[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-137]
EXPERT ASSESSMENTS ON THE
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES:
RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE
FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 29, 2012
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MO BROOKS, Alabama ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
TODD YOUNG, Indiana MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TOM ROONEY, Florida COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
Christopher Bright, Professional Staff Member
Paul Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Arthur Milikh, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Friday, June 29, 2012, Expert Assessments on the Afghan National
Security Forces: Resources, Strategy, and Timetable for
Security Lead Transition....................................... 1
Appendix:
Friday, June 29, 2012............................................ 21
----------
FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 2012
EXPERT ASSESSMENTS ON THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES,
STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Critz, Hon. Mark S., a Representative from Pennsylvania,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 2
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 1
WITNESSES
Boot, Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National
Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations................. 2
Keane, GEN John M., USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army........................................................... 4
O'Hanlon, Dr. Michael, Director of Research, Senior Fellow, The
Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair of the Foreign Policy Program,
Brookings Institution.......................................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Boot, Max.................................................... 26
Keane, GEN John M............................................ 37
O'Hanlon, Dr. Michael........................................ 48
Wittman, Hon. Rob............................................ 25
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 59
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Critz.................................................... 63
EXPERT ASSESSMENTS ON THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES,
STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC, Friday, June 29, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:03 a.m. in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Wittman. I want to call to order the House Armed
Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. I want
to welcome folks this morning.
And today our subcommittee convenes the second of a series
of hearings related to the Afghan National Security Forces. And
at this hearing we will receive testimony from outside experts
about the resources and strategy which the U.S. and NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] are devoting to training the ANSF
[Afghan National Security Forces] and the timetable for
transitioning security lead responsibility to the ANSF.
Our panel today includes Max Boot, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations--Mr. Boot, welcome; Retired General Jack
Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; and Michael
O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow at the Foreign
Policy Program at the Brookings Institution.
General Keane, Dr. O'Hanlon, thank you so much for joining
us today. We look forward to your testimony.
My views on these issues have been informed by a recent
trip to Afghanistan. And during my visit I had several
opportunities to talk with folks in provinces and met with
local leaders, including the chiefs of police. I also had the
opportunity to talk to our military commanders on the ground,
who provided their impressions of the level of support that
will be needed to create a self-sustaining ANSF. It is my hope
that our witnesses today can provide us some further context to
these important issues.
And before we move on, I want to take a moment to highlight
the extraordinary efforts of our All-Volunteer Force serving in
Afghanistan. These brave men and women are conducting daily
combat operations against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and associated
terrorist networks. And earlier this month, I saw their
sacrifice firsthand, and want to convey my appreciation for
their service here today, thank them and their families for the
service and sacrifice they provide to our Nation.
As an administrative note, I recognize that members of
other subcommittees have joined us: Mr. Thornberry, our Vice
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Thornberry, thank you for joining us.
Pursuant to the committee rules, I will recognize these
members after all O&I Subcommittee members have had an
opportunity to question the witnesses.
And, with that, I will turn to Mr. Critz, our acting
ranking member, for any opening statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK S. CRITZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
PENNSYLVANIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I just want to say thanks, gentlemen, for coming in. As
we move forward with the transition in Afghanistan, what we are
trying to do is make sure we have as much information so that
we can make the best decision for our country, for our men and
women in uniform, and for Afghanistan, for the effort made
there.
And I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Critz.
And we will begin with the testimony of the witnesses.
Mr. Boot.
STATEMENT OF MAX BOOT, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK SENIOR FELLOW FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Boot. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for convening
these hearings.
Mr. Wittman. Is your microphone on?
Mr. Boot. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for convening
these hearings and casting such an important spotlight on these
vital issues which I fear get short shrift in our political
culture.
Since the focus of the hearings is the ANSF, let me just
say very briefly that I think ANSF capabilities are increasing
but we must not exaggerate what they can do. And they still
need considerable support from American forces in terms of
intelligence, medevac [medical evacuation], air, fire support,
clearance packages, all sorts of other things, without which
they would not be nearly as effective as they are. And they
still have tremendous challenges in securing a country of 30
million people with a force that is only going to grow to about
350,000 in the course of this year.
Now, the Council on Foreign Relations issued this week a
policy innovation memo in which I suggested seven concrete
steps that we need to take to secure the gains that have been
made by our troops--to whom you have rightly paid tribute--the
gains secured by our troops, by our allies, and by Afghan
troops over the course of the last couple years during the
Afghan surge. I fear that if we don't do enough follow-up, the
gains will be lost, and we will be placing too much of a burden
on the Afghan security forces to try to expand the tenuous
security gains that have been made.
I realize our time is very limited, so let me just run down
very briefly the seven steps that I think are important.
The first and the most important is not to reduce funding
for the ANSF. This is something that causes me the greatest
concern, the fact that currently the Administration plans to
reduce funding from about $6 billion a year down to $4.1
billion a year after 2014, which will necessitate a reduction
in the ranks of the ANSF by about 120,000 soldiers and police.
It is far from clear where these 120,000 could possibly
find gainful and legal employment in Afghanistan's economy.
Many would no doubt wind up working for drug lords or
insurgents. This is perhaps the most calamitous step we could
possibly take to destabilize the situation in Afghanistan. And
I really do not see the necessity of doing so when all we would
be saving is approximately $2 billion a year, which I realize
in the real world is a lot of money but around here is not a
significant portion of the Federal budget.
In any case, we don't have to contribute the entire amount
ourselves; we should certainly do more to try to get our allies
to pay. But I think it is incumbent on us not to reduce and
shortchange the ANSF, which could have calamitous consequences
for Afghanistan's security.
The second most important recommendation that I would make
is not to reduce our own force levels precipitously. By the end
of September, we are going to have 68,000 troops in
Afghanistan. And unless there is a substantial improvement in
the situation on the ground between now and the end of 2014, I
would recommend that we keep those force levels at about
68,000.
Because what the troops have been able to do in the last
couple of years is to vastly improve the security situation in
the south. We have not seen any such improvement in the east,
where Haqqani sanctuaries remain intact only a few hours' drive
from Kabul, as I am sure you heard, Mr. Chairman, during your
visit. This is a very dangerous situation to leave behind which
could potentially destabilize and, in fact, lead to the
overthrow of the current government unless we do more to
establish conditions of security, which will be difficult
enough to do with even 68,000 troops and I fear impossible if
we go substantially below that number.
We also need to make sure--and this is my third
recommendation--we need to make sure that we don't
precipitously cut our force levels after 2014. In some quarters
of this town, there is some magical thinking going on, I fear,
that leaving only a handful of special operators out there by
themselves can secure all of our interests in Afghanistan,
which is far from the case.
Even if we want to maintain the Joint Special Operations
Command at their current or close to their current level of
operations, it requires a vast infrastructure of forward
operating bases, medevac, air support, all sorts of platforms
to enable the men and women of the Special Operations Forces to
be as effective as they are. And if we get force levels below,
let's say, 30,000 after 2014, I fear we will not have the
infrastructure in place to enable us to carry out even the
minimal advisory and special operations missions that I think
most of us agree need to be performed.
In terms of other recommendations, I will run through them
very, very quickly.
I think we need to go slow on peace talks, not try to force
the Karzai government into an ill-advised deal with the Taliban
that would lead to a backlash from the Northern Alliance.
