at air
sovereignty alert sites will not be initiated without a thorough
analysis of its effect on air defense operations and an accompanying
risk mitigation strategy. This will allow NORAD to evolve operations
and meet all of the threats posed by our adversaries.

33. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, do you believe that you have
the right mix of Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard present
within your command?
General Jacoby. Yes. We have met all mission taskings with the
current mix of Active Duty and Reserve component support provided by
the Services. We will continue to work hand-in-hand with our Total
Force partners to ensure current and future mission requirements are
met.

34. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, what is your perspective on the
state of our National Guard and Reserves and their ability to provide
support in times of crisis?
General Jacoby. The National Guard has a long and distinguished
history of responding to our Nation's crises. As a combatant commander
advocate for the Reserve component, I work to ensure that they have the
appropriate resources necessary to be able to respond to NORAD and
NORTHCOM mission requirements when needed. I am proud of NORTHCOM's
current collaborations with the National Guard Bureau in areas like the
Dual-Status Commander and the CBRN Enterprise and expect these and
other programs to continue to mature in the near future.
I have the same level of confidence in the capabilities of our
Reserve Forces and the critical roles they can play in responding to a
crisis in NORTHCOM's AOR. The authorities Congress recently granted the
President to mobilize Reserves for significant domestic emergencies
will greatly enhance the ability of the Nation to leverage the robust
capacity within the Reserve Force. NORTHCOM is actively engaged with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services
and their Reserve Commands, and our Subordinate Commands to develop
plans and procedures to take full advantage of the updated law to allow
timely, total-force support to civil authorities in a disaster.

35. Senator Inhofe. General Jacoby, what has NORTHCOM done to
ensure disaster relief operations are run smoothly and efficiently now
that the dual status commander has become law?
General Jacoby. NORTHCOM has established a cadre of both potential
Dual Status Commanders and Title 10 Deputy Commanders. In addition, we
have developed procedures that focus on the training, planning, and
execution of duties during pre-planned and no-notice events. These
procedures were first implemented during the initial response to
Hurricane Irene and have been further refined during State-level
exercises in California and Arizona last fall.
Our Defense Coordinating Officers and their elements continue to
engage with DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
at the regional planning and execution level. This ensures that current
and future efforts are focused on the integration of National Guard and
Title 10 forces that will respond to an event at a State's request.

JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

36. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, the prosecution of terrorist
detainees belongs in a military tribunal not because it ensures a
particular result, but because it is the best way to present classified
information and present evidence that has been taken from the
battlefield. SOUTHCOM is principally responsible for operating
facilities at Guantanamo Bay, some of which are used to detain
individuals and have been used to adjudicate them. The budget request
for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) includes money to finance all
aspects of detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay. What is your
impression of the operations, quality of our personal, and treatment of
detainees at Guantanamo Bay?
General Fraser. Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) conducts
safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody of detainees.
Eighty percent of the detainee population resides in a communal setting
which has reduced the number of assaults and incidents that have
occurred against the guard force. Those in a communal setting can eat,
pray, and recreate together. We also employ a Strategic Cultural
Consultant, who has been at Guantanamo since 2005. The Cultural
Consultant, along with our Muslim interpreters, ensures we are
culturally aware and religiously sensitive when conducting detainee
operations.
We continue to work very closely with the International Committee
of the Red Cross which sends delegations to observe our detention
conditions and medical care six times a year. They have access to, and
conduct interviews with, all detainees.
Detainees have access to news and watch worldwide events. Despite
the dynamic international environment, there have been fairly few
incidents within the camps because of strong leadership oversight and
the professionalism of the Joint Task Force's personnel.

37. Senator Inhofe. General Fraser, can you explain why we are
using taxpayers' money to develop a soccer field that costs $774,000 at
Guantanamo Bay?
General Fraser. Under Common Article III to the Geneva Conventions
(GC) and DOD policy, the U.S. Government has an obligation to treat
persons detained at Guantanamo humanely. One element of humane
treatment is to provide opportunities for detainees to participate in
recreation, study, sports, and games. In analyzing this issue, the 2009
Walsh Report applied Article 38 of the GC III (Treatment of Prisoners
of War) and Article 94 of GC IV (Protection of Civilian Persons); these
Articles ``provide that detainees are encouraged to participate in
intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, as well as sports
and games. In addition, all possible facilities and equipment are to be
provided for this purpose, including sufficient space for outdoor
exercise and sports. Detainees in a disciplinary status are to be
allowed to exercise and stay in the open air at least 2 hours daily.''
Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross regularly
visits JTF-GTMO to observe conditions of detention, which includes how
JTF-GTMO accommodates and improves recreation over the course of longer
term ``Law of War'' detention.
In early 2011, Camp 4 closed and the remaining detainees were moved
into Camp 6. As a result of this consolidation, JTF-GTMO has been able
to reduce its guard requirement by roughly 150 troops, for a total
reduction of roughly 200 personnel, saving more than $4 million per
year.
The Camp 6 Recreation Yard was built as part of the consolidations
to replicate a similar recreation yard to the one that was in Camp 4.
The recreation yard required security features such as dual containment
fences and two-vehicle access gates; all managed from three climate
controlled guard towers. Security fenced walkways from the camp
building to the yard have several electronic locking gates to
selectively control the movement of detainees from eight different cell
blocks, reducing guard escort requirements and physical interaction.
The field, path, and security fenced walk-ways are constructed of dirt
and gravel and are lighted with full security lights. These
requirements enhance security and safety for both guards and detainees.
All construction costs for JTF-GTMO carry an additional cost factor
of approximately 55 percent because of the unique nature of operating
an isolated base. Construction projects are more expensive due to the
costs to support all labor, shipping costs, and energy costs. Unlike
other overseas bases, the company that did the construction is a U.S.-
owned company and all materials were shipped to Guantanamo from U.S.
suppliers. Once completed, the project will cost $744,000.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

NORTH KOREA

38. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, in your written statement you
stated that we must not allow regional actors, such as North Korea, to
hold U.S. policy hostage by making our citizens vulnerable to a nuclear
ICBM attack. As Senator McCain noted in the world wide threat briefing
earlier this year, North Korea is developing ever-more sophisticated
ballistic missiles. Based on North Korea's development of ICBMs, do you
believe that North Korea is becoming a direct threat to the United
States?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

39. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, do you believe North Korea will
likely possess an ICBM ballistic missile capable of targeting the
continental United States within the next 5 years?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

40. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, what more should be done to
ensure the people of the United States are protected now and in the
future from North Korean missile attacks?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

MISSILE DEFENSE--SEA-BASED X-BAND RADAR

41. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, you write in your prepared
testimony that, ``we must be better prepared to respond to threats that
give us little to no advance warning, which places a tremendous burden
on the low-density, high-demand sensors we have available today to
detect these threats and places a greater emphasis on our requirements
for tracking through all phases of flight. This requires pursuing
future sensor capability, such as the space-based PTSS, ensuring we
have the highest level of GMD for the Homeland.'' Yet, the MDA has
chosen to place the sea-based x-band radar (SBX) in a limited test and
contingency operations status. Doesn't removing SBX from day-to-day
operational readiness run counter to your recommendation to be better
prepared to respond to threats that give us little to no advance
warning?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

42. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, how long would it take to get
SBX prepared for operations assuming you had warnings of a threat?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

43. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, can we count on being warned in
time to activate SBX?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

44. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, why was this decision made to
remove the SBX from day-to-day operational readiness?
General Jacoby. Until recently, the primary function of SBX has
been to support research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of
the GMD system. Due to concerns about where best to base it, the high
cost of operation, and the associated risk of the SBX not being
available when needed, it has not been the key contributor we once
expected it to be operationally.

45. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, what was the rationale for this
decision?
General Jacoby. Until recently, the primary function of SBX has
been to support RDT&E of the GMD system. Due to concerns about where
best to base it, the high cost of operation, and the associated risk of
the SBX not being available when needed, it has not been the key
contributor we once expected it to be operationally.

46. Senator Ayotte. General Jacoby, are we doing all we can to
defend the Homeland against long-range missile threats?
General Jacoby. Yes. I am confident in my ability to successfully
defend the Homeland from the current set of limited long-range
ballistic missile threats. However, we must remain vigilant because of
the uncertainty of threat intentions and capabilities, and we must also
continue our efforts to develop, refine, and adapt the capabilities of
our defense against a ballistic missile attack.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

C-130 TRANSFER FROM FORT WORTH

47. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, one of NORTHCOM's primary civil
support missions is to conduct domestic disaster relief operations. The
Gulf Coast has seen its fair share of natural disasters over the last
decade. Certain assets are extremely valuable--even critical--in
responding to these disasters. What is your assessment of the value the
C-130 capability brings to disaster response efforts?
General Jacoby. While the C-130 has proven its worth in peace and
war, typically there are a number of equipment systems that can provide
capabilities to support DOD civil support requests. As such, we do not
request specific aircraft platforms, but rather capabilities. In turn,
the Joint Staff and uniformed Services prioritize needs and provide
available DOD assets that best meet the needs of the support we
request. The bottom line is that I trust the Total Force to meet
NORTHCOM's requirements needed for disaster response.

48. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, the U.S. Air Force recently
announced a decision to transfer all eight Texas Air National Guard C-
130s from the 136th Airlift Wing in Texas out of the Gulf region
entirely, sending them to Montana. Were you consulted on this decision
prior to its release?
General Jacoby. We were fully aware of and tracked Air Force
aircraft basing decisions throughout the duration of the budget
process. If there had been any impact to our missions, we would have
provided input to the Air Force.

49. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, it is my understanding that
there are no other Air National Guard C-130s currently stationed in the
other Gulf States: Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, or Florida. On
March 5, all five Gulf Coast Governors sent a letter to President Obama
strongly advising against the relocation of the 136th Airlift Wing's C-
130s, arguing that, ``losing the C-130s takes away a powerful airlift
asset for saving the lives of Gulf Coast States citizens.'' These
governors have relied heavily on these eight C-130s in recent years,
including in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The 136th has flown
423 sorties in response to storms, safely evacuated 3,143 passengers,
and delivered 939 tons of emergency aid. Removing these eight C-130s
from Texas and eliminating their proximity to the Gulf Coast seems like
a profound mistake. What is your assessment of the impact on disaster
recovery efforts along the Gulf Coast if these eight aircraft are moved
from Texas to Montana?
General Jacoby. As is the case with all natural disasters, local
and State authorities work together to address, respond, and provide
disaster response and recovery. When local and State resources are
exhausted, civilian officials/agencies request Federal assistance
through the Request For Assistance (RFA) process. NORTHCOM provides the
command and control for DOD assets deployed in support of disaster
relief to fill local and State capability gaps. Because NORTHCOM has
access to several DOD force providers, we are able to respond to these
requests and meet the needs through several options without having
ready-alert forces for a specific need.

50. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, as NORTHCOM commander, what is
your preference in these disaster situations--for governors to employ
the Air Guard or for NORTHCOM to wait for assigned Active or Reserve
component C-130s when necessary to execute missions as ordered by the
President?
General Jacoby. The basis of our National Response Framework is to
employ local and State capabilities prior to a Federal response.

51. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, which force is more capable,
historically, of responding in the shortest amount of time?
General Jacoby. Response time is dependent on the situation,
location of an incident, and the capability required. We do not have
data to suggest one force is quicker to respond than another, but have
identified capabilities that meet requirements for any given situation.
When disaster strikes, we assess and plan in concert with myriad
stakeholders to be ready to provide relief assistance when and where
needed.

52. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, would you agree that a governor
can mobilize Air National Guard assets within hours, while the
execution of a Federal response could take days?
General Jacoby. Local and State authorities have regulated
processes that enable them to respond to need, as required. Likewise,
NORTHCOM has regulated processes that facilitate DOD assistance to
local and State authorities, when requested. NORTHCOM also has the
capability to rapidly employ DOD forces, if needed, and also has
options for decreasing response time, if needed. For instance, a State
can verbally request Federal assistance and NORTHCOM can in turn
receive and execute verbal orders to respond in order to meet the need
of the local and State authorities.
In addition, recent enhancements to Federal procedures have
facilitated an expedited Federal response. For Hurricane Irene, in
August 2011, these enhancements enabled a pre-event mission assignment
and funds from FEMA that allowed deliberate, prudent pre-staging of
Title 10 assets in New England, poised for any regional need.
Speed of Federal response is a factor of speed of request and
priority of effort.

MEXICO

53. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, General Burgess recently
testified before this committee that Mexican President Felipe
Calderon's aggressive campaign against TCOs has resulted in Mexican
security forces having captured or killed 21 of Mexico's 37 most wanted
traffickers. What is your assessment of the progress that has been made
since Calderon took office in December 2006?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

54. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, Mexico will hold presidential
elections this summer. In your opinion, if the next President of Mexico
loses focus on combating the drug cartels and strengthening the rule of
law, what would the likely impact be?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

55. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, can the progress that has been
made since 2006 be sustained if the Mexican Government's attention is
focused elsewhere?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

56. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, how would an increased level of
threat most likely impact the United States?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

57. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, in your prepared testimony you
highlight the Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement (CE2) program
which supports all aspects of the mission-critical NORAD and NORTHCOM
Exercise and Engagement program. You note the CE2 program helps to
build partner capacity and readiness across your AOR. Can you elaborate
on this program's scope and success in Mexico?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

58. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, your prepared testimony states,
``As requested by Mexico, NORTHCOM cooperates with the Mexican military
in support of their efforts to build capabilities and capacities to
employ against TCOs. Above all, we will continue to respect Mexico's
sovereignty and we stand ready to increase coordination and
collaboration to the extent Mexico desires and in accordance with U.S.
Government policies.'' Please elaborate on what type of increased
coordination NORTHCOM could provide, if requested to do so by the
Mexican Government?
General Jacoby. NORTHCOM is prepared to increase the scale and
scope of coordination across the operational spectrum as requested by
the Mexican Government and within the authorities we are allowed as a
geographic combatant command. I believe that counter threat finance is
an area we could better exploit to disrupt the funding streams fueling
TCOs. I also believe that our activities in supporting human rights and
rule of law training could be further expanded in the areas of laws,
transparency, enforcement, prosecution, and incarceration.

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

59. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, you state that DOD is exploring
its spectrum of authorities to improve support to law enforcement
agencies and its ability to interdict transnational threats. To date,
what potential modifications have you identified that could enhance
DOD's ability to support its interagency partners or cooperation with
Mexican partners?
General Jacoby. In the short-term, I believe that there are
procedural and policy changes that we can effect within my command, and
within DOD, that will result in more efficient and operationally
flexible support to our law enforcement agencies and international
partners. My staff is working with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to realize these policy revisions in order to achieve the
desired end state. From a long-term perspective, we are reviewing
existing legislation with DOD to see if there are modifications that
would facilitate better support to our interagency and international
partners, from a detection and monitoring standpoint.

60. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, General Fraser's prepared
testimony highlighted the continued success of JIATF-South, noting
that, ``In 2011, JIATF-South operations resulted in the disruption of
117 metric tons of cocaine, denying illicit traffickers approximately
$3 billion in revenue. Our return on investment is substantial; in
2010, JIATF-South supported the interdiction of eight times the amount
of cocaine than was interdicted on the southwest border, at a third of
the cost and in an operating area that covers 42 million square
miles.'' In your opinion, what factors can you point to that account
for this disparity in cocaine interdiction and cost of operations
between JIATF-South's AOR and the southwest border region?
General Jacoby. The first movement of cocaine from the source zone
typically occurs in large movements via non-commercial air and maritime
trafficking. TCOs are in the money-making business, therefore, many of
the routes they transit not only exploit weakness in our visibility of
their movements, but they are also the most cost-effective routes. The
JIATF-South area of operation and focus remains on interdicting these
large loads shortly after departure--by design, each interdiction does
result in a large return on investment. As the drugs move closer to the
U.S. market, though, the TCOs generally break the narcotics into many
smaller packages to reduce the visibility and risk of interdiction by
law enforcement agencies.
By contrast, the NORTHCOM supporting effort along the southwest
border consists of merely $10 million through the Counternarcotics
Central Transfer Account, which is executed by NORTHCOM's Joint Task
Force North (JTF-N) annually. DOD's Uniformed Services do not receive
specific counternarcotics funding to support domestic law enforcement
agencies. This NORTHCOM effort supports a larger U.S. Government
interagency effort to maintain the North American Free Trade Agreement,
while stemming the flow of all illicit trafficking across our Nation's
border. The fiscal year 2011 NORTHCOM domestic support resulted in the
interdiction of over $52 million of marijuana and various smaller
values of narcotics and undocumented aliens that were seized
principally along the southwest border.

61. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, you note that, ``NORTHCOM's
role in the border security mission is to provide DOD support to U.S.
and foreign law enforcement agencies. Through our subordinate unit,
JTF-N, we provide mutually-beneficial DOD support in a broad range of
unique military categories. Our vision is for JTF-N to be the most
effective integrator of DOD support to law enforcement agencies.'' One
improvement you highlight is the new DHS comprehensive campaign
planning process, which you state will help support the development of
DHS and DOJ strategic guidance, increase interagency planner
cooperation, and ultimately improve unity of effort and synchronization
of resources for countering illegal drugs and other transnational
threats. Another improvement you cite is the military intelligence
training support provided to the DHS-led Border Intelligence Fusion
Section (BIFS) within the DOJ-led El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).
As I understand it, the BIFS develops operational intelligence products
to share with interagency partners for their use in early cueing,
warning, and interdiction operations. Although JTF-N and EPIC are both
located in El Paso, they are separate entities. What is your assessment
of the value of potentially fully integrating the structure and
functions of JTF-N and EPIC, or potentially standing up a new
interagency coordination entity, based on the JIATF-South model, that
would focus solely on the southwest border?
General Jacoby. I support any integration arrangement that provides
greater unity of effort. Since TCOs swiftly adapt to changes in the
operational environment, an integrated interagency entity would
facilitate an agile decisionmaking process to outpace changing threat
vectors. Additionally, there are synergies to be gained by drawing on
the authorities and core competencies of multiple agencies and
departments. Experience has taught us that interagency operations on
the southwest border benefit from tighter integration and more
comprehensive, intelligence-driven operations. The JTF-N partnership
with BIFS that you mention has enhanced intelligence fusing and
produced an improved common intelligence picture. The blending of law
enforcement agency and DOD structures and functions effectively bridges
gaps between Homeland security and Homeland defense missions to protect
our Nation.

MISSILE DEFENSE

62. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, please describe in detail what
metrics you will use to agree to reduce the shot doctrine for
protection of the contiguous United States (CONUS) against long-range
missile threats?
General Jacoby. We continue to work with the MDA and will evaluate
their proposal to reduce shot doctrine as part of the IMTP process. As
we assess improvements to the 2018-2020 architecture and evaluate
potential threats, a reduced NORTHCOM shot doctrine may be possible.

63. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, when was the last drill or
exercise conducted by NORTHCOM against a theoretical or hypothetical
unauthorized or accidental launch by a Russian or Chinese ICBM directed
at CONUS?
General Jacoby. NORTHCOM conducted exercises against similar launch
events during Vigilant Shield 12.

64. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, are you comfortable that there
will not be an intercept test of the GMD system involving an ICBM
target until 2015, yet a mobile ICBM threat against CONUS may develop
sooner than that?
General Jacoby. We are confident the available GMD interceptors are
capable of defending the Homeland against a regional threat and are
therefore comfortable with the current IMTP schedule for a test against
an ICBM target.

65. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, what were the findings of the
NORTHCOM GBI study conducted before the 2010 BMDR?
General Jacoby. The classified findings are contained in the July
2008 GBI study, which we delivered to the Senate Armed Services
Committee in August 2010. As stated in the transmittal memo that was
signed by my predecessor, ``we believe the GBI study commissioned by
NORTHCOM, which was narrowly focused on the homeland defense challenge,
has been superseded by a more robust global approach.''

66. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, please describe whether and why
the Cobra Dane radar is an important capability for CONUS defense.
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

67. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, how does the decision to remove
the SBX from day-to-day operational readiness affect the capability of
the GMD system?
General Jacoby. Removal of SBX from the operational architecture
will not negatively affect the capability of the GMD system.

68. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, how much warning time is
necessary to make SBX operational, in the event of a threat to the
United States?
General Jacoby. Until recently, the primary function of SBX has
been to support RDT&E of the GMD system. Due to concerns about where
best to base it, the high cost of operation, and the associated risk of
the SBX not being available when needed, it has not been the key
contributor we once expected it to be operationally.

69. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, how much lead time would
NORTHCOM need to ensure all available GBI silos would be outfitted with
available GBIs?
General Jacoby. MDA is the organization that would emplace GBIs
into silos. Currently, all available GBIs are emplaced in silos, with
the exception of testing designated GBIs.

70. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, what is the maximum number of
GBIs the United States could deploy each year through 2024?
General Jacoby. The maximum number of GBIs deployed is predicated
on the amount of funding allocated to the production of GBIs. The
current program of record calls for a buy of 57 GBIs. According to MDA,
the rough order of magnitude projection for the production and delivery
rate is about two GBIs per year.

71. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, if there were 10 ICBMs deployed
by North Korea by the end of 2012, would we have enough GBIs to defend
CONUS under current shot doctrine?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

72. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, how about 20 North Korean ICBMs
by 2020, under current and proposed MDA shot doctrine in 2020?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

73. Senator Cornyn. General Jacoby, what are the plans to deploy
SM-3 IIB by 2020 to defend CONUS from North Korean ICBMs?
General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We want to welcome
Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General Amos to the
committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs of
the Department of the Navy in our review of the fiscal year
2013 annual budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO)
request.
We greet Admiral Greenert as he makes his first appearance
before the committee as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). We
want to wish General Amos good health as he recovers from a
visit to the flight surgeon. You look terrific, General, you
really do; and we all know about what you've come through with
flying colors and we're just delighted you're here and looking
so fit.
We are grateful to each of you for your service to our
Nation and for the valorous and truly professional service of
the men and women with whom you serve. We are also very
grateful to their families, knowing the vital role that
families play in the success of careers and missions of our
armed forces.
Two recent changes make the defense budget situation
challenging for the Services in particular. First is the Budget
Control Act passed by Congress last summer, which places
limitations on funding for our national security; and second is
adapting to its changing role in the new strategic guidance
announced by the President last January. Each of our Services
has that challenge.
The Department of Defense's (DOD) most recent defense
strategic guidance, issued in January, refocuses the U.S.
military on the Asia-Pacific and, consistent with that
strategy, DOD has been working to realign U.S. military forces
in countries like South Korea and Japan, and also plans to
position Navy and Marine Corps forces further to the south in
countries like Australia, Singapore, and possibly others.
As we rebalance and realign our presence in the Asia
Pacific, it is important that we not only get strategy right,
but also get sustainability right. This is particularly true
for the Marine Corps. With respect to the realignment of the
marines on Okinawa, for instance, Senator McCain, Senator Webb,
and I have advocated changes to the current plan in ways that
support the strategic goals of the U.S. military posture in the
region, while also accounting for the fiscal, political, and
diplomatic realities associated with long-term sustainability.
Last month, the United States and Japan announced that they
intend to amend certain elements of the plan, including the
delinking of the movement of marines off Okinawa from the
progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility and adjusting the
unit composition and number of marines that will move to Guam.
As the details of these changes are finalized, it is important
that any changes be jointly agreed upon and jointly announced
with Japan, with the goal of achieving a more viable and
sustainable U.S. presence in Japan and on Guam.
As we discuss the budget issues here at home, our thoughts
are principally focused on places far from here. Nearly 20,000
marines are partnered with an approximately equal number of Air
Force security forces in Afghanistan in the effort to bring
security and stability to the people of that country. In
addition, our Navy forces at sea in the U.S. Central Command
area of responsibility (AOR) are joined by another 10,000
sailors on the ground, most supporting our combat forces in
Afghanistan.
We all deeply regret the tragic loss of civilian life in
Afghanistan apparently caused by one of our soldiers last week.
The investigation of that incident needs to go forward
expeditiously and transparently, with the due process that is
also one of those core values that we hold dear as Americans.
We should not lose sight of the fact that our goals remain
clear: to train indigenous Afghan forces; to provide for the
security of the Afghan people; and to support them while they
get larger, stronger, and more capable.
The Taliban's goals are just as clear. They regularly
engage in terrorist acts against Afghan civilians in an attempt
to achieve their political aims. We should not let one tragic
incident which violates our laws and values to muddy the
difference between the Taliban and most of the rest of the
world.
Last year we saw how naval forces could support national
goals on short notice in Libya. Among those forces we had:
first, missile-launching ships that struck Libyan targets;
second, military aircraft supporting coalition operations; and
third, unmanned aerial vehicles providing intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support.
Navy and Marine Corps forces also played a significant role
in aiding the Japanese tsunami relief effort. On our visit to
Japan, the people, still stunned, were most grateful to the
United States for the assistance that we provided.
The use and the possible use of our forces overseas makes
it even more important that our budget provide for their
success and their wellbeing.
Our witnesses this morning are faced with a number of large
challenges that confront the Navy in the budget, such as
balancing modernization needs against the costs of supporting
ongoing operations. Indeed, we face a number of issues that
will need our attention as we review the DOD authorization
request. Making reductions to the shipbuilding plan and
retiring ships earlier than planned, the result will be that
the fleet will not grow to the previously stated goal of 313
ships, but fall from its current level of 288 and only return
to the level of 288 at the end of the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP). The Navy had made modest progress in increasing
the size of the Navy fleet from a low of 274 ships in March
2007, but that progress would be suspended with this budget.
Another challenge, retiring seven Aegis cruisers earlier
than planned rather than modernizing them; delaying the Ohio
replacement program or the SSBNX by 2 years, although the Navy
testified just last year that we needed to maintain the
original SSBNX schedule to ensure that we meet our strategic
deterrent patrol requirements.
Other challenges are reducing the end strength of the
Active component of the Marine Corps from 202,000 beginning
this year to 182,000 by the end of fiscal year 2016 and
modernizing the amphibious tractor fleet with programs for the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and the Marine Personnel
Carrier (MPC) that would replace the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle cancelled last year.
In this authorization request, we are also being asked to
commit future Congresses to several multi-year procurement
programs, including ones for the Virginia-class submarine, the
DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers, and the V-22
tactical lift aircraft.
If we approve these proposals we will be monitoring these
very closely to ensure that DOD actually achieves the proposed
savings and gets costs under control in other acquisition
programs. The future strength of the Navy depends on holding
firm on its cost reduction efforts and expanding them across
the whole acquisition portfolio.
The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires
that DOD make significant changes in its regulations and
procedures governing the acquisition system. While the
legislation should help correct past problems, I also know that
we will succeed only through concerted efforts within the
executive branch to implement that legislation, and I look
forward to hearing how the Navy is proceeding to implement the
provisions of that act.
In addition to concern about future force levels, naval
aviation's force levels are under pressure. The Navy's planning
to conduct a service life extension program on some 150 F-18
aircraft already in the inventory. Also the Navy budget would
continue to buy additional F-18 aircraft, as was planned
before, but the budget would buy fewer Marine Corps and Navy
versions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft than
we had planned at this time last year.
On that point, we saw Secretary Panetta remove the F-35B
short takeoff-vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F-35 from
a probationary status a year earlier than planned. Senator
McCain and I questioned that action, particularly since the
fixes to the problems that caused Secretary Gates to put the F-
35B on probation in the first place have not completed testing.
When we asked the Secretary about this, the answer was in
effect that the F-35B has made progress in testing and is in no
worse shape than the other F-35 variants. We're pleased that
the F-35B has improved testing performance in the past year,
but it seems that it is too early to declare any victories.
I want to commend the Secretary for fully funding this
year's ship depot maintenance account. It is the first time
that the budget request of an administration has done that in
recent history. While our submarine fleet has benefited from
100 percent-funded requirement for many years, and necessarily
so, it is noteworthy that the surface fleet will receive
similar treatment in the fiscal year 2013 budget. The reduction
of the Navy's fleet is an essential element to our national
security and I believe that a fully funded maintenance
requirement is our best chance of ensuring that our fleet
reaches its expected service life. As much of an advance that
it is, and we commend the Navy for it, there still is a backlog
of ship and aircraft depot maintenance that remains.
With the decision to fund naval aircraft depot maintenance
at 94 percent of the requirement, my understanding is that we
now face a $160 million backlog for aircraft and a $217 million
backlog for ship maintenance. We'll be interested in hearing
from the witnesses how the Navy plans to address and fund those
backlogs to mitigate risk across the fleet.
Finally, I want to commend you, Secretary Mabus, for your
effort to lead DOD in making energy efficiency and self-
reliance such a priority. You have correctly placed a very
strong emphasis on an area where, as strong as our military
forces may be, we remain subject to the tyranny of energy
supplies. We thank you for your commitment to a more
sustainable and a stronger Navy.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
witnesses today to discuss the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2013 for the Navy. I know I speak for all members
of our committee when I praise the men and women who serve in
the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for their outstanding and
dedicated service and sacrifice.
While recruiting and retention in the Navy and Marine Corps
remain strong, we should carefully consider plans for 15,100
fewer Active and Reserve members of the Navy and 20,000 fewer
marines, as DOD is currently proposing under its budget plan
covering the next 5 years.
The administration is proposing a reduced defense budget at
a time when the challenges to our security are arguably more
daunting than at any time in recent memory. In particular, the
U.S. Pacific Command AOR is predominantly a maritime theater
and our presence and power projection will continue to depend
on the Navy and Marine Corps.
The Navy remains short of its goal of 313 ships and it
proposes under its current budget request to retire 7 Aegis-
class cruisers earlier than planned, placing to reduced
operating status 2 amphibious lift ships needed by the Marine
Corps. Cuts to our naval capabilities without a plan to
compensate for them puts our goals in the Asia-Pacific region
at greater risk.
First, on the F-35 JSF program. About 50 percent of the
work needed to build all 32 jets under the fourth lot of early
production aircraft is completed. Including the cost of design
changes driven by discoveries late in the development, the
total cost of finishing lot 4 is estimated at about $500
million over the target cost. The high likelihood that
concurrency costs, which was strongly objected to by this
committee and me in particular at the time that it was decided
upon, although stoutly defended by the Navy and the Marine
Corps at the time, will continue to grow, now acknowledged by
the head of acquisition in the Pentagon as acquisition
malpractice. In my view, preventing further cost growth in the
F-35 program is absolutely imperative.
Because of delays in the program, the Navy has decided to
buy more F/A-18s, the Marine Corps is buying ex-British AV-8
Harriers for spare parts, and the Air Force is investing in
refurbished F-16s to fill the gap created by unfulfilled F-35
deliveries. I'd be interested again to hear from the witnesses
as to how we can make some progress in bringing these costs
under control.
The cost of acquisition of the USS Gerald Ford aircraft
carrier has grown over the original estimate by over $1
billion. I repeat: It has grown over cost by $1 billion. I'd be
very curious, Mr. Secretary, what you've been doing on your
watch to try to bring those costs under control, bringing the
total cost of the carrier to over $12 billion and at least $600
million over the legislative cost cap. We do have a legislative
cost cap. The likelihood of future growth in the cost to
complete construction is high.
I expect the Navy will soon ask for legislative relief from
the cost cap. Before I'll support such a request, I need to
understand why the Navy has been unable to control costs on
this program. I'm also reluctant to support additional funding
for the second carrier, CVN-79, until the Navy and the
shipbuilder get Ford-class carrier costs under control.
There are many other programs that are under stress and
duress and are subject to cost overruns, and I won't take the
time of the committee at this time to go over things like the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the Ohio-class replacement
submarines, et cetera.
I'd like our witnesses to elaborate on the strategy for
modernization of the Marine Corps' Ground Combat Vehicle
capabilities, including the ACV, the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle, and the MPC. How does the Marine Corps plan to
accomplish all of this within current and projected budget
constraints in a way that maintains operational capabilities
and readiness?
Secretary Mabus, I understand that your second highest
priority is ``treating energy as a strategic national security
issue.'' Even with the very real threat of sequestration and
the dramatic cuts in end strength and investment and all that
would entail, the Navy has pledged $170 million as its share of
a $510 million effort to create a commercially viable biofuel
market. You've directed the Navy to produce or consume one
gigawatt of new renewable energy by 2020 to power naval
installations across the country.
Using defense dollars to subsidize new energy technologies
is not the Navy's responsibility, nor is it sufficiently
related to the Service's core mission to justify such
expenditures. I hope you will address this issue in your
comments, including where you got the authorization to spend
this money on energy.
Finally, the committee will carefully consider the three
multi-year procurement proposals included with the budget
submission. To be approved, the proposals must meet the
criteria in law, including the requirement for substantive
savings, considered 10 percent, and stability in design.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin, Ranking
Member McCain, members of the committee, I want to start by
thanking you all for the support that you give to our sailors,
marines, civilians, and their families in the Navy, and
ensuring that they get what they need to do their mission.
The pride that General Amos, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and Admiral Greenert, CNO, and I take in leading these
dedicated sailors, marines, civilians of the Navy, who
selflessly serve the United States is exceeded only by the
accomplishments of these brave and completely selfless
individuals.
Whatever is asked of them by the American people through
their Commander in Chief, from Afghan to Libya, from assisting
the stricken people of Japan, to assuring open sea lanes around
the world, from bringing Osama bin Laden to final justice, to
bringing hostages out of wherever they may be hidden by
terrorists or pirates, they answer the call. They get the job
done.
The CNO, the Commandant, and I are confident that the U.S.
Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps, are well prepared to meet the
requirements of the new defense strategy and maintain their
status as the most formidable expeditionary fighting force the
world has ever known. No one should ever doubt the ability,
capability, or superiority of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
As we reposition after two long ground wars, it was
essential to review our basic strategic posture. The new
guidance, developed under the leadership of the President and
the Secretary of Defense, and with the full involvement of
every Service Secretary and Service Chief, responds to changes
in global security. The budget presented to implement this
strategy, which was also arrived at through full collaboration
of all the Services, ensures that the Navy and Marine Corps
will be able to fully execute this strategy while meeting the
constraints imposed under the Budget Control Act passed by
Congress.
This new strategy has an understandable focus on the
western Pacific and Arabian Gulf regions, while maintaining our
worldwide partnerships and our global presence using
innovative, low-cost, light footprint engagements. It requires
a Navy-Marine Corps team that is built and ready for any
eventuality on land, in the air, on and under the world's
oceans, or in the vast cyber seas, and operated forward to
protect American interests, respond to crises, and to deter and
if necessary win wars.
The impact of these two ground wars in the last decade on
our Navy fleet and force is unmistakable. As you pointed out,
Mr. Chairman, a fleet that stood at 316 ships and an end
strength of 377,000 sailors on September 11, 2001 dropped to
283 ships and close to 49,000 fewer sailors just 8 years later
when I took office. This administration has made it a priority
to rebuild our fleet. Despite the budget constraints imposed
under the Budget Control Act, our plan assures that we will
have no fewer ships at the end of the 5-year budget cycle than
we have today, although the fleet of 2017 will include more
capable ships, equipped with state of the art technology and
manned, as always, by highly skilled people.
Although we are presenting one 5-year budget plan and one
FYDP, this is not a one-FYDP issue. As the defense strategy
states, we are building the force for 2020. In the years beyond
the current FYDP we have a plan to grow our fleet and ensure
capacity continues to match missions.
Our plan will have us again cross the threshold of 300
ships by 2019. Overall, we will fully meet the requirements of
the new strategy and maintain the industrial base we need.
The Marine Corps will also return to its maritime roots and
resume its traditional role as the Nation's expeditionary force
in readiness. Our marines will retain the lessons of a decade
of hard and effective fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as they
transition back to a middleweight amphibious force, optimized
for forward presence, engagement, and rapid crisis response. We
will carefully manage the reduction in Active Duty end strength
from 202,000 to 182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016 in order
to keep faith with our marines and their families to the
maximum extent possible.
This restructured Marine Corps, developed under a plan
arrived at after a year and a half of very careful study, will
be smaller, but it will be fast, it will be agile, and it will
be lethal. The number of marines in certain critical jobs, like
special forces and cyber, will be increased and unit manning
levels and therefore readiness will go up.
Both the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to decrease
operational vulnerabilities in ways that are cost efficient.
That means we will maintain our effort to reduce our dependence
on foreign oil and to use energy more efficiently. These
efforts have already made us better warfighters. By deploying
to Afghanistan with solar blankets to charge radios and other
electrical items, the marine patrol dropped 700 pounds in
batteries from their packs and decreased the need for risky
resupply missions.
Using less fuel in theater can mean fewer fuel convoys and
that will save lives. For every 50 convoys we bring in, a
marine is killed or wounded. That is too high a price to pay.
We all know the reality of a volatile global oil market.
Every time the cost of a barrel of oil goes up a dollar, it
costs the Navy $31 million in extra fuel costs. These price
spikes have to be paid for out of our operational funds. That
means that our sailors and marines are forced to steam less,
fly less, and train less. It's for these reasons that we have
to be relentless in the pursuit of energy goals that will
continue to make us a more effective fighting force and our
military and our Nation more energy independent.
As much as we have focused on our fleets' assets of ships,
aircraft, vehicles, and submarines, they don't sail, fly,
drive, or dive without the men and women who wear the uniform
and their families. They have taken care of us. They have kept
the faith with us. We owe them no less. The commitment to
sailors, marines, and their families is there whether they
serve 4 years or 40. It begins the moment they raise their hand
and take the oath to defend our country. It continues through
the training and education that spans their career. It reaches
out to their loved ones, because it's not just an individual
who serves, but the entire family. It supports our wounded
warriors with recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. It
continues with transition services for our veterans to locate
new jobs and the GI Bill for their continued education or to
transfer for a family member's education. The list goes on and
on and on, as it should. Our commitment to our sailors and
marines can never waver, it can never end.
For 236 years, from sail to steam to nuclear, from the USS
Constitution to the USS Carl Vinson, from Tripoli to Tripoli,
our maritime warriors have upheld a proud heritage, protected
our Nation, projected our power, and provided freedom of the
seas. In the coming years, this new strategy and our plans to
execute that strategy will assure that our naval heritage not
only perseveres but that our Navy and Marine Corps continue to
prevail.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Raymond E. Mabus, Jr.

Chairman Levin and Senator McCain, I have the privilege of
appearing today on behalf of the sailors, marines, and civilians who
make up the Department of the Navy (``DON'' or ``Department''). This is
the fourth year that I have been honored to report on the readiness,
posture, progress, and budgetary requests of the Department. The pride
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert, and I take in
leading the dedicated men and women of the Department who selflessly
serve the United States in the air, on land, and at sea is exceeded
only by the accomplishments of these brave and selfless individuals.
Whatever is asked of them by the American people through their
commander in chief--from Afghanistan to Libya, from assisting the
stricken people of Japan to assuring open sea lanes around the world,
from bringing Osama bin Laden to final justice to bringing hostages out
of wherever they may be hidden by terrorists or pirates--they answer
the call and get the mission done.
As we pivot away from a decade of war on two fronts in two separate
nations, the Commandant, CNO, and I are confident that the U.S. Navy
and Marine Corps are well prepared to meet the requirements of the new
defense strategy, and maintain their status as the most formidable
expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known. No one should
doubt the ability, capability, or superiority of the Navy-Marine Corps
team.
The administration's defense strategic guidance, with its
understandable focus on the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf region;
its requirement to maintain our worldwide partnerships; and its call
for a global presence using innovative, low-cost, light footprint
engagements requires a Navy-Marine Corps team that is built and ready
for war--on land, in the air, on and under the world's oceans, or in
the vast ``cyberspace''--and operated forward to protect American
interests, respond to crises, and deter and prevent war.
This new strategy, developed under the leadership of the President
and the Secretary of Defense, with the full involvement of every
Service Secretary and Service Chief, responds to the dynamic global
security environment, while meeting the constraints imposed under the
Budget Control Act (BCA) passed by Congress.
Our ability to meet the demands of this new strategy depends on the
improvements we have begun and objectives we have set regarding how we
design, purchase, and build new platforms, combat systems, and
equipment; increase the development and deployment of unmanned systems
to provide increased presence and enhanced persistence at lower cost
and less danger; and how we use, produce and procure energy. Most
importantly, our efforts and this new strategic guidance and the budget
that guidance informs, will assure that we continue to keep faith with
those who serve our country so selflessly and heroically, our sailors
and marines, civilians, and their families.

FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET SUBMISSION

Fleet Size
On September 11, 2001, the Navy's battle force stood at 316 ships
and 377,000 sailors. Eight years later when I took office, the battle
force had fallen by 49,000 sailors, and to 283 ships. Today, 3 years
into the Obama administration, the fleet increased to 285 ships of all
types.
Many have noted that we have the lowest number of battle force
ships since 1917. But today's ``Fleet'' is best thought of as an fully
integrated battle network comprised of sensors, manned and unmanned
platforms, modular payload bays, open architecture combat systems, and
smart, tech-savvy people. Thus, making comparisons between today's
``total force battle network'' with the battle force of 1917 is like
comparing a smart phone to the telegraph. Still, even though the ships
coming into service today are vastly more capable than their 1917
predecessors, at some point quantity has a quality of its own. This is
why building up the number of ships in our Fleet has been a priority
for this administration from day one.
The topline reductions mandated by the BCA made holding to current
Fleet numbers a difficult challenge. However, I am pleased to report to
you that we have developed a plan that delivers a Fleet with the same
number of ships by the end of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
as we have today--all while still meeting our fiscal obligation to
support a responsible end to our ground combat mission in Afghanistan.
The fiscal year 2013-2017 shipbuilding plan maintains a flexible,
balanced naval battle force that will be able to prevail in any combat
situation, including in the most stressing anti-access/area-denial (A2/
AD) environments.
While our ship count stabilizes in this FYDP, our shipbuilding
plans aim to build a Fleet designed to support the new defense strategy
and the joint force for 2020 and beyond. The specific requirements for
this future Fleet will be determined by an ongoing Force Structure
Assessment (FSA), which should be concluded later this year. Regardless
of the final battle force objective, however, you can expect to see the
Fleet's ship count to begin to rise as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) built during the next 5 years
begin to enter fleet service beyond this FYDP, and as we sustain our
major combatant and submarine building profiles. As a result, even
under the fiscal constraints imposed by the BCA, the battle force is
projected to reach 300 ships by 2019.
While the final ship count will be determined by the FSA, the
decisions made during the recent PB-13 budget deliberations will result
in a battle force consisting of:

Nuclear-powered Aircraft Carriers and Air Wings. With
delivery of USS Gerald R. Ford, the first of a new class of
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, in 2015, we will have 11
CVNs in commission, and will sustain that number at least
through 2040. Our future carriers will be even more powerful,
with new combat capabilities resident in the F-35C Lightning II
Joint Strike Fighter, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler
electronic attack aircraft, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne
early warning aircraft, and new unmanned air combat systems.
Nuclear-powered Attack Submarines. SSNs are the key to
sustaining our dominant lead in undersea warfare. While the
procurement of one Virginia-class submarine was delayed from
2014 to 2018 to help free up budget resources in the FYDP, the
planned fiscal year 2014-2018 Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) of
nine submarines remains intact. To mitigate the loss of large
undersea strike capability when SSGNs retire in 2026-2028, we
invested Research and Development for the Virginia Payload
Module (VPM). VPM could provide future Virginia-class SSNs with
an additional 4 SSGN-like large diameter payload tubes,
increasing each SSN's Tomahawk cruise missile capability from
12 to 40. While we are committed to a long-term force goal of
48 SSNs, low submarine build rates during the 1990s will cause
us to fall below that number for some time starting in the late
2020s. We continue to explore ways to limit the submarine
shortfall by increasing the near-term submarine build rate,
improving affordability, and maintaining the health of this
critical industrial base.
Guided Missile Cruisers and Destroyers. The Arleigh
Burke-class DDGs remain in serial production, with funding in
place for a nine-ship fiscal year 2013-2017 MYP. The next
flight of DDG 51s will introduce a more powerful and capable
Air and Missile Defense Radar in fiscal year 2016. We project
that the new defense strategy will require slightly fewer large
surface combatants so we will retire seven Ticonderoga-class
CGs in this FYDP--all but one before a planned mid-life
ballistic missile defense upgrade, and that one had serious
structural issues--achieving considerable cost savings at
relatively low risk. The long-term inventory of guided missile
cruisers and destroyers is projected to come down as combatants
built at the rate of three to five per year during the Cold War
begin to retire in the 2020s. We are exploring a variety of
ways to mitigate these losses.
Littoral Combat Ships. With their flexible payload
bays, open combat systems, ability to control unmanned systems,
and superb aviation and boat handling capabilities, LCSs will
be an important part of a more agile future Fleet. New crew
rotation plans, built on a modified version of the highly
successful SSBN two-crew model, will allow for substantially
more LCS forward presence than the frigates, Mine Counter-
Measures ships, and coastal patrol craft they will replace, and
will free our more capable multi-mission destroyers for more
complex missions. Although forced to shift 2 LCSs outside the
current FYDP to achieve cost savings, we remain fully committed
to our plan to ultimately purchase 55 of these warships.
Amphibious Ships. 30 amphibious landing ships can
support a two-Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) forcible entry
operation, with some risk. To generate 30 operationally
available ships, the strategic review envisions an amphibious
force consisting of 32 total ships, or 5 ships more than we
have in commission today. The ultimate fleet will consist of 11
big deck amphibious ships, Amphibious Transport Dock LPD-17s,
and 10 Landing Ship, Dock ships (LSDs). To support routine
forward deployments of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), the
amphibious force will be organized into nine, three-ship
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and one four-ship ARG in Japan,
plus an additional big-deck Amphibious ship available to
support contingency operations worldwide. We will place two
LSDs into reduced operations status, allowing us to
reconstitute an 11th ARG in the future, or to build up the
number of ships in the active inventory, if necessary.
Consistent with these changes, we have deferred procurement of
a new LSD, aligning it with LSD-42's planned retirement. We
also intend to disband the third Maritime Prepositioning Force
(MPF) squadron that we placed in reserve last year due to
fiscal restraints, and reorganize the two remaining active
squadrons with more capable ships, making them more effective.
New Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSBs). Navy is
proposing to procure a fourth Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) in
fiscal year 2014, configured to serve as an Afloat Forward
Staging Base (AFSB). This AFSB will fulfill an urgent combatant
commander request for sea-based support for mine warfare,
Special Operations Forces (SOF), Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR), and other operations. To speed this
capability into the fleet, and to ultimately provide for
continuous AFSB support anywhere in the world, we also intend
to request congressional approval to convert the fiscal year
2012 MLP into the AFSB configuration, resulting in a final
force of two MLPs and two AFSBs. This mix will alleviate the
demands on an already stressed surface combatant and amphibious
fleet while reducing our reliance on shore-based
infrastructure.

Most of the ship reductions in the President's fiscal year 2013
budget submission--16 fewer than the comparable years' in the fiscal
year 2012 budget--are combat logistics and Fleet support ships and
reflect prudent adjustments to our new strategy and a lower defense
topline. For example, 8 of the 16 ships cut from our 5-year plan were
JHSVs. These cuts reflect the new 10-ship JHSV requirement developed
during our strategy review.
In addition, we simply delayed purchasing three new oilers, which
were part of an early changeover from single-hulled to more
environmentally safe and internationally accepted double-hulled ships.
Our current Fleet of oilers will not start to retire until the 2020s,
so there is no impact on the number of available oilers for Fleet
operations. Finally, an ocean surveillance ship was added to the Navy's
plan last year to provide greater operational depth to our current
Fleet of five ships; however, after careful consideration, we concluded
we could meet our operational needs with five ships and could cut the
sixth ship with manageable risk.
Ships are not the only platforms in our ``total force battle
network.'' Accordingly, the new defense strategic guidance also
required us to review and evaluate the needs of our naval aviation
community going forward into the 21st century. We plan to complete our
purchases of both the F/A-18 Super Hornet and the EA-18 Growler within
the next 2 years. The Department recently completed a review of our
aviation requirements for the F-35 that validates our decision to
purchase for the Navy and Marine Corps 680 F-35s over the life of the
program. While we plan to slow procurement over the next 5 years to
address program risks, especially concurrency, we remain committed to
procuring 680 aircraft. The F-35B, the short-take-off-vertical-landing
(STOVL) variant, completed successful at-sea trials onboard the USS
Wasp and overall testing is proceeding very well. For the carrier
version, the F-35C, testing exceeded the plan by 30 percent last year.
In light of this encouraging testing performance, we are even more
confident that this multirole, cutting-edge platform will more than
meet our tactical requirements in the future security environment.
The Navy and the Marine Corps continues to carefully monitor strike
fighter capacity requirements as well. Changes in the Marine's force
structure, accelerated transition from the legacy Hornet aircraft to
the Super Hornets, and a reduction in use resulted in an appropriately-
sized strike fighter aircraft inventory. Based on current assumptions
and plans, our strike fighter aircraft shortfall is predicted to remain
below a manageable 65 aircraft through 2028, with some risk.
In the far term, the Navy will need to replace its F/A-18E/F Fleet.
Pre-Milestone A activities are underway to define the follow-on F/A-XX
aircraft. Options include additional F-35s, a variant of the Unmanned
Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS), a
new manned/unmanned platform, or some combination of these. While we
remain committed to the first-generation UCLASS, which will provide a
low-observable, long-range, unmanned ISR-strike capability that will
enhance the carrier's future ability to project power in anticipated
A2/AD threat environments, the target date for a limited operational
capability has shifted by 2 years from 2018 to 2020 to reduce schedule
and technical risk, as well as to meet the savings targets mandated by
the BCA.
The planned reduction in our cruiser inventory has decreased
requirements for MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, allowing us to reduce
procurement in this program by nine aircraft. Fiscal constraints have
also led us to reduce E-2D Hawkeye and P-8 Neptune procurement over the
FYDP. We still intend to procure all the aircraft originally planned,
but at a slower rate.

Future Force Structure Assessment and Re-designation of Primary Mission
Platforms
Given the broad refocus of the Department of Defense (DOD) program
objectives reflected in the new defense strategy, the Navy has
undertaken analysis of the existing Force Structure Requirements and,
in conjunction with ongoing internal DOD studies and planning efforts,
is reworking an updated FSA against which future requirements will be
measured. The new FSA will consider the types of ships included in the
final ship count based on changes in mission, requirements, deployment
status, or capabilities. For example, classes of ships previously not
part of the Battle Force such as AFSBs developed to support SOF/
nontraditional missions, Patrol Combatant craft forward deployed to
areas requiring that capability, and Comfort-class hospital ships
deployed to provide humanitarian assistance, an expanded core Navy
mission, may be counted as primary mission platforms. Any changes in
ship counting rules will be reported and publicized. Any comments on
total ship numbers in this statement are based on current counting
rules.
As noted earlier, in the years beyond the current FYDP, we have a
plan that puts us back on track to increase our Fleet and ensure
capacity matches the demands of the mission. However, with the Fleet
and force we have today, we will meet the requirements of the new
strategy, continue to protect our national interests, preserve our
ability to deter or defeat aggressors, and maintain the industrial base
needed.

Marine Corps
After a decade of hard fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine
Corps will return to its maritime roots and resume its traditional role
as the Nation's naval expeditionary force-in-readiness. We will
carefully manage reduction in active duty end strength from 202,000 to
182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016. Drawing upon its long history
of aligning its training and structure with areas of operations, the
marines will continue to provide tailored security force assistance and
to build partnership capacity missions with allies and other regional
partners. Along these same lines, the Marine Corps will continue to
leverage the experience gained over the past decade of non-traditional
warfare to strengthen its ties to the special operations community. The
resulting middleweight force will be optimized for forward presence,
engagement, and rapid crisis response through strategic positioning at
forward bases in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as
renewed participation in traditional Amphibious Ready Group/Marine
Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) exercises. The Marine Corps shall maintain
required readiness levels throughout the transition process. Most
importantly, we will drawdown without breaking faith with marines and
their families.
In summary, the Department's strategy calls for a world class Navy-
Marine Corps team, and our plan delivers one that is fully ready to
meet the current and emerging challenges. We will maintain a strong
naval presence in the western Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Middle
East. This will be accomplished by adjusting basing assignments for
some units from the Atlantic to the Pacific, as well as by increasing
the number of units operating from ports located in theaters of
interest. We are still committed to strategic dispersal. The Department
will, for example, operate four LCSs from Singapore. Similarly, we will
continue to expand our usage of AFSB and coastal patrol boats around
Africa and in the Arabian Gulf to counter the growth of piracy and the
growing threat of swarming small boats, as well as to help partner
nations build their own maritime capacity while upholding our national
interests. We also received two high-speed ferries from the Maritime
Administration, which will most likely operate in the Western Pacific
supporting the peacetime transport of U.S. Marine Corps forces deployed
to Okinawa and Australia.

SEAPOWER AND NAVAL PRESENCE

Since the end of World War II, the Navy-Marine Corps Team has acted
as the guarantor of the global maritime commons, upholding a
sophisticated set of international rules that rest upon two
inextricably linked principles: free trade and freedom of navigation.
These principles have supported an era of unprecedented economic
stability and growth, not just for the United States, but for the world
at large.
This period of growth has resulted in a truly ``globalized''
economy which owes much to the unique scalability and flexibility of
our naval forces. We can reroute Navy ships and Marine Corps units to
create appropriate responses as actions unfold. We can shift force
concentrations from the Atlantic to the Pacific or from the southern
oceans to northern seas with ease. From a single JHSV to a Carrier
Strike Group and from a Marine Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Team
(FAST) to an Expeditionary Unit, combatant commanders can scale naval
forces and their responses appropriately to emerging challenges across
the spectrum of engagement. Our forces are flexible enough to shift
from supporting combat air patrols over Afghanistan to providing
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Japan at a moment's
notice. Much of their flexibility derives from the use of the high seas
as a vast, unencumbered maneuver space. This freedom of navigation
allows our naval forces to gather information, perform surveillance and
reconnaissance of seaborne and airborne threats, defend regional
partners, interdict weapons of mass destruction, disrupt terrorist
networks, deter, and, if necessary, defeat prospective adversaries.

LAW OF THE SEA

The traditional freedom of the seas for all nations developed over
centuries, mostly by custom, have been encoded within the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This important
treaty continues to enjoy the strong support of the DOD and the DON.
The UNCLOS treaty guarantees rights such as innocent passage through
territorial seas; transit passage through, under and over international
straits; and the laying and maintaining of submarine cables. The
convention has been approved by nearly every maritime power and all the
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, except the United
States. Our notable absence as a signatory weakens our position with
other nations, allowing the introduction of expansive definitions of
sovereignty on the high seas that undermine our ability to defend our
mineral rights along our own continental shelf and in the Arctic. The
Department strongly supports the accession to UNCLOS, an action
consistently recommended by my predecessors of both parties.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 2011

Naval presence serves as a deterrent against those who would
threaten the national interests of the United States even as it assures
allies and partners of our consistent commitment. Our enduring national
security interests require our continued presence to provide the
President and our Nation with credible response options to deter
conflict and, if necessary, defend the United States' national security
interests from the sea. From counter-insurgency and security force
assistance operations in Afghanistan to ballistic missile defense and
humanitarian assistance missions in Europe and the Western Pacific and
naval engagement in South America and Africa, our sailors and marines
are making a difference around the globe every day. On any given day,
more than 72,000 sailors and marines are deployed and almost half of
our 285 ships are underway, responding to tasking where needed by the
combatant commanders.
Visiting our forward deployed forces and meeting with allies and
partners, commanders and staffs, and our marines and sailors on the
ground provides insights as to how we can better support all of their
critical efforts. In June, September, and again in December, I
travelled to Helmand province in Afghanistan on behalf of the
Department, and visited forward operating bases. These were my fifth,
sixth and seventh trips to theater in Afghanistan. In each area,
Taliban offenses and infiltration had been forcefully rebuffed.
Critical relations had been built with local Afghan leaders and
significant progress has been made towards the goal of creating
effective Afghan security forces that will be able to build on these
efforts. I also visited Camp Leatherneck and, among other things,
toured the Concussion Restoration Care Center where I met with Wounded
Warriors. At all of my stops, I expressed the appreciation of the
American people for the courage and sacrifices of our marines and
sailors who serve alongside them on the field of battle.
For more than 6 decades, our Navy-Marine Corps team has been the
strongest naval force afloat and we are committed to maintaining this
position of influence. Our strength, versatility, and efficacy derive
from our unique capacity for global reach, our focus on warfighting
excellence and our commitment to maintaining naval presence in regions
vital to our national interests. We cannot predict the exact nature of
the challenges facing the Department in the 21st century, but a glimpse
back at operations in 2011 illustrate the increasing variability of
events that required a flexible naval response.
Special Operations
U.S. Navy SEALS remain decisively engaged throughout the globe
conducting the Nation's most sensitive and important counterterrorism
operations. They served with great distinction in Iraq and continue to
serve in Afghanistan with telling effect. From the killing or capturing
of the most wanted terrorists to the rescue and recovery of captured
American citizens abroad we ask them to do the most daunting of
missions.
Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya
Having completed operations in Iraq, the Department has maintained
over 23,000 marines and sailors in Afghanistan, largely associated with
Regional Command-Southwest based in Helmand province. This force
provides security and seeks to build the self defense capacity of our
Afghan partners. Currently the Navy has deployed just over 8,000
sailors on the ground, 2,920 of whom are reservists, across the Central
Command supporting joint and coalition efforts. Another 10,000 sailors
are in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean supporting combat
operations from destroyers, submarines, supply vessels and aircraft
carriers, which launch around 30 percent of the aircraft conducting
combat air patrols over Afghanistan. On the first day during the
opening moments of Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya, the U.S. Navy
launched 122 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles from two surface ships and three
submarines, including the guided missile submarine USS Florida, the
first time one of these converted ballistic missile submarines has
fired ordnance in live operations. Ground based Navy E/A-18G Growlers
flying combat missions in Iraq were repositioned to support Odyssey
Dawn, and within 44 hours engaged hostile forces in Libya. When
violence erupted across northern Africa and the Middle East,
significant portions of the Kearsarge ARG and 26th MEU, then off the
coast of Pakistan, were directed to take station off the coast of
Libya.
Ballistic Missile Defense
Another newly emergent mission centers on the Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) capable Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers that provide homeland defense-in-depth, as well as the
protection of U.S. and allied forces in distant theaters. As ballistic
missile capabilities have proliferated around the globe, the demand for
BMD capable ships has increased dramatically. For example, over the
past year, BMD ships like the USS Ramage, USS Monterey and USS Stout
took up station in the eastern Mediterranean to provide BMD for both
Europe and Israel. Elsewhere, elements of Destroyer Squadron Fifteen
provided similar support in the waters surrounding Japan.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Following the devastating earthquake and tsunami last year that
resulted in the deaths of over 15,000 Japanese citizens, the
displacement of thousands, and the worst nuclear accident since
Chernobyl, the Ronald Reagan Strike Group, en route to support combat
operations missions in Afghanistan, was diverted to Japan to provide
humanitarian assistance. Upon arrival, instead of combat, the crews
were employed to shuttle tons of water, food, and blankets to displaced
victims ashore, while the Strike Group's ships simultaneously served as
landing and refueling stations for Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF)
rescue helicopters operating in the region. The Reagan Strike Group
supplemented units of the USS Essex ARG with its embarked 31st MEU,
which is forward deployed in Japan, in what became known as Operation
Tomodachi--``Friendship'' in Japanese. Elements of the Essex ARG
airlifted over 300 JSDF personnel and 90 vehicles from Hokkaido to
disaster areas while USNS Safeguard and Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit
One transported relief supplies to Yokosuka for distribution throughout
the affected areas. Additionally, the Navy transported the equipment
and personnel of the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard's Radiological Control
Team as well as the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response
Force to Japan to assist with nuclear monitoring efforts.
Anti-Piracy
Throughout the year the Navy performed the critical mission of
combating piracy and supporting the anti-piracy efforts of our allies
and partners in the region. Ships operated in conjunction with allies
and partners in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa to prevent the
disruption of the free flow of trade in the Gulf of Aden. More recently
elements of the Stennis Strike Group freed Iranian citizens who were
being held hostage by pirates in the Arabian Sea. Their actions
directly resulted in the capture or killing of 21 pirates and the
freeing of 38 hostages.
Partnership Stations and Maritime Exercises
The Navy remains committed to building our partner nations'
capacities to provide for their own maritime security. This year we
once again created ``partnership stations'' in the Pacific Ocean and
Caribbean Sea, off the coast of South America and around the continent
of Africa to work with local navies to educate their leaders, train
their sailors, strengthen their material infrastructure, increase their
maritime domain awareness, and raise their response capacity. USS
Cleveland, USS Oak Hill, USS Robert G Bradley, the hospital ship USNS
Comfort and High Speed Vessel Swift were strategically deployed to work
with the maximum number of partner navies to provide medical care and
security training while building local naval capacity to plan and
conduct operations in the maritime environment.
Lastly, with an eye to the future of naval and maritime operations
in an increasingly ice-free Arctic, the Virginia-class submarine USS
New Hampshire and the Seawolf-class submarine USS Connecticut conducted
Ice Exercise (ICEX) 2011 with Canadian and United Kingdom counterparts
in the Arctic Ocean.

AIR-SEA BATTLE

The Navy and Marine Corps are working with the Air Force to
implement the Air-Sea Battle concept which seeks to improve integration
of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace forces in order to
provide combatant commanders the range of military capabilities
necessary to maintain operational access and deter, and if necessary
defeat, an adversary employing sophisticated A2/AD capabilities and
strategies.
The Air-Sea Battle concept leverages the military and technological
capabilities, as well as unprecedented Naval and Air Force
collaboration, cooperation, integration, and resource investments
within the Services' purview to organize, train, and equip.
The jointly manned Air-Sea Battle Office has defined a series of
initiatives to achieve the capabilities and integration required in
future naval and air forces so that combatant commanders have the tools
necessary to ensure U.S. freedom of action in future years.
As we work to implement and enhance the Air-Sea Battle concept, the
Navy continues to invest in capabilities to counter advanced A2/AD
challenges, including:

BMD enhancements both in the Aegis Combat System and
the Standard Missile, as well as myriad ``soft-kill''
initiatives;
Integration of advanced air and cruise missile defense
capabilities;
Harpoon missile replacement, which will increase the
range (and speed) at which we can engage enemy surface
combatants armed with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs);
Virginia-class submarines and the VPM, which has the
potential to mitigate the loss of the SSGN undersea strike
capacity when they retire in the mid-2020s;
Improvements in Joint Force Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and ISR capabilities which will
significantly increase our information gathering and
warfighting coverage in access-challenged areas, as well as
provide counters to adversary capabilities; and
Cyberspace capabilities.

DEPARTMENTAL PRIORITIES

The Department must adhere to four key priorities with strategic,
tactical, operational and management elements if we are to maintain our
position as the world's most formidable expeditionary fighting force
while continuously evolving our Navy and Marine Corps as a strategic
asset that provides our Commander in Chief with the broadest range of
options in a highly dynamic international security environment. These
priorities remain:

(1) Taking care of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their
families;
(2) Treating energy as a strategic national security issue;
(3) Promoting acquisition excellence and integrity; and
(4) Continuing development and deployment of unmanned systems.

These principles guide the direction of the Department, from
training our recruits at Great Lakes, Parris Island, and San Diego, to
our ongoing operations in central Asia and the Western Pacific, to
acquiring the Navy and Marine Corps of the future.
In the end it all comes down to stewardship; the careful management
of our people, platforms, infrastructure and energy to guarantee that
your Navy and Marine Corps are ready to defend our Nation's interests.
Taking Care of Sailors, Marines, Civilians, and their Families
As we move forward, the Department is committed to our most
important asset--our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families. A
large part of our commitment is the careful attention to pay and
benefits. No one's pay will be cut; only the growth of pay is slowed in
the later years of our 5-year plan. Specifically, we are proposing
continued pay raises at 1.7 percent for military personnel in fiscal
year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, in line with the private sector,
recognizing the continued stress on our forces and their families, and
providing time for families to adjust.
We support asking Congress to establish a commission with authority
to conduct a comprehensive review of military retirement in the context
of overall compensation. The Commission should seek ways to identify
improvements in the military retirement system, ensuring any proposed
change to military retirement supports required force profiles of the
Department of the Navy in a cost effective manner. We believe that the
Commission should protect, through grandfathering, the retirement
benefits of those currently serving.
With so much of our defense strategy dependent upon our Navy and
Marine Corps, we must ensure that our resources support the most combat
effective and the most resilient force in our history. We must set high
standards, but at the same time we must provide individuals with the
services needed to meet those standards. The Department will soon
announce the 21st Century Sailor and Marine Initiative, which is a set
of objectives and policies across a spectrum of wellness that maximizes
sailor and marine personal readiness. The program consists of five
``pillars:'' readiness, safety, physical fitness, inclusion, and the
continuum of service.
Readiness will ensure sailors, marines, and their families are
prepared to handle the mental and emotional rigors of Military Service.
Both Services are introducing campaigns this year to deglamorize,
treat, and track alcohol use. We will also develop new means to reduce
suicides, and increase our family and personal preparedness programs.
This includes zero tolerance for sexual assault. The DON Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) was created and made part of the
secretarial staff to keep the issue at the front of the discussion, to
strengthen the lines of communication with the Navy Judge Advocate
General (JAG) and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and to
make sure the Secretariat received frequent updates about the incidents
of sexual assault and our progress towards reducing the number of
attacks. We are continually working to improve the reporting,
investigation and disposition of sexual assault cases ensuring
commanders, investigators, and prosecutors receive sufficient training
and appropriate resources. Last year, JAG finalized a complete revision
of the advanced trial advocacy courses that train litigators involved
in sexual assault cases as well as filled the Deputy Director of the
Trial Counsel Assistance Program position with a senior civilian sexual
assault litigator. The JAG and NCIS are working aggressively to educate
lawyers and agents on the unique aspects of sexual assault cases. NCIS
has hired personnel to provide assistance and support to NCIS special
agents; this will enable special agents to focus on conducting
investigative activities, trial preparation and prosecutorial testimony
relative to adult sexual assaults.
Our efforts to ensure the safest and most secure force in the
Department's history extend to encouraging the safe use of motor
vehicles and motorcycles.
Physical fitness is an important central pillar that resonates
throughout the 21st Century Sailor and Marine Program. Personal fitness
standards throughout the force will be emphasized. We will also improve
nutrition standards at our dining facilities with the introduction of
``Fueled to Fight.'' Fueled to Fight ensures that healthy food items
will be available and emphasized at every meal.
The Department will be inclusive, and consist of a force that
reflects the Nation it defends in a manner consistent with military
efficiency and effectiveness. The Department will also reduce
restrictions to military assignments for personnel to the greatest
extent possible, consistent with our mission and military requirements.
We must ensure that all who want to serve have opportunities to succeed
and barriers that deny success are removed. Nothing reflects our core
values of honor, courage, and commitment better than having an
organization characterized by fairness and dedication. Last year for
the first time ever, 16 women were assigned to submarines. This will
expand command-at-sea opportunities and eventually increase the chances
for more women to be promoted to admiral. Additionally, we need an
officer corps that is representative of the enlisted force it leads.
Through increased minority applications from diverse markets, the U.S.
Naval Academy and Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps (NROTC)
programs are achieving historical racial and ethnic diversity rates.
The U.S. Naval Academy received nearly 7,000 minority applications for
its class of 2014, nearly double that of the class of 2010. Along with
recent NROTC additions at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Arizona State
University (with the largest undergraduate population in the country),
next we are establishing an NROTC unit at Rutgers University. Not only
is it one of the Nation's top engineering schools, but more than half
of its class of 2014 identify themselves as minority.
The final pillar, continuum of service, will provide the most
robust transition support in the Department's history. Individuals
choosing or selected for either separation or retirement will be
afforded a myriad of assistance programs and benefits that are
available to them as they transition to civilian life. These programs,
which include education benefits, transition assistance, career
management training, counseling, life-work balance programs, and
morale, welfare, and recreation programs have been recognized by human
resource experts as some of the best corporate level personnel support
mechanisms in the Nation.
Because Navy and Marine Corps were highly successful in meeting
their recruiting goals, we have been able to be very selective,
accepting only the very best candidates who are morally, mentally and
physically ready to serve. Historically high retention rates have put
us below our active duty manning ceiling of 322,700 sailors and 202,100
marines. Our recruiting classes have gotten smaller, as have our ``A''
school classes, and promotion rates from E-4 to E-6 have fallen as
well. More officers in the O-5 and O-6 pay grades are choosing to
remain on active duty rather than retire, leading to smaller promotion
selection groups and repeated adjustments to promotion zones.
We have attempted to deal with this challenge within the enlisted
ranks by instituting the ``Perform to Serve'' program that used a
detailed algorithm to advise personnel specialists on who should be
allowed to re-enlist, but this approach did not fully address either
the systemic manning challenge confronting us or the unsustainable
overmanning in certain enlisted ratings. This past year, given fiscal
constraints and manpower draw-downs, we decided to confront the problem
head on and convened special administrative Enlisted Retention Boards,
Senior Enlisted Continuation boards and officer Selective Early
Retirement Boards to pare back overmanned enlisted ratings and officer
ranks. It was a difficult decision to use these force management tools,
but the future of the Department requires us to fix the problem now
rather than further delaying a decision.
Another vital support program that we remain committed to is the
support we provide to our Wounded Warriors. Since 2001, over 900
sailors and nearly 13,000 marines have been wounded as a result of
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This year we completed the
alignment of the Army's Walter Reed Medical Center with our own
National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda and we continued to invest in
the doctors, techniques, and technologies to care for the injuries that
have become representative of modern warfare: traumatic brain injury,
amputations, burns, and post traumatic stress disorder. The
requirements for the Purple Heart were updated to include the immediate
and lasting damage associated with brain injuries.
Part of our commitment centers around the families and caregivers
that support our Wounded Warriors as they endure the challenges of
recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act provided a Special Compensation for Assistance with
Activities in Daily Living to help offset income lost by those who
provide non-medical care and support to servicemembers who have
incurred a permanent catastrophic injury or illness.
Driven by the moral obligation to assist our injured heroes, the
Department has set a goal of being able to offer every combat wounded
sailor or marine an opportunity to continue their service as a civilian
on the Navy/Marine Corps team. Our Wounded Warrior Hiring and Support
Initiative aims to increase the number of veterans with a 30 percent
and above service-connected disability into our workforce. Through this
initiative, we have hired over 1,000 veterans with 30 percent and above
service-connected disability rating in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year
2011. Our Naval Sea Systems Command alone hired 509 service-disabled
veterans for fiscal year 2011, exceeding its goal of hiring one veteran
for each day of the fiscal year. We recently held our second annual
Wounded Warrior Hiring and Support Conference to provide prospective
employers and human resource professionals with the tools and resources
to enable them to hire, train, and retain our Wounded Warriors in the
civilian workplace.
This past August, the President announced his Veteran's Employment
Initiative that extends tax credits to businesses that hire Veterans.
We work with the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Labor to establish
programs that ease the transition of Veterans into the civilian world.
We are also heavily engaged through the Yellow Ribbon Program in
supporting the reintegration efforts of our Reserve Forces.
I want to address the Defense budget proposals regarding health
care costs. The DON and DOD on the whole continues to face rapidly
rising costs in health care. In 2001, DOD health care costs were
approximately $19 billion. By 2010 that amount had risen to $51 billion
and as a percentage of our budget is approaching 10 percent. This rate
of rise cannot be sustained. We continue to streamline our staffs and
standard operating procedures in an ongoing effort to manage costs
while retaining quality patient care and overall customer satisfaction.
One area where we continue to be challenged is system accessibility for
our retiree community, especially in areas where bases have been closed
due to the BRAC process, leaving behind a large retiree population with
no local access to military treatment facilities. Increasing use of the
affordable Mail Order Pharmacy Program and implementing modest fee
increases, where appropriate, would go far towards ensuring the long
term fiscal viability of the system while preserving equity in benefits
for our retirees.
I consider my obligations to the well-being of every sailor and
marine, and every family member under their care to be sacrosanct. We
worked carefully to develop these proposals, with all participants--the
government, the providers of health care, and the beneficiaries-sharing
in the responsibility to better manage our health care costs. I have
previously asserted that as a former Governor, I well know that the
growth in health care costs is an issue for the country, not just the
military. But, we all have to do our part. The TRICARE benefit remains
one of the best benefits in the country. I hope you will support our
proposed changes.
Also this past year the Department, along with the other military
departments, worked with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and over 70
employers to launch a program targeted at expanding the career
opportunities for military spouses. The Military Spouse Employment
Partnership seeks to help the business community recognize the skills
and talents that military spouses bring to the workforce, but are
unable to fully leverage due to frequent moves of the servicemember in
the family. This partnership between the military and the business
community promises to tap into the energy of one of the most hard-
working, highly skilled, educated, and yet under-utilized segments of
our population.
Overall, the fiscal year 2013 budget reflects a responsible request
for the fiscal support and resources required to support our marines,
sailors, their families, and our retirees in the face of increasing
operational pressures and financial demands upon them. Thank you for
your continuing support.

Energy Security and Sustained Leadership
We must reform how the Navy and Marine Corps use, produce, and
procure energy, especially in this fiscally constrained environment. We
must use energy more efficiently; however, the Department must also
lead on alternative energy, or we will leave a critical military
vulnerability unaddressed, further straining the readiness of our
sailors and marines to be able to respond wherever and whenever called
to defend and protect America's interests.
Fuel is a tactical and operational vulnerability in theater;
guarding fuel convoys puts our sailors and marine's lives at risk and
takes them away from what we sent them there to do: to fight, to
engage, and to rebuild. The Department is also exposed to price shocks
in the global market because too much fuel comes from volatile regions,
places that are vulnerable to instability and ruled by regimes that do
not support our interests. Every time the cost of a barrel of oil goes
up a dollar, it costs the Department $30 million in extra fuel costs.
In fiscal year 2012 alone, in large part due to political unrest in oil
producing regions, the price per barrel of oil is $38 more than was
budgeted increasing the Navy's fuel bill by over $1 billion. These
price spikes must be paid for out of our operations funds. That means
that our sailors and marines are forced to steam less, fly less, and
train less. The threat of price spikes is increased by the
vulnerability of choke points. Energy analyst have speculated that if
Iran ever succeeded in closing the Strait of Hormuz, the price of oil
could rise by 50 percent or more in global markets within days.
We would never let the countries we buy oil from build our ships or
our aircraft or our ground vehicles, but we give them a say on whether
those ships sail, whether those aircraft fly, whether those ground
vehicles operate because we buy their oil. As a nation we use over 22
percent of the world's fuel but only possess less than 2 percent of the
world's oil reserves. Even if we tap every domestic resource we do not
have enough to meet all of our needs over time, and as a minority
producer of fuel we will never control the price.
That is why in the fall of 2009, I established five goals for the
Department the broadest of which is that by no later than 2020, 50
percent of the Department's energy will come from alternative sources.
These goals drive the Navy and Marine Corps to use energy more
efficiently, to explore wider use of alternative energy and to make
energy a factor in the acquisition of our next ships, tactical vehicles
and aircraft.
As one example of our success, the Marine Corps continues to
aggressively pursue technologies that will help achieve greater energy
efficiency while increasing combat effectiveness in the theater. The
Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, deployed to the Helmand Province in
Afghanistan with solar blankets to power radios, LED lights to
illuminate tents, and solar generators to provide power. One 3-week
patrol was able to reduce their carrying weight by 700 pounds, reducing
the number of dangerous resupply missions needed. Even in a tough fight
in Sangin, the marines managed to cut fuel use and logistical support
requirements by 25 percent at main operating bases and up to 90 percent
at combat outposts by relying on these alternative energy technologies.
The Marine Corps is committed to finding more innovative solutions to
decreasing dependence on convoys by conducting two Experimental Forward
Operating Bases (ExFOB) per year (one in Twentynine Palms and one in
Camp Lejeune).
Another initiative to increase alternative energy supply is using
advanced, drop-in biofuel in aircraft and ships. Our criteria for this
fuel are straight forward. It must be ``drop in'' fuel requiring no
changes to our aircraft or our ship or our infrastructure; it must be
derived from non-food sources; and, its production should not increase
our carbon footprint as required by law. In 2011, the Department
completed testing on 50/50 blends of drop-in biofuel and jet fuel on
all manned and unmanned aircraft, including an F/A-18 Hornet at MACH
1.7 and all six Blue Angels during an air show. The Department has also
tested and experimental Riverine Command Boat (RCB-X), a self defense
test ship, a ridged hull inflatable boat (RHIB), and a Landing Craft
Air Cushion (LCAC) that traveled at more than 50 knots.
In March of this past year, the President directed the Departments
of Agriculture, Energy and the Navy to partner with the private sector
to catalyze a domestic, geographically dispersed, advanced biofuel
industry for the United States. In response to this directive, Energy
Secretary Dr. Steven Chu, Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, and I
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) committing our departments
to jointly partner with industry to construct or retrofit multiple
domestic commercial or pre-commercial scale advanced drop-in biofuel
refineries capable of producing cost competitive fuels. Under the MOU
we issued a request for information in August, which drew over 100
responses in 30 days from companies ranging from major oil companies
and large defense contractors to small businesses.
In December, DLA Energy awarded a contract on our behalf to
purchase 450,000 gallons of biofuel; the single largest purchase of
biofuel in government history. The Department will use fuel from this
purchase--awarded to the most competitive bidder under full and open
competition--to demonstrate the capability of a carrier Strike Group
and its air wing to burn alternative fuels in a full operational
environment including UNREPs for destroyers and refueling of helos and
jets on the deck of an aircraft carrier. The demonstration will take
place as part of the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Naval Exercise.
We are also pursuing efficiencies measures in our fleet. The USS
Makin Island, the Navy's first hybrid electric-drive ship, saved $2
million on its maiden voyage from Pascagoula, MS to its homeport in San
Diego, CA. It is estimated to save approximately $250 million in fuel
costs over the course of its lifetime--approximately 40 years--at
current energy prices.
A hybrid electric drive system will also be installed as a retrofit
proof of concept on the USS Truxtun (DDG 103)--an existing Navy
destroyer. We estimate that successful testing will result in fuel
savings of up to 8,500 barrels per year. If these tests are successful
we will continue to install hybrid electric drives as a retrofit on
other DDGs in the fleet. The U.S. Navy has been installing stern flaps
to reduce drag and energy on amphibious ships in an effort to make them
more fuel-efficient, which could save up to $450,000 annually in fuel
costs per ship.
Whether it is the procurement of new ships and aircraft or the
retrofit of existing platforms we are making energy a consideration in
the acquisition process. In addition to traditional performance
parameters such as speed, range, and payload, the Department is
institutionalizing energy initiatives that will save lives, money and
increase warfighting capability. Analyzing energy costs during the
``analysis of alternatives'' phase of major defense acquisition
programs will ensure warfighters get the speed, range, and power they
require, as well as help the department manage the life-cycle costs of
its systems. The Marine Corps pioneered this approach last year by
including system energy performance parameters in developing a new
surveillance system and the Navy has included energy criteria as part
of the procurement of the LSD-X.
All across our shore installations, Navy and Marine Corps are also
undertaking energy efficiency initiatives and installing alternative
energy wherever practical. As just one example, at China Lake Naval Air
Weapons Station we are a net contributor to the local power grid,
creating more than 270 megawatts (MW) of clean, affordable geothermal
power in partnership with the private sector.
In January, we tapped the vast renewable energy resources available
at China Lake again breaking ground on a 13.8MW solar array, offsetting
30 percent of the base's electric load. The contract is a 20-year power
purchase agreement (PPA) having no upfront costs to the Navy and saving
the Navy $13 million over its term.
To meet the energy goal of 50 percent alternative energy ashore, I
have directed the Navy and Marine Corps to produce or consume one
gigawatt of new, renewable energy to power naval installations across
the country using existing authorities such as PPAs, enhanced use
leases, and joint ventures. One gigawatt of renewable energy could
power 250,000 homes, or a city the size of Orlando. This will be a
broad and dynamic project that, over the life of the contract, will not
cost the taxpayer any additional money, and will create domestic
private sector jobs. This will be our path to unlocking our Nation's
clean energy potential that leaves our military more secure, agile,
flexible and ready.
To further facilitate our partnerships with industry, the
Department is trying to make our contracting opportunities more
accessible. Two years ago we introduced a website called Green Biz Ops
which aggregates our energy and efficiency opportunities for
procurement. This site helps all companies interested in doing business
with the Navy--and especially small businesses--find opportunities in
one place. In partnership with the Small Business Administration last
year our agencies launched a ``2.0'' version of Green Biz Ops called
the Green Procurement Portal which expands the site to include more
features as well as energy opportunities across DOD and the Federal
Government.
To prepare our leadership to achieve our energy goals, this fall
the Naval Postgraduate School began offering a dedicated energy
graduate degree program, the first military educational institution to
do so. Later this year, NPS will launch an Executive Energy Series to
bring our senior leadership together to discuss specific energy
challenges that confront the Navy and Marine Corps. This energy-focused
Masters Degree program and the executive energy series will target both
the current and future civilian and military leadership of the Navy and
Marine Corps.
Further, promotion boards have been directed to specifically
consider the background and experience in energy some of our men and
women in uniform are gaining today. Energy is not just an issue for the
future, or just the young officers and policy experts that attend NPS.
It is an issue for all of us.
Those who question why the Navy should be leading on energy should
study their history. The Navy has always led in new forms of energy:
shifting from wind to coal-powered steam in the middle of the 19th
century, from coal to oil in the early 20th century, and pioneering
nuclear power in the middle of the 20th century.

Promoting Acquisition Excellence and Integrity
Especially given the fiscal reality of our budget deficit, we are
fully cognizant of our responsibility to the President, Congress, and
the American people to spend this money wisely. What history shows us
is that when budgets are tight we should get smarter about the way we
spend our money. As noted earlier, rebuilding our fleet has been and
will continue to be a top priority of this administration. Achieving
this lies at the heart of the acquisition excellence initiative that
has been a priority for the Department for almost 2 years now, because
if we do not get smarter about how we buy, in addition to what we buy,
we are not going to be able to afford the Navy and Marine Corps that
the Nation needs in the future.
Improving how we buy means that we have take actions against fraud
and shoddy contractors. The Department's General Counsel and the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) are authorized to take the swiftest and
strongest action in any case where bribery or attempts to gain
preferential contracting treatment are substantiated. When a violation
occurs, RDA may terminate the contract and assess damages immediately,
in addition to pursuing suspension and debarment. The Department's
Acquisition Integrity Program was recently recognized by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) as one of the more effective at using
suspension and debarment practices.
The Department's role in the President's new defense strategy is
clear and will drive acquisition programs underway or in development.
We will carefully define program requirements and then drive
affordability through aggressive ``should cost'' oversight and
competition where possible, such as the fixed price contracts we
negotiated for the LCS or the multi-year procurements that we
negotiated for Virginia-class submarines. Innovative funding strategies
and stable industrial base workload further allow for efficiencies that
provide opportunities to acquire more ships more affordably.
To keep our technological advantage, we plan to invest in science
and technology and research and development to maintain the knowledge
base and keep it moving forward. This is the lesson of the 1920s and
1930s when so much of the technologies that became critical to our
victory in World War II were kept alive in military, academic, and
industrial laboratories. Times and technologies change, and we need to
preserve the capability to change with them. Proper funding of our labs
and research centers is key to incubating the next ``game-changing''
breakthroughs that will sustain the United States' military advantage
over time.
The acquisition workforce was downsized over the past 15 years and,
in truth, was stretched too thin. Accordingly, and with your strong
support, we are increasing the number of acquisition professionals and
restoring to the government the core competencies inherent to their
profession and to our responsibilities in the Department to organize,
train and equip the Navy and Marine Corps. The Department has grown its
acquisition work force by 4,400 personnel since starting the effort 2
years ago, increasing its technical authority and business skill sets.
Additionally the Department is keeping program managers in place
longer to build up their experience, expertise and oversight on
individual programs. We are also investing in education for our program
managers. As an example, we send all of our program managers to an
intensive short course at the graduate business school at the
University of North Carolina, specifically targeting a better
understanding of our defense contractors: what motivates them; what are
their financial situations; and how can we work with them to achieve a
win-win contract award for both the taxpayer and the stockholder. We
are also changing the way in which we evaluate our program leaders to
incentivize them to work with their industry counterparts to manage
costs.
Over the FYDP, affordability will continue to be a central concern
of this Department. As resources are tight, cost has to be one of the
primary considerations of every program, and it ought to be driven by
``should cost, will cost,'' methods. ``Should cost'' scrutinizes each
contributing ingredient of program cost and seeks to justify it. The
``will cost'' method represents an effort to budget and plan weapons
acquisition programs using realistic independent cost estimates rather
than relying on those supplied by the manufacturer. Make no mistake,
our focus will remain on the security of our primary customer, the
American people, for whom we will build the best possible Fleet for the
future.
Shipbuilding/Industrial Base
A healthy industrial base is critical to supporting the
Department's top priorities. The dangerous downward trend in our ship
inventory has been and must stay reversed. Even though we face
increased fiscal constraints, we still plan, as we noted earlier, to
grow the Fleet to 300 ships by 2019. We want to increase the number of
our highly capable large surface combatants to meet the President's
directive that we confront the growing ballistic missile threat to the
United States and its allies, while strengthening our small combatant
inventory to provide the presence needed to maintain freedom of
navigation. We have to make significant investments in support vessels
while continuing our investment in our nuclear submarine force and
maintaining the viability of our last yard capable of building nuclear
powered aircraft carriers.
What all this means is that we will need to closely monitor the
shipbuilding industrial base as we move forward. Much as with energy,
we need to ensure diversity in supply moving forward. We need to
strengthen our relationship with traditional shipbuilders, but we need
to reach beyond them to small and mid-tier shipbuilders to develop
innovative designs and new construction techniques to meet emerging
threats.

Developing and Deploying Unmanned Systems
When I took office in 2009, unmanned systems were already at work
within the Department. To assist our troops on the ground in Iraq and
in Afghanistan we had either purchased or contracted for thousands of
unmanned aerial vehicles that flew hundreds of thousands of hours in
support of our mission. Despite their demonstrated utility, there was
no vision of where unmanned systems belonged in the Navy and Marine
Corps future force structure or coherent plan to achieve that vision.
Over the past 2 years, the Services have worked hard to develop a plan
and the presence and reach of our unmanned systems have expanded,
including the first expeditionary deployment of a Firescout vertical
takeoff and landing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and the first
successful flight of the unmanned combat air system, (UCAS), which will
begin carrier demonstrations later this year. In total, nearly 1,500
unmanned aerial systems deployed into theater.
In the Fleet, unmanned systems need to be integrated into
established operational communities. The marines have been out in front
on this effort, having established four unmanned aerial system
squadrons over the past quarter century, and the Navy is working on
these capabilities as well. This past year a detachment of Helicopter
AntiSubmarine Squadron 42 deployed with a SH-60B Helicopter and a MQ-8B
Firescout and supported combat operations in Libya and counter piracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden. In both environments, they leveraged
the operational flexibility and low signature characteristics of
unmanned systems to support local commanders while keeping sailors and
marines safe from danger. Additionally, our Tactical Air Control
Community took possession of their first Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial
System (STUAS) this past year and began to integrate it into the
Surface Warfare community's day-to-day operations. In the future, the
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aviation community, soon to take
delivery of the P-8A Poseidon, will add the MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance unmanned aerial system to their squadrons and hangars,
extending the reach and persistence of maritime reconnaissance
capabilities.
We will test and field mine hunting and then mine sweeping
capability of the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Module in LCS,
employing airborne and remotely operated vehicles to reduce the risk to
sailors and the cost. Current developmental testing of the Increment I
mine warfare mission package is underway in USS Independence (LCS 2),
demonstrating mine hunting capability with the AN/AQS 20A mine hunting
sonar set, towed by the remotely operated vehicle RMMV. Future
increments will incorporate autonomous mine sweeping and the ability to
find buried mines using unmanned surface and underwater vehicles.
The Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike
(UCLASS) system is changing the way we plan to deliver reconnaissance
and strike capabilities from our venerable aircraft carrier platforms.
Designed to operate in contested airspace and conduct ISR or strike
missions over extended periods of time, the UCLASS at sea will differ
fundamentally from the standard operating procedures of both manned
carrier aircraft or land based unmanned aircraft. Unlike with a manned
carrier aircraft that is mostly used to maintain the qualifications of
its pilot, a UCLASS airframe will be employed only for operational
missions and pilots will maintain qualifications in the simulator,
extending its useful life expectancy considerably. Its airborne mission
time will not be limited by human physiology but rather will be
determined by the availability of tankers to refuel it, ordnance
expenditure, or the need to change the oil after many hours of flight
time. This will allow us to launch from greater distances, effectively
negating emergent A2/AD technologies. We have only just begun to
understand the potential of this unmanned system and the capabilities
that will spiral from it.

CONCLUSION

Our Constitution requires that Congress ``Maintain a Navy.'' We do
so with the world's most advanced platforms, equipped with cutting edge
weapons systems and manned by crews who receive the best training
possible is a credit to our Nation. The Navy that fought and defeated a
more advanced British Navy in the War of 1812 looked very different
from the Navy of 2012. But our sailors and marines continue to live up
to that legacy forged 200 years ago. Today your Navy and Marine Corps
are deployed across the spectrum of engagement from rendering
humanitarian assistance to combat. They often seem to be everywhere
except at home. They bring to these efforts skills, training and
dedication unmatched anywhere else in the world. The enduring support
of this committee for our key programs and our people enables us to
fulfill the ancient charge of the founders that we should sail as the
Shield of the Republic, and we thank you.
The goals and programs discussed today will determine our future as
a global force. At the direction of the President, we have worked to
streamline our processes, to eliminate programs that no longer fit in
the current strategic environment and to construct new approaches to
the challenges of the modern world while retaining the ability to deter
regional conflict and respond rapidly and decisively to emerging
crises. Our specific requests are reflected in the President's fiscal
year 2013 budget submission.
The process by which we arrived at these requests was both
deliberate and determined. We are fully aware of the economic
environment and the fiscal constraints that our government faces today.
We have attempted to balance these considerations with the President's
requirement that we maintain a ready and agile force capable of
conducting the full range of military operations. We want to assure you
that the Department has considered the risks and applied our available
resources efficiently and carefully. This year's request aligns with
the Defense Strategic Guidance and the priorities and missions
contained within it while balancing trade-offs that you and the
American taxpayer expect of us.
For 236 years, from sail to steam to nuclear; from the USS
Constitution to the USS Carl Vinson; from Tripoli to Tripoli; our
maritime warriors have upheld a proud heritage, protected our Nation,
projected our power, and provided freedom of the seas. In the coming
years, this new strategy and our plans to execute that strategy will
assure that our naval heritage not only perseveres, but that our Navy
and Marine Corps continue to prevail.
Thank you and Godspeed.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We will now call on Admiral Greenert.

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS

Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin,
Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the committee,
I'm honored to appear before you for the first time to discuss
the Navy's budget submission.
Because of the dedication of our 625,000 Active and Reserve
sailors and civilians and their families, the Navy and our
primary joint partner the Marine Corps remain a vital part of
our national security. I'm honored to serve and lead the Navy
in these challenging times and I thank this committee for your
continued support.
This morning I'd like to address three points: the Navy's
importance to the Nation's security, our enduring tenets and
priorities that guided our budget decisions, and how these
tenets and how these decisions shaped the budget submission.
Today our Navy is the world's preeminent maritime force.
Our global fleet operates forward from U.S. bases and partner
nation places around the world to deter aggression, respond to
crises, and when needed and when called upon to win our
Nation's wars.
If you will refer to a chartlet (see Figure 1) that I've
provided in front of you, you can see that on any given day we
have about 50,000 sailors and 145 ships underway, with about
100 of those ships deployed overseas. These ships and sailors
allow us to influence events abroad because they ensure access
to what I will refer to as the maritime crossroads. These are
areas where our shipping lanes and our security interests
intersect, and they're indicated in orange on the chartlet. We
can remain forward in these areas because of the facilities and
the support from nearby allies and partners.
[The chart referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

For example, in the Middle East we have 30 ships and more
than 22,000 sailors at sea and ashore. They are combatting
piracy, supporting operations in Afghanistan, assuring our
allies, and maintaining a presence in the region to deter or
counter destabilizing activities. These forces rely on
facilities in Bahrain, who's been a U.S. partner for 6 decades.
In the Asia-Pacific, we have about 50 ships, supported by
our base on Guam and our facilities or places in Singapore, the
Republic of Korea, and Japan. They will be joined next spring
by our first LCS, the Freedom, which will deploy to Singapore
for several months to evaluate the operational concepts
associated with forward stationing a LCS. The lessons learned
from this deployment will help stabilize design and we'll
understand better the operational concepts of our mission
packages.
We are also collaborating with the Marine Corps to
determine the support and the lift that they need in order to
support rotational deployments to Darwin, Australia.
In the Indian Ocean, we depend on Diego Garcia and the
fleet tender and the airfield there for ship repair and
logistics support.
Around the Horn of Africa, we depend on the airfield and
the port in Djibouti to support our forces conducting
counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.
In Europe, we rely on places in Spain, in Italy, and in
Greece to sustain our forces forward in support of our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.
In our own hemisphere, our port and airfield at Guantanamo
Bay will grow more important in the next several years as the
Panama Canal is widened and traffic through this crossroad
increases.
When I assumed the watch as the CNO, I established three
key tenets for our decisionmaking. To me they are the clear,
unambiguous directions for our Navy leadership, and they are:
warfighting is first, operate forward, and to be ready.
Warfighting first, that means the Navy has to be ready to
fight and prevail today, while building the ability to win
tomorrow. This is our primary mission and all our efforts must
be grounded in this fundamental responsibility. Iran's recent
provocative rhetoric highlights the need for us to have forward
deployed warfighting capability. In our 2013 budget submission
we directed funding toward weapons, systems, sensors, and
tactical training that can be more rapidly fielded to the
fleet, particularly in this area. This includes demonstrators
and prototypes that could quickly improve our forces'
capability.
Operate forward, that means we will provide the Nation an
offshore option to deter, to influence, and to win in an era of
uncertainty. Our 2013 budget submission supports several
initiatives to establish our forward posture at the maritime
crossroads. These include placing forward-deployed naval force
destroyers in Rota, Spain, and forward stationing LCSs in
Singapore, and patrol coastal ships in Bahrain. One ship that
is operating from an overseas location can provide the same
presence as about four ships rotationally deployed from the
continental United States.
Be ready, that means we will harness the teamwork, the
talent, and the imagination of our diverse force to be ready to
fight and responsibly use our resources. This is more than
completing required maintenance and ensuring that parts and
supplies are available. Being ready also means being proficient
and confident with our weapons, with our sensors, our command
and control, our communications, and our engineering systems as
well.
Applying these tenets to meet the defense strategic
guidance, we've built a 2013 budget submission to implement
three main investment priorities. Number one, we will remain
ready to meet our current challenges today. Consistent with the
defense strategic guidance, we will continue to prioritize
readiness over capacity and to focus our warfighting presence
on the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. We will also sustain
the Nation's most survivable strategic deterrent in our SSBNs.
Number two, we will build a relevant and capable future
force. Our Navy will evolve to remain the world's preeminent
maritime force and our shipbuilding and aircraft construction
investments will form the foundation of the future fleet.
In developing our aircraft and ship procurement plans, we
really focused on three approaches: to sustain serial
production of today's proven platforms, including the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyers, Virginia-class submarines, and our
Super Hornets. We have moved new platforms to the fleet, such
as the LCS, the JSF, the Ford-class carrier, the P-8A Poseidon
aircraft, and the America-class amphibious assault ship.
To improve the capability of today's platforms through new
weapons, sensors, and unmanned vehicles, including the Advanced
Missile Defense Radar, Firescout, and the follow-on to
Firescout, the Fire-X. New payloads like these will help ensure
we can project power despite threats to access, as described in
the new defense strategic guidance. They will also enable our
continued dominance in the undersea domain environment and
support our goal to operate effectively in cyber space and
fully exploit the electromagnetic spectrum.
In developing the future force, we will continue to
emphasize jointness, as described in our air-sea battle
concept, and we will emphasize affordability by controlling
requirements creep and making costs the entering argument for
new systems.
We will enable and support our sailors, civilians, and
their families. I'm extremely proud of our people. We have a
professional and moral obligation to lead, train, equip, and
motivate them. Our personnel programs deliver a high return on
investment in readiness. We fully fund our programs to address
operational stress, support our families, eliminate the use of
synthetic drugs such as spice, and aggressively prevent
suicides and sexual assaults.
I support the compensation reforms included in the DOD's
2013 budget submission, which I believe are appropriate changes
to manage the costs of the All-Volunteer Force.
In closing, your Navy will continue to be critical to our
Nation's security and prosperity by ensuring access to the
global commons and being at the front line of our Nation's
efforts in war and peace. I assure the committee, Congress, and
the American people that we will focus on warfighting first, we
will operate forward, and we will be ready.
I want to thank the committee staff, those that sit behind
you, Mr. Chairman, for their assistance with our budget
articulation as we worked through the submission. I thank the
committee again for their support to our sailors and families.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:]

Prepared Statement by ADM Jonathan Greenert, USN

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
the committee, it is my honor and pleasure to appear before you to
submit my first budget as Chief of Naval Operations. Thanks to our
625,000 Active and Reserve sailors and civilians and your continued
support, the Navy-Marine Corps team remains vital to our national
security and economic prosperity. Operating globally at the front line
of our Nation's efforts in war and peace, our Fleet protects the
interconnected systems of trade, information, and security that
underpin our own economy and those of our friends and allies. Our Navy
and Marine Corps are the first responders to international crises
through combat operations or humanitarian assistance. After U.S. ground
forces have drawn down in the Middle East, the naval services will
remain on watch with offshore options to deter aggression and--when
necessary--fight and win on, over, and under the sea. Despite the
economic and military challenges facing our Nation, your Navy will
evolve and adapt to fight and win our Nation's wars, remain forward,
and be ready. I appreciate your continued support and look forward to
working together in pursuing our national security objectives.

THE NAVY HAS BEEN IMPORTANT TO OUR NATION'S SECURITY AND PROSPERITY

Today our Navy is the world's preeminent maritime force--but that
has not always been the case. Leading up to the War of 1812, Britain's
Royal Navy held that distinction. Our own Fleet, lacking warfighting
capability, forward posture and readiness, was bottled up in port early
in the war. It was unable to break the British blockade of the Atlantic
Coast or stop the Royal Navy from wreaking havoc along the mid-Atlantic
seaboard and burning parts of Washington, DC, in 1814. Our nation's
economy suffered as shipping costs soared and imports from Europe and
the Caribbean grew scarce. Soon, however, the Fleet developed a
warfighting focus and engaged the British, winning victories on Lake
Erie, at New Orleans, and in the Atlantic that, combined with concerns
about France, brought Britain to the negotiating table. However,
outside of a determined effort from privateers, the U.S. Navy still
could not project power away from home, could not control the sea, and
could not deter aggression against our interests. We needed these key
capabilities--outlined in our Maritime Strategy--then, just as much as
now. The War of 1812 offered a number of hard lessons, and for the next
century our Navy focused on preventing an aggressor from restricting
our trade or isolating us from the sea as our Nation expanded across
the North American continent.
Our Navy operated farther forward as our Nation's economy grew and,
by necessity, became more integrated with Eurasia. In the midst of the
world's first wave of globalization, the Great White Fleet from 1907 to
1909 demonstrated to the world America's emerging power and capability
to project it globally. These episodes of ``operating forward'' became
sustained during World War I as our Fleet convoyed supplies and forces
to Europe and combated German submarines across the Atlantic Ocean. In
World War II, our Navy established dominance in the air, sea, and
undersea domains, going forward around the world to protect sea lanes
and project power to Europe and Africa, and take the fight across the
Pacific to Asia. We sustained our maritime dominance and remained
forward and global throughout the Cold War to contain Soviet expansion
and provide tangible support to allies and partners with whom we were
highly interdependent diplomatically, economically and militarily.
Our Navy today remains global, operating forward from U.S. bases
and international ``places'' around the world. From these ``places'' we
continue to support and operate with allies and partners who face a
range of challenges, from piracy and terrorism to aggressive neighbors
and natural disasters. ``Places,'' from Guantanamo Bay to Singapore,
enable us to remain present or have access to the world's strategic
maritime crossroads--areas where shipping lanes, energy resources,
information networks and security interests intersect. On any given day
over the last year, more than 50,000 sailors were underway or deployed
on 145 of the Navy's 285 ships and submarines, 100 of them deployed
overseas (see Figure 1). They were joined by more than 125 land-based
patrol aircraft and helicopters, 1,000 information dominance personnel,
and over 4,000 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command sailors on the ground
and in the littorals, building the ability of partners to protect their
people, resources, and territory.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

The security and prosperity of our Nation, and that of our friends
and allies, depends on the freedom of the seas, particularly at the
strategic maritime crossroads. Twenty percent of the world's oil flows
through the Strait of Hormuz, the center of a region where more than
12,000 sailors on 30 ships combat piracy, smuggling and terrorism,
deter Iranian aggression, and fly about 30 percent of the close air
support missions in Operation Enduring Freedom. These sailors directly
supported the special operations forces mission that resulted in the
death of Osama Bin Laden, provided ballistic missile defense to our
Arabian Gulf partners, and just last month rescued the crew of the
Iranian dhow, Al Morai, from Somali pirates. Our forces there depend on
facilities in Bahrain, a U.S partner for more than 60 years, for
supplies, communications, and repairs, while our maritime patrol and
reconnaissance aircraft, patrol craft, and minesweepers in the region
are based on the island. Our forces at sea are joined by another 10,000
sailors on the ground, most supporting our combat forces in Afghanistan
as we continue to transition that effort to the Afghan Government.
In the Asia-Pacific, about 40 percent of the world's trade passes
through the 1.7-mile wide Strait of Malacca, while the broader region
is home to five of our seven treaty alliances and many of the world's
largest economies. About 50 U.S. ships are deployed in the Asia-Pacific
region every day, supported by facilities (or ``places'') in Singapore,
the Republic of Korea, and Japan in addition to our bases on Guam. Our
forward posture and ready and available capability proved invaluable to
our allies in Japan following the Great East Japan Earthquake and
Tsunami last March. Twenty four ships, 140 aircraft and more than
15,000 sailors and marines delivered over 280 tons of relief supplies
to beleaguered survivors as part of Operation Tomodachi. Working from
offshore and unhindered by road and rail damage, Navy efforts helped
save lives and fostered a stronger alliance.
Our combined readiness with our Pacific allies and partners is a
result of the nearly 170 exercises and training events we conduct in
the region each year. Our Talisman Sabre exercise with Australia last
year brought together 18 ships and more than 22,500 sailors and marines
to practice operations from maritime security to amphibious assault.
Our Malabar series of exercises continues to expand our
interoperability with India, a key partner in an important part of the
world. From simple maneuvers and replenishment-at-sea in 2002, Malabar
has gone on to include dual carrier flight operations, gunnery
practice, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training, and maritime
interdiction exercises. This year, the U.S. Navy will host Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC), the world's largest maritime exercise, bringing
together more than 20,000 sailors from 14 nations to practice the
entire range of maritime missions from counter-piracy to missile
defense and ASW.
Africa is adjacent to several key strategic crossroads--Bab El
Mandeb on the southern end of the Red Sea, the Suez Canal at its
northern end, and the Strait of Gibraltar at the western edge of the
Mediterranean. Events at each of these crossroads can significantly
impact the global economy and regional security. Supported by our air
and port facilities in Djibouti (Camp Lemonier), our ships form the
backbone of multinational forces from more than 20 nations that combat
pirates and terrorists around East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. In
the Mediterranean and Northern Africa our forward forces enabled a
rapid response to the Libyan civil war. During NATO Operations Odyssey
Dawn and Unified Protector, our ships and submarines fired 221 Tomahawk
Land Attack Missiles and Growler electronic attack aircraft (EA-18G)
redeployed from Iraq in less than 48 hours to suppress and destroy
Libya's air defense network. The Navy-Marine Corps team aboard USS
Kearsarge supported NATO forces with air strikes and personnel
recovery, while on USS Mount Whitney, NATO leaders managed and
coordinated the fight.
We continue our commitment to our NATO allies in the Mediterranean
and other waters around Europe. Supported by facilities in Rota, Spain,
Souda Bay, Greece, and Naples, Italy, our destroyers and cruisers
conducted, among other critical U.S. and NATO missions, continuous
ballistic missile defense patrols in the Mediterranean to counter the
growing Iranian ballistic missile threat. Europe also continues to be a
source of security. Our Fleet trains routinely with allied navies from
the Mediterranean to the Baltic in security cooperation exercises such
as Proud Manta, NATO's largest ASW exercise. Outside the continent, we
operate with our European allies and partners to address our shared
concerns around the world, such as maintaining freedom of navigation
through the Strait of Hormuz, countering piracy around the Horn of
Africa, supporting our African partners with training and assistance,
and responding to crises such as the conflict in Libya.
In Latin America, the ongoing expansion of the Panama Canal will
increase the importance of that strategic maritime crossroad. Today the
waters around Central America already experience a high level of
illegal trafficking, which could adversely affect the increasing volume
of shipping through an expanded canal. Our first Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS), USS Freedom, made its first operational deployment to the region
in 2011, preventing more than three tons of cocaine from entering the
United States as part of Joint Interagency Task Force--South. We
leveraged our port and airfield in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to continue
supporting operations in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. As the
capability of our Latin American partners has grown, so has the
sophistication of our cooperation. In 2011 we conducted ASW training
with Brazil, Peru, Colombia and Chile, where their diesel submarines
helped to train our surface and submarine crews and our crews exchanged
lessons learned on effective undersea operations.

ESTABLISHING FIRST PRINCIPLES

These are challenging and dynamic times for the U.S. military
services and the U.S. national security enterprise. We need to remain
focused on our enduring principles and contributions that hold true
regardless of funding, force structure size or day-to-day world events.
Upon taking office as Chief of Naval Operations, I established these
first principles for Navy leaders to follow in my ``Sailing
Directions.''
I believe historical and current events demonstrate that the Navy
is most effective and best able to support our national security
objectives when Fleet leaders and sailors are focused on three tenets:

Warfighting first
Operate forward
Be ready

I incorporated these tenets into ``Sailing Directions.'' Similar to
their nautical counterpart, my directions describe in general terms
where the Navy needs to go in the next 10-15 years, and the approach we
will take to get there. We applied ``Sailing Directions'' to the final
decisions we made in building our fiscal year 2013 budget submission
and I believe they are consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance
that emerged from our collaborative efforts with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President. I am
in the process of drafting a ``Navigation Plan'' to define our course
and speed now that our defense strategy is established and our budget
request submitted.

MY GUIDANCE FOR THE NAVY AND WHAT WE BELIEVE

We use these three tenets--Warfighting First, Operate Forward, and
Be Ready--as ``lenses'' through which we view each decision as we
organize, train and equip the Navy.

Warfighting First
The Navy must be ready to fight and win today, while building the
ability to win tomorrow. This is our primary mission and all our
efforts from the ``wardroom to the boardroom'' must be grounded in this
fundamental responsibility. The recent posturing and rhetoric from Iran
highlight the importance of our ability to deter aggression, promptly
respond to crisis, and deny any aggressors' objectives. This requires
getting relevant and effective warfighting capability to the Fleet
today, not waiting for perfect solutions on paper that may not arrive
for 10 years. We can no longer afford, strategically or fiscally, to
let the perfect be the enemy of the good--or the good enough--when it
comes to critical warfighting capability. Our history and the
contemporary cases of Iran, North Korea, violent extremists, and
pirates show that conflict is unlikely to appear in the form of the
scenarios for which we traditionally plan. Therefore, our ships,
aircraft and sailors that operate forward must be able to decisively
act and defeat an adversary's actions in situ to deter continued
aggression and preclude escalation. To that end, in our fiscal year
2013 budget submission we shifted procurement, research and
development, and readiness funds toward weapons, systems, sensors and
tactical training that can be rapidly fielded to the Fleet, including
demonstrators and prototypes that can quickly improve our forces'
capability. I request that you support those investments.

Operate Forward
The Navy-Marine Corps team provides the Nation offshore options to
deter, influence, and win in an era of uncertainty. Our naval forces
are at their best when they are forward, assuring allies and building
partnerships, deterring aggression without escalation, defusing threats
without fanfare, and containing conflict without regional disruption.
We keep the Fleet forward through a combination of rotational
deployments from the United States, Forward Deployed Naval Forces
(FDNF) in Japan, Guam and Italy, and forward stationing ships in places
such as Bahrain or Diego Garcia. Our ability to operate forward depends
on our U.S. bases and strategic partnerships overseas that provide
``places'' where the Navy-Marine Corps team can rest, repair, refuel,
and resupply.
Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission supports several initiatives
to establish our forward posture including placing FDNF destroyers in
Rota, Spain, and forward stationing Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in
Singapore and Patrol Coastal ships (PC) in Bahrain. We are also now
collaborating with Headquarters Marine Corps to determine the support
and lift needed for marines to effectively operate forward in Darwin,
Australia. In the FDNF construct, the ships, crews and families all
reside in the host nation. This is in contrast to forward stationing,
where the ship's families reside in the United States and the crew
rotates to the ship's overseas location for deployment. We will rely on
both of these basing constructs and the ``places'' that support them to
remain forward without increases to the Fleet's size. I request you
support funding for these initiatives so our Navy-Marine Corps team can
continue delivering the rapid response our Nation requires of us. We
will continue to pursue innovative concepts for operating forward such
as rotational crewing and employing new classes of ships such as Joint
High Speed Vessels (JHSV), Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), and Afloat
Forward Staging Bases (AFSB).

Be Ready
We will harness the teamwork, talent, and imagination of our
diverse force to be ready to fight and responsibly use our resources.
This is more than simply completing required maintenance and ensuring
parts and supplies are available. Those things are essential, but
``being ready'' also means being proficient and confident in our
ability to use our weapons, employ and rely on our sensors, and operate
our command and control, communication and engineering systems. This
requires practice, so in our fiscal year 2013 budget submission we
increased readiness and procurement funding for training deploying
personnel and for exercise ordnance--funding that I request you
support. Further, we are employing simulation and adjusting our Fleet
Readiness and Training Plan (FRTP) to afford more time to train prior
to deployment. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission provides the
opportunity to build on events such as this year's Bold Alligator, our
largest amphibious assault exercise in more than a decade, which
brought together more than 20,000 sailors and marines and 25 ships from
5 nations. Fundamentally, being ready depends on our ability to train,
lead and motivate our sailors and marines through events such as Bold
Alligator. As we continue to move through challenging times
strategically and fiscally, we will increasingly depend on their
resolve and imagination.

PB13 SHAPED BY THREE MAIN PRIORITIES OF THE CNO

The Budget Control Act of 2011 placed new constraints on our
budget, which required hard choices and prioritization to address. I
applied our tenets to my three main investment priorities as we built
our fiscal year 2013 budget submission to support the new Defense
Strategic Guidance.
Priority 1: Remain Ready to Meet Current Challenges, Today
Readiness means operational capability where it needs to be to
deter aggression, respond to crises, and win our Nation's wars. I will
continue to prioritize readiness over capacity and focus our
warfighting presence on the Asia Pacific and Middle East. Our fiscal
year 2013 decision to decommission seven Ticonderoga-class guided
missile cruisers (CG) and two dock landing ships (LSD) exemplify our
resolve to provide a more ready and sustainable Fleet within our budget
constraints. The resources made available by these retirements will
allow increased funding for training and maintenance. To ensure these
investments improve readiness, we adjusted the FRTP to be more
sustainable and provide units adequate time to train, maintain and
achieve the needed ``fit'' and ``fill'' in their manning between
deployments. The FRTP is aligned to and supports the fiscal year 2013
Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), which is the
authoritative, Secretary of Defense-approved plan for supporting
Combatant Commander presence requirements.
A ready Fleet requires proper maintenance of our ships and
aircraft, and our long-term force structure inventory plans require
each of them to affordably reach expected service life. Our fiscal year
2013 budget submission fully funds ship maintenance and midlife
modernization periods. We are also continuing a series of actions to
address surface ship material condition. We increased the number of
sailors in select surface ships and established Integrated Material
Assistance Teams to ensure adequate personnel for preventive
maintenance and at-sea repairs. To improve maintenance planning and
budgeting, the new surface ship life cycle engineering and support
organization develops comprehensive plans for maintenance and
modernization of non-nuclear ships. These plans will allow us to refine
our assessments of ship material condition, improve our ability to
estimate maintenance costs, and identify actions needed to achieve
expected service life. These initiatives, supported in this budget
submission, have tangibly improved ship readiness and enable more
efficient maintenance periods. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission
also funds aircraft depot maintenance requirements to 94 percent,
meeting our goal for available airframes and engines.
Readiness involves more than material condition. Our capabilities
must also be ``whole,'' meaning our weapons, combat systems, and
sensors must be able to interface with one another, are available in
adequate numbers, and our sailors are proficient and confident in their
use. We emphasized training in our fiscal year 2013 budget submission--
allocating time, ordnance and targets for increased live-fire training
as well as funds to improve the fidelity, capacity and interoperability
of our Fleet simulators. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission also
funds improved data links and radar reliability to enhance the
interoperability and availability of weapons and sensors. In aviation,
we fully funded the Flying Hour Program and invested in F/A-18 A-F life
cycle sustainment and system capability upgrades to ensure these
``workhorses'' of the carrier air wing remain ready and relevant. F/A-
18 A-F sustainment helps ensure our strike fighters reach their
expected service lives and our strike fighter inventory remains
sufficient to meet anticipated needs. Ashore, we fully funded air and
port operations and nuclear weapons infrastructure and security. Our
fiscal year 2013 budget submission accepts some risk in facilities
sustainment and recapitalization, but we anticipate minimal impact on
Fleet readiness. We will continue to closely monitor our shore
infrastructure to ensure it remains capable of supporting the needed
level of Fleet operations. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission
maintains funding for Homeport Ashore to provide quality housing for
our single sailors and increases funding for family readiness programs
such as child development centers.
We must continue improving our fuel efficiency to sustain a ready
and relevant Fleet and our goal remains to reduce our tactical energy
use 15 percent by 2020. We will combine modernization, research and
development, acquisition, and efficient behavior by operators at sea
and on the waterfront to achieve that goal. Our fiscal year 2013 budget
submission continues to incorporate technological advances
incrementally, but steadily. Our Lewis and Clark class supply ships now
employ all-electric propulsion, as will our new Zumwalt-class
destroyers (DDG). Our new hybrid-electric powered amphibious assault
ship USS Makin Island saved more than $2 million in fuel costs on its
maiden voyage from the Gulf Coast to its San Diego homeport. The
insights we gain from these efforts will be applied in developing
requirements for future ships, where energy usage was established last
year as a key performance parameter.

Priority 2: Build a Relevant and Capable Future Force
Our Navy will evolve to remain the world's preeminent maritime
force in the face of emerging threats and our shipbuilding and aircraft
construction investments form the foundation of the future Fleet. In
developing our aircraft and ship procurement plans, we focused on three
approaches: Sustaining serial production of today's proven platforms,
rapidly fielding new platforms in development, and improving the
capability of today's platforms through new payloads of weapons,
sensors and unmanned vehicles.
First, sustained production of today's platforms maintains the
Fleet's capacity, improves the affordability of ships and aircraft, and
fosters the health of the industrial base. Examples of this serial
investment in our fiscal year 2013 budget submission include Arleigh
Burke DDG, MH-60R/S Seahawk helicopters, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and
Virginia-class submarines (SSN). These proven ships and aircraft
represent a known quantity to both the government and contractor and
provide opportunities for cost savings through multi-year procurement.
Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission requests multi-year procurement
of nine Arleigh Burke DDGs and nine Virginia SSNs. Your support for
continued block purchases of DDGs and SSNs is essential to our Fleet's
capacity over the next decade when decommissionings and the procurement
of the new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) combine to reduce the
number of these Fleet workhorses. In addition to the capacity they
bring, our experience with proven platforms also allows us to
incrementally improve their capabilities with new weapons, sensors and
unmanned vehicles, such as we are doing with Arleigh Burke DDG by
adding the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP), SM-6
missile, Advanced Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), and MQ-8 Firescout
unmanned air vehicles.
Second, we will rapidly field the classes of ships and aircraft in
development which are needed to recapitalize the Fleet and pace
emerging threats. Each of these platforms are nearing completion or are
in initial production and offer a significant return on our research
and development investment over the past two decades. We will harvest
this return and focus on capability improvement via new weapons,
sensors and unmanned systems before we begin our next generation of
platforms. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission prudently moves into
sustained production of Freedom and Independence class LCS, MQ-4C Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned air system (UAS), Poseidon
maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (P-8A) and Lightning II
strike fighter (F-35C). We slowed production of the F-35C to allow
lessons from testing to be better incorporated into the aircraft and it
will be a key element of the future carrier air wing. The fiscal year
2013 budget submission continues funding for Gerald R. Ford aircraft
carriers (CVN), although the delivery of CVN-79 was delayed to most
cost effectively maintain our Fleet of 11 CVNs by not delivering the
ship ahead of need. Our budget submission continues funding for the
Zumwalt-class DDG, which will provide an exceptional improvement in
littoral and land-attack capability while also proving several new
technologies to be incorporated into future ships. To sustain our
capacity for amphibious operations, our fiscal year 2013 budget
submission funds continued production of the America class amphibious
assault ships (LHA), the first of which (LHA-6) is nearing completion.
Each of these new platforms is designed to be adaptable and allow
future capability evolution through new payloads. The physical and
electronic open architecture of LCS, for example, will allow it to
change missions in a short refit, but will also allow it to be widely
adaptable over its lifetime. The P-8A has a similar reserve capacity
for adaptation, as well as an operating profile which will allow it to
do a wide range of missions, depending on the weapons and sensors
placed aboard.
Third, we will evolve the force to maintain our warfighting edge by
exploiting the ability of new payloads to dramatically change what our
existing ships and aircraft can do. A focus on what our platforms carry
will be increasingly important as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
threats including new radars and more sophisticated surface-to-air and
anti-ship missiles limit the ability of manned platforms to get close
to an adversary in wartime. Our Air-Sea Battle Concept, developed with
the Marine Corps and the Air Force, describes our response to these
growing A2/AD threats. This concept emphasizes the ability of new
weapons, sensors, and unmanned systems to expand the reach, capability,
and persistence of our current manned ships and aircraft. Our focus on
payloads also allows more rapid evolution of our capabilities compared
to changing the platform itself. This approach is exemplified by our
fiscal year 2013 investment in LCS, which will carry an adaptable
portfolio of unmanned vehicles, weapons, manned helicopters, and
personnel. In aviation, new weapons such as the Small Diameter Bomb,
Joint Standoff Weapon and Mark-54 torpedo will give our legacy aircraft
the stand-off range, penetration, and lethality to defeat adversaries
even if they employ advanced A2/AD capabilities.
Our focus on payloads includes unmanned systems such as the
Firescout UAS (MQ-8B), which already demonstrated in Libya and the
Middle East how it can add significant capability to our legacy
frigates (FFG) and amphibious transport dock (LPD) ships. Our fiscal
year 2013 budget submission continues production of the MQ-8B and adds
the longer-range, higher-payload MQ-8C. The submission also continues
our investment in the Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) demonstrator
and the follow-on Unmanned Carrier Launched Air Surveillance and Strike
system (UCLASS), which will expand the reach and persistence of our
current carrier-based air wings.
Improved sensors and new unmanned systems are essential to our
continued domination of the undersea environment. Our fiscal year 2013
budget submission funds the development of Virginia SSN payload modules
that will be able to carry a mix of missiles, sensors and unmanned
undersea vehicles (UUV) such as the new Large Displacement UUV. These
undersea systems are joined by investments in the P-8A and Arleigh
Burke DDG to improve cueing and close-in ASW operations. Our undersea
superiority provides U.S. forces an asymmetric advantage in being able
to project power or impose unacceptable costs on adversaries. Our
fiscal year 2013 budget submission funds continued development of a new
SSBN to begin replacing the Ohio-class late in the next decade and
sustain the most survivable element of the Nation's nuclear triad. Our
fiscal year 2013 budget submission also includes funding to study the
possible use of Ohio-class guided missile submarine (SSGN) and
Virginia-class SSN as platforms for a future conventional prompt strike
capability.
While we currently dominate the undersea domain, cyberspace and the
electromagnetic spectrum present a different set of challenges and a
lower barrier to entry for our potential adversaries. Our fiscal year
2013 budget submission furthers our goal to operate effectively in
cyberspace and fully exploit the electromagnetic spectrum. Investments
including the SEWIP, EA-18G, Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise
System (CANES), Hawkeye (E-2D) early warning aircraft, Next-Generation
Enterprise Network (NGEN) and Mobile User Objective System support
development of a common operational picture of cyberspace and the
electromagnetic spectrum. They also support robust defense of our
networks and improve our ability to use non-kinetic effects to defend
our ships from attack, conduct offensive operations, and conduct
superior command and control.
It is imperative as we pursue these three approaches to the future
force that we consider both affordability and ``jointness.'' Our fiscal
situation makes affordability essential to sustaining the fleet's
capacity and improving its capability. Working with the Secretary of
the Navy's staff, we are ensuring cost is considered as an entering
assumption in developing requirements for new systems, while
controlling the ``requirements creep'' that impacts the cost of our
programs already in development. Joint capabilities may also be a way
to improve affordability, although we are primarily concerned with how
they can improve our warfighting effectiveness. Our Air-Sea Battle
Concept describes how naval and air forces will develop and field
capabilities in a more integrated manner to allow them to defeat
improving A2/AD threats through tightly coordinated operations across
warfighting domains. Using the Air-Sea Battle Concept and Joint
Operational Access Concept (JOAC) as the starting point, the Navy-
Marine Corps team will continue to expand our integration with the Air
Force and Army in doctrine, systems, training, and exercises to sustain
the ability of U.S. forces to project power.

Priority 3: Enable and Support our Sailors, Navy Civilians, and Their
Families
Today's Active and Reserve sailors and Navy civilians are the most
highly trained, motivated, and educated force we have ever employed.
Our people are the source of our warfighting capability and our fiscal
year 2013 budget submission continues the investments needed to ably
lead, equip, train and motivate them.
Our personnel programs deliver a high return on investment in the
readiness of our sailors and civilians. We fully funded our programs to
address operational stress, support families, prevent suicides,
eliminate the use of synthetic drugs like Spice and aggressively reduce
the number of sexual assaults. I view each of these challenges as
safety and readiness concerns that can be just as damaging to our
warfighting capability as operational accidents and mishaps. To ensure
sailors and their families have a quality environment in which to live,
we sustained our support for quality housing, including Homeport Ashore
for Sailors, and expanded our child development and youth programs.
Our wounded warriors are a top priority. Our fiscal year 2013
budget submission fully funds programs that support the mental,
emotional and financial well-being of our returning warriors and their
families.
The Navy continues to face a unique manpower challenge. Retention
is high, attrition remains steady at a very low level and highly
qualified people continue to want to join the service. To continue
bringing in new sailors with new and diverse backgrounds and ideas, we
must have turnover in the force. To manage our end strength, sustain
upward mobility and address overmanning in some specialties, we
selected 2,947 sailors for separation in 2012 by conducting an Enlisted
Retention Board (ERB). These sailors served honorably and we are now
focused on providing the best transition possible for them, including
early retirement for sailors selected for ERB who will have completed
at least 15 years of Active service as of September 1, 2012. Thank you
for providing this Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012. We do
not plan another ERB for fiscal year 2013. Nor do we plan to offer
early retirement more broadly, but we will evaluate this option if
overmanning in individual specialty ratings/warfare communities again
becomes a concern.
We will continue to use a range of force shaping tools to ensure we
keep our best performers and align our people with needed skills and
specialties. Perform-to-Serve (PTS), our centralized reenlistment
program, will remain the principal method to shape the force. While in
some cases we will be unable to offer reenlistment for sailors due to
high retention and overmanning, PTS also offers sailors the opportunity
to change specialties or enter the Reserves when they come up for
reenlistment if their current specialty is overmanned. We will continue
to offer and regularly adjust Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and
incentive pays for critical specialties to ensure we properly sustain
the skills required in the force.
By managing the size and composition of the force, we are able to
bring in new sailors and civilians. Our fiscal year 2013 budget
submission continues to invest in recruiting quality people, including
diversity outreach and programs to develop science, technology,
engineering and mathematics candidates for the service. Our future
depends on the innovation and creativity that people with diverse
backgrounds, experience and ideas can bring to the Navy.

DOD AND NAVY'S TURNING POINT--AND THE NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGY

We built our fiscal year 2013 budget submission by applying the
tenets of Warfighting First, Operate Forward, and Be Ready to our three
enduring priorities. This approach focused our resources on investments
that are most important to the Navy's ability to be relevant to the
challenges we face as a nation. Today, three main trends place America
and our Navy at a turning point. First, the Federal Government has to
get its fiscal house in order by reducing deficits and putting the
Federal budget on a path toward balance. Second, the security
environment around the world is becoming more dynamic as exemplified by
the ``Arab Awakening,'' ongoing piracy and terrorism, and the continued
threat of aggression from countries including Iran and North Korea.
Third, after a decade of war in the Middle East, we are completing
ground operations and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This confluence of factors was emerging when I wrote my Sailing
Directions and, as they clarified, were the drivers behind the Defense
Strategic Guidance Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense issued by the President and Secretary of Defense.
The Defense Strategic Guidance was developed in a collaborative and
transparent process and I believe it is aligned with Sailing
Directions. The guidance calls for a more agile, lethal and flexible
force to address the challenges and opportunities facing our Nation and
has clear implications for the Navy as a force provider, including:
Emphasize Readiness Over Capacity
We will not let the force become ``hollow'' by having more force
structure than we can afford to maintain, equip and man. Our fiscal
year 2013 budget submission inactivates seven Ticonderoga CGs and two
LSDs. These ships were in need of significant maintenance investment
and six of the seven cruisers required further investment to install
ballistic missile defense capability. Inactivating these ships allowed
almost $2 billion in readiness funding to be shifted to other portions
of the Fleet. This reduction in capacity and our shift to a more
sustainable deployment model will result in some reductions to the
amount of presence we provide overseas in some select areas, or a
change in the nature of that presence to favor innovative and lower-
cost approaches.
Invest in Current Warfighting Capability
Our ability to deter aggression rests on our current warfighting
capability. During the final stages of developing our fiscal year 2013
budget submission, we worked closely with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to shift more than $700 million into procurement, operations
and maintenance, and research and development to rapidly improve the
readiness of warfighting capabilities being deployed to the Middle East
and Asia-Pacific. These changes focused on countering A2/AD threats
through mine warfare (MIW), integrated air and missile defense (IAMD),
anti-surface warfare (ASuW) against fast attack craft and ASW. Our
investments included training targets and ordnance, mine warfare
maintenance and prototype systems, anti-surface and ASW sensors and
weapons, and kinetic and non-kinetic systems for self-defense against
torpedoes, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
Maintain Middle East Presence and Rebalance our Focus toward Asia-
Pacific
The Asia-Pacific and Middle East are the most consequential regions
for our future security and prosperity. Two factors drive the Navy's
ability to provide presence: The size of the Fleet and the amount of
time ships can remain deployed. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission
reduces the size of the Fleet in the next year by decommissioning some
ships, but the Fleet returns to its current size by 2017 and grows to
about 300 ships by 2019. We will work with the Joint Staff and
Secretary of Defense's office to focus our presence on the Middle East
and Asia-Pacific as part of the GFMAP. The mix of ships in the Fleet
between now and 2020 will evolve to include more small combatants and
support vessels that can provide innovative, low-cost platforms for
security cooperation and partnership building activities in Latin
America and Africa. This will enable our carriers, large surface
combatants, submarines, and amphibious ships to focus on the Middle
East, Asia-Pacific, and Europe.
As described above, we are fostering a series of bases and
``places'' with our allies and partners around the world to provide
access and support forward operations at the strategic maritime
crossroads. Some of these facilities will host FDNF or forward
stationed ships and aircraft, while others will extend the range and
duration of deployments by providing places to rest, repair, refuel and
resupply. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission includes funding to
support these facilities, while we are studying options for rotational
crewing which may allow overseas ``places'' to host crew exchanges for
additional classes of ships such as we plan to do for LCSs and
currently conduct for PCs, SSGNs, and mine countermeasures ships
(MCMs).
Develop Innovative, Low-Cost and Small Footprint Approaches to
Partnerships
The United States will continue to be the security partner of
choice, and the Navy will tailor our partnership efforts to be both
affordable and appropriate. The evolution of the Fleet's mix over the
next 8 years will provide ships suited to cooperative operations such
as maritime security; building partner capacity; countering terrorism,
illegal trafficking and proliferation; and providing humanitarian
assistance/disaster response (HA/DR). Ships including LCS (with ASuW
mission packages), JHSV, MLP, AFSB, Hospital Ships (T-AH) and Combat
Logistics Force ships will provide platforms to conduct the low-cost,
small footprint missions called for in the Defense Strategic Guidance.
These ships will free up higher-end combatants for other missions and
will employ innovative crewing concepts such as civilian mariners and
rotational military crews that will provide more time forward per ship.

