[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
BEIJING AS AN EMERGING POWER IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 12, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-178
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON PAUL, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
CONNIE MACK, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH,
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, CaliforniaUntil 8/
TED POE, Texas 14/12 deg.
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID RIVERA, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Toshi Yoshihara, Ph.D., professor, John A. Van Beuren chair of
Asia-Pacific studies, U.S. Naval War College................... 7
Ms. Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow, Freeman chair in China studies,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 14
Richard Cronin, Ph.D., director, Southeast Asia Program, Stimson
Center......................................................... 24
Mr. Peter Brookes, senior fellow, National Security Affairs, The
Heritage Foundation (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs)......................... 44
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Toshi Yoshihara, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 9
Ms. Bonnie Glaser: Prepared statement............................ 16
Richard Cronin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 26
Mr. Peter Brookes: Prepared statement............................ 46
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 76
Hearing minutes.................................................. 77
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress
from American Samoa: Prepared statement........................ 79
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 81
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Dan Burton, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana........... 82
Written responses to questions submitted by the Honorable Dan
Burton received from:
Toshi Yoshihara, Ph.D...................................... 83
Ms. Bonnie Glaser.......................................... 85
Richard Cronin, Ph.D....................................... 87
BEIJING AS AN EMERGING POWER IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2012
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman,
for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize
for 3 minutes the vice chair and the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Asia. I will then recognize other members
seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our
witnesses. And without objection, the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made a part of the record. And members may
have 5 days to insert statements or questions for the record.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes.
This hearing convenes just as the long festering issue of
the South China Sea has once again boiled to the surface. While
the world's attention has turned to other crises, including
Iran's nuclear program and concerns over the faltering euro,
China has upped the ante, playing the role of a schoolyard
bully toward its maritime neighbors. From one end to the other
of the South China Sea, Beijing has increased both in
belligerence and in bellicosity. Even Chinese Government
officials, press, and bloggers incited anti-Japanese feelings
to such a fever pitch that there were anti-Japanese riots in
Chinese cities just last month.
We have news for those bullies in Beijing. The United
States stands by our friends and allies in the Philippines and
Japan. The United States Navy will continue to preserve the
peace in the Pacific waters, including the South China Sea, as
it has done since the end of the Second World War. Beijing also
apparently looked with trepidation on the Secretary of State's
visit to the Cook Islands to attend a Pacific Islands
conference before her stop in Beijing. Beijing has hoped, since
2005, to entice our Pacific allies away from a honey pot of
$600 million in economic assistance and low interest loans. Our
greatest generation, however, did not fight its way from island
to island across the Pacific, from Midway to Guadalcanal to Iwo
Jima only to see their descendants pushed back across the
Pacific by a flood of Chinese cash.
Why are the South China Sea and other waters so central to
the Chinese communist mandarins' aspirations to reestablish the
Middle Kingdom as the dominant power in Asia? Well, these are
the waterways which control the trade and commerce for some of
the most dynamic economies in the world, located in both
Southeast and Northeast Asia. These are the sea lanes through
which vast amounts of fossil fuel are shipped, which energize
the economies of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Whoever
controls these sea lanes can dominate Asia and beyond by
choking off that commerce of oil shipments to the major
stakeholders in the Asian economic miracle.
China, traditionally a land power as symbolized by its
great wall land barrier, has only recently turned its eyes to
the seas. This emerging Chinese sea power was originally
directed toward eventual domination of Taiwan by a potential
naval blockade. The rumored name of Beijing's first aircraft
carrier is to be that of a Chinese Admiral who led a sea
invasion of Taiwan over three centuries ago. But Beijing's
ambitions for a blue water Navy now extend far beyond the
Taiwan Strait. China has forward deployed its sea power in the
resource-rich South China Sea, engaging in naval confrontation
in 2009 with not only the U.S. Naval ship Impeccable, built in
my home State of Florida, but more recently, with the
Philippines and Vietnam as well.
Beijing has adopted an equally aggressive stance toward
America's ally Japan in the East China Sea, and has objected to
U.S. Naval cooperation in the Yellow Sea with our South Korean
ally. Beijing seeks to dominate its maritime negotiations with
its neighbors by picking them off one by one rather than
engaging in the code of conduct regarding the South China Sea.
Nationalistic young Chinese military officers also have
reportedly been eagerly studying the century-old writings on
sea power of an American Admiral. Admiral Mahan's theory, as
discussed in Red Star Over the Pacific, written by one of our
witnesses today, reportedly drew the connection between
thriving commerce and naval supremacy. As the United States
seeks to restore our citizens' economic well-being, commercial
ties with the dynamic economies of East and Southeast Asia
become paramount. Beijing seeks domination of not only the
South China Sea, but also of the Western Pacific. Therefore,
the possibility of naval clashes steadily increases. A
situation where the escalating naval arms race takes place in
order to control the ocean highways of global commerce is not
in the interests of the people of the United States, nor of the
people of Asia.
Other global crises must not distract from our vital
national security interests in the South China Sea and the
Western Pacific. We cannot be indifferent to the potential
placement in harm's way of our sailors and those of our allies
like the 46 young South Korean sailors who perished at sea 2
years ago. We should take a moment to honor the men and women
in our Armed Forces who, since the days of Pearl Harbor, have
served to maintain the peace in the Asia-Pacific region.
As an old naval hymn States, ``Oh, hear us when we cry to
Thee, for those in peril on the sea.'' I look forward to
hearing from our distinguished set of panelists on how best to
address China's growing challenge to America's naval strategy.
And now I turn to my friend from California, the
distinguished ranking member, for his opening remarks. Mr.
Berman is recognized.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And my
poetry will not be up to yours today, but I thank you very much
for calling the timely hearing. Over the past few months,
tensions in the South China Sea have escalated. In the past,
territorial disputes in the region have been contained after
cooler heads prevailed and diplomatic solutions achieved. And I
hope this current situation follows a similar pattern. But what
is different this time is that the tensions have been stoked by
China's increasingly aggressive actions.
Five other countries, along with China, claim ownership of
parts of the South China Sea. But China's territorial claims
are unusually expansive and intentionally vague. And while
China is not the only claiming country to take unilateral
actions to assert its control over territory and resources,
Beijing's actions are, by far, the most provocative. China has
threatened and damaged foreign ships, unilaterally declared a
fishing ban for part of the year in half of the South China
Sea, and arrested foreign fishermen who did not comply.
Beijing has also increasingly militarized the region. It
has established a new military garrison in the Paracel Islands,
and announced the beginning of regular combat-ready patrols in
disputed areas of the South China Sea. These actions run
directly counter to the diplomatic efforts to resolve
differences, and risk further heightening regional tensions.
They also undermine Beijing's assurances to its neighbors and
the world that China seeks a peaceful rise. The immediate
priority in the South China Sea is to deescalate tensions and
to encourage all parties to refrain from taking tit-for-tat
actions that could lead to conflict. Stepping back from the
crisis is in all parties' interests, as the potential costs of
conflict in the region far outweigh any of the potential
economic benefits contained in the sea bed of the South China
Sea.
The political leadership in the claiming countries should
also make efforts to cool domestic public opinion, which is
stoked by strident nationalist sentiments. The United States
has a strong national interest in the maintenance of peace and
stability, freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce,
and ensuring a peaceful resolution of claims in the South China
Sea accepted by all countries.
Secretary Clinton and other top officials in the Obama
administration have repeatedly made clear to Beijing that we
will not allow China to assert its hegemony over the region,
and we must continue to press China to resolve its claims
peacefully.
I thank the panel of experts for being here with us today.
I look forward to your testimony and hearing what steps can be
taken to ensure that the South China Sea does not devolve into
hostile conflict. And I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Thank
you for holding this hearing. Obviously, China is an issue, and
the Chinese expansionism is an issue that I have been deeply
involved in over the years. But let me just state, in light of
today's horrible news from the Middle East, that this
administration's response to the murder of our Ambassador, and
yes, his staff, in Libya, as well as the burning down of the
consulate there and the storming of our Embassy in Cairo, the
response of this administration has not been acceptable. It
suggested, the response suggested an understanding of Muslim
rage toward a negative portrayal of their religion. There is no
understanding of that type of violence. And this is not seen as
a sensitivity by the Muslim world. It is seen as a weakness
toward their most radical elements.
This administration has refused to call these type of
murders over the years, whether it is a Muslim terrorist or
whether it is Chinese militarists in the South China Sea, by
their right name. We should have the courage to stand up or we
will not have a peaceful world.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Faleomavaega is recognized. He is the ranking member on
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Madam Chair, I want to thank you and our
ranking member, Mr. Berman, for your leadership and support of
H.R. 6313. I would also like to ask unanimous consent that the
full text of my statement be added to the record.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And I want to thank you. For the 30
seconds that I have remaining, I don't have much else to say
other than to express my deepest----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Faleomavaega, excuse me if I
interrupt, you have more time because of your position as the
ranking member.
Mr. Faleomavaega. As I was saying, even though things like
this happen, I want to say that for those of us as members of
the committee who have had opportunities in visiting our
Embassies and consulates throughout the world, I know and I
share with your sentiments, and Ranking Member Berman, of what
has happened in this tragedy. And as a member of the committee,
I do want to express our deepest condolences and sympathies to
the late Ambassador, Chris Stevens, and the three members of
our Embassy staff who were killed in this senseless violence
that just occurred.
As I am sure those feelings are the same for all the
members of the committee. Madam Chair, not wanting to detract
from the purpose of our meeting this morning, the United States
does have a national security and economic interest in what is
happening now in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or
the Yellow Sea, or has often occurred.
South China Sea contains vital commercial shipping lanes
and points of access between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
Ocean. It provides maritime lifeline to Taiwan, to Japan, and
to the Korean Peninsula. While China, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei have disputed territorial claims,
China claims most of the 648,000 square miles of the South
China Sea, more than any other Nation involved in these
disputes. China's claim, if enacted, would make Vietnam a land-
locked country, and this is neither right nor fair. Madam
Chair, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this
morning. This issue is very serious. I certainly hope that
China would use better discretion to finding a resolution to
this very serious matter. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr.
Faleomavaega.
Mr. Turner of New York is recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am interested in
hearing what our expert witnesses have to say, particularly in
regard to the consequences of a reduced Navy presence and a
reduced Navy budget. Also, I would like to hear what they have
to say about the potential of cooperation with Japan and South
Korea, rich nations that could do more in naval defense, and if
there is a great potential for that. I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Mr. Keating is
recognized.
Mr. Keating. Madam Chair, I will yield back my time. I
would like to hear from our witnesses.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. Yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mrs. Schmidt.