We need to identify and groom a successor to President
Karzai, who is due to leave office in 2014.
We need to end U.S. subsidies for the Pakistani military,
which is, in effect, subsidizing the other side.
And, finally, I believe we need to launch drone and/or
special operations strikes on Haqqani and Afghan Taliban
leadership targets within Pakistan. They cannot have impunity
to operate within Afghanistan, as they currently have, if we
expect to be at all successful in the long run in Afghanistan.
That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boot can be found in the
Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Boot. We appreciate your
testimony. Thank you for your viewpoints, and we look forward
to questioning.
General Keane.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER VICE CHIEF
OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
General Keane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
and the other members of the committee, for inviting me to
testify today. It is a pleasure always to be back in front of
the House Armed Services Committee and also to talk about an
important subject, the Afghan National Security Forces.
I am delighted to be up here with Michael O'Hanlon and Max
Boot. I have known these guys for years, and I truly admire and
thank them for their continued contribution to national
security.
As you know from the submission to the record, I have done
four assessments in Afghanistan in the last 18 months for our
commanders, and the last one was for General Mattis and General
Allen in January. And I spent a considerable amount of time
with our forces down at the platoon and company level and the
Afghan National Security Forces who are their counterparts.
And I will just say upfront that, you know, we have had
much success in the security situation since we applied the
surge forces, and particularly in the south, which was the
priority of those surge forces. And we have begun, just begun,
to turn the momentum in the east. The frustration there is we
don't have the force generation, because of the pullout of our
surge forces, that we had in the south and southwest, I think,
to be able to achieve the same kind of end state.
Also, the other thing is, I believe the ANSF is a capable
force, and it is beginning to stand up to the task of taking
over from the United States and NATO forces. However, there are
many challenges. You know 2014 is a major transition year for
us, politically, economic, and also from a security
perspective.
Just let me say that on the political and economic side
there has been considerable less effort in a successful
transition than there has been on the security side, from my
perspective, even though that was not the major part of my
assessment in Afghanistan; it has always been security. But you
cannot be immune to what is going on around the security
situation.
I think there are four key decisions that are facing us in
the next year, maybe a year and a half, that are going to be
made that will dramatically influence the stability and
security of Afghanistan, some of which Max has mentioned. And
all four of them will impact dramatically on the ANSF success.
Key decision one is the post-surge U.S. forces. That is the
68,000 that Max mentioned. I totally agree that we cannot
prematurely reduce that force. If we do, we drive the risk up
far too much in terms of what we are trying to achieve in the
east with the forces we have and the side-by-side operations
that are so critical to the Afghans. When they are training
side-by-side with us, what they get out of that in terms of
their own performance and their own growth and development is
exponential as opposed to just providing them advice, because
they see what ``right'' looks like every single day from
sergeants, soldiers, and officers.
Key decision number two is the funding for the ANSF. You
know our plans are a force level of 352,000, which we are about
at. We maintain that through 2015 at a cost of $6 billion,
largely provided by U.S. dollars. Discussions are taking place,
as we know, right now with options on the table to reduce that
to a force of 230,000 beginning in 2016.
Now, think about that. I mean, this makes no sense. How can
we expect the ANSF to protect the people with one-third less
force only a year after we almost zero out the U.S. NATO force
of 100,000? And the issue is about $2 billion a year. We spent
over a decade investing in the training and equipping of the
ANSF. By 2014, we will have the results of that investment: an
ANSF capable of protecting its people. So why, after all these
years of investing, would we gut that force and put the entire
security mission at risk?
In terms of the timetable, the ANSF funding should remain
through 2020, in my view, as part of our strategic partnership
agreement. And, of course, as Afghans are able to pay an even
greater share, then that should be expected. And we can reduce
that force in size prior to 2020 based on the conditions, but
let it be the conditions and not an arbitrary financial number.
A 230,000 ANSF force beginning in 2016 would have a disastrous
impact on the morale of that force and, I believe, in and of
itself, almost certainly guarantees the return of Taliban
domination.
The third key decision is the residual U.S. NATO force
post-2014. This force should be sized for the missions that are
vital to continued success; it should not be an arbitrary
number. Those missions are counterterrorism, training
assistance, security--those are forces to protect the force
itself, which will be largely defensive--and then you need the
enablers. The enablers are needed for all three of the forces.
For counterterrorism, we need enablers. For training
assistance, we do. And we also need enablers for the
international community residual forces and the ANSF.
Now, what are some of the things that the ANSF truly needs?
Well, first of all, it is primarily Army. And when you look at
the Army that is on the battlefield today, it is largely a
maneuver force. So it needs major functional support for
sometime beyond 2014. What am I talking about? Intelligence,
artillery, aviation, engineers, and logistics, to include
medical evacuation.
The intelligence function is almost exclusively human
intelligence. They are good at it, but they have no
technology--no UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], no sensors, no
listening devices to monitor cell phone communication and
radios. And their aviation fleet, some of which is there, is
mostly Russian-made and Italian-made C-27s. Every one of those
C-27 aircraft has been broke, on the tarmac, for months. At
some point, not initially, but at some point, we should
transition them out of those aircraft to U.S. helicopters and
C-130s as part of a long-term partnership with the Afghans,
some of which, in time, they will be able to pay for
themselves.
The other thing is that the ANSF has no route- and mine-
clearing equipment, none. And this should be part of an anti-
IED [improvised explosive device] package that is provided. If
we shut down our intel systems, don't have anti-IED for them,
and they are left out there by themselves, their casualty rate
will spike rather dramatically.
The last decision is the Afghan Taliban sanctuaries. You
know we have one at Miram Shah and one also in Quetta.
And the way you should think about this, think of these
sanctuaries as loosely knitted military bases with the
following functions resident in both: command and control;
intelligence; training; logistics, to include family housing
and barracks. At these bases, leaders set the strategy in
Afghanistan, brief middle-level leaders to return from the
fight to Afghanistan, plan for future operations, provide
intelligence to field commanders, train and refit fighters and
bombers, and provide resources and logistics.
Furthermore, the Pakistan Army, particularly the ISI
[Inter-Services Intelligence], provides intelligence on U.S.
NATO operations in those sanctuaries to those commanders. They
provide training and logistics. And as a result, the Taliban
have managed to protract a war for over 8 years, which has
eroded the political and moral will of the American people and
our NATO partners.
Something must be done about these sanctuaries if we intend
to succeed beyond 2014. We should start building the target
folders now, which would become a major collection item for our
intelligence services, which it is not. And then we should
start conducting drone attacks against those leaders in the
same way we have had success against the Al Qaeda leaders in
the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas].
What would be the result? Well, look at what has happened
to the Al Qaeda after systematic attacks on leadership. They
became largely a defensive organization in Pakistan, no longer
able to control their operations or project power outside of
it. That would be an absolute game changer in Afghanistan, if
we started to systematically change the behavior of the Taliban
leadership both at Quetta and Haqqani leadership also at Miram
Shah.
Let me conclude by saying that these four decisions that
are in front of us are going to determine whether we are going
to be successful in Afghanistan or not. We are on the cusp of
ending our participation in our longest war. Never before in
our Nation have so few served for so long on behalf of so many.
And war is fundamentally a test of wills, and that is why
leadership is always at a premium. This effort has enjoyed your
support, and it begs for your continued leadership and support
as we begin to write the final chapters.