OUR FISCAL YEAR 2013 INVESTMENTS SUPPORT THE DEPARTMENT'S MOST
IMPORTANT MISSIONS

Within the fiscal constraints of the Budget Control Act of 2011, we
applied our priorities and tenets to develop our fiscal year 2013
budget submission, which strongly supports the missions described the
new Defense Strategic Guidance.
Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare
We will support the Joint Force in an active approach to countering
terrorist and extremist threats. With the drawdown in Afghanistan and
sensitivity to U.S. forces ashore, these efforts will increasingly be
conducted from the sea. The Navy's fiscal year 2013 budget submission
increases our ability to support these operations through investments
including the sea-based MQ-8B and longer range, higher payload MQ-8C
UAS, MLP, AFSB, LCS, BAMS, tailored language and culture training, and
increases in SEAL manning. Places including Djibouti, Singapore,
Bahrain and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba will continue to support small-
footprint, long-duration operations to counter illegal activities--
including terrorism, piracy and trafficking--from the Horn of Africa
and Arabian Gulf to the South China Sea and the Caribbean.
Deter and Defeat Aggression
The Navy-Marine Corps team is the Nation's front line to deny an
aggressor's objectives or promptly impose costs on the aggressor. Naval
forces bring two essential qualities to this mission: Presence or
prompt access forward where conflict occurs, and credible warfighting
capability to counter the aggressor. Our fiscal year 2013 budget
submission supports forward operations at the places where conflict is
most likely or consequential--the strategic maritime crossroads. In
addition to the readiness and operations funding that allow our forces
to operate forward, our fiscal year 2013 budget submission also invests
in establishing FDNF DDGs in Rota, Spain, forward stationed LCSs in
Singapore, additional forward stationed PCs in Bahrain and a
sustainable tempo of rotational deployments.
Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission improves the warfighting
capability of the forces we send forward. The centerpieces of naval
capability remain the Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group.
Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission sustains funding for CVNs and
the strike fighters (F-35C and F/A-18 E/F), E-2Ds, and EA-18Gs they
deliver to the fight, as well as the unmanned NUCAS and UCLASS aircraft
that will expand the reach and persistence of the future air wing. To
complement our aviation capabilities, our fiscal year 2013 submission
funds a ``big deck'' LHA in fiscal year 2017 to support power
projection by Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. These ships, aircraft,
sailors and marines have deterred and defeated aggression since World
War II and will continue to do so well into the future.
Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission invests in capabilities to
counter specific types of aggression, such as Iranian threats to deny
access to the Strait of Hormuz through mine warfare. While we develop
the LCS as the future host of MIW capabilities, our fiscal year 2013
budget submission invests in sonar upgrades and maintenance for our
current MCMs, new mine detection and neutralization UUVs, establishment
of an AFSB in the Arabian Gulf to support air and surface MIW
operations, and sea-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR). Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission also funds ASW
improvements geared toward the Iranian threat such as air-launched
Mark-54 torpedoes and torpedo defense systems, as well as ASuW weapons
to counter fast attack craft such as Griffin and Spike missiles for PCs
and rockets for helicopters.
Project Power Despite A2/AD Challenges
Potential adversaries are mounting strategies to prevent U.S.
forces from entering their theater (anti-access) or operating
effectively once within the theater (area-denial). These adversaries
intend to prevent U.S. forces from defeating their aggression or coming
to the aid of allies and partners. Both state and non-state actors are
undertaking these strategies using capabilities including mines,
submarines, anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, anti-satellite
weapons, cyber attack, and communications jamming. The Navy fiscal year
2013 budget submission addresses these threats through a wide range of
investments that support the multi-service Air-Sea Battle concept and
the JOAC. In addition to the MIW, ASuW and ASW investments identified
above, our fiscal year 2013 budget submission funds upgrades in
electronic warfare (EW), integrated fire control, cyber operations,
networks, Virginia SSN and payload modules, and the F-35C.
The Navy's ability to retain access to international waters and
airspace as well as critical chokepoints throughout the world would be
enhanced by accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). As the world's preeminent maritime power, the United
States has much to gain from the legal certainty and global order
brought by UNCLOS. The United States should not rely on customs and
traditions for the legal basis of our military and commercial activity
when we can instead use a formal mechanism such as UNCLOS. As a party
to UNCLOS, we will be in a better position to counter the efforts of
coastal nations to restrict freedom of the seas.
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
The Navy's primary contribution to countering WMD is interdicting
WMD and their precursors through the international Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI). Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission funds
the readiness and force structure necessary to maintain forces forward
at the strategic maritime crossroads where these interdictions are most
common, while continuing to enable PSI by sustaining the command and
control and sensors needed to find and track WMD transporters.
Operate Effectively in Space and Cyberspace
As a forward deployed force, our Fleet is highly dependent upon
space-based systems, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Naval
forces rely on long-haul communications for command and control,
positioning, navigation and timing and administration. Given the
growing A2/AD threat from communications jamming and anti-satellite
weapons, our fiscal year 2013 budget submission includes investment in
the maritime portion of the Joint Airborne Layer Network, a UAV-based
system to assure our ability to communicate and conduct command and
control.
Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum are a key area of
emphasis for our future force development. In the past 2 years, we made
significant investments in personnel for Navy Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet
as well as U.S. Cyber Command, which continue in our fiscal year 2013
budget submission. These highly-skilled operators are developing a
``common operational picture'' of cyberspace and the tools to
effectively defend our interests within it. Cyberspace and the
electromagnetic spectrum are inextricably linked, and in our fiscal
year 2013 budget submission, we fund a range of EW and electronic
support systems including EA-18G, SEWIP, Next-Generation Jammer,
shipboard prototype and demonstrator systems, Ship Signal Exploitation
Equipment, and the E-2D. These systems sustain our ability exploit the
electromagnetic spectrum for sensing and communication, while denying
our adversaries accurate or effective information. We are also
developing the conceptual and doctrinal framework to fully exploit the
electromagnetic spectrum as a warfighting domain.
Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad
with the SSBN and associated nuclear command and control, maintenance,
and support infrastructure. Our fiscal year 2013 program continues to
fund the recapitalization of our Ohio-class submarines and the safe
handling of Trident D-5 missiles through investment in an additional
explosive handling wharf at Naval Base Kitsap. Consistent with the
Defense Strategic Guidance, we delayed the Ohio replacement program by
2 years. This delay will result in an SSBN force of 10 ships in the
2030s and will require a high state of readiness to meet the Nation's
strategic deterrence needs. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission
fully funds the maintenance and support to today's Ohio-class SSBNs to
help maximize their operational availability throughout their service
lives.
Homeland Defense and Support to Civil Authorities
We maintain approximately 45 ships underway around the United
States and another 50 available within days to meet U.S. Northern
Command's homeland defense requirements through our FRTP. The Navy's
fiscal year 2013 budget submission also funds DDG modernization that
can support homeland ballistic and cruise missile defense missions.
Provide a Stabilizing Presence; Conduct Counterinsurgency, HA/DR and
Other Operations
Although our warfighting capability will be focused on the Middle
East and Asia-Pacific, other regions will retain naval presence. The
nature of that presence, however, will change over the next several
years. While today DDGs and amphibious ships conduct security
cooperation operations with partners in Latin America and Africa, our
fiscal year 2013 budget submission funds procurement of JHSV, AFSB,
MLP, and LCS and sustainment of PCs and T-AHs to take on these missions
in the future. To support an expanding range of partnership missions,
they will increasingly carry tailored force packages of marines to
conduct security cooperation activities with partner armies and
marines.
These same ships will support humanitarian assistance operations
and rapid response by U.S. forces to crisis or disaster. They can
embark a wide range of interagency and nongovernmental personnel,
allowing them to support the whole range of development, defense and
diplomacy activities and contribute to non-military efforts to counter
insurgencies and conduct stabilization operations. As naval forces,
they can be backed up by the robust multi-mission capability and
transportation capacity of amphibious ships and embarked marines.
evaluating impacts of the new defense strategic guidance
The new Defense Strategic Guidance is not without risk. In
particular, we will need to assess the impacts of capacity reductions
on the force's ability to address highly likely or highly consequential
security challenges. Senior defense leaders are conducting this
assessment in a series of seminars over the next several months. Within
the Navy, we are also reevaluating our force structure requirements in
light of the Defense Strategic Guidance. We are assessing the
capabilities needed to implement the strategy, what force structure
could deliver those capabilities, and the resulting inventory of ships
and aircraft that will be required. The results of this assessment will
indicate the risk in the ability of the Navy's investment plans to
implement the Defense Strategic Guidance. The force structure
assessment will also indicate what ships should be counted as part of
the battle force, and the extent to which the Navy will need to
implement innovative concepts such as rotational crewing to deliver the
needed level of forward presence.
We will also evaluate the impact of our investment plans on our
industrial base, including ship and aircraft builders, depot
maintenance facilities, equipment and weapons manufacturers, and
science and technology researchers. Some of our suppliers, especially
in specialized areas such as nuclear power, have the government as
their only customer. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission addresses
the health of the industrial base, and we will work closely with our
industry partners to manage the risk of any further budget reductions.
Ship inactivations in the fiscal year 2013 budget submission, when
combined with those of previous budgets, may cause an imbalance in the
Fleet's overall distribution. We are assessing what will be affordable
and appropriate in homeporting new ships or moving existing ships to
ensure we efficiently employ our shore infrastructure, balance our port
loading, and take advantage of collocating ships with common
configurations and equipment.
The health care proposals in the President's budget are consistent
with our efforts over the last several years to pursue a multi-pronged
strategy to control the rate of growth in defense health costs--
identifying more efficient processes internally; incentivizing healthy
behaviors and wellness; and keeping our sailors and marines fit and
ready to deploy. This budget maintains our commitment to those who
serve and have served, and responsibly meets the demands dictated by
Federal budget constraints. I hope you will agree, and support our
efforts. I also support the establishment of a commission to study
changes to the structure and benefits of our retirement program for
those who have not yet entered the service. That assessment must
include an evaluation of the combined impact to our future recruiting
and retention of changes to retirement benefits, pay, and health care.

CONCLUSION

I believe the risks of the new Defense Strategic Guidance are
manageable and can be mitigated with good management of the Joint
Force. Our Navy will continue to be critical to our Nation's security
and prosperity by assuring access to the global commons and being at
the front line of our Nation's efforts in war and peace. I assure
Congress, the American people, and those who would seek to do our
Nation harm, that we will be focused on warfighting, operating forward,
and being ready.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
General Amos.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS

General Amos. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain,
members of the committee, I'm pleased to speak today on behalf
of your Marine Corps. As we sit today in this chamber, more
than 27,000 marines are forward deployed around the world,
defending our Nation's liberty, shaping strategic environments,
engaging with our partners and our allies, ensuring freedom of
the seas, and deterring aggression abroad.
Over the past year the forward presence and crisis response
of America's marines, working in concert with our most
important joint partner, the U.S. Navy, has created
opportunities and provided decision space for our Nation's
leaders. Your marines were first on the scene to provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the first to
fly air strikes over Libya. They evacuated noncombatants from
Tunisia and reinforced our embassies in Egypt, Yemen, and
Bahrain.
While accomplishing all of that, your Marine Corps
continued to conduct sustained combat and counterinsurgency
missions and operations in Afghanistan. Having just returned
last month from visiting many of the nearly 19,000 marines and
sailors currently deployed there, I can tell you firsthand that
their professionalism and morale remain notably strong. There
is an indomitable spirit displayed in all that they do. Their
best interests and the needs of all of our joint forces in
combat remain my number one priority.
History has shown that it is impossible to predict where,
when, and how America's interests will be threatened.
Regardless of the global economic strain placed on governments
and their ability to produce forces today, crises requiring
military intervention will undoubtedly continue tomorrow and in
the years to come. As a maritime nation dependent on the sea
for the free exchange of ideas and trade, America requires
security both at home and abroad to maintain a strong economy,
to access overseas markets, and to assure our allies.
In an era of fiscal constraint, the Marine Corps is our
Nation's risk mitigator, a certain force during uncertain
times, one that will be the most ready when the Nation is the
least ready.
There is a cost to maintaining this capability, but it is
nominal in the context of the total defense budget and provides
true value to the American taxpayer. This fiscal year I am
asking Congress for $30.8 billion, a combination of both base
and OCO money. Your continued support will fund ongoing
operations around the world, provide quality resources for our
marines, sailors, and their families. It will reset equipment
that is worn out from more than 10 years of war. Lastly, it
will posture our forces for the future.
When the Nation pays the sticker price for its marines, it
buys the ability to be able to respond to crises anywhere in
the world through forward-deployed and forward-engaged forces.
This same force can be reinforced quickly to project power and
contribute to joint assured access anywhere in the world in the
event of a major contingency. No other force possesses the
flexibility and the organic sustainment to provide such
capabilities.
As our Nation begins to direct its attention to the
challenges and opportunities of a post-Afghanistan world, a
world where the Middle East and Pacific take center stage, the
Marine Corps will be ever mindful of the traditional friction
points in other regions and prepared to respond to them there
as needed.
The strategic guidance directs that we rebalance and reset
for the future. We have a solid plan to do so and have begun
our execution already. We will train and educate our marines to
succeed in the increasingly complex and challenging world of
the 21st century. In doing so, we will not deviate from
consistency in the five principles so critically important to
the continued success of your Nation's Marine Corps:

one, we will recruit high-quality people;
two, we will maintain a high state of unit readiness;
three, we will balance capacity with strategic
requirements;
four, we will ensure that our infrastructure is
properly cared for; and
five, we will be responsible stewards of our
equipment modernization efforts.

As we execute a strategic pivot, I have made it a priority
to keep faith with those who have served during the past 10
years of war. Through judicious choices and forward planning,
ever mindful of the economy in which we live, we have built a
quality force that meets the needs of our Nation. By the end of
fiscal year 2016, your Marine Corps will be streamlined to
182,100 marines. This Active-Duty Force will be complemented by
the diverse depth of our operational Reserve component that
remains a strong 39,600.
Our emerging Marine Corps will be optimized for forward
presence, engagement, and rapid crisis response. It will be
enhanced by critical enablers, special operators, and cyber
warfare marines, all necessary on the modern battlefield.
To build down the Marine Corps from its current end
strength of 202,000, I will need the assistance of Congress for
the fiscal resources necessary to execute the drawdown at a
measured and responsible rate of approximately 5,000 marines
each year, a rate that guards against a precipitous reduction
that would be harmful to our force.
As we continue to work with our Nation's leadership and my
fellow joint partners, you have my assurance that your Marine
Corps will be ever faithful in meeting our Nation's need for an
expeditionary force in readiness, a force that can respond to
today's crisis with today's force today.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. James F. Amos, USMC

THE INDOMITABLE SPIRIT OF THE U.S. MARINE

Your Marines are Ready Today
We remain a Nation at war. Currently, nearly 20,000 marines are
conducting combat operations in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) remains our top priority. Having recently returned from visiting
marines and sailors currently deployed throughout Central Command, I am
pleased to report their professionalism and morale remains notably
strong. Whether patrolling in Afghanistan or planning at the Pentagon,
serving on Navy amphibious warships or engaging our partners around the
world, the indomitable spirit of our greatest asset--the individual
Marine--stands ready: ready to safeguard our Nation's liberty, to
ensure freedom of the seas and to protect our Nation's interests
abroad. With your assistance, we will continue to resource this
national treasure . . . the U.S. Marine.
2011 Operational Highlights
During the past year, marines have conducted counterinsurgency
operations in Afghanistan, and have responded to a rapid succession of
unpredicted political upheavals, natural disasters, social unrest,
piracy, and emerging threats in various unstable areas of the world's
littoral regions.

Operation Enduring Freedom: We are seeing measurable
progress along all lines of operation in the Helmand Province:
security, reintegration, rule of law, governance, development,
education and health. Over the past year, violence and the
level of collateral damage have decreased significantly.
Throughout 2012, Marines in Regional Command-Southwest [RC(SW)]
will continue transitioning to partnership training missions as
we transfer even greater security responsibility to the
maturing Afghan National Security Forces; police and army
forces in Helmand province have progressed in training and
capability. There is a strong sense of optimism among our
forces in Helmand.
Operation Tomodachi: Following a devastating
earthquake and tsunami in Japan last spring, 3,600 marines and
sailors from our amphibious forces in the Pacific responded
within 24 hours notice. They served as the lead element of the
Joint Force, delivered humanitarian aid (i.e. 500 tons of food
and supplies; 2,150,000 gallons of water; and 51,000 gallons of
fuel), rescued those in danger, provided consequence management
and facilitated the evacuation of almost 8,000 American
citizens. For weeks following this disaster, Marine aircrews
flew through a radioactive environment to save lives, deliver
aid and assist the afflicted.
Operation Unified Protector/Odyssey Dawn: Amidst a
wave of civil turmoil spreading across Northern Africa, two
amphibious warships with embarked marines sped to the
Mediterranean, and took up station off the coast of Libya. The
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), an air-ground-logistics
task force, provided our Nation's leaders invaluable decision
time that allowed the determination of a way ahead and later
integration with the Joint Force with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to enforce a no-fly zone. Marine Aviation assets
were an important component of the Joint Force. Short take-off
and vertical landing (STOVL) Harriers, operating from USS
Kearsarge, conducted the first precision airstrikes and
provided airborne command and control. Our KC-130Js evacuated
non-combatant foreign nationals repatriating them to their
homeland, and our MV-22B Ospreys rescued a downed American
aviator using unprecedented operational reach.\1\
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\1\ The MV-22B Osprey rescue of an American combat aviator on March
22, 2011, was conducted within 95 minutes over a distance of 300
nautical miles (from launch aboard amphibious shipping to recovery of
pilot and then back to shipping).
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Security Cooperation: In 2011, we supported all six
geographic combatant commands with task-organized forces of
marines who conducted hundreds of security cooperation (SC)
activities with the armed forces of more than 75 countries.
Aligned with Defense Strategic Guidance to ``develop
innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve
our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational
presence and advisory capabilities,'' our SC missions focus on
internal defense and participation in coalition operations.\2\
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\2\ Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense January 2012, pg. 3.
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Embassy Reinforcement: We continue providing security
for 154 U.S. Embassies and consulates in 137 countries around
the world through the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group. To
augment this mission, marines from our Fleet Anti-Terrorism
Security Teams rapidly deployed to reinforce embassies. This
past year they deployed to protect American lives and property
in Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen as crisis events unfolded across
the Middle East.

The New Strategic Guidance; How Your Marine Corps is Changing
New strategic guidance issued by the President and the Secretary of
Defense provides the framework by which the Marine Corps will balance
the demands of the future security environment with the realities of
our current budget. The guidance calls for a future force that will
``remain capable across the spectrum of missions, fully prepared to
deter and defeat aggression and to defend the homeland and our allies
in a complex security environment.'' \3\
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\3\ Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense Fact Sheet January 5, 2012, pg. 2.
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We have built a quality force that is fully capable of executing
its assigned missions. Our strategic guidance rightfully focuses our
attention on the Pacific and Central Command regions. Navy-Marine Corps
forward basing, response capabilities and plans are already positioned
to support that strategy, yet we will remain vigilant and capable to
respond on short notice in other areas of the world as the Nation
requires. Marines continually stand ready to contribute decisively to a
joint force, and can help provide access for that force wherever
needed.
Though the fiscal choices made over the past year were difficult,
we are confident that we are managing risk by balancing capacity and
capabilities across our forces while maintaining the high levels of
readiness for which the Nation relies on its marines. The Corps of
today and tomorrow will maintain its high standards of training,
education, leadership and discipline, while contributing vital
capabilities to the Joint Force across the spectrum of military
operations. The emerging strategy revalidates our role as America's
Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Our partnership with the Navy enables
a forward-deployed and engaged force that shapes, deters, responds and
projects power well into the future.
During our force structure assessment, we cross-checked
recommendations against approved DOD Operations and Contingency Plans,
and incorporated lessons learned from 10 years of combat. The resulting
force structure decisions to support the new strategy are:

Reduced the end strength of the Active component of
the Marine Corps from 202,100 beginning this fiscal year to
182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016.
Designed a force with capabilities optimized for
forward-presence, engagement and rapid crisis response.
Funded readiness levels required for immediate
deployment and crisis response.
Properly reshaped organizations, capabilities and
capacities to increase aggregate utility and flexibility across
the range of military operations; also enhancing support
provided to U.S. Special Operations and Cyber Commands.
Properly balanced critical capabilities and enablers
across our air-ground-logistics task forces, ensuring that
identified low-density/high-demand assets became right density/
high demand assets.
Incorporated the lessons learned from 10 years of
war--in particular, the requirements to field a force that is
manned, trained and equipped to conduct distributed operations.
Created an operational Reserve component capability
without any reductions in Reserve Force structure.
Designed the force for more closely integrated
operations with our Navy, special operations, and interagency
partners.

Throughout this period of adjustment, we will ``keep faith with our
marines, sailors, and their families.'' Our approach to caring for them
is based on our recognition and appreciation for their unwavering
loyalty and unfailing service through a decade of combat operations.
This strong commitment will not change.

Maintaining a High State of Readiness
The Navy and Marine Corps Team is the Nation's resource for
mitigating risk. Given likely future operations set forth in the
Defense Strategic Guidance ranging from defeating rogue actors to
responding to natural disasters, the Nation can afford and should
invest in the small premium it pays for high readiness levels within
its naval amphibious forces. Because our Nation cannot afford to hold
the entire Joint Force at such high rates of readiness, it has
historically ensured that marines remain ready; and has used us often
to plug gaps, buy time for decision makers, ensure access or respond
when and where needed.
In order for the Marine Corps to achieve institutional readiness
for crisis and contingency response, we must maintain balance in the
following five pillars:

High Quality People (Recruiting and retaining high
quality people plays a key role in maintaining our high state
of readiness): Recruiting quality youth ultimately translates
into higher performance, reduced attrition, increased retention
and improved readiness for the operating forces. By retaining
the highest quality people, the Marine Corps will continue to
achieve success in today's dynamic environment and meet the
challenges posed to our Nation. We will not lower our
standards.
Unit Readiness (Maintaining readiness of the operating
forces, including appropriate operations and maintenance
funding to train to core missions and maintain equipment): The
Marine Corps deploys units at high levels of readiness for
assigned missions. We source our best trained, most ready
forces to meet geographic combatant commander requirements. One
hundred percent of deployed units report the highest levels of
readiness for their assigned mission. We will be ready to
deploy on a moment's notice.
Capacity versus Requirements (Force-sizing to meet
geographic combatant commander requirements with the right mix
of capacity and capability): The Marine Corps must maintain a
force that meets our ongoing operational requirements to
include our commitment to OEF, our rotational presence abroad,
our many security cooperation and engagement activities, along
with anticipated missions as we reorient to the Pacific.
Infrastructure Sustainment (Investing in real
property, maintenance, and infrastructure): We must adequately
resource the sustainment of our bases and stations to maintain
our physical infrastructure and the means to train and deploy
our forces. As resources become more constrained, we will
become even better stewards of our installations to maintain
our facilities for the next generation of marines.
Equipment Modernization (Ensuring ground and aviation
equipment matches the needs of the emerging security
environment): As we explore options to adjust to changing
fiscal realities, there is a clear imperative for our Corps to
reset portions of our legacy equipment used in OEF and
Operation Iraqi Freedom while we modernize what we must to
guarantee our dominance and relevance against future threats.

FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS

The Frugal Force
The Marine Corps is fully aware of the fiscal challenges facing our
Nation and has critically examined and streamlined our force needs for
the future. We continually strive to be good stewards of the public
trust by maintaining the very best financial management practices. The
Marine Corps has undergone an independent audit in fiscal year 2010,
and our fiscal year 2011 audit is still ongoing. We plan to pursue an
independent audit again for fiscal year 2012, and fully expect an audit
opinion for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. To date, we are the
only service to undertake such independent scrutiny. By the end of
2012, we will complete initial service wide implementation of our
Enterprise Resource Planning System-Global Combat Support System-Marine
Corps (GCSS-MC). GCSS-MC will significantly improve our inventory
accountability and contribute to clean audit requirements. We are proud
of our reputation for frugality, and remain one of the best values for
the defense dollar.
We have four major accounts governing our operations: Investment,
Operations and Maintenance, MILCON and Family Housing and Manpower.
These are our priorities:

Investment

Enhancing programs vital to our ground combat
elements

Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS),
Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System (STUAS)

Maintaining the same investment levels in
other enabling programs

Ground Aviation Task Oriented Radar
(G/ATOR), Next Generation Enterprise Network
(NGEN), Command and Control Situational
Awareness (C2/SA)

Fully funding critical research and
development efforts

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV),
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)

Sustaining other ground and tactical vehicles
until their replacements can be procured

High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) and Amphibious Assault Vehicle
(AAV)

Procuring full programs of record critical to
aviation modernization

F-35B, H-1 Upgrades, MV-22B, KC-130J,
CH-53K

Operations & Maintenance

Fully funding our education, training and
readiness accounts
Resourcing civilian workforce at fiscal year
2010 end-of-year levels
Enhancing support of Marine Special Operations
Command (MARSOC) and Marine Forces Cyber Command
(MARFORCYBER)
Providing continued support to family
readiness and Wounded Warrior programs
Supporting transition from the Navy Marine
Corps Intranet to NGEN
Maintaining energy mandates

Military Construction and Family Housing

Maintaining facility sustainment at 90 percent
of required funding
Increasing facilities demolition funds
Preserving essential MILCON funding

Aviation: Joint Strike Fighter, MV-22B
Osprey
Ground: Marine Corps Security Forces,
Marine Corps University

Preserving environmental restoration funding,
family housing operations and construction

Manpower

Reducing end strength from 202,100 marines to
182,100 marines by the end of fiscal year 2016 in a
responsible and measured way to keep faith with all who
have served
Realigning force structure across the entire
Marine Corps
Maintaining our Reserve component at 39,600
marines

During these times of constrained resources, we remain committed to
refining operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings
to conserve scarce public funds. We have met or exceeded all DOD
efficiency measures to date. This fiscal year, we are seeking $30.8
billion ($23.9 billion baseline + $6.9 billion Overseas Contingency
Operations) to fund our operations, provide quality resources for our
marines, sailors, and their families, conduct reset of equipment worn
from more than 10 years at war and posture our forces for the future.
Marines account for only 8.2 percent \4\ of the total Department of
Defense (DOD) budget. With that, our Nation gains the ability to
respond to unexpected crises, from humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief efforts to non combatant evacuation operations, to counter-
piracy operations, to full-scale combat. When the Nation pays the
``sticker price'' for its marines, it buys the ability to remain
forward deployed and forward engaged, to reinforce alliances and build
partner capacity.
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\4\ This percentage is based on the enacted fiscal year 2012
Defense budget authorization and is slightly larger than the 7.8
percent sum cited in the past. This percentage includes $3 billion in
fiscal year 2012 funding for amphibious warship new construction as
well as Navy funding for chaplains, medical personnel, amphibious
warships (operations and maintenance) and Marine Corps aircraft.
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THE ROLE OF MARINES IN THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Future Security Environment
The rapidly evolving events of the past year alone indicate a new
constant. Competition for resources; natural disasters; social unrest;
hostile cyber activity, violent extremism (criminal, terrorist,
religious); regional conflict; proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and advanced weaponry in the hands of the irresponsible are
becoming all too common. Marine Corps intelligence estimates rightfully
point out that ``more than half of the world's population lives in
fragile states, vulnerable to ruinous economic, ideological, and
environmental stresses. In these unstable regions, ever-present local
instability and crises will erupt, prompting U.S. responses in the form
of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, actions to
curtail piracy, stability operations and the rescue and evacuation of
U.S. citizens and diplomats.'' \5\ These and other sources of stress
are challenging industrialized nations just as they do emerging and
failed ones. Further increased fragility of the global systems impacts
both international markets and our Nation's economic stability. These
challenges are harbingers of potential crisis around the world, and
more specifically for naval forces in the littoral regions.
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\5\ Five-Year Forecast: 2012-2017 Assessment of International
Challenges and Opportunities That May Affect Marine Expeditionary
Forces January 2012, pg 1.
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History has shown that crises usually come with little or no
warning; stemming from the same conditions of uncertainty, complexity
and chaos we observe across the world today. Regardless of the
financial pressures placed on governments and markets today, crises
requiring military intervention undoubtedly will continue tomorrow. In
this environment, physical presence and readiness matter significantly.
Since the 1990s, America has been reducing its foreign basing and
presence, bringing forces back home. This trend is not likely to change
in the face of the strategic and budget realities we currently face.
There remains an enduring requirement to balance presence with cost. In
the past, the Nation has chosen to depend on the Navy and Marine Corps
to provide a lean and economical force of an expeditionary nature,
operating forward and in close proximity to potential trouble spots.
Investing in naval forces that can respond to a wide range of crisis
situations, creates options and decision space for our Nation's
leaders, and protects our citizens and interests is a prudent measure
in today's world.

The Navy and Marine Corps Team
Partnered with the U.S. Navy in a state of persistent forward
presence aboard amphibious warships, your U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
Team remains the most economical, agile and ready force immediately
available to deter aggression and respond to crises. Such a flexible
and multi-capable force that maintains high readiness levels can
mitigate risk, satisfy the standing strategic need for crisis response
and, when necessary, spearhead entry and access for the Joint Force.
More than 60 years ago and arising out of the lessons learned from the
Korean War, the 82nd Congress envisioned the need for a force that ``is
highly mobile, always at a high state of combat readiness . . . in a
position to hold a full-scale aggression at bay while the American
Nation mobilizes its vast defense machinery.'' \6\ This statement
continues to describe your Navy and Marine Corps Team today. It is
these qualities that allow your Marine Corps to protect our Nation's
interests, reassure our allies and demonstrate America's resolve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Committee Report accompanying S. 677 and H.R. 666 of 30 June
1951.
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Reorienting to the Pacific
As our security strategy looks increasingly toward the Pacific,
forward deployed naval forces will become increasingly vital. The
``geographic realities'' of the Pacific theater demand naval
responsiveness. The genesis of the amphibious and power projection
capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps traces back more than 70
years to operations in the Pacific--where today key terrain and
strategic chokepoints are separated by large expanses of ocean. The
Pacific theater is where 30 percent of the world's population and the
same percentage of our primary trading partners reside; where five
major defense treaties are focused; \7\ where 50 percent of the world's
megacities are situated; and where natural disasters over the past
decade have required the greatest attention from the international
community.\8\ The geography of the Pacific has not changed, though our
tactics and operations continually evolve with the changing character
and lethality of modern warfare. Approximately 24,000 marines already
in the Pacific conduct an ambitious, annual training cycle of more than
80 exercises, engagements and initiatives, in addition to the crises we
respond to such as Operation Tomodachi in Japan last year.
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\7\ Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty (1951); Australia, New
Zealand, U.S. (ANZUS) Treaty; U.S. Alliance with South Korea (1954);
Thailand (Manila Pact of 1954); U.S. Japan Security Treaty (1960)
\8\ According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific, during the period 2001 to 2010 in the Asia-
Pacific region over 200 million people per year were affected by
natural disasters. This total amounts to 95 percent of the total people
affected by natural disasters annually. Approximately 70,000 people per
year were killed due to natural disasters (65 percent of the world's
total that died of such causes). An average of $35 billion of economic
damage occurred per year to the region due to natural disasters.
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Forward presence involves a combination of land and sea-based naval
forces. Our enduring bases and presence have served U.S. National
Security interests well for decades. Our rotational presence in
locations such as Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand
and Singapore reassures our allies and partners. Sea-basing, the act of
using amphibious warships with support from maritime prepositioned
ships with various types of connectors, is uniquely suited to provide
the geographic combatant commander with the flexibility to deploy
forces anywhere in the Pacific region without having to rely on
multiple bases ashore or imposing our presence on a sovereign nation.
Sea-basing enables forward deployed presence at an affordable cost.
Forward-deployed naval forces serve as a deterrent and provide a
flexible, agile response capability for crises or contingencies.
Maritime prepositioning offers the ability to rapidly support and
sustain Marine forces in the Pacific during training, exercises, or
emerging crises, and delivers the full range of logistical support
those forces require.

A Middleweight Force from the Sea
As a ``middleweight force,'' marines do not seek to supplant any
Service or ``own'' any domain. Rather, Marine forces operate in a
``lane'' that passes through all domains--land, sea, air, space and
cyber--operating capably and freely throughout the spectrum of threats,
whether they be conventional, hybrid, irregular or the uncertain areas
where they overlap. Whereas other forces are optimized for a particular
mission and domain, the Marine Corps is optimized for rapid deployment,
versatile employment, and self-sustainment via Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces (MAGTF), which are balanced, combined-arms formations under a
single commander. All MAGTFs consist of four core elements: a Command
Element, Ground Combat Element, Aviation Combat Element, and Logistics
Combat Element. MAGTFs are scalable in size and capability.
Bridging a seam in our Nation's defense between heavy conventional
and special operations forces (SOF), the U.S. Marine Corps is light
enough to arrive rapidly at the scene of a crisis, but heavy enough to
carry the day and sustain itself upon arrival. The Marine Corps is not
designed to be a second land army. That said, throughout the history of
our Nation, its marines have been called to support sustained
operations from time to time. We are proud of our ability to contribute
to land campaigns when required by leveraging and rapidly aggregating
our capabilities and capacities. Primarily though, the Corps is a
critical portion of our integrated naval forces and designed to project
power ashore from the sea. This capability does not currently reside in
any other Service; a capability that has been called upon time and
again to deter aggression and to respond quickly to threatening
situations with appropriate military action.
Marine Corps and SOF roles are complementary, not redundant.
Special Forces contribute to the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
demands of the geographic combatant commanders in numerous and
specialized ways, but they are not a substitute for conventional forces
and they do not have a broader range of capabilities and
sustainability. SOF lack the organic logistic capability and capacity
to execute a non-combatant operation, serve as a ``fire brigade'' in a
crisis or conduct combined amphibious and airborne assaults against a
competent enemy. Middleweight naval forces, trained in combined arms
warfare and knowledgeable in the art of maneuver warfare from the sea,
are ideally trained and prepared for these types of operations.

The Littorals
The United States remains a maritime nation that relies heavily on
the oceans and waterways of the world for the free exchange of ideas
and trade. The maritime commons are where 95 percent of the world's
commerce flows, where more than 42,000 commercial ships are underway
daily, where most of the world's digital information flows via undersea
cables, and where half the world's oil travels through seven strategic
chokepoints. To secure our way of life and ensure uninterrupted freedom
of navigation, we must retain the ability to operate simultaneously and
seamlessly while at sea, ashore, from the sea, in the air and, perhaps
most importantly, where these domains converge--the littorals. These
littoral areas exist not only in the Pacific, but throughout the world.
Operating in the littoral environment demands the close integration of
air, sea and land power. By using the sea as maneuver space, flexible
naval forces can quickly respond to crises in the bordering environment
of the littorals.
In the context of the new strategy, the Navy and Marine Corps Team
is increasingly relevant in meeting the exigent military needs of our
Nation. Together, we provide the capability for massing potent forces
close to a foreign shore, while maintaining a diplomatically sensitive
profile. Additionally, when necessary, we are able to project this
power ashore across the range of military operations at a time of our
Nation's choosing. Amphibious capabilities provide the means to conduct
littoral maneuver--the ability to maneuver combat ready forces from the
sea to the shore and inland in order to achieve a positional advantage
over the enemy. Working seamlessly as a single naval force, your Navy
and Marine Corps Team provides the essential elements of access and
forcible entry capabilities that are necessary components of a joint
campaign.

Engagement
In order to keep large crises from breaking out or spilling over to
destabilize an entire region, 21st century security challenges also
require expansion of global engagement with partner and allied
nations--facilitated through persistent forward naval presence--to
promote collective approaches to common security concerns. Our
engagement contributions in support of the geographic combatant
commanders minimize conditions for conflict and enable host nation
forces to effectively address instability on their own as it occurs.
They promote regional stability and the growth of democracy while also
deterring regional aggression. History has shown that it is often far
cheaper to prevent a conflict than to respond to one. This thrust will
necessitate amphibious forces that are not only fighters, but who can
also serve as trainers, mentors and advisers to host nation military
forces.

Integration with the Joint Force
In our new defense strategy, the Marine Corps will fill a unique
lane in the capability range of America's Armed Forces. Whether first-
on-the scene, part of, or leading a joint force, marines instinctively
understand the logic and synergy behind joint operations. Our ability
to deploy rapidly and globally allows us to set the stage and enable
the transition to follow-on Joint Forces in a timely manner. Our MAGTF
structure--with organic logistics, aviation, intelligence, fires and
other assets--enables us to seamlessly team with others and provides
options for the Joint Force Commander to:

Provide a visible deterrent to would-be threats,
without requiring a vulnerable presence ashore at fixed bases
or airfields;
Swiftly respond to small-scale crises with a range of
options beyond precision strike, potentially containing crises
before they erupt into major contingencies;
Partner with the Navy and U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) to shape the operational environment;
Use the sea as maneuver space, avoiding enemy
strengths and striking his weaknesses;
Directly seize or obtain operational objectives from
the sea, without the requirement for large force build-ups or
sustained presence ashore;
Extend the operational reach of the Joint Force
hundreds of miles inland to achieve effects from the sea
through organic MAGTF assets; and
Overcome anti-access and area denial threats in a
single-naval battle approach through the use of landing forces
aboard amphibious warships integrated with other capabilities
to include mine countermeasures and naval surface fires.

Day-to-Day Crisis Response
Engagement and crisis response are the most frequent reasons to
employ our amphibious forces. The same capabilities and flexibility
that allow an amphibious task force to deliver and support a landing
force on a hostile shore enable it to support forward engagement and
crisis response. The geographic combatant commanders have increased
their demand for forward-postured amphibious forces capable of
conducting security cooperation, regional deterrence and crisis
response.
Marines have conducted amphibious operations and responded to
crises throughout the world more than 100 times in the past two
decades. The vast majority of our expeditionary service has involved
crisis response and limited contingency operations, usually conducted
in periods when the Nation has otherwise been at peace. Some of these
were relatively short-term rescue or raid expeditions, while others
evolved into contingencies that were limited in force size, but not
limited in duration, complexity and level of integration with the other
elements of national power. We will contribute to the missions of our
Nation's security strategy in the same way.\9\ On a day-to-day basis,
marines will be forward-deployed and engaged, working closely with our
joint and allied partners. When crises or contingencies arise, these
same marines will respond--locally, regionally, or globally if
necessary--to accomplish whatever mission the Nation requires.
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\9\ The Marine Corps is capable of performing 9 of the 10 stated
missions in the Defense Strategic Guidance to include: Counterterrorism
and Irregular Warfare; Deter and Defeat Aggression; Project Power
Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges; Counter Weapons of Mass
Destruction; Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space; Defend the
Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities; Provide a
Stabilizing Presence; Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency
Operations; Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other
Operations.
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America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness
The new strategic guidance underscores the Marine Corps role as
America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Reliant on a strategically
relevant and appropriately resourced Navy fleet of amphibious warships
and Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) vessels, we are forward deployed
and forward engaged: shaping strategic environments; training partner
nation and allied forces; deterring adversaries; and responding to all
manner of crises contingencies.\10\ Alert and ready, we respond to
today's crisis with today's force . . . today. Marines are ready to
respond whenever the Nation calls and wherever and however the
President may direct.
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\10\ As of January 2012, approximately 30,000 marines were forward
deployed in operations supporting our Nation's defense. This number
includes 19,500 marines in Afghanistan including those serving in
external billets (transition teams, joint/interagency support, etc.),
5,000 marines at sea on Marine Expeditionary Units, and 6,000 marines
engaged in various other missions, operations, and exercises. The
30,000 marine statistic does not include more than 18,000 marines
permanently assigned to garrison locations outside the continental
United States such as in Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific, etc.
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we have worked diligently to prepare for the future
Force Structure Review
In an effort to ensure the Marine Corps is organized for the
challenges of the emerging security environment, we conducted a
capabilities-based Force Structure Review beginning in the fall of 2010
to identify ways we could rebalance and posture for the future. The
Force Structure Review incorporated the lessons learned from 10 years
of combat and addressed 21st century challenges confronting our Nation
and its Marine Corps. The review sought to provide the ``best value''
in terms of capability, cost and readiness relative to the operational
requirements of our forward-engaged geographic combatant commanders.
The results of that effort have been shared with Congress over the past
year. While affirming this strategy-driven effort, we have aligned our
force based on the realities of constrained spending levels and
Strategic Guidance.

End Strength
During our comprehensive Force Structure Review, we tailored a
force structure to ensure a sufficient type and quantity of force
available to meet the forward presence, engagement and crisis response
requirements of the geographic combatant commanders. The resulting
force structure is intended to meet title 10 responsibilities, broaden
capabilities, enhance speed and response options and foster the
partnerships necessary to execute the range of military operations
while providing the ``best value'' to the Nation. This force structure
also accounted for the addition of enabling assets (e.g. combat
engineers, information operations specialists, civil affairs personnel,
specialized intelligence marines, cyber operators, special operators,
etc.) necessary to meet the demands of the battlefields of today and
tomorrow.
As directed, we will draw-down our force in a measured way
beginning in fiscal year 2013. Our fiscal year 2013 programmed end
strength is 197,300 marines. In accordance with Defense Strategic
Guidance, we are resisting the ``temptation to sacrifice readiness in
order to retain force structure.'' \11\ Personnel costs account for
about 60 cents of every Marine dollar; through our force structure
efforts we balanced the requisite capabilities across a smaller force,
in effect trading capacity for modernization and readiness.
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\11\ Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense January 2012, pg 7.
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The resulting 182,100 Marine Active-Duty Force, supported by our
operational Reserve component, retains the capacity and capability to
support steady state and crisis response operations through rotational
deployments, and to rapidly surge in support of major contingency
operations. Although reshaping the Marine Corps from 202,100 marines to
a force of approximately 182,100 marines entails some risk to our
ability to simultaneously respond to multiple large-scale
contingencies, it is manageable. We intend to leverage the diverse
depth and range of assets within our Reserve component both to mitigate
risk and maximize opportunities where available.
As we reduce end strength, we must manage the rate carefully so we
reduce the force responsibly. We will draw-down our end strength by
approximately 5,000 marines per year. The continued resourcing of this
gradual ramp-down is vital to keeping faith with those who have already
served in combat and for those with families who have experienced
resulting extended separations. The pace of active component draw-down
will account for completion of our mission in Afghanistan, ensuring
proper resiliency in the force relative to dwell times. As our Nation
continues to draw-down its Armed Forces, we must guard against the
tendency to focus on pre-September 11 end strength levels that neither
account for the lessons learned of 10 years at war nor address the
irregular warfare needs of the modern battlefield. Our 182,100 Marine
Corps represents fewer infantry battalions, artillery battalions,
fixed-wing aviation squadrons, and general support combat logistics
battalions than we had prior to September 11. However, it adds cyber
operations capability, Marine special operators, wartime enablers and
higher unit manning levels--all lessons gleaned from 10 years of combat
operations; it is a very capable force.
My promise to Congress is that at the end of the day, I will build
and maintain the best Marine Corps our Nation can afford with the
resources it is willing to invest. We are also committed to keeping
faith with marines, sailors, and their families who have sacrificed so
much over the past decade at war. Personnel reductions that become
precipitous are among the worst measures that can be employed to save
money. Our All-Volunteer Force is built upon a reasonable opportunity
for retention and advancement; unplanned and unexpected wholesale cuts
undermine the faith and confidence in service leadership and create
long-term experience deficits with negative operational impacts. Such
an approach would no doubt do significant long-term damage to our
ability to recruit and maintain a quality force.

Civilian Marines
Our Civilian Marines support the mission and daily functions of the
Marine Corps and are an integral part of our Total Force. In
recognition of the need to study and clearly define our civilian
workforce requirements to ensure we had the right workforce in the
right location, at a cost that aligned with our budget, I directed a
full review of the Total Force in late 2010. This measure necessitated
a hiring freeze but resulted in prioritized requirements within
affordable levels and the alignment of resources with capabilities. It
also ensured the civilian labor force was shaped to support the mission
of the Corps today and that projected for the future.
During the fiscal year 2012 budget cycle, there was no growth in
our fiscal year 2011 civilian workforce levels due to necessary
efficiency measures. Consequently, our civilian workforce went from a
planned level of 21,000 personnel in direct funded full-time
equivalencies (FTEs) to 17,501 personnel. This number of FTE personnel
will remain constant in each year of the current Future Year's Defense
Program (FYDP)--there is no growth planned. The end result is a 17
percent reduction in planned growth between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal
year 2012 budget requests.
Our fiscal year 2013 civilian personnel budget reflects efforts to
restrain growth in direct funded personnel. By establishing budgetary
targets consistent with current fiscal realities, we will be able to
hold our civilian labor force at fiscal year 2010 end-of-year levels,
except for limited growth in critical areas such as the acquisition
workforce, the intelligence community, the information technology
community (i.e. conversion from NMCI to NGEN), in-sourcing of security
personnel (i.e. Marine Corps Civilian Law Enforcement Personnel) and
personnel in our cyber community. Our Civilian Marine workforce remains
the leanest among DOD with only 1 civilian for every 10 marines.

OUR PRIORITIES

Commandant's Four Priorities
To best meet the demands of the future and the many types of
missions marines will be expected to perform now and beyond the post-
OEF security environment, I established four enduring priorities in
2010. To that end, we will:

Provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to
Afghanistan. This will not change and remains our top priority;
Rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future and
aggressively experiment with and implement new capabilities and
organizations;
Better educate and train our marines to succeed in
distributed operations and increasingly complex environments;
and
Keep faith with our marines, our sailors, and our
families.

We are making significant progress within each of these four
critical areas; however, there are pressing issues facing our Corps
today that require the special attention and assistance of Congress.
These include specific programs and initiatives within the command,
ground, logistics and aviation portfolios of the MAGTF.

Reset
The Marine Corps is conducting a comprehensive review of its
equipment inventory to validate reset strategies, future acquisition
plans, and depot maintenance programming and modernization initiatives.
As already stated, after 10 years of constant combat operations, the
Marine Corps must reset the force coming out of Afghanistan. The reset
of equipment retrograded to home station from Iraq (approximately
64,000 principal items) is complete. However, the equipment density
list currently supporting combat operations in Afghanistan totals
approximately 95,000 principal items, of which approximately 42 percent
was retransferred directly from Iraq to support the surge of 2009. The
bulk of this transferred equipment included high demand items such as
communications equipment and vehicles to include the majority of our
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles and 100 percent of our medium
tactical vehicle fleet.
Sustaining current combat operations has reduced the aggregate
readiness of the non-deployed force. Non-deployed unit readiness is
degraded and has been the ``bill payer'' for deployed unit readiness.
We sacrificed readiness levels of our home station units to ensure
marines in combat had the very best equipment. Through the support of
Congress over the past few years, we have received a good portion of
the required funding for reset and have made significant progress at
our depots in restoring and procuring required materiel. But there is
more to do at our home stations. Thirty-three percent of nondeployed
units report the highest readiness levels for their designed mission,
which leaves 67 percent of nondeployed units in a degraded state of
readiness. The largest contributing factor to degraded readiness within
non-deployed units is equipment supply. The non-deployed force provides
the Nation depth in responsiveness and options when confronted with the
unexpected. Our marines at home must be ``geared up'' and ready to be
called at a moment's notice. Low levels of readiness within the
nondeployed force increases risk in the timely and successful execution
of a military response to crises or contingencies. Therefore, it is
critical that the Marine Corps continues to receive congressional
assistance on required funding to reset our equipment from the
conflicts of the past decade.
In January 2012, I signed the Marine Corps OEF Ground Equipment
Reset Strategy, rooted in the lessons learned from our successful
redeployment and retrograde from Iraq. This strategy is helping to
identify what equipment we will reset and what we will divest. It
prioritizes investment and modernization decisions in accordance with
the capabilities of our middleweight force construct, defining unit-
level mission essential tasks and equipment requirements to support the
range of military operations, and equips to core capabilities for
immediate crisis response deployment and building strategic depth. We
have issued disposition instructions on 8,400 principal items
associated with the initial draw-down of forces that will occur this
fall. In Afghanistan, 35 percent of that equipment has entered the
redeployment and retrograde pipeline. Initial shipments of equipment
have arrived at home stations and depots, and are being entered into
the maintenance cycle. We currently expect divestment of approximately
21 percent of the total Afghanistan equipment density list as obsolete,
combat loss or otherwise beyond economical repair. These are combat
capability items that must be replaced.
The reset of our equipment after more than a decade of combat
requires an unprecedented level of effort. Our Marine Corps depots will
be asked to do more once again; they stand ready to do so. As our
Nation looks to efficiencies in its Armed Forces, we must maintain a
keen awareness of the role that depots play in keeping our country
strong. The continued availability of our depot capacity both at
Barstow, CA, and Albany, GA, is essential to our ability to self-
generate readiness and to respond when we must surge in response to
wartime demand. Acknowledging fiscal realities, I directed, with the
Secretary of the Navy's approval, the consolidation of the two Marine
Corps depots under a single command with two operating plant locations.
Consolidating our depots under a single commander is the right balance
between fiscal efficiency and meeting the unique requirements of the
Marine Corps. This consolidation will reduce costs, standardize
processes between industrial plants and increase efficiency.

Modernization
In conjunction with our reset efforts, we are undertaking several
initiatives to conduct only essential modernization of the Marine Corps
Total Force. This will place us on a sustainable course to achieve
institutional balance. We are doing so by judiciously developing and
procuring the right equipment needed for success in the conflicts of
tomorrow, especially in those areas that underpin our core
competencies. As such, I ask for continued congressional support to
modernize equipment and maintain a high state of readiness that will
place us on solid footing in a post-Afghanistan security environment.
While budgetary pressures will likely constrain modernization
initiatives, we will mitigate pressure by continuing to prioritize and
sequence both our modernization and sustainment programs to ensure that
our equipment is always ready and that we are proceeding in a fiscally
responsible manner. Modernization programs that require significant
additional funding above current levels will be evaluated for continued
operational requirement and capability/capacity modification.
We recognize that our planned, force structure reduction following
our commitment in Afghanistan will accommodate a level of decreased
modernization investment due to a requirement for a smaller quantity of
modernized equipment. However, any qualitative modernization reductions
will impact our ability to respond to future adversaries and threats.
The current baseline budget allows for equipment modernization on a
reasonable timeline across the FYDP. Possible future reductions in the
baseline budget will result in delays, modification or elimination of
key modernization programs. Modernization in the following areas is
critical to maintaining operational capabilities and readiness:

Ground Combat Tactical Vehicles
Aviation
Preparing for Future Battlefields
Amphibious and Pre-positioning Ships
Expeditionary Energy
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy
The programmatic priority for our ground forces is the seamless
maneuver of marines from the sea to conduct operations ashore whether
for training, humanitarian assistance or combat. Our Ground Combat
Tactical Vehicle (GCTV) Strategy is focused on achieving the right mix
of assets, while balancing performance, payload, survivability, fuel
efficiency, transportability and cost. Vehicles comprising our GCTV
strategy include our entire inventory of wheeled and tracked vehicles
and planned future capabilities including the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV), Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and the Marine
Personnel Carrier (MPC). Throughout 2011 and informed by cost, we
conducted a comprehensive systems engineering review of amphibious
vehicle operational requirements. The review evaluated the requirements
for water mobility, land mobility, lethality and force protection of
the future environment. The identification of essential requirements
helped to drive down both the production and the sustainment costs for
the amphibious vehicles of the future.
We are conducting an Analysis of Alternatives on six ACV options,
the results of which will help to inform the direction and scope of the
ACV program. The MPC program is maturing as a wheeled armored personnel
carrier and complements the ACV as a possible solution to the general
support lift capacity requirements of Marine forces operating in the
littorals.
We are firmly partnered with the U.S. Army in fielding a JLTV to
replace a portion of our legacy medium lift utility vehicles. Our long-
term participation in this program remains predicated on development of
a cost-effective vehicle, whose payload integrates seamlessly with our
expeditionary operations and likely amphibious and strategic lift
profiles.\12\ The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has approved the
JLTV Capability Development Document, and our Combat Development
Command in Quantico is leading the Army and Marine Corps effort to
establish a program of record at Milestone B in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2012. Our approach to JLTV is as an incremental
acquisition, and our objective for Increment I currently stands at more
than 5,000 vehicles. Factoring all the above considerations, the
current pathway for our GCTV Strategy includes the following actions:
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\12\ For two axle combat vehicles, this equates to combat weights
in the 18,000 to 19,000 lbs range, translating to empty vehicle weights
in the range of 12,000 to 13,000 lbs.

Develop a modern ACV.
Develop and procure JLTV.
Sustain High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs) through 2030 by utilizing an Inspect and Repair Only
As Necessary Depot Maintenance Program and a HMMWV Modification
Line.\13\
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\13\ HMMWV recapitalization does not meet Marine Corps requirements
for those light vehicles with the most demanding missions. They cannot
deliver reliability, payload, service life, mobility, the ability to
fit on MPF shipping and growth potential. The JLTV is the most cost-
effective program to meet capability gaps for those light combat
vehicles with the most demanding missions.
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Initiate a legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle upgrade
as a bridge to ACV
Continue research and development in MPC through
fiscal year 2014 to identify the most effective portfolio mix
of vehicles.
Limit procurement of vehicles to reduced Approved
Acquisition Objective estimates as identified.

Marine Corps Aviation
Marine Corps Aviation is proud to celebrate its centennial of
service to our Nation this year. Our priority for aviation is support
of marines in Afghanistan and wherever marines are deployed. On
average, more than 40 percent of our aviation force is deployed at any
time, with an additional 25 percent preparing to deploy. All told, this
equates to two-thirds of Marine Aviation forces currently deployed or
preparing to deploy. We are continuing a modernization effort that
began more than a decade ago. Today, the Marine Corps is challenged to
replace aging platforms that have reached the end of their service
lives or suffered accelerated wear in harsh operating environments,
thus reducing service life and resulting in the loss of critical
warfighting capabilities. Our Aviation Plan is a phased multi-year
approach to modernization that encompasses aircraft transitions,
readiness, aircraft inventory shortfalls, manpower challenges, safety
and fiscal requirements.
In an era of budgetary constraint and amidst calls for reductions
in the collective aviation assets within DOD, it is important to
understand that Marine Air is not redundant with other services'
capabilities. The U.S. Air Force is not designed to operate from the
sea, nor are most of its aircraft suited for operations in the types of
austere environments often associated with expeditionary missions. The
Navy currently does not possess sufficient capability to operate their
aircraft ashore once deployed forward on carriers--and yet history has
shown that our Nation often needs an expeditionary aviation capability
in support of both naval and land campaigns. The following programs
form the backbone of our aviation modernization effort:

F-35B: As we modernize Marine fixed-wing aviation
assets for the future, the continued development and fielding
of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B Joint
Strike Fighter remains the centerpiece of this effort. The
capability inherent in a STOVL jet allows the Marine Corps to
operate in harsh conditions and from remote locations where few
airfields are available for conventional aircraft. It is also
specifically designed to operate from amphibious ships--a
capability that no other tactical aircraft possesses. The
ability to employ a fifth-generation aircraft from amphibious
ships doubles the number of ``carriers''--11 CVN and 11 LHD/
LHAs--from which the United States can employ fixed wing
aviation. Once fully fielded, the F-35B will replace three
legacy aircraft--F/A-18, EA-6B and AV-8B--saving the DOD
approximately $1 billion in legacy operations and maintenance
costs.

The F-35B program has been a success story over the past year. Due
to the performance of F-35B prototypes in 2011, the program was
recently removed 12 months early from a fixed period of scrutiny. The
F-35B completed all planned test points, made a total of 260 vertical
landings (versus 10 total in 2010) and successfully completed initial
ship trials on USS Wasp. Delivery is still on track; the first three F-
35Bs arrived at Eglin Air Force Base in January of this year. Continued
funding and support from Congress for this program is of utmost
importance for the Marine Corps as we continue with a plan to
``sundown'' three different legacy platforms.

MV-22B: The MV-22B Osprey has performed exceedingly
well for the Corps and the Joint Force. To date, this
revolutionary tiltrotor aircraft has changed the way marines
operate on the battlefield, giving American and Coalition
forces the maneuver advantage and operational reach unmatched
by any other tactical aircraft. Since achieving Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) in 2008, the MV-22B has flown more
than 18,000 hours in combat and carried more than 129,000
personnel and 5.7 million pounds of cargo. The MV-22B has made
multiple combat deployments to Iraq, four deployments with MEUs
at sea, and it is currently on its fifth deployment to
Afghanistan. Our squadron fielding plan is well underway as we
continue to replace our 44 year old, Vietnam-era CH-46
helicopters. We must procure all required quantities of the MV-
22B in accordance with the program of record. Continued calls
for cancellation of this program are ill-informed and rooted in
anachronisms when measured against the proven record of
performance and safety this force multiplier brings to today's
battlefields in support of marines and the Joint Force.
CH-53K: We are transitioning our rotary-wing assets
for the future. The CH-53K is a new build heavy lift helicopter
that evolves the legacy CH-53E design to improve operational
capability, reliability, maintainability, survivability and
cost. The CH-53K will be capable of transporting 27,000 pounds
of external cargo under high altitude/hot conditions out to 110
nautical miles, nearly three times the lift capacity of the
legacy CH-53E. It is the only marinized rotorcraft \14\ able to
lift 100 percent of Marine Corps air-transportable equipment
from amphibious shipping (MPF included). Our Force Structure
Review validated the need for a CH-53K Program of Record of
nine CH-53K squadrons.
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\14\ The term ``marinized'' indicates that an aircraft meets naval
aviation requirements for use and storage in a maritime environment.
Aviation platforms used by the Navy and Marine Corps require special
outfitting unique for use on and from naval vessels.
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UH-1/AH-1: The H-1 program, comprised of the UH-1Y
utility helicopter and the AH-1Z attack helicopter, is a single
acquisition program that leverages 84 percent commonality of
major components, thereby enhancing deployability and
maintainability, while reducing training requirements and
logistical footprints. Both aircraft are in full rate
production. The H-1 procurement objective is 160 UH-1Ys and 189
AH-1Zs for a total of 349 aircraft. Currently, 131 H-1 aircraft
are on contract, with 51 UH-1Ys and 21 AH-1Zs delivered to
date. The UH-1Y has already deployed with the 13th MEU and has
supported sustained combat operations in OEF since November
2009. The AH-1Z achieved IOC in February 2011 and saw its first
deployment alongside the UH-1Y in November 2011 as part of the
11th MEU. The continued procurement and rapid transition to
these two platforms from legacy UH-1N and AH-1W assets in our
rotary-wing squadrons remains a priority.
KC-130J: The new KC-130J Hercules has been fielded
throughout our active component, bringing increased capability,
performance and survivability with lower operating and
sustainment costs to the Marine Air Ground Task Force. Using
the Harvest HAWK weapon mission kit, the KC-130J is providing
extended endurance close air support to our marines in harm's
way. Currently, we have procured 47 KC-130Js of the stated
program of record requirement totaling 79 aircraft. Continued
procurement of the program of record will allow us to fully
integrate our Active and Reserve Force with this unique, multi-
mission assault support platform.

Preparing for Tomorrow's Fight
The irregular battlefields of today, and those of tomorrow, dictate
that operations be more distributed, command and control be
decentralized and forces be more dispersed. Using our Force Structure
Review as a guide, we are continuing to build the right capacity and
capability to enable marines operate rapidly as befits the tempo of our
role as a crisis response force. Several important areas to enable our
operations are:

Cyber: The Defense Strategic Guidance rightly informs
that ``modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective
operations without reliable information and communications
networks and assured access to cyberspace and space.'' \15\
Marines have been conducting cyber operations for more than a
decade, and we are in a multi-year effort to expand our
capacity via U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command as we
increase our cyber force by approximately 700 marines through
fiscal year 2016. Given the fiscally constrained environment
and complexity of cyberspace, our approach is strategically
focused on ensuring efficiency in operations and quality of
service. The Marine Corps will aggressively operate and defend
its networks in order to enable critical command and control
systems for marines forward deployed around the world. Recent
cyber accreditations and readiness inspections validate our
network operations command and control processes and
procedures. As we transition to a Government Owned/Operated
network environment, the Marine Corps will pursue efficiencies
through automation, consolidation and standardization to ensure
availability, reliability and security of cyber assets.
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\15\ Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense, January 2012, pg. 5.
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SOF: As the Marine Corps contribution to SOCOM, Marine
Special Operations Command (MARSOC) maintains a shared heritage
and correspondingly strong bond with its parent Service as
``soldiers from the sea.'' MARSOC will provide a total of 32
employable Marine Special Operations Teams in fiscal year 2013
while establishing the staff of the Marine Special Operations
School, maintaining a targeted dwell ratio and continuing
creation of a robust language capability. Based on our Force
Structure Review of last year and a programmed end strength of
182,100 marines, I have authorized an increase of 821 marines
in MARSOC.
Command & Control (C2): Technology and network-based
forces are an essential part of modern operations. Our C2
modernization efforts for the future build upon lessons learned
during combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recent
operations have shown that moving data to lower levels (i.e.
the digital divide) increases operational effectiveness. We are
mitigating the decision to cancel the Ground Mobile Radio by
building on investments already made in tactical communications
modernization. We will continue efforts to ensure C2
Situational Awareness convergence and interoperability with the
Joint Force.
Advisers and Trainers: In recognition that preventing
conflict may be easier than responding to it and that we can
prevent it through selective engagement and employment of
advisers/trainers, we have invested in a new organization
called Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group that
consolidates advisers skills, training and assessment expertise
focused on building partnership capacity. We are investigating
how we can regionally focus the expertise of this organization.

Amphibious Warships and Maritime Prepositioning Shipping
Our Service level requirement to deploy globally, respond
regionally, and train locally necessitates a combination of tactical
airlift, high-speed vessels, amphibious warships, maritime
prepositioning shipping, organic tactical aviation, and strategic
airlift. Significant contributions to U.S. security are made by our
rotational forces embarked aboard amphibious warships. These forces
combine the advantages of an immediate, yet temporary presence,
graduated visibility, and tailored, scalable force packages structured
around the MAGTF. Rotational Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine
Expeditionary Units form together to provide forward deployed naval
forces in four geographic combatant command areas of responsibility.
Not only do they provide the capability for crisis response, but they
also present a means for day-to-day engagement with partner nations and
a deterrent to conflict in key trouble spots.
We maintain the requirement for an amphibious warship fleet for
contingencies requiring our role in joint operational access. One
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault echelon requires 17
operationally available amphibious warships. The Nation's forcible
entry requirement includes two simultaneously-employed MEBs supported
by one or more Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)-MEB to fight as a
Marine Expeditionary Force from a sea base.
Amphibious warships and the requisite number of ship-to-shore
connectors provides the base-line needed for steady state operations
and represents the minimum number of ships needed to provide the Nation
with a sea-based power projection capability for full spectrum
amphibious operations. As of January 2012, there were 29 ships in the
Navy's amphibious fleet, with 3 scheduled for decommissioning and 4 new
ships under construction in the yards. Within the coming FYDP, the
inventory will decline in fiscal year 2014 before rising to an average
of 30 amphibious warships over the next 30 years. The lack of
amphibious warship lift capacity translates to risk for the Nation,
particularly as it reorients to the Pacific.
The continued procurement of scheduled amphibious warships and
planning for MPF shipping is essential to ensure greater levels of risk
are not incurred in coming years.

San Antonio-class LPD: The San Antonio-class LPDs
continue to gain stability with overall warship performance
improving. Through the generosity of Congress, the final two
warships in this program are fully funded, and we expect
delivery of all 11 planned warships by fiscal year 2017.
America-class LHA(R): A growing maritime threat
coupled with aircraft/ground combat equipment modernization
dictates the need for continued optimization of the LHA-6 hull
form, which is now 60 percent complete. As stated last year,
delivery of this amphibious assault warship is scheduled for
fiscal year 2014. The earliest reasonable deployment after
allowing time for sea trials, crew training and other factors
would be in fiscal year 2017. Construction of LHA-7 is
scheduled to commence in early fiscal year 2013, but is not yet
under contract. The Marine Corps is grateful for and firmly
supports the Navy's plan to reintroduce a well deck in our
large deck amphibious assault ships, beginning with LHA-8 in
fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 timeframe.
2 x Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons (MPSRON):
Providing a significant contribution to global coverage,
forward presence and crisis response, the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) program exists to enable the rapid
deployment and engagement of a MAGTF anywhere in the world in
support of our National Military Strategy. This strategic
capability combines the capacity and endurance of sealift with
the speed of airlift. The current MPF program is comprised of
15 ships divided into three MPSRONs located in the
Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) and Pacific
Ocean (Guam and Saipan). In fiscal year 2013, the DoN plans to
eliminate one of these squadrons as an efficiency measure. We
are currently reviewing options to develop a balanced MPF
posture and MPSRON composition that supports geographic
combatant commander requirements, achieves approximately $125
million in savings across the FYDP, attains a higher lift
capacity of the MEB requirement per MPSRON and retains critical
sea-basing enabling capabilities. The continued support of
Congress for the vital capabilities inherent in our MPF program
is essential to the overall warfighting readiness of the Corps.

Expeditionary Energy
For marines, the term ``expeditionary'' is a mindset that
determines how we man, train and equip our force. We know that resource
efficiency aids in combat effectiveness, and that our investments in
reset and modernization will provide a force that operates lighter,
faster and at reduced risk. Likewise, our force will be more energy
efficient to support the type of operations expected of us in the
future. To do this, we are changing the way we think about, and use
energy.
Over the last 10 years of near continuous combat operations, our
need for fuel and batteries on the battlefield has grown exponentially.
Since 2001, we have increased the number of radios our infantry
battalions use by 250 percent and the number of computers/information
technology equipment by 300 percent. The number of vehicles has risen
by 200 percent, with their associated weight increasing more than 75
percent as a result of force protection requirements. In the end, our
force today is more lethal, but we have become critically dependent on
fuel and batteries, which has increased the risk to our logistics
trains. Moreover, a 2010 study found that one Marine is wounded for
every 50 fuel and water convoys.
To reduce our risk and increase our combat effectiveness, in March
2011, I issued the ``Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Strategy and
Implementation Plan'' to change the way we think about and value
energy. This is a ``bases-to-battlefield'' strategy, which means all
marines will be trained to understand the relationship between resource
efficiency and combat effectiveness. We will consider energy
performance in all our requirements and acquisitions decisions. We are
creating the tools to provide commanders the information necessary to
understand their energy consumption in real-time.
Over the FYDP, I have directed $350 million to ``Expeditionary
Energy'' initiatives. Fifty-eight percent of this investment is
directed towards procuring renewable and energy efficient equipment.
Some of this gear has already demonstrated effectiveness on the
battlefield in Helmand Province. Twenty-one percent of this investment
is directed towards research and development of new capabilities and
the remaining investment is to support operations and maintenance. We
expect this investment to improve the energy efficiency of our MEBs by
9 percent. As such, we will enable ourselves to sustain longer and go
further, incurring less risk. The MEB of 2017 will be able to operate 1
month longer on the same amount of fuel that we plan to use today, and
it will need 208 fewer fuel trucks, thereby saving seven million
gallons of fuel per year. This translates to a lighter, more agile and
more capable Marine Corps.
providing capable bases, stations, and support facilities

Fiscal Year 2013 Military Construction
The Marine Corps maintains a commitment to facilities and
infrastructure supporting both operations and quality of life. Our
military construction and family programs are important to sustain our
force structure and maintaining readiness. This fiscal year we are
proposing a $761 million Military Construction (MILCON) program to
support warfighting, family housing and infrastructure improvements.
The focus of our efforts this fiscal year is the construction of Joint
Strike Fighter and MV-22B support facilities, infrastructure
improvements, and training and education facility improvements.
Additionally, this budget request includes replacement of inadequate
and obsolete facilities at various locations.
Through the support of Congress, between fiscal year 2008 and
fiscal year 2012, we programmed 70 bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ)
projects resulting in 149 barracks buildings primarily located at Camp
Lejeune, NC; Camp Pendleton and Twentynine Palms, CA; and Marine Corps
Base, HI. These BEQ projects were typically completed in 2 years, with
most at or below cost. These facilities, that incorporated energy
efficiency measures, have significantly improved the quality of life of
our single marines, who for many years, lived in substandard, World War
II era barracks. Our fiscal year 2013 MILCON program includes a $49
million request for barracks, a motor pool and other facilities to
support the consolidation of Marine Corps Security Force Regiment
assets at Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown, VA. This project was not a
part of our original BEQ initiative, but is necessary as the current
facilities used by the Regiment at Naval Station Norfolk have been
condemned.

Infrastructure Sustainment
As resources and military construction funds become more
constrained, the Marine Corps will continue to rely on the sound
stewardship of existing facilities and infrastructure to support our
needs. In fiscal year 2013, the Marine Corps will again program
facilities sustainment funding at 90 percent of the DOD Facilities
Sustainment Model, resulting in a facilities sustainment budget of $653
million.

Installation Energy Initiatives
The fiscal year 2013 budget provides $164 million in Operations &
Maintenance funding to continue progress in achieving mandated energy
goals by 2015. This funding will target energy efficiency goals
established by the Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007 aimed at
reducing energy intensity by 30 percent from a 2003 baseline. This
progress will be made by replacing older heating, cooling, lighting and
other energy-consuming building components with more efficient
technologies. We will use this funding to achieve renewable energy
goals established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007.
Overall, the planned investments are intended to increase energy
security on our installations while reducing the cost of purchased
utilities.

INVESTING IN THE EDUCATION & TRAINING OF OUR MARINES

Courses and Facilities
A broadly-capable middleweight force will meet future requirements
through the integration of newly acquired and traditional operational
competencies. To remain America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness, the
Marine Corps requires balanced, high-quality training and education at
all levels. As history has repeatedly shown, wars are won by the
better-trained force, not necessarily the larger one. In the midst of
ongoing combat operations, we are realigning our education and training
efforts to enable our marines and sailors to succeed in conducting
distributed operations in increasingly complex environments against any
threat. Training and education, with an emphasis on experimentation and
innovation, will help our Nation maintain global relevance by
developing solutions that continue to outpace emerging threats. These
efforts include continued emphasis on our core values of honor, courage
and commitment, and on building principled warriors who understand the
value of being an ethical warrior. Moreover, in the post-Afghanistan
security environment of reduced defense dollars, we will need to offset
reductions in end strength with better educated and more capable
marines and Marine units. The current and future fiscal environment
requires a selective, strategic investment in training and education .
. . put another way, ``When you're low on money, it's a good time to
think.''
Training
Our current training is focused on preparing Marine units for
combat, counterinsurgency and stability operations in support of OEF.
If anything, the past 10 years of combat have demonstrated that there
is a positive correlation between quality training and education and
individual/unit readiness; both directly translate to operational
success. Therefore, as we draw-down from Afghanistan, our training will
rebalance to support the execution of a wider range of operational
capabilities. We will achieve this balance by leveraging competencies
in entry-level and skills progression training and by re-emphasizing
core competencies in combined arms and amphibious operations, to
include MEB level core capabilities. Training will also feature
significant attention to irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance,
and inter-agency coordination. All our training programs will provide
standardized, mission essential task based training that directly
supports unit readiness in a cost-effective manner.
Specifically, future training will center on the MAGTF Training
Program. Through a standardized training approach, the MAGTF Training
Program will develop the essential unit capabilities necessary to
conduct integrated MAGTF operations. Building on lessons learned over
the past 10 years, this approach includes focused battle staff training
and a service assessment exercise modeled on the current exercise,
Enhanced Mojave Viper. Additionally, we will continue conducting large
scale exercises that integrate training and assessment of the MAGTF as
a whole. The MAGTF Training Program facilitates the Marine Corps'
ability to provide multi-capable MAGTFs prepared for operations in
complex, joint and multi-national environments against hybrid threats.
Education
We are making steady progress in implementing the recommendations
of the 2006 Officer Professional Military Education (PME) Study (The
Wilhelm Report) to transform the Marine Corps University (MCU) into a
``World Class Institution.'' There are two primary resource components
in doing so--funding for military construction, and for faculty and
staff. These two components are not mutually exclusive. New facilities
coupled with increases in resident student through-put require
additional faculty and staff. We will remain engaged with Congress over
the coming years on the approximately $330 million in necessary funding
for facilities, faculty and staff as we continue the transformation of
the MCU. This is a high priority for me. This year, I committed $125
million to get this initiative moving.
We are widening opportunities for resident professional education
by doubling available school seats in courses such as the Marine Corps
Command and Staff College beginning in the academic year 2014. We are
making adjustments to triple through-put at the Expeditionary Warfare
School for our company grade officers. We are increasing enlisted
resident PME courses as well, and are adding more distance education
learning opportunities and requirements, especially at the junior
enlisted and non-commissioned officer level.
As we look to ``whole-of-government approaches'' and the goal of
improved integration in joint and combined operations, we are adding
fellowships to allow more marines the opportunity to benefit from
nontraditional education outside DOD institutions. In the past year, we
have increased our number of marines assigned to the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development through
fellowships and the State-Defense Exchange Memorandum of Understanding.
Later this year, we are adding fellowships at the Departments of
Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury, as well as at Yale
University. We are expanding the scope of training at existing
institutions like the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational
Culture Learning and the Center for Irregular Warfare Integration
Division that focus on readying marines for engagement, security
cooperation and partner capacity building missions. Our goal is to
develop a Corps of Marines that have the skills needed to operate and
engage effectively in culturally-complex environments.
Our education and training programs benefit from our relationships
with allies and partners in the international community. Each year,
hundreds of international military students attend Marine Corps
training and education venues ranging from Marine Corps Command & Staff
College to military occupation specialty producing schools. The
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and
similar security assistance opportunities promote regional stability,
maintain U.S. defense partnerships, and promote civilian control of the
military in student home countries. Many military leaders from around
the world have benefited from the IMET program. To better support DOD's
goal of providing PME to international military students, we have
created a blended seminar program where foreign officers participate in
Marine Corps PME through a mix of non-resident online courses and
resident instruction in the United States.
Training Enablers
In order to fully realize these training and education
enhancements, we will keep investing in the resources, technologies and
innovations that enable them. This investment includes modernizing our
training ranges, training devices, and infrastructure to ensure quality
resources are available to support the training of marines, individual
to MAGTF. We will also leverage advanced technologies and simulation
systems to create realistic, fully-immersive training environments.
keeping faith with marines, sailors, and their families
Mission First, Marines Always
We expect and require extraordinary loyalty from our marines and
sailors--loyalty to country, family, and Corps. Our Nation has been at
war more than a decade, placing unprecedented burdens on marines,
sailors, families, wounded warriors, and the families of the fallen.
They have all made tremendous sacrifices, many in the face of danger;
we owe our complete loyalty back to them all.
We will work to ensure the critical needs of our families are met
during times of deployment and in garrison by providing the services,
facilities and programs to develop the strength and skills needed to
thrive while facing the challenges of operational tempo. If wounded,
injured or ill (WII), we will seek out every available resource to
restore marines to health. We will enable the return to active duty for
those seeking it. For those unable to do so, we will responsibly
transition them to civilian life. We will support and protect the
spouses and families of our wounded and those of our fallen marines.
There are several areas and programs central to our tenet of ``keeping
faith with marines, sailors, and their families.''
Recruiting and Retention
As first stated, the individual marine is our greatest asset; we
will continue to recruit and retain the best and brightest of America's
sons and daughters. Recruiting is the lifeblood of our Corps, and is
our bedrock to ``Make Marines, Win Battles, and Return Quality
Citizens;'' citizens who, once transformed, will be marines for life.
To operate and succeed in potentially volatile times, marines must be
physically fit, morally strong, intelligent, and capable of operating
advanced weapon systems using the latest technology. We will not
compromise on these standards. Recruiting quality youth ultimately
translates into higher performance, reduced attrition, increased
retention, and improved readiness for the Operating Forces. We need
your continued support in maintaining quality accessions.
Our officer accessions mission has continued to decline over the
past 2 years in light of a planned draw-down of forces. Our fiscal year
2013 accession officer mission is 1,500 Active Duty and 125 Reserve
officers. For enlisted marines, the accession figures include 28,500
regular (Active component) and 5,700 reservists. We traditionally
achieve 100-103 percent of our total accession goals, and expect to do
so again in fiscal year 2013. We have continued to achieve
unprecedented levels of enlisted and officer retention. This effort is
critical to the proper grade shaping of the Marine Corps, regardless of
force size. Combined officer, enlisted and Reserve retention efforts
ensure the Marine Corps maintains essential operational experience and
leadership. Although overall retention is excellent, shortages do exist
in certain grades and skills within the officer and enlisted ranks,
requiring careful management and innovative solutions. At a minimum,
sustained congressional funding to incentivize retention is necessary
to maintaining quality personnel in these critical skill sets.
Diversity
Diversity, in both representation and assignment of marines,
remains a strategic issue. The Marine Corps diversity effort is
structured with the understanding that the objective of diversity is
not merely to strive for a force that reflects a representational
connectedness with the rich fabric of all the American people, but to
raise total capability through leveraging the strengths and talents of
all marines. We are near completion of a new comprehensive campaign
plan to focus our diversity effort in areas where improvement is most
needed and anticipate release of this roadmap this year. The accession
and retention of minority officers is an enduring challenge for our
Corps. Mentoring and career development of all minority officers has
become increasingly important in order to change officer profile
projections. Since 2010, we have conducted leadership seminars,
introducing diverse college undergraduates to Marine leadership traits
and leadership opportunities in the Marine Corps, at various locations
throughout our country, and are actively seeking out new communities
within which to continue this effort. Overall, we seek to communicate
the Marine Corps diversity mission through community outreach and
recruit marketing; to ensure continued opportunities for merit based
development and advancement; and to optimize training and education to
increase the understanding for all marines of the value that diversity
brings to the Total Force.
Wounded Warrior Outreach Programs
Through the Wounded Warrior Regiment (WWR) and our ever-expanding
outreach programs, the Marine Corps keeps faith with wounded, ill, and
injured (WII) marines and their families. This enduring commitment
includes full spectrum care and support for WII marines from point of
injury or illness through return to duty or reintegration to the
civilian community. The WWR continues to enhance its capabilities to
provide added care and support to WII marines. Whether WII marines are
joined to the WWR or remain with their parent commands, they are
provided non-medical support through the recovery phases. Congressional
funding for our WII marines allows us to provide robust, interconnected
support in the following areas: Administrative Support, Recovery Care
Coordination, Transition Assistance, Warrior Athlete Reconditioning
Programs, Integrated Disability Evaluation System Support, the Sergeant
Merlin German Wounded Warrior 24/7 Call Center and our Hope and Care
Centers.
The challenging nature of the terrain in Afghanistan requires a
greater level of dismounted operations than was the case in Iraq. This
fact coupled with the prevalence of improvised explosive devices has
caused a growing class of marines and soldiers to suffer catastrophic
injuries--injuries involving multiple amputations that present
significant quality of life challenges. Our Corps, the DoN, DOD, the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Congress are concerned about
this special group of Wounded Warriors must remain committed to
supporting this special group of Wounded Warriors. To help the
catastrophically injured (those who will likely transition to veteran
status) and their families successfully meet these challenges, we must
continue engaging in a high level of care coordination between our WWR
advocates, the VA's Federal Recovery Coordinators, VA Liaisons for
Healthcare stationed at DOD Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs),
Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn
Case Managers and medical providers to ensure all of our wounded
marines' needs are met. This includes arranging for assistive
technologies, adaptive housing, and all available health care and
benefits (DOD and VA) they have earned. Additionally, WWR's Marine Corp
Liaison assigned at the VA collaborates closely with VA Care Management
team to resolve Marine Corp issues or care management needs.
Combat Health & Resiliency of the Force
Marines, sailors, and their families have experienced significant
stress from multiple deployment cycles, the rigors of combat, high
operational tempos, the anxieties of separation and countless other
sources from a decade at war. We remain engaged in developing ways to
reduce the traditional stigmas associated with seeking mental health
care, but perhaps more importantly, we continue to add resources and
access to care to meet the mental health needs of marines, sailors, and
their families.
Post-traumatic stress (PTS) will be a long-term issue for all DOD
leadership, requiring close attention and early identification of those
affected in every Service. PTS is diagnosed as a disorder (PTSD) once
the symptoms become distressful to a marine and his or her ability to
function in the military environment is impacted.\16\ Although most
marines with PTS symptoms will not develop PTSD, our leaders require
the skills and training to identify and intervene earlier for those at
the highest risk of developing PTSD, especially given that often there
are long delays in the development of this condition. As such, we are
empowering leaders to identify and intervene earlier through increased
training and awareness using programs like our Marine Corps Combat
Operational Stress Control Program and embedded Operational Stress
Control and Readiness teams in our ground units. We are employing
better screening practices in our standard health assessments,
establishing deployment health clinics (i.e. facilities not labeled as
mental health clinics nor associated with a Military Treatment Facility
in an overall effort to reduce stigma) and tracking those with
significant injuries often leading to PTSD via our Wounded Warrior
Regiment.
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\16\ The current yearly rate of PTS diagnosis in Active Duty
marines is less than 2 percent as compared to 3.5 percent in the
civilian population. The percentage of marines who will be diagnosed
over their lifetime with PTS is estimated to be 10-18 percent while the
civilian population lifetime diagnosis is estimated to be 6.8 percent.
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We are engaged on multiple fronts to diagnose and treat those with
a traumatic brain injury (TBI) including prevention, education, early
identification, treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration. We are
actively implementing the requirements of DOD Directive Type Memorandum
09-033 regarding mild TBI/concussion. Moreover, the Marine Corps, with
Navy support, has established a Concussion and Musculoskeletal
Restoration Care Center in-theater. This center provides front-line
care to patients with mild TBI/concussion and has dramatically improved
identification, diagnosis, treatment, outcomes and return to duty
rates. In concert with Navy Medicine, we are fielding a TBI module
within the Medical Readiness Reporting System to track TBI exposures
and diagnoses.
Suicide Prevention in the Force
We continue to report a positive, steady decrease in the number of
suicides within the Corps from high levels seen in 2009. While we
cannot yet draw a conclusion between our prevention efforts and the
reduced suicide rate, we are cautiously optimistic our programs are
having a positive effect. However, reported suicide attempts have
continued to increase. We suspect this increase in attempts may be due
to improved surveillance--fellow marines recognizing the signs of
suicide and intervening to stop attempts, and more marines reporting
past attempts when coming forward for help.\17\ Regardless, we still
need to do better because one suicide completed is one too many.
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\17\ There were 33 confirmed suicides and 175 attempts in the
Marine Corps during calendar year 2011.
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Suicide is a preventable loss of life that diminishes readiness and
deeply affects our Marine Corps family. We believe that suicide is
preventable through engaged leadership, focused on efforts aimed at the
total fitness of each marine to include physical, social, spiritual and
psychological dimensions. The Marine Corps is involved with five major
studies to better understand suicide risk among servicemembers,
contributing factors and ways at prevention. This past year, we
expanded our ``Never Leave a Marine Behind'' suicide prevention program
for noncommissioned officers (NCO) and junior marines to the staff
noncommissioned officer and commissioned officer ranks. Our DSTRESS
hotline and website, implemented last year on the west coast as a pilot
program, will be expanded to serve those across the Corps. We will
remain engaged on multiple fronts to combat suicide in our ranks.
Sexual Assault Prevention & Response
The key to preventing sexual assault is ensuring everyone
understands his or her role and responsibilities in preventing it. A
consistent, vigorous training and education element are crucial.
Bystander intervention has been identified as a best practice for
engaging marines in their role to prevent sexual assault and is being
incorporated into our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
training. In January 2012, we launched the video-based NCO Bystander
Intervention course, called ``Take A Stand.'' This course was modeled
after our successful, award-wining Suicide Prevention Program awareness
campaign entitled ``Never Leave A Marine Behind.''
We have initiated aggressive actions to elevate and highlight the
importance of our SAPR program. Our victim-centric SAPR program focuses
on: preventing sexual assault, improving a victim's access to services,
increasing the frequency and quality of information provided to the
victim regarding all aspects of his or her case and expediting the
proper handling and resolution of a sexual assault case. We are
credentialing our Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Victim
Advocates on victim advocacy. We have standardized training protocols
for our 24/7 hotline, in use at all major bases and stations to provide
information, resources and advocacy of sexual assault. We have
increased SAPR training at all levels for our judge advocates (JA).
This year, mobile training teams from our Trial Counsel Assistance
Program will continue to instruct Navy Criminal Investigative Service
agents and JAs on sexual assault investigation and best practices at
bases and stations in Japan, Hawaii, and on the east and west coasts.
Veteran Marines
The concept of keeping faith also applies to our Veteran Marines.
In 2011, the Marine Corps launched a comprehensive effort to anchor the
legacy of our Montford Point Marines--20,000 African American men who
underwent segregated training from 1942-1949 and ultimately integrated
the Corps--into our training and education curricula. The Montford
Point Marine legacy will be used to educate and inspire all men and
women who enter the Marine Corps today regardless of race, religion or
creed. We will teach the importance of varying perspectives,
compassion, courage, perseverance and self sacrifice through the
Montford Point Marine history. We are thankful to Congress for recently
conferring the Congressional Gold Medal on the Montford Point Marines,
a fitting tribute to a pioneering group of marines who fought valiantly
in some of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific and later went on to
serve in Korea and Vietnam.
Family Readiness Programs
As directed in my Planning Guidance issued to the Corps in October
2010, we are in the final stages of a review of all family readiness
programs to identify ways we can better assist and provide services to
our families. Over the past year, Marine Corps Community Services
conducted dozens of focus groups at bases and stations throughout the
Marine Corps with Active and Reserve component marines, commanders,
senior enlisted advisers, and spouses. The focus groups, survey and
prioritization results found that the top-rated programs conformed to
the Commandant's Planning Guidance priorities or congressional
mandates. These assessments revealed opportunities to increase program
success in three areas: (1) defining future capabilities and
sustainability standards that correlate to the Commandant's Planning
Guidance priorities but also recognized unique installation or command
missions, locations or market conditions; (2) balancing available
resources to support priorities and defined capabilities; and (3)
developing accountability and inspection processes to support
capability sustainment. Efforts are currently underway to apply these
results and develop actionable program plans and supporting resource
requirements to provide and maintain capabilities at the appropriate
level for the right duration.
With at least 50 percent of our Corps composed of unmarried men and
women, this year we mandated that every battalion and squadron have a
representative from the Single Marine Program serving on its unit
family readiness command team. This will provide an advocate on behalf
of single marines to ensure information, normally communicated solely
from leadership to Marine spouses and families, is shared with their
parents and siblings.
Transition Assistance
There are three things the Marine Corps does for our Nation: make
marines; win our Nation's battles; and return quality citizens. We are
conducting a wholesale revision of our Transition Assistance Management
Program (TAMP) to better meet the needs of our transitioning marines in
support of returning quality citizens. We are integrating TAMP, as part
of the Professional and Personal Development Program, into the life-
cycle of a marine from recruitment, through separation or retirement,
and through Veteran Marine status.
We have transformed our Transition Readiness Seminar from a mass
training event, in need of great improvement, into an individualized
and practical learning experience with specific transition readiness
standards that are effective and beneficial to marines. In January
2012, we began holding a revised and improved Transition Readiness
Seminar Pilot Program at four separate installations with full
implementation scheduled for March 2012; early feedback on our pilot
program has been very favorable. The revised 5-day Transition Readiness
Seminar includes 2 days of mandatory standardized core curriculum with
four well-defined military-civilian pathways:

University/College
Vocational/Technical training
Employment
Entrepreneurial Endeavors.

In this new system, a marine will choose the pathway that best
meets his or her future goals and will have access to individual
counseling services related to each pathway. The enhanced TAMP program
will support improved reach-back and outreach support for those who may
require more localized support in their hometowns with information,
opportunities or other specific needs. We are determined to make the
Marine Corps TAMP program more value added for our departing marines.
Compensation
The President's budget acknowledges the reality that military pay,
allowances, and health care consume roughly one-third of the defense
budget. These costs cannot be ignored in a comprehensive effort to
achieve savings. In my judgment, this budget achieves the appropriate
balance in compensation, force structure, and modernization. It
sustains the recruitment, retention, and readiness of the talented
personnel that defend our Nation.
The proposed compensation reforms are sensible. Basic pay raises in
fiscal years 2013 and 2014 will match increases in the private sector.
We propose more modest raises in later years--but no reductions, no
freezes. TRICARE enrollment fees and deductibles increase for retirees,
but they are tiered based on retired pay and remain significantly below
market rates. Pharmacy co-pays will trend towards market rates for
retail purchases, but will be substantially lower for generic drugs and
mail-order delivery.
These changes are not intended to alter care services currently
provided to our active duty personnel and their families. Those who
have been medically retired as a result of their service, particularly
our Wounded Warriors, are also exempted. So are our Gold Star Families.
It is the right thing to do for those who have given so much.
Finally, I endorse creating a commission to recommend reforms in
retired pay. Any changes should grandfather benefits for those
currently serving. We cannot break faith.

SUMMARY

History has shown that it is impossible to predict where, when and
how America's interests will be threatened. What is known, however, is
America cannot maintain a strong economy, cannot have a strong
industrial base, cannot have access to overseas markets and cannot
assure its allies without security . . . at home and abroad. Looking
ahead at the fiscal challenges we face as a Nation, our country will
still need to respond to crisis and project power abroad, wherever and
whenever needed. The optimum and most economical means to do so is
through a multi-capable force afloat that can also come ashore rapidly.
The Navy and Marine Corps Team is the Nation's risk mitigator for
an unknown future and the crisis response force that will be ``the most
ready when the Nation is least ready.'' There is a cost to maintaining
this capability. But, with that cost, our Nation gains the ability to
respond to unexpected crises, from humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief efforts, to non-combatant evacuation operations, to the conduct
of counter-piracy operations, raids or strikes. This same force can be
reinforced quickly to contribute to assured access anywhere in the
world in the event of a major contingency. It can be ``dialed up or
dialed down'' like a rheostat to be relevant across the range of
military operations. No other force possesses the flexibility to
provide these capabilities, but yet can sustain itself logistically for
significant periods of time, at a time and place of its choosing.
Through the fidelity and support of Congress, our marines and
sailors in the fight have received everything necessary to ensure
success over the past decade of near constant combat operations. Our
combat forces' best interests and needs remain my number one focus
until our national objectives in the Long War have been achieved.
However, as we rightfully begin to transition to the challenges and
opportunities of the post-OEF world and reorient to the Pacific under
our new Defense Strategic Guidance, the Marine Corps must begin to
rebalance and modernize for the future.
Through judicious choices, forward planning and wise investments--
ever mindful of the economy in which we live--we have worked diligently
to determine the right size our Corps needs to be and to identify the
resources we will require to respond to crises around the world,
regardless of clime or place. As we continue to work with Congress, the
Navy and the DOD in maintaining the institutional pillars of our high
state of readiness, you have my assurance that your Corps will be
``ever faithful'' in meeting our Nation's need for military crisis
response.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
Let's start with a 7-minute round for questioning.
First let me ask each of you, starting with you, Mr.
Secretary, then Admiral Greenert, and then General Amos. DOD
created a new defense strategy to guide creation of the fiscal
year 2013 defense budget request. Did each of you have an
opportunity to provide input into the development of the new
strategy and in your view does the budget request support the
strategy, and do you support the budget request? Secretary
Mabus.
Mr. Mabus. Senator, the answer to all three of your
questions is yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Greenert?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, to all questions.
Chairman Levin. General Amos?
General Amos. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, in terms of the marines on Okinawa,
Guam, and in the Asia-Pacific, I think you're very much aware
of the issues there. Senators McCain, Webb, and I have been
voicing concerns, and others have as well, about some of the
issues that are involved there, including the roadmap
realignment agreement, the buildup on Guam, and some of the
changes that are being considered in the current plan.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2012 contains a statutory provision that would block the
expenditure of funds for the buildup on Guam until a number of
conditions are met. First would be submission to the committee
of the Marine Corps Commandant's preferred force laydown and of
a master plan for the construction of the facilities and
infrastructure necessary to implement that preferred force
laydown.
Another one of the requirements is that the Secretary of
Defense submit an independent assessment of the force, of our
force posture in East Asia and in the Pacific region.
Mr. Secretary, I assume you're familiar with that statutory
requirement?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, I am.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Mabus, do you know if an
independent entity has been selected yet to conduct that
statutorily assessment?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, my understanding is that DOD has
selected someone. I don't know if the contract has been signed
to do that. But my understanding is that the final date
required by the NDAA for submission to this committee, the plan
is to have that report to you by that date.
Chairman Levin. If you could just let us know for the
record if that contract has been signed and with whom, we'd
appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]

A contract was awarded on March 23, 2012, to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies to comply with the provisions of
the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, section 346. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense (Policy) should be contacted if additional
information is required.

Chairman Levin. General, as the United States and Japan
reconsider the plan for the marines on Okinawa, are you
comfortable with the new plans for the laydown and the
composition of marines that are being considered for Guam and
Okinawa?
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, I am, as much as we know today.
As you're aware, both our Government and the Government of
Japan at the very highest levels are still working through some
of the issues, and as much as I know today and what I've heard,
I am comfortable, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, do you need any special authorities or legislation
to ensure that the reductions which you talked about, when
they're made, that we're able to take care of our people?
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, are you talking about the
drawdown?
Chairman Levin. I am.
General Amos. Sir, I need your help.
Chairman Levin. Any special authorities that you need?
General Amos. Not authorities, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. Any help you may need, just let
us know; would you?
General Amos. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. If you know right now and you want to
comment on that, you can. But if not, just let us know.
General Amos. Sir, I was just going to make a comment. When
the budget was submitted, it dropped 20,000 marines in 1 year.
As I said in my opening statement, as we look back on this
thing and planned a year and a half ago how we would draw the
Marine Corps down responsibly that number is executable at
about 5,000 a year without some precipitous action and drop,
with some significant impact on our families. It sends the
wrong signal. So I'll need some help financially to continue to
maintain that ramp at 5,000 a year.
Chairman Levin. All right. You just let us know as this
proceeds as to how we can be helpful.
On the F-35B probation, Secretary Panetta removed the F-
35B, the STOVL variant, from the probationary status a year
earlier than was planned. I think both Senator McCain and I
have indicated that we found that action troubling. The fixes
to the problems that caused Secretary Gates to put the plane on
probation in the first place; the testing has not been
completed on those fixes.
General, I assume you urged the removal of the F-35B from
the probation list. Is that accurate?
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, I think urged would probably be
the wrong adjective. I tracked this, starting a year ago this
last December. I tracked it very, very carefully. I've watched
the six major thresholds, to include the weight of the
aircraft, very, very carefully over this last year. So I was
able to provide my best military advice to the Secretary.
In light of those six major thresholds and looking at the
program's progression, tests, and everything, I recommended
that he consider removing it from probation.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Secretary Mabus, were you involved in that recommendation
as well?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I was.
Chairman Levin. Did you recommend that it be removed from
probation a year earlier, and if so why?
Mr. Mabus. I did, because of the things that General Amos
just mentioned. General Amos has followed this very carefully.
I went out with General Amos to the USS Wasp to watch the first
on-board ship testing of the aircraft and, given the gains that
had been made in weight reduction, given the progress that has
been made on engineering fixes to some issues that had been
found earlier, given the fact that the plane was now either
meeting or exceeding test points, both in terms of number of
test flights or number of test points in each flight, I thought
that it was performing at the level it should be to be treated
as a normal acquisition program and not one that was on
probation.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you a question
about our Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) ships. BMD is
still fairly new and it's a growing mission for the Navy. Much
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense is
going to be based on the Aegis BMD capabilities, whether it's
at sea or ashore.
I think in your prepared statement you note that, ``over
the past year, BMD ships took up position in the eastern
Mediterranean to provide BMD for both Europe and Israel.'' Let
me ask both you and the Admiral whether you are confident that
the Navy's going to be able to continue providing the ships
needed to fulfil missile defense missions such as the ones that
you mentioned for Europe and Israel, given the situation with
the ships and their ability to be present in the Eastern
Mediterranean?
Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, I do remain confident that we will
be able to meet this BMD mission with our Aegis ships, for a
couple of reasons. One is that we are making more ships BMD
capable. We have today I believe 24 ships that are that way. By
the end of the FYDP that number will be close to 40.
Second, as the CNO said in his remarks and also as he has
said numerous times, by stationing four DDGs in Rota, Spain, we
will be able to provide the coverage needed with far fewer
ships than if those ships were stationed in the United States
and had to transit back and forth.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, do you want to add anything to
that?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. Our demand signal is 15 BMD-
capable ships available by fiscal year 2015 for the European
Phased Adaptive Approach. They have to have the right program
with the right missile and proficient, and we are on that track
with this budget submission.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, the reason why Senator Webb, Senator Levin,
and I and others have been concerned about the issue of Guam is
because the costs have escalated dramatically, at least in one
area from $6 billion to $16 billion. There has been slow
progress with the Japanese. So we decided, Senator Levin,
Senator Webb, and others of us, that we needed some outside
independent view of this situation.
We passed the National Defense Authorization Bill in
December. It's now been 2\1/2\ months. How long does it take
for a contract to get an independent assessment, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, since this contract is not under my
purview, since I don't let this contract----
Senator McCain. I see, it's somebody else's responsibility.
I want to tell you for sure that until we get that independent
assessment there should be no concrete plans made by the
Secretary of Defense or DOD until we have a chance to examine
an independent assessment and then go through the authorization
process for any expenditure of funds that need to be made in
order to get this redeployment issue into some kind of sanity.
Believe me, we acted, as is our responsibility, because of
our intense frustration about the lack of progress on this
issue. Now, 2\1/2\ months go by and they haven't even let a
contract get an independent assessment, and we wanted it to be
completed by April 1, which obviously cannot happen. I'm not
going to let you continue to slow-walk us on this issue.
Just to put things in perspective on the F-35 again, we
started the program in 2001. The cost estimates for 2,456
aircraft were going to be $238 billion. We've now had
additional costs of $150 billion, 150 additional billion
dollars in costs. As I understand it--please correct me if I'm
wrong, General Amos--Block 4, 32 aircraft, which are
approximately 50 percent complete, are now $500 million over
originally estimated cost.
Are those figures wrong?
General Amos. Senator, I can't say whether the figures are
wrong or not.
Senator McCain. Do you know what the initial cost was
supposed to be, General?
General Amos. I do. I was the head of aviation.
Senator McCain. Is that fact wrong?
General Amos. That fact is pretty close, sir.
Senator McCain. There's been a $150 billion additional cost
overrun; is that fact true?
General Amos. Sir, I can't comment on that. I don't know.
Senator McCain. You don't even know what the cost overrun
has been?
General Amos. Sir, this is not a single point in time. I've
noticed the program go. I went through the technical baseline
review last year.
Senator McCain. Let me interrupt you again. Do you argue
the fact that there's been $150 billion additional cost to the
aircraft since the original estimate of $238 billion?
General Amos. Sir, I can't comment on that. I can't tell
you whether it's $150 billion. I know it's significant.
Senator McCain. So for the record, you don't know how much
the cost overrun has been for the F-35?
General Amos. Not precisely.
Senator McCain. Roughly? Do you know roughly what the cost
overrun has been?
General Amos. Sir, I don't.
Senator McCain. That's remarkable.
So we continue to have $500 million cost overruns on the
additional 32 aircraft that are 50 percent complete. Does that
mean, Mr. Secretary, that we will have a billion dollar cost
overrun since the aircraft are 50 percent complete on Block 4
aircraft?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, I don't know if you can make that
extrapolation or not.
Senator McCain. All I can say is that I have been watching
this aircraft since 2001 and I've watched the cost overruns
now, and I don't believe that it's inaccurate to state there's
been roughly $150 billion in additional costs. We are now still
in the early stages of what was planned to be 2,456 aircraft.
What is your assessment, Mr. Secretary, of the situation as
regards the F-35 now?
Mr. Mabus. The situation for the Navy and Marine Corps as
regards the F-35 is, because of some of the issues that you've
identified with concurrency and with the readiness of the
aircraft, we have reduced the number of planes that we are
going to buy over the FYDP, but we have remained constant in
the number of total aircraft that we will buy in the program,
680 aircraft total for the Navy. That's 420 for the Marine
Corps, including 360 Bs and 80 Cs for the marines; and the
remainder C variant for the Navy.
It's a capability that we need. It's a capability that the
Marine Corps does not have a backup plan for.
You correctly pointed out that we have bought the Harriers
from the British when they retired their carrier. We did that
to extend the life of the Harrier to make sure that we had the
vertical takeoff and landing capabilities in place until the
arrival in sufficient numbers of the F-35B.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, the USS Gerald R. Ford cost overruns are a
billion dollars. I'm not sure how complete it is. Will the Navy
be asking for legislative relief from the cost cap of $600
million?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, not this year, but I'm certain we will
be asking next year.
Senator McCain. Is it accurate that there is at least $1
billion cost overrun on the USS Gerald R. Ford?
Mr. Mabus. I think it's accurate that it's at least a
billion dollars over the original estimate, and I think it's
important to note what we've done to contain these costs. Since
I've taken office, we have recovered back the fee almost
completely from the shipbuilder that is building this carrier,
so whatever money they get from now on will simply cover their
cost.
Second, for some of the government-furnished equipment from
other vendors we have capped the amounts that we're going to
pay for those. The ship remains on track to be in the fleet in
2015.
But third and perhaps most importantly is one thing you
mentioned in your opening statement. This is the lead ship of a
class. You and I have discussed how much new technology was put
on this previously and how the risk went up and how the down
side of that risk came true. But the one thing that we are
absolutely committed to and the one thing that we will not go
forward with CVN-79 is that we will take the lessons learned
here, we will have a firm price, and we will not come back to
Congress to ask for raising the cost cap on the follow-on ship,
the John F. Kennedy, CVN-79.
Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, you've pledged $179 million
as the Navy's share of a $510 million effort to construct or
retrofit biofuel refineries. Where's the authorization for that
action?
Mr. Mabus. It comes from the Defense Production Act and
from an appropriation made----
Senator McCain. Authorization? You may get an
appropriation. I'd be glad to know where it is in that Act.
By the way, if I could just mention, Mr. Chairman, in 2009
the Navy paid $424 a gallon for 20,000 gallons of biodiesel
made from algae, set a world record at the time for costs for
fuel. According to the plan now, the Navy will need 330 million
gallons per year of alternative fuels to meet the Secretary's
stated goal of having 50 percent of the Navy's energy needs
supplied from alternative sources by 2020 at no price, or cost
there.
I don't believe it's the job of the Navy to be involved in
building and involved in new technologies. Maybe this will be a
Solyndra situation. I don't believe that it's the job of the
Navy to do that. I believe it's the Department of Energy who
should be doing that, and obviously I will seek to act on
amendments on the floor to try to prevent this kind of waste of
the taxpayers' dollars, where they paid $424 a gallon for algae
fuels. I don't think we can afford it.
Chairman Levin. Do you want to just take a moment to
comment if you wish?
Mr. Mabus. Yes. The authority that's being used here is the
Defense Production Act, which has been in place since the early
1950s, which says that if there is an industry that Defense
needs but does not exist in the United States, that Defense not
only can but should invest in that industry. Energy is
specifically mentioned in the Defense Production Act as
something that Defense should look at.
In terms of moving toward biofuels, the numbers that we
bought, small test amounts, was high. It's come down
dramatically since then, even with the small test amounts we've
been buying. I think that we cannot afford not to do this. We
can't afford to be dependent on foreign sources of fuel. We
cannot afford to be dependent on a worldwide commodity that has
the price spikes and the price shocks that we have.
As I said in my opening statement, the only place I have to
go to get money when the price of fuel goes up is out of
operations accounts. I don't think that is something we can
afford.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the three of you for your service and leadership.
I want to ask a few contemporary questions before I get to the
budget, particularly to you, General Amos, about the marines in
Afghanistan.
The first is, we're going through a difficult time,
beginning with some acts of violence by Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) against our troops and now, obviously,
we have had a couple bad situations involving our forces. Give
us a sense, if you can, if what you're hearing from our marines
in Afghanistan about their relationship with the ANSF and, if
it's relevant, with the people of Afghanistan that they're
interacting with? What kind of level of trust interaction do
they have?
General Amos. Senator, I can probably sum it up with just a
recap of an email. I got two of them 2 days ago. We just turned
over the leadership of the marines in the Helmand Province.
Major General John Tulin gave up command to Major General Mark
Reganis.
``The night before was a large dinner hosted by the
Provincial Governor Mangal and Major General Maloof,'' who is
the 215th Corps commander. I'm confident that you've met him on
your many visits in there. ``At that dinner that night, with
all the commanders and the leadership there, there was much
discussion, almost to the point of tears, as General Maloof
recanted the last 13 months of General Tulin's time in
Afghanistan in the Helmand Province. They talked about how the
marines saved the lives of his soldiers, how marines died
saving the lives, trying to retrieve a drowning Afghan
soldier.''
We've not seen the level of violence in Helmand that we've
seen in other places. My sense is that it's a result of strong
relationships, a level of confidence. It doesn't mean there are
not going to be things that are going to happen, Senator. You
know this. But I will tell you that there is a great amount of
confidence between the ANSF, the provincial governors, the
district governors, the leadership, the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams from the United Kingdom. There is a real
sense of brotherhood and bonding there that gives me that sense
of encouragement that I've talked to you about so many times.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General. That has certainly been
my impression. Obviously, when individuals on either side,
Afghan or American--of course, we've been dealing with
cumulatively hundreds of thousands of people in service in
Afghanistan--go awry, that attracts the attention. But my
impression is exactly what you've conveyed, that on the ground
the relationship between the American and Afghan forces is
deep, it's full of trust, and it should give us confidence as
we go forward in our mission in Afghanistan and certainly
discourage anybody from going into a panic mode about picking
up and running.
I want to ask you another very contemporary question since
you happen to be here. Yesterday or this morning in the news
there's much been made about the fact that the marines who met
with Secretary Panetta yesterday were asked to leave their arms
outside of the meeting area. Frankly, I don't know whether the
media in writing about that think that's a good thing or a bad
thing. But I wonder if you could just put it in some context
and explain that decision?
General Amos. Senator, it's my understanding--and I don't
have any more facts than what you have--not because of that
issue, but on another matter, I wanted to talk to the commander
yesterday on the ground and I was unable to connect with him.
But we were exactly in the seam of the turnover. General Tulin
had left. Secretary Panetta arrived. We have a brand new
commander on the ground. He's probably been on the ground less
than 24 hours. He has the Secretary of Defense there.
It's my understanding that the senior leadership, the
sergeant major, made the decision. Okay, we don't have the
Afghans in here with their weapons, so the marines can stack
their arms. We don't typically do that. Sir, I wouldn't make
any more out of it than that. I think it was just a decision
was made. I don't think anything should be read into it.
Senator Lieberman. Good. That's good enough. Thank you.
Admiral Greenert, in your prepared testimony you have a
part where you refer to the history which shows us that
conflict is unlikely to appear in the form of the scenarios for
which we traditionally plan, and you particularly make
reference to the contemporary cases of Iran and North Korea.
Then you say: ``In our fiscal year 2013 budget submission, we
shifted procurement, research and development, and reduction
funds towards weapons systems, sensors, and tactical training
that can be rapidly fielded to the fleet, including
demonstrators and prototypes that can quickly improve our
force's capability.''
Since we're so focused on Iran and the potential threats
represented by Iran, particularly in the maritime context, I
wonder if you could tell us in a bit more detail what the Navy
is asking this committee to authorize for fiscal year 2013 that
will specifically increase our capability to defend against any
Iranian action?
Admiral Greenert. Sure, Senator. After I took the watch, 1
week into the job I went to Japan, Korea, and then I went to
Bahrain to see my counterparts and to sit down in Bahrain and
talk to Admiral Fox, and then I subsequently talked to General
Mattis, and I assessed things to myself. I went through the
Strait of Hormuz on the USS Stennis, and it was a nice clear
day and I got a pretty nice view of Iranian naval units that
come out and monitor it.
So between all of those, I came to the conclusion we could
do better setting the theater. I wanted to be sure, as I've
said in my testimony, that we are ready, that our folks are
proficient, they are confident, and they're good at what they
do, in case called upon, and I wanted to be sure the theater
was set.
Having said that, I requested and we request to improve our
mine warfare capabilities in the theater. We are moving four
more minesweeps to the theater. That will make eight. We are
moving airborne mine countermeasure helicopters. That will take
us to eight in theater. Then those, working with the British
minesweeps there, which we exercise with frequently, sets us up
a little bit there.
I want to improve underwater unmanned vehicle mine
neutralization. There are some systems that were available and
had proven subsequently to be good. I want to be sure we have
counter-swarm capability, so that's improving the Gatling guns
and electro-optical and infrared systems, so that as we go
through, go at night, go during the day, we can see and we have
a really good view of that.
You go through the Strait of Hormuz with a carrier, you
have like a hunting rifle and you also may need a sawed-off
shotgun. Some people use that as a matter of context.
There's anti-submarine warfare improvements, torpedo
improvements, and things of that nature. I'll roll it up to
about $250 million in fiscal year 2013 that I'm requesting, and
it rotates out to about $750 million across the FYDP.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. That's a very encouraging
report.
My time is up. Since Senator McCain understandably and
correctly questioned the panel about programs the Navy has that
are over budget, just give me a quick response to one program
I'm proud to say is not over budget, and that is the
procurement of the Virginia-class attack submarines?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. We just took the California 3
months ago, 8 months early and about $100 million under budget.
That's the good partnership in my view, Senator, that we have
with those two vendors.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wish I had had more time to calculate, getting into this
thing that was brought up primarily by Senator McCain. On the
mandated changes in your 50-50 program on the fuel that you
would be purchasing, just a minute ago, Mr. Secretary, in your
statement you said that every time the cost of a barrel of oil
goes up a dollar it costs the Navy $30 million in extra fuel
costs.
Senator McCain mentioned the purchase of 20,000 gallons of
the algae fuel that was $424 a gallon. I assume that's all
behind us now and we're not doing any more. That was an
experiment and that's gone.
But what we are doing now is talking about the cost of the
50-50 blend. The 50-50 blend as I understand it--and I'm taking
the figures from you guys--would be $15 a gallon. Your JP5, as
I know from my own purchases, is somewhere between $4 and $5 a
gallon. You're talking about an increase of about $10 for each
gallon.
Is my math off here?
Mr. Mabus. No, sir. That's exactly correct. It's again a
test amount. It's 450,000 gallons of biofuel that we bought to
do a demonstration at the Rim of the Pacific exercise in July
off the coast of Hawaii using surface ships and aircraft off
our carrier there.
But the whole point of this is to establish a competitive
industry, and the Navy will not be buying commercial quantities
of biofuels or anything else that is not commercially
competitive in price. But it takes a little while to get there,
and one of the things the Navy can bring is a market for these
fuels.
Senator Inhofe. But the figure that I've heard, I thought
it was a quote from you, that eventually you'll need 330
million gallons per year of alternative fuels to meet your goal
of 50 percent; is that correct?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. All right. That means that that would be 50
percent, so you'd be talking about 660 million gallons. You
apply your $10 to that and this is a huge amount.
Mr. Mabus. I'm not going to apply the $10 to that because
when we get to that level the alternative fuel will have to be
competitively priced with the fossil fuel that it's being
blended with.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I want not to get into that right
now, but for the record I want you to send me what you just now
said and show the documentation. That's not the way I read it.
But that's all right. Will you do that?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, I'll be happy to do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

When the Navy is buying alternative fuels at operational quantities
they must be competitive with the fuels they are replacing.
The purchase of 450,000 gallons of neat biofuels, blended to
900,000 gallons of 50/50 drop-in marine diesel and jet fuel, was
purchased for the 2012 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, at a total
cost $11 million. $11 million is less than the total annual cost of a
$0.01/gallon increase to our fuel and is roughly equivalent to a $.40
increase in the price of a barrel of petroleum. The operational
demonstration at RIMPAC will complete the Navy's testing and
certification program of the hydrotreated esters or fatty acids
alternative fuel pathway by allowing the fleet to utilize these fuels
in operations such as UNREPs for our destroyers and refueling of helos
and jets on the deck of our carrier.
Over the last 3 years we have witnessed the price of alternative
fuels drop dramatically as research and development efforts and
purchase volumes have increased. The final step for these fuels to
reach cost competitiveness is production at commercial scale. To
accelerate this process the Department of Navy has partnered with
Department of Energy and the Department of Agriculture under the
Defense Production Act Title III Advanced Drop-in Biofuels Production
Project. This effort is dedicated to working with industry towards the
construction or retrofit of multiple commercial scale drop-in biofuels
plants capable of producing alternative fuels at a price competitive
with petroleum.

Senator Inhofe. All right.
On TRICARE, we had the Army in here last week and I kind of
pursued this a little bit. I look at some of the changes that
are taking place. I know during the Bush administration they
were talking about making incremental changes in copay at that
time for 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. We put a hold on it in
Congress. Maybe we shouldn't have done that, because I know
that the costs of health care have doubled since 2001.
The budget that we're talking about right now seeks to save
$1.8 billion in 2013 and $12.9 billion over the period of the
FYDP. When you calculate this it's my understanding that the
enrollment fees are going to be increased, depending on what
rank you are, somewhere between 94 percent and 345 percent. I
had sent some stuff in for the record when the Army was in
here. The administration officials said that one goal of the
increased fees is to force military retirees to reduce their
involvement in TRICARE and eventually opt out of the program in
favor of alternatives established by the 2010 Patients
Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Do you want to comment about that? Do you think that's
somebody's goal here?
Mr. Mabus. I will comment about what we've requested in the
budget. As you correctly pointed out, health care costs are
going up dramatically. Personnel costs are the fastest growing
part of our budget. Something had to be done to get that under
control.
The item that's been recommended in terms of TRICARE is
that for working age retirees from the military that their
premiums for TRICARE do go up, because in most cases they have
access to other health care. But even if they want to keep on
TRICARE, the largest increase, which would be for senior
officers, would go up to about $2,400 a year for health care.
That represents less than half of what you would pay as a
Federal employee or as a civilian out in the workforce for
health care. So TRICARE would still be significantly less
expensive than a competing commercial policy.
Senator Inhofe. Have you done any kind of a study--and
answer this for the record because it would be a long answer--
as to the number of people who are retiring who might not be
able to afford this? Because that range that I mentioned I
think is still accurate.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of the Navy has not conducted a study on how many
beneficiaries will no longer be able to afford TRICARE in the out-years
with the increased planned in the fiscal year 2013 proposal. I defer to
Department of Defense for any associated analyses. With regards to
total cost, TRICARE will still be much cheaper than commercial
insurance. It should be noted, however, that when Congress passed
TRICARE it was intended to be used only as a supplemental policy, not a
primary one.

