[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND THE SURROUNDING REGION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 5, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-192
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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______
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON PAUL, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
CONNIE MACK, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TED POE, Texas ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio KAREN BASS, California
DAVID RIVERA, Florida WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
ELTON GALLEGLY, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania THEODORE E. DEUTCH, FloridaRemoved
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 6/19/12 deg.
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New YorkAs
of 6/19/12 deg.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Brenda Shaffer, Ph.D., senior lecturer, University of Haifa...... 9
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., senior research fellow, The Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The
Heritage Foundation............................................ 26
Michael Rubin, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 37
Mr. Alex Vatanka, adjunct scholar, Middle East Institute......... 45
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and
Eurasia: Prepared statement.................................... 4
Brenda Shaffer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 11
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 28
Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 39
Mr. Alex Vatanka: Prepared statement............................. 47
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 66
Hearing minutes.................................................. 67
IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND THE SURROUNDING REGION
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2012
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Burton. We will now call the hearing to order.
This is a very important hearing, in my opinion. Some of
them are not nearly as important as others, but this one is
extremely important because Greg and I, the ranking member, and
Jean, we are all concerned about the influence of Iran in the
entire region, in the Caucasus and also in the Gulf Region.
So today we are here to discuss the influence, expanding
influence in the South Caucasus, but we are also talking
about--I intend to talk about some of the problems in the
Persian Gulf region because that is of vital interest to us. If
the Straits of Hormuz or the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal are
blocked in any way, it could have a devastating impact on the
United States because we still get a large part of our energy
from that region.
I traveled to Azerbaijan and Armenia in early September,
and you have been over there, too, Greg?
Mr. Meeks. Absolutely.
Mr. Burton. Yeah. And I also stopped in Georgia and met in
Tbilisi with President Saakashvili. When I talked to these
leaders, Iran was one of the things that came up at the very
beginning because they all feel the influence and the
aggressive attitude underneath the cover, so to speak, of Iran.
In particular, I think Azerbaijan feels a great deal of
concern, and when I talked to the President and the members of
their Parliament and others there, it was readily apparent to
me that they thought that there ought to be closer ties between
Azerbaijan and the United States and Georgia, and hopefully
Armenia, because Iran is really trying to destabilize or
undermine those governments. We believe that is their long-term
goal.
Iran has been involved in terrorism, as we know, for some
time. It is hardly unique in that area. We have seen the
Iranian regime operating through organizations such as the
Republican Guard and employ such tactics around the globe,
including right here in Washington, DC.
However, the proximity of the South Caucasus to Iran, as
well as strong relationship Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
have with both the United States and Israel, it increases the
appeal of the Iranians for targeting those countries. I applaud
those governments in the region for their vigilance against the
Iranian threat. However, I am particularly concerned about the
security at the U.S. Embassy in Baku, as the age and location
of that facility leave our people there particularly
vulnerable.
I often find myself comparing the geopolitics of the South
Caucasus to a Gordian knot. The tangle of the historical and
current events leaves countries in the region isolated from
their neighbors. Unfortunately, such isolation can play into
the hands of powers lying on the periphery of the region. Press
reports and conversations that I had while I was in the region
indicate that Iran is taking, or at the least has potential to
take advantage of Armenia's regional isolation, and thus the
country's economic dependence on their common border, to use
Armenian banks and enterprises to skirt international
sanctions.
The United States and our regional partners, including
Armenia, must be vigilant by fully applying current laws and
regulations and by amending sanctions as needed to close the
loopholes. I hope the legislation that is currently pending in
the Congress makes its way through rapidly, that will do just
that.
Regarding energy, sanctions are an essential tool in our
continued attempts to isolate the Iranian regime. However, we
have to recognize that for many countries in this
subcommittee's jurisdiction decreasing consumption of Iranian
energy means increasing consumption of Russian energy. Such a
chain reaction is not in the national interest of the United
States.
The solution to this problem requires renewed American
leadership, or partnership, to increase the development of
resources that lie across the South Caucasus and Central Asia,
as well as the infrastructure, the pipelines and other things
needed to transport these resources.
I would also like to elaborate a little bit more about
Bahrain. We have some people on the panel today that we will
ask questions about Bahrain, and they have some intimate
knowledge of some of the problems that have taken place there.
And as I said before, the concerns that we have in the Caucasus
and the whole region is only part of the concern that we feel
for the region. Bahrain has been an ally of the United States
for a long, long time. We have our 5th Fleet there. And the
attempts by Iranians to work with dissident forces there in
Bahrain to undermine that government is something that we must
be concerned about.
I have talked to the leadership over there, and they are
concerned about the problems that some of the people feel
toward the government, and they have tried to work with them to
solve that problem. But so far the problems have not all been
solved, and for that reason they continue to try to work with
them even though we know and they know from intelligence
sources that Iran is stirring things up over there and trying
to undermine that government.
Since we have a great relationship with that government, I
think it is extremely important that we try to work with them,
as long as we have our 5th Fleet there, and it is vital to the
United States interests that we do everything we can to solve
that problem, the problems in that country, without giving Iran
the ability to undermine and destroy that government.
In conclusion, let me just say that the South Caucasus is
of extreme importance, and we have today with us a number of
people from Azerbaijan. They have sent a delegation over here
to follow this hearing because they are very much aware of how
important it is that we illuminate the issue of Iranian
expansionism or their attempt to expand their influence
throughout the region.
The United States must not look weak in this entire region.
We have to look strong. If we look like we are weak, it will
give them the encouragement that they need to continue to move
throughout that whole region. We are concerned, as my
colleagues know, about Libya, we are concerned about Egypt, we
are concerned about Syria, we are concerned about Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Georgia, and the Gulf States, especially Bahrain right
now.
So I will end up by just saying that this is going to be
probably my last hearing as chairman of this committee, but my
good friend Greg, and I am sure my other colleagues will do
everything they can to make sure we continue to pursue this
issue to make sure that not only the region is secure, but our
interests, the United States of America's interests are safe as
well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]
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Mr. Burton. With that, I will yield to my colleague, Mr.
Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you
for holding, as you said, this most important hearing, and I
also want to say to a degree sad, sad because this probably
will be your last hearing here in the United States House of
Representatives after almost 3 decades of service to our
country, and we want to salute you for that.
Some, you know, may be with regret not having Dan Burton to
kick around anymore, but we, indeed, are going to miss you. And
I got to say that it has been an honor and a personal privilege
for me to sit as the ranking member and to work with you over
the last 2 years on this subcommittee.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. Meeks. You have been a chairman that has been very fair
and open, and we have worked together, and you are going to be
missed here. And so I hope that as you retire you will enjoy a
fruitful and prosperous life with your beautiful wife, who is
here, and your family, and you have a great retirement, and
maybe now you will have time to schedule that round of golf
with Bill Clinton.
Mr. Burton. That is an inside joke, folks.
Mr. Meeks. Let me turn to the subject at hand. I believe we
are dealing with an important question in the South Caucasus
region, which represents a complex web of both regional
alliances and conflicts, bitter rivalries, varying degrees of
Western orientation, desperate economic trajectories, and a
potential venue for instability and even violence.
In terms of viewing the South Caucasus region from the
perspective of this subcommittee, it is important to note that
some of our strongest instruments, the Euro-Atlantic
institutions of NATO and the European Union, have a weak
presence in this region and, therefore, are not as relevant as
they are in the Balkans, for instance. Ultimately, this means
that Europe and the United States have less leverage in the
region. This allows other countries in the region to compete
for political, economic, and military influence in the region.
And I am looking forward to hearing our witnesses discuss
this issue today. I really want to hear what you have to say in
this regards. I believe that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
represent trustworthy allies of the United States, but I
realize full well that their bilateral relationships are
complicated and that they have to take their immediate
neighborhood into account also.
With only two open borders, and one of them being with
Iran, Armenia faces the constant threat of isolation, and this
is a core driver in managing Armenia's relationship with Iran.
