[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE DEVASTATING CRISIS IN EASTERN CONGO
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 11, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-191
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON PAUL, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
CONNIE MACK, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TED POE, Texas ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio KAREN BASS, California
DAVID RIVERA, Florida WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York THEODORE E. DEUTCH,
ROBERT TURNER, New York FloridaAs of 6/19/
12 deg.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Johnnie Carson, assistant secretary, Bureau of
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State...................... 10
Mr. Steve Hege (former member United Nations Group of Experts on
the Democratic Republic of the Congo).......................... 32
Mr. John Prendergast, co-founder, The Enough Project............. 47
Mr. Mvemba Dizolele, Peter J. Duignan Distinguished Visiting
Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University................ 58
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Karen Bass, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California:
Letter submitted to President Obama, dated December 10, 2012,
from Members of Congress..................................... 5
Letter submitted to President Obama, dated December 10, 2012,
from various organizations................................... 8
The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement................. 14
Mr. Steve Hege: Prepared statement............................... 36
Mr. John Prendergast: Prepared statement......................... 51
Mr. Mvemba Dizolele: Prepared statement.......................... 62
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 82
Hearing minutes.................................................. 83
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights: Statement from World
Relief......................................................... 84
THE DEVASTATING CRISIS IN EASTERN CONGO
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2012
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
and Human Rights,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:16 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
afternoon. I apologize for the lateness in starting. Today's
hearing will examine U.S. policy regarding the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. This conflict was exacerbated
by Rwanda's intervention in neighboring Eastern Congo as
documented by the release of three United Nations reports this
year. These reports confirmed Rwanda's support of militia who
have ravaged and continue to plague this region. The State
Department was unavailable to testify at our September 19th
hearing on this issue, and the subcommittee promised at that
time the follow-up when State was available to testify.
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, successive U.S.
administrations have turned a blind eye to reports of Rwandan
plundering of resources from the DRC and support for rebels who
have devastated Eastern Congo and its people. It seems that
guilt over the Clinton administration's colossal failure
responding effectively, as they did not, to the genocide in
Rwanda, has led to subsequent U.S. administrations being
reluctant to criticize the Government of Rwanda.
With these U.N. reports on the government's behavior in the
DRC, we must overcome our regret over what happened 18 years
ago. As an NGO letter to President Obama points out, the United
States is now out of step with our European allies, who have
cut aid to Rwanda because of their interference in the DRC, as
recommended by the U.N. Group of Experts in their recent
reports. The Group of Experts also recommended imposing
sanctions on responsible Rwandan officials, including the
Defense Minister.
Additionally, the Government of the DRC has failed to
ensure that its military adequately provides security for its
citizens. In fact, the National Forces of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is alleged to be a perpetrator of human
rights violations in the East. Security sector reform is
critical in the DRC, and the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the DRC, or MONUSCO, has not been able
to completely train military elements that too often terrorize
their own people instead of protecting them.
At this point, it is vital to understand what the
administration intends to do about the U.N. reports on Rwanda's
violations of the arms embargo, on nonstate groups in Eastern
DRC, and how this impacts U.S. relations with Rwanda.
Furthermore, we must know how the administration intends to
deal with the DRC Government in light of its deficiencies in
security sector reform. This hearing will also take a
comprehensive look at who was responsible for the insecurity in
Eastern Congo beyond the two governments and the militias.
Most attention is being paid to the M23 rebel movement in
Eastern Congo, and justifiably so, in light of their recent
seizure of territory and overall destructive impact on the
people of Eastern Congo. However, there are reportedly as many
as two dozen armed groups terrorizing Congolese in this region.
According to a November 2012 report from Oxfam, Commodities of
War, nine of these militias are believed to be the most
prominent. They range from those with a focus on Rwanda or
Uganda to those that were formed in response to the flight of
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to the DRC, or
those singly focused on the DRC itself.
Whatever the reason for their founding, these militias have
terrorized the people of Eastern Congo and the DRC as a whole.
We must identify their support base and then the flow of arms
and other aid that enables their ongoing reign of terror.
According to the U.S. Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, insecurity in Eastern Congo has displaced
approximately 2.4 million people nationwide, especially in the
East. Despite long-standing conflict in Eastern Congo, the OCHA
estimates that the majority of displaced persons typically
return to their areas of origin within 6 to 18 months of their
initial displacement and require minimal return assistance.
While that may be true, it does not account for the kind of
life Congolese will have once they return to their homes. Women
continue to be targeted for gross abuse in the DRC. A study
that recently appeared in the American Journal of Public Health
concluded that an average of 48 women and girls are raped every
hour in the country.
So as with our February 2nd and September 19th hearings on
the DRC this year, more than 100 females in DRC will have been
raped before our hearing today ends. Their rejection by their
families, husbands, and communities casts a cloud over their
future effort to recreate communities destroyed by the militias
in the DRC. This is an issue that must be addressed by the
Congolese themselves, of course, with any help that can be
provided from the outside, sooner rather than later.
Since our hearing in September, M23 has made significant
gains in territorial control, occupying Goma for 10 days while
moving southward potentially toward the South Kivu town of
Bukavu. However, international pressure played a major role in
the group ending its advance southward and withdrawing from
Goma by early December. DRC President Joseph Kabila's
government and the M23 rebels reportedly have agreed to peace
talks in Kampala sponsored by the Government of Uganda. There
have been peace talks and peace accords in the DRC before, and
they didn't hold, as we all know. Will this effort achieve a
lasting peace?
The DRC is home to an abundant mineral wealth, including 70
percent of the world's coltan used to make vital components of
cell phones and other electronic equipment, 30 percent of the
world's diamond reserves, and vast deposits of cobalt, copper,
and bauxite. Unfortunately, these natural resources have
attracted international looters and fueled civil war. Now oil
has been discovered in Eastern Congo. Can a way be found to
prevent the DRC's blessings from being turned into curses?
The tragic genocide in Rwanda in 1994 has had lasting
repercussions in the DRC, but since the 1880s resentment over
the perceived influx of people considered foreigners in Eastern
DRC has contributed to conflict in this region, including two
regional wars. Various leaders of the region have used this
antipathy for political purposes, pitting their supporters
against their perceived opponents. Can the interethnic problems
in the DRC and its neighbors be finally resolved so that a
lasting peace among all the people of the DRC can be achieved?
Our witnesses today are well positioned to address
questions regarding a path forward toward sustainable peace in
the DRC and the obstacles that lie in that path. It is time now
to find a way to bring an end to the horrific suffering of the
people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I yield to my
friend and colleague Ms. Bass for her opening.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for
your leadership on this issue and also for holding this
important hearing. While this committee held a hearing on the
DRC not too long ago, recent events in Eastern Congo motivate a
closer examination of this current crisis. I want to especially
thank Assistant Secretary, Ambassador Carson, and our other
witnesses for offering testimony at today's hearing.
I would also like to commend many of you sitting in the
audience for your tireless work toward peace and justice for
those affected by the past and current crises. Your concerns
have been heard, and this committee will continue to elevate
the status of the DRC so it receives the international
attention needed to bring about lasting peace and stability.
Myself, members of this committee, and our colleagues in the
Senate are deeply concerned with on-the-ground reports of human
rights violations, forced rape, the recruitment of child
soldiers, and the involvement of DRC's neighbors in the Eastern
region.
I want to stress that there is a great need for the
international community to work in common interest toward the
resolution of a crisis that goes well beyond the M23. We must
not look at the current M23 crisis in some civil, political, or
military vacuum. For a credible, reasonable, and long-standing
stability to take hold, I urge that transparent and accountable
processes be put in place that can address reforms at all
levels.
I want to be clear on this point. If we are to see an end
to the violence and instability, then holistic reforms are
desperately needed at all levels, including politically and
economically. We must also see a dramatic reevaluation of the
social constraints to reforms in civic engagement. The results
of the deeply flawed 2011 election lay bare the significant
challenges that must be addressed if we are to see a dramatic
and positive change of course.
Ambassador Carson, I will be interested to hear what new
steps the State Department will take to address these very
serious challenges that remain unaddressed.
Let me remind the committee what is at stake. Continued
failure to achieve stability has torn families apart and shown
clearly the base actions of those who have no concern for life
and have not been brought to justice. For too long, the DRC has
been ravaged by instability and war. For two decades, Eastern
Congo has been under siege by armed groups. Yesterday it was
the National Congress for the Defence of the People, today it
is M23. What will it be tomorrow? Will we stand by and allow a
fragile peace to be held together by empty promises? The
violence, the rapes, the child soldiers, the murders must be
brought to an end.
What is most troubling about this recent conflict is the
documented involvement by neighboring governments and the DRC's
territorial integrity. While the Rwandan and Ugandan
Governments vehemently deny such involvement, a growing body of
evidence raises questions that suggest otherwise. I close these
remarks where I began, urging that all efforts be put toward
establishing mechanisms that lay the foundation for lasting
peace, not only in the DRC, but throughout the region. I ask
that a letter being sent to President Obama be submitted for
the record. Circulated by Representative McDermott, this letter
calls for the establishment of a special U.S. envoy, U.S.
Envoy, and U.N.--and African Union envoy. The purposes of these
roles should be clear, to present a group of international
stakeholders that can provide critical and balanced political
pressure toward a unified policy to address all aspects of this
regional crisis.
Also worth mentioning is a second letter to be sent to
President Obama and Secretary Clinton signed by organizations,
including Africa Faith and Justice Network, The Enough Project,
Global Witness, Open Society Foundations, Refugees
International, among many others.
[The letters referred to follow:]
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Ms. Bass. In addition to calling for special envoys, this
group boldly calls for global leadership to engage
constructively in a comprehensive political process. Thank you,
and I look forward to today's testimonies.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, my friend, Ms. Bass. Any
other panelists like to make an opening comment? Ms. Buerkle?
Yes, Mr. Turner?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just I would like to
raise a point. Throughout the conflict, the mines remain open,
minerals, gems, rare earth provide the financing for the
conflict, I think the motivation for a great deal of it. Who is
buying this material, and what do we know about the chain of
both dollars and material on an international basis? And is
there anything that we or the U.N. or the African Union are
doing to choke this off? That is it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Turner, thank you very much. I now introduce
our witness from the U.S. Department of State, Ambassador
Johnnie Carson, serves as Assistant Secretary of State in the
Bureau of African Affairs, a position he has held since May
2009. Ambassador Carson has a long and distinguished career in
public service, over 37 years in the foreign service, including
time as our Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Ambassador Carson has also served as the staff director of this
subcommittee many, many years ago, and as a Peace Corps
volunteer in Tanzania. Ambassador Carson is the recipient of
numerous awards for his service from the U.S. Department of
State. Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Carson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members of
the committee, thank you for the very kind invitation to
testify before the subcommittee today on the crisis unfolding
in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the DRC.
As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the
Congo is the most volatile in Africa today. An estimated 5
million people have died in the years since the second regional
war began in that country in 1997-1998, and millions more have
been forced to flee their homes. The people of North and South
Kivu provinces, in particular, have faced repeated cycles of
conflict and shocking atrocities. The November 20th fall of
Goma to the M23 rebel group provided a stark reminder that in
spite of the international community's major investments in
humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, the underlying causes of the
recurring conflicts in the Eastern DRC remain unresolved.
The Congolese Government has failed to provide effective
security, governance, and services in the Eastern provinces,
and political and economic tensions persist between the DRC and
its eastern neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Since the M23
rebellion erupted last spring, the United States has worked
closely with international and regional partners to mobilize a
comprehensive response aimed at preventing a further
deterioration of the situation. Secretary Clinton, Ambassador
Rice, and Under Secretary Wendy Sherman have spoken or met with
senior Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and U.N. officials to
advocate for a rapid and peaceful resolution to this crisis.
In the U.N. Security Council, we have taken action to
ensure that five of the M23's most abusive commanders are now
under targeted sanctions. We have also stressed the need to
hold accountable all of those who commit human rights abuses
and atrocities, and I myself traveled to the DRC, Rwanda, and
Uganda between November 24 and 28 with my British and French
counterparts to deliver a clear and common message that the
Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan Governments must work together
to stop this crisis and to work toward a sustainable resolution
of underlying issues.
