[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
WHAT'S NEXT FOR THE U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 6, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-151
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey--
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California deceased 3/6/12 deg.
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
RON PAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CONNIE MACK, Florida ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID RIVERA, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois, Chairman
RON PAUL, Texas ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio Samoa
DAN BURTON, Indiana FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DENNIS CARDOZA, California
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Jim Zumwalt, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.................. 5
Victor Cha, Ph.D., senior adviser, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (former Director for Asian Affairs,
National Security Council)..................................... 20
Mr. Daniel S. Lipman, senior vice president, Westinghouse
Electric Company............................................... 31
Mark Peters, Ph.D., deputy laboratory director for programs,
Argonne National Laboratory.................................... 37
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Jim Zumwalt: Prepared statement.............................. 7
Victor Cha, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................ 23
Mr. Daniel S. Lipman: Prepared statement......................... 32
Mark Peters, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 39
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 58
Hearing minutes.................................................. 59
The Honorable Mike Kelly, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Material submitted for the record 60
WHAT'S NEXT FOR THE U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 2012
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald A.
Manzullo (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Manzullo. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific will
now come to order. On Sunday, June 25, 1950, the armies of
North Korea attacked South Korea in a misguided attempt to
forcefully alter the future of the Korean peninsula. Sixty-two
years later, we continue to grapple with the consequences of
that war. Much has changed for South Korea, however, since that
faithful day so many years ago.
South Korea has undergone a dramatic transformation from a
developing nation to one that is modern, vibrant, and full of
promise, and opportunity. The Korean people deserve our full
praise and admiration for their role in building a nation that
is not only an economic powerhouse, but one that serves as a
beacon of democracy and freedom for those oppressed around the
world. This is the South Korea of today. A country that is
standing on its own right, alongside advanced democracies in
Western Europe, Japan, and even the United States. Given the
positive changes in South Korea, it is only proper for us to
consider real ways to improve the U.S.-Korean alliance beyond a
security-focused relationship.
The future of the U.S.-Korea alliance remains largely
unwritten. It is an opportunity for us to decide whether we
shoot for the stars or embrace the status quo. If we choose the
path of the status quo, then we forfeit a tremendous
opportunity to forge a lasting, mutually beneficial
relationship for generations to come. This is why I urge
President Obama, and policy makers on both sides of the
Pacific, to think big when it comes to the future of the U.S.-
Korean alliance.
First, we must not shy away from having a real discussion
regarding the importance of South Korea's application for a
broader 123 Agreement on civilian nuclear energy. It is in our
own interest, in the best interest of the United States, to
enable Korea to develop a reliable source of domestic energy,
particularly given the positive impact on American jobs in our
own manufacturing sector. Korea has come a long way since the
Cold War and it is my strong conviction that we must negotiate
an agreement that reflects not only the current situation in
South Korea, but one that is flexible in the future.
Developing a closer, more integrated economic relationship
with South Korea is also in the best interest of the United
States. I dare say we in the U.S. can learn something from
Korea's intense focus on research and development, and its
continuing effort to deliver excellence in manufacturing.
Indeed, Korea's global brands are now at the forefront of the
marketplace and there is nothing wrong with developing a closer
partnership so that we can also benefit from their best
practices. This is why I believe we should issue more H-1B
visas so that highly-skilled professionals from South Korea can
work side-by-side with Americans to help propel America's
economy into the future.
Finally, I want to make clear my stance on an issue that is
very important to Koreans and Americans of Korean descent,
namely the issue of the East Sea. I believe it is important for
the United States not to take sides in a debate between Korea
and Japan. Both nations are close friends and allies of the
United States and we should honor both countries by saying once
and for all that both the name ``East Sea'' and ``Sea of
Japan'' should be used side-by-side.
The story of Korea is nothing short of a miracle when one
considers the progress the nation has made in the past 60
years. I recently traveled to Korea to examine for myself the
extent of Korea's development. Let me tell you, I was not only
impressed by the warmth of the Korean people, but I was blown
away at how advanced and refined that country is today. The
people of Korea have taken full advantage of the peace and
security guaranteed by the alliance to build a remarkable
nation.