Azerbaijan has a sizable diaspora in northern Iran, but a
vastly different strategic, social, and political orientation
than Iran's leaders. Despite a potential religious kinship
between Iran and Azerbaijan, Iran has historically sided with
Armenia over the contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan enjoys a solid relationship with
Israel, which further distances Baku and Tehran from one
another.
Georgia has the strongest Western orientation in the
region, and my sense is that this will remain intact even after
their change of government. But like any other country, Georgia
is seeking economic opportunities everywhere, including
potential trade or investment relations with Iran.
I believe there is a potential for Iran to exploit the
complicated relationship between each of these countries and
that the others in the region have significant regional
interests that compete or overlap with Iran. Simultaneously,
each of the South Caucasus nations play an important role in
Western relations with Iran, particularly their ability to
comply with international sanctions, and I think it is
important for the United States policy toward the region to
find ways to strengthen this compliance.
Russia appears to want to limit both the influence of the
United States and Turkey in the South Caucasus, but it is
unclear to me whether they also seek to minimize Iranian
influence. I have followed with great interest Turkey's
attempts to normalize relations with Armenia, and my sense is
that such a step holds the greatest potential to improve both
stability and prosperity in the region. Lifting Armenia's
isolation would not only allow Yerevan greater independence
from Iranian and Russian influence, it would also be mutually
beneficial for Turkey and Armenia in a number of ways, and I am
interested in hearing the panel's perspectives on whether this
is an issue the Turkish and Armenian Governments might be able
to reengage on.
What we can all agree on is this, as I conclude, is that it
is in no one's interest to see a nuclear-armed Iran. And I look
forward to exploring how the South Caucasus region can help the
United States and Europe to prevent this outcome. We cannot
have that as an outcome.
I anxiously await hearing the testimony of our witnesses.
And again, Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure, and I think
that this hearing is very timely at this date.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much. And I am sure my wife put
you up to that nice comment, so I want to thank you for that as
well.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is a
special day for me as well, a bittersweet day after having had
the honor to serve in the People's House for 26 years, and on
this committee for 24 years, and had the honor of chairing this
subcommittee.
I can't tell you what an honor it has been to serve with
you, Dan, not only on this committee, but as next door
neighbors in the Rayburn Building for many years, and for
bringing this important issue before us today. I can't think of
anything that seems to be more timely than bringing this issue
up today.
I would like to also associate myself with a comment that
our ranking member made, a good friend of mine. While I
recognize that Mr. Burton does have a beautiful wife here in
the audience today, I also have a beautiful wife in the
audience here today as well. And we have had the great honor of
having Dan at our home in California, and I am going to leave
the porch light on for the two of you and hope that you will
join us out West.
It has been an honor to serve with you, Jean. The three of
us will be leaving Congress here in a few days. It may be quite
a few days with the way things are going on the Hill and over
on the other side of town. Hopefully we will get through that.
But words can't express the honor that I feel for having
had the opportunity to do so many of the things we have done,
and this being our closing hearing. I want to make sure we have
ample time for all of our witnesses today, so I will defer from
an opening statement. I would like to place one into the record
as a part of the hearing, and just thank you all for the
friendship and the dedication you have shown this great country
for all the years.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Burton. Well, without objection, we will put your
written statement in the record. But I want to tell you, we are
patting each other on the back here today because this is
probably the last time we will get a chance to do that. But,
Elton, you have been a great member, too, and I reciprocate. I
really enjoyed it. And I am glad you are leaving the light on.
He has a beautiful house in California and an extra
bedroom, so I may be going out there to spend a little bit of
time.
Mr. Gallegly. The porch light is on.
Mr. Burton. The porch light.
And Jean is going back to Ohio.
And, Jean, you have been a great person to work with, and
we are going to miss you as well. Sure, we will yield to you.
Mrs. Schmidt. Well, first off, parting is such sweet
sorrow. But I am only sorry that more people aren't here to
listen to this panel on what I believe is one of the most
critical national security issues that the world faces. And I
am glad that Congressman Meeks will be carrying the banner for
this very important region in the world.
It is important for a lot of reasons, but one of those
reasons is the potential for energy, energy from Azerbaijan, to
really free Western Europe from other alternative sources that
may not be right for them or right for the world. And yet it is
not in certain countries' best interest--Iran, Russia comes to
light--for the pipeline to go through to bring natural energy,
oil and gas resources to parts of the world that would like to
have alternative sources
And so I think that it is important for Congress to keep an
eye on this region and to make sure that the stability that has
been in place continues and that these emerging markets are
allowed to continue to grow and prosper, because I truly
believe that they are a bright spot in the world's future.
I yield back.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, and I will miss all you
guys.
Ariel Cohen is a leading expert in Russia, Eurasia, Eastern
Europe, and the Middle East. He serves as a senior research
fellow in Russian and Eurasian studies and international energy
policy at the Heritage Foundation.
And we are glad to have you here. Thank you very much.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute and a senior editor of the Middle East
Quarterly. He was a former senior adviser at the Pentagon.
Thank you for being here.
Dr. Brenda Shaffer is a specialist on the Caucasus, ethnic
policies in Iran, Caspian energy, energy and foreign policy,
and Eastern Mediterranean energy issues. She previously served
as the research director of the Caspian Studies Program at
Harvard University--should have been a Big Ten school, but we
will settle--Harvard University. In January she will be a
visiting scholar at Georgetown University Center for Eurasian,
Russian, and Eastern European Studies.
Alex Vatanka specializes in Middle Eastern affairs with a
particular focus on Iran. He joined the Middle East Institute
as an adjunct scholar in 2007. He also lectures as a senior
fellow in Middle East studies at the U.S. Air Force Special
Operations School and at the Defense Institute of Security
Assistance Management.
Want to welcome all of you, and we will start--I think we
will start with you, Dr. Shaffer, since she is the prettiest
gal at the table.
STATEMENT OF BRENDA SHAFFER, PH.D., SENIOR LECTURER, UNIVERSITY
OF HAIFA
Ms. Shaffer. Thank you very much. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify in front of this committee.
We often think of Iran as a Middle Eastern country, but
actually it sits in the crossroads of a number of regions,
Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. And actually
the influence between Iran and the South Caucasus is two ways.
Not only is Iran, as you pointed out correctly, extremely
active in subversion in the region and destabilizing any of the
countries that are pro-Western in the region, but also there is
two-way influence because Iran itself is a multi-ethnic
country.
So to understand any of Iran's policies in the region, we
have to remember that half of the population of Iran isn't
Persian; of that half of the whole of the population of Iran, a
third is ethnic Azerbaijani. And this is really what drives
Iran's policies in the region, is to destabilize Azerbaijan, to
make sure that its own ethnic minorities cannot be attracted to
Azerbaijan, cannot be thinking about breaking off from Iran or
any type of other activity.
And for this reason, for instance, we find that the Islamic
Republic of Iran is actually an ally of Christian Armenia in
its struggle against Azerbaijan, and in fact the war effort,
the occupation of Armenia, of 20 percent of Azerbaijani
territory could not have taken place without Iranian supplies,
Iranian support.
And in fact the ethnic minorities of Iran are located
mostly in the border areas of Iran, so it affects Iran's
relations with a number of neighboring states, with Pakistan,
with Turkey, with Turkmenistan, with Iraq, because there is co-
ethnics on each side of the border with the states that are
Iran's neighbors.
Many of the top leaders of Iran are actually ethnic
Azerbaijanis. Khamenei, the spiritual leader, is actually from
Khomein on northwest Iran. When he goes to that area he speaks
Azerbaijani. Mousavi, the head of the Green Movement, is also
ethnic Azerbaijani. And despite the integration of Azerbaijanis
into the leadership of Iran, all the non-Persian minorities are
not allowed to use their language in schools, they are not
allowed to use it in court, and the Azerbaijanis, among them a
third of the population, women going into trials in courts in
Persian and not understanding even what is happening in the
court side.
