[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-135]
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES:
RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE
FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 20, 2012
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MO BROOKS, Alabama ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
TODD YOUNG, Indiana MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TOM ROONEY, Florida COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
Christopher Bright, Professional Staff Member
Paul Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Arthur Milikh, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, June 20, 2012, Afghan National Security Forces:
Resources, Strategy, and Timetable for Security Lead Transition 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, June 20, 2012......................................... 25
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2012
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE FOR
SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Andrews, Hon. Robert, a Representative from New Jersey,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 2
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 1
WITNESSES
Sedney, David S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia......................... 2
Townsend, MG Stephen, USA, Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan
Coordination Cell, The Joint Staff............................. 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Sedney, David S.............................................. 30
Townsend, MG Stephen......................................... 35
Wittman, Hon. Rob............................................ 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Andrews.................................................. 45
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 46
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 52
Mr. Critz.................................................... 51
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 49
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE FOR
SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 20, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Wittman. Today the Oversight and Investigations
subcommittee convenes the first of a series of hearings related
to the Afghan National Security Forces.
At this hearing, we will receive testimony from the
Department of Defense about the resources and strategy related
to training the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and the
timetable for transitioning security lead responsibility from
U.S. and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces to
the ANSF. The Department of Defense today is represented by Mr.
David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia; and Major General
Stephen Townsend, Director of the Pakistan-Afghanistan
Coordination Cell.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your participation. Thank
you for your service to our country. We look forward to your
testimony on plans for training and equipping the Afghan
National Security Force, and details about the projected size
and related rationale of the ANSF in the near and long term.
Many of us on the committee have just returned from a
congressional trip to Afghanistan. And during our visit, we
traveled to several provinces and met with local leaders,
including the chiefs of police in a number of provinces. We
also had the opportunity to talk to the military commanders on
the ground who provided their impressions of the level of
support that will be needed to create a self-sustaining ANSF.
It is my hope that our witnesses today can provide further
context on these important issues. And as an administrative
note, I recognize that members of other subcommittees will join
us. And pursuant to the committee's rules, I will recognize
these members after all O&I Subcommittee members have had an
opportunity to question the witnesses. And we have with us
today, in the stead of Mr. Cooper, our ranking member, Mr.
Andrews.
And I would like to turn it over to him for any opening
statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ANDREWS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
JERSEY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also appreciate the
witnesses and their service to our country. And I want the
record to show that I will never fill Mr. Cooper's shoes in any
way, shape, or form. I will make sure he tells him that.
Thank you for calling the hearing. Look, a pivotal aspect
of our country's strategy in Afghanistan is for the Afghans to
be able to provide their own security. And a pivotal aspect of
that goal is the training of the security forces and where that
all stands.
No reflection on today's witnesses, but one of the reasons
why I think it is so timely the chairman called this hearing is
that, frankly, through two administrations we have had a long
history of unfounded and inaccurate optimism on these
questions. And I know that the two witnesses are dedicated to
telling the facts as they see them.
I know the committee is dedicated to hearing the facts as
they are. So, Chairman, thank you for this opportunity, and we
thank the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. We appreciate your
leadership on this issue also.
At this point, I would like to ask unanimous consent that
non-subcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate in
today's hearing after all subcommittee members have had an
opportunity to ask questions. Is there an objection? Without
objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the
appropriate time for 5 minutes.
And with that, we will begin with our witnesses, and begin
with Mr. David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Mr. Sedney, the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DAVID S. SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
Mr. Sedney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
ranking member--or acting ranking member. Thank you. Thank you
for the opportunity to be here today.
The subject, as the two of you have introduced it, we in
the Administration believe is exactly on point. The key to
success in Afghanistan is the success of the Afghan National
Security Forces over the long term. The United States'
fundamental objectives--our strategy, our campaign plan in
Afghanistan--have been consistent since President Obama
announced them in December of 2009.
Our goal remains to deny safe havens to Al Qaeda, and to
deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan
government. Thanks to more than 10 years, and particularly over
the past 2-plus years, of dedication and sacrifice of our
forces, our coalition partners and their Afghan partners and
the Afghan people, we have taken enormous strides toward these
objectives.
To that end, U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces continue to
work to drive down the Taliban-led insurgency in their
strongholds and to build up the capacity of the Afghan security
forces and the Afghan government. Our efforts remain on track
to enable the Afghans themselves to assume the lead for
security nationwide by the end of 2014.
As we continue to shift more areas to Afghan security lead
and, by the end of this September pull out the final 23,000
surge troops which will return home at that time, that is all
made possible by the improvements in the Afghan National
Security Forces. American and coalition forces that remain on
the ground after September will facilitate the continued
transition of security to the Afghan National Army and Afghan
National Police, in accordance with General Allen's campaign
plan.
As you said, as I mentioned, the key to this success is the
increasing capability and confidence of the Afghan security
forces and to the Afghan people in those security forces. The
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are both on
schedule to meet their goal for size by or before October, this
year.
Additionally, I would point out that the Afghan security
forces now participate in over 90 percent of all operations in
Afghanistan, and are in the lead for over 40 percent of these
missions. And that rate of growth is on an upward trend. As
General Allen stated to the House and Senate in March, the ANS
\1\ are better than we thought they were to be--and
importantly, they are better than they thought that they could
be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Mr. Sedney intended to say ``ANSF'' rather than ``ANS.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This improved capacity is allowing the Afghan security
forces to assume the security lead effectively. With the first
two tranches of transition that are already under way, 50
percent of the population lives in areas where the Afghan
security forces are in the lead. That number will climb to 75
percent with the recently announced tranche three of
transition, which will begin to be put in place this summer.
Tranche three contains a number of contested areas; areas
where the Taliban is active. Tranche three will really test the
Afghan security forces. This fighting season that is coming
up--that we are already in this year--will be the most
significant challenge for the Afghanistan security forces, as
they are more in the lead than ever before.
However, the time for this test is now, when we and our
coalition partners have the forces in theater to ensure their
success. Certainly the insurgency retains the ability to carry
out complex attacks. April 15th attacks in Kabul, the recent
attack on forward operation base Salerno, were sophisticated
and coordinated. However, I would point out that those attacks
were largely tactical and operational failures.
And the response to the attacks, particularly in Kabul,
highlighted the increasing competence of the Afghan security
forces. Because in Kabul, the Afghan security forces carried
out the complete reaction and taking down of the forces that
had attacked. We have seen two major achievements in the last 6
weeks that have sent a strong signal to the Afghan people, to
the Taliban people, and to countries in the region.
First, the strategic partnership agreement that President
Obama and President Karzai signed in May. President Obama
subsequently made a speech to the nation from Afghanistan. That
showed that the United States and Afghanistan are committed to
a mutually beneficial relationship, not just until 2014 but
beyond 2014. That strategic partnership extends for 10 years,
until 2024.
Secondly, the Chicago Summit--the NATO Summit in Chicago--
earlier this month was a great success, and demonstrated the
continued dedication of over 50 NATO and other partner
countries to supporting stability and security in Afghanistan.
In Chicago, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force]
members and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Lisbon
timeline to complete transition by the end of 2014, and also
and very importantly, to continue engagement in Afghanistan
after 2014.
As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen put it, ``NATO and our
ISAF partners will not leave the task undone. We will not let
Afghanistan slip back into the hands of militants, which the
vast majority of Afghan people utterly reject. We will finish
the job to help create a secure Afghanistan, secure for our
shared security.''
Again I will repeat, our goal is to ensure that Afghanistan
is never again a base from which attacks are launched on the
United States, our allies, and our partners. And in Chicago,
our partners acknowledged once again that shared goal. I would
also point to two recent U.S.-Afghan bilateral arrangements:
the detentions and special operations memorandums of
understanding.
They preceded the strategic partnership agreement, and
those two MOUs [Memorandums of Understanding] are critical to
demonstrating U.S. commitment to Afghanistan's sovereignty, and
they rely for their execution on the increased capacity of the
Afghan National Security Forces.
Now while I have stressed the successes and the progress, I
also want to very directly acknowledge that we have serious
challenges still ahead. Limited governance capacity and
corruption continue to plague Afghanistan, and they limit the
effective governance that will be necessary for full
transition.
Additionally, as stated by General Allen in his testimony
and repeatedly in testimony by other witnesses from this
Administration and others, the Taliban-led insurgency continues
to operate from safe havens in Pakistan. And although we have
had indisputable successes against Al Qaeda, as I am sure all
of you are aware, we continue to press the Pakistanis on the
need for them to take action against the Taliban and affiliated
groups which operate out of Pakistan and carry out attacks on
coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.
We will continue to work with our allies and partners, in
the Pakistani and Afghan governments, and our international
partners to address these issues. We will keep Congress
informed of our progress. As I close, I would like to thank the
House Armed Services Committee and this subcommittee for the
opportunity to appear before you today, for your continued
support for our men and women in uniform, and for your support
to the Afghan security forces.
Because without your commitment to funding and resourcing
the Afghan forces we could not have achieved the progress of
the last 3 years. I look forward to your questions, look
forward to your insights. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney can be found in the
Appendix on page 30.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Sedney. Thank you so much for
your testimony.
We now look forward to the testimony of Major General
Stephen Townsend, Director of the Pakistan-Afghanistan
Coordination Cell.
STATEMENT OF MG STEPHEN TOWNSEND, USA, DIRECTOR, PAKISTAN/
AFGHANISTAN COORDINATION CELL, THE JOINT STAFF
General Townsend. Chairman Wittman, Congressman Andrews,
members of the subcommittee thanks for this opportunity to
appear before you today and discuss how the Afghan National
Security Forces are doing. Our bottom line up front is that we
are on track to achieve our Nation's strategic objectives in
Afghanistan.
A sustainable and sufficient ANSF, and transition, are two
linchpins of our strategy. And to echo what Mr. Sedney said,
the ANSF continue to grow and improve, and remain on track to
assume the lead for security by the end of 2014. ISAF remains
focused on building a capable ANSF of 352,000.That becomes a
mechanism for defeating the insurgency. The ANSF continue to
meet or exceed this year's recruiting objectives, with the Army
and the Air Force expected to meet their combined goal of
195,000 by the end of this summer. And the police reaching
their goal of 157,000 by October.
To be sure, the ANSF continues to face challenges such as
literacy, attrition, and shortages of noncommissioned officers.
The NATO training mission and the Afghan ministries provide
literacy programs to approximately 90,000 ANSF each day. This
is going to make the ANSF one of the most literate elements of
Afghan society.
Attrition continues to be an issue, as well. Although
attrition will not keep the ANSF from meeting their manning
goals, it continues to hamper the long-term development of the
ANSF. The security ministries continue to implement policies to
combat attrition, and they are working. Attrition has gone down
over the last several months .
One example is, the MOD [Ministry of Defense] recently
approved stricter timelines to drop AWOL [absent without leave]
personnel from unit rosters. Shortages of NCOs [noncommissioned
officers], sergeants, continue to affect the development of the
force as well. The army and police are training and promoting
from within their ranks to fill these critical positions.
The ANSF are taking the lead in training their own forces,
and they are implementing instructor cadre training programs.
These Afghan instructors are providing more basic and advanced
skills training at Afghan-led training centers every day.
Operationally, the ANSF is making steady progress as well. ISAF
Joint Command currently rates 67 percent of the army units and
62 percent of the police units.
And the top two tiers, or categories, of operational
effectiveness--that is, effective with advisors and independent
with advisors--from January to April, the percentage of Afghan-
led partnered operations increased from 33 percent to 59
percent. In some regions, Afghan forces conduct more
independent operations than they do partnered operations.
The ANA [Afghan National Army] special operations forces
also continue to grow and increase their operational
proficiency. For example, ANA SOF [Special Operations Forces]-
led operations increased from 44 percent in January to 54
percent in April. As we plan for a responsible drawdown of our
forces in Afghanistan, the ANSF will continue to face
challenges on the battlefield. But they won't face these
challenges alone.