Mrs. Schmidt. First, I want to send my condolences to the
people in Libya, our American Embassy people who have been
mortally wounded and those that have died. It was an
unthinkable act. And we all need to pray for their families as
we go forward. I am looking forward to the hearing today. It is
very important to keep all waters open as we move toward global
trade more and more actively every day. So I am looking forward
to hearing from the witnesses. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. I will echo all of those who have expressed
our regret and sadness at the events in Benghazi, the death of
Ambassador Chris Stevens. As it happens, my wife is a diplomat
with the State Department. I have always known that that is
both important and sometimes dangerous work. As to the issue
that is before us today, I echo Mr. Turner in stating that we
ought to be focusing a bit on burden sharing. We did in the
Cold War against the Soviet Union. And those nations in the
Asia-Pacific region, particularly those that have concerns
about Chinese expansionary claims, ought to be devoting a
reasonable portion of their GDP to their own naval defense. And
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Duncan
of South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I echo my
colleagues' concern about the events on the ground in Libya and
Egypt, and just want to express my sympathy for those who have
lost lives and families that are concerned around the world. I
visited with the Filipinos in June 2011. And their concerns
were the Chinese excursion into the South China Sea,
specifically around the Spratlys. And while the Chinese were
there, the available, potential resources that might be
available there. We see China going all around the world
gobbling up access to minerals. And I think this is an example.
I would love to hear more about that in this hearing. I yield
back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr.
Fortenberry, the vice chair on the Subcommittee on Africa,
Global Health, and Human Rights, is recognized.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for
earlier having a moment of silence in memory of our lost
diplomats. I would like to turn my opening comments and my
opening here to that situation. Last year an intense debate was
underway in Congress as to how to respond to the turmoil in
Libya. The imminent slaughter of the people of Benghazi by
former dictator Qadhafi led the United States to sustain a NATO
coalition to stop the bloodshed. Now our Ambassador, Chris
Stevens, is dead, killed by the very people that we saved.
Americans can tolerate ingratitude, we can tolerate insult, but
we cannot tolerate the senseless killing of the official
representative of our country and those who served with him,
three others.
The governing structures of Libya must respond in the
strongest way. They should publicly state their condemnation
and commitment to restoring order. Democracy is not an
election, it is the understanding of the protection of the
inherent dignity and rights of each person within the
structures that bring about the just rule of law. We honor
Ambassador Stevens, Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith, and two
others whose names I do not yet have for their heroic service.
And may they rest in peace. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Fortenberry. Well said. And the Chair--I am sorry, Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Kelly yields back. Thank you. The Chair is pleased to
welcome our witnesses. First we welcome Professor Toshi
Yoshihara. Thank you, Professor. He is the John A. Van Beuren
chair of the Asia-Pacific studies at the U.S. Naval War
College, and an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies
Institute at the War College. Dr. Yoshihara is most recently
the co-author of ``Red Star Over the Pacific: China's Rise and
the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy,'' to which I referred
to in my remarks. His articles on maritime issues and naval
strategy have appeared in numerous journals and periodicals. We
welcomes you, Professor.
Then we will hear from Bonnie Glaser, who is a senior
fellow and the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Prior to joining CSIS, Dr.
Glaser served as a consultant for various U.S. Government
offices, including the Departments of Defense and State. She is
currently a board member of the U.S. Committee on the Council
for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific, and is a member of
the Council of Foreign Relations.
I am pleased to welcome Dr. Richard Cronin, the director of
the Southeast Asia Program at the Stimson Center. Dr. Cronin
works on trans-boundary and nontraditional security issues in
Southeast Asia from a political economic standpoint. He joined
the Stimson Center after a long career at the Congressional
Research Service. We welcome you, Dr. Cronin.
And we welcome back Mr. Peter Brookes to our committee, a
senior fellow for national security affairs at the Heritage
Foundation. Previously, Mr. Brookes served as the deputy
assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in
the George W. Bush administration, and previously a
professional staff member of this committee. A retired
decorated Navy commander, Mr. Brookes served in active duty in
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.
So we will welcome all of our witnesses today. And I ask
that you keep your presentations to no more than 5 minutes. And
without objection, your entire statements will be inserted into
the hearing record. Dr. Yoshihara, we will proceed with you.
Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF TOSHI YOSHIHARA, PH.D., PROFESSOR, JOHN A. VAN
BEUREN CHAIR OF ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Mr. Yoshihara. Thank you for having me. Madam Chair and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
share my views on China's maritime strategy and what it means
for the future of the South China Sea. The following remarks,
which express my views alone and do not represent the views of
the U.S. Navy, summarize the prepared statement submitted to
the committee.
In my judgment, China's recent assertiveness in the South
China Sea is a harbinger of things to come. Beijing's sea power
project has opened up new strategic vistas for Chinese leaders
and military commanders. With larger and more capable seagoing
forces at its disposal, Beijing is well positioned to fashion
sophisticated strategies that will be more effective and
equally difficult to counter.
Before delving into Chinese strategy, I think it is worth
emphasizing the material dimension of Chinese sea power, which
is providing Beijing with the tools to pursue its ambitions.
Sea power is more than just a navy. Rather, it is a continuum
that gives Beijing a range of options. And China is modernizing
and expanding across the board, from its navy to its sister
services, to its civilian agencies. In short, Beijing already
possesses diverse elements of sea power to defends its nautical
prerogatives.
Let me now turn to the challenges that Beijing's burgeoning
sea power already poses to the region. For the purposes of this
testimony, I would like to confine my remarks to strategies
that China has already employed or is in a position to
implement vis-a-vis weaker local players in Southeast Asia.
In the event of crises between China and relatively weak
southeast Asian powers, innovative combinations of military
forces could be used to compel the will of Beijing's southern
neighbors. Consider the anti-ship ballistic missile, a
maneuverable ballistic missile capable of hitting moving
targets at sea. If it performs as advertised, the reach of such
shore fire support over the entire South China Sea would ease
the burdens on the Chinese fleet, while applying constant
pressure on challengers to Beijing's interests in peacetime.
This type of gunboat diplomacy with Chinese characteristics is
conceivable in the future.
China's ability to exercise the nonmilitary elements of its
sea power was on full display during the standoff with the
Philippines this past spring. The Scarborough Shoal face-off
involved Coast Guard-like noncombat vessels. Employing non-navy
assets revealed a sophisticated, methodical strategy for
securing China's maritime claims. The use of nonmilitary means
eschews escalation, while ensuring that disputes remain
localized. Specifically, it deprives the United States the
rationales to step in on behalf of embattled capitals in the
region.
At the same time, noncombat ships empower Beijing to exert
low grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South
China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe
weaknesses while testing political resolve. Keeping disputes at
a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative
to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.
A series of showdowns may pass without an end in sight, or
any tangible gain for China. But the cumulative effects of a
continuing stalemate could induce strategic fatigue that, in
turn, advances China's aims. Short of a shooting war, Chinese
provocations are too slight for the United States to intervene
militarily.
As China pushes and probes, the prospects of recurring
confrontations with little hope of direct U.S. intervention
could weigh heavily on Southeast Asian capitals. Applied with
discipline and patience, such a strategy of exhaustion could
gradually erode regional confidence and undermine the political
will to resist.
Fortunately, there is still time. China is at least a
decade from amassing the type of preponderant sea power that
can keep the United States out of the South China Sea while
running roughshod over Southeast Asian states. In the meantime,
Washington can adopt measures to ensure that regional
submission to China's wishes is not a foregone conclusion.
First, Washington and its allies and friends should
actively help Southeast Asian states help themselves. Local
actors must possess some indigenous capability to cope with
Chinese encroachments at sea.
Second, the United States should encourage the development
of a region-wide information sharing arrangement to keep track
of China's maritime forces.
Third, the United States should draw up plans that would
enable the rapid deployment of units armed with maritime strike
capability on friendly or allied soil. Finally, the U.S. Navy
should revisit prevailing assumptions about sea control. A far
more lethal nautical environment lies in store for a service
long accustomed to uncontested waters.
Raising the cost of China's assertiveness in the South
China Sea would complicate Beijing's calculus, while inclining
Chinese leaders to think twice before they act. Inducing
Chinese caution, moreover, would apply a brake to Beijing's
momentum at sea, brightening the prospects for restoring
equilibrium to the region and for retaking the strategic
initiative. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Professor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoshihara follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Ms. Glaser, thank you.
STATEMENT OF MS. BONNIE GLASER, SENIOR FELLOW, FREEMAN CHAIR IN
CHINA STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Glaser. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman,
distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to appear
before your committee today to provide testimony on China as an
emerging power in the South China Sea. The territorial and
maritime disputes in the South China Sea pose a major test of
China's peaceful rise. In my written testimony, I list numerous
examples of recent destabilizing activity in the region. And I
conclude that there is a negative action-reaction cycle in the
South China Sea. However, it is important to note that China's
claims, policies, ambitions, behavior, and capabilities are
significantly different from those of other actors.
China's 9-dash line claim is expansive and vague. Beijing
resists engaging in multilateral discussions on the territorial
and maritime disputes in the region, preferring bilateral
mechanisms where it can apply leverage over smaller, weaker
parties.
China's behavior in the South China Sea is deliberate and
systematic. Its actions are not the unintentional result of
bureaucratic politics and poor coordination. The clear pattern
of bullying and intimidation of other claimants is evidence of
a top leadership decision to escalate China's coercive
diplomacy. This has implications not only for the Philippines
and Vietnam, the primary targets of China's coercive efforts,
it also has broader regional and global implications.
First, China's propensity to flout international laws and
norms is worrisome, and it sets bad precedents. The result of
Beijing's refusal to abide by its verbal agreement with Manila
to withdraw all of its ships from the lagoon in the area around
Scarborough Shoal is that a new status quo has been established
that favors Chinese interests. No country has publicly
condemned this action, and this has set a dangerous precedent.
Second, China's increased willingness to employ economic
leverage to coerce countries to modify their policies in
accordance with Beijing's wishes is a worrying trend. China's
move to quarantine imported tropical fruit from the Philippines
to pressure it to cede control over Scarborough Shoal was a
flagrant breach of international norms. And this follows
Chinese blocking of rare earth minerals to Japan in retaliation
for Tokyo's detention of the captain of a Chinese fishing
trawler in 2010.
If China's economic coercion continues to go unchallenged,
undoubtedly such tactics will be used again and again. And a
growing number of nations in the world whose economies are
increasingly dependent on trade with China are vulnerable to
such pressure. Third, China's unwillingness to undertake
serious diplomacy to resolve disputes should be a cause for
concern, along with its rejection of a rules-based framework
that would restrain the actions of all parties. In the future,
China will not only be a major economic power, but also a major
political and military power. Beijing calculates that time is
on its side, and it does not want to be constrained by binding
agreements.
It is my estimation that China's pattern of assertive
behavior on issues related to sovereignty will continue after
the Chinese leadership transition takes place for the following
reasons: First, legitimacy. Because the party bases its
legitimacy in large part on nationalist credentials, no Chinese
leaders will take early steps to curb domestic pressure to
firmly defend Chinese sovereignty territorial integrity.
Second, personality. Xi Jinping is widely believed to be highly
self-confident. He is likely to stand up for Chinese interests
in the international arena, especially those deemed to be
China's core interests, which include issues related to
sovereignty.