The ethnic minorities have a variety of views toward
Tehran, toward the state. Most of the Iranian Azerbaijanis I
would say to date see themselves as citizens of Iran but would
like a place also for their culture, not to separate from Iran,
not to break up Iran, but to change, to change Iran. But a
number of the other groups, for instance the Baloch, the Arabs,
the Kurds, are really having an active, full-scale insurgency
going on. We don't hear about it too much in the press, we
don't hear about it too much from American officials, but real
insurgencies where Iranian soldiers, when they go into the
Baloch-populated areas, the Arab-populated areas of Iran, are
seriously under threat.
I welcome and thank you, Mr. Burton, for being one of the
only Members of Congress and U.S. officials who has actually
tried to integrate Iran and South Caucasus policies, because
again we tend to think about it, even think, for instance, in
the National Security Council we have the Caucasus together
covered with the Balkans, two regions that are completely
different, the dynamics are completely different, there is no
dominant power in the Balkans, where in the South Caucasus we
have a region with huge influence of Turkey, Iran, Russia all
competing in this region, and this region is vitally important
for the outcomes in Russia-Iran, Iran and Turkey. So I thank
you, first thing, for calling attention of integrating these
two policies.
As part of that integration, I think U.S.-Iran policy could
benefit if the South Caucasus was integrated into these
policies. One issue pointed out is the sanctions regime. These
countries are crucial to the sanctions regime, both on the
negative and positive, meaning the countries like Azerbaijan
that fully implement the sanctions are watchdogs for the United
States, are doing a very important job, but the countries that
don't implement the sanctions, it is a loophole, it is very
dangerous. And I think especially we see this in the
nongoverned territories, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, their financial institutions, moving of gold. It is a
real black hole for the sanctions, and it is something that I
hope the U.S. will pay attention to monitor and to close these
gaps.
Another point is that the U.S. Congress, we should work
harder to resolve these secessionist conflicts in the Caucasus.
They also make the countries more vulnerable to Iranian
influence, to Iranian destabilization issues. And I think one
thing that the Congress, I could say, has not been so helpful
is that for most of its history the Congress has earmarked
money to the secessionist region of Nagorno-Karabakh. That is
in violation of U.S. law. It would be as if you were earmarking
money for Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank,
something the Congress even wouldn't do for an ally of the
United States like Israel, let alone to earmark money for
occupation of a territory that the U.S. law recognize as
occupied territory.
I think also we should follow up in terms of monitoring the
institutions like Voice of America that receive U.S. financial
support to see if they can give more of a voice to the ethnic
minority issue in Iran.
And I think we should be well aware, as you pointed out,
that if there will be any sort of tightening of the sanctions,
military action in the region, one of the first countries to be
attacked by Iran, and Iran has made this clear, is Azerbaijan.
It is a long border, it is very porous, people are going back
and forth. They are trying constantly to do terrorist events,
and we must increase our security cooperation with Azerbaijan
to make sure that they don't pay the price for being a neighbor
of Iran.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Shaffer follows:]
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Mr. Burton. We will now go to Mr. Cohen.
STATEMENT OF ARIEL COHEN, PH.D., SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, THE
KATHRYN AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, it is indeed with sorrow that I
hear about your stepping down. I testified before you several
times, and it was always a great pleasure. I was always very,
very impressed by your knowledge, the knowledge of other
members. And I am sorry to hear Ms. Schmidt and Mr. Gallegly
are retiring.
The topic today is important indeed. The Islamic Republic
of Iran has emerged as a major anti-status quo actor in the
Middle East, threatening America's Sunni Arab allies along the
so-called Shi'a Crescent, from Lebanon, via Syria and Iraq, to
the Persian Gulf. Iran's implacable hatred of Israel and
threats to wipe the Jewish State off the map are widely
reported. What is less known are the threats Iran presents with
its destabilizing influence in South Caucasus.
Our country worked for the last 20 years in a bipartisan
fashion, in the first Bush, Clinton, and the second Bush
administrations, to stabilize South Caucasus to have for the
peoples of the region security, economic development, the rule
of law, and democracy. Today all these American interests are
threatened by Iranian attempts to export terrorism, destabilize
neighboring Azerbaijan, bypass U.N. and E.U. Sanctions.
The energy development is also stalling because of Iranian
policies objecting to the national sector regime for the
Caspian, are preventing gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to
traverse the Caspian Sea in pipelines and be shipped further
west to Turkey and Europe. But the main current concern is
Iranian export of terrorism into the South Caucasus.
The U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan, which I visited in October
and spoke to Ambassador Morningstar, and such ``iconic''
locations as McDonald's were all targeted by Iranian terrorist
cells and were rounded up by Azeri security. The Qods--or
``Jerusalem''--Force, the Iranian elite paramilitary
organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC, is
exporting the Islamic revolution by fostering militant Shiite
movements, creating deterrence and retaliatory networks,
destabilizing regimes unfriendly to Iran, and Azerbaijan is in
their crosshairs.
The relationship with the United States, Western Europe,
and Israel are irritating the Iranian leadership to the point
that some of their statements are questioning the sovereignty
of the country of Azerbaijan, reminding the Azeri leaders that
in the distant past Azerbaijan used to be a province of the
Persian empire.
Iran's anti-Israel agenda is brought to bear by targeting
the Embassy of Israel, the Ambassador of Israel, and even local
Jewish community leaders and a rabbi. These cells, too, were
rounded by Azeri security.
In the broader geopolitical sense, the Iranian activity in
South Caucasus is dangerous because they are aiming to bust the
sanctions regime by developing their presence in Armenia and
Georgia, possibly in Azerbaijan, by putting their front
organizations, front companies to acquire dual-use technologies
and technologies with military applications to plan banking
operations, very important for our Treasury effort, such as the
Mellat Bank, a bank that is under U.S. Treasury sanctions and
the British Treasury sanctions. Mellat Bank branch is operating
out of Yerevan.
The Iranian drug trade is an especially pernicious activity
that is targeting South Caucasus. While Iran is becoming
increasingly a transit country for Afghan opium and heroin,
Iran is running its own drug operation, such as methamphetamine
production, supervised by pharmacists and professional
chemists, and trying to run these with speedboats into
Azerbaijan, et cetera.
I would like the rest of my presentation to be included in
the record and just focus on our policy recommendations.
The U.S. Government needs to expand anti-terrorism and drug
trafficking cooperation between the U.S. and the three South
Caucasus States, neutralizing Iranian subversive activities;
focus Intelligence Community efforts on collecting and
neutralizing Iranian sanction-busting activities in financial
and technology transfer sectors in the region; cooperating with
our Western European and other allies; uphold the interests of
small South Caucasus countries when attempting to construct an
effective Iran policy, which leads to elimination of Tehran's
nuclear weapons program; sustain Caspian energy projects, and
help European countries in diversifying their energy supplies
by connecting them to energy resources of the Caspian Sea and
Central Asia region. And specifically we should support and
help Turkey and Azerbaijan and Europe to finalize the TANAP and
Nabucco West projects.
Finally, we should develop a comprehensive interagency soft
power strategy, including broadcasting, including exchanges to
powerfully support the Iranian opposition, including that of
the Iranian Azerbaijanis, and leading to a victory of
democratic forces in Iran.
As Professor Blank of the U.S. Army War College wrote,
``The administration has hitherto treated South
Caucasus as an afterthought or as an overflight issue
on the road to Afghanistan. Such neglect is dangerous
and misconceived. The mounting threats in the Middle
East, Iran, and the Caucasus show how vital it is that
the U.S. strengthen pro-Western regimes, for if we
continue to neglect the Caucasus, this neglect will
quickly become malign, and malign neglect invariably
generates not only instability, but also protracted
violence.''
By its aggressive action, Iran is endangering the fragile
equilibrium in the strategically sensitive region which is
important for U.S. interests. America should remain vigilant to
deter violence, extremism and terrorism practiced by the
Islamic Republic against America's friends and allies in the
Caucasus. Thank you so much.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Doctor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
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Mr. Burton. I think we will now go to you, Michael.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Rubin. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Honorable
Members----
Mr. Burton. Incidentally, before we do, Dana Rohrabacher,
Congressman Rohrabacher from California has joined us. He is a
valuable member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. And the next
ranking member from New York, thank you for coming. We
appreciate. He is going to be the ranking member of the full
committee.