You know, Ryan Crocker, who you all know well, our
distinguished and capable Ambassador in Afghanistan and former
Ambassador in Iraq and Pakistan, has said, ``How we leave a war
and what we leave behind is far more important than how we
began it.''
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Keane can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Keane.
Dr. O'Hanlon.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL O'HANLON, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, SENIOR
FELLOW, THE SYDNEY STEIN, JR. CHAIR OF THE FOREIGN POLICY
PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you and the
General and Max have framed the discussion beautifully, so I am
just going to pick up on one or two points and be brief.
First of all, I would like to underscore my concern, as
well, about the projected intention to downsize the Afghan
security forces quickly after 2014 or 2015. And I agree, by the
way, with the argument that we have to be careful about our own
forces. But I am especially concerned about what we are saying
now about the potential downsizing of the Afghan forces.
And I just want to give a quick anecdote based on my trips
to Afghanistan of how this concept of downsizing rapidly began
and, I think, how it has been misconstrued in the ensuing
discussion. As I understood things from discussions at the U.S.
part of the training command, the United States initiated a
discussion about what long-term Afghan forces might have to be,
in terms of their size and capability and cost, and did not
work through NATO or with the Afghans, just tried to get some
notional concepts on the table, one of which was this famous
option to go to 230,000 Afghan forces or, in a suspiciously
precise formulation, 228,500 Afghan Army and police.
That was one of four scenarios based on a certain assumed
threat environment, a relatively favorable one, because, of
course, 228,500 is a lot less than we have now. Right now we
have about 130,000 NATO troops and about 300,000 Afghan forces
in the field, plus another 40,000 or so that are training. So
right now we have more than 400,000 combined forces. We are
intending to go down, perhaps, to 230,000.
Again, this was one of four scenarios, which the United
States did not intend to be a prediction of where we should go,
but the idea was to give some concreteness to the planning
exercise and also give our diplomats in the State Department,
who I think have done a very good job with a difficult
portfolio, something to plan for with NATO allies; going to our
allies and saying, can you at least consider this to be a
minimal requirement, and therefore try to pony up some fraction
of the cost even for this minimal requirement.
But, unfortunately, what was designed as an illustrative
scenario and a way to go out and elicit some help from allies
has become the default plan. And I don't quite know when or how
that happened, but I think it is a bad idea. I think we should
assume the Afghan forces need to stay at 350,000 for some
number of years after 2015 until proven otherwise.
And Max's point is right on the money, that the $2 billion,
plus or minus, that is at issue here, while it is real money,
is nothing compared to the $100 billion a year we are spending
now on our own operations in the field. And if we even had to
add 2,000 more American troops post-2014 to compensate for an
insufficiently sized Afghan force, that would consume all the
savings right there because of the enormous expense of our
forces in the field.
So I just wanted to add my voice----
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
Dr. O'Hanlon [continuing].and also explain the genesis of
what I think has become, you know, misconstrued. It was
supposed to be an option or a scenario. Now it has become the
default plan.
Just four more quick points, then I will be done. And this
is in the spirit of reminding some of the broader debate and
discussion about some of the good news from Afghanistan. We are
all aware of the bad news. I don't in any way trivialize it. I
think the bad news is being accurately reported, and it is
real. But the good news needs to also be kept in mind. And I
think the General and Dr. Boot have done a good job, as have
you, of reminding the country in this discussion of what we are
able to make progress up against, but let me add four more
specific points.
One is--and it is a point that General Allen has made, and
others--the Afghan forces are now leading about 40 percent of
all operations. And these are typically the easier ones, so,
you know, we have to be clear and transparent about that. But
they are doing a fair amount even with the more difficult
missions--for example, the April 15th coordinated attacks in
Kabul and elsewhere, which were handled primarily by the Afghan
security forces. And I believe that was also the case in the
tragic attacks last week at the hotel resort near Kabul in
which Afghan forces took the primary role. Their special forces
are getting pretty good, by all accounts, and I think that is
worth bearing in mind, as well.
Secondly, the Afghan local police, they tend to make the
news when they do something wrong or when somebody else, some
militia claims to be Afghan local police and goes out and does
something wrong. And I think, however, this force, on balance,
is doing extremely well. There have been some investigations of
the various alleged misdoings of some of the individual units.
And for those who aren't familiar, perhaps C-SPAN viewers,
with exactly what this concept is, these Afghan local police
are essentially community-watch organizations under government
supervision with American training but, nonetheless, different
than the Army or the police. And they defend their own
communities; they are not allowed to go beyond their
communities, as you well know.
And there have been some cases of abuse, but--there were, I
think, nine alleged cases last year. Subsequent investigations
suggested that one or two were serious violations of proper
procedure or law by the Afghan local police. Overwhelmingly,
however, these forces are operating well, and they are holding
their own. They are taking the highest number of casualties,
percentage-wise, of any Afghan force. And even when they are
overmatched, they are holding their ground 80 percent of the
time against insurgents, even when they don't have help quickly
from Afghan Army or NATO Army forces. So I think they deserve
credit.
The bad news here is that the reason they are good is
because we are being very careful in how we build them up. And,
again, I think members of this committee are well aware of this
fact, but that this is not an out-of-control reincarnation of
the Afghan militias. We are having American and other NATO
special forces operate in the field with these folks for
several months at a time before we certify them as ready to go
on with their own missions. And that is why there are only
12,000 of them right now.
So I do think we have to bear in mind, this is not going to
be the silver bullet that the Sons of Iraq, to some extent,
were in Anbar Province. It is not going to be that big of a
contribution to Afghan security. But it is still a useful one.
That is my second point.
Third point: People talk about sometimes in very loose ways
how the Afghan security forces are dominated by the Tajiks or
other minority groups. And it is true that we have too high of
a dependence on Tajik officers in certain parts of the Afghan
security forces. But the overall ethnic composition of the
Afghan security forces almost exactly mirrors the demographics
of Afghanistan. And, of course, that is because of people like
General Caldwell and General Bolger and their associates in the
Afghan forces making great effort to ensure that this is so.
And then, finally, my last point: Where we do see
misbehavior, corruption, nepotism, and, to some extent, ethnic
partiality in the behavior of Afghan leaders, the Afghan
leadership and the NATO leadership are trying to get rid of
these people and replace them. And, again, as you know from
your recent trip, and some of the things I was told on my trip
in May, 50 Afghan Army leaders in the east of Afghanistan have
been replaced in just the last year--50. And this is often the
Americans, having eyes on the operations of these Afghans,
reporting up the chain of command, and then General Allen or
someone else may go see General Karimi or Minister Wardak or
President Karzai, and there is an exchange of views. And the
Afghans ultimately make the decisions, they control their own
security forces, but we provide them with information, and they
take it seriously.
And then, finally, B.K. Mohammadi, the Minister of
Interior, some people think that he is a little too aggressive
in how he fires people. Some people think he is a Tajik, you
know, nationalist of some type. But, for the most part, what
appears to be the case is he is firing incompetent leaders of
whatever ethnic persuasion they may be. And he has just
replaced 70 in Herat, including a number of his own fellow
Tajiks.
So I see a lot of signs of hopefulness in the Afghan
security forces. The title of my testimony was that the glass
is about 55 percent full, and that is the point I will finish
on. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. O'Hanlon can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Dr. O'Hanlon.