And third, interests. Beijing has drawn the conclusion that
Deng Xiaoping's policy toward managing the South China Sea
disputes has failed. A new, tougher policy will likely emerge
after the leadership transition.
Finally, I would like to offer a few policy
recommendations. The Obama administration has rightfully
enunciated a set of principles to guide behavior in the South
China Sea. It is important that the U.S. hew closely to these
principles and censure any party that acts contrary to them.
Being objective and fair will give credibility to the U.S.
policy. Secondly, the U.S. should urge all claimants to the
South China Sea to bring their maritime claims in conformity
with the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. It should then
encourage joint development agreements to extract resources.
Third, the U.S. should continue to press China and ASEAN to
initiate negotiations on a code of conduct that contains a
dispute settlement mechanism. Once the process of negotiation
begins, it is likely to have a calming effect that will defuse
tensions. Fourth, it is imperative that the U.S. continue to
strengthen our economic, diplomatic, and military engagement in
East Asia. The rebalancing of U.S. strategic priorities to Asia
is essential to ensure that the peace and stability that has
prevailed in the region for the past two decades endures.
And finally, the United States should ratify the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea to increase the effectiveness
of U.S. efforts to pursue a rules-based approach to managing
and resolving disputes over maritime jurisdiction. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Dr. Cronin.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD CRONIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, SOUTHEAST ASIA
PROGRAM, STIMSON CENTER
Mr. Cronin. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Bring the microphone closer to you.
Mr. Cronin. Yes, I will. Thank you. I am pleased and
honored to have an opportunity to testify on this very
important and even urgent issue. If I may say a word about the
Stimson Center. We are a non-profit, nonpartisan institution
devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a
unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach. Stimson's
approach is pragmatic, geared toward providing policy
alternatives, solving problems, and overcoming obstacles to a
more peaceful and secure world. I am speaking for myself, and
not Stimson, but my remarks are intended to contribute to these
objectives.
China's rise and its ambitions to make up for past
centuries of humiliation and become the dominant power in East
Asia and Southeast Asia is probably the most important
geostrategic issue facing the United States in the 21st
century. In the South China Sea and elsewhere, including other
parts of East Asia, the maritime territorial disputes are the
product of a shrinking world and a combination of natural
resources that have ever increasing value because of the fast
growing imbalances between supply and demand. For the United
States, as well as China's neighbors, the most challenging
aspect is its lack of commitment to a rules-based international
system except as serves its perceived national interests. This
aspect of Beijing's policies and actions is nowhere more
apparent and challenging than in the case of the South China
Sea, which is a locus of serious and potentially volatile
maritime territorial disputes.
Of particular concern to the United States, which maintains
a significant military presence in the region, is the fact that
China is seeking to redefine the very definition of
international waters, traditionally known as the high seas, by
asserting rights of sovereignty where none exist. While the
Chinese Government has negotiated and committed to numerous
international agreements, based on prevailing international
laws, rules and practices, its strong preference, as Bonnie has
already pointed out, is for bilateral agreements based on
political relationships and power disparities that favor China
rather than multilateral agreements that are based on
established rules and norms. These tendencies are particularly
troubling in China's expansive claims in the semi-enclosed
South China Sea, one of the world's most geographically and
commercially important bodies. The South China Sea has globally
important fisheries and undersea oil deposits and gas, which
are still largely unexplored, but already vital to the energy
needs and economies of five other coastal and archipelagic
neighbors, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the
Philippines.
Since about 2009, incidents at sea involving China and
several neighbors, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, have
become more frequent and more serious. And I will skip
describing the situation at Scarborough Shoal with the
Philippines and other incidents with Vietnam in the interests
of time. The single greatest obstacle to resolving maritime
disputes in the South China Sea is a fundamental divide between
China on one side and the Southeast Asian claimants on the
other over both competing territorial claims and the rights to
the seas around them. Most of the current issues relate to
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, commonly known as UNCLOS, as has already been mentioned.
The main purpose of UNCLOS was to bring order to a chaotic
rush involving numerous coastal nations, including the United
States, during the Truman administration to lay claim to
offshore natural resources that was already underway. UNCLOS
has served its purpose well in generating recognized EEZs, that
is exclusive economic zones, and facilitating resolution of
disputes in many parts of the world that has become a huge
source of contention in the South China Sea.
The most controversial issue of principle in international
law is China's claim to roughly 90 percent of the South China
Sea on the basis of past discovery and historical use. To the
consternation of every other South China Sea neighbor, and with
no basis under UNCLOS or any other international law, China's
maps include a so-called U-shaped line colloquially known as
the Cow's Tongue because of its drooping shape. There is a map
in my testimony on this with this line. And on one hand it is a
subject of derision by every country, but on the other hand,
the Chinese are not only--it is not only a nominal notion of
their claim, but as you may know recently, China actually
announced the opening of nine oil development blocks
essentially where the line cuts deeply into Vietnam's economic
zone in the Continental Shelf.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. If you could wrap up, Dr. Cronin.
Mr. Cronin. Pardon?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. If you could wrap up.
Mr. Cronin. Okay. I will wrap up. Thank you very much. In
my statement, I talk about the negative impact on ASEAN, which
I think everyone is aware, including the failure to achieve a
communique, a final communique at the ASEAN meetings in Phnom
Penh this summer, this July. The other thing that I have
written about and would mention is simply that China's
declaration of the so-called Sansha City, which is on a tiny
Yongxing Island, otherwise known as Woody Island, that
effectively creates an administrative zone over not only the
islands of the South China Sea, but also submerged areas like
the Macclesfield Bank, and of course the Scarborough Shoal.
In my testimony, there is a map showing which countries
occupy which islands in the sea. So, okay, let me just wrap up
then in this way.
U.S. policy implications--in my statement, I have kept
remarks on U.S. policy relatively brief, thinking it might be
more useful to discuss this issue in response to your questions
and comments. With its rising naval power, China could, in
theory, enforce its claims despite the complaints of its
neighbors, but only at serious risk to other important
equities, Chinese equities, starting with the desire not to
unite its neighbors against it. The commitment of the United
States not to be pushed out of the South China Sea, including
the so-called rebalancing of U.S. military forces toward the
Asia-Pacific region, also has a deterrent effect, much as China
rails against what it sees as a growing U.S. effort to contain
China and deny it the fruits of its rising power status.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Dr. Cronin.
Mr. Cronin. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Mr. Brookes.
STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BROOKES, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (FORMER DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS)
Mr. Brookes. Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the
committee. Thank you for the kind invitation to appear today.
It is great to be back in the committee room after an absence.
I want to commend the committee for holding this timely hearing
today. It is very important. I am glad you are here doing that.
The views I express today are mine, and do not reflect those of
any of the organizations I may be associated with, including
the Heritage Foundation. Based on the thoughtful testimony so
far, I feel like everything has been said, but not everybody
has said it. With that in mind, let me make a few points which
I think will complement my written testimony.
First, I would suggest that China is not an emerging power.
Outside the United States, it is the major or dominant power in
the South China Sea. We should fully recognize that. As a major
power, China has arrived. China is developing a navy and air
force, including missiles, that will be able to assert China's
claims in the South China Sea. Their aircraft carrier, of which
there may eventually be a number, their ballistic missile
programs, stealth fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Absent
significant U.S. basing in Southeast Asia, China's aircraft
carrier program, when fully operational, I think could be a
game changer. While China will seek to assert its claims
peacefully, Beijing could easily militarize the situation.
In any case, other regional players already know of China's
growing military capabilities and will be deterred by them. I
think the Chinese actions in the South China Sea put the matter
of China's peaceful rise into serious question. The question,
of course, is what to do about it. Here are some ideas which go
beyond my written testimony. It is my sense that friends and
allies in the region need diplomatic reassurance about our
enduring presence in the region. I sense we are trying do this.
The question is about its effectiveness. Do they really believe
it? I sense people are really, really nervous about the
American presence, future presence in the region, as well as
the rise of China. But my real concern is our ability to
project force into the South China Sea with the looming budget
cuts and sequestration that face us in January under the Budget
Control Act.
You all know the numbers. I don't need to tell you about
the defense budget and the effects on our force structure and
what they might be, especially for our Navy, especially as a
Navy veteran. With budget cuts and other global commitments and
obligations, that powerful pivot we talk about may be little
more than a pirouette. Diplomacy is always more effective when
backed up by a strong national defense. We also must take steps
to distance ourselves from the notion that America is in
decline, especially in Asia. Unfortunately, in some corners I
think that is the perception. Strong American leadership is
required, whether we are talking about Asia or anywhere else in
the world. Of course, any and all of these actions meant to
stem perceptions of the Sun setting on America in the Pacific
will be helped by returning this Nation to economic vitality,
which undergirds our political and military power. Thank you,
Madam Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you for
excellent testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brookes follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I will begin the question and answer
segment. Our Defense Department issued an annual report on
military and security developments in the People's Republic of
China. And it discussed in detail the construction of this new
naval base in the South China Sea. And our report states that
the base is large enough to accommodate the mix of nuclear
power attack and ballistic missile submarines and advanced
surface combatants, including aircraft carriers.
Submarine tunnel facilities at the base could also enable
deployments from this facility with reduced risk of detection.
So I ask the panelists, could the continued Chinese naval
build-up in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific
eventually limit our U.S. Navy ability to patrol these waters,
which would, of course, adversely impact the security and
economic well-being of the American people and our allies in
the Asian and Pacific region?
And secondly, about the U.S. allies' naval confrontation
with China, looking at what has just been happening recently,
in April Chinese maritime surveillance vessels began a 10-day
standoff with a Philippine coast guard cutter in the South
China Sea. Then in July, Chinese patrol boats had a similar
confrontation with the Japanese coast guard in the East China
Sea. And last December, the captain of a Chinese fishing boat,
illegally poaching in the Yellow Sea, killed a South Korean
coast guard officer.
So if a naval confrontation between Chinese vessels and a
U.S. treaty ally such as the Philippines, Japan, or South Korea
ever results in an exchange of gunfire, what are the treaty
obligations of the United States Navy to come to the assistance
of these allies? We will begin with the professor.
Mr. Yoshihara. Thank you for those questions. Let me focus
my attention on your first question about the Chinese naval
buildup in the South China Sea. I think it is very important to
note as a premise that the South China Sea is sort of a
strategic pivot. It is a body of water that connects the
Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It is at the junction of
these two very important oceans that supports trade between
Europe, Middle East, and East Asia, as well as trans-Pacific
trade. So having command or having the capacity to control
events in the South China Sea would give China tremendous
amounts of strategic influence and power. Here are a couple of
things that motivate China to, in fact, continue this buildup.
First of all, having a naval base in Sanya on Hainan Island
gives China an additional naval option with their nuclear
attack submarines. These nuclear attack submarines can be used,
for example, to break out into the Western Pacific to deter
U.S. naval operations and air operations and other military
operations related----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I going to interrupt you there,
Professor, just to give the others a chance, if I may. Thank
you. Ms. Glaser.