So we are pleased to have both of you here today. Thank
you.
And with that we will go ahead with your statement. And if
we could keep your statements to 5 minutes, it would be great.
Mr. Rubin. Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members, thank you for
the opportunity to testify.
Iranian officials sometimes quip that they play chess while
Americans play checkers. Increasingly this appears to be the
case in the Caucasus and the surrounding region. While many
American policymakers focus on Iranian influence and activity
in Afghanistan and the broader Middle East and perhaps describe
the Islamic Republic as a regional power, the Iranians
themselves now describe themselves as a ``pan-regional power.''
Iranians have a sense of near abroad over the former domains of
the Persian Empire as strong as that of Russian nationalists
who pine to exert their influence over the states of the former
Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are front and
center in this conception.
Iranian strategy is multifaceted, combining both terror
campaigns and soft power. Beyond headline-grabbing bombings and
assassination plots, the Islamic Republic seeks to expand its
reach through education and with charities.
Within the Caucasus, the Islamic Republic concentrates its
subversion efforts at Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is one of only
three countries beyond Iran--Bahrain and Iraq being the
others--which is majority Twelver Shiite. Because these
countries' success challenge the claim that the Islamic
Republic's rule is divinely inspired, Tehran subverts them.
Baku's rejection of religious populism and its mosque-state
separation contrast sharply with Iran's theocracy. The fact
that Azerbaijanis enjoy a greater life expectancy, are more
literate, and because of recent sanctions on Iran enjoy greater
purchasing power than Iranians embarrasses the Iranian clergy.
It is hard for the Supreme Leader to claim that he presides
over a near-perfect Islamic system as the deputy of the messiah
on Earth when secular governments outperform him.
As I detail in my written testimony, Iran has sought to
undermine Azerbaijani territorial unity and sponsored anti-
Western political parties. After attempts to send radical
missionaries into Azerbaijan failed, Tehran shifted to provide
scholarships to train Azerbaijani clerics in Iran. This has
been a tactic which has paid long-term dividends to the Islamic
Republic in other countries, like Bahrain.
Iranian authorities also utilize charities to expand their
influence. Of myriad Iranian charities, the Imam Khomeini
Relief Committee is the regime's chief aid organization abroad.
With assets supplied by the Supreme Leader, the committee
sponsors programs similar to those conducted by Western NGOs,
but while the committee's activities might look at first sight
benign, its track record is sinister. In 1997 its office
provided cover for surveillance against the U.S. Embassy in
Tajikistan. In 2010 the U.S. Treasury Department designated the
committee's branch in Lebanon to be a terrorist entity. With
both Revolutionary Guard and Relief Committee funded from the
same trough, it is likely that the committee offices in
Azerbaijan now also provide cover for Revolutionary Guard
activities.
Is Armenia the weak link, however? For American policy,
Armenia is the weak link. It increasingly provides the central
pivot for a Russia-Iran access which undermines both U.S.
interests and national security. In 2008 U.S. diplomats
concluded that Armenia shipped Iran weaponry which the Islamic
Republic used to kill Americans in Iraq.
Whereas the Armenian Government has long sought to keep its
banking cooperation with Iran outside the limelight, Armenia's
warm embrace of Iran is apparent. Sanctioned Iranian banks
appear to operate in Yerevan. In October 2011 the Iranian press
reported that a member of Armenia's Nuclear Energy Organization
suggested that Iran had enticed several Armenian nuclear
scientists to work in Iran's nuclear program.
While the Armenian-American community is vibrant, it is
unfortunate that organizations representing the diaspora in the
United States do not do more to encourage change in the
Armenian Government's behavior. By ignoring Armenia's pro-
Iranian orientation, Armenian-American community--the community
squanders an opportunity to build a true strategic partnership
between Washington and Yerevan.
What worries me looking into the future is this: The
strategic situation has never been more perilous. The recent
Georgian elections threaten to radically reorient Georgia,
which under President Saakashvili has been reliably pro-
Western. A reorientation of Georgia's relationship with Iran
might accompany its shift to Moscow.
Georgia is not the only company in play. While there remain
sectarian tensions between Turkey and Iran, it would be a
mistake for American policymakers to assume Turkey will
cooperate with the West regarding Iran. To dismiss Turkish
outreach to Iran, such as the gold for gas scheme, as simply
economic opportunism misses the point.
Across administrations, U.S. strategy is too often reactive
rather than proactive. Alas, the absence of a coherent U.S.
strategy to counter and roll back Iranian influence in the
Caucasus increasingly proves the Iranian chess and checkers
quip correct. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Doctor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Mr. Vatanka.
STATEMENT OF MR. ALEX VATANKA, ADJUNCT SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST
INSTITUTE
Mr. Vatanka. Thank you very much. Chairman Burton, members
of the committee, thank you very much for having me here this
afternoon. It is an honor to join you.
I wanted to focus on Iran's failures to project its
influence in the South Caucasus region, if I may. As has been
said, Iran has deep roots in this part of the world. It is the
giant neighbor to the south after all. Much of the South
Caucasus has at one time or another been under Iranian
influence or been part of the Persian Empire. Therefore cross-
border, that is to say people-to-people ties remain strong.
By most estimates there are some 20 million people in Iran
that are ethnic Azerbaijani. Just to remind everyone, that is
over twice as many as you have in the Republic of Azerbaijan.
One of the largest Armenian diaspora communities anywhere in
the world is also to be found in Iran, estimated at some
80,000.
But I would argue that while Iranian civilization is close
to the peoples of the region, the world views and goals of the
Islamist regime in Tehran have no appeal.
I think we have to deal with three key facts when assessing
Iran's influence in the South Caucasus. First, because the
Islamist regime in Tehran is beholden to Russia and Moscow's
support oftentimes that it provides to Iran in places like the
U.N. Security Council, the Iranians are very worried about
upsetting Russia's interests in the South Caucasus. This is
best reflected by Iran's position in regards to Armenia and
Georgia, where Russian interests are strongest. I have provided
more detail in my testimony and provided some examples.
Second, I think where we have a failure, it is Iran's so-
called big brother approach, which I think is heavily tainted
with an ideological syndrome. So I would quickly say it is not
just that Iran doesn't want to be active in the South Caucasus
because it fears that the Russians might be upset, but it is
also because of a failure of its model as a political
invitation that has extended over the last 20 years to these
three countries, particularly Azerbaijan.
In Azerbaijan, where Russian interests are least sensitive,
in my view, Iran has also failed to gain any traction. This is
thanks to--excuse me--where Iran has basically insisted on Baku
sharing its anti-American and anti-Western positions, and this
is a call which the authorities in Azerbaijan have repeatedly
over the last 2 decades rejected.
I think Baku would have been far more open to Iranian
overtures if Iran did not insist on this anti-Westernism as a
common platform, but I am afraid to say that seems to still be
the case if you listen to the latest statements coming from
Tehran.
One of the best examples of how Iranian intervention in
Azerbaijan have failed to result or produce results for Tehran
is this Iranian insistence that Azerbaijan walk away from its
relations with the State of Israel. In doing so not only does
Iran want to impose this ideological will on a smaller and pro-
Western neighbor in Azerbaijan, but it also fails to recognize
the needs of Baku.
In my conversations with diverse voices in Azerbaijan, I
was constantly reminded of the fact that the State of Israel
provides material support to Baku as the country develops and
looks to enhance its international position.
What can an internationally isolated Iran in turn offer
Azerbaijan? The answer to that is very little, at least while
Tehran pursues the policies that it is pursuing at the moment.
Let me also say this. This is widely recognized to be a
problem, but those nonideological actors in Tehran, they see
the problem. The trouble is they are not in the driving seat,
so they are just banging their heads against the wall, saying,
we are losing on the regional level. And the narrow sets of
interest, Iran Ayatollah Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are
calling the shots to the detriment of the national interests of
the country of Iran.
Let me just very briefly say a few words about the Iranian
influence that does exist. This refers to Armenia and Georgia.