All three governments reiterated to us their commitment to
these goals. We also stressed that there should be no impunity
for senior M23 leaders who are under ICC indictment or
international sanctions for human rights abuses. The M23 would
not be the threat that it is today without external support,
and we will continue to discourage outside parties from
providing any assistance to the M23 movement. There is a
credible body of evidence that corroborates key findings of the
Group of Experts report concerning Rwandan Government support
to the M23, including military, logistical, and political
assistance.
The British Government has recently indicated that it
shares this assessment. We do not have a similar body of
evidence that Uganda has a government policy of support for the
M23. Based on this evidence, we have repeatedly pressed Rwanda
to halt and prevent any and all forms of support to Congolese
armed groups.
Looking forward, we expect all parties, including Rwanda,
to cease any support to M23 and other armed groups, abide by
the Kampala Accords of November 21 and 24, and to work
constructively with its neighbors and the international
community and take affirmative steps to end impunity for M23
commanders responsible for human rights abuses in order to
reach an acceptable political agreement.
We ask the Government of Uganda to also ensure that
supplies to the M23 do not originate in or transit through
Ugandan territory, including from individual officials who
might be acting on their own. The Department continues to
monitor closely all potential sources of external support, and
we will continue to respond appropriately, including by
reviewing our assistance to deter this support as the situation
develops.
We are taking a number of other steps in concert with other
international partners as a part of our comprehensive response
to the current crisis. First and foremost, we are monitoring
humanitarian needs and mobilizing an appropriate response. The
humanitarian situation in the Eastern Congo remains deplorable,
as it has been for years, but recent attacks by the M23 and
other armed groups have displaced hundreds of thousands and
left some areas of North and South Kivu inaccessible to
humanitarian response.
The United States provided more than $110 million in
humanitarian assistance for Congolese refugees, internally
displaced persons, and conflict-affected civilians in Fiscal
Year 2012, and at the U.N., we have urged donors to respond to
the U.N.'s consolidated appeal for the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
Second, the International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region, known as the ICGLR, the African Union, and the Security
Council have all demanded that the M23 refrain from further
offensive operations, and to remain out of Goma. While the
Congolese Government has agreed to hear the grievances of the
M23 in discussions that are now taking place in Kampala, we
continue to call for accountability for the M23's most abusive
leaders, and we will continue to speak out against the forcible
recruitment of children and the other crimes of the M23's
soldiers and rebels.
Third, we believe that Presidents Kabila, Kagame, and
Museveni must continue to engage in direct talks to address the
underlying causes of instability in the region as well as the
potential drivers of progress. We support the appointment of a
U.N. Special Envoy to facilitate a long-term solution of these
problems, and we will consult with the U.N. Secretary General
about this. We will work to ensure that any agreement between
the parties is transparent, sustainable, and enjoys support and
commitment of the region.
Fourth, more must be done to protect civilians in the
Eastern DRC. We and our fellow Security Council members and
troop-contributing countries are reviewing options for
improving the U.N.'s ability to protect civilians and help
implement defined aspects of a potential regional political
settlement.
Fifth, the DRC Government has the primary responsibility
for protecting its territory and all, all of its citizens. We
are urging President Kabila to take clear and bold measures to
ensure that the soldiers of the Congolese army are
professionally trained, adequately paid and supported, and
respectful of their citizens and of international human rights
norms. The extension of effective governance combined with
legitimate provincial elections would also help to underpin a
lasting peace.
We believe that the time has come for the region's leaders
and the international community to break the cycle of violence
and impunity that has existed for far too long in the Eastern
DRC. We and, most importantly, the region's political leaders
must ensure that the national security and territory, integrity
of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi are protected. We must
help build a future for people who have seen more conflict than
peace over the past 2 decades. We must help turn the vast
mineral and agricultural wealth of the Eastern DRC into a
source of economic pride and progressThe Honorable Johnnie
Carson, assistant secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S.
Department of StateMr. John Prendergast, co-founder, The Enough
ProjectMr. Steve Hege (former member United Nations Group of
Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo)Mr. Mvemba
Dizolele, Peter J. Duignan Distinguished Visiting Fellow,
Hoover Institution, Stanford University benefiting the people
of the region and not contributing to conflict.
The leaders of the region must establish nonviolent means
of addressing their political, security, economic, and border
differences. As Secretary Clinton noted when she visited Goma
in 2009, the Congolese people are courageous and resilient, and
there are reasons for hope across the entirety of the DRC,
including progress toward paying soldiers through electronic
and mobile banking, and building the capacity to provide
justice in response to mass atrocities and human rights
violations.
We need to build on these steps, which have been gravely
set back by the current M23 rebellion. The decisions taken
today, the decisions taken now will have a direct impact on
what happens over the next several months as well as the next
several years. They will affect the behavior of other militias
in the Kivus, the success of reforms to promote the conflict-
free trade and mineral resources, and the ability to sustain
operations against the vicious Lord's Resistance Army of Joseph
Kony that has operated in the northern part of the DRC and in
the Central African Republic.
Today's crisis is a tragedy, but it also offers a genuine
opportunity to help the Congolese people set a more sustainable
course toward peace and stability in their own country as well
as with their neighbors. The framework for action at the
national, regional, and international levels that I have
outlined today could help enable the peoples of the region to
escape the recurring cycles of conflict which have hampered
progress in the Eastern Congo for nearly 2 decades.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify this
afternoon. I have a longer submission for the record which you
may have. I look forward to answering any of your questions.
Mr. Smith. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. Without
objection, your full statement and the letters referenced by
Ms. Bass before will be made a part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, a couple hours ago, at least
online, the Guardian newspaper posted an article, the title of
which is, ``Obama accused of failed policy over Rwanda's
support of rebel group,'' and it points out the letter that we
all are aware of, signed by 15 organizations, takes the
administration to task for its policy. The article begins,
``Leading campaign groups and thinktanks have written to Barack
Obama accusing him of a failed policy over Rwanda's support for
rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and calling on
the President to impose sanctions.'' The letter says in
pertinent part, ``As the situation once again dramatically
deteriorates in Eastern Congo, the U.S. response to the crisis
has patently failed and is out of step with other western
nations. Since M23 was created in the spring of 2012, U.S.
officials continue to place faith in engaging Rwanda in a
constructive dialogue. This approach has clearly failed to
change Rwanda's policy, as evidenced by the direct involvement
of the Rwandan army in the recent takeover of Goma as
documented by the United Nations Group of Experts.'' The
Rwandans say that the report is fabricated and ``The U.N.
group's report says: `Rwandan officials co-ordinated of
creation of the rebel movement as well as its major military
operations' as well as providing troops and arming the group.''
It recommends imposing sanctions against Rwandans
officially. You have just testified there is a credible body of
evidence that corroborates key findings of the Group of Experts
reports, including evidence of significant military and
logistical support as well as operational and political
guidance from the Rwandan Government to the M23. You also point
out that we do not have a similar body of evidence that Uganda
has a government-wide policy of support to M23.
Now, as we all know, and I on the House side pushed very
hard to get this legislation passed, a bill that was authored
by then-Senator Barack Obama called the Democratic Republic of
Congo Relief Security and Democratic Promotion Act of 2006. It
calls on the U.S. Government to withhold assistance to any
foreign country taking action to destabilize the DRC.
I wonder if you could tell us, do the actions of Rwanda
merit a withdrawal of funding? Does it not rise to, given the
corroboration of evidence, as you pointed out, to withholding
aid to Rwanda until they change?
Mr. Carson. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I reject the
headline that the administration has failed to speak out
against the M23 and against those----
Mr. Smith. That is not what they said, with all due
respect. They talked about a failed policy, not that we didn't
speak out against M23, so just be clear.
Mr. Carson. I think that what we say and do is a part of
the policy effort, and I reject that notion, and I must reject
it pretty soundly. First and foremost, we have been engaged on
this issue since the M23 rebellion began in April of this year.
Since April up until yesterday, we have at all levels of the
U.S. Government, senior levels of the U.S. Government been
working to advance greater peace and stability, an end to the
current fighting, a current withdrawal of M23 from Goma, and
discussions between the leaders in the region.
Let me just give you a quick catalog. Certainly between
April and September, I and Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, were in contact on numerous
occasions telephonically with leaders in the region. I also met
with leaders about this issue at the African Union summit in
June.
In September of this year, Secretary Clinton invited the
Presidents of Rwanda and of the DRC to meet with her on the
margins of the U.N. General Assembly to try to find ways to end
the current rebellion. We participated in September as well in
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's special meeting on the Great
Lakes Region. In addition, Under Secretary Wendy Sherman
traveled to the region in October, met with Presidents Kagame,
Kabila, and Museveni, and this was one of the most important of
her sets of meetings out there. She met with President Kagame
for over 5 hours in Kigali on that visit.
Shortly after that we actually did take some action.
Because we had information that we believed indicated Rwandan
support, we cut off our foreign military financing to the
Rwandan Government, one of the first such public acts by any
government. And I can say that I traveled to the region for
several days just after Thanksgiving and traveled to Kampala,
to Kigali, and to Kinshasa to meet with the leaders of all
three countries. I also traveled with my British and French
counterparts. In addition, we have sanctioned M23 leaders. We
are about to sanction more M23 leaders and officials, and we
have continued to advance our diplomacy as well as speak out
against what has been happening in the region.
So, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, anyone who would
suggest that we have been inactive would be----
Mr. Smith. Again, Mr. Secretary, or Mr. Ambassador, you are
both, no one is suggesting inactivity. It is the policy itself
that is under scrutiny and being criticized by those 15
organizations, and--I mean, let me ask you this: Are there
sanctions contemplated or have there been any sanctions imposed
upon any Rwandese officials or military?
Mr. Carson. No. But we have, as I pointed out, implemented
sanctions which have cut off foreign military financing to the
Rwandan Government and to the Rwandan military.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary----
Mr. Carson. I think those are sanctions, and I think they
are very public, and they have been terminated.
Mr. Smith. You mentioned support for U.N. envoy. How about
a U.S. envoy?
Mr. Carson. We actually have a U.S. Envoy for the Great
Lakes Region. His name is Ambassador Barrie Walkley. He has
been on the job for nearly a year. Ambassador Walkley is
infinitely qualified to serve as our envoy there. He has served
in two francophone African countries as Ambassador and he has
previously served as deputy chief of mission in the DRC. He
travels to the region quite frequently, and so there is an
envoy out there already. One may quibble with the level, but
the existence is there. He is active, and he is working hard on
this issue along with other officials.
Mr. Smith. Understood. But the gravitas of a Presidential
envoy I believe would send, perhaps, a stronger message to
those that are part of the peace process.
Let me ask you, if I could, John Prendergast, in his
statement, very strongly says, ``By global standards the
international effort to construct a credible peace process for
Congo is manifestly derelict, condemning that country to
further cycles of devastating conflict. When the curtain is
pulled back, when one looks behind the occasional United
Nations Security Council resolution calling simply for an end
to the violence, the international diplomatic response is
revealed to be shockingly ineffective, perhaps even violating
the Hippocratic Oath, `first do no harm.' '' Then he goes on
from there. How do you respond to that?
Mr. Carson. Well, I think I don't need to respond for the
entire international community. All I do is respond for the
U.S. Government. I know Mr. Prendergast, we have been long-time
colleagues and friends. He has a great deal of knowledge and
expertise on the region, but I would submit that the actions
that we have taken reflect a high degree of interest in this
situation.
Mr. Smith. Would troops recently pledged by the South
African Development Community comprise a credible force to
protect the DRC-Rwanda border?
Mr. Carson. Last week, the SADC countries met in Dar es
Salaam, and there they agreed to send in some 4,000 troops into
the Eastern DRC to serve as an international or, I should say,
a neutral international force; 1,000 troops were pledged by
Tanzania, the other 3,000 were going to be drawn from a
southern African stand-by force. I do not know the capacity or
the ability of the countries in the region to pull those troops
together, but what I would say is that the U.N. currently has
the largest peacekeeping force in the world in the DRC, and if
there is an interjection of a new force, it should be done very
carefully in cooperation and collaboration with the United
Nations. It should be well thought out and well resourced, and
one should consider whether it is not better to augment and
integrate those new forces into an expanded and more assertive
U.N. force than to create a new force that would be operating
in the area in which there are already a large number of
military and rebel forces. It could create some concerns about
operational effectiveness and operational overlaps.