To support the ANSF during transition, ISAF is shifting to
a security force assistance model. That puts Afghans in a lead
combat role and has ISAF forces increasingly assuming a train,
advise, and assist role. During this transition period, ISAF
will still fight alongside our Afghan partners when needed, but
we will shift into more of a support role as the Afghans move
to the front.
ANSF's operational challenges include logistics, army and
police interoperability and confidence, among others. In my own
opinion, the ANSF's greatest challenge is one of confidence.
Our agreement to stand with them beyond 2014 has been a
tremendous boost to their confidence. The will of their force
will strengthen as their leadership strengthens and as their
capabilities improve, and as they continue to move more and
more to the front.
Circling back to the bottom line, we assess that our
security strategy, our security transition, is on track to have
a sufficient and sustainable ANSF assume full responsibility
for security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Finally,
thank you all for the work that you do on behalf of our service
men and women, as well as your efforts to ensure their
protection and safety as they complete their mission in
Afghanistan.
I stand ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Townsend can be found in
the Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Major General Townsend. Appreciate
your testimony, as well as Mr. Sedney.
We will begin now with questioning. And I want to begin
with Mr. Sedney to get your perspective. You had spoken about
transition, that we are in tranche two now. When we were
downrange, we spoke with General Allen just last week,
Ambassador Crocker, about some concern about the more difficult
areas in transition being pushed to the end, to tranche five.
I know now there is a repositioning to put some of the more
difficult areas into tranche three. Let me ask you this. If you
do not achieve the desired results in this transition--whether
it is tranche three, four, or five--are there contingency
plans? We know 2014 is the complete turnover. Are there
contingency plans, are there alternative schedules if goals
aren't met, if transition doesn't take place smoothly in some
of these more challenging areas within Afghanistan?
Can you give us your perspective on what you see as those
contingency scenarios and alternate schedules?
Mr. Sedney. Thank you very much, Congressman. And thank you
and you and your colleagues for making the trip out to
Afghanistan to speak directly with our commanders and our
troops and, of course, our Afghan partners.
In terms of plans for how we are going to evaluate the
success of transition and how we might adjust the existing
campaign plan, the process that we have in place is one where
at the end of this fighting season--and including after the
remainder of U.S. surge forces return home at the end of
September--General Allen and his staff will review what
happened over this year.
As I said in my testimony and as I am sure you heard our
there, this is going to be a testing summer for the Afghan
security forces. They are going to be in the lead as never
before. So we are going to have to evaluate them. At the same
time, beginning in just a few weeks, the third tranche of
transition will be started, including in some very difficult
contested areas.
So General Allen will have had the summer's experience to
evaluate that. He will do that, then he will submit a report up
the chain of command evaluating what he believes are what the
future requirements are. So rather than developing a whole list
of contingency plans, what we are focusing on is making what we
are doing now successful. And we have a review process in
place, whereby the commander in the field will evaluate if
there are changes that are necessary; he will recommend those
up the chain of command through General Mattis at CENTCOM [U.S.
Central Command] and then to the Secretary and to the
President. So that is the process that we are looking for. I
will say, and you have been in Afghanistan more recently than I
have, but I will be able to--that won't be the case in about 5
days because I will be back out there myself and will be
looking at that.
As General Allen said in his testimony, and as you may have
heard when you were out there, we are finding that the Afghans,
rather than doing less well than we expected, are often doing
better than we expect. There are some cases where they aren't
doing as well as either we expect, or they, and that is where
we are able to give them the additional help that they need.
But we are also, as I said, seeing places where they are
doing better than expected. We have, actually, some very
aggressive and I think it is a very positive thing, Afghan
commanders who are pushing to do even more than sometimes we
think they are ready to. That is a judgment that our commanders
out in the field have to make every day about whether people
are ready to do things.
If you stretch too far, that can be dangerous. But if you
don't stretch far enough, then you are not going to achieve
your goal. So we do have this review process in place for this
year. I would expect we would have the same process in place.
I would also add that in terms of the issue of the
composition of the Afghan security forces, Secretary Panetta,
in his formal meetings with the Afghan interior defense
ministers in April for a group that is called the Security
Consultative Forum--where we meet and discuss the strategic
level issues relating to the Afghan security forces--they
agreed on a 6-month review process to examine the performance
of the Afghan security forces, to evaluate what additional
inputs might be needed, what changes might be needed.
So again, we have these review processes in place that we
take very seriously, and look forward to being able to come
back and brief you and your colleagues as these review
processes are completed.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Sedney.
Major General Townsend, we know right now the majority of
efforts there are along the lines of village stabilization
operations. And that most of that is being executed by our
special operators. As we begin to draw down forces to the
68,000 by the end of 2013, the question is, is that transition
going to take place in a way to make sure that support elements
are in place to make sure our special operators continue to
have what they need as they get placed more and more out on an
island to pursue these operations?
The concern is, if it isn't strategic in the way the
drawdown is structured that those special operators may not
have what they need--whether it is air support, whether it is
other logistical support--and they find themselves on an
island. Can you speak to that issue? And is the planning taking
into account strategically where we will be in continuing to
pursue this fight, especially along the lines of the village
stabilization operations with our special operators and ANSF
forces in these areas?
General Townsend. Yes, sir. As you might expect, we are
planning for various contingencies through now until the 2014
and even beyond 2014 what we call our ``enduring presence''
might look like. And none of those plans have really firmed up
yet.
But the VSO, Village Stability Operations, and Afghan local
police initiative that you mentioned, is a very high priority
for COMISAF [Commander of the International Security Assistance
Forces]. And so, absolutely, I can assure you that the planning
will allow for the proper support that those hearty little
bands of special operations folks, and also general purpose
forces out on the frontier where those sites are at, the
support they need will be there for them.
VSO-ALP [Village Stability Operations-Afghan Local Police]
is something that is part of our enduring presence planning. So
we envision that program continuing after 2014. So even in our
enduring presence footprint, there will be VSO-ALP support and
support to those forces that are providing it.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
And with that, I will move to Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you. I thank the witnesses for your
testimony.
Mr. Secretary, you indicated that Afghan security forces
participate in 90 percent of operations and are in the lead in
40 percent. What is the difference between being in the lead
and participating?
Mr. Sedney. I am going to call a little bit on my
uniformed----
Mr. Andrews. [Off mike.].
Mr. Sedney [continuing]. Uniformed colleague here because
he is a lot more accustomed to describing operations than I
would say. But I think, to me, one of the key things that I
look at when I look at reports from my uniformed colleagues on
this, when the issue comes to lead, are they lead in planning
the operation.
Not just are they lead in carrying it out, but do they have
the capacity to plan, do they execute according to plan? And
then afterwards, do they have the capability to do an after-
action review to see what went wrong, what went right in order
to do it the next time better.
But I am going to defer a little bit on this to you, Steve.
Mr. Andrews. General, what would that look like?
General Townsend. I will use a very kind of a simple
analogy of a patrol. A patrol gets a mission and they meet
together. The first thing they do is they plan that mission.
When the Afghans are in the lead, they are planning the
mission. We are kind of helping and advising.
Just a short while ago, almost every mission in Afghanistan
would have been planned by an American, sergeant or officer.
When that patrol rolls out the gate, who is leading that
patrol? Who is actually in front, and who is in the command
position? A short while ago that would have been an American.
Now, increasingly--and actually the latest reports are more
than 40 percent--they are in the mid- to high-50 range. Half of
those patrols are now led by an Afghan leader with an American
leader tagging along behind watching the Afghan leader control
the operation.
When you get to the objective, the force that is on the
patrol, what is the predominance of the force? At RC-East
[Regional Command-East], in a recent report, said 61 percent of
the troops on a mission these days in RC-East are Afghans. That
was not the case when I was there a little over a year ago in
RC-East. And then on the objective, who is actually giving the
orders----
Mr. Andrews. Right.
General Townsend [continuing]. And who is controlling the
soldiers as they move about the objective. Increasingly, in
more than half the cases now that is an Afghan. So that is sort
of the difference between participating and leading.
Mr. Andrews. Very helpful. That is very helpful. Thank you.
Mr. Sedney. Can I just add one thing, sir?
Mr. Andrews. Well, I just----
Mr. Sedney. Okay.
Mr. Andrews [continuing]. Want to jump to the next
question. What is the difference between a unit that is
independent with an advisor and effective with an advisor? What
is the difference?
General Townsend. Effective with an advisor is really a
matter of degree. If you are an effective with an advisor, you
are getting a lot of advice. And if you are independent with an
advisor, you are getting much less advice. But the big
difference is, who is generating the operations?
Mr. Andrews. Gotcha.
General Townsend. If an Afghan commander is saying, ``Hey,
we need to do an operation tomorrow,'' and giving orders to an
Afghan subcommander, then they are generating the whole idea of
the operation. And so that is really the difference between
being independent----
Mr. Andrews. This is not a trick question, but is it
possible for an Afghan unit to be not in the lead, but be
independent with an advisor? Or is that oxymoronic?
General Townsend. Okay, I haven't really thought about this
particular question. To be not in lead----
Mr. Andrews. Right. Well, I will put it to you this way. If
an Afghan unit is in the lead of an operation, are they by
definition independent? Or are they just effective?
General Townsend. No, they may just be effective.
Mr. Andrews. Gotcha. Are there any Afghan units that are in
the lead that don't hit the top two categories?
General Townsend. Yes, there are actually.
Mr. Andrews. Are you concerned that American troops might
be under the command of a commander who is in an outfit that
isn't at least effective?
General Townsend. Sir, they are not. American troops are
not under the command of the Afghan leader there. They are
partnered and they are on the battlefield together, but there
is an American leader there in charge of American troops.
Mr. Andrews. All right. Do we have any data on the
attrition rates among the Afghan security forces? Are they up,
are they down?
Mr. Sedney. Yes, we do have data, which we will be happy to
provide the committee. We have some nice graphs. The answer is
that the attrition is down in both the Afghan National Army and
Afghan National Police over the last 6 months.
Happy to pass these graphs up to you if you would like.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 45.]
Mr. Andrews. Sure. Unanimous consent to put them in a
record, if that is----
Mr. Sedney. Okay, we can do that.
Mr. Andrews. What is the bottom line, though?
Mr. Sedney. Bottom line in----
Mr. Andrews. What was the attrition rate a year ago? What
is it now?
Mr. Sedney. In the case of the Afghan National Police, a
year ago attrition was ranging from 1.4 percent to 4.6 percent.
In the last 6 months it has ranged from 3.4 percent to, in the
most recent period, 0.5 percent.
Mr. Andrews. What is the main reason for attriting? Why do
people leave?
Mr. Sedney. I am going to defer a little bit of this to my
colleague here. But a lot of the reasons--attrition are people
who have entered and leave before their contracts are up; the
most common reason, is family reasons. People have family
problems at home, and they feel they can't solve them. So
going----
Mr. Andrews. My time is about to expire. One thing, if you
have it, I would be interested in the KIA [killed in action]
rates for Afghan forces. I hope it is zero, I mean God forbid.
But I mean, what is happening with their KIA rates? Are they
going up or down, or staying the same?
General Townsend. I don't know which way they are trending,
but I do know that their army loses, they have twice the
casualty rate that we do. And their police have about four
times the casualty rate that we do. So they are in this thing.
Mr. Andrews. I offer no glee with that statistic, by the
way. I just want to know what it was. I am sure you don't
either.
Thank you. This is very, very helpful. I appreciate your
testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.
We will go to Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things,
when General Allen was making his presentation just the other
day he just talked about tranche one, tranche two, tranche
three. And what I asked is that we need a better way of
measuring progress across that continuum of ineffective all the
way to independent with advisor, whatever your scales are
either on a district-by-district basis or some sort of way to
communicate progress in the transition.
In other words, Mr. Sedney, you said that after the first
two that 50 percent of the population lives under the control
of the Afghans. Which would say that we are done with
transition in both tranche one and tranche two. And I am not
sure that was accurate.
And maybe I just misunderstood it. But we need some of the
metrics that you are using to show yourselves progress. We need
those, too. And so any way you can be helpful in that regard,
we are open to that. Rob and I were over there last week, and
we went down to Panjwaii District.