It is very important to recognize that overwhelmingly we are
talking about economic cooperation and trade between Iran
versus Armenia and Georgia. These countries are not looking
to--it is very important to emphasize this--these countries are
not looking to hear the Iranian political message of anti-
Westernism. They look to Iran, particularly Armenia, out of
simple necessity and the geographic reality that they have to
deal with. But whenever they can they have preferred Western
partners, particularly look at Armenia's continued pursuit of
better ties with Turkey.
In conclusion, let me very briefly say that the South
Caucasus, when you measure the Iranian influence there, simply
does not match the proximity of Iran and historical ties that
that country has with the region, and this can be, as I said,
overwhelmingly blamed on Iran's insistence on this anti-Western
platform that it continuously seeks and will not get from the
three States of the Caucasus.
Final point I will make, and I am running out of time, I
say the only real negative driver that I can see changing the
status quo is if the Iranian standoff with the U.S. and the
international community continues, there is a likelihood that
radical elements in Tehran, and we have already heard this,
will look at the region, particularly Azerbaijan, as a platform
and a battleground to confront the United States and its
allies.
Chairman Burton, members of the committee, thank you very
much for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vatanka follows:]
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Mr. Burton. First of all, before I take my time, I want to
congratulate Mr. Engel on being the ranking Democrat. He is
going to be a powerhouse here on the committee for the next
couple of--well, maybe 6 years. So congratulations. You have
worked hard for it, and you deserve it.
One of my concerns and the reason I wanted to hold this
hearing is because we have been focusing on Iran's nuclear
program. We have been talking about the threat that that
presents to the entire region and how Israel would have to
respond to that in the event that they continue with that
program.
But one of the things that is not being discussed is what
this hearing is about today, and that is the subversive
movement by Iran to undermine governments in the entire region.
Our hearing today is on the Caucasus and that whole region, but
I want to go into a broader area. Bahrain is one of the areas
that I am very familiar with because I was in the Persian Gulf
region recently. It is not under this committee's purview, but
it fits into the overall problem that we see.
So I would like to start with you, Dr. Rubin, and ask you
what you think of Iran's underground movement to try to
undermine those governments to gain more and more influence and
how extensive is it. And I would like for you to include
Azerbaijan, that whole region, Georgia, Armenia, and I would
like for you to also interject into your comments, and I will
let your other colleagues speak as well, what is going on in
Bahrain and in the Persian Gulf.
Mr. Rubin. Sir, I spent 14 years in a Quaker school, and
when I was being schooled in the Quaker school we always
learned that multiculturalism was always about appreciating our
differences. But fundamentally multiculturalism isn't about
walking into a sushi restaurant and ordering a mojito. It is
ultimately about different peoples thinking in very, very
different ways.
When it comes to Iran, we need to recognize that both in
the constitution and in the statute of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps is the imperative to export
revolution. In the year 2008 the former President, Mohammad
Khatami, said, well, when we talked about export of revolution,
what we meant is to build ourselves up into a soft-power power
which everyone around could emulate, and it was actually the
Revolutionary Guard and the hardline judiciary which shot him
down and said, no, export of the revolution is fundamentally
about insurgency. I have detailed this in my written testimony.
Now, when it comes to the Iranian strategy, I already
talked about the soft-power strategy of trying to infiltrate
countries through charities. We also have the infiltration in
through the media as well.
Within Bahrain there is a special problem, and I
highlighted this, the parallels in Azerbaijan. In Bahrain's
case, because of Saddam Hussein's crackdown in Iraq over the
decades, most Bahraini clergy, instead of going to Najaf and
Karbala to study, ended up going to Qom in Iran where the
Iranians tried to indoctrinate them. I would hazard to guess
that there is not a single village mullah under the age of 55
in Bahrain who hasn't studied in Iran, and that is going to be
a problem which will take generations to work out of the
system.
Now, many of the grievances in Bahrain are real, but that
doesn't mean that the Iranians aren't trying to take advantage
of them. As you know, earlier this year I went to Bahrain, and
when I was meeting with oppositionists, I found many of the
younger opposition to be quite sincere. Some of the older
opposition, from the days of the 1981 fighting, what they were
saying to me in English versus what we Googled them saying to
the Persian press in Persian was radically different as to the
status of the U.S. 5th Fleet headquarters and so forth. So we
do have a constant problem in which many of the people working
on behalf of Iranian interests----
Mr. Burton. But what did they say? You said you spoke to
them in Persian.
Mr. Rubin. Okay. When they spoke in English, they would
talk about how we genuinely want reforms and that so long as
the reforms occur, the United States of course would be welcome
to keep the 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. Not when I spoke
to them in Persian, but when we Googled their names in Persian
to call up what they had said to the Iranian press, they talked
about how the colonial vestige of the American satan must be
expelled forthwith. So a slight difference in tone between what
they were saying in English and what they were saying in
Persian. That is constantly a problem, of course, in the Middle
East, as you know, where interlocutors will be told one thing
and they will be told another subsequently.
When it comes to television, most Bahrainis will listen to
Iranian television and radio almost exclusively. Most Bahraini
Shiites I should say. Now, when it comes to the Bahraini--the
media--oftentimes what the Iranians will do is distribute cell
phones, distribute video cameras, and urge students to be
stringers. If you can film anything of interest, send it back,
and we will give you a salary. This encourages people to film
greater unrest. Instead of having one Voice of America
correspondent in the area, imagine having 500 Voice of Iran
correspondents in the area, and this is ultimately the problem
we have.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Rubin, we will proceed with that. I want to
give you all a chance to respond. But Mr. Rohrabacher has to
catch a plane, he has got to go back to California, and he is
going to be very active in this region in the next couple of
years I understand.
So, Mr. Rohrabacher, we will recognize you so you can catch
your plane.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And I would like to
especially thank Ms. Schmidt and Congressman Burton for the
hard work they have put in over the last 2 years and actually
many more years than that, and just thank you both for laying
the stage. Whoever is going to be coming next will be able to
pick up something and carry the flag, and I hope whoever that
is, it could be me, who knows, will do half as good a job as
you guys have done. So thank you very much.
I would like to thank the panel and thank the chairman for
this particular hearing. I think that Americans' understanding
of what is going on in Iran and around Iran is so limited and
so cliched that it really is a threat to making the policies
that we need to make that will benefit the United States as
well as benefit the cause of world peace.
Most people only know that the mullahs in Iran are
oppressive to their own people and have said they are going to
wipe out Israel, and that is it. And most people think all
Iranians are Persians, and today's testimony is going to be of
great assistance in laying the foundation for perhaps new
policies that will be approached in the coming year.
Let me just note, and, Mr. Chairman, for the record I have
a copy of H. Con. Resolution 137, which is a resolution that I
submitted earlier this year which basically states that the
people, that the Azeri people who we have heard in testimony
number up to 20 million in Iran, that those Azeri people have a
right of self-determination to determine what their status will
be in the future, whether it is a status as part of Azerbaijan
or whether it is a part of Iran or whether it is a sovereign
country of their own. And that resolution, while it didn't go
many places here on Capitol Hill, it certainly was an area of
discussion in that part of the world.
And let me just note, I believe in the right of self-
determination not only for the Azeri people, but for all the
peoples of that region and of the world. It is a part of the
things that we as Americans are supposed to believe in because
our Declaration of Independence was a declaration of the rights
of people to determine self-determination that God has given
every person, not just Americans.
I also am very grateful to the panel today for pointing out
the complications of Iranian policy to the various, not just
Israel, but the other conflicts in the region as well,
especially dealing with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
I think that we owe a great deal of debt to the Government
of Azerbaijan for being willing to step up to this threat from
the mullah regime and not cower before it. And that type of
courage, I hope, would be--would actually inspire those of us
in the United States who are engaged in policymaking to
understand that the mullah regime needs to be treated for what
it is.
The Mullah regime is a gangster regime that murders its own
people and threatens the peace and civility of an entire region
of the world. And we should be looking for allies in that part
of the world, and not just Israel, but other countries of the--
other countries in that region to try to isolate and, yes,
empower the people of Iran to win their freedom against this
gangster regime. Whether it is promoting self-determination or
the right to self-determination or just pure democracy, we
should--the Iranian mullahs should not be on the offensive,
they should be on the defensive, because they do not represent
anything but an evil force in their own country and in that
region.