Mr. Smith. I, too, have been in Goma myself a few years
back, and know how unbelievably unstable that area is. Part of
the problem, I believe, is that there are insufficient troops
deployed, even under the large U.N. deployment there, and then
there is always the question of the rules of engagement.
Let me ask you one final question before I yield to my
friend, Ms. Bass. There are rumors, maybe they are just rumors,
that the administration sought to delay the U.N. Group of
Experts report on the DRC this past summer and attempted to
soften criticism of Rwandan involvement with M23. Can you speak
to that?
Mr. Carson. I reject that as out of hand.
Mr. Smith. Okay. And one final question, the Rwandans join
the U.N. Security Council next year. Does that have any bearing
on what our policy will be, particularly when it comes to
sanctions, since they will be on the Security Council?
Mr. Carson. No, it does not. I would just hope that the
Rwandans, when they join the Council, will carry out their
duties in a responsible and thoughtful way just as the other 15
members of the Security Council do.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Ambassador Carson. I want to change
the subject a little bit and wanted to ask if you could speak
to some of the background of the M23. I mean, I do understand,
you know, when they started and why, but I just wanted to know
if you had any further insight as to what their ultimate aim
is, what is the motivation for them to continue, and also, the
idea--you mentioned that there wouldn't be impunity to the
commanders of the M23 to be reintegrated back into the DRC's
Armed Forces, but how do you reintegrate any of them? How big
is the M23? How many soldiers are there?
Mr. Carson. Let me speak to the first question of aim and
motivation. I believe that the current group of M23 rebels want
to be able to maintain themselves as consolidated military
units in the eastern part of the DRC. I think they see
themselves as guardians of the Tutsi population in the East. I
suspect that some of them have political ambitions and would
seek to try to be able to be the top officials in local
administrations in the East.
Beyond that, I don't know what their aims and motivations
are. I know that when this rebellion started back in March and
April there was a clear desire on the part of the now
constituted M23 rebels not to be moved from the eastern part of
the DRC into other parts of the country, and their officers did
not want to leave the military commands in which they had been
assigned to take on different commands.
Impunity, I think there should not be impunity for those
M23 leaders who fall into three categories--those who are
clearly ICC indictees, those for whom there are international
and binational sanctions already, and thirdly, for those where
there is evidence or a growing body of evidence that they have,
in fact, committed atrocities and war crimes and rapes
throughout the last 7 or 8 months. I don't have an exact figure
for the number of M23 rebels. Initially when they broke away in
April of this year, the number was probably no more than 1,000.
Today that number has probably swelled for a lot of reasons,
but it is not a legion of people.
Ms. Bass. You know, when you were saying previously that
what the President, one of the things that led to the recent
rebellion was the President trying to scatter the troops,
because how can you ever have peace if, even if you did have
sanctions against the top commanders, how can you have an army
when you have a faction that wants to separate and operate
independently? I don't know how that works.
Mr. Carson. It doesn't work very well. But let me say that
there have been a number of countries that have effectively
integrated rebel groups into their militaries and in the
process, have made those militaries stronger and more
consolidated. Here I think there was an effort by the M23 not
to leave the Kivus, not to be reassigned to other parts of the
DRC, and for their leaders, not to move out of the areas in
which they called home. I don't think you can effectively
operate a military in which you have a reintegrated rebel group
deciding what it wants to do rather than what the military
command and the government wants it to do.
Ms. Bass. Right. Exactly. You also talked previously about
the ongoing tension on the border of Rwanda and the DRC, and
you mentioned the U.N. peacekeeping forces, and also the
possibility of troops coming from South Africa to secure that
border. Where are the peacekeeping troops? Are they all over?
Aren't they already on that border?
Mr. Carson. No, they aren't. I think that the MONUSCO
troops are scattered throughout the eastern part of North and
South Kivus. They are there largely to protect civilian
populations, refugees, and displaced persons. They are not, in
fact, monitoring or working and observing along the border, but
are near and in towns, villages, near refugee camps and
displaced-persons camps to respond to crises and to help the
FARDC, the Congolese military, when they are called upon to do
so.
Ms. Bass. Could you speak to the impact that conflict
minerals might be playing, the role conflict minerals might be
playing, especially in providing resources to the M23?
Mr. Carson. Let me say that conflict minerals have always
been a factor in providing resources to rebel groups in the
eastern part of the Congo, but quite honestly as serious as
conflict minerals are, they are probably not the primary reason
for the current crisis. They are one of the, you know,
underlying systemic reasons why the crisis can continue, but I
think that the current crisis is to be found in what are the
so-called grievances and in discipline of the M23 and the
support that they have received from outside of the country.
Ms. Bass. And then finally, how would you assess the U.S.
Government's response to the humanitarian crisis in the eastern
region of the DRC, if you could describe it?
Mr. Carson. I think, as I noted in my testimony, we have
given in excess of $110 million in humanitarian assistance.
Ms. Bass. Maybe you could explain what some of those
dollars are for?
Mr. Carson. These dollars are used to provide food to
displaced persons throughout both North and South Kivus, it is
to provide food and assistance to refugee populations who are
there, it is to provide shelter, shelter material and blankets,
it is also to provide clean and potable water, and also to
provide prophylaxis for malaria and also the medicines for
dealing with issues of cholera and hygiene.
Ms. Bass. And, I am sorry, just one final question. What
more would you like to see from Congress? How can we be helpful
in this situation?
Mr. Carson. Congresswoman Bass, I think your hearings,
hearings such as this one give us downtown an opportunity to
indicate to you what we are doing. They also give us an
opportunity to hear from you what things you think we haven't
been doing that might be useful to do to improve the situation.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, a statement from World Relief
will be made a part of the record. I yield to Mr. Marino.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador, for
being here today.
Mr. Ambassador, my research shows me that the United
States, perhaps with some assistance from other countries in
Europe, have given about $1 billion over the last 10 years to
Rwanda and not quite that much to Uganda. Can you explain if we
have reduced any amount given to either of those countries and
how much?
Mr. Carson. Mr. Congressman, we have certainly in the last
6 months reduced our foreign military financing to Rwanda by
some $200,000. This would have been monies that the Rwandan
military could have used for the financing and purchasing of
equipment. We have not reduced any of our development
assistance money to Rwanda, and I might say here that Rwanda
does a remarkably good job of utilizing its foreign assistance
resources probably more effective than most countries across
Africa. They do a very good job in using that money to provide
health care, agriculture, education to their people, and they
do get very high marks for that. We have not touched any of
their development assistance money.
Mr. Marino. How do you draw the distinction between where
the--did you say $200,000? That is a drop in the bucket,
$200,000. And I think the remark from the Prime Minister or the
General was $200,000 was nothing, it doesn't bother us at all.
So it doesn't seem that we are very serious about this,
blatantly not very serious about this, and how is the so-called
remainder of the billion over the 10 years less the $200,000,
how is that disbursed and who disburses it?
Mr. Carson. I am not sure what the billion is that you are
referring to?
Mr. Marino. The billion dollars that my research shows that
the U.S., with some assistance from Europe, has given Rwanda
over the last decade. Now, you say that has been reduced at
least this year, I am assuming this year by $200,000, so if you
break that billion over a 10-year period, still $200,000 is
nothing over an annual basis, and how can we guarantee that
even though there is a reduction of $200,000, and you say, I
believe you say to the military, and correct me if I am wrong,
it is all fungible.
Mr. Carson. It is not fungible. Let me, first of all, say
that in Fiscal Year 2012 that has just concluded, we provided
Rwanda with some $195 million in assistance. This money went
primarily into health and to agricultural programs. Rwanda has
used its development assistance dollars extraordinarily well.
As I said, probably better than most other African countries
and most other developing countries.
Mr. Marino. How do you----
Mr. Carson. Moreover, we do not provide them with direct
budgetary support. We are not providing them with a check or
with cash. We work through NGOs, through international
development organizations and agencies, and there is a high
degree of accountability for all of the funding that we have
given to the Rwandan Government. Their utilization of foreign
assistance in an effective manner really is not at question nor
at issue because in that regard, we have to be both frank and
honest, and they do a very good job. We don't give them cash,
we don't write them a check, but the monies that they get
through the international partners is effectively utilized for
the purposes it is intended for. We are pretty----
Mr. Marino. I have understood through my research and
contacts that there has been a great deal of hijacking of these
resources by groups such as M23 and using it for their own
purposes or selling that to buy weapons. Do you have any
information on that?
Mr. Carson. Not--I am not aware of that whatsoever.
Mr. Marino. Has the U.S. had any contact, directly or
indirectly, with M23 leaders?
Mr. Carson. No. I am not aware of any direct contact
between U.S. officials and M23 leaders. There have been two
meetings in Kampala between leaders of the M23 and members of
the DRC Government along with other diplomats. We have been in
the room as observers when those sessions have been public, but
we have had no direct contact of which I am aware with any, and
I underscore any M23 leaders.
Mr. Marino. Are there any plans to get more directly
involved for whatever reason by the Department of State with
M23?
Mr. Carson. Well, I think--no, not at the--no, not that I
am aware of. Certainly not.
Mr. Marino. You stated that numbers have increased with
M23, they have swelled over the last several months. For what
reasons?
Mr. Carson. Defections from the FARDC, recruitment of
individuals in the communities that they have captured and
taken over, the forced recruitment of young men, all of these
have contributed to an expansion of their numbers.
Mr. Marino. You started explaining a little bit the reason
for the crises, but can you expand upon your answer as what you
see the cause, the direct cause of the crisis that is taking
place, particularly with M23's origination?
Mr. Carson. Well, M23 rose out of the--an organization
called the CNDR which was integrated into the Congolese army
back in March 2009. Most of these individuals were from North
and South Kivu, they were a part of a rebel movement. Most of
them were Rwandaphones and Tutsis in origin. In order to bring
an end to a previous rebellion by this group, the Government of
the DRC brought them in to the military, integrated them in,
and attempted to make them a part of the army. They broke away
in April of this year. I might add that not all of the CNDR
members from 2009 and before broke away. Some of them remained
in the army. But the principal reasons for their decision to
bolt and run, they claim, was a failure of the DRC Government
to live up to the agreement of March 23, 2009, but other things
that are clear is that the DRC Government wanted to move units,
some of these integrated CNDR units to other parts of the
country. They resisted this. They wanted to move some of the
leadership to other parts of the country. They resisted this.
President Kabila also did something that disturbed the
CNDR, and he announced that he would try to arrest one of the
most notorious of the CNDR leaders who had been integrated into
the army, and that was Bosco Ntaganda, who was an ICC indictee,
and so all of these reasons that have a lot to do with
disgruntlement within this integrated rebel faction are the
background to the current crisis.
Mr. Marino. Mr. Ambassador, you stated that the aid that we
are supplying to Rwanda via NGOs, how can we guarantee that any
of that aid is not going into regions controlled by M23.
Mr. Carson. Again, I want to separate both the DRC from
Rwanda. We have no evidence, no proof that any of the aid that
we have given to Rwanda has been misused or mischanneled into
the hands of any rebel group. As I said before, the issue here
really is not about the effective utilization of aid and aid
resources. Rwanda has a high level of credibility with respect
to the way it uses its resources. That is not at issue. I have
no doubt that they are using their resources well.
So it is not funneling across the border, and it is not
direct assistance, so we work with NGOs and international
organizations. We audit what we give, and they use it
efficiently. It is not being misused.
And in the areas of the DRC, we are providing only
humanitarian support and assistance. And that humanitarian
support and assistance is going through organizations, mostly
U.N. organizations, World Food Programme, or through UNHCR, or
through the development assistance arm of the international--of
the United Nations, or through Caritas or Save the Children or
ICRC.
Mr. Marino. Is that an audit that the State Department
conducts or is that an audit based on information that the NGOs
give the State Department?
Mr. Carson. We can provide you with a full answer to this,
but USAID conducts routine audits of all of its assistance
programs. I cannot tell you when they did the last ones with
respect to these programs. But they conduct routine audits to
ensure that there is accountability. Again, that is not at
issue here.
Mr. Marino. How do you get the attention of a country like
Rwanda and Uganda from supporting M23 by not stopping aid to
the country, whether it is for humanitarian needs or not? How
do you get their attention?
Mr. Carson. By engaging them continuously, diplomatically,
at a high level, and by doing such things as indicating that
we, as we have done, that we will cut off their foreign
military financing if they persist in carrying on.