And we had a presentation by the Afghan commander there on
operations over the next several months in his AO [area of
operations] that was as professional as anything we would get
anywhere else by folks in our uniforms. This guy was very
impressive. Maybe it was just the interpreter knew what to do
and he might have not been very impressive at all, but I
suspect he was being interpreted correctly.
But I came out of that meeting very impressed with this
guy, and the fact that he is going to be in charge here pretty
soon. Major General Townsend, the ALP [Afghan Local Police]--
the numbers we are shown for post-2014 in terms of the numbers
of security forces versus the money that will be needed year in
and year out to fund those--the money to pay the ALP, is in the
estimate of what the international community will have to come
up with each year to fund the security forces.
But the force number itself, the 30,000 ALP guys, are not
in the force number itself. My concern is, hey, I am sold on
the project--on what we are doing with ALPs--because the
Taliban's sold on it. They are threatening them. They are
coming after them because they see them as a threat to their
ability to operate within these villages.
Is there someone in the Ministry of Interior who is going
to take ownership of the ALP and be that champion that is
necessary to prolong this? I know we like it, but there has got
to be somebody in the Afghan system that is going to share that
idea with us. Are you aware, Mr. Sedney, or either one of you?
General Townsend. Sure. First, I would like to answer just
the thing you said about transition at the start. Those
measurements are there. They are measurements to all the stages
of transition. And to answer your sort of unasked question
about, you know, has any place completed it. No, none of the
tranche one or tranche two districts, provinces, or
municipalities have completed all four stages of transition
yet.
Some of them are in stage three, and some of them, a
couple, have entered stage four. But none of them have
completed transition just yet.
Mr. Conaway. Well, having that information would be
helpful.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 46.]
General Townsend. Sure. Then on your question about the ALP
versus the troop numbers, and is anybody going to take charge
of that. First, the troop numbers, you are correct, are not in
the ANSF end-strength, by design. The money, however, is. And
what we anticipate in funding in the outyears, international
contributions, the MOI, the Ministry of Interior, already owns
the VSO-ALP program.
And, in fact, there is a chain of command that runs through
the police chain of command. And those ALP forces are
responsible to the district chief of police. So there already
is a funding, a training funding and equipping line, that comes
down through the Ministry of Interior to the ALP.
Mr. Conaway. I guess the question then is, between the two
of you are y'all confident that the Afghans sufficiently value
this program that they won't siphon off that funding and go
somewhere else with it after transition.
Mr. Sedney. Well, I think there are two questions there.
Are we confident they won't siphon off the funding. Yes, we are
confident of that because we control that funding. So that
funding right now does not go to them.
Mr. Conaway. No, no, no. I mean post-2014.
Mr. Sedney. But post-2014, the ALP program has been
controversial in Afghanistan. There is ownership for the
Ministry of Interior. As the ALP-VSO program has proven its
effectiveness, we are getting more and more support from the
top levels there.
As that continues over the next 2 years I think we are very
much on track for that. But it is certainly no secret that a
number of high-ranking Afghans, people in their parliament,
have been critical in the past of the ALP program. To get that
buy-in, we are going to need at least another year or two of
success to build that support.
Bureaucratically, as my colleague said, yes, in the
Ministry of Interior there is a structure that governs the ALP.
Right now, that structure is very--we have a lot of mentors in
that process. So we are building that capacity and we think we
are on track to complete by 2014. But it is one of things that
we are going to be having in that review process.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.
We will now go to Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, you mentioned earlier something that I had heard
last year and the year before. The concern for attrition and
the lack of NCOs. And if you could, now the Secretary mentioned
that the attrition had gone from 4.4 percent--in a range of, we
will say, around 4.5 percent a year ago, I believe--to 3.4
percent a month ago; ranging down to half a percent.
And just for comparison purposes, what is the U.S.
military? What is our attrition rate?
General Townsend. Congressman, I don't know the answer to
that question. I can tell you this about the Afghanistan
attrition. For the last--we have got a goal of 1.4 percent per
month. And they have--the Afghan army is--about at that goal
now. It has been declining, their attrition has been declining,
for the last several months.
The police are actually at that goal. And, in fact, I think
they are slightly below the goal. They are meeting the goal,
exceeding the goal now. The army is not quite there yet. But it
has been on a steady slope of improvement for the last several
months.
Mr. Critz. Well, good, good. And that is because the police
force was what I was going to ask about next, as well. But can
you explain when you say that there is an issue with NCOs? What
exactly do you mean?
General Townsend. First of all, there is just a shortage.
About 17,000 NCOs short in the army, and about 11,000 NCOs
short in the police.
Mr. Critz. So if 17,000--how many NCOs do they have and how
many does that mean that they need?
General Townsend. That is a good question. I don't know. I
will ask my colleagues here.
Mr. Critz. Well, 17,000 short of some number.
General Townsend. Yes, yes. I don't know that off the top
of my head.
Mr. Critz. Okay.
General Townsend. So with the NCOs, there are two real
issues here. One is a cultural one. They have not been an army
that had a professional noncommissioned officer core
previously. So, you know, we are trying to, one, train the army
and the senior leadership of the army to value noncommissioned
officers.
So that is a work in--that is probably the broad thing that
is going on. Then next is actually filling their ranks. And
then they have standards for the noncommissioned officers. They
have to be able to read, so that is one shortfall there that we
are working on. So as these guys get recognized in the ranks as
a high-performing soldier they are identified to be in
noncommissioned officers school.
They had to go to read, and they have to go to an NCO corps
and pass that before they can be an NCO. So it is a work in
progress, filling these slots.
Mr. Critz. Well, the reason I ask is, like I said, I had
heard that issue in years past. I was in Afghanistan 2 years
ago, I was in Afghanistan last year. And I am curious, with the
growing amount of the force, has it remained a constant
percentage of lack of NCOs? Or is it a number that has
increased exponentially, or are we seeing a sharp decline in
the--I mean, we all know that you have got to have those
sergeants on the ground because you are going to have some
lack, or approaching chaos at some points, if you don't have a
amount of people you need.
And that is, as we transition here, I am trying to find out
will we have the NCOs needed to support this 352,000 level? Or
as we discussed at the Chicago Summit in May, are we looking
more at a 230,000 number? And where are we going with this?
General Townsend. Well, we will have the NCOs we need
because that is a focused area that we are trying to improve.
So we will look at the data and we will try to provide you an
answer before the hearing is over. If not, we will provide it
for the record as to the general population of NCOs.
My guess is it probably remained pretty constant, slightly
improving. Because we have been growing the force.
Mr. Critz. Yes.
General Townsend. So it is hard to actually, you know, meet
the objective when you are adding requirements, which we have
been doing. But we will have the NCOs we need to man and lead
the 352,000 force.
I will let Mr. Sedney address where it goes from there.
Mr. Sedney. Just two additional points, Congressman. The
first is, as Steve stated, the reason they don't have enough
NCOs is because just as on our forces, in order to be a really
effective NCO you have to have 10 or 15 years of experience.
And this is an army that generally has less than five.
And so they are going to grow into that. Secondly, on
filling the NCOs through the process that General Townsend
described. Because we will have reached the numerical goals,
the 352,000, by the end of this summer, that is going to give
the Afghan security forces 2 years--from October 2012 through
the end of 2014--to refine their quality, to build this NCO
course, to build their junior- and middle-level officer corps.
Will the process be finished? No. We, and others, will have
to remain to train, advise, and assist and after that. But they
will have the beginnings of what they need in terms of numbers
if not in quality by 2014, and the next 2 years is when we will
see the greatest progress in the NCO and junior officers.
Mr. Critz. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Critz.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Townsend
and Secretary Sedney, thanks so much for your service to our
country.
A couple points. First of all, I have a concern, I think,
in looking back at U.S. military history and our involvement in
South Vietnam. One of the issues, I think, that complicated the
efforts of the army of South Vietnam was that we gave them our
doctrine. And it was of high mobility, and that was difficult
to support after we left Vietnam.
And I was in Afghanistan in November. And they took me out
to see a training exercise. And it was for artillery. And it
was with towed artillery. And having served in the United
States Army in mechanized infantry, been an infantry officer in
the United States Marine Corps, I am thinking why on earth have
we procured for them towed artillery instead of mortars.
And when I pressed the ISAF representative, he said,
``Well, sir, you know, Karzai had insisted on, you know,
heavier, more expensive--he wanted F-16s [Fighting Falcon
fighter jets] and he wanted this and he wanted that. And so
towed artillery was kind of the compromise.''
And I am wondering how many areas like that, that where we
have given them weapons and tactics that don't fit their--that
aren't realistic as to their capability to maintain that after
we are gone. And and General Townsend, I wondered if you could
reflect on that.
General Townsend. Yes, sir. I have actually seen that same
towed artillery. I would point out that the U.S. Army and the
U.S. Marine Corps today have a lot of towed artillery. And the
Afghans have had towed artillery for decades. So towed
artillery is nothing new, and there is nothing out of character
for the Afghan army of the past or the present.
They do have mortars, as well. They have light mortars and
medium-caliber mortars, much like we do. So they have, I think,
indirect fire systems that they can have high mobility with.
And then they have some that are less mobile. But I have seen
them attach those, tow those E-30 howitzers behind their----
Mr. Coffman. I want to remind you this is at U.S.
taxpayers' expense. And mortars don't require all of the
support elements that towed artillery does. And so you and I
obviously differ on that. Let me ask you about my concern about
the culture of corruption in Afghan security forces, which is
stunning.
I pressed the Oversight and Investigations Committee, under
Darrell Issa, to conduct an investigation into the conduct of
Afghan security forces and the lack of oversight at the Dawood
military hospital where, in part, $42 million of U.S. military
aid has been missing, unaccounted for. Where the general
officer in charge of that hospital was merely transferred, was
never relieved.
Where Afghan police and Afghan soldiers were dying in the
hospital from malnutrition and from a lack of medical care
because the families couldn't come up with the necessary
bribes. Certainly it speaks to a lack of oversight for ISAF
personnel, the monitors. But also it speaks to not just the
culture of corruption, but also just the fact that to what
extent have we formed a military organization that--I mean, how
capable are they when they would allow this to occur?
And so I am wondering if you all could reflect on that. Who
wants to start?
Mr. Sedney. Maybe if I could start, Representative Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Sure.
Mr. Sedney. First of all, thank you for your concern and
interest in this area. The situation you mentioned at the
military hospital is one that as we became aware of it we began
investigating and began working with the Afghans to take
corrective action. There are currently investigations and
corrective action under way with that hospital.
Let me just go back to the words you used--``a culture of
corruption.'' There is, to be frank, not just hundreds but
thousands of years of history in Afghanistan's surrounding
regions where corruption has been part of the fabric of life.
It is not something that the Afghan people, however, want.
It is not something that the majority of the Afghan military
officers and the leaders of the Afghan military want
themselves; from the ministers on down, I have seen a lot of
both leaders at the top, leaders in the middle, and ordinary
soldiers who are committed to not allowing corruption to
destroy the structures that the Afghans need and that we are
financing.
But yes, there is corruption. As I mention in my prepared
statement, corruption continues to be a problem. We have to
work with the Afghans to give them the capability to get rid of
that corruption. That is a challenge because not only do you
need to have the laws in place, you have to have the effective
structures in place, you have to have a judicial system,
prosecutors, courts, a system of incarceration.
All of these things the Afghans are building, or in some
cases rebuilding. So it is a huge challenge. But while
recognizing that corruption is a problem, I would not agree
that it is endemic to the point where our investments are not
going to pay off.
We have some really good partners in the Afghans. We have
some problematic ones. We have some ones who are corrupt, and
we need to work with the Afghans to get rid of those. But I
appreciate very much the point you are making.
The things that happened in that hospital are the kind of
things that should never have happened to any human being
anywhere. And we are working with the Afghans to correct them.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last point, I am just
concerned that that issue at the hospital is something that
very well could be representative throughout the Afghan
security forces. And I think we in Congress certainly need to
know--to get down to the bottom of it.
Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.
We will move to Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me as a
nonmember of this subcommittee to ask questions today. I
appreciate it.
And greetings, gentlemen. Mr. Sedney, can you characterize
for us the evolution of the Afghan Security Forces readiness
over the last decade? And basically tell me when did they start
turning the corner to become a force to be reckoned with in
Afghanistan?
Mr. Sedney. I can. I actually was on the ground in
Afghanistan, deputy chief of mission, at our embassy on May 1,
2002, when the first U.S. special forces arrived to begin
training the Afghan army a little over 10 years ago. From that
very, very, I will have to say, discouraging start--when we had
not enough money, not enough trainers, not enough trainees in
windowless, bombed-out buildings--to what we have today, we
have made incredible progress.
I would also say that for too long the effort in
Afghanistan was underresourced both in terms of money, but also
in terms of the level of training and support that we were able
to give. The former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff,
Admiral Mullen, described that very graphically when he said--
--
Mr. Johnson. But you don't have to go----
Mr. Sedney [continuing]. ``In Afghanistan, we just do what
we can.''
Mr. Johnson. Yes, I don't want you to go too far----
Mr. Sedney. But the turning point, I would say really, was
about 3 years ago, following the strategic review by President
Obama and members of this Administration, which recognized what
we had not been doing in Afghanistan. Where we put additional
resources, both personnel and money, and we really began to
build the Afghan security forces to a size and capability that
they are now showing.
Mr. Johnson. All right.
Mr. Sedney. We made the strategic decision, and the impacts
we are seeing today.
Mr. Johnson. And let me interrupt you because I got a few
other questions. I am sorry, I would love to listen. So how
many Taliban are we fighting now in Afghanistan?
Mr. Sedney. There are estimates from the intelligence
community, and I will defer to them on that, but I would say it
is a very hard figure to come up with how many. Because many of
the people----
Mr. Johnson. [Off mike.].
Mr. Sedney [continuing]. Who fight with the Taliban are
part-time Taliban. There are people who fight just for a day,
and there are permanent fighters.
Mr. Johnson. I understand.
Mr. Sedney. There are Taliban in Afghanistan, there are
Taliban in----
Mr. Johnson. Well, I would include all of those part-
timers.
Mr. Sedney. And Taliban in Pakistan.
Mr. Johnson. In fact, I think probably most of them would
be part-timers. But approximately how many, 20,000?
Mr. Sedney. Again, deferring to the intelligence community,
the last estimate that I recall seeing that was releasable
publicly was 15,000 to 20,000. I don't know if you have a
better or a different figure, Steve.
General Townsend. No, same figure.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Now, the commitment to withdrawing our
forces by the end of 2014, does that include special operations
forces?
Mr. Sedney. We have committed to drawing down our forces by
the end of 2014, and ending a lead combat role. But we have
committed to continuing a presence in Afghanistan after 2014.
In the strategic partnership agreement that we signed with
Afghanistan last month, we agreed to begin negotiations on a
bilateral security agreement which will set the parameters for
what that force is, including the participation of special
forces after 2014.
So we are about to begin those negotiations to come up with
how many special forces there will be in Afghanistan after
2014.
Mr. Johnson. All right, thank you. We are talking about
230,000 Afghan National Security Forces by 2017. We would be
drawing down about 120,000 from the force at its maximum
height. That is going to produce 120,000 jobless individuals
who understand how to fight. And what do we do with those?
And also, 230,000 on 20,000. How do we get to that 230,000
manpower figure for 2017?
Mr. Sedney. That was exactly one of the subjects that
Secretary Panetta discussed with the Afghan minister of
defense, Minister Wardak, and Minister of Interior Mohammadi in
their security consultative forum in April. And they agreed to
have a regular 6-month review of where the Afghan security
forces stand and what our future plans are--and the security
situation in Afghanistan--to see what pace that would allow for
the drawdown of Afghan security forces to a long-term,
sustainable level.
And the goal of something in the neighborhood of 230,000 by
2017 is one we broadly agreed to. But the actual pace--and the
character, the way we get there is something we will be doing
in these 6-month reviews. In terms of what happens to those who
might be demobilized, there is a certain level of natural
attrition.
Afghan security forces, army, and police sign on for 3-, 4-
, and 5-year contracts. And a lot of them leave--30 percent to
40 percent of them leave--at the end of their contracts. That
is normal in forces. So there is a certain level of normal
reduction in forces.
There is the possibility of such things as a reserve force.
And we have had experience in Afghanistan----
Mr. Johnson. Who will pay?
Mr. Sedney. Pardon?
Mr. Johnson. Who would pay for those--well, I guess--yes.
Mr. Sedney. In terms of payment, we have worked on a future
plan of funding for Afghanistan that would come from the United
States, would come from our international partners but more and
more from Afghanistan itself--with a goal of Afghanistan paying
for its own security forces by the year 2024.
Mr. Johnson. And how did we arrive at the 230,000 mark for
2017? And is that still a reasonable guestimate of the number
of Afghan security forces on the ground at that time, given the
fact there are 20,000 Taliban?
Mr. Sedney. Well, that figure certainly depends on the
degrading of the Taliban. As I said, our campaign plan has been
to degrade the Taliban, push the Taliban down, build up the
Afghan security forces. And in our reviews, we are going to
check and see whether that is actually happening.
But a much-diminished Taliban, a much less effective
Taliban, will require less forces. And that is what that
calculation is based on. But we are going to be looking at it
every 6 months to see if, in fact, that is happening.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Thank you. We are
going to start with the second round of questioning. There is
some interest in panel members for us to do that.
General Townsend, I will follow up on Mr. Johnson's
question. And that is, looking at the underlying assumptions on
where we are going, transitioning with ANSF--as we spoke of
352,000 force structure by the end of 2012, and then
transitioning to 230,000 by the end of 2017--I guess my
question is, what are the assumptions and analysis that went
into that to determine that that was a proper force structure
at that time?
How does that coincide with the coincidence of a drawdown
of American troops or ISAF troops during that time period? If
you can just lay out where the thought process has gone, where
it has been, where we are today with how we came to that number
of 230,000.
I know there is obviously a resource element associated
with that, but also a strategic element associated with that.
So I would like to get your reflection on that.
General Townsend. First of all, the 352,000 was the result
of a lot of analysis, to include wargaming and that kind of
thing, to allow us to defeat--allow the ANSF to defeat--the
Taliban. So that is how we get to 352,000. Then there has been
a decision here in our Government to sustain that through 2015,
as you know.
And that is to get them through a year or more after our
drawdown, and through elections. Some sensitive timeframes that
will happen in the future there. So then how do you get to some
number in the future? And why 230,000? Actually, ISAF and NTM-A
[National Training Mission-Afghanistan] ran a number of
planning excursions and 230,000 is just one of them.
Quite honestly, it is one that we would probably pick for
ourselves that is a smaller force that is pretty well equipped
and capable. There were other courses of action, some larger
with less capability. To have more troops, you would have to
have, you know, fewer trucks and helicopters and things like
that.
So the approximately 230,000 course of action is one that
we agreed to with the Afghans and our international partners.
And as you said, there is a resource--you know, that is the
$4.1 billion course of action. But these 6-month reviews that
Mr. Sedney talked about are every 6 months we are going to
reevaluate.
If that still makes sense to us, based on the threat, based
on what is going on in the world. That Afghans, quite honestly,
would like to have a larger force and more capability. But the
world community is going to fund most of that, and so, you
know, there is a tradeoff there. So I think that as we go down
the road we will make these 6-month reviews and determine if
230,000 makes sense, or maybe something else makes sense.
At some point in the near future here we are going to be
asking Afghans, okay, give us your course, your preferred
course of action. Because we have done a lot of that planning,
and then brought them into it.
Mr. Wittman. Gotcha.
Mr. Sedney, in speaking about those 6 months' reviews, I am
assuming that they will also include ISAF forces. You are
looking at drawdown, obviously, after 2015 of the ANSF forces.
But also ISAF forces to the end of 2014, where we will be,
theoretically, out. Will those 6-month evaluations also
consider if we haven't reached an acceptable security condition
with that transition with ISAF force presence after December
2014?
Mr. Sedney. Well, the ISAF mandate the NATO heads of state
have agreed on runs out at the end of 2014. That was the
decision, made at Lisbon in 2010, that the Afghan security
forces would be fully in the lead by the end of 2014. In terms
of moving towards that, very definitely both the size, but more
importantly the capabilities and the actions that will be
carried out by the ISAF forces will be considered.
But as NATO stated in Chicago in defining essentially an
interim milestone in 2013, that that will be the point at which
Afghan forces are in the lead, with our support. So there will
be a year and a half with the Afghan forces in the lead and
ISAF support. And as they become more and more in the lead,
they will need less and less ISAF support.
So we will be evaluating in those 6-month reviews, looking
primarily at the performance of the Afghan security forces. And
then if there are areas where the Afghan security forces need
additional training, advising, assisting--areas where they are
facing challenges--then the commander in the field, I am sure,
will recommend methods to do that.
So yes, it is very much a joint unitary process, looking at
the entire spectrum in the whole country of Afghanistan.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Sedney.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I understand that President Karzai, by the constitution,
cannot run again. And that there has not been a credible
election yet in Afghanistan. And I know in Iraq, under General
Casey, coalition forces actively supported the independent
electoral commission of Iraq to make sure that there were
credible elections.
What efforts are going to be made next time to make sure--
or to assist the Afghan people to make sure--that there is a
credible election so that there is a peaceful transition of
power?
Mr. Sedney. Thank you very much, Mr. Coffman. You have hit
on a key issue, which is the successful elections and a
successful transition of power; something that does not happen
in that region of the world in general. So it will be an
historic achievement, and one that the Afghan people are very
much aware of.
As you said, President Karzai has pledged publicly, and
privately to the U.S. Government, that he plans to step down to
facilitate a transfer of power. In terms of the Department of
Defense, in terms of the military role, in terms of the role
that NATO and ISAF will play in both of the last two elections,
in 2004 and 2009, the actual security protection that was
available in areas where security had been achieved was led by
the Afghan forces, particularly in 2009.
I know it is the judgment of our commanders in the field
that that is going to be able to be the case in 2014, as well.
So in terms of the military's role, we will be supporting the
Afghan security forces to the degree necessary in 2014 for
those elections in order to carry out the security. The biggest
challenge, of course, is having a credible and legitimate
process that results in a transfer of power that the Afghan
people, the international community, see as legitimate.
That there is a very active political dialogue in
Afghanistan already, and our colleagues at the State Department
and elsewhere are working to that end. But I would say on the
security side, all the indications are--and Steve, you can
correct me if I am wrong--we think the Afghan security forces
are going to be in a very good shape to take the lead and be
very effective at it in maintaining security during the
election period.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Going forward, President Karzai has come
down on these night raids which, in terms of my understanding,
are very effective in terms of capturing key insurgents. Where
are we at right now with night raids in terms of working with
the Karzai administration?
General Townsend. Quite honestly, Congressman, the night
raids question has pretty much dropped in the pressure. It was
highly pressurized a few months ago, and now it has dropped
significantly because we have made this agreement on night
raids, or special operations, with the government of
Afghanistan.
And essentially, we are turning over night raids, at an
accelerated pace, to them. They have now four of their own
strike forces that are doing these raids side-by-side. They are
partnered with Americans, they are enabled by Americans. But
they are completely in the lead for four of these strike
forces.
There are coalition forces that are still operating each
night. They are partnered also with Afghans. But it is the
discussion we had earlier about who is in the lead and who is
participating. But because of that agreement and because of the
continuing success of these operations, the pressure on that
topic has dropped significantly with the government of
Afghanistan.
Mr. Coffman. In terms of our ability to phase down our
forces, being able to redeploy them out of Afghanistan
utilizing Pakistan has become an issue in working with the
Pakistani government. I wonder if you could reflect on where we
are right in that negotiation process.