As we celebrate the 60th anniversary of D-Day and the
sacrifices of the great generation, let us also take a moment
to recognize the sacrifices of Korean veterans on this
important occasion of Memorial Day in Korea. I now recognize
the ranking member for his opening statement.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you
for holding this hearing about the expanding U.S.-Korean
alliance and I commend the Obama administration for their
successful passage of the U.S.-Korean Free Trade Agreement
which will create about 70,000 jobs for American workers. The
U.S.-Korean Free Trade Agreement also promises to increase U.S.
gross domestic product somewhere between $11 billion to $20
billion in new U.S. exports annually.
It will also expand U.S. businesses' access to the $1
trillion South Korean market. For now, the U.S. continues to be
South Korea's third-largest trading partner and South Korea is
the United States seventh-largest trading partner. Two years
ago, trade between the U.S. and South Korea totaled over $86
billion. Given the historic nature of the passage of the U.S.-
Korean Free Trade Agreement last year, I want to publicly
acknowledge the grassroots efforts of Mr. Dong-Suk Kim, founder
and former president of the Korean-American Voters' Council.
Mr. Kim gathered Korean-American business leaders from all
over the country, urged Congress to pass the U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, and I applaud him for all that he has done for
increasing Korean voter turnout from less than 5 percent in
1996 to over 65 percent in 2008, and also for his work during
the 110th Congress, which led to the successful passage of
House Resolution 121; a resolution calling upon the Government
of Japan to issue a formal apology for the Imperial Armed
Forces coercion of some 200,000 Asian-Pacific young women into
sexual slavery during World War II.
Many of these young women were Korean. They are still
awaiting their apology from the Government of Japan.
Particularly, I want to thank my colleague, Congressman Mike
Honda of California, for introducing the legislation, and on a
bipartisan basis, the late Chairman Tom Lantos was also very
much a part of that legislative activity. Also want to thank
Mr. Tom Kim for his tireless efforts in representing the Korean
Embassy here in the United States. All of us know how hard Mr.
Kim had worked to garner support for the passage of this
legislation.
I especially commend Korea's Ambassador to the United
States. He is actually a former Prime Minister, Han Duck-soo,
for his leadership in resolving differences in getting the deal
done. Also want to express my appreciation for Chairman Kim
Seung-youn of the Hanwha Group who personally made the time to
visit Washington and rally support for passage of the U.S.-
Korean Free Trade Agreement. Once more, I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this hearing and I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses this afternoon.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. Congressman Kelly, do you have an
opening statement?
Mr. Kelly. I do, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding
this hearing. First of all, I think the relationship between
the United States and Korea could not be stronger. The Republic
is so strong with us right now. We have one of the strongest
relationships in that part of the world and I think the
passage, of course, is a good example of how we are working
closely and geopolitically, how important it is to the United
States and the Republic, and, Mr. Kim, thank you so much for
your tireless work on that. I appreciate it.
We also have another opportunity to strengthen our trade
partnership and advance national security interest in the area
of energy. In our second panel today, we are going to hear from
the Westinghouse Corporation. I got to tell you, after 40 years
of our really close partnership in nuclear energy, it is now
time to renew our 123 Agreement with Korea to strengthen our
cooperation in this area.
A solid 123 Agreement will create good jobs for Americans
in a key industry. I am talking about red, white, and blue
jobs. I am talking about evening the playing field for American
energy companies that are competing with foreign companies and
ensure American global leadership through energy exports with
strong domestic energy companies such as Westinghouse. So,
Chairman, I want to thank you. And again, this is very timely
with Memorial celebrations in Korea.
And this is a partner. The Republic has been a partner with
us since 1950 in every endeavor we have had militarily. They
don't wait for the call, they don't wait for somebody to say,
we need your help. They are there and they stay until it is
over. So I want to publicly thank you for that commitment and
you need to get that same commitment back from the United
States, and I think we can provide that for you. So, Mr.
Chairman, thank you so much.
Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, along with my
colleagues, will congratulate Tom Kim for all of his hard work
in regard to the relationship that we have with Korea. I don't
want to be redundant, but a lot of my colleagues here are too
young to remember the Korean War, but I remember it, and
millions of people had to be killed, or wounded, or left their
homes when the Communists invaded from the North, and when the
Chinese then came in as well.