Mr. Marino. I don't mean to be facetious, but this may be
more rhetorical than a question you have to answer, but how is
that negotiating going?
Mr. Carson. It is like any set of negotiations, sometimes
much longer than any of us would like, but we know that
persistence over the long run pays off.
Mr. Marino. So is it your position that the U.S. keep the
plan that they have in operation right now and continue trying
to negotiate this? At what point do you stop? How many people
have to die before you stop the negotiations and get serious
about this?
Mr. Carson. We can't stop. We continue, and we will
continue to persist. This is not in our hands alone. We can
only facilitate. We can only encourage. We can only prod,
cajole, and push peace, and the effort to bring about peace and
stability is always in the hands of those who are adversaries.
Our desire is to get them to see reason, and to see it sooner
rather than later, and to understand that the persistence of
conflict and violence only means greater loss of life and hurt
for people.
But it is not simply in our hands. We can only do as much
as we can to bring people to the table and encourage them to
see reason.
Mr. Marino. And in closing, this is more of a statement
than it is a question, from my reading of the research, it
seems that this situation is not getting the attention that I
think is required from the United Nations as well.
Thank you, Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Without objection, the audit information requested by Mr.
Marino and promised by Ambassador Carson will be made a part of
the record. So we look forward to receiving it.
Chair recognizes Chairman Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Chairman Smith.
Let me just ask Ambassador Carson a couple of questions.
One, just going to MONUSCO's mandate, I think the force there
of M23, that militia is probably about 2,500 people from at
least the press accounts. And I know the French have a
perspective here that the ability to secure the safety of the
civilian population could be addressed by a more robust
authorization that would allow them to come to the defense of
the civilian population. And I was going to ask you that
question.
And the second question I was going to ask you goes to the
issue of naming Rwanda for its involvement here with M23, and I
know there was that debate in the Security Council over whether
or not we would expressly name them. And as I recall, the U.S.
position was not to do so at the time. But I think in light of
events since then, we have now sort of taken the position, or
it seems that the administration has taken the position that we
are pointing to Rwanda's engagement here. So de facto maybe we
have named them. Just a couple of--just your observations on
those two points, Ambassador.
Mr. Carson. Chairman Royce, thank you very, very much for
both of those questions, and also thank you for your continued
interest in Africa. Let me respond to the second question first
and repeat a part of my testimony that you may have missed at
the beginning.
I said that the M23 would not be the threat that it is
today without external support. And we will continue to
discourage outside parties from providing any assistance to the
M23. There is a creditable body of evidence that corroborates
key findings of the Group of Experts reports concerning Rwandan
Government support to the M23, including military, logistical,
and political assistance.
Mr. Royce. Ambassador, I think you put that very, very
well. My only question was, we hadn't put it in the resolution,
in Resolution 2076, and perhaps it should have been there. But
you couldn't be more explicit than you just were, and I thank
you for that.
And let me just ask you about the proposed alternatives to
ensure more civilian safety with respect to the mandate.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, the current MONUSCO mandate is
for some 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers. Currently, that mandate is
undersubscribed by approximately 2,000 individuals. I think
MONUSCO today has a force level of approximately 17,700
individuals.
Certainly, it would be desirable to see the full complement
of the mandate met. It certainly would help to allow the
MONUSCO to carry out its responsibilities. Following in the
aftermath of the current situation in Goma, and the Eastern
Congo, I think I also made reference to in my statement, to the
fact that it would be useful for a reexamination of the
effectiveness of the force and whether the mandates and other
responsibilities are being met and whether there are adequate
resources to meet them. But the force is undersubscribed by
approximately 2,000 people.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador. The last question I will
ask you just goes to this group, the Allied Democratic Forces/
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, which has been
around for a while, and it goes to this issue of rebel groups
increasingly joining forces beyond their national borders. This
particular group has done some work with al-Shabaab, and a
bombing, for example, July 11, 2010, in Kampala, which killed,
I think, over 70 people.
And so you have this nexus. If we look at the leader of
this group, he got his training, I think he is a converted
Catholic, Jamil Mukulu, who converted to radical Islam probably
while he was in Sudan. But in Sudan, he met Osama bin Laden,
and through the initial work with these radical organizations
put together his own little vision of how he could create
change, and including a lot of mayhem, but none of it that
spectacular until al-Shabaab began to give him the wherewithal,
you know, to carry out attacks like this one.
And I was going to ask you about that phenomenon. You have
these organizations where part of his support network come from
disaffected Congolese, and here is Ugandans in the operation as
well and, you know, people from throughout the region who join
a cause that becomes sort of transnational, and begin working,
in this case they suspect him of working with al-Qaeda as well.
Ambassador Carson, just anything you can do to bring me up
to speed in terms of organizations like this that, frankly, he
is based right now in eastern Kivu. So, you know, we have got
the--in North Kivu. So we have got the same phenomenon
spreading, apparently.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, three quick points on that. First
of all, it is absolutely essential that all the states in the
region agree and commit themselves not to harbor, not to
support, not to defend, not to provide equipment, or
sustenance, or training to rebel groups operating against the
leaders of a neighboring state. This is one of the problems
that we face today with the M23. It is also a problem that we
face with the Allied Democratic Forces. This is incumbent upon
all of them, incumbent upon every state in the Great Lakes to
do this. If we could get that, we could cut off a lot of the
support for rebel groups.
With respect to the Allied Democratic Forces, indeed, they
have been operating in the eastern part of North Kivu against
the Ugandans. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo needs to do everything that it possibly can to not allow
groups like this to continue to operate out of and from their
territory. I am not in any way accusing them of aiding and
abetting, but the mere fact that they don't have security and
control of the territory effectively allows this to go on. But
it needs to stop, clearly needs to stop.
Third point, with respect to the leader of the Allied
Democratic front, Mr. Mukulu, we have, in fact, sanctioned him.
We have imposed both visa travel and financial sanctions on him
in response to the very criminal things that we know that he is
responsible for doing.
Mr. Royce. Ambassador, thank you very much, and thank you
for all your work on the ground in Africa with these groups. I
know that as things were unfolding in Eastern Congo you were
there trying to influence the course of events, and we
appreciate that.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
Let me ask just two final questions.
And, Ms. Bass, if you have a final question, please fire
away.
Again, you have in your testimony made it very clear that
there is a credible body of evidence that corroborates key
findings of the Group of Experts, including evidence of
significant military and logistical support, as well as
operation and political guidance from the Rwandan Government to
the M23. I know on your most recent trip you were precluded the
opportunity to meet with Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda.
Did the officials with whom you met with, did they dispute
that, and when Under Secretary Sherman met with President
Kagame some months back, several weeks back, did she get a
report back from him? Did he tell her that this is all rubbish,
not true, or did he admit to anything?
Secondly, one of my most disappointing takeaways today, and
Mr. Marino, I think, drew you out further on the suspension of
foreign military financing, that we are talking about $200,000
when the 2006 Act at least envisioned a more robust and
credible sanction against a country that is aiding and abetting
a nefarious organization like M23. So if you could speak to
whether or not additional sanctions are under consideration, at
least against Rwanda, and specific individuals as well.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, let me answer the first question.
You are correct. As I stated earlier, I and my British and
French colleagues met in Kampala for several hours with
President Museveni, and in Kinshasa we met for an extended
period of time with President Kabila, as well as his Foreign
Minister and his Prime Minister.
In Kigali, it is regrettable that President Kagame chose
not to meet with us. The message about our concerns, again, not
just those of the United States, but Britain, and France, we
traveled there as the P3, the three permanent members of the
Security Council who have worked together on many, many issues,
but we did speak with the Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister
Louise Mushikiwabo, plus some of her colleagues. Again, we
raised the issue of the need to end outside support.
As in previous discussions, the Rwandan Government
strongly, vehemently denies that it is providing any assistance
to the M23, and it has not taken the steps of publicly
denouncing on a bilateral basis the M23. So we have raised
this, and it is important that we continue to monitor this, as
others in the international community do, on a very, very close
basis.
With respect to your second question, about international
support to, or at least our bilateral support to the Rwandan
Government, I start with what I said to Congressman Marino
earlier, is that they utilize their international assistance,
not only from us in particular, but others, very, very
effectively. And they use it with great integrity. People get
it. We are not providing any cash or check transfers. It all
goes through international organization and donor groups that
work with the government. We don't think there is a level of
fungibility, and we do not believe that the money is being
misused or misdirected. We focused on the military because that
is where the issue and the problem derives.
I know that a number of European governments have suspended
large amounts of funding to the Rwandan Government, but they
handle their resources differently. In most instances, they are
making budgetary transfers that are cash payments and checks
into the government. We don't do that. So it is a very, very
different thing. Our desire is not to hurt the Rwandan people.
Our desire is not to cut them off from essential support for
agricultural, education, or health programs. Our real desire is
to get a change in the regional policy.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, but sanctioning individuals
within the Rwandan Government would not in any way hurt
individuals. And frankly, the argument you are making, I serve
in this panel and began my service on this panel in my second
term, in 1983, and voted in favor of sanctioning South Africa,
and there were people who said you will hurt innocent people if
you do so. But sometimes the egregious harm is so compelling
that a very strong statement needs to be made. But minimally, I
would think we would want to sanction individuals in the
Rwandan Government.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, I have heard your request and
your concerns.
Mr. Smith. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador.
I would like to now ask our second panel to make their way
to the witness table, beginning first with Steve Hege, who has
worked on the Eastern DRC, where he has served with three
consecutive mandates as the armed groups expert for the United
Nations Group of Experts on the DRC. He investigated and
coauthored six public reports submitted and presented to the
U.N. Security Council's sanctions committee. During the group's
recently expired 2012 mandate, he was also the coordinator of
the six-member team working under Security Council Resolution
2021. Prior to joining the U.N. Group of Experts, Mr. Hege
worked with several humanitarian and peace-building
organizations.
We will then hear from John Prendergast, who is a human
rights activist, a bestselling author, and co-founder of The
Enough Project, an initiative to end genocide and crimes
against humanity. He has worked for the Clinton administration,
the State Department, and in Congress. He has also worked for
the National Intelligence Council, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch,
the International Crisis Group, and the U.S. Institute of
Peace. He has helped fund schools in Darfurian refugee camps
and helped launch the Satellite Sentinel Project with George
Clooney. Mr. Prendergast has worked for peace in Africa for
well over a quarter of a century.
Then we will hear from Mvemba Dizolele, who is a visiting
fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and
professor, lecturer in African studies at the Johns Hopkins
University's School of Advanced International Studies. Mr.
Dizolele has testified several times before the Congress. His
work has appeared frequently in many major news publications
and he is a frequent commentator on African affairs on
television and radio. He has served as an election monitor in
the DRC in 2006, and again in 2011, and has also been embedded
with United Nations peacekeepers as a reporter there. In
addition, he is a veteran of the United States Marine Corps.
Thank you for your service. And I would like to now go to
Steve Hege.
STATEMENT OF MR. STEVE HEGE (FORMER MEMBER UNITED NATIONS GROUP
OF EXPERTS ON THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO)
Mr. Hege. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members
of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights,
thank you for this invitation to testify at this hearing on the
current crisis in Eastern Congo. I have been working in the
Congo for over 8 years, including the past three as a member of
the United Nations Group of Experts. The Group of Experts'
mandate recently expired on 30 November, during which I served
as the coordinator of our six-member team. As such, I am no
longer affiliated with the United Nations, and the views I
share today do not reflect those of the organization or that of
the Group of Experts, but rather strictly my personal
perspectives.
The Group of Experts is a Security Council-mandated body
which reports to the Council's sanctions committee. Its role is
to investigate, document, and inform the sanctions committee of
violations of the United Nations' arms embargo on non-state
actors in the DRC, as well as related issues such as the
illegal trade in natural resources and serious violations of
international law, including the recruitment and use of child
soldiers. During the course of the previous mandates, the group
found that since the very outset of the M23 rebellion, the
Government of Rwanda had provided direct military support to
M23, facilitated recruitment, encouraged desertions from the
Congolese Army, and delivered arms and munition, political
advice, and intelligence to the rebels.
At the strategic level, Rwanda has also spearheaded
fundraising and membership drives for the political cadres,
even nominating the movement's political leadership and
directly instructing them of their demands to be made before
the Congolese Government.