Members of the panel, thank you so much. And we will begin
with our line of questioning.
I want to go back to my conversations when I was in theater
with General Allen and Ambassador Crocker and their assessment
of where we are, where they see the need going forward. One of
the concerns that I have in looking at, strategically, the plan
going forward, as you know, now we are in a situation of a
force of 68,000 at the end of 2012, and then making the
decision through 2013 as to where we progress by 2014, and
doing that in a transition of five tranches.
Now, the concern to me is that, as you look at those
tranches, the easier transition points take place up front, the
more difficult transition points take place in the end, which,
to me, is counterintuitive to drawing down our forces, having
less capability there. So you have less capability facing a
more difficult transition time, and then not having a full
complement there in place of ANSF.
So my concern is, does that logically make sense in how the
transition is to take place? So I got their perspective there.
They have proposed making some changes, moving some of the more
difficult areas of transition into tranche three, which is what
they are beginning that effort now.
That being said, as you said, the interesting point is a
somewhat of a different approach as far as the total number of
ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] forces after
2014 and then a drawdown, as you said, with ANSF forces not
long after they are up to the full 350,000. My conversations,
too, with Defense Minister Wardak is that he feels that going
to 230,000 at that point in time, at the end of 2016, will
leave a power vacuum and that they are concerned about being
able to transition those 120,000 people into some productive
element of society there and not have them become part of the
insurgency.
So I think there are a number of different areas there
where it looks like, to me, there is some counterintuitiveness
about the plan going forward.
All of you all touched on certain parts of that. I want to
get your thoughts about what impact that has on our success on
the current track and what the contingency should be if these
scenarios, as they are planned now, knowing what has been
proposed, what should the contingency be if those elements of
the plan don't work out as proposed.
And I will go--I will start with Mr. Boot.
Mr. Boot. Well, I would just reiterate what General Keane
said, which is that all of our decisions need to be conditions-
based. They should not be imposed based on a timeline dictated
in Washington or on budget decisions made in Washington for
purely Washington reasons. I think they ought to correspond to
the conditions on the ground.
And I think we need to be, as General Keane suggested and I
think as Mike would certainly agree, I think we need to be very
careful about the drawdown and managing that in a responsible
way so that we don't leave a power vacuum. And I am afraid that
could well be the result of the current trajectory that we are
on.
So I think we need to be very careful, go slow, and make
sure that we are not shrinking the ANSF or shrinking our force
presence prematurely, even if conditions have not improved a
good deal. And there has been some improvement, certainly, in
the last couple of years, but it is very uneven. It has been
mostly focused on the south. The east remains very dangerous
and still in need of considerable pacification.
So I would, you know, as my colleague said, I would urge a
go-slow, conditions-based approach.
General Keane. You know, it is pretty interesting what has
happened to us. I think if the Administration at the beginning
asked one of the generals, ``I will give you 5 years to solve
this war, and I will give you the resources to do it,'' I think
anybody would have taken that. And that is what we have; 2009
to 2014, it is 5 years.
But what is the problem? The problem is, right from the
beginning, we start tying their hand. The first tying of the
hand was Petraeus and McChrystal recommended a minimal force of
40,000; they got 30,000, which was 25 percent less. What did
that do to us? They wanted to conduct a simultaneous campaign
in the south and in the east to collapse the enemy, put as much
pressure on it. Without that additional 10,000, could not do
it. We had to do it sequentially. What did that do? Protracts
the war, drives up casualties, evaporates more political will
at home.
Second problem we have, another handcuff, is Petraeus wants
to keep the surge forces that the President gave him, the
30,000, much longer at a much higher level. They are all gone
before this year is out.
So that is where we are at the point of your question now.
Given those two things, those dynamics have already happened--
and there is pressure on the commanders to stay on a schedule
that transitions our combat forces in 2013 totally, not 2014,
and then be out of there by 2014. In my judgment, what is
happening to support that is far from conditions-based. That is
a date that we are moving to, and, by God, we are doing it.
We should take that pressure off of them so that they can
come back and say, look, we have to slow this down a little
bit. That is the major issue. We have--two major issues, to
answer your question, in terms of contingencies is: slow down
that transition if the commanders are having problems with it,
which I think they will, particularly in the east; and, also,
keep the ANSF at the resource level it should be at with its
enablers.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Dr. O'Hanlon.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Chairman, I will put it in these terms
because I agree with what my colleagues have said.
As we all remember, when President Obama was inaugurated,
he had been adamantly against the Iraq war but he gave his
field commanders time to execute the drawdown over the next 19
months and wound up keeping 50,000 troops, which I think was a
good decision on his part, rather than the original intention
to go very small. And he gave the field commanders time, as
well, to figure out what the drawdown path would be. And as we
all recall, they were allowed to keep the forces through the
Iraqi elections of early 2010 and do most of the drawdown a
year and a half into the Obama presidency.
I think something similar is going to be necessary and
advisable with whoever is in the White House come January.
Whoever does a policy review in the late fall, early winter, I
hope they give the field commanders the same leeway. Because
the answer to your question, in my mind, is that as we do this
transition to Afghan lead, we need to have substantial
capability that we still retain to be able to back them up if
they get into trouble, as they likely will.
So what I would anticipate is that, if we stay at 68,000
through the fall, which I hope will be the case, then we do a
review by the newly elected President, whether it is Governor
Romney or President Obama, and then early in 2013 the President
largely defers to field commanders and keeps probably most of
those 68,000 through much of the fighting season of 2014, if
that is what field commanders recommend. That is my instinct
about where I think we need to go to address the problem that
you mentioned.
Mr. Wittman. Very good, members of the panel.
I want to welcome Ranking Member Mr. Cooper and turn to him
if he has any opening statements, and if not, turn to him for
questions.
Mr. Cooper. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since I was late
getting here, let me defer to my colleague, Mr. Critz, who was
more prompt than I was. I apologize for having been slow.
Mr. Wittman. No problem.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. O'Hanlon, you made a statement that there has been, I
guess, some issue that maybe more of the commanders were Tajik,
but if you look at the entire force, it really,
demographically, matches the country.
Is the leadership geographic? In other words, is the Tajik
leadership in Tajik areas? Is it tribal almost in the way it is
set up, that maybe we are looking at something further down the
road, that Tajiks are in command in Tajik areas and then other
tribal areas have other commanders?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Congressman. Let me briefly answer
and, if you don't mind, invite my colleagues who may know
certain aspects of this better than I do to correct me if they
see any place where I am wrong.
Generally speaking, I believe that while many of the Tajik
leaders of course come from the northern and eastern parts of
Afghanistan, they are deployed throughout the country in
current operations. And the main additional problem--I mean,
there are ethnic issues, as you well know, and challenges. The
other one is that it is hard to recruit southern Pashtun from
the provinces like Kandahar. And we haven't been able to do
very well with that, even when we try to incentivize them,
feeling that they can stay in their own home district or
province for a certain period of time.
So there are challenges. I don't want to trivialize that.
And sometimes we have to rely on commanders or recruits from
other provinces to fill more of a given part of the south than
we would like.
But, overall, the Tajiks, even though they come from the
north and east, they are deployed throughout the country. And
they are serving well throughout the country, as best I know.