Mr. Sedney. We have been talking with the Pakistanis about
reopening the ground lines of communication, and we continue
those discussions. I think people from my office have been
involved in those discussions. My deputy was in Islamabad for
about the last 6 weeks or 7 weeks carrying them out.
We have not reached agreement yet, but we do find a great
deal of willingness on the Pakistan side to reopen those. And
we will report back to the committee when that happens. But
what I would stress is that primarily due to our partnership
with a number of other countries to the north of Afghanistan we
have been able to continue operations without any interruption
or any hindrance.
And that the level of supplies for our troops in
Afghanistan, for our NATO partners' groups in Afghanistan, is
higher now than it was before those Pakistani ground lines of
communication were closed. It does cost more money. It is a
much longer route. It goes through some more difficult areas in
terms of development of the transportation networks.
But all that said, due to some tremendous work by our
colleagues at TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], at
CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], and by a number of civilian
carriers, we are actually in very good shape and able to move
forces in and out and equipment in and out of Afghanistan, as
is necessary.
However, we don't want to be dependent upon the north any
more than we want to be dependent on Pakistani. We were very
much interested in having both routes open. There is both
healthy competition there and a diversity of supply lines that
we think is strategically important.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.
And we will move back to Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. The $4 billion, Mr. Sedney, that is
projected to be necessary to support that smaller force of
230,000 dollars--230,000 ANSF in 2017--that represents about 20
percent of the current Afghan GDP [gross domestic product]. If
we assume that Afghanistan will experience economic growth and
improvements in governance, maintaining that force will, of
course, require substantial international contributions.
What steps are being taken to get commitments from
international donors, and how much progress have we made?
Mr. Sedney. Thank you, Congressman. Last year, former
Secretary of Defense Gates, proposed publicly that our ISAF and
other partners contribute 1 billion euros a year towards the
future cost of the Afghan security forces. Since that time, we
have been working very actively with our NATO and other
partners, including countries in the Middle East and in Asia
that are also part of the ISAF force.
And I would say we are very, very close to that goal right
now. Because some of these discussions are still in diplomatic
channels, we are not in a position to give you the details now.
But very soon we will be able to. We have gotten a very
positive response, and countries are willing to make multiyear
commitments.
Obviously, each country has different budget processes,
different political processes. But the commitments that were
made in Chicago have been very positive. At the same time, as I
mentioned before, the goal by 2024--the goal set out by
President Karzai and endorsed by just about every Afghan that I
know--is that Afghanistan will be able to become self-
sustaining for its security forces.
That is a very stretched goal that is going to require a
huge growth in the Afghanistan economy. There are other
prospects in a number of areas--agricultural, transportation,
mining--for that growth. But in the end, it all depends on
security. If security is in place, Afghanistan has a lot of
areas where its economy can grow and meet that goal.
And that, of course, comes back to the Afghan security
forces. But as I said, we have been very pleased with the
response from other countries, and we look forward to giving
you more details of that once the diplomatic discussions are
completed.
Mr. Johnson. I understand also that the poppy crop has
been--or the level of production has declined dramatically this
growing season. What is the reason for that?
Mr. Sedney. The full evaluation of that is still ongoing,
including by our intelligence agencies. And we should have
their official reports in a few weeks. But from what we
understand, there is a combination of factors involved. One of
the largest is weather and crop blights, other natural factors.
But we have also seen a decline in production, particularly
in areas where we have been most effective in our military
counterinsurgency operations. Particularly in the Helmand
Province area, where the combination of increased security and
an effective crop substitution effort--this is a whole-of-
government effort, with the participation from our colleagues
in the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, State Department, and other
international partners--giving farmers the opportunity to grow
something else.
Even though it might be less profitable in one sense is
much more secure because they don't have the risk of having
their crop destroyed, they have legitimate outlets for it, they
are not being preyed upon by Taliban and criminals. So we have
seen that happening. But I would say the largest reasons, at
least anecdotally that we can report right now, are natural.
But they are both natural and as a result of our policies.
Mr. Johnson. Can you share a little bit with us about the
Afghanistan police forces that we are also training, and what
will be our financial commitment, if any, for them after 2014?
Mr. Sedney. Well, the financial commitment we talked about
before was for the Afghan security forces, including the army
and the police; both the uniformed police, the border police,
and the Afghan local police that the chairman discussed before.
The police, as a whole, in Afghanistan, as in every other
conflict and post-conflict societies, does lag behind. The
police in Afghanistan, Representative Coffman mentioned before,
casualty rates. The police bear a much higher casualty rate
than the army. They tend to be in smaller groups, often
isolated, and are quite often the choice of target for the
insurgents.
That combination has made it more challenging to build the
police. However, we see significant progress in the police. The
attrition figures that I mentioned before show that the
policemen are staying in, staying in longer, becoming part of
their communities in an effective way.
There are continuing problems with corruption, as
Representative Coffman mentioned. It is a problem in the police
forces in many areas in Afghanistan that needs to be addressed.
I don't know, Steve, if you have any comments about the police,
from your experience.
General Townsend. My experience over the last year in RC
East, where the police continue to improve--and this is most
notable in the selection and promotion of police leadership--
when I first got there, I had an Afghan police general who was
my partner. And when I heard word of his impending assignment I
was quite nervous because he was not very corrupt.
And I thought an honest guy, trying to do right for his
country. I was very concerned. And in every case, the incoming
leader proved to be better than his predecessor. So that was my
experience in RC East.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
I would like to thank the members of the committee and our
witnesses today for your testimony. We appreciate the time. And
with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
June 20, 2012
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 20, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Rob Wittman
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Hearing on
Afghan National Security Forces: Resources, Strategy,
and Timetable for Security Lead Transition
June 20, 2012
Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee
convenes the first of a series of hearings related to the
Afghan National Security Forces.
At this hearing, we will receive testimony from the
Department of Defense about the resources and strategy related
to training the ANSF and the timetable for transitioning
security lead responsibility from U.S. and NATO forces to the
ANSF.
The Department of Defense is represented today by:
LMr. David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia;
and
LMajor General Stephen Townsend, Director of
the Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell.
Thank you for your participation.
We look forward to your testimony on plans for training and
equipping the ANSF, and details about the projected size and
related rationale of the ANSF in the near and long term.
I have just returned from leading a congressional trip to
Afghanistan. During my visit, I traveled to several provinces
and met with local leaders, including the chiefs of police. I
also had the opportunity to talk to military commanders, who
provided their impressions of the level of support that will be
needed to create a self-sustaining ANSF. It is my hope that our
witnesses today can provide further context on these important
issues.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 20, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS
Mr. Sedney. See attached ANA and ANP Charts from April 1230 Report,
pgs. 20 & 30, with attrition levels through March 2012. [See page 10.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ANA Attrition Rates, December 2011 through May 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dec 2011 Jan 2012 Feb 2012 Mar 2012 Apr 2012 May 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.3% 1.9% 1.8% 1.2% 1.6% 2.3%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANP Attrition Rates, December 2011 through May 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dec 2011 Jan 2012 Feb 2012 Mar 2012 Apr 2012 May 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.4% 1.0% 1.1% 0.6% 1.3% 1.0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
General Townsend. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.] [See page 12.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 20, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. How was the 2014 transition deadline initially
determined?
Mr. Sedney. The security Transition process was jointly conceived
and developed by the Afghan Government, the U.S. Government, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF) nations at a variety of international fora,
beginning with the London Conference in January 2010 and culminating
with the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010. Over this period, the
Inteqal (``Transition'') Framework, which governs the Afghan-led
transition process, was developed based on mutually agreed criteria for
phased transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. Following
this joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment, the ISAF contributing
nations gathered in Lisbon and confirmed their commitment to this
framework, signing a declaration with the Afghan government to transfer
primary security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan government by
the end of 2014.
Mr. Wittman. On what assumptions about the security environment and
ANSF size and capability was the 2014 decision based?
Mr. Sedney. The Inteqal (``Transition'') Framework, which governs
the Afghan-led transition process, was developed based on mutually
agreed criteria for phased transition to Afghan security lead by the
end of 2014. ISAF contributing nations gathered in Lisbon in 2010 and
confirmed their commitment to this strategy and timeline, signing a
declaration with the Afghan government to transfer primary security
responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.
In 2011, the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive
analysis to examine options for the development of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), and identified the minimum level of
capabilities needed to establish and preserve security in Afghanistan
sufficient to support our core national security goals, and to yield an
ANSF structure that is sustainable within the limits of Afghan human
capital, economic capacity, and the International Community's
willingness to provide long-term assistance.
The current planned ANSF force of 352,000 is considered necessary
to complete the Transition to Afghan lead security responsibility by
the end of 2014, and to secure the country during the transition of
power following the Afghan Presidential election in 2014, while
mitigating the effects of the U.S. and coalition drawdowns. In April
2012, Secretary Panetta and the Afghan Ministers of Defense and
Interior committed to conducting six-month reviews of the ANSF force
structure to determine future needs based on the evolving security
environment.
Mr. Wittman. What is the evidence that security situation in
Afghanistan will be sufficiently improved by 2017 to allow the ANSF to
be reduced by 120,000 troops?
Mr. Sedney. An improving security environment would allow for a
carefully planned, conditions-based reduction to an enduring force by
2017; however, no plans have been finalized at this time. Plans to
reshape the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) into a more
sustainable force and to refocus toward enduring security roles are
still in development and pre-decisional. In April 2012, Secretary
Panetta and the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior committed to
conducting six-month reviews of the ANSF force structure to determine
future needs based on the evolving security environment.
Mr. Wittman. If conditions on the ground in Afghanistan do not
improve as expected what will be the mechanism for revising the current
sizing strategy?
Mr. Sedney. General Allen, Commander of the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF), committed to working with the Afghan Ministry
of Defense and Ministry of Interior to conduct six month reviews of the
operational conditions and the capability of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) in order to adapt the plan for the final size
and structure of the ANSF as conditions require. The first of these
reviews will occur following this summer fighting season once ISAF has
had a chance to observe the ANSF as it increasingly takes the lead and
its capabilities are tested.
Mr. Wittman. What factors will determine the size of ANSF after the
U.S. and NATO transition primary security responsibility to the ANSF?
Mr. Sedney. The residual type and intensity of the threat in a
post-2014 environment, and the capabilities exhibited by the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) in the field, are among the most
important factors in determining the size of the ANSF after the
transition. In addition to operational considerations, follow-through
on international pledges made at the Chicago Conference to help sustain
the ANSF through 2017 will influence end strength. Accordingly, Afghan
government's ability to sustain the ANSF using approaches and cost
factors that are appropriate in an Afghan context will also affect the
long-term size of the Afghan force.
Mr. Wittman. What plans are being developed to manage the reduction
in the ANSF from 352,000 to 230,000?
Mr. Sedney. Plans for a managed force reduction of the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) are still in development and pre-
decisional at this time. The Department of Defense is fully aware of
the challenges associated with managing a responsible reduction, and is
examining multiple contingencies and policy options. This includes
examining lessons learned from previous force reductions and
demobilizations that will help inform future plans.
Mr. Wittman. When will the ANSF be fully trained?
Mr. Sedney. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is on track
to meet its goal of recruiting a force of approximately 352,000 by
October 1, 2012. Those recruits will enter training as slots are
available. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is scheduled to achieve its
surge-level end-strength of 187,000 soldiers inducted by December 2012,
and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December
2013. The Afghan National Police (ANP) is expected to reach its surge-
level end-strength of 157,000 personnel inducted by February 2013, and
to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December
2013. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is expected to reach its goal of 8,000
airmen inducted in December 2014, and to have these personnel trained,
equipped, and fielded by December 2017; although we are currently
examining methods to accelerate this process.
Mr. Wittman. When will the full-strength ANSF be fielded?
Mr. Sedney. The Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
are expected to have their full surge-level end strength trained,
equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The Afghan Air Force are
expected to have their full surge-level end strength trained, equipped,
and fielded by December 2017; although we are currently examining
methods to accelerate this process.
Mr. Wittman. If security conditions do not improve sufficiently by
December 2014, will all U.S. combat forces be withdrawn nonetheless by
that date?