Senator Inhofe. I wanted to get to one other thing and that
is what's happening right now over in AFRICOM. I got back
recently from the Horn of Africa and I talked to Admiral Losee
and several others. We're concerned about the activity over
there. We know about the increased activity in Somalia and
along the east coast, but we also know that more recently the
activity is on the west coast. I know that at times you've had
64 incidents of piracy that were reported in 9 countries off
the Gulf of Guinea. I was there and talking to some of the
people, and they don't seem to have any resources over there.
I wonder how thin you're getting spread down there. Are you
able to do all the stuff that you had not anticipated would
happen 2 years ago?
Admiral Greenert. We're able to do what we're asked to do
in the global force management plan. What we need to do in the
future to get better is we need to coordinate and synchronize
with our partners. We had an international seapower symposium
last October, we got together with the Nigerian navy, the
Guinea navy, the French navy, and all those of us that operate
in the Gulf of Guinea.
What's happening sometimes is we show up and there's two of
us there, and then there's nobody there for a period of time.
So I'm meeting in fact next week with the chief of the French
navy and that's one of the things we're going to sit down and
do, Senator. We need to synchronize what we're bringing
forward.
For us as we move into the future, when we bring on the
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and the LCS we will actually
have a better opportunity to patrol in that area with a ship
that resonates better.
Senator Inhofe. I'd direct this at both you and General
Amos. I was in Liberia not long ago and met with the Navy and
with the marines there, and a lot of what they're doing, the
increased activity in the western part of Africa, the section
1206 and the train and equip programs have been very helpful.
Would you comment as to that?
General Amos. Senator, it's been about a year and a half
since I was over there in the Liberia side. But we put that
detachment in there to train those two infantry battalions. The
previous contractor was unsatisfactory with the government. My
sense in talking with the President, the American ambassador,
there and the chief of defense was at that time they'd been
very happy. All my reports have been very favorable.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral, do you agree with that?
Admiral Greenert. I do agree. It's a very worthwhile fund.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Amos, I just wanted to ask one question on the Camp
Lejeune water situation. In a recent statement made immediately
after the airing of the Semper Fi, Always Faithful, documentary
about the water contamination issue at Camp Lejeune, Major
General Kessler, the Commander of the Marine Corps
Installations Command, stated that, ``We are committed to
finding a responsible solution to this challenging and complex
situation.''
I understand that the Agency for Toxic Substance and
Disease Registry (ATSDR) has the lead in studying the
contamination issues at Camp Lejeune. Is there anything that
Congress can do to expedite the care for the servicemembers and
their families that may have been affected by the contaminated
water? I know we have the bill that hasn't come forward yet. So
that's just one question.
Also, can you just talk a little bit about the progress the
Marine Corps has made to find and notify those who have lived
on the base during that period?
General Amos. Senator, I read the same comment from General
Kessler, and I agree with him. Since 1991, we have spent $30
million in an effort to try to bring science into this. There
are allegations out there. I've read them. We've spent an awful
lot of time and effort. I'm committed as the Commandant of the
Marine Corps to be faithful, to take care of my marines, and
that means all the marines. That's not just the ones on Active
Duty; all those that have gone before.
The truth of the matter is today science has not proven
precisely yea or nay with regards to the Camp Lejeune water and
its affiliation with cancer. That's the job of the ATSDR and
that's the job of the National Academy of Sciences.
We have gone out and we've spent $30 million. We have a web
site that I know you're familiar with. The Secretary of the
Navy and I just published a new book and did put it back on the
web site with facts and communication tips. We just in the last
3 years have added another 25,000 people to the registry. We're
sitting at about 179,000 folks that have registered now that we
provide information to and that they can get it off the web
site.
The key is to give them as much information as soon as we
know scientifically what the relationship is. We're committed
to that, Senator. Short of Congress specifically going to a
marine or a marine family and authorizing on a unique basis
care for that individual, I can't think of anything else short
of waiting for the science.
Senator Hagan. I appreciate the efforts that you and
Secretary Mabus are putting towards this.
I also wanted to ask, General Amos, about the JSF, which we
know is essential to the Marine Corps's ability to operate and
move seamlessly from the sea ashore and in the air. I know I
don't need to tell you about the aircraft capability of STOVL,
because we know that that is key to preserving the strategic
value of the amphibious capabilities.
I'm pleased that Secretary Panetta has removed the JSF from
probationary status. The F-35B is scheduled to replace three
aircraft currently in use by the Marine Corps, which I
understand is going to save approximately $1 billion in
operations and maintenance costs. Additionally, the timely
fielding of the F-35B will preserve the number of ships from
which the United States can launch strike aircraft.
Does the current production rate for the F-35 sufficiently
address the projected strike fighter shortfall, and have the
Navy and Marine Corps adequately addressed the issues relating
to the tactical air (TACAIR) integration?
General Amos. Senator, the very last point on TACAIR
integration, I am a fan of it. The Secretary, the CNO, and I
signed an agreement just a year and a half ago. Not that we
needed to sign an agreement, but to show our Services and DOD
the level of commitment between DOD and the two Services. I'm
committed to it. I'm a fan of Marine Corps squadrons on Navy
carriers and will continue to be that way.
The amount of the production rate of six per year of my
variant for the next 3 years is satisfactory to maintain, and
we can maintain the strike fighter shortfall, we can maintain
that at that production rate. If the production rates stay
shallow beyond the next 3 years, then we'll probably have to go
back to revisit and take a hard look at the strike fighter
shortfall. We're managing it right now. It is manageable
through just careful flying and management of the airplanes.
The numbers are down well below 100 at this point. Anything
below that is manageable.
I'm convinced that we are probably in a good position right
now.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I wanted to move to sexual assault. Both veterans and
Active Duty servicemembers have cited that the Pentagon and
military commanders are not doing enough to prosecute sexual
assault cases. If it's true, the failure to provide just this
basic guarantee of safety to women, who now represent over 15
percent of our armed forces, is not just a moral issue but a
defining statement about the condition and approach of our
military. In the Navy and the Marine Corps today, what
challenges do you face and how do you plan to overcome those
challenges to create a culture where we can put sexual assault
in the past? What further steps need to be taken to hold more
of the perpetrators of these heinous crimes accountable for
their actions?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, you described what happens very
accurately. It's a crime. It's an assault. It's an attack on a
servicemember. The people who join the Navy and the Marine
Corps swear to not only protect the United States, but also
their fellow sailors and marines. This is an attack on one of
their shipmates, and any amount of sexual assault is
unacceptable.
We've done a lot and we're continuing to do a lot. First, I
established an Office of Sexual Assault Prevention in my
office. It reports directly to me. I see the person in charge
of that office on a very routine basis. As a result of that,
we've undertaken a lot of programs, particularly in the most
at-risk elements, the young sailors and marines, ages 18 to
about 25.
We have one program now that we require of every
servicemember when they come out of boot camp and they go into
their A school in the Navy, and every single one does, they
have three 90-minute sessions on this. We have found that at
Great Lakes, where boot camp and the A schools are, that sexual
assaults have declined pretty dramatically when we started this
program.
Second, I announced last week that we're undertaking an
initiative called 21st Century Sailor and Marine, to make sure
that the Navy and Marine Corps and the sailors and marines that
comprise it have the tools to be resilient. One of the things
that we have found is not just in sexual assault, but also in
domestic violence, in driving under the influence (DUI), in
fitness, in child abuse, and in suicides, is the presence of
alcohol. So we are undertaking programs to try to make sure
that we catch a problem before it creates a life-altering or
life-ending or career-altering or career-ending event for
somebody.
We have run two pilot programs on this, one with the
Pacific submarine fleet in Washington State, one at the Naval
Academy, where we have tested for alcohol, and all forms--
domestic violence, sexual assault, suicide, DUIs, fitness--all
the issues have gone down between 40 and 50 percent as a result
of this program. We're seeing some programs that work. They
require very active command involvement. They require active
leadership by the commanding officers, the sergeant majors, and
the command master chiefs. But we are going to change the
culture and make sure that these attacks cannot be perpetrated,
and it's better to prevent one than it is to prosecute one, but
if one occurs we will hold people accountable to the maximum
extent we possibly can.
Senator Hagan. I certainly do appreciate your efforts in
this and the ongoing programs. I'm pleased to hear that.
I also want to tell you that I'm pleased with the efforts
that you're undertaking from the renewable energy source for
the Navy.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, and thank you all,
gentlemen, for being here.
As a member of the Budget Committee, I know that the cuts
you're already undertaking are very significant, and I know
that the sequester would be catastrophic to DOD. But it remains
the law. The sequester is in law and will take effect unless
Congress takes action.
I don't know that it would be that easy to fix it. I just
want to tell you, I think the President and the White House
team and the DOD team need to be thinking about what we can do,
because I for one do not intend to eliminate the sequester
totally, as the President's budget basically does. I think
we'll have to find cuts in other programs in the remaining 60-
plus percent of the budget that's been protected from any cuts.
That's where we need to find some savings, too. It can't all
come from DOD.
That's a complex matter, but I just would warn you that
we're heading to that time and it could be a problem if we
don't have a real solid plan to get out of it.
With regard to Navy shipbuilding, you have a force
structure assessment coming up, I believe, Mr. Secretary, and
you've stated you intend to reach an inventory of 300 ships by
2019. With this force structure assessment, how confident are
you that it will maintain that as a goal, based on the budget
and other things? Do you expect that the assessment group could
come back and recommend even less than 300 ships?
Mr. Mabus. I don't know what the force structure
assessment's going to come back at, Senator. But I feel
confident that having a fleet of around 300 ships will meet
whatever force structure assessment or whatever strategy that
drives that force structure assessment.
We do have that plan, as you pointed out, to get to 300
ships by 2019.
Senator Sessions. One thing about it, I may not be here and
you may not be here in 2019. So plans when they get out too far
don't have much reality to them, and that's what worries me. We
had a plan to have 316 ships and did have that many in 2001.
When you took office it had dropped to 283. As you noted from
your remarks, we had gone down 49,000 sailors. Some of that is
because we use better equipment, better ships that need fewer
people to man them, and I give the Navy credit for that,
Admiral. We have to, like everyone else, see how we can do
these things better.
With regard to the LCS, I'm concerned about the overall
reductions in that budget in the FYDP. I understand it still
remains a top Navy priority to have 55 ships produced through
that program. Where are we in terms of cost and schedule for
the LCS, Mr. Secretary or Admiral? How does the current
contract, the execution of the program, compare with the
initial purchase of the first ship in that program? How do you
see that program developing?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, I'm very proud of the LCS program. The
first ships of both variants came in, as lead ships do, very
expensive and very high priced.
Senator Sessions. First in class is always more expensive.
Mr. Mabus. First in class, it is.
Senator Sessions. What does it look like now?
Mr. Mabus. The price has come down from the bids on ships
5, 6, and 7; the initial bids, the price has come down from
that by 40 percent. The price is coming down for every ship in
this contract. We have a block buy of 10 ships from each
vendor, so a total of 20 ships. The 10th ship of each one will
be significantly less expensive than the first ship.
These are all fixed price contracts, so we're certain that
we will reap these savings. We were able to get 20 ships
instead of 19 as originally planned, and save $2.9 billion.
Both shipyards are performing very well. The ships
themselves, as the CNO has mentioned, are going to be one of
the very important parts of the Navy going forward. We're
planning to forward deploy LCSs to Singapore, the first one
next year in a proof of concept and then on a more regular and
permanent basis in the 2015 timeframe.
So we remain absolutely committed, not only to the
platform, but to buying out the entire 55. For purely budgetary
reasons, we had to slide two at the end of this 5-year plan to
make the budget. But we remain committed to buying the entire
class of 55 ships as quickly as we can.
Senator Sessions. Briefly, General Amos, does the LCS
provide benefits for the Marine Corps?
General Amos. Senator, it could. There's been discussion
between the CNO and I about what we call a Marine Corps module.
We have not done anything with that, but I think the
possibilities are there, absolutely.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Greenert, do you have any
comments on that ship line?
Admiral Greenert. Combined with the mission module, it will
be a quantum leap in something like mine countermeasures. Now
we kind of mow the grass, finding mines, locating them, and
neutralizing them. What we'll be able to do with this is at the
same time find them, localize them, and neutralize them with
unmanned vehicles, and the volume will be three times the
volume that we have today.
So as we look at the challenges that we consider in the
world today, the Strait of Hormuz and otherwise, imagine the
capability enhancement.
Senator Sessions. I know we're facing a lot of challenges
with regard to the Navy plans and the DOD plans. Less Air Force
planes, less prepositioning squadrons for the marines, and also
less JHSVs. The JHSV has been a very popular ship, has it not,
Admiral Greenert, by the commanders who've benefited from it?
Admiral Greenert. It has, yes. The Westpac Express, which
is what it's kind of based on, has been successful. There's
great anticipation by the combatant commanders for the JHSV.
Senator Sessions. It is being reduced, and maybe we can
examine that. What are your thoughts about that?
Admiral Greenert. We looked at that and said, I think we
need 21, and we said, well, what if we crew it with Maritime
Sealift Command people, because they operate at 270 days a
year, instead of sailors, 180. With that, it becomes a
requirement of 16 ships to provide the same presence.
We said, if we forward-station them, they're there. If we
can do that, we can get by with 10. We did a study on that and
that's where the 10 comes from, and that's how that worked its
way in that direction.
Subject to change in the world and to strategy, we think
we're good with ten, and so do the combatant commanders, sir.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and to
the Naval Services.
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, your budget includes
a proposed delay of the Ohio replacement class submarine, the
SSBNX, by 2 years. Last year the Navy testified that they
needed the original schedule to maintain strategic deterrence
patrol requirements, which begs the question: If this
postponement is in effect, can you maintain the level of
strategic systems patrolling during the transition from the
Ohio-class to the new class? Admiral Greenert?
Admiral Greenert. Today, Senator, we have 14 Ohio-class
submarines. Two are in overhaul, so that leaves us with 12
really operational. With that, there are 10 or 9 available at
any given time for U.S. Strategic Command.
We feel due to this delay we will ride a period where we'll
have 10 operational, sometimes 9. So we'll have a similar risk
there. We have to watch it very closely because at that
timeframe in that future--I'm talking about the late 20s and
the 30s--we'll have older Ohios. So we'll have to watch it very
carefully. But right now we think that we can mitigate that
risk.
Senator Reed. In thinking forward, what assumptions are you
making? Because frankly, you pointed out with the age of the
fleet, if you're assuming sort of standard operational
availability that assumption might not be a very good one. So
are you making any heroic assumptions that fill the gap on
paper?
Admiral Greenert. Being Navy nukes, we don't try to be
heroic. We're engineers. You know us, Senator.
Senator Reed. I disagree. You're heroes.
Admiral Greenert. But the long-term maintenance will be
complete on the class at that time, so we were comfortable
about that, that we'll have shaken all that down. So far the
returns on the extension of the Ohio-class, because that's what
we're talking about in that timeframe, are good. We have to pay
attention to the sea water systems, the hull measurements, and
the reactor plant components, which were subjected to neutron
irradiation.
We've done this before, that is the process, but not on
this class of ship. The returns are good so far. We must be
vigilant.
Senator Reed. Let me ask another related question, and this
we've touched upon in some private meetings, the Ohio
replacement is part of the broader issue of the nuclear triad,
which for both strategic reasons and for economic reasons is
going to have to go under significant reevaluation. It seems to
me, as I've said before, that, given the historic relative
invulnerability of missile submarines, and given the fact that
this is really the only new strategic system that is being
planned actively and funding being afforded to it, delaying it
might have implications for the overall triad in terms of how
do we maintain it, particularly if we find ourselves on the air
and land side with not enough assets.
So this raises a huge question. I don't know if you have
any comments today on that topic.
Admiral Greenert. That's a good question. We looked at the
nuclear strategic force structure, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, bombers, and the submarines. We're comfortable with
the 2-year delay in the Navy, with what we have to deliver as
it stands today. There's a study underway, nuclear posture,
post-nuclear posture review study. Pending the results of that,
we're comfortable.
But we need to bring the Ohio replacement in. It's
important. It is the survivable piece of the triad, as you
said. The Department's been pretty clear on that to us in
general.
Senator Reed. Changing subjects from ballistic missile
submarines to attack submarines, with a constant theme, the
Virginia-class within your budget we're doing two a year, and I
thank you gentlemen and your predecessors for working that. It
took many years. But we're slipping one of the boats, and that
causes problems. It causes problems, I think, in the overall
cost of the program. Let me ask either the Secretary or the CNO
whether you would concur that would add additional costs to the
program over time? Then what steps you might take to mitigate?
For example, if we could include an additional ship in the
multi-year contract, allowing long-term purchases, that might
be the most effective way to deal with that?
Admiral Greenert. There's an operational cost that I'll
quickly allude to. There's SSN years, the requirements of the
global combatant commanders, and we have a deficit in the 20s
and 30s. This will exacerbate that by moving the boat from 2014
to 2018, and that's regrettable. The year 2014 will be hard for
us. We will retire ships early in that year more than any other
year in the FYDP.
If we could work a procurement process using a fiscal
arrangement, and we will ask for a multi-year procurement in
that class, as was stated earlier. We would ask for a block
buy. We have good data on our block buy, where we have saved
substantial amounts of moneys. It's most efficient. As you
alluded to, the workforce learning curve is high, the vendors
are good. Everything comes about. We're getting these
submarines in early.
If we could find a way to incrementally fund this, we are
confident there are substantial savings and we would get a 10th
boat for less than the notional cost.
Senator Reed. So there would be a cost savings in terms of
doing this contractual rearrangement. Then there's also the
operational costs you'll have to bear because you just don't
have enough ships capable to go to sea. So there are two costs
that can be mitigated by this process; is that accurate?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. There's a capability, a
capacity, and a cost factor in these.
Senator Reed. I presume that industry is seriously engaged
with you to try to find a reasonable way to get this done.
Mr. Secretary, do you want to comment?
Mr. Mabus. Yes. We're working with industry. We're working
to try to find innovative ways to fund this so that we can meet
the mitigation that you and the CNO have talked about.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
My time has expired. General Amos, you look great. I wish I
looked that good even without an operation. So keep it up. Tell
those marines to keep going. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, I was very pleased to receive word the other
day that a memorandum of agreement had been signed for the LHA-
7 America-class amphibious ship that's very important for our
future freedom of the seas. As we draw down forces in some
areas of the world and focus on the Asia-Pacific region, this
will be a linchpin in the American force.
I assume we will see that final contract concluded within a
matter of weeks?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, we anticipate that final contract
before the end of April.
Senator Wicker. Excellent. Thank you very much.
Let me ask you then, both of you, Secretary Mabus and
Admiral Greenert, about the shipbuilding industrial base. Of
course, your main concern is getting the job done, but we also
have to be concerned about the employment peaks and valleys
that we may see. I noticed in your testimony, Secretary Mabus,
we're not going to be back to 300 ships until 2019.
The current FYDP says we'll have new construction of 41
ships. This is a decrease of some 17 ships from the previous
FYDP. Considering that and the fact that we're not going to
even get within 13 ships of our requirement until 2019, what is
that going to do to the so-called employment valleys, where
employment at the shipyards is here and then it dips down and
then we're expecting it to be able to come back and have the
capacity to go up to a previous level? How is that going to
play out?
Mr. Mabus. You're absolutely correct that the industrial
base is one of the things, particularly in shipbuilding, that
we have to protect. Once you lose those unique skills, it's
very hard to get them back when you need them.
In terms of that, we want to make sure that we have an
industrial base that provides as much competition as possible,
so that we not only protect the industrial base, but we also
protect the taxpayers in terms of how much money we pay for
ships. Today we have 37 ships under contract, which I believe
will keep all of our shipyards at a fairly steady manning pace.
For Pascagoula, for example, they have a DDG-51, they have
the LHA-7 that you pointed out, they have LPD-26, and we're in
negotiations over LPD-27. If you take all those and you project
them forward, there's still going to be at any time in an
industry like that some peaks and valleys, but we think we've
smoothed it out to the maximum extent that we can.
In terms of our other shipbuilders, we only have one yard
that builds auxiliaries. They now have in the current
shipbuilding plan and in the FYDP a request for about one ship
per year, which will keep them stable.
But we keep a close eye on the industrial base and on the
competition inside the industrial base, because sometimes one
of the things that causes these peaks and valleys is not the
welder out there, it's the overhead. It's the amount of money
that the shipbuilder decides is necessary in terms of the
support services. We keep a close eye on this and we expect the
shipbuilders to do the same.
But you're absolutely correct in your concern for the
industrial base and we certainly share that concern.
Senator Wicker. Admiral, if sequestration kicks in what's
it going to do to what Secretary Mabus was just talking about?
Then, Mr. Secretary, I'll let you answer that question also.
Admiral Greenert. In this strategy, one of the things we
talk about is reversibility. That's the ability to ramp up if
need be. But you have to have an industrial base to do that. In
my view, if sequestration kicks in we will lose the abilities
that Secretary Mabus referred to in some shipyards. When I do
rough math, I'm looking at not 285 ships in a given year, I'm
looking at 230 ships. We don't have enough force structure to
accrue that kind of savings without reducing procurement.
I'm very concerned about an industrial base that would be
able to adjust from sequestration. It would be very difficult
to keep a shipbuilder that could be efficient in the types of
ships we need.
Senator Wicker. Say that again about 230 ships.
Admiral Greenert. We have 285 ships today. You do rough
math, you look at the kind of numbers we talk about, and where
I am today, it's just simple, straight application of math from
where we are today. We could be around 235 ships.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Mabus. Sequestration has two big problems that there's
been a lot of conversation about, and a lot of testimony before
you. One is the amount, but second is how it is implemented,
without regard for strategy, without regard for priorities, and
you simply have to take a certain percentage out of every
account.
It would be a big issue for shipyards, like the CNO said.
It would also be a big issue because if we have to take a
certain amount out of every single program line, there are some
contracts that we already have out there that we would have to
take money from. So for both reasons, the amount that is being
reduced and the way that they're being reduced, I believe that
Secretary Panetta described the effects as catastrophic.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
We're going to take a 10-minute break. [Recess.]
The committee will come back to order.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my welcome and aloha to our panelists, who
are considered distinguished leaders of our country. I want to
thank you very much for your tireless efforts in leading the
men and women of our Navy and Marine Corps for our country. I
also want to recognize and thank the military members and their
families for their outstanding service.
Mr. Secretary, it's always good to see you and speak with
you. I always wish you well. In your written testimony, Mr.
Secretary, you indicate the Naval Academy received nearly 7,000
minority applications for the 2014 class, and it's double the
number for the class of 2010. Can you discuss what the Navy's
doing to achieve these significant gains, as well as the
benefits of a larger pipeline of qualified minority officers
for the Navy and Marine Corps?
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. I will return the good
wishes, and it's very good to see you.
The Naval Academy has had an outreach program going now for
several years to make sure that we get as diverse an applicant
pool as is possible. Everybody should be accorded the honor of
defending this country through military service.
As you pointed out, the number of minority not only
applicants, but also acceptances, has gone up dramatically. We
have outside the Academy taken action to make sure for both the
Navy and the Marine Corps that we are gathering in highly
qualified, diverse background Americans, not just diversity in
ethnicity or national origin, but also in terms of geography,
in terms of backgrounds, and in terms of educational
experiences, because we believe that we will be a better
fighting force having that diversity of points of view that we
bring to bear on any issue.
We have also expanded Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
(ROTC), returning it to some schools, such as Harvard, Yale,
and Columbia, where it had historically been, but where it had
been absent for almost 40 years. We are bringing Naval ROTC to
other schools, like Arizona State and Rutgers, to make sure
that we do reach the widest population possible.
Finally, the other thing that we have to do in the military
is not only get these young, diverse Americans to sign up, but
also to remain and make the Navy and Marine Corps a career, so
that the diversity at our higher ranks will mirror the ones at
our lower ranks.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral, good to see you, too. First, I applaud the
decision to fully fund ship and depot maintenance accounts. The
Navy is taking steps to improve maintenance work on its surface
ships so as to mitigate problems in material readiness that
have come to light in recent years. Admiral, can you talk about
some of these improvements? How will these steps affect ship
maintenance work? Talk particularly, if you can, about Pearl
Harbor and other shipyards as well.
Admiral Greenert. Aloha, Senator.
The biggest change is called the Surface Management
Engineering Program. We have this in the submarine program and
the carrier program. Actually, we reinstituted it into the
surface program. It's laying out the key and critical
maintenance procedures that need to take place when we bring a
surface ship in for maintenance, to ensure that it gets to its
expected service life.
It involves going into the tanks, looking at the turbines,
the shafts, the shaft seals, those long-term items that you
might be tempted not to look at and that we didn't look at in
the past, where we started finding emergent problems coming up.
That's the biggest change.
Then it's to have the discipline to see to it that when we
bring the ship in for maintenance that we get that work done.
We have to man the shipyards, such as Pearl Harbor, so we have
the right planners that can lay out what needs to take place so
we're efficient when we bring the ship in.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
General Amos, I understand that you recently signed a
revision to a 15-year-old policy addressing hazing. You also
ordered the Service to begin tracking all hazing allegations
and investigations, and called on leadership to get more
aggressive in confronting claims of abuse, and instituted new
protections for victims and whistleblowers.
General, I really applaud your attention to this very
serious matter. Can you discuss some of these new protections
for victims and whistleblowers?
General Amos. Senator, it's true I signed a new order out.
I was a bit surprised to find out it was as antiquated as it
was. So we did do that. It did put my fingerprints as the
Commandant of the Marine Corps on the entire matter.
I've required all leadership, all my general officers, all
my commanding officers, to immediately put their attention and
their leadership fingerprints on the matter of hazing and to
eradicate it. It is like a cancer that is treated and gets beat
back and you begin to feel good about it, but if you don't keep
persistent attention on the matter across the Marine Corps, all
202,000 marines, then it begins to show again, and then you
have to treat it again.
This is a leadership issue, Senator. Clearly I'm not happy
with it. I have not set anything in motion with regards to
whistleblowers specifically, but the Marine Corps understands,
they've gotten the message loud and clear, that, number one,
this is a leadership issue; number two, it's their
responsibility; and number three, it's absolutely without
exception unacceptable behavior, and if found out then it's my
full intention to prosecute it in every case.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, Mr. Secretary, and General, for being
here today. I appreciate it, and your service to our country.
Admiral Greenert, Admiral Locklear has described the
Virginia-class submarine as the backbone of our attack
submarine force. Based on the line of questioning you just had
with Senator Reed, you said that the slipping of the Virginia-
class production will exacerbate the shortfall that we're going
to see going forward.
I have a couple of questions for you. First of all, let me
say that I'm very proud of the maintenance done at the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the excellent work done there on the
Virginia-class submarine, and the importance of that work when
we think about the role of the Virginia-class submarine as the
backbone of our attack submarine force.
But it's my understanding--this is obviously a very
important issue for us--that the Navy was only able to support
61 percent of the combatant commanders' requirements for attack
submarines in 2011; isn't that right?
Admiral Greenert. That's right.
Senator Ayotte. So we're only currently in 2011, when the
combatant commanders asked for support of attack submarines,
meeting essentially 6 out of 10 requests?
Admiral Greenert. That's right, ma'am. They provide their
requests, they're adjudicated within the Joint Staff, and then
we get our distribution for providing worldwide presence.
Senator Ayotte. The Navy has a requirement for 48 attack
submarines?
Admiral Greenert. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Based on where we are, and when we look at
the build rates that are proposed, is it correct to say that
the Navy will only have 39 attack submarines if we look forward
to 2030?
Admiral Greenert. That will be the low point, yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. So we'll have a nine-submarine shortfall in
2030 if we continue with the proposed build rate that we have
in this budget?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am. That's the depth, and there's
a breadth to that, too, of course. Any time you go below 48,
there's the divot, so it's also the width of that as well.
Senator Ayotte. Right. So this is a real concern, and what
it also results in, as I understand it, is a 43-percent
reduction in forward presence and a 60-percent reduction in
undersea strike volume if we allow our submarine force to go
below this level, down to the 39?
Admiral Greenert. I can't validate the numbers themselves,
but you're in the rough order of magnitude. It would be
dramatic. It's very important.
Senator Ayotte. This is at a time, obviously, where we're
shifting our focus to the Asia-Pacific region, and of course
this is an important capability to have in that region, but not
only in that region. We've talked about the importance in the
Middle East and other areas around the world.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, Senator. With the submarines we
have, the Asia-Pacific would get the attention. So it's the
rest of the world we also have to pay particular attention to.
Senator Ayotte. We have other hot areas that we would want
to be able to do, not only focus on the Asia-Pacific, but of
course the Middle East and other areas around the world, our
own homeland as well. Isn't that right, Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. That's right, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. I'm very concerned about the proposal in
the fiscal year 2013 budget of where this will bring our
production rate. I think that's something that we have to look
at very carefully in this committee.
I have to ask you an important question. Would you be
proposing this production rate but for us handing you a number
in the Budget Control Act?
Admiral Greenert. This was a budgetary process. It was all
about not having enough money in 2014, our toughest year.
Senator Ayotte. It was about just the number we handed you
and nothing to do in terms of what we would need for capacity
to protect, to have a full, robust force where we would want to
be as we look forward; isn't that right?
Admiral Greenert. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. That's a real concern to me, because we
can't drive our national security interests, particularly on
something so important as our attack submarine fleet, and also
the overall size of our fleet, by just being handed a number by
Congress.
Are we taking on additional risk by doing this?
Admiral Greenert. There is risk. As you mentioned, capacity
is the primary. These are very capable submarines. It's the SSN
capacity around the world.
Senator Ayotte. I think that's something that this
committee has to look at and address as we look at the
authorization and further consider the proposal for fiscal year
2013.
I wanted to ask all of you gentlemen, in particular General
Amos. Last year the Navy announced the plans to place 6 of the
16 ships from the 3-squadron Maritime Prepositioned Forces for
the Marine Corps into reduced operating status. This proposal
was made at a time before the Arab Spring, before we've seen
some of the unrest in the Middle East that has come forward.
I was concerned about that reduced operating status at the
time. In fact, General Panter came before the committee and
said that it required additional analysis before we went on
reduced operating status.
But let's push forward to where we are today. We have three
prepositioned forces. As I understand the fiscal year 2013
proposal, we're going to go from three to two. In the area that
we're going to take out one of the prepositioned forces is in
the Mediterranean. Just so people understand what areas that
allows us for faster response time because we have the
prepositioned forces ready to go there in terms of the
equipment needed if we have to respond, that's the area of
Syria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, and the entire
west coast of Africa. There's nothing happening in that area of
the world at all that we might want to keep a focus on at the
moment?
My question first to General Amos would be was it the
Marine Corps' proposal to eliminate one of these prepositioned
squadrons?
General Amos. Senator, discussion came about the time I
became the Commandant, so just about 18 months ago, as we were
looking. This was before the Budget Control Act and where we
are today, so I want to put it in context. But I looked at this
thing, having looked at Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons
(MPSRON) for many, many years, and said, okay, what do we
really need as a Nation?
My instinct at that time was probably two squadrons. So
then the discussion began 18 months ago, do we need three or do
we need two? But how do we do this thing? I'm a believer that
two is sufficient, Senator. I think we make adjustments on some
of the areas that you just talked about and we're going to end
up having to be more flexible, there's no question about it.
But my concern with the MPSRONs going to two was that once
we made that decision, let's build them correctly, let's make
sure that the two MPSRSONs themselves are what I would call
enhanced. In other words, they have some of the newer ships
that are available, with greater capabilities, and they have
the ability to offload, use these things, and not only for
training but also for contingencies.
That's where I am. I'm very comfortable with two. I was
briefed last night that it hasn't come to the Secretary of the
Navy for his final decision yet, but among the two Services
they've worked the details out where they have a pretty good
plan with 13 ships out of the two. So that's where I know it as
of today, Senator. I'm comfortable with two; I just want to
make sure that they are the right makeup.
Senator Ayotte. In last year's defense authorization I
included asking for a certification for the readiness posture
of reducing the status of one of the forces from yourself,
Commandant, as well as obviously from the CNO and the Secretary
of the Navy, and then to have the Secretary of Defense make a
certification to Congress that he felt that acceptable
readiness posture would still be available.
I'm going to ask that the same type of certification be
done if we're going to reduce this, because we're not only
going from a reduction, but an elimination. We need to
understand what additional risk we're taking on with that and
whether in all of your esteemed opinions that this is
sufficient in terms of our readiness in a critical area of the
world.
Mr. Mabus. Senator, we are treating the requirement that is
in the current NDAA about reduced operating status to also
apply to the removal of one squadron, and that was the report
that General Amos referenced that the certifications will be
coming.
Senator Ayotte. Very good. I appreciate that.
My time is up. I can't leave, though, without saying that
I'm deeply troubled, Admiral, when you tell me that if we
allow, this Congress, sequestration to go forward that our
fleet could be in a position where it would go from 285
capacity to 235, when we know just last year the CNO, your
predecessor, had told us that the ideal capacity for our fleet
to meet all of our needs is actually 313.
So I hope that we will act immediately on a bipartisan
basis in Congress to stop the sequestration, because when you
think about our fleet going down to 235 that is an unacceptable
risk to our country and our allies. I thank you for your
testimony today and I hope we work immediately so that this is
not hanging over the head of DOD for you to have to worry about
and for our military men and women to know that we are behind
them and we're not going to allow this to happen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. Thank you for being so
patient. I think I'm the last man standing, or the second to
the last man standing, so I'll try to walk through a couple
issues.
Let me say I want to talk a little bit about the Arctic, as
you can imagine. But first I want to comment on the very early
stages of this discussion about your research and your
development with regards to energy. I will tell you I'm going
to be a huge supporter of your efforts of DOD. I may have some
questions about some of the efforts that you're doing, but if
we go back to the 60s in Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, a lot of people forget that they decided to do some
simple things. They just wanted to communicate between some of
the different facilities and, lo and behold, today we have the
Internet.
Now, you took an initiative. You actually hired someone out
of the private sector because you thought it was such an
important thing. The military has been the lead in many areas
that have advanced this economy in many ways. I use that as an
example, the 1960s, when the military saw the high value of
communication and connectivity, and most people didn't even
know what the heck we were talking about, but DOD spent money,
probably a lot of money in those early days, which was probably
criticized. I'm sure there was some criticism back then. But
today what would we do without it?
So I think what you're doing in alternative and renewable
energy, even though I will have some questions on some of the
expenditures and taking the lead in some of these areas, it is
critical for our long-term national and economic security.
I was just in Afghanistan, General, and I saw, I think it
was at Boldak and a forward operating base, the power of the
solar panels and the change that has occurred through on-the-
ground testing. As the marines tell me all the time: We don't
want to carry a lot of junk; we want to carry what we need to
do our job. When you can knock a lot of pounds off the weight
and transfer it off the backs of the marines and then they can
do their job because they have better energy sources, like
solar panels and the utilization of the battery systems, that's
powerful. That gives us tactical advantage, at least from my
perspective.
So I want you to know, from a person from a State that
produces a lot of oil and gas, we like what you're doing around
renewable and alternative energy and research to help this
country be more economically secure from a national security
perspective. I hear this debate out there because people wonder
why you're in the business. Well, because you're in the
business of saving lives. Part of the work you do in the
military is try to look at risk analysis, and you have high
risk when you move those convoys of diesel. If you can reduce
the risk you save lives, and that's how I look at it.
That's not necessarily a comment. I just get very
frustrated when I start hearing the noise out there on what's
going on.
So again, I'll pause and just say thank you for the work
you're doing on the ground. I was impressed by the technology.
The marines were excited at what they were producing and how
they could do things that they couldn't do before in 2- and 3-
day increments with energy sources with self-sufficiency.
So let me pause there. But let me get to the larger
question if I can: The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), do you support it?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, strongly.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Begich. Thank you.
Let me also say, we had General Jacoby here of U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM). He was talking about the
importance and the evolution of Arctic, and one of the
agreements they're working on--I think he was doing it that
day, as a matter of fact--between NORTHCOM and the Coast Guard
is a gap analysis process of what we may need. Today you
probably saw, or maybe not, because you've been stuck here, the
Snow Dragon, which is an icebreaker from China.
They're moving up to the Arctic. They're not messing
around. They see that as an opportunity economically and
militarily.
Can you give me your thoughts, Mr. Secretary and then
Admiral, how you view the Arctic? Are we prepared? I know you
did a study on the Arctic roadmap, which was released by the
Navy through your Task Force Climate Change. Are we prepared?
If not, what do we need to do?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, you accurately pointed out we've
released the Arctic roadmap in 2009, and we are following that
roadmap. Both the CNO and I have recently been to Canada to
talk to our Canadian allies about what they are doing in the
Arctic, what we are doing in the Arctic, and how we can better
coordinate.
The question you asked immediately before that. One of the
things that would help us the most is by approving the UNCLOS.
It would help us in terms of the rights of freedom of
navigation. It would also help us as a Nation establish our
claims in the outer continental shelf and the Arctic. As you
are far better aware than I am, we have different nations
competing for the same resources in an Arctic that is going to
be increasingly ice-free in the summer, so that you can not
only have navigation through there, and you're already
beginning to see that, but also extraction of seabed resources.
I think the first thing we could do is become a signatory
to the UNCLOS conference. Second, we are actively doing things
like Ice Exercise (ICEX), where I went last year. We operate
with the Canadians in their Operation Nanook. But I think that
our plan is to become more capable in the Arctic as the Arctic
becomes more accessible over time.
Senator Begich. Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. I back everything the Secretary just
said. I'm completely in line with that. I would add that as we
organize, train, and equip, operations in the Arctic have to be
a bullet, a factor, a principle, just like operating in the
Gulf, which unfortunately we didn't do right the first time, so
we had problems with warm water, sand, and grit.
Likewise, we need to continue to do the Nanook exercises
with the Canadians and the Norwegians, keep those deliberations
and collaboration going on, continue with ICEX, so we're
comfortable operating in that domain. That includes critical
infrastructure, making sure our command and control can be
supported in that area of the world. Just as we prepare our
Navy, the Arctic operations have to be a factor in that.
Senator Begich. One of the things I know and I'm hoping
for, and maybe we could get this at a later time from you,
maybe as you lay the Arctic roadmap out, tell us where you
think you are time-wise on resources and how you're doing,
because when I see the map, I love this map. I just want to
have more numbers up here, because I see China and what they're
doing. They're not messing around. They see us as incapable
because we don't have enough ice-capable vessels, so they're
taking advantage of that. We need to equalize our opportunities
up there.
I would like at some point, a determination of here's where
we are, here's where we think we're going, and here are some
gaps that we need to fill; if that's possible to do in a
written statement.
[The information referred to follows:]

Where we are:
The Navy has made significant progress and completed several major
action items in the Arctic Roadmap to include the Arctic Mission
Analysis, two Capabilities Based Assessments and the Fleet Arctic
Readiness Assessment. These documents provide the foundation and
justification for future efforts and identify the most likely Navy
missions and capability needs in the region. We have also made great
strides in strengthening existing and fostering new cooperative
relationships in the region. The principle international example of
this is the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable effort, which is designed
to promote regional understanding, dialogue and cooperation among
Arctic Security Forces, enhance multilateral Arctic security and safety
operations, and adapt to the changing environment and emerging
missions. It is co-sponsored by U.S. European Command and the Norwegian
Defense Staff, but much of the work behind the design and execution has
come from the efforts of Task Force Climate Change and the Arctic
Roadmap.
Where we are going:
To facilitate the way ahead on the Navy's plan for the Arctic, we
are co-sponsoring an Arctic Symposium at the Naval War College with the
U.S. Coast Guard. This symposium will examine maritime challenges in
the Arctic region and will develop a risk-based investment and policy
strategy that identifies and prioritizes near-term (within the next 5
years) Arctic capability needs. It will include a timeline for
addressing these capabilities and identify either an existing forum or
propose a new forum through which we can leverage federal investments
to avoid overlap and redundancies in addressing mid- and long-term
Arctic capability needs. The capability recommendations identified in
the Symposium will be incorporated into the budget process, enabling
the final phase of the Arctic Roadmap that includes execution of Navy
budget initiatives to address Arctic requirements.
Gaps that we need to fill or potentially fill:
As identified in the Department of Defense Arctic Report to
Congress in May 2011 and supported by the Navy's Capabilities Based
Assessments, there are three capability gaps that have the potential to
hamper Arctic operations over the next three decades. The first gap is
in Arctic communications, and the second is in navigation, to include
accurate charting of the sea floor, sea ice and weather observation and
forecasting capabilities. The final gap is in the ability to obtain and
sustain awareness across all domains in the Arctic region.
Specifically, there is a significant gap in the area of maritime domain
awareness, which was identified as a key area for improvement in the
U.S. Arctic Policy (NSPD-66/HSPD-25).

Senator Begich. My time is up, but one other piece I'd say
is we should have further discussion on the need for a U.S.-
controlled deepwater port in the Arctic. We can have further
discussion. Not only for military activity, but all the other
activity that's going on up there, we are just at a lack of
facility up there.
But again, thank you all very much. I didn't mean to get
into my rant there about alternative and renewable energy, but
just a last data point: Alaska by 2025 will be run on 50
percent renewable energy. We understand the value of it, so I'm
glad you guys do, too.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all three of you for your extraordinary and
distinguished service to our Nation, and particularly, General
Amos, thank you for your endurance and tolerance with us. I
know your back must be reaching a point of some pain anyway.
But I'm glad to see you here, as Senator Reed said, looking
like all of us would like to look with or without that kind of
surgery.
Let me begin by saying also how much I admire and respect
the success--and I underscore the word success--of our marines
and our soldiers in Afghanistan, where I have recently visited,
despite all of what we see and all of what's been emphasized at
the ground level, in targeting high-level leadership of the
Taliban, the insurgents, and the work done in terms of training
and transition. I think the work has been very, very
impressive, and I know you've testified already to that effect,
but I would just underscore it now.
I gather that improvised explosive devices (IED), the
roadside bombs, continue to be a problem there, and I wonder
whether you feel that we are making any progress in that area?
General Amos. Senator, they continue to be the low-grade,
low-expense, highly effective weapon of the enemy, especially
in the counterinsurgency environment. They're cheaply made. A
little bit of fertilizer and technical know-how, and you can
make something that becomes pretty catastrophic.
We have made progress. We have put a lot of money into
trying to find these things under the ground. Interestingly
enough, what we found to be the most successful has been often
the human eyeball, teaching observation skills to our marines,
who've kind of gone back to the way we have done business in
the past.
So we use some of those things. We use ancient things like
a bamboo pole that's about 12 or 15 feet with a small hook on
it, and you kind of drag the ground in front of you looking for
a command wire. It doesn't cost anything, but saves lives.
Dogs. We've tried everything from ground-penetrating radar to
mine rollers. Mine rollers continue to be very successful.
They're made in Panama City for the most part. We repair those.
They find the pressure-plated mines on the roads that our
vehicles go on.
The ones that get us the most are those ones that are off
the road, on canal sides, along footpaths and off areas, where
marines might patrol. Sir, we are mindful; we teach people how
to look for IEDs and there's a series of ways we grow that
experience. But nothing replaces the human eyeball.
It's still a high threat and you still see our great young
heroes up at the new Walter Reed without their legs today
because of IEDs.
Senator Blumenthal. The Pakistanis have been of very little
or insignificant help in interdicting the ammonium calcium
nitrate fertilizer that flows across the border?
General Amos. Sir, what I've read is that's absolutely
correct. Fertilizer comes in. Of course, it's a big
agricultural area where we are, Helmand. It's kind of the
breadbasket of Afghanistan. So you need fertilizer. We don't
need it to make IEDs.
Senator Blumenthal. I want to ask a quick question about a
program that you and I have discussed before, the transition
assistance program that you have very, very commendably in my
view emphasized for our marines, and hopefully will be expanded
for our soldiers as well. Is that transition assistance skill
training, counseling, expanding, and enhancing in the way that
you have planned to do?
General Amos. Senator, it's in its debut stages. We did our
first two beta tests in the middle of January, and we're
unveiling it both on the east coast and the west coast. We're
unveiling it now to the rest of the Marine Corps over this
spring and the beginning of the summer. In a nutshell, for all
the members, that's taking the old transition program that I
went through as Captain Amos years ago, which hadn't changed
any, to completely new, let's get our veterans hired, how do we
take that young marine that joined the Service and make him a
marine for life, such that when he or she finishes their tour
in 4 years, 8 years, they come out the other side and they have
the greatest opportunity and chance to get a job, to go to
school, to learn a trade, or to start a business.
Those are the four main pathways that we have set for our
marines. It is a significant effort and we probably won't see
the real benefits of this for another couple of years. I'm
willing to wait, but we're on it right now, Senator. I'm very
optimistic.
Senator Blumenthal. That's very exciting and very
promising. Thank you and the Marine Corps for that great work.
Secretary Mabus, in light of the Navy's need for strategic
dispersal of undersea warfare assets and the commitment to keep
40 percent of the attack submarines on the east coast, please
give us your assessment of the capacity and military value of
the submarine base at New London.
Mr. Mabus. The submarine base at New London is one of the
key components of the strategy in terms of what you pointed
out, the fact that we will be keeping attack submarines in a
40-60 split, Atlantic-Pacific; what Admiral Greenert testified
to a little bit earlier, that it's not just the Pacific where
the capacity and the capability of these incredible warships
are needed.
I also want to thank the State of Connecticut. They have
invested about $40 million into the sub base there to upgrade
some facilities so that we can maintain that base at the high
rate of operational readiness that it is, and that's very much
appreciated and it's been very helpful.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for those comments. I will
say on behalf of the State of Connecticut, we've been proud to
support that sub base because it performs such an important
mission.
Would you agree also that with the increasing trend toward
unmanned underwater vehicles and countermine warfare, the
strategic importance of that base is only increasing?
Mr. Mabus. I will agree with that, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time is up, but again I want to thank all of you for
your service and for your very helpful testimony today. Thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you
and I probably are the only people here who would remember
this, but I just have to say, listening to Senator Begich's
questions about wanting a deepwater port in Alaska brought back
fond memories of Senator Stevens, when I was Secretary of the
Navy many years ago, under the strategic dispersal concept at
that time he was pushing very hard for home ports in Alaska. Of
course, at that time we had 568 ships in the Navy.
But also, Admiral, I take your comment about learning how
to operate in the Persian Gulf, that really brought back a
strong memory to me from when I was Secretary of the Navy. We
had just started, actually, operating full-time in there. I
remember visiting the USS Stanley in the Persian Gulf back in
1987. The first thing I would do when I would go aboard a ship,
it came from my youngster cruise at the Naval Academy when I
worked in the engineering spaces with the snipes, was always to
go down in the engineering spaces and ask them the last time
their commanding officer had visited the engineering spaces.
The railings on the ladder going down in the engineering spaces
were so hot you couldn't hold onto them. So we've come a long
way since then.
I remained almost to the end of this hearing because I was
quite surprised, Secretary Mabus, to hear the response with
respect to the questions from Chairman Levin and Senator McCain
regarding this independent study for the layout on Okinawa and
Guam that we had mandated. Perhaps this is just a
miscoordination, because I know it's not under the jurisdiction
of the Navy, but I hope what you said is not right.
We mandated by law that there be an independent study and
that they would report to the Secretary of Defense 90 days
after the signing of the NDAA, which was December 31, which
means that this independent study not only is supposed to have
been contracted, but it's supposed to give its first report to
the Secretary of Defense in about 2 weeks. Then the Secretary
of Defense has up to 90 days after that to report to us.
This is not a small thing. We're not in any way up here
attempting to kill this program. We're trying to unstick it.
Administrations have been working on this issue for a little
more than 15 years. I have had dozens of Japanese delegations
visit my office just over the last year, including another one
coming in this afternoon.
I have been saying to them over the last 3 months that
there is an independent review that's going to take place in
tandem with the reviews that are going on. I'm visiting Japan
on April 1. I had assumed that there would be some sort of
preliminary report in from the study. Then we're hearing that
apparently there hasn't even been a contract let. I hope we can
clarify this.
Admiral, maybe you can clarify this for me, that the Navy
has halted potentially about $3 billion worth of construction
projects on Guam as we attempt to sort all this out. Is that
correct?
Admiral Greenert. I don't know that that number is correct.
I'll have to go back and do the research on that. There are
some on hold, but the specifics and what they're based on, I
better check it out before I give you an answer.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Navy has not terminated any of its previously awarded military
construction projects on Guam related to the U.S. Marine Corps
relocation. Approximately $474 million in construction is underway at
Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Base Guam and on civilian roadways
(funded through the Defense Access Roads program). However, the
Department of the Navy has deferred award of approximately $687 million
in projects appropriated by the United States and the Government of
Japan, pending the completion of new environmental studies and master
planning related to the reduced Marine Corps laydown on Guam. That
figure consists of: $580 million for five construction projects funded
by the Government of Japan, $74 million for roadway improvements in
northern Guam, and $33 million for a cultural repository, mental health
facilities and school vehicles and supplies.

Senator Webb. We are in a freeze, and it's being
misunderstood on Guam. The situation on Okinawa is one of
probably the top two most volatile domestic political issues in
Japan. We need to get this going. I know there are continuing
talks. We follow them every day in my office.
This is a part of it. It's designed to get an independent
set of eyes on this because there are so many turf battles over
in DOD, quite frankly.
Admiral Greenert. There are harbor projects, regardless of
how many marines are on Guam, that are proceeding.
Senator Webb. I know that. I came back from Guam a little
more than 2 years ago and did everything I could to get the
White House to put money into that from the Tiger funds. We
follow this very closely.
But at the same time, you know and, General Amos, I know
you know--you and I have had many talks about this--that one of
the big questions on Guam was just exactly what the Marine
Corps laydown would look like. I had my own questions about
this when I first revisited Guam a couple of years ago because
they were doing a laydown that included dependent personnel,
family personnel, which was driving up infrastructure and the
numbers, from 8,000 to potentially more than 20,000 people.
So we know that this needs to be redone. But I can't
emphasize strongly enough how important it is that, first of
all, the law be obeyed here and, second of all, that we reach
an end point on this for the good of our strategic posture in
that part of the world and also for our relations with the
Japanese and the people of Guam.
No further response is required, but I just wanted to
reemphasize what Chairman Levin and Senator McCain were saying.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Mabus, General Amos, and Admiral
Greenert, for being here this morning. Hopefully I am the last
person that you have to hear from. I figure on this committee
we always save the best for last.
I actually want to begin where some of my colleagues left
off, particularly Senator Begich, and that is on the issue of
energy. I want to thank you very specifically, Secretary Mabus,
for coming to testify on Monday. The Water and Power
Subcommittee of the Energy Committee in the Senate, which I
chair, held a field hearing down at Norfolk on the USS
Kearsarge. I want to compliment the great staff work in finding
a ship that was named after a mountain in New Hampshire for us
to hold the hearing on. It was a nice benefit to the hearing.
But it was an excellent hearing and it's one that I wish
everybody on this committee could have gone to, to see very
directly the difference that moving towards alternatives and
energy efficiency is making for the efficiency and the capacity
of our fighting men and women out in the field to do their
jobs. Secretary Mabus, you made the point that national
security in today's day and age is really about energy
security, and if we don't have to be defending the Straits of
Hormuz and deploying men and women around the world to defend
foreign oil that comes to us, then we are in a much better
position to defend the country.
I was also impressed at some of the statistics that you
mentioned in your testimony and that we heard at the hearing.
The Federal Government is the biggest energy user within
America. DOD is the biggest energy user within the Federal
Government; 93 percent of all energy used is used by DOD. As
you so rightly point out, so much of that is fuel to power our
vehicles.
I know that there was an exchange earlier around the cost
of biofuels. I wonder if you could speak to the memorandum of
understanding that you have with the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Energy to try and move forward to develop
a biofuel that is drop-in, that will allow us to be more
efficient and reduce the dependence on oil?
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. It was good to see you on
the USS Kearsarge.
The memorandum of understanding that Energy, Agriculture,
and Navy signed and that the President announced last August
was in response to the direction of the Commander in Chief to
our three departments to come up with a geographically
dispersed, commercially viable, competitively priced biofuel
industry for the country. Navy's contribution to that would
come from the Defense Production Act, which, as I pointed out a
little bit earlier, explicitly mentions energy as one of the
things that the Defense Production Act could be used for.
I think it's important that the requirement is drop-in
fuel. We're not going to change the engines on our ships or our
aircraft. We have to have a fuel that will operate on the fleet
we have today, with the aircraft we have today.
Second, that this be a geographically dispersed effort; and
third, that it help this industry reach commercial viability.
We have seen the cost of biofuels come down dramatically just
in the small amounts that we have been buying so far. We bought
biofuels to test and certify our aircraft on, including the
Green Hornet; and the Blue Angels have flown on biofuels. We
made, as I pointed out at the hearing, the largest purchase, we
believe, in American history, 450,000 gallons for use in the
Rim of the Pacific exercise this summer.
The cost has been cut in half in the last 2 years just in
those test amounts. We are convinced that as the military
brings a market here that the cost of biofuels will be
competitive with existing fossil fuels.
Finally, one of the things that we got to talk about at the
hearing is that this really is one of the core competencies of
the U.S. Navy. We moved from sail to coal in the 1850s, from
coal to oil in the early part of the 1900s, and we pioneered
nuclear in the 1950s. Every single time there were concerns
about was the Navy trading one form of very certain energy for
another that was uncertain or more costly. Every single time,
the change has proven to be correct.
So I appreciate your help, the opportunity to testify on
the USS Kearsarge, which represents both the Navy and the
Marine Corps in their efforts, but also the opportunity to talk
about how we are planning to use these biofuels and the way
that we believe the costs will come down.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Amos, we also saw a very impressive demonstration
of some of the equipment that the marines are using out in the
field in Afghanistan. I asked one of your Marine Corps
colonels, Colonel Shurett, who was there, what had been the
reaction to the marines out in the field when they were
introduced to things like solar blankets and some of the
smaller weight batteries and the generators that are now going
into Humvees. He said, ``Well, the first reaction wasn't so
positive, but once they realized it could help them complete
their mission easier and more effectively they're sold.''
So I wonder if you could comment on that?
General Amos. Senator, I'd be happy to. I'll tell you,
marines are slow to change. We have 236 years of history
unhindered by change and progress. But once we do, we get on it
with reckless abandon.
Here's a case in point. Those marines--I remember in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, after we crossed the border into Iraq,
one of the things we worried about and struggled with were
batteries. I mean, honest to goodness, I would sit at briefs
with three- and four-star generals and we'd be talking about
batteries. By the way, you couldn't get them, and then once you
got them you had to carry them.
Here's a case in point where those solar panels, the
ability to recharge your radio batteries while you're humping
along a ridgeline in the Helmand Province, that's what sold it
for the marines.
The other thing I'll tell you is that all of a sudden it
went from being 120 degrees outside and in their shelters and
now, just with a little bit of ingenuity and some of the energy
initiatives, you can actually walk inside these things and it
may be 87 degrees, you might as well be at the North Pole.
That's what these kids feel like.
They really have gotten into it, and it's exciting. From my
perspective, we're just on the cusp of it. I think there's so
much more we can do when we're dedicated to doing it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
My time is up, but as a final comment, you'll not be
surprised to hear that I am also concerned about our four
public shipyards and the fact that this year's military
construction budget does not, again, contain much-needed
dollars for the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. We have a request
for modernization report that we, Senators Collins, Ayotte, and
I, included in the NDAA last year, and it's due back by
September 1. I hope that that will be on time, and we will see
what your commitment is to supporting our public shipyards.
Mr. Mabus. It will be on time.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Do either of my colleagues have additional questions?
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to ask one last question to really follow on
Senator Ayotte's questions about the submarine force and about
the possibility of going back to the two subs a year program
for 2014, which I strongly support. I know we've talked about
it a little bit.
I believe that going back to that program would be cost
effective in the long run. I would just like, if you would,
Admiral Greenert, to comment on the possibility of alternative
plans and the possibilities for transitioning to that kind of
2014 two-sub option?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, Senator. Right now, of course,
the submarine is in fiscal year 2018. We are requesting a block
buy starting in fiscal year 2014 through 2018. We would request
a multi-procurement authority. That gives us the opportunity to
make what we call an economic order quantity buy, so you can
buy the reactor vessels, turbines, the shafts, and all that at
a much better price. The vendors are more efficient, the
workload and the learning curve is more efficient. Everything
is more efficient. We have experience in this, and that's
partly the reason why these submarines are coming in under
budget and on time.
What we're looking for is an opportunity, using fiscal
processes, to be able to, if necessary, incrementally fund this
such that the savings we know we will accrue in the later years
can be rolled forward and therefore applied to a second
submarine in fiscal year 2014. Right now our budget request has
one submarine. So we'd like to pursue that, and we appreciate
your willingness to help us with that.
Senator Blumenthal. I am eager to help you, and I thank you
for that excellent answer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Let me just close by commenting further on this energy
issue, which I made reference to in my opening statement,
commending you, Secretary Mabus, for the initiatives that
you've shown in the Navy. By the way, the Army was here at its
posture hearing not too many days ago with batteries, pointing
out how much lighter the batteries are that they're now going
to use with the troops and what a difference that makes in
terms of weight and security for our people, as well as energy
independence for the Nation.
So you're going to find a lot of support for the energy
initiatives that you've taken on this committee. There may be
opposition to it from some and questions probably from all of
us. But basically I believe most of us will support, at least I
hope most of us will support, the initiatives that you've taken
and that the Army is now taking as well.
We've seen this before. We've gone through this whole
business before when we've tried to take some action on energy
alternatives. What we saw is the argument made: well, heck,
they cost more in the short run. Well, of course they do, and
that's why we can't just rely on the private sector to produce
them, because the private sector has a different goal than our
military does and our government does. Their goal,
legitimately, is profit. Our goal is the Nation's security.
Those are not always the same. Short-term profit is not always
the same as planning for our Nation's security.
What you have done here is taken some initiatives which are
the right way to go. They fill in a vacuum that exists in the
private sector. They fill a vital need. We cannot rely on the
marketplace to take these initiatives because there's a short-
term loss. They're not as competitive in the short term. That's
why you have to have these test samples run and a number of
other short-term production activities.
I just want to add my voice at the end of the hearing, as I
did at the beginning of the hearing, in support for these
creative initiatives which are directly aimed at enhancing the
security of our country.
If there are no further questions, we will adjourn again,
with thanks to all of you, and good wishes for your continuing
strong recovery, General Amos.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK

1. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus, electronic attack is a
powerful capability that has proven its worth on the battlefields of
Afghanistan and in the airspace above Libya. The Marine Corps is
scheduled to begin decommissioning the aging EA-6B fleet in 2016.
According to fiscal year 2013 budget justification documents, the
procurement plan for the EA-18G, along with the F/A-18E/F, provide ``a
solid transition to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).'' However, reports
indicate that the Navy may no longer be planning to use the JSF as an
airborne electronic attack (AEA) platform. What capability gap for AEA
will result from the decommissioning of the EA-6B?
Secretary Mabus. There will be no gap resulting from the
decommissioning of the EA-6B. The Navy is replacing their EA-6Bs with
EA-18G aircraft. Currently all three Active component Navy
expeditionary squadrons and 3 of the 10 carrier air wing squadrons have
completed transition to the EA-18G. Navy EA-18G squadrons have
completed two expeditionary deployments including combat operations in
support of Libya Operation New Dawn (OND), one carrier deployment and
one squadron is forward deployed in Japan as part of the USS George
Washington (CVN-73) Carrier Strike Group.
The Navy will complete its divestiture of the EA-6B by 2015. The
Marine Corps will continue to fly the EA-6Bs through 2019. As the
Marine Corps EA-6B fleet draws down, the Marine Corps will transition
to a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Electronic Warfare (EW)
`system of systems' approach. This approach will provide the MAGTF
commander with more capability and more capacity in EW by providing
systems that are organic to the MAGTF which will reduce dependency on
low-density/high-demand platforms such as the EA-6B. Podded EW systems
that are platform agnostic, networked together and coordinated at a
tactical level will be more integrated and more responsive than current
Marine Corps EW solutions. Systems like Intrepid Tiger II and software
defined jamming payloads will provide the warfighter with a more
flexible and more responsive EW capability that is designed to be
interoperable with the joint force.

2. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what
affect will changes to the JSF program have on the Navy's AEA
capability?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Changes to the JSF fleet have
no impact on the Navy's AEA capability. The Navy is transitioning its
entire EA-6B fleet of aircraft to the EA-18G and will be completely
divested of the EA-6B by end of fiscal year 2015.

3. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, please
describe the importance of controlling the electro-magnetic spectrum
for your ability to conduct operations?
Admiral Greenert. In the next 2 decades, we believe the
electromagnetic environment will become an essential and primary
warfighting domain. Programmatically, organizationally and conceptually
(our CONOPS) we are making investments to fully ``operationalize'' this
important area of warfighting. By 2025, the Navy will manage sensors,
attacks, defense and communications, treating EW and Cyber environments
as maneuver spaces on par with surface, undersea and air. We see EW,
cyber, and spectrum management operations, to include AEA, as essential
elements of controlling the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for global
maritime operations and addressing the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
strategies of potential adversaries. An example of this is the recent
significant contribution of EA-18G aircraft conducting EW in support of
U.S. and NATO forces during the conflict in Libya.
The Navy continues to sharpen its focus on the ability to fight and
win in the EMS. As described in my Sailing Directions, Navy will
``operationalize'' cyberspace with capabilities that span the EMS--
providing superior awareness and control when and where we need it. It
is a key area of emphasis for our future force development. We have
made significant commitments in this area that include standing up the
Information Dominance Community--a workforce focused on this important
area--as well as recapitalizing our assets that enable us to exploit
the EMS for sensing and communication, while denying our adversaries
accurate or effective information. From EA-18G ``Growler'' with planned
Next Generation Jammer, to shipboard EW modernization with Shipboard EW
Improvement Program and Ship Signal Exploitation Equipment, our Navy is
committed to conducting sophisticated AEA as well as effectively
operating in and controlling the EMS today and far into the future.
General Amos. Controlling the EMS is equally as important as
controlling the air, land, and sea domains in which we fight. However,
we do not need to control this entire spectrum, all of the time. In
order to operate decisively in a modern electromagnetic environment and
meet mission objectives, it is essential that we achieve Spectrum
Control at the time and place of our choosing.
The EMS is an increasingly congested and contested arena. Our
success in any operation from disaster response to irregular warfare
and major combat operations will be linked to our ability to
communicate, pass data, collect signals intelligence, control unmanned
vehicles, guide our advanced weapons and utilize global positioning
systems. Our adversaries, as well as users of commercial technology and
the world's growing demand for the spectrum, will challenge the
fundamentals of our operations. Thus, operational success will become
increasingly dependent upon our ability to achieve control and affect
maneuver within the EMS.

4. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert and General Amos,
operationally, how will the decommissioning of the EA-6B affect the
Navy's and the Marine Corps' ability to supply AEA platforms to support
the warfighter?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy is transitioning its fleet of EA-6B to
the EA-18G and will be completely divested of the EA-6B by the end of
fiscal year 2015. By 2016, all 10 carrier air wings will have EA-18G
squadrons attached to them. Currently all three Navy Active component
EA-6B expeditionary squadrons have completed transition to the EA-18G
and the Reserve component squadron will complete its transition in
2016.
General Amos. Over the coming years as the EA-6B fleet draws down,
the Marine Corps will transition to an EW `system-of-systems' approach
in support of our MAGTF. In time, this approach will provide the
commander with more capability and capacity to conduct EW by providing
systems that are organic to the MAGTF. This will reduce our dependency
on low-density/high-demand platforms. Podded EW systems that are
platform neutral, networked together and coordinated at a tactical
level will be more integrated and more responsive than current EW
solutions. The capabilities being designed into the F-35B, integrated
with systems like Intrepid Tiger II and software-defined jamming
payloads, will provide the warfighter with a more flexible and more
responsive EW capability that is designed to be interoperable with the
Joint Force.

5. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, will the Navy be able to
meet the AEA requirements of the combatant commanders?
Admiral Greenert. Yes. The Navy will continue to meet AEA
requirements of combatant commanders. In PB 2011, Navy procured
additional EA-18Gs to recapitalize Navy expeditionary squadrons. Navy
has sustained operations and maintenance for Navy expeditionary AEA as
well as carrier-based AEA missions. The EA-18G is replacing the EA-6B
squadron-by-squadron and preventing a potential capacity shortfall in
this mission area during the transition. Coupled with the Next
Generation Jammer (NGJ), the EA-18G will provide full spectrum
electronic attack against high-end threat systems and increased
capability in Electronic Support and Communications.

6. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus, the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) contains no funding for EA-18G procurement after fiscal
year 2013. Does the current EA-18G procurement plan account for changes
to the JSF program and the effect those changes will have on the Navy's
AEA capability?
Secretary Mabus. The U.S. Navy's EA-18G procurement program is a
self contained electronic attack capability and is independent of the
F-35 program. The EA-18G program fully recapitalizes the U.S. Navy's
EA-6B electronic attack capability independent of JSF program changes.
The Navy will complete procurement of the program of record (114 EA-
18Gs) with the last 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2013. To date, all three
U.S. Navy Active component expeditionary squadrons and three carrier
based squadrons have completed transition from the EA-6B to the EA-18G.
The remaining seven carrier based and one Reserve squadron will
complete transition by 2016.

KANSAS CITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTER

7. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus and General Amos, the Marine
Corps Enterprise Information Technology Services (MCEITS) program is
currently located at the Kansas City Information Technology Center
(KCITC). I understand that the Marine Corps has committed to staying at
the KCITC through at least 2017 and is currently conducting a business
case analysis (BCA) to help determine a final location for the MCEITS
program. I have expressed to the Marine Corps on multiple occasions the
clear advantages of keeping the MCEITS program in Kansas City due to,
among other things, the duplicative costs to the U.S. taxpayers
associated with moving the program's personnel and equipment. I am
confident that, if done correctly, the Marine Corps BCA will
demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of maintaining operations in Kansas
City. Will the BCA consider only the costs to the Marine Corps, or will
the analysis provide a thorough review by taking into account all
Federal funds associated with each scenario?
Secretary Mabus. The Marine Corps is conducting a BCA comparing the
costs and relative benefits/challenges associated with establishing a
consolidated IT Center to house MCEITS and similar functions in one of
three potential locations after 2017. Factors that will be considered
include costs (initial purchase or construction cost of facility, costs
to upgrade existing facilities, long-term maintenance costs, and long-
term operating costs), ability to attract and maintain a qualified
workforce, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection concerns, relocation costs
and potential encroachment risks.
The possible locations were selected as a result of a Regional,
Site and Facility Evaluation Study completed by the Marine Corps in
October 2010. This study focused on the physical requirements for the
proposed IT Center; the additional studies being performed include a
secondary economic analysis that will focus on life-cycle costs over a
30-year period for each of the alternatives, and a BCA. The BCA, which
will follow the Department of the Navy Enterprise IT Business Case
Analysis Template (version 1.1, dated 15 July 2011), will identify the
specific functions to be included in the IT Center, overall economic
viability, ability of each alternative to satisfy the requirements for
an Integrated IT Center, comparison of Mission and Operational Impacts,
and a comparison of any risks associated with each alternative.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is conducting a BCA comparing the
costs and relative benefits/challenges associated with establishing a
consolidated IT Center to house MCEITS and similar functions in one of
three potential locations after 2017. Factors that will be considered
include: costs (initial purchase or construction cost of facility,
costs to upgrade existing facilities, long-term maintenance costs,
long-term operating costs), ability to attract and maintain a qualified
workforce, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection concerns, relocation costs
and potential encroachment or future Base Realignment and Closure
risks.
The possible locations were selected as a result of a Regional,
Site and Facility Evaluation Study completed by the Marine Corps in
October 2010. This study focused on the physical requirements for the
proposed IT Center; the additional studies being performed include a
secondary economic analysis that will focus on life-cycle costs over a
30-year period for each of the alternatives, and a BCA. The BCA, which
will follow the Department of the Navy Enterprise IT Business Case
Analysis Template (version 1.1, dated 15 July 2011), will identify the
specific functions to be included in the IT Center, overall economic
viability, ability of each alternative to satisfy the requirements for
an Integrated IT Center, comparison of Mission and Operational Impacts,
and a comparison of any risks associated with each alternative.

8. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus and General Amos, in August
2011, the assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations,
and Environment stated that the analysis was expected to be complete in
spring 2012. However, on March 1, 2012, the Marine Corps informed me
that the analysis will be complete in the fourth quarter of 2012. What
accounts for the delay in the expected completion of the BCA?
Secretary Mabus and General Amos. Completion of the BCA for the
consolidated IT Center involves a number of steps, including a study of
existing and proposed business relationships between computer platform
managers, like the MCEITS program, and data users; and revalidation of
requirements (personnel and square footage) anticipated post-2017, when
the occupancy agreement at the Bannister Complex in Kansas City
expires. Finalizing the scope of work for the BCA has required
additional time, particularly as more organizations become interested
in migrating to MCEITS. Our current projection is that the BCA will be
complete by the end of August 2012 and certainly in time to support our
decision schedule for a permanent location after 2017.
In the interim, the Marine Corps has informed GSA of our intent to
renew the occupancy agreement on 256,000 square feet of space at
Building 2306 in the Bannister Complex in Kansas City through 2017.

F-35 PROGRAM

9. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus, for the third year in a row,
the Department of Defense (DOD) has been forced to delay plans for full
production of the F-35. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has
stated that the delay is not a budget issue, but rather a fundamental
problem with the F-35 program. Frank Kendall, Acting Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has stated,
``putting the F-35 into production years before the first test flight
was acquisition malpractice.''
While much attention has been given to the problems plaguing the
Marine Corps F-35B variant, the F-35A and F-35C both suffer from
significant design issues. For example, the F-35C has encountered a
problem with its tailhook, a real and significant problem for an
aircraft designed to land on an aircraft carrier deck. Last year, the
Navy requested additional Super Hornets in order to mitigate delays in
the JSF procurement schedule. Fiscal year 2013 marks the third delay in
3 years for the JSF program, but, under current plans, the F/A-18
production line will end in fiscal year 2014, well before the F-35C is
projected to be combat ready. Ending a viable aircraft production line
before the JSF program will be able to meet full combat capability
inevitably assumes a level of risk to the Navy and to the military as a
whole. What are the risks to the Navy's tactical air (TACAIR) inventory
of continued delays to the F-35 program combined with the potential end
of the F/A-18 production line?
Secretary Mabus. The PB-13 Strike Fighter shortfall will remain
below a manageable 65 and is predicted to peak at 56 aircraft in 2025.
The forecasted inventory is based on, among other factors, the SLEP of
150 legacy Hornets and the F-35 production levels as layed in with PB-
13. Based on current conditions, The Department considers the shortfall
manageable with acceptable risk.

10. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus, can the Navy determine with
certainty that the current service life extension program (SLEP) for
the F/A-18 will meet program goals?
Secretary Mabus. Risk is inherent to extending the service life of
any aircraft. The service life assessment program (SLAP) has been
completed. Based on the results of SLAP, the Department believes at
least 150 of these aircraft can reach 10,000 flight hours. The F/A-18
A-D SLEP program is currently underway. We are continuing to design the
kits and installations that will be required to extend the service life
of these aircraft based on the assessment that was done during SLAP.
The technical risk of developing the required modification kits is
deemed low, however, changes in fleet usage and aircraft condition
could dramatically change the technical risk evaluation. The cost and
schedule risks are medium and known uncertainties at this phase of the
program remain, therefore we are unable to say with certainty that the
currently planned SLEP will meet program goals.

11. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus, if F-35 delays continue,
will the Navy allow the F/A-18 line to close?
Secretary Mabus. The Department remains committed to the F-35
program. The Department of the Navy does not currently plan to keep the
F/A-18 production line open beyond the final procurement of EA-18G
aircraft in fiscal year 2013 and F/A-18E/F in fiscal year 2014;
however, if further delays were discovered beyond the current F-35
program as presented in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
request, then depending on the character of the delays, the Department
would consider all options, including procuring additional F/A-18 Super
Hornets. Currently, the F/A-18 production line shut down begins with
the key long lead suppliers in June 2012. With regard to the EA-18G
unique parts, the final orders are being placed this summer to support
the final fiscal year 2013 procurement.

12. Senator McCaskill. General Amos, the Marine Corps F-35B variant
has had a particularly troubled history. Former Secretary of Defense
Gates placed the program on a 2-year probation, and while Secretary
Panetta has chosen to lift that probation after only 1 year, the
analysis for doing so remains in question. The Marine Corps has put the
future of its tactical fighter capability in a program that has shown
to be unreliable. In light of the many problems associated with the F-
35B, has the Marine Corps considered procuring a mix of F/A-18s and F-
35s in order to mitigate risks to the future fighter fleet?
General Amos. The Marine Corps has no plans to procure the Super
Hornet at this time. The F/A-18 E/F lacks a fifth generation capability
that our MAGTF require to conduct missions across the range of military
operations now and in future decades. With its expected service life
and necessary survivability upgrades, this platform does not meet our
vision for TACAIR recapitalization.

13. Senator McCaskill. General Amos, how often does the Marine
Corps reevaluate the decision to procure only F-35Bs?
General Amos. The Marine Corps' JSF Program of Record is a mixed
procurement of F-35B and F-35C aircraft. We review and revalidate our
procurement quantity and mix on an annual basis in concert with the
annual DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System
(PPBES) process. In addition, we periodically review our overall
operational requirements and force structure to ensure we can meet the
Nation's needs and our assigned missions in support of the geographic
combatant commanders.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

CVN-78 AND CVN-79 FORD-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER

14. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the cost to complete
construction of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) aircraft carrier has
overrun significantly. At this point, its cost is expected to grow over
the original estimate by at least $1 billion--bringing the cost to well
over $12 billion and exceeding the legislatively-provided cost cap by
as much as $600 million. What approaches that the Navy has not yet
taken will the Navy take in the future to ensure that the Ford-class
carriers' costs get under control?
Secretary Mabus. Few major programs carry greater importance or
greater impact on national security, and no other major program
comprises greater scale and complexity than the Navy's nuclear aircraft
carrier program. Accordingly, successful execution of this program
carries the highest priority within the Department of the Navy. The
attached letter sent to Senator McCain, dated March 26, 2012, includes
a detailed review and the steps we are taking to drive affordability
into the remaining CVN-78 construction effort.
[See attached letter as follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

15. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, will the Navy be asking for
legislative relief from this cost cap this year or next year, and, if
so, given how much costs are expected to increase, why should Congress
provide the Navy with that relief?
Secretary Mabus. Coincident with the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2014, the Navy will request an increase to the
congressional cost cap for the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-
78). Beginning in fiscal year 2014, the estimated costs to complete CVN
will exceed the congressional cost cap established by section 122 of
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2007, Public Law 109-
364, and later adjusted by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to
authority granted under section 122.
The Navy remains steadfast in its commitment to keeping aircraft
carrier construction costs on the sustainable path laid out by former
Secretary Gates in 2009, and with the shipbuilder, continues to work to
improve cost performance on CVN-78 and to improve manufacturing and
organizational performance for future aircraft carriers.

16. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, will the Navy be requesting an
above threshold reprogramming (ATR) request to cover cost growth for
completing the construction of CVN-78, and, if so, please describe the
source of funds for the ATR and why the funding is needed.
Secretary Mabus. The Department continues to review the execution
of the CVN-78 construction program. Any shortfalls requiring a prior
approval reprogramming action will be briefed to the committee after
submission of the reprogramming request.

OTHER AIRCRAFT CARRIER MATTERS

17. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, I understand that the Navy
will be requesting to move $18 million of unspent funds from the
completed CVN-70 Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) program via Special
Transfer Authority (STA) to cover incurred costs on the CVN-71 RCOH
currently in progress at Huntington Ingalls in Newport News, VA. Please
explain the genesis of the funding and why it is needed on the CVN-71
RCOH.
Secretary Mabus. The Navy projects the CVN-71 RCOH to complete in
June 2013, 4\1/2\ months after the original contract duration. The
current estimate of total funding required to complete the CVN-71 RCOH
is $153 million. The $135 million requested in the President's budget
is intended to be applied against the projected $153 million shortfall.
The remaining funding required will be requested separately.
The CVN-71 RCOH has included more new work and has experienced more
growth as compared to previous CVNs. In addition to incorporating the
SRA package into the CVN-71 RCOH Execution Contract, an additional 134
new work items were added to the Authorized Work Package (AWP) early in
the execution period. As a result, the growth work incurred on CVN-71
RCOH exceeded that experienced on the CVN-70 RCOH, specifically in the
areas of aircraft launch and recovery equipment, shafting, tanks,
emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and ventilation.
To reduce costs and schedule risk on the CVN-71 RCOH, the Program
Office descoped work from the CVN-71 RCOH as well as rescreened work
from NNS to Government Alteration Installation Teams (AITs).
Additionally, the Program Office has limited changes on CVN-71 RCOH to
authorized mission critical growth work only.
To reduce future RCOH costs, the Program Office is implementing the
following initiatives for CVN-72 and future RCOHs: improved planning,
rates reduction, service reductions, supervision reductions, government
furnished equipment (GFE) cost reductions, risk management programs,
implementation of a rotatable pool of refurbished parts, condition
based maintenance, and configuration control. Examples of improved
planning include design reuse, improved baseline work package
definition, more accurate/complete cost data sheets (estimates), and
co-yard best practices. These actions resulted in a 4 percent labor
hour reduction in the CVN-72 work package. Additionally, the CVN-72
RCOH will apply lessons learned from CVN-71 RCOH by integrating the SRA
work into RCOH within the Carrier Continuous Maintenance Plan (CMP)
with a focus on modernization, insertion and maximization of AIT
efforts, proper utilization of NNS critical skills and resources, and
development of an RCOH execution schedule for a notional 44 months.

18. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the Navy is requesting $135
million to complete the CVN-71 RCOH.
Has there been unexpected cost growth in the CVN-71 RCOH, and, if
so, please explain the reasons for this cost growth; the history of
cost growth in this program; and what steps that have not yet been
taken that will be taken in the future to reduce cost growth on CVN-71
RCOH and future RCOH programs.
Secretary Mabus. The Navy projects the CVN-71 RCOH to complete in
June 2013, 4\1/2\ months after the original contract duration. The
current estimate of total funding required to complete the CVN-71 RCOH
is $153 million. The $135 million requested in the President's budget
is intended to be applied against the projected $153 million shortfall.
The remaining funding required will be requested separately.
The CVN-71 RCOH has included more new work and has experienced more
growth as compared to previous CVNs. In addition to incorporating the
SRA package into the CVN-71 RCOH Execution Contract, an additional 134
new work items were added to the Authorized Work Package (AWP) early in
the execution period. As a result, the growth work incurred on CVN-71
RCOH exceeded that experienced on the CVN-70 RCOH, specifically in the
areas of aircraft launch and recovery equipment, shafting, tanks,
emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and ventilation.
To reduce costs and schedule risk on the CVN-71 RCOH, the Program
Office descoped work from the CVN-71 RCOH as well as rescreened work
from NNS to Government AITs. Additionally, the Program Office has
limited changes on CVN-71 RCOH to authorized mission critical growth
work only.
To reduce future RCOH costs, the Program Office is implementing the
following initiatives for CVN-72 and future RCOHs: improved planning,
rates reduction, service reductions, supervision reductions, government
furnished equipment (GFE) cost reductions, risk management programs,
implementation of a rotatable pool of refurbished parts, condition
based maintenance, and configuration control. Examples of improved
planning include design reuse, improved baseline work package
definition, more accurate/complete cost data sheets (estimates), and
co-yard best practices. These actions resulted in a 4 percent labor
hour reduction in the CVN-72 work package. Additionally, the CVN-72
RCOH will apply lessons learned from CVN-71 RCOH by integrating the SRA
work into RCOH within the Carrier Continuous Maintenance Plan (CMP)
with a focus on modernization, insertion and maximization of AIT
efforts, proper utilization of NNS critical skills and resources, and
development of an RCOH execution schedule for a notional 44 months.

19. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, I understand that the Navy
will be requesting a $33.8 million ATR to cover increased research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs on the Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System (EMALS). Please explain the source of the
funding and why the funding is needed on the EMALS.
Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy continues to review
execution of the EMALS program. Based on the current status of the
program, the department does not intend to request a reprogramming
action this year.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

20. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, construction of the follow-on
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) seaframes (LCS-3 and -4) is almost
finished--with their costs leveling out at about $400 million each. How
likely is it that the cost to build each LCS seaframe that the Navy
intends to buy under its dual-award block-buy strategy will come in at
less than the cost of completing the construction of LCS-3 and -4? In
other words, how executable are these prices over the entire intended
purchase?
Secretary Mabus. Beginning with the construction contracts for LCS-
3 and LCS-4 which were awarded in 2009, the Navy transitioned to fixed-
price type contracts, thus limiting the Navy's cost liability. Use of a
fixed-price type contract was continued as part of the dual Block Buy.
As execution of the dual Block Buy contracts continues, lower costs can
be expected for follow ships as the design becomes more stable and
minimal non-recurring engineering changes are required. LCS-3 and LCS-4
have experienced minimal design changes and are reflecting the results
of the learning and investment by both builders as evidenced by the
cost leveling at an average of about $400 million each.
The pricing within the dual Block Buy also accounts for significant
planned facility upgrades, funded by both public and private resources,
to improve the production quality and efficiency of both shipyards. As
a result, the Navy anticipates a continuation of the learning and
production efficiencies experienced on LCS-3 and LCS-4 at each shipyard
during the execution of the Block Buy contracts. Increased staffing
levels for program management and on-site government oversight have
both increased in recent years which will also contribute to ensuring
the Industry teams success in meeting their cost and schedule
objectives.
The average awarded cost of the 20 ships on the dual Block Buy
contracts is $357 million which is well below the projected $400
million average cost of LCS-3 and LCS-4.
The Navy is confident that the development risks associated with
new ship designs have been retired with the construction of the first
four ships.

21. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, as you know, the LCS combat
capability comes from the integration of three interchangeable types of
mission modules into the seaframes--not the seaframes by themselves. At
this point, what are the major challenges facing the Navy's development
of these mission modules?
Secretary Mabus. While significant combat capabilities are added
with the mission packages, the ship has inherent capabilities with its
sophisticated sensors, gun and missile systems. The unique process by
which mission modules are integrated with the ship provides LCS with
combat capability that can be easily updated as technology matures.
Navy has made and continues to make significant progress in the
development and testing of the mission modules.
At this stage in mission module development, weight, performance,
and integration continue to be on track. A robust testing phase is
underway for all Mission Packages (MPs) to evaluate their performance
and integration with the ships. As testing progresses, Navy is
quantifying and validating the MP capabilities.
The Mine Countermeasures (MCM) MP recently completed Phase 2 of
developmental testing (DT) on LCS-2 with the MCM MP detachment able to
conclusively demonstrate the viability of using unmanned and airborne
systems to detect and neutralize mines. Preparations for Surface
Warfare MP DT are in progress for commencement later this year.
Preliminary testing of Increment 2 Anti-Submarine (ASW) MP systems has
begun on white shipping.

PROPOSED EARLY RETIREMENTS OF CRUISERS AND AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

22. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, how does
retiring seven Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers early and putting two
LSD amphibious ships in reduced operating status reconcile with the
Secretary of Defense's new strategic guidance, which puts renewed
emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region?
Admiral Greenert. The decision to decommission seven Ticonderoga-
class cruisers and two amphibious ships was made to ensure sufficient
resources were available for readiness while maintaining the proper mix
of capability in the battle force in a fiscally constrained
environment. The Navy selected ships for decommissioning based on an
analysis of the costs required to sustain their material condition and
update their combat capability. The selected ships had little or no
previous modernization completed, were the oldest ships in their class
and would become increasingly expensive to maintain, operate, and
upgrade to remain relevant to evolving threats.
The Navy has certified to the Secretary of Defense that we will
meet the fiscal year 2013 Global Force Management Allocation Plan and
requirements in the Defense Strategic Guidance. From fiscal year 2013
through fiscal year 2020, the Navy ship inventory and extrapolated
force presence will increase in the Asia-Pacific and Arabian Gulf
regions.
General Amos. The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of
Responsibility (AOR) is dominated by the ocean and so is ideally suited
to naval and amphibious forces. As such, amphibious shipping is optimal
for the movement, maneuver and employment of marines across the range
of military operations. PACOM currently has four amphibious warships
forward deployed that are critical to day-to-day operations in the AOR.
Refocusing the national security strategy on the Pacific requires an
increase in mobility. Emergent requirements, such as the Australia and
Guam MAGTFs, will require additional amphibious shipping capacity.
Other lift options, such as the Joint High Speed Vessel, somewhat
mitigate the lack of mobility to conduct movement of forces, but do not
replace all of the capabilities inherent in amphibious shipping that
permit the maneuver of forces in response to crises. Decreasing the
number of amphibious warships in the inventory reduces the number of
vessels available to support an increased U.S. presence in the Asia-
Pacific region and the rest of the world. Furthermore, it stresses the
ability to support CENTCOM Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary
Unit (ARG/MEU) rotation.
In 2009, the Department of the Navy identified a requirement for a
38 amphibious warship fleet to lift two Marine Expeditionary Brigade
assault echelons in support of operational plans calling for a joint
forcible entry operation. Compelled by fiscal realities, we accepted
risk down to 33 warships, and the Navy has adjusted this inventory to
32 warships over the current Long Range Shipbuilding Strategy.
Regardless of total inventory, we require 30 operationally available
ships to support geographic combatant commander operational plans (with
risk), day-to-day forward deployed and rotational requirements such as
our ARG/MEU, and crisis response missions. When considering the term
``operationally available'', it is important to note that it implies a
ship that is able to deploy immediately or on relatively short notice
in order to meet operational plan response timelines. Factoring
maintenance cycles and other prevailing conditions, the amphibious
warship fleet typically requires an inventory above 30 vessels to meet
day-to-day deployable threshold in support of the previously-mentioned,
required mission profiles.

23. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, what is the
Navy doing to enable it to reactivate at a later date the seven
cruisers it plans to retire early?
Admiral Greenert. The seven cruisers will be retained in the
inactive ship inventory as retention assets identified as Out of
Commission, in Reserve (OCIR) and will be held in reserve to support
the Navy's future mobilization requirements. Ships in OCIR status are
retained on the Naval Vessel Register and assigned Maintenance Category
B. Category B ships receive a standard inactivation lay-up which
determines the amount of maintenance and repair that will be performed
prior to and during the inactivation. The ship and its equipment will
be preserved in an ``as-is'' condition with the application of
dehumidification and cathodic protection to minimize long-term
degradation and maintain the ship's condition at decommissioning. All
C-3/C-4 Casualty Report (CASREP) deficiencies will be corrected before
decommissioning unless waived by the responsible Ship Resource/Platform
Sponsor.
General Amos. Given that cruisers are a Navy, not Marine Corps,
equity/platform, I defer to Admiral Greenert's response.

24. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, what are the
potential operational implications of these early retirements?
Admiral Greenert. The fiscal year 2013 budget reflects the Navy's
strategy to build ships better suited for current and future needs. The
Navy is funding this effort, in part, by deactivating older, less
capable ships that are increasingly expensive to maintain, operate, and
upgrade to remain relevant. Keeping these ships in service would divert
funding from other programs vital to the Navy's mission, including the
modernization and procurement of ships critical to fleet needs.
Innovative approaches are being employed to mitigate the potential
impacts to presence caused by early ship retirements. For example,
relocating four Ballistic Missile Defense capable destroyers to Rota,
Spain will provide presence and be a more efficient option to source
European Command's Ballistic Missile Defense mission. Effectively, it
frees up six surface combatants for other operations. The integration
of Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and LCS will allow cruisers,
destroyers, and amphibious ships to shift to other missions by taking
on security cooperation, humanitarian assistance and disaster response,
and maritime security operations. These new ship classes are also
designed to spend 50 percent or more of their service life forward,
significantly increasing the forward presence per hull. Navy will
continue to explore new employment models to sustain our forward
operations.
General Amos. In terms of amphibious warships, the Marine Corps
requires 30 operationally available vessels (10 LHA/D, 10 LPD, 10 LSD)
at any given time in order to still be able to execute the 2.0 Marine
Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelon operational planning requirement
in support of geographic combatant commander operational plans for
joint forcible entry operations, respond to crisis, and to conduct
rotational deployments such as our Amphibious Ready Group/Marine
Expeditionary Units. When considering the term ``operationally
available'', it is important to note that it implies that a ship that
is able to deploy immediately or on relatively short notice. Factoring
maintenance cycles and other unforeseen conditions, an amphibious
warship force structure typically requires an inventory above 30
vessels is necessary to meet day-to-day the daily deployable threshold
in support of the previously-mentioned, required mission profiles. In
as much as any early retirements of amphibious warships would cause the
fleet to drop below this level, Marine forces would still be able to
respond around the world, but the force will require more time to
respond and the rate of response will be impacted. As such, projected
early retirements of amphibious warships might necessitate that
geographic combatant commanders review and revise their plans to
account for potentially increased response times. In turn, these
commanders may place a heavier demand on intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR), prepositioning, forward deployed forces, and
strategic air and sealift to ensure forces are available in the timings
required.

25. Senator McCain. General Amos, according to the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), the Marine Corps needs a minimum of 38 amphibious
ships. Just last year, we heard testimony that the Marine Corps could
accept the risk associated with 33 ships. Now, the Navy proposes a 32-
ship amphibious fleet. What has changed?
General Amos. Nothing has changed from a Marine Corps requirements
perspective. The Marine Corps continues to require 30 operationally
available amphibious ships (10 LHA/D, 10 LPD and 10 LSD) in order to
meet 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade assault echelon lift requirements
and to provide global coverage, forward presence and crisis response.
In 2009, the Department of the Navy determined that the force
structure requirement to support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(MEB) assault echelon (AE) lift for a joint forcible entry operation
(JFEO) is 38 total amphibious assault ships. Understanding this
requirement in light of fiscal constraints, the Department's leadership
agreed to sustain 33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon.
This agreement accepted risk in the arrival of some MEB AE combat
support and combat service support elements. It determined that risk
could be accepted by planning for 15 rather than 17 amphibious ships
for each MEB AE, and thus the Department's goal was to be able to
deploy 30 operationally available amphibious warships (10 LHA/D, 10
LPD, 10 LSD) to meet 2.0 MEB AE operational planning requirements. The
Department's most recent Long Range Shipbuilding Strategy adjusted this
requirement to 32 amphibious warships, reflecting plans for 11 LHA/Ds,
11 LPDs and 10 LSDs in commission, plus a commitment to maintain two
LSDs to be decommissioned in fiscal year 2013 in Category B
mobilization status.
Regardless of total amphibious warship force structure inventory,
the Marine Corps requires 30 operationally available ships to support
geographic combatant commander operational plans (with risk) for JFEO,
rotational deployments such as our ARG/MEU units at sea, and
unforecasted crisis response missions. When considering the term
``operationally available'', it is important to note that it implies a
ship that is able to deploy immediately or on relatively short notice.
Factoring maintenance cycles and other unforeseen conditions, the
amphibious warship force structure requires an inventory above 30
vessels to meet a day-to-day daily deployable threshold in support of
the previously-mentioned, required mission profiles.
The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and
I are committed to resourcing the President's strategic guidance. I am
concerned that the competition for defense dollars beyond the FYDP will
force even more difficult choices within DOD and among many important
Department of the Navy programs. The Secretary has had to make some
tough calls in this regard, but both the CNO and I believe that the
risks accepted in this FYDP will allow for many important programs to
mature and compete successfully in future FYDPs. That said, it is
critical to change the minimum requirement from 32 amphibious warships
to 33 over the next year.

26. Senator McCain. General Amos, what are the risks with a 32-ship
amphibious fleet and how will the Marine Corps manage these risks?
General Amos. An amphibious warship inventory that does not
maintain 30 operationally available warships (10 LHA/D, 10 LPD, 10 LSD)
adversely affects our ability to conduct day-to-day deployments, meet
necessary training standards, and surge forward in response to crises
with a balanced combat capability. When considering the term
``operationally available'', it is important to note that it implies a
ship that is able to deploy immediately or on relatively short notice
in order to meet operational plan response timelines. Factoring
maintenance cycles and other prevailing conditions, the amphibious
warship fleet typically requires an inventory of at least 33 ships to
maintain an operationally availability level of 30.
An amphibious warship fleet with fewer than 30 operationally
available amphibious warships would increase risk associated with
meeting day-to-day and wartime combatant command (COCOM) requirements.
Marine forces would still be able to respond around the world, but the
rate of response might vary. Shortfalls in these types of critical
warships will require personnel, equipment and sustainment to close
across strategic distances via TRANSCOM and will be subject to
prioritization of limited assets to meet competing demands. Marine
forces would still be able to respond around the world, but the rate of
response might vary. Shortfalls in these types of critical warships
will require personnel, equipment and sustainment to transit strategic
distances via TRANSCOM and will be subject to prioritization of limited
assets to meet competing demands. As a means to mitigate this risk,
geographic combatant commanders may place a heavier demand on ISR,
prepositioning and forward deployed forces to ensure forces are
available in the timings required.
Shortfalls in amphibious lift remain a concern as we work with the
Chief of Naval Operations and his staff to mitigate risk in meeting the
amphibious lift requirement. We are aggressively reviewing our
amphibious concepts, doctrine, and plans; and recently stood up the
Ellis Group, a consortium of amphibious warfare experts that is
partnered with the Navy to develop innovative solutions to overcome
these challenges and look for new methods to operate given amphibious
ship shortfalls.

27. Senator McCain. General Amos, how are the risks exacerbated by
the planned retirement of one of the three Maritime Prepositioned
Squadrons?
General Amos. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) remains a key
component of our Nation's overall global response strategy and maritime
expeditionary capability. As the Nation's crisis response force, the
Marine Corps must be prepared to rapidly respond to contingencies
across the range of military operations. During fiscal year 2013 budget
development, the MPF structure, capabilities, and associated capacity
was thoroughly examined and assessed, and the Marine Corps position is
reflected in the fiscal year 2013 President's Budget Request. With an
acceptable level of risk, the Marine Corps can meet existing
operational requirements by maintaining two full, operationally
enhanced, Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons (MPSRON-Es) that
support the geographic combatant commanders and retain critical sea-
basing enabling capabilities. Specifically, the current three MPSRON
set is capable of carrying 58 percent of a three MEB requirement. Two
MPSRON-Es can carry 69 percent of a two MEB requirement. Based on the
new strategic guidance, this risk is acceptable. Marine Corps and Navy
leadership are closely coordinating to develop an enhanced two-MPSRON
program that maximizes afloat capacity, provides operational relevance
for combatant commanders for use not only during contingencies but for
engagement as well, and mitigates the risk associated with the loss of
MPSRON 1. Plans call for the remaining two MPSRONs to be enhanced by
increasing the number and type of ships assigned to each MPSRON as well
as by optimizing the equipment and load configuration for the ships.
The U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command are directly
affected by the MPF reorganization. Both combatant commanders have
stated that the associated risk is acceptable, recognizing potential
capability gaps, timely force closure and crisis response time.
We have conducted a thorough review and assessment to preserve
capabilities and ensure the enhancement of the remaining two squadrons
of the MPF; this remains a national imperative. Achieving the
appropriate ship mix and embarked equipment sets/density is ongoing to
optimize operational capability and mitigate risk. Additional
mitigation is provided by Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway
(MCPP-N): a task-organized equipment set forward deployed in the
USEUCOM AOR. The Marine Corps is committed to maintaining a ready,
relevant and responsive MPF posture consisting of two enhanced MPSRONs
that best balances military risk with operational necessity.

MARINE CORPS CUTS IN END STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE

28. Senator McCain. General Amos, under DOD's plans, the Marine
Corps will lose 20,000 Active Duty marines over the next 4 years and
reduce six combat battalions and four TACAIR squadrons. I remain
concerned about the impact of these cuts, which, in my view, reflect
budgetary imperatives rather than the national security threats we
face. Did this 20,000 proposed reduction result from a neutral
requirements-based review?
General Amos. Yes it did result from a neutral requirements-based
review. In an effort to ensure the Marine Corps is organized for the
challenges of the emerging security environment, we conducted a
capabilities-based Force Structure Review beginning in the Fall of 2010
to identify ways we could rebalance and posture for the future. The
Force Structure Review incorporated the lessons learned from 10 years
of combat and addressed 21st century security challenges confronting
our Nation and its Marine Corps. The review sought to provide the
``best value'' in terms of capability, cost and readiness relative to
the operational requirements of our forward-engaged geographic
combatant commanders. The results of that effort have been shared with
Congress over the past year. While affirming this strategy-driven
effort, we aligned our force based on the realities of constrained
spending levels and the new Strategic Guidance.
During our comprehensive Force Structure Review, we tailored a
force structure to ensure a sufficient type and quantity of force
available to meet the forward presence, engagement and crisis response
requirements of the geographic combatant commanders. The resulting
force structure is intended to meet Title 10 responsibilities, broaden
capabilities, enhance speed and response options and foster the
partnerships necessary to execute the range of military operations
while providing the ``best value'' to the Nation. This force structure
also accounted for the addition of enabling assets (e.g. combat
engineers, information operations specialists, civil affairs personnel,
specialized intelligence marines, cyber operators, special operators,
et cetera) necessary to meet the demands of the battlefields of today
and tomorrow.
Our 182,100 Marine Active-Duty Force, planned to be in effect by
the end of fiscal year 2016, retains the capacity and capability to
support steady state and crisis response operations through rotational
deployments, and to rapidly surge in support of major contingency
operations. Although reshaping the Marine Corps from 202,100 marines to
a force of approximately 182,100 marines entails some risk to our
ability to simultaneously respond to multiple large-scale
contingencies, it is manageable. We intend to leverage the diverse
depth and range of assets within our operational Reserve component both
to mitigate risk and maximize opportunities where available.
Our planned end strength of 182,100 marines represents fewer
infantry battalions, artillery battalions, fixed-wing aviation
squadrons, and general support combat logistics battalions than we had
prior to September 11. However, it adds cyber operations capability,
Marine special operators, wartime enablers and higher unit manning
levels--all lessons gleaned from 10 years of combat operations; it is a
very capable force.

29. Senator McCain. General Amos, what is the risk of these
reductions to your ability to support the requirements of the combatant
commanders, particularly in major conflicts in the Asia-Pacific or in
the Middle East?
General Amos. The primary risk involved with cuts to Marine Corps
end strength and force structure entails our ability to respond to
multiple, simultaneous large scale contingencies in support of the
geographic combatant commanders. However, I have assessed this risk to
be manageable. The Marine Corps intends to leverage the diverse depth
and range of assets within our 39,600 strong operational Reserve
component both to mitigate risk and maximize opportunities where
available.

30. Senator McCain. General Amos, have you developed a risk
assessment to accompany the fiscal year 2013 budget?
General Amos. Yes, in the development of our fiscal year 2013
budget, we did assess risk. Manpower is the single greatest area where
the Marine Corps has taken some risk. Reduced end strength creates risk
in warfighting capacity as operating force manning levels will go from
99 percent for both officer and enlisted ranks to 95 percent for
officers and 97 percent for enlisted. However, this risk is manageable
and provides an affordable solution that maintains a ready, capable and
more senior force in support of the new strategic guidance. This
enduring strength level and force structure ensure that the Marine
Corps retains the necessary level of non-commissioned officer and field
grade officer experience and warfighting enablers to support the future
security environment and needs of the Nation after the drawdown in
Afghanistan.
The Marine Corps maintains its operational forces at a high level
of readiness. Any further reductions in funding to the operations and
maintenance account will degrade Marine Corps training at every level,
from small-unit to large scale MAGTF, and will reduce forward-deployed
training with partner nations and allies. Other areas where the Marine
Corps is taking some risk is in both the maintenance and modernization
of equipment necessary after more than 10 years of war. While the
current budget will allow for the reset and reconstitution of equipment
on a reasonable timeline, any future reductions will result in delays,
modification, or elimination of key maintenance and modernization
programs. Lastly, any additional large-scale budget reductions in
fiscal year 2013, such as those pending in the sequestration component
of the Budget Control Act of 2011, will result in increased risk to the
concept of maintaining a modernized and ready force, and could
potentially impact the requirements of the new strategy and our ability
to provide operational reach during times of crisis.
With that said, the fiscal year 2013 budget ensures the Marine
Corps remains the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness, while
simultaneously keeping faith with our marines, sailors, and their
families. It funds a force that is fully capable of executing all
assigned missions in the new Defense Strategic Guidance with
capabilities optimized for forward-presence, engagement and rapid
crisis response.

31. Senator McCain. General Amos, have these reductions in end
strength already been factored into the operational plans of the
combatant commanders?
General Amos. Our planned force reductions are being made with a
full understanding of the demands the geographic combatant commanders
have for Marine forces. The reductions in Marine Corps end strength
should not impact current Operational Plans. The only category where
risk is a factor is in cases where Marine forces would be called upon
to respond to multiple, simultaneous large- scale contingencies. In
such cases, we would be able to rely on the operational depth and
flexibility resident in our Reserve component.

32. Senator McCain. General Amos, do Marine Corps troop reductions
introduce any risk to operations in Afghanistan?
General Amos. No, they do not. While we are making some very
measured reductions in the Marine Corps Active component before we
completely transition from Afghanistan (5,000 marines per year in
fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014)--we will retain enough of the
right type of forces to continue to support all existing CENTCOM
requirements for Operation Enduring Freedom. I am committed to ensuring
we provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan.
This remains my top priority.

REVERSIBILITY

33. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, DOD has cited reversibility
in connection with its new strategic guidance. What is the Navy doing
to enable it to reactivate at a later date the seven cruisers it plans
to retire early?
Admiral Greenert. The seven cruisers will be retained in the
inactive ship inventory as retention assets identified as Out of
Commission, in Reserve (OCIR) and will be held in reserve to support
the Navy's future mobilization requirements. Ships in OCIR status are
retained on the Naval Vessel Register and assigned Maintenance Category
B. Category B ships receive a standard inactivation lay-up which
determines the amount of maintenance and repair that will be performed
prior to and during the inactivation. The ship and its equipment will
be preserved in an ``as-is'' condition with the application of
dehumidification and cathodic protection to minimize long-term
degradation and maintain the ship's condition at decommissioning. All
C-3/C-4 CASREP deficiencies will be corrected before decommissioning
unless waived by the responsible Ship Resource/Platform Sponsor.

34. Senator McCain. General Amos, DOD has also cited reversibility
with respect to personnel cuts. But, the force reductions the Marine
Corps proposes may result in the loss of combat-experienced Marine
Corps noncommissioned officers (NCO) and NCOs in-the-making. With
regard to your proposed personnel cuts, what does reversibility mean?
General Amos. We carefully designed our 182,100 Active-Duty Force
to meet expected post-Operation Enduring Freedom operational
commitments in support of the new Defense Strategic Guidance issued in
January 2012. This force will contain sufficiently experienced non-
commissioned officers and provide both a grade and year of service mix
appropriate to sustain the force in the future, and it will be
complemented where necessary by our highly capable Reserve component of
countless combat veterans. If operational requirements necessitate an
increase in the size of the Marine Corps, we will be able to
accommodate additional requirements for non-commissioned officers via
retention and promotion.

35. Senator McCain. General Amos, once you have discharged a
combat-trained marine, how do you reverse that decision?
General Amos. Approximately 75 percent of our first-term enlisted
marines choose not to re-enlist in the Marine Corps beyond their first
4-year initial term. However, all marines (officer and enlisted) have
an 8-year commitment upon signing a contract to serve. Thus, those
marines who voluntary separate prior to 8 years of active duty service,
must complete their contractual obligation in a Reserve status, namely
either the Select Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) or the Individual Ready
Reserve (IRR). Those marines who affiliate with the SMCR often fulfill
their remaining obligated time in SMCR units. Our Marine Forces Reserve
maintains contact with marines in the IRR and informs them of
opportunities within a SMCR unit. Per provisions of Title 10, marines
in the IRR are subject to Presidential Reserve Call-up Authority for
limited periods of time in specific cases impacting national security.
Once beyond the 8 year mark, those marines who do not remain affiliated
with either the SMCR or IRR quickly lose their technical and tactical
proficiency in their military occupational specialty, and more
importantly, there is no contractual obligation remaining for their
military service beyond that point.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

36. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, is there a
projected strike fighter shortfall for the Navy and Marine Corps, and,
if so, what is that number?
Admiral Greenert. The PB-13 strike fighter shortfall will remain
below 65 aircraft and is predicted to peak at 56 aircraft in 2025. The
strike fighter shortfall today is zero aircraft.
General Amos. The Navy and Marine Corps continue to carefully
monitor strike fighter inventory requirements and projected
availability. The currently projected fighter inventory peak shortfall
estimate is 56 aircraft in 2023. This shortage results primarily from a
decrease in the 5 year utilization rate history, accelerated Navy
transition from legacy Hornets to Super Hornets, and changes in Marine
Corps force structure. The shortfall will be seen predominantly in the
Marine Corps through 2023 due to the concentration of the F/A-18A-D in
our tactical aircraft inventory, and will continue to rely heavily on
F-35 procurement rates. The U.S. Navy will possess the majority of the
shortfall in the mid 2020's due to service life limits in the F/A-18 E/
F Super Hornet.

37. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Amos, in your
opinion, what options would help mitigate the strike fighter shortfall?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy will continue to ensure sufficient
strike fighters for deploying air wings through the management and
supply initiatives including the accelerated transition of legacy
Hornet (F/A-18A-D) squadrons into Super Hornets (F/A-18E/F) and the
service life extension of 150 legacy Hornets.
General Amos. The Marine Corps continues to meticulously manage the
flight hours and fatigue life of our legacy TACAIR. We have provided
fleet users guidance and actions to optimize aircraft utilization rates
while maximizing training and operational opportunities. The High
Flight Hour and Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) efforts can
effectively extend the F/A-18 A-D service life to 10,000 hours, thereby
mitigating the impacts of the strike fighter shortfall. Continued
investment in program related engineering and program related logistics
funds within the Operations and Maintenance, Navy accounts is critical
for sustaining the Navy's legacy platforms through the TACAIR
transition. Additionally, any opportunity to increase the current F-35
procurement rates will enable the Marine Corps to transition out of
legacy platforms, thereby reducing projected shortfall numbers.

CEASE AND DESIST LETTER

38. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, will the Navy comply with the
request made by me and the chairman in our letter of March 19, 2012,
not to implement any of its proposed force structure reductions in 2012
before Congress has authorized the Navy to do so?
Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy has not undertaken any
efforts to ``restrict Congress' ability to consider and act on the
fiscal year 2013 budget request'' and certainly we have not taken any
steps to ``implement decisions that would be difficult or impossible to
reverse''. However, we have made prudent fiscal decisions such as
placing funds on withhold for proposed fiscal year 2013 program
terminations (i.e. Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, Medium Range Maritime
Unmanned Aerial System, and SPS), canceled ship depot maintenance
availabilities (for ships planned for fiscal year 2013 cruiser
decommissionings i.e. Port Royal), program delays (i.e. LSD(X)), and
not backfilled some vacant positions (that are slated to be eliminated
in fiscal year 2013). None of these actions are irreversible.
The Department will continue to exercise increased fiscal scrutiny
of resource application in areas of potentially declining resources.
There may be the need for future action based on emergent unforeseen
execution issues (i.e. fuel ($.5 billion), COCOM demands ($.5 billion),
ship maintenance ($.3 billion)) which cannot be covered by current
mitigation efforts.

USE OF THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT TO CONSTRUCT BIOFUEL REFINERIES

39. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, in March 2011, the President
directed the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Navy to assist
the development of a sustainable commercial biofuels industry. The Navy
has pledged taxpayers' funds of $170 million as its share of a $510
million effort to construct or retrofit biofuel refineries in order to
create a commercially viable market. With a range of alternatives to
petroleum already commercially viable and in use, why should the Navy
subsidize the development of biofuel refining capability over any other
reasonable alternative energy solution?
Secretary Mabus. There are currently no commercially viable, in-use
petroleum alternatives that are drop-in substitutes for JP-5, JP-8, or
F-76. To be fit for Naval purposes, a drop-in alternative fuel must
require no changes to infrastructure and its use must result in no
degradation of performance--performing seamlessly to our ship and
aircraft operators. First-generation biofuels do not have the energy
density, long-term storage stability, cold flow properties, and ability
to be used in seawater-compensated fuel tanks that the Navy requires.
Since the Navy owns and operates ships and aircraft for many decades,
it is more cost effective for the Navy to concentrate on an energy
solution that works directly with the platforms that we already possess
than one that requires new platforms or major platform overhauls.
Advanced alternative fuels are the best way to address the Navy's sole
dependence on highly volatile global oil prices. In fiscal year 2012
alone the Navy faces more than $1 billion in additional fuel costs due
to the increased cost of petroleum. The Navy must find that money in
the current year budget, and there are only a few accounts with funds
that can be transferred to pay for the price spike; operations and
procurement. If we transfer funds from operations, our planes and
aviators spend less time in the air, our ships and sailors spend less
time at sea, and our marines and sailors have less time to train. If we
take money from procurement, we have fewer funds to purchase new
platforms and other technology.

40. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, why should Congress believe
that the Navy would be any better at doing this than the Department of
Energy (DOE) and Solyndra?
Secretary Mabus. The advanced biofuel commercialization initiative
being pursued by the Departments of Navy, Agriculture and Energy will
utilize the authority of the Defense Production Act Title III (DPA).
DPA is neither a loan guarantee nor a grant program and cannot
accurately be compared to the DOE's funding of Solyndra. The DPA
authority dates back to 1950 and has been used to support the
industrialization of defense critical domestic industries such as
steel, aluminum, titanium, semiconductors, beryllium, and radiation
hardened electronics. Under the authority the Federal Government
participates as a co-investor for a prescribed period of time,
generally 5-10 years, and requires at least a one-to-one cost share.
This means that the Federal Government has the teeth of both day-to-day
oversight as well as the ownership of specific assets. When utilizing
the DPA authority DOD generally employs a multi-phased approach and the
advanced biofuels effort will do the same. On March 29, a draft special
notice was published that outlines this approach. In phase one,
companies will complete rigorous technical, architectural/engineering,
business case and financing deliverables. This data will be evaluated
by both a team of government experts and a third party reviewer and
only those companies deemed competitive from this process will be
eligible for funding in phase two.

41. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, to your knowledge, has anyone
in the Navy been contacted by a Member of Congress or staff with any
instruction or guidance on the use of any part of the $150 million
added by Senate appropriators in the fiscal year 2012 Omnibus
Appropriations Act to the account for the Defense Production Act to
fund this initiative?
Secretary Mabus. Department of Navy representatives have met with
and briefed both members and professional staff members from the DOD
committees (Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate Appropriations
Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House
Appropriations Committee) as well as the Agriculture and Energy
Committees on the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Department of
the Navy/DOE alternative fuels initiative and the applicability of DPA
Title III.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

TRICARE COST INCREASES

42. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, DOD's healthcare costs have
doubled since fiscal year 2001, growing from around $17 billion to over
$42 billion in fiscal year 2009. Healthcare is projected to consume 12
percent of DOD's budget in 2015, compared to 4.5 percent in 1990.
During the Bush administration, attempts were made to raise TRICARE
premiums, and Congress placed the premium increases on hold for fiscal
year 2007, fiscal year 2008, fiscal year 2009, and fiscal year 2010.
Our military's greatest asset is the people who have volunteered, and
we cannot afford to lose those qualified career servicemembers because
of poor benefits. The new Obama budget calls for military families and
retirees to pay more for their healthcare, while leaving other Federal
unionized workers alone. The budget seeks to save $1.8 billion in
fiscal year 2013 and $12.9 billion over the FYDP.
For example, enrollment fees for TRICARE Prime in the fiscal year
2013 budget request would increase fees anywhere from 30 percent to 78
percent. Over 5 years, compared to current fees, the fiscal year 2013
proposal would increase the enrollment fee by 94 percent and up to 345
percent for some retirees. This plan also calls for pharmacy co-pays to
double and then triple over the FYDP. There is no debating the fact
that healthcare costs are absorbing large parts of DOD's budget.
Programs are on unsustainable paths, and we do need to increase rates
and co-pays as Congress did in fiscal year 2012. However, I am deeply
concerned that the magnitude of the fiscal year 2013 increases will
break faith with our servicemembers and their families. If costs rise
345 percent, as planned in the fiscal year 2013 proposal, will some
Navy beneficiaries not be able to afford TRICARE?
Secretary Mabus. I appreciate your recognition that the rate of
growth in our health care expenditures within DOD is not sustainable. I
was pleased that Congress supported the TRICARE Prime fee increases
last year and strongly believe that we must move forward with the
proposed adjustments to enrollment fees and co-payments as identified
in the DOD fiscal year 2013 budget request. Today, a TRICARE-eligible
working age retiree's family of three contributes a lower percentage
towards their total health care costs than they did in 1996. Despite
health care costs doubling or tripling since the full implementation of
TRICARE, out of pocket expenses, including enrollment fees, deductibles
and cost shares, has only grown 20 to 30 percent. The proposals will
bring beneficiary cost shares closer to the original levels mandated by
Congress when the program was established.
In order to help ensure affordability and equity among our retired
beneficiaries, the proposed increases to TRICARE Prime enrollment fees
for working age retirees (under age 65) and the enrollment fee TRICARE
for Life (TFL) beneficiaries will be phased-in over a 4-year period and
will be tiered based on the amount of the beneficiary's military
retirement fee. The retired pay tiers will also be indexed to ensure
that beneficiaries are not pushed into a higher tier as a result of
annual cost-of-living increases. This construct and tiering are
consistent with the recommendations from the DOD's 2007 Task Force on
the Future of Military Health Care.
Even with these proposed increases, our beneficiaries will continue
to have access to one of the most comprehensive and affordable health
benefits available--and deservedly so.

43. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, do you know how many
beneficiaries will no longer be able to afford TRICARE in the out-years
with the increases planned in the fiscal year 2013 proposal?
Secretary Mabus. The constructs for the proposed changes to TRICARE
fees, including tiering the increases to the beneficiaries military
retirement pay, are largely based on recommendations contained in the
DOD's 2007 Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care. It is
clear that our working age retirees are paying a lower out of pocket
costs now than when TRICARE was fully implemented in 1996 so we need to
move forward implementing a more equitable cost structure for our
TRICARE retiree beneficiaries. While I do not have any specific
projections about beneficiaries and would accordingly defer to DOD, I
do believe our beneficiaries recognize the shared responsibilities for
their health care benefits. The fiscal year 2013 budget proposals are
reasonable in scope, appropriate in tiering, indexing and phasing, as
well as necessary for the Department to deliver a long-term sustainable
health benefit.

44. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, if beneficiaries no longer
opt-in to TRICARE, will cost-driven attrition put TRICARE's
sustainability at greater risk than healthcare costs?
Secretary Mabus. The proposed TRICARE enrollment fee increments
only apply to retirees, not Active Duty personnel. Military retirees
over age 65 have access to Medicare for their healthcare needs.
Military retirees under age 65 may have access to other health
insurance mechanisms such as employer sponsored health insurance
programs.

45. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, are other options available
for Navy beneficiaries that are driven out of TRICARE due to cost?
Secretary Mabus. We are committed to providing a high quality,
affordable health care program to our retirees and their families. They
have earned this benefit through years of dedicated service and
sacrifice. While working age retirees may have access to employer-
sponsored health insurance and our over 65 million beneficiaries will
continue to be Medicare-eligible, I do not believe that the proposed
fee increases will result in our beneficiaries being displaced from
TRICARE and that is not the intent. These well-developed proposals will
be tiered based on the beneficiary's retiree pay meaning those who
receive higher retirement pay will pay higher enrollment fee than those
who earn less. With this tiered system, TRICARE will still be far lower
than other health care options. The construct for the fiscal year 2013
tiers are the same levels recommended by the DOD's 2007 Task Force on
the Future of Military Health Care.

46. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, is the state exchange system
being considered as a viable alternative to TRICARE for military
beneficiaries?
Secretary Mabus. I am not in a position to offer perspectives about
the proposed state exchange systems associated with the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. I will, however, reiterate
my commitment to providing an outstanding health care benefit program
to our retirees and their families. Even with this proposed adjustment
to fees for our retiree beneficiaries, TRICARE will remain
exceptionally affordable and one of the finest health care benefits
available.

47. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, do you consider the proposed
increases to be fair and appropriate given the time and the sacrifices
of our military members and their families?
Secretary Mabus. The proposals are reasonable in scope, appropriate
in tiering, indexing and phasing, as well as necessary for the
Department to deliver long-term sustainable health benefits. It is
important to recognize that these proposals are largely focused on the
retired military population and, even with the proposed increases, the
amount of beneficiary cost-sharing remains far below the levels
experienced by retirees in the mid-1990s. The TRICARE fee proposals do
not affect our active duty service members, and specifically exempt
medically-retried service members and their families, as well as
survivors of military members who died on active duty. Even with these
proposed increases, our beneficiaries will continue to have access to
one of the most comprehensive and exceptionally affordable health
benefits available.
The Military Health System is not immune to the challenges of
health care spending that our country is facing. Moving forward, we
must balance controlling health care costs with maintaining an
affordable benefit and this responsibility must be shared by all of us.
These proposals are important to maintaining our obligations to
beneficiaries and ensuring our commitment to improving the long-term
fiscal stability of the Military Health System. Under the leadership of
the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments have worked
carefully to develop these proposals. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Defense has articulated the potential risks to other programs should
these proposals not be authorized. We are at an important inflection
point within our health benefit program and I believe our beneficiaries
recognize these challenges.

U.S. NAVAL FORCES AFRICA

48. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) was created in February 2007. On October 1,
2008, AFRICOM took command of U.S. military operations in Africa. Last
year, I visited Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and
met with Admiral Losey, Commander, CJTF-HOA, their staffs, and the
servicemembers deployed in support of CJTF-HOA. I am impressed with the
number of operations being conducted by the Navy in and around the
African continent to include combating the transit of extremists,
counter-piracy, military-to-military engagements, and building maritime
security capacity through the Africa Partnership Station (APS) program.
I also understand the Navy is expanding its survey of ports in Africa
in order to initiate more contact with African countries through port
visits, continuing to build relationships with our African partners.
The Navy has done incredible work combating high-seas piracy in the
Gulf of Aden. High-seas piracy is now becoming increasingly common on
the west coast of Africa. In 2011, 64 incidents of piracy were reported
in 9 countries off the Gulf of Guinea region, up from 45 incidents in 7
countries in 2010. These attacks seem to be a natural extension of the
common practice of siphoning off crude oil from land-based pipelines
done by Nigerian gangs.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has begun to form alliances
with drug traffickers and other criminal syndicates in South America.
The proceeds from drug trafficking are being used to fund terrorist
activities in north and east Africa. On February 2, 2012, 10 defendants
were arraigned in Mauritania's economic capital of Nouadhibou for
possession of 2 tons of drugs. The defendants were directly connected
to AQIM. Which, if any, African nations have the resources to assist
with building a coalition to fight piracy off the West Coast of Africa
and the Gulf of Guinea?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. No African nation is
singularly capable of providing the adequate means or leadership to
develop a regional coalition to combat piracy and other maritime
illicit activities in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) at this time. However,
recent developments since 2010 among the member nations of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS) show promise of growing collective and
coordinated action within West and Central Africa and the GoG.

49. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what is
the plan to help build the capacity of African nations in those regions
to be able to combat piracy on their own, and what assistance do you
need from Congress?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy, through the
leadership of U.S. Naval Forces Africa and the U.S. Sixth Fleet,
remains committed to building partnerships in Africa via innovative,
low-cost, small-footprint efforts such as maritime exercises,
operations, rotational training missions, and supporting Offices of
Security Cooperation.
Africa Partnership Station (APS) and African Maritime Law
Enforcement Program (AMLEP) continue to be the flagship maritime
security cooperation events for AFRICOM executed by Naval Forces Africa
(NAVAF). The strength of APS and AMLEP lies in their cooperative,
multilateral, multiagency approach whereby U.S. maritime forces
leverage the subject matter expertise of its international partners and
the U.S. interagency to provide training and courses of instruction to
strengthen African maritime security, capability, and capacity.
As part of the interagency, I would like to recognize the
contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard. Their support to AMLEP
operations has been instrumental in developing maritime security
capabilities off the west coast of Africa to combat illegal fishing
activities which cost the region up to $1 billion in losses every year.
They have also contributed to the reduction in illicit trafficking
activities in the region. I would also note the important role the U.S.
Coast Guard has played in assisting Liberia to reestablish its own
Coast Guard.
Consistent with strategic guidance AFRICOM is expanding Offices of
Security Cooperation with additional Foreign Area Officers (FAO) as a
low-cost, small-footprint, force multiplier to building partnership
capacity and affinity for U.S. policies with partner African nations.

50. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, do you
see your engagements in Africa and AFRICOM increasing, decreasing, or
staying the same in fiscal year 2013 and through the FYDP?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Due to budget challenges and
asset availability we anticipate a decrease in Navy ship presence
around the continent. However, the Navy stands by to support the
requirements of the combatant commander and we expect the number of our
overall engagements to stay the same--although the nature of these
engagements is evolving.
We anticipate further cooperation and integration with our Euro-
Atlantic partners, who understand the value of engagement in Africa and
appreciate the global challenges of African maritime security. For
example, Africa Partnership Station (APS) will work with 12 different
Euro-Atlantic partners this year including Brazil, Canada, Italy,
Spain, Portugal, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Belgium,
Norway, and the Netherlands. This work includes partner staff officer
exchanges, training teams for ships, and maritime patrol aircraft
operating in theater.
Additionally, we have seen an increase in participation by regional
partners, and by the end of this year we'll have up to seven different
African maritime forces providing training teams in the effort to build
additional maritime capacity in the region. Our four regional exercises
will be co-sponsored by African partners through regional organizations
such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic
Community of Central African States taking on a key role.
While we may see a reduced U.S. Navy footprint associated with our
engagements in Africa, the desire is for the overall level of
engagement in Africa to remain steady--or even increase slightly. We
anticipate this trend in the changing nature of U.S. Navy engagement in
Africa to continue next year and for the near future.

NAVY GREEN FLEET ALTERNATIVE FUEL PROGRAM

51. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, as you
know, I served as Chairman of the Environment and Public Works (EPW)
Committee in the Senate for several years. I now serve as Ranking
Member on the EPW Committee. The Navy plans to sail its green fleet, a
strike group powered by alternative fuels, by 2016. The success of this
green fleet is predicated upon biofuel, much of it algae-based,
becoming practical and affordable. In 2009, the Navy paid $424 per
gallon for 20,000 gallons of biodiesel made from algae, which set a
world record at the time for the cost of fuel. In December 2011, the
Navy purchased 450,000 gallons of biofuel for $12 million, about $26
per gallon.
This purchase is part of a larger deal in which the Navy has
pledged taxpayers' funds of $170 million as their share of a $510
million effort to construct or retrofit biofuel refineries in order to
create a commercially viable market. This biofuel will be mixed with
petroleum-based fuel in a 50/50 ratio to yield a blend that will cost
roughly $15 per gallon; nearly four times the market price of Jet
Propellant-5 (JP-5). This, of course, is coming at a time where the
Obama administration is cutting the defense budget by $487 billion over
the next 5 years and potentially another $500 billion due to
sequestration.
I have been a strong supporter of alternative energy solutions to
include non-algae biofuels and natural gas. However, DOD pushed back on
those efforts, specifically coal-to-liquid fuels, stating that DOD
would not be used to prop up the alternative energy sector in the
United States. Some of this technology and production capability has
now moved to China. With the Navy and Marine Corps budgets already
decreasing--forcing cuts to personnel, ships, and aircraft--what will
be the impact of tripling or quadrupling your fuel costs?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The referenced 2009 algae R&D
program, which was funded through a congressional add, involved many
labor hours conducting research on the algal pathway and the 20,055
gallons of fuel was the result of this rigorous R&D work. Therefore, it
is inaccurate to divide the total project cost by the amount of fuel
delivered to determine total fuel cost.
Since the volumes of biofuel required for testing are very small in
comparison to overall petroleum use, the Navy does not anticipate a
tripling or quadrupling of fuel costs from testing and certification
efforts. Of the $4 billion budget for liquid fuel in fiscal year 2012
and the additional $1 billion we will pay due to the increase in the
price of fossil fuel, just $12 million (0.2 percent of the overall fuel
bill) will be spent on biofuel to further Navy's on-going test and
certification efforts. The Navy has no plans to purchase alternative
fuel for operational use until it is cost competitive with conventional
fossil fuels.
There are a number of studies that state the case that biofuels
will be cost competitive in the 2018-2025 timeframe without government
investment. These studies are from LMI and Bloomberg New Energy
Finance. Additionally, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Energy has met with over 80 alternative fuel companies,
trade organizations, and venture capital and investment firms over the
past 2 years. When directly asked about the potential for their product
to be cost competitive with fossil fuels, the resounding reaction from
numerous alternative fuel companies is that the costs for alternative
fuel will be cost competitive in the future. Highlighted is the fact
that from a long-term perspective, the cost of biofuels will continue
to drop, while the price of fossil fuels is only expected to increase.
For example the cost of biofuel purchase by the Navy has been cut by
more than half over the last 3 years, even with the purchase of
relatively small amounts.

52. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, how many
steaming or flying days did the Navy sacrifice in order to purchase
biofuels?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Fleet executed all
planned steaming days and flight hours. The fuels referenced were for
testing and evaluation purposes and, thus, not part of the Navy's
operational fuel purchase. Therefore there was no impact to the number
of steaming and flying days associated with this purchase.
By continuing to rely on petroleum fuels, DOD is subject to price
volatility in the global petroleum market and bears potential exposure
to foreign supply disruptions. Last year after the Libyan crisis
occurred, the price per barrel charged by the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) Energy increased $38 to $165 per barrel. With this increase in
the price of a barrel of oil, the Department of the Navy realized a
$1.1 billion increase in our fuel bill. These mid-year increases equate
to less flying hours, less steaming hours, and less training,
ultimately impacting readiness. Additionally, national security is
threatened by the potential to be physically cut off from foreign
sources of petroleum.
Currently, the Navy uses about 50 percent of its tactical fuels
stateside, and 50 percent deployed overseas. The stateside portion is
where most of our crucial training and readiness events take place.
When petroleum prices exceed budget forecasts or supplies are
constrained, the amount of training can get reduced. To ensure the Navy
is ready to serve national interests, this training must not be subject
to the vagaries of the petroleum market. Domestically sourced and
produced advanced alternative fuels could provide energy security for
training and readiness and more budgetary certainty as alternative fuel
prices will not move directly with the petroleum prices.

53. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, at what
cost to the readiness of our naval and Marine Corps forces will you
continue to advocate for defense funds on biofuels?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy's small investment
in testing and certifying drop-in alternative fuels has no impact on
readiness. While the recent $12 million purchase of alternative fuels
represents only 0.2 percent of Navy's overall annual fuel spend, the
bigger challenge to the readiness of our naval forces is due to
increased fuel price volatility of conventional fossil fuels. In fiscal
year 2012 alone, this volatility resulted in an additional $1 billion
bill to Navy operational and maintenance accounts that we must resolve
within our operating budget. Were the Navy to reconcile this bill
exclusively by cutting flying hours and steaming hours, the additional
$1 billion in fiscal year 2012 would represent a 20 percent decrease in
flying and steaming hours. More likely, in addition to cutting flying
and steaming hours, the Navy will resolve the deficit by also reducing
sustainment of our facilities, delaying new programs, and delaying new
and ongoing procurements.
Navy is pursuing alternative fuels to achieve a less petroleum-
dependent future but will not purchase alternative fuels for
operational purposes unless the price is competitive with conventional
fossil fuels. Given the increasingly volatile and challenging market
and supply constraints associated with conventional fossil-fuel based
petroleum, a robust advanced drop-in alternative fuels market is an
essential element of our national energy security. Advanced drop-in
domestically produced alternative fuels that use renewable feedstocks
provide a secure, assured alternative that reduces the risks associated
with petroleum dependence.

54. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, since
you'll eventually need 330 million gallons per year of alternative
fuels to meet your goal of having 50 percent of the Navy's energy needs
supplied from alternative sources by 2020, what price are you willing
to pay per gallon of biofuel to achieve this goal?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. When the Navy is buying
alternative fuels at operational quantities they must be competitive
with the fuels they are replacing.
To meet our 2020 goal, the Navy estimates that annually we will
need 336 million gallons of neat advanced alternative fuels blended 50-
50 with conventional petroleum-derived fuels. This estimated amount is
after the Navy takes into account its achievements in energy
efficiencies.
Advanced alternative fuels are the best way to address the Navy's
sole dependence on highly volatile global oil prices. For every dollar
rise in the price of a barrel of oil, the Navy's fuel bill rises by $30
million. In fiscal year 2012 alone, increased price volatility has
resulted in $1 billion additional bill to the Navy and a more than $3
billion additional bill to DOD. These increases in price must be paid
for either out of the Department's operations which means we will steam
less, fly less and train less or out of other procurements such as
ships and planes. Conversely, the cost of biofuels has been cut by more
than half over the last 3 years, even with the purchase of relatively
small amounts.

55. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, if this
is a priority of yours, are you planning to make any additional
purchases of alternate or synthetic fuels with defense funds this year
or in fiscal year 2013?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. In fiscal year 2012 Navy is
forecasted to spend nearly $4 billion on liquid fuel. Of this, only $12
million, or 0.3 percent of the total fiscal year 2012 fuel bill will be
used to procure alternative fuel. This purchase price is roughly
equivalent to a $.40 increase in the price of a barrel of petroleum. In
early fiscal year 2012, Navy purchased 450,000 barrels of alternative
fuel for $12 million to support the Green Strike Group demonstration at
RIMPAC that will take place in July 2012. The exercise culminates our
testing and certification program by allowing the fleet to utilize
alternative fuels in operations such as UNREPs for our destroyers and
refueling of helos and jets on the deck of our carrier. In addition,
Navy has programmed $16 million in fiscal year 2012 and just over $11
million in fiscal year 2013 for the alternative fuels test and
certification program. This funding supports the testing and
certification of alternative fuels for use in Navy systems, and some
portion of the funding goes to fuel purchases.

56. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, is the
continued use of nuclear power on Navy ships a part of your plan for a
green fleet?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Yes, nuclear powered aircraft
carriers and submarines will continue to be an integral part of Navy's
fleet, and are vital to Navy's ability to carry out its mission.
Nuclear power provides the Navy with unique tactical and strategic
benefits, and plays a key role in reaching the Secretary's goal of 50
percent use of alternative energy by 2020.

57. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, why did
you restrict the proposal to only fuels derived from plants or algae
when other cheaper alternatives to petroleum already exist?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. There are currently no
commercially viable, in-use petroleum alternatives that are drop-in
substitutes for JP-5, JP-8, or F-76. To be fit for Naval purposes, a
drop-in must require no changes to infrastructure and its use must
result in no degradation of performance for our ships and aircraft.
First-generation biofuels do not have the energy density, long-term
storage stability, cold flow properties, and ability to be used in
seawater-compensated fuel tanks that the Navy requires. Gas-to-liquid
and coal-to-liquid technologies are not likely to meet the Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA) Section 526 regulations.
We have not issued a request for proposal (RFP) for fuels derived
only from plants or algae. We have been feedstock agnostic as long as
they meet EISA Section 526, and do not impact food production. Previous
and future solicitations include plant material, algae, municipal solid
waste, animal waste, animal products, municipal sewage sludge, food
waste, yard waste, forest thinning, crop residue, and other vegetative
waste. For a more expansive list of eligible feedstocks, contact USDA's
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).
Fuel for the Green Strike Group in 2012 is primarily derived from
animal fats (byproducts from the poultry industry). A small (10
percent) portion of the feedstock was derived from algae.

58. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what
trade-offs in terms of operational capability are being made to fund
the green fleet?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Navy is not forgoing any
operational capability to fund the Green Strike Group demonstration
during RIMPAC 2012. On the contrary, Navy's investments in the testing
and certification of alternative fuels for use in Navy's platforms will
only increase Navy's future combat capability. Investing in future
technologies, which the alternative fuel effort represents, is crucial
to Navy's ability to remain the world's premier Navy and avoid
detrimental operational effects of rising energy costs.
The need to find cost competitive alternative fuels has never been
greater. In fiscal year 2011 alone, the price of petroleum went up by
$38/bbl, an increase of 30 percent, which equated to a $1.1 billion
increase, that was not included in the budget. This extreme price
volatility and upward trend of fuel prices significantly impacts
readiness in execution years and represents the real future opportunity
cost of failing to position the Navy to use promising cost effective
energy sources.

59. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, is the
Navy looking at all sources of domestic energy alternatives, to include
biodiesel and liquid hydrocarbon fuels made from coal using the
Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Biodiesel, by definition, is
fatty acid methyl ester (FAME), and does not come from the Fischer
Tropsch (FT) process or from coal. Biofuel produced by this process is
not a suitable fuel for use in Navy ships and aircraft as it does not
exhibit the energy density, cold flow properties, oxidative stability,
and non-miscibility with water that the Navy requires.
We have looked at renewable diesel and synthetic paraffinic
kerosene (SPK) yielded by the FT process and we have available data
from the Air Force's extensive testing of FT-SPK. We believe that fuels
created by the FT process, which can also use bio-derived feedstocks,
can be made suitable for Naval use. However, coal-to-liquid fuels are
not likely to meet the Energy Independence and Security Act Section 526
requirements without further development on carbon capture and
sequestration technology that has yet to be demonstrated at a
commercial scale in the United States.

F-35

60. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, the Navy strike fighter shortfall is assessed to be 65 aircraft
in the 2018 to 2019 timeframe. The President's budget request cuts the
F-35 budget by $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2013 and $15.1 billion over
the FYDP. This fiscal year 2013 cut results in 179 fewer planes being
procured over the FYDP. Fiscal year 2013 is the third straight
President's budget that has scaled back F-35 orders. This delay will
increase the overall cost of the program, is already negatively
impacting our international partners in this program, could potentially
reduce the total number of F-35s procured, and will require the Navy to
extend the service life of the F/A-18. While the United States has not
cut the total number of aircraft to be procured, our international
partners are cutting and looking at alternatives to replace their
fighter fleets by 2018--the year many of their legacy aircraft must be
retired with no SLEP planned or budgeted.
These short-term cost savings are having immediate negative impacts
on our long-term readiness, the readiness of our international
partners, and the viability of the entire program. Affordable F-35
recapitalization is dependent on capturing economies of commonality and
scale as quickly as possible. Yet, basic economics tell us that if you
continue to reduce the number of aircraft, unit costs will not continue
to come down. Increasing the production rate is the key to future
affordability and the only path to replacing our aging Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps fleets of multi-role fighters. In your opinion, what
can be done in the near-term to help drive down costs and ensure an
efficient ramp rate to make certain the F-35 program will be affordable
in the long-term?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. DOD reduced low-rate initial
production (LRIP) rates to reduce F-35 program concurrency until there
is higher aircraft design maturity. Continuing at higher production
rates at this stage of development would only result in higher numbers
of aircraft that would have to be retrofitted in the future at an
overall higher cost to the U.S. Government and the taxpayer. This
production strategy decision was informed by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's (OSD) `Quick Look Review' in the fall of 2011
that affirmed that DOD is still in the `discovery' portion of F-35
testing with a design that is no more mature than other aircraft at an
equivalent point. Towards balancing overall program cost and risk,
while implementing a strategy leading to long-term affordability and
efficiency, DOD developed a production ramp to support the prime
contractor and supplier base that leads to a projected full rate
production decision in the fiscal year 2019/fiscal year 2020 timeframe,
following successful completion of Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation.
General Amos. A series of system reviews and cost control
initiatives, overseen by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with participation by all
the services and managed by the JSF Program Office, have been
instituted as part of the program restructure and Defense Acquisition
Board decision in February 2012.
Affordability is the balance of cost and capabilities required to
accomplish assigned missions. Since 2000, the Marine Corps has avoided
the cost of new tactical aircraft procurement during a time where
capabilities and service life of our legacy aircraft were sufficient to
meet the missions assigned. The return on investment in capabilities of
the F-35B outweighs the unavoidable legacy aircraft operations and
sustainment cost increases we will incur with the F/A-18, AV-8B, and
EA-6B. Optimizing this balance is, and will be, a continual process of
refinement as the program development, production, and sustainment
processes mature over the next few years.

61. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, recent delays in the F-35 program have required the Navy to
procure an additional 41 F/A-18E/F aircraft and to extend the life of
150 F/A-18A, B, C, and D aircraft from 8,000 to 10,000 hours. Will the
proposed fiscal year 2013 delay force the Navy to SLEP or procure more
F/A-18s?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The PB-13 Strike Fighter
shortfall will remain below a manageable 65 and is predicted to peak at
56 aircraft in 2025. The Navy will continue to manage the Strike
Fighter inventory through the implementation of management and supply
initiatives, including the accelerated transition of legacy Hornet
squadrons into Super Hornets and the service life extension of 150
legacy Hornets.
Change in strike fighter shortfall projection is mainly attributed
to: A substantial decrease in Hornet 5 year utilization rates and the
proposed Marine Corps TACAIR force structure end state of 20 squadrons
(18 act/2 res), vice 24, in accordance with overall Marine Corps
structure reductions.
The Navy does not plan to increase the F/A-18E/F POR of 565
aircraft or to SLEP more than 150 aircraft.
General Amos. Current Marine Corps aircraft transition planning and
implementation does not include the purchase of additional F/A-18s. If
the JSF delivery profile remains unchanged, and the service life of 150
F/A-18A-D is extended to 10,000 flight hours (along with success in
other mitigation efforts), the Department of the Navy will continue to
assess the most recent shortfall projection as manageable. The Navy
fiscal year 2013 funding fully supports this strategy. However, any
further delay in the JSF delivery profile will have a negative effect
on existing strategies and the projected strike fighter shortfall in
both magnitude and duration. Expanded inventory management decisions
(i.e. Service Life Extension Programs of additional legacy aircraft)
are possible but depend greatly upon expected JSF availability, legacy
aircraft utilization and attrition rates.

62. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, when does the Marine Corps plan
to achieve F-35B initial operating capability (IOC)?
General Amos. The Department of the Navy has not yet determined IOC
for the F-35B and the F-35C. The Navy and Marine Corps require service-
specific operational capabilities as defined in the F-35 Operational
Requirements Document prior to considering declaration of IOC.
Achieving these capabilities are event-driven and dependent upon the
progress of the rebaselined JSF Program.
For F-35C IOC, the Navy requires the following:

(1) One squadron of 10 F-35C aircraft.
(2) Functional Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS)
(including peripherals) and carrier integration modifications in place
to support CVN deployments, airworthiness and flight deck
certifications.
(3) Trained aircrew, maintainers, and support personnel.
(4) System Development and Demonstration/Operational Evaluation
complete and Joint Program Office/F-35 contractor procedures,
processes, and infrastructure capable of sustaining operations of the
F-35C IOC squadron.

For F-35B IOC, the Marine Corps requires the following:

(1) One squadron of 10 F-35B aircraft with required spares, ground
support equipment, tools, technical publications and a functional ALIS
(including peripherals).
(2) One squadron manned with trained/certified personnel capable
of conducting autonomous operations.
(3) F-35B aircraft with the requisite performance envelope,
mission systems, sensors and weapon clearances (Block 2B).
(4) Home base supporting infrastructure and facilities ready and
capable of supporting and sustaining operations.
(5) Qualifications/certifications required for deploying on F-35B
compatible ships and to austere expeditionary sites.
(6) The ability to execute the tactical aircraft directed mission
sets.
(7) Joint Program Office/F-35 contractor procedures, processes,
and infrastructure capable of sustaining operations of the IOC
squadron.

63. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what has been the reaction of the allied partners on the
restructured production plan for the F-35 program?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Overall, partner nations
remain very supportive of the F-35 program and the cooperative
partnership established via the 2006 Joint Strike Fighter Production,
Sustainment, and Follow-on Development (PSFD) Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). While all nations have expressed concern about F-
35 progress, no partners have indicated any plans to leave the program
due to the technical or programmatic challenges encountered in recent
years. While Italy recently announced plans to reduce total procurement
to 90 (vs. 131) aircraft, we understand this is due to national
economic challenges vs. programmatic concerns. And while the potential
exists for other partners to consider changes--no other nation has
formally advised DOD of any modification to national procurement plans.
General Amos. The F-35 Lightning II Program is a joint, multi-
national program among the U.S. Air Force (USAF), U.S. Navy (USN), U.S.
Marine Corps, and eight cooperative international partners: the United
Kingdom (UK), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Turkey (TU), Canada
(CA), Australia (AS), Denmark (DK), and Norway (NO). The International
Partners as well as our U.S. Service partners are keenly interested and
engaged in seeing the JSF enter into service as soon as practicable and
affordable. The United States is obviously leading on test,
development, production and sustainment of the aircraft and has assumed
the highest risk in regards to the concurrency strategy of these
efforts. Our partners sometimes can misinterpret our confidence in the
F-35 program when we restructure it. However, from a Marine Corps
perspective, we are continuously engaged with our international
partners, particularly those procuring the F-35B and F-35C variants, in
seeking out and planning for opportunities to collaborate in
development, training, and long term sustainment of the JSF. Stability
in procurement rates, infrastructure build-out, and meeting our
development and test schedules demonstrate our commitment to the
program and our international partners.

64. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, does DOD believe that the recent announcement will impact when or
how many aircraft the international partners will ultimately buy?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. No. Overall, partner nations
remain supportive of the F-35 program and the cooperative partnership
established via the 2006 JSF PSFD MOU. While all nations have expressed
concern about F-35 progress, no partners have indicated any plans to
leave the program due to the technical or programmatic challenges
encountered in recent years. While Italy recently announced plans to
reduce total procurement to 90 (vs. 131) aircraft, we understand this
is due to national economic challenges vs. programmatic concerns. And
while the potential exists for other partners to consider changes--no
other nation has formally advised DOD of any modification to national
procurement plans.
General Amos. Just as the United States has done in the past, our
international partners in the JSF program will continue to make
adjustments in their procurement plans based on the common factors of
need, funding available, and affordability. In response to decreased
U.S. procurement rates submitted in the fiscal year 2013 budget, it is
anticipated the partners will adjust the timing of their procurements
and possibly reduce their procurement targets. These adjustments will
be coordinated with the Joint Program Office and be formally presented
at the fall 2012 Joint Executive Steering Board that oversees
international governance of the JSF Program.

65. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, is there a cost impact for the partner countries based on the
changes DOD is implementing?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. We are continuing efforts to
understand what cost impact will result for F-35 partner nations
resulting from DOD PB13 quantity changes. Specific F-35 unit recurring
flyaway costs changes will ultimately depend upon the outcome of
contract negotiations with the prime contractor (Lockheed-Martin) for
future LRIP annual procurement actions that combine U.S., Partner, and
(as applicable) Foreign Military Sales purchases in any given LRIP
contract.
General Amos. We are continuing efforts to understand what cost
impact will result for F-35 partner Nations resulting from DOD fiscal
year 2013 quantity changes. Specific F-35 unit recurring flyaway costs
changes will ultimately depend upon the outcome of contract
negotiations with the prime contractor (i.e. Lockheed-Martin) for
future LRIP annual procurement actions that combine U.S., partner, and
(as applicable) Foreign Military Sales purchases in any given LRIP
contract.

66. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what is the importance of international participation to
controlling costs on the F-35 program?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. In addition to the important
national security and coalition warfare benefits and synergies,
international participation in the F-35 program is also important to
DOD for the affordability benefits such participation enables. With
additional international procurements, program costs can be shared over
a higher production quantity base--thereby enabling lower overall costs
to the U.S. Government as the Department moves down the aircraft cost
curve. While higher quantities enable lower costs through production
efficiencies, controlling overall program costs have many additional
components, to include, productivity improvements, elimination of low-
value added tasks contributing to program cost, and similar cost
reduction initiatives that are also being implemented in the F-35
program.
General Amos. In addition to the important national security and
coalition warfare benefits and synergies, international participation
in the F-35 program is also important to DOD for the affordability
benefits such participation enables. With additional international
procurements, program costs can be shared over a higher production
quantity base--thereby enabling lower overall costs to the U.S.
Government as the Department moves down the aircraft cost curve. While
higher quantities enable lower costs through production efficiencies,
controlling overall program costs have many additional components, to
include, productivity improvements, elimination of low-value added
tasks contributing to program cost, and similar cost reduction
initiatives that are also being implemented in the F-35 program.

67. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, what feedback are you getting from pilots and crew at Pax River
on the aircraft performance and flight characteristics?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The F-35 Integrated Test
Force (ITF) test pilots conducting the developmental test of the F-35B/
C aircraft at NAS Patuxent River have provided positive comments about
the aircraft performance and handling characteristics within the
current flight test envelope. The aircraft performance in many flight
regimes is similar to legacy Marine Corps and Navy tactical fighter
aircraft, and in other areas the F-35B/C variants provide performance
and handling qualities that surpass the characteristics of prior
tactical platforms. In particular, the test events executed last fall
on the USS Wasp have indicated that the F-35B provides a significant
increase in ease of operations in the shipboard environment.
General Amos. Feedback from the aircrew and maintenance personnel
at our primary test facility at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD,
has been extremely positive and favorable. As demonstrated in 2011,
flight test is proceeding in accordance with the plan and the results
of testing are as expected for this stage of development.

68. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, how are these aircraft flying?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The eight F-35 B and C
variant aircraft assigned to the Patuxent River F-35 ITF are executing
flight test in accordance with the revised baseline test plan
established in 2011. Test point execution remains ahead of plan for
calendar year 2012 for the B and C variants, and the aircraft are
flying routinely to execute developmental flight test, and executing
ground-based tests as required to meet program goals.
General Amos. Both the F-35C and F-35B variants are achieving
developmental test points within the restructured program parameters.

69. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Amos, you recently lifted the F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing
(STOVL) variant from probation. Please discuss the reasons that led to
this decision.
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Secretary Gates placed the F-
35B on probationary status because it was experiencing significant
unique technical issues (which will be discussed below). As a result of
these issues, the Department of the Navy supported the decoupling of F-
35B testing from the other two variants, allowing the program to
increase focus on F-35B specific developmental issues, while testing on
the other variants progressed. In 2011, the program office addressed
all F-35B probationary risk areas, F-35B successfully completed more
flights and more test points than planned, and overall, F-35B is
currently demonstrating development, test, and production maturity
comparable to, and not substantially different from, the other F-35
variants.
When F-35B was placed on probation, the following five F-35B-unique
technical issues were identified as focused risk areas to be addressed
during the probationary period: Bulkhead Cracks: Cracks developed in
the F-35B flight station (FS) 496 bulkhead after 1,500 hours of fatigue
testing. Auxiliary Air-Inlet Doors: Vortices rolled off the upper lift-
fan door created loads on the auxiliary air-inlet doors in excess of
design limits. Clutch Plate Heating: Higher-than-expected clutch
heating was encountered intermittently during F-35B up and away flight.
Drive Shaft Articulation: Higher-than-expected thermal growth of the F-
35B airframe and engine exceeded the drive shaft articulation
(horizontal movement) standards. Roll Control Nozzle Heating: The roll
control nozzle was overheating during STOVL operations at low airspeeds
(less than 60 knots).
These five technical risk areas have now been addressed in the
following fashion: The FS 496 bulkhead has been redesigned for
production, with additional fixes identified for retrofit of aircraft
already delivered. Upper auxiliary air inlet door hardware has been
redesigned and began flight test in December 2011. Analyses of test
flight results to-date show the design corrected the anomaly. We have
confirmed the source of the clutch-plate friction that was causing the
heating condition and are correcting the design. While the new design
is being qualified and produced, we have mitigated its potential impact
on the current aircraft operations by adding a temperature sensor which
alerts the pilot to modify the aircraft flight conditions to ensure
clutch temperatures do not exceed design limits.
The vertical lift propulsion system drive shafts are being custom
fitted with spacers to ensure the shaft can accommodate the airframe
thermal expansion and contraction, ensuring their airworthiness. While
``tuning'' drive shafts to specific aircraft eliminates the
probationary risk area, it also reduces commonality and may increase
maintenance cost and complexity. As such, we do not believe this
hardware resolution is an affordable fleet solution. To address
commonality/affordability, we are designing a new driveshaft
configuration to provide a common configuration and meet the aircraft's
thermal requirements to permit faster maintenance change-outs and
reduce the number of unique end-items. The probationary airworthiness
risk associated with roll post nozzle actuator heating has been
addressed by insulating the actuator with a thermal blanket. To reduce
aircraft weight, however, we are designing a new actuator that will
also eliminate the need for a thermal blanket. That actuator design
completed its critical design review in January 2012.
The Secretary of Defense decision to lift probation will result in
absolutely no reduction in Department of the Navy's F-35B oversight or
the level of attention given by DOD to each of the F-35 variants going
forward.
General Amos. Based upon the current assessment of the F-35B STOVL
and the requirements of the defined exit criterion, the Commandant of
the Marine Corps and other Department leadership recommended the
removal of F-35B from probationary status. The Secretary of Defense
determined that the F-35B had made sufficient progress in development,
test and production such that no uniquely distinguishing issues require
more scrutiny than the other two variants of the F-35, and on January
20, 2012 he announced that F-35B was no longer in a probationary
status.
Looking back to the 12 months of fixed scrutiny, the F-35B program
made positive increases in flight test metrics, resolved technical
issues, and met performance requirements. In October 2011, the F-35B
satisfactorily executed a limited demonstration of ship suitability
when two aircraft completed the initial sea trials on USS Wasp. Testing
included flight envelope expansion, airborne and deck handling
qualities, and the aircraft effects on the shipboard environment. The
sea trials were very successful. Flight deck heating and exhaust jet
blast velocity demonstrated satisfactory results.
F-35B weight essentially has remained stable since January 2011. In
addition, engine performance data collected has allowed credit for
better lift performance and the Vertical Landing Bring Back) Key
Performance Parameter has maintained a consistently positive margin. In
2011 the F-35B performed on or ahead of the test plan. Total flights
planned versus actual were 293/333 and total test points planned versus
actual were 2272/2636.
The FS 496 bulkhead has been redesigned for production, with fixes
identified for retrofit as needed. F-35B fatigue test (also known as
durability test) resumed January 19, 2012. This particular test had
been halted for new bulkhead fabrication and instrumentation and test
article reconstruction in November 2010. The redesigned upper auxiliary
air inlet door hardware began flight test in December 2011. Analyses of
the results from early test flights are promising; weather and pace of
flights will determine when this is completed. Additionally, ordering
of modification kits for aircraft retrofit began in parallel with this
testing in order to gain clearance for fleet STOVL mode operation as
soon as possible.
Airworthiness concerns with the lift fan clutch heating issue have
been mitigated by the incorporation of a temperature sensor that alerts
the pilot to take corrective action if the clutch exceeds acceptable
temperatures. At the same time, a detailed root cause investigation for
a permanent fix to eliminate clutch heating is underway. The
airworthiness risk associated with roll post actuator heating has been
mitigated by insulating the actuator with a thermal blanket. The
critical design review for a new actuator design that will eliminate
the need for a thermal blanket was conducted January 19-20, 2012.
The vertical lift propulsion system drive-shafts are being custom
fitted with spacers to ensure the shaft can accommodate the airframe
thermal expansion and contraction. While this is currently a
maintenance burden, it eliminates the airworthiness concerns with the
current driveshaft design. A new driveshaft that can meet the actual
aircraft environmental requirements is in the early phases of the
design process.