Mr. Critz. And you are saying that we have--maybe we are
lacking in Pashtun commanders, then?
Dr. O'Hanlon. In certain parts of the force. I think, for
example, the Afghan police, the ANCOP [Afghan National Civil
Order Police] forces, sort of the elite paramilitary, I think
those are 50 percent-plus Tajik-led, if I am remembering my
statistics correctly. That is not true of every kind of unit in
the Afghan security forces, but that is one concrete example.
And that causes you some concern.
Mr. Critz. Yeah.
Dr. O'Hanlon. But on the other hand, the units are
individually integrated. And there is a balance, a relatively
good balance, if you look throughout the force. There is still,
I think, 40 percent Pashtun leadership out of a Pashtun
population of 45 percent.
So it is not bad if you look nationwide across all
different aspects of the Afghan security forces. But the Uzbeks
and the Hazara are somewhat underrepresented, and the Tajiks
are overrepresented, especially in a couple wings of the
military.
Mr. Critz. Okay.
Mr. Boot, you made a statement that part of the seven
points was that--one of them was that we should discontinue
subsidy to the Pakistan military. What is your prediction as to
what that would yield?
Mr. Boot. Well, I can't say for certain what would happen
if we stopped subsidizing the Pakistani military, but I do know
that we have given them tens of billions of dollars in subsidy
over the course of----
Mr. Critz. Well, if you are going to make that statement,
though, you have to figure out it is going to have some impact.
So----
Mr. Boot. No, no. Absolutely.
Mr. Critz [continuing]. What is the impact?
Mr. Boot. What I was going to say is that we have tried
very heavily subsidizing them over the course of the last
decade, an effort basically to wean them away from the Taliban,
the Haqqanis, to basically bribe them, in a way, into becoming
our allies, and that effort has totally failed. And I think, as
a starting point, we need to recognize that effort has failed,
that the Pakistanis remain as deeply committed to the Afghan
Taliban, the Haqqani network now as they were a decade ago. And
so, for that reason, I think it has been counterproductive to
give all the subsidies that we have given to the Pakistani
military, which, in essence, has been basically indirectly
subsidizing the very forces that are killing our personnel in
Afghanistan.
So I think--I am not saying cut off all aid to the state of
Pakistan. I think we should certainly continue to fund civil
society in Pakistan and an alternative to the military-
dominated, ISI-dominated foreign and national security policy
they pursue. But I think we need to recognize that Pakistan is
not our friend here and that giving further subsidies to the
military will be counterproductive.
And I don't think it would lead to the kind of consequences
that some people fear, such as a jihadist takeover of the
State, because I believe that the Pakistani military is still
very good at internal control and will still be able to remain
in power. But the resources that they use in large part for
preparing for war against India and for subsidizing jihadist
groups that attack ourselves and our allies, those resources
will be decreased.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Critz.
We will go to Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In reviewing your written statements that have been
provided to our staff, one thing stands out, in particular, by
Dr. O'Hanlon: ``I do not believe it likely that this Congress
or a future Congress will sustain up to 20,000 GIs in
Afghanistan at a cost of perhaps $25 billion a year and add
another $3 billion to $5 billion annually in direct security
and economic support for the Afghan Government and people.''
Then he concludes with, ``But given American politics and
budget constraints, it would be likely that we are not going to
be able to do some of the things that have been suggested.''
On the other hand, I am looking at other testimony of Mr.
Boot and General Keane. One wants us to ``provide $6 billion a
year for the Afghan National Security Forces.'' We also have a
request of perhaps up to ``$25 billion to $35 billion''
annually for United States support personnel and Special
Operations Forces. We have the comment that it ``costs
approximately $6 billion'' to properly fund the ANSF.
``Discussions are ongoing to reduce the funding to
approximately $4 billion, which results in an ANSF reduction
from 352,000 to 230,000 beginning in 2016. This makes no
sense.''
That is quoting from some of the excerpts of the
testimonies provided.
Let me see if I can try to interject some financial reality
to the position that the United States of America is in. Then I
am going to ask you to think about where the money is going to
come from that you are asking for.
We blew through the $15 trillion debt mark in November.
This year we are going to blow through the $16 trillion debt
mark. We have had three consecutive deficits in excess of a
trillion dollars a year. We are going into our fourth one of a
trillion dollars a year. We have seen what has been going on in
Italy, Greece, and Spain; they are on the verge of insolvency
and bankruptcy. But for other communities in Europe, they would
have already been in insolvency and bankruptcy. I don't know of
anyone similarly situated that would help the United States
avoid insolvency and bankruptcy if we continue on this path.
If we do continue on this path, there is one outcome and
one outcome only, and that is an American insolvency and
bankruptcy, which, in turn, means that we may have no money for
national defense. Think about that. No military personnel at
all. Even with the sequestration, which is a tip-of-the-iceberg
kind of situation, you are looking at laying off 700,000
American uniformed personnel and/or civilian DOD support
workers and/or private contractors who are supporting our
military with a gee-whiz-bang weaponry that is so desired by
other nations elsewhere but they don't have and which gives our
military capabilities far above and beyond what our enemies
typically can field.
So, given this kind of situation, given the Afghan
economy--I have been to Afghanistan, as have you. Personally, I
don't think that their economy in the next decade will be able
to support their own defense needs, which means it is going to
have to be America, if we are going to continue to put money
into this, as you all acknowledge in your testimony.
Where do you think the money ought to come from to pay for
the sums that you suggest are desirable or needed to stabilize
the Afghan situation as we continue to draw down our troops? Do
you want to cut other parts of national defense? If so, where?
Do you want to cut the welfare programs, entitlement programs?
If so, which ones? Please give me ammunition or guidance on the
priorities so that we can get our financial house in order and
do what you want us to do.
Mr. Boot first, then General Keane, and then Dr. O'Hanlon.
Mr. Boot. Well, Congressman, I agree with you about the
dire state of our finances, but I don't agree that defense is
the primary contributing factor to it. Clearly, as we all know,
it is entitlement spending. Defense is only taking about 4
percent of our gross domestic product and less than 20 percent
of the Federal budget. That is the entire defense budget; that
is not the part for Afghanistan.
And no matter what happens, we are going to dramatically
reduce our spending in Afghanistan from about $100 billion
today down to some lesser level. And even at the levels that
General Keane and I and Michael O'Hanlon recommend, you are
talking about a two-thirds reduction in the amount of money
that we are spending in Afghanistan, down to, let's say, $30
billion, $35 billion a year. And, yes, that is a lot of money,
but the question in my mind is, what is the alternative?
And if we are, in fact, trying to desperately stabilize the
situation in Afghanistan, and not only in Afghanistan but also
in Pakistan--because our presence in Afghanistan also allows us
to effect developments in Pakistan, which, if that were to
fall, would be the ultimate nightmare, a nuclear-armed state--
and we are able to prevent Afghanistan from falling back under
the control of the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies, in
effect, to prevent----
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Boot----
Mr. Boot [continuing]. A recurrence of the conditions that
led to 9/11.
Mr. Brooks [continuing]. I am going to interject for just a
moment. I agree with you that national defense shouldn't take
the hit that it has taken. That is why I voted against the
Budget Control Act that imposes the sequestration.
You have mentioned entitlements. Is that where you think we
ought to cut because you believe that is a lesser priority than
national defense? That is my question. Where would you cut?