The Rwandan Army has not only set up an elaborate
recruitment network within Rwanda to ensure a steady supply of
new troops to M23, including children, but they have also
integrated their own officers and trainers within M23's chain
of command on the ground in North Kivu. During all major
military operations, the Rwandan Army has deployed thousands of
additional troops to reinforce M23 in their principal attacks,
such as the recent offensive on Goma.
While members of the international community have expected
Rwanda to diminish its support in light of diplomatic and
financial pressure, the group has found that such direct
involvement has only increased with time, precisely because
M23's de facto chain of command culminates with the Minister of
Defense of Rwanda, General James Kabarebe. Nevertheless, the
Government of Rwanda continues to deny any involvement. In
annex 3 of our final report, we thoroughly responded to each of
their criticisms. However, when its substantive arguments
proved unconvincing, Rwanda turned to attacking the Group of
Experts, claiming bias and even orchestrating a media campaign
defending that I was a sympathizer of the Rwandan Hutu rebels
of the FDLR and a denier of the Rwandan genocide.
Nevertheless, Rwanda had previously recognized my
objectivity through the group's extensive detailed
investigations on the support networks and financing of the
FDLR in recent years.
In addition to Rwandan backing to M23, in our final reports
the group documented support for the rebels from important
networks within the Government of Uganda. Senior Ugandan
officials provided the rebels with direct troop reinforcements
in Congolese territory, weapons deliveries, technical
assistance, joint planning, political advice, and facilitation
of external relations. They also supported the creation and
expansion of the political branch of M23 permanently based in
Kampala even before President Kabila had ever authorized any
interaction with the rebels. A Ugandan Government
representative acknowledged this type of support was indeed
taking place in an official meeting of the Group of Experts in
early October.
Throughout our mandates, the question most often posed to
us was quite natural and logical: Why? Why would Rwanda
undertake such a risky and politically dangerous endeavor?
Though it is not the work of the Group of Experts to establish
causes or drivers of conflicts, I will humbly attempt to
analyze some of the stated motives behind this war, beginning
with M23's key demands.
Since the rebellion's initial stages, M23 has presented an
assortment of demands and justifications. First, the rebels
have claimed that the government reneged on the 23 March 2009
peace agreements. Nevertheless, in reality, this accord was
essentially an afterthought to formalize a bilateral deal
between Kinshasa and Kigali which was predicated on the
affording the latter with immense influence in the Kivus, in
exchange for arresting CNDP Chairman Laurent Nkunda and forcing
the rest of the CNDP to join the national army under the
leadership of Bosco Ntaganda.
For many within the CNDP and the Rwandan Government, the
integration of the CNDP into the Congolese Army was merely a
tactical move, but never constituted a fundamental alteration
of their objectives. The short-term deal, nevertheless, was
immensely generous to Rwanda, the Congolese officers of the
CNDP, particularly Ntaganda and his loyal officers, who took
control over much of the army in Eastern Congo.
Paradoxically, the rebels have also complained of the
pervasive corruption within the Congolese Army. Nevertheless,
as the most powerful commanders in the Eastern DRC, they were
some of the worse perpetrators of salary theft and
racketeering. Moreover, the rebels have claimed discrimination
of Tutsi officers within the army and the killing of those
former CNDP officers who had been redeployed outside of the
Kivus.
While certain historical animosities cannot be denied,
dozens of Tutsi senior officers and over four-fifths of the ex-
CNDP have chosen not to join the rebellion. In recent months,
M23 has increasingly claimed that they want a review of the
discredited 2011 Presidential elections in an attempt to
attract sympathies of a broader constituency. Nevertheless, the
CNDP political party had in fact joined the President's
electoral alliance and many top M23 commanders orchestrated
massive fraud on his behalf.
Now, if it is not really the claims of the March 23rd, 2009
agreements, or good governance, human rights, then what does
Rwanda really want in this crisis? Despite the extremist
paranoia about Balkanization, which has been so prevalent for
many years amongst the Congolese population traumatized by
multiple foreign invasions, only one of the rebel demands has
any lasting explanatory power, and that is federalism. Rwandan
orchestration of the M23 rebellion becomes more comprehensible
when understood as a determined and calculated drive to spawn
the creation of an autonomous federal state for the Eastern
Congo. There has been speculation over whether Rwandan
involvement was driven by security interests, economic
interests, or cultural ties, but a federal state for the
Eastern Congo would encapsulate all of these issues.
Prior to the November 2011 elections, one of the most
senior Rwandan intelligence officers argued that because the
Congo was too big to be governed by Kinshasa, Rwanda should
support the emergence of a federal state for the Eastern Congo.
He told me, Goma should relate to Kinshasa in the same way that
Juba was linked to Khartoum in reference to Sudan.
During our official meetings with the Rwandan Government in
Kigali in July, the Rwandan delegation consistently stated that
our investigations were simply a distraction from reaching a
definitive solution for governance in the Eastern Congo. When
pushed further, several representatives did not hide the fact
that the only solution they had in mind was indeed federalism.
Not surprisingly, Rwanda has openly aided and abetted self-
declared Congolese secessionists so as to set the bar high
enough to position federalism eventually as an acceptable
compromise. During several internal meetings of M23 for
mobilization, senior government officials, including the
Minister of Defense's special assistant, openly affirmed that
establishing this autonomous state was in fact the key goal of
the rebellion. One M23 spokesperson recently stated to the New
York Times, ``We want more than decentralization, we want
federalism,'' and ``The eastern parts of the Congo's interests
are in eastern Africa.''
Even senior Ugandan security officials also acknowledge
that this was the aim of the Rwandans in this M23 war. One
officer who was himself involved in supporting M23 in
cooperation with the Rwandans told us, ``they're thinking big .
. . you need to look at South Sudan.''
This objective also explains why Rwanda has consistently
sought to depict all armed groups in the Eastern DRC as one
single, united, credible front against Kinshasa, and repeatedly
calling the Congo a big black void in the Congolese state as
fictitious. A federal autonomous state for the Eastern Congo
would cement and guarantee Rwanda's already extensive influence
over military, political, economic, and cultural aspects of
life.
The Government of Rwanda, to its great credit, since the
horrific events of the genocide in 1994 has exhibited
unparalleled ambition to rebuild its country with unmatched
progress. However, that same determination has led Rwanda's
leaders to erroneously adopt this inherently destabilizing
long-term geopolitical strategy for the Eastern DRC.
So if Rwanda's geopolitical aspirations are indeed as I
suspect so ambitious, then what can we expect from current
negotiations, particularly when Rwanda has demonstrated in
recent weeks that it has the upper hand on the battlefield? For
his part, President Kabila feels very strongly about
negotiating the March 23rd agreement, but talks will inevitably
falter unless the key issue of federalism is put front and
center on the negotiating agenda.
Will the U.S. and others in the international community
support a federal solution for the Eastern Congo with full
knowledge that this was likely Rwanda's primary objective in
the first place?
Stepping back from the current dynamics, federalism in and
of itself is neither inherently a good or bad proposition, but
when driven by a neighboring state which would benefit
enormously from it federalism can be problematic to say the
least. Diplomats commonly affirm that Rwanda can and must be a
part of a solution. Which solution, I would ask. The Rwandan
solution for this crisis appears to have been identified well
before the shots were even fired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share the
findings of the group and my perspectives on the crisis.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hege follows:]
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Mr. Smith. And now Mr. Prendergast.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-FOUNDER, THE ENOUGH
PROJECT
Mr. Prendergast. Thanks very much, Representatives Smith
and Bass and Marino and Turner, for your extraordinary
commitment to the people of the Congo. It is deeply appreciated
by everyone in this room, I can tell you.
I want to begin, though, by echoing something you said,
Congressman Smith, earlier in the hearing. No one is
questioning the hard work and the dedication and the decades-
long commitment that key administration officials have
exhibited on behalf of peace in Congo. I would particularly
point out for special commendation Ambassador Johnnie Carson,
and Ambassador Susan Rice at the U.N. I am particularly
saddened by the personal attacks we have seen against
Ambassador Rice in the press and the blogosphere over the last
couple weeks over issues related to the Congo. The Washington
shark cage has been fully activated and I guess some people see
blood in the water. But knowing Johnnie and Susan and working
with them over the past 16 years, I can tell you from personal
experience that they have worked tirelessly for peace in the
Great Lakes.
Reasonable people, however, can disagree over tactics and
over strategy, and it is in that spirit that I deliver my
testimony today. I am going to focus my remarks on issues
related to the Congolese peace process in the interest of a
division of labor amongst my colleagues here at the table.
Throughout the latest Congolese conflagration and previous
cycles of conflict there, the root causes of war have not been
addressed, leaving these peace processes, the endless peace
processes to focus on flimsy power-sharing deals and
arrangements that have undermined the sovereignty of the
Congolese State and the professionalism and neutrality of its
armed forces. This, in turn, has left the civil population of
Eastern Congo subjected to globally unparalleled violence,
perdition, and impoverishment.
Another unrepresentative agreement between powerful
interest with the biggest guns that we may see coming out of
these Kampala talks might ease open fighting momentarily, but
it lays a deeper foundation for further devastation and state
deconstruction down the road. The United States should not be a
party to such a short-term and destructive approach and must
alter its policy to help avert an outcome that simply sows the
seeds for further war. This hearing and your leadership, I
believe here in Congress, will be an important building block
for the kind of step-change that we are seeking from the
administration and the broader international community.
Here is the crux of it. The lack, I think, of a credible
and effective and internationally mandated and leveraged peace
process addressing these issues in Eastern Congo is becoming a
major reason for that war's continuation. The current
negotiation in Kampala between the Government of Congo and the
M23 rebels is already making the same mistakes as its
predecessor processes and will likely result in the same kind
of short-term deal that keeps the Congolese Government in
power, reduces international pressure on Rwanda and Uganda for
backing the M23, and redivides the spoils of war. The root
causes of structural violence will remain unaddressed and any
agreement will lack the involvement of political parties, of
representative civil society elements, including women and
religious leaders and local armed groups representing the
diverse voices and interests of Eastern Congo.
The time has come finally for a real international peace
effort, the kind that actually has a chance of ending the
deadliest war globally since World War II, and the U.S. needs
to help make that happen because if it is left solely to the
combatants and their regional sponsors, it will not.
We believe that two key pieces of the solution are missing
now. For a lasting peace, a process needs to address those
fundamental root causes, rooted in economic and political
drivers of war.
First the economic. A shared framework for the future must
be agreed upon, in which the entire subregion of Central
Africa, Congo first and foremost and at the center, can benefit
much more from peaceful, legal natural resource development
rather than the violent illegal extraction that exists today.
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank bill, which this Congress
heroically passed in the face of a lot of industry money and
lobbying, a nascent regional certification effort, initiatives
by some of the forward-leaning companies, electronics companies
who have started working in support of real progressive change,
and then new OECD guidelines, these are all catalyzing movement
in the right direction, but more must be done to change the
economic incentives from war to peace, just as cleaning up the
blood diamond trade helped incentivize peace in West African
countries.
Coupled with strong international investment, these efforts
will create the conditions, I think, for transparent and
effective governing institutions. Dealing with the economic
roots of war not only removes the main driver for the conflict
today, but creates the main engine for state reconstruction.
Second, the politics. A political framework for Congo must
be agreed upon that restores public confidence and brings back
the viability of the Congolese State while ensuring that
further rebellion does not ensue. President Kabila faces a
political crisis as a result of the failures of the army and of
the elections last year, and the talks with M23 alone will only
erode his authority and provide further insult and injury to
the Congolese people.
It is now time for a wider inter-Congolese dialogue in
which leaders from the government, from political parties, and
from throughout civil society across Congo actively participate
and decide on a national consensus on reforms on key issues
such as the political framework for the country,
decentralization, protection of minorities, the return of
refugees, and other issues that would be put on the table by
the Congolese themselves.
I have five recommendations for strengthening U.S. policy,
some of which are echoing some of the good points that you all
at the congressional table raised earlier. The first one, and
foremost, I think, is the need to appoint this Presidential
envoy, and I say Presidential because it needs to have that
kind of rank. The current U.S. policy structure simply doesn't
allow the United States to exercise its latent leverage, its
creativity, and the international coordinating function with
respect to supporting peace in Congo that we should be
planning. If you appoint a Presidential envoy, that helps to
rectify those problem. The envoy should be a high-level
individual with experience and relationships in the region who
will be responsible for developing a unified policy, the step-
change we are talking about, toward the regional crisis and be
able to fully invest in helping to deepen this political, this
peace process to address its current gaping deficiencies. Such
an envoy, we hope, would leverage America's economic,
political, and military influence to ensure that all parties
fully cooperate with the international political process and
work closely with the AU and the U.N. and the ICGLR.