So, Mr. Chairman, I had my say. Maybe there is someone who
has 45 seconds to comment on that on the panel. Thank you.
There you go. Mr. Cohen. You have got 15 seconds.
Mr. Burton. If you have a comment, go ahead.
Ms. Shaffer. I think it is very important that you
mentioned Iran's policies toward the conflicts in the region,
because I think we can learn really how--how there is such a
gap between Iran's rhetoric of Islamic solidarity, helping
oppressed peoples and its activities in actuality. And, I mean,
Iran should be the poster child of helping Muslims around the
world, but in its close region, it helps Armenia against
Azerbaijan, it helps Russia against Chechens, it bowed out of
Tajikistan for Moscow's interest.
And even when it tries to explain its hostility toward
Azerbaijan, it says, well, it is about Israel. To tell the
truth, Azerbaijan and Israeli relations actually came to
``frutation'' only about 4 to 5--5 years ago did they establish
close cooperation. Iran has been trying to undermine Azerbaijan
stability and supporting its adversaries in the region since
the beginning of independence.
Again, it goes back to this ethnic issue. Just as you have
brought attention of Congress on the multiethnicity of the
Iran, Iranian leaders, the first day in the Tehran Times when
the Soviet Union broke up, the first article was not about what
a great opportunity to expand Islamic fundamentalism and
Islamic influence, it was, we must be careful that the ethnic
hand won't come over the border the other way. And this is what
drives Iranian policy in the region.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We have people in Belujistan, we have
people who are Azeris, we have many different groups of people
who deserve their freedom who are now under the thumb of the
mullah dictatorship. We should be on the side of democracy and
freedom in Iran, and that would solve a lot of our other
problems.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I won't take
the whole time.
I want to start by, first of all, telling you how much I
have appreciated our friendship through the years, and from the
time we both served on the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee,
first you as chair and me as ranking member, then me as chair
and you as ranking member, we have always been friends, and you
have always been a gentleman and a very good student of foreign
policy. And it has just been a pleasure working with you, and
personally I am going to miss you. So I hope you will come back
and visit.
I hope your district and the country understands how--what
a patriot you are and how much you care. Even when we've
disagreed on things, I never have had doubt for one moment that
you didn't say anything that you didn't believe. That you--you
are a patriot, you are a tremendous American, and you really
love this country. And, you know, we love you; even on this
side of the aisle we are going to miss you.
And I want to say something to you're my good friend, dear
friend, Jean Schmidt. Going to miss you, too, my cochair of the
Albanian Issues Caucus and someone that I have gotten to know
very well. We have traveled together, as Mr. Burton and I have,
and we have gotten to know our families on a personal level.
And I'm going to miss you very, very much. And you, too, are a
great patriot and amazing woman, amazing woman.
I don't know, I tell a little tale out of school, we are--
when we are traveling abroad, we always have these big, strong
Marine guys or whatever following us and taking care of us and
whatever. And Congresswoman Schmidt is an avid runner. She
competes in all kinds of classical marathons, thank you. And I
want to tell you, those Marine guys that are less than half her
age, they couldn't hold a candle to her when she gets up at
4:30 in the morning and is ready to do running. So we are going
to miss you, Jean. Please keep in touch. And honored to call
both of you my friend. So thank you.
I wanted just to ask anyone who can answer just one
question. It involves the relationship with Azerbaijan and
Israel. There had been reports, I guess it must have been 6
or--6 months ago to a year, I guess, where there was talk that
Azerbaijan had agreed to let Israel use its bases in case
Israel felt it had to make a strike on Iran to destroy Iran's
nuclear capability. There seemed to be, whether it was our
State Department or someone somewhere, went public on it. And
it seemed to me that it undermined any kind of deal that
Azerbaijan and Israel have had.
I am wondering if any of you can shed some light on that
for me and, you know, just tell me your thoughts. Because I
have to tell you, my thoughts were I was disappointed when I
thought on the U.S. side that we were--we were sort of bringing
that to light. I was--I thought that was something that was
better left unsaid.
Yes, Ms. Shaffer. Dr. Shaffer.
Ms. Shaffer. I think this shows the power, also the
negative power, of the Internet. Here a guy wrote an article,
who, by his own biography, had served as an advisor to Yasser
Arafat, for instance, when he was in Lebanon, an article based
on six unnamed sources--I can understand an article that has a
couple unnamed sources and some people on the record--six
unnamed sources, two independent scholars--in my opinion,
independent scholars are either unemployed or on the payroll of
someone they don't want to mention--and this creates noise all
over the world as if it is the reality, and everyone else has
to respond to it.
I think there has been a big disinformation campaign going
on in a number of media sources that are trying to break apart
the friendship between Israel and Azerbaijan. It makes a lot of
people--and trying to make Azerbaijan pay in the Muslim world
for its close friendship to Israel. And I think these articles
that are always, you know, talking about military cooperation
here, military cooperation there. If you show a map, there is a
lot of countries that Israel is going to have a military attack
on Iran. There is a lot of countries it has to pass over before
it gets to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is a landlocked country. So
that would mean that its planes were flying over Turkey,
Georgia, a number of other countries, before it reached
Azerbaijan.
This really isn't about Azerbaijan and Israel. I think that
we have to be very careful with many of these--the impact of
these articles, which we really don't know who is behind them
and why--I mean, if a student of mine wrote paper with six
unnamed sources, I wouldn't give them a very good grade.
Mr. Engel. Yes. Dr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. I am not sure if it is the purview of this
committee or the full committee, but as that publication hurt
U.S. policy and U.S. relations with both Israel and Azerbaijan,
I am wondering if an investigation can be made as to whether
U.S. sources were involved in leaking this information; or,
alternatively, maybe it was commissioned by the Iranian regime.
And because what Dr. Shaffer mentioned the connections of the
author to Yasser Arafat, and I am personally aware of those
connections, he is not hiding them. It could be it was done on
behalf of the Islamic Republic here in Washington, which also
raises very serious questions as to the influence of that.
Mr. Chairman, if I may go back to the Bahrain issue? If you
look at the map, Bahrain is there across Iran on the shores of
the Persian Gulf. As Dr. Rubin said, Bahrain has 70 percent
Shia majority. Some Iranian officials claim that Bahrain is a
14th province of Iran. This is kind of rhetoric that we heard
by Saddam Hussein which led to the war in Kuwait. So this is a
highly explosive territorial claim, and if, through its
military power or through subversion, and supporting the Shia
radicals in Bahrain, Iran overthrows the current regime and
establishes hold on Bahrain, then it can close the Persian Gulf
from both sides, which has tremendous implications for energy
traffic--40 percent of all oil in the world is shipped through
the Persian Gulf--and it establishes an Iranian bridgehead on
the southern or eastern shore of the Persian Gulf aimed right
at Saudi Arabia.
So geopolitically, purely looking at the map, and
understanding that such a step would unfortunately prevent the
Fifth Fleet to continue being there, this is a development that
Iranians are pursuing, and that is extremely dangerous to our
national security interest, to the interests of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, and to our allies in the Persian Gulf.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Let me also join the chorus to say to Jean that
we will miss you. I was just thinking before Eliot, when he was
talking about our travel together, and the fact that you outrun
everybody, and also the fact that we have gotten to know one
another on these trips and talked about family, and friends,
and life and what it really means, and your dedication as a
true patriot to our great country of ours. So we are going to
miss you and the service that you have rendered here in the
United States Congress, and I want to wish you well in your
future endeavors.
Let me now go to the witnesses.
As I indicated in my opening statement, it seems to me
influence is stronger when you divide and conquer. It seems to
me if you can divide folks up in the region, et cetera, then
you can have more influence. And that is what my concern is, to
a large degree, in the South Caucasus. And that is why I will
just open up with this question.