MISSILE DEFENSE--SM-3 AND AEGIS

70. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, I
continue to have concerns about our current missile defense plan. While
the SM-3 Block IB (short/medium range) will be tested this year and
hopefully fielded in 2015, the SM-3 Block IIA (short/medium/
intermediate range) is in design with a 2018 projected fielding date
and the SM-3 Block IIB (long range) is still a concept. Intelligence
estimates state that Iran may have a long range ballistic capability by
2015. What is your current level of confidence in being able to deploy
the SM-3 2A by 2018 and the SM-3 IIB by 2020?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. SM-3 block IIA and SM-3 block
IIB are being developed by the Missile Defense Agency. Both programs
are expected to begin deliveries in 2018 and 2020 respectively. Based
on the close relationship that Navy shares with MDA in developing and
proving Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities, Navy has confidence
that MDA will execute the programs as planned.

71. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, Aegis
missions include maritime security, anti-submarine warfare, surface
warfare, and missile defense. By the end of this year, 23 Aegis ships
will be ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable and 110 SM-3
interceptors will have been delivered. However, the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review notes, ``the demand for missile defense assets
within each region over the next decade will exceed supply.'' Do we
have enough Aegis ships and missiles to meet the wartime requirements
of all our combatant commanders?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Demand for missile defense
assets, to include multi-mission Aegis ships and missiles, continues to
exceed supply within each region as stated in the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review. While Navy is filling the most critical
combatant commander demands for multi-mission Aegis ships, Navy is not
able to meet the full demand without exceeding personnel and homeport
tempo guidelines designed to sustain a capable force over time.
Combatant commander demands are reviewed periodically and
adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense through the Global Force
Management process to ensure the demands are prioritized based on
overarching global defense priorities and that the Navy's limited BMD
capacity is applied to the most critical needs.
Navy is employing a number of material and non-material approaches
to mitigate the capacity shortfall by moving forward with three
coordinated efforts to increase the capability and capacity of its BMD-
capable combatants. Navy will also forward deploy four BMD-capable
destroyers to Rota, Spain, in order to source EUCOM demands more
efficiently.
Navy continues to review force structure as a function of demand
and fiscal conditions and shares the committee's concerns regarding our
limited BMD capacity but is working within the constraints of the
existing fiscal environment and therefore accepts risk.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), as the acquisition organization
responsible for delivery of the SM-3 missile, is procuring SM-3
missiles to support Navy sourcing Global Force Management plans.

72. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, is the
demand for Aegis ships now and in the future outstripping supply?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy currently has
sufficient surface combatants to meet the most critical demands for
multi-mission warships. The Navy continues to review force structure as
a function of demand and fiscal conditions and is currently conducting
a force structure assessment in support of revised strategic guidance,
which will further refine the large surface combatant requirement.

73. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, are there
Aegis readiness concerns, and, if so, how does the fiscal year 2013
budget address these concerns?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. As part of our normal process
of improving system reliability and performance, Navy has established
an Aegis Combat System Readiness Review board to provide a holistic
assessment of continued Aegis readiness in terms of interoperability,
maintainability, test & evaluation, manpower, training, and current
development efforts. This effort continues to improve current readiness
and enables Navy's Aegis Surface ships to meet current and future
threats. The fiscal year 2013 budget provides $249 million in fiscal
year 2013 and $552 million across the FYDP to address this process of
improving reliability and performance. Specifically, we are addressing
interoperability and computer software improvements, SPY readiness
improvement actions such as increasing SPY transmitter reliability,
increasing waterfront technical support and training, and including
improvements based on Fleet feedback into current Aegis development.

DETAINEES AND GUANTANAMO BAY

74. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, last
year, terrorist Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was interrogated aboard a U.S.
Navy ship. This move by the Obama administration seemed to be as, or
more, focused on avoiding the use of the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay as properly interrogating Warsame and preparing him for
trial. The interrogation aboard a Navy ship seems to have brought as
much international backlash for the Obama administration as
transferring Warsame to Guantanamo Bay would have. The administration
was accused of violating the Geneva Convention by prolonging
interrogation of Warsame on a ship. If Warsame had been transferred to
Guantanamo Bay, he would have had the benefit of the Expeditionary
Legal Complex and appropriate legal representation. I joined several
other members of this committee in protesting the transfer of Warsame
to Article III, civilian, courts in New York. I have long-supported the
use of the world-class detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and the
Expeditionary Legal Complex that is best-suited to hold, interrogate,
prepare, and try detainees. Are you comfortable with the Obama
administration's practice of prolonged detention on Navy ships instead
of immediate transfer to a detention facility; the most appropriate of
which is Guantanamo Bay?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy does not conduct
long-term detentions, or internment, aboard naval vessels. The Navy
does, when necessary, temporarily detain individuals aboard vessels for
screening, as was the case with Ahmed Warsame, or for other lawful
purposes. Temporary detention of al Qaeda detainees aboard U.S. Navy
vessels provides a legal, humane, and operationally feasible
alternative to conducting tactical screening and interrogation
operations in land-based facilities, particularly when those facilities
are thousands of miles removed from the point of capture. Congress has
afforded the executive branch the critical legal authority to use
``necessary and appropriate force'' against al Qaeda and associated
forces, which includes the authority to detain members wherever they
may be captured, pursuant and subject to the law of war. The execution
of this detention authority may lawfully occur--temporarily--aboard
U.S. Navy vessels. Such detentions fully comply with Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, DOD Directive 2310.01E (the DOD Detainee
Program), and the Detainee Treatment Act. Nothing in the law of armed
conflict prohibits the temporary holding of detainees at sea for
screening or other lawful purposes. Indeed, in cases of capture at
sea--as was the case with Mr. Warsame--some period of detention at sea
would be absolutely necessary.

75. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what are
the risks associated with prolonged holding of detainees on Navy ships?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. No military operation can be
conducted completely free from risk. As the Navy's Operational Risk
Management Instruction (OPNAVINST 3500.39C) directs, it is incumbent on
commanders and leaders at all levels to recognize and consider those
risks and, through prudent planning, effective training, and sound
execution, mitigate them to acceptable levels commensurate with the
imperative of accomplishing the mission.

76. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what is
your impression of the operations, quality of our personnel, and
treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Detention operations at
Guantanamo Bay are conducted under the command and control of a Joint
Task Force. Those operations are conducted professionally and in full
accordance with U.S. law and the law of war. The quality of U.S.
military personnel at the base is outstanding. Detainees are treated
humanely and in accordance with U.S. regulations and international law.

77. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, have you
changed any operations in preparation to close Guantanamo Bay in
accordance with President Obama's Executive Order to close the
facility?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Detention operations at
Guantanamo Bay are conducted under the command and control of a Joint
Task Force and not the Department of the Navy. The Navy continues to
support the Joint Task Force's detention operations. In the event that
the President orders the termination of detention operations at
Guantanamo Bay, the Navy is prepared to support the Joint Task Force in
its efforts to terminate the mission.

MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH

78. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, there are over 34,000 marines
deployed, with over 22,000 in Afghanistan. In 2007, the Marine Corps
increased their end strength by 27,000 marines. The Marine Corps
expects to achieve an end strength of 202,934 at the end of fiscal year
2012; 834 higher than its permanent authorized end strength of 202,100.
Although end strength numbers are planned to remain relatively stable
through fiscal year 2014, there is a planned reduction of 15,300
marines in fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016. The Marine Corps
continues to struggle to achieve its goal of 1 to 3 dwell time. What is
the current dwell time ratio for the Marine Corps?
General Amos. As of May 2012, there were more than 26,000 marines
deployed around the world, 17,800 of which were in Afghanistan. We
expect our overall force level in Afghanistan to continue decreasing
throughout the remainder of this calendar year in accordance with
prescribed DOD timelines and objectives. Pending final congressional
approval of the fiscal year 2013 budget, the Marine Corps' active duty
end strength is scheduled to be 197,300 marines by October 1, 2013.
Over the FYDP, our end strength is slated for continued reductions with
a final goal of 182,100 marines on active duty by the end of fiscal
year 2016, thus equating to a measured and responsible rate of
reduction of approximately 5,000 marines per year over the FYDP. There
are no scheduled reductions in our Reserve component, which will remain
at 39,600 marines.
During times of war, the deployment to dwell time (DEP:DWELL) goal
for the Marine Corps continues to be 1:2 for our Active component
combat units and 1:5 for Reserve component forces (See attached two
slides depicting DEP:DWELL ratios of primary Marine Corps combat units
for the past 9 years. Column 1 reflects combined ratios throughout
operations ISO of both OIF/OND and OEF. Column 2 reflects support to
OEF only). Given the drawdown of Marine forces in Afghanistan over the
coming year, we anticipate the dwell time of our combat units to
improve. However, many units throughout the Marine Corps already have
more favorable dwell times greater than 1:2. Moreover, through our
force structure review conducted in 2010-2011, we addressed the
manpower issues associated with marines in ``high-demand/low-density''
military occupational specialties (e.g. signals and geospatial
intelligence, linguists, etc), resulting in improved dwell times among
those in these fields. We continue to work actively to recruit, promote
and retain the right number of marines in the right occupational
specialties, thus promoting resiliency in our Total Force.
In a post Operation Enduring Freedom security environment (i.e.
2014 and beyond), we will strive for a 1:3 DEP:DWELL goal within our
active duty combat units. We have revised our Marine Corps Service
Campaign Plan to synchronize the mechanisms of our institution to
facilitate and support these future goals.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

79. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, what is the dwell time goal for
the Marine Corps?
General Amos. During times of war, the DEP:DWELL goal for the
Marine Corps continues to be 1:2 for our Active component combat units
and 1:5 for Reserve component forces. Given the drawdown of Marine
forces in Afghanistan over the coming year, we anticipate the dwell
time of our combat units to improve. However, many units throughout the
Marine Corps already have more favorable dwell times greater than 1:2.
Moreover, through our force structure review conducted in 2010-2011, we
addressed the manpower issues associated with marines in ``high-demand/
low-density'' military occupational specialties (e.g. signals and
geospatial intelligence, linguists, etc) resulting in improved dwell
times among those in these fields. We continue to work actively to
recruit, promote and retain the right number of marines in the right
occupational specialites, thus promoting resiliency in our Total Force.
In a post-Operation Enduring Freedom security environment (i.e.
2014 and beyond), we will strive for a 1:3 DEP:DWELL goal within our
active duty combat units. We have revised our Marine Corps Service
Campaign Plan to synchronize the mechanisms of our institution to
facilitate and support these future goals.

80. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, what risks are associated with
reducing the Marine Corps' size?
General Amos. As directed over the coming FYDP and pending
congressional approval, we will draw down our force from its current
end strength of 202,100 marines to 182,100 in a measured way beginning
in fiscal year 2013 and concluding at the end of fiscal year 2016. As
we reduce end strength, we must manage the rate carefully so we reduce
the force responsibly. We will draw-down our end strength by
approximately 5,000 marines per year. The pace of Active component
drawdown will account for completion of our mission in Afghnistan,
ensuring proper resiliency in the force relative to dwell times.
By the end of fiscal year 2016, the resulting 182,100 Active-Duty
Force, supported by our operational Reserve component, retains the
capacity and capability to support steady state and crisis response
operations through rotational deployments, and to rapidly surge in
support of major contingency operations. Although reshaping the Marine
Corps from 202,100 marines to 182,100 marines entails some risk to our
ability to simultaneously respond to multiple large-scale
contingencies, it is manageable. We intend to leverage the diverse
depth and range of assets within our Reserve component both to mitigate
risk and maximize opportunities where available.

81. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, what assurances do we have that
we will not need a larger Marine Corps in the future?
General Amos. I cannot assure you that we will not need a larger
Marine Corps in the future. However, the 182,100 Active Duty Marine
Corps force that we have designed through our Force Structure Review
and in support of the new Defense Strategic Guidance issues in January
2012 can support the geographic combatant commanders' demand for crisis
response, forward presence and large scale amphibious operations as
part of a joint campaign. This force, complemented where needed by our
39,600 Reserve component, will have enough flexibility to respond to
the unknowns of the future security environment.

82. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, what is the primary driver behind
the decision to reduce the size of the Marine Corps?
General Amos. In an effort to ensure the Marine Corps is organized
for the challenges of the emerging security environment following our
commitment in Afghanistan, we conducted a capabilities-based Force
Structure Review beginning in the fall of 2010 to identify ways we
could rebalance and posture for the future. The Force Structure Review
incorporated the lessons learned from 10 years of combat and addressed
21st century challenges confronting our Nation and its Marine Corps.
The review sought to provide the ``best value'' in terms of capability,
cost and readiness relative to the operational requirements of our
forward-engaged geographic combatant commanders. The results of that
effort have been shared with Congress over the past year. While
affirming this strategy-driven effort, we have aligned our force based
on the realities of constrained spending levels and new Defense
Strategic Guidance issued in January of this year.
During our comprehensive Force Structure Review, we tailored a
force structure to ensure a sufficient type and quantity of force
available to meet the forward presence, engagement and crisis response
requirements of the geographic combatant commanders. The resulting
force structure is intended to meet title 10 responsibilities, broaden
capabilities, enhance speed and response options and foster the
partnerships necessary to execute the range of military operations
while providing the ``best value'' to the Nation. This force structure
also accounted for the addition of enabling assets (e.g. combat
engineers, information operations specialists, civil affairs personnel,
specialized intelligence marines, cyber operators, special operators,
etc.) necessary to meet the demands of the battlefields of today and
tomorrow.
The resulting 182,100 Marine Active-Duty Force, supported by our
operational Reserve component, retains the capacity and capability to
support steady state and crisis response operations through rotational
deployments, and to rapidly surge in support of major contingency
operations. Our 182,100 Marine Corps represents fewer infantry
battalions, artillery battalions, fixed-wing aviation squadrons, and
general support combat logistics battalions than we had prior to
September 11. However, it adds cyber operations capability, Marine
special operators, wartime enablers and higher unit manning levels-all
lessons gleaned from 10 years of combat operations; it is a very
capable force.

UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA TREATY

83. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, one of the first things
President Reagan did when he entered the White House in 1981 was to
reject the United Nations (U.N.) Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS).
Despite the Clinton administration signing the treaty in 1994 and
efforts by the George W. Bush administration, this Senate has refused
to ratify it. U.S. accession to UNCLOS would harm U.S. national
interests and jeopardize our sovereignty. UNCLOS gives the U.N. the
power authority to regulate seven-tenths of the world's surface area,
to levy international taxes, to regulate ocean research and
exploration, to impose production quotas for deep-sea mining and oil
production, or to create a multinational court system. UNCLOS will
restrict intelligence gathering and mandate technology transfers and
information-sharing with our allies and our enemies. UNCLOS will
constrain U.S. naval activities and do nothing to resolve maritime
territorial claims issues. UNCLOS would expose the United States to
countless environmental lawsuits to include suits based on alleged U.S.
contributions to global climate change. In the end, UNCLOS would expose
the United States to lawsuits on virtually any maritime activity with
any judgment rendered by the UNCLOS Tribunal being final, unappealable,
and enforceable in U.S. territory. Are you comfortable with Article 298
that says a dispute over whether an activity is military would be
decided by an international tribunal or other manner as prescribed by
the treaty?
Secretary Mabus. Accession to UNCLOS will in no way impair U.S.
military operations, including intelligence gathering operations. I am
also comfortable with the dispute resolution procedures set forth in
UNCLOS because the United States will be able to exempt all military
activities. Furthermore, the U.S. will determine what constitutes a
military activity. UNCLOS makes it clear that a State Party may
completely reject all the dispute resolution procedures--on its own
terms--for disputes involving maritime boundaries, military activities,
and matters before the Security Council. Military officers serving on
the delegation that negotiated the Convention ensured that the military
activities exemption is ironclad. Accordingly, there are no processes
or procedures available to an opposing State, court, or tribunal to
attempt to review a State's determination that an activity is a
military activity. Finally, to ensure that no one could mistake that
the United States rejects dispute resolution for military activities,
the proposed Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent could contain
language conditioning accession to the Convention based on its
understanding that under Article 298(1)(b) each State Party has the
exclusive right to determine whether its activities are or were
``military activities'' and that such determinations are not subject to
review.
Becoming a party to UNCLOS would not require any compromise to U.S.
national security. The effect would be just the opposite. Becoming a
party would significantly enhance U.S. national security. Twelve Chiefs
of Naval Operations and five Secretaries of the Navy are on record
supporting U.S. accession to UNCLOS. Every President since Ronald
Reagan has supported its ratification and the Secretary of Defense,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, and I
strongly support it as well.

84. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Mabus, can you foresee any
requirements of the treaty forcing the United States to make a choice
between national security and fulfilling the treaty requirements, and,
if so, how would you go about addressing the conflict?
Secretary Mabus. No, becoming a party to the treaty would not
require any compromise to U.S. national security. The effect would be
just the opposite. Becoming a party would significantly enhance U.S.
national security. Twelve Chiefs of Naval Operations and five
Secretaries of the Navy are on record supporting U.S. accession to the
Law of the Sea Convention. Since the satisfactory resolution of the
deep seabed mining provisions in 1994, all three Presidents have
supported U.S. accession.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

SSBN(X)

85. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, the
Navy is designing the SSNB(X) with 16 submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) tubes as opposed to the 24 currently on Ohio-class subs.
This decision was made to reduce the procurement cost of boats 2
through 12 in the program to $5.6 billion. With implementation of the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Navy will inactivate 4
tubes per sub in current Ohio-class subs, so that only 20 missiles are
aboard each SSBN. This brings the fleet capacity down to 240 SLBMs. The
Navy in the Ohio replacement program, however, is planning a force of
12 SSBNs with 16 tubes, which will take our SLBM fleet even further
down, from 336 missiles to 192 missiles. We can't predict with
certainty the need for strategic deterrent forces out to the year 2080,
when the final SSBN(X) is scheduled to leave service, and for that
reason I believe we may be taking on significant additional risk with
this decision. Is the plan to design the SSBN(X) with 16 tubes rather
than 20 fully supported within all parts of DOD including STRATCOM?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Ohio-class SSBN shipfill
requirement of 288 missiles is based on 12 operational Ohio-class
SSBNs. The Navy maintains 14 Ohio-class SSBNs to support taking ships
offline for an extended mid-life refueling. The Ohio Replacement will
be built with a life-of-ship reactor which will eliminate the mid-life
refueling and allow 12 Ohio Replacement SSBNs to provide the same at
sea presence as 14 Ohio-class SSBNs.
OSD and U.S. Strategic Command concur with the Navy's plan to
recapitalize the Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent with a class of
12 Ohio Replacement SSBNs, each hosting 16 missile tubes. While
developing the Ohio Replacement Milestone A Service Cost Position,
coincident with the submission of the New START implementation plan,
the Navy conducted an in-depth, extensive review of the capability
requirements for the Ohio Replacement SSBN. This analysis concluded
that a force of 12 Ohio Replacement SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each
can carry all the sea-based warheads and maintain sufficient excess
capacity for the future, meeting the Nation's sea-based strategic
requirements. A 20-tube variant would inappropriately sacrifice other
shipbuilding requirements for excess capacity.

86. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert,
regarding procurement cost, how certain are you that reducing the
number of tubes will have a significant impact on actually reducing
procurement cost?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The cost savings associated
with a 16-Tube vs. a 20-Tube Ohio Replacement SSBN design is expected
to be approximately $3 billion across the total class. Reducing the
design by four missile tubes (one quad pack) is estimated to save $0.2
billion per ship (average follow ship hulls 2-12) and approximately
$0.5 billion of non-recurring engineering costs for the first ship. All
costs are in fiscal year 2010 dollars.

87. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, with a
growing threat of strategic nuclear advancement in countries such as
Iran, and with SSBNs accounting for the most survivable leg of the
triad, does this reduction in SLBMs make sense and how will it affect
our ability to provide strategic deterrence for the United States and
our allies?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The plan to reduce deployed
SLBMs is aligned with the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and
DOD policy objectives. While these reductions are necessary to meet the
limits directed by the New START Treaty, they do not adversely impact
our strategic deterrence against threats to the United States or our
allies.

MARINE CORPS EQUIPMENT RESET/REGENERATION

88. Senator Chambliss. General Amos, in your prepared statement you
discuss the Marine Corps strategy for resetting your equipment based on
nearly 11 years of war. You have also redeployed equipment from Iraq to
Afghanistan which resulted in deferring previously planned reset
actions. You state that the reset of equipment retrograded to home
station from Iraq is complete; however, the equipment density list that
supports combat operations in Afghanistan totals approximately 95,000
items. A large portion of that equipment is communications equipment
and vehicles such as mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles and all
of your medium tactical vehicle fleet.
I am extremely impressed with what the Marine Corps has been able
to accomplish--with both your people and your equipment. It is a
testament to your leadership and can-do attitude and as you state,
``your proud . . . reputation for frugality.'' However, this bill is
going to come due and--as you say in your statement--``while you have
received a good portion of the required funding for reset . . . there
is more to do at home stations [and depots to reset the forces].''
Looking forward, and assuming you get the money you need to perform
this reset and regeneration work, do you have the people and other
resources you need to perform this work?
General Amos. The Marine Corps' $3.2 billion strategic reset
liability is an end-of-war estimate that is continuously assessed
against a myriad of costing variables associated with transportation,
labor, contracted logistics and other costs associated to the repair
and replacement of the equipment needed to meet enduring force
structure requirements. Separate and distinct from the strategic reset
liability is our request for operational reset funding of $1.1 billion
in fiscal year 2013 to support/maintain ongoing operations in
Afghanistan, stock rotation and in-theater reset actions. Strategic
reset is executed as forces permanently retrograde from Afghanistan.
Marine Corps Logistics Command and the newly established Marine
Corps Depot Maintenance Command are planning to hire the necessary
workforce to meet our reset demands. We anticipate the workload within
our organic depots to increase steadily through fiscal year 2015 and we
project over 80 percent of our strategic reset dollars will be executed
within these same depots.
As good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, we are continuously
revalidating our strategic and operational reset requirements with the
most current planning factors available. Accordingly, we expect to make
minor adjustments to ensure we request only the resources needed to
reset the force. The continued support of the Congress will ensure we
meet our ground equipment reset objectives and remain America's
Expeditionary Force in Readiness.

NEW MARINE DEPOT MAINTENANCE COMMAND

89. Senator Chambliss. General Amos, the Marine Corps recently
activated Marine Depot Maintenance Command which combines Marine Corps
Maintenance Centers at Albany, GA, and Barstow, CA, under a single
headquarters with two operating plant locations. I understand that the
purpose of the Marine Depot Maintenance Command is to provide
innovative worldwide maintenance repairs and technical services for
ground combat, combat support, and developmental projects. I know this
command has only been operating for a short time, but I would
appreciate any thoughts you have on how it is operating so far as well
as any additional explanation you have regarding the efficiencies and
improvements that the Marine Corps hopes to achieve through this new
command.
General Amos. The consolidation of our two maintenance centers
under the single Marine Depot Maintenance Command was a strategic
initiative to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our organic
depot maintenance program. Marine Depot Maintenance Command began
operations during the first quarter of fiscal year 2012, and is
aggressively working to achieve full capability by the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2013.
Under the new model, our two organic plants will provide
maintenance and maintenance-related services, while the production
planning, business operations, engineering, and material management
will be performed at the single headquarters element. This initiative
reduces the duplicative business overhead functions inherent with two
separate commands.
Marine Depot Maintenance Command is expected to yield significant
efficiencies and improvements in two key ways: cost savings and
standardization of business and production processes. Beginning in
March 2013, we anticipate a net annual savings of $14 million to $16
million and an overall net savings of $65 million to the Department of
the Navy Working Capital Fund across the FYDP. Further, the
standardized business and production processes resulting from a
consolidated command structure will lead to greatly reduced variability
in end products and services.

F-35

90. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and
General Amos, affordability is the underlying premise of the F-35
program--yet this budget proposes for the 4th year in a row a flat
production rate of 30 aircraft per year. In your opinion, what can be
done in the near-term to help drive down costs and ensure an efficient
ramp rate to make certain the F-35 program will be affordable in the
long-term?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The reason we reduced LRIP
rates is that we wish to reduce F-35 program concurrency until there is
higher aircraft design maturity. Continuing at higher production rates
at this stage of development would only result in higher numbers of
aircraft that would have to be retrofitted in the future at an overall
higher cost to the U.S. Government and the taxpayer. This production
strategy decision was informed by the OSD's `Quick Look Review' in the
fall of 2011 that affirmed that DOD is still in the `discovery' portion
of F-35 testing with a design that is no more mature than other
aircraft at an equivalent point. Towards balancing overall program cost
and risk, while implementing a strategy leading to long-term
affordability and efficiency, we developed a production ramp to support
the prime contractor and supplier base that leads to a projected full
rate production decision in the fiscal year 2019/fiscal year 2020
timeframe, following successful completion of Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation.
General Amos. An efficient JSF ramp rate as presented in the fiscal
year 2013 budget submission represents an effective approach to
controlling cost growth. Furthermore, it avoids concurrency costs
associated with development and production occurring at the same time,
yet retains a rational ramp rate that preserves industrial base
investments made to date and leverages the capacity to optimize
production growth when appropriate.

91. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and
General Amos, please speak to the importance of international
participation to controlling costs on the F-35 program.
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. In addition to the important
national security and coalition warfare benefits and synergies,
international participation in the F-35 program is also important to
DOD for the affordability benefits such participation enables. With
additional international procurements, program costs can be shared over
a higher production quantity base--thereby enabling lower overall costs
to the U.S. Government as the Department moves down the aircraft cost
curve. While higher quantities enable lower costs through production
efficiencies, controlling overall program costs have many additional
components, to include, productivity improvements, elimination of low-
value added tasks contributing to program cost, and similar cost
reduction initiatives that are also being implemented in the F-35
program.
General Amos. The international partners, to include the United
States, are keenly engaged in seeing the JSF enter into service as soon
as practicable and affordable. Adjustments based on affordability and
need are the prerogative of each JSF partner. As such when and how many
aircraft are procured affect the procurement cost of the aircraft in
both the short and long term. The decisions of each partner, including
the United States, directly affect the consortium of nations involved
with this program. We can expect our fiscal year 2013 decisions to have
an impact on procurement plans of our international partners.

92. Senator Chambliss. General Amos, Secretary Panetta recently
visited Naval Air Station (NAS) Patauxent River where he announced the
removal of the F-35B STOVL from probationary status. I understand he
also visited with some of the test pilots and other test program
personnel during his visit. What feedback are you getting from pilots
and crew on the F-35B performance and flight characteristics?
General Amos. Feedback from the aircrew and maintenance personnel
at our primary test facility at NAS Patuxent River, MD, has been
extremely positive and favorable. As demonstrated in 2011, flight tests
are proceeding in accordance with current planning and results are as
expected for this stage of development.

COMMERCIAL ULTRA-HIGH FREQUENCY CAPACITY

93. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, I
understand the existing satellite constellation providing ultra-high
frequency (UHF) capacity for U.S. Government agencies is nearing the
end of its lifespan, and the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
satellite program includes legacy capacity which, in time, will
ultimately replace the existing constellation. However, the initial
MUOS satellite orbits are not projected to cover North and Latin
America which creates a capability gap, especially if one of the aging
satellites fails. How many of the existing UHF follow-on (UFO)
satellites, in percentage terms, are within 12 months of their nominal
design life?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Seventy-five percent (six of
the eight) of UFO satellites currently on orbit are at or beyond their
14 year design life. The remaining two have been on orbit for 12.4 and
8.3 years. Despite projected losses in the UFO constellation, current
predictions indicate that the UFO constellation augmented by the MUOS
legacy payloads will likely provide the required legacy UHF capacity in
all Areas of Responsibility (AORs) through at least 2018. MUOS wideband
code division multiple access (WCDMA) terminals are projected to be
available in 2013 and will start fielding in 2014. Extended
availability of legacy capacity will allow the MUOS WCDMA-capable
constellation to reach Full Operational Capability and the
corresponding terminal programs to synchronize fielding timelines.

94. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, since
the MUOS advanced waveform terminals are likely to be slow to roll out,
even with the launch of MUOS-1, is it possible that our UHF systems
might fail to deliver the currently stated requirement for UHF service?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Statistical reliability
analysis conducted by the Navy has shown that the launch schedule
anticipated by the Navy for MUOS satellites (actual dates will be set
by the Air Force Current Launch Schedule Review Board) will maintain
the legacy UHF SATCOM requirements set by the JROC through 2018.
In an effort to reduce the risk of an unplanned loss of a UHF
satellite to acceptable levels, the Navy has aggressively implemented
several mitigation activities to extend the service life of the
existing constellation and increase on-orbit capacity. As a result, the
current legacy UHF SATCOM capacity provides the warfighter with
approximately 459 more accesses (111 more channels) worldwide than
required by the stated Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
capacity requirement. This additional capacity is equivalent to three
UFO satellites, provides a buffer against unplanned losses in the
future, and minimizes the training and mission impact to a manageable
level.

95. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what
is the status of the MUOS-1 advance waveform terminal program?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) Network Enterprise Domain (NED) program office is
projecting Formal Qualification Testing (FQT) of the MUOS WCDMA
waveform v3.1 (a.k.a. Red/Black Waveform) in August 2012. This waveform
will then be ported on the Handheld Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS)
Manpack radio, via an applique to the existing form factor. The HMS
Manpack will then be the first radio to have the MUOS capability. This
would mean that an operationally representative user terminal would be
available in time for the MUOS Developmental Testing (DT)/Operational
Testing (OT) period in early fiscal year 2014.

96. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, when
will these terminals be available for global deployment?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The JTRS NED program office
is projecting FQT of the MUOS Waveform v3.1 (a.k.a. Red/Black Waveform)
in August 2012, which would enable it to be ported to the JTRS HMS
Manpack radio by February 2013. This would mean that an operationally
representative user terminal would be available in time for the MUOS
Developmental Testing (DT)/Operational Testing (OT) period in early
fiscal year 2014. The Navy currently intends to buy 202 JTRS HMS
Manpack radios across the FYDP, including 50 radios in fiscal year 2013
to support MUOS testing, as part of an inventory objective of
approximately 450. The Navy does not have the details of the current
MUOS terminal fielding plan for the other services.

97. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, how
long will DOD be reliant on legacy UHF satellite services?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy anticipates the
legacy capability will meet and exceed the current requirement levels
through 2018. Legacy capacity is expected to decline after 2018 due to
the expiration of the UFO satellites, but the legacy payload on MUOS
satellites, each of which provide legacy capacity equivalent to one UFO
satellite, will continue to maintain legacy capability throughout the
lifetime of the MUOS program.
The level of DOD reliance on legacy UHF satellite services depends
on the fielding of MUOS capable terminals. The Navy currently intends
to buy 202 JTRS HMS Manpack radios across the FYDP, including 50 radios
in fiscal year 2013 to support MUOS testing, as part of an inventory
objective of approximately 450. The Navy does not have the details of
the current MUOS terminal fielding plan for the other services.

98. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, will
coalition forces also be adopting the advanced waveform?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The National Security Agency
currently restricts the MUOS WCDMA waveform from being released outside
of the United States.

99. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, recent
stories published in defense and aerospace professional journals
describe a shortfall in existing UHF capacity, citing that only 10 to
20 percent of requests are filled. Today, there are commercial
companies who are prepared to manufacture and launch UHF satellites at
no cost to the U.S. Government, except in return to have the
opportunity to sell capacity if it is needed via the Government
Services Administration schedule. The United States made the decision
in 2010 to partner with the Australians on a commercially-provided,
UHF-hosted payload in the Indian Ocean region. Now that the private
sector intends to launch an identical payload into the Atlantic Ocean
region, what U.S. and allied plans are being made to take advantage of
this capability?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The DOD partnered with the
Australian Minister of Defense (not the commercial provider) for access
to 250 kHz of UHF narrowband satellite communications (SATCOM) on a
commercial satellite payload that Australia is leasing over the Indian
Ocean Region from 2012 to 2027. In exchange, the United States will
provide the Australians access to 200 kHz of spectrum over the Pacific
and 50kHz of spectrum globally from 2018-2033.
Since all DOD requirements for UHF SATCOM capacity are projected to
be met over the Atlantic Ocean Region through 2018, the U.S. DOD is not
planning to take advantage of this commercially-provided UHF hosted
payload in the Atlantic Ocean region.
Through a combination of the implemented gap mitigation actions,
commercial leases, international partnerships, and the MUOS legacy
payloads, the DOD UHF SATCOM leadership is maximizing technical and
fiduciary efficiencies to ensure the warfighter has access to legacy
UHF SATCOM capacity that meets the CJCS requirements and provides a
buffer against unplanned losses. Despite projected losses in the UFO
constellation, current predictions indicate that the UFO constellation
augmented by the MUOS legacy payloads will likely provide the required
legacy UHF capacity in all AORs through at least 2018. MUOS WCDMA
terminals are projected to be available in 2013 and will start fielding
in 2014. Extended availability of legacy capacity will allow the MUOS
WCDMA-capable constellation to reach Full Operational Capability and
the corresponding terminal programs to synchronize fielding timelines.
Because DOD requirements are met for the foreseeable future, the U.S.
Navy is not pursuing any additional commercial UHF SATCOM capacity at
this time. The Navy will continue to monitor the health of the current
UHF SATCOM constellation for any signs that it is degrading more
rapidly than currently projected. If it appears the level of legacy UHF
SATCOM service will fall below CJCS requirements, the Navy will revisit
all options, including commercial leases and hosted payloads, to
maintain the current level of legacy service to the warfighter until
the transition to the MUOS WCDMA capability is complete.
Additional details are available in the Report to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on ``Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) Requirements and Options for Additional
Capacity'' submitted on March 19, 2012.

100. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, given
that a commercial capability would not cost anything upon launch,
wouldn't its augmentation and license to launch act as insurance should
another UFO satellite reach a point of failure?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. UHF SATCOM payloads currently
available on commercial satellites provide less than 3 percent of the
capacity of a MUOS WCDMA payload due to the inherent limitations of
their design and the UHF SATCOM spectrum. The Navy has evaluated the
use of hosted UHF payloads on commercial satellites, is currently
leasing capacity on two commercial satellites, and has access to
additional commercial capacity through partnerships with foreign
governments. The current military and leased commercial legacy UHF
SATCOM capacity provides the warfighter with approximately 111 more
channels worldwide than required by the CJCS capacity requirement,
which is equivalent to three UFOs and provides a buffer against
unplanned losses in the future. Because DOD requirements are met for
the foreseeable future, the U.S. Navy is not pursuing any additional
commercial UHF SATCOM capacity at this time. The Navy will continue to
monitor the health of the current UHF SATCOM constellation for any
signs that it is degrading more rapidly than currently projected. If it
appears the level of legacy UHF SATCOM service will fall below Chairmen
Joint Chief of Staff requirements, the Navy will revisit all options,
including commercial leases and hosted payloads, to maintain the
current level of legacy service to the warfighter until the transition
to the MUOS WCDMA capability is complete.
Navy does not approve or disapprove spectrum licensing requests. To
obtain a license for any commercial UHF payload, the commercial vendor
must formally submit the application to operate their UHF payload to
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC would forward the
application to the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA). The NTIA would then request a formal response
from the DOD. The DOD would evaluate the application and provide the
NTIA with a formal response. The Navy is not currently aware of any
pending UHF SATCOM licensing requests.
Additional details are available in the Report to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on ``Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) Requirements and Options for Additional
Capacity'' submitted on March 19, 2012.

101. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert,
according to COCOMs and other Services, the demand for UHF SATCOM is
very high and many requests are denied. Can you address this problem?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Chairman, Joint Chief of
Staff sets requirements for Narrowband MILSATCOM for all DOD users
based on warfighter needs, and the Navy fills those as the DOD
Acquisition Agent for Narrowband SATCOM. CJCS legacy UHF SATCOM
requirements are met, and are projected to be met or exceeded through
2018. The follow on MUOS CJCS requirements are captured in the MUOS
Capabilities Production Document dated 15 January 2008, and the MUOS
program is on track to meet all key performance parameters given in
that document. Increased capacity requirements, combined with inherent
limitations of the military UHF SATCOM spectrum, drive the need to move
beyond legacy UHF waveforms found in current military and commercial
UHF SATCOM systems to the new WCDMA capability found in MUOS.

VIRTUALIZED NETWORKS

102. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, a
promising and cost-effective new cybersecurity technology is that of
virtualized networks which use virtual machines inserted between the
operating system and the network interface to provide a capability
analogous to spread-spectrum frequency-hopping radios for internet
protocol (IP)-based networks and devices. This capability allows for a
multitude of cybersecurity options, including: creation of stealthy
networks; permitting multiple peers to relay traffic; isolating attacks
and rerouting them for analysis and response; and allowing rapid
changes to a device's network identity. In addition, multiple robust
offensive options are also available. Please comment on any work the
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is doing regarding assessing
virtualized network technologies to reduce hardware requirements and
costs.
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. As the Department of the Navy
Corporate Laboratory, NRL continuously investigates all areas of
information technology security to best leverage successful
technologies for Naval use. NRL works closely with the authoritative
cyber elements of the Navy, to include OPNAV N2/N6, Commander 10th
Fleet, and Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command to help develop and
select technologies to better defend our cyber assets. NRL has reviewed
many concepts, including IP agility, and virtualization, and will
continue to evaluate any new technology with respect to scaling and
security concerns inherent to military architectures.
The fact of the matter is that commercial industry is driving the
technology and capabilities for virtualized networks and virtual
machines. With the assistance of NRL, the Navy has been and will
continue to leverage this commercial industry investment to reduce our
per-unit costs across the Navy's networking and computing enterprise.
Specific initiatives to date include:

Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI)/Next Generation Network (NGEN)
The Navy through the existing NMCI infrastructure and systems and
the replacement services of NGEN have incorporated server
virtualization on nearly all key IT services, eliminating over 2,000
servers and reducing its infrastructure footprint by approximately 40
percent. This not only reduced per-unit costs but also improved the
reliability and availability of the affected systems by approximately
30 percent. More recent efforts are now underway to bring these same
virtualization capabilities to the NMCI/NGEN desktop computers to
further expand these services improvements and efficiencies.

OCONUS Navy Enterprise Network (ONE-NET)
Technical refresh of all ONE-NET data center infrastructure is
underway and has been completed in 5 of 11 data centers at the Local
Network Service Centers (LNSC) and 2 of 3 of the Theater Network
Operations Security Centers (TNOSC) data centers. This refresh provides
reduction in physical server count and data center footprint by
implementation of virtualization capabilities for core services as well
as centralization of email services to the TNOSC. This has resulted in
an average 30 percent reduction in physical servers at completed
locations in addition to providing a flexible, scalable architecture to
allow the platform to accommodate the OCONUS rapidly changing
environment and provide a means for further consolidation of services.

Consolidated Afloat Network And Enterprise Services
The Navy recently awarded a contract to Northrop Grumman to replace
our existing shipboard networks and computer systems with a system that
uses virtual machines and virtual networks. This system will establish
a standard computing environment across ship classes, reducing the
number of hardware variants within the Navy's inventory. This enables
the Navy to reduce both acquisition and life-cycle costs.

Regarding virtualization related to consolidating equipment hardware
for cost savings:
CENTRIXS-Virtualization was recently implemented at the Pacific
Regional Network Operating Center (NOC) during migration to the new P-
173 facility. This resulted in significant operational cost-savings and
a more dynamic, flexible architecture capable of supporting increased
cyber-security through the use of rapid addition of virtual machines in
the near future. As reference the original 77 servers supporting seven
different networks were reduced to 21 servers now running almost 100
virtualized machines consistent with the DOD guidelines for distributed
application. The P-173 implementation has become the accredited
virtualized standard to be implemented at other Naval NOCs.
The major challenge for leveraging virtualization to reduce
hardware requirements and cost is a policy issue--not a science and
technology issue. Virtualization allows for the abstraction of software
from hardware, turning hardware into a commodity that could be
purchased Navy-wide. However, current programs of record are still
buying dedicated hardware for their software, which defeats the cost
savings potential of virtualization. The consolidation of hardware and
rapid hardware refresh are policy issues that will need to be
addressed. Furthermore, current policies (or at least their current
interpretations) do not allow the certification and accreditation (C&A)
of software divorced of a specific hardware implementation. C&A, as
well as testing and evaluation, policies will need to be updated to
enable software to be hosted on a wide range of hardware platforms and
also ensure that software can be rapidly updated to deliver new
capabilities.

103. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, would
virtualized networking significantly and economically enhance the
cyberwarfare capabilities of the Navy by simultaneously providing
defensive and offensive capability?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Yes, virtualization will
enable the Navy to enhance our cyber warfare capabilities.
On the defensive side, the Navy currently employs multiple security
products (both hardware and software) at each of our tactical Network
Operating Centers. As part of our information dominance strategy, we
are investigating migration to a common hardware environment that
supports virtual network defense capabilities. Our goals include
lowering infrastructure costs and providing a more robust platform to
rapidly integrate emerging defense capabilities to counter both main-
stream and advanced persistent cyber security threats to the Navy's
networking and computing enterprise.
As stated in the National Institute of Standards and Technology's
SP800-125: ``Full virtualization has some negative security
implications. Virtualization adds layers of technology, which can
increase the security management burden by necessitating additional
security controls. Also, combining many systems onto a single physical
computer can cause a larger impact if a security compromise occurs.
Further, some virtualization systems make it easy to share information
between the systems; this convenience can turn out to be an attack
vector if it is not carefully controlled. In some cases, virtualized
environments are quite dynamic, which makes creating and maintaining
the necessary security boundaries more complex.'' The benefits of
virtualization need to be balanced against these challenges to assess
its overall utility from a network defense perspective.
Pacific Fleet is actively engaged in the Computer Adaptive Network
Defense in Depth (CANDID) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration
(JCTD) to examine these issues and improve the overall security of the
networks used to support operational forces.
On the offensive side any discussion of this topic needs to be
addressed in a classified environment.

104. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what
is NRL doing with respect to virtualized networking to establish
stealth and maneuver in the cyber arena?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy is aggressively
assessing and investing in stealth and maneuver in the cyber arena from
the perspective of mission assurance in a cyber contested environment
that needs both a ``fight tonight'' and long-term enterprise strategy.
The ability to defend and sustain our command and control at the
tactical, operational and strategic tiers and supporting operations
such as logistics is a key tenant to any warfighting operation which
will be Joint and most likely an allied coalition effort. Virtual
networks for the protection of critical functions through cryptographic
isolation from broader enterprise network access is a part of a
holistic approach that also encompasses terrestrial and space
transport, sensors, and risk management mechanisms for access to
information.
The Navy has several ongoing efforts that have the combined effect
of creating ``cyber terrain'' for which principles of war in the
physical space can be applied by the operational commander for
defending and obfuscating critical infrastructure, deterrence by
denying an adversary intelligence, and having a clear view of any
adversary actions that can be used for situational assessment and
future exploitation. These efforts include:

The service lead for the fiscal year 2011 2-year
CANDID JCTD for Joint Command and Control (C2) mission
assurance in the PACOM area of responsibility that is providing
the ``fight tonight'' solution for implementation of a C2
virtual secure enclave on existing service networks and data
boundary sharing devices for COCOM risk managed access from the
broader enterprise. CANDID is utilizing commercial internet
protocol (IP) security strategies that have been validated by
NSA, server virtualization and secure client access methods to
the protected data services, such as CITRIXS, that can be used
on existing services' information technology (IT)
infrastructure. This all provides the benefits of reduced cost,
scalability to implement today on service networks and
increased security.
Investing in an aligned computer network defense
approach for sensing and responding to network threats that
attempt to disrupt, alter, or compromise our lines of
communication.
Employing new long haul DISA network transport
services that are cryptographically separated from end-user
networks to prevent denial of service threats.
Investing in virtualization and cloud computing
technologies that will inherently provide CANDID virtual
networking capabilities in future enterprise networks ashore
and at the tactical edge.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

SHIPBUILDING

105. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, the
current FYDP has the Navy investing an average of $13 billion annually
in shipbuilding over the next 5 years. This will result in the new
construction of 41 ships, a decrease of 16 ships from 57 ships in last
year's FYDP. Moreover, the Navy's Long-Term 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
indicates we will build ships at ``minimum sustaining rates''. The
relatively low orders for new ships proposed in this plan may
jeopardize our ability to support our shipbuilding industrial base over
the intermediate- to long-term. I am particularly concerned that the
postponed construction of new ships will lead to job reductions. I am
also concerned about the follow-on impacts on our supplier base that
cannot be quickly resolved when new construction is initiated. This
will raise costs and make it difficult to realize desired shipbuilding
cost efficiencies over the long-term. It is irresponsible to think one
can lay off skilled workers/engineers and expect them to be immediately
available when future contracts are awarded. Is the Navy concerned
about the employment valleys that will emerge when ships are delayed in
the budget?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Despite the constraints of
the congressionally passed Budget Control Act, the Fleet will be at the
same level at the end of FYDP as it is today, and will continue to grow
outside the FYDP as the shipbuilding plan delivers three to four
littoral combat ships, two to three destroyers and two to three
submarines per years. Under this plan, Navy will reach 300 ships by
2019. It should be pointed out; however, that ship levels did shrink in
the 8 years before I took office. The fleet stood at 316 on September
11, 2001, but dropped to 283 by 2008.
Over the past several years, the Navy has placed a priority on
increasing shipbuilding rates and providing stability for the
shipbuilding industrial base. Stability translates into retention of
skilled labor, improved material purchasing and workforce planning,
strong learning curve performance, and the ability for industry to
invest in facility improvements, all resulting in more efficient ship
construction and a more affordable shipbuilding program which will
minimize the impact on employment when ships may be delayed in the
budget.

106. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what is
the Navy's plan to help mitigate any such impacts on the industrial
base?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy's fiscal year 2013
shipbuilding plan supports a stable shipbuilding industrial base. The
Navy recognizes that level loading of ship procurement to help sustain
minimum employment levels and skill retention promotes a healthy U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base. Consequently the ship construction plan
has been adjusted to reduce year-to-year budget fluctuations as much as
possible while maintaining the best feasible procurement sequence to
help stabilize shipyard loading.
The shipbuilding plan effectively accounts for and supports both
the anticipated combatant commander demands and those of the national
shipbuilding design and industrial base to build and sustain tomorrow's
Navy. In the near-term the Navy has a good understanding of
requirements, costs and capabilities and the construction plan is based
on actual contract costs or, at the least, well founded cost estimates
based on this understanding. The Navy's construction plan assesses
those costs to the greatest extent possible to ensure the industrial
base remains evenly loaded and the workforce levels can be sustained at
profitable levels within the individual shipyards. New construction
will be funded consistent with balanced investment profiles and
expected future budgets.

AMPHIBIOUS SHIP GAP

107. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, from an operational
perspective, the Navy budget calls for a decrease in the number of
deployable battle forces to 284 ships in fiscal year 2013, including 11
aircraft carriers and 31 large amphibious ships. Force structure
changes will result in a Navy fleet size of more than 280 ships over
the next 5 years. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
the Navy's fiscal year 2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan's stated minimum
number of amphibious warships available for deployment is 30, while the
Marine Corps' objective is to have 34 amphibious warfare ships
available for deployment. These reduced numbers of amphibious ships
will pose challenges to fulfilling the amphibious force requirements,
and give rise to a sea-lift capability gap and aviation-lift gap as
early as 2015. Combatant commanders' requests for amphibious ships have
increased over 80 percent over the last 5 years. How does the Navy's
30-Year Shipbuilding Plan address these combatant commanders' requests,
given the fact that approximately 1 out of 10 amphibious ships are
always in cycle for scheduled maintenance?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy's PB2013 force structure and readiness
investments will deliver forces to meet the fiscal year 2013 Global
Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The GFMAP is the Secretary of
Defense-approved plan for allocation of forces to the combatant
commanders. The GFMAP addresses the most urgent combatant commander
requirements and manages risk within the DOD's resource and force
structure constraints. Navy supplies forces to combatant commanders
using the Fleet Readiness and Training Process (FRTP). The FRTP ensures
ships, aircraft, and their crews complete required training,
maintenance, and certification prior to deployment. Amphibious ship
maintenance is part of the FRTP and is factored into the commitments
for presence identified in the GFMAP. Going forward, the shipbuilding
program described in the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan builds and maintains
a battle force inventory of approximately 300 ships and achieves an
inventory of 31 amphibious ships by 2020.

108. Senator Wicker. General Amos, with a pivot to the vast Asia-
Pacific region and given the Navy's inability to meet its own
requirement of 313 ships, currently at 284, how will this affect your
ability to protect American security interests?
General Amos. The Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility
(AOR) is dominated by the ocean and so is ideally suited to naval and
amphibious forces. As such, amphibious shipping is optimal for the
movement and employment of marines across the range of military
operations. PACOM currently has four amphibious warships forward
deployed, that are critical to day-to-day operations in the AOR.
Refocusing the national security strategy on the Pacific requires an
increase in mobility. Emergent requirements, such as the Australia
Marine Air Ground Task Force, would benefit from additional amphibious
shipping capacity. Other lift options, such as the Joint High Speed
Vessel, somewhat mitigate the lack of mobility, but do not replace all
of the capabilities inherent in amphibious shipping. Decreasing the
number of amphibious warships in the inventory reduces the number of
vessels available to support an increased U.S. presence in the Asia-
Pacific region and elsewhere for that matter. Furthermore, it stresses
the ability to support CENTCOM Amphibious Ready Group/Marine
Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) rotation.
Within the Navy's total ship inventory, the Marine Corps has an
enduring requirement for 30 (10 LHA/D, 10 LPD, 10 LSD) operationally
available ships needed to execute geographic combatant commander
operational plans requiring joint forcible entry, conduct rotational
deployments (e.g. Marine Expeditionary Units at sea) and respond to
crisis around the world. When considering the term ``operationally
available,'' it is important to note that it implies a ship that is
able to deploy immediately or on relatively short notice. Factoring
maintenance cycles and other prevailing conditions, the amphibious
warship fleet typically requires an inventory above 30 vessels to meet
a day-to-day deployable threshold in support of the previously
mentioned, required mission profiles. If this inventory were to fall
below 30 warships, Marine forces would still be able to respond around
the world, but the rate of response might vary. As a means to mitigate
this risk, the geographic combatant commanders may place a heavier
demand on ISR, prepositioning, forward deployed forces, and strategic
air and sea lift to ensure forces are available in the timings
required. Shortfalls in these types of critical warships will require
personnel, equipment and sustainment to transit strategic distances via
TRANSCOM and will be subject to prioritization of limited assets to
meet competing demands. Having 30 amphibious ships operationally
available at the time and place needed by the geographic combatant
commanders will significantly reduce these risks.

BOW DOMES

109. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, as the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
closely monitor all facets of the Navy's shipbuilding plan.
Specifically, with respect to the Seawolf program, what is the status
of the Seawolf spare bow dome?
Admiral Greenert. During the USS Seawolf (SSN-21) Depot
Modernization Period at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate
Maintenance Facility (PSNS&IMF), significant de-laminations were found
in the SSN-21 bow dome which required repair. A repair was conducted on
the de-laminations in March 2011 using a vacuum assisted resin transfer
molding process.
Concurrent with repairs to the USS Seawolf bow dome, the spare
Seawolf-class dome was shipped to PSNS&IMF to be available if needed.
With all three Seawolf-class submarines homeported in the Pacific
Northwest, PSNS&IMF is logistically the best location to store the
Seawolf class spare bow dome.
During the transit along the northern coast of California, the
shipment encountered high sea states and damage occurred to the bow
dome and fixture. In the current state the spare Seawolf dome is not
usable.
Navy experts are analyzing the damage to the spare dome and
evaluating several options to repair or replace the spare bow dome.

110. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, can the neoprene boot be
removed from the Seawolf spare dome and reused?
Admiral Greenert. While removing the neoprene boot may be possible,
it has never been done before and there is a risk that the boot would
be damaged to the point that it would be unusable as a result of such a
procedure. Prior to considering such a procedure, a rigorous technical
evaluation would be required. NAVSEA is evaluating the damage and
options to repair or replace the spare bow dome, no decision has been
made at this time. If a decision is made to repair the spare bow dome,
a technical evaluation of removing the boot will be considered at that
time.

111. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, does the Navy have plans to
build additional spares if the current spare cannot be repaired?
Admiral Greenert. No decision has been made at this time. Navy
experts are analyzing the damage to the spare dome and evaluating
several repair or replacement options. If the spare bow dome cannot be
repaired, the Navy will weigh the cost and schedule for replacement
options against the risks to determine if maintaining a risk mitigation
spare bow dome is required.

112. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, will there be a competitive
solicitation for Block IV and beyond for Virginia-class bow domes?
Admiral Greenert. Currently, there is a single vendor that provides
Virginia-class bow domes and boots. Although the development of an
alternate method and source for dome fabrication has been demonstrated,
it does not yet include a process for installing a boot over the glass
reinforced plastic dome. Until further development of the alternate
method has been completed and technically approved, a competitive
procurement is not planned. Currently the shipyard procures the bow
domes.

113. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, what is the time table for
Block IV solicitations for bow domes?
Admiral Greenert. The Request for Proposal to Electric Boat (EB)
for the Block IV ships is planned to be released in August 2012. The
bow dome is contractor furnished equipment so the exact time table for
solicitations is not known, however it is anticipated EB will begin
issuing Requests for Information (which are the basis for the
shipbuilder proposal) to vendors starting in April 2013.

114. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, the current autoclave
infrastructure will only work on Virginia-class size domes and boots.
What are the Navy's plans for building bow domes and boots for sizes
larger than Virginia-class?
Admiral Greenert. The Ohio Replacement SSBN will have a bow dome
larger than the Virginia-class. The Navy has not made a decision on the
type of bow dome that will be used.

NATURAL GAS

115. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, in 2009, the Navy paid $424 a
gallon for 20,000 gallons of biodiesel fuel made from algae. The Navy
now requires 330 million gallons per year of alternative fuels to meet
the Secretary's stated goal of having 50 percent of the Navy's energy
needs supplied from alternative sources by 2020. What efforts are
ongoing or will start in fiscal year 2013 with DOE on developing new
technologies for improving biodiesel fuel?
Secretary Mabus. The referenced algae R&D program, which was funded
through a congressional add, involved many labor hours conducting
research on the algal pathway and the 20,055 gallons of fuel was the
result of this rigorous R&D work. Therefore, it is inaccurate to divide
the total project cost by the amount of fuel delivered to determine
total fuel cost.
Regarding the question on biodiesel, the term biodiesel applies
strictly to FAME fuel, which is not suited for use on Navy platforms
due to its inferior energy density, cold flow properties, oxidative
stability, and the issues created when it is used in seawater-
compensated fuel tanks. The Navy has been testing fuel from a different
family of fuels known as hydrotreated esters or fatty acids (HEFA) that
can serve as a drop-in replacements for Navy fuels. HEFA fuels do not
have the performance issues of biodiesel, and are categorized into what
industry calls ``advanced drop-in biofuels,'' or fuels that function
the same as the product they are intended to replace with no changes to
infrastructure, engines, or performance.
The Navy will be working closely with the DOE (as well as USDA) in
fiscal year 2013 on advanced drop-in biofuels as partners in the
Defense Production Act Title III Advanced Drop-in Biofuels Production
Project, to which each agency will eventually contribute $170 million.
This effort is dedicated to advancing the domestic drop-in biofuels
industry to commercial maturity.
Various offices within the DOE, including Advanced Research
Projects Agency-Energy, work in collaboration with the Office of Naval
Research and the Navy Research Lab on next generation advanced drop-in
biofuels pathways, on subjects ranging from using seawater to produce
syngas, to electrofuels.

116. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, when will Congress be briefed
on the results of the Navy's $170 million portion of the $510 million
effort to construct or retrofit biofuel refineries?
Secretary Mabus. We will provide progress updates upon achieving
major milestones in this effort. On March 29, the DPA title III
executive agent issued a draft notice to industry and we anticipate
Broad Agency Announcement for phase one this summer. When utilizing the
DPA authority DOD generally employs a multi-phased approach and the
advanced biofuels effort will do the same. In phase one, companies will
complete rigorous technical, architectural/engineering, business case
and financing deliverables. This data will be evaluated by both a team
of government experts and a third party reviewer and only those
companies deemed competitive from this process will be eligible for
funding in phase two.

DOD GREEN BUILDING POLICY

117. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, in December, Congress passed
and the President signed the NDAA which directed DOD to produce a
report on the cost of building certification under Leadership in Energy
Environmental Design (LEED) and other green building rating systems.
The enacted law also included a strict ban on the use of funds to
obtain LEED Gold or Platinum certification for any DOD construction
that would increase costs. Not long after Congress passed this ban, a
Navy official claimed, as quoted by the Federal Times, that ``the Navy
is moving ahead with its plan to certify all of its buildings as LEED
Gold by the end of fiscal year 2013.'' Can you give me an update on
your plans to address the specific language we included in the NDAA
bill last year?
Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy has taken steps to
ensure full and immediate compliance with NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012
language pertaining to expenditure of funds for achieving LEED Gold or
Platinum certification. In coordination with OSD and the other
Services, the Navy is finalizing formal LEED policy reflecting the NDAA
language and its limitations. As required by the NDAA, the Navy is
reviewing energy-efficiency and sustainability standards. The results
of that review will be consolidated into the OSD report due to the
congressional defense committees later this year.

118. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, are you moving forward with a
LEED policy despite congressional direction to look at all green
building rating systems and the ban on LEED Gold and Platinum
certifications?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy has taken steps to ensure full and
immediate compliance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 language
pertaining to expenditure of funds for achieving LEED Gold or Platinum
certification. In coordination with OSD and the other Services, the
Navy is finalizing formal LEED policy reflecting the NDAA language and
its limitations. As required by the NDAA, the Navy is reviewing energy-
efficiency and sustainability standards. The results of that review
will be consolidated into the OSD report due to the congressional
defense committees later this year.

119. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, are you considering other
green building rating systems or alternative approaches to your green
building policy?
Secretary Mabus. The report on cost-benefit, return on investment,
and long-term payback of LEED and other green building rating systems
affects all the Services. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD I&E) is leading the
services in evaluating green building rating systems including LEED.

120. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, I understand that the Navy is
under pressure to reduce costs. My State is a leader in the processing
and availability of construction materials, which are recognized by
several green building rating standards. I will also note that some
rating standards (e.g. National Green Building Standard and Green
Globes) equally recognize construction materials certified under the
Sustainable Forestry Initiative, Forest Stewardship Council, American
Tree Farm System, and Programme for the Endorsement of Forest
Certification systems. Their recognition helps to promote sustainable
forestry, protect jobs, and keep costs low. Do you have a plan to
ensure that requests for proposal (RFP) for future construction
projects explicitly allow forestry certification standards to equally
compete?
Secretary Mabus. It is the Department's understanding that the
Forest Stewardship Council certification is an open industry
certification standard, available to the entire timber industry, and
there are many available timber sources complying with this standard.
The Department is changing the language in RFPs which currently
mandate LEED Materials and Resources Credit 7 with the Federal mandate
associated with this issue, Guiding Principle V. ``Reduce Environmental
Impact of Materials.'' The new language will effectively make the LEED
Credit 7 ``optional'' for certification and allow the contractor to
choose wood products from forests certified by other timber certifying
agencies.

TRAINING COSTS AND SCHEDULE DELAYS

121. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, the time between receiving a
commission to when the servicemember reports for duty can often be a
lengthy period, especially in the aviation community. My office has
been working with OSD on determining cost and schedule delays for newly
commissioned military officers. Given the current austere fiscal
environment, how much money is being spent by the Navy on personnel
between their post-commission and pre-specialty training?
Secretary Mabus. The majority of officer pipeline training ``down
time'' occurs in the production of naval aviators and flight officers.
The cost associated with officers Not Under Instruction (NUI) was $52.1
million in fiscal year 2011, a 27 percent reduction from fiscal year
2010. This figure includes time spent Awaiting Instruction (AI),
Awaiting Transfer (AT), on Medical Hold (HM), on Legal Hold (HL) and
during Interruption of Instruction (II). Each is tracked and
appropriate measures taken to minimize time lost in each category,
which reduces total time NUI. It is far less costly for sailors to
remain in an AI and AT status than to construct, operate, and maintain,
new facilities along with instructor, simulator and labs that have
large funding tails.

122. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, additionally, what measures
has the Navy implemented to reduce the amount of time and costs
associated with this down time?
Secretary Mabus. Measures being implemented within the Navy
Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E) Enterprise to
reduce the amount of time and costs associated with this ``down time''
(i.e., time not under instruction (NUI)) include:

Naval Aviation Schools Command coordinates directly
with accession sources to smooth the flow of students following
graduation by adjusting reporting dates on permanent change of
station orders to minimize wait time.
The 1-week Division Officers Leadership Training
Continuum, previously conducted during other phases of aviation
pipeline training, is now administered while student naval
aviators await Aviation Preflight Indoctrination (API).
We are maximizing available training seats to reduce
or eliminate missed training opportunities (MTO), which
represent a more significant risk than time spent awaiting
instruction.
We have increased focus on reducing time Awaiting
Transfer (AT) following training since the investment is far
greater later in the student training path.
Local commanding officers assign some officers to
collateral duties while awaiting instruction as specific needs
arise.

MILITARY EDUCATION

123. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, there is a growing trend
within DOD to conduct joint military education. However, each military
department has its own military academy and own war college. I continue
to be concerned about redundancy and lack of efficiency with regard to
our professional military education programs. What are the operating
costs for the Navy War College (NWC) and the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA)?
Admiral Greenert. NWC and USNA are unique education institutions
that develop Navy's future maritime leaders for service in a seagoing,
military organization. USNA sea-centric disciplines include naval
architecture, ocean engineering, naval mechanical engineering, and
oceanography. Its undergraduate education prepares newly commissioned
officers for fleet service as members of the submarine, surface, and
aviation communities. NWC builds leaders and commanders who integrate
maritime capabilities into joint and combined operations and plans. It
develops leaders with attributes necessary to innovate, adapt and
succeed in planning and delivering maritime warfighting and support
capabilities to assure naval dominance on, under, and over the seas.
NWC operating costs were $86.5 million in 2011. Operating costs for
the USNA were $328.0 million in 2011.
USNA operating cost includes Operation and Maintenance (O&M,N),
Other Procurement (OPN) and facilities funding. It also includes
Military Personnel (MP,N) for commands that exist solely for support to
USNA.
Funding information in this response is not directly comparable to
responses to similar questions that addressed only direct operating
costs because this funding information includes facility costs for USNA
and military personnel costs.

124. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, what measures are being
implemented to ensure efficiency and reduce redundancies among the
Services with regard to undergraduate and postgraduate professional
military education?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy works to promote efficiency and
eliminate redundancy both with our Service-specific education and
within Joint Professional Military Education. Within the Navy, the USNA
and the NWC are accredited institutions that efficiently develop Navy's
future maritime leaders. In 2009, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
(VCNO) was appointed as Navy's Education Executive Agent to guide
Navy's investment in education by providing the vision and direction to
enable unity of effort through coordinated policy, validated
requirements, prioritized resources, and standardized processes. The
VCNO-chaired Advanced Education Review Board (AERB) was also
established in 2009. The AERB meets semi-annually under the VCNO's
personal direction to evaluate educational policies, goals, and
practices of the USNA, NWC, and Naval Postgraduate School for
effectiveness and efficiency. Additionally, the AERB ensures that
advanced education policy, programs, long-range objectives and resource
investments are in keeping with Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
guidance and implementation of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower.
There is a common core of Joint and Service professional military
education requirements over an officer's military career. For the Navy,
those requirements are expressed as learning outcomes designed for each
level of professional military education.
The USNA offers an undergraduate curriculum accredited by the
Middle States Commission on Higher Education that concentrates on both
undergraduate academic education and undergraduate-level Professional
Military Education (PME) appropriate to develop newly commissioned Navy
and Marine Corps officers. Best practices and efficiencies are shared
between the Service Academies annually on a formal basis.
For commissioned officers and warrant officers, the faculty at the
Naval War College is responsible for developing and executing four
levels of professional military education: Primary, Intermediate (with
Joint Professional Military Education Phase I), Senior (with Joint
Professional Military Education Phase II), and Flag-level. Using a
single faculty to design and execute these programs ensures that the
education is progressive and efficiently designed to build knowledge
and skills over a career.
Likewise, the faculty at the Naval War College designs and executes
all Service-wide Navy Professional Military Education for enlisted
personnel through four levels of educational programs: Introductory,
Basic, Primary (all distance learning delivered via Navy Knowledge
Online), and the Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA). The Senior Enlisted
Academy is an integral element of the Naval War College and the
enlisted faculty there provides expertise and perspective necessary for
developing enlisted education. Again, the single faculty working in a
single geographic location helps ensures curricula are designed most
efficiently.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes two directives
for joint professional military education: the Officer Professional
Military Education Policy and the Enlisted Professional Military
Education Policy. These directives contain common educational polices,
standards and educational outcomes expressed in terms of learning areas
and learning objectives. This common core of instruction taught in all
service schools and colleges accredited by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff provides focus and promotes efficiency of the joint
education system. In addition, the CJCS issues annually a list of up to
10 special areas of emphasis to highlight the concerns of OSD, the
Services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff regarding
coverage of specific current joint subject matter.
The Chairman's directives on joint professional military education
establish organizational structures, processes and venues described
below to ensure joint education is delivered efficiently and is current
and relevant to the needs of the joint force and the Nation.

The Military Education Coordination Council (MECC)
serves as an advisory body to the Director, Joint Staff on
joint education issues and consists of the presidents,
commandants, and directors of the joint and Service
universities and colleges, heads of other accredited
institutions, and the Joint Staff J7. The purpose of the MECC
is to address key educational issues of interest to the joint
education community, promote cooperation and collaboration
among MECC members institution, improve efficiency, and
coordinate joint education initiatives. The MECC meets at least
once annually.
The Joint Faculty Education Conference for officer
joint professional military education meets twice annually. The
purpose of these conferences is to present emerging concepts
and other material relevant to maintaining curricula currency,
assessing proposed special areas of emphasis, comparing
curricula content/delivery and sharing best practices.
Intermediate-level and Senior-level colleges
accredited by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
delivery of congressionally-mandated Joint Professional
Education Phases I and II periodically undergo an
accreditation--the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education
(PAJE). The accreditation serves three purposes: oversight,
assessment, and improvement. This process is generally guided
by accepted civilian accreditation standards and practices
tailored to the needs of joint professional military education.
Most members of the accrediting team are peers from sister
professional military education institutions and their
expertise assures quality and assists with program improvement.
This accreditation mechanism also facilitates the
identification of best practices, minimizing redundancy, and
provides a forum for leveraging lessons learned and sharing
effective and efficient means of curricula development and
delivery.
The Enlisted Military Education Review Council (EMERC)
serves as an advisory body to the Deputy Director, Joint Staff,
for Military Education on enlisted joint education issues and
consists of the senior enlisted representatives from each
Service or institution. The EMERC addresses key educational
issues of interest to the joint education community and
promotes cooperation and collaboration among EMERC member
institutions and coordinates joint educational initiatives. The
EMERC meets at least once annually.
The Joint Faculty Education Conference for enlisted
joint professional military education meets annually. Sponsored
by the Joint Staff J-7, this conference presents emerging
concepts and other material relevant to maintaining curricula
currency, comparing curricula content/delivery and sharing best
practices.

We believe the Navy's professional military education system for
officers and enlisted personnel in both the service-specific and Joint
PME arenas is efficient and effective. The system of collaboration and
oversight mechanisms described above provides an array of opportunities
to address redundancy and ensure efficiency in the design and delivery
of Navy and Joint professional military education.

SEABEES

125. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, for over 60 years Seabees
have had a presence in Gulfport, MS, with four naval construction
battalions based in Gulfport. Their skills will be in demand for future
combat, humanitarian assistance, and partnership-building missions.
What do you see as the current contribution of the Seabees?
Admiral Greenert. Naval Construction Forces (NCF) continue to be
forward deployed to critical areas throughout the world. They provide a
full spectrum of contingency engineering capabilities, participate in
critical theater engagement exercises and provide responsive military
support for disaster preparation and recovery.
During the past 10 years, the NCF has been a key enabler in all
phases of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). At
the outset of OEF, Seabees deployed into Airbase Rhino with Task Force
58 in support of initial operations in Afghanistan while simultaneously
providing support to Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines in
the southern Philippines in 2001.
Navy Seabees supported both the Navy ashore at Kuwait Naval Base
and the marines with the First Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) during
initial operations in OIF. Seabee engineering and construction teams
have provided enduring support to the joint warfighting effort in OIF/
OEF. In addition to supporting the joint fight in OIF/OEF, Seabees have
answered the call from the Navy as part of its response to every major
humanitarian assistance/disaster recovery mission during the same
period, to include Hurricane Katrina relief, the 2009 Pakistan
earthquake, 2010 Haiti earthquake, and most recently Operation
Tomodachi following the Great East Japan earthquake in Japan.

126. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, what role do you see the
Seabees playing in your vision of the future of the Navy?
Admiral Greenert. As a scalable, deployable force, the NCF provides
command and control of expeditionary engineer forces in support of the
Navy, Marine Corps, and the joint force across the full range of
military operations. As a peacetime expeditionary force, the NCF will
continue to be forward deployed to critical areas throughout the world
including the Asia-Pacific and Horn of Africa. They will provide a full
spectrum of contingency engineering capabilities, participate in
critical theater engagement exercises and provide responsive military
support for disaster preparation and recovery enhancing our global
partnerships and aiding to maintain regional stability.
During wartime, military construction (MILCON) is a necessary
component of the modern joint force and most military operations. The
Seabees and NCF are mobile and self-sufficient, able to deploy quickly
into harsh or unsecured environments and build what needs to be built
while defending themselves. Their ability to build logistics bases,
provide berthing for deployed troops, or construct needed roads,
bridges and airfields in support of joint combat operations is a
critical enabler of the modern joint force.

127. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, do you see their role
diminishing in the future or increasing in the future?
Admiral Greenert. The NCF role in wartime operations will remain
the same. Consistent with the Secretary of Defense's new strategic
guidance, the Seabees are postured to transition from an emphasis on
winning today's wars to preparing for future challenges, protecting the
broad range of U.S. national security interests. This includes a
peacetime role that increasingly emphasizes a focus on the Asia-Pacific
region and continued ability to support stability and counterinsurgency
operations, humanitarian assistance efforts, and disaster relief
response around the globe.

128. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, what impacts to the Seabees
community will be felt from the fiscal year 2013 budget?
Admiral Greenert. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) forces,
including the Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB), will
continue to deliver Navy core capabilities integral to executing the
new Defense Strategic Guidance. During fiscal year 2012, two active
NMCBs will be decommissioned. Although smaller with reduced capacity,
the remaining construction forces will still meet combatant commanders'
warfighting and engagement requirements as described in wartime
operational plans and the Secretary of Defense-approved Global Force
Management Allocation Plan.

BROAD AREA MARITIME SURVEILLANCE

129. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, the Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is a DOD Acquisition
Category 1D program that received approval from the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to enter System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) on April 18, 2008. Following a full
and open competition, Northrop Grumman Corporation was selected as the
best overall value solution to meet the Navy's persistent maritime ISR
requirements. The BAMS UAS program successfully conducted its System
Functional Review in June 2009 and is progressing toward future program
milestones utilizing the Systems Engineering Technical Review process.
SDD aircraft delivery is anticipated in 2012 with IOC planned for 2015.
The MQ-4C BAMS program is on track to deliver IOC to the fleet by
fiscal year 2015, including a scheduled first flight this year. BAMS
will operate as an adjunct to the P-8A Poseidon and is a key piece of
the overall replacement strategy for the P-3C Orion. Can you please
describe the key mission of BAMS?
Admiral Greenert. The BAMS UAS will complement the Navy's Maritime
Patrol and Reconnaissance Force by providing persistent maritime ISR to
supported commanders. BAMS will enhance battlespace awareness, deepen
understanding of high-interest activity in the maritime/littoral
environment, provide long dwell coverage in zones of interest, and
contribute to indications and warning. BAMS will vastly increase
situational awareness of operational commanders and provide
surveillance coverage when and where no other naval or joint forces may
be present. In a combat environment, BAMS will track adversary
operations, shorten sensor-to-shooter kill chains, and provide battle
damage assessment. BAMS has a secondary role as an airborne
communications relay node. Navy currently plans on assigning five BAMS
orbits (each comprised of four air vehicles, a ground station, and a
support system). IOC is estimated to be December 2015.

130. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, what is the Navy's plan for
the development and procurement of BAMS?
Admiral Greenert. The MQ-4C BAMS UAS is an Acquisition Category
(ACAT) 1D program that entered SDD based on a Milestone B Acquisition
Decision Memorandum issued on April 18, 2008. Following a full and open
competition, an SDD contract was awarded to the Northrop Grumman
Corporation on April 22, 2008 based on a best value source selection
process.
BAMS UAS SDD test aircraft first flight is scheduled for fall 2012
and will commence flight test activities culminating in OPEVAL in
fiscal year 2015, supporting initial operational capability in
December, 2015. Navy plans to procure a total of 70 BAMS Unmanned
Aerial Systems, with 2 being dedicated test assets and the remaining 68
supporting operational force structure requirements. BAMS UAS program
of record assumes a 4-year ramp-up, followed by a 20-year program
service life with 20 aircraft continuously deployed around the world in
support of 5 orbits. The remaining procurement will provide replacement
UASs for service life and attrition loses.

131. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, what is the current status
of the program?
Admiral Greenert. The MQ-4C BAMS UAS program is executing within
the Acquisition Program Baseline cost, schedule and performance
parameters. First aircraft production has been underway since
completion of the critical design review in February 2011. Two SDD test
aircraft are in final production. Aircraft rollout is scheduled for
June 14, 2012 at Northrop Grumman Palmdale, CA, facility. BAMS UAS
first flight is scheduled for fall 2012, which will be followed by a
30-month integrated test plan culminating in OPEVAL in fiscal year
2015.
All major subsystems are currently undergoing component
qualification testing. The BAMS UAS multi-function active sensor radar
system has commenced testing on a surrogate aircraft. Long lead funding
to produce three system demonstration test articles (formerly LRIP 1)
has been awarded. These aircraft will initially support capstone
developmental test events and initial operational test and evaluation
before being transferred to the fleet to help establish the first BAMS
UAS orbit in CENTCOM in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016 (at which
time initial operational capability will be declared). Milestone C is
on schedule to meet the APB threshold requirement. A successful
Milestone C will support a full-rate procurement decision in December
2015.

132. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, what are the specific
requirements for the program?
Admiral Greenert. The BAMS UAS provides a multiple-sensor,
persistent maritime and littoral ISR data collection and dissemination
system with a secondary capability to serve as an airborne
communication relay. The mission sensors provide 360 degree radar,
electro-optical/infrared, automatic identification system and
electronic support measures with specific emitter identification
coverage. The BAMS UAS program of record assumes a 20 year program
service life with 20 aircraft continuously deployed around the world in
support of 5 continuous orbits.

RAIL GUN

133. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, has the Navy looked at the
uses of a rail gun system that is less than 32 megajoules (MJ) that
could be used for ship self-defense and a direct fire capability, and
if so, what is the status of that system?
Admiral Greenert. Yes. Navy's conceptual electro-magnetic railgun
(EMRG) system will be capable of operating at muzzle energies up to 32
MJ. The EMRG would be multi-mission capable, including direct fire ship
self-defense against surface craft and anti-ship cruise missiles and
could also contribute to a layered anti-ship ballistic missile defense
system. Systems operating at less than 20 MJ can provide support for a
smaller subset of this mission set. Navy is examining the platform
impact related to the installation of a small (3-7 MJ) railgun onboard
LCS from a space, weight and power allocation perspective. This system
size will be examined to determine potential operational missions and
the business case for the system.

134. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012 requires the Navy to report on a multi-mission rail gun system.
Has the Navy consulted with industry on this system, and if not, why
not?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy continues to incorporate and rely
heavily upon industry partners in all aspects of the EMRG effort.
Industry provided valuable insights and system perspectives at the
multi-mission workshops hosted at John's Hopkins University's Applied
Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) in 2010 and 2011. Industry partners also
provided input into the final workshop report that was signed by Chief
of Naval Research in 2011. The Navy has established integrated product
teams with key industry team representation. Contracts with industry
have been awarded for pulsed power and energy storage, launchers, and
projectile development. One industry 32 MJ launcher prototype has been
delivered to the Navy and is in testing at the Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Dahlgren Division railgun facility. Another industry launcher
is to be delivered and tested from May 2012-July 2012. These tests are
a collaborative effort between Navy and Industry with all data openly
exchanged within the program's information assurance guidelines.

135. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, OSD is working on a study of
point defenses for forward operating bases in the western Pacific. Has
the Navy been consulted on that study?
Admiral Greenert. Yes. The Navy is working with OSD on the point
defense study by providing Railgun analysis. Members of the Navy staff
meet twice a week with OSD to provide updates.

136. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, is industry involved in that
study as well?
Admiral Greenert. Industry is aware of this ongoing study at OSD.
Industry provided insights and technical options which are included in
our analysis. This study currently centers on defining the system
operational requirements based on an ongoing analysis of the threats
and a range of sensitive engagement scenarios. The output of this
effort will form the basis of system performance requirements. Due to
the nature of this analysis, Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics
Lab, a University Affiliated Research Center, is currently the only
outside government organization involved. We fully intend to integrate
our railgun industry partners into the process as we approach the
preliminary design phase of the prototype systems to meet the
requirements to engage the threats of interest.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

MARINE CORPS CUTS IN END STRENGTH

137. Senator Brown. Secretary Mabus, how much risk does the Marine
Corps inherit by reducing its Active Duty end strength by 20,000
marines and what is the Marine Corps' plan to come down responsibly
without breaking faith with its marines and their families?
Secretary Mabus. The risk will be in our capacity to respond to
multiple large scale crises. The Marine Corps will still have the
capacity to respond to a single Major Combat Operation (MCO) with a
swing force capability. We will also accept risk in sustained major
combat operations, irregular warfare and capacity for forward
engagement. As well, we will accept a small amount of incremental risk
in the manning levels of our active duty units. In comparison to the
pre-9/11 force there will be fewer battalions and squadrons.
In order to responsibly reduce the size of the Marine Corps, we
will use a gradual 4-year drawdown ramp, making maximum use of
voluntary measures to include natural attrition and early separation/
retirement authorities. In order to maintain faith with our marines we
do not plan on using a reduction-in-force and will minimize the use of
involuntary separations. OCO funding will be required from fiscal year
2013 through fiscal year 2016 in order to enable a 4-year drawdown ramp
that keeps faith with marines and enables reversibility. This plan will
ensure personnel readiness to meet operational requirements; honor
obligations to those who serve and have served; and retain necessary
noncommissioned officer and field grade officer experience to enable
reversibility.

138. Senator Brown. Secretary Mabus, has the Marine Corps
considered increasing end strength in the Marine Corps Reserve
component as a way to limit the number of Active Duty reductions,
preserve readiness, and save money; and if not, please tell me why.
Secretary Mabus. During the Marine Corps' 2010 Force Structure
Review a comprehensive assessment of the Marine Corps Total Force was
reviewed to determine how the Marine Corps would meet its future
wartime missions. As a result, the Marine Corps determined it did not
need to increase the Reserve component end strength of 39,600, but did
realign some capability from the active to the Reserve component as
well increase current Reserve capability. These capabilities included
civil affairs, counter-intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicles,
amphibious assault vehicles, combat engineers, artillery/naval gunfire
capability, as well as bridging capability.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

139. Senator Brown. Secretary Mabus, please comment on the Navy's
sexual assault prevention program.
Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy is committed to
eliminating sexual assaults Department-wide and to ensuring
compassionate support of sexual assault victims. We seek a culture of
gender respect where sexual assault is never tolerated. The Department
established the Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
(SAPRO), which reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy.
In addition to the SAPRO office, I have introduced the 21st century
sailor and marine initiative. This comprehensive initiative
consolidates objectives and policies to maximize sailor and marine
personal readiness. One important portion of this initiative works to
remove the stigma of reporting sexual assault incidents. This includes
eliminating requirements to report post-assault counseling on some
Federal security clearance forms, and improving victims' abilities to
quickly transfer from a command. Since alcohol is shown to be a common
factor in sexual assault and domestic violence, the Navy is instituting
breathalyzer tests for sailors as they report for duty.
The Navy-level prevention strategy has three main components. The
first involves the progressive dissemination of a clear, consistent,
top-down leadership message that sexual assault is never acceptable
anywhere in the Department of the Navy, and that all sailors and
marines have a shared responsibility to protect each other from sexual
assault. The second component involves the broad application of updated
Service-level training tools across the Navy and Marine Corps
respectively. Our goal is to effectively reach all sailors and marines
with information that is current and relevant. Our third main strategy
component involves pilot demonstration initiatives at selected sites to
objectively assess additional new approaches to sexual assault
prevention. Underlying the Department's concepts is our commitment to
candid self-assessment.
The Department of the Navy is unique among the military departments
in having created a dedicated Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office (Navy-SAPRO), led by a senior civilian executive who reports
directly to the Secretary. Since its beginnings in late 2009, Navy-
SAPRO's activities have been broad-based and include the following:

Conducted the first Department-wide prevention summit
in 2010 for Navy and Marine Corps Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARCs); then expanded that format in 2011 to
include installation commanders and regional military leaders;
and this year is engaging operational leaders through mini-
forums at force concentration areas worldwide.
Visibly underscored our commitment to combating sexual
assault through extensive world-wide site visits--each
typically include senior leader briefings, meetings with SAPR
program managers and other key stakeholders, and focus-group
discussions with individual sailors and marines.
Since 2010, Navy-SAPRO has applied data-driven
insights in partnering with the Navy to pilot simultaneous
prevention initiatives, including new formats of large-group
and small-group training, at Training Support Center Great
Lakes--a concentration of the Navy's youngest, most junior, and
at-risk sailors. This rigorous approach uses anonymous surveys
and careful tracking of reported cases to candidly assess
efficacy in reducing the underlying incidence of sexual
assault. Results are still preliminary, but exciting in
suggesting positive impacts--documented nowhere else.
Conducted a world-wide, anonymous, web-based, sexual
assault survey to begin tracking in a standardized way the
underlying incidence of sexual assault among sailors and
marines. Over 115,000 active duty personnel participated. We
plan to repeat this effort every 2-3 years to assess our
progress.
Published a 22-page Commander's Guide booklet with key
background points, a summary of commanding officer core
responsibilities in preventing and responding to sexual
assaults, and additional detail on aspects of personal
leadership, victim response, and offender accountability. The
Guide has been well-received and widely distributed in a top-
down manner by senior leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps to
emphasize its importance.

In addition to these Department-level efforts, both the Navy and
Marine Corps are engaged in coordinated Service-level activities. Both
services operate extensive Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
(SAPR) programs for victim support, both are actively reviewing their
numerous levels of sexual assault prevention and response training
curricula. Flag/general officer managers of the Service-level programs
meet weekly with Navy-SAPRO to coordinate and share insights. Both
Services have openly addressed sexual assault issues in special senior
leader forums and various regional mini-summits and workshops. In these
endeavors, both Services, along with Navy-SAPRO, have worked
extensively with civilian subject matter experts. Some specific
accomplishments include the following:

Both Services have worked with the Naval Audit Service
to track the responsiveness of first-contact SAPR phone lines
used for victim support and assistance, resulting in dramatic
improvements in service and reliability.
The marines have begun Service-wide implantation of
their new ``Take a Stand'' training that targets junior marines
through interactive sessions facilitated by small-unit leaders,
using professionally produced video segments.
The Navy has implemented its own ``Bystander
Intervention'' program at ``A'' Schools Navy-wide. This
training utilizes local facilitators in a structured curriculum
involving junior sailors in three sequential, interactive,
small-group sessions.

FLEET MODERNIZATION

140. Senator Brown. Secretary Mabus, rebuilding and modernizing the
Navy's fleet is obviously one of your top priorities, and you've said
the Navy must ``carefully define program requirements, drive
affordability, and pursue aggressive cost oversight and competition.''
I understand the Navy is leveraging the strategic weapons system on the
current Ohio-class submarine as a cost efficient means to develop the
strategic weapons system on the Ohio-class replacement. Please discuss
this.
Secretary Mabus. To lower development costs and leverage the proven
reliability of the Trident II (D5) strategic weapon system (SWS), the
Ohio-replacement SSBN will enter service with the Trident II (D5) SWS
and D5 life-extended missiles onboard. The Navy is extending the life
of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class submarine service
life and to serve as the initial baseline mission payload for the Ohio-
replacement submarine platform. These D5 life extended missiles will be
shared with the existing Ohio-class submarine until the current Ohio-
class retires. Maintaining one SWS during the transition to the Ohio-
class replacement is beneficial from a cost, performance, and risk
reduction standpoint.

COMMONALITY

141. Senator Brown. Secretary Mabus, please discuss if and how the
Navy is utilizing commonality in the acquisition process to drive down
life cycle cost.
Secretary Mabus. Commonality is used to drive down life cycle cost
in the development, production, and sustainment phases. For
development, commonality reduces costs compared to each program
developing unique solutions. In some cases, common subsystems already
exist, which further reduces the development cost and risk. In the
production phase, the main cost savings is achieved by the increased
yearly production quantity, spreading the overhead costs across
multiple customers and sharing engineering changes. Similar factors
apply to the sustainment phase, with the addition of shared
obsolescence and diminishing parts management.
Some examples of commonality include the main propulsion gas
turbines where the LM 2500 is used among the LCS-2, DDG-51, CG-47, FFG-
7 classes and the former classes of DD-963, DDG-993 (173 vessels). The
application of this common main propulsion turbine has supported
acquisition, logistics, training and maintenance savings for the Navy.
The Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS) is designated by a CNO
memorandum dated 21 Feb 2006 as the Navy's sole aviation mission
planning system to reduce redundancy and promote cost-sharing. Thirty
type/model/series (T/M/S) aircraft (with 10 more T/M/S to be added by
2016) are supported by JMPS through government integration and
logistics shared across the platforms. For tactical-wheeled vehicles,
the Navy and Marine Corps utilize several common platforms, including
the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

142. Senator Brown. Admiral Greenert, with respect to our forward
posture in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, you've
prioritized readiness over capacity, which perhaps is a good thing. How
does the Navy's acquisition plan for the LCS reflect the President's
strategic guidance, specifically in these regions?
Admiral Greenert. The LCS will fulfill broad mission requirements
where the capabilities provided by high-end multi-mission ships are not
required. LCSs meet warfighting demands in the areas of mine
countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare to counter
adversary A2/AD efforts. These ships will also be called upon to
conduct maritime interdiction operations; provide a stabilizing
presence by building partner capacity, strengthening alliances and
increasing U.S. influence; and conduct stability and counterinsurgency
operations through security force assistance and other engagement
missions. LCS will use the concepts of forward stationing and
rotational crewing to maximize the presence provided by each ship. We
continue to make necessary investments in LCS readiness to ensure each
ship has the right maintenance, crew size, and crew training. We will
deploy USS Freedom (LCS-1) to Southeast Asia in 2013 to evaluate the
operational concept for LCS and refine its readiness requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

SHIPBUILDING

143. Senator Collins. Secretary Mabus, in his testimony before the
committee last month, Secretary Panetta expressed his unequivocal
support for the multi-year procurement plan for the DDG-51 destroyer
program. He said the plan is important for the size of the Navy's fleet
of ships, the sustainment of the fragile industrial base, and to
achieve cost savings for American taxpayers. In comparison to single-
year procurement for the DDG-51, the Navy estimates that the multi-year
procurement will result in cost savings of $1.5 billion during the next
5 years, a net savings of 8.7 percent. Please describe how the Navy
reached the estimated savings for the multi-year procurement request
for the DDG-51 program.
Secretary Mabus. Savings are detailed below:

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

144. Senator Collins. Secretary Mabus, I want to thank you for the
Navy's ongoing effort to reduce the $3 billion backlog of sustainment,
restoration, and modernization funding at its four public shipyards.
Last week a $38 million contract award that is the first of four
modernization contracts for projects at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
during fiscal year 2012 was awarded. With that award, the Navy has
invested about $440 million during the last 5 years to sustain,
restore, and improve energy efficiency at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I
want to note, however, that all of the new MILCON projects funded
during the last 5 years were added by Congress. In the committee report
accompanying last year's Military Construction/Veterans Affairs (VA)
Appropriations Act, the Senate Appropriations Committee urged the Navy
to evaluate and accelerate MILCON projects in the FYDP that could
improve the safety, effectiveness, or efficiency of the work performed
at the Navy's public shipyards. However, the only MILCON project at any
naval shipyard I could identify in this year's budget request was a $32
million project at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Given the concern expressed
by the Senate Appropriations Committee regarding MILCON at the
shipyards, what review did DOD conduct to evaluate the acceleration of
MILCON projects that could improve the safety or efficiency at our
shipyards?
Secretary Mabus. As part of our fiscal year 2013 President's budget
submission process, the Navy assessed all MILCON requirements to
balance risk across the Navy and provide the most capability within
fiscal constraints. This review evaluated each MILCON project for
overall alignment with the Chief of Naval Operations' Guiding
Principles to include mission support and quality of service (includes
safety) and overall cost reduction (efficiency).
As a result of this review process, the Navy's PB13 submission
accelerated a MILCON project, P286 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Berth 11/
13 Waterfront Support Facility ($14.4 million), from outside the FYDP
to fiscal year 2015. This project will improve the efficiency of
processes for SSN-688 and -774 class depot availabilities.
The Navy remains committed to investing in the Naval Shipyard
infrastructure within today's fiscally constrained environment through
sustainment, restoration, and modernization, and MILCON. We will
continue to assess all MILCON requirements to balance risk across the
Navy and provide the most capability within fiscal constraints.

145. Senator Collins. Admiral Greenert, every one of your
predecessors since 2006 has called 313 ships the minimum necessary to
meet our national security requirements. We are now at 285 ships and
under this budget request, the Navy fleet will remain constant during
the next 5 years rather than increasing towards the 313-ship goal. The
looming cruiser-destroyer gap, which remains the largest shortfall
among any class of ships, will widen rather than shrink under this
budget proposal. The Navy fleet currently consists of 84 large surface
combatants when we were told by the Navy last year that 94 large
surface combatants are necessary to meet BMD requirements. Excluding
the proposal in the President's budget request to retire seven cruisers
early, the Navy was on course to meet the requirement of 94 large
surface combatants in only 7 of the 30 years covered by the 30-Year
Shipbuilding Plan. How many ships short of the minimum large surface
combatants do we need to be before we have crossed a red-line as it
relates to our maritime national security interests?
Admiral Greenert. The 94 large surface combatant requirement is a
result of a previous force structure assessment which was superseded by
the new Defense Strategic Guidance issued in January 2012. The Navy is
currently conducting an updated force structure assessment that will
address both peacetime and wartime requirements in support of the
Defense Strategic Guidance. This assessment will include large surface
combatants and the need to meet BMD requirements, and will guide our
future shipbuilding plans.
We anticipate our shipbuilding plans will deliver enough surface
combatants to meet our updated requirements until the 2030s, when
Arleigh Burke destroyers begin to decommission in large numbers. We are
evaluating a range of options to alleviate this anticipated shortfall.
For example, forward deploying 4 DDGs to Rota, Spain, replaces the need
for 10 rotational CONUS-based DDGs to meet Secretary of Defense-
directed GFMAP requirements. This reduces the overall requirement for
large surface combatants by six ships.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

V-22

146. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus, it is my understanding that
the Navy is considering using at least some of the 48 V-22 Osprey tilt
rotors in the current program of record to replace the aging C-2A
Greyhound carrier on-board delivery aircraft and has looked closely at
the V-22 in their analysis of alternatives (AOA). What is the decision
time-line for that replacement aircraft?
Secretary Mabus. The timeline for the decision is dependent on the
results of the AoA Update which is expected to be completed in May
2012. The AOA Update could conclude that additional risk reduction or
competitive strategies are appropriate which would impact the timing of
the final decision on the replacement aircraft. Therefore, a definitive
decision timeline for the C-2A replacement aircraft is not presently
available.

147. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus, how risky would interruptions
in the production line be based on what you currently know about the
Marine Corps multi-year negotiations for the V-22?
Secretary Mabus. An interruption in the V-22 production line is
unlikely to occur. The Department is confident that it will be able to
complete negotiations and award the follow-on multi-year contract in
time to avoid interruptions to the production line.

SHIP RECYCLING

148. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus, it took the Navy more than 18
months to award the contract to dispose of the USS Saratoga. What
accounts for this delay?
Secretary Mabus. The length of time to contract for the disposal of
ex-Saratoga by dismantling is governed by the Federal Acquisition
Regulations and attracted significant competition, requiring a
significant amount of time for each technical and price proposal
received to be evaluated in accordance with the RFP. Additionally,
weaknesses in all of the initial proposals received required the
contracting officer to issue discussion questions to each offeror in
the competitive range. Time was required for offerors to respond to the
questions and for the Government to evaluate their responses. Upon
completion of the evaluation of responses to discussion questions, the
offerors in the competitive range were requested to submit final
proposal revisions, which were then evaluated upon receipt. Following a
best-value evaluation and determination of the ``apparent awardee'', an
unsuccessful offeror protested the determination to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). In addition, two unsuccessful offerors
submitted size protests to the Small Business Administration (SBA).
Following resolution of the three protests--one with GAO and two with
SBA, the current apparent awardee was designated. Additionally, a
protest challenging the current apparent awardee's status as a small
business was recently submitted and is awaiting a decision by SBA. The
award of the contract is, therefore, awaiting both the SBA size protest
decision and the apparent awardee's acquisition of the required
security clearances from DSS.
A dismantling contract for ex-Saratoga (CV-60) has not yet been
awarded. However, an ``apparent awardee'' was recently identified. As
specified in the request for proposal (RFP) for ex-Saratoga, the
successful offeror must have a facility security clearance at the
confidential level at minimum, and key personnel must have personal
security clearances at the confidential level as a minimum, prior to
contract award. Therefore, NAVSEA has sponsored the ``apparent
awardee'' to the Defense Security Services (DSS) to obtain the
necessary security clearances.

149. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus, what will the Navy do to
expedite the award process of the USS Forrestal and the other aircraft
carriers that are now decommissioned and ready to be recycled?
Secretary Mabus. On January 26, 2012, the Navy issued a pre-
solicitation notice at https://www.fbo.gov/
index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=ce6de50e17d6f1e16841b
33603f8ee26&tab=core&--cview=0 announcing the intent to issue a
solicitation for the dismantling of ex-Forrestal (AVT-59), ex-
Independence (CV-62) and ex-Constellation (CV-64). While the
solicitation of ex-Saratoga will result in a contract for that ship
only, the follow-on CV dismantling solicitation anticipates the award
of multiple 5-year indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ)
contracts. Additional CV-59/63 class aircraft carriers may be solicited
under the IDIQ contracts during the 5-year period if required. The RFP
is expected to be released in May 2012.

150. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus, each day the Navy maintains a
decommissioned vessel represents a cost to U.S. taxpayers. How much
does it cost per day to maintain an average decommissioned Navy vessel?
Secretary Mabus. The direct cost to maintain a stricken CV-59/63
class aircraft carrier in the Navy's inventory of inactive
conventionally-powered ships is approximately $411.00 dollars per day,
less for a smaller vessel.

151. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus, how much does it cost per day
to maintain a decommissioned aircraft carrier?
Secretary Mabus. The direct cost to maintain a stricken CV-59/63
Class aircraft carrier in the Navy's inventory of inactive
conventionally-powered ships is approximately $411.00 per day.

152. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus, how much could the Navy save
each year by expediting the ship disposal process?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy is expediting the ship disposal process.
For example, the Navy successfully reduced its inventory of inactive
conventionally-powered ships from nearly 200 in 1997 to 57 ships as of
April 26, 2012; only 15 of which were in the inventory in 1997. Further
expediting is limited by the dispositions assigned to inactive ships
and the need to remove equipment and material from ships designated for
dismantling in order to support active Fleet requirement. Thus, savings
from expediting the ship disposal process beyond what the Navy is
already doing cannot be achieved without sacrificing other Navy policy
objectives or losing the savings that are obtained by harvesting
equipment and material from ships designated for dismantling before
they are scrapped.
Of the 57 inactive ships in the inventory, 23 are designated for
dismantling. The remaining 34 are retained for other policy objectives
including ships in reserve for future reactivation, foreign military
sale transfer, logistic support, donation as museums/memorials, and
Fleet training use.
Before a ship can be solicited for dismantling, the Navy
accomplishes disposal preparations on each ship, including
environmental surveys and extensive equipment removals to support other
Navy requirements. 10 of the 23 ships designated for dismantling are
currently undergoing equipment removals. Another 3 ships designated for
dismantling are subject to Environmental Assessment development in
order to comply with the National Historic Preservation Act because
they are eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic
Places.
The following actions have been taken to expedite the disposal of
the remaining 10 ships designated for dismantling that have completed
pre-disposal preparations and equipment removals:

Ex-Saratoga (CV-60) is pending contract award for
dismantling upon the apparent awardee obtaining a facility
security clearance at the confidential level from the Defense
Security Service.
On January 26, 2012, the Navy issued a pre-
solicitation announcement for the dismantling of additional
aircraft carriers, including ex-Forrestal (AVT-59) and ex-
Independence (CV-62). A RFP is planned for issuance in May
2012.
September 2011, the Navy executed a Memorandum of
Agreement with the Maritime Administration (MARAD) for the
scrap sale of Navy-owned merchant-type ships over 1,500 tons.
MARAD solicited the ex-Mount Baker (T-AE 34) in February 2012
and contract award is pending. A bidders' inspection period is
advertised for April 30 to May 11, 2012 for the scrap sale of
four additional ships.
The Navy is working with the DLA to develop a similar
Memorandum of Agreement for the scrap sale of two frigates.

AIR-SEA BATTLE CONCEPT

153. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, your
prepared testimony highlights the importance of the Air-Sea Battle
Concept, which seeks to improve integration of air, land, maritime,
space, and cyberspace forces to combat growing A2/AD threats. Admiral
Greenert, you note some of the new investments required to implement
this concept include the LCS, as exemplified in the fiscal year 2013
budget, new weapons such as the Small Diameter Bomb, Joint Standoff
Weapon, Mark-54 torpedo, and a focus on unmanned systems. Please detail
the impact sequestration will have on the Navy's ability to make these
investments.
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Department has not begun
planning for sequestration because any planning for sequestration would
be a government-wide effort guided by OMB. If sequestration occurs,
automatic percentage cuts are required to be applied without regard to
strategy, importance, or priorities, resulting in adverse impact to
almost every contract and operation within the Department.
Sequestration would adversely impact the components of the Air-Sea
Battle through contract cancellations, contract terminations,
undetermined cost increases caused by inefficient contracting and
schedule delays. A detailed review directed by OMB would be required to
determine specific impact to the Navy's Air-Sea Battle concept.
Assuming the Fiscal Year 2013 Defense Appropriations Act conference
report contains sequester provisions similar to those in the Fiscal
Year 2012 Act, the Department would be forced to reduce each line item
within each appropriation by a percentage of the available funding.
This percentage would be calculated based on the ``budgetary
resources'', primarily the enacted 2013 appropriation and any
unobligated balances carried forward at the end of fiscal year 2012. We
currently estimate the reduction would be between 5 and 10 percent.
Obvious examples of the problems this method causes are fractional cuts
to major acquisition items like ships or aircraft, which could not be
delivered with partial funding. With several thousand individual line
items in our accounts, the Department could not fix all of these issues
with the transfer authority which Congress typically provides. This
would leave broken programs across all accounts and similarly impact
the programs that apply the tenets of the Air-Sea Battle Concept.

154. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, please
comment on the importance of the F-35 to the Navy's implementation of
the Air-Sea Battle Concept.
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The fifth generation F-35 is
a key joint program with direct application within the Air-Sea Battle
Concept--the integration of air and naval forces to counter and shape
the A2/AD environment.
The Joint Strike Fighter represents unprecedented multi-service,
allied and coalition cooperation. It is the first aircraft to be
developed within the Department of Defense to meet the needs of three
Services simultaneously and will replace three different legacy
aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition, the
United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Turkey, Israel, and Singapore are either partners or
participants in the aircraft's development program and the Japanese
Government recently announced it would purchase 42 of the fighters.
The F-35 provides fifth generation technology and capabilities,
which are critical enablers for the joint force of the future that may
be required to overcome access challenges in the global commons.
Bringing maneuverability, survivability, advanced avionics and stealth
technology to the battlespace, the aircraft is able to operate against
adversaries across the spectrum of conflict, fighting air-to-air and
air-to-ground missions. The aircraft's sensors improve and leverages
many other, already existing systems and capabilities across the
Services.
These capabilities, bonded jointly across all U.S. Military
Services and with coalition and allied nations provide a key platform
from which to maintain domain dominance and execute effective
networked, integrated, attack in depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat
adversaries' A2/AD threat capabilities--the central idea of the ASB
Concept.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

VAW-77

155. Senator Vitter. Admiral Greenert, under the proposed 2013
spending plan released by the Navy, the Navy Reserve's Carrier Airborne
Early Warning Squadron 77 (VAW-77) would cease to exist September 30.
The squadron was created in 1995 as a result of the United States
escalating the war on illegal drug trafficking, and employs
approximately 100 Active Duty and Reserve Navy aircrews, and about 55
civilian contractors. In the documents presented to my office, the Navy
has stated that these choices were made within the limits of the
resources available to the Navy due to the Budget Control Act to
balance direct warfighting capability against missions like those
assigned to VAW-77. However, earlier this week, the commanders of U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Northern Command testified to this
committee that there is increased drug activity in the region, and that
with the current resources, we are only capable of interdicting 30
percent of the material illegally transported into the United States.
If the Navy remains committed to missions within the strategic reserve,
including counternarcotics and human trafficking interdiction, does the
Navy still have a need for the capability that these squadrons provide?
Admiral Greenert. Although the programmed force structure does not
meet all COCOM peacetime demands, the Navy remains committed to
countering illicit trafficking. Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission
meets the presence requirements in the Secretary of Defense-approved
GFMAP, which includes forces for these missions.

156. Senator Vitter. Admiral Greenert, what will the Navy use to
replace the VAW-77 to fulfill the ongoing need to combat increasing
cartel activity and illegal drug trafficking?
Admiral Greenert. Although the programmed force structure does not
meet all COCOM peacetime demands, the Navy must balance risk in a
fiscally confined environment informed by the new defense strategy. The
Navy is not replacing VAW-77 for this mission, but will continue to
counter illicit trafficking operations with ships, helicopters, and
aircraft assigned to Naval Forces SOUTHCOM in accordance with the
Secretary of Defense-approved Global Force Management Allocation Plan.

157. Senator Vitter. Admiral Greenert, in your opinion, does this
decision limit U.S. capabilities beyond where they should be to
adequately address the future challenges?
Admiral Greenert. No. Although the current force structure does not
meet all COCOM peacetime demands, the Navy continues to meet the
requirements of the Secretary of Defense-approved Global Force
Management Allocation Plan, which includes counter illicit trafficking
operations.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Akaka, Nelson, Webb, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Chambliss, Wicker, Brown,
Portman, Ayotte, Graham, and Vitter.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine,
general counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J.
Paul, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional
staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, Minority Counsel.
Staff assistants present: Mariah K. McNamara, Brian F.
Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Nick Ikeda,
assistant to Senator Akaka; Ryan Ehly, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Mara Boggs,
assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to
Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman, assistant to Senator
Gillibrand; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to
Senator Brown; Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Charles
Brittingham, assistant to Senator Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. I want to welcome
our witnesses, Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, back to
the committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs
of the U.S. Air Force in our review of the fiscal year 2013
annual budget and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
request.
Mr. Secretary and General, please extend on behalf of our
committee our gratitude to the men and women of the Air Force
and their families for the many sacrifices that they have made
on behalf of our Nation, and thanks to the both of you for your
long careers of leadership and service.
The Defense Department's most recent defense strategic
guidance issued in January refocuses the U.S. military on the
Asia-Pacific. We will be interested to see how the refocusing
has been reflected in the Air Force budget and plans.
Last year we saw how Air Force personnel and equipment
could support national goals on short notice in Libya. Among
those forces, we had: first, tankers supporting coalition air
operations; second, strike aircraft providing strikes against
important ground targets; and third, manned aircraft and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) providing intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support.
Air Force assets also played a significant role in aiding
the Japanese tsunami relief effort.
A number of ongoing critical issues confront the Air Force.
We know the Air Force is providing forces to the Central
Command war efforts in a number of traditional roles, but it's
also providing airmen in support of land component tasks. We
look forward to hearing this morning about how the Air Force is
supporting these current operations while preparing its forces
to deal with future demands.
This committee has sought to ensure that our combatant
commanders have what they need to succeed in those conflicts,
including advanced technologies for ISR. I would note that in
particular the new budget will continue the expansion of air
operations, or ISR support, within theater. The committee
appreciates the fact that General Schwartz has been taking
extra steps to accelerate that fielding by altering Air Force
approaches to pilot training and accelerating production of
Predator and Reaper UAVs.
The committee has also encouraged the Air Force to look at
ways to buy space systems that reduce cost and technical risks
in very complicated systems. The Air Force has developed and
fielded one spacecraft in the Operationally Responsive Space
(ORS) Program, that was developed in less than 3 years, for a
fraction of the cost of normal imagery. In that regard, I have
questions as to why the Air Force is proposing to cancel that
program.
Another acquisition challenge facing the Department is the
stretching out of production lines which delays modernization
programs and increases unit costs.
Foremost among these is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program. Given the continuing troubles and delays with the
system design and demonstration phase of the JSF program, the
Air Force will be extending the service lives for existing
fighters, including the F-16 and F-15 fighter fleets.
One acquisition program that appears to be moving forward
as planned is the strategic tanker modernization program. The
Department of the Air Force announced a winner of the tanker
competition in late February last year. We find it concerning
that the contractor has already announced that the contract for
engineering and manufacturing development of the tanker will
likely go to the ceiling price. We look forward to receiving
more details on the Air Force's plans for executing that
program.
Underlying all of these major acquisition concerns is an
acquisition management issue. Secretary Donley, we look forward
to hearing from you about your continuing efforts to bolster
the quantity and the quality of the Air Force acquisition
corps, how this effort is progressing and if it has been
impacted by recent hiring and salary freezes.
In addition, the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act
(WSARA) of 2009 has required the Defense Department to make
significant changes in its regulations and procedures governing
the acquisition system and we look forward to hearing how the
Department of the Air Force is proceeding to implement the
provisions of the WSARA.
Now, the major Air Force budget issue this year is likely
to be Air Force plans to downsize the current force and to make
significant changes in almost every area of the force
structure. A very troubling aspect of the budget proposal is
that within these force structure changes the cuts in manpower
and aircraft are falling disproportionately on the Air National
Guard.
The Air Force is proposing to make major shifts in both
strategic and tactical airlift programs, many of which hit the
Air National Guard hard. Here are some examples:

The Air Force wants to retire the remaining C-
27A aircraft, which are all in the Guard and Reserves,
and to lower the minimum number of strategic aircraft
to 275 aircraft, down from the 301 level that we
adopted just last year.
The Air Force also wants to retire 65 older C-
130 aircraft, mostly in the Guard and Reserves, leaving
318 aircraft to support tactical operations, roughly a
17 percent force reduction.
Finally, the Air Guard wants to eliminate the
planned 38-aircraft program for the C-27s, all of which
were going to the Guard, and rely instead on the
remaining C-130 fleet to provide direct support for
Army operations.

In the fighter forces, the Air Force is planning a cut of
almost one-third in the A-10 force, with that cut weighted
heavily toward the Air National Guard. I have serious doubts
and many questions about the wisdom of doing that and the
disproportionate impact of these proposed cuts on the Air
National Guard.
The Air Force is planning to increase the size of Active
Duty A-10 training squadrons at a time when the overall force
will be shrinking by almost one-third. That makes no sense to
me.
The Air Force asserts that the cut to the A-10 force falls
more heavily on the Air National Guard forces because the Air
Force will need to keep more of the force in the Active
component because of forward deployments and dwell time
considerations. However, as general purpose ground forces are
withdrawn from Afghanistan, there will be less and less demand
for forward-deploying A-10 forces to provide close air support.
The Guard has shown their extreme capability and ability to
deploy A-10 forces to provide that close air support, including
in Afghanistan.
In airlift, we have similar questions. The Air Force budget
would reduce strategic airlift forces, with no apparent plan
for how such forces could be reconstituted if needed in the
future.
Now look at the C-27s. The Air Force had established a
requirement, validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC), for 38 C-27 aircraft to provide direct support
to Army ground forces. Again, all of those aircraft were going
to the Guard.
Nobody forced the Air Force to join with what was a joint
program with the Army and then take sole ownership of it. No
one forced the Air Force to testify that they needed to pursue
the C-27 because the C-130s could not meet requirements when
the committee questioned why the Air Force couldn't rely on the
C-130 fleet and instead had to start the C-27 program. Now the
Air Force says that the C-130 is perfectly fine for meeting the
direct support mission.
In the area of ISR, the Air Force is proposing a couple of
major changes: terminating the Global Hawk Block 30 program and
retiring all Block 30 aircraft already in the force; and
shifting all 37 operational MC-12 ISR aircraft to the Air
National Guard. The Air Force rationale behind the shift of all
MC-12s to the Air National Guard is that with the withdrawal of
general purpose ground forces from Afghanistan the demand for
the MC-12 ISR mission will be reduced so much that the Air
National Guard will be able to support the ISR demand without
breaking guidelines for dwell time. Now, that position ignores
the facts that, unlike the A-10, Special Operations Forces
(SOF) are relying heavily on the MC-12 to support their
activities and, unlike general purpose ground forces, SOF are
not leaving Afghanistan or other areas of the region where they
are currently operating any time soon.
Just last June, Under Secretary Carter certified, as part
of a Nunn-McCurdy breach in the Global Hawk program, that the
Global Hawk Block 30 program was both essential to national
security and there was no other alternative that would provide
acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at
less cost. If that were true, how could the situation change so
rapidly that the Air Force now wants to drop the program?
So we will look forward to exploring these and other issues
with our witnesses this morning. We again thank them for their
attendance and their service, and I call upon Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses to discuss the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2013 for the Department of the Air
Force. We all appreciate the outstanding service and sacrifice
of all the men and women who are serving in the U.S. Air Force
today.
Secretary Donley, I understand that the Department of
Defense (DOD) may be preparing to implement force structure
changes in 2012 that could restrict Congress' ability to
consider and act on related proposals in the fiscal 2013 budget
request. Chairman Levin and I have sent a letter to the
Secretary of Defense, which I ask to be made part of the
record, that requests the Department take no action that would
be difficult or impossible to reverse if Congress disapproves a
related proposal in the fiscal year 2013 request. I request
that you also refrain from taking such actions.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator McCain. Given the proposed reduction of nearly
10,000 airmen over the next 5 years, I ask that our witnesses
address the capability and readiness risk the Air Force is
prepared to accept as a result of these manpower reductions and
your plans to lessen any negative impacts on affected airmen
and their families.
I've been pleased with the stewardship of our witnesses of
the Air Force's acquisition portfolio. I have questions
regarding your largest procurement programs. On the KC-46A
aerial refueling tanker, we continue to closely monitor the
aerial refueling tanker program to assure that it achieves
intended results on cost, schedule, and performance. I think
you conducted a very sound competition on this program last
year and are executing a viable acquisition strategy. But
integration of military software and hardware with a commercial
derivative aircraft continues to be a significant risk. Our
witnesses should address how the Air Force is addressing this
aspect of the program.
The F-35 JSF program. As we all know, I've been frustrated
by the fundamental disconnect between how many aircraft the
Department signs up to buy and the program's slow progress in
developmental testing. This has created excessive concurrency
between testing and production that has resulted in incredibly
costly, excessive design changes and retrofits in production. I
hope that your decisions now to flatten out production,
allowing the program to get heavy learning before committing to
higher production rates, will work out.
The Air Force budget included $16 billion to modernize its
inter-theater airlift fleet of C-17s and C-5s. In addition, the
Air Force plans to retire 27 older C-5As. Last year, at the Air
Force's request, Congress approved the retirement of 14 C-5As,
in part because the Department had 44 more C-17s than needed.
These C-17s were earmarked by the Appropriations Committee
without authorization and at a cost to the taxpayer of over $13
billion. I would request that the witnesses comment on the
right number and mix of large cargo aircraft based on the
mobility capabilities requirements study for 2016 and a cost-
benefit analysis.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently found:
``Space launch acquisition processes from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and DOD are not
formally coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully
leverage the government's investment because the government is
not acting as a single buyer.'' The GAO also expressed concern
recently regarding the adequacy of analysis supporting the Air
Force's proposed block buy strategy for the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle program.
I recently wrote to Secretary Panetta requesting that he
look at 16 areas of duplication in the DOD budget, including
space launch. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' views on
the costs of space launch and how they are facilitating
competition to ensure continued affordable access to space.
Finally, on readiness, at about this time last year we
first learned that the Department estimated that the cost of
owning and operating JSFs could amount to as much as $1
trillion over the program's life. I understand that the
Department is trying to drive this cost down. However, this
whole issue highlights the larger problem of whether the
acquisition process is ensuring that new aircraft, weapons, and
other systems are sufficiently reliable and don't become too
expensive to operate.
I'd like to conclude with a comment on sequestration.
Secretary of Defense Panetta has repeatedly stated that defense
sequestration, required under the Budget Control Act, would be
``catastrophic.'' I'd like for our witnesses to provide us with
their assessment of just how severe across-the-board cuts would
be to the U.S. Air Force.
I thank the witnesses and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses to discuss the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2013 for the Department of
the Air Force. Our thoughts and prayers are with all our deployed
airmen, particularly those who are currently engaged in combat
operations in Afghanistan.
Secretary Donley, I understand that the Department of Defense (DOD)
may be preparing to implement force structure changes in 2012 that
could restrict Congress' ability to consider and act on related
proposals in the fiscal year 2013 budget request. Chairman Levin and I
have sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense that requests that the
Department take no action that would be difficult or impossible to
reverse if Congress disapproves a related proposal in the fiscal year
2013 request. I request that you also refrain from taking such actions.
Given the proposed reduction of nearly 10,000 airmen over the next
5 years, I ask that our witnesses address the capability and readiness
risks the Air Force is prepared to accept as a result of these manpower
reductions, and your plans to lessen any negative impacts on affected
airmen and their families.
I have generally been pleased with the stewardship of our witnesses
of the Air Force's acquisition portfolio, but I have a few questions
regarding your largest procurement programs.
On the KC-46A aerial refueling tanker: I continue to closely
monitor the multi-billion KC-46 aerial refueling tanker program, to
ensure that it achieves intended results on cost, schedule and
performance. The Air Force conducted a very sound competition on this
program last year and, from all reports, is executing a viable
acquisition strategy. But integration of military software and hardware
with a commercial derivative aircraft continues to be a significant
risk. Our witnesses should address how the Air Force is addressing this
aspect of the program.
Next, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program: For several
years, I have been frustrated by the fundamental disconnect between how
many F-35 jets the Department signs up to buy and the program's slow
progress in developmental testing. This has created excessive
`concurrency' between testing and production, and has resulted in
costly design changes and retrofits in production. I am pleased that
the Department has now decided to `flatten-out' production, allowing
the program to get `heavy learning' under its belt before committing to
higher production rates. I fully support the Air Force's new
acquisition strategy, starting with the sixth and seventh lots of early
production, to link the number of production aircraft on contract with
actual program performance.
On Air Mobility Programs: The Air Force budget request includes $16
billion to modernize its inter-theater airlift fleet of C-17s and C-5s.
In addition, the Air Force plans to retire 27 older C-5As. Last year,
at the Air Force's request, Congress approved the retirement of 14 C-
5As, in part because the Department had 44 more C-17s than needed.
These C-17s were earmarked by the Appropriations Committees without
authorization and at a cost to the taxpayer of over $13 billion. I ask
that the witnesses comment on the right number and mix of large cargo
aircraft, based on the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016
and a cost-benefit analysis.
Next, on Space Policy: The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recently found that `[s]pace launch acquisition processes for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and DOD are not formally
coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the
government's investment because the government is not acting as a
single buyer.' GAO also expressed concern recently regarding the
adequacy of analysis supporting the Air Force's proposed block-buy
strategy for its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. I recently
wrote to Secretary Panetta requesting that he look at 16 areas of
duplication in the DOD budget, including space launch. I look forward
to hearing our witnesses' views on the cost of space launch and how
they are facilitating competition to ensure continued, affordable
access to space.
Finally, on Readiness: At about this time last year, we first
learned that the Department estimated that the cost of owning and
operating JSFs could amount to as much as $1 trillion over the
program's life. I understand that the Department is actively trying to
drive this cost down and that this estimate will change based on data
from actually operating and sustaining these aircraft. This, however,
highlights the larger issue of whether the acquisition process is
ensuring that new aircraft, weapons, and other systems are sufficiently
reliable and don't become too expensive to operate. I would like to
hear from the witnesses how they intend to address this very important
issue.
I will conclude with a comment on sequestration. Secretary of
Defense Panetta has repeatedly stated that defense sequestration
required under the Budget Control Act would be `catastrophic.' I ask
our witnesses to provide us with their assessment of just how severe
across-the-board cuts would be for the Air Force.
The Air Force faces many difficult challenges, but the leadership
of today's witnesses has helped position the Air Force to deal with
them effectively and decisively. I look forward to your testimony
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF THE U.S. AIR
FORCE

Secretary Donley. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and
members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here today
representing more than 690,000 Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and
civilian airmen. I'm also honored to be here with my teammate,
the dean of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of America's
finest public servants, General Norty Schwartz. We are joined
today by the Director of the Air National Guard, Lieutenant
General Harry M. ``Bud'' Wyatt, USAF, and the Chief of the Air
Force Reserve, Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr.,
USAF.
For fiscal year 2013, the U.S. Air Force requests $110.1
billion in our baseline budget and $11.5 billion in the OCO
supplemental appropriation to support our work. This budget
request represents the culmination of many hard decisions taken
to align our fiscal year 2013 budget submission with the new
strategic guidance and with the cuts required by the Budget
Control Act over the next 10 years.
Finding the proper balance between force structure,
readiness, and modernization has been our guiding principle. In
short, we determined that the Air Force's best course of action
is to trade size for quality. We will become smaller in order
to protect a high quality and ready force, one that will
continue to modernize and grow more capable in the future.
The capabilities resident in the Air Force mission set are
fundamental to the priorities outlined in the new strategic
guidance and in assessing how to adjust Air Force programs and
budgets in the future. We've taken care to protect the
distinctive capabilities we bring to the table: control of air,
space, and cyber space; global ISR; rapid global mobility, and
global strike, all enabled by effective command and control.
The Air Force and our Joint Interagency and Coalition
teammates and partners rely on these capabilities and, though
we will be smaller, we intend to be a superb force at any size,
maintaining the agility and flexibility that is inherent in our
air power capabilities and ready to engage a full range of
contingencies and threats.
This budget protects the Air Force's top priorities. We
protect the size of the bomber force. We are ramping up our
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) force to a goal of 65 combat
air patrols (CAP), with the ability to surge to 85 CAPs. We
protect our Special Operations Forces capabilities, largely
protect space programs, and protect our cyber capabilities.
But as we get smaller, it is not possible to protect
everything. Our proposed force structure changes include the
reduction of 286 aircraft over the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), including 123 fighters, 133 mobility aircraft, and 30
ISR platforms.
Many of these changes correspond to adjustments in the
overall size of the Armed Forces, especially the Army and
Marine Corps ground forces, which is the case for the proposed
reduction in A-10s. Our smaller force structure has also led us
to favor divesting smaller niche fleets, such as the C-27J, and
emphasizing multi-role capabilities that will provide
operational flexibility across the spectrum of conflict,
demonstrated by our C-130s and by our choices in fighter force
structure, which include a smaller A-10 fleet and plans for the
F-16 service life extension.
We also emphasize common configurations, which can be seen
in adjustments to C-5 and C-17 mobility fleets and in our
ongoing efforts to seek common configuration within the F-22
and F-15C fleets.
Because force structure changes have a ripple effect on
manpower needs, our budget proposal calls for a reduction of
9,900 Air Force military personnel. By component, this amounts
to reductions of 3,900 Active Duty, 5,100 Air National Guard,
and 900 Air Force Reserve personnel. Fighter, mobility, and
other force structure changes have been strategy-driven based
on changed requirements and consistent with that strategy,
especially where the Air National Guard units have been
affected, we have proposed to remission units where feasible.
We've carefully balanced our Active and Reserve component
changes to make sure we can meet the demanding operational
tempos, including both surge and rotational requirements, that
are part of the current and projected strategic environment.
As our force gets smaller, all of our components get
smaller together and will become even more closely integrated.
We remain fully committed to our total force capability and
have proposed several initiatives to strengthen integration of
effort, including increasing the number of Active/Reserve
component associations from 100 to 115.
Our intention is to protect readiness at any force level
because if we're going to be smaller we have to be prepared. To
that end, we put funds in critical areas, such as flying hours
and weapons systems sustainment. We also support the Air
National Guard readiness reset, which balances manpower across
the States from lower demand units to new, high demand ISR
missions, and increases readiness in 39 units. We are committed
to ensuring that our military forces do not go hollow and
readiness bears close watching as we move forward.
Mr. Chairman, modernization is our most significant
concern, especially as our fleets age and new technologies
drive new investment needs. In this year's budget proposal, we
slow modernization as we protect programs that are critical to
future capabilities. We also restructure or terminate some
major programs to protect key priorities. Protected
modernization priorities include: the long-range strike bomber,
the KC-46 refueling tanker, and key space programs, such as the
Space-Based Infrared System and Advanced Extremely High
Frequency Satellites, follow-On Global Positioning System work,
and advanced ISR.
We remain fully committed to the F-35 JSF, which is the
future of the fighter force. But we reduce the rate of
procurement for a few years because in our judgment, Lockheed
Martin is not ready to ramp up to full-rate production.
Due to recent delays in the F-35 program, we also proceed
with an F-16 service life extension program.
Among the programs slated for termination are: the Global
Hawk, RQ-4 Block 30 aircraft, because, among other reasons, we
could not justify the cost to improve the Block 30's sensors to
achieve capability that already exists in the U-2; and the
Defense Weather Satellite System, a termination initiated by
Congress, one we can accept for now because the program is
early to need.
As noted earlier, we decided to divest the C-27J, but we
have a good alternative to this aircraft with the multi-role
capable C-130, which has demonstrated its ability to provide
the direct support mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. We remain
committed to providing this support to the Army.
In other cases, we eliminated programs that were judged to
be non-essential in the current budget environment, such as the
Light Mobility Aircraft and the Light Attack and Armed
Reconnaissance Aircraft.
Through more disciplined use of resources, the Air Force
continues to wring savings out of overhead, to squeeze
discretionary spending, and find more efficient ways of doing
business. In fiscal year 2012, we committed to $33.3 billion in
efficiencies across the FYDP. In this year's budget we
identified about $3.4 billion in efficiencies and another $3.2
billion in programmatic adjustments to add on top of the
original $33.3 billion.
In keeping with our enduring obligation to take care of our
people, we will keep faith with airmen and their families.
Doing right by our servicemembers is key to our ability to
recruit and retain a high quality force. Nevertheless, the
impact of increasing personnel costs continues to be a serious
concern. Therefore, we support the military compensation
program reforms in the President's budget, which include a
modest pay raise, proposals to control health care cost growth,
and calls for a commission to recommend reforms in retired pay.
We must continue to seek and develop reforms to ensure the
long-term sustainability of the benefits our men and women in
uniform have earned.
Identifying $487 billion in defense cuts to comply with the
current requirements of the Budget Control Act has been
difficult. Our Air Force will get smaller, but we are confident
that we can build and sustain a quality force that is ready for
the contingencies ahead and that will improve in capability
over time. However, further cuts through sequestration or other
means will put at risk our ability to execute the new strategy.
To get this far, we have made tough decisions to align,
structure, and balance our forces in a way that can meet the
new strategic guidance. If substantially more reductions are
imposed on DOD, we will have to revisit the new strategy. We
cannot afford the risk of a hollow force.
Mr. Chairman, General Schwartz and I feel deeply that our
leadership team has inherited the finest Air Force in the
world. It is our obligation to keep it that way so that our
joint and coalition partners know that they can count on the
U.S. Air Force to deliver the capabilities that we need to meet
the security challenges ahead, and so that our future airmen
remain confident, as we are today, that they are serving in the
world's finest Air Force. That is our obligation going forward
and it is our intention to meet that obligation.
Mr. Chairman, we remain grateful for the continued support
and service of this committee and we look forward to discussing
our proposed budget. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Schwartz.

STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE U.S. AIR FORCE

General Schwartz. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman,
Senator McCain, and members of the committee, I'm privileged to
be here today with Secretary Donley once again representing the
men and women of the U.S. Air Force. I begin by noting, as the
Chairman did earlier, that a year and one day ago America's
airmen commenced operations to help enforce the United Nations-
sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya. Throughout the month of
March 2011 and beyond, our airmen, along with their joint
teammates, impressively conducted concurrent major operations
ranging more than 5,500 miles apart and spanning the entire
spectrum of operations, from ongoing combat operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, to surge operations in Japan to provide
humanitarian disaster relief, to a third major front, a
predominantly air-focused campaign in North Africa.
These simultaneous operations were most assuredly by not
trivial. Indeed, they were to become yet another dramatic
example of the professionalism and skill of America's airmen
and their capacity to act and to shift focus on short notice,
leveraging air power's unparalleled versatility and
tailorability, all critical attributes that are emphasized by
the new defense strategy guidance.
As we prepare for the future, we know that maintaining a
ready force that exhibits these and other important attributes
will remain vital to addressing potential similar scenarios and
will continue to be extremely important to our Nation's broader
success in the future security environment.
But in light of fiscal circumstances both presently and for
the foreseeable future, helping to ensure America's success
requires carefully calibrated choices by America's Air Force
and our Armed Forces. This budget request therefore supports
our airmen in our continuing efforts to structure the force for
maximized versatility and minimized risk, in a sustainable
tempo for all components across the full spectrum of
operations.
Due to evolving geopolitical trends and anticipated
security requirements, the new defense strategic guidance
emphasizes Air Force capabilities as fundamental to its major
priorities, such as defeating and deterring aggression,
projecting power in anti-access and area denial environments,
conducting space and cyber operations, and operating,
maintaining, and securing two of the three legs of the Nation's
nuclear deterrent.
As we balance our military forces toward a more air and
maritime posture, our broader strategic partnership between the
Nation's air and sea services, as articulated in the Air-Sea
Battle concept, will be ever more important to our national
interests. We must maintain the ability to project power in
areas where burgeoning capabilities could increasingly threaten
our access and freedom to operate, threats such as ballistic
and cruise missiles, advanced submarines and fighters,
electronic warfare systems, mines, and advanced air defense
systems.
As innovative airmen, we remain committed to working with
our Navy, Marine Corps, and Army teammates to develop highly
integrated and tightly coordinated schemes of maneuver and to
conceive cross-domain approaches to full-spectrum challenges.
To achieve our goals, we continue to support joint strategies
in all of the Air-Sea Battle's dimensions--institutional,
conceptual, as well as material--enabling enhanced teaming of
advanced air and naval assets, including important subsurface
assets, to gain and exploit access, deter adversary preemption,
and dissuade coercion of our partners--all contributing to
increasing regional stability.
As Secretary Donley mentioned, the wide array of Air Force
capabilities which remain vital to our Nation's diplomatic,
economic, and military interests fall into four general
categories of enduring and core contributions: air and space
control, global ISR, rapid global mobility, and global strike,
plus the Air Force's high-volume command and control of air,
space, and cyber systems, integrating and harmonizing our four
core contributions across multiple operating domains.
As part of the defense strategic guidance, we are
structuring our force to be agile and responsive across these
four areas even as we accept risks with a smaller force. While
still maintaining quality, we will divest nearly 230 fighter,
mobility, and ISR aircraft in fiscal year 2013, toward a total
of 286 aircraft retirements and a projected savings of $8.7
billion over the FYDP.
These savings can be applied to our modernization strategy,
as Secretary Donley discussed, as well as to all important
operations and sustainment accounts. We have no illusions about
the road ahead being easy, but we do have confidence in our
ability to execute and manage a $487 billion cut in defense
spending over the years. I must echo, however, Secretary
Donley's concern that across-the-board cuts driven by
sequestration would dramatically change the complexion of our
thoroughly deliberated defense strategy. We effectively would
be sent back to the drawing board because indiscriminate
salami-slicing of the budget would nullify our carefully
considered and responsible reductions that preserve our
readiness and effectiveness notwithstanding fiscal constraints
and a smaller force.
Finally, please allow me to make one comment concerning
military compensation. I appeal to the committee to carefully
consider those initiatives in our budget proposal that begin to
tackle escalating personnel costs--compensation, health care,
and retirement. Among all the other challenges facing us, the
reality of fewer members of the Armed Forces costing
increasingly more to recruit, train, and retain for promising
careers is, I think, the monumental defense issue of our time.
Our inability to address this issue properly will place other
areas of the budget, including force structure and
modernization, under yet more pressure, forcing out needed
military capability at a time when we are already right-sized
for the likely missions ahead.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, the
Air Force remains committed to providing global vigilance,
reach, and power for America's needs today and for our
aspirations and the challenges that the Nation will face
tomorrow. We look forward to your questions, sir. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Donley and General
Schwartz follows:]

Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael B. Donley and Gen. Norton A.
Schwartz, USAF

INTRODUCTION

Since the first clash of battle, warriors have relied on breaking
through the lines to achieve victory. However, once the airplane was
used over the battlefields of World War I, the battle itself was
forever revolutionized. In the 65 years since the establishment of the
United States Air Force as a separate Service, its technological,
strategic, and tactical innovations have been elemental in shaping the
way the United States engages in war, deters aggression, and maintains
peace. Because America's airmen characteristically view defense
challenges differently, our Air Force has pioneered advancements that
have been essential in ensuring our Nation's security while reducing
the overall casualty counts inflicted by war. As the Department of
Defense (DOD) faces fiscal pressures and an evolving strategic
environment, America will continue to depend on the Air Force to
contribute innovative strategies and systems to conduct our most
important military missions.
During the past decade, the United States has engaged in a
prolonged war aimed at disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda
and its network. A major part of this effort involved long-term and
large-scale presence on the ground. The withdrawal of combat forces
from Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan signal the beginning of a new
chapter for America in which we will rely more heavily on airpower to
complement innovative, lower-cost, lighter footprint approaches around
the world. As the Nation sustains its global presence with a renewed
emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to continued focus on
the Middle East, we must maintain the best military in the world--a
force capable of deterring conflict, a force capable of projecting
power, and a force capable of winning wars. We will preserve the
capability and expertise in irregular warfare that we developed over
the past decade and we will invest in fielding appropriate amounts of
new and existing military capabilities in order to meet the national
security challenges of today and the future.
Despite new challenges and fiscal stress, America is and will
unquestionably remain the global leader. The strategic choices embodied
in the proposed fiscal year 2013 budget reflect 21st century defense
priorities and will enable your Air Force to play a critical role in
sustaining that leadership. As DOD's recently released strategic
guidance articulates, the Joint Force of the future must be smaller and
leaner--but agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. The
Air Force will leverage the innovative ability and technological acumen
of its airmen as we conduct the military missions that protect our core
national interests: defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates and
succeeding in current conflicts; deterring and defeating aggression,
including those seeking to deny our power projection; countering
weapons of mass destruction; operating effectively in cyberspace and
across all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent;
and protecting the homeland. Air Force contributions to total Joint
Force effectiveness make us indispensable in carrying out these
missions and overcoming existing and emerging threats in this strategic
environment.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

After 10 years of sustained large scale overseas operations, major
changes in the strategic environment required a reshaping of defense
strategy and priorities. Over the last several months, the Air Force,
together with our joint partners, has reassessed our future military
strategy and posture to determine how the Air Force will best
contribute to achieving U.S. security objectives, including freedom of
action in the global commons.
The major factors and trends of the strategic environment
identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) continue to
affect the security environment and inform its trajectory. The rise of
new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the proliferation
of conventional arms, and the transfer of other destructive enabling
technologies are all trends that still require focused attention when
considering how the Air Force will execute America's national security
strategy.
Since the release of the QDR, however, we have witnessed events
that further inform our strategy. The Arab Awakening in the Middle East
and North Africa has brought about regime changes in some nations in
the region and challenged the stability and security of others. The
global economic crisis has made some nations reluctant to support
international cooperative military efforts as they have shifted their
focus towards domestic issues. The economic crisis continues to
contribute to the economic and political shift toward the Asia-Pacific
region; although we will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied
military presence in--and support for--partner nations in and around
the Middle East. The demise of Osama bin Laden and other senior al
Qaeda leaders has led to deterioration in the organization's leadership
and impaired its strategic coherence, although the threat of extremism
remains. We are also transitioning out of the post-Cold War world where
our military could easily gain access to the battlefield and operate
major systems unimpeded. Today, adversaries are developing ways to
prevent our access to the battlefield and deny our freedom of action
once there.
As a result of these factors, DOD undertook a comprehensive
strategic review and recently released new strategic guidance,
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.
The new guidance notes the importance of recalibrating Joint Force
capabilities and investments to succeed in the following key military
missions: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat
aggression; project power despite anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
challenges; counter weapons of mass destruction; operate effectively in
cyberspace and space; maintain a secure and effective nuclear
deterrent; defend the homeland and provide support to civil
authorities; provide a stabilizing presence; conduct stability and
counterinsurgency operations; and conduct humanitarian, disaster
relief, and other operations. In determining development of the force
required to meet these missions, the Secretary of Defense has directed
that we maintain a broad portfolio of capabilities that, in the
aggregate, offer versatility across this range of missions. Other
factors that are important to the implementation of the new strategy
include understanding which investments must be made now and those that
can be deferred, maintaining a ready and capable force, reducing ``the
cost of doing business,'' examining how the strategy will influence
existing campaign and contingency plans so that more limited resources
are better tuned to their requirements, determining the proper Active
and Reserve component mix, retaining and building on key advances in
networked warfare on which the Joint Force has become truly
interdependent, and maintaining the industrial base and investment in
promising science and technology.
Airpower--the ability to project military power or influence
through the control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to
achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives--has been a
necessary component of successful U.S. military operations for many
decades, and a reasonable assessment of the strategic environment
suggests an even greater role for those capabilities. Since the end of
the Cold War, the Air Force's contributions to national security have
evolved with the times. We have become not only more effective, but
also increasingly intertwined with the successful operation of the
Joint Force. We have now reached a point where no other Service
operates independently of the Air Force; we are a necessary catalyst
for effective U.S. and coalition military operations. As we realign our
resources to support the new strategic guidance, the capabilities that
underpin these contributions on which the Joint Force depends will be
protected.

REALIGNMENT TO THE NEW DEFENSE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

The Air Force has made the hard choices to closely align with the
new strategic guidance by trading size for quality. We will be a
smaller, but superb, force that maintains the agility, flexibility, and
readiness to engage a full range of contingencies and threats.

New Concepts
One way in which the Air Force is posturing itself for the future
in light of the strategic guidance is through our pursuit of the Air-
Sea Battle concept in partnership with our sister Services. The rise of
near peer capabilities--such as fifth-generation fighters, air defense
systems and ballistic missiles--evince emerging A2/AD threats. The Air-
Sea Battle concept will guide the Services as they work together to
maintain a continued U.S. advantage against the global proliferation of
advanced military technologies and A2/AD capabilities. Air-Sea Battle
will leverage military and technological capabilities and is guiding us
to develop a more permanent and better-institutionalized relationship
between the military departments that will ultimately shape our Service
organizations, inform our operational concepts, and guide our materiel
acquisitions.

Enduring Air Force Contributions
The Air Force will also continue to bring four enduring and
distinctive contributions to the Nation's military portfolio to support
the new strategic guidance: (1) air and space control; (2) global
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); (3) global
mobility; and (4) global strike. These four core contributions--plus
our ability to command and control air, space, and cyberspace systems--
will sustain our Nation's military advantage as the Joint Force becomes
smaller and as we face emerging A2/AD threats.

Air and Space Control
From the World War II Pacific island-hopping campaign, to the
success of liberation forces in Libya, control of the air has been and
remains an essential precondition for successful land and maritime
operations. Today, control of the air and space, along with assured
access to cyberspace, allows U.S. and coalition forces to take
advantage of unique capabilities in mobility, strike, and ISR and
permits surface forces freedom of action without the threat of
adversarial attack from above. Whether friendly naval forces are
helping to secure vital lines of communication and transit, marines are
conducting amphibious operations, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are
executing counterterrorism missions, or ground forces are engaged in
combined-arms maneuvers, these operations all fundamentally depend on
the Air Force to provide mission-essential control of air and space. In
the coming decade, our ability to assert control in all domains will be
increasingly at risk as sophisticated military technology proliferates.
The new strategic guidance demands that we forge ahead and maintain the
air and space power advantages that will enable our entire Joint Force
to deter and defeat aggression, operate effectively in space and
cyberspace, defend the homeland, and conduct stability operations.

Global ISR
Combat experience over the last decade has shown how important ISR
capabilities are to the counterterrorism and irregular warfare
missions, and has also made it increasingly clear that these
capabilities will be required in contested environments in future
conflicts and as we take an active approach to countering extremist
threats. Through a mix of aircraft and satellite sensors and
corresponding architecture for exploitation and dissemination, Air
Force ISR affords U.S. leaders an unparalleled decisionmaking advantage
on which commanders rely--from supporting national strategic
decisionmaking to successful outcomes in life-and-death tactical
situations. Moreover, airmen provide expert processing and exploitation
of staggering volumes of raw data and timely dissemination of usable
intelligence. In the past 10 years, Air Force ISR contributions have
been ascendant, particularly from our space-enabled remotely-piloted
systems. But power projection in the future strategic environment will
require extending today's ISR capability into contested battle spaces.
This demands significant and sustained attention to modernization of
our ISR capabilities.

Global Mobility
The capability to get friendly forces to the fight and to extend
the range of airborne strike platforms is a unique Air Force
contribution that not only enhances Joint effectiveness, but also
embodies the Nation's global reach and power. The military's ability to
deter and defeat aggression, project power, provide a stabilizing
presence, conduct stability operations, and conduct humanitarian and
other relief operations depends on the airlift and in-flight aerial
refueling that the Air Force provides. We ensure that joint and
coalition assets get to the fight and remain in the fight, posing a
potent threat to adversaries and a persuasive presence to allies. Our
airlift fleet transports massive amounts of humanitarian-relief
supplies and wartime materiel to distant locations around the world in
impressively short time periods. Furthermore, in-flight aerial
refueling is the linchpin to power projection at intercontinental
distances. Global mobility also provides for persistent pressure and
over-watch once we arrive, as demonstrated last year in the skies over
Libya.

Global Strike
Finally, the Air Force's ability to conduct global strike--to hold
any target on the globe at risk--will be of growing importance in the
coming decade. Our conventional precision strike forces compose a
significant portion of the Nation's deterrent capability, providing
national leaders with a range of crisis response and escalation control
options. Our nuclear deterrent forces provide two-thirds of the
Nation's nuclear triad, quietly and competently forming the foundation
of global stability and underwriting our national security and that of
our allies. However, increasingly sophisticated air defenses and long-
range missile threats require a focused modernization effort
exemplified by the long-range strike family of systems. A key element
of this effort is the long-range strike bomber (LRS-B) which will
strengthen both conventional and nuclear deterrence well into the
future.
Collectively, these capabilities, and the Air Force's ability to
command and control the air, space, and cyber systems, provide the
Nation with the global vigilance, global reach, and global power
necessary to implement the new strategic guidance.

ADAPTING TO CONSTRAINED RESOURCES

Although the contributions that the Air Force provides to the Joint
Force have increased in relevance over time, there has not been a
corresponding increase in resources. The Air Force has entered this era
of fiscal austerity significantly smaller, with older equipment, and
with a smaller budget share than any military Department in half a
century. The Air Force has been continuously engaged in combat for over
two decades and has taken on a range of new missions. Yet over that
same time period, our aircraft inventory and end strength declined.
Since 2001, we have reduced our inventory by over 500 aircraft and have
added new missions, while end strength has come down by thousands of
airmen, leaving us next year with the smallest force since our
inception in 1947. Meanwhile, the average age of Air Force aircraft has
risen dramatically: fighters stand at 22 years; bombers, 35 years; and
tankers, 47 years. Reduced manpower, full-scale operations, and reduced
training opportunities have pushed our readiness to the edge. The
budget increases that have occurred in the last decade were primarily
consumed by operational expenses, not procurement. There is a
compelling need to invest in next-generation, high-impact systems so
that the Air Force can continue to provide the capabilities on which
our Nation relies. The failure to make the proper investments now will
imperil the effectiveness of the future force and our ability to
execute the new strategic guidance for decades to come.
We are mindful, however, of the current fiscal situation and
recognize that we must contribute to government-wide deficit reduction
as a national security imperative. Our ability to make proper
investments to modernize and sustain the capabilities of the Air Force
is directly tied to the economic health of the United States. In
addition, as respectful stewards of the American taxpayer's dollars,
the Air Force is committed to achieving audit readiness and meeting
Secretary Panetta's accelerated goal to achieve auditability of the
Statement of Budgetary Resources by 2014. Over the last year, the Air
Force has made real progress, receiving clean audit opinions on two
important components of our budget and accounting processes from
independent public accounting firms. In the coming year, the Air Force
expects to have independent auditors examine the audit readiness of our
military equipment inventories, our base-level funds distribution
process, and our civilian pay process.
The Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget request reflects aggressive
prioritization of limited resources, heavily informed by the new
strategic guidance, with regard to both capability and capacity of our
forces--that is, both what capabilities we should buy and how much of
them. The budget brings together strategic guidance with fiscal
constraint. Its guiding principle was balance. To retain critical core
Air Force capabilities and the ability to rapidly respond to mission
demands, the Air Force balanced risk across all mission areas.
Although we will be smaller and leaner, we will not sacrifice
readiness. Selected reductions in force structure and modernization
programs were based on careful assessments reflecting the requirements
to address potential future conflict scenarios and to emphasize the
Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions. Force and program development
choices were also influenced by the need to protect our ability to
regenerate capabilities to meet future, unforeseen demands. Our budget
request seeks to leverage strong relationships with allies and
partners, including the development of new partners. Finally, the
fiscal year 2013 budget request honors and protects the high quality
and battle-tested professionals of the All-Volunteer Force.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The fiscal reality and strategic direction mean that the Air Force
will continue the long-term trend of accepting a smaller force to
ensure high quality. In planning for a smaller force, our decisions
favored retention of multi-role platforms over those with more narrowly
focused capabilities--for example, F-16s over A-10s and F-15Cs, and C-
130s over C-27s. Where feasible, we sought to divest smaller fleets
with niche capabilities and stressed common configurations for key
platforms in order to maximize operational flexibility and minimize
sustainment costs.

Aircraft
In meeting the force sizing requirements of the new strategic
guidance, and to remain within the constraints of the Budget Control
Act, the Air Force made the difficult choice of divesting 227 aircraft
from our combat and combat support aircraft fleets in the fiscal year
2013 budget request. Total divestitures rise to over 280 aircraft over
the fiscal year 2013-2017 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) period.
These divestitures will result in $8.7 billion in savings across the
Active and Reserve components.
In order to balance current and future requirements in the Combat
Air Forces (CAF), we are reducing the total number of combat-coded
fighter squadrons from 60 to 54 (31 Active squadrons and 23 Reserve
component squadrons). As part of a broader strategy to reshape the Air
Force into a smaller, yet capable force, we divested 21 F-16 Block 30
aircraft in the Reserve component and 102 A-10s in the Reserve
component from the total aircraft inventory. In making these difficult
choices, we considered several factors: the relative operational value
of weapon systems to counter capable adversaries in denied
environments; fleet management principles, such as retiring older
aircraft first and prioritizing multi-role aircraft; and operational
flexibility, forward-basing, and host-nation commitments. The
allocation of reductions between the Active and Reserve components took
into consideration the Air Force's surge requirements as directed by
the new strategic guidance, the expected future deployment tempo, the
need to increase means to accumulate fighter pilot experience, and the
imperative to ensure that the Reserve component remains relevant and
engaged in both enduring and evolving missions.
In the Mobility Air Forces (MAF), we sized the fleet to a total of
275 strategic airlifters--52 C-5Ms and 223 C-17s. We will seek
legislative approval to retire 27 C-5As across fiscal year 2013-2016,
going below the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
strategic airlift floor of 301 aircraft. This will avert higher
sustainment costs for aircraft with substantially less reliability than
the C-17 or C-5M. For our intra-theater airlift, the fleet was sized to
meet the airlift requirements of the new strategy, including our direct
support requirements of ground forces. We will retire 65 C-130Hs across
fiscal year 2013-2017 and are divesting the C-27J fleet. After these
retirements, we will maintain a fleet of 318 C-130s (134 C-130Js and
184 C-130Hs). Our air refueling fleet is being reduced to 453 tankers
after retiring 20 KC-135s. The development and procurement of the KC-
46A is on-track for initial delivery in fiscal year 2016 with the
strategic basing process underway.
In our ISR aircraft fleet, we plan to divest all 18 RQ-4 Global
Hawk Block 30 aircraft and retain the U-2S Dragon Lady program. Due to
the reduction in high altitude ISR combat air patrol (CAP)
requirements, the need for RQ-4 upgrades to meet current U-2 sensor
operational performance levels, and the high operational costs of the
RQ-4, continued investment into the U-2 is both the fiscally and
operationally responsible choice. Transferring the MC-12W Liberty from
the Active component to the Air National Guard (ANG) reflects the
assessment that the ANG is the appropriate place for long-term,
scalable support of medium altitude ISR. The Active component will
retain association with the ANG units. The MC-12W will also perform the
mission of the divested RC-26 fleet. Finally, we will retire one E-8C
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft that is
damaged beyond economical repair.
Air Force leaders recognize that proposals to retire aircraft are
often contentious and that Congress has at times written legislation
blocking or delaying proposed retirements. We are committed to
faithfully executing the law; however, we urge the congressional
defense committees and Congress as a whole to be especially cautious
about proposals to block or delay aircraft retirements that do not
provide the additional human and financial resources needed to operate
and maintain those airframes. Retaining large numbers of under-
resourced aircraft in the fleet in today's fiscally constrained
environment will significantly increase the risk of a hollow force.
After the intense efforts to find efficiencies over the past few years,
the Air Force has only a limited ability to reallocate resources and
personnel to uncovered operations without creating major disruption in
other critical activities.

End Strength
In correlation to the reductions in our aircraft force structure,
we are also adjusting our end strength numbers. Since 2004, our Active,
Guard, and Reserve end strength has decreased by over 48,000 personnel.
By the end of fiscal year 2013, end strength will be reduced a further
9,900 from 510,900 to 501,000. This will result in a reduction in
Active Duty military end strength from 332,800 to 328,900, Reserve
military end strength will decrease by 900 to 70,500, and Air National
Guard military end strength will decrease by 5,100 to 101,600. Although
the reductions in aircraft and personnel carry risk, we are committed
to managing that risk and ensuring successful execution of the new
strategic guidance.

Reserve Component
The Air Force has enjoyed great success in leveraging our Total
Force Enterprise to present our enduring core capabilities to the joint
warfighter. The Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve are
integrated into all major Air Force mission areas, train to the same
high standards as the Active component, and are invaluable partners in
helping us meet our many and varied commitments. This will not change--
we will rely on our Air Reserve Component (ARC) as both a strategic and
operational reserve. A strategic reserve can be employed to mobilize
significant numbers of airmen in the event of a significant national
crisis while an operational reserve will still be used to augment day-
to-day operations.
Maintaining the appropriate mix of forces between the Active and
Reserve components is critical to sustaining Air Force capabilities for
forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate rotational demands
within a smaller overall force. Over the years, we have adjusted the
mix between Active and Reserve components to ensure we maintained a
ready and sustainable force and could meet our surge and rotational
requirements. The Air Force has successfully met the demand of
increased operations tempo through a combination of volunteerism,
selective mobilization, and the establishment of classic, Active, and
ARC associations to better manage high activity rates. However, 2
decades of military end strength and force structure reductions in our
Active component have shifted the ratio of Active to Reserve component
forces. In 1990, the Reserve component represented 25 percent of Total
Force end strength; today that percentage is at 35 percent. Reserve
component aircraft ownership also increased from approximately 23
percent to 28 percent over the same period.
The Total Air Force leadership carefully considered the ratio
between the Active and Reserve components for the proposed force
structure reductions in the 2013 budget request. The expected
deployment tempo and the need to increase pilot seasoning drove the
allocation of reductions between components. The proper ratio between
components must be achieved to maintain acceptable operations tempo
levels within each component and to preserve the ability of a smaller
Air Force to meet continued overseas presence demands and the rapid
deployment and rotational force requirements of the strategic guidance.
While the Air Force Reserve and ANG are significantly affected by
the proposed 2013 Air Force budget request, they remain essential
elements of our Total Force. Due to the magnitude of the budget
decline, our programmed reductions are wide-ranging, directly impacting
over 60 installations. Thirty-three States will be directly impacted,
but all 54 States and territories will be affected in some way by the
proposed aircraft and manpower reductions. Although some squadrons will
actually grow larger, it is unlikely that there will be a 100 percent
backfill of personnel or alternative mission for every location.
Without the Total Force re-missioning actions we are proposing, these
reductions would have significantly affected 24 units and left 8
installations without an Air Force presence.
In close coordination with our ANG and Air Force Reserve leaders,
we have developed a detailed plan that will mitigate the impact by
realigning missions to restore 14 of the 24 units. Nine of the
remaining 10 units have existing missions, or the mission will transfer
from the Air National Guard to the Air Force Reserve. Our plan also
maintains an Air Force presence on seven of the eight affected
installations. This plan will allow us to preserve an appropriate
Active to Reserve component force mix ratio and minimizes the
possibility of uncovered missions. The aircraft force structure changes
also presented an opportunity for the ANG to realign manpower to ensure
proper mission resourcing while simultaneously bolstering ANG
readiness. The fiscal year 2013 adjustments in strategy, force
structure, and resources allowed us to realign manpower within the ANG
to properly source its growing MC-12W and MQ-1/9 missions.
After the proposed force reductions and mitigations, Reserve
component end strength will make up 33 percent of Total Force military
personnel, a reduction of 2 percent from the fiscal year 2012 numbers.
Within the CAF, the Reserve component will have 38 percent of total
aircraft which is 4 percent lower than fiscal year 2012. For the MAF,
the Reserve component shares shifts from 51 percent to 46 percent. In
order to maintain capability, the Air Force intends to grow the number
of Total Force Integration associations from 100 to 115. This will
enable the seasoning of our Active Duty personnel while improving the
combat capacity of our Reserve component.

READINESS

Readiness is comprised of complementary components, such as flying
hours, weapon system sustainment, and facilities and installations. A
good readiness posture depends on health in all of these key areas. In
spite of aircraft divestments and reduction in personnel, we are
committed to executing the defense strategy and will ensure America's
Air Force remains ready to perform its mission every day. High
operations tempo has had some detrimental effects on our overall
readiness, particularly in the context of aging weapons systems and
stress on our personnel. Since September 11, 2001, the Air Force has
flown more than 455,000 sorties in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom
and New Dawn and more than 350,000 sorties in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom. In 2011, our airmen averaged approximately 400
sorties every day, with December 17, 2011, marking the first day in 20
years that the Air Force did not fly an air tasking sortie in Iraq.
Maintaining our ability to be ready across the full spectrum of
operations has been challenging in recent years, especially for the CAF
and certain limited-supply/high-demand units. We will continue to
revise our readiness tracking systems to provide increasingly accurate
assessments and mitigate readiness shortfalls. Preserving readiness and
avoiding a hollow force was a non-negotiable priority for the Air Force
and the DOD in developing the 2013 budget.

Weapons System Sustainment
During previous budget cycles, the overall Air Force weapons system
sustainment (WSS) requirement increased each year due to sustainment
strategy, the complexity of new aircraft, operations tempo, force
structure changes, and growth in depot work packages for legacy
aircraft. In fiscal year 2013, although the Air Force is retiring some
combat, mobility, and ISR force structure, our overall weapon system
sustainment requirements continue to increase. These cost increases,
along with a reduction in the Service's Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) request, resulted in a slight decrease in the percentage of
weapons systems sustainment requirements funded from fiscal year 2012
to fiscal year 2013. WSS is funded at 79 percent of requirement in the
fiscal year 2013 budget.
We maintained our readiness capability in the portfolio areas most
directly affecting readiness such as aircraft, engines, and missiles,
while taking some risk in areas that are less readiness related in the
short-term such as technical orders, sustaining engineering, and
software. Additionally, the Air Force continues to conduct requirements
reviews and streamline organizations and processes to reduce
maintenance and material costs, develop depot efficiencies, and manage
weapon system requirements growth. The goal of these efforts is to
sustain fiscal year 2012 weapon system sustainment performance levels
for fiscal year 2013.

Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
The sustainment portion of facilities sustainment, restoration and
modernization (FSRM) was funded just over 80 percent of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) facility sustainment model. Due to
current fiscal realities the revised strategic guidance, the Air Force
is also taking a deliberate pause in its military construction (MILCON)
program, resulting in a nearly $900 million reduction from fiscal year
2012 enacted levels. To manage the risk associated with these actions
we continue civil engineering transformation to employ an enterprise-
wide, centralized, asset management approach to installation resourcing
which maximizes each facility dollar.

Flying Hour Program
The emphasis on readiness in the new strategic guidance reinforced
Air Force focus on the importance of maintaining our flying hour
program (FHP). The fiscal year 2013 budget removes flying hours where
associated with the retirement of some of our oldest aircraft and
divestiture of single-role mission weapon systems. In the remainder of
the FHP, however, levels are consistent with fiscal year 2012 levels to
prevent further erosion of readiness. The fiscal year 2013 baseline FHP
remains optimized as we continue to fly a significant portion of our
hours in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR),
but still poses a measured risk to our full spectrum training and
readiness levels. As operations in the CENTCOM AOR decrease, these OCO
hours will migrate back to our baseline program to ensure peacetime FHP
requirements are met. We are also committed to a long-term effort to
increase our live, virtual, and constructive operational training (LVC-
OT) capability and capacity by funding improvements in our LVC-OT
devices (e.g., simulators and virtual trainers) and networks.
Although the Air Force has no single rollup metric to measure FHP
requirements, we are working toward a set of metrics that clearly
articulate the training requirements needed to support desired
readiness levels. Our challenge is that the diversity of our missions
does not lend itself to yardsticks like ``hours per crewmember per
month.'' The Air Force operates a wide variety of aircraft--including
multi-role aircraft--that require differing training requirements in
amount and type for each aircrew member. In addition, we have critical
space and cyber units that involve no aircraft at all. As we develop
FHP metrics, we will dovetail our efforts with the work being done at
the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office at the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to study the relationship between defense
funding and military readiness and mature necessary metrics and
assessment tools.
Even though the Air Force will be smaller in capacity, we will
remain highly capable and lethal, as well as ready, agile, and
deployable.

MODERNIZATION

Looking ahead, the Air Force faces two primary strategic
challenges. In the face of declining budgets, we must still provide the
essential force structure and capabilities on which the Joint Force
depends. Historical and projected uses of U.S. military forces, and our
inability to accurately predict the future, make the complete
divestment of the capability to conduct any 1 of the 12 Air Force core
functions imprudent. Yet, the new strategic guidance also requires
continuing modernization of our aging force to address the
proliferation of modern threats. Finding the right balance requires a
long-range plan that begins with a strategic vision. Implementing
across the board cuts will not produce the envisioned Joint Force of
2020.
Accordingly, we carefully scrutinized all our weapons systems and
capabilities to determine which require investment today and those that
can be deferred. We then made the tough choices to maximize our
military effectiveness in a constrained resource environment. Combat
and combat support aircraft force structure reductions, coupled with
reduced development and procurement of preferred munitions and other
key modernization programs, were essential to achieving the Air Force
fiscal year 2013 budget targets.
In fiscal year 2013, we have programmed $35.8 billion for
modernization, approximately 33 percent of the Air Force total
obligation authority. We are slowing the pace and scope of
modernization while protecting programs critical to future warfighter
needs. Focused investment in high priority programs such as the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter, long-range strike bomber, KC-46A refueling
tanker, service-life extension of the F-16, Space-Based Infrared and
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF), and our space
launch capability is critical to the Department's overall strategy.
Access and continued freedom of maneuver within cyberspace is an
essential requirement for our networked force, therefore the
development of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities remains a top
Air Force priority. Additionally, in coordination with the Navy, the
Air Force will fund modern radars, precision munitions, and other
priorities to support the Air-Sea Battle concept and ensure worldwide
power projection despite increasing A2/AD challenges.
To continue funding these high priority investments, we made the
hard choices to terminate or restructure programs with unaffordable
cost growth or technical challenges such as the RQ-4 Block 30, B-2
Extremely High Frequency radio improvements, and the Family of Advanced
Beyond Line of Sight Terminals. We eliminated expensive programs with
more affordable alternatives that still accomplish the mission, such as
the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, the C-27J program, and
Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS). Likewise, we discontinued or
deferred programs that are simply beyond our reach in the current
fiscal environment, such as the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform,
Light Mobility Aircraft, and Light Attack and Armed Reconnaissance
aircraft. The fiscal year 2013 budget also accepts significant near-
term risk in military construction for current mission facilities,
limiting ourselves to projects required to support new aircraft bed
downs and emerging missions.
Underpinning the Air Force's ability to leverage and field these
crucial technologies is America's aerospace research and development
infrastructure--a national asset that must be protected to ensure
future U.S. advantages in technology and civil aerospace. Therefore,
the Air Force's budget protects science and technology funding as a
share of our total resources.

MORE DISCIPLINED USE OF DEFENSE DOLLARS

In June 2010, the Secretary of Defense challenged the Services to
increase funding for mission activities by identifying efficiencies in
overhead, support, and other less mission-essential areas in an effort
to identify $100 billion in DOD savings for reinvestment. Our fiscal
year 2013 budget continues to depend on successfully managing and
delivering the $33.3 billion in Air Force FYDP efficiencies associated
with the fiscal year 2012 PB submission. We are actively managing and
reporting on these, as well as the Air Force portion of DOD-wide
efficiencies. In light of the current budget constraints, the Air Force
continues to seek out opportunities for additional efficiencies.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request includes additional savings of
$6.6 billion from our more disciplined use of defense dollars. This
represents $3.4 billion in new efficiency efforts as well as $3.2
billion in programmatic adjustments. These reductions continue to focus
on overhead cost reductions and spending constraints consistent with
Executive Order 13589, ``Promoting Efficient Spending,'' and specific
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) spending guidance. Areas in which
we are seeking major efficiencies and spending reductions in this
budget submission include information technology, service contracts,
travel, and inventory.
We are identifying and eliminating duplicate information technology
applications across our business and mission system areas. Policies and
better spending controls will be placed within modernization and legacy
systems sustainment areas. We have committed to save $100 million in
fiscal year 2013 and $1.1 billion across the FYDP in this area. We
continue to put downward pressure on service support contract spending
and are committing to an additional $200 million reduction in fiscal
year 2013 and $1 billion across the FYDP. These efforts are consistent
with Secretary of Defense-directed efficiencies across the DOD and OMB
guidance to reduce spending by 30 percent from a 2010 baseline.
Executive Order 13589 also directs reductions in travel across
Departments. The Air Force budget for travel has steadily declined from
actual spending of $984 million in fiscal year 2010 to a budgeted-level
of $810 million in fiscal year 2012. Between Air Force budget
reductions and DOD-directed travel reductions, the fiscal year 2013 PB
reflects an additional $116 million travel savings in fiscal year 2013
and $583 million across the FYDP. Finally, a bottom-up review of base-
level inventory is planned, with the intent of identifying consumable
and repairable items that are excess, including Government Purchase
Card-procured excess inventory. We estimate $45 million savings in
fiscal year 2013 and $225 million across the FYDP.

TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

Regardless of any strategy realignment or future mission
commitment, the hallmark of our success as an Air Force has always
been, and will remain, our people. Our mission effectiveness depends
first and foremost on the readiness and dedication of our airmen.
Nearly two decades of sustained combat, humanitarian, and stability
operations have imposed extraordinary demands on our force. As we look
to the future of reduced funding and fewer manpower positions, we are
working hard to continue meeting the needs of a 21st century force. The
Nation owes a debt of gratitude for the sacrifices made by our airmen
and their families.
Despite the difficult budgetary environment, we are committed to
our Air Force community. Therefore, quality of service programs must
continue as one of our highest priorities. We are sustaining cost-
effective services and programs to maintain balanced, healthy, and
resilient airmen and families so that they are equipped to meet the
demands of high operations tempo and persistent conflict. As our force
changes, we must adapt our programs and services to ensure we meet the
needs of today's airmen and their families. Developing our airmen will
be a key focus as we continue efforts to reduce the ``cost of doing
business'' and develop lighter-footprint approaches to achieving
security objectives. We will do this by developing expertise in foreign
language, regional, and cultural skills while also ensuring our
educational programs focus on current and anticipated mission
requirements.
Even as Air Force end strength continues to be reduced,
requirements for some career fields--like special operations, ISR, and
cyber--continue to grow. We will continue to size and shape the force
through a series of voluntary and involuntary programs designed to
retain the highest quality airmen with the right skills and
capabilities. As we take steps to reduce our end strength, we will
offer support programs to help separating airmen translate their
military skills to the civilian workforce and facilitate the transition
in a way that capitalizes on the tremendous experience in technical
fields and leadership that they accrue while serving.
Although retention is at a record high, we must sustain accessions
for the long-term and utilize a series of recruiting and retention
bonuses to ensure the right balance of skills exist across the spectrum
of the force. Enlistment bonuses are the most effective, responsive,
and measurable tool for meeting requirements growth in emerging
missions, while retention bonuses encourage airmen to remain in, or
retrain into, career fields with high operational demands.
We recognize the unique demands of military service and want to
ensure that our airmen are compensated in a way that honors that
service. Accordingly, the President has announced a 1.7 percent
increase in basic military pay for fiscal year 2013. The costs of
military pay, allowances, and health care have risen significantly in
the last decade. These costs have doubled DOD-wide since fiscal year
2001 while the number of full-time military personnel, including
activated Reserves, has increased only 8 percent. As budgets decrease,
we must find ways to achieve savings in this area to prevent overly
large cuts in forces, readiness, and modernization. As part of a DOD-
wide effort, we are looking at a gamut of proposals, including health
care initiatives and retirement system changes, to meet deficit
reduction targets and slow cost growth. Proposed health care changes
will focus on working age retirees and the retirement commission will
address potential future changes, with the current force grandfathered
into the current system. As we consider these options, we must go
forward with balanced set of reductions in the military budget that not
only implements the strategic guidance, but also does our part to
alleviate the Nation's economic difficulties. Any solutions to this
problem will be deliberate, will recognize that the All-Volunteer Force
is the core of our military, and will not break faith with the airmen
and families who serve our Nation.
With this as a backdrop, the Air Force has approached its
investment strategy in a way that seeks to apply our resources to the
people, programs, and systems that will best contribute to the new DOD
strategic guidance.

AIR FORCE CORE FUNCTIONS

The Air Force Core Functions provide a framework for balancing
investments across Air Force capabilities and our enduring
contributions as we align our resources to the new defense strategic
guidance. However, none of these core functions should be viewed in
isolation. There is inherent interdependence among these capabilities
within the Air Force, the Joint Force, and in some cases, throughout
the U.S. Government. The Air Force's budget request of $110.1 billion
reflects the difficult choices that had to be made as a result of Air
Force fiscal limitations, while still providing an appropriate balance
of investment across our core functions in a way that best supports key
DOD military missions. Additional detailed information about each core
function, including specific investment figures, can be found in the
Budget Overview Book and in the detailed budget justification documents
provided to Congress.
Air Superiority
U.S. forces must be able to deter and defeat adversaries in
multiple conflicts and across all domains. In particular, even when
U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region,
they must also be capable of denying the objectives of--or imposing
unacceptable costs on--an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.
Securing the high ground is a critical prerequisite for any military
operation to ensure freedom of action for the Joint Force and the
Nation. In making operational plans, American ground forces assume they
will be able to operate with minimal threat of attack from enemy
aircraft or missile systems. For nearly 6 decades, Air Force
investments, expertise, and sacrifice in achieving air superiority have
ensured that condition. The last time any American ground forces were
killed by an enemy air strike was April 15, 1953.
But while the United States has enjoyed this control of the air for
the last 60 years, there is no guarantee of air superiority in the
future. Airspace control remains vitally important in all operating
environments to ensure the advantages of rapid global mobility, ISR,
and precision strike are broadly available to the combatant commander.
Fast growing, near-peer capabilities are beginning to erode the legacy
fighter fleet's ability to control the air. Likewise, emerging
adversaries are developing significant air threats by both leveraging
inexpensive technology to modify existing airframes with improved
radars, sensors, jammers and weapons, and pursuing fifth-generation
aircraft. Simultaneously, current operations are pressing our legacy
systems into new roles. As a result, the legacy fighter fleet is
accumulating flying hours both faster and differently than anticipated
when they were purchased decades ago.
Given these realities, the Air Force's fiscal year 2013 budget
request of $8.3 billion includes initiatives to address current and
future air superiority needs. We continue incremental modernization of
the F-22 fleet, including Increment 3.2A, a software-only upgrade
adding new electronic protection (EP) and combat identification
techniques. The fiscal year 2013 budget request includes approximately
$140.1 million for Increment 3.2B, which includes the integration of
AIM-120D and AIM-9X capabilities, data link improvements, and faster,
more accurate target mapping. We are continuing the F-15 active
electronically scanned array radar modernization program, funding the
F-15 Advanced Display Core Processor, and funding the development and
procurement of an Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability
System. We are also investing in fourth-generation radar upgrades to
ensure their continued viability, sustaining the development and
procurement of preferred air-to-air munitions and select electronic
warfare enhancements, and resourcing critical readiness enablers,
including training capabilities and modernized range equipment.
As part of our air control alert mission, the Air Force, working
closely with U.S. Northern Command, reduced full-time Air National
Guard requirements at two sites while maintaining overall surveillance
and intercept coverage.

GLOBAL PRECISION ATTACK

A critical component of the broader mission to deter and defeat
aggression is the Air Force's ability to hold any target at risk across
the air, land, and sea domains through global precision attack. Global
precision attack forces perform traditional strike and customized ISR
roles to support joint and coalition ground forces every day. However,
as A2/AD capabilities proliferate, our fourth-generation fighter and
legacy bomber capability to penetrate contested airspace is
increasingly challenged.
The A2/AD threat environment prescribes the type of assets that can
employ and survive in-theater. While the Air Force provides the
majority of these assets, success in this hazardous environment will
require a combined approach across a broad range of assets and
employment tools. Even then, these will only provide localized and
temporary air dominance to achieve desired effects. Simultaneously,
ongoing contingency operations in a permissive, irregular warfare
environment at the lower end of the combat spectrum require adapted
capabilities, including longer aircraft dwell times and increasing use
of our platforms in unique intelligence gathering roles. Our fiscal
year 2013 budget request of $15.5 billion applies resources that will
help the Air Force best meet threats in evolving A2/AD environments.
To enhance our global strike ability, we are prioritizing
investment in fifth-generation aircraft while sustaining legacy
platforms as a bridge to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the centerpiece
of our future precision attack capability. In addition to complementing
the F-22's world class air superiority capabilities, the F-35A is
designed to penetrate air defenses and deliver a wide range of
precision munitions. This modern, fifth-generation aircraft brings the
added benefit of increased allied interoperability and cost-sharing
between Services and partner nations. The fiscal year 2013 budget
includes approximately $5 billion for continued development and the
procurement of 19 F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL)
aircraft, spares, and support equipment. In fiscal year 2013 we
deferred 98 CTOLs from the F-35A program.
As we move toward fifth-generation recapitalization, we are funding
fourth-generation fighter modernization to ensure a capable global
attack fleet. Reserve Component recapitalization will begin based on F-
35 production rates, basing decisions, the F-16 service life extension
program (SLEP), and combat avionics programmed extension suite. The Air
Force will continue to plan and program for approximately 350 F-16
service life extensions and capability upgrades over the FYDP to ensure
a viable F-16 combat capability across the total force and to mitigate
the effects of F-35 procurement rate adjustments on the total fighter
force capacity during completion of system development and low-rate
initial production.
In our fiscal year 2013 submission, we accepted risk by retiring
102 A-10s and 21 F-16s. Although the A-10 remains essential for
combined arms and stability operations, we chose to retire more A-10s
because other multi-role platforms provide more utility across the
range of the potential missions. We are retaining enough A-10s to meet
the direction of the new strategic guidance to maintain readiness and
capability while avoiding a hollow force.
We are modernizing conventional bombers to sustain capability while
investing in the Long-Range Strike Family of Systems. The bomber fleet
was retained at its current size because we recognized the importance
of long range strike in the current and future security environments.
The Air Force is enhancing long-range strike capabilities by upgrading
the B-2 fleet with an improved defensive management system (DMS) and a
new survivable communication system, and is increasing conventional
precision guided weapon capacity within the B-52 fleet. We are
investing $191.4 million in modernizing the B-1 to prevent obsolescence
and diminishing manufacturing sources issues and to help sustain the B-
1 to its approximate 2040 service life. In addition to aircraft
modernization, we are upgrading our B-1 training and simulator systems
to match aircraft configuration and ensure continued sustainability. We
are also seeking legislative assistance to repeal Public Law 112-81
Sec. 132 which limits the use of funds to retire six B-1s as proposed
in the fiscal year 2012 budget. This repeal would allow the DOD and the
Air Force to execute the retirement of three combat-coded and three
training-coded B-1s in fiscal year 2012.
Procuring a new penetrating bomber is critical to maintaining our
long-range strike capability in the face of evolving A2/AD
environments. The new long-range, penetrating, and nuclear-capable
bomber (LRS-B), which will be capable of both manned and unmanned
operations, will be designed and built using proven technologies, and
will leverage existing systems to provide sufficient capability. It
will also permit growth to improve the system as technology matures and
threats evolve. We must ensure that the new bomber is operationally
capable before the current aging B-52 and B-1 bomber fleets are
retired. LRS-B is fully funded at $291.7 million in the fiscal year
2013 budget.

GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Global integrated ISR includes conducting and synchronizing
surveillance and reconnaissance across all domains--air, space, and
cyber. These ISR capabilities produce essential intelligence to achieve
decision superiority through planning, collecting, processing,
analyzing and rapidly disseminating critical information to national-
and theater-level decisionmakers across the spectrum of worldwide
military operations. Air Force ISR growth and improvement over the last
decade has been unprecedented. Because of the dynamic nature of the
operating environment, the Air Force conducted an extensive review of
the entire Air Force ISR enterprise in 2011 to inform future planning
and programming decisions. Even as the United States plans to reduce
our military presence in CENTCOM AOR, combatant commands will continue
to use our ISR capabilities to combat global terrorism, provide global
and localized situational awareness, and support future contingencies.
Recognizing the need for continued and improved ISR capabilities,
and based on the 2011 ISR review, the Air Force is investing $7.1
billion in this core function in fiscal year 2013. We are continuously
improving the current suite of capabilities and will field the MQ-9
Reaper to meet delivery of 65 remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) combat
air patrols (CAPs) by May 2014. We are actively managing our
procurement rate of MQ-9s to efficiently increase RPA fleet size while
allowing for necessary aircrew training. We are extending operations
for the U-2 Dragon Lady manned aircraft, in lieu of investing more
heavily in the RQ-4 Block 30 Global Hawk fleet. Despite early
predictions, the savings anticipated by the use of Global Hawks have
not come to fruition and we will not invest in new technology at any
cost. Divesting the RQ-4 Block 30 fleet and extending the U-2 will save
the Air Force $815 million in fiscal year 2013 and $2.5 billion across
the FYDP. Sustaining the U-2 fleet will ensure affordable and sustained
high altitude ISR for the combatant commanders and joint warfighters.
We will maintain investment in the MC-12 Liberty as we transfer it
to the Air National Guard, but we will establish Active unit
associations to meet combat air patrol and surge requirements. The MC-
12 will also perform the mission carried out by the RC-26 as we divest
11 of those aircraft from the Air National Guard (ANG). In the ANG, six
RPA units have been or are currently being established, and an
additional five units will stand-up in fiscal year 2013. An ANG ISR
group with two squadrons will be established to conduct ISR in
cyberspace and to conduct digital network intelligence and cyber target
development.
We are developing a more balanced and survivable mix of airborne
platforms to enable continued operations in permissive environments and
to enable operations in A2/AD environments. We are exploring innovative
ways to leverage space and cyberspace capabilities as part of the
overall mix of ISR capabilities and partner with joint, coalition, and
interagency partners, including the use of Air-Sea Battle as a
framework to develop required capabilities for the Joint fight. We are
investing $163 million in fiscal year 2013 in our ground processing
enterprise, the Distributed Common Ground System, and will continue
migration to a service-oriented architecture to handle the increasing
quantities of ISR data that is integrated and delivered from emerging
sensors and platforms operating in all domains. We will also improve
our ability to move information securely and reliably over information
pathways. Finally, we are improving analyst capability through improved
training, automation and visualization tools while we deliberately plan
for future operations using a refined capability planning and analysis
framework.

CYBERSPACE SUPERIORITY

Access and continued freedom of maneuver within cyberspace is an
essential requirement for our networked force. Today's modern forces
require access to reliable communications and information networks to
operate effectively at a high operations tempo. Air Force and DOD
networks face a continuous barrage of assaults from individual hackers,
organized insurgents, state-sponsored actors, and all level of threats
in between. Our adversaries are also realizing gains from
electronically linking their combat capabilities. This is creating new
warfighting challenges that the Joint Force must be prepared to
address. As we work to ensure our freedom of movement in cyberspace, we
will also work with Service, Joint, and Interagency partners on
additional and further-reaching cyberspace initiatives.
We are using a cyber strategy which not only improves the Air
Force's ability to operate in cyberspace, but also mitigates constantly
increasing infrastructure costs. This approach focuses on near-term
FYDP investments to automate network defense and operations which
increase both combat capacity and effectiveness. This effort, led by
24th Air Force, under Air Force Space Command, includes continued
development of the Single Integrated Network Environment which provides
a seamless information flow among air, space, and terrestrial network
environments, and most importantly, mission assurance to the
warfighter.
Our fiscal year 2013 budget request for cyberspace superiority is
$4.0 billion. With these funds, we are expanding our ability to rapidly
acquire network defense tools, such as Host Based Security System, a
flexible, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)-based application to monitor,
detect, and counter cyber-threats to the Air Force Enterprise. We are
also investing in advanced technologies to monitor and secure both
classified and unclassified networks. We have made considerable
progress in our efforts to meet the emerging challenges and threats in
cyberspace by fielding a Total Force of over 45,000 trained and
certified professionals equipped to ensure continuity of operations in
cyberspace. The establishment of an additional ANG network warfare
squadron (NWS) will enhance the Maryland ANG 175th NWS as they actively
conduct cyber defense to protect networks and systems. The Air Force
Reserve will also stand up an Active association network warfare
squadron with the 33rd Network Warfare Squadron at Lackland AFB, TX.
To keep with the rapid pace of technology, the Air Force is
developing Joint standardization and acquisition strategies to enable
quick delivery of cyber capabilities to address constantly evolving and
more technologically advanced cyber threats and to improve intelligence
capabilities in cyberspace. The Air Force is spending $27.3 million on
the Air Force Wideband Enterprise Terminal, leveraging Army procurement
efforts for significant quantity savings, Joint standardization,
interoperability, and enabling wideband global satellite communication
(SATCOM) Ka-band utilization, resulting in greater bandwidth for
deployed warfighters. The Air Force continues efforts toward the single
Air Force network, which increases Air Force network situational
awareness and improves information sharing and transport capabilities.
For future budget requests, the Air Force is working with DOD to define
near- and long-term solutions to deliver warfighting communication
capabilities, such as Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals
(FAB-T) and upgrading the Air Force's wideband enterprise terminals to
provide Joint standardization and greater bandwidth.

SPACE SUPERIORITY

America's ability to operate effectively across the spectrum of
conflict also rests heavily on Air Force space capabilities. Airmen
provide critical space capabilities that enhance the DOD's ability to
navigate accurately, see clearly, communicate confidently, strike
precisely, and operate assuredly. General purpose forces, the
Intelligence Community, and SOF depend on these space capabilities to
perform their missions every day, on every continent, in the air, on
the land, and at sea. In addition, space operations help ensure access
and use of the global commons, enabling a multitude of civil and
commercial activities such as cellular communications, commercial and
civil aviation, financial transactions, agriculture and infrastructure
management, law enforcement, emergency response, and many more. Like
air superiority, space-based missions can easily be taken for granted.
The Air Force has maintained its record of successful space
launches, began on-orbit testing of the first AEHF military
communications satellite, and launched the first Space Based Infrared
System geosynchronous satellite. Our ability to deliver space
capabilities is currently without equal. As we become a smaller, leaner
force in accordance with the new defense strategic guidance, the
leveraging and multiplying effects that space provides will become
increasingly important. Improving space situational awareness will be
key to protecting the unique advantage space provides.
Rapid technology advancements and the long-lead time for
integrating and fielding new space technology results in an ongoing
need to plan, design, and implement space advancements. We must procure
our space systems at the lowest cost possible while providing assured
access to space. Our innovative acquisition strategy for the Efficient
Space Procurement (ESP) \1\ of complex space systems is designed to
identify efficiencies and use those resources to provide enduring
capability and help provide stability to the space industrial base.
While we are modernizing and sustaining many of our satellite
constellations, funding constraints have slowed our ability to field
some space capabilities as rapidly as is prudent. Therefore, as we
continue to sustain our current level of support to the warfighter, the
current fiscal environment demands that we explore alternate paths to
provide resilient solutions. As we incorporate the tenets of the new
National Security Space Strategy, we are actively developing
architectures that take into consideration the advantages of leveraging
international partnerships, commercial space capabilities, and hosted
payloads. One example being tested is a commercially hosted infrared
payload (CHIRP) launched from Guiana Space Center, Kourou, French
Guiana, which begins to explore the utility of a dedicated payload for
missile warning hosted on a commercial communications satellite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Previously known as Evolutionary Acquisition for Space
Efficiency (EASE).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the $9.6 billion in funds for space programs in the fiscal
year 2013 budget request, the Air Force is recapitalizing many space
capabilities, fielding new satellite communications systems, replacing
legacy early missile warning systems, improving space control
capabilities, and upgrading position, navigation and timing
capabilities with the launch of Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF
satellites and the acquisition of GPS III satellites. Consistent with
the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, the Air Force is canceling the DWSS, saving
$518.8 million in fiscal year 2013 and $2.38 billion over the FYDP. The
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) will continue to
fulfill this critical requirement as the Air Force determines the most
prudent way forward.
We are seeking legislative support in repealing the establishment
of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Program Office. Rather than
funding a single organization with a very broad and diverse mandate, we
have determined that embedding resilience and operational
responsiveness in the architecture of individual space mission areas
represents a better approach. The closure of this office will require
repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2273a, the enabling legislation for ORS. Key
personnel and capabilities, funded at lower levels, will become part of
the Air Force Space and Missile Center.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OPERATIONS

Credible nuclear capabilities are required to deter potential
adversaries from attacking our vital interests and to assure our allies
of our commitments. Although the threat of global nuclear war has
become more remote since the end of the Cold War, the prospect of
nuclear terrorism has increased. Proliferation of nuclear weapons,
especially among regional power aspirants, is on the rise. Advanced air
defenses increasingly threaten the survivability of current bombers.
Area denial and ballistic missile threats reduce our basing options and
challenge the responsiveness and survivability of long range strike. As
a result, the United States must shape its deterrent forces to maintain
the attributes which lead to stability among major powers and which
extend deterrence for regional challenges and non-state actors while
assuring allies.
The Air Force is responsible for two of the three legs of the
nuclear triad and continuing to strengthen the Air Force nuclear
enterprise remains a top Air Force priority. Air Force investment in
our bombers and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems
reflects our commitment to the nuclear deterrence mission well into the
future. Our request of $5.1 billion for this core function in fiscal
year 2013 increases sustainment for the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030
with fuze component replenishment and replacement programs, as well as
new transporter erectors. We are also enhancing long-range strike
capabilities by upgrading the B-2s with an improved DMS and a new
survivable communication system. These investments will ensure the Air
Force maintains the capability to operate and sustain safe, secure and
effective nuclear forces to deter adversaries, project power into
denied environments, hold any target at risk, and respond appropriately
if deterrence fails. In particular, the responsiveness of the ICBM leg
and the flexibility of the bomber leg are valued attributes in the new
strategic setting. We are committed to a future force that will have
the flexibility and resiliency to adapt to changes in the geopolitical
environment or cope with potential problems in the nuclear stockpile.
The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty requires the United States
to reduce warheads and delivery capacity by 2018. Our fiscal year 2013
budget request includes $20.1 million to fund treaty preparatory
actions that began in fiscal year 2012 and additional actions necessary
to accomplish the treaty-required reductions by 2018. While final force
structure decisions have not yet been made, we are continuing to
develop detailed plans, working with the DOD and U.S. Strategic
Command, for executing force reduction decisions which retain the
attributes of the Triad needed for 21st century deterrence.

RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY

The Air Force provides unparalleled in-flight refueling and cargo
carrying capacity in support of worldwide operations. Mobility forces
provide vital deployment and sustainment capability for joint and
coalition forces by delivering essential equipment, personnel, and
materiel for missions ranging from major combat operations to
humanitarian relief operations. Achieving unprecedented survival rates,
our highly skilled aeromedical transport teams swiftly evacuate combat
casualties, ensuring our wounded warriors receive the best possible
medical care. A unique Air Force contribution, rapid global mobility
must be maintained on a scale to support DOD force structure and
national strategic objectives.
On any given day, the Air Force fleet of C-17s and C-5s deliver
critical personnel and cargo, provide airdrop of time-critical
supplies, food, and ammunition, and enable rapid movement of personnel
and equipment. Air Force air refueling aircraft will continue to play a
vital, daily role in extending the range and persistence of almost all
other Joint Force aircraft. The Air Force remains committed to fully
funding the acquisition of the new KC-46A tanker with $1.8 billion in
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) in fiscal year
2013, while also resourcing critical modernization programs for the KC-
10 and KC-135 fleets. This will ensure our Nation retains a tanker
fleet able to provide crucial air refueling capacity for decades to
come. The retirement of 20 KC-135s is consistent with our analysis of
warfighting scenarios based on the strategic guidance and will results
in savings of $22.5 million in fiscal year 2013. As part of our energy
efficiency initiatives, we plan to begin upgrading 93 KC-135 engines in
fiscal year 2013 and 100 more each year through the FYDP. We anticipate
overall savings in fuel and maintenance of $1.5 billion from this $278
million investment.
In addition, with our fiscal year 2013 budget request of $15.9
billion in rapid global mobility funds, the Air Force will continue to
modernize its inter-theater airlift fleet of C-17s and C-5s. To move
towards a common fleet configuration, the Air Force is investing $138.2
million in fiscal year 2013 for the Global Reach Improvement Program
(GRIP). The GRIP brings the multiple variants of C-17 to a standard
configuration, designated the C-17A, that will provide efficiencies in
operations and weapon system sustainment. We also plan to transfer
eight C-17s from the Active component to the ANG in fiscal year 2013,
and an additional eight in fiscal year 2015. We are modernizing the
most capable C-5 airframes while retiring the final 27 of the oldest
model, the C-5A. On the remaining 52 C-5s, the Air Force is investing
$1.3 billion in modernization in fiscal year 2013 to improve capability
and reliability, including $1.23 billion on the Reliability Enhancement
and Re-engining Program. We currently have seven operational C-5Ms. The
retirement of the last C-5A by fiscal year 2016 is timed to match the
completion of the last C-5M upgrade.
Because the strategic guidance reduced the overall requirement for
intra-theater airlift, we are retiring C-130H aircraft (39 in fiscal
year 2013 and a total of 65 over the FYDP). These older aircraft would
require costly modification or modernization to remain viable. We will
maintain the necessary intra-theater airlift capability and capacity by
completing the recapitalization of older C-130E/H aircraft with the C-
130J. The remaining legacy C-130H aircraft are being modernized to
reduce sustainment costs and ensure global airspace access.
Finally, after rigorous mission analysis, we determined the mission
performed by the C-27J fleet could be performed by the C-130 fleet
which is fully capable of meeting direct ground support and homeland
defense requirements.\2\ The fiscal constraints that demand we become a
smaller Air Force also support the decision to retain aircraft that
have multiple role capabilities, like the C-130. Therefore, all 21 C-
27Js in the current fleet will be retired and we are canceling
procurement of 17 additional aircraft. Without question, the Air
Force's commitment to support time-sensitive, mission-critical direct
airlift support to the Army is unaltered by the divestment of the C-
27J.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Six of the seven Air National Guard units that are affected by
the divestment of the C-27J fleet are being backfilled with MC-12W
Liberty, ISR/cyber, MQ-9, or C-130 units.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control (C2) of our forces has never been more vital or
more difficult than in the highly complex 21st century military
operations that depend on close joint and coalition coordination. C2 is
the key operational function that ties all the others together to
achieve our military objectives, enabling commanders to integrate
operations in multiple theaters at multiple levels through planning,
coordinating, tasking, executing, monitoring and assessing air, space,
and cyberspace operations across the range of military operations. No
longer in a Cold War technological environment, the Air Force is
transforming its C2 to an internet protocol-based net-centric
warfighting capability. To do so, the Air Force must sustain, modify,
and enhance current C2 systems, and develop deployable, scalable, and
modular systems that are interoperable with joint, interagency, and
coalition partners.
The Air Force is focusing its attention to modernization efforts to
operate in A2/AD environments with our fourth- and fifth-generation
weapon systems. In doing so, the Air Force will continue to use a
balanced approach across the C2 portfolio by investing in sustaining
legacy platforms while modernizing our C2 aircraft fleet and ground
operating nodes only as needed to sustain our capability. Our fiscal
year 2013 budget request of $5.8 billion for C2 includes $200 million
to support secure and reliable strategic level communications through
the E-4 National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC). We are also
spending $22.7 million to begin fielding a cockpit modernization
development program to sustain the capability of the existing Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) platform and we will continue to
modernize and sustain the Theater Air Control System Command and
Control Centers (CRC). The modernization of the Air Operations Center
(AOC) will move this weapon system to an enterprise system which can
accept rapid application upgrades and enable future warfighting
concepts.
To reduce unnecessary cost, the Air Force will retire one JSTARS
aircraft that is beyond economical repair, saving the Air Force $13
million in fiscal year 2013 and $91 million over the FYDP. The JSTARS
re-engining system development and demonstration (SDD) flight test
program completed in January 2012; however, because the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2012 reduced re-engining funding, full completion of the re-
engining SDD is under review. The JSTARS re-engining program is not
funded in fiscal year 2013. We also terminated our portion of the Army-
managed Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) small airborne radio program
that was over cost and behind schedule and will instead leverage
industry-developed hardware, while continuing the development of the
required radio waveforms. The termination of this program and the
associated non-recurring engineering will save $294 million in fiscal
year 2013 and $3.2 billion over the FYDP.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Success in counterterrorism and irregular warfare missions requires
the ability to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically
sensitive environments, using other than conventional forces. Air Force
special operations capabilities continue to play a vital role in
supporting U.S. Special Operations Command and geographic combatant
commanders. SOF depend on a balanced force of air, sea, and land
capabilities; Air Commandos bring specialized expertise for
infiltration and exfiltration and the kinetic and non-kinetic
application of airpower that are essential to joint special operations
capabilities.
Our investments in SOF must strike a balance between winning
today's fight and building the Joint special operation force of the
future, including the ability to act unilaterally when necessary.
Despite the challenging fiscal environment, with our budget request of
$1.2 billion, the Air Force was able to sustain nearly all of the SOF
aviation improvements realized over the past several years. The
programmed buy of 50 CV-22 Ospreys will complete in fiscal year 2014,
and the procurement of MC-130Js for the recapitalization of 37 MC-130E/
Ps will also complete in fiscal year 2014. MC-130H/W recapitalization
will begin in fiscal year 2015, a year earlier than scheduled in the
fiscal year 2012 PB, which ensures a continued, more capable SOF
mobility fleet. The Air Force is modernizing our SOF precision strike
capability by procuring AC-130Js, on a one-for-one basis, to
recapitalize our legacy AC-130Hs. We are also ensuring our Battlefield
Airmen continue to receive first-class equipment and training by adding
funds to operations and maintenance accounts.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

The Air Force remains committed to modernizing crucial combat
search and rescue (CSAR) capabilities. The additional use of personnel
recovery (PR) forces for medical and casualty evacuation, humanitarian
assistance, disaster response, and civil search and rescue operations
has steadily risen since the early 1990s. This increase in usage has
taken its toll on the aircraft and significantly affected availability.
Currently, Air Force PR forces are fully engaged in the CENTCOM and
Africa Command AORs, accomplishing lifesaving medical and casualty
evacuation missions. They are also supporting domestic civil land and
maritime search and rescue, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief,
and mass casualty evacuation missions. The dynamic geopolitical
environment suggests that the continued need for PR forces to conduct
non-permissive CSAR in contingency operations and permissive
humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and civil search and rescue
operations will remain.
To ensure the Air Force is able to provide this vital core function
in the future, we are recapitalizing our fixed wing aircraft,
replenishing our rotary wing aircraft through the Operational Loss
Replacement (OLR) program, and replacing aging rotary wing aircraft
through the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) program. The $1.4 billion
fiscal year 2013 budget request for PR includes $152.2 million for the
HC-130J and $183.8 million for the OLR and CRH programs. The fiscal
year 2013 RDT&E funding for the CRH was reprogrammed to support the
acquisition of two test aircraft. The program remains on track to
produce a replacement for the HH-60G through a full and open
competition, with initial operational capability planned for fiscal
year 2018. The Air Force also continues to fund the HH-60G and HC-130
sustainment programs while continuing to invest in the Guardian Angel
program that provides first-class equipment and training for the rescue
force.

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

Building the capacity of partner governments and their security
forces is a key element in our national security strategy. The
establishment of strong, foundational aviation enterprises in our
partner nations enables successful, sustainable security within their
own borders while contributing to regional stability. Successful
partnerships ensure interoperability, integration and interdependence
between air forces, allowing for effective combined and coalition
operational employment. These partnerships also provide partner nations
with the capability and capacity to resolve their own national security
challenges, thereby reducing the potential demand for a large U.S.
response or support.
The necessity for partnering is evident every day in Afghanistan
where U.S. and coalition air forces provide flexible and efficient
airpower support to International Security Assistance Force operations.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, airmen are building the capabilities and
capacities of the Iraqi and Afghanistan air forces so that they can
successfully employ airpower in their own right. In addition, the
success of the Libya operations last year can be partly attributed to
years of engagement that led to improved interoperability and highly
capable and equipped partner nations.
These international engagements require airmen to perform their
duties effectively and achieve influence in culturally-complex
environments around the globe. Fielding the Joint Strike Fighter and
other platforms will help further our partnerships with more
established allies. The U.S. role in the 12-nation Strategic Airlift
Consortium enables a unique fully operational force of three C-17s to
meet the airlift requirements of our European allies. The fiscal year
2013 budget request of approximately $300 million in this core function
continues to fully resource the Strategic Airlift Consortium effort at
Papa AB, Hungary. The Air Force also committed to field a new aviation
detachment in Poland.
Due to fiscal constraints, the Air Force terminated the Light
Attack Armed Reconnaissance and the Light Mobility Aircraft programs;
however, the Air Force believes this requirement can be substantially
met with innovative application of Air National Guard State Partnership
Programs and Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons. We are working with
partner nations to build and sustain ISR capacity and help them
effectively counter threats within their borders. We are also pursuing
international agreements to increase partner satellite communication,
space situational awareness, and global positioning, navigation, and
timing capabilities.
The Air Force also recognizes that it cannot build effective
international partnerships without effective U.S. Government
interagency partnerships. To that end, we are a strong supporter of
State-Defense exchanges and other programs that provide interagency
familiarity and training.

AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT

Underpinning our capacity to perform the missions in these core
functions is the ability to create, protect, and sustain air and space
forces across the full spectrum of military operations--from the
training, education, and development of our airmen to excellence in
acquisition. The fiscal year 2013 budget request includes $31.0 billion
for agile combat support.
We will continue to support our airmen and their families through
quality of life and support services such as child care and youth
programs and initiatives, medical services and rehabilitation for
wounded warriors, improvements to dining facilities, food delivery,
fitness centers, and lodging. We are partnering with local communities,
where feasible, to provide the highest quality support, and we are
changing the way that we provide services so that airmen and their
families are more able to easily access and receive the support they
need. To ensure we continuously focus on and improve readiness and
build a more agile and capable force, we have strengthened technical
and professional development by enhancing technical training,
professional military education, and language and culture programs.
The Air Force is committed to sustaining excellence with a smaller
force. We remain attentive to force management efforts and continue to
size and shape the force to meet congressionally-mandated military end
strength. A series of voluntary and involuntary force management
efforts have been successful in reducing Active Duty end strength.
Force management programs in fiscal year 2012 include voluntary and
involuntary programs which lessen the need for involuntary actions in
fiscal year 2013. We are posturing accessions for the long-term and
ensuring the right balance of skills exists to meet operational
requirements. The Air Force will meet its OSD-directed civilian end
strength target for fiscal year 2012 and the fiscal year 2013 PB makes
minor adjustments to our civilian end strength. The Force Management
Program is not a quick fix, but a tailored, multi-year effort to manage
the force along the 30-year continuum of service.
We are improving acquisition processes, recently completing
implementation of the Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP). We have also
institutionalized the ``Better Buying Power'' (BBP) initiatives
promulgated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics and are expanding those improvements through
our Acquisition Continuous Process Improvement 2.0 (CPI 2.0) effort.
The major elements of the CPI 2.0 initiative--process simplification,
requirements, realizing the value proposition, and workforce
improvement--will build upon the BBP initiatives and continue our
momentum in improving our acquisition workforce skills.
We are ensuring the Air Force continues to have war-winning
technology through the careful and proactive management of our science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workforce and improving
our means to attract and recruit future innovators for the Air Force.
Properly funding our science and technology laboratories enables them
to continue discovering, developing, and demonstrating high payoff
innovations to address the changing strategic environment and sustain
air, space, and cyberspace superiority. Therefore, the Air Force's
budget protects science and technology funding as a share of our total
resources.
Science and technology investments are also a key toward enhancing
our energy security and meeting our energy goals. The Air Force is
requesting over $530 million for aviation, infrastructure, and RDT&E
energy initiatives in fiscal year 2013 to reduce energy demand, improve
energy efficiency, diversify supply, and increase mission
effectiveness. A focus of these initiatives is to improve our energy
security by diversifying our drop-in and renewable sources of energy
and increasing our access to reliable and uninterrupted energy
supplies. We are investing more than $300 million in energy RDT&E,
which includes $214 million for the fiscal year 2013 Adaptive Engine
Technology Development (AETD) initiative. This initiative will build
upon the Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) effort to reduce
energy consumption and improve efficiency and reliability of future and
legacy aircraft.
We are continuing to support an important aspect of our readiness
posture through weapons system sustainment, the requirements for which
have grown due to the complexity of new aircraft, operations tempo
increases, force structure changes, and growth in depot work packages
for legacy aircraft. We are mitigating overall WSS growth through
efficiency efforts and requirements reviews. WSS funding through OCO
supplemental requests remains critical while we continue to be engaged
in these global operations. For fiscal year 2013, we are seeking $11.6
billion in WSS (including OCO). We are committed to retaining three
strong organic depots. In fiscal year 2012, we are investing
approximately $290 million in new technologies and infrastructure in
all of our depots. Although we may have a short-term challenge to meet
the Title 10, Sec. 2466 Depot 50/50 Rule requirements due to force
structure changes, we have a robust plan in place to perform organic
repair for future weapon systems like the KC-46A.
As noted earlier, Air Force continues to emphasize the importance
of maintaining readiness in support of our FHP. The Air Force's $44.3
billion fiscal year 2013 operations and maintenance request supports
1.17 million flying hours for new pilot production, pilot development,
maintenance of basic flying skills, as well as training of crews to
support combatant commander priorities.
Facility sustainment, restoration and modernization and MILCON are
essential tools for providing mission capability to our warfighters.
The $441 million in MILCON funding, a $900 million decrease from fiscal
year 2012 enacted levels, represents a conscious decision to take a
deliberate pause in MILCON investment. During this pause, we will
maintain funding levels for facility sustainment at $1.4 billion and
restoration and modernization at $718.1 million. We will continue to
fund the most critical construction priorities of our combatant
commanders and the Air Force, including projects aligned with weapon
system deliveries--supporting beddowns for the F-22, F-35, HC-130J/C-
130H, and MQ-9. In addition, our investment funds some much-needed
support to our airmen, with $42 million in dormitory recapitalization.

CONCLUSION

Given the continuing complexity and uncertainty in the strategic
environment, and facing substantial budget reductions, DOD and Air
Force resources are appropriately targeted to promote agile, flexible,
and cost effective forces, and to mitigate strategic risks. The fiscal
year 2013 Air Force budget request reflects the extremely difficult
choices that had to be made that will allow the Air Force to provide
the necessary capability, capacity, and versatility required to prevail
in today's and tomorrow's wars, prevent and deter conflict, and prepare
to defeat adversaries and succeed across the range of potential
military operations--all the while preserving and enhancing the All-
Volunteer Force. Additional reductions would put at risk our capability
to execute the new strategic guidance.
We are confident in our airmen and their families. They are the
best in the world, and we rely on them to meet any challenge, overcome
any obstacle, and defeat any enemy--as long as they are given adequate
resources. As they have time and again, our airmen innovators will find
new and better ways to approach future military challenges across the
spectrum of domains and against nascent threats. We are committed to
excellence and we will deliver with your help. We ask that you support
the Air Force budget request of $110.1 billion for fiscal year 2013.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
We'll start with 7-minute round.
First, to both of you: DOD created a new defense strategy
to guide creation of the fiscal year 2013 defense budget
request. Did you both have an opportunity to provide input in
the development of that strategy and in your view does the
budget request support the strategy and do you support the
budget request? Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Donley. Yes, sir. The Chief and I both had
opportunities to participate in all the Department's
deliberations, which includes deliberations with the President
on the strategic guidance, and we believe we are supporting
that in our proposed budget proposal.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. General?
General Schwartz. I would agree with that, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, the Air Force is proposing some major force structure
reductions. The Air Force chose to apply these reductions more
heavily to the Air National Guard. The Air Force plan would cut
the end strength for Active-Duty Forces by 1.2 percent while
the Air National Guard would be cut four times as much, 4.8
percent, four times as much percentage-wise.
I have some real problems with these proposed force
reductions. For instance, the Air Force asserts that the cut to
the A-10 force falls more heavily on the Air National Guard
forces because the Air Force will need to keep more of the
force in the Active component due to forward deployments and
dwell time considerations. Here's the problem with that. First,
the Guard's A-10s have more than shown their ability to support
wartime operations, including in Afghanistan.
Second, at the same time that you proposed these major cuts
in the overall force and in the Guard particularly, you're
going to be increasing the number of A-10 aircraft in Active
Duty training squadrons, and you also have some new defense
strategic guidance. Despite that guidance, the Air Force is
reducing its forward-stationed fighter presence in Europe by
only one squadron, and that would leave five to six fighter
squadrons in Europe. These are F-15s and F-16s.
Now, the Council of Governors has made a proposal to you to
restore some end strength and force structure to the Guard. The
specific question is, if you have discussed this matter with
the governors, are you still in discussions with the governors?
Secretary Donley. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we are.
Chairman Levin. Are you willing to reconsider your proposed
reductions in the Guard and the structure of the Guard if those
discussions lead to that result?
Secretary Donley. Well, I need to defer to the Secretary of
Defense, who offered this opportunity to the Council of
Governors about, I think about 2 to 3 weeks ago now. We have
met with the Council of Governors or their representatives
several times in the last couple of weeks and I would say those
discussions are ongoing at this point.
We have not yet had an opportunity to brief DOD leadership
on the status of our work. We expect to do that later this
week.
Chairman Levin. So those discussions are ongoing?
Secretary Donley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Are you willing to reconsider the proposed
reductions after the conclusion of those discussions? Is it
possible, in other words, that those discussions will lead to
some changes in your proposal?
Secretary Donley. It's possible, sir. This is a decision
for the Secretary of Defense, again, who opened up this
opportunity to the Council of Governors and he will have to
assess the progress and the value of whatever proposition is
laid before him.
Chairman Levin. Will you get back to us on this matter
prior to markup on the defense bill, which is in about a month
and a half?
Secretary Donley. We will.
[The information referred to follows:]

From March 4, 2012, to date, Headquarters Air Force (HAF) and
National Guard Bureau staffs conducted a comprehensive review of the
Council of Governor's (CoG) proposal. Over 1,000 man-hours were
expended by the two staffs to complete the necessary analysis. Based on
criteria approved by the Secretary of the Air Force, and conveyed to
the CoG representatives, they evaluated the impacts based on five
criteria in the categories of demand, weapons systems, manpower, cost,
and policy, consistent with the fiscal year 2012 Program Objective
Memorandum development criteria. These criteria encompassed
considerations such as meeting combatant commanders' demand
requirements, fiscal implications, training requirements, and personnel
effects to include rated manning and sustaining the force. The results
of this analysis determined the CoG proposal did not meet any of the
five criteria. In particular, the proposal retained combat force
structure unnecessary to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance, produced
an unacceptable impact to the combatant commanders (U.S. European
Command and U.S. Africa Command), reduced the Total Force's capacity to
meet worldwide rotational requirements, adversely impacted the
sustainability of the force, and imposed an additional cost on the Air
Force budget of between $528 million to $805 million, an amount we view
as unaffordable. After discussing the analysis with The Adjutants
General (TAGs) representing the CoG, the HAF and Air National Guard
(ANG) Bureau teams met multiple times daily between March 6th and 9th
to jointly evaluate three additional excursions with differing sourcing
and/or numbers of F-16, KC-135, A-10, and C-130 aircraft. On March 9,
the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Chief
and Vice Chief of Staff, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and
the Director of the ANG conducted a video teleconference with the CoG
co-chair TAGs from Washington and Iowa when two additional excursions
were discussed. All these options attempted to provide the ANG with
combat and/or enabler missions sourced from various locations, to
include reallocation of assets within the ANG. These options were not
acceptable to the CoG. The Air Force's analysis is currently undergoing
review by Office of the Secretary of Defense's (DOD) Cost Analysis and
Program Evaluation office.
The force structure programmed in the fiscal year 2013 President's
budget, represents optimized capability and capacity to meet the new
DOD strategic guidance while satisfying the fiscal restrictions imposed
by the current Federal budget environment and meets combatant commander
and foundational demands with increased but manageable risk.
Ultimately, the Air Force will defer to the Secretary of Defense to
decide this matter.

Chairman Levin. Did you have recommendations from the
National Guard as to which Air National Guard bases would lose
A-10s? Did you get recommendations from the Guard?
Secretary Donley. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Did you follow those recommendations?
Secretary Donley. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Now let me go to the question of strategic
airlift. General Schwartz, the Air Force plans would reduce
strategic airlift forces from a level of 301 aircraft to 275
aircraft by retiring the remaining C-5A aircraft. It's not
clear to me that the Air Force has any plan for how such forces
could be reconstituted if needed in the future and by having
that responsiveness comply with the direction in the new DOD
strategic guidance, which requires that responsiveness.
How could you say that the Air Force plan is responding to
the Secretary's strategic guidance when you don't apparently
yet have such a plan?
General Schwartz. Sir, the analysis indicated that, given
the revised defense strategic guidance and the size of the
ground forces, that the requirement for mobility in one of the
metrics that we use routinely, in million ton-miles per day,
was 29.4 million ton-miles per day. At 275 strategic
airlifters, that is 223 C-17s and 52 modified, re-engined C-5s,
now designated C-5Ms, produces between 30.4 and 30.6 million
ton-miles per day.
That is less than the 32.7 million ton-miles from the
Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, which was done 3
years ago, and there is an ongoing effort to renew and to
perform a new study for the airlift fleet. But the analysis
that we and the Department did reflected that 275 strategic
airlifters was sufficient to perform the missions anticipated.
Chairman Levin. My time is up. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses. As I understand it, Secretary
Donley, the three major programs that the Air Force is looking
forward to are the tanker program, the F-35, and the long-range
strike aircraft. With sequestration in its present anticipated
form if it were not changed, what would be the impact on those
three major Air Force programs for the future?
Secretary Donley. Well, Senator, if sequestration were to
kick in, the Department would be required to take a 10 percent
reduction in each of the accounts in the Air Force. If
personnel were held neutral, if we protected personnel
accounts, then those reductions would go up to 13 percent. So
in the procurement accounts, for example, this would affect all
of our major programs. It would affect the MQ-1/9 program, the
KC-46 program, JSF. All these programs that have been
continuing for a couple of years, some of which are on fixed-
price contracts, would be impacted by these across-the-board
reductions.
Senator McCain. Would you do us a favor and perhaps in
writing give us a detailed, not minutely detailed, but
certainly an assessment of the impact on Air Force to provide
or be provided the necessary weapons systems to defend the
country? We'd appreciate that. This issue is going to come to a
head at some point sooner or later.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department is not currently preparing for sequestration, and
the Office of Management and Budget has not directed agencies,
including the Department of Defense, to initiate plans for
sequestration; therefore, we are unable to provide a detailed
assessment at this time. However, sequestration would drive major
additional reductions beyond the first phase of the Budget Control Act
reductions to the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget request. As Air
Force leadership has testified, the proposed fiscal year 2013 budget is
a balanced and complete package. Under sequestration, some
modernization programs would need to be reduced and possibly
restructured and/or terminated. Our readiness and operations would be
impacted, as well as all investment accounts, including our high-
priority modernization efforts.

Senator McCain. On the refueling tanker, is integration
still a significant risk and are you confident that the program
will remain on cost and on time?
Secretary Donley. Currently we are confident that the
program will remain on schedule. I think it will also remain on
cost, but to the extent that it does not this is a risk to the
contractor, because we have a fixed price development and
procurement contract in place for this aircraft. So most of the
risk is on the contractor if there are additional costs--if
there are cost overruns above the ceiling.
Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz, it's
now been judged that a major mistake was made in the F-35 JSF
program of ``concurrency'' and now there's a new way of
addressing it called a developmental approach that will let the
program decide how many production aircraft the Department
actually signs up for with how well the program actually does
in development and testing; is that correct?
Secretary Donley. I think that describes generally the
status of the program where it's at, sir.
Senator McCain. Did you know at the time of this
concurrency that it was going to fail?
Secretary Donley. Sir, I think----
Senator McCain. I think it's been described by the
acquisition czar in the Pentagon as ``acquisition
malpractice.''
Secretary Donley. This is the largest defense program that
we have and it is extremely important that it succeed. I think
all of us who stepped into the program in the last couple of
years recognized that it needed to be restructured and that we
were entering this period where the concurrency was extreme
between the completion of development and beginning of
procurement.
Senator McCain. So you really had no idea that this whole
concurrency idea was doomed to failure, as some of us here did?
Secretary Donley. Certainly, I had not been involved in the
program when it was initiated.
Senator McCain. I see, it didn't happen on your watch. I
can't tell you how many times I've heard that as a member of
this committee.
General Schwartz. Senator, may I add something, please?
Senator McCain. Yes.
General Schwartz. Sir, I think the reality is that there
was a sense in the broader community, perhaps not here on the
committee, but certainly in the aerospace industry, that with
all the advanced computers and advanced design capacity and so
on, that you could design and produce an airplane that would
perform coming up on first flight. This was true in the
military side. It was also true in the commercial side, 787 is
a case in point. So I think we all have learned that the notion
of perfect design is a dream.
Senator McCain. I won't pursue this except to say that,
what is your confidence that the F-35 will not experience
further cost overruns, and are you going to have to procure
other aircraft in order to make up for the shortfall or delays
in providing these aircraft in an operational status?
Secretary Donley. A couple of angles to that, sir. With
respect to the status of the current program, we have slowed
the program to get through this concurrency period with the
least risk.
Senator McCain. Does that mean you're going to have to
acquire additional aircraft to make up for that shortfall?
Secretary Donley. Again, two angles. One is that we've told
the contractor and the program office that there is no more
money to put against contract overruns or problems in this
program. So to the extent that there continues to be cost
growth or challenges, undiscovered issues in front of us as
system development and demonstration completes, it's going to
be paid for by tails. We'll have to take down the number of
aircraft that we have planned in procurement to pay for that
work, because no more money is going to be migrating into this
program.
The second part of the answer to your question is----
Senator McCain. The ultimate result in reducing numbers of
aircraft increases cost per aircraft.
Secretary Donley. It does, and those aircraft would have to
be bought later. Assuming we're going to buy those aircraft,
they would be bought later in the procurement profile, or not
bought at all.
The second part, just if I may touch quickly, the results
of this program have caused us to undertake a service life
extension program for the F-16s.
Senator McCain. But no additional purchases?
Secretary Donley. No additional purchases.
Senator McCain. I thank you, and I hope that the refueling
tanker will be a much greater success than the F-35 was.
One other issue, I understand, is you believe that there
needs to be another base realignment and closure (BRAC). Could
you briefly, General Schwartz, tell us why you think there
needs to be another BRAC, as we've already had significant base
closures in the past 10 to 15 years?
General Schwartz. Sir, the reality is that since BRAC 2005
the Air Force has retired almost 500 aircraft from the
inventory, and the induction of that is that that created
additional capacity. It's our belief that only through a BRAC-
like process where we definitively assess and determine where
excess capacity exists can we get to a position where we reduce
that capacity and then invest in those things that remain and
are most important to us.
The bottom line is that BRAC 2005 did not close major Air
Force installations. It largely realigned installations. We
have since had reductions and that needs to be addressed.
Senator McCain. There's no doubt in your mind that we need
to close additional Air Force installations?
General Schwartz. I think that if we do not do that, sir,
we will place the force again under more pressure to put
spending into excess capacity when it should go into readiness
and modernization.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome the Secretary and General Schwartz and to
thank you so much for the leadership you have for the Air Force
and their families. We're really grateful for that. General
Schwartz, I'd also like to add my congratulations on your
retirement later this year and wish you and your family well. I
also thank the men and women of the Air Force, the Active,
Guard, Reserve, civilians, as well as their families, for their
service to our country.
Secretary Donley, while the administration proposes to make
a significant strategic commitment to the Asia-Pacific region,
it also faces significant service-wide cuts, as has been
discussed, to force structure and terminations or delays even
in a number of weapons system programs. Mr. Secretary, can you
talk about the potential risks and challenges facing the Air
Force with the coupling of the new strategy and the proposed
force reductions?
Secretary Donley. Well, sir, I touched on a couple of these
in my opening remarks, but I would like to come back to them.
First is readiness. We have made a strategic-level decision to
continue to trade size, that is to become a smaller Air Force,
in order to protect its current readiness and to make sure that
it can as a smaller force still modernize going forward, so we
still have resources set aside for important investments like
tanker, bomber, JSF, as just a few examples.
We need to make sure that our forces are postured, Active,
Guard, and Reserve, so that we are ready for the challenges of
the current and future security environment that we're looking
toward in the next decade. We face significant challenges in
this international security environment and the Air Force can
be called on in a very short period of time, as the chief and
as the chairman mentioned in the Libya example, where we had
only a few days to put together a coalition team to put
aircraft over Libya, Libyan air space, as part of a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation.
So we need to be prepared. We do not have a long
opportunity to run up and slowly develop readiness over a
period of time. We can be called on on just very short notice.
The second thing is that, as I mentioned, our overhanging
concern in the Air Force is modernization. Our force structure
is aged, our aircraft are aged, and beyond where they should
be. The average age of the fighters is 22 years. The average
age of the airlifters is 35 years, and of the tankers it's
north of 45 years, and the bombers are in the same kind of
situation.
So we have an extreme requirement for modernization that it
will be very difficult to meet in this budget environment. But
we must protect those core capabilities for the future so the
Air Force continues to get better over time.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Schwartz, sexual assault continues to be a serious
issue within our military. I know that the leadership within
the Services is working hard to address the problem. In order
to help prevention efforts, I believe it is very important to
teach our newest recruits that this is absolutely unacceptable.
My question to you: What is the Air Force doing in basic
training, in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and
the Air Force Academy, to educate airmen on this very serious
matter?
General Schwartz. Sir, at all accession sources we have a
course and a program of instruction which emphasizes, in my
shorthand, that we don't beat up on our wives, we don't beat up
on our kids, and we don't assault our teammates, our fellow
airmen. That is the simple mandate.
To enforce that, we have implemented changes that I think
improve our likelihood of properly investigating cases and
properly prosecuting them. We have 14 Office of Special
Investigation agents who are dedicated to sexual assault cases.
They understand the nuances of these investigations and the
techniques that are associated that differ from other kinds of
investigation. Likewise, we have 18 prosecutors, who are not
dedicated, but who have special experience and skills to take
on major difficult cases like this.
The bottom line, sir, is that we're working the culture
piece certainly at accession and throughout the career life
cycle. We emphasize this through leadership, intervention, and
enforcement.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
General Schwartz, China's recent modernization efforts
include an aircraft carrier, a stealth fighter, and advanced
space programs, to name a few. General, at the unclassified
level which of their modernization efforts concerns you the
most?
General Schwartz. I would say there are areas in not so
much hardware, but in integration of electronic warfare
techniques, of cyber capabilities, and so on, with more
traditional tools of the trade. They are becoming more
sophisticated in this respect and that is the thing that I am
paying the most attention to.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
also share your concerns to the disproportionate cuts to the
Air Guard. Before I begin, I'd like to say that, while I have
no doubt the leadership at the National Guard Bureau knew the
cuts were coming, there were also a lot of folks in my State
that were blindsided by these cuts and were really not provided
any opportunity to provide input. The same with the Reserves,
and that deeply concerns me.
I'm trying to wrestle with a lot of what's going on, not
only in Massachusetts, but throughout the country. For example,
at Westover--I was there again yesterday, and the maintenance
crews out there are incredible. For the last 36 months, they
have a mission capable rate of 73 percent. In the last 12
months they have a 78 percent mission capable rate, compared to
40 percent for most Active Duty components, give or take.
So yet you are looking in the proposal to cut half their
fleet, even though you're cutting eight C-5Bs and turning them
into C-5Ms, but you're basically dismantling, proposing
dismantling, crews that have twice as high a mission capable
rate than the Active Duty components. I don't get it. Can
either one of you explain that?
General Schwartz. Sir, the logic behind this is that the C-
5M will be an inherently more reliable and have higher
utilization than its predecessor, the C-5 A or B.
Senator Brown. How can that be when they have a 78 percent
mission capable rate? It's already twice as high, so how do you
justify that?
General Schwartz. Those additional crews are going to
maximize the availability of that airplane, of the eight
aircraft that remain at Westover. We're increasing the crew
ratios because we recognize that we will be able to get better
utilization out of the C-5M than we did with its predecessor
versions of the C-5.
Senator Brown. Once again, sir, their turnaround time is
about 16 days, compared to 30, 40 days in the Active component.
Then you have 78 percent mission capable rate, which is pretty
much almost twice as much as on the Active component. Yet
you're taking half the fleet. Even if you say the C-5Ms are
going to be a more capable aircraft, they're already getting
that capability out of the aircraft that they're losing. So
isn't there more value for the dollar not only on the aircraft
savings, but keeping crews that are in place forever doing a
great job by all respects? Not to say anything about the
economic impact to Massachusetts in particular. Once again, I
don't quite see the logic there. You say logic. I don't see it.
Anything to add on that?
General Schwartz. I would just indicate again that to
achieve the additional crew ratios that we think are necessary
with a 16-airplane fleet would drive the numbers of personnel
well above those currently possessed at Westover. So the game
plan here was to use those members of the organization already
present against the fewer aircraft because of the increased
crew ratios and redistribute the remaining M models to another
Guard unit which has similar capability in order to maximize
its potential as well.
Senator Brown. Interesting. I'd like to explore that a
little bit more, maybe offline, because I'm not quite sure why
we don't take and put an Active component at Westover, like
they did in Wyoming, if you're looking at getting more flight
capabilities out of there and taking crews that are basically
twice as much, twice as good, quite frankly, as the Active
components.
What's going to happen to those crew members that are there
and the team and camaraderie, and really providing mission
capable planes that are actually going from the line to the
active, just going right overseas? What's going to happen to
those folks?
General Schwartz. The team will remain largely intact at
Westover, with somewhat fewer aircraft, sir. I would just
indicate, as the Secretary mentioned earlier, we agree with
you. We favor Active Associations.
Senator Brown. Okay. Well, maybe we can talk offline about
doing that.
General Schwartz. Very well, sir.
Senator Brown. Is it true that there are Russian aircraft,
cargo planes, delivering American goods to American soldiers in
Afghanistan? Is that accurate? Am I getting good information?
General Schwartz. There is contract lift from a number of
entities that supports the military mission in Afghanistan.
Senator Brown. Including Russians?
General Schwartz. Actually, I'm not sure it's Russian. It
might be.
Senator Brown. It's Russian. So why wouldn't we use our own
aircraft if we have, apparently, the capability to do so? Why
wouldn't we be providing our own aircraft to do that, I'm
presuming at a cost savings to us?
General Schwartz. The reality is that it's not necessarily
cheaper to operate organic aircraft on a routine basis relative
to what's available from the commercial sector.
Senator Brown. I know that it was already referenced, the
Council of Governors have voiced specific concerns. Mr.
Secretary, you said, well, it's up to Secretary Panetta. Well,
he's going to basically rely on your recommendations. From what
I'm hearing through the Council of Governors is that really
there's just been lip service given to their very real and
legitimate proposals.
I know that on March 23rd you're going to discuss the
matter internally with Pentagon officials. Is that accurate?
Secretary Donley. That's correct.
Senator Brown. Like the chairman and Senator McCain, I'd
like to have an understanding as to if in fact you're not going
to take any of their recommendations. I have said and it's been
proven that we have--the Guard and Reserve units, you get a
better value for the dollar. We're looking at cost savings. The
fact that you can get that in the Guard and Reserves is
something I think we really need to take into consideration.
The chairman also brought up the Global Hawk, the Block 30.
It's said in a DOD report that the U-2 would cost $220 million
more per year than the Global Hawk Block 30. So can you state
for the record, General Schwartz, what's changed since that
report came out and whether the Air Force is considering giving
the Global Hawk 30 aircraft to NATO, special forces, or the
Navy, as opposed to putting them in storage where they'll just
collect dust? Has there been any consideration on that?
General Schwartz. Two things, sir. A major change was a
JROC adjustment of the required number of orbits for the high
altitude surveillance, which I would like to address the
specific number with you offline. Decreasing that requirement
enabled the U-2 to cover the requirement with the fact that it
has 33 airframes available, even though it doesn't have the
legs or the persistence of the Global Hawk. That was a key
factor.
Another factor was the reality that the airplane is not
less expensive to operate as the U-2. It was not maturing as
quickly as we had hoped and, importantly, that the sensor
package on the Global Hawk needed significant improvements to
match the capability on the U-2.
So the bottom line was we opted, under the pressures of the
budget, to rely on the proven U-2. With respect to the use of
the aircraft, we'll have 18 airplanes, 6 of which will go into
non-recoverable storage. The other 12 will go into recoverable
storage and it is possible there will be other uses of them
either domestically or with partners.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz, for your
service and for being here today.
As we all know, progress is currently being made toward
constructing a new command headquarters for U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) with military construction (MILCON) funds
requested by the President, and authorized and appropriated by
Congress in fiscal year 2012. Because of the nature and the
size of it, it'll have to be phased funding over the next
several years.
In a hearing before this committee last month, General
Dempsey made a statement regarding emerging threats as it
relates to regional conflict in the future. He said, along with
service chiefs and combatant commanders, that you all believe
that the homeland will no longer be a sanctuary in 2017 and
therefore commands like U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM),
STRATCOM, may become more important in that environment.
Can the two of you speak to why we need a new headquarters
at STRATCOM to take on the new commands and to be an effective
fighting force for the years ahead?
General Schwartz. Sir, I guess I would just summarize by
saying that we're operating a command that has multiple
responsibilities in cyber, in space, and the highest
technologies we have, in a platform that's 50 years old, and
it's not well suited to the demands of today's missions. So the
commitment is to provide a facility that is appropriate to the
mission and not gold-plate it, but to do what's needed.
As you're aware, there's $160 million roughly in the fiscal
year 2013 proposal to continue that effort for STRATCOM.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. To oversimplify, but to put in
layman terms, it's pretty hard to fight in cyber space, cyber
and space commands, with drop cords. Modernization is
absolutely essential for the technology as well as perhaps just
the structure. Is that accurate?
General Schwartz. I would agree with that, sir.
Senator Nelson. Even no matter how long the drop cord is,
right?
I'm following up on the thoughts about BRAC. Obviously,
it's easier to--and you're finding out this morning that it's
easier to talk about cutting than it is to actually propose and
defend cuts. But as we look at BRAC, are we spending enough
time looking at our overseas military operations or are we
focused here at home?
It seems to me that our presence abroad in many respects
continues to grow, as in the Pacific-Asia command, at a time
when we're talking about more regional and more agile forces to
be able to deal with the emerging threats. Could you relate to
that?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir. Clearly there are opportunities
for base infrastructure reductions overseas, and that is almost
as complicated a process as BRAC would be domestically because
of interaction with allies and so on and so forth. But it is
clear that there are opportunities, as the chairman mentioned
earlier, in a number of areas, and we would pursue those on
parallel tracks. That would certainly be my proposal.
Senator Nelson. Well, as it regards to, let's say, Asia-
Pacific, our new national strategy calls for an increase in our
presence. The three large developed democracies in the region,
Japan, South Korea, and Australia, collectively have an economy
that is 25 percent larger than China's and incalculably larger
than North Korea's. As a percentage of gross domestic product,
however, they spend less than half of what the United States
does on defense.
But a larger presence, if it's necessary in that region to
deter or repel aggression from these threats--can you comment
on what we would be doing to try to get a larger contribution
from those that will most directly benefit from our presence in
the region?
General Schwartz. I think it's important to recognize that,
in particular with our South Korean allies and our Japanese
allies, over many decades they, in fact, have underwritten our
presence to a substantial degree through allocations of
resources for bases in Japan and Korea. Our partner in
Australia, that is a team that fights above their weight.
So, sir, I think you will not see recommendations to
diminish our presence in the Asia-Pacific for good reasons,
including the mandate from the defense strategic guidance.
Senator Nelson. But we also, in addition to having them as
allies, need to have them as financial partners. Can we work
toward having their percentage of partnership costs increase?
General Schwartz. I think that is a worthy objective and
our interaction with the Japanese, for example they're
seriously considering acquisition of the F-35, is an example of
the Air Force to air force partnership and a manifestation of
that partnership over many decades. Certainly we should support
that, support the Republic of Korea air force, and likewise the
Aussies and Singapore and others operate systems that are
interoperable with ours and magnify our respective
capabilities.
Senator Nelson. I don't mean to imply that they're
unwilling to help to a greater degree. But sometimes you have
to make the ask or you don't get the offer.
I also agree with the comments from my colleagues about
reducing the size of our Guard and Reserve units at a time--and
I'm referring back now to some comments by General Fogleman,
former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, when he wrote an
article suggesting that to reduce the personnel costs of DOD,
maintain a smaller standing Army--he mentioned Army, but I
suspect that it applies to the Air Force as well--and shift a
lot of the responsibility to the Guard and Reserves. I noticed
that my colleague Senator Brown made a comment about comparison
between effectiveness of Guard versus Active Duty components.
I hope that you'll take a very, very close look at this,
whether it's the Council of Governors or just in general, to be
sure that we're moving in the right direction. There's no real
room for margin of error here if we make the decision, because
the reduction will occur and then reestablishing the presence
of the Guard and Reserve will be very difficult.
General Schwartz. Sir, there is no difference between the
Guard, Reserve, and the Active Duty. You cannot tell the
difference between an airman in the field on what component
they come from. So this is not an issue of who's more superb
than another.
The fundamental question here is with smaller air forces
how do you manage the activity level across the entire
portfolio in ways that don't produce adverse effects, on the
Active Duty side activity levels, that in a better economy
might cause people to move on, or on the Reserve and the Guard
side activity levels that might make employers less hospitable
to the support that they provide to our Guard and Reserve
airmen.
Senator Nelson. I know it's delicate, but is it a fact then
that the total force is easier to operate on an integrated
basis during, let's say, high operations tempo?
General Schwartz. A total force clearly gives us more depth
and more breadth and more experience, as Senator Brown
suggested, particularly in the Guard and Reserve. The key thing
is to get the balance right, and that depends on what do we
think the activity level is likely to be and how much force
structure we have left?
My only appeal, Senator, to the committee would be that if
our proposals or those amended proposals as a result of the
Council of Governors' recommendations are not sustained and we
get force structure back from this committee or others, that
the appropriations come along with that force structure,
because the fastest way I know to go hollow is to get force
structure back without the resources to support them.
Senator Nelson. That's a point well made.
Thanks to both of you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Schwartz. Thank you, Secretary Donley,
for your service to our country.
Secretary Donley, can you help me with the audit issue?
Secretary Panetta has said that he wants DOD to be audit-ready
by 2014. As I understand it, the Air Force may have the most
difficulty in meeting this goal. With some of the tough choices
you're asking us to make, having good financial data and making
sure that our DOD is auditable I think has to be a top priority
for us.
So can you help me? What are the challenges that the Air
Force faces on meeting the 2014 deadline and can we expect that
you will meet the deadline?
Secretary Donley. You are correct, Senator, that I think
the Air Force probably has one of the tougher challenges among
the Services in getting to this deadline. This is not a
deadline for complete auditability of all our financial
statements, but a statement of budgetary resources, which is a
discrete piece, but nonetheless very important.
We're going to have to work hard to get there. We have put
additional auditing resources on this work and we're also
contracting out to auditing financial firms to help us work
through this, to make sure that we test ourselves along the way
and are prepared as best we can be.
We've already had clean opinions on both budget authority
and the funds balance with Treasury down to the major command
level, and our next steps are to take that down to the base
level in fiscal year 2012 and to also assert readiness on spare
engines and missile motors this year. So we have a fairly
detailed plan for how to get there, but it's going to take a
lot of focus and a lot of concentrated work to execute that as
planned.
Senator Ayotte. Do you both agree that this is important
for us to do? Is this an important exercise?
Secretary Donley. We do. We do. I think there are some
aspects of the work, as Secretary Hale has testified, that are
more important than others, and he has focused the Department
on those aspects of our work that are the most important, not
only to the taxpayers, of course, and to our stewardship of
resources, but also to our management, internal management of
resources, our ability to get greater efficiencies out of the
things that we are doing internal to the Services.
Senator Ayotte. Very good. I appreciate it.
I had introduced an amendment to the NDAA that passed
unanimously--it didn't end up getting adopted in the House--to
basically say to DOD to meet the 2014 deadline that the
Secretary has set for it. So this is I think very, very
important, and I appreciate that both of you are looking at
this as very helpful to the Air Force and also to making future
financial decisions and management decisions for the Air Force.
So thank you very much for your commitment to that.
General Schwartz. Ma'am, if I could just say one thing
quickly.
Senator Ayotte. Sure.
General Schwartz. At our last four-star meeting the four-
stars got the guidance that this is their business; this is not
business for the suits. This is business for the uniforms, and
that's part of our effort to make 2014.
Senator Ayotte. Very good. Thank you, General. I appreciate
that.
Let me ask you, General Schwartz. The F-35 JSF, are the
Chinese and Russians developing a fifth generation fighter?
General Schwartz. They are working on it, yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. You know I'm a huge fan of the A-10 because
I am married to an A-10 pilot. Our soldiers and marines love
the A-10 and F-16s. But can you tell us, what is the difference
in terms of capability between these legacy aircraft and the
fifth generation fighter? Why is it so important to us?
I know that the program has had difficulties, but as I
understand there isn't an alternative and we need this fifth
generation fighter.
General Schwartz. The bottom line is that the operating
environments that we will be required to operate in have become
more contested, both by radar threats, by infrared threats, and
even to some extent perhaps cyber threats. So the issue is you
need an airplane, a design that allows you to survive in this
more hostile environment.
That is the principal aspect of generation five. Number one
is stealth, that is low observability in a radar environment,
but also highly integrated avionics that allow the pilot and
the system to perceive a target, engage a target, and disengage
rapidly, more rapidly than did the legacy platform--all for
survivability.
Senator Ayotte. What would the life cycle sustainment cost
of the legacy fighters we just talked about that the F-35 is
replacing be if the Air Force did not procure the F-35, because
there's obviously significant legacy costs there that we're
trying to address?
General Schwartz. Yes, ma'am. I think, as a case in point,
we're re-winging the A-10s that you referred to before. That is
an effort that's ongoing and will continue with the 242 A-10s
that remain in our inventory after the proposed reduction if
you approve it.
Likewise on the F-16, there are cockpit improvements for
avionics, as well as structure on the F-16. The service life
extension will do that. So no airplane ages without the need
for investment. This is true in big airplanes and small
airplanes, particularly high performance aircraft, though,
where the margin of error is reduced. So that's the key aspect
and why we answered to Senator McCain that we're not interested
in buying generation 4.5 as substitutes, because it doesn't
make sense to us, ma'am, that we would spend money on airplanes
that are not as capable but would last as long as the
generation five counterparts.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
The KC-46A. This is obviously very, very important, the
next generation tanker. How long has the KC-135 been around?
Secretary Donley. Average age of the KC-135s is 49 years.
Senator Ayotte. Forty-nine years, that's right. I have to
say, actually older than this Senator. So I appreciate the KC-
46A program, and I know that you're going to be going to the
basing criteria soon. As I understand it, if you looked at the
KC-135 right now it's based roughly 60 percent Guard and
Reserve and 40 percent Active Duty. I know we've talked about
this in the past; I talked about it with General Johns--that we
have concurrent basing for the Active Duty and the Guard,
because, let's face it, we wouldn't have been able to do what
we need to do in Iraq and Afghanistan without our Guard.
I'm very proud of our 157th Air Refueling Wing, because we
have the highest utilization rate in the Air National Guard for
the KC-135 and also we have very strategic refueling tracks. So
it's my hope, as I reiterated before, that as you issue this
basing criteria that it will be concurrent, that it'll be
objective and transparent, because that's the way, of course,
we want everything to be around here, and will look also to the
experience of our Guard and Reserves, tremendous experience. I
think that so many of our pilots in the Guard and Reserve have
flown in the active duty also before they've served and have an
amazing amount of experience, which I think will help us with
this new tanker if we base it concurrently.
So I appreciate your efforts in that and look forward to
seeing the criteria as it comes forward.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I just wanted to
emphasize, like I'm sure everybody has, your service to our
country, and we do thank you for that.
General Schwartz, with the reduction of 9,900 airmen it's
going to require a lot of diligence and exacting management of
personnel to ensure that you have the right skills and the
experiences in the right place at the right time. As the force
perhaps becomes smaller, what type of force-shaping tools are
you implementing to ensure that you do have the right people
with the right specialties and that you retain and grow the
skills that you need in adequate numbers?
I just wanted to sort of focus on how many pilots you have
now, what's the outlook for 3 to 5 years in the future, and
then in particular with unmanned aircraft being used more, do
you see a shift in focus from piloted aircraft to unmanned
systems? Secretary Donley, feel free to weigh in.
General Schwartz. Yes, ma'am. There's a whole range of
tools that we use, most of which are voluntary, some of which
are involuntary, which we are very reluctant to employ for
obvious reasons. We have bonuses and incentives that--the
bonuses primarily apply to enlisted career fields that are in
high demand and short supply. The incentives relate to officer
career fields like the pilots, where there is an aviation
incentive program to maintain the pilot cadres in all of the
Services. That is important and certainly will be more
important as the economy recovers and there's greater demand
for these kinds of skills in the private sector.
With respect to the balance between manned and remotely
piloted aviation, clearly the glidepath is to more remotely
piloted capacity in our Air Force. We're currently training
more RPA pilots than we are bomber or fighter pilots, I mean,
just to give you a sense of how the scales have tipped here.
That will continue----
Senator Hagan. Percent and numbers? Do you have any
specifics on that?
General Schwartz. If I may, ma'am, if I can give that to
you for the record. I don't have the exact numbers right off
the top of my head. I should, but I don't today.
[The information referred to follows:]

Across the Total Force during fiscal year 2012, the Air Force plans
to train 948 manned aircraft pilots, of which 364 will receive initial
qualification as fighter and bomber pilots. The Air Force plans to
train a total of 414 remotely piloted aircraft pilots during fiscal
year 2012.

General Schwartz. But I would say that the RPA pilots share
in that incentive pay, and it's appropriate that they do. The
idea here is not to balkanize one group of aviators from
another, but rather to recognize that they're all contributing
to the mission in different ways through different means and so
on. So what we have tried to do is to normalize the RPA
community, demonstrate their value both to the Air Force and to
the joint team, and retain them for the important missions that
they do.
Senator Hagan. How about from the standpoint of other areas
where there may be a shift in focus or emphasis that requires
more of one skill set than another? I don't know if it's in the
maintenance, and areas like that.
General Schwartz. Sure. I mean, cyber is a rising area.
Senator Hagan. I was definitely going to ask on cyber.
General Schwartz. Clearly there are multiple opportunities
for anyone with this skill set. So yes, we need to attract
those people into our Air Force and keep them as they build
experience. They can make much more money on the outside,
there's no question. But the rewards of military service and so
on I think can help us balance that out, given the very
important missions that cyber professionals perform in our Air
Force.
I would just mention one thing quickly. Here's an area
where the Guard and Reserve construct is even more valid, you
know, is especially valid; let me put it that way. There are
areas of the country which are sort of cyber-intensive--the
Northwest, in Washington State, certainly the Valley in
California, Austin, TX, and so on. We have attempted to
establish Guard or Reserve units in those locales in order to
give cyber professionals in industry the opportunity to serve
as well and bring that expertise to bear.
Senator Hagan. I think you left out North Carolina in that
description.
General Schwartz. Bad on me, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. But what we're talking about now is science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education, and
that's an area that we as a country have to focus on in order
to be competitive in the business world and in the military
world while we're in the 21st century. Specifically, what is
the Air Force doing to recruit and retain highly trained and
qualified STEM professionals, and at the same time what is the
Air Force doing to recruit, train, and retain the cyber airmen
and encourage innovation in the cyber security operations?
Secretary Donley. A couple of issues there, Senator, but
I'll try to hit on a couple of them. First of all, we have put
a great deal of emphasis on rebuilding our acquisition
workforce in the last couple of years. So we've brought more
than 8,000 personnel into the acquisition workforce, focused on
cost estimating, on systems engineering, highly technical
capabilities that support our weapons system managers and
program managers. So this work has been ongoing.
We continue to have dialogue internally about how to
strengthen recruiting and officer development in the STEM
career fields especially, how to shape our ROTC programs, how
to shape the curriculum at the Air Force Academy, to emphasize
this work.
We also appreciate the support of others. There is a
program that is sponsored by the Air Force Association known as
Cyber Patriot, which has recruited youngsters into cyber
competition at the high school level, has grown leaps and
bounds over the past several years as youngsters come into
these clubs and competitions and become aware of the importance
of this work to our national security. This is future seed corn
for the United States, not just for the military, but for our
Nation at large. So many dimensions to this, but we appreciate
very much the importance of developing, maintaining, and
retaining that STEM expertise going forward.
Senator Hagan. I see that my time is up. I'd like to follow
up with you on the specific programs and learn more about it
and do some follow-up on that. So thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan. I would
join Senator Hagan, by the way, General, in suggesting that the
number of States on your list of those being potentially
impacted by cyber attacks should be greatly expanded. I'll
leave it at that.
Senator Portman is next.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it,
and I appreciated your comments earlier, as well as Senator
McCain's, about some of the challenges we face with the
sequestration.
Gentlemen, I know there's been a lot of discussion about it
today, but the bottom line is, if you could tell me whether you
think already in terms of your supply chain and your various
contractors that, if you see adjustments being made already in
light of the fact that on January 1, 2013, the sequestration
under current law would take place?
Secretary Donley. Certainly, Senator, sequestration is of
concern to us, and it is of even more concern, I think, to the
contracting community, which wants to better understand what
the impacts would be as we are potentially compelled to just
step in and cut funding in major accounts, including programs
for which they have, if you will, a financial cash flow that
they are working to pay their employees.
So this is the concern of the industry, I think. They would
prefer to get as far in front of these issues as they can. They
would like to plan better for this, and so the uncertainty
overhanging the Department and the defense industrial base is
significant here.
Senator Portman. This is what I'm hearing from the private
sector and certainly hearing from you. We had similar testimony
from the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army last
week. So the conclusion, of course, is that we need to move
quickly on this, not wait until the end of the year, in fact do
something before the end of the summer, if we are going to
avoid some of this dislocation.
General, you and I have talked about the C-27 before and I
noted in the chairman's opening remarks he also addressed it as
to why you changed your minds since you came to us and told us
how great this program was and how it performed a mission that
the C-130 could not. In fact, he also said that ``the Guard has
shown their incredible value to the Air Force,'' which I agree,
and he talked about why this joint program was something that
seemed to make so much sense at the time.
I have strong views on this. I think this is the right
thing for the taxpayer to continue the program, because I think
these planes will operate less expensively, and we'll talk
about that in a minute. I think it's certainly the right thing
for our military. They perform an incredible mission. We had
General Odierno sitting in the seat where you are a week ago
telling us about how he visited the 179th from Mansfield, OH,
in theater in Afghanistan and the great work they're doing with
the Army and how the Army really loves to have the ability to
have you, through your Air National Guard, embedded with them
and providing that service.
I would like to start with just a general question: What's
the cost to operate a C-27, which is the smaller, for those of
you who aren't following this closely, air cargo plane, as
compared to your alternative if you are to phase out this
program that's just getting started, which would be to go to C-
130s? What are the costs to operate?
General Schwartz. The latest numbers we have is about
$9,000 per flying hour for the C-27, a little bit higher for
the C-130J and about $10,400 for the C-130H.
Senator Portman. Okay. Well, those are new numbers to me. I
don't know what you're including in there, but the numbers
you've given us before are $2,100 to $2,700 for the C-27, which
is the smaller, more efficient aircraft, and the C-130 was
$5,100 to $7,100 per hour. Of course, the CH-47, which is your
other alternative, $11,000 per hour. So I don't know where
those numbers come from.
Let me just give you the opportunity to correct me and
maybe say why those numbers have suddenly leapt up.
General Schwartz. The $2,100 number is the number that's
used for accounting purposes when the airplane is used in a
direct support mode, what we call special assignment airlift.
This is a list of costs that do not reflect necessarily the
actual flying hour costs. So what I gave you was what is the
current best assessment of actual flying hour costs, the point
being that, yes, the C-27 is somewhat cheaper to operate on a
per-hour basis than the C-130 because it has two versus four
engines.
But a key factor here is that the maintenance for the C-130
is organic and the maintenance for the C-27 is contractor
logistics support, and there's a considerable difference in
relative expense there that goes into the flying hour
calculation.
[The information referred to follows:]

Organizational (base) level maintenance and depot-level repairs for
our legacy C-130E/H aircraft are largely provided by organic Air Force
personnel. Our C-130J aircraft are maintained by a mix of organic Air
Force and contractor logistics support personnel. Our C-27J aircraft
are currently sustained entirely by contractor personnel.
Air Force aircraft reimbursable cost-per-flight-hour (CPFH) rates
published by SAF/FM are largely based on historical sustainment costs
and projected cost growth factors such as inflation. Our C-130E/H/J
aircraft are mature weapon systems, with fairly stable sustainment
strategies and costs which result in well-understood CPFH estimates.
However, the C-27J is a relatively new and immature weapon system, with
evolving sustainment strategies and costs, and the influence of 100
percent contractor logistics support for this platform is not well-
reflected in the currently published reimbursable CPFH for this
platform. Because our C-130 and C-27J aircraft currently employ
different sustainment approaches, and the sustainment costs for the
latter are not as well-understood as the former, it is difficult to
directly compare the CPFH for these aircraft using the traditional
reimbursable CPFH lens. A more accurate CPFH comparison between these
platforms would be based on normalized total life cycle costs, and the
CPFH data provided to the committee staff reflect this normalized life
cycle point of view.

Senator Portman. I am finding out new information as we
talk. This has been incredibly confusing for me, because I am
trying to get to the facts, as I know you are. We had a private
conversation about this and none of these data points on $9,000
an hour were there then. I assume that you're talking about
some of the maintenance costs, as opposed to organic costs,
additional costs. I would say that other information we have
indicates that there are a lot of organic costs because the C-
130 parts and maintenance and so on is often interchangeably.
I think the real issue here is overall life cycle costs.
The committee report for last year's defense authorization
directed that there be a cost analysis for future C-27 buys. My
understanding is we weren't going to be seeing that report from
you, and instead we've gotten one or two Power Point slides
with the analysis. What I've seen trickle out of the Air Force
over the past 6 weeks is confusing, to say the least. The
data's been inadequate and inconsistent. It's left us all with
more questions than answers.
I have in front of me here three different Air Force
documents with life cycle costs ranging from $111 million per
aircraft, and a couple weeks later to $308 million per
aircraft, presented to my staff, then a few days later $270
million. I understand your analysis shop recently came out with
a comment saying that the $111 million was not part of a
``formalized, authorized, signed document.'' Then it appears
the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) was directed
not to be constrained by some of the assumptions, and we have
life cycle costs dropping down to $166 million per aircraft,
back below the C-130 costs.
So frankly, it's been a dizzying 6 weeks going through
these various numbers, and unfortunately it leaves me with the
feeling that you're trying to get this analysis to match a
budget decision that was made by the Air Force and, frankly,
not based on some very important information that we're getting
again from the Army and others about the performance side of
it.
So we'd love to see more than a Power Point slide. We'd
love to see some consistent analysis. I will tell you also that
when you look at the data in terms of the payloads that are
being carried, as you know much better than I do, these C-130s
often do not have a large payload. When you need a part, say a
helicopter part, and you have to move it, having a smaller
airplane makes a whole lot more sense, when you only have one
pallet or two or a small number of special operators.
According to the Operation Enduring Freedom data the
committee has received from the Department regarding the C-27J,
65 percent of the time C-27s have been tasked to move only one
pallet of cargo. The remaining 35 percent, they've been tasked
to move only two or three pallets of cargo.
I guess I would ask, in your opinion would it be more
efficient to move one, two, or three pallets of cargo with a C-
130H or with a C-310J, and if not why not?
Secretary Donley. Sir, with respect to the numbers, we'll
be happy to get back with you and discuss in whatever level of
depth you would like to how those numbers are derived. As you
appreciate, it's all about the assumptions. It's all about the
assumptions. So I wouldn't have any more to add to your pile
today on that subject.
[The information referred to follows:]

The C-27J service cost position (SCP) is displayed in the table
below. It reflects total life cycle costs (LCC) associated with a 25-
year C-27J program of record (POR).

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Note: Development and production estimates include Army funded sunk
costs ($14.6 million development and $494.4 million procurement for 13
aircraft)
Ground Rules and Assumptions:
The POR is documented in the March 14, 2011, Cost Analysis
Requirements Description and an April 5, 2011, depot summit memorandum.
This POR includes a fleet of 38 aircraft, based at 9 installations with
4 primary aircraft assigned (PAA) per unit and two additional PAA at
the training location. The manpower requirements for the POR were
compiled by Air Mobility Command/A1 with inputs from Air Education and
Training Command, Air National Guard, and Air Force Material Command,
in accordance with the Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02,
enclosure 8.
The Air Force met with Mr. Brent Bombach, Military Legislative
Assistant for Senator Portman, on April 17, 2012, to discuss the SCP
and the cost benefit analysis (CBA). The following documents were
provided: (1) USAF manpower estimate for the C-27J cargo aircraft
(Spartan) dated August 31, 2010; (2) C-27J SCP operations and support
estimate dated March 26, 2012; (3) a briefing describing production
estimate details; and (4) a description of underlying assumptions used
to develop the depot activation support program office estimate and
SCP, dated April 5, 2011.
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA):
After the SCP was endorsed, the Air Force performed a CBA of
procuring more C-27Js than the program of record vice recapitalizing C-
130s. To support this report requirement, the Air Force conducted
analytic comparative launch and checkout capability (LCC) excursions
based on the SCP data. These excursions departed from the program of
record by consolidating aircraft into larger units, applying reduced
personnel assumptions (less than both the manpower estimate and the Air
National Guard unit manpower document), and reducing flying hour
assumptions. Additionally, research, development, test, and evaluation
and military construction were not included in the excursions in order
to focus on incremental costs. Procurement cost of $32 million was used
vice the $65 million average procurement cost, a 30-year life cycle was
assumed, dollars were converted to base-year 2011, and a net present
value discount rate of 2.3 percent was applied to reflect future value.
These steps enabled the examination of comparative LCC representing
high- and low-cost ``bookend'' values of expected costs for the next
incremental buy beyond the program of record 38 aircraft. Similar
manning, basing, and operation assumptions were applied to the
comparative LCC for the C-130 which enabled a relative comparison of
the next incremental C-27J procurement to the recapitalization of a C-
130H. These relative comparison LCC values do not represent the full
LCC of either system.
The CBA showed the comparative incremental costs to procure an
additional C-27 or recapitalize a C-130 were nearly the same. The lack
of a cost benefit for procuring additional C-27Js led to the conclusion
that the more versatile and capable C-130 was the better option in
today's constrained fiscal environment.

Secretary Donley. But I would ask you to think about the
strategic-level discussion that we had in the Air Force about
how big the tactical airlift fleet is going to be going forward
and how many fleets we're going to manage. I think we made the
right strategic choice here. We're about to embark on a C-27
capability which would be, I think, nice to have and does
satisfy a very narrow piece of the direct support mission that
we provide as support for the Army.
But as you look at fleet management overall, the better
strategic choice in our view was to go with the C-130 because
it is more flexible across the broader range of tactical
airlift requirements. As we go forward, it didn't make sense to
us to commit to building a very small C-27 fleet that was going
to be on contractor logistics support forever and to try to
build and sustain that going forward in the context of a
smaller tactical airlift fleet.
So this was the strategic level choice that we made here.
Senator Portman. Mr. Secretary, my time has expired, but
could you give me an answer to the question about moving one,
two, or three pallets? Is it more cost effective to do it with
a C-27 or a C-130?
General Schwartz. Clearly more cost effective to move one
pallet on a C-27, if it's within range.
Senator Portman. So if 65 percent of the time, based on
what you've given us in terms of data, that's what the task has
been and the other 35 percent of the time it's to move two or
three pallets, it would seem to me that we'd need to look at
this cost accounting in terms of the loads being carried.
Mr. Secretary, I'd love to get into more detail. The Power
Points have gone up, down, all around, and to understand what
your assumptions are would be very helpful to me.
I appreciate both of your service so much and I just think
we have a fundamental disagreement here on this issue, and I'd
hope that you'd be willing to look at some data that we can
provide that maybe changes some of the assumptions and
therefore some of the ultimate costs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Welcome, General.
We've had a discussion on this topic before, but my
greatest concern is the strategy that the Air Force is using
for your restructuring. Specifically, nearly half of the Air
Force personnel cuts come from the Guard, but they only cost
taxpayers a third less to maintain them compared to active
duty. Some of the other cuts in the other Services, they did
not take them from Guard and Reserve; they took them from
active duty. Even when the Joint Chiefs of Staff did a report,
they found that Guard and Reserve provide capabilities at a
lower cost and that they could be able to rely--and would be
more flexible than just relying on full servicemembers.
I'm also concerned about New York being a State that's
receiving one of the largest percentages of cuts. We are
bearing 19 percent of the overall Air National Guard cuts. I
question that decision, largely because of the capabilities
that New York has to offer. Not only do we excel at homeland
security and cyber missions and unmanned vehicle missions, but
we also are positioned with a northern border, an eastern
seaboard, and New York City is arguably the number one terror
target in the Nation. So a large military presence is
warranted.
It's also welcomed. New York has great respect for our
military men and women and their families. We welcome their
presence with open arms. We also have 100 percent staffing with
our Guard units and we have no environmental issues that would
concern the military for all of our different bases.
So my concern is is that the strategy for cuts are
disproportionately affecting the Guard and Reserve, are not
taking advantage of known benefits and strengths. So I just
wanted to ask whether you will reconsider this strategy in
light of some of these concerns.
Second, I know Chairman Levin talked about the work that
the Council of Governors has done and they have an alternative
proposal that will cut close to three-quarters of a billion
dollars in savings beyond your proposal. In light of that as
well, is there any room for reconsideration of your overall
strategy about how to handle these cuts?
Secretary Donley. Senator, I would just repeat that the
discussions that the Secretary had set in motion a couple of
weeks ago with the Council of Governors continue and we have
not yet reached a conclusion, and we will get back to the
committee as soon as that work is done.
I know that you've raised a number of issues here, but just
to make sure that at the highest strategic level the rationale
was that the Department had concluded that we had excess
tactical lift capabilities, and that is why C-130s have been
put on the table. As we went through that assessment, the
majority of this capability is already in the Guard and
Reserve, I think. So the focus of our discussions internally
has been how to balance the Active and the Reserve component
force structure, as the Chief has articulated, to make sure
that we do not break the Active Force or the Guard or Reserve
as we consider Total Force management across this particular
fleet, and each fleet assessed on its own.
Senator Gillibrand. Specifically with regard to two areas
that are receiving significant cuts, Rome Labs and Niagara.
Now, the Air Force cyber science and technology funding is
going down in fiscal year 2013 and 2014, and that's a very
curious decision from my perspective, particularly in light of
Secretary Panetta's earlier testimony, particularly also in
light of the questions that Senator Akaka asked concerning
China being our largest threat would be electronic warfare and
cyber attack.
So first, why is that cut being pursued? I would consider
this to be one of our highest priorities for long-term national
security, and I think investing now to make sure we have the
brightest minds, the talent and resources necessary to build
for future threats would be a preferable approach.
Secretary Donley. Just a couple of points. Certainly the
civilian manpower adjustments that the Air Force has been
compelled to make over the last couple of years has affected a
number of installations, and especially those that are heavy
users of civilian personnel, if you will. So that is certainly
part of the equation.
With respect to cyber funding, I would also note for the
committee's broader interest here that while this is a very
critical area for our national security going forward, the
numbers within our cyber spending and our cyber manpower are
moving around quite a bit. So there's not a lot of dollar
growth on the cyber side, in part because we are gaining
information technology (IT) efficiencies as we move down the
road. So we are programming reductions in spending for IT
because we believe and have experience that we can do this work
more efficiently. So you do not see a steep ramp of growth in
spending for IT. In fact, you see a little decline. We are
still working through the manpower implications of that as
well.
Senator Gillibrand. With regard to Rome Labs specifically,
it's going to be cut 18.5 percent. Now, I think you're aware
that Rome Labs has a very successful collaboration with
universities and companies in terms of developing the most
cutting-edge technology. It's a very technology-rich
environment. In that 18.5 percent cut, the programs that are
suffering the most are those that support command and control,
planning, and communications, and with STRATCOM being one of
the main consumers of this work.
Is someone else going to fill this need, and if not how do
you justify losing that capability?
Secretary Donley. Senator, I'd like to get back to you on
the record with a more complete answer on the internal dynamics
of Rome.
[The information referred to follows:]

In the fiscal year 2013 force structure announcement, the Air Force
announced net personnel changes that included a reduction of 13
military positions and an increase of 3 civilian positions. This
equated to a net 1 percent reduction in personnel--from 793 military
and civilian personnel to 783 personnel. The addition of the three
civilian positions was a previously announced action communicated to
Congress via the November 2, 2011, and January 11, 2012, civilian
announcements. The reduction in 13 military positions are attributed to
efficiencies in support of the Secretary of Defense memorandum, dated
June 4, 2010, on improving Department of Defense business operations
through workload divestitures, reorganizations, and consolidations, and
the Departments efforts to optimize resources within major commands.