Mr. Boot. Well, I think entitlements are driving the out-
of-control deficits. And so, if we are going to address the
deficits, we need to go where the money is, which is in
entitlements, not in defense.
Mr. Brooks. Well, you other two, the gavel has hammered, so
you all get off the hook.
Thank you, Mr. Boot.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.
I will ask that the witnesses, if you would, provide your
comments in writing back to the committee for Mr. Brooks'
question.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Mr. Wittman. And we will go to Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank the witnesses.
In view of the pending vote, I want to be brief. I want to
explore two issues: one, the vulnerability of our troops to
cutoff of supply through Pakistan, particularly if we make a
dramatic curtailment in aid to Pakistan; and, second, the
allegiance of ANSF troops. What risk do we face that we may be
training a force that could turn against us?
So if you would help me with both of those questions, that
would be great.
General Keane. I will be glad to jump in.
Well, obviously, we have had our main supply route closed
for a number of months now, and we are able to sustain the
force that we have. Two means to do that is the other supply
route in the north and also the air line of communication that
we have established. I think it is overstated, our dependency
on that main supply route. It certainly is desirable because it
is a lot easier to use, it is less costly, although the
Pakistanis certainly want us to pay through the nose for the
challenges that we had between them.
So I think we could actually take the issue off the table,
in my judgment, in terms of our relationship with Pakistan on
this issue because we do have alternatives. And, most
dramatically, our force size is coming down rather
significantly, and therefore there is less requirement.
And we have issues inside the ANSF, clearly, in terms of
what we refer to as green-on-blue atrocities. And there is no
doubt that the Taliban have looked at, how do we get at U.S.
forces? Their major means of doing that has been, by and large,
on the roads or on footpaths using explosive devices. And we
are painfully aware of that. Their other strategy is
infiltration into the security forces to be able to attack U.S.
forces. And that has taken place.
The good news is, in talking last night to General Bolger
and also to Minister Wardak, General Wardak, who you know is--
they believe that they are stopping about 75 percent of what
has happened by increasing their intelligence, by vetting
people better, et cetera. They are very much aware of the
challenge that we have.
And I think the way our forces look at it is, as
debilitating as that is, it is something that--a tool that the
enemy is using. As the enemy is using an IED against us, they
are using that kind of infiltration against our forces. It is
frustrating for our forces to deal with that, but at the same
time, look, our soldiers are pretty tough, and their resilience
is extraordinary. And that does not diminish their performance
nor the quality of that performance nor the extraordinary
morale that they have had for all these years.
Mr. Cooper. Would the witnesses generally agree with
General Keane's assessment there, that we should take the
Pakistan supply route off the table in negotiations with the
Pakistanis and that there is not that significant a worry about
green-on-blue?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Well, I certainly agree that, logistically
speaking, we are in a much better place vis-a-vis Pakistan. And
my hat is off to our military logisticians and our diplomats
who have developed the Northern Distribution Network. It is an
amazing alternative. It still increases slightly uncomfortably
our dependence on Vladimir Putin, but some of those routes
don't require his explicit permission, and, in any event, we
are in a much better place.
I think the green-on-blue situation is still very
troublesome. I don't think the General would trivialize it
either. And I think it does run a risk of really eroding our
ability to cooperate well with Afghan forces. General Allen was
very concerned about it when he testified in March. I think it
has risen to being a strategic concern. But I agree with
General Keane that there are serious efforts being undertaken
to try to at least cap it. That is not good enough, but that
may be the best we can do in the short term. That would be my
reflection there.
If I could briefly comment on to whom the Afghan forces are
loyal, because I think you asked a great question on that,
Congressman, as well. A lot of this is going to turn on the
2014 elections in Afghanistan, which are crucial, as we all
recognize.
I talked to a top Afghan general when I was visiting last
month, and we asked him, what is your number-one concern about
security in Afghanistan? And he said the 2014 elections,
because we get the wrong person elected and all bets are off.
And even though I don't think President Karzai has been a
stellar leader, there are a couple of things he has done
correctly that I believe the next leader needs to emulate, and
one of them is to have non-Pashtun vice presidents. Now,
preferably someone of greater repute than Fahim Khan, who is,
of course, his first vice president. But the basic concept of
having maybe a Tajik as the first vice president and made a
Hazara or Uzbek as the second is a solid concept that I think
probably needs to be adopted. I think a Pashtun will win in
2014.
Then the other point is in terms of the ministers of
security. You need at least one non-Pashtun in those top two
positions, as well. These are some of the elements that I think
will be important.
And then, of course, the President can't be more corrupt
than Karzai's family. There are two or three people whose names
I heard mentioned frequently as potential contenders who I
think we need to find a way, quietly or explicitly, to veto.
And that is the point I was trying to get at in my testimony,
where I can't imagine this Congress funding $5 billion a year
for Afghan aid if the next President of Afghanistan is even
more problematic in this domain than the Karzai regime. And I
think we need to send that message soon.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
We will go to Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank the witnesses for their preparation and their
testimony this morning.
Dr. O'Hanlon, especially thank you for the advice you have
given us over the weeks and years on strategic issues. You have
been invaluable. We appreciate that very much.
Mr. Boot, in the last sentence of your testimony, you say,
``Most Afghans have no desire to be ruled by the Taliban. They
simply need our continuing aid to consolidate their post-2001
efforts to create a more inclusive and more moderate state.''
How committed to a more inclusive and moderate state do you
think the Karzai regime is in Afghanistan?
Mr. Boot. Well, as Mike suggested, obviously President
Karzai and his family are deeply problematic. There are
obviously deep issues of corruption there, although it is
possible to work with them, as we have seen in the recent
agreements that were reached on night raids and the handover of
the Parwan Detention Facility.
And, basically, at the end of the day, I mean, I think
there is no question that the Karzais, like a lot of the elites
in Afghanistan, are trying to get the most they can out of the
state. And a lot of them are doing very well, with Dubai bank
accounts and so forth. But I think we are, in a lot of ways,
encouraging that by not having good controls over our spending.
And by also setting deadlines for our departure, what you are
basically saying is, get as much as you can now because the
country is going to go----
Mr. Andrews. But isn't the other half of that argument
saying that, you know, we will stay indefinitely and keep
writing checks, isn't it encouraging that kind of behavior?
Let me ask you this question: I completely agree that,
obviously, an extension of Taliban rule in any part of that
country is wholly undesirable, and it is the reason we are
still there; it is what we are trying to prevent. I am
concerned, though--I want to know if any of the witnesses are
concerned--that the present regime might find it quite
acceptable to have an unwritten agreement where they would stay
in power but there would, in fact, be parts of the country that
would be ruled by the Taliban and do whatever they want.
I mean, aren't we at risk that this regime would double-
bank us, preserve their own control of the country, their own
wealth, and just look the other way as the Taliban rules
certain parts of the country and perhaps once again is the host
for the Al Qaeda parasite? What is wrong with that hypothesis?
Any of the witnesses.
General Keane. Well, first of all, this regime is going,
and thank God for that. You know, Ryan Crocker, I think, has
worked--you know how capable he is as an ambassador. He is the
best in the business----
Mr. Andrews. He sure is.