I have been watching, because I think it is extremely
important, if we could get Turkey and Armenia to have a better
relationship, to move that tighter together, because if you
have them divided, et cetera, that helps weaken the
relationship.
So my question, first question, is, do you think that
there's any prospect maybe in--because I always have the
statement that there is--there is two of the oldest forms of
relationships between countries. One is trade or economic
engagement, and the other is war. I like trade and economic
engagement much better than war to try to have relationships.
So I was wondering whether or not did you see any prospect for
increased economic engagement in between Armenia and Turkey
and--or would the relaxation of the closed border between
Turkey and Armenia or even the normalization of diplomatic
relations in the region, would that make a difference? Would
you see that being possible anytime soon in any--I am one to
believe the glass is half full all the time, but I would like
to get your viewpoints.
You can start. go ahead.
Mr. Vatanka. I will be very brief, if I may.
As far as I can see, the Turks have already said they are
interested in that kind of a development vis--vis Armenia. And
Armenians, as I stated earlier, definitely are trying to expand
in terms of their partners that they have in the region. But I
am not sure about the timing right now. Certainly I think the
Turks have their hands full with everything going on in the
region, specifically in Syria. So I am not sure if they are
going to do something as radical as that, because that is going
to be perceived, at the very least, as a radical step in Baku.
And Turkey does not want to walk away from its very close ties
with Azerbaijan.
So that is how I see it. I think timing here is very
important. Secondarily, you want to make sure those areas
understand the motive, that this is not going to be done at
their sort of cost.
If I may just very quickly, two points I also wanted to
make in terms of Israel and Bahrain. First, when I was in
Azerbaijan, there were two messages that pretty much stood out
for me very clearly. One was the Israel-Azerbaijan relationship
which is not just about Iran. It is a key factor, but it is
more about developing Azerbaijan's diplomatic, economic, and
political clout on the international stage, Israel being
forthcoming. So that, I think, is an important factor to
remember.
But number two, equally important, Azerbaijan, as far as I
could see, is not interested in becoming battleground and
certainly doesn't want to be involved in a war with Iran. It
will play its role, as far as I could see, as an international
partner in terms of maintaining the sanctions and so forth, but
it is not going to sort of stick its head out because it
certainly doesn't feel comfortable in that regard.
On Bahrain, the thing to remember--again, I was in Bahrain
this year. And one of the issues, again, that stood out
clearly, there is some genuine grievances on the ground, and I
heard Bahraini officials admit to that. So there are things,
reform, that needs to be done on the ground.
Where the Iranian danger comes in if there is a vacuum,
because whenever Iran has really succeeded under a regional
level has been where there has been a vacuum. We have seen that
in Lebanon in the 1980s. We saw that with the creation of
strength in Hamas in the 1990s. That is what the Iranians are
very good at, to come in and fill vacuums.
The important thing for the United States is that
opposition in Bahrain, at least the moderate voices in the
Bahraini opposition, don't feel the need that there is only
Iran to turn to. United States, I think, can play an important
role in that regard.
Ms. Shaffer. Mr. Meeks, I think you are correct that the
conflicts create vulnerability to the countries, but more for
Iranian influence, for Russian influence. And for precisely
this reason, the normalization between Turkey and Armenia and
the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border has to take place in
a greater regional context, meaning if you just look at Turkey-
Armenia, you say, okay, fine, they trade, yes, there can be
many benefits. But we have to use this border issue as a means
to further resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh complex, because if one
border happens, but still the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan continues, we don't have peace in the region, we
won't have that kind of stability we want to achieve.
In fact, today Armenia occupies 20 percent of Azerbaijan's
territory. The only nonmilitary means, the only thing Armenia
wants that it doesn't have, is actually the trade with Turkey.
Therefore, we have to use that lever for some movement in the
peace process to really--you know, maybe not the whole
resolution for Armenians to leave a few of the occupied
districts to show some sort of sign of the process moving
forward. And so to put peace, again, peace on two sides of
Armenia's borders, because if not, all we are doing is putting
war closer and closer in the region.
Mr. Rubin. Representative Meeks, I certainly agree with the
desire that there would be some sort of rapprochement, but, in
the larger context, I really don't think it would be enough,
given the recent changes in Turkey.
Turkish and Iranian leaders coordinate closely on
international efforts to restrict free speech that criticizes
Islam. Hakan Fidan, Turkey's Intelligence Chief, makes little
secret of his preference to Tehran over Washington, which
raises questions about intelligence sharing, especially when it
comes to some of the coding and technology for the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter.
In 2010, what concerns me most is that Turkish and Chinese
Air Forces conducted joint war games over the--over Turkey
without first alerting either NATO or the Pentagon. And, of
course, the Chinese fighter jets couldn't have gotten to Turkey
if they hadn't stopped first and refueled in Iran.
What I see now beyond just the issue of the Turkish-
Armenian dispute is that Iran feels that it is about to deliver
us a coup de grace, because they have Armenia in their camp,
increasingly they seem to have flipped Turkey in many ways,
they are very optimistic about what the future will bode with
regard to Georgia, which only leaves only Azerbaijan behind,
which leads me to think that even if you do have some
rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, that we are going to
have a much hotter time in the region over the months and
perhaps year to come.
Mr. Cohen. Just to follow up on this, Armenia enjoys a
historic and strategic relationship with Russia. It has very
strong ties with Iran. So two out of three major powers in the
Caucasus are in the Armenians' corner. On the other hand,
Turkey, historically, is supporting Azerbaijan and made it
clear to Armenia, after the memoranda was signed back in 2010,
I believe--2010 or 2009--in 2009, that Turkey will link the
opening of the border to progress on the Karabakh issue. And we
understand it because countries support their allies. In the
case of Turkey, Azerbaijan is an ally.
But I also want to support what my colleague Mr. Rubin said
about Turkish-Iran relations. Those relations are developing.
And doubling of trade by 2015 between Turkey and Iran while
Iran is under international sanctions is proclaimed again and
again as a strategic goal of the Turkish Republic, which raises
a question how our ally, Turkey, is playing a policy or
conducting a policy that appears to be contradicting our
sanctions against Iran.
Mr. Meeks. And I know I am out of time, but just following
up on that, though, it seems to me--and this is what I also
stated in the opening statement--that when you look at some of
our allies, whether it is Turkey in particular and others, they
look at their national interests, and they are dependent upon
either Russia or Iran for their oil or their--you know, their
resources. So they go back and forth because they need it. And
one or the other could be bad for us, et cetera, if they are
completely dependent upon it. So people are looking at what
they have in their particular regions.
What I would think, then, in order to eliminate some of
that--and I throw that question out as my last question for
now, then I yield to the chair and to Jean--is my thought is
what could we do to help transit from the Caspian so that we
can get oil into these regions so they are not dependent on
Russia or Iran? And what do you see the United States doing, or
how we can be more helpful to make sure that transit exists so
that they can get the resources they need with regards to what
they need for their vital necessities?
Mr. Cohen. Sir, these are very important questions. And on
oil, the United States took a principled and active position
both under Clinton and George W. Bush to promote the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan main oil export pipeline--Ceyhan is a port in
Turkey. That pipeline is at capacity of about 1 million barrels
a day, but because of the Iranian obstructionist position on
delineating and demarcating the Caspian, additional oil
pipelines cannot be built from Kazakhstan, for example, and
they are going to have to ship that oil into the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline by tanker.
On gas, the same Iranian position prevents gas from going
from Turkmenistan or, in the future, from Kazakhstan into
Azerbaijan and then into Turkey. But today the TANAP Pipeline,
the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey, is going to join a pipeline that will supply additional
gas and also natural gas from Kurdistan, from Northern Iraq;
can be pumped into Turkey and then further to the European
markets.
Additionally, Turkey has excellent relations with Sunni
Arab countries, many of which are exporters both of oil and
liquid natural gas, like Qatar. So Turkey has its sources of
both oil and gas, and if Turkey wasn't so disruptive in its
relationship with Israel, there could be a place of discussing
the Israeli and Greek Cypriot offshore gas fields supplying
some gas to Turkey in the future.