Ms. Glaser. Yes. First, I would say briefly the United
States overall will face Chinese growing military capabilities
a less permissive environment. It will be more costly for the
United States to exercise the kind of sea control we have now
in the future. And we will have to think through what is the
best way to address that. The capabilities that China is
deploying in Hainan is just among those capabilities.
There are, of course, many more: Development of ballistic
and cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons, et cetera.
Regarding your second question, I am not an attorney, and the
interpretation of the law is important when we look at
treaties. But administration officials of course have made
clear that we do have treaty obligations to Japan in the case
of the Senkakus.
We remain neutral, of course, on the sovereignty over those
islands. But we do recognize that the Japanese have
administrative control over those islands. And so if the
islands were attacked, the United States, my understanding, is
obligated under Article 5 of that treaty. It is a bit less
certain I think in the case of the Philippines. There isn't the
same language in the treaty that refers to administrative
control.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I will just interrupt you
there a second.
Ms. Glaser. Can I just finish just this sentence?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Yes.
Ms. Glaser. Sorry. I was just going to add if the
Philippines' naval forces were attacked, regardless of where
they were, I do believe that we would have an obligation to
come to their defense.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Dr. Cronin, a minute.
Mr. Cronin. I will just leave the military issues to the
military experts, except to say that obviously, the U.S.-China
military balance, if you will, is a distinct issue, but it is
also connected to the politics of the region and our
relationships with not only China, but with our allies and
partners. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Brookes.
Mr. Brookes. We face the tyranny of distance in the
Pacific. And if we don't have the correct number of platforms--
--
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Tyranny of distance.
Mr. Brookes. Tyranny of distance, that is right, when
people talk about that because it is such a big theater. If we
don't have the numbers of platforms needed to project that
power, if we don't have the basing for refurbishment and
replenishment, we can't be a player. On the treaty, I would
suggest that you ask the Congressional Research Service to tell
you that. I have always operated under the belief that all of
our treaty obligations, including those of NATO, require us to
go through our constitutional processes of each country before
any action would be taken, military or otherwise.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. I am pleased to
yield to Mr. Berman for his question-and-answer period.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Dr. Cronin
near the end of his testimony seemed to be saying that China's
activities in the South China Sea sort of are constrained by
its desire not to see all of its neighbors united against it. I
would like the panelists to react to that. I look at it, and I
am wondering does China really have that constraint on them
these days, or do they not think that they can pretty much do
what they want to do here because of some combination of their
military power and their economic power and their political
power is going to keep that from happening? I am curious.
Ms. Glaser, perhaps you or others could just react to this
constraint that presumably exists on China's behavior.
Mr. Yoshihara. Just very briefly, at least in terms of
certain segments of China's strategic community, there is a
belief that China's time has come, that China has already
risen, and that it is time to shed this notion that China
should keep low until it becomes powerful enough. I think there
are those in China's strategic community that believe that
China is already powerful enough. And some of the disturbing
statements that we have heard that small powers had better
listen to big powers are thinly veiled sort of, you know,
threats to the smaller states that the power that China has
accrued has increasingly given it the capacity to essentially
coerce and intimidate its neighbors.
Mr. Berman. Is that an open question in China, or is that a
strategy that has been now incorporated?
Mr. Yoshihara. It certainly is an active debate. I think
there are those who have said that Chinese actions today are
really jumping the gun, and that China should slow down and
seek to walk the dog back. But there is clearly an active
component of that debate that says that China should push
forward.
Ms. Glaser. Yes, Congressman Berman, very good question.
Thank you for that question. I agree with Dr. Yoshihara in some
regards, but I believe that the resource question here is very
critical. The Chinese believe that other countries in the
region are developing these resources in what the Chinese view
as disputed areas. And they are no longer going to tolerate it.
The leadership does have to balance the growing nationalist
sentiments against the longer term need to have good relations
with its neighbors. But I think that the Chinese believe that
if they can intimidate the United States, and I would agree
with Mr. Brookes that they see the United States as weak and
potentially in decline, they can compel their neighbors to
accommodate to China's rise and to respect Chinese core
interests. And I do believe that we need to stand up to that,
and the nations in the region need to stand up to that.
Mr. Berman. But does that provide an opening for a strategy
of joint resource development, something that the U.S. could
seek to encourage and facilitate?
Ms. Glaser. Absolutely. And I mentioned that in my oral
remarks. I do believe that resource development by all the
countries, all of the claimants, would be a very, very good
outcome. But the preconditions are that there must be a setting
aside of sovereignty claims. And at the moment, that appears to
be quite difficult.
If we can get all of the claimants first to agree to set
aside sovereignty and begin to put forward some good models of
resource development--and there are a few that already exist,
for example--but none that include China, then perhaps China
could be brought along. But I think joint resource development
would be a very positive outcome.
Mr. Cronin. Thank you, Congressman Berman.
In the interest of time, I didn't round out my full
statement, which is in my written statement, but it would seem
at this point yes, China is sort of losing, running amuck and
losing a sense of the politics of the region and what kind of
relationship it wants to have with its neighbors.
But I also think this is a very peculiar time right now.
This has been a summer of many different voices in China, many
different power centers being active. And now we have this very
strange situation of the presumed next premier and party leader
disappearing.
Mr. Berman. It is a bad back. Everybody can understand
that.
Mr. Cronin. A bad back, right.
I mean, a lot of things are going on in China's politics
right now. And one of the things, the international crisis
group, a point that they have made and others have made, there
are like seven different agencies and departments involved in
making and carrying out Chinese policy in the South China Sea,
maritime policy. There is a big coordination issue there.
Now, having said that, you know, it does look like this is
receding right now in terms of China's concerns, that is
relations with its neighbors. However, there are a couple of
practical issues, I think, that do argue for the possibility of
joint development. And one is, for instance, all of the
countries understand the issue, including China, of fishery
depletion and the need to do something about that. And China
imposes unilaterally fishing bans and the neighbors don't like
that. But in general, the neighbors have a common interest in
that.
The other thing is the oil and gas. You can't just barge in
and get the oil and gas out without big problems. Just if I
could to say, one thing about setting aside sovereignty, which
Bonnie has mentioned, yes, the problem so far, though, is there
have been three or four different initiatives with co-
development, including one with the Japanese. And in every
case, the issue is China keeps insisting--in other words, China
is saying to its neighbors what is mine is mine; what is yours,
we can co-develop because it keeps insisting on the sovereignty
issue.
Mr. Berman. Got it. Mr. Brookes.
Mr. Brookes. In Beijing's mind, the South China Sea is not
disputed; it is Chinese territory. I mean, this goes back to
when they would have their historic claims, they would base
this on the Republic of China's claim going back to the 1930s
and maps that were developed then, and even in the 1940s. They
are hoping for acquiescence.
These fishery ships, these maritime patrol vessels are
basically wolves in sheep's clothing. They will militarize the
situation if they have to. But my view is they are trying to
prevent counterbalancing because this falls into everybody's
fears about China. And so what they are doing is if people will
give, they will take. What they really don't want is major
powers and the United States to seriously counterbalance
against China's efforts in Asia, East Asia generally.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Kelly, the vice chair on the Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific is recognized.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you all for
being here today.
On August 6, Taiwan's President Ma issued an East China Sea
Peace Initiative which calls upon all the parties to--the chair
will dispute--in the East China Sea, to put aside their
differences, embark on a peaceful dialogue and cooperate to
develop natural resources in the area. We will start with you,
Mr. Brookes, how do you assess President Ma's initiative?
Mr. Brookes. I was actually in Taiwan last week. He also
made a trip to the Diaoyutai Islands, which some people
consider to be somewhat provocative. I have looked at this East
Asian Peace Initiative, and he basically says put sovereignty
aside and let's try to co-develop these sort of things. China
and Taiwan's claims are basically the same, going back to the
Republic of China. I think any good idea should be looked at.
The question is whether the Chinese are willing to work
along with them, or work with them. In fact, I understand the
Chinese have actually approached the Taiwanese about working
together because their claims are the same.
I think we should look at any opportunity. Unfortunately, I
am a bit skeptical about the possibilities of negotiations
based on what we have seen through ASEAN most recently. Efforts
at code of conduct, China's unwillingness to work
multilaterally and preference for bilateral talks.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you.
Dr. Cronin, any feeling on that?
Mr. Cronin. Again, that is out of my area.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. Ms. Glaser?
Ms. Glaser. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I also
was just in Taiwan a couple of weeks ago, and discussed this
proposal with President Ma and his advisers.
I would agree with Peter that any good proposal should be
looked at. But truthfully, it is quite difficult for Taiwan to
be an actor regionally, or in the international community if
there is to be a code of conduct that will guide behavior in
the South China Sea, Taiwan is likely to be excluded, and that
is really quite unfortunate.
I think the most useful thing that Taiwan could do would be
to bring this nine dash line, which was originally an 11 dash
line, created in 1947 by the Republic of China, if they could
bring their claim into in accordance with international law, it
would set a model for the mainland, and I think that then the
ASEAN countries perhaps would be more willing to work with it
because they would see Taiwan as a constructive actor in a very
important way.
Mr. Kelly. Doctor, anything different?
Mr. Yoshihara. I actually see the China's sort of very,
very expansive claims as part of its strategy. It is trying to
move the ball forward by making all kinds of extravagant
claims, whether it is historic or whether the entire South
China Sea is a territorial sea. So I think it would be very,
very difficult to negotiate on that basis.
Mr. Kelly. My question, I guess, would be okay, so
everybody does come to the table, the reality of that really
working, and who would broker it? Who would be the arbiter? Who
would sit down and work this out? Because the feeling I am
getting is it is nice to talk about things in settings like
this, but the reality of it is the toughest guy in the
neighborhood kind of runs the policy for the neighborhood. I
know we tiptoe around these different things because we
sometimes don't think it is politically correct. I don't think
there is any question about what China's intentions are and
where they are going.
Mr. Brookes, thanks for saying it is not an emerging power;
it is a power. And I would also suggest that with our
continuing loss of sovereignty and our own debt, we have
weakened ourselves to the point where it is hard; it is hard to
police the world when you are not the strongest guy in the
world. And when you do resolution after resolution, we have
become kind of a toothless tiger who continues to say what we
are going to do and then backs off in the end.
I am concerned, though, and you hit on it, because without
a dynamic and robust economy, we cannot continue our presence
in the world. It is just that simple. Now, sequestration is
going to lead to the smallest Navy since 1915, the smallest
ground force since 1940, the smallest Air Force in our history.
That is not Mike Kelly saying it, that is Secretary of Defense
Panetta. I just think at some point, we better wake up and
smell the coffee. We are well past the midnight hour in this
country to continue to talk about our role in the world when we
have a diminished influence because we really don't have the
ability at times to do what we say we are going to do.
Now, having said all of that, where do we go with this?
Seriously, where do we go with this? I don't see any reason for
China to negotiate with anybody. Why would they? If they hold a
lot of your debt and they are the strongest player in that area
in the world, who would influence the Chinese?