Mr. Sedney. The transition strategy and framework, established at
the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit and reaffirmed at the 2012 NATO Chicago
Summit, is on track to transition full security responsibility to the
Afghan Government and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by
December 2014. As provided for in the Strategic Partnership Agreement,
an enduring presence will remain in Afghanistan to ensure that our hard
fought gains are consolidated and sustained by providing continuing
support for the ANSF and for counterterrorism operations.
Mr. Wittman. What conditions will the United States consider when
determining the extent of further U.S. troop drawdowns?
Mr. Sedney. The campaign plan calls for several conditions to be
met before completion of the transition in Afghanistan. The ability of
the Afghanistan National Security Forces to provide suitable and
sustainable security for a given area will be one of the key factors in
determining U.S. and coalition forces presence. Other factors involve
the ability of the provincial government to provide adequate services
to the Afghan people, including access to basic social services, rule
of law, and the capability for economic growth.
Mr. Wittman. Who will decide the scope and pace of U.S.
withdrawals?
Mr. Sedney. The Department of Defense is currently working with
commanders in the field to determine the scope and pace of additional
force reductions after October 2012. Plans for further reductions are
still in development and pre-decisional at this time. Following the
summer fighting season and the full recovery of U.S. surge forces by
the end of September 2012, General Allen will conduct an assessment to
determine force levels for 2013. This assessment will take into account
the aftermath of the fighting season and the progress of the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) and evaluate what combination of forces
will be needed to handle the operating environment in 2013. This
assessment will then be pushed up the chain of command for review. The
safety of U.S. forces and the success of the mission are the primary
concerns in our planning efforts.
Mr. Wittman. Will a continued, steady drawdown of U.S. troops
increase the risk of successfully transitioning security to the ANSF by
the 2014 deadline?
Mr. Sedney. The scope and pace of additional U.S. force reductions
after October 2012 are still being determined. Future reductions will
be tied to the conditions on the ground and the ability of the
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide security as they
assume the lead. The performance of the ANSF over this summer fighting
season, as we drawdown to the pre-surge level of 68,000 and as the
Afghans increasingly take the lead in contested areas, will provide a
good baseline assessment for how the ANSF can handle U.S. force
reductions in the future.
Additionally, as the ANSF increase in capability and take the lead
in conducting operations, the International Security Forces Assistance
(ISAF) will transition to the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model.
This represents a shift in focus from conducting counterinsurgency
operations to providing partnering and advising assets necessary to
develop and support ANSF operational effectiveness. Finally, in
accordance with the Strategic Partnership Agreement, we will continue
to provide support after 2014 to the Afghan Government and the ANSF to
ensure a sustainable transition of security responsibilities
Mr. Wittman. What size U.S. military presence will be needed in
Afghanistan to achieve the U.S. goals of conducting counterterrorism
operations and training and advising the ANSF?
Mr. Sedney. The United States, along with its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Allies, will maintain an enduring presence to
support the continued training and development of the Afghan National
Security Forces and to engage in counterterrorism efforts aimed at
combating al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Future U.S. force level
requirements will be determined based on what assets are needed to
support those activities and missions, and will be guided by the need
to ensure that Afghanistan has the ability to secure itself against
internal and external threats.
Towards that end, an Afghanistan-United States Bilateral Commission
was established under the Strategic Partnership Agreement to promote
cooperation and monitor progress. A U.S.-Afghanistan Working Group on
Defense and Security will conduct regular assessments of the threat
level in Afghanistan as well as the Afghan government's security and
defense requirements. Recommendations will be made to the Bilateral
Commission that should establish mutually determined levels of support
and assistance.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ
Mr. Critz. How willing is the Afghan government to accept the
transition?
Mr. Sedney. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. How confident are we that the Afghan government is
aligned with U.S. interests? How do we make sure our interests are
aligned?
Mr. Sedney. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. Is there any evidence that old members of Northern
Alliance are rearming for possible civil war after transition, as
suggested by CRS?
Mr. Sedney. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. Could you please identify any provinces or locations
where you are concerned local militia may cause problems for the
national Afghan government?
Mr. Sedney. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. How have the most recent Parliamentary elections (2010)
impacted the opinion of Afghans on the legitimacy of the government and
its ability to provide security?
Mr. Sedney. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. What is your opinion about governing capacity at local
levels?
Mr. Sedney. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. How willing is the Afghan government to accept the
transition?
General Townsend. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. How confident are we that the Afghan government is
aligned with U.S. interests? How do we make sure our interests are
aligned?
General Townsend. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. Is there any evidence that old members of Northern
Alliance are rearming for possible civil war after transition, as
suggested by CRS?
General Townsend. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. Could you please identify any provinces or locations
where you are concerned local militia may cause problems for the
national Afghan government?
General Townsend. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. How have the most recent Parliamentary elections (2010)
impacted the opinion of Afghans on the legitimacy of the government and
its ability to provide security?
General Townsend. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Critz. What is your opinion about governing capacity at local
levels?
General Townsend. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. Breakdown of $4.1b spending. Does it include train and
equip, SFA (Security Assistance Force) or only direct costs to train,
equip, and pay for salaries and operations of the ANSF?
Mr. Sedney. [The information referred to is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. Describe the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model:
numbers, ROE, etc. Where are we with the planning for this?
Mr. Sedney. ISAF Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities are the
cornerstone of developing ANSF capacity in support of Transition.
Advisor Teams are instrumental in advising and assisting the fielded
ANSF as they assume the lead for security through the Transition
process. With Afghan leadership and our continued support, the ANSF
will become an institution of national unity, the ultimate mechanism
for defeating the insurgency and the long-term guardian of Afghan
peace, stability, and prosperity well after 2014. This model
operationalizes the shift from ISAF's role in combat operations and
partnering with ANSF units to a mission focused primarily on training,
advising, and assistance.
The exact details for SFA are classified by Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers--Europe (SHAPE). The Department of Defense can provide a
classified briefing describing the numbers, locations, and composition
of SFA Advisor Teams.
The planning for training and deploying Advisor Teams remains on
schedule. This model is not entirely new. It builds upon the experience
and lessons learned from previous mentor teams. To codify these
lessons, SHAPE published a detailed concept of operations in March
2012. The first U.S. Advisor Teams deployed in January 2012 in advance
of the concept of operations. Successive U.S. Army and Marine Advisor
Teams have been deploying throughout 2012. The second phase of Advisor
Teams, with U.S. and international contributions, will arrive in the
fall of 2012. Recognizing the challenges in shifting to a new model
while still engaged in combat operations, SHAPE and the U.S. are
engaging partner nations to continue to support the SFA model through
2014. This effort will ensure achieving the Lisbon Transition
milestone, though some requirements will end as ANSF units demonstrate
the capacity for independent operations and geographic areas
successfully exit from Transition.
Mr. Cooper. How many Taliban are we fighting? How many of these are
``hard core'' ideologically committed fighters and how many are part-
time, local fighters? How are these numbers derived? What are the
metrics we use to determine if someone is a Taliban fighter?
Mr. Sedney. [The information referred to is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. Explain in more detail why the poppy crop is down? How
much is due to environmental factors (drought, blight, etc.) and how
much due to ISAF or GIROA efforts? Can this lower level of production
be sustained once U.S. forces withdraw?
Mr. Sedney. The primary causes for the lower poppy crop yield are
environmental factors, including bad weather and poor soil conditions.
It is uncertain whether blight can be attributed as a factor in the
lower crop yield. The poor soil is, in part, a result of the success of
the Afghan government-led Helmand Food Zone program, which increased
food production and reduced poppy cultivation in food zone areas with
higher soil quality. This pushed poppy farmers away from the province's
fertile land to a more austere desert environment. The weather this
year has been particularly unfavorable to poppy crops with colder
temperatures and more precipitation than in past years.
U.S. forces in Afghanistan do not directly support poppy
eradication efforts other than to provide in extremis support to
eradication teams under attack, consistent with North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
policy. The U.S. Department of State supports the Afghan Government's
``Governor Led Eradication'' program. Although final verified results
are not available for the Governor Led Eradication program at this
time, the program is on track to more than double last year's result of
3,810 hectares of poppy eradicated. Eradication efforts must be
carefully planned to inflict the most damage on major drug producer's
poppy crop and be focused in areas where farmers have access to
alternatives to poppy cultivation. This requires a whole-of-government
approach led by the Afghan Government with enabling support from the
U.S. Government.
Sustained lower level production will depend, in part, on continued
U.S. assistance to Afghanistan after 2014. Department of Defense is
working presently on a post-2014 CN strategy for Afghanistan.
Mr. Cooper. How do we deal with the Pakistan safe havens? Is
Pakistan currently taking actions to eliminate safe havens for the
Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, or HiG? Do we expect such
actions in the future? Why or why not?
Mr. Sedney. Militant and terrorist networks continue to exploit
Pakistan-based sanctuaries. At the same time, there appears to be a
growing recognition on the part of many Pakistani leaders that a secure
and stable Afghanistan is vital for Pakistan's future. We look forward
to Pakistan taking action towards achieving this goal. These
sanctuaries remain a strategic threat to the campaign in Afghanistan. A
capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), along with the support
of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) training, advice,
assistance, layered defense, and enablers, is the best mechanism to
mitigate the effects of these sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the threat must also be mitigated within Pakistan, a
security interest that Pakistan shares. Pakistan has suffered enormous
casualties as a result of transnational terrorist networks and from
acts of terrorism that often emanate from sanctuaries inside Pakistan.
This includes more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded in
action and more than 30,000 civilian causalities since September 11,
2001. Security assistance is a key tool designed to advance U.S.
interests by helping Pakistan's efforts in this fight against the
militants that enable safe havens, and the Coalition Support Fund
authority is used to reimburse Pakistani efforts in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom.
Nevertheless, where Pakistan's action to combat sanctuaries falls
short, the U.S. Government will continue to engage Pakistan's civilian
and military leaders and urge them to take action to dismantle these
sanctuaries. This includes holding Pakistan to its commitments to
pressure the Haqqani Network and to encourage all Taliban elements as
well as other Afghan groups, including Hizb-e-Islami, to join a
political settlement in Afghanistan.
Mr. Cooper. How do we deal with Afghan government corruption? What
are the impacts of corruption? What level of confidence should NATO
members have that corruption will be controlled post-2014? Does
corruption currently undermine the effectiveness of GIROA and the ANSF?
Is governmental corruption linked at all to the Taliban's ability to
recruit new fighters?
Mr. Sedney. The United States has implemented a number of
initiatives both to support the Afghan government in its efforts to
reduce corruption and organized crime, and also to ensure that U.S.
contracting and development assistance are not subject to fraud and
corruption. These initiatives include: sustained engagement, capacity-
building, and technical assistance in key Afghan ministries; an
expansion of interagency efforts to mature conduct thorough assessments
of organized crime and corruption in key sectors as a basis for action;
the creation of joint, Presidentially-sponsored forums to promote
inter-ministerial coordination and develop concrete counter-corruption
recommendations; and the development of investigative leads and other
forms of support for vetted Afghan law enforcement, investigative, and
oversight bodies. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)-
Shafafiyat coordinates counter-corruption efforts within the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). CJIATF-Shafafiyat
fosters a common understanding of the corruption problem, plans and
implements ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrates ISAF anti-
corruption activities with those of key Afghan and international
partners in an effort to address President Karzai's goal of an ``active
and honest administration'' in Afghanistan.
Despite this sustained effort, corruption remains one of the
biggest challenges facing Afghanistan. It undermines the effectiveness,
cohesion, and legitimacy of the Afghan Government and alienates
elements of the population. It deters investment, impedes licit
economic growth, enables criminal networks to influence important State
institutions and functions, and facilitates the narcotics trade and
other transnational threats emerging from Afghanistan. Therefore,
counter-corruption efforts are essential to strengthening critical
Afghan institutions and consolidating gains in the wake of improved
security as the process of transition continues.