General Keane [continuing]. In this part of the world. And
he is confident that there will be a political transition. And
that was not always the view. There was some speculation, as
you know, that Karzai would find some means to sort of hang on
here by constitutional reform. Not happening. He is going.
I don't think we will get a transformational leader, but I
do believe we will get a leader who clearly understands the
legacy of the past and the problems it has caused his country
and they will try to make some incremental improvements, much
more along the lines of what we had seen take place in Korea
over a number of years.
So I am not of the mind that the regime is going to get
worse, although there is potential for that. And I clearly
believe that we should be all-in helping to influence that
situation, as Michael has suggested, and do a much better job
of it here than what we did in Iraq.
Mr. Andrews. If I could paraphrase my question, what I am
really asking is, how confident are we that the Afghan regime's
interests are truly aligned with ours? And to the extent that
they are not, what can we do to influence the regime in
becoming aligned with it?
And the specificity of this is that it is absolutely not in
our best interests for the Taliban to control a square inch of
Afghanistan. I agree with that. But they may see it as being
somewhat in theirs. How do we make sure that our interests are
aligned?
General Keane. Well, I don't know--just to finish up, I was
going to answer that question. I don't know political leaders
in Afghanistan that I have dealt with who would be willing to
cede any of that country to the Taliban, and for all the
obvious reasons in terms of tyrannical rule, violation of human
and civil rights, and what that would mean inside of their
country. There would be absolutely no toleration for political
leaders doing something like that, in my view.
You know, one of the most remarkable things that took place
was the loya jirga that took place last summer asking for the
special relationship with the United States. The participation
in that came from virtually every province in the country----
Mr. Andrews. My time is about to expire. I appreciate the
answer.
Let me just close, Mr. Chairman, by saying this, that I
sometimes think, through our majority and yours and through the
Republican administration and the Democratic administration, we
have been asking the wrong question, which is, how competent
are we at transitioning over to Afghan security? I think the
question is, how willing are they to accept it?
And, you know, our troops are doing a fantastic job there
under very difficult circumstances. I think these gentlemen
have given us very sage tactical advice on how to achieve it.
But tactical measures fail if there isn't strategic uniformity,
and I really wonder if it exists here.
Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. We appreciate that.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for spending your time with us
today. As you can see, we are on the front end of a vote
series, and I want to make sure that we have an opportunity, if
there are any questions that the panel has to ask, that they be
able to submit those in writing and to ask that you be able to
answer those for the committee.
Mr. Wittman. And, with that, again, thank you for appearing
before us today.
And, with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 29, 2012
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 29, 2012
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Statement of Hon. Rob Wittman
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Hearing on
Expert Assessments on the Afghan National
Security Forces: Resources, Strategy, and
Timetable for Security Lead Transition
June 29, 2012
Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee
convenes the second of a series of hearings related to the
Afghan National Security Forces.
At this hearing, we will receive testimony from outside
experts about the resources and strategy which the U.S. and
NATO are devoting to training the ANSF and the timetable for
transitioning security lead responsibility to the ANSF.
Our panel today includes:
LMax Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow
for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations;
LRetired General Jack Keane, Former Vice Chief
of Staff of the U.S. Army; and
LMichael O'Hanlon, Director of Research and
Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Program at the
Brookings Institution.
Thank you for your participation. We look forward to your
testimony.
My views on these issues have been informed by a recent
trip to Afghanistan. During my visit, I traveled to several
provinces and met with local leaders, including the chiefs of
police. I also had the opportunity to talk to military
commanders, who provided their impressions of the level of
support that will be needed to create a self-sustaining ANSF.
It is my hope that our witnesses today can provide further
context on these important issues.
Before we move on, I want to take a moment to highlight the
extraordinary efforts of our All-Volunteer Force serving in
Afghanistan. These brave men and women are conducting daily
combat operations against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and associated
terrorist networks. Earlier this month, I saw their sacrifice
firsthand, and I want to convey my appreciation for their
service here today.
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 29, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Dr. O'Hanlon. I believe that deficit reduction must be broad-based
to be politically feasible and mathematically practical and
economically wise. That means entitlement spending, discretionary
spending, and revenues must all be on the table. Our current deficit is
roughly $1 trillion a year, perhaps a bit less if one adjusts for where
we stand in the economic recovery. I believe that, beyond declining war
costs in Afghanistan, the core defense budget can absorb those cuts
scheduled in the first tranche of the Budget Control Act without
serious prejudice to our national security, as I explained in detail
last year in my book The Wounded Giant: America's Armed Forces in an
Age of Austerity.
I agree that American deficits and the economic weakness they
engender have become a major threat not only to our economy and our
future way of life, but to our national security as well. Admiral Mike
Mullen was right on this point. Indeed, this has been an important
theme of my two latest books--The Wounded Giant in 2011, where I looked
for economies in the defense budget, and Bending History: Barack
Obama's Foreign Policy this year (with Martin Indyk and Kenneth
Lieberthal), where we argued that even though President Obama's foreign
policy record is reasonably good in one sense, it is built on the shaky
pillar of an American economy that is going through extremely difficult
times. Economic renewal must be the agenda of the next Congress and the
next presidential term, be it under Governor Romney or President Obama.
Otherwise our national security will likely suffer.
In terms of deficit reduction strategies, I believe on policy and
political grounds that the only way to move forward is to create a
climate of shared sacrifice. While I support the defense cuts in the
first tranche of the Budget Control Act, as reflected in the Obama
administration defense strategy document of 2012 and budget proposal
for FY 2013, I am troubled by the BCA's almost exclusive focus on so-
called discretionary budget accounts. More effective deficit reduction
efforts require tax and entitlement reform that slow the growth of the
latter and lead to net revenue increases in regard to the former, in my
judgment. The entitlement reforms need not be cuts per se, and the tax
reform need not involve higher rates if sufficient loopholes are
closed, but we need to spend less and take in more revenue than current
projections imply.
On Afghanistan, we need to do what it takes to prevent the return
of Al Qaeda to a sanctuary in that country, as the threat of Al Qaeda
is much greater than the $25 billion a year in steady state costs I
would project for the mission there from 2015 through 2020. But this
continued investment in Afghanistan only makes sense if Afghans do
their part as well, particularly with their 2014 election and
governance reforms. [See page 16.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 29, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ
Mr. Critz. What is your understanding of the breakdown of $4.1B
spending proposed for ANSF? Does it include train and equip, SFA
(Security Assistance Force) or only direct costs to train, equip, and
pay for salaries and operations of the ANSF?
Dr. O'Hanlon. The $4.1 billion/year figure for post-2014 expenses
is for just the Afghan security forces. I consider it unrealistically
low by comparison with likely needs.
Mr. Critz. What are your thoughts on the Security Force Assistance
(SFA) model: numbers, ROE, etc. Where are we with the planning for
this? Do you think it will work?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I believe we will need some 20,000 U.S. forces in
Afghanistan after 2014 to do the job right--at least for a few years,
or until Pakistan begins to clamp down more effectively on the Taliban
sanctuaries on its soil, or until there is a peace accord between major
elements of the Afghan Taliban and Afghan government.
Mr. Critz. Is the ANSF respected by Afghans? Is it respected by the
Taliban? Are there differences in perceptions about the various
elements of the ANSF?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Yes the ANSF is generally respected by Afghans
according to all polls I have seen, but there are also concerns about
corruption within its ranks. I believe the Taliban is gaining more
respect for the ANSF, particularly its special forces and certain other
units. But the Taliban also probably still thinks that on balance it
can defeat the ANSF once NATO is gone.