Mr. Brookes. I think the point here is that we have to work
with like-minded powers in the region. We are just talking
about the South China Sea today, but we have disputes in the
East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. I think, once again,
diplomatic reassurance, economic strength, and the ability to
project military power into the region, and working with our
friends and allies are the only things that can do it.
I think the thing that China most fears is counterbalancing
against it. And right now I think China has pursued a divide-
and-conquer sort of strategy. That is why they were successful
in the last ASEAN meeting where they were able to prevent the
South China Sea issue from being drawn up. But I think that we
have to show leadership. We have to gather our friends and
allies, and we have to oppose China on a number of fronts.
Mr. Kelly. Doctor? I am really concerned about this. I
think our ability to build coalitions is dwindling very
quickly, when our allies continue to question our ability to
really show up and help them on the day that they need the
help.
Mr. Cronin. Well, if I may, Congressman, I still don't
think anybody in the region, and I will speak from what I know
from people I have talked to in Southeast Asia, that believes
that the U.S. isn't the strongest power still. And I don't
think there is anybody in the U.S. military that doesn't
believe that we are greatly, by multiples, stronger than China
at this point in time. Whether or not they are a rising power,
a current power, have been a power, I wouldn't want to trade
the U.S. Navy and Air Force for any existing force.
Mr. Kelly. I am not suggesting that. But I am suggesting
this: If we ever go into a fair fight, shame on us. When we
have the ability to be greater than anybody else in the world
and defend ourselves better than anybody else, to go into it
and saying we just want to be on an equal basis, believe me, I
don't want them to come out of the locker room. I don't want
them to get on the bus to come to even play the game.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Kelly, thank you Dr
Cronin.
Before I recognize Mr. Faleomavaega, I would like to
recognize our distinguished guests. We have 12 members of
Parliament from Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia who are in
attendance as part of the House Democracy Partnership, so we
welcome all of you. Please stand. Welcome. Thank you.
With that, Mr. Faleomavaega, the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific is recognized.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I always have tremendous reluctance when we discuss this
important issue concerning China because it is not as simple as
we make it to be. I always try to remind my colleagues that
when China became an independent nation in 1949, there were 400
million Chinese living in China. It took us 226 years to reach
a population of only 320-some million. So now we are dealing
with a country that is 1.3 billion people. So if you want to
look at it from that perspective, I think we have to be a
little more soul-searching in terms of what we are trying to do
in handling this important nation.
I want to ask Dr. Yoshihara, we currently operate the
largest military command in the world. It used to be called
CINCPAC but it is now Pacific Command. It stretches from
Madagascar, the entire Indian Ocean and the entire Pacific
Ocean, and it goes all of the way to Central and South America,
with about 220 ships and 240,000 Marines, Army and military
personnel and is administered by a four star admiral out of
Pearl Harbor.
It is my understanding, and correct me, Dr. Yoshihara,
maybe the others can correct me on this, the United States
currently has over 700 military installations both in and
outside the United States. My understanding is that China does
not have one military base anywhere outside of China. Now, I
don't know if that balances. I liked Mr. Brookes' comment about
counterbalancing. We used to think of the Monroe Doctrine--
remember the Monroe Doctrine? Any country that dares come to
our hemisphere of influence, get out. And now this pivoting,
new--and I don't consider it new foreign policy that we have,
that we are now trying to contain China. China just barely got
this aircraft carrier from the Ukraine. We have 11 aircraft
carriers. What are we doing with them? So to suggest that we
are becoming a declining world power, I beg to differ with this
assertion.
Dr. Yoshihara, is Admiral Mahan's theory still relevant
today? The country that controls the seas controls the world,
just as the British have proven it to be in their history?
Mr. Yoshihara. Certainly the Chinese think so. The Chinese
read Admiral Mahan's theory. I have an entire bookshelf that
has multiple translations of his works in China. And we really
only have one. And the only reason why that one is in print is
because of the Naval War College. So there is a real
intellectual shift and enthusiasm for Mahan's theory, and in
particular this notion that wealth begets power, power begets
more wealth.
As to your point about U.S. naval power, yes, it is true.
On paper, the United States is much more powerful than China.
But I think if you look at our global--the range of operations
that we have to conduct around the globe, we are stretched
thin. And the prospects of our shipbuilding patterns to
increase are fairly low. And of course, we have to fight the
tyranny of distance, which was just mentioned.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So are you suggesting that we should
reduce the $500 billion reduction that President Obama
suggested for the 10-year period of our defense budget? Do you
think that maybe our defense budget needs to be part of the
overall deficit reduction process that we should be going
through as a country?
Mr. Yoshihara. I would suggest that in the environment
which we will be facing in the China seas, it is going to be
much tougher to maintain presence and to maintain our
operations. So we need to have redundancy, and we need to have
the capacity essentially to take greater risk in China's
maritime domain.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Ms. Glaser?
Ms. Glaser. Yes, thank you, Congressman. I agree with you
we shouldn't make the Chinese 10 feet tall; but we do have to,
I think, be aware that the Chinese take advantage of what they
see as U.S. weakness when they see it. We can look back in the
period in the Vietnam War when the United States pulled out. We
can also look at when the U.S. withdrew from Clark and Subic
bases in the Philippines.
Mr. Faleomavaega. My time is running out. I would love to
continue that dialogue.
Here is the problem: The 10 ASEAN countries are weak
militarily. They are looking to the United States for help. The
point here is are we going to be able to do this? In my humble
opinion, we have got some very serious problems. We are
literally the policemen of the world, if you want to put it
that way. And I want to ask Mr. Brookes, is this what we should
be doing continuously? We fought two world wars. We got into
Vietnam and Korea. For 10 years we have been in this quagmire
in Iraq and Afghanistan. So what does this do with our overall
defense posture? Is it really defending the interests of our
people?
Mr. Brookes. Quickly, I guess I have 10 seconds, that is
the purpose of our national defense, to protect and advance
American interests. Now, we can disagree on what those
interests are. But I think that is where we should be.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am sorry, Madam Chair, my time is up.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr.
Faleomavaega. Mr. Turner of New York is recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Just a brief question, if you would, on North Korea. It has
always been the tool or the surrogate of the Chinese since
1950. What is that relationship right now? Is it strained with
continued North Korean irrationality? What do we see going
forward? Dr. Yoshihara, if you would?
Mr. Yoshihara. That is not my area, so I will defer to the
other panelists.
Ms. Glaser. Thank you, Congressman, I will be happy to
comment. I talk to a lot of Chinese about their relationship
with North Korea. There were some signs of strain in the
immediate aftermath of the death of Kim Jong-il. We have seen a
warming trend in the relationship. There are suspicions on both
sides, and the North Koreans in particular feel uncomfortable
about their excessive dependence on the Chinese. The Chinese
are not happy with North Korea's nuclear program. But at the
end of the day, they prioritize stability. The Chinese are
going to continue to maintain that relationship. It is a
mutually dependent one. And the North Koreans will also
continue to maintain that relationship. I think fairly soon,
after the 18-party Congress in China, we will likely see the
visit by the new North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, to Beijing.
Mr. Cronin. I think, Congressman, if you asked the Chinese,
they would say they wished that North Korea was a tool or
surrogate for them. But Bonnie is right, definitely there is a
power relationship there. The status of North Korea is a buffer
as far as China is concerned. But they are not exactly a
country that can easily be manipulated by anybody,
unfortunately.
Mr. Brookes. I think in many ways North Korea serves
China's purposes strategically. It serves as a buffer state, as
Rich just mentioned, and I think there is a reluctance on the
part of the Chinese, despite the problems that North Korea has
provided for them, to allow a unification of the Korean
peninsula. I think they are very concerned about a powerful
Korea. They have some history as well. There is a lot of
history in Asia, as we know, some of it very unpleasant. And I
think they are worried about a united Korea that might be a
friend to the United States and having American troops, perhaps
U.S. Troops north of the 38th parallel. Remember what happened
in 1950 with that.
So I think there is a strategic element there as well. I
mean, you can't change geography; geography is destiny. The
Korean peninsula is attached to China, and they have strong
strategic concerns about what happens there.
Mr. Turner. Is there still a degree of trust? The North
Koreans seem often irrational.
Mr. Brookes. I would say that North Korea is quite rational
in its own way. We see the world through a different paradigm,
through a different lens, but they have been very successful in
maintaining that repressive state for many, many years despite
deprivation. Their rational may not be your rational; but they
do have a thought process and a certain logic to what they do.
And they have been successful in many ways in pursuing that.
Mr. Turner. Would it be fair to say that you anticipate no
change in that relationship in the foreseeable future?
Mr. Brookes. I think we are all trying to find out what is
going to happen with the new North Korean leader. There is
always talk of reform. But every time I hear that, I say we
have seen this movie before.
I was in North Korea in 1988 as a Hill staffer for this
committee, actually. And there were the same sort of little
openings going on and private markets and things like that, but
it was eventually shut down. So the last thing that they want
to do is lose control, and regime survival is their highest
calling, as it is with the Chinese communist party. So I think
they might do some things. This is a young leader, but I sense
power is probably what will most drive him.
Mr. Turner. Anything to add? Otherwise, I yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Turner. Mr. Connolly
of Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome to our
panel. My friend from Pennsylvania, Mr. Kelly, is so articulate
and so persuasive, he almost persuaded me that we are a third-
rate power in the world. And then I listened to my friend, Mr.
Faleomavaega, and I was reminded that actually we are the ones
with global reach. We are the ones with 11 carrier groups. And
we are the ones that spend more money on any basis you want to
measure it by than anybody on the planet in terms of defense.
So, Dr. Cronin, you were trying to respond and you ran out
of time to Mr. Kelly's assertions that we were apparently in
decline, and he cited a number of statistics that he attributed
to Secretary of Defense Panetta. I think Mr. Panetta was
warning that if these trends continue, that may be where we end
up. I hardly think Secretary Panetta was saying that our Air
Force is now at the level of 1915 and our Navy at 1940 and so
forth. Would you comment briefly to clear up the prowess, or
lack thereof, of the United States military in the world?
Mr. Cronin. Well, thank you. I don't think I can clear up
that entirely because it would get involved in arguments about
forces and force structures and capabilities, et cetera. But
definitely, I don't think many people, including the Secretary
of Defense, think that the United States is in any way in
decline. And more as a political economist, I don't believe the
United States economically is in the kind of decline that some
people despair about. So I think we still have resilience. We
certainly have military capabilities. The 1940s, let's say a
1940 F-4 fighter, you could buy a lot of them today for the
same money as a top of the line front line aircraft. But which
one would you rather have? It is a different world.
So I do think that the Secretary of Defense has been
concerned, very concerned about the sequestration issue, and
with good reason. But overall, I am not a declinist. I think
that there are questions about sustainability in the long term,
but I don't see any sign of a growing weakness on the part of
the United States.
Mr. Connolly. And if you might permit me an editorial
comment, if sequestration is the crisis some of our colleagues
make it out to be, and I am certainly concerned about it, then
surely we would not have taken a 5-week recess in August, and
surely, we are not prepared to take a 7-week, 4-day recess
starting next week because it is a crisis. But that is a
different matter.