And we, along with the United Nations' allies, fought and
made sure that South Korea remained free. And if you look at
that country after the decades since the Korean War, you see
what a great economic miracle that has taken place in South
Korea and you go just north of there to North Korea, we were
just up there on the 38th Parallel at Panmunjom just a couple
weeks ago, and there is no comparison. It is just a disaster.
You got a line here and on one side you have got complete
poverty, and tyranny, and dictatorship, and on the other side
you have got a miracle that took place since the war ended.
And as my colleagues both have had, or my others have said,
they have been a friend and an ally forever. We value that
friendship. We are committed and will remain committed, I hope,
as an ally and a supporter of Korea to make sure that we don't
see a revisiting of the Korean War. And I hope that 20, 25, 30
years from now our relationship has even grown stronger
economically as well as militarily. So thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for having this hearing and I really appreciate you yielding to
me.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think all of us
realize that South Korea has been a long ally, an important
ally, for the United States and I think relations between our
two countries stand to become even stronger as the benefits of
KORUS, as the benefits of this trade agreement, are realized. I
think passage of the legislation was historic and it is going
to bring benefits to both the American and Korean economies.
Unfortunately, it took years for the administration to act and
that allowed the European Union to gain a foothold in the
Korean market at the expense of U.S. businesses.
And I think that took away U.S. marketshare that won't be
easily regained. But now that the legislation is in force, this
is an important point. I would like to just speak for a minute
about another important challenge and that is North Korea,
because I think it is disappointing that we do not have a
proactive policy to change the regime in North Korea. Success
cannot be built on wishful thinking about a regime that has
shown a desire only to extract concessions from us and from
South Korea.
I think we need to make human rights a central part of our
agenda. This committee is long focused on the atrocities
carried out by the regime against its own people. We have heard
from numerous North Korean dissidents who have told us of
unspeakable cruelties that they have undergone themselves and I
am glad that South Korea has placed an even greater focus on
North Korean human rights as was evidenced by the massive
street demonstrations against China's repatriation of North
Korean refugees.
Human rights needs to be a centerpiece of this alliance and
we have yet to fully explore how we can push a human rights
agenda formed together with our South Korean ally. I think
working together with South Korea on this mission, given the
suffering that is occurring in the North, is very important. I
thank you and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. Our first witness is Deputy
Assistant Secretary James Zumwalt with the Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs. He previously served as the Embassy Tokyo
Deputy Chief of Mission. I met Jim in Beijing a few years ago
at the home of the Ambassador, when Ambassador Kelly had just
returned from the initial six party talks and briefed us there
at that time. Mr. Secretary, we look forward to your testimony.
Your testimony and the written testimony of all the other
witnesses will be made part of the record.
STATEMENT OF MR. JIM ZUMWALT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Zumwalt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted a
written statement for the record. Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Faleomavaega, members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to appear before you today to discuss our
relationship with the Republic of Korea. The alliance between
the United States and the Republic of Korea remains a lynchpin
of security and prosperity in Northeast Asia. This alliance has
never been stronger. It has served us well in countering the
threats from North Korea.
Before discussing our partnership with the Republic of
Korea, I would note that the greatest challenge our alliance
faces continues to be North Korea, and the United States is
fully committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea, and we
will continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder in the face of
North Korean provocation. We will continue to coordinate
closely with the Republic of Korea and other allies and
partners on North Korea policy.
We are committed to the de-nuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, but we also remain deeply concerned about the dire
human rights situation in North Korea. And I agree with the
members' comments that we need to work very closely with our
allies on addressing North Korean human rights issues.
The U.S.-Republic of Korea comprehensive strategic
partnership is based on our common values, our shared
interests, and trust built up over decades of cooperation. Our
common values of commitment to freedom, democracy, and the rule
of law, along with the close ties between the Korean and the
American peoples, form a foundation of an increasingly global
partnership between our two great nations.
The Republic of Korea embraces its role as one of the
world's wealthiest nations with the capacity and the
responsibility to contribute to resolving global problems. The
United States and the rest of the international community
benefit from Korea's growing global leadership and engagement.
Our bilateral ties are growing and deepening. In the last 3
months, our relationship marked three major milestones.
The first, as many of you mentioned, was the coming into
force of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. The second was
President Obama's third visit to Korea as President. And the
third was the Republic of Korea cementing its status as a
country with global interests when it hosted more than 50 world
leaders for the 2012 Nuclear Securities Summit.