The second recommendation is one that everyone seems to be
for, but it is not happening. That is to get a U.N. envoy out
there as soon as possible. Everyone is saying that they want
this, including, we just heard, from Ambassador Carson very
encouragingly. But it wasn't in the United Nations Security
Council resolution last week. The congressional letter that
Congresswoman Bass referred to earlier couldn't be better timed
in that regard. Both of these envoys will be appointed only, I
think, if the Congress stays on this case and demands that we
see these kinds of things happen.
The third recommendation--again, I am echoing--we want to
support robust United Nations sanctions against key people. The
international community I think is--and this is terribly
important for the peace process and for forward movement--we
are leaving a huge reservoir of leverage on the table by not
following the recommendations of the U.N. Group of Experts and
others. There must be accountability for those who have
restarted Congo's war and for those who are orchestrating or
funding crimes against humanity and war crimes.
As a responsible supporter of the United Nations sanctions
regime, the United States should be compelled to push, to
impose sanctions on all individuals identified in the U.N.
Group of Experts final report, and those individuals and
entities that are supporting the criminal networks, the mafia
networks through the trade and natural resources. This won't
happen, I do not believe, if Congress doesn't continue to pound
away on this issue. So I think progress is, in part, in your
hands.
The fourth recommendation I would put forward is the
importance, and this was well articulated in the discussion I
think between Ambassador Carson and the congresspersons on the
panel, we need to suspend certain U.S. assistance to any
government supporting conflict and obstructing peace. That is
military assistance for sure, but there are certain categories
of bilateral non-military assistance, and particularly
multilateral assistance, non-humanitarian aid to governments,
whoever they are, who are supporting a conflict in Eastern
Congo.
Now, for example, if Rwanda and Uganda are found to be
continuing their support for M23 and are supporting M23 efforts
to obstruct a peace process, progress at the peace table, then
corresponding measures should be taken by the U.S., other
partner governments, and multilateral organizations to which
the U.S. contributes huge amounts of American taxpayers'
dollars. Let's be clear about this aid. We don't want health
and education and microenterprise, the kind of small-scale
assistance that goes to the people of Rwanda to be stopped.
That aid should continue, I believe. But it is the budget
support and military assistance, those two categories of aid
that are critical. And it is the World Bank, the World Bank has
$135 million on the table right now in budget support for the
Rwandan Government. That should not be disbursed until we get
clear forward movement on the peace process in Congo.
Fifth, and finally, and this one hasn't been discussed yet,
but we would call for a high-level summit on responsible
investing in the Great Lakes. The United States, in partnership
with the European Union, the African Union, could facilitate an
international investment conference on investing in peace mines
rather than the conflict minerals that exist today, in order to
help expand the pie in the region for conflict resolution and
for development in which all the people of the subregion can
benefit, particularly and at the center, the people of the
Congo.
The summit could focus on developing market-based
opportunities for responsible investment in Congo and the
region. Again, we have got to turn those incentives away from
illegal, extractive, violent mining, to peaceful, legal
development that goes into the tax treasury, into the treasury,
and funds development in Eastern Congo.
Bob Hormats, an Under Secretary of State in the
administration, could be a kind of person who could help
spearhead that as someone who has helped build this public-
private alliance that involves companies and the United States
Government and civil society, trying to help promote
responsible investment, spurred on by 1502 from the Dodd-Frank
law.
Conclusion, my bottom line is this, in two sentences. A
credible, internationally driven peace process that deals with
the root causes and includes broader Eastern Congolese civil
society won't absolutely guarantee peace, but its absence,
however, absolutely guarantees war. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Prendergast.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Mr. Dizolele.
STATEMENT OF MR. MVEMBA DIZOLELE, PETER J. DUIGNAN
DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Dizolele. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and
members of the Subcommittee on Africa, thank you for the
invitation and honor to testify before your committee. I come
before you as a Congolese and concerned U.S. citizen. The views
I express today in the statement are mine and mine alone.
This important hearing comes at yet another critical time
for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and I would like to
commend you for your interest in my home country.
Congo is too big to fail, and the U.S. should care today
for the same strategic and security reasons it did during the
Cold War. With its mineral and other natural wealth, DRC is the
equivalent of the world's breadbasket of critical resources. At
this time of Chinese scramble for resources, we cannot stand
idle and let Uganda and Rwanda destabilize the heart of Africa.
Measured in human lives, the cost of their military
adventurism, which has indirectly killed over 6 million
Congolese, now rivals King Leopold's holocaust. Ironically,
Rwandan President Paul Kagame blames King Leopold for the
current crisis.
Substantial U.S. military assistance to Rwanda and Uganda,
and Washington's reluctance to denounce and stop the support
for these regimes, makes the U.S. an accomplice to the tragedy.
Today the greatest challenge and obstacle to resolving the
crisis in Congo is neither the confusing alphabet soup of
militia names, nor the lack of engagement of the international
community. Rather, it is the lack of understanding of the
drivers and dynamics of the conflict that stands between
policymakers like yourselves and the right prescriptions.
For two decades the policy discourse on DRC has been
defined by a narrative that focuses on the ramification of the
problem, such as ethnic identity, citizenship issues, sexual
violence, looting of natural resources, but ignores the root
causes of the crisis. While the problem is often viewed as a
humanitarian disaster, which it is, DRC is paralyzed by a
political crisis which requires political solutions and that is
where you can have the greatest impact.
Congo has been muddling through a series of crises for
nearly two decades. The causes, of course, are well known: An
inept government with a weak leadership, no articulated vision,
no legitimacy after the botched 2011 election, lack of capacity
to resist or contain predatory designs of neighbors, i.e.,
Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, proliferation of armed groups, and
an underachieving and over-politicized U.N. peacekeeping
mission.
This cocktail of problems is topped by an apathetic
diplomatic community motivated by short-term interests of the
countries it represents, rather than the long-term
stabilization of Congo and Central Africa.
The M23 rebellion is to be understood through this optic.
As the M23 crisis enters a new phase with the withdrawal of the
rebels from the battered city of Goma, the people of North Kivu
and their fellow Congolese citizens everywhere wonder whether
the storm has passed or the rebels' retreat represents the
quiet before a super storm. Either way, telltale signs and
history indicate that the conflict will continue unless
appropriate deterring measures are taken.
M23--like its precursor, the CNDP of Laurent Nkunda--and
the dozen armed groups roaming the hills of eastern provinces,
expose Congo as a dysfunctional state with weak political
leadership and lacking a competent army and security
institutions. With the failing of the state, old latent
community grievances stemming from land disputes, demographic
pressure, ethnic tensions, and control of resources and trading
routes has turned Eastern Congo into a tinderbox. This means
that ambitious war entrepreneurs and demagogues only need a
cause and find a sponsor--it can be a community, a business,
political elite or a state--to start a militia.
The M23, which is primarily a Tutsi mono-ethnic armed
group, sought to exploit these dormant grievances, citing
discrimination against Tutsis as one reason for the rebellion,
but they failed to generate support from important Tutsi
communities, such as the Banyamulenge who have so far refused
to join M23. Instead, the Banyamulenge are serving with the DRC
Army and fighting the rebellion.
The rebellion had also threatened to take over Goma and
march on Kinshasa and liberate the DRC. But when Goma fell to
M23 elements, spontaneous protests broke out in Bukavu, in
Kisangani, and Kinshasa, denouncing Kinshasa's failure to
protect the city and exposing even a greater ire against the
rebellion and the United Nations Stabilization Mission,
MONUSCO.
While it may be too early to draw meaningful conclusions,
M23's failure to rally other Tutsis who had previously
presented a common front may signal the beginning of a new era
of trust building between ethnic groups. After two Presidential
and legislative elections that empowered the Congolese to seek
change through the ballot instead of at the barrel of the gun,
M23 has no popular appeal.
But the highly controversial and contested 2011
Presidential and legislative elections eroded the legitimacy of
President Kabila, making it impossible for the government to
mobilize the masses in this time of crisis.
M23 rebellion further exacerbated the legitimacy crisis by
exposing the state's inability to protect its citizens. The
government has failed to build a professional army, perhaps the
single most important element in ensuring Congo's territorial
integrity, and the security of its citizens and coveted natural
resources.
Without such a competent military, DRC is unable to stop
the proliferation of militias. Instead, the Government of DRC
has chosen to compromise with militiamen and co-opt them into
the army with no disruption of their ranks and files. The lack
of an adequate military integration program has resulted in the
establishment of parallel commands and structures in the
national army. This means that the militias who join the
national army remain in their areas of control and keep their
command nearly intact. This arrangement allows the former
militiamen to perpetrate abuses on the civilian populations and
keep their access to local resources, all under the protection
of the Congolese military uniform. This integration model
enabled disgruntled ex-CNDP elements stationed in North and
South Kivu to mutiny and launch M23 when DRC ironically sought
to arrest their commander, General Bosco Ntaganda.
The predatory designs of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda also
fuel the volatile situation as we have heard before. Both
Rwanda and Uganda invaded Congo twice, with continued
incursions into Eastern Congo where they still support
militias. Several U.N. reports, as we heard Steve Hege say a
few minutes ago, have linked both countries to Congolese
militias and the looting of resources. And of course, now they
are linked to M23.
Both countries have denied the charges and insist that they
are wrongfully accused and used as scapegoats for the DRC
Government's failures. Their denial and deceit, however,
undermine the chances for lasting peace. It is impossible to
solve the crisis when the parties to the conflict refuse to
assume their share of responsibility. When you invade your
neighbor twice, arm militias, support rebellions, loot its
resources, and indirectly cause the death of over 6 million
Congolese, you are not a scapegoat. You are a serious problem.
So we know the primary supporters of the militias, and
whether they be in Congo or in neighboring countries or
overseas. We also know the primary routes of the illicit export
routes, and which neighbors profit from. So what should the
U.S. do? I think that is probably what is of most interest to
you. Number one, we need to unequivocally support security
sector reform for the reasons we have heard today, from my
colleagues and from the Assistant Secretary. Reform is long
overdue. But reform means serious commitment to rebuilding a
new army, and not cobbling together old militias and new units.
Millions of dollars have been invested in training, but not
enough attention has been devoted to the reconstruction of the
military.
Unfortunately, these initiatives amount to very expensive
window-dressing. For instance, the Belgian-trained elite units
that fought M23 early in the spring did not receive the
institutional support they needed to succeed in their mission.
U.S. AFRICOM has also trained a unit which could have made a
positive contribution in North Kivu in another context, had the
leadership and the structure been different.
The current broken military structure cannot absorb newly
trained units effectively. Real military reform requires that
we break down the old decrepit foundation and build a new army
from scratch. And such a reform process will phase out and
discharge top commanders who came from militias, as well as
former militiamen who now fill the ranks. We cannot put new
wine in old vases. They will break.
So, number two, we need to implement U.S. law. The
Congolese, like many other people in the world, look up to the
U.S. as a beacon of principles and leadership. There is a law
passed by then-Senator Barack Obama, we have mentioned that
already, called the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief,
Security, and Democracy Promotion Act. This bill includes
provisions on conflict minerals, sexual violence, sanctions on
armed groups and their state sponsors, and so far, we have
hardly scratched the surface of this law. It still baffles
people. It definitely baffles the Congolese.
Number three, we need to activate the State Department
Reward to Justice Program. I think we need to encourage
associates of militias who are trying to get out of the system
to turn on their colleagues who are keeping them in the system.
It is very much like a gang mentality where once you are in, it
becomes very difficult to get out, especially if that is based
on ethnic affiliation.
Number four, we need to apply sanctions against individuals
and institutions identified in the reports. I commend the U.S.
Government and the Congress for the recent initiative to
sanction leaders of M23, but it will not serve the intended
purpose. If we sanction Makenga, we sanction Bosco Ntaganda or
anybody else and will not sanction the backers in Rwanda or
Uganda or where else they may be, then the game will continue.