Ms. Glaser, I wonder if you can comment, we have sort of
focused on what is our responsibility and what are our
strengths and what are China's strengths. But what is the
responsibility of countries in the region of the South China
Sea? What is Japan prepared to do? What are the Philippines
prepared to do? What is Vietnam prepared to do when they
believe that their sovereignty has been encroached upon? Ms.
Glaser, and I see Dr. Yoshihara is also prepared to comment.
Ms. Glaser. I will be brief and leave some time for my
colleague.
I think you are absolutely right, that the countries in the
region do have obligations as well. One obligation they have is
to have greater situational awareness in their waters. This is
something that the United States is trying to assist the
Philippines in doing. Right now we are helping them, for
example, by intelligence sharing. We are actually also helping
them to develop the capability to do that by themselves. We
have also transferred a cutter to the Philippines. They have an
obligation to maintain that equipment now that they have
acquired it.
The other thing that I would say is that all of these
countries in ASEAN have the obligation to work together, to be
more proactive and to agree how they are going to cope with the
pressure that China is putting on them, because if they are not
united, the Chinese will easily be able to divide them and win
in this game.
Mr. Connolly. Before Dr. Yoshihara comments, Mr. Brookes
made the point, and I thought a very insightful one, the
Chinese are counting on acquiescence, and it seems to me the
key in the region is not to acquiesce. And that requires a
strategy. That requires intestinal fortitude. The United States
can be part of that strategy, but the idea that we are the
substitute for that strategy is just not going to work.
Ms. Glaser. Absolutely.
Mr. Connolly. No matter how strong we are or the Chinese
are weak. Dr. Yoshihara.
Mr. Yoshihara. Absolutely. We need to make the regional
partners basically the first responders to Chinese
encroachments and maneuvers at sea. And I think our help with
the Philippines is a good start, but it is really a very modest
move. What we need to do is to give the Philippines more
capabilities that would give them the capacity both to monitor,
but also to challenge Chinese movements at sea.
With regard to Japan, I think the keyword is resilience.
The capacity essentially to withstand a first Chinese strike,
for example, and enable the alliance to rapidly recover and
retake command of the commons, for example. I think those are
the kinds of things that are not only necessary, but, in fact,
imminently doable in financial terms.
Mr. Cronin. If I could, one of the problems with the
Philippines, of course, is we can try to help them build their
capacity, but they can't afford to operate what we want to give
them or sell to them at cut-rate prices.
When it comes to acquiescence, there is a certain element
here that needs to be kept in mind, and that is that China can
push and China can bully and China can try to dominate, but at
some point they back countries into a corner. And I would give
Vietnam as an example. They are not going to acquiesce. I am a
Vietnam veteran. It is quite a turn of the world to see our
evolving relationship with the Vietnamese right now. There are
some problems with it, but nonetheless, they have joined the
TPP talks, they are talking to us about weapons acquisition, et
cetera. But even more than that, if you look, you can find on
YouTube a Chinese film of their attack on Vietnam's forces in
the Spratlys in 1988. It is a brutal thing to watch. They mow
down the Vietnamese standing in waist-deep water on a reef. But
if you look at that and you see what the Vietnamese have done
with that film, they are not going to be pushed out. Again, you
can't just go drill on someone else's continental shelf or EEZ
without big problems because drilling is a much more vulnerable
activity. Fishing, that is a different matter.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Wasn't it the Paracel Islands that the
Vietnamese and the Chinese had to face off and not the other
islands?
Mr. Cronin. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Wasn't it the Paracel Islands that you
were talking about?
Mr. Cronin. Well, in 1974, China attacked the waning South
Vietnamese Government and captured some important reefs on the
Paracels, which gave them control of the Paracels. In 1988,
they attacked, I think, it was Johnson Reef in the Spratlys.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So it was the Spratlys. So the video you
were talking about----
Mr. Cronin. That was on the Spratlys in 1988.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, it is. I have seen that video.
Mr. Cronin. Yes. It is pretty rough, isn't it?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, it certainly is.
Dr. Yoshihara, you mentioned that we have seen double digit
hikes in military spending in shipbuilding on the part of China
over this last decade or two, while at the same time, American
shipbuilding is going down and our Navy is shrinking. Don't you
think there is another dynamic to what is going on here? The
fact is, how is China paying for those ships? We have seen
decades where we have sat and watched the most historic
transfer of wealth and power from one country to another, from
the United States to China, and we were told that we had these
trading rules and these rules of economy because it would
promote a more peaceful world. They would become more
benevolent as they became more prosperous. Is what we are
saying now is that theory that has been proven totally wrong,
and in fact, that money that was transferred, the wealth that
was created in China by our investment, by the permitting of
the technology transfers, et cetera, now hasn't that resulted
in a less peaceful world and a more risky world?
Mr. Yoshihara. Right. I think one of the enduring
assumptions underlying U.S. policy toward China has been that
long-term engagement, both economic, diplomatic, and otherwise
will essentially sort of mellow out the Chinese regime.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Tame the dragon?
Mr. Yoshihara. That it will gradually change China from
within. That has been a consistent policy, I think, across all
administrations. But now what I think we are beginning to hear
is whether this is really more of feeding the beast? I think
the point about that is that this resource mismatch is
beginning to put pressure on us. We like to talk about the
pivot and the rebalance. We have to keep in mind that the pivot
or the rebalance is really a redistribution of existing forces;
right? This is not really a major buildup on our part overall;
whereas China has the deep pockets to keep building across the
board, all kinds of capabilities that can go to sea and take to
the air.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And their deep pockets was what I was
trying to stress, comes from the fact that we have accepted
economic policies that resulted in this massive transfer of
wealth. It is no surprise that this has happened. I mean, some
of us have been talking about it for decades. I have been here
for two decades talking about this. We are giving them, they
are using all of our R&D. They are stealing it, or our own
companies are investing there and building high-tech companies
and providing them what they need to develop more wealth for
their society. And like you say, instead of taming the dragon,
we have been feeding the beast.
Let me see what I have here. I am sorry, but I been running
back and forth between two hearings today.
Do you think that the Chinese, at this point, unless the
United States, and we are talking about this pivot to the
Pacific, if we don't show our military strength and are
unwilling to actually have some of these confrontations, like
in the Spratlys, will that lead to an even more dangerous
world? Or are we talking about maybe the United States
shouldn't be confronting this greater Chinese Navy? Whoever
wants to answer that.
Ms. Glaser. Congressman, I think it is very important for
the United States not just to have a military presence, but
also the economic and the diplomatic engagement. I would say
especially economic. We really need to expand our economic
relationships with these countries to move forward with TPP. We
are being marginalized by all of the other countries
negotiating very low quality FTA agreements.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's note that we have engaged and we
have encouraged our businessmen to invest in a dictatorship,
the world's biggest human rights abuser, while other countries
like the Philippines and other countries that are democratic,
have been struggling along. That type of skewed value system is
coming back to haunt us now.
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr.
Rohrabacher.
Ms. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized.
Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you. As this discussion continues, I
become more concerned, and I need more education on the issue.
My concern is understanding China is a long-term thinker, and
so it will create a strategy in the region so that it can
overtake it at a time when the rest of the world is least
prepared to act. What I am saying is we are seeing, with
President Ma of Taiwan, a more cozying up of a relationship
with China. You saw that with the Beijing Olympics and being
able to have air flights from Taiwan to China to make it easier
for those that were going over there. Now you are seeing it
with the waterways, trying to resolve those issues. And you are
also seeing a much more direct link to economic ties where
Taiwanese businessmen are actually setting up factories in
China. That is one pivot there.
But then you are also looking at the neighborhood and its
inability, or its ability, to be able to handle its own affairs
against China, including military affairs. Do they have enough
military strength, military smarts, military capabilities?
Also, what is their economic relationship in the area and how
much of a tie do they have to China?
Then you look at the United States and our indebtedness to
China beyond the issue of sequestration, which may reduce our
military overall strength, both in the short and the long run.
My concern is that with all of these issues coming to attention
here in this committee, what is our best way forward out of
this in the 3\1/2\ minutes that I have left. And I probably
would like to start with Mr. Brookes, because you have the
military expertise, and then go on down the line.
Mr. Brookes. Thank you. As I mentioned previously, I think
one of the things is we have to provide diplomatic reassurance
to our friends and allies in the region that we are going to
have an enduring presence there. I think people are very
nervous, not surprisingly so, and I think there are questions
about the durability of American commitment in that part of the
world considering there are so many other commitments; Iran,
for instance, and the Persian Gulf and the issues there. And of
course, our ability to project power, as you have talked about,
the defense cuts that are looming. I mean, this is a big
theater. We have talked about how many aircraft carriers we
have, but they are not just operating in the South China Sea,
they are operating around the world because America is a global
power with global interests.
But once again, and this is getting a little bit beyond my
portfolio, but I think we need to revitalize our economic
strength here at home, which will allow us to have that the
diplomatic influence, diplomatic power, as well as being able
to build a military capable of supporting or protecting and
advancing American interests.
Mrs. Schmidt. Let me add to it. I know that there is an
economic dance between the U.S. and China because they could
call in the loan at any time, and yet they need our goods and
services over there at the moment to satisfy their emerging
middle class. But at some point, they may pull that trigger
which will undercut our ability to operate as a superpower; am
I correct in that?
Mr. Brookes. I have a different view of that. I think it is
very unlikely that China will call the debt because since their
currency is not convertible, they have to buy American dollars.
When Chinese firms repatriate profits back to China, since they
can't trade them, they have to trade them for RMB or yuan, and
the Chinese have to buy something with it. So they can buy
goods, American goods, agricultural, things like that, or they
have to buy American debt. So I don't think that sort of threat
is something that--it would probably collapse the American
economy. I am not an economist, so this is a general--and I
don't think that is in China's interest, considering we are a
large export market of theirs. So I think it is a standoff.
Mr. Cronin. Yes, thank you, if I could.
On the issue of the debt, I think, and Peter started to go
that direction, that it is actually a relatively small part of
the total debt. There is no way to really call it in. The
problem the Chinese have is something that we used to call a
dollar trap. That is, you sell Treasury bonds and the value of
the U.S. dollar goes down, and so you are cutting your own
throat. The other point is, more basic, and it is, really, this
is our policy, don't blame it on China, China is saying we buy
stuff from them and they are saying okay, here, take our
dollars and buy more. And the way they do that is by buying
U.S. debt. And we are going along with that. So you want to
blame Penneys, you want to blame Sears, you want to blame
Costco, whoever, or the U.S. Government for those policies.
But the other point is, and I think more important, is that
China has a lot of problems, and China's manufacturing is
falling. Exports are falling. Exports, in general, are falling.
They have this huge domestic political issue. And the benefits
of China's wealth have not been spread much beyond the coast
and the military. So it is a very skewed and unbalanced
political and economic system, and I think it is far less
sustainable in the way that it is going right now than our
economy for all its problems.