The United States and the Republic of Korea already enjoy
one of the world's most vibrant economic relationships. The
entry into force of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement will
lead to even more trade and investment between our two
countries. Extensive people-to-people relations, including
robust flows of Korean travelers and Korean students to the
Untied States, form a strong base for our bilateral
relationship. Recent polling shows that 72 percent of Koreans
hold favorable views of the United States and an even larger
number see the alliance as strong.
In closing, I would like to mention that we announced
yesterday that the United States will host the second ever
meeting of our foreign and defense ministers in Washington on
June 14th. This meeting will enhance our solidarity as our
alliance takes on an increasingly global scope. This so-called
two-plus-two dialog among Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Gates, Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung Hwan and Korean Defense
Minister Kim Kwan Jin, will even further strengthen our
alliance, advance our partnership on a broad range of global
and regional issues, and enhance our close coordination on
North Korea.
Thank you for inviting me to testify on this important
topic. Congressional support for the Republic of Korea and for
our alliance and partnership has been critical to the success
of our relationship. I look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zumwalf follows:]
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Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Could you inform us of the status of the administration's
negotiations with South Korea regarding civilian nuclear
cooperation and what happens if an agreement cannot be reached
by 2014 when the current 123 Agreement expires?
Mr. Zumwalt. As you mentioned, we are talking with the
Republic of Korea about a successor agreement on civil nuclear
cooperation and I agree with you that negotiating,
successfully, a successor agreement is very critical and we
share the desire to see a vibrant South Korean civil nuclear
industry. And there are several reasons for that; one, of
course, we want to see Korea's economy prosper, but also, the
U.S. nuclear industry is very closely tied with counterparts in
South Korea, so the success of South Korea's civilian nuclear
industry is also a success for the United States.
And a good example of that was when South Korea
successfully got a contract to export nuclear reactors in the
Persian Gulf and that Korean proposal included many components
manufactured here in the United States. So this was an example
of how success in the South Korean nuclear industry really is a
win-win; a win, also, for the United States. So we share that
goal to negotiate a successor agreement that will lead to
Korea's nuclear industry continuing to prosper.
We also, of course, and South Korea shares this concern
with us, have concerns about proliferation of material that
could be used in manufacturing nuclear weapons. So we are now
in the process of negotiating an agreement that will meet both
of these objectives at the same time. We are in the middle of a
negotiation. I hesitate, a little bit, to answer your question
about what would happen if we fail because we don't plan on
failing. We plan on succeeding and I think, right now, all of
our attention is on negotiating an agreement that will be a
worthy successor to the agreement we presently have.
Mr. Manzullo. Let me rephrase that second question. If the
agreement expires on its own in 2014, what is the impact of
that?
Mr. Zumwalt. Yes. I think we agree that having a successor
agreement is very important and so our intention on both sides,
I think, is to negotiate so that we can have an agreement and
we realize that time is short, so we need to work on this very
closely. But success is very important to the United States and
important to Korea.
Mr. Manzullo. Congressman Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony this afternoon. It
is quite obvious, Mr. Secretary, that we cannot talk about
U.S.-Korean relations without also including North Korea. A
couple of months ago we had a hearing on the situation dealing
with North Korea. We had all kinds of experts that came and
testified and how well they were very familiar with the
situation in North Korea, and what we should do, and what the
other countries should do, but no one ever mentioned the fact
that maybe we ought to consult, also, with South Korea as part
of the equation and the problems that we are faced with.
And let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, is the administration
seriously consulting with South Korea on all aspects dealing
with the Korean Peninsula?
Mr. Zumwalt. Cooperation with regional partners is very,
very important and I agree with you completely that it is very
important for us to consult closely with South Korea, also with
Japan, China, Russia, and other countries on North Korea. We do
consult very closely, in fact, Chairman Manzullo, when you were
in Seoul, actually, I was there as well with Ambassador Glyn
Davies, our special envoy for North Korea, who was meeting in
Seoul with Korean and Japanese counterparts for a trilateral
discussion on what we should do regarding North Korea.
He went on to Beijing and then on to Tokyo as well.