Mr. Critz. What are your thoughts on why the poppy crop is down?
How much is due to environmental factors (drought, blight, etc.) and
how much due to ISAF or GIROA efforts? Can this lower level of
production be sustained once U.S. forces withdraw?
Dr. O'Hanlon. My understanding of the reasons for reduced poppy
production suggest that we should consider this only a modest success
to date (in other words, blight and related causes account for much of
the decline--and production is in fact still rather high).
Mr. Critz. How do we deal with the Pakistan safe havens? Is
Pakistan currently taking actions to eliminate safe havens for the
Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, or HiG? Do we expect such
actions in the future? Why or why not?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Pakistan is not doing much yet to shut down
sanctuaries on its soil. Bruce Riedel and I wrote about our ideas in a
new Brookings book, Campaign 2012. Basically we advocated being tougher
on the Pakistani military (e.g., less aid) and more supportive of the
Pakistani economy and civil society (e.g., more development aid and
greater efforts to move to a free-trade accord)
Mr. Critz. How do we deal with Afghan government corruption? What
are the impacts of corruption? What level of confidence should NATO
members have that corruption will be controlled post-2014? Does
corruption currently undermine the effectiveness of GIROA and the ANSF?
Is governmental corruption linked at all to the Taliban's ability to
recruit new fighters?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Yes Afghan government corruption is still serious and
yes it helps the insurgency. I favor focusing on the looming 2014
elections in Afghanistan and underscoring to President Karzai how
important it is that he and his supporters NOT try to engineer the
election of a successor who may make the problem worse. I also believe
that modest reductions in our aid budget are a good thing not a bad
thing, for this same reason.
Mr. Critz. In your opinion, what will determine ANSF success? What
factors could undermine ANSF capability and success in the future?
Dr. O'Hanlon. To be successful, the ANSF needs to avoid ethnic
fights from within its ranks, have adequate western financial support
and mentoring and combat backup even after 2014, and get a little help
from Islamabad in terms of Pakistan at least partially curtailing the
ability of the Afghan insurgency to use Pakistani sanctuaries.
Mr. Critz. Can the Afghan Local Police (ALP) be sustained when we
leave? Who will fund and train? Does the Afghan Ministry of the
Interior have the ability to effectively oversee and control the ALP
sites and units in the absence of USSOF?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I am a supporter of the ALP, yes, but I would not
grow it so much that we can't help oversee it after 2014 ourselves, at
least to a degree.
Mr. Critz. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ALP?
Dr. O'Hanlon. The ALP is a good fighting force overall but it can
be sucked into tribal politics locally and its effectiveness can be
compromised as a result, or it can even be used to settle tribal scores
rather than fight the Taliban. Also negative perceptions of the ALP can
grow even if the ALP units themselves get better, because of the rumor
mill.
Mr. Critz. Can you please explain your understanding of the
procedures by which we control ALP funding and make sure it won't be
misspent.
Dr. O'Hanlon. The ALP is a good fighting force overall but it can
be sucked into tribal politics locally and its effectiveness can be
compromised as a result, or it can even be used to settle tribal scores
rather than fight the Taliban. Also negative perceptions of the ALP can
grow even if the ALP units themselves get better, because of the rumor
mill.
Mr. Critz. General Allen has stated there are three key factors for
successful transition in Afghanistan: 1) security, 2) governance, and
3) development. Do you agree? Are there any other factors that you
believe are significant?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Yes, beyond what General Allen has cited, Pakistani
help, or at least less Pakistani damage to our efforts, would be a 4th
leg of the effort in my eyes.
Mr. Critz. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Taliban
insurgency?
Dr. O'Hanlon. The Taliban is unsophisticated and has lost lots of
its midlevel commanders over the years and has an unappealing ideology
for most Afghans. But it has intact high-level commanders and
sanctuaries in Pakistan, great tenacity, the ability to play off
perceptions of Afghan government corruption to recruit, and a smart use
of tactics that minimize harm to most of the population while employing
assassination and precise strikes against government officials and
security forces. It is alas an impressive enemy on balance.
Mr. Critz. How would you define a successful outcome of the
American/coalition effort in Afghanistan?
Dr. O'Hanlon. A minimal but perhaps adequate definition of success
is an Afghanistan that does not fall apart and that controls most of
its territory and thereby precludes return of extremist sanctuaries (at
least big ones) to its own territory. To make this sustainable, the
government will need greater legitimacy among its own people, too.
Mr. Critz. Lieutenant General Bolger stated that if the ANSF is
reduced below 352,000 he believed many of those that leave ANSF will go
into civilian positions with the Afghanistan government. Do you agree?
Will there be any program to facilitate such placements? Do those
personnel have skills that would be directly applicable to such
positions? Can GIROA support such an increased number of personnel?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I think unemployment will be a big problem in
Afghanistan for many years to come. Many will compete for government
jobs because the private sector is weak and will remain weak for a long
time to come. I am not sure that most soldiers who leave the ANSF will
find other government work.
Mr. Critz. Please describe your understanding of the operational
assessment process used to evaluate the ANSF in the 1230 reports? What
data is collected? Who evaluates the data? What method of analysis is
used to evaluate the data? Who makes the final decision as to a CUAT
determination? Is there any additional information the 1230 reports
should include in the future?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I think the CUAT system is better than what preceded
it but still relies too much on the judgment of the NATO commanders who
work with any given Afghan unit. This unintentionally biases the data.
I am more interested in demonstrated field performance by Afghan units
than in CUAT scores.
Mr. Critz. What areas of ANSF should the subcommittee focus its
investigation on?
Dr. O'Hanlon. The subcommittee should keep focusing on ANSF field
performance, corruption, and ethnic cohesion.
Mr. Critz. How willing is the Afghan government to accept the
transition?
Dr. O'Hanlon. The Afghan government wants the transition. At least
it feels that way now!
Mr. Critz. How confident are we that the Afghan government is
aligned with U.S. interests? How do we make sure our interests are
aligned?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Our interests are adequately aligned over the long
term because we both want a functional, stable Afghanistan. But on the
means to get there, we often diverge a good deal.
Mr. Critz. Is there any evidence that old members of Northern
Alliance are rearming for possible civil war after transition, as
suggested by CRS?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I do believe the worries of civil war among Afghans
are greater now than say 5 years ago. I do not believe they are acute
or continuously worsening, however. At least not at this point.
Mr. Critz. Could you please identify any provinces or locations
where you are concerned local militia may cause problems for the
national Afghan government?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I am most worried about the south and east,
naturally, but also Baghlan and parts of the north where there are
Pashtun pockets of population.
Mr. Critz. How have the most recent Parliamentary elections (2010)
impacted the opinion on Afghans on the legitimacy of the government and
the its ability to provide security?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I am a guarded optimist about the Afghan parliament.
I think it is gradually doing a better job. I would encourage the U.S.
Congress to ``partner'' more with the parliament to help it develop
further.
Mr. Critz. What is your opinion about governing capacity at local
levels?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Provincial governance is getting better all the time,
as I learned from a visit to the Asia Foundation (among other research
efforts) when last in Afghanistan in May. District governance is still
spotty and very uneven.
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