Thank you.
Ms. Glaser. I will just briefly speak, if I could,
Congresswoman, to the military issue.
Regardless of how much power projection capability we have,
we do face a growing anti-access area denial threat. It will be
more difficult for the United States, more costly, for us to
operate in a conflict close to Chinese shores. As a result, we
do need to take steps to improve the survivability of U.S.
forces in the zones of potential conflict to prepare to operate
effectively from greater ranges in the event that we have to do
that.
We have to encourage regional states to develop their own
anti-access area denial capabilities. And then we have to work
with the states in the region to develop asymmetrical
capabilities and operations to counter these threats. Thank
you.
Mr. Smith [presiding]. The Chair recognizes himself for 5
minutes.
Ms. Glaser, you note that China's behavior in the South
China Sea is deliberate and systematic. Dr. Yoshihara, you said
that China's recent assertiveness in the South China Sea is the
harbinger of things to come. And China has a coherent strategy
approach, including the rise of an intellectual military
complex. And, Mr. Brookes, you said that some in the Chinese
elite view the U.S. as a declining power, and the perceptions
are growing regarding America's lack of capabilities.
My first question is, how well or poorly in your opinion
has the Obama administration understood this ominous threat?
Has there been a difference at the Pentagon versus the
Department of State, and have we responded in an adequate way
to this, as you put it, this ominous--this harbinger of what is
happening? Whoever would like to start.
Mr. Yoshihara. I believe that the pivot and the rebalancing
is a good start. What it does is it signals our resolve. It
also bolsters the confidence of our allies and our partners and
friends in the region. But I think more can be done.
As I said, the pivot and the rebalancing is really largely
a redistribution of existing forces. When we send the littoral
combat ship to Singapore, for example, that is actually read
potentially as a sign of weakness on the part of the Chinese
because they know that the littoral combat ship is not a ship
for high-end conventional combat. And so some of our actions
actually could be seen as a weakness and potentially more of a
provocation than as a reassurance.
So I think we need to be thinking about maintaining our
resilience, maintaining our capacity to survive the anti-access
zone and to essentially conduct operations continuously.
Let me just add one other point. I think we need to show
the Chinese that the open commons is a good thing for China
because if China's neighbors adopted the same policies that the
Chinese are implementing now, the biggest loser is China
because of China's own tyranny of geography which is that it is
close to choke points, and China cannot escape those choke
points. And so what we need to do is demonstrate our confidence
in the region by continuing our freedom-of-navigation
operations to show that this is something that the Chinese can
do too. So when the Chinese conduct freedom-of-navigation
operations, we won't make a fuss about it and say this is
potentially a win/win situation if we all have a stake in
maintaining the open commons. Thank you.
Ms. Glaser. Thank you, Congressman. I think that the Obama
administration in its first year in office was perhaps a little
bit naive about China and expected that the Chinese would step
up and take a bigger role in helping to solve problems such as
global warming and global proliferation of WMD. I think that
the Chinese proved that they were not willing to work too
closely with the Obama administration in some of these areas.
I think that after that, the U.S. did get tougher. I would
really commend the State Department and Secretary Clinton, I
think that she has done an enormous amount of work, put in
great effort, going to the region and trying to engage with all
of these countries and demonstrate U.S. commitment. But our
staying power is still in doubt.
One of the most difficult challenges is that if we are too
tough with the Chinese, then smaller states in the region get
worried because they don't want to see U.S.-Chinese competition
in their back yard. They don't want to be forced to choose
between the U.S. and China. So it is a very difficult balancing
act for the United States.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask a second question if nobody else
wants to touch on that one.
I have held a number of hearings, and you said it yourself,
Ms. Glaser, that China's propensity to flout international law
and norms is worsening, and it sets bad precedents. Nowhere is
that more apparent than in human rights. And, unfortunately,
there has been a poor record in my opinion on the part of the
Obama administration toward China on being consistent,
transparent, and very aggressive in promoting fundamental human
rights. With that said, and then that carries into the law of
the sea and all of the other kinds of flouting that we see
going on.
One of the hearings I had last year around this time, we
had Valerie Hudson who wrote a book called ``Bare Branches.''
That book is an insight into what the terrible consequences of
population control will be in a whole host of areas. We know on
trafficking it is a huge problem with the missing girls. But
when it comes to instability at home, and the willingness and
even the perceived necessity of projecting power, which the
Chinese are creating the capability to do, and already have it,
is another worrisome detail. Maybe you can shed some light on
this, the State Department and the Pentagon, do they understand
this instability? They have an economy that could implode soon
because of the workers and the number of young people vis-a-vis
older, and the missing girls. Huge, huge problems of
instability. How is that playing? Do they understand it?
Mr. Cronin. Well, I can't speak for whether they understand
it or not. I would say that the most distinguishing feature of
the last 2 years is that the State and Defense have been so
close together on how they perceive the world and how they
approach it from a policy point of view.
I share your feeling, frankly, that China is a huge--has a
huge internal problem. So I am actually not a fan of the idea
that they will get richer and become more middle class and then
their political system will change. So I do think China remains
a very dangerous situation, if you will, creates a very
dangerous situation. And has an unpredictability that we have
to worry about which is why we need to keep our powder dry and
why we need to, I think as Bonnie pointed out, there are
certain particular strategic military responses that we have to
make to China's growing capabilities, but we can do that. And I
guess I am a little more confident that we can take care of
that. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Brookes, you talked about in my last
question, and I know I am out of time, about the aircraft
carrier and that Beijing has a significant power projection
platform to assert its interest along its periphery. How far
does that periphery go, in your opinion? And you in your
testimony, Dr. Yoshihara, you talked about the anti-ship
ballistic missile and the other tools and weapons that Beijing
has. Does anybody remember the Sheffield and the Exocet that
took it out in the Falkland Islands. I read your testimony very
carefully, Doctor. The last big sea battle was back in World
War II. Do we have an undo sense of bravado and capability when
other things could very seriously undermine it? Can you speak
to, again, the aircraft carrier issue and the fact that they
have other things?
Mr. Brookes. China's power projection capability continues
to expand. Once they put an aircraft carrier to sea, and my
understanding is they have several others that are being looked
at, and they have a fully operational air wing. It is just like
ours. They still have that capability. And then when they put
more, their ballistic missile capability is increasing
significantly. They supposedly have a capability to take out a
large, high-value target like and aircraft carrier with a land-
based ballistic missile. That is very troubling. I think the
range is about 1,000 miles is what we are speculating at this
point. They can cover the South China Sea. In fact, some people
have speculated in the Department of Defense that some of the
platforms that they are building are able to cover the South
China Sea.
The other issue, of course, is it is starting with the
South China Sea. We can't ignore what is happening in the East
China Sea where they have claims as well. So we have to look at
it holistically and not just limit ourselves to what is going
on down there.
Mr. Yoshihara. If I may quickly comment, the Chinese
actually have written extensively about the Falkland Islands
War and trying to learn lessons from that particular conflict.
One of the takeaways from that particular conflict was that it
was a close-run thing. If the Argentineans had actually struck
more ships, if they had been a little bit more aggressive in
their use of their missiles and their aircraft and more ships
were sunk, Britain would have been in a lot of trouble. And so
I think this is a lesson that they are learning, that if they
put our ships at risk at the same rate, for example, then we
may be compelled to sort of back down.
So again, I think we are cognizant of this challenge. We
are exercising and thinking more about how to assert sea
control and also to operate in a sea-denied environment. So I
think we are moving in the right direction, but I think more
work needs to be done.
Mr. Smith. You did talk about littoral ships being
deployed. Are you concerned that the Pentagon is buying
aluminum ships? It is buying some steel, but some aluminum as
well? I mean, that is what the Sheffield was. One Exocet
missile took it out, and it burned like a Roman candle.
Mr. Yoshihara. Right. I don't know sort of the technical
aspects of it. But again, as I mentioned, the Chinese--some
Chinese do not seem to take the littoral combat ship very
seriously. They see that as more as a sign of weakness than a
sign of strength.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Duncan, the gentleman from South
Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One thing about sitting this far down on the dais is that
most of the gritty questions have been asked. I think we have
beat the issue up pretty good today about understanding that
China is a presence that is exerting its influence all over. I
believe that is gunboat diplomacy, and I think we are
witnessing that in modern times.
I think Ms. Glaser is correct, we don't need to make the
Chinese out to be 10 foot tall. That is a great comment.
But in basic grade school playground-style bullying, we are
seeing the biggest player on the playground, so to speak, using
its size and strength to exert their influence and try to get
its way. I think the way to counter that and the way that we
have been able to counter that is with the United States'
strength both economically and militarily. So I just want to
lend my voice to really the concern over sequestration and what
that is going to do to the United States military. That has
been brought out by a number of my colleagues today.
I want to go back real quickly to my concern over the
United States debt. We hit a milestone of $16 trillion in debt.
I just want to remind the folks on the panel today that
Proverbs is pretty clear in 22:7 that the borrower is servant
to the lender. At what point in time will our debt be so large,
and so large to one creditor that we are doing their bidding,
so to speak? I think we have to be aware of that.
The Chinese are building temporary structures in the
Spratlys--pole buildings. They are driving T posts in atolls,
putting signs up that it is Chinese territorial waters, I
believe to try to claim the natural resources that everyone
believes are there. The Philippines, the Filipinos are very,
very concerned about that. They believe those resources are
theirs, and they hope to garner that resource at some point in
time. So we have talked about all of this. I guess the question
I have for the panel, give me some solutions. What can we do?
What should be done? I think the last question earlier I guess
what Mrs. Schmidt was asking, you all answered that. Give me
some solutions, Mr. Brookes.
Mr. Brookes. I thought some of the things that have been
said here today would be very constructive. I have tried to do
it at the macro level, but some of the things Bonnie talked
about were important. In other words, to make sure that we have
the capabilities for the threats that we face, we need to
mobilize our allies and friends to be able to deal with the
potential for Chinese aggression.
And another important thing is, of course, unfortunately,
there are some stumbling blocks along the way, such as the
capabilities of some of the potential partners in Southeast
Asia and Japan. They have some treaty issues that would
potentially prevent them from operating alongside others under
collective self-defense in the South China Sea.
But I think we have to do a strong effort, and I imagine it
is probably being done, for people to understand, even in
northeast Asia, that what happens in the South China Sea is
going to affect them. Japan, I am not sure if this is still
true, some 80 percent of their energy is imported and passes
through the South China Sea area. If this becomes a Chinese
lake effectively, I think there will be significant problems
potentially down the road for Japan and Korea. So I think
working together with allies and pooling our defense
capabilities, and having a strategy is a basic thing that needs
to be done.
Mr. Duncan. Dr. Cronin.
Mr. Cronin. One thing to think about is that these
structures that they are building are very vulnerable. So it is
not a case that they are building up something that is some
impregnable thing. I think in this case we should keep in mind,
and work with our allies and friends on the issue of the rule
of law and the fact that those structures under the U.N.
conference on the Law of the Sea, they are entitled to nothing
but a 500-yard safety zone. In other words, they are on
Philippines EEZ, some of them, on their economic zone, so they
shouldn't be there. But technically, they have a right to be
there so long as they don't try to exploit the resources. Well,
obviously, they have more reason. It is not that they are going
to follow those rules, if they have to, if they can avoid it.