If Makenga becomes a burden, he will be replaced. When Nkunda
became a burden, he was arrested and replaced with Bosco. So
tomorrow it will be somebody else, and I think we cannot act
like we are doing something impactful when in fact we are just,
again, doing window dressing like with security sector reform.
And then number five, we need to push for the completion of
the electoral process and opening of the political space. We
have talked about Rwanda and Uganda, but the big elephant
really is Kinshasa. Eastern Congo often is discussed as if it
were a country. Eastern Congo is not a country, it is part of a
larger country called Congo. The crisis that is taking place in
the Kivus in Eastern Congo has its roots in Kinshasa, in the
failure of that leadership. For the last 5 years, from 2006-
2011, the Congolese have been emboldened by the electoral
process. We have not stood, we, meaning the international
community, have not stood up with the Congolese to fight that.
We need to open that process so that the botched electoral
system would move forward. We need to support the holding of
the municipal and provincial elections. At this point, both the
national senate and the Electoral Commission are serving
without any mandate. So until that happens, we have a system
that has no legitimacy.
Then last, we need to insist on the restructuring of the
Independent National Electoral Commission. They are part of the
problem. We looked the other way when the system was botched.
We cannot move on without this change. This is why President
Kabila cannot really speak with the backing of his people. This
is why when people riot against M23, they also automatically
riot against Kabila, and that cannot continue.
Then, finally, I would like simply to say that this
conflict has gone on too long. It has gone on too long. It
challenges now our morals and principles as a country. We
cannot talk about democracy, we cannot be outraged about sexual
violence when, in fact, we are not taking the steps to stop
this. In Congo, armed groups and their international and local
backers are the enemies. But there is an even greater enemy,
and the greater enemy is the Congolese Government in its
failures. It is also the Congolese army, which itself is a big
tapestry of different militias. When you are in Congo and you
see, if you want to talk about insecurity, I define insecurity
as the feeling you get in your gut when you see somebody in
uniform in front of you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Dizolele, thank you so very much for your
testimony.
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Mr. Smith. All three of your testimonies were
extraordinarily incisive, certainly timely, and prescribed a
way forward for the administration as well as for Congress, so
for that, our subcommittee is deeply grateful for your presence
here today and for sharing with us not only your understanding
of the situation on the ground but what ought to be done
perhaps to truly rectify it.
I think the emphasis on root causes couldn't be more timely
as well. I will never forget years ago, in the early days of
the war in Yugoslavia, I, along with Congressman Frank Wolf,
went to Vukovar and other places in Croatia after it had been
devastated, and then we went to Belgrade and met with Slobodan
Milosevic and others within that dictatorial government of his,
and I will never forget getting a map of a greater Serbia that
included Bosnia and Croatia, and the lack of understanding on
all of our part about what the end game was was appalling. We
thought this was something that would abate over a short period
of time, and I think, Mr. Hege, your point about the key goal
of establishing an autonomous state is largely
underappreciated, and perhaps our other two distinguished
witnesses might want to speak about that. You point out that
Rwanda's deeply ingrained federalist vision is born out of the
geopolitical regional strategy adopted by Kigali's leadership.
A federal autonomous state for the Eastern Congo would cement
and guarantee Rwanda's already extensive influence over
military, political, economic, and cultural aspects of life.
And I think that is underappreciated almost in the extreme
as to the why of it. We know the mineral wealth is an engraved
invitation to looters and thieves, you know, to do what they
do, but this idea that it is part of the government's overall
strategy, perhaps you as well as our other very distinguished
witnesses might want to elaborate on.
Mr. Hege. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the question of the
Rwandan strategy for creating or spawning an autonomous state
for the Eastern Congo, a few things that I would like to
mention as well in terms of timing. Some of my colleagues here
have mentioned the cyclical nature and the numbers of wars that
have taken place in Eastern Congo. It appears that the Rwandan
backers of M23, the real masterminds that orchestrated the
creation of the rebellion were looking toward the post-
electoral period precisely for the reasons that Mvemba
described, the discredited 2011 Presidential elections as a
period where they would be able to mobilize an eastern common
front against a delegitimized Kinshasa and President Kabila
himself. This was certainly a part of their calculations about
why to push for this now.
Also the question of the CNDP's cycles of impunity and the
fact that the international community was increasingly
resistant to allowing their capacity to control parallel chains
of command to have access, unfettered access to illegal trade
in natural resources. They understood that this was a time in
which that, those networks could be curtailed, that Kinshasa
could attempt to curtail them, and that they would need to
capitalize on that, on those assets before any of those
individuals were eventually redeployed out of the Kivus or in
the case of Bosco Ntaganda that he would have been arrested
himself.
The third element that I think that they took into account
in preparing this strategy, because it was quite well prepared,
we have extensive evidence that shows Makenga himself back all
the way in 2011 was amassing huge amounts of weapons at his
home and in numerous arms caches in preparation for a return to
war precisely after the elections, but the Rwandans also
understood that there was a generalized Congo fatigue, as it is
often described, that there is a sentiment that Congo is sort
of always a mess. President Kagame, I have been told by Rwandan
diplomats, likes to say that the Congo has been a mess before
he was born and will be a mess infinitely or indefinitely.
Certainly within the U.N., there are member states that are
questioning the strategy on the Congo, how long can they
continue to foot the bill for a peacekeeping mission which is
so costly, and should we start to think of more radical
solutions, definitive long-term solutions for the Eastern Congo
and whether the current governance structure is a viable one. I
think that Rwanda felt that that was a right period to push for
this, and that unfortunately their success on the battlefield
recently would likely embolden them to continue to drive for
this end game, and any other issues, smokescreen issues on the
table in political talks would only prolong this process until
they can get to that key and core issue.
Mr. Prendergast. I want to add to what Steve said and then
Mvemba will have something, too, of course. I will do my three
points: Security interests, economic interests, and political
interests that the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda have in
Eastern Congo and why there continues to be intervention, both
direct and indirect, by the neighboring governments in Eastern
Congo.
Security first. Rwanda has been legitimately concerned over
the last 18 years since 1994 about the possible strengthening
of the FDLR. They want to ensure without any doubt that the
FDLR cannot come back and threaten Rwanda. And then in that
context, can't allow a strong Congolese state that might
provide support to the FDLR. For the Ugandans, they will say it
is the ADF, and we have talked, we have heard already some back
and forth with Ambassador Carson and the committee on that.
There is a second role, issue, the economic issues that I
think are deeper than the security ones. Rwanda has benefited
massively over the last decade from the looting of natural
resources in Eastern Congo, particularly, and this is why this
whole campaign in the United States has unfolded particularly
amongst young people on college campuses, this conflict
minerals campaign because everyone is somehow complicit in
this, all of us that buy cell phones and laptops and other
electronic instruments are helping to underwrite this smuggling
network and these competing mafias that are ruining and
continue to immiserate the people of Eastern Congo.
Tin, tantalum, and tungsten are the three minerals today.
There were others decades ago, and going all the way back to
King Leopold, that looting that goes across borders that
benefits us with no protections for the Congolese people. It is
a huge windfall for Rwanda. Foreign exchange, balance of
payments, all the rest of it drives their economic development
miracle, post-genocide economic miracle. In Uganda it is gold,
it is smuggled gold. Huge amounts of gold travel across the
border illegally from Congo into Uganda and are then exported
out of the country. These are, again, windfalls that are hard
to replace by domestic economic development.
Then the third arena, the third issue is political. Both
Uganda and Rwanda I think, the bottom line, want proxies in
positions in Eastern Congo, whether they are military or
civilian authorities, to ensure their economic and security
interests. So when President Kabila tried after the elections
to redeploy the CNDP elements, as Ambassador Carson was
describing, he described all the facts of what happened, but
what was underneath the facts, I think, was that the CNDP had
established for years with Rwanda and Uganda, particularly
Rwandan support, this ability to export illegally and extract
natural resources and ensure the political and security
interests of the State of Rwanda. And so when Kabila, when
President Kabila tried to redeploy these forces out of that
region, which would have undermined that control, that proxy
control that the neighboring countries have over the politics
and the economics of the east, the rebellion immediately
occurred because they couldn't allow that to happen, so of
course, the Rwandan support comes pouring in into the formation
of the M23. They change the acronyms, it is the same group.
Whittled down, though, Mvemba's points are very important
about the lack of any kind of domestic constituency that the
M23 have, but nevertheless the result is the same. It is more
destabilization, more instability, and then allowing those that
have powerful proxies inside Eastern Congo to profit from that
destabilization.
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple
points. One is on the peacekeeping mission. We have brought up
MONUSCO a few times today. I think MONUSCO is now part of the
problem. It has become an enabler of insecurity just like
Rwanda and Uganda and the government in Kinshasa in the sense
that, you know, part of the challenge when we look at Congo, is
that a lot of people discovered Congo with the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda, but Congo existed way before that. Those of us who were
born there and grew up there knew a country that worked. So
when we go to Congo today, we don't recognize this country.
That does not mean the Congolese people are not capable. Some
of you are old enough to remember the first U.N. mission in
Congo, ONUC. ONUC was much more bolder, robust but also very
determined to carry out its mandate. It lasted only 4 years.
The war in 1960 was much bigger than what we are seeing
today. You had Che Guevara show up in Congo, you had the
Chinese, you had the Egyptians, you had French mercenaries, and
the Belgians who wanted Katanga. But because ONUC was really
committed in helping the Congolese meet their obligation to
protect their country and build it together, they fought, they
protected the civilians, and they allowed then Colonel Mobutu
to build an army that eventually became the country, the army
that the U.S. relied on in Angola, in Chad, when somehow Congo
was your strategic ally.
I am not sure what happened, but I simply mean that we need
to scale down that MONUSCO mandate very quickly, make it very
clear how much longer they are going to stay in Congo, and what
the mission should be so that the Kinshasa government does not
lean on the U.N. for excuses.
So let me illustrate. If 200 women are raped in some hamlet
in North Kivu, the headlines in the New York Times will say
some women were raped, in fact, but the blame will fall on the
U.N. first. They will say there was a contingent of Bangladeshi
troops around that didn't do anything. No one will ask where
was the Congolese army. And we can do that because there is a
force there that is supposed to help that is falling much
shorter.
The U.N. has failed to protect civilians throughout this
entire M23 event. They failed in Bunagana, but the press was
not there to report it, so they are going to just live with
M23. When Rutshurv and Kiwanja fell, MONUSCO forgot that in
2008 there had been massacres there by CNDP. They didn't do
anything. They said we will absolutely protect Goma, Goma will
not fall. Well, then when Goma fell, they say we didn't fight
because they didn't want to endanger civilians. And then when
M23 withdrew and they raided Kibumba, Mugunga, and Kibati IDP
camps, the U.N. was nowhere to be seen. So going on nearly two
decades, the U.N. is not the solution for the DRC. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass.
Ms. Bass. I am going to unfortunately have to leave at this
point, but I want to thank you all for your testimony and the
time you took out to come, and I look forward to continue to
work with you, and especially to follow up on what we can
specifically do here in Congress and I am most interested in
the notion of sanctions and also sanctions on individuals and
how that might work and how we might get that started from
here, so thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Marino.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. Thank
you for being here. Most of us in the room here know at least
one measure that must be taken against Rwanda and Uganda, and
that is considering the enactment of serious stinging
sanctions. However--and let's call this the way it is, you
know--the Obama administration refuses to engage in serious
monetary sanctions against these countries, and this is not
atypical in other foreign affairs matters that plague the world
today with this administration.
So my simple question is, what do you propose that we do or
that you can do to persuade this administration to enforce
these sanctions the way that it has been so eloquently stated
here today from you gentlemen and from this panel? So you can
start, Mr. Hege, and each one of you, could you respond to
that, please.
Mr. Hege. Sure, I can speak from the perspective of the
Group of Experts. We submit annually a list of recommended
individuals and entities for consideration before the U.N.
sanctions committee. Obviously the United States Government
plays an important role in taking forward and studying those
names. Many of those names, while the list remains
confidential, many of those names are included in our public
reports, so there is not a great deal of surprise of the
contents of that list.
However, the group itself steps away from the consideration
and discussions of the list that it provides, so in essence, we
remain sort of indifferent to the steps that are taken
subsequently. However, I can say, having stepped away from my
role in the Group of Experts, that measures to identify the
individuals and sanction the individuals who are externally
supporting M23, and in our conclusion they are not necessarily
just externally supporting, they are actually commanding and
running the rebellion in its day-to-day activities, which goes
beyond external support in many cases. That measures to
identify them, be that sanctions, be that diplomatic pressure,
all of that is critically important in identifying the problem.