Senator Gillibrand. Fine.
My time is up, but I will just say that we've discussed
Niagara in depth and obviously it was to serve as a cost-
sharing model. So I would like you to relook at that issue and
consider whether adding missions or adding other, expanding
collaborations with Homeland Security would be something
feasible.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, Senator McCain mentioned BRAC and you
said we're going to need to close additional installations.
Senator Hagan had a conversation with you about the
requirements for pilots. How do you see the requirement going
forward for the next 5, 10 years with regard to undergraduate
pilot training?
General Schwartz. We'll maintain the 1,100 per year output
for as far as I can see, sir.
Senator Wicker. Okay. We train those at basically three
bases right now, and then there's a fourth hybrid base. You
don't see BRAC addressing that particular issue, do you?
General Schwartz. Sir, I can't speculate on that, but we do
not see reducing capacity of the pilot production.
Senator Wicker. So that wouldn't be your recommendation.
Now, Secretary Donley, we had a conversation earlier about
the tanker and, very frankly, the leadership of this committee,
Republican and Democrat, mentioned the tanker. The winner of
the contract came forward with an astoundingly low bid. You've
been asked about that today. I want you to clarify something
you said, because I think you said that if there are cost
overruns the overruns would be borne mostly by the
manufacturer. What did you mean by the ``mostly'' and what part
would the taxpayer bear?
Secretary Donley. I don't have the numbers off the top of
my head. The program has a target cost and it has a ceiling,
and the bids that came in that were evaluated and based on the
source selection of last year were evaluated at the ceiling,
the higher of those two levels. This is a fixed price contract,
so any costs above the ceiling belong to the contractor.
Senator Wicker. Okay, but I do believe the record will show
that you said ``mostly.'' Was that just a slip of the tongue?
Secretary Donley. Above the ceiling, it's on the
contractor.
Senator Wicker. Above the ceiling, it's on the contractor.
Well, let me just say, we're going to be looking at this very
closely. There was a very low bid. I think you'll find that we,
Congress, mean for it to be honored and we don't want to see
any slippage there.
With regard to the C-27Js, Senator Portman just said that
he has a fundamental disagreement with the Air Force on this
issue and we want to see more facts. I want to join him on that
and observe, based on the testimony and the questions today,
that there appears to be a fundamental bipartisan disagreement
between a large number of members of this committee and the Air
Force position.
I think it was mentioned already that last week, in
response to my question, General Odierno--I asked him, did the
Air Force consult the Army? Was the Army included in this
decision? Basically, his answer was that the Army was brought
into the conversation after the decision was made. I quote from
General Odierno: ``I would say we had a discussion about it as
a joint group together once the decision was made.''
There are some real problems with this decision and let me
just observe that without asking you to comment.
Also, with regard to the Global Hawk, I want to join myself
with the comments of the chairman and also with Senator Brown.
We need to be able to rely on what this committee is told and
we shouldn't expect such a reversal in a short period of time.
The number one unmet requirement of combatant commanders is
the need for persistent ISR. Mr. Secretary, just 7 months ago
Deputy Secretary Carter certified in writing to Congress that
the Global Hawk was essential to national security, there was
no other acceptable capability to meet the requirement, and
that the Global Hawk was $220 million less expensive per year
to operate than the U-2.
Now essentially we're told that the requirements have
changed, the assumptions have changed, the data is different.
Seven months later, we're told: Never mind what the Under
Secretary for Acquisition came and said in a certified
statement.
Mr. Secretary, is there a business case analysis in writing
that is available to us that supports the termination of this
$4 billion aircraft?
Secretary Donley. Senator, I think I'm confident that we
can provide you the analysis that ties to the changed
requirement. As the Chief suggested earlier, some of this is
classified and needs to be discussed offline. But there were
changes in the requirement that allowed us to reconsider. When
the certification came over on Global Hawk Nunn-McCurdy breach
previously, the certification to which you referred, the
question then was is there anything else that could provide the
capability that the Global Hawk provides to meet that
requirement? So it was a higher requirement, it was focused on
the persistence of the Global Hawk capability, and the analysis
at that time said it would require additional dollars, it would
be more expensive to have the U-2 provide that persistence at
that level of activity.
But when the level of activity changed, the requirement
changed, we concluded that the U-2, given its existing fleet,
would be able to meet that requirement. Then the issue was in
the cost comparison, what would it take to have any other
aircraft operate as well as the U-2 with that requirement? At
that point the comparison between the sensors became evident
and the need for Global Hawk Block 30 to have an improved
sensor adds cost to that program through the end of this
decade. When you look at the costs of the two programs down on
paper, it's cheaper for us to continue with the U-2 program.
The airframe still has life through about 2040 and it needed
minor upgrades to the weapons system, which we are undertaking.
But taking all that into consideration, it's cheaper and we
can get that mission done with the U-2 going forward.
Senator Wicker. Well, we'll have a further conversation on
that.
Briefly, Mr. Secretary, let me just mention, you're
proposing to take 10 C-310Js from Keesler, move them to
Dobbins. We have provided considerable capability at Keesler
for the C-130Js. The taxpayers have expended a considerable
amount of money to accommodate the C-130J airframes and their
air crew at Keesler, including state-of-the-art simulators.
You're not going to be asking us to do some MILCON at other
bases to replace this state-of-the-art MILCON that we have
already available for these C-130s at Keesler, are you?
Secretary Donley. Senator, typically when aircraft move, a
different type aircraft moves from one location to the next,
there are sometimes MILCON. We will have no major MILCON
activities associated with this. There will be some minor what
are referred to as add/alter adjustments to existing
facilities.
Senator Wicker. Well, if implemented this move would leave
Keesler without a flying mission, and the taxpayers have
expended considerable dollars for the C-130Js, and I'm very
concerned about this proposal.
Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join my colleagues in thanking you for your service and
note that the description that you gave earlier of trading, I
think you put it, size or number or quantity for quality is a
dilemma faced by many of your colleagues in DOD. Certainly we
are sympathetic to not only the goal, but the difficulty of
achieving it, and really thank you for your tremendous
leadership in this time of austerity and needing to do more
with less.
I would like to focus first of all on the JSF and the delay
in procurement schedule. I know you've talked about it a bit.
But overall, doesn't the stretch-out or delay increase
potentially the cost of procurement per plane?
Secretary Donley. It probably does. Those details are being
worked now and there is an updated systems acquisition report,
which will come to Congress later this spring.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you anticipate it will be this
spring that we'll learn more about those costs?
Secretary Donley. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Can you give us a rough estimate or
description of what the impacts may be of this stretch-out or
delay?
Secretary Donley. Well, it adds time to the program and
that usually means cost. So in simple terms that's what it is.
But it is also important to recognize that part of the reason
for this stretch-out is that we are consciously avoiding larger
costs that we would have to incur sooner in the program if we
had to take aircraft off the production line and send them
right back in to be refitted or upgraded to the latest
configuration. So we're trying to minimize the number of
aircraft that we have to do that with by slowing this ramp.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Like others who've asked you for additional information on
the C-27J, I'm very concerned about the impact on our active
force and our National Guard. I wonder whether there is any
consideration being given to modifying the decision on that
program?
Secretary Donley. Senator, as I mentioned, the Secretary of
Defense had opened the window to provide the Council of
Governors an opportunity to make suggestions, and that
discussion with the Council of Governors continues. I haven't
had a chance yet to brief the Secretary of Defense or the DOD
leadership. That will occur later this week. We'll get back to
the committee when that is done.
But I would also note, if I might, that in recognizing the
impact of the C-27 changes across the Guard and specifically
the units that might be impacted, where we could we took
mitigating action to bring in follow-on missions--MC-12
missions, RPA, mission control units. So where we've been able
to, we have put in mitigating issues behind the C-27.
General Schwartz. I would only elaborate by saying that
putting the C-27 back is a $1.4 billion proposition.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, General Schwartz, since the
Secretary mentioned it, would you comment on the MC-12 role in
homeland security and crisis response and its potential mission
in those areas of responsibility?
General Schwartz. It is a very good platform which involves
both electrooptical and infrared capability, as well as signals
capability on the same platform and a capacity to support
ground forces simultaneously with gathering of intelligence.
Clearly, we have 37 airplanes presently. Five more are in the
process of delivering. Thirty of those are deployed. Seven have
remained stateside for training purposes The reputation that it
has gained is that this is a platform that needs to remain in
the enduring force structure, and it will.
It clearly has applicability to domestic missions, properly
executed, whether that be support to counterdrug missions in
the south and southwest area, or other kinds of law enforcement
sort of applications, again properly executed. So the MC-12 is
a high utility platform, and the reason it started in the
Active Duty was because we did it in 7 months. We fielded the
capability in 7 months time and built the crew force and all
that went along with it.
Once we hit a steady state, it is a suitable mission and an
enduring one for the National Guard, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. So you would see it continuing?
General Schwartz. Without a doubt.
Senator Blumenthal. Finally before my time expires, I
wonder if you could talk, General Schwartz, about the Pave Hawk
helicopter and what the status of that program is?
General Schwartz. We just recently released a draft request
for proposal for the Combat Rescue Helicopter replacement. That
acquisition process is underway, and here again this is an area
of our Air Force that has very significant joint team support,
for obvious reasons, and it is a core Air Force mission that
we're going to sustain.
So the program is underway. It is in the budget in the 2013
recommendation and it is not something that we want to back
away from, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. So you would see a continued commitment
to it?
General Schwartz. Certainly would.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for coming. As you can tell from the
questions here today, all of us, a lot of us, have different
concerns about how you meet the budget requirements placed upon
you. Maybe we should be thinking about are these requirements
too severe, given the threats that we face and all the good
programs are at risk.
So, General Schwartz, you're right, we can't have it both
ways. We can't rearrange the budget for you, send it back to
you, your priorities, and say, now go do all we want, if we
don't increase the money.
But, having said that, I think the Global Hawk and the U-2
discussion is really a fascinating one for me. This is 2012 and
we're talking about how a manned aircraft can do a better job
than a drone through now and 2040. I just don't get that when
it comes to this kind of mission. It doesn't make common sense
to me, and what I'm worried about is what happened to the
Global Hawk in terms of cost? I mean, it's gone up just
exponentially over what was proposed. Is that because we keep
changing the requirements or because of problems with the
contract?
General Schwartz. Senator Graham, two things. First of all,
it's important to appreciate we're not getting out of the
Global Hawk business. We're going to retain the Block 40 Global
Hawk capability for ground moving target indicator, as well as
the communications platform for Block 20. So we're focused on
the Block 30.
A couple things. I think that reliability of the Global
Hawk was an issue. Subsystems in the Global Hawk aircraft were
problematic. The generators, for example, are a case in point,
which the contractor has corrected, but it took time to do so,
and resources.
Senator Graham. Did they competitively bid for this
program?
General Schwartz. They did.
Senator Graham. Shouldn't we have a hearing one day, Mr.
Chairman, about how a system competitively bid could be so
overrun with costs and find out where the problem lies? Is it
the Air Force changing the requirements or is it the contractor
not being able to fulfill their promise?
General Schwartz. You will recall, Senator, that the
original birth of this system was as a tech demonstrator.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Schwartz. So it had an unusual birthing process, to
be sure.
Senator Graham. Because we had a need, right?
General Schwartz. This was a technology effort that proved
out, and we're going to make use of the Global Hawk capability.
NATO will with the Alliance Ground Surveillance, the Germans
will with the Block 30 equivalent platform.
Senator Graham. I guess what I'm saying is that we're
shelving some of the Block 30 Global Hawks along with the idea
it doesn't work as well as the U-2. I just find that hard to
believe. The U-2 is a great platform and great crews and
maintainers, but I just can't believe that a manned aircraft
can do all the things that these drones are capable of doing
for the next 25 or 30 years.
General Schwartz. In the long run, Senator Graham, I would
agree with you.
Senator Graham. Let's see if we can.
General Schwartz. I'm not dealing with the long run.
Senator Graham. I know, I know. But somebody needs to be,
and maybe that's what we're all up here for, is to try to find
out the long run and not create budget crises that really make
short-term decisions that are not long-term smart. So I'd like
to use the Global Hawk/U-2 debate as a case study in why
programs cost more than they should, why they take longer, and
where are we as a Nation with a vision.
I just envision more drones, fewer manned aircraft when it
comes to surveillance, because the cost of losing a pilot in a
war is a lot different than it is losing a drone.
So now let's move on to the Air Guard. You've gotten a lot
of questions about how we're going to meet our budget goals on
the personnel side. I guess the problem I have, like a lot of
us up here, is that on the Air Guard side we're losing 5,100
people from the fiscal year 2012 enactment and 3,900 on the
active duty side. There's 328,900 Active Duty airmen, there's
7,500 active duty reservists in the Air Force Reserves, and
101,600 Air National Guard. They get hit disproportionately
harder than anybody else by a factor of three or four. Why is
that?
Secretary Donley. Senator, we have outlined the process
that we went through based on changes in the strategy and
adjustments in force structure that came from that, reductions
in fighter force structure, reductions in mobility force
structure. We then made decisions about which platforms to take
additional risk in, and then we went from there to look at the
Active Duty-Reserve component ratio in each of those platforms
to make sure that we could sustain a ready force.
Senator Graham. Is the basic premise that if you have less
fighters you ought to take them out of the Air Guard and put
them in the Active Force?
General Schwartz. The logic, Senator, has to do with the
anticipated tempo in each of the components. What we did was we
said we did not want to operate the Active Duty on a routine
basis below a one to two deploy to dwell, 6 months deployed, 1
year home, and not less than one to four, ideally one to five,
for the Guard and Reserve, given those are our management
redlines.
We looked at the available force structure and the expected
activity level and worked the mix in order not to cross those
thresholds.
Senator Graham. I guess my concern is that the lessons
learned from the last 10 years is you can't go to war without
the Guard and Reserve. You all know that. it's not a slam on
anybody. Our Active Air Force is the best in the world by a
factor of many, and the Guard and Reserve does have capability
and experience.
This idea of using Guard units with active associates is a
good idea, but only so far. I'm not trying to create a cheaper
Air Force in the National Guard, Air Guard. I'm not trying to
create more Air Guard wings where you have 80 associates from
the Air Force making that Air Guard unit about two-thirds
cheaper to maintain, equally deployable. That's a good concept,
but only so far.
I just think what you're hearing from the committee here is
that we're losing a lot of capability in a part of our military
force that's just cheaper to maintain, and these are pretty
experienced folks and they've gone to war, they've done a good
job, and they get home and a lot of their missions are going
away. That talent pool that we're losing I think has to be
factored in there.
So I hope you can work something out with the governors and
I would urge you to do that.
My last inquiry is about Iran. How large is the Iranian air
force?
General Schwartz. It's a modest air force. I don't have
specific numbers. I can give that to you for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Islamic Republic of Iran operates two separate air forces, the
Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force (IRGCAF). In terms of assets, the
IRIAF operates a wide range of tactical aircraft: U.S.-built aircraft
such as the F-4, F-5, and F-14; fighters from Russia, China, and France
such as the MiG-29, F-7, and Mirage F-1; as well as several types of
indigenously-produced Iranian aircraft that appear to be based off of
the U.S. F-5. The IRGCAF operates one type of jet-powered combat
aircraft, the Russian-built Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack plane, as well
as various transport and utility aircraft. IRIAF missions include
ground attack, air intercept, and long-range strike; however, the
IRGCAF mission set is limited to missions such as ground attack and
support of ground troops. The combined force of the IRIAF and IRGCAF is
currently estimated to consist of roughly 600 operational aircraft,
including about 330 combat aircraft. The combined personnel strength of
the IRIAF and IRGCAF is estimated at around 30,000.
Sources:
NASIC: 2012 Global Threat Estimate--Threats to the U.S. Air Force
(released February 2012; accessed April 17, 2012).
Jane's World Air Forces: Iran (updated April 4, 2012).

Senator Graham. When you rate air forces in the world, it
is an older, more modest air force; is that correct?
How large is their navy?
General Schwartz. I'm not an expert in that area, sir.
Senator Graham. Is it fair to say from the Air Force side
if you were asked to take the Iranian air force down, that it
is well within our capabilities?
General Schwartz. One on one, there would be no doubt about
that. But it's not just airplanes against airplanes. This is,
as you are very well aware, this is a more complex undertaking.
Senator Graham. They have rockets, they have missiles.
General Schwartz. They certainly do.
Senator Graham. But my question is about their air force.
Their air force would not fly long and it would not fly far; do
you agree with that, in a fight with the United States?
General Schwartz. If that was the mission, that would be
the outcome.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here. I appreciate it.
General Schwartz, we've had a lot of good discussions.
First I want to thank you for coming up to Alaska regarding
Eielson and trying to understand and help the people of Alaska
understand what the intent of the Air Force is and the process
of the Air Force.
But here's my struggle, and I continue to struggle. First,
in your analysis the savings that occur or the analysis that
says here's how much savings will occur are put into the budget
and then it's analyzed for us to all look at. But as we both
know, you're just now sending up the on-site team--I think it's
going to be second or third week of April--to actually do the
full analysis.
Here's my struggle: that we know, based on your statements,
there are savings that need to be achieved in the budget. We
understand that, both to the Secretary and the General. But the
problem is you're now starting to do the full analysis to
understand what the savings are. I understand you did tabletop,
but what goes on in the Pentagon and what's real are sometimes
very different on the ground.
So I'm trying to understand how you get to these savings,
and we received a letter recently with some information. But do
you have a detailed analysis that you utilize to determine the
savings that would be achieved by the Air Force in regard to
Eielson? I'm going to use Eielson because my worry is there's
40-some other States that are being affected with other types
of reductions, and if you're now just going through this
process of really fully doing the on-the-ground analysis, how
are we to make a decision when our markup is occurring so soon?
Secretary Donley. Senator, certainly we have programmed and
budgeted for operations at Eielson, as we do for other bases
and units. We understand generally the costs of operations for
the infrastructure, for the personnel, for the aircraft, and
that is programmed. So if we make force structure adjustments
that move or reduce, we have a pretty good handle on what the
personnel, flying hour, force structure, operational impacts
are, and those numbers are used as the basis for our decisions.
Senator Begich. Let me follow up on that. In the report
that I saw, you're going to achieve savings in the base support
of Eielson beginning in 2015. But you're starting the process
now, and so I guess I want to ask two parts. We've heard some
numbers in regards to personnel, and I want to dice this a
little bit because I'm concerned the process and this is the
exact same debate we had when BRAC occurred several years ago.
It is the exact same debate.
But we're not going through a BRAC process now. What you're
going through is a realignment. Exactly the same debate. So my
concern now is is this a process that's going to go around the
loop.
Why I want you to dice the personnel issue, you have
uniformed personnel and you have civilian personnel. Can you
tell me now what you anticipate the civilian reduction will be
for Eielson? Whoever wants to answer this.
General Schwartz. The total reduction of personnel is about
660, based on reconfiguring Eielson to a support base rather
than its current full-up configuration. I don't recall
specifically the split between military and civilian, and we'll
provide that for the record, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Begich. Let me pause you there, General. This is a
question we've asked in our meeting down in the Visitors
Center. We've had it out in Alaska. We've asked in writing.
This is the fourth request. Why I ask this is because it's
critical on the civilian piece, because under BRAC there are
special requirements when you start touching civilian employees
and the quantity, under the law.
So the question I would have is, that number is critical
and for that not to be supplied to us is problematic as we are
going through this markup.
General Schwartz. That's why it was a 2015 target, sir, and
the result of which will be confirmed by the site survey that
occurs next month.
Senator Begich. I know, but here's the challenge, General.
We're starting the process. I went through this with missile
defense. They always talk about the year we're in. The
decisions we make here at the markup have long-term impacts to
the military deployment of services. It doesn't matter whether
it's Air Force, Army, whatever. So for us to be in a narrow
window is unacceptable.
In other words, you should be able to say to me in 2013
here's what it's going to be, 2014 it's going to be this, 2015
it's going to be this, 2016 it's going to be this, because in
order for you to make this decision that you brought to us I'm
assuming someone in the Pentagon had these discussions. So it
shouldn't be new information. It should be readily available
like that, because anything you do in the DOD is long-term.
Everything we do here, even though it seems like it's a 1-year
pain in the neck at times because of the short-term process, it
creates long-term implications.
So that's what I want to know, because if you're saying to
me in this narrow window, yes, nothing touched in 2013
civilian, that's an unacceptable excuse, because what we do
here will affect civilian employees in 2015, in 2016, 2017. I'm
not even sure because I don't know that. But that's what you
stated.
So do you get my point there?
General Schwartz. I do, sir.
Senator Begich. Secretary, do you understand what I'm
referring to?
Secretary Donley. I do, and we'll do the best we can to get
you the numbers available on the timeline you need.
Senator Begich. I'm looking--not the best. I'm expecting an
answer because we have to make these decisions, and it's very
difficult. I'm a huge supporter of the military, but when I
hear that the decision has been made on what it will save and
now we have teams going up there to determine it, if I was any
other Senator I'd be asking the exact same question from their
own home States, because if the analysis is now being started
for our State are we just the anomaly? Are we the unique State?
My bet is no. I'm assuming it's happening in other States. So I
expect that.
The other thing, I know a month ago our team was up there.
We have requests that are still due that we have not received.
So I would hope that you would get that to us. It's critical.
Then the last thing, if I can just tag on one item on the
tankers, just a question because I want clarification on this.
That is, you called it--I can't remember the phrase you used,
but you have ceiling and you have bid. Or are they the same?
Secretary Donley. They're not. Its target and ceiling are
the terms.
Senator Begich. What do you budget for?
Secretary Donley. The ceiling.
Senator Begich. So in your budgets--I'm just going to use a
hypothetical--if a tanker is a dollar ceiling and it was bid at
50 cents, you really budget for the dollar, correct?
Secretary Donley. I believe we're covered for that.
Senator Begich. Believe or yes? Confirm that. Because you
see the difference?
Secretary Donley. I do, I understand.
Senator Begich. Okay, and I'll leave it at that, because I
think that's what one member was trying to get to.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to extend a little
bit there.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Begich.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for all of your
service.
I wanted to start by asking about the A-10s. The Air Force
is proposing disbanding A-10 aircraft at the 917 Fighter Group
at Barksdale Air Force Base and the Louisiana National Guard's
259th Air Traffic Control Squadron at England Airpark. Now,
they have been used extensively in joint training, specifically
at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk in
the Green Flag East Exercises. 70 percent of all those
exercises involve those A-10s, and that training is absolutely
essential, the best training available for the sorts of
conflicts we have been in.
I'm concerned that the Air Force decision to cut that is
being made in a narrow smokestack while the use is joint and
that's not fully being appreciated or factored into the
decision. Can you tell me what, specifically what consultation
with the Army or with the Louisiana National Guard went on
before that Air Force decision was made?
Secretary Donley. Sir, back to the strategy-driven changes
here, the adjustments in the strategic guidance impacted the
second major contingency and directed us not to plan for
extended operations, for stability operations, on an ongoing
basis. That's what affected the force structure requirements
for the second contingency most.
Having come off of recent fighter force structure
adjustments to the F-16 force and to the F-15 force, that
strategic guidance focused on taking additional risk in the A-
10 force structure. So that is how we got to additional
reductions in the A-10. Then we worked through, as the Chief
and I have described, the more detailed analysis of inside the
A-10 force structure the Active and Reserve component mix,
making sure that we had the right balance so that we could meet
the requirements of the strategy, we could meet surge
requirements, and we could maintain ongoing expeditionary
operations if required to do so, make sure we didn't break the
Active Force----
Senator Vitter. In all that strategic context, what was the
consultation ahead of the decision with the Army regarding this
specific decision, and the Louisiana National Guard?
General Schwartz. The Army was certainly part and parcel of
this conversation throughout. They were at the table when these
decisions were taken. I'm not saying they liked them, but they
understood them.
Again, General McKinley was also at the table and was aware
of this, and we interacted with him. I can't say for certain
whether the The Adjutant General from Louisiana was informed.
Senator Vitter. With regard to this JRTC training at Fort
Polk, will anything replace those A-10s?
General Schwartz. Just like at the National Training Center
out in California, we'll support the training demand there as
we do in California.
Senator Vitter. Now, the nearest at least A-10s are a ways
away. Was there a cost analysis done of what that involves
compared to what we're doing now?
General Schwartz. Senator, again we need to sort of
remember that A-10 isn't the only airplane that can do close
air support or do fast forward air controll, as we call it. The
F-16 is certainly capable of doing that, the F-15E is. We have
bigger planes, including the B-1, doing close air support, as
you're aware. So the bottom line is here that, while history
sort of encourages us to think in traditional terms, there is
more variety out there to support the training and the close
air support mission than just the A-10.
Senator Vitter. Take the A-10 out of my last question. What
will replace that aspect of training at JRTC and what's the
cost analysis of that? Was that done prior to the decision?
Secretary Donley. I don't recall whether there was a cost
analysis of what replaces it. But back to the Chief's point,
there are a number of assets available to support the JRTC. So
it would depend on what the demand signal is for an exercise in
terms of how the Air Force would support it, where those assets
might come from to do that work.
I would also add, in addition to the platforms the Chief
has mentioned, the RPA that we have added have brought air-to-
ground capability that is being used extensively as well.
Senator Vitter. Okay. On Global Strike Command, that was
stood up in December 2009 to improve the safety and security
and effectiveness of nuclear-capable assets, particularly
following the 2007 nuclear weapons incident. Is there any
discussion whatsoever now about reversing that decision and
going to the pre-Global Strike Command model?
Secretary Donley. No.
Senator Vitter. Final focus, B-52 funding. B-52s continue
to be very significant in so many ways. One of the proposed
cuts that impacts them is the Connect program, which would
provide digital communication and mission retasking capability.
Give us a sense of why you think that's justified and what
capability the B-52s will be left with absent that upgrade?
General Schwartz. The B-52s will have an older, but
sustainable, communications system both for tactical and
strategic command. This was an affordability issue for us and
that was the primary motivation, that we could perform the
mission with the legacy system and that's what we decided to
stay with.
Senator Vitter. Just in layman's terms, one big difference
would be that the planes have to sort of come back and land to
be retasked in terms of a mission, compared to what the Connect
capability would have been?
General Schwartz. There is still an airborne retasking
capability, not as versatile, not as broadband, but there's
still an airborne retasking capability.
Senator Vitter. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Vitter.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service.
Secretary Donley, I recently read a disturbing article that
the Afghan air force officials may have been using aircraft to
transport narcotics and illegal weapons. This report, combined
with the actions of an Afghan air force colonel who killed
eight of our Air Force officers, shows a troubling state of
affairs for the Afghan air force. I understand that you don't
have responsibility for the training of the Afghan air force.
Also, I would like to know if we have established the
Afghan air force with our money, American money, which I would
assume we did? What types of missions are they flying and do
these missions justify the investment we're making? Just an
overall assessment from you of the Afghan air force in light of
all of these troubling events?
Secretary Donley. Some of these events, Senator, have been
indeed troubling. But we remain committed to our continuing
effort to help the Afghans develop an indigenous air force.
They are flying a G-222 aircraft, which is the equivalent of a
C-27-like aircraft. They've had several delivered. They
continue to try to work up the operational capability, improve
the reliability of that system. They fly MI-17 helicopters, MI-
35 helicopters as well.
I would say that they have made important contributions at
the national level. They've supported Afghan elections by
moving ballots around the country to support the electoral
process, and they've also provided leadership lift when that
has been required. So especially in the remoter parts of this
very rugged country, the contributions that they bring are
important and we need to continue supporting that element.
Senator Manchin. We are paying? We're basically footing the
whole bill?
Secretary Donley. Afghan national security funds are doing
that. There are NATO funds involved. So we're doing this with
partners.
Senator Manchin. We're not training them? If we're putting
all that money in, why would we not be training?
Secretary Donley. We are training.
Senator Manchin. Oh, we are training.
Secretary Donley. We are training. We are responsible for
the security of our airmen who are performing that mission.
Senator Manchin. I think you would have to understand why
some of us are so upset, when we're cutting, we're cutting our
own Air Force by over 200 aircraft by 2013, while we're
building up the Afghan air force. It's hard. It's hard for
those of us in West Virginia to understand that logic.
General Schwartz. Senator, I think the bottom line is if we
want the Afghan National Army to provide for security so that
the partners there can rely on that, that they need an air
element in order to support the ground forces. One case in
point is a recent event where they performed their first
casualty evacuation event. The helo went out, recovered injured
Afghan Army troops, and returned them to Level III care.
Imagine the psychology of this, where the Afghan army
begins to understand that if they're wounded it isn't over for
them and they won't be left on the battlefield to bleed out.
These are the kinds of things that the Afghan air force can do
on behalf of the army that will reinforce their capacity to
perform the defense mission.
Senator Manchin. Will they be able to maintain that without
our consistent help and constant help in perpetuity?
General Schwartz. Sir, I can't say about perpetuity.
Senator Manchin. Basically, you've assessed them and the
quality of people that they are and what their mind set is.
General Schwartz. Clearly we will need to have a continuing
training mission over the years.
Senator Manchin. That's my problem.
General Schwartz. But it will not be a combat mission.
Senator Manchin. I just believe we should be out of there,
period.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, I have to say this has
been quite a lively hearing. I think from both of your
histories you know what happens when rice bowls are at risk.
It's been very interesting to watch this.
I also would like to say, having spent time in the
Pentagon, I don't think anybody, any of our compatriots up here
or anybody, should walk away from this hearing believing that
these issues aren't thoroughly argued and scrubbed inside the
Pentagon. I think probably the toughest job would be at a
higher level in the Pentagon, as on any given day you're
working on three budgets. As you both well know, you're
implementing one, you're arguing one over here, and you're
developing one.
It takes an enormous amount of time. I just recall this
period when we had Gramm-Rudman--and Secretary Donley, you were
in public service at the time, too, when Gramm-Rudman came in
there in 1987-1988, when we had to take 10 percent out of a
budget that had already been scrubbed by OMB. Very, very tough.
I understand the attempts at fairness here that you're trying
to put on the table. I just want to say that for the record.
There's been a lot of discussion about BRAC. I have been
one who has supported something, for lack of a better term, an
overseas BRAC. With respect to Pacific-Asia, this is not a
proposal at this point that would reduce in any way our
presence or our effectiveness over there, and of course we're
attempting to take on that. It's more an objective of gaining
an efficient restructuring without reducing our overall
capabilities and without messaging in a negative way what our
strategic objectives are in that part of the world.
In that regard, I have some questions that I've raised in
other forums about the capacity in which a number of the Air
Force installations are operating in that part of the world.
General, what would you say the percentage capacity would
be of permanently assigned Air Force units at Andersen Air
Force Base, Guam?
General Schwartz. Sir, except for base support, in terms of
aviation there are no permanently assigned aviation units at
Andersen.
Senator Webb. Do you have one, a rotating unit that is
permanently considered to be----
General Schwartz. I mean, transitions. But we have a bomber
presence, a continuous bomber presence at Guam, and we have a
periodic fighter presence there as well.
Senator Webb. But in terms of, let's just say, a
permanently assigned rotational force, as a comparison a Marine
battalion?
General Schwartz. It's a squadron equivalent.
Senator Webb. You have a squadron equivalent, which would
be how many aircraft?
General Schwartz. It's six to eight bombers, for example.
Senator Webb. On any given day, you would assume that there
would be six to eight at Andersen?
General Schwartz. Or basing from Andersen going elsewhere,
correct, sir.
Senator Webb. How about Yokota?
General Schwartz. Yokota has a squadron of 18 C-130s as the
flying operation.
Senator Webb. How about Misawa?
General Schwartz. Misawa has two squadrons of F-16s. I
think it's 54 aircraft, sir.
Senator Webb. What would that be in terms of--those bases--
and if you're not comfortable doing this off the cuff, I'd
appreciate having this within the next 10 days or so, because
I'm going out there. Here's what I'm looking for: Andersen,
Yokota, Misawa, Kadena, the number of rotionally assigned. I
understand what you're saying when you say it's not permanent
units, but rotational units that you could expect; and what
percentage capacity that would be on these installations,
number of aircraft, and maybe even a historical referent.
I think when I was working out there in 1973-74 we saw the
ultimate extreme in terms of capacity because they were running
B-52s daily into Southeast Asia from Guam and it was really at
max load.
General Schwartz. Sir, we'll provide that to you before
travel. The only thing that I would caution on, and we'll do so
in writing as well, is that that the major bases, in particular
Andersen and Kadena, are expansion locations in contingencies.
That needs to be considered as well. With your permission,
we'll provide that data.
[The information referred to follows:]

There are no permanently-assigned Air Force aviation units at
Andersen Air Force Base. However, there is one permanently assigned
U.S. Navy unit flying MH-60S helicopters with 14 aircraft assigned. In
evaluating installation capacity, the Air Force considers numerous
factors, such as runway operational capacity, ramp and hangar space,
airspace and range availability and capacity, housing and base
operating support, among others. Capacity also varies depending on type
of missions being supported. In the event of contingency requirements
in the Asia-Pacific region, a vast majority of required forces would
rotate in from outside the region. Therefore, we must maintain the
capacity to absorb those forces when the situation arises.

Senator Webb. I understand that. Any way you want to
present that's fine.
I understand also we all understand if there really were a
broadly based contingency situation in that part of the world
there'd be a lot of other assets that would be put into play, a
lot of other facilities that would be put into play as well.
But I'd appreciate that. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first of all, thanks for your service. Thanks
for always being willing to talk about the various issues that
you and I have in common and that we have discussed over the
years. You have always responded to my inquiries.
I was going to raise an issue relative to Global Hawk,
which is a key asset to the intelligence community. I
understand there have been several questions asked about that,
so I'm not going to go into it. But just know that I am very
concerned about the cancellation of a program that provides
such a great asset to the community, and at the same time as
one that's been certified by the Department through Secretary
Carter to be virtually irreplaceable. So with that, I want to
move on to something else.
Mr. Secretary, one of the issues that we worked on very
closely was the reorganization of Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC). I appreciate your willingness to accommodate many of
the concerns that Senators had with respect to that, that
reorganization. While I do not feel completely comfortable with
everything the reorganization will do, I believe we have the
procedures and reporting requirements in place to identify and
correct problems should they arise.
My main concern with the reorganization is the effect that
it may have on sustainment of weapons systems, given that the
sustainment program management and depot maintenance
activities, which were formerly combined in a single chain of
command, will now be separated into two separate chains of
command. Now, can you just for the record explain why you think
this new construct that separates sustainment program
management and depot maintenance functions will help or at
least not hurt the Air Force's ability to sustain weapons
systems?
Secretary Donley. Sir, our intent in this restructure was
to support, better support the Commander of AFMC in his
oversight of the procurement and the sustainment of weapons
systems, and to strengthen the acquisition chain of command
that helps support those systems, all the way from the system
sustainment and the air logistics complexes all the way up
through the major--through the program offices, and to develop
a stronger acquisition chain to do that, and in the process
reduce his direct reports from 12 to 5, and in that process
help us to meet required reductions in overall size of our
civilian strength in the Air Force.
So that was the rationale for the proposals that we had put
on the table and have discussed with you.
Senator Chambliss. There are some reporting requirements in
there and we look forward to monitoring this realignment as we
go through it and continuing the dialogue with you and General
Schwartz with respect to the issue, and fully expect that if
it's not working that you're going to be willing to look at
whatever changes might be necessary.
General Schwartz. Absolutely, Senator. We're not backing
into this. Changes like this require tweaking. I'm sure there
will be tweaking and we'll be ready to act when that's
required.
Senator Chambliss. General Schwartz, you indicated in
earlier testimony before this committee that the Air Force's
ground moving target indicator analysis of alternatives (AOA)
would be used beginning in fiscal year 2013 to guide Air Force
investment in ISR weapons systems, such as the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). Can you give
us an update on the AOA status and when we can see those
results?
General Schwartz. Sir, the AOA was approved by the Air
Force and provided to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
CAPE for their sufficiency review on January 25. That review is
still underway and once they bless it, why, it'll clearly come
forward to Congress.
The substance of that AOA indicated that a blend of Global
Hawk Block 40 and a business class ISR platform was the least
cost, highest performing alternative. Notwithstanding the AOA,
sir, the reality is that there's not enough space to undertake
a new start business class ISR platform. We simply don't have
the resources.
So we will continue with the combination of the JSTARS
ground moving target indicator (GMTI) capability with the
companion Block 40 Global Hawk.
Senator Chambliss. So there's still no change in the
opinion of the Air Force about the GMTI mission and its
criticality to the warfighters?
General Schwartz. No, sir, there isn't. If there wasn't the
resource crunch that we have, this would certainly be on our
minds. But there are two areas in our Air Force that need
attention that we don't have the resources for. One is GMTI, as
you addressed, and also the trainer mission is also a concern.
We simply don't have enough space to initiate a new start.
Senator Chambliss. You mentioned that things have changed
since 2005, the last round of BRAC, and that another round of
BRAC is necessary, and particularly because you're flying fewer
airplanes in the Air Force today than what you were flying even
back in 2005. Can you define that a little bit further with
respect to what types of facilities need to be looked at closer
than others, i.e., what types of bases are we looking at?
Fighter bases, transport bases?
General Schwartz. I'd say yes to both probably. I think
here's part of the issue. Not only do we have fewer, fewer
aircraft on concrete throughout the country and overseas; there
is also a fundamental question of right-sizing our squadrons
for maximum efficiency. The reality is that larger squadrons
are more efficient because of less support equipment required,
because of overlap and so on.
So another part of the question is what are we going to do,
for example, with F-35s? Will the F-35 Active Duty squadrons be
24, 30, or maybe even 36 aircraft? We haven't come to that
decision yet because we don't have those airplanes. But when we
do make that decision, that will have an effect on the
infrastructure required to support it all.
My view is that we need to have good assessments of
capacity and we need to do that because if we don't, we're
going to be expending resources in areas less important to us
than others like readiness and modernization.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, thanks very much for
your testimony. I appreciate the directness of the testimony,
the honesty of your assessment of the Air Force at this time.
Some of the language in your posture statement really jumps
out, that, notwithstanding all that we've asked you to do in
recent years, the aircraft inventory and end strength has
declined and, well, strength has come down by thousands of
airmen--here's the quote: ``leaving us next year with the
smallest force since our inception in 1947.''
That's a really powerful statement and one that we have to
heed. Again, your testimony convinces me that the budget that
has been submitted to us really does take unacceptable risks
with our national security. Again, a lot of it is compelled by
Congress through the Budget Control Act, but we have the
ability and I'm viewing these hearings as the exercise of our
responsibility to review that, this budget, in that context and
do whatever we can through authorization and appropriations
committees to make sure that we reduce the level of risk from
unacceptable to acceptable and do whatever is necessary,
including raising taxes, to make sure that we can afford that.
I do want to say in passing that I was here when Senator
Ayotte referred to one of the aircraft as older than she is. It
strikes me that this should create the Ayotte rule, that no
aircraft in the U.S. Air Force now is older than she is now. If
you get close to the age of the chairman and me, our Air Force
is really in trouble. But we don't think there's any danger of
that.
Let me ask you one current sort of topical question and
then a larger question. The topical question is about Syria.
There's ongoing repression, in my opinion slaughter, by the
Assad government of its people. The President has condemned it
and asked Assad to step down. The opposition forces there have
now asked the world community for military assistance,
including the possibility of using air power. I understand that
no decision has been made, certainly not by our Commander in
Chief, at this point.
But I just wanted to ask you this question. In some ways
it's like the one that Senator Graham asked about Iran, which
is whether you believe it's within our ability to neutralize
the Syrian Government regime's air defenses and achieve air
superiority over Syrian territory?
General Schwartz. It is doable.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Schwartz. But it would not be easy. This is not an
unsophisticated adversary.
Senator Lieberman. Why don't you talk about that a little
bit?
General Schwartz. I'd prefer, sir, frankly, to do this in
another forum. But this is not a week's effort. Let me put it
that way.
Senator Lieberman. Right. But again, you have no doubt that
the U.S. Air Force could do it?
General Schwartz. I believe that's the case, and certainly
if we had our major partners with us that would be beneficial
as well.
Senator Lieberman. I agree. I think the expectation is that
if ever this did happen--and this is very theoretical at this
point, or at least tentative--that the United States wouldn't
go it alone. I certainly wouldn't want us to go it alone. I
hope some of our major partners and some of our allies in the
Gulf, who have increasingly sophisticated air capacity, would
join with us as well, and I think there's some interest in
that.
The second question is broader, General Schwartz. I read
with great interest the article that you wrote on air-sea
battle with Admiral Greenert. I thought it was a great idea
that the two of you came together. I very much appreciated your
insights on how you see the development and implementation of
this concept, which I personally think is crucial to ensuring
our military advantage against growing anti-access and area
denial challenges, particularly in the Western Pacific and the
Persian Gulf.
So I wanted to ask you at this hearing on your budget--and
Secretary, I'm happy to urge you to join in--if you would
highlight the areas of the proposed budget for fiscal year 2013
that you think are most important to supporting the concept of
air-sea battle? Why don't you just at the beginning give us a
short form of what the concept of air-sea battle is and then
talk to us about what's in this budget to support it?
General Schwartz. Sir, the notion is that for the two
Services that operate routinely in the global commons and have
a rapid response expeditionary capability, that if we did our
work together, if we teamed properly, that we could leverage
each other's capability in ways that we hadn't really thought
through well enough before. I mean, we have partnered, but it
was irregularly. It was sort of the one-off, and the issue was
how to normalize that level of collaboration, part one; how to,
at the operational level, look at the way we provide mutual
support, either in the air or even across domains.
For example, there are two stealth platforms in DOD, the B-
2 and the submarines. By the way, we support Admiral Jon
Greenert's effort to pursue the Virginia-class efforts, because
that is important to the Air-Sea Battle portfolio.
But finally, the third thing is at the materiel level. How
do we coordinate how we do things in ways that use common data
links? How do we use Global Hawk together, both Block 40 and
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance in this instance? So at many
levels, at the tactical level, at the operational concept
level, at the materiel level, there are areas here where we as
an Air Force and Navy can make our presence felt, that we can
assure freedom of action, not without effort, but assure
freedom of action and access to better collaboration and
teaming of the capabilities we currently possess.
What's important to us in this area? Electronic warfare,
clearly. Long-range strike bomber is a case in point, and the
family of systems more broadly.
Senator Lieberman. You got some money for research,
development, RDT&E, for the long-range bomber in the budget.
General Schwartz. Absolutely, yes, sir, that's correct.
The kinds of data link efforts that we have underway again
to magnify individual assets to make them, network them in a
way that's far more compelling.
Senator Lieberman. Secretary, do you want to add anything
to that?
Secretary Donley. Just a couple of things. Obviously, the
Chief mentioned the joint collection and passing of ISR data is
of certainly a common interest. Missile defense is another area
of common interest. Our mutual work on the F-35, the advanced
air-to-air capabilities that will be developed to support that
platform, the advanced air-to-ground capabilities, and also, as
the Chief mentioned, the deep strike capability.
So these are all areas where we share materiel,
operational, and theater level interests in the joint fight.
Senator Lieberman. These are supported in the budget before
us.
Thank you both. That was an excellent short description of
the air-sea battle concept, and I really applaud you for
working with the Chief of Naval Operations on developing this
concept. It's not only cost effective, but obviously it'll
maximize our capabilities against enemies.
General Schwartz. For the record, sir, I'd like to
compliment Admiral Gary Roughead, with whom this began, and
Admiral Jon Greenert, who continues it.
Senator Lieberman. Good. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Just two quick questions. One is the ORS program, which as
I understand it was a program which was coming in below cost.
Why was that program cancelled?
Secretary Donley. Sir, our strategic-level decision with
respect to the ORS program is that we likely have an
unsustainable model going forward. The purpose of this program
was to help us develop the operational concepts and the
capabilities, the technical capabilities, to gain rapid access
to space, to do rapid integration of payloads and launchers,
and to demonstrate the capability to provide rapid response and
augmentation to combatant commanders should they lose space-
based capabilities or need augmentation.
However, ORS was taxed in its ability to meet competing
demands with limited resources, to provide resilient
capabilities for military satellite communications (SATCOM)
capabilities, for ISR, and for missile warning, and all these
areas of the space domain, all these different mission sets. We
simply did not and probably could not put the resources forward
necessary to support a robust ORS program from that one
platform, if you will.
At the strategic level, working with the Deputy Secretary
and other members of the DOD team, we came to the conclusion
that it would be a better approach to develop resiliency in our
space programs through the individual architectures for missile
warning, through the architecture for military SATCOM, and to
figure out cost-effective ways to build in resiliency through
hosted payloads, use of international partnerships, and other
capabilities that we could add to the organic U.S. space
capabilities.
We do think there's value here, but this needed a major
restructuring, and there is statutory language that would need
to be adjusted for us to change course, and that's what we have
proposed.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, let me just wind up with a
question, or a comment about the force structure changes that
are in the budget request that we've all, or most of us, have
discussed this morning. The letter which I wrote with Senator
McCain to the Secretary of Defense has been already put in the
record, formally requesting that the Department take no actions
to implement decisions in this regard that anticipate
Congressional approval of what may turn out to be contentious
proposals before the committees have had an opportunity to
produce bills reflecting their responses to the fiscal year
2013 budget request.
So from that request, but also from comments that you've
made before the appropriators, am I correct in believing that
you're not going to be making the force structure changes that
were proposed in the fiscal year 2013 budget request until the
congressional defense committees have had a chance to mark up
that fiscal year 2013 budget request?
Secretary Donley. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. With that assurance, I think a
lot of us will feel more comfortable as we proceed here, and we
greatly appreciate your testimony this morning. We've covered a
lot of ground, and I think all of us are very appreciative of
the service that you two perform for us.
So we thank you, and we'll stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES

1. Senator McCaskill. General Schwartz, the Air Force has announced
plans to begin implementation of major force structure changes that
will affect almost every State. Missouri will benefit from additional
A-10s at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB) and more advanced C-130s for the
139th Airlift Wing located at Rosecrans Air National Guard Base in St.
Joseph. However, the loss of a National Guard air control squadron from
Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis will result in the loss of more than
200 billets. As in Missouri, the reductions across the entire force
fall most heavily on the National Guard. When determining the announced
force structure changes, what factors did the Air Force consider?
General Schwartz. The new Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic
Guidance ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st
Century Defense'' directs the Services to build a force that will be
smaller and leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. To
deliver the capabilities required by this strategy, and remain within
funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all
service core functions. While remaining consistent with the new
strategy, the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget submission achieves
$8.7 billion in savings across the Active and Reserve components by
retiring over 200 aircraft in fiscal year 2013 and 286 aircraft over
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Our programmed force
reductions are wide-ranging and affect over 60 installations.
This was an integrated, Total Force effort--Active Duty, Reserve,
and National Guard--working together to achieve our end state of a
ready and sustainable force that can meet our surge and rotational
requirements. The Air Force realigned our forces to better meet this
new strategic guidance to: ensure the Total Force can fulfill surge
requirements; maintain a balance between components that allows us to
fulfill continuing rotational requirements at sustainable rates; retain
the recruiting, training, and operational seasoning base required to
sustain the Total Force's needs into the future; and ensure the Reserve
component remains relevant and engaged in both enduring and evolving
missions.
To meet this end, the Air National Guard (ANG) developed five
capstone principles to help guide this transition: allocate at least
one flying wing with ANG equipment to each State; recapitalize
concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG
resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia
construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (emergency support
functions) relevant to the States. Similarly, the Air Force Reserves
used the following four principles: ensure aircraft reductions do not
negatively impact operational support to Combatant Commands; ensure
force structure movements do not create any new Air Force bills; ensure
risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected
increases in mission capability rates; and, consider locations that
continue to have an Air Force mission due to the presence of another
Air Force component. This Total Force approach allowed us to maintain
the right Active/Air Guard/Reserve mix, and meet our operational
demands with a leaner force while taking care of our airmen.

2. Senator McCaskill. General Schwartz, did the relative cost of
Active component versus Reserve component personnel weigh heavily on
the final outcome?
General Schwartz. No. Air Force force structure reductions were
based on ensuring the plan could provide the capabilities needed to
meet the new DOD strategy. Over the past two decades the Air Force has
primarily reduced active duty end strength and force structure, causing
an imbalance between Active and Reserve components. As the Air Force
considered reductions in fiscal year 2013, the Air Force carefully
considered the rationale between the Active and Reserve components and
made choices to ensure the Total Force can fulfill the Air Force's
surge requirements as directed in the new DOD strategy; achieve the
balance between Active and Reserve components required to meet
rotational requirements at deploy-to-dwell rates that are sustainable
to both the Active and Reserve components; ensure the Active component
retained the recruiting, training, and operational seasoning base
required to sustain the Total Force into the future; and, ensure the
Reserve component remains relevant and engaged in both traditional and
evolving missions.

3. Senator McCaskill. General Schwartz, how did dwell time
considerations affect the Air Force's decisions?
General Schwartz. The Air Force used specific rate of deployment
assumptions for Active Duty, Air Force Reserve Command, and ANG during
development of the fiscal year 2013 President's budget. In accordance
with Secretary of Defense memorandum, ``Utilization of the Total
Force,'' Jan 19, 2007:

``(Third,) the planning objective for involuntary
mobilization of the Guard/Reserve units will remain a 1 year
mobilized to 5 years demobilized ratio. However, today's global
demands will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units
to be remobilized sooner than this standard. Our intention is
that such exceptions be temporary and that we move to the broad
application of the 1:5 goal as soon as possible. Continue to
plan your force structure on that basis.''
``The planning objective for the Active Force remains
1 year deployed to 2 years at home station.'' (1:2 ratio)

This guidance has been repeated in numerous subsequent documents,
including the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, current Guidance for
Employment of the Force (S), and Air Force Instruction 10-401, among
others, and is used for all Air Force force structure planning for
post-surge operations.
Current Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff,
combatant commander, and Service developed integrated scenario
constructs (ISC) used for force sizing require that all programmed Air
Force fighter, bomber, tanker, and mobility aircraft be used during the
surge (1:0 ratio).

4. Senator McCaskill. General Schwartz, what capabilities will be
lost due to the proposed elimination of the 121st Air Control Squadron?
General Schwartz. The proposed elimination of the 121st Air Control
Squadron (ACS) will not adversely affect the enterprise-wide air
control capability. The Air Force currently has 10 control and
reporting centers--5 Active Duty and 5 ANG--operating in the United
States and overseas. The proposed force structure changes would reduce
these numbers by one ANG unit and two Active Duty units. The 121 ACS
would represent half of a single control and reporting center weapon
system capability, about 10 percent of the total ANG control and
reporting center capability, and about 7 percent of the proposed Total
Force control capability. The Air Force can meet current air control
commitments with this leaner force structure.

5. Senator McCaskill. General Schwartz, what additional risk will
the Air Force assume?
General Schwartz. Taking into account current commitments both at
home and overseas, the Air Force assumes minimal additional risk due to
the closure of the 121st Air Control Squadron. The combined impact of
all air control squadron (ACS) cuts (two Active Duty ACSs and one ANG
ACS) is the elimination of three of the current ten control and
reporting centers. The Air Force will have the capacity to have three
control and reporting centers committed at any one time (two supporting
deployed taskings and one supporting homeland defense missions) with
four remaining, if required, elsewhere.

6. Senator McCaskill. General Schwartz, with the movement of A-10s
to Whiteman AFB, is the Air Force also considering moving A-10
maintenance and repair operations to Whiteman?
General Schwartz. The Air Force Reserve is moving three A-10s and
applicable manpower for both maintenance and operations. The unit was
previously a 24 primary aircraft authorized (PAA) unit as a result of
2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC); however, as part of the
Combat Air Forces (CAF) force structure reductions in the fiscal year
2010 PB, both the Whiteman and Barksdale units were reduced to 21 PAA.
This fiscal year 2013 PB action will take the Whiteman unit back to 24
PAA. There has been no discussion on moving the A-10 centralized
intermediate repair facility (CIRF) for A-10 engines. Hill AFB, UT, is
the depot repair facility, and Bradley Air National Guard Station
maintains the engine CIRF.

LONG-RANGE STRIKE BOMBER

7. Senator McCaskill. General Schwartz, DOD is pivoting to a
strategy that focuses on the Asia-Pacific region. In that shift, the
strategy calls for rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region and
protecting freedom of access throughout the global commons. To
accomplish these, the strategy says we must maintain the ability to
operate in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments and that
development of a new stealth bomber is, therefore, needed. Also,
increasingly sophisticated air defenses and long-range missile threats
require a focused modernization effort. A key element of this effort is
the long-range strike bomber (LRS-B) which will strengthen both
conventional and nuclear deterrence. What capabilities do you need from
a future penetrating bomber to address our shifting focus on the Asia-
Pacific region?
General Schwartz. The LRS-B's unique capabilities include long
range, significant payload capacity, operational flexibility, and
survivability in anti-access environments. It is a key component of a
family of systems which will make up the joint portfolio of deep-strike
capabilities needed in the vast Asia-Pacific region.

8. Senator McCaskill. General Schwartz, what capabilities do you
need from a LRS-B to counter increasingly sophisticated air defenses?
General Schwartz. The LRS-B's unique capabilities include long
range, significant payload capacity, operational flexibility, and
survivability in anti-access environments. It will employ a mix of
standoff and direct attack munitions to provide effects within hours,
across the spectrum of conflict and despite increasingly sophisticated
air defenses. Specific operational and programmatic details are
classified.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal

JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

9. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Donley, the mission success of the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) program has been
realized in the past 10-plus years of combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Can you provide any feedback from end-users regarding
JSTARS capabilities and its interoperability with ground forces or
threat-based system performance capabilities?
Secretary Donley. Feedback from end-users regarding the JSTARS
capabilities and interoperability has been significant and positive.
The Special Operations Task Force-South, Intelligence Officer (SOTF-
SOUTH S2) stated that with regards to ground moving target indicator
(GMTI) support, the ``JSTARS ability to acquire and pass updated geo-
locations in near-real-time acts as a valuable force-multiplier for
many of our assigned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) assets.'' The 603d Air Operations Center Dynamic targeting chief,
commenting on information flow, emphasized that ``the 10 lines used to
take 20 minutes to pass until you got here..now [take] 10 seconds.''
The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe highlighted his satisfaction
with JSTARS performance over Libya, stating, ``JSTARS is essential to
the C2 [command and control] analysis and targeting cycle and their
loss would significantly degrade NATO's ability to bring dynamic
targeting strike assets to bear on Regime forces.'' Finally, the
Operation Odyssey Dawn Combined Forces Air Component Commander called
JSTARS ``a real game changer.''

10. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Donley, are there any
capabilities or aircraft enhancements that should be added to JSTARS?
Secretary Donley. JSTARS is currently undergoing several
sustainment/modernization efforts to enable continued safe/effective
operation of the E-8C beyond fiscal year 2020.

Prime mission equipment/diminishing manufacturing
sources (PME/DMS) upgrades mission systems components and
updates aircraft to a Linux-based operating system.
The avionics (DMS) program will modernize the E-8C
cockpit to incorporate military, civil, and international
flight certifications.
The single channel ground-air radio system (SINCGARS)
entails voice communication radios/filters being retrofitted on
aircraft and trainers providing required off-board
communication links.
The enhanced land maritime mode (ELMM) sensor system
improvement implements vastly improved maritime/land tracking
capabilities, with in-progress installation scheduled to
complete September 2012.
The communication and networking upgrade (CNU) is
modernizing hardware for improved tactical network
communications; retrofits started in the second quarter of
fiscal year 2012.

REVITALIZING THE AGING C-130 FLEET

11. Senator Blumenthal. General Schwartz, one key to revitalizing
the aging C-130 fleet could be to replace the older four-bladed
propellers with newer eight-bladed propellers that increase performance
while providing significant operations and maintenance savings in the
out-years. The Air Force has recently validated the performance of
these new propellers on the C-130 and the Navy has validated the
logistic benefits on their E-2 fleet. Can you provide any details or
plans the Air Force has to repropeller the older C-130s and any
potential savings involved in doing so?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is dedicated to modernizing the C-
130H fleet. Currently, there is no requirement or plan to replace the
C-130H propeller and we have not examined the costs. There is one unit,
the 109th Airlift Wing, New York ANG, that is currently modifying two
LC-130 aircraft with eight-bladed propellers to increase take-off
performance and replacing the jet-assisted takeoff rockets needed to
lift-off from ice and snow-covered runways under arctic conditions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

KC-46A AERIAL REFUELING TANKER

12. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, last
year, the Air Force conducted a very sound competition on the KC-46
tanker program and it seems to be executing a viable acquisition
strategy. But, integration appears to be a significant risk to its
finishing the development of this next-generation aircraft. How is the
Air Force addressing this element of risk?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force determined the
KC-46 development schedule is moderate risk. Boeing and the Air Force
are closely monitoring several schedule risk issues to include: in-line
provisioning of military capabilities on the 767-2C commercial assembly
line; concurrency of Federal Aviation Administration certification
processes; and flight test and software development. The Air Force and
Boeing have implemented a robust risk management process to mitigate
these risk items. The Air Force will continue to firmly manage program
execution to ensure Boeing delivers KC-46 aircraft in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the contract. DOD and the Air Force are
closely monitoring the program cost, schedule, and performance
baselines established at contract award.

13. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are
the other most significant elements of risk in this program and how is
the Air Force addressing them?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Boeing's planned closure of
the Wichita, KS, finishing center by the end of 2013 introduces
additional schedule risk. However, if the transition of the operation
to the Puget Sound area is executed efficiently and on schedule,
overall risk is reduced due to collocated Federal Aviation
Administration and military testing, collocated manufacturing
expertise, and elimination of ferry flights from the commercial
assembly line to the military finishing center.
Several technical risk areas are also being closely monitored, to
include: wing aerial refueling pod buffeting (an issue with previous
767-based tankers); fly-by-wire boom integration; radar warning
receiver integration; 3-D Remote Boom Operator Vision System; and
aircraft empty weight projections (increased aircraft weight would
reduce fuel/range offload performance). The overall technical risk on
the program is considered low.
The Air Force and Boeing have implemented a robust risk management
process to mitigate these risk items. The Air Force will continue to
firmly manage program execution to ensure Boeing delivers KC-46
aircraft in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.
DOD and the Air Force are closely monitoring the program cost,
schedule, and performance baselines established at contract award.

14. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, to what
extent has the configuration of this aircraft changed since it was
originally selected to replace the Air Force's legacy tanker fleet?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Since contract award, there
have been no major engineering, design, capability, or configuration
changes to the KC-46 affecting the cost, schedule, or performance
baseline.

CEASE AND DESIST LETTER

15. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, will the Air Force comply
with the request made by me and the Chairman in our letter dated March
19, 2012, not to implement any of its proposed force structure
reductions in 2012 before Congress has authorized it to do so?
Secretary Donley. No force structure reductions will be implemented
in 2012 prior to congressional concurrence. I am committed to wait for
congressional deliberations before implementing the fiscal year 2013
force structure changes proposed in congressional testimony earlier
this year.

MILITARY SPACE

16. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently found that ``[s]pace
launch acquisition processes for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and DOD are not formally coordinated, duplicate
one another, and may not fully leverage the government's investment
because the government is not acting as a single buyer.'' How does the
Air Force intend to address this concern?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We coordinate with NASA on
many launch-related activities. For example, the Air Force, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and NASA have jointly approved a new
entrant strategy that provides a single approach for potential new
entrant certification. We have also conducted several joint meetings
with NASA and the National Reconnaissance Office to provide insight
into each organization's acquisition strategies. We will continue to
work with NASA to ensure full understanding of our programmatic
decisions on the launch industrial base. However, the Air Force
believes flexibility of separate acquisition approaches can be
beneficial, and the unique mission requirements of DOD and other
agencies may not be met most efficiently by a ``one size fits all''
contracting approach. Since NASA and the DOD have different mission
needs, budget authorities, and appropriations, we have the need for
each agency to have its own launch service contracts.

17. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, GAO also
conveyed concern about the adequacy of the analysis supporting the Air
Force's proposed block-buy strategy for its Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program. How does the Air Force intend to address the
unsustainable level of cost-growth we've seen in the cost of space
launch?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force's EELV
acquisition strategy is based upon procuring a planned number of cores
and launches needed in each fiscal year while concurrently infusing
competition as soon as at least one certified new entrant launch
vehicle is available to meet the government's risk requirements for
placing critical national security payloads in orbit. We plan to
execute this strategy through a series of phases.
The first phase consists of a sole-source contract that allows for
on-ramps for new entrants. Specifically, Phase I will entail procuring
boosters at a steady rate over a 3- to 5-year period of time. This will
allow the contractor to pursue economic order quantity procurements
from subcontractors and vendors, make investments that reduce overall
cost and achieve greater manufacturing learning curve reductions. The
decision on the specific contractual commitment will be balanced based
on price, operational requirements, budget realities (including all
fiscal law constraints), and independent assessments of the potential
for eventual competition. The Air Force will conduct its own analysis
of the United Launch Alliance (ULA) proposed prices. The analysis will
be based upon independent cost estimates in addition to thorough review
of ULA's and suppliers' proposals. The results will inform the decision
on the length and quantity of the buy as well as the government
negotiation team's determination of fair and reasonable prices. We will
invite the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to fully participate in
fact finding and negotiations.
The Air Force plans for the follow-on phases to be full and open
competition for launch services among certified providers, and the same
diligence will be given to properly analyzing the costs for those
launch services.

18. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how will
the Air Force ensure the availability of competition to help drive
costs down?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Currently, no new entrant
has demonstrated the capability to launch EELV-class payloads. However,
the Air Force is committed to certifying new entrants for EELV launches
as soon as feasible. The current EELV acquisition strategy allows for
competition following the certification of a new entrant. Once a new
entrant is certified, launch services above the fiscal year 2013 Phase
I Buy (a sole-source award beginning in fiscal year 2013 committing to
3 to 5 years of steady rate production) baseline will be competed.
Following Phase I, we plan to compete Phase II and beyond under full
and open competition among certified launch vehicle providers. Phase II
will immediately follow Phase I to provide continued access to space.
In order to facilitate the certification of potential new entrants,
the Air Force has identified and funded, with Congress' authorization
and approval, two opportunities on which providers may bid: the Space
Test Program-2 and the Deep Space Climate Observatory missions. These
EELV-class missions have a higher risk tolerance and will provide an
opportunity for potential new entrants to prove their capability for
certification. The timeline for certification depends on the new
entrants, specifically, their technical progress, the quality and
sufficiency of the data provided to the Air Force, and their
demonstrated successful flight history.

AIR FORCE STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

19. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, is there a projected strike
fighter shortfall for the Air Force? If so, what is that number?
General Schwartz. There is no projected fighter shortfall.
Approximately 1,900 total aircraft inventory and 1,100 primary mission
aircraft inventory are required to accomplish warfighting scenarios,
assuming an increased level of aggregate risk. Updated warfighting
scenarios informed the new strategic guidance and how the Air Force
determined force structure requirements. Specifically, the new
scenarios allow the United States to rapidly respond and swiftly defeat
a highly capable adversary as well as deter and defeat an opportunistic
aggressor, if required, without conducting long-term stability
operations. Increased risk means objectives may take longer and forces
may accept more losses.

20. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, in your opinion, what options
would help mitigate the strike fighter shortfall?
General Schwartz. The Air Force has no fighter shortfall and is
sized at approximately 1,900 total and 1,100 primary mission fighter
aircraft. This sizing assumes increased aggregate risk based on Air
Force warfighting analysis that informed the Defense Strategic Guidance
and accounted for fiscal realities. The new strategic guidance allows
the United States to respond rapidly and swiftly defeat a highly
capable adversary while deterring or defeating an opportunistic
aggressor without conducting long-term stability operations. Increased
risk means objectives may take longer and forces will accept more
losses.
Additionally, the Air Force took several steps to mitigate risk.
Specifically, the Air Force has funded a scalable service life
extension program (SLEP) and Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite
for 300 Block 40-50 F-16s. The total effort is planned for 350 F-16s,
but is scalable to 650 aircraft primarily to account for variables in
F-35A procurement. Full-scale durability tests are underway for the F-
16, the F-15C, and the F-15E. These efforts have demonstrated higher
service lives when combined with modernization efforts and ensure a
viable and balanced mix of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft. This
risk mitigation plan assumes the Air Force realizes its planned F-35A
procurement rates and quantities. Congress can help by fully funding
Air Force fighter modernization and fifth-generation procurement
efforts.

REDUCTIONS IN PERSONNEL

21. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, I appreciate the difficult
decisions the Air Force had to make to stay within the limits of the
fiscal year 2013 budget. In its budget request, the Air Force proposes
to reduce their ranks--by 3,900 from the Air Force's Active component;
900 from the Air Force Reserve; and 5,100 from the ANG. Please explain
the rationale for these decisions; the risk in capability and readiness
that the Air Force is accepting with these decreases; and the Air
Force's plans to lessen any negative impact on affected airmen and
their families.
General Schwartz. In light of the revised DOD Strategic Guidance,
the Air Force conducted an analysis of core function requirements to
inform force structure changes and develop a risk-balanced force.
Additionally, the Air Force had to stay within fiscal constraints when
considering future force structure options. To meet the force sizing
requirements while remaining within the constraints of available
funding, the Air Force made the difficult choice to retire 200 aircraft
in fiscal year 2013 and an additional 59 across the FYDP. To meet
mission requirements with this reduced force structure, the Active
component to Reserve component ratio was evaluated and adjusted to
ensure the resulting force was capable of meeting surge and rotational
demands while preserving the symbiotic relationship of the Total Force.
The Air Force considered multiple factors including the demands of
foundational requirements, the long-term health of the enterprise,
preserving force readiness while not exceeding operational temp goals
of 1:2 ratio for the Active component and 1:5 ratio for the Reserve
component, and preserving the continuum of service construct between
the Active and Reserve components. This risk-balanced force allows the
Air Force to stay within fiscal constraints while meeting surge,
rotational, and forward presence demands and respond to events in the
timeframe required to meet national defense requirements.
More than 21 years of sustained combat operations have had an
adverse impact on full-spectrum readiness. A smaller force combined
with the need to reset to the new strategy creates a readiness
imperative reflected in our fiscal year 2013 budget decisions, and we
continue to emphasize readiness in fiscal year 2014 programming and
budgeting processes. Our top readiness concern involves resetting to a
force that is capable, agile, lethal and designed to make vital
contributions to the joint team's portfolio and support the new
strategy.
The force structure reductions were determined using a deliberate
and collaborative process that leveraged careful analytical review of
warfighting scenarios consistent with the new strategic guidance.
Overall, the new force structure is at an increased, but manageable
risk of taking longer to meet mission objectives and incurring
increased attrition.
We understand the turbulence these reductions will cause our Airmen
and their families and will exhaust all available measures to minimize
negative impact to them. The Air Force is committed to using voluntary
measures first, incentives as appropriate, and involuntary programs
only if necessary to meet end strength requirements.
The Active component has legislative authorities to offer voluntary
early retirement and early separation measures to encourage voluntary
actions. The Air Force plans to also offer incentives such as, Palace
Chase transfers to the Air Reserve component to promote voluntary
separation. For those affected by involuntary separation, our Airman
and Family Readiness Centers will continue to provide support through
the Transition Assistance Program and veteran's benefits seminars to
help ensure a smooth transition to civilian life for Airmen who can no
longer serve in uniform.
The ANG and Air Force Reserve worked in concert to submit unified
legislative budget proposals for four force shaping authorities: (1)
temporary early retirement authority; (2) permanent change of station
authority for Air Reserve component affected members; (3) extension of
TRICARE for 6 months; and (4) continuation of GI Bill educational
benefits for Air Force Selected Reserve members who were previously
qualified, but were involuntarily separated due to end strength
reductions or force management actions. If approved, these tools will
help lessen the impact of force management efforts.
To achieve the desired end strength, the Air Force Reserve is
proposing to reduce accessions, especially non-prior service recruits.
To ease the impact on affected personnel, Air Force Reserve Command is
setting up a clearing house to match personnel against vacant/new
positions brought on by mission changes. Also, inactive duty training
travel pay will be authorized for affected members who fill a vacant
position in a unit more than 150 miles from their home.

FORCE SHAPING TOOLS NEEDED BY THE AIR FORCE

22. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what additional legislation,
if any, would you need to achieve the cuts in end strength proposed by
the Air Force?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is currently pursuing four Active-
Duty Force management legislative proposals through the fiscal year
2013 legislative process. The four proposals were combined into one
omnibus proposal, 224(6), which is currently at Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for approval. Omnibus proposal 224(6) contains the
following legislative proposals:

Regular lieutenant colonels and commanders retirement
for years of service (YOS) - The proposal will provide the
Service Secretaries the temporary statutory authority to reduce
the maximum years of active commissioned service for officers
in the regular grade of O-5 from 28 to no less than 25 years
through 31 December 2018.
Regular colonels and Navy captains retirement for YOS
- The proposal would provide the Service Secretaries the
temporary statutory authority to reduce the maximum years of
active commissioned service for officers in the regular grade
of O-6 from 30 to no less than 27 years through 31 December
2018.
Enhanced Authority Selective Early Retirement Board
(SERB) - This proposal would provide the Service Secretaries
the temporary statutory authority to implement the following
four provisions through 31 December 2018: lieutenant colonels
would be SERB eligible following a single failure of selection
for promotion; colonels would be SERB eligible upon completion
of 2 years (vice 4 years) time-in-grade; expand eligibility
criteria and suspend the prohibition in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 638(c)
against SERB consideration more than once in 5 years; and
shorten the periods of continuation established under 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 637 for officers on Active Duty.
Enhanced authority for selective early discharges -
This would provide the Service Secretaries the temporary
statutory authority to continue convening early discharge
(i.e., reduction-in-force) boards through 31 December 2018.

Minimum commissioned service for voluntary retirement as an officer
- This proposal would extend the expiration date of 10 U.S.C
Sec. Sec. 3911(b), 6323(a)(2), and 8911(b) from 30 September 2013 to 30
September 2016 and continue the authority for ``prior service''
officers to voluntarily retire with 8 years commissioned service
instead of 10 years. The ANG is currently pursuing three force shaping
legislative proposals through the fiscal year 2013 legislative process
to support the fiscal year 2013 changes in ANG missions and end
strength. Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC) proposals 292 and 294 are
currently at OMB for approval; OLC 293 has been sent by OMB for
legislative consideration. They are described below:

OLC 292 - would allow members of the Selected Reserve
to qualify for non-regular service retirement with 15, rather
than 20, creditable years of Reserve service. The National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 provided
this authority for Active component members.
OLC 293 - would extend the eligibility of members of
the Selected Reserve for TRICARE Reserve Select and TRICARE
dental insurance for 180 days at the discounted rate for
members of the Selected Reserve who are involuntarily separated
without cause due to end strength reductions or force
management actions.
OLC 294 - would establish a new category of
eligibility for military permanent change of station moves of
family and household goods for traditional reservists displaced
by force drawdowns who are hired to fill a bona fide
traditional unit vacancy in another Reserve unit somewhere else
in the country.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER BASING

23. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, it was reported that the Air
Force has begun reducing the planned number of F-35 bases from over 40
to around 30 in an attempt to rein in sustainment costs. What criteria
are you using to reduce the number of potential F-35 bases?
General Schwartz. While the Air Force has not yet finalized the
planned number of F-35 bases, we are working to manage F-35 operations
and sustainment costs. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans,
and Requirements is operationalizing the process by commissioning a
RAND Project Air Force study to evaluate F-35 basing, specifically
squadron and wing size and number, based on three main criteria: combat
capability, readiness, and force development. This study will expand
and combine work in five areas: operations and sustainment costs, pilot
absorption, force development, infrastructure and airspace
requirements, and Active and Reserve component mix. These efforts will
then inform the strategic basing process.

AIR FORCE PLANS FOR GUAM

24. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, the Air Force has a plan to
rotate global strike assets at Andersen Air Base. This plan calls for
over $2.9 billion in new construction mostly on the north side of the
runways to build hangars and squadron facilities that will be empty
between deployments. Coincidentally, the Marine Corps is planning to
build the same types of facilities right next door for Marine Corps
aircraft being restationed from Okinawa. Considering the Air Force
military construction (MILCON) request for fiscal year 2013 is the
lowest in over 25 years, what is the status of this plan?
General Schwartz. The Air Force has been rotating global strike
assets to Joint Region Marianas-Andersen for roughly 10 years, and will
continue to do so in the future, although due to lack of dedicated
facilities, work-arounds have been required. Independent of the Marine
Corps Pacific laydown and despite the deliberate pause in MILCON in
fiscal year 2013, the Air Force still requires infrastructure to
support assets at Andersen. While there may be some gaps in the Air
Expeditionary Force rotation, there is a near-continuous deployment
presence at Andersen. Marine facilities are being constructed to meet
Marine requirements and are not redundant to Air Force requirements and
vice-versa.
Regarding the status of the Air Force plan, all facilities
requested to date are necessary to operate from Andersen for the
foreseeable future. The Air Force is evaluating the need to harden
facilities, and to what level of protection, because there are vertical
facilities that must be hardened. The Air Force is taking steps within
the FYDP to do this. The $2.9 billion figure for new construction is
only an estimate at this time.

25. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, is it fully funded in the Air
Force's 5-year spending plan?
General Schwartz. No. The Guam Strike program is an important
enduring requirement, but in fiscal year 2013, we took a deliberate
pause in MILCON and absorbed a large reduction in the overall MILCON
program across the FYDP. Depending on the ultimate number of facilities
constructed at Guam and the level of hardening required, the Guam
Strike program could potentially absorb a very large portion of the
FYDP MILCON. For the short-term, the Air Force has placed $254 million
in the FYDP against Guam Strike in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, and will
adjust this amount in the future, as necessary.

26. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, does the Air Force have a
plan for strategic lift at Andersen Air Base to address the needs of
the Marine Corps forces potentially coming to Guam in addition to Air
Force requirements?
General Schwartz. The Air Force will provide strategic lift of
Marine Corps forces at Andersen AFB through the established priority-
based system managed by Air Mobility Command as the air component to
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Peacetime movements of forces
will be scheduled and paid for by the Marine Corps per business rules
established in the Transportation Working Capital Fund. Contingency
scheduling will be in accordance with time-phased force deployment
document associated with the contingency or the combatant command's
request for forces.

IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION

27. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, the Budget Control Act
requires DOD to reduce in January 2013 all major accounts over 10 years
by a total of $492 billion through sequestration. This will result in
an immediate reduction of an additional $55 billion to the fiscal year
2013 defense program alone. Secretary of Defense Panetta has asserted
many times that the impact of these cuts would be ``devastating'' and
``catastrophic''--leading to a hollow force and inflicting serious
damage to our national defense. But, this month, the Military Services
must begin developing some type of guidance on developing a budget for
fiscal year 2014. If sequestration were to occur, how would Air Force
programs be impacted?
Secretary Donley. If sequestration occurs, automatic percentage
cuts are required to be applied without regard to strategy, importance
or priorities, which would impact almost every program within the
Department. Some programs could need to be reduced and possibly
restructured and/or terminated to implement the across the board 2013
reductions. All investment accounts would be impacted including our
high-priority modernization efforts such as MQ-9, Joint Strike Fighter,
and KC-46A. It is difficult to predict the effect such a major
disruption would have on funding requirements for fiscal year 2014 and
beyond.

28. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, how would sequestration
specifically impact Air Force operations and readiness?
Secretary Donley. Under sequestration, programs could need to be
restructured, reduced and/or terminated. Sequestration would force an
immediate percentage reduction in our operation and maintenance
accounts which could damage readiness, for example through reduced
flying hours or training, and make our ability to cover any emergent
execution year requirements extremely difficult.

29. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, to what extent might
sequestration lead to the Air Force's having to realize significant
cancellation- or termination-liability or major cost increases or
schedule delays in its major programs?
Secretary Donley. Sequestration would drive major additional
reductions beyond the first phase of the Budget Control Act reductions
to the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget request. As Air Force
leadership has testified, the proposed fiscal year 2013 budget is a
balanced and complete package. Under sequestration, some programs would
need to be reduced and possibly restructured and/or terminated. All
investment accounts would be impacted including our high-priority
modernization efforts such as MQ-9, Joint Strike Fighter and KC-46A.
Sequestration is likely to drive overall cost increases and schedule
delays which cannot be quantified at this time.

30. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, is DOD currently conducting
any planning for sequestration in your areas of responsibility? If so,
please describe them.
Secretary Donley. DOD is not currently preparing for sequestration,
and OMB has not directed agencies, including DOD, to initiate plans for
sequestration.

31. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, how will you assess the risks
associated with each cut and communicate them to Congress in a timely
manner?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force assesses risks through a deliberate
corporate process aligning each item and platform with the new DOD
Strategic Guidance ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense.''

32. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, to date, has the Air Force
begun any planning that would ameliorate the impact of cuts required
under sequestration, such as prioritizing programs in preparation for
reprogramming actions or terminations? If so, please describe them.
Secretary Donley. The Department is not currently preparing for
sequestration, and OMB has not directed agencies, including DOD, to
initiate plans for sequestration.

AIR FORCE F-16 PILOT TRAINING EFFICIENCIES

33. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, you stated on February 29,
2012, that ``[y]ou can base the F-35 or any weapon system at multiple
locations and that requires additional support equipment, it requires
additional infrastructure, and so on and so forth. If, on the other
hand, you choose to base at fewer locations and have larger squadrons--
24, 30, perhaps 36 aircraft per squadron--there are considerable
savings and efficiencies associated with that.'' That seems to make
sense. But at a time when the Air Force is looking for efficiencies in
every phase of operations and training, you are still planning to spend
over $50 million to split F-16 pilot training between Luke AFB, AZ, and
Holloman AFB, NM. What is the current cost estimate for all costs to
make this move and the additional costs over the 20 years for the
longer F-16 training syllabus at Holloman AFB due to range
restrictions?
General Schwartz. The current estimate to move the two F-16
squadrons from Luke AFB to Holloman AFB includes $37 million in MILCON
and $19 million in operations and maintenance (O&M) construction costs,
for a total of $56 million. The F-16 training syllabus at Holloman AFB
will have the same requirements and not be longer than the syllabus at
Luke AFB.

34. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, can you update me on the
rationale how this initiative will lead to more efficient F-16 pilot
training?
General Schwartz. Moving F-16 training squadrons from Luke AFB, AZ,
to Holloman AFB, NM, was not designed as an efficiency initiative, but
rather as a move to facilitate the upcoming beddown of the F-35
training mission at Luke. This F-16 move is timed to occur almost
simultaneously with the arrival of the first F-35 squadron at Luke AFB,
which will minimize population fluctuations to the Glendale, AZ,
community.
The Air Force is currently making a concerted effort to increase
our production and absorption of new fighter pilots and the F-16 is
currently our largest fighter pilot absorption platform. In this effort
to increase our fighter pilot inventory, we must synchronize our
increased production capability with an increased absorption capacity.
Moving the Luke AFB F-16 squadrons in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year
2014 is the best solution for maintaining this balance. While it will
take a few years to grow our absorption capacity by forming Active-
Reserve Associations, we have already increased our production
capability by reducing our F-16 syllabus. We will increase it even more
by starting F-16 training at the ANG unit in Tucson in fiscal year
2013. These two production increases more than offset the training
reduction generated by moving the training squadrons.

35. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, is it true that the transfer
to Holloman AFB is having a significant impact on the production of F-
16 pilots at a time when the forecast for demand is a 250-pilot deficit
over the next 3 years?
General Schwartz. The Air Force F-16 training pipeline has the
ability to absorb minor losses in training that will occur due to the
movement of the two squadrons from Luke AFB to Holloman AFB and still
meet future F-16 pilot requirements. Operational F-16 squadrons are
limited in the number of new pilots they can accept and season, which
is a determining factor in the number of students produced by training
units. With the movement of these squadrons, the production of F-16
pilots through Holloman AFB will continue to meet the demand requested
by operational squadrons.
The transfer of F-16 squadrons from Luke AFB to Holloman AFB will
only result in the loss of one ``B-Course'' (16 Specialized
Undergraduate Pilot Training graduates) for each squadron movement
between fiscal years 2013 and 2012 (fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year
2014). We are currently in the process of transitioning to a reduced
syllabus, which is increasing our training capacity by 16 B-Course
quotas per year. This will completely offset the production loss from
the transfers in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014.

36. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, are you still committed to
your plan to prevent an operational pause at Luke AFB by not beginning
to move any portion of the first of two F-16 squadrons until Luke AFB
receives its first F-35 squadron?
General Schwartz. While the Secretary and I remain committed to
managing impacts from these moves at Luke, Holloman, and Tyndall AFBs,
we never committed to not moving F-16s before the potential arrival of
F-35s. Since the original announcement of the F-16 fighter moves, the
plan has always been that the F-16s would depart Luke before the F-35s
would begin to arrive at the Pilot Training Center (PTC-1). When we
first announced these moves to Congress in July 2010, the F-16
squadrons were planned to depart Luke almost 2 years before the F-35s
began to arrive at PTC-1. In June 2011, we adjusted the movement
timelines for various reasons and slipped the movement of the F-16s six
quarters; but we continue to show an F-16 unit departing Luke before
the F-35 arrives at PTC-1. The current schedule anticipates the first
F-16 squadron will begin their move from Luke in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2013 and the first F-35 arrival at PTC-1 in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2013. Luke AFB is the preferred alternative for
PTC-1.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

C-5A RETIREMENTS

37. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, many
studies have examined the proper size of the strategic airlift fleet.
Two years ago, 316 strategic airlifters were described as the sweet
spot. Last year, the Air Force requested a reduction of the strategic
fleet to 301, based on analysis of the most stressing scenarios--and
Congress approved. Now the Air Force is proposing to further reduce
their number of strategic airlifters to 275 by retiring the entire C-5A
fleet. I understand the Air Force's desire to save money. However, I am
still concerned about this decision. What objective studies has the Air
Force done to show that 275 strategic airlifters is the right number,
based on current and projected future requirements?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We carefully analyze each
warfighting scenario laid out by OSD to determine the air fleet
capacity required to support strategic guidance. We measure capacity in
million ton-miles per day (MTM/D), which expresses a theoretical
capacity of the fleet to move an amount of cargo over a set distance
per day and is used as a common metric for quantifying airlift
requirements as a basis for computing the size and optimal mix of
airlift forces.
The strategy that informed the decision to reduce the fleet to 301
aircraft was supported by Case 1 in the Mobility Capabilities
Requirements Study 2016, which required a fleet with a capacity of 32.7
MTM/D. That fleet of 301 aircraft provided a capacity of 32.7 MTM/D,
meeting the requirement at the time.
However, the current strategy has reduced the requirement, and Case
1 is no longer valid. Instead, Case 3 is consistent with the new
strategic guidance. Case 3 requires a strategic airlift capacity of
29.1 MTM/D. The removal of all 27 C-5As reduces the fleet capacity to
30.4 MTM/D, which meets this current requirement.

38. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, DOD
has a long history of contracting with the Russians to use former
Soviet-bloc AN-124s to carry U.S. military equipment. In fact, between
2005 and 2009, DOD spent $1.7 billion on these contracts. Will DOD
continue to contract with the Russians to fly AN-124s to meet U.S.
military logistics requirements if the C-5A fleet is completely
retired?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Based on current
projections, we do not anticipate that retiring the C-5A fleet will
have a significant impact on the United States' organic capacity to
support operational requirements. TRANSCOM will continue to contract
for the use of foreign carriers through our Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet
(CRAF) partners, subject to policy limitations that limit the use of
foreign carriers to situations where CRAF carriers are either unable or
unavailable to perform missions. However, the Air Force cannot comment
on how TRANSCOM will exercise its contracting options in the future.
Such determinations will need to be based on policies, requirements,
and capabilities at the time.

39. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz,
offering retired C-5As to CRAF carriers could allow the United States
to stop outsourcing these missions to the Russians at the cost of
billions of dollars to U.S. taxpayers, and would also allow for
retention of these aircraft which have significant service life
remaining. In the event Congress grants you authority to retire C-5As,
would you support offering the retired C-5As to the CRAF to establish
the first ever U.S.-flagged outsized cargo carrier?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Not at this time. The C-5A
is a ``Category C'' aircraft and is on the U.S. Munitions List. If
authorized to retire, the aircraft carries a demilitarization code of
``C,'' requiring removal or demilitarization of key points, including
fuselage, tail assembly, and wing spars prior to transfer. Certain
aircraft components carry a demilitarization code of ``D,'' requiring
total destruction. Removal or destruction of code ``C'' and ``D''
components essentially renders the aircraft as scrap and useless for
CRAF purposes.

40. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
would be the disadvantages of this course of action?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The benefits of transferring
C-5A aircraft to CRAF are limited. The Air Force delivered the ``Report
on Retirements of C-5A Aircraft'' to the congressional defense
committees in October 2010. This report stated the transfer of these
aircraft to the commercial fleet creates a capacity increase that is
not required and that there is a high cost to demilitarize the C-5As.
Moreover, any transfer of C-5A aircraft to a flying status for CRAF or
with a foreign partner instead of storage would result in a continued
demand for aircraft spares. This demand, in conjunction with a
reduction of aircraft in aerospace maintenance and regeneration group
storage, reduces the availability of the number of spare parts,
burdening the Air Force supply chain and driving aircraft availability
lower.
The C-5As that are being retired under the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012, and prior years, are being put into type 1000 storage for
reclamation and can be used for spare parts or can be restored.

JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

41. Senator Chambliss. General Schwartz, you mentioned in your
testimony that although the initial findings of the Ground Moving
Target Indicator (GMTI) analysis of alternatives indicate that a blend
of Global Hawk Block 40 and a business class ISR platform is the least
cost, highest performing alternative for carrying out the GMTI mission,
there are not enough resources in the Air Force budget to pursue that
approach and, therefore, the Air Force is recommending a blend of the
current JSTARS platform and Global Hawk Block 40 instead. Does the Air
Force have a recommendation regarding whether it is appropriate to
reengine some or all of the JSTARS aircraft that would be part of the
blended approach consisting of JSTARS and Global Hawk Block 40?
General Schwartz. The Air Force recommends against re-engining any
of the operational fleet. Re-engining only some aircraft would result
in a split fleet and reduced efficiencies. Re-engining the entire fleet
would exhaust funds that could potentially be used to enhance the
JSTARS mission area's capability and efficiency.

42. Senator Chambliss. General Schwartz, if you do not have a
recommendation at this time, when do you expect the Air Force will have
a recommendation in this regard?
General Schwartz. The Air Force does not consider re-engining the
operational JSTARS fleet a viable option.

COMMON VERTICAL LIFT SUPPORT PLATFORM

43. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the
Common Vertical Lift Support Platform program was terminated in the
President's fiscal year 2013 budget request. This platform was to be
the replacement for the Air Force UH-1N Hueys that suffer from
shortfalls in lift capability, speed, survivability, supportability/
maintainability, night/adverse weather capability, and avionics/human
factors. The Air Force has stated that an urgent operational need has
existed since 1996 to recapitalize these aircraft. Can you explain the
rationale and justification for terminating this program?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Due to the current fiscal
environment, the Air Force is taking an acquisition pause to explore
more cost effective strategies to meet the nuclear security and
continuity of government (COG) missions. Our UH-1N Huey helicopters
will continue to operate and support the nuclear security and COG
missions. Additionally, we have made physical security and surveillance
upgrades at our missile launch facilities to reduce the risk during
this acquisition pause.

44. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do
you know what the cost to taxpayers will be to continue to fly and
maintain 40-year-old helicopters as compared to the costs of
recapitalization?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The cost to continue UH-1N
operations is not fully captured at this time. UH-1N sustainment issues
have been addressed to ensure the fleet will continue flying through
2020. Air Force Global Strike Command is developing the UH-1N master
plan to define the way ahead for the weapon system. In the near-term,
our acquisition efforts focus on addressing identified safety and
selected capability upgrades, obsolescence, and operational loss
concerns.

45. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz,
without the acquisition resources available to satisfy this urgent and
compelling need, has the Air Force considered any more affordable
alternatives, such as leasing aircraft to accomplish this mission?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is taking an
acquisition pause to explore more cost effective strategies to meet the
nuclear security and COG missions. We are considering all alternatives
to address these mission requirements, and no decisions have been made
at this time.

F-35

46. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz,
affordability is the underlying premise of the F-35 program--yet for
the 4th year in a row, the fiscal year 2013 budget proposes a flat
production rate of 30 aircraft per year over concerns about concurrency
costs that in this lot are estimated to be as low as only $1 to $3
million per aircraft. However, the lower rate of production the Air
Force is recommending increases the production cost of the aircraft by
$10 to $20 million per aircraft. Are you satisfied that the production
rate the Air Force is recommending is the best use of Air Force dollars
over the long-term, given that the lower production rate will
significantly drive up overall cost over the long-term?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We are satisfied the
recommended production rate is the best use of Air Force funding. In
large part, the Air Force deferred 98 F-35A conventional take-off and
landing (CTOL) aircraft to outside the FYDP to mitigate increased
concurrency costs. The Department's estimated concurrency costs for the
low rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 7 aircraft in fiscal year 2012
(fiscal year 2013) range from $7 million per aircraft, if only the
``must fix'' changes are incorporated, up to $15 million per aircraft
if all changes are incorporated. While the deferment of aircraft did
result in a unit cost increase of approximately $10 million per
aircraft in fiscal year 2013, we believe the realignment of the pace of
production balances the need for a stable industrial base with the
realities of increasing concurrency modification costs and a resource-
constrained fiscal environment.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

AIR FORCE BUDGET CUTS

47. Senator Wicker. General Schwartz, on January 26, the Secretary
and Chief of Staff of the Air Force held a press conference to discuss
the aircraft force structure overview. The budget proposes retiring 286
aircraft in the FYDP including 227 in fiscal year 2013 alone. Some of
these cuts include the divestiture of some C-130J aircraft, eliminating
10 aircraft from Keesler AFB in fiscal year 2014 and divestiture of all
C-27 aircraft, eliminating all six aircraft from Meridian in fiscal
year 2013 and 20 KC-135s. One method that will help the Air Force deal
with budget cuts is to re-mission bases and assets. What impacts will
this have on the overall Air Force operational readiness and
responsiveness?
General Schwartz. The Air Force conducted an analysis across
dissimilar portfolios to arrive at a balanced force with risk shared
across the force. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states U.S. forces
will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability
operations. Additionally, the USAF must stay within certain fiscal
constraints when considering future force structure. To meet the force
sizing requirements while remaining within the constraints of available
funding, the Air Force made the difficult choice to retire one F-16
squadron, five A-10 squadrons, the C-5A fleet (27 aircraft), divest the
C-27 fleet, and retire twenty KC-135 aircraft. The Air Force will
retire 39 C-130Hs in fiscal year 2013 and 65 C-130Hs in the FYDP which
will impact 6 States. Ten C-130Js from Keesler will be moved to Dobbins
AFB in fiscal year 2014; no C-130Js will be divested. Several of the
squadrons listed as retired were backfilled with other missions and
bases (like Keesler AFB and Naval Air Station Meridian) remain open. To
keep risk at an acceptable level, this smaller force must be trained
and ready for full-spectrum operations at all times. We made readiness
investments a priority in our fiscal year 2013 budget decisions, and we
continue to emphasize readiness in future programming/budgeting
processes to ensure the Air Force is capable and ready.

SEQUESTRATION AND BUDGET PLANNING

48. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the
Budget Control Act passed by Congress and signed by the President last
August requires sequestration to be implemented across all departments,
including DOD beginning January 2013. Sequestration is not
hypothetical; it will take place unless legislation is passed to undo
it. Our national defense is solely a Federal responsibility. Defense
spending is a twofer that supports our National security and our high-
tech manufacturing workforce. I hope the Air Force will make an
aggressive effort to educate our Senate and House colleagues of the
impact sequestration will have on our airmen and industrial base. I
know you agree that sequestration will have grave consequences on our
military. I am disappointed DOD's budget request assumes that
sequestration will not take place when it is indeed the law of the
land. Unless it is undone, sequestration will be implemented on January
2, 2013--285 days from today. Has OMB provided the Air Force with
specific guidance regarding when you will be required to submit a
revised budget plan that takes sequestration into account?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. At this time, the Air Force
has not received any guidance with regard to submitting a revised
budget that takes sequestration into account. We will work with OMB and
DOD to comply with any guidance we receive.

GLOBAL HAWK

49. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the Air
Force budget proposes termination and divestment of the Global Hawk
Block 30 in order to save $2.5 million over the next 5 years. Global
Hawk is too expensive and Cold War era U-2 spy aircraft can still do
the job, according to the administration. The Block 30 is proposed for
termination and they remain committed to future Global Hawk models.
Global Hawk models will be in the future for the Air Force, Navy, and
foreign countries such as the United Kingdom. The other models will be
produced for the Air Force, Navy, and foreign allies. Block 30
advocates argue the United States should get some return on investment
for the billions invested in the 14 drones the Air Force already has in
its fleet--all added within the past 18 months, the 4 still in
production, which would be retired before a mission is flown. Block 30
advocates also note Global Hawk provided key situational awareness to
enable the capture of Qaddafi as well as the successful raid on the Bin
Laden compound in Afghanistan. How well is the Global Hawk currently
performing in theater?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. In Libya, Global Hawk
provided electro-optical, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar and
was used in a traditional ISR role with dynamic responsiveness due to
its enhanced duration/dwell time and the ability to fill gaps between
other ISR collects. Overall, Global Hawk was successful in Operation
Odyssey Dawn and in its continued support for Operation Unified
Protector. Assessment details can be made available at a higher
classification. In the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater, Global
Hawk continues to support the combatant command with both theater and
tactical ISR. To date, RQ-4 has flown over 50,000 combat hours in
support of CENTCOM operations.
In a humanitarian/disaster relief support role, Global Hawk
leveraged its range and endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following
the Haiti earthquake, Global Hawk executed a response mission in 12
hours effectively providing initial situational awareness information,
highlighting earthquake damage, status of critical infrastructure and
identifying food/aid drop zones and indicators of mass population
migrations. Eight missions were flown, satisfying 2,621 targets.
In Japan, Global Hawk capitalized on its range and endurance to be
overhead in 21 hours. Imagery products were provided to the Secretary
of State within 40 minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure
damage assessment, supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of
evacuation support, Global Hawk collection focused on the Fukushima
nuclear power plant. Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, Japan
allowed U.S. Pacific Command to use the Global Hawk within the 20 km
nuclear engagement zone. Infrared imagery taken directly over the top
of the reactors allowed engineers to frequently monitor core
temperature levels. In 21 missions and 300 on-station hours, Global
Hawk collected more than 3,000 images.

50. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz,
combatant commanders have an insatiable need for persistent ISR. While
budget pressures require tough choices, the decision to pull 18 Global
Hawk Block 30 aircraft out of the active inventory seems shortsighted.
Can you tell me how the Air Force will meet this requirement without
the inclusion of the Global Hawk assets?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. In September 2011, the DOD
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviewed recent adjustments
in military strategy and determined conventional high-altitude ISR
requirements could be reduced. With the divestiture of 18 Global Hawk
Block 30 aircraft, the Air Force will satisfy the modified high-
altitude requirement with the U-2, which remains viable until 2040.

51. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, can you
compare the operational capabilities and limitations of both the U-2
and Global Hawk?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Both U-2 and Global Hawk are
operationally capable platforms that offer various advantages and
disadvantages. For instance, the U-2 does not meet the range and
endurance of the Global Hawk aircraft, but has superior sensor range
and resolution. The Block 30 benefits from the versatility of carrying
both its electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor and its all-weather
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensor concurrently, while the U-2 is
more specialized, requiring it to swap out its sensors, depending on
the mission planned, weather forecast, sensor availability, et cetera.
In either case the U-2's multi-spectral sensor and its SAR each
outperform the Block 30 in sensor range and image quality.

52. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, are
there operational circumstances where a Global Hawk could be the Air
Force's preferred choice for a mission over the U-2?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Global Hawk is better suited
in operational scenarios that favor endurance (long travel distances,
persistence overhead, et cetera), while the U-2 offers higher quality
imagery at standoff ranges. Additionally, the U-2's defensive system
offers the capability to operate in contested environments, while the
unmanned Global Hawk avoids putting a pilot in harm's way. Although
scenarios that leverage Global Hawk's advantages do exist, the U-2's
capabilities satisfy the Department's existing high altitude ISR
requirements within the context of the JROC's review of airborne and
space-based assets in the ISR portfolio.

53. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, just 7 months ago, Deputy
Secretary Carter certified in writing to Congress that the Global Hawk
system was ``essential to national security,'' there was no other
acceptable capability to meet the requirement, and that the Global Hawk
was $220 million cheaper per year to operate than the U-2. Your
recommendation to terminate Block 30 contradicts Deputy Secretary
Carter's recommendation. Can you explain how an asset can be critical
to national security and cost less than the alternative, but just 7
months later be terminated?
Secretary Donley. In last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification, the
RQ-4 was determined to be $220 million less expensive per year to
operate than the U-2. However, OSD, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE), based this analysis on a high-altitude orbit 1,200
miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the fiscal year
2013 budget review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to
be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that
the cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at
$32,000 per hour (as stated in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs
Database), the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in the
fiscal year 2013 budget review.
After the Nunn-McCurdy review, the DOD JROC reviewed recent
adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-
altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further
determined the U-2, which remains viable until 2040, was sufficient to
meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with
this newly reduced force structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given that there is essentially no difference in the operating
costs between the RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their normal
operating locations, and the U-2 meets the new strategy requirements.
The decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 results in $3.8
billion saved. Although money was saved with the decision to divest the
Block 30s, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate and sustain
the U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the
taxpayer of $2.5 billion.

54. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, what business case analysis
has been completed that supports the termination of the $4 billion
newly-purchased aircraft?
Secretary Donley. In September 2011, the DOD JROC reviewed recent
adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-
altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. With the divestiture of 18
Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft, the Air Force will satisfy the modified
high-altitude requirement with the U-2, which remains viable until
2040.
In support of the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request
(PBR), the Air Force analyzed the operational output of both the RQ-4
and the U-2 using existing contingency operations for both aircraft and
determined that the U-2 capability was sufficient for operational
needs. When analyzed in this context, the U-2 and RQ-4 operating costs
were nearly equal. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost database figures
in fiscal year 2011 show that both the U-2 and RQ-4 costs approximately
$32,000 per flying hour.
Ultimately, continued investment in the Global Hawk Block 30 was
not prudent given that there is essentially no difference in the
operating costs between the RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their
normal operating locations, and the U-2 meets the modified strategy
requirement. The decision to divest the Global Hawk Block 30 resulted
in $3.8 billion saved. Although money was saved with the decision to
divest the Block 30s, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate
and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net saving to
the taxpayer of $2.5 billion.

GREEN BUILDING POLICY

55. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, in December, Congress passed
and the President signed an authorization bill for DOD which directed
DOD to produce a report on the cost of building certification under the
Leadership in Energy Environmental Design (LEED) and other green
building rating systems. The enacted law also included a strict ban on
the use of funds to obtain LEED Gold or Platinum certification for any
DOD construction that would increase costs. Can you give me an update
on the plans to address the specific language we included in the
authorization bill last year?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force will support OSD as it prepares the
required report. Furthermore, the Air Force is complying with the
requirement that no authorized funds be appropriated, obligated,
expended, or otherwise made available for achieving any LEED gold or
platinum certification by DOD in fiscal year 2012.

56. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, are you moving forward with a
LEED policy despite congressional direction to look at all green
building rating systems and the ban on LEED Gold and Platinum
certifications?
Secretary Donley. In accordance with congressional direction, the
Air Force is not pursing LEED Gold or Platinum certifications. The Air
Force continues to pursue LEED Silver where it is appropriate pending
completion of the congressionally-directed study by DOD. At that time,
we will reevaluate our policy.

57. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, are you considering other
green building rating systems or alternative approaches to your green
building policy?
Secretary Donley. In conjunction with the congressionally directed
study, the Air Force will work in concert with OSD to look at alternate
approaches to the current green building policy.

58. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, my State is a leader in the
processing and availability of construction materials which are
recognized by several green building rating standards. Some rating
standards (e.g. National Green Building Standard and Green Globes)
equally recognize construction materials certified under the
Sustainable Forestry Initiative, Forest Stewardship Council, American
Tree Farm System, and Program for the Endorsement of Forest
Certification systems. Their recognition helps promote sustainable
forestry, protect jobs, and keep costs low. Do you have a plan to
ensure that requests for proposals for future construction projects
explicitly allow forestry certification standards to equally compete?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force will work in concert with OSD to
identify and evaluate alternative green building rating standards as
part of the report on the cost of building certification under the LEED
and other green building rating systems directed in the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2012.

TRAINING COSTS AND SCHEDULE DELAYS

59. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, the time between receiving a
commission to when the servicemember reports for duty can take time,
especially in the aviation community. My office has been working with
OSD determining cost and schedule delays for newly commissioned
military officers. Given the current austere fiscal environment, how
much money is being spent by the Air Force on personnel between their
post-commission and pre-specialty training?
Secretary Donley. Assessment of costs involved in managing the
annual accession surge is complex because of the interplay between the
varied number of assignments, the large number of military training
pipelines, and the number of personnel within those pipelines who may
be delayed due to training seat availability and medical/security
screening. However, regardless of the reasons for delays encountered by
new officers between their commissioning and pre-specialty training, we
work very hard to maximize the utilization of officers awaiting
training through various assignments to create a valuable and
productive period for newly commissioned officers as they are immersed
into the operational Air Force.

60. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, what measures has the Air
Force implemented to reduce the amount of time and costs associated
with this down time?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force does not have the capacity to train
all new accessions immediately; therefore, sequencing training of
students throughout the year maximizes efficiencies and resources to
support the training pipelines. The vast majority of newly accessed
officers are accessed each year via the Air Force Academy and Air Force
Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs in the May/June
timeframe. In an attempt to maximize the efficient sequencing and
smooth flow of more than 3,000 newly accessed officers into constrained
specialty training pipelines, while minimizing the officers' time away
from their primary assignments, the Air Force has implemented the
following initiatives to maximize efficiencies:

Stagger ROTC accessions: Law and policy allow the Air
Force to commission ROTC cadets and delay their active duty
start for up to 12 months while in an inactive status (unpaid)
in the Reserves. Officers are put on extended active duty about
30 days before training to allow time to travel, relocate, and
in process at the new base and unit;
Temporarily assign new accessions to supplement
recruiting programs;
Temporarily assign new accessions to augment staffs
and operations to cover workload increases or manning shortages
(caused by deployments);
Assign new accessions to permanent duty stations while
awaiting training, during which time they can accomplish on-
the-job training with their assigned units;
Assign new accessions to training wings, which will
facilitate their interaction with experienced aviators and
provide the flexibility to allow last minute fills to what
would otherwise be vacant training seats; and
Direct new accessions to use the time between their
accessioning and initiation of formal training programs to
complete administrative and ancillary training courses required
for their future assignment.

MILITARY EDUCATION

61. Senator Wicker. General Schwartz, there is a growing trend
within DOD to conduct joint military education. However, each military
department has its own military academy and its own war college. My
concern regarding redundancy and lack of efficiency continues with
regard to our professional military education programs. What are the
operating costs for the Air Force War College and the Air Force
Academy?
General Schwartz. The fiscal year 2012 appropriated operating cost
for Air War College (AWC) is $26.29 million. This includes $12.3
million for military pay and $13.99 million for operations and
maintenance costs, including civilian pay. This amount includes mission
operation and maintenance, base operations (BOS) and school personnel
pay. The BOS dollars are comprised of costs from other program element
codes (not professional military education - 84751F). The fiscal year
2012 appropriated operating cost for the U.S. Air Force Academy is
$479.9 million. This includes $198.3 million for military pay and
$281.6 million for operations and maintenance costs, including civilian
pay.

62. Senator Wicker. General Schwartz, what measures are being
implemented to ensure efficiency and reduce redundancies among Services
with regard to undergraduate and postgraduate professional military
education?
General Schwartz. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
convenes a group called the Military Education Coordinating Committee
(MECC) twice a year, composed of key leaders from the professional
military education (PME) service schools to discuss and coordinate
Joint curriculum and administrative matters. CJCSI 1800.01, Officer
Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), defines sets of
learning areas and special emphasis items that should be common between
each Services' programs to ensure consistency of Joint education. The
OPMEP also delineates the learning objectives intended for junior, mid-
grade, and senior PME programs to reduce redundancy between those
levels. Periodically, members of the service schools form teams and
conduct a review of how they comply with and execute their programs.
This is called the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education and
schools must pass this review to retain their Joint PME certification
capability.

ON BASE EDUCATION

63. Senator Wicker. General Schwartz, under which authority are the
for-profit schools allowed to advertise on a base?
General Schwartz. The Department's policy in Department of Defense
Instruction (DODI) 1344.07, Personal Commercial Solicitation on DOD
Installations, gives clear and concise guidance to the Services
regarding personal commercial solicitation and advertising procedures.
This uniform policy is in place to safeguard the welfare of DOD
personnel as consumers from potentially unscrupulous advertisers. The
policy requires installation commanders to implement the procedures and
take the appropriate action for individuals and firms which violate
these requirements.

64. Senator Wicker. General Schwartz, under which authority are
for-profit schools able to actively recruit servicemembers and their
families for their schools on a base?
General Schwartz. The Department's policy in DODI 1344.07, Personal
Commercial Solicitation on DOD Installations, gives clear and concise
guidance to the Services regarding personal commercial solicitation and
the advertising procedures.
Personal commercial solicitation on-base by Academic Institutions
(AIs) requires the permission of the local installation commander, or
their designated representative with permission to conduct commercial
solicitation extended to AIs on an equitable basis. Once approval is
gained, specific appointments must be made with individuals concerned
and the commercial agents must identify themselves as representing the
specific AI. Those appointments will only be conducted in areas
specified by the installation commander, or designated representative.
Sales literature for AIs may only be displayed in locations specified
by the installation commander, or designated representative.
Presentations (such as school fairs or job fairs) are conducted by AIs
without approved MOUs only with express permission of the local
installation commander or designated representative.
We also require very specific guidelines for advertisement:

DOD personnel may not represent, or appear to
represent, an AI in any official capacity, with or without
compensation.
DOD personnel may not designate themselves as a
counselor/advisor representing the AI.
No AI display signs are permitted during appointments
at pre-arranged locations.
Military official and unofficial notices, such as a
``Daily Bulletin'' or e-mail, cannot announce the presence of
an AI agent or their availability.
Commercial solicitation of DOD personnel in a mass or
captive audience is prohibited.
Making appointments with, or soliciting military
personnel who are in an ``on-duty'' status, is prohibited. The
prohibition includes solicitation via electronic means over
government-provided telecommunications devices (telephone,
computers, Blackberries, fax machines, et cetera).
Commercial solicitation of individuals without
appointment, even in areas approved by appointments by the
installation commander, or designated representative, is
prohibited.
Use of official DOD identification by active, retired,
National Guard, or Reserve members for the purpose of access to
military installations or facilities to conduct, or to
facilitate personal introduction for the purpose of commercial
solicitation is prohibited.
Release of listings of DOD personnel for purposes of
commercial solicitation except through the DOD Freedom of
Information Act Program covered in DOD Directive 5400.7 is
prohibited.
Using any portion of a base installation as a showroom
of services without the permission of the installation
commander, or designated representative, is prohibited.

65. Senator Wicker. General Schwartz, why are the for-profit
schools allowed on a base when veterans service organizations who are
capable of counseling veterans, while aiding them in the transition
from military life to civilian life, not allowed the same courtesy?
General Schwartz. Although I am not aware of instances where a
veterans service organization has been denied access to an installation
if proper protocol was followed, personal commercial solicitation on-
base by AIs must first have permission of the local installation
commander, or their designated representative, to conduct commercial
solicitation extended to AIs on an equitable basis. Once approval is
gained, specific appointments must be made with individuals concerned
and the commercial agents must identify themselves as representing the
specific AI. Those appointments will only be conducted in areas
specified by the installation commander, or designated representative.
Sales literature for AIs may only be displayed in locations specified
by the installation commander, or designated representative.
Presentations (such as school fairs or job fairs) are conducted by AIs
without approved MOUs only with express permission of the local
installation commander, or designated representative.
Our Education Center professionals encourage members to seek advice
(e.g., legal, personal financial management counseling, and supervisory
mentoring) before making a substantial financial commitment to an AI if
part of the solicitation is beyond service benefits, such as tuition
assistance of G.I. Bill benefits. We also established very specific
guidelines for advertisement:

DOD personnel may not represent, or appear to
represent, an AI in any official capacity, with or without
compensation.
DOD personnel may not designate themselves as a
counselor or advisor representing the AI.
No AI display signs are permitted during appointments
at pre-arranged locations.
Military official and unofficial notices, such as a
``Daily Bulletin'' or e-mail, cannot announce the presence of
an AI agent or their availability.
Commercial solicitation of DOD personnel in a mass or
captive audience is prohibited.
Making appointments with, or soliciting military
personnel who are in an ``on-duty'' status, is prohibited. The
prohibition includes solicitation via electronic means over
government-provided telecommunications devices (telephone,
computers, Blackberries, fax machines, et cetera).
Commercial solicitation of individuals without an
appointment, even in areas approved by appointments by the
installation commander, or designated representative, is
prohibited.
Use of official DOD identification by Active, retired,
National Guard, or Reserve members for the purpose of access to
military installations or facilities to conduct, or to
facilitate personal introduction for the purpose of commercial
solicitation is prohibited.
Release of listings of DOD personnel for purposes of
commercial solicitation except through the DOD Freedom of
Information Act Program, covered in DOD Directive 5400.7, is
prohibited.
Using any portion of a base installation as a showroom
of services without the permission of the installation
commander, or designated representative, is prohibited.

The following practices by AIs are prohibited on all DOD
installations:

The offering of unfair, improper, and deceptive
inducements.
The use of rebates or inclusion of prohibited military
tuition assistance benefits to facilitate transactions or
eliminate competition.
The use of manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent
devices, schemes or artifices, including misleading advertising
and sales literature.
The use of oral or written representations to suggest
or give the appearance that DOD sponsors or endorses any
particular AI, its agents, or its commercial services.
Entering into any unauthorized or restricted area.
Soliciting door-to-door.

BLUE DEVIL 2

66. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, the Air Force has received
very positive feedback from the field regarding the success of the Blue
Devil Block I surveillance program. On February 29, 2012, Steven
Walker, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science and
Technology, told a House Armed Services Subcommittee that ``since
December 2010, Blue Devil ISR has been instrumental in identifying a
number of high value individuals and improvised explosive device
emplacements.'' The Air Force, with funding furnished by the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and the DOD
ISR Task Force, has executed over $150 million to develop the Blue
Devil Block 2 (BD2) airship, which significantly extends the proven
Blue Devil capability in support of CENTCOM priorities. Now that the
BD2 airship is nearing completion, the Air Force has indicated to OSD
leadership its intent to mothball the airship rather than deploy it to
Afghanistan. The BD2 requirement was recently revalidated by CENTCOM in
a February 2012 Request for Information. In light of this, why has the
Air Force elected to place the BD2 airship in storage rather than
deploy this capability to Afghanistan?
Secretary Donley. After significant effort to fulfill the urgent
need of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan for longer endurance ISR capabilities,
the Air Force determined that, due to multiple technical challenges,
BD2 could not reliably be delivered within acceptable cost, schedule,
and performance risks. As a result, it no longer met CENTCOM
requirements for long endurance ISR. Cost risk, coupled with a 9-month
schedule delay made the deployment of BD2 an unaffordable and late
solution for CENTCOM's long endurance ISR requirement. This resulted in
CENTCOM supporting the decision to descope the program.

67. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, the Air Force has been
provided with $60 million in fiscal year 2012 funding from JIEDDO and
the DOD ISR Task Force to fund completion of the airship and initial
deployment costs. Why has the Air Force elected not to use these funds
to support deployment of the BD2 capability?
Secretary Donley. The BD2 long endurance ISR operational
demonstration quick reaction capability is facing cost and technical
performance challenges. Higher than expected deployment and sustainment
costs, coupled with contractor cost growth, resulted in an estimated
$189 million shortfall, making BD2 unaffordable. Additionally, the
program is currently estimated to be 9 months behind schedule. As a
result of these issues, the BD2 contract has been descoped to deliver
the airship only, without a payload, and not to deploy to theater.
Based on contractor proposals, the current cost estimate for
deployment support is $150 million. As such, the $60 million of fiscal
year 2012 funds that were appropriated to support deployment is
insufficient to fund deployed operations. The Air Force remains
committed to long duration ISR and is currently evaluating alternatives
to accomplish this mission.

68. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, the Air Force cost estimate
for a 12-month deployment of the BD2 airship to Afghanistan is two
times higher than the estimated deployment costs for comparable
programs, to include the Army's Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence
Vehicle Airship program. Has the Air Force solicited a competitive bid
from industry for the BD2 airship deployment?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force did not solicit a competitive bid
from industry for BD2 because of the time-sensitive nature of deploying
a quick reaction capability. The BD2 airship was initiated using rapid
acquisition authority under which the Secretary of Defense determined
the capability was urgently needed and designated the Secretary of the
Army as the cognizant senior DOD official. In October 2010, the Army's
Engineering Research & Development Center awarded a contract to MAV-6.
Program management was redirected to the Air Force in November 2010, at
which time the Air Force initiated a subsequent contract with MAV-6.
The quick reaction nature of BD2 required the airship to be developed
in parallel with the logistics support concept.

LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT

69. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, in 2009 the Air Force
regained its source selection authority from the Secretary of Defense
who had assumed those responsibilities due to concerns involving the
Air Force's tanker competition. Since then, some troubling miscues have
occurred in Air Force acquisitions ranging from mistakenly sending
proprietary data to competing companies to improper advisory and
assistance contracts in support of the Combat Search and Rescue
helicopter program. On March 2, 2012, the Air Force set aside a
contract for a light attack aircraft for the Afghan air force. I
understand that after an 8-day review of an 18-month procurement, the
Air Force has determined issues with the light attack aircraft
procurement were isolated incidents associated with irregular
paperwork. I applauded your effort to review the procurement to ensure
it was handled properly, but in light of previous issues with other
high profile contracts, what confidence do you have that this is, in
fact, an isolated incident?
Secretary Donley. The Commander of Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) initiated a Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI). Part 1 of
the CDI focused solely on execution of source selection processes/
procedures leading to original light air support (LAS) contract. Part 2
of the CDI is ongoing and is reviewing two source selections from each
AFMC product center and Air Force Space Command's Space and Missile
Systems Center to assess the quality and consistency of source
selection procedures implemented in other Air Force systems acquisition
programs.
The Air Force continues its steadfast commitment to ``Recapture
Acquisition Excellence.'' In 2011, we completed the Acquisition
Improvement Plan (AIP) chartered in 2009. This was the largest and most
significant acquisition reform launched by the Air Force in the last
decade. The AIP completed more than 170 process improvements and
concentrated on improving our source selection process by strengthening
source selection governance, improving source selection training,
requiring multi-functional independent review teams, establishing on-
call source selection augmentation, identifying/tracking personnel with
source selection experience, updating the acquisition planning process,
and simplifying the source selection process. The success of this
program is demonstrated by the accomplishment of 209,500 contracting
actions by the Air Force in 2011 with only one sustained protest.
In November 2011, I approved a follow-on effort to AIP called
Acquisition Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) 2.0, which will
further our efforts to improve the capabilities of our acquisition
workforce. Among other efforts, CPI 2.0 continues improving our source
selection process by re-engineering the competitive award process,
implementing a more effective contract award process, and increasing
source selection experienced personnel. Once the LAS report is
finalized and released, we will incorporate any lessons learned into
our CPI 2.0 effort.

70. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, is the Air Force the entity
best suited to lead this investigation?
Secretary Donley. It is appropriate for the Air Force, specifically
the AFMC, to conduct the investigation. Air Force commanders have
explicit authority to direct initiation of investigations involving
personnel and programs under their command. In the case of LAS
aircraft, the individuals who conducted the initial LAS source
selection were assigned to a center subordinate to AFMC. Regarding the
complex source selection and acquisition issues that the investigation
involves, AFMC has the greatest amount of expertise in the field of
government acquisition and the largest numbers of qualified acquisition
personnel available to shed light on any mistakes that may have
occurred. Additionally, the CDI is being accomplished in cooperation
with OSD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics).

71. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, please provide an update on
the light attack aircraft procurement.
Secretary Donley. The LAS contract that was originally awarded on
December 22, 2011, to Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) was terminated by
the Air Force on March 2, 2012, as part of the Air Force's corrective
action in response to the suit filed by Hawker Beechcraft Defense
Corporation (HBDC) in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The Air Force
Service Acquisition Executive was not satisfied with the documentation
supporting the original LAS source selection, which prompted
termination of the contract with the SNC. Additionally, the Commander
of AFMC ordered a CDI into the LAS contract process on February 27,
2012. Part 1 of the CDI is complete, focusing solely on the execution
of the source selection processes and procedures in the original LAS
contract. However, release of the CDI report would compromise the
integrity of the ongoing source selection process due to the source
selection sensitive information contained in the report.
After studying the circumstances prompting the corrective action
and facts from the subsequent CDI, the Air Force decided to issue an
amendment to the LAS Request for Proposal (RFP) to both offerors. Air
Force officials met with both original offerors, SNC and HBDC,
individually, to review the amended RFP changes line-by-line on April
17, 2012. Both were provided the opportunity to submit comments on the
draft RFP amendment, after which the Air Force released the final
amended RFP on May 4, 2012. While the decision process will be event-
driven, the Air Force targets a source selection decision in early
calendar year 2013. This would allow first aircraft delivery to
Afghanistan in the third quarter of 2014.

72. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, what specific issues have you
found?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force Investigating Officer findings/
recommendations were as follows:

There was no criminal misconduct, intentional
violation of law, or abuse of authority;
There was a failure to fully adhere to source
selection processes outlined in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation and Supplements, which affected both offerors;
There was an inexperienced team, complacency, and
fractured team relationships; and
Robust planning is needed for source selection
documentation management.

73. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, when will a final report be
available?
Secretary Donley. Part 1 of the CDI has been completed, but will
not be released. The CDI report contains source selection sensitive
information, the release of which would compromise the integrity of the
on-going source selection process. Part 2 of the CDI is still being
conducted. A determination about the releasability of this information
will be made once this part of the investigation has concluded.

74. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, is it the Air Force's
intention that light attack aircraft comply with U.S. weapons,
communications, and anthropometric standards in order for U.S. military
personnel and partners to work seamlessly?
Secretary Donley. Ultimately, the aircraft is designed for use by
the Afghan Air Force in support of Afghan operations, but will be
capable of integrating effectively with other partner nations' forces.
Since LAS is a security assistance effort for Afghanistan, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A)
defined the weapons, communications, and anthropometric requirements
based on Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) requirements. The LAS system
requirements document (SRD) was developed using the memorandum of
request developed by NATC-A. In accordance with the LAS SRD, the
aircraft shall meet U.S. Government release and export requirements.
The LAS communication suite will support voice communications with
operational agencies and air traffic control facilities and have the
capability to be upgraded to accommodate secure voice communications.
The LAS aircraft will be able to employ a .50 caliber machine gun,
2.75-inch rockets, and 250-pound and 500-pound laser-guided and
conventional munitions as outlined in MIL-STD-8591. As for
anthropometric standards, the memorandum of request did not specify
compliance with MIL-STD-1472 and instead specified an accommodation of
pilot seating heights of 34 to 40 inches.

75. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, I understand that on March 5,
2012, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns met with Brazilian
government officials to reassure them the Embraer Super Tucano would
still be in the light attack aircraft competition and explained that
the cancellation of the contract was part of an internal Air Force
process. That same day, the Brazilian External Affairs Ministry
commented on the cancellation of the light attack aircraft contract and
said, ``this development is not considered conducive to strengthening
relations between the countries on defense affairs.'' What interaction,
if any, has occurred between the Air Force and the Department of State
(DOS) on the light attack aircraft procurement?
Secretary Donley. Following the termination of the LAS contract,
the Air Force Foreign Policy Advisor's office and the DOS Political-
Military Bureau discussed the status of the LAS contract. Additionally,
the Air Force Public Affairs talking points were provided via OSD to
the DOS.

76. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, what was discussed during
these meetings between the Air Force and DOS?
Secretary Donley. Following the termination of the LAS contract,
the Air Force Foreign Policy Advisor's office and the DOS Political-
Military Bureau discussed the status of the LAS contract.

77. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, have the requirements for the
light attack aircraft procurement in any way been shaped by
considerations involving trade and the U.S. relationship with the
Brazilians?
Secretary Donley. No. The LAS program is a security assistance
effort for Afghanistan. The aircraft requirements were defined by NATC-
A and have not been shaped by trade relationships with Brazil.

78. Senator Wicker. Secretary Donley, do you believe the Brazilian
Ministry of Defense views the U.S. Foreign Military Financing of light
attack aircraft procurement for the Afghans and the Brazilian FX-2
fighter competition as two separate matters?
Secretary Donley. The LAS program is a security assistance effort
for Afghanistan funded by Afghan Security Forces Funds. The Air Force
cannot speak on behalf of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, but there
is no connection between the U.S. Government's advocacy for the F/A-18
sale and the LAS contract.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

79. Senator Portman. General Schwartz, I was pleased to see in your
written testimony that despite the difficult budgetary environment we
are faced with, the Air Force recognizes the importance of investing in
its workforce by developing and educating its airmen. With that stated,
I am concerned with the proposed reductions to your educational/
training institutions that could impede your ability to meet those
goals. Does the Air Force maintain a commitment to the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) as a fully-accredited, graduate degree
granting education and research institution?
General Schwartz. AFIT is the Air Force's graduate institute for
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. It is independently
accredited by the Higher Learning Commission and has several degree
programs accredited by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and
Technology, Inc. (ABET). AFIT's research funding has grown steadily
over the last decade (600 percent improvement since 2002). Several of
AFIT's degree and research programs are one-of-a-kind within DOD. AFIT
is integral to the Air Force's continued technical dominance in air,
space, and cyberspace. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we
plan to do everything possible to leverage this Air Force educational
advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain maximum
benefit. Policy guidelines are in place requiring better utilization of
AFIT assets and are consistent with my desire to maintain the viability
of AFIT.

80. Senator Portman. General Schwartz, do you have any additional
plans to reduce the authorized positions at AFIT beyond the reductions
that have been proposed in the fiscal year 2013 budget request?
General Schwartz. At this time, the Air Force has no immediate
plans to reduce the authorized number of positions at AFIT beyond those
captured in the fiscal year 2013 force structure announcement (a
reduction of 57 military and 50 civilians).

81. Senator Portman. General Schwartz, with the proposed fiscal
year 2013 reductions to AFIT, how will the Air Force meet its
educational requirements in specialties such as nuclear engineering and
cyberwarfare which are not taught at civilian institutions?
General Schwartz. AFIT has completed a top-down prioritization of
its academic and research programs with respect to its mission of
providing defense-focused education and research. With regard to the
graduate school, nuclear engineering, cyber warfare, and operations
research are the top priorities. In fiscal year 2012, under Resource
Management Decision (RMD) 703, AFIT reduced 49 support staff positions
and 15 military positions. Through optimal prioritization, these
reductions will have little impact on meeting the Air Force's technical
student production and research needs.

82. Senator Portman. General Schwartz, is the Air Force considering
making a policy change that would move away from traditional
instruction in favor of alternative methods such as distance learning?
General Schwartz. Air Force course owners/sponsors are expected to
analyze all potential delivery methods and select the method which
achieves the desired learning objectives at the lowest cost. This is
directed in Air Force Instruction 36-2201, Air Force Training Program,
and is also directed by DOD policy in DOD Instruction 1322.26,
Development, Management, and Delivery of Distributed Learning. The Air
Force currently accomplishes a significant amount of training and
education through distance learning (DL). For example, in calendar year
2011, over 9 million training events were completed on the Air Force's
Advanced Distributed Learning Service (ADLS). For professional military
education (PME), the majority of the Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty
force complete PME using DL methods. Only a fraction of mid-grade and
senior officers (less than 20 percent) are selected to attend the
traditional, resident version. The Air Force is actively tailoring the
existing resident programs to incorporate blended learning (BL)
techniques as a means of improving the quality, extending access, and
reducing time away from home station.

83. Senator Portman. General Schwartz, what do you feel are the
appropriate qualifications for the position of AFIT commandant?
General Schwartz. The AFIT commandant position has for the first
time transitioned to a civilian position titled, the AFIT Director and
Chancellor. I believe the AFIT Director and Chancellor should possess a
number of qualifications. For example, he or she should possess a
resume that reflects a wide breadth of leadership experiences both in
and outside of academia. He or she must possess exceptional
demonstrated skill in implementing a long-term vision and strategic
plan, a proven track record of promoting the development of educational
and research programs, and a history of providing value-added
consultations that have contributed to the advancement of national
defense. The incumbent must also demonstrate the ability to develop
policies and programs to achieve long-range strategic plans and
continuously assess the compliance and effectiveness of such programs
and policies. Serving as the senior civilian in AFIT, the incumbent
must also demonstrate successful human resource management, to include
performing a full range of personnel decisions, fostering professional
development, and exercising strong interpersonal communication skills.
In addition to the specialized experience required for the Director
and Chancellor of AFIT, there are additional factors that must be
considered, such as the academic leadership and the contribution and
professional reputation of the incumbent. The incumbent must also
demonstrate widely recognized contributions that significantly impacted
their organization as evidenced by achievements that set a standard or
established best practices for the professional community. The
incumbent must have received recognition at the service- or department-
level as a technical expert through activities in academia or by the
receipt of honors, awards, or other peer recognition external to their
organization or agency.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly A. Ayotte

TRIAD OF BOMBERS

84. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, you
write in your posture statements that ``the United States must shape
its [nuclear] deterrent forces to maintain the attributes which lead to
stability among major powers and which extend deterrence for regional
challenges and non-state actors while assuring allies.'' To what extent
is a triad of bombers, submarines, and intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) necessary to maintain the attributes which lead to
stability?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The triad produces the
attributes of responsiveness, survivability, and flexibility which are
needed to deter nuclear-armed adversaries and provides credible
assurances to allies. In addition, the Nuclear Posture Review concluded
each leg of the triad provides unique attributes that combine to create
a synergistic deterrent effect, greater than just the sum of the parts,
and a hedge against uncertainty. Thus, the triad underwrites both
global and regional stability.

85. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, would it
be advisable to maintain a nuclear triad should the United States
pursue further negotiated nuclear arms reductions with Russia beyond
New START force levels?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, it is advisable to
maintain the triad beyond New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
force levels. The Nuclear Posture Review concluded the United States
should retain a nuclear triad under the New START treaty. It examined
possible ``dyads'' and determined there was substantial value in
retaining a diverse triad force structure to hedge against any
technical or geopolitical problem or operational vulnerability in one
leg. Moreover, analysis indicates the complementary attributes of the
triad are important in the complex, multi-nodal security environment we
face. For the foreseeable future, the triad will continue to provide
the best mix of unique attributes necessary to maintain stability.

86. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, are
there scenarios where lower numbers of deployed nuclear forces could
lead to the abandonment of one of the legs of the triad? If so, what
could be the consequences for stability and extended deterrence?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Stability is the preeminent
goal of any future force structure. For the foreseeable future, the
triad will continue to provide the best mix of attributes necessary to
maintain stability. Elimination of one leg of the triad would move the
Nation into uncharted territory. In the emerging complex, multi-nodal
security environment, potential future reductions must be grounded in a
strategy-based understanding of the attributes needed to provide and
extend deterrence and assurance while supporting both global and
regional stability.

PRIORITY PROGRAMS

87. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, in your
prepared statements, you cite the following as high priority programs:
(1) KC-46A; (2) F-35; (3) LRS-B; (4) service life extension on the F-
16; (5) space-based infrared and advanced extremely high frequency
(AEHF) satellites; and (6) space launch capability. What impact would
defense sequestration have on these six high priority programs?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Sequestration would drive
major additional reductions beyond the first phase of the Budget
Control Act reductions to the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget
request. As Air Force leadership has testified, the proposed fiscal
year 2013 budget is balanced and complete. Under sequestration, all
investment accounts would be impacted. Some modernization programs
would need to be reduced and possibly restructured and/or terminated.
All investment accounts would be impacted, including our high-priority
programs. The KC-46A, F-35, LRS-B, service life extension on the F-16,
space-based infrared and (AEHF) satellites, and space launch capability
would all be subject to reductions that could impact contracts and
result in increased costs and potential delays.

F-35

88. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what is
the cost of maintaining the legacy fleet, if we do not move forward
with F-35? Some suggest it would be a least two to three times, perhaps
more, than the estimated operations and sustainment cost for F-35 and
in an advanced threat environment, the legacy 4th generation aircraft
may not survive. While I asked this question in the hearing, I would
appreciate a more specific response in writing. I am not seeking
details on current fiscal year 2013 proposals; instead, I am seeking a
specific number for the operations and sustainment cost for the
aircraft that would be used in lieu of the F-35 if the program were
canceled.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Defense Strategic
Guidance states that, ``the U.S. military will invest as required to
ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area
denial (A2/AD) environments.'' While 4.5-generation fighters offer
improved capabilities over legacy fourth-generation fighters, 4.5-
generation fighters cannot successfully operate in an A2/AD
environment. No matter what upgrades we incorporate, the 4.5-generation
fighters will not possess the required survivability in this emerging
threat environment. The advanced capabilities and survivability
inherent in fifth-generation fighters is necessary to successfully
operate against A2/AD threats.
SLEPs and capability modifications for legacy fourth-generation
fighters are less costly than producing new aircraft and could mitigate
quantity shortfalls in the near- to mid-term. Therefore, funding SLEP
and capability modifications for legacy fourth-generation fighters is a
crucial part of the Air Force fiscal year 2013 President's budget (PB),
building a bridge to a necessary fifth-generation fleet. The capability
of the 4.5-generation and legacy aircraft is inadequate to counter
emerging A2/AD threats in the mid- to far-term. It would be fiscally
irresponsible to invest resources procuring a force structure (i.e.,
procuring 4.5-generation aircraft) that is deficient in meeting the
demands of the new strategic guidance.
Without new aircraft (F-35s, F-Xs) to replace legacy fighters, the
size of the Air Force fleet would significantly diminish as they run
out of service life. Under current projections, reductions would be 10
percent by 2020, 46 percent by 2030, and 96 percent by 2040. For fiscal
year 2013-2017, the Air Force plans to spend approximately $9 billion
per year to operate legacy fighters, to include F-22s, that will be
part of our fleet for the foreseeable future. The Air Force will spend
approximately $1.8 billion per year in investments on these fighters to
extend service life and make necessary capability improvements. Beyond
the FYDP, sustainment costs will appropriately decrease as legacy
fighters run out of service life and inventories shrink.

89. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
investments have been made in the development and design of the F-35 to
reduce operations and sustainment costs over the life of the program?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The F-35 Joint Program
Office (JPO) is currently implementing an affordability strategy by
developing an affordability management plan focused on: reducing the
costs of support products, such as support equipment, spare parts, and
training devices; baselining requirements with the Services and
leveraging increased efficiency opportunities; and addressing
reliability and maintainability. The JPO is creating contract and
pricing opportunities to reduce the cost of Joint Strike Fighter
support products by leveraging economic order quantity buys for spare
parts in conjunction with production buys and implementing pricing
improvement curves that leverage learning opportunities. By creating a
common sustainment baseline which harnesses the F-35 support system
design, the JPO is articulating the optimum level of infrastructure and
products required to support operations of the global fleet. By
optimizing the amount of equipment procured early, we are able to
affect the lifecycle operations and support (O&S) costs. In parallel,
the program office is actively managing the reliability and
maintainability of systems/subsystems and components. Where they fall
short of meeting their design specifications, the implementation of
appropriate modifications will enable us to control cost growth.
In 2011, the JPO implemented a number of technical changes and
affordability initiatives which resulted in an over $30 billion
reduction, in base year 2002 dollars, in the 2011 O&S estimate. This
helped to offset externally-driven increases in areas such as military
and contractor labor rates. Additionally, the JPO conducted sustainment
baseline deep dives into support equipment, spares, and manpower, as
well as the initial phase of a business case analysis on supply chain
management, field operations, sustaining engineering, and fleet
management.
The 2012 efforts will include a manpower review into the
appropriate labor mix and contractor rates, a review of competitive
options for the long-term provision of support equipment and spares,
enterprise software licensing, engine life improvements, reprogrammed
laboratory requirements, and additional Service planning factors such
as aircraft utilization rates, contingency planning, and squadron
manning requirements. In addition, the Air Force is studying the
impacts to maintenance manpower, support equipment, and spares
requirements by varying squadron size and number of F-35 bases.

90. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, are
these investments accounted for in the operations and sustainment cost
estimate in the Selected Acquisition Reports?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The F-35 JPO works closely
with the Office of the Director, CAPE. Following completion of CAPE's
independent cost estimate (ICE), the then Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Mr.
Frank Kendall, directed CAPE's operations and support (O&S) estimate be
used for planning purposes in the new acquisition program baseline
(APB) and the December 2011 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). As JPO
cost estimates are updated to reflect the investment made to reduce
costs, that information is provided to CAPE and their estimate will
likely be updated. The annual SAR will continue to reflect the CAPE O&S
estimate, with updates as required.

91. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the F-35
was designed to be an international program from its inception. We have
formal, binding agreements with our international partners that have
been cemented over the past 11 years. The F-35 is not only our largest
defense program, but the largest program for many of our closest allies
as well. Your predecessors, their deputies, and acquisitions executives
have all taken different approaches to how they managed these critical
relationships. I hope you will take an active and personal role with
our international partners on the F-35 program to keep them informed on
and committed to the program. Can you tell me what your plans are in
this regard?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force will continue
to engage with program partners and posture for continued training and
potential operations. Air Force senior leaders continuously engage our
counterparts during regularly scheduled meetings, such as the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) Conference, the Joint Strike Fighter Executive
Steering Board (JESB) meeting, and the Senior Warfighter Group (SWG),
in addition to various bilateral meetings that occur throughout the
year.

LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION CONTRACTING

92. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, in light
of the March 13, 2012, JSF program memorandum titled: ``Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) 6/7 Contracting Strategy,'' has anyone in DOD
consulted with the international partners on the proposed LRIP 6/7
procurement strategy?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The JPO informed the
international partners of the proposed LRIP 6/7 strategy in early
spring 2012 and has provided regular updates, to include ensuring they
have seen the draft requests for proposal. The JPO will keep the
partners informed as the strategy progresses.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

C-130 MOVE

93. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, Representative Kay Granger
asked you at a House hearing on March 6 whether the Air Force had made
a determination of the costs associated with relocating the eight C-
130s of the 136th Airlift Wing in Fort Worth from Texas to Montana. You
responded that the Air Force ``had not completed all our work.'' How
much savings in the FYDP does the Air Force anticipate will result from
the proposed move of eight C-130s from Texas to Montana?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force does not expect to realize any
savings from the movement of C-130s from Fort Worth, TX to Great Falls,
MT. The move better postures Total Force lift capabilities within the
United States and fills an existing requirement for lift in the
Northwest, specifically Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Regions VIII, IX, and X.

94. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, how do you justify the
proposal to move these aircraft when no thorough cost analysis has been
conducted?
Secretary Donley. The transfer of eight C-130s from Carswell, TX,
better postures Total Force lift capabilities within the United States
and fills an existing requirement for lift in the Northwest,
specifically FEMA Regions VIII, IX, and X.
The new Defense Strategic Guidance reduced the overall requirement
for intra-theater airlift. Using scenarios similar to the Mobility
Capabilities Requirements Study (MCRS-16, Case 3), the Air Force
determined excess capacity existed in the fleet. The reduced
requirement permits the retirement of 65 older C-130H aircraft and the
divestiture of the entire C-27J fleet.

95. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, the following quote appeared
in the March 2012 issue of National Guard magazine: ```I'm extremely
pleased that we are going to retain a flying mission for Montana,' said
Brigadier General John E. Walsh, the Montana adjutant general, but
moving aircraft from one State to another, providing appropriate
infrastructure, and training pilots and maintainers is not cheap, he
points out. When the F-15s were transferred from Missouri to Montana in
2009, it cost about $40 million. `The one concern I have with all the
movement of all this aircraft is the cost,' he says.'' I find these
statements troubling, and I agree with his concerns. Was the Montana
adjutant general consulted about the cost of this move prior to the
plan being announced?
Secretary Donley. Direct coordination with individual State
Adjutants General does not occur during the Air Force budgeting
process. However, the National Guard Bureau represented ANG concerns
during Air Force budget deliberations, and participated throughout the
Air Force's fiscal year 2013 Program Objective Memorandum process.

96. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, if the Montana adjutant
general is concerned about how much this will cost, why does the Air
Force not appear to be concerned?
Secretary Donley. The transfer of eight C-130s from Carswell, TX,
is a decision based on mission leveling within the ANG and Air Force
Reserve. It better postures Total Force lift capabilities within the
United States and fills an existing requirement for lift in the
Northwest, specifically FEMA Regions VIII, IX, and X.
In particular, Congressmen Denny Rehberg, of Montana's at-large
district, has stated, ``This mission is a perfect fit for Montana. Not
only do we have one of the largest international boarders among the
United States, but the vast open space is susceptible to natural
disasters including fires, floods, and tornados.''

97. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, I note that the Air Force
budget request for fiscal year 2013 includes $3 million in funding to
construct temporary shelters for these C-130s, as Montana is not
currently equipped to house them. The Air Force has also requested $20
million in MILCON funding for fiscal year 2014 for conversion of
Montana's existing F-15 facilities to support the C-130s. According to
DOD Form 1391 requesting this fiscal year 2014 funding, the C-130
cannot fit inside Montana's existing hangars for maintenance, thus
negatively impacting the C-130 mission. It is my understanding that
until this proposed MILCON project is completed, the lack of a fuel
cell control facility will cause maintenance delays, forcing fuel cell
work to be done on the ramp in harsh winter conditions, delaying the
availability of the aircraft, and thus negatively impacting mission
readiness. This construction project would not be completed until 2016.
How do you plan to address the obvious risk to mission readiness for
these C-130s until the project is completed?
Secretary Donley. The risk to mission readiness due to the absence
of a fuel cell hangar until 2015 is minimal. Actual aircraft groundings
due to fuel-related problems needing a fuel cell hangar are not common.
Risk mitigation to scheduled fuel cell maintenance, which normally
occurs as part of an isochronal inspection once every 540 days, can be
accomplished by servicing aircraft at other wings. Risk mitigation to
unscheduled fuel cell maintenance problems includes working outdoors,
weather conditions permitting, and a one-time flight waiver to a
facility with a fuel cell.

98. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, how do you justify assuming
such risk that would be nonexistent if the C-130s were left in Texas?
Secretary Donley. Moving the C-130s from Texas does not garner any
additional risk nor does it impact the Gulf States' ability to respond
to natural disasters. The Gulf region will continue to receive coverage
from C-130s in Little Rock, AR, and C-17s from Jackson, MS. Active
component forces remain available to respond to contingencies and
disasters worldwide through the Global Force Management Process. The
Air Force will remain trained and ready to provide assistance and
support to civil authorities, to include those in Texas and her
neighbors, should such a need arise.

99. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, moving the C-130s from Texas
would eliminate the only ANG unit on the Gulf Coast with a C-130
airlift capability. The 136th has been used multiple times in hurricane
evacuation and Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA)
operations. On March 5, all five Governors of the Gulf Coast States
sent a letter to President Obama strongly advising against the
relocation of these aircraft, stating that: ``losing the C-130s takes
away a powerful airlift asset for saving the lives of Gulf Coast States
citizens.'' These are Governors who have relied heavily on the 136th
Airlift Wing in response to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008,
Hurricane Dean in 2007, and Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in
2005. The 136th has flown 423 sorties in response to storms, safely
evacuating 3,143 passengers and delivering 989 tons of emergency aid.
Were you aware of this?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force has mitigated risks and maintains a
strong position to support the Gulf States. The transfer of C-130s is a
decision based on mission leveling within the ANG and Air Force
Reserve. It better postures Total Force lift capabilities within the
United States and fills an existing requirement for lift in the
Northwest, specifically FEMA Regions VIII, IX, and X. The Gulf region
will continue to receive coverage from C-130s at Little Rock, AR, and
Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport, GA.
Specifically, Arkansas hosts the 189th Airlift Wing which provides
formal training to upgrading aircrews and operates nine C-130s at
Little Rock AFB. In Georgia, the 165th Airlift Wing operates eight C-
130s at Savannah, GA. While not C-130 aircraft, in Mississippi, the
172d Airlift Wing operates nine C-17s at Jackson International Airport,
providing both tactical and strategic airlift and airdrop capabilities.
Although these airlift wings are under control of their respective
States, they remain available to assist in regional emergencies under
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (E-MAC). Additionally, when
an incident becomes a federally-declared emergency, Air Mobility
Command steps in to provide airlift support via the Global Force
Management process which pulls from any and all available forces,
including the 189th, the 165th, and 172d Airlift Wings.

100. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, do you believe Montana has a
greater need for these aircraft than the Gulf Coast States?
Secretary Donley. Air Force assets are aligned to provide maximum
capabilities to meet both assigned and ad hoc missions. In FEMA Regions
VIII, IX, and X, covering the northwestern part of the United States,
including Montana, there has been a need for lift capabilities postured
to meet potential natural disasters. The Gulf region has lift
capabilities to meet any homeland defense crisis that may arise.
Additionally, the Secretary of Defense asked Air Force leadership
to work with the Council of Governors on various options regarding the
ANG force structure. The Air Force determined we can mitigate impacts
to affected States with a $400 million package that would maintain an
additional 24 C-130 aircraft in the ANG.

101. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, how do you plan to
accommodate the requirement in the Gulf States for these aircraft,
often in emergency circumstances with immediate needs?
Secretary Donley. The Gulf region will continue to receive coverage
from C-130s in Little Rock, AR, and C-17s from Jackson, MS.
Specifically, Arkansas hosts the 189th Airlift Wing which provides
formal training to upgrading aircrews and operates nine C-130s at
Little Rock AFB. In Georgia, the 165th Airlift Wing operates eight C-
130s at Savannah, GA. In Mississippi, the 172d Airlift Wing operates
nine C-17s at Jackson International Airport, which can provide both
tactical and strategic airlift and airdrop capabilities. While these
airlift wings are under control of their respective States, they remain
available to assist in regional emergencies under E-MAC. Additionally,
when an incident becomes a federally-declared emergency, Air Mobility
Command steps in to provide airlift support via the Global Force
Management process which pulls from any and all available forces,
including the 189th, the 165th, and 172d Airlift Wings.
Moving C-130 aircraft from Texas does not impact the Gulf States'
overall ability to respond to natural disasters. The Air Force will
remain trained and ready to provide assistance and support to civil
authorities, should such a need arise.

102. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, how will the Governors
respond to future emergencies if there are no longer National Guard C-
130s on the Gulf Coast?
Secretary Donley. During emergencies, the Gulf Coast Governors can
call upon the C-130 support in the bordering States of Georgia and
Arkansas. Specifically, Arkansas hosts the 189th Airlift Wing which
provides formal training to upgrading aircrews and operates nine C-130s
at Little Rock AFB. In Georgia, the 165th Airlift Wing operates eight
C-130s at Savannah, GA. In Mississippi, the 172d Airlift Wing operates
nine C-17s at Jackson International Airport, which can provide both
tactical and strategic airlift and airdrop capabilities. While these
airlift wings are under control of their respective States, they remain
available to assist in regional emergencies under E-MAC. Additionally,
when an incident becomes a federally-declared emergency, Air Mobility
Command steps in to provide airlift support via the Global Force
Management process which pulls from any and all available forces,
including the 189th, the 165th, and 172d Airlift Wings.

103. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, what is your preference in
these disaster situations--for State Governors to employ the Air Guard
or for U.S. Northern Command to wait for assigned Active or Reserve
components C-130s to execute missions as ordered by the President,
which could add at least several days of delay?
Secretary Donley. In accordance with the national response
framework, States have the primary responsibility to plan and execute
response operations to mitigate effects from disasters. Should a
State's resources become overwhelmed, or the state anticipates
insufficient internal resources, it may request aid through E-MAC from
surrounding States. Considerable lift capability exists through this
congressionally-approved interstate mutual support system. Should the
disaster exceed E-MAC-provided resources, the Federal Government can
provide assistance as stipulated in the Stafford Act. Experience has
shown with a Presidential declaration and a validated request for
assistance (RFA) or mission assignment (MA) from FEMA, the Air Force
can have personnel and equipment ready for mission execution within 4
hours of the authorization. For activities covered under the current 10
U.S.C. Sec. 12302 (Ready Reserve) recall authority, we have recalled
and readied forces for deployment in as little as 4 hours.

104. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, with the elimination of C-
130s on the Gulf Coast, it seems that it could now take days before
DSCA operations could be fully implemented. What is your assessment of
which force is more capable, historically, of responding in the
shortest amount of time?
Secretary Donley. History has shown the Governor has immediate
authority and access to the ANG. If the situation cannot be mitigated
using State resources, the State may request aid through E-MAC from
surrounding States. Through this approved interstate mutual support
system, E-MAC offers assurances that capable airlift exists. Experience
has shown with a presidential declaration and a validated RFA or MA
from FEMA, the Air Force can have personnel and equipment ready for
mission execution within 4 hours of the authorization.

105. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, would you agree that history
shows a Governor can mobilize ANG assets within hours, while execution
of a Federal response could take days?
Secretary Donley. In most cases, the Governor has greater and more
rapid daily access to National Guard assets within his or her State.
Because DOD isn't designated as a first responder, situations where
action is not essential to preserve life and property require us to
wait for appropriate activation authorities to employ National Guard
assets in a Federal capacity. At the same time, for major events where
Federal assets are clearly required and needs have been anticipated,
the Federal response, including the use of Title 10 forces, can be
immediate.
Having the State Adjutant Generals qualified as dual-status
commanders also contributes to a rapid response capability.

106. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, when did the decision
process begin to relocate these C-130s?
Secretary Donley. The DOD Strategic Guidance, ``Sustaining US
Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense,'' was released
in January 2012 and directs the Services to build a force that will be
smaller and leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. The
proposed fiscal year 2013 President's budget was developed to satisfy
this new strategic guidance and to meet the requirements of the Budget
Control Act of 2011. The transfer of eight C-130s from Fort Worth, TX,
better postures Total Force lift capabilities within the United States
and fills an existing requirement for lift in the Northwest,
specifically FEMA Regions VIII, IX, and X.

107. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, was the obvious pressure
from the Montana delegation the biggest factor behind this decision?
Secretary Donley. No. The transfer of C-130s to Great Falls, MT,
better postures Total Force lift capabilities within the United States
and fills an existing requirement for lift in the Northwest,
specifically FEMA Regions VIII, IX, and X.
The proposed plan for Montana is consistent with the new DOD
Strategic Guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For
21st Century Defense,'' which directs the Services to build a force
that will be smaller and leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically
advanced. It is an integrated, Total Force effort to achieve our end
state of a ready and sustainable force that can meet our surge and
rotational requirements, and reflects the ANG's Capstone Principles:
allocate at least one flying wing with ANG equipment to each State;
recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force;
manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the
militia construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (emergency support
functions) relevant to the States.

FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

108. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz,
according to DOD's new strategic guidance released in January a
``strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in
Europe has been created and in keeping with this evolving strategic
landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve.'' It goes on to
state that: ``whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost,
and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives,
relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.''
The Army has adjusted to this approach by announcing the elimination of
two heavy brigades forward-stationed in Europe, while also establishing
and maintaining a new rotational presence in Europe. Yet, this concept
of rotational forces is not mentioned in the Air Force's strategy.
There are currently 69 F-16s, 96 F-16s, 15 KC-135 tankers, and a number
of other Air Force aircraft throughout Europe. Yet, the only
substantial change to the Air Force posture in Europe seems to be the
inactivation of a squadron in Germany, resulting in the retirement of
20 A-10s and deactivating an air control squadron at Aviano Air Base,
Italy. At the same time, the Air Force is proposing reductions of
nearly 200 aircraft in fiscal year 2013 from installations across the
United States. Please explain this discrepancy and expound on why the
Air Force is not more deliberately adjusting its European footprint in
accordance with the Secretary of Defense's strategic guidance.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is reducing
our aircraft assigned in Europe by 10 percent; our overall reduction of
200 aircraft in fiscal year 2013 represents around 4 percent of our
Total Force. In relative numbers, we are taking a much larger reduction
in Europe than in the rest of the world. We believe this is consistent
with the Defense Strategic Guidance. At the same time, this was not an
easy decision. Our Europe-based force is the cornerstone of our
commitment to our NATO allies.
The U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) footprint has continuously
evolved to meet the strategic needs of the Nation. In the past, this
has translated to a significant drawdown of forces and infrastructure,
including the reduction of multiple fighter squadrons and ancillary
units in theater. USAFE currently uses rotational forces to augment its
capability and meet war fighting requirements. USAFE's forces meet NATO
requirements and provide a limited, but strategic mission capability to
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) as
recently demonstrated during the operations in Libya. Since 2006, USAFE
has reduced manpower by 3,884 personnel (11 percent), realigned 17
units, and closed 2 installations and 44 sites. The command is
currently working two major installation streamlining actions and
continues to pursue other efficiency efforts. Existing installations
support EUCOM operations, but are directly tied to the ability of the
United States to prosecute and sustain global operations through
logistics, mobility, communications, and intelligence supported by
USAFE installations which directly enable operations in CENTCOM and
AFRICOM.

109. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the Air
Force currently has 14 C-130J aircraft at Ramstein AFB, Germany. It is
my understanding that the number of C-130Js in Europe will not change
even though the Army will be pulling back half of its brigade combat
teams (BCT) (two of four) from Europe. Why did the Air Force find it
acceptable to balance missions across the States, as General Schwartz,
you testified before the Subcommittee on Defense of the House
Appropriations Committee, but did not find it acceptable to balance
missions for the same aircraft across Europe, even though the Army will
be substantially reducing its European presence?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Permanent forward based
mobility forces are required to execute steady state operations within
a given theater and preserve strategic flexibility in time of crisis.
USAFE is the air component for EUCOM and AFRICOM, an area of
responsibility spanning two-thirds of the Earth's surface and 105
countries. However, USAFE only holds 4 percent of the theater airlift
force and 3 percent of the tanker force, represented by a single C-130
squadron and a single KC-135 squadron, respectively. EUCOM and AFRICOM
airlift studies from 2010 state that the current EUCOM mobility force
structure is less than required to respond to crisis in the European
and African theaters and execute the enduring requirements that dictate
persistent (365 days/year) presence.
The USAFE force size in Europe is not based on the Army's
footprint. C-130 Joint airdrop/air transportability training with the
173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is an integral part of the
training required to maintain the combat-ready status of U.S. Forces.
The 173 ABCT requires 13,500 jumps per year, in addition to any
deployment preparation. However, the BCTs being removed from Europe are
heavy BCTs, a minor mission set for the EUCOM assigned C-130Js.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

110. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley, on March 13, 2012, the JSF
Program Executive Officer (PEO) sent a memo to the Air Force Service
Acquisition Executive regarding the F-35 JSF LRIP 6/7 contracting
strategy. It is my understanding that the F-35 program is implementing
a contracting strategy that attempts to link development and test
progress in 2012 to the number of aircraft that can be purchased in
these LRIP lots. This is a novel and somewhat unusual concept, which
necessitates close consultation with Congress. Is it your understanding
that DOD is asking for formal approval of this proposal from each of
the congressional defense committees via letter prior to moving forward
on a joint F-35 LRIP 6/7 contract? If not, please explain.
Secretary Donley. It is the intention of the Air Force and the DOD
to ensure the defense committees are kept apprised of our plans as we
move forward in the procurement of the LRIP Lots 6 and 7 aircraft. The
congressional defense committees were first briefed on the strategy on
February 15-16, 2012, and then notified via letter from the Air Force
Service Acquisition Executive on March 15, 2012.
DOD is implementing an event-based contracting strategy for LRIP
Lots 6 and 7 that buys aircraft production quantities based upon
development and test progress. This strategy provides a means to have
control of production informed by demonstrated development performance
against the 2012 plan and concurrency cost risk reduction.
The Department will request Lockheed Martin provide a consolidated
proposal for LRIP Lots 6 and 7 that affords flexibility with future
procurement quantities. First, we will award 25 aircraft in Lot 6, out
of 31 authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2012. Second, we will
provide a means to procure from zero to six of the remaining fiscal
year 2012-funded Lot 6 aircraft concurrent with the Lot 7 contract
award in 2013. Finally, we will link the total aircraft quantity
ultimately procured in Lot 6 to Lockheed's development performance and
concurrency cost risk reduction efforts.
Currently, appropriated fiscal year 2012 funding is necessary to
implement this contracting strategy. The variable quantity of up to six
additional Lot 6 aircraft will be paid for with the fiscal year 2012
funds originally authorized and appropriated by Congress for their
purchase; however, these funds will not be obligated on contract until
fiscal year 2013.
The Department intends to award Lot 7 aircraft and the Lot 6
variable quantity aircraft through fully definitized contract actions
in fiscal year 2013. The initial Lot 6 contract award for 25 aircraft
will require an undefinitized contract action (UCA) to ensure
production flow is not disrupted. However, the Department does not
intend to award a UCA for the 25 aircraft in Lot 6 until essential
agreement is reached for Lot 5.
We believe our plan for negotiations for LRIP 6 and 7 will allow us
to control production quantity based on the performance of the
development program. It is important that Lockheed Martin demonstrate
performance and help us to establish the confidence that the F-35 is a
stable and capable platform.

ADDITIONAL BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ROUNDS

111. Senator Cornyn. General Schwartz, at today's hearing, you
indicated that, in the long run, a manned aircraft may not be able to
do all of the requirements that an unmanned aircraft is capable of
doing. You went on to stress that you are not dealing with the long
run, implying that you instead need to worry about cost savings now and
in the immediate future. Yet, you also mentioned during the hearing the
need for additional Air Force base closures, which inherently involves
long-term considerations. According to a GAO report published March 8,
2012, the 2005 BRAC round was estimated to cost $21 billion (and
actually cost $35.1 billion), and it will result in only a $9.9
billion, 20-year net savings (73 percent lower than what was originally
estimated). With current budgetary constraints, do you believe we have
another $20 billion+ to seriously consider another round of BRAC?
General Schwartz. New rounds of BRAC may have a lower upfront
investment because they would be focused on eliminating unnecessary
infrastructure and installations, rather than transformation as in BRAC
2005. The amounts you cite were for all of DOD. The Air Force effort
produced a much more positive and timely result. The Air Force
implemented all assigned BRAC 2005 recommendations on time and for less
than initially estimated. Based on submitted budget justification
material in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget, the Air Force net
implementation costs through fiscal year 2011 were actually a savings
of $756 million ($3.8 billion invested, offset by $4.5 billion in
savings for the 2006 through 2011 period). In addition, $957 million in
net annual recurring savings will continue in perpetuity. New rounds of
BRAC are essential to meeting fiscal constraints and will provide an
effective, fair process for the Department to identify and shed its
excess infrastructure.

112. Senator Cornyn. General Schwartz, has there been a business
case analysis completed to support your opinion that another BRAC round
is necessary? If so, under this assessment, how many years would it
take to start seeing a positive savings from BRAC?
General Schwartz. The Air Force has not conducted a business case
analysis for another BRAC. However, we began BRAC 2005 with a known
excess infrastructure capacity and ended the BRAC process by closing
only seven small installations or facilities. As a result of force
structure reductions since 2005 and projected in the 2013 budget, the
Air Force has and will continue to have infrastructure excess to its
needs. The best, most equitable way to determine the excess as well as
potential costs and savings from shedding excess infrastructure in the
United States is through the statutorily-defined BRAC process.

DATA AT REST ENCRYPTION REQUIREMENTS

113. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz,
military computers containing critical government data are frequently
at rest. As a result, the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) issued a
memorandum on July 3, 2007, to address the encryption requirements for
sensitive unclassified data at rest on mobile computing and removable
storage devices. What is the status of the Air Force's implementation
of the data at rest encryption requirements?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force has not met
the DOD CIO data at rest (DaR) encryption mandate due to funding cuts
and redirection of funds to the highest-priority cyber-related project
in Air Force Space Command (AFSPC): collapsing multiple unclassified
networks into a single Air Force non-secure internet protocol router
network, known as the Air Force Network. The Air Force has developed a
plan to deploy BitLocker, which is bundled with Windows 7 as a low cost
solution on laptops, to meet some DaR requirements and improve overall
security posture. BitLocker is Federal Information Processing System
140-2 compliant and meets three of seven DaR requirements planned for
Air Force implementation. AFSPC will implement BitLocker on all Air
Force laptops beginning in fall 2012. The Electronic Systems Center in
AFMC is researching and determining the cost of fielding a fully
compliant DaR product. AFSPC is developing courses of action to
reallocate funds to support fully compliant DaR fielding beginning in
fiscal year 2013 or fiscal year 2014 with an estimated completion date
in fiscal year 2015 or fiscal year 2016.

LONG-RANGE STRIKE BOMBER

114. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I was
encouraged to see that the fiscal year 2013 Air Force budget request
appears to protect the LRS-B program, with a marked increase in
proposed spending over the FYDP. What is the Air Force's plan to
protect funding for the LRS-B program in the face of possible
sequestration in fiscal year 2013 and beyond?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. With or without
sequestration, the LRS-B will remain an Air Force priority; however,
sequestration would drive major additional reductions beyond the first
phase of the Budget Control Act reductions to the Air Force fiscal year
2013 budget request. As Air Force leadership has testified, the
proposed fiscal year 2013 budget is a balanced and complete package.
Under sequestration, some programs would need to be reduced and
possibly restructured and/or terminated. All investment accounts would
be impacted including our high-priority modernization efforts, such as
MQ-9, Joint Strike Fighter, and KC-46A.
Additionally, sequestration would force an immediate percentage
reduction in our operation and maintenance accounts which could damage
readiness and make our ability to cover any emergent execution year
requirements extremely difficult.

115. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what is
the projected delivery date for the first LRS-B?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The projected delivery date
for the first LRS-B is the mid-2020s, before the current aging bomber
fleet begins to go out of service.

116. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how
many total aircraft does the Air Force plan to purchase?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force plans to
purchase 80-100 LRS-Bs to ensure flexibility and sufficient capacity
for Joint Force commanders.

117. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, at this
time, does the Air Force plan still consist of both manned and unmanned
LRS-B aircraft?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes. The LRS-B will be
designed to accommodate both manned and unmanned operations.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Ayotte, and
Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Thomas K.
McConnell, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
and Michael J. Sistak, research assistant.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Hannah I.
Lloyd, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Ryan Ehly, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey
Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Mara Boggs, assistant to
Senator Manchin; Elana Broitman, assistant to Senator
Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Clyde
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch,
assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
Ayotte; and Rob Epplin, assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today's hearing continues a series of posture hearings that
the Senate Armed Services Committee is conducting on our
combatant commands within the context of the fiscal year 2013
budget request and the President's new Strategic Guidance.
Today we receive testimony from the U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), a sub-unified
command of STRATCOM. Let me first welcome General Robert
Kehler, the Commander of STRATCOM, and General Keith Alexander,
the Commander of CYBERCOM, and thank them both for their
service to our Nation. We also want to thank the fine men and
women who serve in these commands for their dedication and
service to our Nation and a special thanks to their families.
STRATCOM manages nine missions across the Department of
Defense (DOD). These missions range from satellite and space
situational awareness, missile defense, and electronic warfare,
to combating weapons of mass destruction. STRATCOM coordinates
the activities of CYBERCOM across the DOD. Unlike combatant
commands which are regionally focused, STRATCOM's missions are
global.
As noted in the President's Strategic Guidance, STRATCOM
commands ``nuclear forces that can under any circumstances
confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable
damage.'' That capability needs to be preserved as we continue
to reduce the size of these forces and modernize the
infrastructure at the Department of Energy (DOE) that supports
this mission.
General Kehler, here are some of the issues that I hope
that you will address this morning.
First, are you satisfied with the direction that we are
taking in our nuclear force posture and with DOE's role in
maintaining our nuclear stockpile so that we can continue to
reduce its size without testing while ensuring the stockpile
remains safe and meets military requirements?
Second, do you believe we are on a sustainable path to
protect our space assets and to reconstitute them, if
necessary, given the congested and contested nature of space?
Third, DOD is allocated a block of the electromagnetic
spectrum that connects our space, cyber, and electronic warfare
assets to our forces. STRATCOM is the lead combatant command
for synchronizing spectrum operations. How concerned are you
about the prospect of losing spectrum and what are you doing to
preserve the Department's access to it?
Fourth, with the cancelation of the Operationally
Responsive Space program, are you worried about our ability to
field low-cost but rapidly deployable satellites that can fill
capability gaps between large national intelligence satellite
collection systems and the Department's airborne surveillance
platforms?
Fifth, what is your strategic vision for the combined use
of space and cyber? These two domains are integrally linked but
we have not seen a plan for integrating capabilities and
operations.
Let me now turn to CYBERCOM for a moment.
There is much for us to examine in this increasingly
important and complex, but still new mission area, not only as
it affects DOD, but the government and the economy as a whole.
General Alexander has stated that the relentless industrial
espionage being waged against U.S. industry and government
chiefly by China constitute ``the largest transfer of wealth in
history.'' The committee needs to understand the dimensions of
this technology theft and its impact on our national security
and prosperity.
The Armed Services Committee has focused for some time on
the need to develop comprehensive policies and frameworks to
govern planning and operations in cyberspace. What are the
Rules of Engagement if we are attacked by another nation, and
what is the doctrine for operations, and deterrence, and
warfighting strategies. The administration has made progress in
these areas, as reflected in recent strategy statements and in
the development of comprehensive legislation to improve
cybersecurity. But much more needs to be done.
As a still-developing sub-unified combatant command, the
committee needs to understand the current and planned
relationships between CYBERCOM and STRATCOM and the other
combatant commands. The Defense Department is considering the
establishment of component CYBERCOMs at the combatant commands.
We need to know what command arrangements would apply to these
potential components, as well as the authorities and the
missions that STRATCOM has delegated to CYBERCOM and those that
it plans to retain.
General Alexander has stated publicly that he believes he
needs additional authorities to defend the networks and
information systems of the rest of the Federal Government and
those of critical infrastructure. The committee needs clarity
on exactly what authorities General Alexander might be seeking
and whether they go beyond what the administration has
requested in its legislative proposal to Congress.
General Alexander has also often stated that DOD does not,
in fact, have a unified network but rather 15,000 separate
networks or enclaves into which CYBERCOM has little visibility.
The committee needs to understand what can and should be done
to correct what would seem to be an urgent and critical
problem.
DOD has conducted a pilot program with a number of major
companies in the defense industrial base (DIB) and multiple
Internet service providers (ISP), like AT&T and Verizon. Under
that pilot program, the National Security Administration (NSA)
provides signatures of known cyber penetration tools and
methods directly to the DIB companies or to the ISPs that
provide the DIB companies their communications services. The
companies then use these signatures to detect and block
intrusion attempts.
Carnegie Mellon conducted an independent assessment of the
DIB pilot for DOD and concluded that NSA provided few
signatures that were not already known to the companies
themselves, and in many cases, the DIB companies by themselves
detected advanced threats with their own non-signature-based
detection methods that probably were not known to the NSA. So
we need to hear from General Alexander on his view of those
issues as well.
We thank you both again for your service and for being here
this morning.
Now we call on Senator McCain.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Levin follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

Good morning. Today's hearing continues a series of posture
hearings that the Armed Services Committee is conducting on our
combatant commands within the context of the fiscal year 2013 budget
request and the President's new Strategic Guidance. Today, we receive
testimony from the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the U.S. Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM), a sub-unified command of STRATCOM. Let me welcome
General Robert Kehler, the Commander of STRATCOM and General Keith
Alexander, the Commander of CYBERCOM and thank them for their service
to our Nation. I also want to thank the fine men and women who serve in
these commands for their dedication and service to our Nation.
STRATCOM manages nine missions across the Department of Defense
(DOD). These missions range from satellite and space situational
awareness, missile defense, and electronic warfare, to combating
weapons of mass destruction. STRATCOM coordinates the activities of
CYBERCOM across the DOD. Unlike other combatant commands which are
regionally focused, STRATCOM's missions are global.
As noted in the President's Strategic Guidance, STRATCOM commands
``nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary
with the prospect of unacceptable damage''. This capability needs to be
preserved as we continue to reduce the size of these forces and
modernize the infrastructure at the Department of Energy (DOE) that
supports this mission.
General Kehler, here are some of the issues I hope you'll address
this morning:
First, are you satisfied with the direction that we are taking in
our nuclear force posture and with DOE's role in maintaining our
nuclear stockpile so we can continue to reduce its size without testing
while ensuring the stockpile remains safe and meets military
requirements?
Second, do you believe we are on a sustainable path to protect our
space assets and reconstitute them if necessary given the congested and
contested nature of space?
Third, DOD is allocated a block of the electromagnetic spectrum
that connects our space, cyber and electronic warfare assets to our
forces. STRATCOM is the lead combatant command for synchronizing
spectrum operations. How concerned are you about the prospect of losing
spectrum and what are you doing to preserve the DOD's access to it?
Fourth, with the cancellation of the Operationally Responsive Space
program are you worried about our ability to field low-cost but rapidly
deployable satellites that can fill capability gaps between large
national intelligence satellite collection systems and the DOD's
airborne surveillance platforms?
Fifth, what is your strategic vision for the combined use of space
and cyber? These two domains are integrally linked but we have not seen
a plan for integrating capabilities and operations.
Let me turn to CYBERCOM for a moment.
There is much for us to examine in this increasingly important and
complex--but still new--mission area, not only as it affects DOD, but
the government and the economy as a whole.
General Alexander has stated that the relentless industrial
espionage being waged against U.S. industry and government, chiefly by
China, constitute ``the largest transfer of wealth in history.'' The
committee needs to understand the dimensions of this technology theft
and its impact on national security and prosperity.
The Armed Services Committee has focused for some time on the need
to develop comprehensive policies and frameworks to govern planning and
operations in cyberspace. What are the Rules of Engagement if we are
attacked by another nation, what is the doctrine for operations, and
deterrence and warfighting strategies. The administration has made
progress in these areas, as reflected in recent strategy statements and
in the development of comprehensive legislation to improve
cybersecurity. But much more needs to be done.
As a still-developing subunified combatant command, the committee
needs to understand the current and planned relationships between
CYBERCOM and STRATCOM and the other combatant commands. DOD is
considering the establishment of component CYBERCOMs at the combatant
commands. We need to know what command arrangements would apply to
those potential components, as well as the authorities and missions
that STRATCOM has delegated to CYBERCOM and those it plans to retain.
General Alexander has stated publicly that he believes he needs
additional authorities to defend the networks and information systems
of the rest of the Federal Government and those of critical
infrastructure. The committee needs clarity on exactly what authorities
General Alexander is seeking, and whether they go beyond what the
administration has requested in its legislative proposal to Congress.
General Alexander has also often stated that DOD does not in fact
have a unified network but rather ``15,000'' separate networks or
``enclaves'' into which CYBERCOM has little visibility. The committee
needs to understand what can and should be done to correct what would
seem to be an urgent and critical problem.
DOD has conducted a pilot program with a number of major companies
in the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) as it is called, and multiple
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) like AT&T and Verizon. Under this
pilot program, the National Security Agency (NSA) provides
``signatures'' of known cyber penetration tools and methods directly to
the DIB companies or to the ISPs that provide the DIB companies their
communications services. The companies then use these signatures to
detect and block intrusion attempts.
Carnegie Mellon conducted an independent assessment of the DIB
pilot for DOD and concluded that NSA provided few signatures that were
not already known to the companies themselves, and in many cases the
DIB companies by themselves detected advanced threats with their own
non-signature-based detection methods that probably is not known to the
NSA.
I look forward to hearing General Alexander's views on these
issues.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us
this morning and for their many years of service to our Nation.
STRATCOM is in the midst of pivotal change as we proceed
with the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and the
nuclear triad and further embed cyberdefense and cyberattack in
the core mission competencies of 21st century warfare.
On nuclear modernization, I am encouraged that even with
the unprecedented level of defense spending uncertainty, the
Department has maintained its commitment to modernizing the
triad of nuclear delivery vehicles. Unfortunately, the same
cannot be said for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) and their proposal to abandon or delay key elements of
the nuclear weapons complex modernization plan. Ratification of
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty was
conditioned on a commitment by the President to modernize the
weapons complex. Modernization is universally recognized as
essential to the future viability of the nuclear weapons
complex and a prerequisite for future reductions. It has now
been over a year since the treaty entered into force, and we do
not see any sign of the administration keeping those
commitments.
Core to the STRATCOM mission is deterrence. However, as the
frequency, sophistication, and intensity of cyber-related
incidents continue to increase, it is apparent that this
administration's cyber deterrence policies have failed to curb
those malicious actions. The current deterrence framework,
which is overly reliant on the development of defensive
capabilities, has been unsuccessful in dissuading cyber-related
aggression. Whether it is a nation state actively probing our
national security networks, a terrorist organization seeking to
obtain destructive cyber capabilities, or a criminal network's
theft of intellectual property, we must do more to prevent,
respond to, and deter cyberthreats. The inevitability of a
large-scale cyberattack is an existential threat to our Nation,
and a strategy overly reliant on defense does little to
influence the psychology of attackers who operate in a world
with few, if any, negative consequences for their actions.
Last July, General Cartwright, the former Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, criticized the administration's
reactive Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace saying, ``If it's
okay to attack me and I'm not going to do anything other than
improve my defenses every time you attack me, it's very
difficult to come up with a deterrent strategy.'' I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses if they believe that a
strategy overly focused on defense is sustainable and whether
they agree more must be done to deter and dissuade those who
look to hold U.S. interests at risk via cyberspace.
The Senate will soon begin debate on cybersecurity
legislation. The central themes in that debate will focus on
how to improve information sharing across the spectrum and
whether a new Government bureaucracy will improve our
cybersecurity. I have proposed legislation, the Strengthening
and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education,
Information, and Technology (SECURE IT) Act, that first focuses
on removing legal hurdles that hinder information sharing
rather than adding regulations that would shift focus and
previous resources away from the actual cyberthreat. If a
timely response is essential, how would another layer of
bureaucratic red tape be helpful?
While the SECURE IT Act does not give new authorities to
the National Security Agency (NSA) or CYBERCOM, few will deny
that those institutions, not the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), are most capable of guarding against
cyberthreats. Unfortunately, other legislative proposals favor
prematurely adding more government bureaucracy rather than
focusing on accomplishing the objective of protecting our cyber
interests.
General Alexander, during a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)-sponsored symposium at Fordham University, you stated
that if a significant cyberattack against this country were
being planned, there may not be much that either CYBERCOM or
NSA could legally do to discover and thwart such an attack in
advance. You said: ``In order to stop a cyberattack, you have
to see it in real time and you have to have those authorities.
Those are the conditions we've put on the table. Now how and
what Congress chooses, that'll be a policy decision.'' In a
fight where the threat can materialize in milliseconds and
quick action is essential, I look forward to better
understanding what authorities you believe are needed to
protect United States interests both at home and abroad.
The DOD is requesting nearly $3.4 billion for cybersecurity
in fiscal year 2013 and almost $17.5 billion over the Future
Years Defense Program. The cyber budget is one of the only
areas of growth in the DOD budget because of broad agreement
that addressing the cyberthreat must be among our highest
priorities.
I thank the witnesses for appearing before the committee
today and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our distinguished witnesses
for joining us this morning--and for their many years of service to our
Nation.
U.S. Strategic Command is in the midst of pivotal change as we
proceed with the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and the
nuclear triad and further embed cyberdefense and cyberattack in the
core mission competencies of 21st century warfare.
On nuclear modernization, I am encouraged that even with the
unprecedented level of defense spending uncertainty, the Department has
maintained its commitment to modernizing the triad of nuclear delivery
vehicles. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the National
Nuclear Security Administration and their proposal to abandon or delay
key elements of the nuclear weapons complex modernization plan.
Ratification of the New START treaty was conditioned on a commitment by
the President to modernize the weapons complex. Modernization is
universally recognized as essential to the future viability of the
nuclear weapons complex and a prerequisite for future reductions. It
has now been just over a year since the treaty entered into force, and
the President has already reneged on his commitment to modernization.
Core to the Strategic Command mission is deterrence. However, as
the frequency, sophistication, and intensity of cyber-related incidents
continue to increase, it is apparent that this administration's cyber
deterrence policies have failed to curb malicious actions. The current
deterrence framework, which is overly reliant on the development of
defensive capabilities, has been unsuccessful in dissuading cyber-
related aggression. Whether it's a nation state actively probing our
national security networks, a terror organization seeking to obtain
destructive cyber capabilities, or a criminal network's theft of
intellectual property, we must do more to prevent, respond to, and
deter cyber-threats. The inevitability of a large-scale cyberattack is
an existential threat to our Nation, and a strategy overly reliant on
defense does little to influence the psychology of attackers who
operate in a world with few, if any, negative consequences for their
actions.
Last July, General Cartwright, the former Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, criticized the administration's reactive
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, saying `If it's okay to attack me
and I'm not going to do anything other than improve my defenses every
time you attack me, it's very difficult to come up with a deterrent
strategy.' I look forward to hearing from our witnesses if they believe
that a strategy overly focused on defense is sustainable, and whether
they agree more must be done to deter and dissuade those who look to
hold U.S. interests at risk via cyberspace.
The Senate will soon begin debate on cybersecurity legislation. The
central themes in that debate will focus on how to improve information
sharing across the spectrum and whether a new government bureaucracy
will improve our cybersecurity. I have proposed legislation, the SECURE
IT Act, that first focuses on removing legal hurdles that hinder
information sharing, rather than adding regulations that would shift
focus--and precious resources--away from the actual cyberthreat. If a
timely response is essential, how would another layer of bureaucratic
red tape be helpful?
While the SECURE IT Act does not give new authorities to the
National Security Agency or U.S. Cyber Command, few will deny that
those institutions, not the Department of Homeland Security, are most
capable of guarding against cyberthreats. Unfortunately, other
legislative proposals favor prematurely adding more government
bureaucracy, rather than focusing on accomplishing the objective of
protecting our cyber interests.
General Alexander, during a Federal Bureau of Investigation-
sponsored symposium at Fordham University, you stated that if a
significant cyberattack against this country were being planned, there
may not be much that either Cyber Command or the National Security
Agency could legally do to discover and thwart such an attack in
advance. You said, ``In order to stop a cyberattack you have to see it
in real time, and you have to have those authorities. Those are the
conditions we've put on the table. Now how and what Congress chooses,
that'll be a policy decision.'' In a fight where the threat can
materialize in milliseconds and quick action is essential, I look
forward to better understanding what authorities you believe are needed
to protect United States interests both at home and abroad.
The Department of Defense is requesting nearly $3.4 billion for
cybersecurity in fiscal year 2013 and almost $17.5 billion over the
Future Years Defense Program. The cyber budget is one of the only areas
of growth in the DOD budget because of broad agreement that addressing
the cyberthreat must be among our highest priorities. I thank the
witnesses for appearing before the committee today and look forward to
their testimony.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
General Kehler.

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC DEFENSE

General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If it is okay with
you, I would like to have my statement admitted to the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
General Kehler. Sir, Senator McCain, and distinguished
members of the committee, thanks for this opportunity to
present my views on STRATCOM's missions and priorities.
I am very pleased to be here today with General Keith
Alexander, CYBERCOM's Commander, and of course, as both of you
have pointed out, cyber is a critical component of our global
capabilities.
Without question, Mr. Chairman, we continue to face a very
challenging global security environment marked by constant
change, enormous complexity, and profound uncertainty. Indeed,
change and surprise have characterized the year that has past
since my last appearance before this committee. Over that time,
the men and women of STRATCOM have participated in support of
operations in Libya and Japan, have supported the withdrawal of
U.S. combat forces from Iraq, and have observed the Arab
Spring, the bold operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the
death of Kim Jong Il, and the succession of Kim Jong-un,
growing violence in Syria, continued tensions with Iran, the
passage of the Budget Control Act, and the adoption of new
defense Strategic Guidance.
Through this extraordinary period of challenge and change,
STRATCOM's focus has remained constant: to partner with the
other combatant commands; to deter, detect, and prevent attacks
on the United States, our allies and partners; and to be
prepared to employ force, as needed, in support of our national
security objectives. Our priorities are clear: deter attack,
partner with the other commands to win today, respond to the
new challenges in space, build cyberspace capability and
capacity, and prepare for uncertainty. Transcending all of
these priorities is the threat of nuclear materials or weapons
in the hands of violent extremists.
We do not have a crystal ball at STRATCOM, but we believe
events of the last year can help us glimpse the type of future
conflict that we must prepare for. Conflict will likely be
increasingly hybrid in nature, encompassing all domains, air,
sea, land, space, and cyberspace. It will likely cross
traditional geographic boundaries, involve multiple
participants, and be waged by actors wielding combinations of
capabilities, strategies, and tactics. I think it is important
to note the same space and cyberspace tools that connect us
together to enable global commerce, navigation, and
communication also present tremendous opportunities for
disruption and perhaps destruction.
Just last month, DOD released new Strategic Guidance to
address these challenges. This new guidance describes the way
ahead for the entire DOD, but I believe many portions are
especially relevant to STRATCOM in our broad assigned
responsibilities.
For example, global presence, succeeding in current
conflicts, deterring and defeating aggression, including those
seeking to deny our power projection, countering weapons of
mass destruction, effectively operating in cyberspace, space,
and across all other domains, and maintaining a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent, are all important areas in the
new strategy where STRATCOM's global reach and strategic focus
play a vital role.
No question these are important responsibilities. There are
real risks involved in the scenarios we find ourselves in
today. It is my job to prepare for those events and to advocate
for the sustainment and modernization efforts we need to meet
the challenges. In that regard, the fiscal year 2013 budget
request is pivotal for our future. We are working hard to
improve our planning and better integrate our efforts to
counter weapons of mass destruction. We need to proceed with
planned modernization of our nuclear delivery and command and
control systems. We need to proceed with life extension
programs for our nuclear weapons and modernize the highly
specialized industrial complex that cares for them. We need to
improve the resilience of our space capabilities and enhance
our situational awareness of this increasingly congested,
competitive, and contested domain. We need to improve the
protection and resilience of our cyber networks, enhance our
situational awareness, increase our capability and capacity,
and work across the interagency to increase the protection of
our critical infrastructure. We need to enhance our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. We
need to better manage and synchronize the crucial processing,
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities that support them.
We need to get better at electronic warfare. We need to
practice how to operate in a degraded space and cyberspace
environment. We need to improve our understanding of our
adversaries. We need to review our plans and improve our
decision processes and command relations, all subjects that the
two of you touched on in your opening comments.
In short, the new national security reality calls for a new
strategic approach that promotes agile, decentralized action
from a fully integrated and, I would say, fully interdependent
and resilient joint force. These are tough challenges, but the
men and women of STRATCOM view our challenges as opportunities,
a chance to partner with the other commands to forge a better,
smarter, and faster joint force.
We remain committed to work with this committee, the
Services, other agencies, and our international partners to
provide the flexible, agile, and reliable strategic deterrence
and mission assurance capabilities that our Nation and our
friends need in this increasingly uncertain world.
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor and a privilege to lead
America's finest men and women. They are our greatest
advantage. I am enormously proud of their bravery and
sacrifice, and I pledge to stand with them and for them to
ensure we retain the best force the world has ever seen. In
that, I join with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior leaders, my
colleagues, the other combatant commanders in thanking you for
the support you and this committee have provided them in the
past, present, and on into the future.
Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pause and
remind the committee that STRATCOM is headquartered in the
great State of Nebraska, and I wanted to take this opportunity
to thank Senator Ben Nelson for his service. Senator Nelson
will retire at the end of this Congress, and during his
service, he has worked diligently to better the lives of our
troops and to improve America's strategic forces. Those who
live and work at Offutt Air Force Base are well aware of his
deep commitment to them. So on behalf of your fellow Nebraskans
at STRATCOM, Senator, we offer our thanks.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I'm very
pleased to be here alongside General Keith Alexander, Commander of U.S.
Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)--an essential component of U.S. Strategic
Command's (STRATCOM) global capabilities.
Since I assumed command a little more than a year ago, we have been
challenged by new fiscal constraints at home and complex national
security events abroad. I am very proud of how our men and women in
uniform and Defense civilians are meeting these financial and
operational challenges with professionalism, dedication, and a keen
mission focus. I know our team members very much appreciate your
support, and I look forward to working with you as we maintain the
world's finest military, avoid a hollow force, and make strategy-based
capability decisions, all the while keeping faith with our All-
Volunteer Force.

INTRODUCTION

Today, I am pleased to report to you that America's Strategic
Command is strong, resilient, and ready. At STRATCOM, we continue to
improve our capabilities and synchronize our multiple mission
responsibilities--individually and with our partners in the other
combatant commands (COCOM)--to deter strategic attacks, to enhance the
combat capability of the joint force, and to assure access and use of
the critical domains of space and cyberspace. I look forward to
discussing the global strategic environment, the new Defense Strategic
Guidance, and how STRATCOM's strategic deterrence and assurance efforts
support the National Security Strategy.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Without question, we face a very challenging global security
environment. The coming years are likely to be characterized by
constant change, enormous complexity, and profound uncertainty. Since
my last appearance before the committee, we have witnessed our fair
share of change. The Budget Control Act of 2011 realigned national
fiscal priorities. U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq, and they partnered
with our allies to support the Libyan people. The Arab Spring brought
dramatic change to an unsettled region, and tensions grew inside Syria
and between Iran and the world. In North Korea, Kim Jong Il's death
made way for a new generation in power. And, violent extremists
suffered several setbacks--most notably Osama bin Laden's death.
Some of these events were positive; some were not. For some, the
outcome remains uncertain. In a few cases we were surprised and,
looking forward, surprise is one of the greatest dangers we will face.
Indeed, violent extremism, popular revolutions, persistent conflict,
financial stress, competition for natural resources, and the transition
and redistribution of power among global actors will continue to bring
uncertainty to our National security landscape.
Hybrid Conflict
Conflict remains a fundamentally human enterprise conducted for
political purposes. Yet, technology and ideology are pushing its means
and methods in new and evolutionary directions at an ever-increasing
pace. At STRATCOM, we believe we can glimpse the future of conflict if
we look carefully today, so that we can prepare.
First, conflict will encompass all domains--including air, sea,
land, space, and cyberspace--all tied together through the
electromagnetic spectrum. Second, it will cross traditional geographic
boundaries--particularly with the emergence of new cyber weapons, the
increased use of space, and the proliferation of familiar weapons like
ballistic missiles. Third, it will involve multiple participants. A
wider range of actors has access to advanced capabilities with lower
entry costs, seeking to challenge us from the shadows. Finally,
conflict will be hybrid--not neatly categorized as ``regular'' or
``irregular'' warfare. More actors, leveraging combinations of
capabilities, strategies, and tactics--potentially including weapons of
mass destruction (WMD)--will seek to achieve their goals by denying or
disrupting our Nation's ability to project power and maintain global
awareness across all domains.
These are sobering challenges. Hybrid, technologically advanced,
and cross-domain threats can reach our doorstep in seconds, threatening
vital capabilities and critical infrastructure. The same networks that
enable global commerce, navigation, and communication also present
tremendous potential for disruption. In particular, cyber tools
combined with phenomenal increases in computing power may have
surpassed the threat posed by more traditional means of espionage,
presenting particularly problematic economic and national security
challenges.
The time honored military concepts surrounding speed and distance
have also changed, increasing the speed at which initiative can shift,
compressing our decision space, and stressing our strategies, plans,
operations, and command relationships. Centuries ago, it could take
months to influence an adversary by moving an army. However, navies,
then airpower, and now space and cyberspace capabilities dramatically
compressed the time and distance required to create effects.
Adversaries today need not occupy any territory to create disruptive
and potentially decisive strategic effects across domain and geographic
boundaries. We should not expect adversaries to leave our homeland
completely undisturbed while we operate globally.
New Strategic Approach
In such a complex and profoundly uncertain world, sustaining the
strategic stability that enables security at home, global commerce for
our Nation, and freedom of action within the global commons requires
great resilience and deep integration. The threats we face are not
divisible by geography or domain. We must meet them with a similarly
indivisible joint force--the strength of which lies not in its parts,
but in their sum.
Our challenges demand strategic thinking, unity of action, joint
interdependence, commander focus, flexibility, decentralized execution,
and innovation. They also require a robust, strategic imagination that
allows us to anticipate the unexpected and to react to surprise in
stride when--not if--it occurs. As a result, at STRATCOM we are
emphasizing that every plan and operation must be well integrated with
other combatant commands. We must work together, across other COCOMs
and interagency partners, to shape the environment away from conflict,
to assure our allies, to expand our leaders' decision space, and to
protect our Nation's global access and freedom of action.
As the U.S. transitions from a decade of conflict abroad and acts
to sustain its leadership in the world, we are guided by a new
strategic approach entitled Priorities for 21st Century Defense. We
understand that we will face the future with a joint force that is
smaller, but also more agile, flexible, ready, and technologically
advanced. We will have a global presence, emphasizing the Asia-Pacific
region and the Middle East, while preserving key commitments elsewhere
and our ability to conduct primary missions to protect our core
national interests.
The new defense strategic guidance establishes priorities and
delineates ten primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces--most of which
have particular relevance to STRATCOM. For counterterrorism and
irregular warfare, STRATCOM provides space, ISR, precision strike, and
cyber support. As we fulfill our responsibility to deter and defeat
aggression, we are developing tailored, 21st century deterrence options
to address a wider range of adversaries across the spectrum of
conflict. STRATCOM's global capabilities also enhance the ability of
the joint force to project power despite anti-access and area-denial
challenges, perhaps our greatest military advantage. This supports
deterrence at all levels. STRATCOM plays a key role in DOD efforts to
counter weapons of mass destruction, synchronizing planning, advocating
for capabilities, and delivering expertise to other commands. In
closely linked, technologically advanced national security areas we
ensure America's ability to operate effectively in cyberspace and space
each and every day. Here we face real threats to our systems and
networks--threats that are growing and require continued vigilance,
improvement, and resilience. As we work to Maintain a Safe, Secure, and
Effective Nuclear Deterrent, the strategy says ``we will field nuclear
forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the
prospect of unacceptable damage both to deter potential adversaries and
to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count
on America's security commitments.'' The professionals in STRATCOM
perform the nuclear deterrence mission every day. Finally, and while
principally the role of geographic COCOMs, we supports a wide range of
efforts to Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil
Authorities, including our cybersecurity assistance to the Department
of Homeland Security and missile defense programs.

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These are not the only primary missions mentioned in the new
strategy. As a supporting command, STRATCOM also regularly contributes
to COCOM efforts to provide a stabilizing presence; to conduct
stability and counterinsurgency operations; and to conduct
humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.
In sum, the new strategy calls for a strategic approach that
promotes agile, decentralized action from fully integrated--I would say
fully interdependent--and resilient commands and joint forces. And,
over the last decade, our joint force has made great strides
integrating unique Service and interagency capabilities. Our joint
forces have become more integrated, and our joint commands have become
more interdependent--producing greater unity of effort. Since the
threats we face are not necessarily divisible by geography or domain,
integration that advances cross-domain synergy \1\ is imperative.
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\1\ Cross domain synergy: ``The complementary vice merely additive
employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances
the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the
others--to establish superiority in some combination of domains that
will provide the freedom of action required by the mission.'' Joint
Operational Access Concept, Foreword.
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Achieving effective joint force synergy was a key principle in the
strategy that shaped fiscal year 2013 budget requirements. Implementing
the new strategy in a period of fiscal constraints is a substantial
challenge, but I am confident that we can recalibrate our capabilities
and make selective additional investments to succeed in these mission
areas, based on priorities outlined in the strategy. This is the right
approach.

U S. STRATEGIC COMMAND TODAY

Over the last decade, STRATCOM's responsibilities have grown in
size and scope, responding to evolving national security needs. Ten
years ago this fall, DOD disestablished both U.S. Space Command \2\ and
the first U.S. Strategic Command \3\--merging them and beginning the
development of STRATCOM with its broad, functional responsibilities.
Within just the past year, the Secretary of Defense added to our duties
by reassigning the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) \4\ to
STRATCOM. We also returned several ``information operations''
responsibilities to the Joint Staff, such as planning, coordinating,
and executing cross-areas of responsibility (AOR) and national-level
operations, supporting other combatant commands' planning efforts, and
advocating for military deception and operations security capabilities.
This realignment of responsibilities allows us to better focus on the
enduring joint electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum mission.
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\2\ A unified combatant command responsible for military space
activities and (at the time) the relatively new computer network
operations mission.
\3\ A unified combatant command activated in 1992, solely focused
on the nuclear deterrence and associated command and control missions.
\4\ Formerly assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command, JWAC is
headquartered at Naval Support Facility Dahlgren, VA.
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The long series of changes begun in 2002 might appear random, but
it was not. Moving missions of global significance and trans-regional
impact to a single combatant command allows one organization to apply a
global, strategic perspective to unique problem sets and to gain
synergy from a range of strategic capabilities. STRATCOM is now able to
provide our National leaders with a range of strategic, operational,
and tactical options and capabilities that contribute to deterrence and
enhance the effectiveness of the joint force.
Today, STRATCOM exists to perform two fundamental missions: 1) to
deter attack and assure our allies with a combination of capabilities
that goes far beyond the nuclear force; and, 2) along with the other
COCOMs, to employ force as directed to achieve national security
objectives. The complementary (not merely additive) nature of
STRATCOM's unique, strategic responsibilities allows us to wield
formidable global capabilities every day, usually as a supporting
command (and usually supporting multiple commands simultaneously),
supporting global and regional deterrence and assurance activities.

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For example, STRATCOM provided several of America's unique B-2
bombers to U.S. Africa Command to support last year's Operation Odyssey
Dawn--quickly providing an essential capability not otherwise available
in that command. After the tragic events in Japan, STRATCOM also
delivered substantial modeling and communications support to U.S.
Pacific Command's (PACOM) Operation Tomodachi recovery efforts.
Finally, later this year and in recognition of emerging Asia-Pacific
challenges, we will co-host a major exercise with PACOM to test and
demonstrate joint capability and command interdependence, as we
continue to explore and refine opportunities for greater collaboration.
These and many other scenarios highlight how the interdependent
combination of capabilities and synchronization of activities within
STRATCOM and with the other COCOMs facilitates a more flexible and
effective joint force effort. To that end, our staff is developing and
implementing a more comprehensive and deliberate deterrence and
assurance campaign to sustain our capabilities, synchronize our
efforts, and position us to act as needed.

DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE

Deterrence and assurance have been part of the National lexicon for
well over half a century, and although different today, they remain
important and highly relevant concepts. The Cold War ended 20 years
ago. Today, deterrence and assurance are not solely about Cold War
deterrence objectives, they are about our Nation's unique security
needs--in a world that still has nuclear weapons. Deterrence is
fundamentally about influencing an actor's decisions. The deterrence
decision calculus still revolves around familiar concepts like imposing
costs and denying benefits; however, in today's world we also strive to
highlight the consequences of restraint (benefits of the status quo).
Deterrence is about communicating our capabilities and intentions,
and it is about more than just one weapon system. It is about what the
U.S. and our allies as a whole can bring to bear, tailored to specific
actors and threats. Its practice encompasses both the nuclear and a
strong conventional offensive force, missile defenses where
appropriate, unfettered access and use of space and cyberspace, and, in
all warfare areas, modern capabilities that are resilient and
sustained. Our challenge is to apply deterrence and assurance concepts
to today's complex global security environment. Deterring, detecting,
and preventing attacks against the U.S. is the responsibility of every
combatant commander, and although strategic deterrence is STRATCOM's
particular responsibility, it is a global charge we carry out in close
coordination with other COCOMs and elements of government.
For decades, ``strategic deterrence'' focused solely on leveraging
U.S. nuclear capabilities to deter our adversaries, but that day--the
era of ``one-size-fits-all'' deterrence and assurance--has passed.
Strategic deterrence today requires combinations of tailored options
and capabilities, wielded across multiple commands as an integrated
whole, based on a robust understanding of the adversary's decision
calculus and our mission context. It requires faster output from our
intelligence, strategy, and planning experts. This is not easy. We must
shape deterrence approaches that communicate expectations, strength,
and resilience well in advance of adversary decisions, taking every
opportunity to better understand each actor's expectations and
perceptions--particularly in space and cyberspace.

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
The threat posed by WMD in the hands of violent extremists
transcends all of STRATCOM's priorities and encompasses every
geographic AOR. The 2010 National Security Strategy states that ``there
is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass
destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear
weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional
states.'' \5\ Published shortly thereafter, the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) noted that 21st century nuclear dangers are ``grave and
growing threats.'' Nuclear weapons foster a sense of strategic
stability between some actors, but WMD in general remain dangerously
alluring capabilities to rogue and non-state actors.
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\5\ National Security Strategy of the United States, pp. 4.
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The NPR elevated the prevention of nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism to the top of the policy agenda as it outlined five
objectives to guide the United States in reducing global nuclear
dangers. STRATCOM plays a principal role in efforts to reduce nuclear
dangers by deterring WMD usage, dissuading their acquisition, and
supporting efforts to eliminate potential WMD threats. This is a great
challenge, and we are working to ensure our sense of urgency and pace
of preparation match the threat.
We have unique CWMD responsibilities at STRATCOM. We synchronize
global CWMD planning efforts across the COCOMs, work to improve
interagency relationships, and synchronize advocacy for essential CWMD
capabilities. Our semi-annual global CWMD synchronization conferences
have highlighted the need to improve coordination and to expand
foundational intelligence and information sharing to deter and address
emerging threats. This includes accelerating the speed with which we
develop and field capabilities like stand-off detection for nuclear
materials, better nuclear forensics, and improved global situational
awareness.
One important CWMD development in the past year was the activation
of STRATCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-
E). SJFHQ-E stood up officially on 3 February 2012 \6\ and is commanded
by the two-star officer who is also deputy director of the STRATCOM
Center for Combating WMD (SCC WMD) \7\. When fully operational next
year, SJFHQ-E will be a full-time, trained, deployable, joint command
and control element able to quickly integrate into an operational HQ,
conduct both deliberate and crisis planning, and maintain awareness of
the WMD environment. This small standing headquarters will be augmented
when needed and will operate in close coordination with the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency and the U.S. Army's 20th Support Command.
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\6\ Our goal is for SJFHQ-E to reach full operational capability by
the end of 2013.
\7\ Located at Fort Belvoir, VA, SCC WMD is co-located with the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Mr. Ken Myers serves as the SCC
WMD Director, as well as the DTRA Director.
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Nuclear Deterrence
Ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force
remains a core responsibility of STRATCOM and is my number one
priority. As stated in the NPR, nuclear weapons retain an important
role in our country's defense. They represent a unique, relevant, and
powerful deterrent capability even as their role changes. Nuclear
deterrence remains a tremendously important component of strategic
deterrence as we seek to influence adversary decision makers by
communicating a credible capability.
We have witnessed an impressive, 65-year period with neither
nuclear use nor great-power war, during which we regularly adjusted our
nuclear capabilities to match the global environment. Since the end of
the Cold War, we significantly altered our own nuclear force structure
and posture. We reduced the total number of ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs), converted four Ohio-class SSBNs to carry
conventional cruise missiles, affirmed the B-1 bomber's non-nuclear
role, removed all dual-capable heavy bombers from nuclear alert,
eliminated the Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM),
substantially reduced the Minuteman ICBM force, withdrew numerous
weapons abroad, and dramatically reduced our nuclear stockpile. In
total, our stockpile is down over 75 percent from the day the Berlin
Wall fell.
These are significant changes. At each decision point along the
way, the United States carefully accounted for potential impacts on
deterrence capability and strategic stability. The end result is a
substantially smaller force but one in which confidence remains to
deter adversaries, assure allies, and maintain strategic stability in a
crisis.
STRATCOM operates the nuclear deterrent force and is responsible
for nuclear weapon employment planning. I can assure you that today's
weapons and Triad of delivery platforms are safe, secure, and
effective. The Triad--SSBNs, ICBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers,
with their associated tankers--continues to serve us well by providing
unique and important attributes (survivability, promptness, and
flexibility) that create insurmountable problems for any would-be
adversary. Moving forward, and to sustain our strong nuclear deterrent
force, we fully support the continued modernization and sustainment of
delivery systems, weapon life extension programs, stockpile
surveillance activities, nuclear complex infrastructure
recapitalization, naval reactor design activities, and upgrades for
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities. We are
also working across DOD to finalize and synchronize New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START) implementation decisions routine
operations and maintenance to minimize impacts on the operational
force. We are on track to fully implement the central limits of New
START by February 5, 2018.
As we consider possible future changes, I remain committed to the
principle that a well-defined strategy must ultimately drive nuclear
force structure and posture. STRATCOM is a full participant in the
analysis of future deterrence requirements called for in the NPR, and
we are providing military operational advice regarding implications of
alternative approaches. Let me briefly review today's nuclear force.

Weapons
Over the past few years, a national consensus emerged around the
need to modernize our weapons, delivery platforms, and the programs and
facilities that sustain them. Since assuming command, I visited each of
the Nation's nuclear laboratories \8\ and key industrial facilities.
Seeing the condition of our Nation's nuclear facilities and meeting the
dedicated people who are the actual stewards of our nuclear weapons
stockpile provided me a unique and irreplaceable appreciation for their
needs.
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\8\ Los Alamos National Laboratory (NM), Sandia National Laboratory
(NM), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (CA).
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As our weapons continue to age and we face the continued erosion of
the nuclear enterprise's physical and intellectual capital, we must
protect important investments for stockpile certification, warhead life
extension, and infrastructure recapitalization. These investments are
central to the new Priorities for 21st Century Defense, and without
them, maintaining the long-term credibility and viability of the
Nation's nuclear deterrent will not be possible. Of all the elements of
the nuclear enterprise, I am most concerned with the potential for
declining or inadequate investment in the nuclear weapons enterprise
that would result in our inability to sustain the deterrent force.

Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
The Navy's SSBNs and sea-launched Trident D-5 ballistic missiles
constitute the Triad's most survivable leg. This stealthy and highly-
capable force requires modernization to replace aging and hull life-
limited Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. Although the Ohio-
class replacement program will now be delayed by two years, the risk
will be manageable. We must continue necessary preparatory activities
and work to develop and field the Common Missile Compartment for both
the Ohio-class replacement and the United Kingdom's Vanguard follow-on
submarines. With your support, I am confident that today's approach
described in the fiscal year 2013 budget request will continue the sea-
based leg's strong deterrent capability.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
The Air Force's widely dispersed Minuteman III ICBMs comprise the
Triad's most responsive platform leg, and the Air Force is successfully
concluding efforts to sustain the Minuteman III force through 2020 and
to enhance safety and security for the foreseeable future. STRATCOM is
working with the Air Force to support life-extension programs to
sustain the force through 2030. We are also participating in the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives to study the full
range of concepts to eventually inform a decision to recapitalize the
land-based Triad leg.

Heavy Bombers
While the Nation relies on the long-range conventional strike
capability of our heavy bombers, their nuclear capability continues to
provide us with critical flexibility and visibility, as well as a rapid
hedge response against technical challenges in other legs of the Triad.
Planned sustainment and modernization activities will ensure a credible
nuclear bomber capability through 2035. Looking forward, a new,
penetrating bomber is required to credibly sustain our broad range of
deterrence and strike options beyond the lifespan of today's platforms.
The budget supports this effort, and STRATCOM is working with the Air
Force to develop requirements for the next dual-capable (nuclear and
conventional) long-range strike platform and associated Long Range
Stand-off missile. The Air Force is also replacing the aging KC-135
tanker fleet with the KC-46A, ensuring an enduring air refueling
capability essential to long-range bomber operations and airborne
nuclear command and control platform endurance.

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
In many ways, the NC3 component of the nuclear deterrent force is
the most problematic. Ensuring continuously available and reliable
communication from the President to the nuclear force is fundamental to
our deterrence credibility. As with many systems and capabilities
across our force structure, various NC3 components require
modernization. Through smart investment and programming decisions,
leveraging existing and emerging technologies, and in partnership
across the department and interagency, we can achieve a robust and
resilient 21st century NC3 architecture that both ensures this critical
communication chain remains protected and is capable of addressing a
broader range of threats and operational requirements. Within this
context, I want to convey my appreciation for Congress' focus on NC3,
and specifically fiscal year 2012 support for the new STRATCOM
Headquarters Command and Control Complex at Offutt Air Force Base.
As we pursue deterrence and assurance concepts in today's complex
global security environment, we recognize that a broad range of
capabilities must contribute to tailored options. We believe the full
range of capabilities assigned to STRATCOM comprise our deterrence
``tool kit.'' Each of these also contributes to daily operations and
activities that enhance the combat capability of the joint force. Let
me briefly describe the status of other capability areas:
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
In a global environment characterized by complexity, asymmetric
threats, and uncertainty, detecting and understanding adversary plans,
intentions, and warning indicators has never been more important. As
ISR technologies and platforms have improved in both the quality and
quantity of data collected, we have seen a steadily increasing demand
for ISR collection to meet routine and crisis requirements. Through our
Joint Functional Component Command for ISR (JFCC ISR),\9\ STRATCOM's
leadership in managing DOD's ISR capabilities and in assessing ISR
performance has been pivotal to meeting today's intelligence
challenges.
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\9\ Located at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling (JBAB), DC. LTG Burgess
is the Director of DIA and is dual-hatted as CDR JFCC ISR.
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As our global knowledge demands expand, orchestrating our ISR
operations to gain greater effectiveness and efficiency is increasingly
necessary and challenging. First, preventing strategic surprise
requires unparalleled battlespace awareness. Second, the demand for ISR
collection continues to outpace our ability to fully resource that
demand. Therefore, we must refine our ISR global force management
processes and hone our collection strategies to improve our agility and
effectiveness, making our ISR capabilities even more responsive combat
multipliers.
Our ability to process and analyze data from increasingly capable
ISR platforms is also a growing challenge. Not only are analysts
dealing with more data, but also with an increased operations tempo
that imposes ever greater demands on the timeliness of their analyses
and reporting. Conservative estimates predict a one hundred percent
increase in analysts is necessary to meet our combatant commanders'
requirements. This level of growth would be unrealistic in almost any
environment, let alone a fiscally constrained one, driving us to seek
further efficiencies and concepts to get more from our existing
analytic enterprise.
A key to doing this will be to improve data management, increase
computing power and capability to help the analysts, and manage ISR
processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) more effectively. Our
intent is to manage resources globally while maintaining regional and
local focus. This will ensure we can move faster to our highest
priorities during and between emerging crises and contingencies,
guaranteeing knowledge dominance for our commanders. JFCC-ISR has been
pursuing these goals, and their efforts paid dividends during the
recent simultaneous intelligence demands imposed by Libyan operations,
the Japanese reactor crisis, and the Afghanistan surge. While our
vectors are in the right direction, we must continue to build our ISR
concepts and processes to be even more agile and effective in the
future.

Global Strike
STRATCOM is responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing
global strike activities (kinetic nuclear, kinetic conventional, and
non-kinetic) and advocating for required capabilities. Global strike
capabilities allow DOD to expand the range of integrated deterrent
options available to the President and enable combatant commanders'
access to capabilities not otherwise available in their particular AOR.
STRATCOM's unique strategic capabilities enable us to rapidly support
national and theater global strike missions in a number of ways.
In addition, STRATCOM continues to support and advocate for a rapid
conventional strike capability. This would enhance strategic deterrence
with the ability to promptly deliver a non-nuclear effect against a
limited subset of highest value targets at substantial ranges. The Air
Force, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Army
have made important progress developing non-ballistic, boost-glide
technologies applicable to a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
mission, as highlighted by the Army's successful flight test of the
Advanced Hypersonic Weapon concept this past November. I ask for your
continued support of research, development, test, and evaluation
funding as we explore various conventional global strike system
concepts and basing alternatives.

Integrated Missile Defense (IMD)
Ballistic missiles remain a significant threat to the U.S. homeland
and a growing threat to our allies and our forces deployed abroad. As a
means of terror, or to deter U.S. or allied regional intervention, or
as a trans-regional means to employ WMD, ballistic missiles continue to
become more accurate, lethal, and capable--attractive attributes to any
number of current or potential adversaries.
In response, U.S. and allied capabilities to deter, detect, and
defeat these weapons are also growing, and decades of research and
development continue to pay dividends in terms of capability and
credibility. And, as we consider a more integrated joint force, missile
defense is an area that particularly highlights the importance of
considering the full range of integrated strategic capabilities--since
ballistic missile threats can rapidly transit areas of responsibility
and may perhaps best be deterred or defeated via space, cyberspace, or
global strike capabilities long before their launch requires action
from regionally-based interceptors.
Ballistic missile threats are likely to grow at least as rapidly as
our defensive assets, and we have little margin for error in
acquisition and force management decisions. STRATCOM plays important
roles coordinating operational support and synchronizing missile
defense planning, operating concepts, and capability advocacy. Our
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC
IMD) \10\ leads an annual global ballistic missile defense assessment
to look across all areas of responsibility, consider individual
combatant commanders' assessments of risk, find common threads, and
make recommendations to reduce global risk. STRATCOM also coordinates
the Air and Missile Defense Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) across
other COCOMs, improving the Services' and the Missile Defense Agency's
(MDA) understanding of prioritized joint warfighter capability needs.
This enhances efforts to provide persistent detection; expand data
sharing among the U.S., allies, and partners; field effective defensive
systems; and provide appropriately robust joint training. As the Joint
Functional Manager for missile defense capabilities, JFCC IMD
recommends the global allocation of low-density, high-demand assets,
including force rotations, and force sufficiency--thus making the best
use of limited resources.
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\10\ Located at Schriever Air Force Base, CO. LTG Formica serves as
CDR JFCC IMD, as well as Commanding General U.S. Army-Strategic
(ARSTRAT) and Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC).
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Over the past year, these efforts substantially improved our
overall missile defenses. We upgraded and integrated early warning
radars in Greenland and England, improving battle-management software
for data integration. We increased the number of Aegis BMD-equipped
ships. And, we fielded and integrated additional elements of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), an effort that improves
missile defenses through the acquisition and integration of more
advanced capabilities and the expansion of key partnerships.
In specific cases, such as limited threats against the United
States and/or regional contingencies, our growing missile defenses play
important deterrence and assurance roles. The application of future
Phased Adaptive Approaches to other regions is an integral part of
theater defenses, and we must continue to strengthen regional
partnerships to meet emerging ballistic missile threats. I am confident
that planned and budgeted missile defense investments will continue to
support deterrence and assurance goals by significantly improving the
protection of our homeland, our forward-based forces, and our allies.
STRATCOM is committed to future capability development efforts that
leverage past successes, address the most pressing and most likely
threats, and produce field-tested, reliable assets in a cost-effective
manner.
Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) and Electronic Warfare
The EMS is the connective tissue for literally every aspect of
civil, commercial, and military activity. For example, signals flowing
through the spectrum connect airborne ISR aircraft to the ground troops
they support, to the fleet offshore, and to commanders anywhere in the
world. We are all linked, in an increasing number of ways, to modern
technological necessities whose very design assumes unfettered access
across the spectrum. Yet, this access is something we assume with
increasing risk, particularly for the closely linked national security
areas of space and cyberspace.
Today, there are three general concerns regarding the EMS. First,
increased demand for interconnectivity and a growing base of EMS
``users'' is creating pressure to make greater segments available for
public use. Second, growing use is creating ``crowding'' in the EMS--a
problem that can result in inadvertent interference of civil,
commercial, and military activities alike. EMS use priorities must be
carefully managed to ensure access for force training, readiness, and
operations. Finally, our growing civil, commercial, and military
reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum presents adversaries an
opportunity. We must assume adversaries will seek disruptive or
destructive EMS capabilities to obtain their own asymmetric edge. At a
time when no single discipline or command can address any conflict
alone, efforts to strengthen integration, ensure persistent spectrum
access where and when we need it, and deter adversary disruption or
exploitation are important deterrence and assurance objectives.
To improve joint approaches to the electromagnetic spectrum,
STRATCOM is focusing its enduring electronic warfare and
electromagnetic spectrum responsibilities by establishing the Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center (JEMSCC). The JEMSCC will
expand previous joint electromagnetic spectrum operations efforts,
effectively organizing a single warfighter organization to advocate for
and support joint electronic warfare capability strategy, doctrine,
planning, requirements, resources, test, training, and operational
support. The JEMSCC will place a particular focus on the coordination
of electromagnetic spectrum-related elements to enhance joint
warfighting capabilities across domains and our ability to fight
through degraded environments.
Space
The National Security Space Strategy highlights the importance of
U.S. leadership for the global economy, scientific discovery, modern
necessities, our national security, and global strategic stability.
Though increasingly contested, congested, and competitive, space
remains the ultimate high ground, and ensuring access to mission-
essential space capabilities through all phases of conflict is
essential to maintaining and enhancing the strategic advantages space
provides. Mindful of the need to maintain and enhance space's benefits
for our national security enterprise, particularly in light of today's
dynamic operating environment, the National Security Space Strategy
identified a set of interrelated strategic approaches designed to
sustain not just America's leadership in space but our ability to
provide benefits for global navigation, commerce, communication, and
research. As the combatant command responsible for military space
operations, support, and capability advocacy, STRATCOM fully supports
these approaches and is actively pursuing capability and cooperative
improvements.

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The space domain physically borders every geographic area of
responsibility and shares virtual boundaries with cyberspace. It is
vital to monitoring strategic and military developments, responding to
natural and man-made disasters, and understanding environmental trends.
In short, space systems provide unfettered global access. However, we
cannot assume that our space advantages will automatically continue.
Today's constellations continue to age and require replacement, and
although we still maintain a qualitative edge, technological diffusion
and the sheer number of spacefaring nations could place our space
advantages at risk. Our assets also face a range of challenges from
both natural or unintentional manmade threats (space weather,
accidental collisions, and inadvertent electromagnetic interference)
and purposeful jamming, cyber intrusions, interference, anti-satellite
weapons, and kinetic attack (on space- or terrestrial-based space
assets).
Sustaining U.S. advantages in the space domain requires that we act
deliberately to enhance our own military advantage and to reduce
strategic risk--both of which require broad collaboration across the
U.S. Government and with our international partners. We must
comprehensively assess the space capabilities we require to sustain our
military advantage--focusing on cross-service and cross-organization
capabilities to secure the greatest value. This includes working with
the Services to refine and communicate clear, well-defined, and
realistic requirements for each capability, mindful that the long-term
strategy for assured access to space relies on a capable national
industrial base. We must also take advantage of opportunities to work
with other partners. For example, in January U.S officials announced a
20-year agreement that will add Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and New Zealand to our current partnership with Australia
for global military satellite communications. Now shared with these
additional partners, the Wideband Global Satellite Communications (WGS)
program provides high-capacity communications for many more military
users, and this agreement expands the program to secure a planned,
ninth satellite.
Reducing risks to space assets begins with situational awareness.
Establishing and maintaining situational awareness in this vast, global
domain is fundamental. It is also problematic. Each orbital regime
presents its own unique challenges, and space is a harsh and
technically challenging environment. Over the past several years, the
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) under the direction of our Joint
Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE) \11\ has made great
progress expanding the number of objects tracked, the number of
satellite close-approaches analyzed, and the number of partners
involved in the space situational awareness sharing process. We
currently track more than 22,000 orbiting objects, and the JSpOC
Mission System (JMS) and additional sensors contained in the fiscal
year 2013 budget request will further improve our ability to detect
smaller objects (increasing the number of objects tracked) and the
frequency and fidelity of analyses (further contributing to the safety
of space flight). Agreements that allow us to expand space surveillance
and communication access points and data sharing hold great promise for
improving shared space situational awareness and operational
effectiveness. Additional sharing agreements, particularly those that
lead to the eventual transition of the JSpOC into a truly international
Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), have great potential to
demonstrate space leadership and expand information available to all
users. Finally, clearly communicating expectations and a shared
understanding of space norms and responsibilities among space-faring
nations will provide an important foundation for deterring undesirable
aggression against space capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Lt. Gen. Helms
serves as CDR JFCC Space as well as Commander, 14th Air Force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyberspace
Few might ever have imagined how cyberspace would evolve--globally
connected and geographically unconstrained--to define modern life for
billions of people. Not only have we woven cyberspace into nearly every
facet of our personal lives, it has also become essential to the
functioning of the global economy and military operations across all
domains. In cyberspace we seek to conduct commerce, share information,
learn, and entertain. But, through cyberspace others seek to vandalize,
steal, disrupt, and, potentially, to destroy. In the military, we rely
on many domains or capabilities with the reasonable expectation that we
can secure them when required. However, in cyberspace, and across the
broader electromagnetic spectrum, we find ourselves almost completely
reliant on something we will likely never completely secure. Dealing
with that reality is an extraordinary challenge.

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This reliance, like all of our technological advantages, is also
clear to potential adversaries who are seeking to use cyberspace as a
means to act against U.S. data, forces, or critical infrastructure--
particularly shared network infrastructure. Our challenge is to deploy
resilient capabilities, sufficient capacity, and effective defenses
that preserve access to our technological advantages by securing
critical resources and preparing to operate and deliver effects--even
when under threat of cyber intrusion.
The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace
outlines five strategic initiatives to focus efforts to leverage
cyberspace's tremendous opportunities while managing its dynamic nature
and vulnerabilities. STRATCOM is responsible for operating and
defending DOD information networks, planning against designated
cyberspace threats, executing cyberspace operations as directed,
advocating for cyberspace capabilities, and synchronizing activities
with other combatant commands and agencies. In addition to our
substantial work maturing the cyber mission, forces, capabilities, and
relationships, we are continuing to improve operating concepts to
better address cyberspace threats and support combatant commands. While
much remains to be done, we have made substantial progress, and
CYBERCOM continues to play an essential role operating and defending
DOD's information networks.
Moving forward, we must continue to improve situational awareness
and clarify the global roles, responsibilities, expectations, and
authorities that contribute to stable and effective deterrence and
assurance. Effective defensive and offensive preparation begins with
situational awareness. Threats in cyberspace are anything but static,
and a useful defensive strategy or capability existing one moment may
be ineffective mere seconds later, and improved relationships and
technical capabilities allow us to better understand the dynamic cyber
environment. Gaining this awareness and then acting quickly and
effectively requires improving the complex interagency and
international relationships. Cybersecurity requires the entire
government's effort. No single agency or department can effectively
address the threats we face in cyberspace; we must constantly evaluate
relationships and operational constructs to address constantly evolving
threats. The recent Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Pilot program is a
great example of the benefits of partnership and the type of activity
we look forward to furthering in the future.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The DIB pilot completed transitioning to the Department of
Homeland Security this January and is now called the Joint
Cybersecurity Pilot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in all of STRATCOM's unique functional mission areas, but
particularly in cyberspace, I am concerned about sufficient technical
capacity and personnel. We must ensure information technology
capabilities are fielded with sufficient capacity and in a more
resilient, defensible structure that still reaps as many benefits as
possible from the open nature of the internet. Furthermore, we need the
best trained and educated people to work our cyberspace challenges, and
growing tomorrow's cyberspace professionals is fundamentally about
education. Ensuring our future security in cyberspace--and really
across STRATCOM's strategic responsibilities--begins with efforts to
encourage and improve science, technology, engineering, and math
education from an early age. It also includes the recognition that
traditional military recruitment and retention programs may not be the
best or fastest way to build a stable cyber cadre for the long term.

OUR PEOPLE

At STRATCOM, we recognize that our people are our greatest and most
enduring strength. Shaping the future joint force, professionally and
personally, requires diligent attention. As a reflection of our
strategy, we must support educational (including lifelong science,
technology, engineering, and math ) and other personnel efforts that
enable us to recruit, train, exercise, develop, and sustain the unique
deterrence, space, and cyber workforce we need.
Indeed, the All-Volunteer Force is our military's greatest
strength, and we must keep the faith with our people and their
families. Our servicemembers, civilians, and their families bear unique
sacrifices for our Nation, and we especially appreciate their
sacrifices over the past decade at war and at home. These sacrifices
have come at great cost, and we must continue identifying stresses and
providing our troops and their families necessary care. Suicides remain
my greatest personnel concern, and I appreciate Service efforts this
year to improve the personal resiliency of each member. One suicide is
one too many. This is not only every commander's business, but it is
the business of every soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and civilian.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, it remains a great honor to lead the men and women of
U.S. Strategic Command. This is an interesting time for our Nation; and
this is more than an interesting time for STRATCOM. However, the
challenge before us is not just to live in interesting times but to
continue to excel in these interesting times. Ultimately, our goal is
to anticipate and prevent strategic attacks, to continue to assure our
allies, and to ensure we maintain access to space and cyberspace, which
provide the U.S. decisive strategic and operational advantages to
achieve our global security objectives. Our success will hinge on the
quality of our people and the effectiveness of our response to a new
national security reality that continues to test our agility,
flexibility, and resolve. Dealing effectively with these challenges and
identifying and pursuing opportunities that result will require all the
imagination, innovation, and discipline we can muster. Dealing
effectively with these challenges will also require us to synchronize,
collaborate, and coordinate with the other combatant commands,
agencies, and allies to an unprecedented degree.
These are just the sort of interesting times and challenges
STRATCOM was designed to address. We are equal to the task and
determined to continuously improve and stay ahead of the challenge. I
appreciate your continued support for STRATCOM and all of our
servicemembers and civilians, and I look forward to continuing to work
with you over the coming year.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General, and thank you
for your reference to Senator Ben Nelson. We all feel very much
the way you do, and we are grateful for your reference to him.
Thank you.
General Alexander?

STATEMENT OF GEN KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER
COMMAND, AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL
SECURITY SERVICE

General Alexander. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I am pleased to appear
with General Bob Kehler, and I echo his comments all across the
board, including those about Senator Nelson.
I would start up front by echoing some of those comments.
Namely, it is a privilege and honor to lead the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of CYBERCOM and NSA. We
have great people. Thanks for what you do to get those great
people for us.
I would also like to thank you and your colleagues for your
support in helping this command move rapidly forward in our
efforts to address emerging threats and concerns to our Nation.
I also need to thank all our partners throughout DOD, DHS,
and the FBI. We endeavor to build capability and capacity.
Cyber is a team sport, and we could not have come this far and
accomplished this much as we have without them.
Many changes and substantial progress have been made since
I last spoke to the committee almost 2 years ago. Cyberspace
has increasingly become more critical to our national and
economic security. Mr. Chairman, you brought up one of the
quotes about the greatest transfer of wealth. I think that is
absolutely correct. We are seeing increased exploitation into
industry, other government agencies, and the theft of
intellectual property is astounding. I will address parts of
that shortly in my comments coming up.
I also think that the threat has grown in terms of
activists, nation states, and non-nation state actors. The
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
both emphasized cyber as an area of investment in a leaner
defense budget. The task of assuring cyberspace access and
security has drawn the attention of all our Nation's
leadership. CYBERCOM is a component of a larger U.S.
Government-wide effort to make cyberspace safer and a forum for
vibrant citizen interaction to preserve our freedom to act in
cyberspace and defend our vital interests and those of our
allies.
CYBERCOM is charged to direct the security, operations, and
defense of the DOD information systems. But our work is
affected by threats outside DOD's networks, threats the Nation
cannot ignore. What we see both inside and outside DOD
information systems underscores the imperative to act now to
defend America in cyberspace.
The American people expect broad and efficient access to
cyberspace. The military and civilian sectors rely on
accessibility. Increased interconnectedness of information
systems, growing sophistication of cyber criminals and foreign
intelligence actors has increased our risk.
Last spring, in his international strategy for cyberspace,
the President confirmed an inherent right to protect ourselves
against attacks in this domain as in traditional domains. He
said: ``When warranted, the United States will respond to
hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to
our country. CYBERCOM exists to ensure the President can rely
on the DOD information systems and has military options
available to defend our Nation.''
The President and the Secretary of Defense recently
reviewed our Nation's strategic interests, issued guidance on
defense priorities. In sustaining U.S. global leadership,
priorities for 21st century defense, the Secretary focused on
protecting access throughout the cyber domain. CYBERCOM's role
is to pay attention to how nations and non-nation state actors
are developing asymmetric capabilities to conduct cyber
espionage and attacks. DOD recently added detail to that
position. In accordance with the President's strategy, the
Department further explained our deterrent posture to Congress
in its cyberspace policy report last November.
DOD components, especially CYBERCOM, work to dissuade
others from attacking or planning to attack the United States
in cyberspace. We work with a range of partners, U.S.
Government allies, private industry to strengthen the defense
of our citizens, the Nation, and allies in cyberspace. I want
to assure you that all of our work is performed to safeguard
the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. These
responsibilities are very much on our minds.
In establishing the U.S. Combatant Command (COCOM)
relationships, you asked about our relationships with the other
commands, and I would like to briefly address that.
First, we are establishing a cyber support element at each
of the six geographically based COCOMs. U.S. Central Command's
cyber support element is up and operational. U.S. Pacific
Command's cyber support element is partially operational, and
the others are on their way.
The purpose is to provide technical expertise and
capability and improve integration of cyber capabilities into
the COCOM mission planning efforts. Our goal is to ensure each
COCOM has a full sweep of cyber operations to choose from and
an understanding of effects these options can produce in their
area of responsibility.
Mr. Chairman, you also asked about the standing Rules of
Engagement. The Department is conducting a coordinated,
thorough review with the Joint Staff of existing standing Rules
of Engagement on cyberspace. These revised standing Rules of
Engagement should give us authorities we need to maximize pre-
authorization of defense responses and empower activity at the
lowest level. Issues being ironed out are what specific set of
authorities we will receive, conditions in which we can conduct
response actions, and we expect that those will be done in the
next few months.
DOD's role in defense against cyberattacks. Defending the
Nation in cyberspace requires coordination with several key
Government players, notably DHS, the FBI, the Intelligence
Community. I would just like to put some of this on the table
because it is my opinion that we need all three working
together as a joint team. DHS has the lead for coordinating the
overall national effort to enhance cybersecurity of U.S.
critical infrastructure. They lead in resilience and preparing
the defense. The FBI has the lead for detection, investigation,
prevention, and mitigation response within the domestic arena
under their authorities for law enforcement, domestic
intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. Of
course, DOD, NSA, and CYBERCOM lead for detection, prevention,
and defense in foreign space, defense of the Nation if the
Nation comes under attack.
I would like to go into, if I could, a little bit on what I
see we need in cyberspace, the requirements to defend the
Nation from attack because there has been a lot of discussion
on this, and I think it is important to put this up front. I
think this is the heart of some of the discussion that is going
on with the legislation today.
First, we need to see the attack. What do I mean by that?
That was a quote that we made up at Fordham University. If we
cannot see the attack, we cannot stop it. What we are not
talking about is putting NSA or the military into our networks
to see the attack. What we are talking about that all of you
put on the table is we have to have the ability to work with
industry, our partners, so that when they are attacked or they
see an attack, they can share that with us immediately. The
information sharing and the liability that goes along would
allow industry, armed with signatures that we can provide,
signatures that they have--I agree it takes all of us working
together--to provide a better defense. What we need is for them
to tell us that something is going on.
There are a couple of analogies that I would like to use.
These are not perfect analogies, just the best that I can come
up with. Being in the Senate Armed Services Committee here, I
use the missile analogy.
So if a missile were coming into the country and we had no
radars to see it, we could not stop that missile. If we have a
cyberattack coming in and no one tells us that that cyberattack
is going on, we cannot stop it.
Today, we are in the forensics mode. What that means is an
attack or an exploit normally occurs. We are told about it
after the fact. I think we should be in the prevention mode in
stopping that. A lot of that can be done by industry. I think
that industry should have the ability to see these and share
that with government in real time.
When you think about it, it is almost like the Neighborhood
Watch program. Somebody is breaking into a bank. Somebody needs
to call the authorities to stop it. In cyberspace, what we are
saying is armed with the signatures, the malicious software,
those things that help us understand that an attack is going
on, we believe that industry is the right one to tell the
government that they see that and get us to respond to it.
So I just want to clarify it because I do not believe we
want NSA or CYBERCOM or the military inside our networks
watching it. We think industry can do that, and we think that
is the right first step. Actually that is in both of these
bills.
The second part. I used that one because I think there is
another part to this that we have in force within DOD, and that
is what standards do we build our networks to and how much of a
defense do we put in there. How do we make our defense better?
So we have put in a series of defensive capabilities, if you
will, the standards that we operate and defend our networks.
How do you align your networks? How do you know that they are
configured right? How do you make them defensible so that they
will last when somebody is trying to get in?
We have a great Information Assurance Directorate, and one
of the former directors told me that 80 percent of the exploits
and attacks that come in could be stopped just by the hygiene
itself.
Mr. Chairman, you also brought up the issue of the Carnegie
Mellon report, and I would like to just hit some of that
because I do think that is an important report and it really
applies to this discussion that we have going on now.
As I have stated previously, that report and that
assessment was early on in the DIB pilot. That does not mean
that we cannot do better. In fact, let me turn that around and
say for us to be successful in cyberspace, it is going to
require Government and industry working together with the best
of both. Industry partners see signatures that Government does
not see, and government sees signatures or malicious software,
exploitations, and attacks into the country that industry does
not see. The information sharing and the ability to do that is
key to stopping that.
What I see from the DIB pilot was increased discussion
between Government and industry. This was a good thing and it
has grown and it continues to grow and we are getting better.
So in legislation what I think is we need to make the first
step. We need to start on that journey. We will not get it
perfect, but we need that ability for industry to share with us
the fact that these attacks and exploits are going on. But if
we cannot stop them, we cannot help.
There are five areas that I focused on with our folks, with
the folks at CYBERCOM.
First, we have to build and train cyber forces. These are
things that General Kehler and I are arm-in-arm on. These are
the key things that we have to do.
Second, we have to have a defensible architecture. You
mentioned the 15,000 enclaves, and the reality is our
integrated architecture, the way that we have set them up, if
went to the way Google, Yahoo, and others are doing it in the
Defense Department, we would have a more defensible
architecture. That is the way we are pushing, and the Services
are helping us get there.
I think we have to partner with DHS and FBI. The reason
that I bring DHS into this is that I believe we want them
working with the rest of government to help set up the rest of
government networks and work with that. We do not want to take
the people that I have and push them over here. I think we want
the people that we have looking outside, and I think that goes
to Senator McCain's comments. We are the offensive force. We
are the ones that are going to protect the Nation. We need to
see what is going on and be prepared to do that. We can give
and work with DHS and provide capabilities and technical
expertise, and that is growing.
Finally, I would add in the FBI. They have some tremendous
capabilities. They have the law enforcement arm.
When you put all three of us together, I think our country
knows that what we are doing is transparent and we are doing
the right thing. In doing that, you have brought all three
players to the table.
I see command and control and partnership as key especially
with our allies, and I would put the allies on the table
because this is going to be huge for our future. The concept
for operating in cyberspace we have mentioned earlier.
So it is an honor and privilege to represent the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of CYBERCOM here today.
I thank you for the opportunity to discuss our many
accomplishments and progress in building capabilities to
perform our mission in the future.
I would ask that my statement for the record be included on
the record.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Alexander follows:]

Prepared Statement by GEN Keith B. Alexander, USA

Thank you, Chairman Levin, and Ranking Member McCain, for inviting
me to talk to you about Cyber Command. I am here representing Cyber
Command, with an authorized staff of 937, and operational service cyber
components totaling over 12,000 men and women, whose great work helps
to keep our Nation more secure. Their ranks include uniformed members
of all the military Services and the Coast Guard, as well as civilians
and officials from several Federal agencies partnered with us in our
missions. There is no finer group of Americans anywhere, and the work
they do is vital to our security now and in the future. I am proud and
humbled to be associated with them.
The fiscal year 2013 President's budget for Cyber Command provides
$182 million and 937 personnel to perform our global mission. As demand
to develop and integrate capabilities into cyber planning and
operations continues to grow, we continue to work with the Department
to shape our resource requirements and workforce to provide the
necessary level of effort against growing mission sets and threats. I
last spoke to the committee in open session just about a year ago.
Since then, Cyber Command has made substantial progress in building
capabilities to perform its missions. I hasten to add, however, that
our Nation's need for mission success has also grown, both in its scope
and in its urgency. Secretary of Defense Panetta recently told Members
that ``our adversaries are going to come at us using 21st century
technology,'' including cyber threats. Chairman Dempsey amplified that
statement, noting that we are ``very concerned about cyber.'' Both
emphasized that cyber is one of the areas slated for investment in an
overall Defense budget that will be leaner in the future. The United
States relies on access to cyberspace for its national and economic
security. The task of assuring cyberspace access continued to draw the
attention of our Nation's most senior leaders over the last year, and
their decisions have helped to clarify what we can and must do about
developments that greatly concern us.
Cyber Command is, of course, a component of a larger, U.S.
Government-wide effort to make cyberspace safer for all, to keep it a
forum for vibrant citizen interaction, and to preserve our freedom to
act in cyberspace in defense of our vital interests and those of our
allies. Although Cyber Command is specifically charged (among other
missions) with directing the security, operation, and defense of the
Department of Defense's (DOD) information systems, our work and our
actions are affected by threats well outside DOD networks; threats the
Nation cannot afford to ignore. What we see, both inside and outside
DOD information systems, underscores the imperative to act now to
defend America in cyberspace. In my time with you today, I want to talk
about that larger, strategic context, to note some recent changes in
the ways that we express our cyber posture in public, and to explain
what these developments mean specifically for the progress of Cyber
Command and the larger cyber enterprise.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

In framing my comments on our progress at Cyber Command, I have to
begin by noting a worrisome fact: cyberspace is becoming more
dangerous. The Intelligence Community's world-wide threat brief to
Congress in January raised cyber threats to just behind terrorism and
proliferation in its list of the biggest challenges facing our Nation.
You know this if you are a national leader or a legislator, a military
commander, a corporate executive or chief information officer, or just
an ordinary citizen shopping or spending leisure time on-line. Out of
necessity, more and more of the time and resources that every American
spends on-line are being consumed by tasks to secure data, encrypt
drives, create (and remember) passwords and keys, and repeatedly check
for vulnerabilities, updates, and patches. Americans have digitized and
networked more of their businesses, activities, and their personal
lives, and with good reason they worry more about their privacy and the
integrity of their data. So has our military. Those Americans who are
among the growing number of victims of cybercrime or cyber espionage,
moreover, are also spending their time trying to figure out what they
have lost and how they were exploited.
Dangers are not something new in cyberspace, of course. Observers
theorized about hypothetical cyber attacks on data and information
systems 20 years ago. When I spoke to you last year, however, I noted
the sort of threats that were once discussed in theoretical terms were
becoming realities and actually being deployed in the arsenals of
various actors in cyberspace. I specifically use the broader term
``actors'' instead of ``states.'' In 2010 we saw cyber capabilities in
use that could damage or disrupt digitally controlled systems and
networked devices, and in some cases we are not sure whether these
capabilities are under the control of a foreign government.
Furthermore, we believe it is only a matter of time before someone
employs capabilities that could cause significant disruption to
civilian or government networks and to our critical infrastructure here
in the United States.
We have long seen cyber capabilities directed by governments to
disrupt the communications and activities of rival States, and today we
are also seeing such capabilities employed by regimes against critics
inside their own countries. Events during the Arab Spring last year
offer a wealth of examples. Popular protests against authoritarian rule
raised hopes across the Maghreb and beyond--hopes that were organized,
informed, and expressed in no small part by expanded capacity for
communications and the new social media applications that use it. The
response of the former regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia--and some
current regimes as well--was to try to filter, disrupt, or even shutter
these channels for news and communications, whether to stifle ongoing
protests by their own citizens or to keep their peoples from hearing
that discontent in other lands had toppled autocratic regimes. Some
regimes, moreover, even reach out via cyberspace to harass political
opponents beyond their borders.
Cyber crime is changing as well. In part this is due to heightened
security and wariness among governments, businesses, internet service
providers (ISPs), and average users. Law enforcement and ISPs, for
example, have gotten better at identifying ``botnets,'' banks of
computers slaved together for criminal purposes, and have become more
skilled at neutralizing them. But now the more sophisticated cyber
criminals are shifting away from botnets and such ``visible'' means of
making money and toward stealthier, targeted thefts of sensitive data
they can sell. Some cyber actors are paying particular attention to the
companies that make network security products. We saw digital
certificate issuers in the United States and Europe hit last year, and
a penetration of the internal network that stored the RSA's
authentication certification led to at least one U.S. defense
contractor being victimized by actors wielding counterfeit credentials.
Incidents like these affect DOD networks directly, targeting them with
similar malware, often spread by clever ``phishing'' e-mails that hit
an information security system at its weakest point--the user. Nation-
state actors in cyberspace are riding this tide of criminality. Some of
these actors can and may turn their resources and power against U.S.
and foreign businesses and enterprises, even those that manage critical
infrastructure in this country and others. State-sponsored industrial
espionage and theft of intellectual capital now occurs with stunning
rapacity and brazenness, and some of that activity links back to
foreign intelligence services. Companies and government agencies around
the world are thus being looted of their intellectual property by
national intelligence actors, and those victims understandably turn for
help to their governments.
The expanding popularity of social media and wireless consumer
electronics is driving cyber crime as well. More and more malware is
written for wireless devices, particularly smartphones, and soon, we
anticipate, for tablets as well. These criminal gangs are trying to
exploit social media users and wireless networked systems, but can also
exploit our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in their purely
social activities. Real and potential adversaries can and do learn a
great deal about our personnel, procedures, and deployments by
monitoring the use that our people make of popular social media. As our
military goes wireless these threats to our weapons systems,
communications, databases, and personnel demand attention.
Finally, I need to mention a recent development of concern to us at
Cyber Command and across our government and allies. Last year we saw
new prominence for cyber activist groups, like Anonymous and Lulz
Security that were encouraging hackers to work in unison to harass
selected organizations and individuals. The effects that they
intentionally and indirectly cause are chaotic and perhaps exaggerated
in the popular media, but the work of preventing those effects from
disrupting DOD information systems does draw attention and resources.
We are also concerned that cyber actors with extreme and violent
agendas, such as al Qaeda affiliates or supporters, could draw upon the
experiences and ideas of more sophisticated hactivists and potentially
use this knowledge for more disruptive or destructive purposes, though
it remains unclear what the likelihood of such an event is.

OUR NATIONAL CYBER POSTURE

The American people have rightly come to expect broad and
economical access to cyberspace. They have saved their personal
information, business files, research projects, intellectual capital,
and recreational pursuits in digital formats and stored in networked
computing devices. Moreover, they have built social and professional
webs of contacts in cyberspace--the all-important ``who you know''--and
have thus come to rely on the accessibility of these networks. Our
military and our government have done likewise. This increased inter-
connectedness of our information systems, combined with the growing
sophistication of cyber criminals and foreign intelligence actors, has
increased our risk. Our inter-connectedness is now a national security
issue. Ensuring and securing our computing systems has focused the
energies of America's leadership at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue
and in the Cabinet departments. Recent decisions have helped to clarify
our posture for defending net users and the Nation in cyberspace, and
have sent strong signals to anyone who might impair our interests in
this domain.
The President confirmed our inherent right to protect ourselves
against attacks in this domain, as in the traditional domains, last
spring in his International Strategy for Cyberspace, saying ``When
warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace
as we would to any other threat to our country.'' We Reserve the right
to use all necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic--as appropriate and consistent with applicable international
law. In so doing, we will exhaust all options before military force
whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs of action against the
costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and
strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad international support
whenever possible. As in the other domains, of course, the United
States will seek to exhaust all options before employing military
force, and will seek international support whenever possible. Cyber
Command exists to ensure that the President can rely on the information
systems of the Department of Defense and has military options available
for his consideration when and if he needs to defend the Nation in
cyberspace.
President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta have recently
reviewed our Nation's strategic interests and issued guidance on our
defense priorities. In Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense, the Secretary focused on protecting access
throughout the domain. For Cyber Command, this means we must pay
attention to the ways in which nations and non-state actors are
developing asymmetric capabilities to conduct cyber espionage--and
potentially cyber attacks as well--against the United States as well as
our allies and partners. In this context, our cyber capabilities
represent key components of deterrence. Since modern forces cannot
operate without reliable networks, we will invest in advanced
capabilities to defend them even in contested environments.
The Department of Defense recently added detail to that position.
In accordance with the President's International Strategy, the
Department further explained our deterrent posture to Congress in its
``Cyberspace Policy Report'' last November. DOD's components,
particularly Cyber Command, seek to maintain the President's freedom of
action and work to dissuade others from attacking or planning to attack
the United States in cyberspace. We will maintain the capability to
conduct cyber operations to defend the United States, its allies, and
its interests, consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict. Our
indications and warning and forensic intelligence capabilities
necessary to identify our enemies and attackers in cyberspace,
moreover, are improving rapidly. As the Department's report to Congress
noted, the co-location of Cyber Command with the National Security
Agency provides our Command with ``unique strengths and capabilities''
for cyberspace operations planning and execution. I can assure you
that, in appropriate circumstances and on order from the National
Command Authority, we can back up the Department's assertion that any
actor contemplating a crippling cyber attack against the United States
would be taking a grave risk.
Cyber Command works with a range of partner agencies in the U.S.
Government and among our allies, along with parallel efforts in private
industry, to strengthen the overall defense of our citizens, the
Nation, and allies in cyberspace. The Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security collaborate on various initiatives, including the
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Pilot, a test program to establish
a construct for Commercial Service Providers to provide managed
security services enhanced by government threat information to Defense
Industrial Base companies; and the Enduring Security Framework, an
executive and working-level forum with key partners in the commercial
technology marketplace.
Finally, I want to assure you that all of our work is performed
with our responsibility to safeguard the privacy and civil liberties of
U.S. persons very much in our minds. We take very seriously, in all of
our operations, our duty to ensure that defending the Department of
Defense's information systems and the Nation's freedom to access
cyberspace does not infringe on Americans' civil liberties, those
rights guaranteed by the Constitution that I and every member of my
Command swore an oath to uphold.

BUILDING THE ENTERPRISE

Cyberspace has a scope and complexity that requires inter-agency,
inter-service, and international cooperation. Within the Department of
Defense, cyberspace issues are handled by our command and a diverse set
of other agencies and organizations, many of which have their own
initiatives with government, allied, and industry partners. It is
important to keep this context in mind as I review the efforts,
accomplishments, and challenges of Cyber Command.
When I spoke to you a year ago, our command had just become
operational. Just a year later, we have a record of success. We are in
action every day making the Department's networks more secure and its
operations more effective. We are actively directing the operation of
those networks and making commanders accountable for their security.
Let me tell you about some of our recent successes:

This time last year, sophisticated cyber intruders
compromised the security of the algorithm employed in tokens
distributed by the RSA Corporation. This was very serious news,
since a large number of enterprises, including some in the
Department of Defense, rely on two-factor authentication using
RSA tokens. Indeed, the systems of some non-DOD users were
breached not long after the compromise by intruders exploiting
the stolen certificates. Cyber Command had immediately
recognized the danger to DOD information systems, warned those
DOD networks at risk, and took swift mitigation efforts. We at
Cyber Command directed and oversaw the replacement of all RSA
tokens throughout DOD. Partly as a result of our actions, we
have not seen any intrusions of DOD networks related to the RSA
compromise.
Just a few months ago, we saw an example of how Cyber
Command has improved DOD's cybersecurity. In late 2010, cyber
actors took advantage of a vulnerability in Adobe software that
allowed them to install malicious software on computers whose
users clicked on an apparently harmless link, a ruse called
spearphishing. In that case, as Cyber Command was just
beginning, several DOD networks/systems were breached and our
experts could only react to stop files from being stolen and
new breaches from being opened. A year later, by contrast, our
defensive posture and cyber command and control processes had
matured to the point where we were prepared not just to react
but to counter such tactics. When another Adobe vulnerability
was discovered in late 2011, Cyber Command quickly took action
to ensure that no one would be able to use it against us. Sure
enough, malicious cyber actors seized upon the vulnerability
and used it to mount a spearphishing campaign targeting DOD
networks. This time we were waiting and were able to block this
campaign from exploiting our systems and acquiring any DOD
files.
The year 2011 might well be remembered as the Year of
the Hacker. Various on-line groups garnered headlines for their
efforts to publicize causes of concern to them by breaching the
security of government and private networks. The on-line
collective calling itself Anonymous, to mention just one of
these groups, announced several attempted attacks against
Department of Defense information systems. Cyber Command was
able to direct and integrate pro-active defensive cyber
operations to successfully counter these threats. Over the past
year, there have also been related, well-publicized examples of
major exploitations or attacks against Defense contractors and
other holders of intellectual property vital to our national
security. The Cyber Command-led defense of the Department's
information systems, however, prevented any of these threat
actors from having a similar effect against DOD networks.
Finally, the investigation of the WikiLeaks breach continued,
and its progress was closely followed by the hacker groups. In
response to the WikiLeaks breach, Cyber Command was able to
direct actions across the Department that quickly reduced risks
to DOD information. These measures supported operational
commanders exercising their accountability for cybersecurity in
their units.

I'd be pleased to give you more details on these events in closed
session, and to tell you about still others that remain too sensitive
to mention here.
I am proud of this record of success but aware that more needs to
be done by Cyber Command as part of the larger cyber enterprise that
includes the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/
CSS), the Service cyber components, and the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA). I foresee five challenges over the coming year that
Cyber Command will face and continue to address. Those areas are the
following:

(1) Concept for Operating in Cyberspace: Every domain, by
definition, has unique features that compel military operations in it
to conform to its physical or relational demands. Doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures have been under development for millennia in
the land and maritime domains, for a century in the air domain, and for
decades in space. In the cyber domain, however, we are just beginning
to craft new doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. At the
strategic level, we are building our organizational structures to
ensure we can deliver integrated cyber effects to support national and
combatant commander requirements; we are developing doctrine for a pro-
active, agile cyber force that can ``maneuver'' in cyberspace at the
speed of the internet; and we are looking at the ways in which
adversaries might seek to exploit our weaknesses. At the operational
level, our objectives are to establish a single, integrated process to
align combatant commanders' requirements with cyber capabilities; to
develop functional emphases in the Service cyber components; and to
draft a field manual or joint publication on cyber operations and
demonstrate proof of concept for it. Finally, rapid deconfliction of
operations is required, and that is garnering leadership attention as
well. We are currently working closely with two of the geographic
combatant commanders. Our goal is to ensure that a commander with a
mission to execute has a full suite of cyber-assisted options from
which to choose, and that he can understand what effects they will
produce for him. Though we can only work such an intensive process with
two of the combatant commanders at this time, we will be able to reach
out eventually to all of the combatant commands.
(2) Cybersecurity Responsibilities: Defending the Nation in
cyberspace requires a coordinated response among several key players
from throughout the government. It takes a cross-government team to
mature and implement an effective cyber strategy for the Nation. From
my perspective, there are three key players that make up this team:

Department of Homeland Security--lead for
coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the
cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastructure, and
ensuring protection of the civilian Federal Government
(.gov) networks and systems.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--
responsible for detection, investigation, prevention,
and response within the domestic arena under their
authorities for law enforcement, domestic intelligence,
counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. Importantly,
when malicious cyber activity is detected in domestic
space, the FBI takes the lead to prevent, investigate,
and mitigate it.
Department of Defense/Intelligence Community/
NSA/Cyber Command--responsible for detection,
prevention, and defense in foreign space, foreign cyber
threat intelligence and attribution, security of
national security and military systems; and, in
extremis, defense of the homeland if the Nation comes
under cyber attack from a full scope actor.

Cyber Command is working to ensure we have identified the roles and
responsibilities correctly to accomplish our mission. Overall, our most
pressing need across the government is to ensure we can see threats
within our networks and thus address malware before it threatens us.
Foundational to this is the information sharing that must go on between
the Federal Government and the private sector, and within the private
sector, while ensuring appropriate measures and oversight to protect
privacy and preserve civil liberties. We welcome and support new
statutory authorities for DHS that would ensure this information
sharing takes place; an important reason why cyber legislation that
promotes this sharing is so important to the Nation. Finally, we are
working within the Department and administration on establishing the
Rules of Engagement and criteria upon which Cyber Command will act. We
are working with the Joint Staff to develop a decision framework that
allows us to identify threats and ensure senior leaders can share
information rapidly and take action, if necessary.

(3) Trained and Ready Force: At present we are critically short of
the skills and the skilled people we as a Command and a nation require
to manage our networks and protect U.S. interests in cyberspace. Our
prosperity and our security now depend on a very skilled technical
workforce, which is in high demand both in government and industry. We
in DOD need to build a cyber workforce that can take action quickly
across the full range of our mission sets as necessary. This will
require us to adopt a single standard across the Department and the
Services, so that we can truly operate as a single, joint force. In
order to achieve our goals in this area by 2014, we must build a
skilled force capable of full-spectrum cyber operations across a
continuum of threats. We also need to build our workforce at Cyber
Command and the Service Cyber Components so that, in extremis, we have
the capability to defend the Nation in cyberspace. We are reviewing
recruitment and incentive programs in order to build and retain the
best of the best cyber defenders, and we are working to standardize,
track, and manage the training needed for all cyber personnel.

Let me mention one of the ways in which we are building the cyber
force. Last fall we sponsored our first major tactical exercise, which
we called Cyber Flag (after the Red Flag exercise that has trained
generations of fighter pilots since the 1970s). This was a large,
multi-day affair, in which operators from our Service cyber components
engaged in realistic and intense simulated cyber combat against
``live'' opposition. This unprecedented exercise attracted a great deal
of interest from senior leaders in the Pentagon and other departments
and agencies, and dozens of observers attended its sessions.
Nevertheless, Cyber Flag was no mere drill, but a training exercise for
those necessarily engaged in cyber operations now. The lessons that
network operators learned first-hand in Cyber Flag are being applied
daily in defense of our networks and in support of national policy
goals.

(4) Defensible Architecture: Our current information systems
architecture in the Department of Defense was not built with security
uppermost in mind, let alone with the idea of operationalizing it to
enable military missions. Instead, we have seven million networked
devices in 15,000 DOD network enclaves. Our vision is to fashion that
architecture into an operational platform, not just a channel for
communications and a place for data storage. To do so, our DOD cyber
enterprise, with the Department's Chief Information Officers, DISA, and
Cyber Command helping to lead the way, will build a common cloud
infrastructure across the Department and the Services that will not
only be more secure but more efficient--and ultimately less costly in
this time of diminishing resources--than what we have today.

Cyber Command will directly benefit from this in its mission of
directing the security, operation, and defense of DOD information
systems. Our strategic objective is to reduce the attack surface of our
critical networks that is available to adversaries, enabling us to
``Defend and Jump'' as needed. Our operational objectives are to reduce
the number of network enclaves to the minimum possible; to implement a
common cloud-based infrastructure to improve security across all of
DOD; to move to a more secure model for data and services with better
tagging and metadata; to implement identity-based access controls to
services, as well as attribute-based access controls to control who can
use those data; and finally to grow the capability to rapidly
reconfigure the single network in response to mission requirements or
enemy actions.
The NSA has begun making this vision a reality, with collateral
benefits for Cyber Command in the process. The agency has sharply
consolidated the number of desktop applications, closed half its help
desks, trimmed the number of data centers required, and saved money
through corporate management of software licenses. Similar actions
taken Department-wide will not only improve the security of the DOD's
networks but also reduce its information technology costs, freeing
money for other purposes and allowing for a re-dedication of cyber
personnel to more urgent needs.

(5) Global Visibility Enabling Action: We cannot wait for the
implementation of that vision of a defensible architecture, however, to
improve our situational awareness. Our commanders and our Services need
to know what's happening inside and outside our networks, but at
present we cannot even develop a definitive picture of the 15,000 DOD
network enclaves and lack the capability to easily understand what is
happening as it occurs. Furthermore, we must know in real time when and
how the internet and the overall cyber environment inside and outside
the United States are threatened in order to counter those threats. In
this area, our strategic objectives are to enable unity of effort
across DOD, the Federal Government, private partners and allied
nations; to develop faster, more comprehensive, and timelier warning of
threats against DOD networks and critical infrastructure; and to move
beyond situational awareness to enabling integrated operational
responses in cyberspace. Our operational objectives are to gain
visibility of, and fuse information from, our own and public networks
to enable action; to partner with the interagency, private
infrastructure providers and global partners to share information; and
to build capabilities to empower decisionmakers.

Cyber Command Major Accomplishments (March 2011 to March 2012)

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS

Common Operating Picture (COP) Exercise: Cyber Command Joint
Operations Center, the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center and the DOD
Cyber Crime Center participated in a White House-led National Level
Exercise to test the Federal Government's ability to develop a COP
appropriate for White House-level consumers.
Cyber Training Advisory Council (CYTAC) Creation: The CYTAC is an
advisory and coordination committee established to improve the quality,
efficiency, and sufficiency of training for computer network defense,
attack, and exploitation that will work to coordinate and standardize
cyber training across all military services, Cyber Command, and NSA.
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) War Game THOR'S HAMMER: Cyber
Command personnel supported NRO's space and cyber wargame that
increased the participant's understanding of critical space asset
capabilities and their vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. Additionally,
the wargame highlighted the interrelationship between space security
and cyberspace security.
DHS National Cyber Incident Response Program: Synchronized DHS
National Cyber Incident Response Program (NCIRP) with the DOD's
Cyberspace Conditions alert system to facilitate future actions.
Global Cyber Synchronization Conference: Hosted the second Global
Cyber Synchronization Conference on behalf of STRATCOM to integrate
operational planning requirements across the combatant commands.

POLICY AND DOCTRINE

The administration is working with Congress to finalize
cybersecurity legislation. Within the administration, there is a strong
and unified working relationship between DOD, DHS and NSA on
cybersecurity matters; and NSA, NIST and DHS are closely partnered to
address cybersecurity standards.
Senate Cybersecurity Exercise: Members of the Senate participated
in a cybersecurity exercise on 7 March 2012 as the result of an all-
Senate cybersecurity threat briefing given by the White House and
Departmental Secretaries on 1 February 2012.

SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Cyber Command Cyber Support Element (CSE) Placements: Working with
the combatant commands to place a CSE at each COCOM tailored to their
mission support requirements for cyberspace operations. Cyber Command
has a full CSE deployed to U.S. Central Command, a partial CSE to
PACOM, and expects to deploy a CSE to AFRICOM and SOCOM within 6
months.
Cyber Command Force Management Workshop: The Cyber Command Force
Management Workshop held in November brought together service cyber
components to discuss Cyber Command support for the Combatant
Commanders.
Trained and Ready Cyber Forces: Cyber Command, NSA and the
military's cyber service components completed development of the Joint
Cyberspace Training and Certification Standards (JCT&CS) document that
will serve as the common foundation for training all cyber operators to
unified standards across the DOD.

ENHANCING DEFENSES

Global Thunder 12: The Cyber Command Joint Operations Center (JOC)
supported STRATCOM's annual Field Training Exercise (FTX) designed to
validate our Nuclear Command Control Communications (NC3) OPLAN tasks.
The JOC supported this FTX with reporting, analysis, conducting de-
confliction, and responding to cyber related events.
Cyber Command Support to Nimble Ghost: Cyber Command worked with
the Joint Staff for this DOD exercise to provide a forum for senior DOD
leaders to examine policies and procedures that enable the defense of
DOD critical U.S. networks and explore the department's ability to
respond to a major cyberspace attack.

BUILDING TEAM CYBER

DHS Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future: Offered substantive
comments in response to a review of DHS' draft Blueprint for a Secure
Cyber Future; the Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security
Enterprise.
Enhanced DHS and DOD Cybersecurity Operational Collaboration:
Efforts remain underway by DHS and DOD to clarify responsibilities,
assign specific actions, and establish timelines for implementing the
DHS-DOD Joint Cybersecurity Vision in a cybersecurity work plan.
Tri-Lateral Defense Cyber Contact Group: Cyber Command and NSA
personnel attended the Tri-Lateral Defense Cyber Contact Group (DCCG)
completing a planning-focused tabletop exercise with the United
Kingdom, Australia, STRATCOM, and OSD(P); used to develop a listing of
issues that impede our ability to conduct cyberspace operations
trilaterally.

CONCLUSION

We are working on all five of these focus areas simultaneously
because they all demand our attention and because progress in each
depends on progress in the others. Our capabilities across the board
have to improve together, or good ideas in one area can be undermined
by continuing weakness in another. We are moving with all deliberate
speed, moreover, because the American people will rightfully want
results, not excuses, as we defend our Nation.
In conclusion, allow me to thank you again for inviting me here to
talk about the achievements and the plans of Cyber Command. Cyberspace
provides both incredible opportunities and significant challenges for
the Department of Defense and the Nation. Cyber Command is part of a
whole-of-government effort to capitalize on those opportunities, and to
reduce and mitigate the uncertainties. With your continued support, I
have no doubt that the hardworking and capable men and women of the
Command will rise to those challenges and continue to make our Nation
proud of their accomplishments. Now I look forward to continuing this
dialogue with you, both here and in the months ahead.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. Your statement
will be made part of the record.
We will start with a 7-minute first round.
General Kehler, first, do you support the fiscal year 2013
budget request?
General Kehler. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. General Kehler, you made reference to an
effective nuclear command and control network that needs
improvement, I believe, in your opening statement. Are those
efforts underway to modernize that command and control network?
Can you describe those efforts a little bit?
General Kehler. Yes, sir, I can. Of course, the nuclear
command and control system is composed of many, many parts.
There are parts of the nuclear command and control system that
are not survivable. However, inherent in the nuclear command
and control system is a thin line that ultimately would be
survivable under any conditions so that we could always ensure
that the President of the United States is connected to the
nuclear forces.
Investments are underway in those critical capabilities,
the capabilities that are part of the space architecture layer,
of course, advanced extremely high frequency satellites. The
first one is on orbit. The second one will go to orbit in the
next year or so. I do not have the exact date. That will be the
satellite-based survivable part of our thin line network as we
go forward.
We have some issues with terminals and terminals lagging
the deployment of the satellites. That means we are going to
have to use older terminals. We will not get the full
capability of the satellites at first. We are working that
problem.
We have some issues to make sure that our bomber
connectivity is maintained. The Air Force program supports
that, and so I am comfortable that we are going forward there
to maintain the connectivity at the force end of this.
We are also upgrading some of our other components to the
network, ground-based parts of the network, et cetera.
So I will always be a little uncomfortable about the
network. I will tell you that I think there is more to be done.
We are working that inside the Department for future budget
requests. In fact, we are undertaking a fairly substantial
review at this point in time about the nuclear command and
control system and how it does or does not support other issues
as well.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review called out for studying
additional reductions in nuclear weapons. Do you think it is
possible to further reduce our nuclear weapons beyond the New
START levels?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I think there are
opportunities to reduce further, but I think that there are
factors that bear on that ultimate outcome. Rather than get
into those, which I do not think would be appropriate, I would
just simply say I do think there are opportunities here, but
recognizing that there are some factors that bear on this.
I would also mention it is never our view that we start
with numbers. We start with an assessment of the situation we
find ourselves in, the strategy, our objectives, et cetera, and
ultimately then you get to numbers.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Alexander, are you advocating for any additional
legal authorities that are not included in the cybersecurity
legislation that was proposed by the administration to Congress
or that is included in the Lieberman-Collins bill?
General Alexander. No, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. I noted the industrial espionage campaign
in my opening statement, and you made reference to it in your
statement, particularly China's aggressive and relentless
industrial espionage campaign through cyberspace.
Can you give us some examples in open session of the
technologies that have been stolen through penetration of major
DOD contractors and perhaps the Department itself, and do you
know whether or not in fact we have raised this issue,
particularly Vice President Biden, with the Chinese?
General Alexander. Senator, I am not aware on the last,
what Vice President Biden has shared with the Chinese for that
discussion.
But we are seeing a great deal of DOD-related equipment
stolen by the Chinese. I cannot go into the specifics here, but
we do see that from DIB companies throughout.
There are some very public ones, though, that give you a
good idea of what is going on. The most recent one, I think,
was the RSA exploits. RSA creates the two-factor authentication
for things like PayPal. So when you get on and order something
and pay for it over the network, the authentication is done by
encryption systems that RSA creates. The exploiters took many
of those certifications and underlying software which makes it
almost impossible to ensure that what you are certifying or
what someone else is certifying is in fact correct.
Now, RSA acted quickly and is replacing all those
certificates and has done that in priority order for the
Defense Department and others.
But when you think about it, the ability to do it against a
company like RSA is such a high-order capability, RSA being one
of the best, that if they can do it against RSA, that makes
most of the other companies vulnerable.
Chairman Levin. We took some action in the counterfeiting
area in our defense authorization bill to try to stop that type
of theft, particularly again by the Chinese when it came to the
supply of parts for weapons systems. I think it will be
important for you to talk to Vice President Biden or his office
so that you can see what steps were taken to inform the Chinese
of our position on this.
We have now got to find ways--and I think you are the
perfect person to be a spokesman for this--to stop their theft
of other kinds of intellectual property through the use of
cyber.
I wonder if you could give us some examples or give us some
options. I think Senator McCain also made reference to this.
What are the options for us in terms of action for them or
anyone else who is stealing our information or our intellectual
property to pay a price for this?
General Alexander. Well, I suppose using the rest of
STRATCOM would be out, Mr. Chairman.
I think the first thing that strikes my mind--and I want to
be clear on this because the most important thing that we can
do right now is make it more difficult for the Chinese to do
what they are doing. The analogy that I put on the table is we
have all our money in our banks, but our banks have the money
out on tables in New York City at the park. We are losing the
money, and we are wondering why. Nobody is protecting it or it
is not well-protected. Our intellectual property is not well-
protected and we could do better protecting it. So step one is
take those steps to do that.
I do think what the Department is doing--you asked for
authorities that would need legislation. I think those are in
the legislation. What the Department is doing with the
authorities we already have is maturing the standing Rules of
Engagement that would allow us to stop some of these exploits
as they are going on. I think we can do that with minimal risk,
and I think those are some of the things that we can do. Stop
them in progress.
As an example, we saw an adversary trying to take about 3
gigabytes, a lot of information, from one of our defense
contractors. We saw that in foreign space. The issue was now we
had to work in human space to reach out to them to say they are
trying to steal something. You have to stop it. There has to be
a better way to do that because that is almost like going at
network speed now trying to send a regular mail letter to them
that you are being attacked. So we have to bring this up into
the network age to get these responses out.
So I would advocate--and I think the way we are going is--
to, one, build our defense and, two, have options that would
stop it.
Beyond that, I think the President and the Secretary need
options that would take it to the next step. These are not
options that we would take, but these are options that we would
propose to the administration. If they exceed certain limits, I
think it is our responsibility jointly and with the COCOM's to
say here are the options you can now take to stop these acts.
Depending on the severity of the act, here is what we would
propose to be done.
So I think our job would be to defend and protect and to
stop some of these attacks, analogous to the missiles coming
in, and give the administration options of what they could do
to take it to the next step if they choose. Those include cyber
and other options that are available. I think the White House
has put that forward in their cybersecurity thoughts.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I want to thank the witnesses.
I would ask General Alexander, do you agree with what
Secretary Panetta and the FBI have said, that cyberattacks may
soon be the number one threats to the United States?
General Alexander. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator McCain. Would you agree that the major threats to
our national security come from outside the United States
specifically, obviously from unclassified information, from
China?
General Alexander. Absolutely.
Senator McCain. Absolutely. So then what is the logic in
providing the overall authority to the DHS? Anyone who has been
through an airport, as I do regularly, as most of us do, have
no confidence in the technological capabilities of the DHS. In
fact, as an example nothing has changed as far as airport
security is concerned since probably September 12, 2011. So the
major threat comes from overseas. What would be the logic then
in making the lead organization the DHS?
General Alexander. Senator, I think the issue--if I could,
I want to break this out into three areas to make sure my
response is----
Senator McCain. Make it brief please. I have additional
questions.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
I see three major things. We want DHS to take the lead on
resilience in working with civilian agencies and critical
infrastructure. We want DOD to take the lead on defending the
Nation under cyberattack, FBI under law enforcement and
intelligence. I think all three of us need to work together as
a joint team to move this forward. If we do not work as a team,
then the Nation suffers. So inside the United States, that is
where I think DHS has the lead. They do not in terms of the
foreign and the things coming in. That is where you would want
us to have the lead.
Senator McCain. How many people are under your command?
General Alexander. In CYBERCOM, counting our Service
components, a little under 13,000.
Senator McCain. So we now have 13,000 and CYBERCOM was
recently formed up. So now we need other agencies. Why should
the responsibility not lie with CYBERCOM?
General Alexander. Senator, I do think the responsibility
for defending the Nation against attack lies within CYBERCOM. I
think the lead for working with critical infrastructure and
helping them defend and prepare their networks should lie with
DHS.
Senator McCain. That is a curious logic, General, in fact,
most curious.
So really all we formed up CYBERCOM for was to worry about
external threats. Is that what you are saying? So the DHS
should take the lead for anything that happens in the United
States from outside, but you are still there with your 13,000
people?
General Alexander. Not quite that way, Senator. Probably I
am not clear enough on this. In terms of DHS's roles and
responsibility is working with critical infrastructure and
other government agencies on developing the standards and the
protocols of how they build their networks and to be the public
interface. I think that is the role that we want them to do.
Their people go out and reach out with critical infrastructure
and make sure those government systems are adequately
developed.
If they are attacked, no matter where that comes from, now
I think the President has options of what he can do. We are one
of those sets of options, and if chosen, we are prepared to do
that.
More importantly, where those people really come in is in
our offensive capabilities. You asked that earlier. So the
offensive capabilities would be to support the other combatant
commands and their plans and capabilities.
Senator McCain. So your job is to support other commands
with their offensive capability. You know something, General?
One of the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission was there is too
much stovepiping in our Intelligence Community. You are just
describing stovepiping to me at its ultimate.
General Alexander. Well, that is not the intent.
If I could go one point further, the bulk of our forces are
folks that operate and defend the DOD networks. That is where
we are today. The bulk of them are operating and defending our
networks. So if you think about what the Army, Navy, and Air
Force do in operating and defending the networks, that is the
first mission that CYBERCOM was given. We are developing the
second parts of that.
But I would point out, when you say stovepipe, Senator, I
do not agree with that because this is an integrated network.
It is one network trying to work everything together. So it is
just the opposite of a stovepipe.
Senator McCain. Well, it is interesting that Michael
McConnell at George Washington University, former Director of
National Intelligence, said current U.S. cyber defenses are
weak and the bills on Capitol Hill are insufficient. So,
obviously, the former Director of National Intelligence has a
significant disagreement with your assessment.
So according to a recent article in the Washington Post,
the White House blocked draft legislation that would have given
NSA or any government entity the authority to monitor private
sector networks for computer viruses and to operate active
defenses to block them. The NSA supported the authority but the
White House did not. According to an administration official,
blocking of the draft caused some consternation because NSA
wanted to get that authority.
There are some who propose that NSA should be able to
detect but not read the cyberattack information. Do you agree
or disagree with that?
General Alexander. I disagree. I think the approach that we
have put on the table is the appropriate one which is we give
that to industry. They can look at that and when they see that,
tell us. I think that is the first right step, Senator. I think
if we go too far, it sends the wrong message, and I think we
can take this journey and learn as we go on it.
Senator McCain. General Cartwright, the former Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said DOD is spending 90
percent of its time playing defense against cyberattacks and 10
percent playing offense and that the Department should invert
this defense/offense ratio to signify that a cyberattack on the
United States will have negative consequences.
Your answer, as I understand it, is, well, we will act in
some way or fashion. Perhaps you can be a little more specific
how we can gain the offense here.
General Alexander. I actually agree with his statements,
and I would like to characterize it in my words, if I could,
Senator. More than 90 percent of our force was developed--all
of our force in cyber, as we started, was on the defense and
operate. We did not have offensive capability. So what we are
looking at now is how do we grow that capability. So if you
think about what we have within our fleets, air wings, and
brigades is the operate and defend capabilities. The offensive
capability primarily lies in the exploitation capabilities of
NSA and others. We are developing those.
I agree that we need to develop those more and faster, and
we are working on that with the services and that is part of
our growth plan.
I think, in terms of this, Senator, I do not want to give
you the impression that I do not believe we should defend the
United States. I do. But I do think we can do that in a way
that works with industry without having us in the middle of the
network. They share the information with us, and I think that
is the right first step to take.
Senator McCain. Industry, according to industry, does not
need additional regulations. They need the ability to share
information which is our proposal rather than additional new
government regulation implemented by probably the most
inefficient bureaucracy that I have ever encountered in my
number of years here as a Member of Congress. The DHS wasted
$887 million on a virtual fence on the Arizona-Mexico border,
that has made not a single technological advance as far as
airport security is concerned to ease passengers' transit from
one place to another, and has shown an incredible ability to
illustrate inefficiency at its best.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both
of you.
Obviously, my friend from Arizona and I have a disagreement
here. The first thing I want to do very briefly is come to the
defense of the DHS. The fact is that we have not had a major
terrorist attack on the United States since September 11, and
you have to give the leadership, bipartisan over two
administrations, and the thousands of people who work at DHS
some credit for that.
Second, in terms of the stovepiping, I think a better
analogy here--and it is not a perfect one--is to compare the
relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the FBI to the relationship between CYBERCOM and NSA and DHS.
CIA has authority outside of the United States of America. The
FBI has authorities--I am speaking about terrorism, for
instance, or threats to the Nation--within the country. The
problem before September 11 is that they were stovepiped. They
were not cooperating enough. In the same way, NSA, CYBERCOM, as
you have said, has the responsibility to protect America--it is
a jewel. It is a national treasure--from cyberattack, along
with many other responsibilities that you have. DHS has a
domestic responsibility, a preventive responsibility. In that
sense, it is a little different and less expansive than FBI in
the other case.
The interesting thing that you have testified to and I
think Senator McCain was not hearing is that you are building
exactly the kind of cooperative relationship between NSA,
CYBERCOM, DHS, and the FBI that did not exist before September
11. The fact is Senator McCain and I introduced an amendment to
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) last December
that codifies in law the working agreement between NSA and DHS.
Incidentally, I will just say this for the record. I have
talked to Admiral McConnell, a former Director of National
Intelligence. I have heard him speak in a public setting. He
thinks both bills are not strong enough, but if you ask him do
you prefer the Cyber Security Act of 2012, which Senator
Collins, Feinstein, Rockefeller, and I have put in, or the
Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research,
Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012 (SECURE IT),
which some of my colleagues have put in, he could not be
clearer. SECURE IT does not do it because it does not provide
for defensive preparation by the private sector.
Look, I know the private sector is lobbying against this. I
think there is a terrible trap here. This is not just a
question of regulation of business. This is a protection of our
homeland. You have told us in response to Senator McCain's
question--General Dempsey, Secretary Panetta, Director
Mueller--cyberattack is the main area of vulnerability we have
today. Shame on us if we look at this as business regulation.
This is homeland security. We have to get together before too
long and make this happen.
I want to come to the particular difference between the two
bills. There are two critical things that have to be done here
in my opinion. There are many important things. One is an
information sharing authorization section. The other is
protection of the most critical cyber infrastructure which is
owned by the private sector, 90 percent of it, finance,
transportation, electricity, water, all of which is vulnerable
to attack by an enemy.
Both bills have information sharing. Only the bill that
Senator Collins and I have introduced has a provision for DHS
to work with the private sector to require the most critical
covered infrastructure, not every business, to take certain
actions to defend their network, to defend our country.
General Alexander, I believe I heard you say--I just want
to have you confirm it--that you believe we need both of those
authorities in government, that is, information sharing and a
system for protecting and better defending privately-owned,
covered critical infrastructure. Is that right?
General Alexander. Senator, that is correct. As you have
stated, the hard part is determining how you do that in such a
way as not to burden industry. But I do think we have to set up
some standards. We use what we call the gold standard. The gold
standard was one that we thought provided our networks the best
defensible posture. We give that out for free. We put it on the
NSA.GOV Web site as here is a set of standards. I think as we
work with industry, the issue is how do you make sure that they
are as defensible as possible without being over-burdensome. So
I do think that we have to set that up. It is like roads, like
cars.
Senator Lieberman. Exactly. This is not regulation
actually. These are standards for what we are going to ask them
to do to defend our country. They are then going to figure out
how to do it.
Incidentally, business is understandably worried about
their bottom line. We have to be worried about the security of
the American people.
Incidentally, I take it from what you said earlier that the
fear of a cyberattack against the United States--I mean a major
cyberattack--is not theoretical but real in your mind, General
Alexander.
General Alexander. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. It literally could happen any day. I am
not predicting that it will. But right now our privately-owned
cyberspace infrastructure, as compared and distinguished from
DOD's, is vulnerable to attack. Is that correct?
General Alexander. That is correct, Senator. In fact, if I
could add, it is my opinion that every day the probability of
an attack increases as more tools and capabilities are out on
the Internet.
Senator Lieberman. Right. It is very important for people
to hear that.
I want to relate the requirement on the most critical
covered infrastructure to take some defensive action to your
description that I thought was excellent about what you mean
when you say you want to see an cyberattack coming. You have
made very clear that you do not want NSA into our private cyber
systems, but you need to have the private cyber systems be able
to tell you when an enemy attack is coming. Right?
General Alexander. That is correct.
Senator Lieberman. So you can act. To me, that is probably
the most significant gain that we will have from DHS, informed
by you, setting these standards for defense for the privately
owned cyberspace. Look, I hear so many stories about critical
infrastructure operating systems using defensive systems that
are 15 years old without even basic detection capabilities. I
think one of the most important things that is going to happen,
as a result of the system we are talking about, is that the
most critical infrastructure--not every business at home, but
the most critical infrastructure--will have to develop within
itself or hire some of the private companies that do this the
defensive systems that will let them know, which a lot of them
do not now, when they are being attacked so they can
immediately get to you so you can spring into action to
essentially counter-attack. Is that correct?
General Alexander. That is correct. Under those conditions
is what the administration and the Department is looking at on
the Rules of Engagement. So when we actually do that, those
will become the Rules of Engagement that we are working on.
Senator Lieberman. Let me just ask finally is your
relationship under the memorandum that we codified into law
with DHS working well as far as you are concerned.
General Alexander. It is. It is growing. Secretary
Napolitano is wonderful to work with. She came out to NSA and
CYBERCOM and had a chance to sit down with all of us.
Absolutely her heart is in the right direction. She understands
what we bring to the table. She leverages that not only in the
cyber mission but across the board. I think we are making the
correct strides.
When you add FBI's tremendous technical capabilities in
there, that is the team that I think the government wants and
needs in place. The reality is we can put all of our manpower
internal and it will not solve the problem. We have to work
together as a team. I do believe that is the best way to
approach it. To answer your response, DHS has been good to work
with. They are growing their capabilities. It will take time.
We provide a lot of assistance to that, and we think that is a
good relationship.
Senator Lieberman. That is exactly what they tell me: good
relationship and they are benefitting enormously from your
extraordinary expertise. Thanks, General.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Kehler. Senator Lieberman, could I add a comment?
Chairman Levin. If you make it brief.
General Kehler. It will be very brief.
This is really about balanced responsibilities. When you
look at balancing the responsibilities between the military,
the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and DHS, if we
were not talking about cyber, we know how to do that. We
understand what that balance looks like. We understand that
when DHS needs military support, we have what we call defense
support of civil authorities. We have ways that we can provide
support to them.
The question is what happens when you add cyberspace to
this mixture, and that is the balance that we are trying to
make sure that we are striking. I think that is an important
point for us as we go forward. The bottom line here is all of
us working together to improve the protection of our Nation and
the national security.
The second point that I would make quickly is there are
basically three things we are going to have to do here. One is
protect ourselves better related to cyberspace for the very
reasons that you mentioned. The second is we have to become
more resilient, recognizing that we are not going to be perfect
at protection or defense. We have to be more resilient,
particularly on the military side. Then lastly, we have to do
better at an offensive capability and balance that in a better
fashion as we go forward.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The first question I am going to ask I already know the
answer, but I am going to have to ask it just to get it in the
record.
In yesterday's Wall Street Journal, they talked about
President Obama's meeting with Russian President Medvedev
yesterday, Monday, when President Obama said--and I assume he
said this without knowing that the mic was on, but this needs
to be in the record. I would ask the record to reflect this
accurately. On all these issues, but particularly missile
defense, this--this can be solved, but it is important for him,
incoming Russian President Vladimir Putin, to give me space.
``This is my last election, and after my election, I'll have
more flexibility.''
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Senator Inhofe. So the question is do either one of you
want to comment? [No response.]
I did not think so.
The second thing that I would like to mention is to thank
General Alexander for making the trip that you made to Tulsa
University. Just real briefly, tell me what you found out
during your visit.
General Alexander. Thank you, Senator. First, there are two
things.
I am really impressed with the way the American people,
especially in Tulsa, have come together to help fund that
university and the young folks that go there. From my
perspective, one of the key things--and I should have thought
about this earlier--that Tulsa University is doing is in the
information assurance area, coming up with better ways to
defend networks. When you think about that, that is exactly
what we are talking about on the resilience side. So when you
look at what those young people do, they find problems in
networks. They showed us some in the Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system and others that if we now made
some slight changes, I think those changes and upgrades in the
security of those networks would make them more secure.
So what I found was tremendous young people doing great
things, some of whom we have hired, and we continue to hire
from Tulsa and other universities throughout the country that
are doing programs like that in the information assurance area.
So thank you.
Senator Inhofe. I thank you for going out. One of the
things that we do have that you probably witnessed was the
community support behind the program, behind the university. So
anyway, it is a good program.
General Kehler, back during the time that we were
considering the bill a year ago, we were talking about the fact
that President Obama was weighing options for sharp new cuts in
our nuclear arsenal unilaterally. Then, of course, that was an
agreement with Russia to bring it down to the 1,550. I guess it
was a month ago, it was reported that President Obama is
weighing the options of sharp new cuts to our nuclear arsenal
unilaterally, potentially up to--and these are the figures they
used--80 percent proposing three plans that could limit the
number as low as 300.
Now, it was in 2008--I always remember and I carry this
with me--Secretary Gates stated as long as others have nuclear
weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves
to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over 2 dozen--
that is about 30, as I understand it--allies and partners who
rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it
unnecessary for them to develop their own.
Now, I would like to ask what kind of implications this
would come up with in terms of our allies, those 30 other
countries that are depending upon our umbrella, if we were to
voluntarily bring it down 80 percent.
General Kehler. Sir, I would make a couple of points.
The first thing I would say is, as I said earlier, we do
not start with numbers. We have been starting with strategy
objectives, national security objectives, et cetera.
The study that you referred to is still ongoing. No
conclusions have been reached yet, and so it is not appropriate
for me to comment on the study. STRATCOM has been a full
participant in the study, and I believe that, as I said
earlier, there are opportunities here for additional
reductions.
Senator Inhofe. Unilateral reductions.
General Kehler. Well, sir, all along here and going all the
way back to the Nuclear Posture Review, I think the viewpoint
has been that it is best to do this with Russia. The Russian
and the U.S. arsenals still really drive this conversation, and
so doing this with Russia is certainly the preferred way
forward. I think that the need to continue to deter and assure
allies remains.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, the point I am getting to, though, is
the key word is ``unilateral,'' and that is what concerns me.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Let me, just real quickly, cover just a
couple of other things here.
This, General Kehler, was the triad--I think it was about
2004 or 2005--showing the cliff.
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Senator Inhofe. You are somewhat familiar with that. Now, I
am wondering if we could get this updated. First of all, during
the consideration of the New START, the President said: I
intend to modernize or replace the triad strategic nuclear
delivery system, a heavy bomber, air launch cruise missiles,
and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and nuclear
powered ballistic missile submarine and Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missile, and maintain the United States' rocket motor
industrial base. He goes on and elaborates on that.
Now, this statement was made after this chart. Do you have
an updated chart on this that would reflect what is happening
today?
General Kehler. Sir, may I take that for the record and get
back to you?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, you certainly may. That is very
reasonable.
General Kehler. I am happy to do that.
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Senator Inhofe. Then the last thing on that is something
that no one ever talks about but I have always been concerned,
and that is relating to the tactical nuclear weapons. Several
of us on this side of the aisle and on the other side of the
aisle made an effort to include tactical nuclear weapons at the
time that we were looking at the New START program. As it is
right now, it is about a 10 to 1 advantage of Russia over
ourselves. Do you agree or disagree with me that that should be
a part of the plan?
General Kehler. I agree that it should be a part of the
plan. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you for your service and for your kind
remarks this morning. I appreciate that very much.
General Kehler and General Alexander, the comments today
and all the discussion for some period of time has indicated
the growing threat of cyber warfare threat to the United
States' national security. As we engage in this discussion,
there is an ongoing restructuring of STRATCOM's headquarters
with a new headquarters at Offutt.
General Kehler, can you give us some indication why an
aging facility would not be an appropriate facility as we take
on new responsibilities but particularly as it relates to the
high-tech cyber situation?
General Alexander, if you had some thoughts about that, it
would be helpful too. Thank you.
General Kehler. Sir, the activities that go on at STRATCOM
are unique activities. We perform those activities,
particularly the command and control that we have for our
strategic forces, the planning that we do for our strategic
forces, the intelligence support that is required behind our
continuing need for strategic-level deterrence and being able
to command and control forces under high stress. All of those
really come together at STRATCOM headquarters.
The demand that today's systems place on that headquarters
building have far outpaced the ability of the building to keep
up. Not only do we have vulnerabilities because of the cyber
concerns that we have expressed earlier, but we have physical
plant vulnerabilities there. You are well aware of some of the
failures that we have had, catastrophic failures, in the
building systems themselves that have threatened to take that
one-of-a-kind location and really make it inoperable for
months. We barely averted that kind of a catastrophe a year ago
in December with a flood, of all things, in the basement, a
burst water line.
So as we looked at ways forward, given the unique nature of
what we do, given the one-of-a-kind responsibilities that are
performed there and given the continued importance of all of
that in our deterrence posture, the conclusion that the
engineers reached was that you could not modify the building,
that basically what you needed to do was go and build a new
command and control facility that houses all of the activities
that we are going to need to perform.
That remains my assessment today, that we need to get
moving on this. I think that it is proceeding well. I believe
that we are headed toward contract award. I know the Corps of
Engineers has responsibility in this regard, and things seem to
be moving forward, at least everything that I can be aware of.
Much of this, of course, needs to be in the realm of the Corps
and others.
So from my perspective, Senator, the bottom line is the
recognition that we do something unique there, that it is not
about a brick and mortar building. It is about what goes on
there in the computer systems and the need for support systems,
information technology, and the supporting networks that put
all of that together so that we are prepared to continue to
perform this deterrence mission as far into the future as we
can see.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
When it comes to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement (CMRR) facility, the NNSA has deferred for 5 years
the construction of the CMRR facility. Is this, the CMRR
facility, a concern for you in not only meeting our
responsibilities and obligations and commitments on the New
START treaty but just in general keeping our arsenal current?
General Kehler. Senator, it is a concern for me. I think of
all of the items in the 2013 budget, those items that would be
associated with STRATCOM's portfolio of mission
responsibilities, fare generally pretty well. There were some
delays and programmatic adjustments and other things that were
made. I think we can manage risk across all of that.
When I look specifically at the weapons complex, the
ability of the complex to provide us the weapons that we need
that have the appropriate life extensions provided, that give
us the flexibility to manage the hedge and allows us to look at
potential reductions, as we go to the future, in the stockpile,
I think the thing that concerns me the most is our continued
investment in the weapons complex. So the issue with CMRR does
concern me. I understand the 2013 budget does provide for us to
get moving in a number of areas.
The Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense sent a
letter to Congress that reminded them that we are not ready yet
to lay out what happens in 2014 and beyond. Until we are ready
to lay all of that out, I remain concerned.
Senator Nelson. It could be appropriate to at least start
the process as in the case of the STRATCOM headquarters which
is going to be a phased-in funding over several years. At least
a start could be made on CMRR in a similar fashion. Otherwise,
it looks like we have just put together baling wire and maybe a
duct tape structure to get us through 2013 budget-wise.
General Kehler. Senator, this is ultimately a due-out from
the Departments of Energy and Defense, and we owe you the
alternatives. I do not have with me today, because we do not
have yet, a set of viable alternatives that we can come and
present. I do agree, though, with the main thrust here and that
is I see no alternative, as we look to the future, aside from
modernizing the complex.
Regardless of what happens, we have a fairly extensive
backlog of weapons awaiting dismantlement that require the same
kind of a modern complex to dismantle. So I think from both
sides of this equation, we need a modern weapons industrial
complex. It is highly unique and it is very specialized. We
need that kind of a complex so that we have a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent.
Senator Nelson. It is hard to draw an analogy other than to
say that trying to put together something on a stop-gap basis
might get us through 2013 but does not position us for what we
might do years beyond and particularly with an aging stockpile.
General Kehler. Senator, we owe you some answers, and the
study to produce those is underway.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Alexander, as you relate to the responsibilities
with cyber, I think you made it very clear that there is a role
for the DOD. There is a role for Homeland Security. There is a
role for our law enforcement agencies, and continuing to find
ways to work together is a reduction of stovepiping that has
been so predominant in the past.
Are you comfortable that the agencies that are all trying
to work together understand the important need not to stovepipe
and to break down even with some comparable authorities that
will go to different agencies, but to continue to work together
on this important threat to our country and to our business,
which is also a threat to our country?
General Alexander. Senator, I do.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kehler, would you consider the air operations
groups currently supporting the Global Strike Command a
valuable resource?
General Kehler. Senator, yes, we sure do.
Senator Brown. Are they irreplaceable? Are they such an
integral part of what you are doing that if you did not have
them, we would be in trouble?
General Kehler. The entire force that Global Strike Command
brings to STRATCOM--in fact, that is one of Air Force
components, one of our major components as a matter of fact.
They bring us the entire dual-capable bomber force, the B-52s
and the B-2s. They also bring us the entire ICBM force. They
bring us an air operations center that allows us to manage all
of our air activities in STRATCOM. So what Global Strike
brings--and all of its subordinates are all very valuable to
us.
Senator Brown. That actually provides real-world, time-
sensitive planning support as well. Correct?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Brown. When you are answering those questions like
that, that is why I am a little concerned with the Otis Air
National Guard Base. I was there a couple of months ago, and
they have a great mission and their air operations group
supports STRATCOM's Global Strike Command by providing exactly
what you have indicated, the irreplaceable, real-time,
sensitive support. Yet, I have heard that the Air Force wants
to break up this very valuable, irreplaceable unit to save
money. I was wondering if, number one, you were aware of or
were given the opportunity to comment on that proposal
affecting that group and Otis in particular.
General Kehler. Senator, if I could take that for the
record, I would appreciate that. I do not know enough about the
details.
Senator Brown. Okay, that would be helpful because I agree
with you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The combatant command develops requirements from Operational Plans.
The Services provide forces or resources to fulfill those requirements.
In this case, the National Guard Bureau serves as a force provider for
this particular capability and has provided the following statement in
regards to the 102nd AOG: The Air National Guard (ANG) had to make
difficult decisions as a result of PB13 Force Structure announcements.
Specifically, the ANG did not receive additional manpower for the MC-12
and the new Remotely Piloted Aircraft missions. The four component
Numbered Air Force units were slated for divestment to provide needed
manpower for higher priority missions.