A series of recent Afghan government commitments towards anti-
corruption and good governance has instilled confidence in the
international community. Cooperating to strengthen Afghan institutions
and governance is one of the basic tenets of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic
Partnership Agreement and a critical component underpinning the
enduring partnership. At the Tokyo conference in early July, the
international donor community and Afghanistan developed a framework for
accountability, whereby money would be withheld if Afghanistan cannot
meet benchmarks for improving governance and finance management, as
well as for safeguarding the democratic process. Following this
conference, President Karzai issued a 23-page decree ordering the
Supreme Court to accelerate corruption investigations and requiring his
ministries, prosecutors, and judiciary to institute a list of
government reforms to address bribery, cronyism, and nepotism.
Mr. Cooper. In your opinion, what will determine ANSF success? What
factors could undermine ANSF capability and success in the future?
Mr. Sedney. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made
tremendous strides in their development as a force capable of providing
security for Afghanistan. As of June, Afghan forces were in the lead
for over 70% of total conventional operations across Afghanistan.
Efforts to continue developing ANSF leadership, improving the overall
quality of the force, and further expanding enabler capabilities, such
as logistics, close air support, medical evacuation, and intelligence
will affect the long-term success of the ANSF's ability to provide
security for the Afghan people.
Factors that will challenge the ANSF's success in the future
include limited resources to fully implement current development plans,
sourcing the right mix of Security Force Assistance Teams to mentor and
advise ANSF units, developing an ANSF enabler capability, and improving
ANSF retention and attrition rates to sustain overall force quality.
Mr. Cooper. Can the Afghan Local Police (ALP) be sustained when we
leave? Who will fund and train? Does the Afghan Ministry of the
Interior have the ability to effectively oversee and control the ALP
sites and units in the absence of USSOF?
Mr. Sedney. The Afghan Ministry of Interior will continue to
administer the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program after the security
transition is completed at the end of 2014. The ALP model is for it to
become a program commanded and controlled by local Provincial and
District Chiefs of Police (COP). It was established in 2010 by an
Afghan Presidential Decree. Pay, uniforms, and equipment are
distributed through the Afghan National Police system. U.S. Special
Operation Forces and Coalition Forces continue to develop capacity in
the ALP and will continue to work with District COPs, and Provincial
COPs to develop and maintain a sustainable program. These over-watch
efforts are part of a long-term engagement plan to transition security
to Afghan control.
Mr. Cooper. As ALP is part of MOI, is ALP officially considered
part of ANSF? If not, why is ALP funded through ANSF?
Mr. Sedney. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) are validated by and
report to the Ministry of Interior. They are not part of the Afghan
National Police tashkil and do not count toward the Afghan National
Security Force approved level of 352,000 personnel. However, as part of
the Ministry of Interior, the ALP are funded through the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund.
Mr. Cooper. Explain the procedures by which we control ALP funding
and make sure it won't be misspent.
Mr. Sedney. The Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC)
oversees the management of all Afghanistan Security Force Funds (ASFF).
ASFF provides support to the Ministry of Interior for the Afghan Local
Police (ALP) for salaries, equipment, and recruiting. The funds are
executed in accordance with standard procedures used for all U.S.
financial support provided to the Afghan National Security Forces. The
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan oversees the
obligation and execution of the ASFF.
Mr. Cooper. General Allen has stated there are three key factors
for successful transition in Afghanistan: 1) security, 2) governance,
and 3) development. Do you agree? Are there any other factors that you
believe are significant?
Mr. Sedney. Yes, I agree with General Allen. Security, governance,
and development are the three pillars of the Inteqal ``Transition''
Framework, which governs the transition process. Improvements in
security conditions and the performance of the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) have been the keys to success thus far in the transition
process, but good governance and development are necessary to ensure
that those gains result in sustainable Afghan self-reliance. Although
there are many factors influencing the success of Transition, regional
security and cooperation from Pakistan and Iran is another critical
factor. The insurgency's safe haven in Pakistan remains one of the
biggest threats to a durable and sustainable Afghanistan. Strengthening
border coordination and cooperation between Afghanistan and its
neighbors will be necessary for long-term success.
Mr. Cooper. LTG Bolger stated that if the ANSF is reduced below
352,000 he believed many of those that leave ANSF will go into civilian
positions with the Afghanistan government. Do you agree? Will there be
any program to facilitate such placements? Do those personnel have
skills that would be directly applicable to such positions? Can GIROA
support such an increased number of personnel?
Mr. Sedney. Plans for a managed force reduction of the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) from 352,000 to 230,000, which would
include contingency plans for the ``reintegration'' of demobilized
personnel, are still in development. A common feature of reintegration
programs during past demobilizations is job training and job placement
to ensure that reintegrees have the appropriate knowledge and skills to
pursue alternate livelihoods. It is unknown at this time what the
Afghan government's civilian workforce requirements will be three to
four years from now and whether they will be able to absorb any of
these personnel.
Mr. Cooper. Please explain the corrective actions and
investigations taken regarding the alleged loss of $42 million at the
Dawood hospital.
Mr. Sedney. Since 2010, the U.S. and Afghan governments have
conducted a series of investigations, including several by the
Department of Defense Inspector General for Special Plans and
Operations (DOD IG-SPO), on the management, medical care services, and
logistics capability and accountability at Dawood National Military
Hospital. These investigations arose from concerns raised by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-
A) regarding the status of the medical logistics system within the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the alleged mismanagement
and corruption at Dawood Hospital.
At the urging of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
leadership, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) replaced key
leadership at both Dawood Hospital and the Medical Command, including
the Afghan National Army (ANA) Surgeon General and Commander of Dawood
Hospital, General Ahmed Zia Yaftali, in December 2010. New leadership
was brought in to establish more stringent planning and oversight and
to advance the professional conduct and accountability of the medical
staff and administrators.
Based on the findings and recommendations of DOD IG-SPO, NTM-A
medical advisors and mentors have worked in close coordination with
their Afghan counterparts to establish systems and processes that have
significantly improved logistics and supply management and have
introduced greater transparency and efficiency. These changes have
improved accountability while also reducing theft, misappropriation,
unauthorized use, and improper distribution.
Numerous oversight mechanisms are now in place to ensure continued
progress. The Logistics Training Advisory Group (LTAG) and Medical
Training Advisory Group (MTAG) conduct continuous ``Battle Field
Circulations'' to provide daily monitoring and to ensure compliance.
The Logistics Validation Team provides quarterly assessments. DOD IG
and the Afghan MOD continue to monitor the progress and provide
frequent reviews.
Additionally, an Afghan inter-ministerial investigative team with
the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) is currently
investigating the allegations of corruption and mismanagement at Dawood
hospital. The HOOAC investigation is supported by sustained ISAF and
interagency engagement and is overseen by a joint Afghan-international
Special Cases Committee.
Mr. Cooper. Please describe in detail the operational assessment
process used to evaluate the ANSF. What data is collected? Who
evaluates the data? What method of analysis is used to evaluate the
data? Who makes the final decision as to a CUAT determination?
Mr. Sedney. The CUAT, a method used to assess progress in the
development of the ANSF, was developed in early 2010 by the ISAF Joint
Command (IJC) with the first reported cycle (referred to as Cycle 1)
being released in May 2010. It was implemented to inform Coalition
commanders on progress of the ANSF in their area of operations and to
provide input to the multiple reporting requirements of the ISAF
headquarters. The CUAT was developed through interaction between the
staffs of ISAF, IJC, and the Regional Commands (RCs) and was based on
existing reporting constructs in place at the time. The CUAT was
developed because assessment tools in place at the time were not
providing sufficient detail on the development and progress of the
ANSF.
The CUAT is completed by the commander of the partnered Coalition
unit or advisor team that has responsibility of an ANSF unit. Once
completed by the partnered Coalition unit, the CUAT is reviewed by the
partnered Coalitions unit's chain of command and forwarded to IJC for
review. IJC reviews the CUATs with the Regional Commands and compiles a
summary table of the CUAT cycle results which are forwarded to ISAF
headquarters for use in various reporting requirements.
The primary purpose of the CUAT is to rate an ANSF unit's
effectiveness by assigning the unit a rating on a five-level scale
(known as Ratings Definition Levels, or RDLs) based on the unit's
ability to operate independently. An RDL rating reflects an ANSF unit's
overall operational effectiveness; however, this overall rating is
derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The overall score
is based on nine capabilities-based functional areas: leadership,
operations, intelligence, logistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance,
communications, and training and education. Those functional
assessments are based on quantitative data (personnel, equipment, and
training) as well as qualitative assessments by the Coalition partnered
advisors on areas affecting the overall effectiveness of the unit.
Leadership assessments (``very positive,'' ``positive,'' ``neutral,''
negative,'' and ``very negative'') and partnering data are also
incorporated into CUAT reports.
While the CUAT in and of itself is an incomplete assessment, it has
aided in meeting the requirement to track the ANSF's growth and
development towards a capable fighting force. ISAF and its subordinate
commands are continuously scrutinizing both the CUAT and their overall
approach to assessing the ANSF.
Mr. Cooper. Breakdown of $4.1b spending. Does it include train and
equip, SFA (Security Assistance Force) or only direct costs to train,
equip, and pay for salaries and operations of the ANSF?
General Townsend. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. Describe the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model:
numbers, ROE, etc. Where are we with the planning for this?
General Townsend. Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a central
pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. The SFA model
supports ISAF in assuming a supporting role in the campaign while
enabling the ANSF to assume the lead security role across all of
Afghanistan as part of the Lisbon-based security transition process.
SFA teams vary in size based on operational requirements and are
focused on executing train, advise, and assistance missions with ANSF
counterparts (Army and Police). SFA teams operate under the standard
ISAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) and retain the inherent right to self-
defense. Planning is complete while deployment of teams and overall SFA
footprint will adjust as units improve over time.
Mr. Cooper. How many Taliban are we fighting? How many of these are
``hard core'' ideologically committed fighters and how many are part-
time, local fighters? How are these numbers derived? What are the
metrics we use to determine if someone is a Taliban fighter?
General Townsend. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. Is the ANSF respected by Afghans? Is it respected by
the Taliban? Are there differences in perceptions about the various
elements of the ANSF?
General Townsend. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. Explain in more detail why the poppy crop is down? How
much is due to environmental factors (drought, blight, etc.) and how
much due to ISAF or GIROA efforts? Can this lower level of production
be sustained once U.S. forces withdraw?
General Townsend. The primary causes for the lower poppy crop yield
are environmental factors such as bad weather and poor soil conditions.
Blight cannot be attributed as a factor with any certainty. The poor
soil is, in part, a result of the success of the GIROA-led Helmand Food
Zone program which reduced poppy cultivation significantly in the food
zone while pushing poppy farmers away from the province's fertile land
to a more austere desert environment. The weather this year has been
particularly unfavorable to poppy crops with colder temperatures and
more precipitation than in past years.
U.S. forces in Afghanistan do not directly support poppy
eradication efforts other than to provide in extremis support to
eradication teams under attack, consistent with NATO/ISAF policy. The
U.S. Department of State supports the Afghan Government's ``Governor
Led Eradication'' (GLE) program. While final, verified results are not
available for the GLE at this time, the program is on track to more
than double last year's result of 3,810 hectares of poppy eradicated. I
believe that the eradication effort must be carefully planned to
inflict the most damage on major drug producer's poppy crop and be
focused in areas where farmers have access to alternatives to poppy
cultivation. This requires a whole-of-government approach led by the
Afghan Government with enabling support from the U.S. Government.
Sustained lower level production will depend, in part, on continued
U.S. assistance to GIROA after 2014. The Department of Defense (DOD) is
working presently on a post-2014 CN strategy for Afghanistan; I look
forward to providing a copy of this strategy in November 2012.
Mr. Cooper. How do we deal with the Pakistan safe havens? Is
Pakistan currently taking actions to eliminate safe havens for the
Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, or HiG? Do we expect such
actions in the future? Why or why not?