Unfortunately, the Turkish leadership today is at the head
of the crowd that is bashing Israel and supporting the
terrorist organization Hamas, including its latest attacks on
Israel with rockets. And right now I think Turkey shot itself
in the foot by excluding itself from the east Mediterranean gas
development of Israel and Cyprus.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Before we go to my good friend Jean, let me
just say that you have been an outstanding panel, and I hope
that we can get the information you are giving us today out to
everybody, because I don't think the things you are telling us
today are widely known. And so we really appreciate you being
here.
Jean.
Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you. And I want to continue on
Congressman Meeks' discussion about oil. Forty years ago--and I
can't believe I can say 40 years ago--when I was studying
Middle East politics, I had a professor that said the reason
why the Middle East is important is a three-letter word, and
that is called ``oil.'' And it still is.
And as we look at the emerging markets of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, we see oil-rich, natural-gas-rich countries that
really want to not just continue the development of these
energy resources, but also distribute it into areas that, quite
frankly, are good for international security, which I am
talking about is Western Europe, which right now has to get
their energy sources from places that aren't so popular.
But in reading your testimony, Mr.--Dr. Cohen, I--I am
getting a deeper understanding as to why Iran doesn't want
this. Iran doesn't want it for a multitude of reasons. One, it
doesn't want these countries to continue to develop and become
more Western and more attractive for business, international
business, to come to their borders; but also because it is not
in Iran's best interest to have anybody else pumping these
supplies.
So it is in Iran's best interest, it seems, to be
subversive in all of these countries in any single way that
they can, including trying to make Turkey not be as friendly to
the United States as I believe Turkey wants to continue to be,
to be disruptive by not allowing the Caspian Sea to be open
enough to allow these pipelines to go through.
And so really what we--we have to do not just as the United
States, but as an international body, in my view, is apply
international pressure to allow these new countries to develop.
And the other thing that I am thinking of when I am looking
at this--maybe I am wrong in this, and please tell me--is it is
not in Russia's best interests either. You know, Russia lost
its--some of its best parts of itself 20 years ago, when you
look at Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and the fact that they are
free. And they can do what they want to do. It is not in
Russia's best interest for these countries to make money and
become emerging markets that can be world players. And so of
course Russia, in my view, is looking at Iran to smother them
and hurt them.
And am I right or am I wrong in this? And what as an
international body should the international body be doing in
the--concretely to allow that pipeline to go through? Because I
truly believe it is in the best interests of the world for it
to start pumping energy quickly.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, ma'am. Clearly the increase of supply of
oil and gas, and now gas is becoming a globally transshipped
commodity in the form of LNG, liquid natural gas, it is very
much in the interests of every developed economy, every
developing economy that is not hydrocarbon rich.
And you are absolutely right. There is a confluence of
interest between Russia and Iran. These two countries form a
north-south axis, whereas Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
countries all the way east to China and West to Europe comprise
an east-west axis, the corridor through which oil, gas, but
also industrial goods, ideas, and information can flow.
The Russian situation is not dissimilar. The Russian
situation in Europe with gas is similar to Iranian or Saudi
situation with oil. It is all about market share.
Mrs. Schmidt. Right.
Mr. Cohen. So if you have Azerbaijani gas, Turkmen gas
competing with the Russian gas in European markets, or, for
that matter, Qatari LNG, or LNG from Algeria or Nigeria, it
will drive the Russian market share down, it may drive the
prices down. And Europe is really at a--at a crossroads,
because they need to decide whether to go with natural gas or
they continue with coal and continue with nuclear. So gas plays
a strategic energy role in Europe right now.
And you asked about what can we do.
Mrs. Schmidt. That is the most important question of all.
Mr. Cohen. A $64-trillion question.
We did not coordinate enough with Western Europe. Western
Europe by itself, especially now with the economic crisis, is
not really focused enough on ensuring that east-west pipelines
will go through.
I think the EU lost to the Russians on Nabucco, the big
pipeline that was supposed to carry gas from the Caspian
through Turkey into Western Europe. But TANAP is a good,
smaller alternative to Nabucco, with a spur, a side pipeline,
most probably what is called West Nabucco, which is a pipeline
to Austria.
We could have done more, especially when the regime, the
leader, changed in Turkmenistan. I had conversations with
senior State Department officials saying, let us invite the new
leader, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow--the new--Turkmenbashi--the
new President, to Washington. And there was a huge pushback
because they wanted for the Foreign Minister to visit, then
they wanted the Prime Minister to visit. Then they were
concerned, justifiably so, about human rights in Turkmenistan.
In the meantime, Mr. Putin was there in 2 weeks signing deals.
The Chinese now are the principal buyer for Turkmen gas.
So I do not want to present it as only a zero-sum game, but
this is a game of immense and intense competition between the
buyers of these natural resources.
Ms. Shaffer. Yes. Russia and Iran have been allies in
trying to make sure that less and less oil from the Caspian
region reaches international markets; unsuccessful, thanks to
really strong U.S. policy efforts in the early days after the
Soviet break-up.
But where actually Russia and Iran are rivals is the
question of natural gas, and I talk about this in depth in my
testimony. The only country that really has the volume that
could--to be a true rival to Russian dominance in a number of
markets in Europe is Iran. And now because of the conflict
between Iran and the West, Iran is in a box.
It really helps us understand Russia's kind of policy on
Iran. Sometimes it is with us, sometimes it is against us on
the sanctions, because basically what Iran's interest is that
Iran--Russia's interest on Iran is that there is no war, no
peace; no resolution of the conflict, no ending of the nuclear
Iranian nuclear; on the other hand, no full-scale war, because
it is in Russia's interest that the Iran volumes are locked up
in Iran and don't reach outside markets and compete with
Russia.
We saw this even--for instance, Iran opened the pipeline to
Armenia to supply gas. Gazprom bought up this pipeline, even
though what does it matter to the--a pipeline between Iran and
Armenia, Armenia is not a large market, just to make sure the
Iranian gas doesn't transit through Armenia and end up in
European markets.
Mr. Cohen. Let me add about Iran. I have been watching
Iranian oil and gas industry for a long time. With this regime,
because this is a highly ideological regime that does not allow
private property of natural resources, doesn't allow Western
investment, that creates such an oppressive atmosphere inside
the country that a lot of Iranian engineers, scientists,
doctors leave the country. This regime is not really capable to
be a good steward of Iranian natural resources in a way like
Saddam Hussein was not a good steward of the Iraqi natural
resources.
What we are facing in terms of the economic and
developmental interests of the West, of the newly
industrialized countries of Asia, and from the point of view of
the Iranian people themselves is a recognition that is often
lacking that this particular ideological Islamist dictatorship,
Shia militant dictatorship, is working against best interests
of their own people as well as against the economic interests
of potential buyers of Iranian natural resources. They don't
negotiate well. They don't have the legal base to allow Western
investment. And, yes, they are under sanctions and will be, God
willing, until such time as they reverse their nuclear military
program.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Jean, Mrs. Schmidt.
Let me just end up by saying I want to thank my colleague,
my buddy here for about 20 years, for being such a good friend.
And I want to thank you once again for being such a great
panel. I really, really appreciate it.
The one thing I hope--and I know we have C-SPAN here, and I
hope this is transmitted to our State Department--it sounds to
me like where Azerbaijan is concerned, where the Persian Gulf
is concerned, and Bahrain, as well as the other Persian Gulf
countries, as well as the entire region, Turkey and everything
else, it is extremely important that our State Department
doesn't drop the ball. They need to be extremely involved right
now, and I hope the administration realizes.
One of the things that I am concerned about--and my
colleague and I have some differing opinions on some of these
things. One of the things I am concerned about right now is we
are so concerned about the financial cliff that we are losing
sight of something that may be of greater importance in the
next 5 or 10 years, and that is if everything goes awry in the
Middle East, we could be shutting off some of our lights here
because of a war that would get out of hand. So our State
Department and people like you need to be listened to. We need
to be involved. And I want to thank you once again for being
here.
And I want to thank our friends from Azerbaijan and Bahrain
and others who are here today for attending.
And with that, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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