Senator Brown. I agree with everything you just said in
your opening response to my questions, that it is
irreplaceable. It is valuable, and I know what these folks do
there, and especially being on the eastern seaboard of the
United States and covering all of the eastern United States in
some respects, I mean the Air Guard, in particular, and Army
Guard, as well and Reserves--they give you great value for the
dollar. I am deeply concerned that we are cutting off our nose
to spite our face. It is kind of like the Air Force is saying,
okay, I am going to keep all my toys here, and by the way, the
Guard and Reserves--we are going to take away what you have. I
have not been yet convinced that these cuts represent either an
acceptable level of risk or an efficient use of the money. So I
would ask--and I will get you the very specifics questions for
the record. I appreciate that.
I know we are talking about cybersecurity. I know there are
many proposals. We have one in government regulations and the
administration. The military is working on a whole host of
things. How are the Rules of Engagement actually working or
being implemented or coming along with regard to the CYBERCOM
operation?
General Alexander?
General Alexander. Right now we are updating, if you will,
the Rules of Engagement that the chairman has put out dated in
2005. Given where we are today, what the Joint Staff has taken
on is to update those. Right now all our measures are internal
to our networks, what DOD is authorized to do. What we are
looking at within DOD and then within the interagency what are
the next steps that we should have and how do we take those
steps. I think over the next month or 2, the Joint Staff will
complete those standing Rules of Engagement and then move those
to the interagency and share those.
Senator Brown. What role do you see or what segments of the
private sector should fall into DOD's responsibility, if any?
General Alexander. This is where the discussion comes in.
First----
Senator Brown. Let me just extend on that. If attacked,
what entities would be considered an extension of U.S.
Government facilities?
General Alexander. I think those are decisions that you in
the bills and the administration would make on when we actually
implement response options or response options to defend
against an attack. That is the first step.
So let me start with technically what we are doing. I think
the first part of that, Senator, is to have the information
sharing, to know that an attack is going on. We discussed that
a little bit previously. That is the ability for industry to
tell us that something is happening and that either FBI, if it
is domestic, DHS, or if it is foreign, that FBI and CYBERCOM
and NSA would respond to.
The issue and I think what we are going to walk our way
through candidly is we have to start someplace. I think putting
out where we are on the information sharing and having industry
take the lead with DHS on providing us the insights of what is
going on is the first right step. I think that is the best step
that we can take.
More importantly, I think we need to take that step. What
we cannot do is wait. I think your question and where you are
going on this is absolutely right. We have to take measures
now, and I think those are absolutely important because my
concern and the statements that go to that is that if somebody
is attacked, the way we find out about it today is after the
fact. You cannot stop it then. Now you are in the forensics
mode. So I think what everybody agrees is so we have to get to
a point where industry can tell us when something is going on
so that we can help prevent it.
Then the options come up to what industry has included in
that, and those are parts of the bills that I know that you are
all considering.
Senator Brown. That's great, but I tell you what. We do not
have all the answers. I can tell you that firsthand. What I am
concerned about is that we create a bill that has so much red
tape and so much overlap and duplication that you cannot get
out of your own way. So I would ask for your recommendations
and guidance as well to be part of the process and let us know
what your thoughts are and where you feel the weaknesses or
strengths lie so we can expand or detract from that.
I am deeply concerned, and I think you are right. I know
you are right in the fact that we are always reacting instead
of being proactive, and when that attack happens, we find out
about it after, after our technology and intellectual property
and military secrets and plans are stolen. That deeply concerns
me.
I was wondering as the technology continues to advance,
potential cyberattacks are capable, as I think have referenced,
and executed at increasing speeds. Do you have enough leg room
from the authorization standpoint to act at the earliest
possible opportunity to defeat a cyberattack before it is
launched? Do you have enough flexibility do you think?
General Alexander. Those are some of the issues that are
being considered in the Rules of Engagement. So I will not know
until we are complete with that. We are pushing for what we
think we need, and I think what the Chairman and the Joint
Staff and then OSD will do is say, okay, what makes sense.
Being extremely candid on this, it really comes down to
what are those actions that make the sense that we could do
defensively, analogous to the missile shoot-down. I think there
are some there that we are getting agreement on, yup, it makes
sense to stop that attack from going. But if you were to go
after a computer in foreign space or some other thing, that
might be a response option that would now take, I think, the
President and the Secretary to step in and start making
decisions versus us taking that on. I think that is probably
where we will end up. That makes a lot of sense from my
perspective.
Senator Brown. Thank you very much, both of you. This is an
issue that deeply concerns me and many other members of the
committee. I will be submitting some questions for the record
or maybe we can speak offline. I do not want you to have to
reinvent the wheel, just some certain areas that I think I need
a little bit more understanding of. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of you for your testimony today and certainly
for your service to our country.
General Alexander, the administration believes that it is
crucial for critical infrastructure companies to carefully
diagnose their cyber vulnerabilities and the risk posed to the
American people should these vulnerabilities be exploited and
to take steps to eliminate these vulnerabilities. The
administration has proposed legislation to ensure that industry
stands up to these responsibilities as a matter of national
security. The administration is also seeking to extend the
signature-based defense that the NSA and that CYBERCOM have
developed for DOD's critical infrastructure.
Since the administration is seeking to implement both
approaches, the implication is that neither one alone is seen
as sufficient to meet the threat. Others, however, take the
position that information sharing, in conjunction with NSA's
defensive solution, would be enough, that it is not necessary
to require critical infrastructure companies to build up their
own defenses.
Do you believe that NSA's signature-based defense deployed
recently in the DIB pilot program can defend our Nation's
critical infrastructure against nation state cyberthreats, or
do you believe that the critical infrastructure companies also
need to close their vulnerabilities?
General Alexander. Senator, first, I think it is the
latter. We need both. But I would like to take it one step
further because I do not think what we are talking about is
having NSA deploy capabilities out there. Rather, what we are
talking about is NSA providing technical capability to others
to run, so we do not want, to run stuff within industry. So I
want to make that clear. It is not us putting stuff out there
for us to operate. What we are really saying is industry has a
bunch of signatures that can detect foreign actors that are
coming against them. Government has some of those. NSA, DHS,
and FBI, all of us need to work together to provide the best
set of signatures to protect that critical infrastructure.
Industry can actually operate that and tell us when that
occurs.
I also think that you need to set a set of standards for
how those systems are operated to give you the best and I will
call that--and General Kehler mentioned it and it is in there--
resilience. We need the resilience in those networks to ensure
that they can operate and be defensible while we are trying to
defend the country outside.
Does that make sense?
Senator Hagan. Yes.
Just last Friday--and I read about it yesterday--Microsoft
was accompanied by U.S. marshals and they raided office
buildings in Pennsylvania and in Illinois to disrupt a group of
computers, a botnet, that was harvesting bank accounts,
passwords, and other personal information from millions of
computers. Microsoft's actions show what is possible and some
say is certainly necessary now to stop cyber crimes.
What are your thoughts on these actions taken recently, and
should they serve as a model for other private industries? Is
there a take-away for DOD on this recent raid?
General Alexander. Senator, I think it shows how we can
work together, industry and Government, to do what is right
here, and by bringing both of those together, we are better off
for it. I think what we have to do is we have to come up with
that solution in this area too, and I know both bills are
looking at that. I think that information sharing is critical.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
General Alexander, it is often argued that terrorist groups
and rogue nations, such as North Korea, for example, do not yet
possess the sophisticated and extensive cyber capabilities to
effectively cripple our Nation's critical infrastructure. For
example, General Cartwright, the former Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, has publicly expressed doubt that this class of
actors could carry out such attacks today. However, we are
aware of what is described as a thriving international black
market where it is possible to buy or to rent cyberattack tools
and large-scale supporting infrastructure such as thousands or
even millions of compromised computers that are deemed to be
effective against almost any type of network or information
system.
This black market has developed to support the vast cyber
criminal activities that have been estimated by some to now
yield more revenue than the global illegal narcotics trade.
This criminal money then, obviously, fuels research and
development of modern and up-to-date cyberattack tools.
Could this black market in cyberattack tools and
infrastructure now or in the future enable terrorists or rogue
nations to acquire ready-made capabilities to inflict
significant damage on the U.S. economy and our critical
infrastructure? Are you worried about that?
General Alexander. Senator, that is my greatest worry. I
would go beyond that group. I think the proliferation of cyber
weapons, if you will, grows, that we cannot discount the
actions that one smart person can do. From my perspective, when
we see what our folks are capable of doing, we need to look
back and say there are other smart people out there that can do
things to this country. We need to look at this and say how are
we going to defend. From my opinion, as you described
accurately and I agree with it, it could be non-nation state
actors all the way up to nation state actors like North Korea.
I would not discount any of them. We have to be prepared for
all of them. Only one of them could do tremendous damage to
this country.
Senator Hagan. Last July, General Cartwright, also speaking
as the Vice Chairman, noted the challenges of recapitalizing
all three legs of the triad with constrained resources. General
Kehler, you have raised a similar point, that we are not going
to be able to go forward with weapons systems that cost what
weapons systems currently are costing today. In the search for
a solution to these challenges, options seem to take the form
of delaying the current programs or reducing the size of the
planned programs.
What are your thoughts on the pluses and minuses of each of
these options?
General Kehler. Senator, first of all, I continue to
support the need for a balanced triad of strategic deterrent
forces. I think the triad has served us well. I think it
continues to serve us well. I think that as we look to the
future, there are attributes that are spread across the triad
that continue to make sense for our national security.
Having said that, I am concerned about the costs. So I
think there are a couple of things that we need to keep in
mind. We need to phase these programs appropriately. We need to
make sure that we have matched the investment with the needs.
We need to control costs. I think there are a number of
programmatic steps to take as we go forward.
When I look at the Ohio-class replacement program, I know
that we are making decisions here today that will be with us
for decades to come. The Ohio-class replacement program, as far
as we can see into the future, we believe that we see the
strategic need for a submarine-based part of our deterrent. So
moving forward with that, even though we have had to delay the
program some, is going to be important. That is also important
with our allies, the British.
I think it important that we have a dual-capable long-range
bomber. It needs to be nuclear capable but it will not just be
used for nuclear purposes. If we do our deterrence job right,
it will never be used for that purpose. It may very likely be
used to employ conventional weapons which is what B-52s and B-
2s and B-1s have done. That program is underway. I think
controlling costs is going to be a big issue in both of those
programs.
The next question then becomes the future ICBM, and we have
begun an analysis of alternatives to look at what shape, form
that might take. Then as we go to the future, I think we will
get to a number of decision points on all of these systems that
will allow the future environment to shape what the ultimate
force outcome becomes.
Senator Hagan. My time is up. Both of you, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Alexander, and thank you, General
Kehler, for being here today and for your service.
General Kehler, the Senate support for the New START treaty
was tied to modernization of the United States' nuclear complex
and strategic delivery system. Specifically during the Senate
confirmation, the President committed to modernization in what
became known as the 1251 plan that was incorporated in the 2010
NDAA. Is that not right?
General Kehler. Senator, yes.
Senator Ayotte. If you look at that commitment in the 1251
plan, there was an initial plan submitted in May 2010 and then
a month before the ratification of the Senate treaty, there was
$4.1 billion added over 5 years to the plan. Is that not right?
General Kehler. Yes. Are you talking about the DOD?
Senator Ayotte. Yes. But that was specifically reflected a
month before the ratification of the START treaty put into the
1251 plan as incorporated in the 2010 NDAA.
General Kehler. Senator, I think that is right. That is a
little before my time, but I think that is right.
Senator Ayotte. The reason that was done is because
modernization was such an important issue to getting that
treaty through the U.S. Senate because modernization is very,
very important for our nuclear program. Is that not correct?
General Kehler. Yes, it is.
Senator Ayotte. The 2013 budget request underfunds the
commitment made that was expressly made in conjunction with the
ratification of the START treaty by over $4 billion over the
next 5 years. Is that not the case?
General Kehler. It is lower than the level of the 1251
report. Yes, it is.
Senator Ayotte. It is $4 billion lower, roughly.
General Kehler. I think that is right, yes.
Senator Ayotte. The President, a month before ratification
to get the Senate to sign on to the reductions in the START
treaty, added $4 billion because we were so worried. I was not
here at the time, but I know many of my colleagues were very
worried about modernization of the program if we were going to
make the reductions required by the START treaty.
If the President is not following through, why did we not
include the $4 billion in the commitment on modernization? In
particular, just to break that down, Senator Nelson had asked
you about the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement
Facility. That is an 83 percent cut in that facility. In fact,
we are not following through at all in our commitment to that
facility. Are we?
General Kehler. The commitment has been delayed, if I
understand the budget correctly. The building has been slipped
to the right 5 to 7 years I believe was the number.
Senator Ayotte. Would that not be a broken promise from
what was required by the 2010 NDAA and what was specifically
contained within the 1251 plan?
General Kehler. It is certainly different than the 1251
plan, yes, clearly.
Senator Ayotte. If my colleagues signed on to the START
treaty concerned about modernization, with a commitment from
the administration of a certain level of resources,
particularly this facility that we have talked about, the CMRR
facility. It is critical, is it not, to modernization?
General Kehler. Yes, it is.
Senator Ayotte. So no doubt that we need it to modernize.
General Kehler. In the long run, there is no doubt we need
it.
Senator Ayotte. So when you were being questioned by
Senator Nelson, you said you owe us answers to this. Is that
true?
General Kehler. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. I guess I would reframe it. I think what we
need is a commitment from the administration to follow through
on what they promised in conjunction with the ratification of
the START treaty. What are the concerns that you have if we do
not modernize?
General Kehler. I have a lot of concerns if we do not
modernize. There are four pieces to this from my vantage point
anyway.
Piece number one is the delivery systems, and I just
mentioned that there are modernization plans in place for the
delivery systems or there is a study underway to take a look at
the ICBM leg and what we might need as we go to the future.
There is command and control and the commitment to both of
those.
The real issue for me is the weapons end of this and the
weapons complex that supports those. In an era that we are in
today, without nuclear explosive package testing where we do
not do any yield testing, that puts a strain on the industrial
base in a way that I believe has not been strained in the past.
It strains the science and engineering skills that we have to
make sure that as we do life extensions, that we have the
appropriate science bases and understanding to be able to do
those extensions without nuclear testing.
We have issues with aging. Most of the problems with the
weapons that we have today is that they are reaching the end of
their lifetimes in various stages. So being able to have life
extension for those weapons is also very important.
At the end of the day, if you have a more modern complex,
we think that we probably can have a smaller stockpile because
the way we would hedge against failure would be different as we
go to the future.
Senator Ayotte. But if we just reduce our stockpile and we
do not modernize, are we not taking on additional risk?
General Kehler. I think there are scenarios there where
that can be additional risk, yes.
Senator Ayotte. I certainly would like to know why, as
reflected in the DOD fiscal year 2013 budget, the
administration has not followed through on its commitment to
modernization because I think that was critical, as I
understand it, to many individuals around here. They were
concerned about that in the debate over the START treaty. So it
was a very important issue, and that is why it was specifically
incorporated and tied to the START treaty in the 2010 NDAA. I
would hope you would take that for the record and get back to
us on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The fiscal year 2013 budget request reflects the administration's
commitment to the Nuclear Enterprise and is sufficient to certify the
stockpile, conduct required maintenance, and support fiscal year 2013
activities for ongoing and planned life extensions. The Budget Control
Act required responsible choices, to include a construction sequencing
adjustment between the Uranium Processing Facility and the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility. The Department of
Defense and Department of Energy are committed to maintaining a safe,
effective, and secure nuclear deterrent and are working to develop an
executable, long-term plan.

General Kehler. We will certainly do that. I fully
understand the concern, recognizing that nothing was immune
when we went through the budget reduction to include the
nuclear force. I believe that we balanced the investments in
much of the portfolio. It does not look like the 1251 report,
but I think we balanced much of it. What concerns me the most,
I think, is the industrial complex.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
I also wanted to follow up with a question about Russia. As
I understand it historically, General Kehler, why did the
Russians not want us to improve our missile defense system in
Europe and expand it? They have been very concerned about that.
Why is that?
General Kehler. I could give you my understanding of where
I think they are. They are very concerned. At least in the
informal contacts that I have had with some Russian officials,
they continue to say that they are concerned that our
deployment of a missile defense system will tip the strategic
balance in our favor, that it will render their offensive
capabilities irrelevant. Our contention is that is not at all
true, and therein has been the conversation back and forth.
Senator Ayotte. My time is up.
So when the President said that essentially he had to be
given space to the Russians the other day, what he was really
talking about is their concerns about us expanding or enhancing
our missile defense system in Europe. Even on the continental
United States, it could be interpreted that way because the
Russians do not want us to do that.
So I am really concerned about that statement that Senator
Inhofe asked you about in the context of what it means in terms
of what we would be conceding to the Russians going forward in
protecting the United States of America and our allies.
So thank you very much for appearing today. I appreciate
it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your extraordinary service to our Nation
in each of your commands and responsibilities and to the men
and women who serve under you.
General Kehler, if I could begin just briefly following up
on a remark that you just made about the Ohio-class submarine
which you have said is going to be of strategic vital
importance as far as we can see into the future. I probably am
paraphrasing you, not quoting you directly. But I agree
completely, and I wonder if you could speak to the significance
of the Ohio-class submarine replacement in terms of what its
value is. How does it add value to our strategic force and why
is it so important to continue building it without further
delay?
General Kehler. Senator, each of the elements of our
nuclear deterrent force brings something unique to the mixture,
and the strength of the overall deterrent has always been in
the sum of its parts. So as we look at this today and as we go
to the future, the inherent survivability of the submarine-
based deterrent has been of great value to us. It continues to
be of great value as we go forward at many levels. Strategic
stability is really built on survivability. The understanding
that neither side possesses an overwhelming advantage to strike
first, that even in the event of that kind of a highly
unlikely--I mean, the world is different today and we
understand that. But stability, particularly in an unforeseen
crisis as we look to the future, something that would arise
that would put us in crisis with any of the nuclear contenders,
having a survivable element of our strategic deterrent is
extraordinarily valuable. We believe that that remains valuable
as we look to the future.
Now, you can get survivability a lot of ways. An airborne
aircraft is a pretty survivable platform, and if it stands off
or it can penetrate or it has stealth--I mean, there are lots
of attributes there that get to survivability.
But we have looked at our submarine force as providing the
bulk of our survivable deterrent, in particular the day-to-day
survivable deterrent. Submarines that are at sea are inherently
survivable.
The issue will be with Ohio-class replacement is making
sure it stays that way and making sure that we can deploy a
platform that has those attributes that is perhaps lower in
cost to operate when it is fielded, and we can guarantee, as we
look to the future, that it can stay a step ahead of any
developing technologies that might threaten it.
Senator Blumenthal. So you would say that the commitment of
our military, our Defense Department, and our strategic
planners is undiluted when it comes to the Ohio-class
replacement.
General Kehler. Within the modernization efforts that we
are undertaking in our strategic deterrent, this one and the
long-range strike bomber are both at the top of my list.
By the way, we do not talk much about the need, but the
need for a replacement tanker is equally important to STRATCOM,
and that is, of course, underway with the Air Force today as
well.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
General Alexander, I was struck by your extraordinarily
insightful and helpful testimony about the wide ranging breadth
of potential cyberthreats relating to industrial espionage and
intellectual property theft, as well as the potential
infiltration of social media. It reminded me of a separate and
perhaps unrelated aspect of problematic conduct involving
social media that I have highlighted recently which is the
demands that employers have made for passwords, log-in
information from prospective job applicants or from employees
which enables them to invade the private communications, e-
mails, g-chats, private accounts of their employees and
potentially people with whom their employees communicate,
including potentially service men and women or loved ones or
family or service men and women who are applying for jobs.
I wonder if you could comment on the potential security
threats apart from the invasions of privacy that may occur from
the demand for information from employees about their security
accounts and also what the needs are in terms of background
checks on the part of your agency.
General Alexander. I think, Senator, that is a great
question. I think, first of all, asking for potential employees
for their passwords and other things is odd from my
perspective, to say the minimum.
I think the issue that I see in here is a couple things.
One, how do you secure those so that somebody else does not
gain access to all of them. One of the Senators--I think
Senator Hagan--had a great comment about the theft of bank
records and what was going on about what she is seeing what
Microsoft and the authorities are doing to make that easier. I
am concerned about that. I am not sure about the foreign
threats to this as I am to what that means to the future.
We have some tremendous capabilities in cyberspace, we as a
Nation, the iPads, the iPhones. I think our people should feel
free to use those and know that they are going to be protected
in using them. Both their civil liberties and privacy and as a
country. I think we can do both, and I think we should push for
both.
This is a new area, and you can see. I mean, you are
hitting right on some of the key parts when you look at how the
companies are wrestling with this too. How do you provide
maximum benefit without intruding. I think that is going to be
an issue that we are going to wrestle with for several years.
Senator Blumenthal. When it strikes you as odd, I assume
that ``odd''--and it is a very well chosen word--may be a
euphemism for strange or unnecessary or invasive, unacceptable.
General Alexander. Senator, I am not completely up to speed
on all of it. I did read it. So I do not know all the facts
that go with it. My initial reaction was this does not seem
right. That is what I mean by ``odd.'' But I do not have all
the facts.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, General, and thank you for
your great work on this issue. I hope you will give thought as
well--and I may ask you a question in writing about it--
regarding the potential uses of the National Guard cyber units
and how they can better assist you and the cost-effectiveness
of building those programs through our National Guard.
General Alexander. We are working with the National Guard,
and there are a number of those. I will start right with the
Maryland National Guard, the Delaware National Guard, go out to
Washington. There are some great ones. I am sure Connecticut
too. I did not want to miss that. But I do think this is an
opportunity where the National Guard has some technical
expertise as civilians working in this area, especially when
you look in the high-tech areas. So this is something that we
can leverage and we are working on that.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Alexander, I very much appreciate the attempts you
have made today to clarify the roles of DOD versus DHS versus
the FBI when it comes to dealing with cybersecurity. As the
discussion today has indicated, I believe there is a lot of
confusion over who does what and who should do what. As you
correctly said, this has to be a team approach, and DOD, DHS,
and the FBI have different but complementary roles.
So what I would like to do since, based on some of the
questioning I heard today, I think there is still a little bit
of confusion, is just take you through a series of questions in
the hopes of clarifying who does what.
First, let me say do you agree that our critical
infrastructure today is not as secure as it should be.
General Alexander. Senator, I do.
Senator Collins. Second and related to that, several
studies and experts have told us on the Homeland Security
Committee that critical infrastructure operators are not
taking, in some cases, even the most basic measures such as
regularly installing patches or software updates or changing
passwords from default settings. Those are pretty basic and
known vulnerabilities. Would you agree with that assessment?
General Alexander. I think those are basic vulnerabilities.
I would add to that we see that in a number of cases in other
areas as well.
Senator Collins. In addition to just critical
infrastructure. The reason I am focused on critical
infrastructure is, obviously, if there is an attack on critical
infrastructure, the consequences are so much greater than if
there is an attack on one particular business even though that
too can have significant economic consequences and cause many
problems.
So my third question is to try to better define the roles.
Would you agree that DHS has the lead role in interacting with
the owners and operators of critical infrastructure to get them
to strengthen their protections, harden their defenses up front
as opposed to when an attack occurs?
General Alexander. I do agree with that, Senator.
Senator Collins. The distinction that I am trying to make
is once there is an attack that has significant consequences,
DOD would become the lead agency just as you would if we were
attacked by missiles. Is that an accurate assessment?
General Alexander. That is correct.
Senator Collins. There is where I think the confusion lies.
It is the role of DHS under the current practice of this
administration and under the legislation that Senator Lieberman
and I have authored to try to strengthen the defenses of our
critical infrastructure. In our legislation and in a
collaborative effort with industry, which is absolutely
critical that it be collaborative, the Department with industry
would develop risk-based performance standards. Is that your
understanding?
General Alexander. That is my understanding, Senator.
Senator Collins. The reason for that is to ensure that the
owners of critical infrastructure implement these risk-based
performance standards. But I would point out to my colleagues
this is not some new bureaucracy as we have heard today. It
would be a collaborative effort, and the owners and operators
of the critical infrastructure would decide how to meet those
standards. It would not be dictated by the Department. Is that
your understanding?
General Alexander. That is my understanding.
Senator, if I could, I think that is the key point because
I think the concern that I hear, that we all hear, is just that
key point. How do you do this in such a way that helps industry
without--I will use the term ``over-regulating.'' This is
outside of my area of expertise, but how do you get them the
standards and help them build a more resilient network, a more
defensible network, if you will? That is the key to this, and I
do think that is the key issue that you are wrestling with. I
think that is where we can provide technical expertise to DHS
and others. I think that is where we have to partner with
industry and just as you said. I agree with the way that you
have stated that, and I think that is extremely important, that
bringing the industry folks together to help decide is what I
get because they want to be a player in this because this is,
from their perspective, important as well.
Senator Collins. In fact, we need the expertise of
industry, of NSA, of DHS, of everybody working together, the
results of the investigations from the FBI because this is a
huge problem, and it has consequences for our national security
and our economic prosperity. It is so critical that we work
together to solve this problem. I know that is what you are
committing to doing and that is what you are doing.
That is the one final point that I want to make today. NSA
is already working with DHS, for example, at what is called the
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center,
which is the 24-hour/7-day-a-week entity that has been set up.
There is an exchange of personnel between DHS and NSA. Is there
not?
General Alexander. There is.
Senator Collins. Under the bill that Senator Lieberman and
I have introduced, to try to get that essential visibility that
you have emphasized is so important, we would require mandatory
reporting in the event of an attack because this cannot be
discretionary if in fact there is a significant attack on
critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure is defined as
infrastructure, an attack upon which, would cause mass
casualties, a severe economic impact, or a serious degradation
of our national security.
So do you support requiring that mandatory reporting in
such cases?
General Alexander. I do, Senator, and I think I would add,
as we discussed earlier, that in order for us to help prevent
it, it has to be in real-time. I think that is absolutely vital
to the defense.
Senator Collins. The reporting and information sharing
under our bill is bi-directional, as has become the latest
phrase to be used in this. In other words, it is in both
directions. Even NSA, the capabilities of which are
unparalleled, can learn from the private sector. I think you
learned that in the DIB study where there were some signatures
that the private sector had that NSA may not have had. Is that
accurate?
General Alexander. That is accurate and logical when you
think about it. Adversaries will do different things for
different sectors of the Government, will use different tools
for different sectors of the Government. That is one of the
great things that we learned on it and how we have to go
forward on the DIB pilot.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here.
General Alexander, let me turn to you first. I have been
concerned, as we all have, for some years about the potential
of cyberattacks on our electricity grid here in the United
States and the potential effects that such attacks would have
on the critical missions, especially during an emergency or
during periods of prolonged power outages.
Given the uptick of tensions in the Persian Gulf and the
presence of our military in the region, I am interested to know
about our potential vulnerabilities of our own military to
cyberattacks in the Gulf on that electrical infrastructure that
our military depends on. I am thinking about this from the
perspective of the U.S. military's reliance on fuel in the
region, fuel that cannot be produced without the electricity
that runs oil extraction wells and refineries and that powers
pumps for offloading fuel for storage and use.
Do we have an assessment of how dependent the U.S. military
in the Gulf is on electricity infrastructure? Do we have a
backup plan if there were to be a prolonged grid outage? Do we
understand the constitution and the vulnerability of the
electricity grid in the Persian Gulf well enough to measure the
effect on the oil production and transportation system
especially but not limited to the oil refineries there?
Thank you for letting me direct that trio of questions at
you.
General Alexander. Senator, I thought you were going to ask
me if I got the new iPad. I thought that is how we were going
to start this out. So I did. I got the new iPad. It is
wonderful.
Senator Udall. Well, we are envious.
General Alexander. That is a really good and complex
question. So let me expand it, if I could, not to make it
harder.
The underlying grids that are in the Gulf States and other
parts of the region--the military will normally have backup
power for military operations, generator power and other
things, to operate all our critical capabilities. So for the
most part, both for our computer networks and for our
operations, we have backup power for our critical
infrastructure.
That is not the same for the flow of oil and electricity
per se throughout the region. I think the concern that we have,
the concern that I think everyone shares here is what you were
driving at. Note that this is one network, one global network,
with a lot of little pieces but all interconnected. So you can
be anywhere on the network. My concern is not only in the Gulf
but here in the United States. So as we go forward, in a
crisis, no matter where it erupts, is that increasingly the
probability that cyber will be part of that crisis grows and we
have to be prepared for it. It will cover all the things that
you mentioned because those are the easier things to attack and
have some significant advantage for the adversary.
Senator Udall. So you are saying we have more work to do
here to understand the potential threat and to prepare for it.
General Alexander. We do. Senator, I think we are looking
at it both from how do we defend the DOD networks. Great
progress there. With Senator Collins, we just talked about
defending the critical infrastructure and support to our
allies. I think all of those have to be laid out and discussed,
and it is growing.
Senator Udall. Also what I was saying and I think you
agreed with was the flow of oil on which the world's economy
depends could also be affected by something in this realm of
cyberattacks, and we also need to be prepared for that.
General Alexander. It could be. I would not put that
highest on the list. I think the electricity and the other--but
you can see how that would--it all depends on flow and things
opening up and SCADA systems, if you will.
Senator Udall. So SCADA systems in that part of the world
are vulnerable and we are also dependent on them at the far
reach of the United States or Europe or the Asian oil markets
as well.
Thank you for that. Obviously, more attention needs to be
paid to that.
Let me move to a question dealing with computer network
exploitation (CNE) versus computer network attack (CNA). How do
you exactly draw the line between those two, and how does the
Government change legal authorities funding personnel and
infrastructure when moving from CNE to CNA?
General Alexander. CNE is largely done under title 50. I
say largely, not solely, but largely done under title 50. So
that would go to the Intelligence Community and fall under the
Executive Order 12333. While title 10 is normally where we
would conduct CNA, you could also do it under covert action. In
times of crisis and war, our forward operating elements would
operate CNA and exploit under title 10, and it would be done in
conjunction with title 50 so the deconfliction would have to
do.
The good part about training our forces together and
operating together is to ensure that we can deconflict those
kinds of things. It flows back to the defense. The same thing
on the defense. That is why I think the good part about putting
the defense to operate with the exploit and attack puts it as
one team, not two different teams, which is what we largely had
up until 2008.
Senator Udall. So you sound as if we are well prepared to
deal with those differences.
General Alexander. No. I think we are well prepared to
state how, Senator, we would deal with those. I think there is
a lot that we have to do, and that begins with grow the force
and train them. That is the most important thing that I think
we can do right now.
I think the partnership with industry is critical on
learning and protecting the critical infrastructure. I think
those are the right steps to make.
I think all of these are in motion. I would just like it to
go faster.
Senator Udall. Have we conducted--I say ``we''--the U.S.
Government, your command and so on--some exercises to get at
this CNA/CNE hand-off, if you will, and relationship that you
just outlined?
General Alexander. We did have a great exercise out in Las
Vegas, Nellis. Yes, outside Las Vegas. We actually never got to
Las Vegas. Let the record state that.
Senator Udall. Your iPad would have been handy in Las
Vegas, by the way.
General Alexander. What we did learn is just some of the
things you say. While I cannot go into all of that here, it was
a tremendous exercise. I will give the Air Force credit for
helping to set it up there. They did a wonderful job. We
brought in all of our capabilities and our components, and some
tremendous lessons learned. I think at a classified level, we
could go into those. When you see that, you would say, okay, so
you are headed in the right direction. I think, Senator, we
are.
Senator Udall. I assume I will see you in a classified
setting at some point in the near future where we can discuss
it further.
General Alexander. I think this afternoon, Senator.
Senator Udall. My time is about to expire. But long-term--
and you may want to take part of this for the record--how do
you see the relationship between the NSA and CYBERCOM evolving
and changing?
General Alexander. I think, Senator, they are inextricably
linked. I would put it as a platform. You do not want--any more
than we want DHS to recreate an NSA, we do not want CYBERCOM to
recreate an NSA. So we need these two components of DOD to work
closely together. NSA has the technical talent. It has the
access, got the capability. CYBERCOM will have the forces to
deploy and the capability to leverage that platform and work
with the intelligence side of NSA to further support the
combatant commands. So I think that that relationship is
growing, is headed in the right direction. I think that is one
of the things that we have talked about and we both strongly
agree is something that we have to maintain.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that.
General Kehler, I know my time has run out, but if you want
to reply further for the record, I would certainly appreciate
it; thank you for your service as well.
[The information referred to follows:]

I concur with General Alexander's comments.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
General Alexander, I thank you particularly for your recent
trip down to Fort Gordon where you gave a pat on the back and a
morale boost to some of the smartest, hardest working, most
committed Americans who are doing a great job of helping to
protect our great country. I thank you for doing that at NSA/
Fort Gordon.
General Alexander, CYBERCOM you said had 13,000 employees.
Let me make sure I get this right in my mind. Actually you have
13,000 personnel under your direction. CYBERCOM itself has
what? Maybe 1,000 or so personnel?
General Alexander. A little under 1,000 authorized, about
900 and some, and that is not only the CYBERCOM staff but also
operates and directs the defense of the DOD networks. But that
is correct. So what I counted in that other 12,000 is our
cyber, Army CYBERCOM, Air Force CYBERCOM----
Senator Chambliss. Various Services.
General Alexander. That is right.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. I wanted to make sure I understood
that.
NSA today does a pretty good job of intercepting and
protecting the dot gov, the dot mil networks. In fact, I have
heard you say that the DOD information systems are probed as
many as 250,000 times an hour, over 6 million times a day from
criminals, terrorist organizations, including 100 foreign
intelligence organizations. Even with that huge magnitude of
hacks into the system, General, NSA has done a remarkable job
of protecting that system. Are you satisfied with where you are
in that regard today?
General Alexander. Actually I am going to answer this twice
and contradict myself. We are making progress and I think we
are doing a good job on it, but we are not where we need to be,
Senator. There are two reasons I say that. I do think we have
the best defense right there, but it could be better, and I
think for the future for military command and control it must
be better. So I think the IT modernization that the Defense
Department is looking at is a key part to even make it better.
Senator Chambliss. The legislation that we are talking
about, whether it is the administration's proposal or
Lieberman-Collins bill, one and the same, or the alternative
legislation--neither one of those really address that issue.
This is work that you are doing protecting dot gov and dot mil.
Right?
General Alexander. That is correct in part. If I could say,
the slight difference is the information sharing of those
things that we do to protect our networks that go beyond what
you would normally do for a civilian network are the things
that we think should be included in the information sharing
parts that both of those have.
Senator Chambliss. I am going to get to information sharing
in just a minute.
Now, going one step further there, NSA also monitors the
DIB. There have been numerous attempts, and it may be within
those numbers that I have heard you use before. Hacks into the
DIB have happened, and NSA does a good job of protecting those
scenarios. Where that has happened, you have been notified and
you are able to respond to it. Am I correct?
General Alexander. Not quite. There is an innuendo that I
think is extremely important. The ISPs operate that. We provide
them signatures, as do the other industry players, and the ISPs
actually do the work. The reason that that is important is that
I believe that is how we can scale in protecting other critical
infrastructure and the mechanisms that Homeland Security and
others are working with. So what we bring to the table and what
the FBI and others would bring is specific things that we see
going on in the network that may be sensitive or classified. So
we bring that, but they actually operate it. The part that we
are able to work with the DIB is to understand that they will
protect and safeguard classified information. That is a key
element of this approach.
Senator Chambliss. My point being that your relationship
with the ISPs today allows the DIB to have that protection.
General Alexander. That is correct. Now it has been taken
over by DHS. So they actually lead. They are the lead interface
for the new DIB pilot and have been doing that for 6 weeks. We
are at the table and provide technical support, but they are
actually the lead on that as well.
Senator Chambliss. I am looking at another what I would
assume you would consider critical infrastructure, our electric
grid. If the electric grid is hacked into today, there is a
mechanism in place that was developed by industry where if they
see something unusual, then they notify the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and NERC immediately
goes to U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT) and
notifies USCERT about it, which is under DHS. They are able to
provide protection to the grid under voluntary standards that
the industry put forth. Am I correct?
General Alexander. Yes, but I think, Senator, that is
slightly different, if I could, because in those notifications,
you have gone out of real time to now a part where actually we
are in the forensics mode. So what they are telling is
something has occurred, and by the time it gets to USCERT, what
USCERT could do is not prevent it but only help them understand
it.
So I think the information sharing part of what you and
others have proposed would take that to a more real-time
capability or at least allow that where they could say I see X
happening and they, industry, could tell the government that
that event is occurring so that you could take it from the
forensics side to the prevention side, which is I believe
hugely important for the protection of the country.
Senator Chambliss. Now coming back to what you just alluded
to and you stated earlier and that is on information sharing.
This is really the key, as I understand it, from the standpoint
of being able to provide blanket protection to virtually every
segment of the economy or every industry that wants the
protection out there or that needs the protection. If they have
the capability of sharing proprietary information with both the
government, as well as with other like industries, then is that
not the crux of what it is going to take to be able to protect
all of the industrial base from a cyberattack in the short run,
as well as in the long run?
General Alexander. Not actually. From my perspective,
Senator, the issue in this part really lies in two great
capabilities. The one that we provide, I agree, they want that.
They want to know what are the foreign, state, and other
sensitive things that could attack them. Industry also brings
together the McAfees, the Symantecs, the Lockheed Martins, and
all those that work in this area, also bring a wealth of
knowledge in how to configure and operate their networks to a
certain standard. It is our assumption in going into this that
those networks like the DOD networks would be operated to a
standard. If they are not operated to a standard, then what
happens is you have other ways of getting into the network that
we probably are not looking at. We assume that the doors will
be locked. If the doors are not locked, then somebody would get
in or if the window was open. What we would be doing is looking
for other types of nation state threats and assume that what I
will call the stuff that the antivirus community generally sees
and is working on today is taken care of.
What that means, I think, as you put all that on the table,
is, one, we all have to work together and share information. I
agree with that part. I do think we have to have some set of
standards. I think that is where working with the industry,
just as you said--so how do you get to that standard and how do
you have the industry players work with the government and say,
so what is the right way to approach it?
As you may know, we had a meeting a few years ago with a
number of the electric companies who asked just that question.
So how do we do this and who is going to tell us how we work
it? I think that is the approach that we have to take, help
them get there in such a way that it is not burdensome but
helpful.
Senator Chambliss. I think that part of both pieces of
legislation is about the same. With respect to getting
voluntary participation versus mandatory is a little bit
different. But the fact of getting the industry to set the
standards is the key, and getting the industry to share the
information is the other piece of that both pieces of
legislation have that is a critical part of it.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I did want to say to General
Kehler I did not vote for the START treaty. One reason I did
not is because I was apprehensive about the administration not
being able to do what they said they would do on modernization.
I thank you for your specific comment on that about the fact
that you are concerned about it. That is a critical aspect of
this, and we look forward to working with you as we go forward.
It has to be done. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Kehler. Senator, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Chambliss, for that
comment.
General Kehler, it was great to be with you yesterday and
talk about some of the issues you just mentioned because the
understanding that Senator Kyl had, Senator Chambliss, about
the START and what kind of funding would be laid out for the
next decade to modernize our nuclear weapons has not been
funded and Senator Kyl was deeply disappointed about that.
Mr. Chairman, I am troubled today about this little
overheard conversation between the President and Mr. Medvedev
where President Obama says of all these things, but
particularly missile defense, this can be solved, but it is
important for him to give me space. Mr. Medvedev said I
understand. I understand your message about space, space for
you. This is my last election. After my election, I will have
more flexibility. I understand. I will transmit this
information to Vladimir.
This is not a little matter. I will tell you why it is not
a little matter. We had a long debate over the missile defense.
The left has never favored missile defense. President Bush was
preparing to place a system in Poland. Out of the blue, it was
canceled. The Pols were deeply shocked and disappointed. So
were the Czechs. We were promised do not worry about it. We
will have another system when, in effect, I felt that they were
trying to change the course of things, and Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) Block IIB, and we were going to have that, something
that was not even on the drawing board then. But we were about
to implant in Poland a system that we had proven, the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense system that we had already placed in
the United States.
So I guess what it says to me, the President makes us
assurances that we are going to implant a new system. It will
be an SM-3 system. It will protect America. Sure, we canceled
that one, but we are going to build this new one. But the
Russians object to the new one. They have objected steadfastly
for no good reason that I can see other than maybe domestic
Russian politics or use leverage against the United States.
So now it looks like the President is saying we are going
to take care of those concerns too. We are not going to build
the new system. We are not going to place it there. After the
election, I will take care of it, Vladimir. But that is not
what he told the American people, what he told Congress. He
told Congress we were going to build this system.
So I am worried about it. I know the significance of this
little conversation, and it concerns me.
I am also concerned that the policy of the Defense
Department of the United States, when it comes to the nuclear
weapons you control, General Kehler, is that we are moving to a
world without nuclear weapons, the complete elimination of
them. The Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review has 30
references to a world without nuclear weapons in it. This was
directly driven by the policy of the President. He is the
Commander in Chief. That is what he wanted. That is what DOD
put in there.
So that is one reason Congress insisted that we budget
sufficient money to modernize the aging nuclear weapons that we
have. We insisted on that and it came up as a part of the New
START debate. The President sent a letter to us and promised
it. But it is not occurring. The money is not there.
So we are at a time of great danger, as I see it. The
defense budget is under great stress. We are looking to save
money wherever we can save money, and it appears to me that the
administration does not have the kind of rigorous intellectual
support for missile defense or nuclear weapons necessary to
ensure we keep these programs on track.
So with regard to that system, let me ask you a few
questions, and if you have answered these, let me know because
I am ranking member on another committee that I had to attend
this morning.
Tell me about the nuclear weapons that we have for the
submarines, aircraft, and so forth. You explained to me several
of them were being delayed under the budget plans that you
have. Would you just tell us what the budget has caused you to
delay?
General Kehler. Senator, first let me make the point that
the stockpile and the deployed force that we have today I am
confident is safe, secure, and effective. Those are the three
watchwords that we tend to use when we are talking about this,
and so today I believe that that deterrent force could meet its
objectives and that it is safe, secure, and effective.
However, we have weapons that are beginning to reach their
end of life. It is not classified information that the W-76
submarine weapon life extension program is underway as we sit
here today. I am very encouraged by that, and the program seems
to be moving forward successfully.
What the budget reductions did was it slowed the delivery
of those weapons. I believe while all of these budget
reductions I think in a perfect world we would say we really
wish we did not have to deal with budget reductions, but the
fact of the matter is that they are there and the nuclear force
was not immune. So I believe that we can manage that delay in
the W-76 because it is toward the end of the program that we
can manage this. I think that that is manageable.
The aircraft-delivered weapons are also reaching a critical
point in terms of their age. The B-61 in particular needs to go
through life extension. The fiscal year 2013 budget begins that
life extension effort, although it will give us the first unit,
what we call the first production unit, most likely in 2019
instead of 2017, which is what the 1251 report had suggested. I
believe that is manageable risk as well.
Senator Sessions. I would just add a political risk that
when you push things out--and you are assuming Congress will
act rationally and predictably in the future, but I would just
say the more things are pushed out and they are not done when
you planned to do them, the greater the danger is that somehow
it will not happen.
But go ahead.
General Kehler. Yes, sir. In terms of operational risk, I
believe we can manage operational risk on both of those.
We are beginning a study to look at the ICBM and remaining
submarine warheads to see whether or not we can get commonality
out of those as we look to a future life extension program. We
believe that there are some possibilities there. We would like
to go study that and see.
So in terms of the weapons for the fiscal year 2012 budget
that we are executing now that you all appropriated last year--
for the fiscal year 2013 budget that is laying on the table, I
believe that we can go forward with manageable operational
risk.
The issue is what happens beyond 2013, and that is where
the Secretaries of Energy and Defense have said that we do not
have the complete plan in place for what happens beyond 2013.
That concerns me. When I look to the infrastructure, the
industrial complex--and as I mentioned earlier to another
question, it is a very unique, highly specialized industrial
complex--the plan to upgrade the uranium processing facility
remains in place. The plan to upgrade what we call CMRR, or the
chemical and metallurgical building that allows us to process
plutonium, is not in place. That has been slipped fairly far to
the right, 5 to 7 years depending on which of the documents you
look at. I am concerned about that. I am concerned about our
ability to provide for the deployed stockpile, and that is my
number one concern here. So I have some concerns.
We owe you answers. The two Departments are working
together to look at what alternatives might exist. We are
participating in that review, and as the customer, if you will,
for all of this at the deterrence end of this street, I will be
concerned until someone presents a plan that we can look at and
be comfortable with and understand that it is being supported.
So I am not saying there is not a way forward. I am hopeful
that there is. We just do not have it yet, and until we do, as
the customer I am concerned and I will remain concerned until
we go a little farther down the road.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. You are the customer. You are
the person for whom these weapons are delivered. You need to
share with us--and I believe you have honestly--both the good
and the bad news. I think it is up to Congress to make sure
that out of all the money we spend on national defense, we make
sure that we have sufficient funds to maintain a credible
nuclear stockpile.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning and for
your service, and hopefully I will not keep you too much past
lunch.
I wanted to start, General Kehler, if I could, with talking
about New START treaty implementation. The treaty was an
extremely difficult and contentious debate here in the Senate,
and your predecessor, General Chilton, as well as seven of the
last eight commanders of STRATCOM, voiced their support for the
treaty, which I think was very helpful in getting it done.
But can you tell us a little bit about how the
implementation of the treaty is progressing?
General Kehler. Senator, I can. There are a number of
segments in implementation of the New START treaty that have to
move forward together.
The first segment is that we need to eliminate those
launchers that count against the overall treaty limits that
have not been in use for a very, very long time. We call them
``phantoms'' simply because they count on the books, but they
have been deactivated a very long time ago. Some number of
bombers, B-52s are in the bone yard and need to be dismantled.
There are 100 ICBM silos that have been empty now for a number
of years that we do not have any plans to go back to that need
to be eliminated as well, not converted from nuclear to non-
nuclear, but completely eliminated. Those processes are
underway. The wheels are turning. They are about to finish the
environmental impact studies that go along with eliminating
those silos. So I am comfortable that those pieces are moving
forward correctly.
The second thing is we have to get ourselves down to the
central limits of the treaty, and that is 1,550 deployed
warheads, 700 deployed launchers, and up to 800 deployed and
nondeployed launchers. That requires us to select a force
structure mixture and we have gone through the joint chiefs
with proposals. We believe that we are settling on a final
proposal that the chairman and I can take to the Secretary of
Defense.
In the meantime, we have begun reconfiguration activities.
We are de-MIRVing (multiple independent reentry vehicle) all of
the ICBMs. That work has begun and it is going to continue. We
are reconfiguring the numbers of warheads on the submarines so
that we can get our warheads down to certain limits. So all of
these steps are underway, Senator.
I will tell you that we know that there is a clock running
here. We have to be at those central limits not later than
February 5, 2018, and the goal we have set for ourselves is a
year in advance of that so that we have time. The ICBM fields,
for example, reconfiguring those--we know we will have to make
some adjustments in the ICBM force. We know we will have to
make some adjustments in the SSBN forces, the submarine force.
There is a long lead time on being able to do that. The ICBM
fields are sensitive to weather, of course, and so we have to
leave ourselves some slack. I am okay with that, but we are
getting to the point now where we need to make some final force
structure decisions, and I believe we are poised to make those.
Senator Shaheen. So based on that, you are comfortable on
the central limits that we will meet the deadlines?
General Kehler. Yes, I am comfortable we are going to do
that.
Senator Shaheen. The Russians are also meeting their
requirements under the treaty, as far as we know?
General Kehler. They are.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
I want to switch now to the refueling tankers because,
General Kehler, as I know you have commented, one of the
important support elements of the long-range bomber is
obviously a refueling capability. We have seen that at Pease
Air Force Base (AFB) where we have the 157th Air Refueling
Wing, and I have had a chance to ride along on some of those
planes. So I appreciate the skill and the importance of having
that component.
So can you talk very briefly about how critical it is for
the Air Force to modernize that refueling capability and how
important it is that we have the new KC-46A tanker for those
long-range bomber operations?
General Kehler. Senator, the one word that we typically use
to describe STRATCOM is ``global.'' That word has been used for
STRATCOM since it was Strategic Air Command, and so I think we
appreciate the value of what makes us a global command.
In large part, what makes us a global command is our
ability to project power. In large part, our ability to project
power is based upon our tankers. It is not the only thing that
allows us to project power. By the way, I think that the big
advantage that the entire United States military has is our
ability to project power, which is why anti-access area denial
counter-strategies against us are so concerning.
In that mixture, when I look at my friends in Air Mobility
Command and our colleagues in U.S. Transportation Command, I
think there is probably no more valuable military assets that
we have than our long-range aircraft that can give us strategic
mobility and the tankers that make it so. So when I look at
important things for us in the future, a modern tanker fleet is
irreplaceable and is crucial for our success. I think that the
United States' ability to project power relies on that as well.
By the way, it relies pretty extensively on space and
cyberspace as well for us to be able to project power.
So all these pieces go together, and anymore, it is almost
impossible to say that one platform only exists in the air.
They are connected by cyber. They are relayed by space. They
are really truly global in nature and being able to move a lot
of fuel to power projection forces is critically important.
Senator Shaheen. I know it goes without saying that in
addition to the equipment that is required for all of that, the
skills of the human talent that is required to do that is also
critical.
General Kehler. The most critical part.
Senator Shaheen. Given that, one of the things that I have
worked on in my civilian life before I came to the Senate was
the importance of education, and obviously, one of the things
that we are struggling both in the private sector now and the
public sector--and I think it is particularly true in the
defense arena--is making sure that we have the trained
engineers, scientists, mathematicians, technicians that it is
going to take for all of these jobs in the future.
So could I ask maybe if both of you might comment on what
your commitment is to making sure that we have the Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)-trained people
that we are going to need for the future and whether there are
any particular efforts that you see that the military is
involved in to help make that happen?
General Kehler. Senator, again, having people who are STEM
people who have that set of skills is irreplaceable for us.
Anything we can do to support the development of our young
people in that regard we need to go do. I would say it this
way. In all of our combatant commands, you can look and you can
see who the warriors are. Typically they are someone with a set
of warfighting that you would recognize on television. They
carry a rifle. They fly an airplane, et cetera. In STRATCOM--
and General Alexander can speak to CYBERCOM--but across
STRATCOM, whether it is space or any of the other things that
we do, the engineers and the scientists very often are people
with that kind of background. Those are our warriors. So it is
even more magnified, I believe, in STRATCOM the value of people
with that kind of background than it may be in other places.
General Alexander. Senator, I would just add NSA has a
program with over 100-plus universities for information
assurance and cyber-related stuff. We do that in conjunction
with DHS, and now we bring CYBERCOM into that. So that offers
us a wealth. Tulsa University was one of those that we work
with, and there are many others.
But I think the issue with science, technology,
engineering, and math, the STEM program, is critical for our
country. We, the military, cannot do this. It is going to take
you in Congress to help generate that. We need more scientists,
and we need to start that in fourth grade. It is the things
that we have absolutely got to push. I have 14 grandchildren.
All of them should be engineers and scientists and
mathematicians. Maybe one could be a lawyer.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for leaving us a little room
here.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Shaheen. I would go for a doctor myself.
Thank you. I think as you point out, this is an area where
the military and the civilian sector really need to work more
closely than we have in the past. I think as we talk about what
we need to do in our education system, I think it is important
to point out that this is a national security issue as well. So
thank you all very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I happen to agree with Senator Shaheen about her efforts in
the STEM skills. I happen to also agree, despite that I am a
lawyer and married to a lawyer, with your comment about
engineers. We need a heck of a lot more of them. I will not be
negative about whether we need more lawyers. I will just be
positive about needing more engineers.
Both of you, we are very grateful for your comments.
The only thing I think I would add probably, General
Alexander, is that you make repeated reference to what we need
to do in the area of cyber in terms of working with industry. I
obviously agree with that in terms of needing performance
standards. They are going to work to try to come up with
performance standards. I think it is important, however, to
emphasize that even though they will be adopted, that they are
going to have to be followed. The industry can decide how to
meet those standards but there will be standards. I do not
think you should shy away from that. I think we are talking
about national security here, and this is not a question of
pro-business/anti-business. This is the security of the United
States we are talking about. We want to work with business, but
we cannot just allow business here to dictate what the security
of this country is by saying that they oppose standards.
Instead, we would hope that they would work with us on those
standards and understand that there is plenty of flexibility in
deciding how to meet those standards, but not whether to meet
those standards.
Are you with me so far?
General Alexander. I am, Senator. Mr. Chairman, I agree.
Chairman Levin. Also another piece is the information
sharing piece. As you point out, you want them to get to the
point where they can tell us about an attack. The bills make it
easy for them to tell us because, I guess, we are addressing
some of the issues about proprietary information, for instance,
so that they will be protected on that.
But I think, as your answers to Senator Collins made clear,
that whether or not they share--and we are talking here about
the major infrastructure in this country--whether or not they
share information with us is not a question of whether they
agree to it or not. At some point, with major infrastructure
there is going to be a requirement that they share information
relative to attacks with us. We will protect them in terms of
proprietary information, but they have to help protect the
country by understanding that there should be, and I believe
hopefully will be, requirements that they share information of
attacks on that major infrastructure with us.
I would just urge that you not be reluctant about talking
about their obligation, not only that they will get to the
point where they will share, but that there is a responsibility
that needs to be placed upon them, and again talking here about
major infrastructure, responsibility that will be placed upon
them to share that information of major attacks with us.
Would you agree with that?
General Alexander. Chairman, I do.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
We thank you both. It has been a very, very helpful
hearing.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

SPACE DEBRIS

1. Senator Levin. General Kehler, are you concerned about our
ability to track and maneuver Department of Defense (DOD) satellites
with the increasing amount of debris in space?
General Kehler. Yes. The increasing amount of debris in space and
its potential impact to daily operations is an issue U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) is continuously addressing. While we are currently
effective in ensuring we can operate in the domain, we need to
continually upgrade our equipment, space situational awareness systems
and relationships with allies and partners to ensure we are effectively
sharing necessary information to meet this growing challenge to
preserve the advantages that space provides.

2. Senator Levin. General Kehler, are you concerned about other
nations denying us access to space?
General Kehler. Yes. Our forces derive significant advantages from
our space capabilities. Potential adversaries understand this and are
actively seeking capabilities to deny our full use of space. We are
working diligently to ensure our access to and use of space cannot be
denied.

3. Senator Levin. General Kehler, does DOD have a plan to defend
satellites in space if they come under threat?
General Kehler. Yes. Military planners, in conjunction with the
Intelligence Community continue to work aggressively to find solutions
to counter any hostile actions in space. We have various plans in place
to improve our protection posture.

4. Senator Levin. General Kehler, we are negotiating with the
European Union (EU) a code of conduct on space operations to avoid
collisions with other satellites and share space data. Do you support
such a concept?
General Kehler. Yes. Ensuring the stability, safety, and security
of our space systems is of vital interest to the United States and the
global community. The time is right for the development of a structure
for space activities that encourages all spacefaring nations to act
responsibly in a space environment that is increasingly congested and
contested. Through voluntary and pragmatic transparency and confidence-
building measures, an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities could contribute to enhancing the long-term sustainability,
stability, safety, and security of the space environment, as well as
help reduce the risk of mishaps, misperceptions, mistrust, and
misconduct. While such an approach will not eliminate the possibility
of intentional threats, it will help reduce unintentional threats due
to unsafe behavior.

SPECTRUM

5. Senator Levin. General Kehler, in February it was legislatively
proposed that DOD move operations from a block of spectrum you now use.
The cost to DOD, I understand, would have been about $14 billion. Can
you please explain the importance to DOD of its operating spectrum and
how any movement from it should be paid for and coordinated?
General Kehler. Answer: The operating spectrum utilized by DOD is
critical to national security and any transition into, or out of, any
bandwidth must be assessed for impact to operations, relocation,
implementation and administration costs, timelines, and coordinated
among all effected organizations. The National Telecommunications and
Information Administration's Assessment of the Viability of
Accommodating Wireless Broadband in the 1755-1850 MHz Band Report,
dated March 2012 concluded it is possible to repurpose the entire 95
MHz block of spectrum, but cites challenges with the estimated
relocation cost/timeline of $18 billion over 10 years. This does not
include costs to incumbent systems in comparable bands or
implementation and administration costs for DOD, which it estimates at
an additional $272 million for vacating the identified spectrum.
The identified block of spectrum is used to conduct uplink
operations for 140+ active satellite systems representing 45+
operational constellations or programs currently being developed
including Global Positioning Satellite, Wideband Global Satellite
Communication, Advanced Extremely High Frequency, Mobile User Objective
System, Space Based Infrared System, and Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance programs.
The report highlights that some systems will remain in the band
indefinitely. To ensure maximum flexibility, DOD seeks to maintain the
1755-1850 MHz band for satellite tracking, telemetry, and commanding
(TT&C) operations including, but not limited to, vehicle anomalies and
emergencies. Further, testing and training for electronic warfare and
some software defined radios will require continued operation within
the band. Collectively, these programs provide space effects to
combatant commands, deployed forces, national leadership, and the
general populace.

6. Senator Levin. General Kehler, you are the combatant command who
advocates for preserving our electromagnetic spectrum. What actions can
you as the combatant commander for spectrum operations take to help
preserve DOD's access to it?
General Kehler. STRATCOM provides warfighter operational impact
assessments to all proposed frequency auctions and advocates for the
spectrum needs of the combatant commands. Our justification of
exclusive use protects the DOD from immediate loss of spectrum. Our
assessments also identify, where possible, the timeframe for which
frequency coexistence would be possible or, when to vacate a frequency
band once older systems are replaced.

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

7. Senator Levin. General Kehler, does STRATCOM support the initial
requirement that led to the development of the Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) program?
General Kehler. Yes, I fully support the requirement for
Operationally Responsive Space. ORS was initiated to meet an immediate,
urgent need using a highly responsive process for delivering
capabilities. The ORS process was designed to deliver solution concepts
within about 60 days, and (when directed) field space capabilities
within about 24 months.

8. Senator Levin. General Kehler, does the ORS program still meet a
valid STRATCOM requirement?
General Kehler. STRATCOM maintains a requirement to rapidly
improve, augment, or reconstitute on-orbit capability.

9. Senator Levin. General Kehler, I understand that the satellite
ORS-1 is directly tasked by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in contrast
to the normal tasking process for large overhead systems--do you find
that is a new paradigm that is beneficial to DOD?
General Kehler. ORS-1 was just recently declared operational, and
we are currently in the process of evaluating the overall utility of
the mission, including its tasking process. The original requirements
for ORS-1 were to support CENTCOM, so this system is operating exactly
as it was designed. CENTCOM values their ability to fully manage
collection operations for the ORS-1 satellite, and appreciates the
ability to task ORS-1 for high-value image collection where the
priority of that collection is certain. We are still evaluating the
overall return-on-investment for space capabilities designed to support
and be tasked by a single regional commander.

COMBINED SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

10. Senator Levin. General Kehler, you have under your command
three operations that can be used together: space, cyber, and
electronic warfare. Are you developing an operations plan to
synchronize all three elements?
General Kehler. Yes. STRATCOM continually reviews the adequacy of
operational plans to ensure our ability to leverage capabilities across
all domains to best meet national policy and strategy objectives. As
necessary, we make changes or develop new plans to synchronize all
available elements to ensure national security.

11. Senator Levin. General Kehler, what do you judge as the largest
policy issue in such a combined operation?
General Kehler. In my judgment, the largest policy issue in such a
combined operation would be the lack of policy precedent regarding
military action in cyberspace.

12. Senator Levin. General Kehler, where do you judge the Services
are in their cyber efforts and would they be capable today of
synchronizing cyber, space, and electronic warfare?
General Kehler. One of our greatest challenges in cyberspace is to
build and sustain a cyber-workforce which can bring the capacity and
capabilities required to conduct operations quickly across the full
range of our missions and threats. STRATCOM, CYBERCOM, and the Service
Cyber components are working hard to identify critical capability gaps
within our cyber-workforce related specifically to emerging threats and
our ability to integrate cyber, space, and electronic warfare efforts.
These domains require technically demanding expertise in a highly
competitive environment to continue to build capability and capacity.
Efforts to synchronize cyber, space and electronic warfare are ongoing
to achieve the requirements and meet mission demands.

GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSE INTEGRATION

13. Senator Levin. General Kehler, one of your functional commands
is the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense (JFCC-IMD). As your prepared statement indicates, STRATCOM
leads an annual global ballistic missile defense assessment and
considers the missile defense priorities of all the combatant commands.
You also state that over the past year, our efforts ``substantially
improved our overall missile defenses.'' Based on this assessment, do
you believe the current and planned missile defense capabilities, such
as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and the European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, are providing
capabilities needed to protect our Homeland, our forward-based forces,
and our allies?
General Kehler. Based on STRATCOM annual assessments, I am
confident national and regional missile defense systems adequately
protect our homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends against the
intended threat. However, as adversaries' ballistic missile
capabilities improve in range, accuracy, countermeasures, numbers, and
ability to conduct structured attacks, it becomes increasingly
important to continue improving GMD system capabilities and
reliability, and to deploy the remaining phases of the EPAA on
schedule.

PRECISION TRACKING SPACE SYSTEM

14. Senator Levin. General Kehler, STRATCOM has expertise and
responsibilities for a variety of intersecting issues, including
missile defense and space-based sensors that provide missile warning.
Your prepared statement mentions our ``efforts to provide persistent
detection'' of missiles. I gather STRATCOM has done an analysis of the
Precision Tracking Space System being developed by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA). Do you believe that system would provide a useful and
persistent capability to detect and track ballistic missiles?
General Kehler. We conducted a remote sensor assessment during the
fiscal year 2013 Program Review. The assessment compared PTSS
operational capabilities and attributes with airborne infrared sensor
and ground-based sensor capabilities and limitations. The results
showed PTSS can significantly contribute to both homeland and regional
missile defense by providing continuous threat tracking to facilitate
large raid handling, engage-on-remote capability, and shoot-assess-
shoot tactics against post-boost targets. Placing persistent sensors in
space offers the opportunity to engage threats launched from land or
sea, free of geographic, strategic warning time, or host nation basing
complexity constraints.

KILL VEHICLE TEST PLAN

15. Senator Levin. General Kehler, the MDA has designed a fix to
the problem that caused a flight test failure of the GMD system, using
the newest model of kill vehicle. MDA plans a flight test in December
to demonstrate that the fix works--using the hardware planned for
operational deployment--before we build, refurbish, or assemble more of
the kill vehicles that failed. On March 13, the Commander of U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), General Jacoby, told this committee he
supports that plan to test and demonstrate the system. Do you support
the MDA plan to test and demonstrate that the fix to the GMD kill
vehicle works before producing or deploying more of them?
General Kehler. I support MDA plans to conduct a non-intercept GBI
flight test and performance demonstration with an upgraded kill vehicle
prior to resuming deployment of the system.

MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

16. Senator Levin. General Kehler, in February, an international
group of experts, called the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, issued
a report advocating missile defense cooperation between Russia and the
United States, with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies. The group proposed that the partners should share satellite and
radar early warning data, thus improving their ability to detect,
track, and defeat ballistic missiles from the Middle East. This is
consistent with U.S. and NATO proposals for cooperation with Russia on
missile defense. Do you agree that sharing such early warning data,
which would involve sharing classified information subject to national
disclosure policy, could improve our ability to defeat ballistic
missiles launched from Iran, and that such cooperation could benefit
our security?
General Kehler. Sharing satellite and early earning data with
Russia as part of the principal of information sharing, is beneficial
in increasing transparency and building confidence in Russia that the
European Missile Defense system is not directed at them. In order to
improve our ability to defeat ballistic missiles launched from Iran,
only Russian radars which are both technically interoperable with our
IMD systems and in the right geographic position could aid in the
defeat of these missiles. Our ability to defeat Ballistic Missile (BM)
launches from Iran may be improved through integration of U.S. and
Russian BM warning systems and the sharing of classified information.
However, section 1244 of the fiscal year National Defense Authorization
Act requires congressional notification by the President 60 days prior
to any instance in which the U.S. Government plans to provide such
information to the Russian Federation.

17. Senator Levin. General Kehler, do you agree that such
cooperation with Russia could send a powerful signal to Iran that the
United States and Russia are united in opposing Iran's acquisition of
long-range missiles and nuclear weapons?
General Kehler. The inclusion of Russia as part of the
international communities' opposition to the proliferation and use of
ballistic-missile technologies would be a welcome addition and
demonstrate a united stance against the pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

NUCLEAR PIT PRODUCTION SHORTFALL

18. Senator Lieberman. General Kehler, I share many of the concerns
my colleagues have already expressed concerning the shortfalls in
funding and capacity for the modernization of our nuclear weapons. Does
STRATCOM still have a validated requirement for the production of 50 to
80 plutonium pits per year starting in 2021?
General Kehler. Yes, DOD's current plutonium pit production
requirement is 50 to 80 pits per year to respond to technical failure
of a warhead and remove reliance on the nondeployed stockpile for
hedging. The President's Budget submission for 2013 delays this
capability until at least 2028.

19. Senator Lieberman. General Kehler, the fiscal year 2013
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget request proposes
to delay the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) for 5 years. The director of Los
Alamos National Laboratory has stated that without the CMRR-NF he
cannot meet the requirement of 50 to 80 pits per year. What steps are
you taking to try to mitigate the expected shortfall in pit production
capability?
General Kehler. We are working in an interagency forum to identify
options to mitigate this delay, including increasing interim pit
production capability at existing facilities. The Nation needs to have
a plutonium capability to support our deterrent, dismantle retired
weapons, and support non-proliferation initiatives.

20. Senator Lieberman. General Kehler, do you believe that there is
any risk that this stated 5-year delay to the CMRR-NF will become
lengthier or turn into a permanent cancellation?
General Kehler. The nation requires an executable plutonium
production strategy to support the deployed force and reduce reliance
on the nondeployed stockpile. DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE)
are currently working on a revised nuclear weapons and infrastructure
modernization plan to address such risk.

21. Senator Lieberman. General Kehler, in that event, how would you
address the pit production shortfall to ensure the continued
reliability and credibility of our nuclear deterrent?
General Kehler. Today's stockpile is safe, secure, and effective
and can be certified without CMRR-NF. Both Departments are examining
options to provide an interim pit production capability within the
existing facilities. Until CMRR-NF or an equivalent capability is
available, life extension options may be limited and we will continue
to rely on the nondeployed stockpile to manage risk.

22. Senator Lieberman. General Kehler, do you believe there is a
risk to the long-term reliability and credibility of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal if we continue to defer modernization?
General Kehler. While I am extremely confident in today's deterrent
force, deferring modernization does increase risk across the nuclear
enterprise. Maintaining the credibility and long-term reliability of
the nuclear force will require continued investments in sustainment,
modernization, life extension, and replacement programs. While the
fiscal environment may impose difficult choices, we are prioritizing
our investments to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent force.

23. Senator Lieberman. General Kehler, can you highlight some of
the specific manifestations of that risk for us?
General Kehler. As the force continues to age, the risk of
technical failure increases, certifying the stockpile will likely
become more difficult, and sustainment costs will rise. One specific
risk of delayed NNSA infrastructure modernization is our inability to
respond to an unexpected technical failure in a timely way.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

24. Senator McCaskill. General Alexander, you stated in your
testimony that U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is critically short of the
skills and the skilled people necessary to manage our networks and
protect U.S. interests in cyberspace. Our prosperity and our security
now depend on a very skilled technical workforce, which is in high
demand both in government and industry. You stated that you are
reviewing recruitment and incentive programs in order to build and
retain the best-of-the-best cyber defenders. Can you please provide
specific details on what CYBERCOM is doing to compete with the private
sector when it comes to hiring and retaining the top talent in cyber
operations?
General Alexander. Initial assessment and recruiting to identify
the best candidates possible to support the cyberspace mission is
critical. The Joint Cyberspace Training and Certification Standards
(JCT&CS) provides the Services an overarching framework for training
the current and future cyberspace workforce spanning a career. JCT&CS
also provides key insights into the preliminary knowledge, skills, and
abilities needed to ensure success. Service recruiting efforts are
advised by these standards and special screening techniques and
evaluations will be developed to identify suitable candidates. In
addition, it appears that talented personnel are drawn to the newness
of this command and our challenging mission. We anticipate the
competition for cyber talent to become more intense. We are working
with DOD to ensure appropriate recruiting/retention policies and
incentives are developed so we can recruit top quality talent. To
address the anticipated challenges in the short-term, we are
collaborating with STRATCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to permanently extend the temporary hiring authorities granted to us
(e.g. Schedule A--which is set to expire December 2012). In the long-
term, we are advocating for: special salary rates, tuition
reimbursement, access to specialized training and robust professional
development opportunities as incentives for potential employees and to
retain them once they are hired. Underlying all of these initiatives,
we support the development of separate cyber operations/planner career
fields for our civilian and military personnel. Delays in recruiting
and retaining cyber talent could adversely affect the command's future
operational capability.

25. Senator McCaskill. General Alexander, does CYBERCOM have the
necessary authority to adjust policies to attract and retain the level
of talent that is necessary to operate our networks and protect U.S.
interests in cyberspace?
General Alexander. Currently, CYBERCOM does not have all of the
necessary authorities to adjust policies aimed at attracting and
retaining skilled military and civilian cyber professionals. The
responsibility to recruit and retain military members lies with each of
the Services. While CYBERCOM can influence the skill-levels and
training required to accomplish the cyber mission, the Services are
responsible for the recruitment, retention, organization, training and
equipping functions for their personnel. The ability to adjust civilian
personnel policies requires approval from agencies and offices outside
of CYBERCOM. The extension or permanent institution of direct hiring
authorities for CYBERCOM will require coordination and approval from
offices within DOD and Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Likewise,
the creation of a more flexible personnel system, which would help
CYBERCOM keep pace with market demand for high-demand skill sets, will
require coordination and approval from our Executive Agency (the
Department of the Air Force), OPM, and perhaps Congress. For example, I
require the ability to dynamically adjust duty responsibilities and pay
commensurate with changing skills, mission requirements, and
organizational structure. Unfortunately, the tools at my immediate
disposal are not flexible enough to guarantee CYBERCOM has the type of
force necessary to operate our networks and protect U.S. interests in
cyberspace.

COORDINATION

26. Senator McCaskill. General Alexander, CYBERCOM is tasked with
centralizing and coordinating the cyber activities of DOD. However,
each of the Services, along with each of the combatant commands, have
cyber capabilities and responsibilities that do not fall within the
chain of command of CYBERCOM. What is CYBERCOM's relationship to each
of the Services?
General Alexander. Currently, CYBERCOM does not have all of the
necessary authorities to adjust policies aimed at attracting and
retaining skilled military and civilian cyber professionals. The
responsibility to recruit and retain military members lies with each of
the Services. While CYBERCOM can influence the skill-levels and
training required to accomplish the cyber mission, the Services are
responsible for the recruitment, retention, organization, training and
equipping functions for their personnel. The ability to adjust civilian
personnel policies requires approval from agencies and offices outside
of CYBERCOM. The extension or permanent institution of direct hiring
authorities for CYBERCOM will require coordination and approval from
offices within DOD and OPM. Likewise, the creation of a more flexible
personnel system, which would help CYBERCOM keep pace with market
demand for high-demand skill sets, will require coordination and
approval from our Executive Agency (the Department of the Air Force),
OPM, and perhaps Congress. For example, I require the ability to
dynamically adjust duty responsibilities and pay commensurate with
changing skills, mission requirements, and organizational structure.
Unfortunately, the tools at my immediate disposal are not flexible
enough to guarantee CYBERCOM has the type of force necessary to operate
our networks and protect U.S. interests in cyberspace.

27. Senator McCaskill. General Alexander, how does CYBERCOM
coordinate the various cyber activities and responsibilities of the
Services?
General Alexander. CYBERCOM maintains a mutually supportive
relationship with each of the Services through the established CYBERCOM
Service components that I mentioned in my response to Question #26. All
CYBERCOM Service components are under Operational Control (OPCON) of
CYBERCOM. The Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control
Concept of Operations, signed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
on 1 May 2012, provides guidance for responsibilities. The Services are
responsible for protecting and sustaining their core business functions
of recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping their forces. They
are also responsible for executing information assurance, network
operations, certification and accreditation, and computer network
defense functions assigned to them in accordance with DOD regulations,
orders, or directives. We will continue to work closely with the
Services to develop mutually acceptable ways to satisfy both Service
and Joint warfighting requirements. Effective command and control is
critical to achieve unity of effort across cyberspace. Partnership,
collaboration, and cooperation amongst the Services, combatant
commands, and other agencies are the keys to successful cyberspace
operations.

28. Senator McCaskill. General Alexander, does CYBERCOM have the
authority to override decisions regarding cyber activities carried out
by each of the Services?
General Alexander. Yes, CYBERCOM has the authority to override any
decisions regarding cyber activities carried out by each of the
Services. The DOD Global Information Grid (GIG) is a series of
interconnected networks, and actions on one portion of the GIG could
cause cascading negative effects on other portions of the GIG. CYBERCOM
enacts this authority through the publishing of Operations Orders and
Directives to each of the Services. CYBERCOM will work closely with the
Services on all aspects of cyberspace operations that may affect
Service equities or missions. The Services have the responsibility to
execute information assurance tasks, operate Service specific networks,
conduct certification and accreditation, and computer network defense
functions assigned to them in accordance with DOD regulations, orders,
or directives. Under the Unified Command Plan, CYBERCOM is tasked with
synchronizing planning for cyberspace operations, and will do so in
coordination with other combatant commands, the Services, and as
directed, appropriate U.S. Government agencies.

29. Senator McCaskill. General Alexander, what is CYBERCOM's
relationship to each of the combatant commands?
General Alexander. We have an ongoing and maturing operational
relationship with each of the combatant commands. CYBERCOM has deployed
Cyberspace Support Elements (CSEs) to PACOM and CENTCOM and will
eventually place CSEs at the other combatant commands as resources
permit, and as directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
approved Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control Concept
of Operations (dated 1 May 2012). The CSEs link our global and regional
planning with the theater and operational planning conducted by each
combatant command, provide significant and timely insight and
assistance in defining combatant command cyber operational
requirements, facilitate critical reach-back to Fort Meade, and become
the combatant command's advocate among competing priorities for access
and intelligence to support cyberspace operations. I have tasked each
CYBERCOM Service component to ``lead the joint effort to provide cyber
support'' for a specific combatant command. For example, U.S. Army
CYBERCOM is tasked to provide support to CENTCOM and U.S. Air Force
CYBERCOM is tasked to support EUCOM. In efforts of a global or trans-
regional nature, CYBERCOM generally is designated as the supported
command with the appropriate combatant commands designated as
supporting command. Where operations are projected within a specific
area of operations, it is more common for the geographic combatant
commander to have the lead as supported command, with CYBERCOM
designated as the supporting command. While each operational situation
is different, I have confidence in our ability to synchronize our
activities with the combatant commands.

30. Senator McCaskill. General Alexander, how does CYBERCOM
coordinate the various cyber activities and responsibilities of the
combatant commands?
General Alexander. The Office of the Secretary of Defense newly
published Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control
Concept of Operations, dated 1 May 2012, directs CYBERCOM to coordinate
various cyber activities and responsibilities of the combatant commands
through CYBERCOM Cyber Support Elements (CSE). Each combatant command
will have a fully functioning CSE which remains under OPCON of
CYBERCOM, but is in direct support of its assigned combatant command
through the Joint Cyber Center (JCC). The JCC functions as the nexus
for the combatant command cyberspace enterprise. CYBERCOM has deployed
CSEs to PACOM and CENTCOM and will eventually place CSEs at the other
combatant commands as resources permit. The CSE's mission is to
facilitate geographic/functional cyber operations for the combatant
commander and enable CYBERCOM to support global cyberspace operations.
When resourced, CYBERCOM CSEs will perform forward liaison function and
will assist the supported combatant command and CYBERCOM by performing
the following tasks:

(1) Provide functional and technical expertise to the combatant
command/JCC staff on the subjects of cyberspace planning, operations,
exercises, development of cyber joint intelligence assessment products,
intelligence collection and analysis, targeting, and assessment of
operational readiness.
(2) Reach back to Headquarters, CYBERCOM and CYBERCOM Service
components to enable coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization
of supporting CYBERCOM effects as requested by the combatant command.
(3) Inform the combatant commander of orders issues by CYBERCOM,
and inform CYBERCOM of combatant command network events.
(4) Ensure combatant command's requirements for global and
regional threat warnings are clearly communicated to CYBERCOM.
(5) Relay to CYBERCOM the impacts to combatant command and its
subordinate component's mission critical operations that result from
capability and capacity gaps in assigned or attached cyberspace units,
as identified by the combatant command.
(6) Report CYBERCOM readiness information relevant to the
combatant command JCC, and monitor status reporting of combatant
command assigned or attached cyberspace units and capabilities for
CYBERCOM.

31. Senator McCaskill. General Alexander, does CYBERCOM have the
authority to override decisions regarding cyber activities carried out
by each of the combatant commands?
General Alexander. Yes, CYBERCOM has the authority to override
decisions regarding cyber activities carried out on the DOD GIG by the
combatant commands. The GIG is a series of interconnected networks, and
actions on one portion of the GIG could cause cascading negative
effects on other portions of the GIG. CYBERCOM enacts this authority
through the publishing of Operations Orders and Directives to each of
the combatant commands. CYBERCOM will work closely with the combatant
commands on all aspects of cyber operations that may affect combatant
command equities or missions.

NUCLEAR TRIAD

32. Senator McCaskill. General Kehler, you have stated that our
Nation needs to maintain the current nuclear triad of Submarine
Ballistic Missile, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers. A viable nuclear force requires
sufficient force structure, expertise, and industrial-based support for
weapons. What is being done to ensure that the industrial base for
nuclear weapons is being maintained?
General Kehler. The fiscal year 2013 budget request continues to
fund numerous delivery platform, weapon, and facility sustainment and
modernization programs that exercise critical scientific, engineering,
and production skills across the industrial base. Specifically, NNSA's
weapons infrastructure continues to be transformed with facility
improvements in uranium processing and handling, non-nuclear component
production, high explosive manufacturing, and radiological research.
The most effective steps we can take to ensure the industrial base for
nuclear weapons is being maintained is by continuing to support the
life extension, surveillance, and sustainment programs needed to ensure
a safe, secure, and effective deterrent force.

33. Senator McCaskill. General Kehler, how can we ensure that the
nuclear force is not hollowed out?
General Kehler. To avoid a hollow force, DOD and DOE must ensure
adequate sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of the Triad;
ongoing surveillance and maintenance of the stockpile; and sustained
investments in supporting infrastructure and the highly specialized and
experienced human capital needed take us to the future.

34. Senator McCaskill. General Kehler, can you talk about what role
the B-2 bomber plays in contributing to the nuclear triad and its
enduring value to U.S. national security as the U.S. nuclear strategy
continues to evolve for 21st century missions?
General Kehler. The B-2 is an integral part of the nuclear triad
and our Nation's sole penetrating dual-capable bomber. It provides the
President a flexible capability to project conventional and nuclear
power worldwide regardless of adversary anti-access/area denial
strategies.

NEW START

35. Senator McCaskill. General Kehler, in April 2010, the United
States and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START). The Treaty places certain limits on U.S. and Russian strategic
offensive nuclear forces, including limits on delivery vehicles and
numbers of warheads. As commander of STRATCOM, what is your assessment
of the New START's effects on U.S. national security interests?
General Kehler. New START enhances U.S. national security interests
because it constrains future Russian strategic nuclear force levels and
provides us transparency into Russian strategic forces via outside
access in order to verify compliance. The treaty permits us to sustain
and modernize our nuclear force and to mix and posture that force as
needed to meet national security objectives.

36. Senator McCaskill. General Kehler, how will U.S. national
security be strengthened as the United States and Russia complete
implementation of the New START?
General Kehler. U.S. national security will be strengthened as the
United States and Russia complete the implementation of New START
because it will provide transparency and limit the potential future
growth of strategic arsenals.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall

CYBER ATTACK IN THE PERSIAN GULF

37. Senator Udall. General Alexander, what do we understand about
the Iranian capability to conduct a cyber attack on the electricity
grid or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in the
Persian Gulf?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

38. Senator Udall. General Alexander, are we monitoring that
capability and their interest in it closely enough to get ahead of a
problem?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

39. Senator Udall. General Alexander, who gets those reports, how
often are they generated, and who else should see these reports?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

40. Senator Udall. General Alexander, who besides the Iranians is
being monitored for this capability and are we monitoring all potential
cyber attackers on this very precious region?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

vulnerability of electrical grid in the middle east
41. Senator Udall. General Alexander, do we understand the
constitution and the vulnerability of the electricity grid in the
Persian Gulf well enough to measure the potential impact on the oil
production and transportation system, especially but not limited to the
oil refineries there?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

42. Senator Udall. General Alexander, do the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab
Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman) or a subset of those have a single grid?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

43. Senator Udall. General Alexander, are those country grids
interconnected as they are here in the United States between Canada and
Mexico, or is each country's grid separate both physically and by SCADA
system management, so a cyber attack might take out one country's power
and refining but not the next?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

44. Senator Udall. General Alexander, does anyone keep spare large
electric transformers in a safe and invulnerable location for grid
reconstitution?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]

U.S. MILITARY DEPENDENCE ON COMMERCIAL POWER GRID IN MIDDLE EAST

45. Senator Udall. General Alexander, is the U.S. military in
Bahrain, Dubai, and other locations in the Gulf dependent on the
electricity generated in the host country, and what's our back-up plan
if the electricity suffers a prolonged grid outage?
General Alexander. The U.S. military typically uses various
electricity sources, depending on the location and mission, with pre-
planned back-up sources. Additionally, we understand both the Joint
Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiated Operational
Energy Divisions to address combat capabilities, their respective fuel
and energy trade-offs, as well as reliance on commercial
infrastructure. This initiative was a result of the 2008 Defense
Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy. Other elements of DOD
may be able to provide amplification on this issue.

46. Senator Udall. General Alexander, how much storage capability
do we have there for emergency diesel electric generators and will our
back-up electric power capability cover all our mission critical
functions or only a subset, and if so, which subsets?
General Alexander. The U.S. military typically maintains various
amounts of storage capability, depending on the location and mission,
with pre-planned back-up capability. Additionally, we understand both
the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiated
Operational Energy Divisions to address combat capabilities, their
respective fuel and energy trade-offs, as well as reliance on
commercial infrastructure. This initiative was a result of the 2008
Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy. Other elements
of DOD may be able to provide amplification on this issue.

47. Senator Udall. General Alexander, have the GCC countries'
militaries thought about this problem and are they prepared for it?
General Alexander. After coordination with other elements of the
Department, we understand in April 2012 Oman hosted a Cyber Defense
conference for the GCC in Muscat (agenda available at
www.cyberdefencesummit.com/summit/agenda). As GCC countries continue to
develop their IT infrastructure and heavy reliance on information and
communications technology, governments must ensure they protect their
critical assets. The repercussions of a cyber-attack against important
institutions and sectors including energy and utilities can have an
immense impact on the country's economic prosperity and undermine its
sovereignty. In many countries given the typical mandate for militaries
to protect civilian infrastructure from physical attack, cybersecurity
responsibilities are divided between military and civilian leadership,
both of which were represented at the Oman conference.
The Middle East and particularly the Gulf remains a significant
concern for international cyber warfare. As a specific example, for
numerous reasons--including the probability that the fate of the global
economy relies on Saudi Arabia, which heavily deploys computer networks
to maintain productivity in one of the world's most strategic energy
producing regions-strong commitment to Saudi cybersecurity is
paramount.

48. Senator Udall. General Alexander, have the electric companies
or their equivalents in the Gulf become aware of the potential for
cyber attacks as a part of war, and what are they doing to prepare and
respond to the vulnerabilities and the threats?
General Alexander. The concerns over cyber attacks are well known
and publicized across the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime to war
and across various sectors. Electric power producers can deploy a
number of products from a variety of venders to help protect
information systems from cyber attack. After coordination with other
elements of the Department, we understand in April 2012, Oman hosted a
Cyber Defense conference for the GCC in Muscat (agenda available at
www.cyberdefencesummit.com/summit/agenda). As GCC countries continue to
develop their IT infrastructure and heavy reliance on information and
communications technology, governments must ensure they protect their
critical assets. The repercussions of a cyber-attack against important
institutions and sectors including energy and utilities can have an
immense impact on the country's economic prosperity and undermine its
sovereignty. In many countries given the typical mandate for militaries
to protect civilian infrastructure from physical attack, cybersecurity
responsibilities are divided between military and civilian leadership,
both of which were represented at the Oman conference.
The Middle East and particularly the Gulf remains a significant
concern for international cyber warfare. As a specific example, for
numerous reasons--including the probability that the fate of the global
economy relies on Saudi Arabia, which heavily deploys computer networks
to maintain productivity in one of the world's most strategic energy
producing regions-strong commitment to Saudi cybersecurity is
paramount.
Additionally, other elements of DOD may be able to provide
amplification on this issue.

MOVING CRUDE OIL THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF DURING A PROLONGED POWER
OUTAGE

49. Senator Udall. General Alexander, I understand that 77 percent
of the crude oil leaving the Straits of Hormuz travels in one form or
another to the Pacific. China gets 50 percent of its crude from inside
the Straits, and Japan gets 65 percent of its crude from inside the
Straits. Australia, India, Singapore, and the U.S. military in the
Pacific and the Indian Ocean are also dependent on that oil for both
military tactical fuels and for electricity in many cases. What will a
region-wide cyber attack on the electricity grid that results in a
prolonged power outage in the Persian Gulf do to the ability to move
crude oil in and out of there at the current rate, especially the oil
and fuel that supports the U.S. military in the Indian Ocean, such as
at Diego Garcia, and all the way into the Pacific Ocean?
General Alexander. The concerns over cyber attacks are well known
and publicized across the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime to war
and across various sectors. After coordination with other elements of
the Department, we understand in April 2012, Oman hosted a Cyber
Defense conference for the GCC in Muscat (agenda available at
www.cyberdefencesummit.com/summit/agenda). As GCC countries continue to
develop their IT infrastructure and heavy reliance on information and
communications technology, governments must ensure they protect their
critical assets. The repercussions of a cyberattack against important
institutions and sectors including energy and utilities can have an
immense impact on the country's economic prosperity and undermine its
sovereignty. In many countries given the typical mandate for militaries
to protect civilian infrastructure from physical attack, cybersecurity
responsibilities are divided between military and civilian leadership,
both of which were represented at the Oman conference.
Additionally, we understand both the Joint Staff and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense initiated Operational Energy Divisions to
address combat capabilities, their respective fuel and energy trade-
offs, as well as reliance on commercial infrastructure. This initiative
was a result of the 2008 Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy
Strategy.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand

ROME LABS

50. Senator Gillibrand. General Alexander, I am very pleased to see
that cyber is one of the areas where DOD is focusing. So, I was very
disappointed to see that the budget documents reflect almost a 20
percent cut in funding for the Information Directorate research at the
Air Force Research Lab in Rome, New York. The Rome Lab leverages
successful collaborations with universities and companies in what is a
very technology-rich environment in central New York. This cut really
does not make sense to me. While I know you do not oversee the Rome
Lab, you work with and rely on some of their research. In fact, the
National Security Agency (NSA) consistently provides Rome Lab with
additional funding. Can you tell me about your experience in
collaborating with the Air Force Research Lab in Rome, NY, and what
future projects you expect to undertake?
General Alexander. We have a strong collaborative effort with Air
Force Research Lab (AFRL) in Rome, NY through U.S. Air Force Cyber/24th
Air Force. We have directly invested Research Development Test and
Evaluation funds in the past towards eight research efforts at AFRL
under a CYBERCOM-run program called ``Call for Proposal'' and we
currently fund one research effort. AFRL is seeking to embed up to two
individuals into CYBERCOM to work on advanced concepts and
experimentation and technology discovery in support of CYBERCOM's
Science and Technology and R&D roadmaps. CYBERCOM has a seat on the OSD
Cyber S&T Priority Steering Council EXCOM governance board which
provides the roadmap across the Future Years Defense Program for all
labs including AFRL. As the CYBERCOM Service Components continue to
organize, train, and equip their respective forces, we will work more
with 24th Air Force in supporting their needs. We expect AFRL to
undertake more efforts that are in alignment with 24th Air Force
priorities (ex. anti-access and area denial support).

51. Senator Gillibrand. General Kehler, the Air Force cyber science
and technology funding is going down in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal
year 2014--why is that?
General Kehler. The Department's new strategic guidance highlights
the increasing importance of cyber operations which is why it is one of
the few areas where investments were increased in the administration's
budget request for fiscal year 2013. We continue to work with the Air
Force to ensure our priorities are appropriately addressed, to include
the important work being done at Rome Labs and other cyber research
facilities.

52. Senator Gillibrand. General Kehler, doesn't decreasing cyber
research undermine our ability to stay ahead in this quickly evolving
field?
General Kehler. Cyber research is indeed critical for the United
States to maintain its leadership in the cyber domain. While individual
programs may have experienced funding decreases, cyber is one of the
few areas in which DOD increased its overall investments including
offensive and defensive capabilities.

53. Senator Gillibrand. General Kehler, where is cyber research
being increased if it is decreased in the Services?
General Kehler. As stated in Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,
cyber is one of the few areas in which DOD increased its overall
investments including offensive and defensive capabilities. The Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency program funding for cyber science and
technology funding has been substantially increased. Additionally,
STRATCOM has cosponsored several joint capability technology
demonstrations for cyber research and several cyber limited objective
experiments.

NATIONAL GUARD AND CYBER MISSIONS

54. Senator Gillibrand. General Alexander, Secretary Donley has
spoken about the Guard's unique position and assets in contributing to
the Nation's cybersecurity, since Guard members can work on both Title
32 and Title 10 missions, and leverage the training that their
information technology professionals received in their civilian jobs.
Do you plan to make use of the Guard more robustly for the cyber
mission?
General Alexander. CYBERCOM has a Guard and Reserve Directorate
(GRD) who is in the initial phases of establishing habitual
relationships with the National Guard Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQs)
in each of the 54 States and Territories with a planned outcome over
the coming years of establishing productive operational relationships.
The GRD is also working through the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to
scope current National Guard forces and capabilities. Additionally, the
GRD is working with the NGB National Guard Coordination Center (NGCC)
to establish a process for leveraging CYBERCOM capabilities to a State
or Territory JFHQ request for cyber mitigation.
The habitual relationships under development tacitly recognizes
that the first military forces likely to respond to a cyber attack are
National Guard elements operating under Title 32 to fulfill the
immediate tasking by state authorities, frequently in response to
municipal needs. CYBERCOM's developing relationships with the State and
Territory JFHQs will reduce the timeline between cyber event and
CYBERCOM's provision of operational information or dynamic actions to
support the JFHQ response, even while they function under Title 32
authorities.
CYBERCOM will also increasingly rely upon members of the Reserve
and National Guard during steady-state operations. The civilian IT
sector provides cutting edge cyber expertise and capabilities. The GRD
is working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the NGB to
develop new or modify existing manpower databases in order to quantify,
track, and leverage the cyber expertise among reservists and national
guardsmen.
Additionally, we are planning a Cyber Guard exercise this summer.
This will demonstrate not only the capabilities of the National Guard,
but also explore the command and control interfaces with the National
Guard leadership, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Northern
Command and CYBERCOM. Finally, the GRD is working with NGB on looking
at developing future National Guard units within the states with
available manpower to fulfill identified shortfalls.

55. Senator Gillibrand. General Alexander, I understand that
sometimes the time that it takes to get people security clearance
hinders your ability to work with the Guard. Is that still true?
General Alexander. The security clearance process at CYBERCOM is
well established. The standard for entry is to possess a Top Secret
clearance with eligibility for Sensitive Compartmented Information and
to have successfully passed a counter-intelligence polygraph. There are
no additional clearance requirements levied on those National Guard
units currently working CYBERCOM-related missions. Future units
engaging with CYBERCOM will require the same security requirements as
those of the command. We are currently working with U.S. Air Force
Space Command and U.S. Army CYBERCOM to establish procedures for
existing National Guard units with cyber expertise to meet CYBERCOM
security procedures. As the National Guard looks to remission some
units towards a cyber capability, the CYBERCOM Guard Reserve
Directorate will work with National Guard Bureau to ensure that the
correct cyber-focused Air Force and Army occupational specialty
structures and requisite security requirements are in place.

56. Senator Gillibrand. General Alexander, are there ways we in
Congress can assist you, and if so, what does that mean concretely?
General Alexander. I appreciate the collective legislative branch
support for cybersecurity legislation that, at a minimum ensures the
following; removes existing barriers and disincentives that inhibit the
owners of critical infrastructure from sharing cyber threat indicators
with the Government; ensures that infrastructure is sufficiently
hardened and resilient.
Regarding the National Guard and cyber missions, the States and
Territories should be able to track those National Guard units whose
personnel require Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
access. We will ensure that there is sponsorship of an SCI billet
(position) and then it will be up to the State Security Managers to
track and provide oversight of an individual's timely compliance in
submitting the appropriate documentation.

57. Senator Gillibrand. General Alexander, I understand that the
Washington National Guard's 262nd Network Warfare Squadron, for
example, has a cyber mission. Will additional bases around the country
receive the cyber mission?
General Alexander. The Washington Air National Guard's 262nd
Network Warfare Squadron (NWS) is one of several National Guard units
with a cyber mission. Other Air National Guard (ANG) and Army National
Guard (ARNG) units working cyber missions include:

Delaware ANG 166th NWS, New Castle, DE;
Kansas ANG 177th Information Warfare Squadron,
Wichita, KS;
Maryland ANG 175th NWS, MD;
Rhode Island ANG 102nd Information Warfare Squadron,
North Kingston, RI;
Utah ANG 101st Information Operations Flight, Salt
Lake City, UT;
Vermont ANG 229th Information Operations Squadron,
Northfield, VT;
Virginia ARNG Data Processing Unit, Fairfax, VA; and
Washington ARNG 56th Theater Information Operations
Group, Camp Murray, WA

In addition to these units, there are initiatives at the State-
level to develop cyberspace capabilities among other existing
information operations and communications units.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

VIRTUALIZED NETWORKS

58. Senator Chambliss. General Alexander, a promising and cost-
effective new cybersecurity technology is that of virtualized networks
which use virtual machines inserted between the operating system and
the network interface to provide a capability analogous to spread-
spectrum frequency-hopping radios for Internet protocol-based networks
and devices. This capability allows for a multitude of cybersecurity
options, including: creation of stealthy networks, permitting multiple
peers to relay traffic, isolating attacks and rerouting them for
analysis and response, and allowing rapid changes to a device's network
identity. In addition, multiple robust offensive options are also
available. Can you comment on any work CYBERCOM is doing regarding
assessing virtualized network technologies to reduce hardware
requirements and costs?
General Alexander. Network virtualization offers tremendous
opportunities to reduce cost and streamline our network footprint.
Through DOD information technology effectiveness, we assess a large
reduction in hardware requirements and associated costs. However, the
opportunity to further harden our networks through virtualized
technology is just as important. We will improve our ability to command
and control DOD networks, standardize security configurations, and
minimize the impact of sophisticated attacks. Finally these virtualized
networks, can save on power, space, and cooling costs, as they
constitute smaller devices that can consolidate more than one standard
desktop system.
In November 2011, I briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
difficulty of protecting and defending the heterogeneous make-up of the
Department's sprawling, 15,000-network Global Information Grid. I
argued that a new Joint data-centric approach is necessary, with one
common architecture, governance and operations instead of 4 Service and
10 combatant command approaches. Resulting from this briefing, the DOD
CIO's office, the Joint Staff, CYBERCOM and the Services have been
busily engaged in defining this vision of the Joint Information
Environment (JIE). While CYBERCOM's imperative for establishing the JIE
is to establish a more defensible architecture, the use of virtualized
network or cloud technologies and services in order to accomplish that
goal will inherently reduce costs through standardization and joint use
of hardware, software, and network components.

59. Senator Chambliss. General Alexander, would virtualized
networking significantly and economically enhance our cyber warfare
capabilities by simultaneously providing defensive and offensive
capabilities?
General Alexander. Network virtualization offers tremendous
opportunities to reduce cost and streamline our network footprint.
Through DOD information technology effectiveness, we assess a large
reduction in hardware requirements and associated costs. However, the
opportunity to further harden our networks through virtualized
technology is just as important. We will improve our ability to command
and control DOD networks, standardize security configurations, and
minimize the impact of sophisticated attacks. Finally these virtualized
networks, can save on power, space, and cooling costs, as they
constitute smaller devices that can consolidate more than one standard
desktop system.
In November 2011, I briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
difficulty of protecting and defending the heterogeneous make-up of the
Department's sprawling, 15,000-network Global Information Grid. I
argued that a new Joint data-centric approach is necessary, with one
common architecture, governance and operations instead of four Service
and ten combatant command approaches. Resulting from this briefing, the
DOD CIO's office, the Joint Staff, CYBERCOM and the Services have been
busily engaged in defining this vision of the JIE. While CYBERCOM's
imperative for establishing the JIE is to establish a more defensible
architecture, the use of virtualized network or ``cloud'' technologies
and services in order to accomplish that goal will inherently reduce
costs through standardization and joint use of hardware, software, and
network components. Offensive capabilities are not enhanced or affected
by using virtualized networking as the basis for the JIE. The
capabilities used for offense are separate and distinct from the
capabilities used for defense.

60. Senator Chambliss. General Alexander, what is CYBERCOM doing
with respect to virtualized networking to establish stealth and
maneuver in the cyber arena?
General Alexander. Virtualized networking is a key component in the
development of infrastructures that will enable CYBERCOM Service
Components the ability to execute their mission in contested
environments. We are collaborating with mission partners across the DOD
to leverage this technology as a means to quickly establish logical
presence around the world ensuring freedom of maneuver in cyberspace.

61. Senator Chambliss. General Alexander, do you believe there is a
disproportionate focus in the cybersecurity arena on storage and
processing of data versus on protecting networks, and if so, is this
appropriate?
General Alexander. The focus in the cybersecurity arena on storage
and processing of data versus protecting networks is not
disproportionate. When you move into virtualized environments, storage
and processing of data become critical to ensuring the integrity of
virtualized environments.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

SECURID

62. Senator Brown. General Alexander, in your written statement,
you refer to details about a cyber attack on RSA (the Security Division
of EMC), which is a company headquartered in my home State of
Massachusetts. You stated: ``Indeed, the systems of some non-DOD users
were breached not long after the compromise by intruders exploiting the
stolen certificates.'' I understand that the systems of only one non-
DOD user were attacked not long after the compromise by intruders
attempting to exploit information stolen from RSA, and that the attack
was unsuccessful. It is also my understanding that certificates were
not stolen from RSA, nor was the RSA algorithm compromised, but that
other information related to RSA's SecurID tokens was stolen. Please
clarify your written statement submitted for the record on March 27,
2012.
General Alexander. During the cyber attack against RSA, the
Security Division of EMC, the adversaries extracted information related
to RSA's SecurID two-factor authentication products. SecurID products
apply additional layers of security to systems requiring users to
authenticate their identities. Alone, the information extracted during
the attack does not put RSA SecurID customers at risk. However, in
combination with other user data or incorrect network configurations,
networks are more susceptible to attacks.
In the weeks following the cyber attack on RSA, we found evidence
of multiple non-DOD users' systems being attacked. The attackers
demonstrated similar or equivalent tactics, techniques, and procedures
as those used against RSA. In one case, a non-DOD user reported to the
NSA that they had been attacked, and that they believed that
information extracted from RSA was used to facilitate the attack.
Although NSA investigated this intrusion, we were unable to
independently verify that information extracted from RSA was used as
part of the network intrusion.
The RSA name is shared by the RSA company and a popular encryption
algorithm invented by the founders of the RSA company. The cyber attack
against the RSA company should not be construed as an attack or
compromise of the RSA public key algorithm. In addition, SecurID tokens
employ cryptographic algorithms that we believe to be sound. The
security of the RSA algorithm and other encryption algorithms used by
RSA products have not been affected or degraded in any way by this
cyber attack.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

GOAL OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

63. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, in December 2010, I opposed
ratification of the President's New START treaty, in part because of
serious doubt about the President's long-term nuclear weapons policies.
The reality is that nuclear weapons are proliferating in the world, not
going away. The Russians maintain a sizeable nuclear arsenal. But, more
alarmingly, Iran continues to make progress in its pursuit of nuclear
weapons, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains a serious threat
to regional security and stability, and the full extent of the Chinese
nuclear arsenal is not known. Nuclear weapons exist, and this is not a
genie that we can put back in the bottle by unilaterally disarming and
dismantling our nuclear weapons. Yet, all the while, the administration
is reportedly contemplating deep reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. How
realistic is the President's goal of a world without nuclear weapons?
General Kehler. The administration has said that the goal of a
world without nuclear weapons is a long term pursuit and the conditions
that would ultimately permit the United States and other nations to
give up all their nuclear weapons without risking greater international
instability and insecurity do not exist today. Any future reductions in
U.S. nuclear forces must strengthen deterrence of potential regional
adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and
assurance of our allies and partners. In addition, it is important that
Russia join us in any effort to move to lower levels.

64. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, if President Obama were to
succeed in eliminating the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal, what effect do
you think that would that have on the global threat picture for the
United States?
General Kehler. I agree with the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
statement that the conditions which would ultimately permit the United
States and others to give up their nuclear weapons without risking
greater international instability and insecurity are very demanding and
do not exist today. I believe that as long as nuclear weapons exist,
the United States must sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear
forces to deter potential adversaries and reassure allies and partners.

DEEPER NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS

65. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, the administration is
conducting a review of U.S. nuclear deterrence requirements, ostensibly
to support another round of nuclear arms reductions with Russia. It
appears, however, that the President has already determined that
additional reductions are necessary. This past weekend, he told an
audience in South Korea that he can ``already say with confidence that
we have more nuclear weapons than we need.'' Yet, during consideration
of the New START treaty, the then-commander of STRATCOM, General Kevin
Chilton, told the Senate: ``I think the arsenal that we have is exactly
what is needed today to provide the deterrent.'' In light of this
authoritative statement from a subject matter expert on nuclear forces,
how can the President subsequently conclude that we have more nuclear
weapons than we need?
General Kehler. I remain committed to the principle that a well-
defined strategy should drive our nuclear force requirements. STRATCOM
is a full participant in the ongoing analysis of future deterrence
requirements called for in the NPR, and we are providing military
advice regarding strategies and their implications for force
requirements.

66. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, we have been told that the
deterrence relationship between the United States and Russia is stable.
We've been told that neither side has an incentive to strike first in a
crisis; and there is no arms race. So, in light of this stability
achieved by our current approach, why must we reduce below New START
levels of 1,550 warheads on 700 strategic delivery systems?
General Kehler. Any future nuclear reductions below New START
levels must be strategy based, continue to strengthen deterrence of
potential regional adversaries, sustain strategic stability vis-a-vis
Russia and China, and continue to assure our allies and partners.
Additionally, implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and
the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in the NPR will
allow the United States to shift away from retaining large numbers of
nondeployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise, allowing reductions in the nuclear stockpile. Finally,
Russia's nuclear force will remain a significant factor in determining
how much and how fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces.

67. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, what justification can you
offer for risking U.S. national security by altering U.S. nuclear
strategy in pursuit of deeper reductions?
General Kehler. A key premise of the 2010 NPR was that any
successful strategy for deeper reductions must be balanced, with
movement in one area enabling and reinforcing progress in other areas.
For example, increased infrastructure investment and a sound Stockpile
Stewardship Program will facilitate reductions in both deployed and
nondeployed nuclear weapons. The elements of such a strategy must also
be integrated, both nationally--across Federal agencies and between the
executive and legislative branches--and internationally among a wide
range of partner governments. An effective strategy must also be
sustained over time, with support from a long succession of U.S.
administrations and Congresses.

68. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, do you believe U.S. allies
still feel assured under our nuclear umbrella, and if not, do you
foresee them building up their own nuclear capabilities?
General Kehler. Assuring our allies continues to be a fundamental
component of STRATCOM's mission. We continuously work with our allies
and partners on extended deterrence issues to ensure they understand
the breadth of capability that the United States can employ and are
positioned to make contributions to our combined deterrence capability.

69. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, would a shift in U.S. nuclear
doctrine away from counterforce and flexibility toward minimum
deterrence weaken the credibility of U.S. nuclear use on behalf of
allies?
General Kehler. The current nuclear employment strategy reflects
existing guidance and objectives for the nuclear deterrent force. The
number of deployed nuclear weapons under New START supports our current
strategy to include extended deterrence to allies. The credibility of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent requires we maintain a ready, trained, and
effective force with a demonstrated willingness to implement our
deterrent capabilities at any force level on behalf of our allies,
partners, and the Nation.

70. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, do you believe that at lower
numbers, the implications of cheating become more important?
General Kehler. Cheating at any force level is cause for concern--
in part because it indicates intent. However, it is not always true
that cheating provides a significant military advantage. The
implications of cheating at lower force levels are functions of the
force structures, capabilities, and intent of the two sides. We would
analyze the nature of any cheating very carefully and provide a
military assessment of the potential implications along with
recommendations to address it.

71. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, would lower strategic nuclear
force levels exacerbate the existing disparity in tactical nuclear
weapons between Russia and the United States, and if so, wouldn't this
affect allied calculations during future crises?
General Kehler. I agree with the importance the NPR places on
Russia joining us in any effort to move to lower nuclear force levels
and its recommendation that non-strategic nuclear weapons, together
with the nondeployed nuclear weapons of both sides, should be included
in any future reduction discussions or agreements between the United
States and Russia.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCES

72. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, according to DOD data, since
2001, China has perhaps tripled the size of its ICBM force. Add to this
China's ambitions for a submarine-based nuclear force as well as
increasing numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Dr.
James Miller, who is currently the acting Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, testified to Congress in March 2011: ``The lack of
transparency surrounding China's nuclear programs--their pace and
scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guide them--raises
questions about China's future strategic intentions.'' His concerns
seemed to be confirmed in December 2011, when research by Georgetown
University revealed that China could have as many as 3,000 nuclear
missiles and thousands of miles of underground tunnels to hide this
arsenal. How large is this force likely to be in another 10 years?
General Kehler. I take very seriously China's nuclear capabilities,
intentions, forces, strategy and doctrine. I also agree that increased
transparency in nuclear programs reduces ambiguity and the associated
risk of misinterpreting intentions. I defer to the Intelligence
Community assessments of China's future strategic forces and note DIA
Director Lieutenant General Burgess' 12 February 2012 Senate testimony
in which he indicated China currently has fewer than 50 ICBMs capable
of reaching the United States and will probably double that number by
2025. I do agree that China has extensive underground tunnels.

73. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, what is your assessment of the
incentive that further reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons would provide
to China and other nuclear powers to build up to U.S. and Russian
levels?
General Kehler. It is difficult to assess the actions others may
take in response to situations which have yet to occur. If Chinese
leadership should perceive a political or military advantage, an
incentive to increase capacity could result. However, they may choose
to maintain their current structure. U.S. nuclear forces are intended
to deter any potential nuclear-armed adversary.

74. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, how many nuclear weapons does
the United States need to maintain to convince China not to seek
strategic equivalence?
General Kehler. It is not possible to accurately determine the
precise level or conditions at which the PRC leadership might elect to
attempt to match the U.S. nuclear inventory.

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION FUNDING

75. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, in testifying before this
committee, you expressed concerns about the funding shortfall for NNSA
Weapons Activities. Using the 1251 modernization plan as a baseline,
the fiscal year 2013 request falls $372 million short, and funding
between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2017 could fall $4 billion
short of the 1251 commitment. You noted the slips to the B-61 and W-76
Life Extension Programs, and indicated that while it would increase
risk, you thought it was manageable. You also expressed concerns about
deferring the start of construction of the CMRR-NF and, perhaps most
important, you were uncertain about the administration's alternative
course of action for producing the necessary number of nuclear pits to
maintain a responsive infrastructure. It seems strange that DOD would
agree to the fiscal year 2013 funding request and alternative to CMRR-
NF without knowing whether it is technically feasible, cost-effective,
or whether the funding will be provided in the out-years to accomplish
these tasks. In light of these comments, what is the state of thinking
in DOD regarding the way forward?
General Kehler. The President's fiscal year 2013 budget request for
NNSA Weapons Activities funds required life extension and stockpile
stewardship programs with manageable risk. What concerns me is that we
do not yet have an executable program defined for fiscal year 2014
budget and beyond. To that end, STRATCOM is participating in a DOD/DOE
interagency team to balance our weapon needs, NNSA's infrastructure and
stockpile stewardship requirements, and projected fiscal constraints to
ensure we maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent well
into the future.

76. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, how could the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC) approve the fiscal year 2013 budget request with so much
uncertainty?
General Kehler. The fiscal year 2013 budget request is sufficient
to certify the stockpile, conduct required maintenance, and support
fiscal year 2013 activities for ongoing and planned life extensions.
Given the confluence of a late fiscal year 2012 appropriation and
constrained out-year budget targets, the NWC recognized the necessity
to move forward in fiscal year 2013 while commissioning an interagency
working group to develop an executable plan.

77. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, this committee supported the
full funding request for NNSA Weapons Activities last year. The
committee cannot wait until DOD completes its assessment this summer.
Will you commit to helping this committee identify efficiencies within
the national laboratories or NNSA that could free up funding for the
important weapons life extension programs and, perhaps, even to fund
the construction of CMRR-NF on its original schedule?
General Kehler. The committee has my full support to ensure the
Nation's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable.

MISSILE DEFENSE

78. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, I am also particularly
concerned regarding President Obama's recent unfortunate admission to
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that he is waiting until after the
election, when he can exercise more flexibility to deal with issues
relating to missile defense. Although not having to worry about the
judgment of the American people on this issue may be convenient,
allowing the President to make more concessions to the Russians, to do
so would be antithetical to our safety and security, as well as
dishonest and contrary to the assurances President Obama has given. In
order to secure Senate support for the New START treaty, President
Obama pledged to continue development and deployment of all stages of
the PAA to missile defense in Europe. What is the precise status of the
plan to deploy the remaining three phases of the PAA?
General Kehler. The plan for the remaining three phases of the EPAA
is on track. EPAA Phase II will provide a capability against short and
medium-range threats by 2015 with the installation of an Aegis Ashore
battery in Romania and introduction of the more capable SM-3 IB
interceptor. EPAA Phase III will enhance capability against
intermediate-range threats by 2018 with the installation of an Aegis
Ashore battery in Poland and SM-3 IIA interceptor at sea and ashore
with improved on-board discrimination and reliability. EPAA Phase IV
will provide intercept capability against intermediate-range threats
and an additional layer for homeland defense against non-advanced
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles with the SM-3 IIB, an
advanced discrimination and higher velocity interceptor.

79. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, President Obama's discussions
with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the Nuclear Security Summit
in Seoul do not appear to have produced any fruit, with Medvedev
stressing that the United States and Russia remain in their respective,
opposing positions on missile defense. Ellen Tauscher, former Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs,
stated at the 10th Annual Missile Defense Conference this week that the
administration is committed to ``getting Russia inside the missile
defense tent now,'' so that the United States can demonstrate to Russia
that missile defense systems ``will not threaten Russia's strategic
forces.'' She believes this conversation, and associated exchanges of
information that have been discussed, are ``essential because Russia
has not been convinced by our technical arguments that the NATO system
isn't a threat even despite . . . detailed technical responses to
Russia's inaccurate assumptions about our missile defense
capabilities.'' It seems that Secretary Tauscher is operating based on
a flawed assumption that Russia will eventually agree to our missile
defense plan, despite already receiving repeated assurances and
technical responses from the United States. What is your assessment of
the likelihood that further dialogue will placate Russia's fears
regarding the deployment of missile defense systems in Europe?
General Kehler. I will defer to the Department of State to assess
the likelihood that further dialogue will succeed in placating Russia's
missile defense fears. The United States will proceed with missile
defense in concert with our friends and allies. I support the policy
and I believe that we can only be better served by working to assuage
Russian concerns that our limited capability is not arrayed against
their strategic nuclear forces.

80. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, do you believe that offering
them concessions, such as viewing Aegis SM-3 missile defense flight
tests, will improve the likelihood that Russia will be willing to
cooperate in the future?
General Kehler. It is important to maintain an open and transparent
approach to addressing Russian concerns, which might facilitate or
enable future missile defense cooperation. We continue to offer
cooperative opportunities, such as inviting Russia to observe our
recent Nimble Titan 12 capstone event, in order to further the dialogue
on missile defense.

81. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, in your opinion, what would be
the ramifications if the United States were to continue fielding the
PAA without Russia's blessing?
General Kehler. As long as the United States retains the support of
our NATO allies in continuing to field these systems as part of our
contribution to the NATO territorial missile defense capability, it may
have no direct impact. We continue to assure the Russians that they are
not our adversary and that we are not building this system in response
to their strategic nuclear forces. Russia, however, has indicated that
continued deployment could result in a military response or withdrawal
from the New START treaty.

FUNDING FOR THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT

82. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, last year, Dr. James Miller
testified to Congress that the 10-year cost of sustaining and
modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be approximately $125
billion over 10 years, which does not include NNSA funding for the
nuclear weapons complex and the warheads. Assuming that amount remains
roughly constant, that is about $12.5 billion per year for the nuclear
deterrent, which equates to approximately 3 percent of the defense
budget. During the Cold War, we devoted up to 25 percent of the defense
budget on nuclear deterrence. We should bear this in mind. It's
important for Congress to understand just how much our nuclear
deterrent costs. What is the total that DOD plans to spend over the
next 10 years to sustain and modernize U.S. strategic forces?
General Kehler. The pending National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 Section 1043 Report will include a
breakdown of DOD's nuclear enterprise funding. As stated in the
Secretaries' memorandum to the committees, the DOE portion will be
delivered later this year.

83. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, please provide as soon as
possible a breakdown of that funding by weapon system or whatever
category makes the most sense.
General Kehler. The pending NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 Section 1043
Report will include a breakdown of DOD's nuclear enterprise funding. As
stated in the Secretaries' memorandum to the committees, the DOE
portion will be delivered later this year.

CONNECTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION AND REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

84. Senator Cornyn. General Kehler, the 2010 NPR stated:
``Implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship program and the nuclear
infrastructure investments recommended in the NPR will allow the United
States to shift away from retaining large numbers of nondeployed
warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise,
allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These investments
are essential to facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence
under New START and beyond.'' In other words, the modernization program
was intended to give us, among other things, a modern manufacturing
capability necessary to extend the life of our nuclear weapons and to
be able to respond to unforeseen events that may require the
manufacture of nuclear weapons components, such as the nuclear pits.
The logic was that once we had this capability, we would eliminate some
of the nuclear warheads that are in the nondeployed or hedge category.
For example, the United States has approximately 5,000 nuclear warheads
of all types; of this, approximately 2,000 are in the operational
category, the rest are nondeployed. If the CMRR-NF is delayed from 2021
to 2028, at the earliest, does it not follow that we should similarly
delay the elimination of our nondeployed or hedge weapons?
General Kehler. There is a relationship between our nuclear
infrastructure's capacity and responsiveness to the Nation's ability to
respond to technical or geopolitical surprise. Today we rely on
nondeployed weapons to manage this risk; the capability that CMRR-NF
provides is only one of the factors that determine the size of the
nondeployed stockpile. I continue to support the retention of
nondeployed weapons as a hedge against risk, and believe we must
modernize our nuclear infrastructure to sustain our deterrent force for
the long term.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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