As I said, Rwanda continues to identify itself as the
solution. However, sanctions or efforts to identify publicly
the individuals running the rebellion in the Rwandan Government
would go a long way to ensuring that the problem is squarely
understood as a Rwandan orchestration, as a Rwandan-driven and
commanded rebellion, and that will have enormously important
consequences for any peace negotiations in terms of framing the
issue and not necessarily getting lost in, as I said, some of
the smokescreen issues that have been post facto used as
pretext to justify the rebellion. So I would encourage any of
those measures and any symbolic efforts that can be made to
ensure that the problem itself is squarely identified partly as
a Rwandan-driven rebellion. Thank you.
Mr. Marino. Thank you. Mr. Prendergast.
Mr. Prendergast. Thank you. There has been an amazing
amount of continuity, I think, in U.S. policy going back to the
Clinton administration, Bush administration, Obama
administration. All three very, very slow to utilize pressures.
Mr. Marino. Agreed.
Mr. Prendergast. It has been an incentive-based policy.
This is a long-term problem, a belief I think fundamentally--we
heard it from Ambassador Carson very clearly today--a belief in
quiet diplomacy and in direct engagement in what I would call
in the conflict resolution theory an insider partial model that
has been pursued, and I think the response to that, I will give
my recommendations as to what Congress can do to help the
situation, and then say what we can do as civil society groups
on the congressional side, I think publicizing the failure of
this 15-year policy.
Again, what has been so effective about Congress' work, it
has been bipartisan. The failure has largely been bipartisan,
so a bipartisan effort in Congress saying it is not working, we
need to do something differently is crucial. That can be done
through the media and through, I think, the contact with--
direct contact with administration officials. The letter that
is circulating, there are numerous I think initiatives, both in
the Senate and the House, right now attempting potentially to
pass a quick resolution before the end of the term.
There are various things that could be done to put this
very clearly on the public record, this 15-year failure of
constructive engagement, which is where we are going now as we
bring that kind of terminology that has been used in other
contexts and talk about this. We need more, we need to utilize
those sticks.
For our part, the NGO community, the civil society
community, the letter that was cited by Congressman Smith at
the opening is an example of how groups that work on all kinds
of different issues internationally are coming together and
saying let's unify our voices around a certain set of points
and an agenda that can press the administration to become more
bold in its approach, and we will undertake, as will other
groups, The Enough Project and many other groups, a series of
campaigns going out, particularly to young people, to faith-
based groups and others who actually care about what is
happening in the Congo, and that I think constituency of
conscience is actually expanding fairly rapidly on Congo, just
as we saw in 2003, 2004, 2005 on Darfur, we are starting to see
that now in Congo, and the more I think Americans care about
what is happening to the people of Congo and say, you know
what, the present, the status quo is just simply unacceptable,
and U.S. policy, the more, I think, we will have a shot at
altering that status quo.
Mr. Marino. Thank you.
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Congressman Marino. That is an
important question. I think all of us today who spoke to you,
including Ambassador Carson, mentioned all the ingredients that
need to be put in place. I think on one side you have the
government that refuses to call a spade a spade, so we talk
about external threat, external support. If it is external,
then we know where it is coming from, we should be able to name
it. But I think we have talked about everything. So personally
I would say one recommendation in order to put pressure on the
Obama administration--the U.S. Congress has always been at the
forefront of certain watershed events in Congo and Africa.
It was this House that passed the anti-apartheid bill, it
was this House that supported the emergence of the democracy
movement across Africa in the 1980s. I think the chairman was
around. So I think one recommendation I will say, because
Africa is always a very bipartisan area, maybe you should
consider passing a robust, more robust version of the Obama law
here that you can push then to be applied because I am not sure
why the White House, and the State Department are shying away
from that and decide to hide behind the economic miracle of the
Rwandan recovery. It is very troubling because this is what
happened with King Leopold. He was a great philanthropist, he
was bringing civilization to the savages in Congo, he was
saving them from slave traders. Look at this great global trade
outpost called Congo. But then behind the shadow of that
civilizing mission, they were chopping off people's limbs,
killing people, over 10 million of them.
Something similar is happening today. We have laws on the
books. People are speaking, good people like you listening to
us, but nothing is happening. So I think you have community
leaders like John, who has rallied thousands of millions of
young people to push Congo causes, have been listening to us,
then I think we need your support so that the other side can
start listening to what we ask because the interest is already
there. Thank you very much.
Mr. Marino. I think I am right in saying that you do agree
with me, each of you, that the previous administrations and
this administration know what the facts are, know what is going
on. I mean, they are not ignorant to these facts. I mean, it is
very blatant. But they chose and choose not to do what should
be done about this.
So, Mr. Prendergast, I think you are absolutely right in
getting more people involved, particularly young people. I am a
freshman, next year I am coming back as a sophomore, and my
daughter and I had the opportunity to visit the continent of
Africa. We went to Liberia and Ghana. My daughter is going to
be a physician. But she said, ``Dad, we have to take care of
these people, we have to help them, and if we do not do it, who
is going to?'' So you know, it is like banging my head against
the wall sometimes. I have signed numerous letters that have
been sent to the administration and the secretaries. We never
get a response from them. So maybe we do have to take this
more, with more passion to the public to get our Government to
respond to it. You can be assured that my daughter and I will
be there doing it. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Marino. Let me just ask
one final question, and then I will leave any final comments to
our three distinguished witnesses.
Mr. Hege, there have been reports that at least one U.N.
Security Council member wanted to delay the report on Eastern
Congo this summer to perhaps lessen its criticism of the role
played by Rwanda. Can you definitively tell us is that true or
not?
Mr. Hege. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We submitted an
interim report during the month of May which did not include
information regarding arms embargo violations committed by the
Government of Rwanda, precisely because those violations had
just really manifested themselves more overtly. However, we
briefed the sanctions committee of those, of the information we
had gathered in June and suggested that we provide an
additional annex to that report, that interim report, outlining
the violations of the arms embargo by the Government of Rwanda.
The committee requested that we engage once again with the
Government of Rwanda, although we had already gone to Kigali in
May to meet with them over a period of 3 days during which they
refused to accept us for any substantive meetings. We remained
in our hotel room for those 3 days. The committee asked us to
provide, particularly the Minister of Foreign Affairs--the
Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time was coming to
New York at the end of June. I personally met with her in New
York.
I presented to her our work, our methodology, our approach,
the reason why this information had not been included in the
interim report. I outlined in detail our findings, and at that
stage, she declined to provide any response, explanation or
justification of those, of our findings. As such, we proceeded
to submit that document, and it was then made public as an
addendum and not an annex to our interim report.
So the answer to your question is, yes, as a committee the
consensus of the committee was that Rwanda, the Rwandan
Government, its request to have an additional right of reply
should be granted by the group, and out of good faith in
working for and under the guidance of the sanctions committee,
we provided them with that opportunity. They declined to
provide any right of reply, and unfortunately proceeded to make
public statements that nevertheless, they had never been
provided a right of reply, which for us, obviously, is quite
frustrating, given that we purposefully delayed the submission
of that information in order to engage in this dialogue with
the Government of Rwanda.
So we, as I said, proceeded to submit that, and that report
then was published at the end of June.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Any final comments from any of our
distinguished witnesses?
Mr. Dizolele. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just want to
mention two things. I originally at the outset said Congo is
too big to fail. There are quarters of enlightened people,
smart people, you know a couple weeks ago, the New York Times
ran a piece saying Congo should be split in half or in various
portions. Anybody who entertains that idea is smoking
something, because if Rwanda, as small as it is, has trouble,
we know Rwanda would be the ideal country if I were a leader:
Everybody speaks the same language; they have the same name;
and they have two castes, the Hutus and the Tutsis. Yet, they
have been killing each other over and over.
If Rwanda thinks or if anybody thinks Rwanda can control
the Kivus, then we have not seen the half of it. The Kivus are
not Rwanda, is not the same makeup, they don't know these
people. The Rwandans tried to march all the way to Kinshasa,
and they were kicked out of Kinshasa by the civilians in 1998,
which led them to do the rebellion.
So this is an idea that we should resist by all means, so
anybody who is entertaining that will have blood on his hands,
and he doesn't know the half of it.
Number two, I think we need to stand for something. In DRC,
the people of Congo have already rallied around the democratic
principles. They are waiting for your support. The Congolese
don't need help changing things. They need help to push the
process along. They are very capable people, they are
resourceful, and I would like, on their behalf, to thank you
for your continuous interest in their plight. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Prendergast. My last point, Congressman Smith and
Congressman Marino, would be that we have, today, I think a
clash of two visions of policy. One vision is a belief that I
think we need to encourage the neighboring countries of the
Congo to become part of a solution, and thus sanctions and aid
cutoffs and those kind of things, punitive measures would
undermine our influence. So that would be, I think, at this
juncture what the administration and past administrations have
pursued vis-a-vis Congo and the continuous intervention cycles
that we have seen from outside from the region.
The alternative belief that I think this table has
articulated and the committee, key members of your committee
have articulated as well, is that these kinds of punitive
measures which, by the way, involve withholding hard-earned
U.S. taxpayer dollars for the kinds of support that are
fungible, military and budgetary support. We are not talking,
again, about the development and humanitarian assistance that
goes straight to the people of Rwanda but, rather, the budget
support that goes to the countries, the government. That if we
utilize these punitive measures, that that will provide
leverage for a solution, and if we are successful, I think, in
convincing the administration to move in that direction, which
I believe we will work assiduously to do, then we need to have
somewhere for Rwanda, Uganda, and other elements in the Congo
that don't want a solution, we need to have a place for them to
go, and I believe that place is a legitimate, credible,
internationally supported peace process that allows the Eastern
Congolese people to be part of the solution at the table, and
the root causes finally to be addressed, and it is not going to
happen unless we get U.S. leadership, and that is why we need
that Presidential envoy. Thank you so much.
Mr. Hege. Just to conclude, there is a great deal of
analysis of Rwandan Government behavior which concludes that
essentially their sticks don't work, that they are very
ambitious, very determined, and that any punitive measures will
not necessarily deter their behavior. There is likely a great
deal of evidence. Since our reports in June exposed their
direct creation of M23, the rebellion has only grown and their
involvement has only become more overt, and I would say many of
their commanders have become more emboldened. Obviously the
taking of a very important provincial capital such as Goma was
a perfect example of that.
However, that doesn't mean, as I said earlier, that we
shouldn't continue to frame the problem as a Rwandan determined
effort to obtain this objective, which is, as I said, an
autonomous Eastern Congo. They believe that any of the short-
term consequences of their current project may be outweighed by
the gains of that state, particularly, as I said, given the
wealthy economic interests that Rwanda has in Eastern Congo,
the cultural ties, and the security interests that they would
be able to ensure, including the FDLR and other political
dissidents.
However, that said, what is needed at this point in order
to, faced with that Rwandan determination, a peace process will
have to find a way to identify a solution which appears to
appeal to their long-term objective in order for them to stop.
I am not convinced that anything less at this stage than
something close to that long-term objective would call the
Rwandans to stop.
However, if that solution is identified, it could be some
sort of decentralization process, as already stipulated by the
Congolese constitution. However, that, the implementation of
that agreement will require significant accompaniment,
tremendous long-term investment not only from the United
States, but other members of the international community to
reinforce the capacities of the Congolese state and precisely
insulate it from external control and manipulation, and that
will be, as I see, practically and realistically, one of the
keys to moving forward from this current crisis, but it
requires, as I said, a very long-term commitment to building up
an economically and politically independent Congolese State in
the Eastern Congo, where its neighbors will eventually look at
it as an equal and not a country which it can continue to
manipulate, they can continue to manipulate and benefit from.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, all three, for your extraordinary
insights again and testimony, and I do want to thank C-SPAN for
in their editorial and independent judgment seeing their way
clear to cover this hearing because people in America know far
too little as to what is going on in DR Congo, and as you
pointed out earlier, the enormous loss of life, 6-plus million
people who have died, and the fact that as we speak people's
lives are being taken from them by this terrible rebellious
M23. So thank you so much, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
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