But I do think that there is a combination----
Mr. Duncan. They are not a signer to any sort of U.N.
treaty like that?
Mr. Cronin. Pardon?
Mr. Duncan. Even if China is not a signer, a signatory
party to any sort of treaty?
Mr. Cronin. They signed it but with the reservation that
their nine dash line and all of their claims precede.
Mr. Duncan. Gave them an out?
Mr. Cronin. Right. But with the other countries, though,
there is an affinity now between the U.S. and all of the other
countries in the region which China has created. And that
affinity is that all of the other countries accept sort of a
rules-based international order. I think there are two
different poles on this issue. One is the sort of very
practical matter of what do you do about somebody sitting on an
atoll and building this structure. But other is the issue of
not what kind of world that we want, but what kind of world do
the other countries in the region want? And so, you know, was
it Bismarck who said politics of war is politics by other
means. Well, politics is still a factor here, and relationships
are a factor here. So, I think the United States has to take a
strong position on these issues.
China doesn't want an escalated conflict. That would
totally create a problem.
Mr. Duncan. Let me give Ms. Glaser a chance to answer.
Mr. Cronin. So they are trying to get what they can without
paying a price.
Ms. Glaser. Thank you. I will be brief and concrete.
First, I think, we do need a code of conduct. The 2002
declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea
that was signed is not legally binding. It is voluntary. It has
some useful provisions, but they are just not mandatory. We
need a code of conduct that has a dispute settlement mechanism
so if we have an incident like Scarborough Shoal, there is some
panel, there is some way that the dispute can by diffused and
resolved.
Second, a mechanism on cooperating on fishing would be
very, very useful. There is a serious problem with fish
depletion. People are fishing further from their shores.
Fishermen, their livelihood is being affected. So enabling
fishermen to fish in these disputed waters I think would be
useful.
Finally, I will repeat what I said earlier, that I think
there is a need for every claimant to define its territorial
and maritime claims clearly. The Chinese are the most egregious
in this regard, though there are some others that are not
completely clear. And then agree to set aside these disputes
and find models of joint development. Brunei and Malaysia, for
example, are engaging in a joint oil development project, and
we need to have more of these. If ASEAN can do this
effectively, I think China can be brought into those kinds of
arrangements.
Mr. Duncan. Dr. Yoshihara.
Mr. Yoshihara. Yes, I think we can think creatively. In
fact, we can think asymmetrically about the problems. In fact,
we can turn the tables on the Chinese by, I think, developing
and focusing on our own anti-access forces in the region. We
have heard from the panelists that China is not 10 feet tall.
So, therefore, we should focus on some of their structural
weaknesses, and they are weaknesses that they cannot repair in
time. And there are two weaknesses--their anti-submarine
warfare capability and their mine countermeasure capability.
These are areas that they have always been very bad in, and
they will not have the resources to fix those areas rapidly
enough.
Those areas happen to be our strengths. Our submarine force
is one of the best in the world. And in fact, Japan has already
made a decision to increase it submarine force by over 30
percent. That is how worried the Japanese are, and we should, I
think, be also focused on submarine warfare.
And I would suggest that with the second element, that we
need to revisit offensive mine warfare which we employed very
effectively during World War II. These are the kinds of high-
end military capabilities that, again, would seek to deter the
Chinese from taking on potentially dangerous, destabilizing
actions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Smith. The Chair recognizes Mr. Kelly for one final
question.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brookes, I know there has been some conversation, not
an awful lot, but about the Law of the Sea. And I know there is
differing opinions on good, bad, indifferent and what it would
be. This is a treaty that while we have been involved, we have
never ratified. President Reagan was one of the ones who said
he did not want to do it. Mr. Cronin, you kind of like it. This
could probably be a whole panel discussion. Just plus and
minuses.
Mr. Brookes. I oppose it, and the reason I oppose it is the
international seabed authority. I have no problem with the
navigational matters, and we abide by those matters as a
standard maritime practice. But I am opposed to the
international seabed authority which is this U.N. body which is
based in Kingston, Jamaica, and the effects that might have on
our extended continental shelf. But I have no problem with the
maritime guidelines and territorial----
Mr. Kelly. So that is your main objection?
Mr. Brookes. That is my objection.
Mr. Kelly. Very good. I will say this. Because some of the
conversation over our debt, I have actually had the unique
experience of actually running a business in the private
sector, which a lot of my colleagues have not. The relationship
to debt to equity, are you kidding me? It is not an issue? Only
in this town do we really believe that debt is not an issue in
our ability to sustain our way of life and our form of
government. This has become incredibly amazing to me, that we
sit back and think that you can just keep borrowing and
borrowing and borrowing, and it really doesn't matter. And I
know why the Chinese invest. Of course, we are still the best
investment in the world. I don't think anybody is putting money
in Greece right now.
So a lot of this stuff is just kind of common sense. But
what bothers me is if we really do believe that not
controlling, not having sovereignty, control of our debt is not
important, we have been asleep for way too long, way, way too
long. This is just practical economics. This is economics 101.
I hate to phrase it that way, but I have been amazed in my 20
months here that there is somehow a disconnect between the
amount of money that you owe and your future and your
sustainability. So that is something that is incredible.
Now, the other thing I want to say, we quote a lot of
people today, and there was a Spanish philosopher, Santayana,
who says, ``Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.'' This is not a new issue in the world, what we are
seeing happening. And I am very much concerned that somehow we
believe that if we just pull the covers up over our head, that
we will get past the midnight hour, and the skies will be blue
again and the sky will shine and everything will just be hunky
dory. It not going to work that way. I think, Ms. Glaser--oh,
it is Doctor, you say, ``Fortunately, there is still time to
maximize the convergence of interests and organize an effective
response. China is at least a decade away from amassing the
type of preponderant sea power that keep the United States out
of the South China Sea.''
Now, my references early on to Secretary of Defense Panetta
deal with 10 years away. There is kind of a convergence that is
happening. In 10 years, you say China could be at that rate. In
10 years, the Secretary of Defense says that we will have the
smallest Navy since 1915, the smallest ground force since 1940,
and the smallest Air Force in our history. There is in the
future a coming together with history and the facts of the
past. And I really am concerned, as we look into the future,
that we somehow seem to think that we can have a blind eye to
what is happening and think it is going to be all right. We
have seen this happen before. There is countless examples
throughout history. And to sit back now and think that somehow
we can wish this away. I will tell you this: In my lifetime,
what I have experienced in this part of the world, they are
wired differently than we are. Okay?
Playing nice is fine. But a lot of people consider our
kindness as weakness. And when the United States stops being
the strongest player in the world, our allies stop looking to
us because we really can't protect them. So a lot of the things
that we see coming I think are absolutely essential that we
recognize what the new dawn is bringing. And to sit here and
think that we don't have to address that. It is great to have
these discussions in a panel like this. In the real world, if
you don't come to some really strong conclusions and some
strong responses to it, you are doomed.
I thank you all for being here today. I really do. And I
don't know how long it is going to take before we wake up.
There is things happening around the world, we have just seen
it the last couple days, this is absolutely crazy what is going
on. And we continue to think it is going to be all right. It is
not going to be all right. We need to be the strongest player
in the world, not because we wasn't to take over the world, but
that we are the only ones that can protect the rest of those
out there that are weak. So I thank you all for being here. Mr.
Chairman, thank you for indulging me.
Mr. Smith [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelly. Let
me just conclude, and perhaps you might want to speak to this
very briefly, but the issue of China's motive. We know there is
a profit motive, there always is, the need for oil, the need
for scarce resources. But I have been struck for years by the
hearkening back to the opium wars that I hear all the time. I
watch China's channel here in Washington and I am amazed how
many documentaries there seem to be on that. When the big
censorship issue was very front and center, it has not abated
one bit, but now it is no longer Google, it is others, if you
typed in torture, you got the horrific atrocities committed by
Japan against Chinese citizens. Nothing about their systematic
use of torture, of course. And you got something about
Guantanamo. But that is all you got. And it seems to me that
Japan really needs to have a great deal of concern, which as
you pointed out, Doctor, they are beefing up their expenditures
for defense. But perhaps you could take it and write back,
because it is late, but the issue of motive. This is not--you
know, a democratic China we have no fear of. But a dictatorship
that controls the propaganda machine and does so as effectively
and adroitly as Beijing does, we have reason to be concerned.
And especially when they bring up these pasts as if they were
yesterday. Your thoughts? Does that drive them?
Mr. Brookes. I think we have to be conscious of history.
You can deny it, but you can't escape it. That is all I would
say on that. And we have to be understanding of other cultures.
I think it is critically important to get a sense of where they
are coming from, and to better understand and to increase the
chances for peace and stability.
Ms. Glaser. I would share your concerns about essentially
the victim mentality in China, this looking back at the period
where they were exploited. This is a function, in large part,
of education in the Chinese system. So it is access to
information and the lack of it, absolutely. And then it is also
education in the schools. I have heard 5-year-old children
singing anti-Japanese songs. Surely they don't really know what
they mean, but they grow up to understand that. And they watch
these documentaries on TV. So the nationalism is really stoked
by the government. And I think that is really quite dangerous.
Mr. Yoshihara. If you read mainstream Chinese scholars
about what China wants to be when it grows up, there is a
growing school of thought that China does, in fact, want to be
a world power, if you are talking about motives. Many of them
say they like the system run by the United States, this liberal
international order. But all of them say, I think with the
caveat, that yes, they like the system--after all, China has
benefited most from it--but that they would like to change this
from within when they get strong enough, because China was not
present at the making. And that they want to make the rules
change so they benefit China because the rules currently
benefit the United States.
So if you want to think broadly about what China really
wants when it becomes a world power, those are the kind of
things that I think we should be looking out for. And China's
claims over the EEZ, I think, is part of this pattern of
eroding and changing the rules that have underwritten this
current liberal international order.
Mr. Cronin. Yes, I agree. I think that it is easy enough to
say remember history, but history has different
interpretations. And so we need to put each other--it is
helpful for us to put ourselves in the other countries' shoes
only to understand where they are coming from, how does their
mind work? How do they process these issues? And I think really
the most important thing the United States can do, and
particularly relatively cheaply, is try to understand where
these guys are coming from, what is driving them. And also, to
remember that we have got some problems with our alliance
relationships as well. I mean, the Japanese, you can criticize
the Chinese for bringing up history, but go talk to the right
wing in Japan and you will find that, you know, some of them
haven't learned anything since World War II. So that is also a
problem. But I do think understanding the other party, the
enemy, however you want to call it, is vital. And understanding
ourselves and being honest with ourselves about what we want
and what we are willing to pay for.
Mr. Smith. On that note, thank you so very much for your
extraordinary testimony and incisive comments. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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