General Townsend. Militant and terrorist networks continue to
exploit Pakistan-based sanctuaries. These sanctuaries remain a
strategic threat to the campaign in Afghanistan. A capable ANSF, along
with the support of ISAF training, advice, assistance, layered defense,
and enablers, is the best mechanism to mitigate the effects of these
sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the threat must also be mitigated within Pakistan,
which is an interest that, to a degree, Pakistan shares. Pakistan has
suffered enormous casualties as a result of military operations against
the networks that enable safe havens and from acts of terrorism that
often emanate from the sanctuaries, including more than 11,000 military
personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian
causalities. Security assistance is a key tool designed to advance U.S.
interests by helping Pakistan's efforts in this fight against the
militants that enable safe havens; Coalition Support Funds, meanwhile,
reimburse Pakistani efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Nevertheless, where Pakistan's support falls short, we will
continue to engage Pakistan's civilian and military leaders to take
action on its side of the border to dismantle these sanctuaries, to
include holding Pakistan to its commitments to squeeze the Haqqani
Network and encouraging all Taliban elements as well as other Afghan
groups, including Hizb-e-Islami to join a political settlement in
Afghanistan, as Pakistan's previous Prime Minister publicly committed.
Mr. Cooper. How do we deal with Afghan government corruption? What
are the impacts of corruption? What level of confidence should NATO
members have that corruption will be controlled post-2014? Does
corruption currently undermine the effectiveness of GIROA and the ANSF?
Is governmental corruption linked at all to the Taliban's ability to
recruit new fighters?
General Townsend. The United States has implemented a number of
initiatives to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to reduce
corruption and organized crime, while working to ensure the U.S.
contracting and development assistance are not subject to fraud and
corruption. These initiatives include sustained engagement, capacity-
building, and technical assistance in key Afghan ministries, an
expansion of interagency efforts to mature organized crime and
corruption estimates in key sectors as a basis for action, the creation
of joint, Presidentially-sponsored forums to promote inter-ministerial
coordination and develop concrete counter-corruption recommendations,
and the development of investigative leads and other forms of support
for vetted Afghan law enforcement, investigative, and oversight bodies.
CJIATF-Shafafiyat coordinates counter-corruption efforts within ISAF,
fostering a common understanding of the corruption problem, planning
and implementing ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrating ISAF
anti-corruption activities with those of key Afghan and international
partners, to address President Karzai's goal of an ``active and honest
administration'' in Afghanistan.
Despite this sustained effort, corruption remains one of the
biggest challenges in Afghanistan. It undermines the effectiveness,
cohesion, and legitimacy of the Afghan Government and alienates
elements of the population. It deters investment, impedes licit
economic growth, enables criminal networks to influence important state
institutions and functions, and facilitates the narcotics trade and
other transnational threats emerging from Afghanistan. Counter-
corruption efforts are therefore essential to strengthening critical
Afghan institutions and consolidating gains in the wake of improved
security as the process of transition continues.
A series of recent commitments made by Afghanistan towards anti-
corruption and good governance has instilled confidence in the
international community. Strengthening Afghan institutions and
governance was one of the basic tenets of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic
Partnership Agreement and a critical component underpinning our
enduring partnership. At the Tokyo conference in early July, the
international donor community reached agreement with Afghanistan on a
framework for accountability, whereby money will be withheld if the
country cannot meet benchmarks for improving governance and finance
management, as well as safeguarding the democratic process. Following
this conference, President Karzai issued a 23-page decree ordering the
Supreme Court to accelerate investigations and his ministries,
prosecutors, and judiciary to institute a list of government reforms
battling bribery, cronyism, and nepotism.
Mr. Cooper. In your opinion, what will determine ANSF success? What
factors could undermine ANSF capability and success in the future?
General Townsend. The ANSF has made tremendous strides in their
development as a force capable of providing security for Afghanistan.
Continuing to develop ANSF leadership, improving the overall quality of
the force, and further developing enabler capabilities, such as
logistics, close air support, medevac, and intelligence will affect the
long-term success of security transition and the ANSF's ability to
provide security for the Afghan people.
Factors which will challenge the success of the ANSF in the future
include limited resources to fully implement current development plans,
sourcing the right mix of Security Force Assistance Teams to mentor/
advise ANSF units, development of ANSF enabler capability, and
improving ANSF retention and attrition rates to sustain overall force
quality.
Mr. Cooper. Can the Afghan Local Police (ALP) be sustained when we
leave? Who will fund and train? Does the Afghan Ministry of the
Interior have the ability to effectively oversee and control the ALP
sites and units in the absence of USSOF?
General Townsend. The Afghan Ministry of Interior will continue to
administer the Afghan Local Police program after security transition is
completed at the end of 2014. The Commander of ISAF has submitted a
request through CENTCOM to SECDEF, requesting enduring ALP funding
post-2014. ALP is an Afghan-owned program commanded and controlled by
local Provincial and District Chiefs of Police (COP) that was
established by a 2010 Afghan Presidential Decree. Pay, uniforms, and
equipment are all distributed through the Afghan National Police
system. U.S. Special Operation Forces and Coalition Forces continue to
develop capacity in the ALP, District COPs, and Provincial COPs to
maintain a sustainable program. These overwatch efforts are part of a
long term engagement plan to transition security to Afghan control,
ensuring that ALP will have effective oversight in the absence of daily
coalition presence.
Mr. Cooper. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ALP?
General Townsend. The program's primary strength lies in the local
selection process of ALP members. They are handpicked by the local
village elders to protect the villages they come from. This differs
from the ANP and ANA model where the majority of soldiers and police
officers come from different regions of Afghanistan to perform their
duties.
The ALP program has significant Afghan and coalition oversight
through the Village Stability Operations initiative, and links together
the local elders, GIRoA (for pay and weapons), and the Chiefs of
Police. Additionally, the National Directorate of Security (NDS)
performs background checks during in-processing adding another layer of
quality control. The success of the program is dependent upon the
leadership and when needed, tactical support by the District and
Provincial Chiefs of Police. ALP works best in areas where police
leaders understand and embrace the program as part of the fabric of
Afghan National Security Force composition in rural areas. High
casualty rates among ALP and local leaders at the sub-national level
continue to be a challenge as well.
Mr. Cooper. As ALP is part of MOI, is ALP officially considered
part of ANSF? If not, why is ALP funded through ANSF?
General Townsend. The Afghan Local Police are validated by and
report to the Ministry of Interior. They are not part of the Afghan
National Police tashkil and do not count toward the approved Afghan
National Security Force approved level of 352,000. However, they are a
legitimate GIRoA security force and eligible for funding from the
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.
Mr. Cooper. General Allen has stated there are three key factors
for successful transition in Afghanistan: 1) security, 2) governance,
and 3) development. Do you agree? Are there any other factors that you
believe are significant?
General Townsend. Yes, I agree with General Allen. Security,
governance, and development are the three pillars of the Inteqal
``Transition'' Framework, which governs the transition process, and are
carefully evaluated and monitored to judge the readiness of an area for
each successive stage of transition. Improvements in security
conditions and the performance of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) have been the keys to success so far in the transition process,
but good governance and development will help ensure that those gains
result in sustainable self-reliance. While there are many factors
influencing the success of transition, another critical one is regional
security and cooperation. The insurgency's safe haven in Pakistan
remains one of the biggest threats to a durable and sustainable
Afghanistan. Strengthening border coordination and cooperation between
Afghanistan and its neighbors will be necessary for any long term
success.
Mr. Cooper. LTG Bolger stated that if the ANSF is reduced below
352,000 he believed many of those that leave ANSF will go into civilian
positions with the Afghanistan government. Do you agree? Will there be
any program to facilitate such placements? Do those personnel have
skills that would be directly applicable to such positions? Can GIROA
support such an increased number of personnel?
General Townsend. Plans for the managed force reduction of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) from 352,000 to 230,000, which
includes contingency plans for the ``reintegration'' of demobilized
personnel, are still in development. A common feature of reintegration
programs during demobilizations in the past is job training and job
placement to ensure that reintegrees have the appropriate knowledge and
skills to pursue alternate livelihoods. It is unknown at this time what
GIROA's civilian workforce requirements will be 3-4 years from now and
whether they will be able to absorb any of these personnel. However,
any job training and placement reintegration program for demobilized
ANSF will take into account these market demands.
Mr. Cooper. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Taliban
insurgency?
General Townsend. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. Please explain the corrective actions and
investigations taken regarding the alleged loss of $42 million at the
Dawood hospital.
General Townsend. Since 2010, the governments of the United States
and Afghanistan have conducted a series of investigations, including
several by the Department of Defense Inspector General for Special
Plans and Operations (DOD IG-SPO), on the management, medical care
services, and logistics capability and accountability at Dawood
National Military Hospital. These investigations arose from concerns
raised by the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) regarding the
status of the medical logistics system within the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) and the alleged mismanagement and corruption at
Dawood Hospital.
At the urging of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
leadership, the Afghan Ministry of Defense moved to replace key
leadership at both Dawood Hospital and the Medical Command, including
the ANA Surgeon General and Commander of Dawood Hospital, General Ahmed
Zia Yaftali, in December 2010. New leadership was brought in to
establish more stringent planning and oversight to advance the
professional conduct and accountability of the medical staff and
administrators.
Based on the findings and recommendations of DOD IG-SPO, NTM-A
medical advisors and mentors have worked in close coordination with
their Afghan counterparts to stand up systems and processes that have
significantly improved logistics and supply management and have
introduced greater transparency and efficiency. These changes have
improved accountability while reducing theft, misappropriation,
unauthorized use and improper distribution.
Numerous oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure continued
progress. The Logistics Training Advisory Group (LTAG) and Medical
Training Advisory Group (MTAG) conduct continuous ``Battle Field
Circulations'' to provide daily follow up and ensure compliance. The
Logistics Validation Team provides quarterly assessments. DOD IG and
the Afghan MOD continue to monitor the progress and provide frequent
reviews.
Additionally, the allegations of corruption and mismanagement at
Dawood hospital are currently under criminal investigation by an Afghan
inter-ministerial investigative team with the High Office of Oversight
and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), supported by sustained ISAF and the
interagency engagement and overseen by a joint Afghan-international
Special Cases Committee. These investigations are still ongoing.
Mr. Cooper. Please describe in detail the operational assessment
process used to evaluate the ANSF. What data is collected? Who
evaluates the data? What method of analysis is used to evaluate the
data? Who makes the final decision as to a CUAT determination?
General Townsend. The CUAT, a method used to assess progress in the
development of the ANSF, was developed in early 2010 by the ISAF Joint
Command (IJC) with the first reported cycle (referred to as Cycle 1)
being released in May 2010. It was implemented to inform Coalition
commanders on progress of the ANSF in their area of operations and to
provide input to the multiple reporting requirements of the ISAF
headquarters. The CUAT was developed through interaction between the
staffs of ISAF, IJC, and the Regional Commands (RCs) and was based on
existing reporting constructs in place at the time. The CUAT was
developed because assessment tools in place at the time were not
providing sufficient detail on the development and progress of the
ANSF.
The CUAT is completed by the commander of the partnered Coalition
unit or advisor team that has responsibility of an ANSF unit. Once
completed by the partnered Coalition unit, the CUAT is reviewed by the
partnered Coalitions unit's chain of command and is entered into the
CIDNE database. IJC reviews the CUATs with the Regional Commands and
compiles a summary table of the CUAT cycle results which are forwarded
to ISAF headquarters for use in various reporting requirements.
The primary purpose of the CUAT is to rate an ANSF unit's
effectiveness by assigning the unit a rating on a five-level scale
(known as Ratings Definition Levels, or RDLs) based on the unit's
ability to operate independently. An RDL rating reflects an ANSF unit's
overall operational effectiveness; however, this overall rating is
derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The overall score
is based on nine capabilities-based functional areas: leadership,
operations, intelligence, logistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance,
communications, and training and education.
While the CUAT in and of itself is an incomplete assessment, it has
aided in meeting the requirement to track the ANSF's growth and
development towards a capable fighting force. ISAF and its subordinate
commands are continuously scrutinizing both the CUAT and their overall
approach to assessing the ANSF.
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