Ambassador Robert King, our Ambassador for North Korea human
rights issues, was just in Brussels for meetings with friends
on North Korea human rights issues and his counterparts from
Republic of Korea, from Japan, and other places, had good
discussions----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Secretary, I didn't mean to interrupt
your statement, but I just want to cut to the chase of what I
am trying to say expressing my sense of concern. There is a
feeling amongst some of our Asian allies that we do things but
sometimes they don't seem to be consulted fully as an equal
partner in the process. I remember years ago when there was a
big debate in the Philippines whether or not we should continue
having Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, and guess what, the
Philippine Senate decided not to have us around because they
felt our real purpose for being in the Philippines was to
provide the strategic and military capability to defend Japan
and not necessarily the Philippines.
So I just wanted to get to that idea. Are we really serious
in looking at South Korea as a co-equal partner in the process,
and not only at our convenience, and not seriously as a co-
equal? That is the basis of what I am trying to suggest to you
or ask you here with this question. Are we serious? Is South
Korea an equal partner in the process?
Mr. Zumwalt. Thank you for that clarification. I agree with
you that we need to consult very closely with our friends and
counterparts in the Republic of Korea about North Korea policy.
The next opportunity for us to do so will be next week when the
Korean foreign and defense ministers come to Washington for
meetings with Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. And one of
the main things we will be talking about is our policy----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Secretary Gates? Is he still----
Mr. Zumwalt. Sorry. Excuse me. Secretary Panetta. Excuse
me. So that will be the next opportunity for us to have these
consultations. But I agree with you completely that full and
complete consultations with our counterparts in the Republic of
Korea is very important as we address North Korea.
Mr. Faleomavaega. The question about the six party talks,
and quite obviously, it hasn't gotten anywhere. Do you think
that perhaps the negotiation process should actually involve
China, the United States, North and South Korea? Why is Japan
and Russia included in the process? Do they have a, literally,
direct interest in this process? It seems to me that North
Korea really wants to deal more with China and the United
States, and as well as with South Korea. Why include Russia and
Japan in the process?
Correct me if I am wrong, but would you say that the six
party talk has been a failure? Why do we continue if it is a
failure?
Mr. Zumwalt. I think we are all very frustrated with our
lack of progress in talking with North Korea about seeking a
different path, but we remain determined. If North Korea
chooses a different approach, we remain prepared to engage with
North Korea. But really, the problem is not Russia or Japan, or
including certain people, the problem really has been in North
Korea. And so I think our attempt has been to engage regional
partners----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Secretary, I hate to interrupt you.
My time is about ready to go and I just want to say to the
chairman as a matter of observation. How do you de-nuclearize a
country that is already nuclear? I just want to leave that with
question. Okay? Because my time is up. I am sorry. I yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Manzullo. You are not going to attempt to answer that
question, so I will go on to Congressman Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Zumwalt, I know the
implementation of the course was a big accomplishment. I think
it took much too long, but we can't do anything about what
happened before. So the implementation right now, is it going
smoothly and is it improving the relationships that we needed
to have with the Korean people?
Because I know in the elections, it hurt the conservative
party, the fact that we couldn't get there quicker to the
agreement, and so since the implementation now, just kind of
give us a thumbnail sketch of what you see happening and the
State Department working with South Korea to make sure that we
get the maximum benefit for both countries out of that
agreement.
Mr. Zumwalt. I think implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free
Trade Agreement is a very important issue going forward because
we want to make sure that both sides get the benefits that were
promised from this agreement. We have a system setup whereby
there is an oversight committee looking at problems with
implementation and the first meeting of that, which was chaired
by U.S. Trade Representative Kirk here in Washington, occurred
just last month.
And actually, this week, we have three committees looking
at various issues regarding implementation. All reports are, so
far, the implementation is going well. But another issue in
addition to implementation, obviously, is making sure that the
benefits of the agreement are understood by the business
communities in both countries. And so one other area we want to
work on very closely is making sure that U.S. companies
understand the benefits and can take advantage of the benefits
that KORUS implementation will make available to them.
Mr. Kelly. And I understand the relationship we are
developing. Is there anything else you think we can do? Is
there anything that State Department is looking at? Anything
else, other than what you have already talked about? I know
that that was a tough hurdle to get over and really, it was our
dragging our feet on it that caused the problem in the
Republic. So I like the fact that we the have open dialog, but
the opportunities are really off the charts for job creation in
both countries and that region of the world.
It is just really, with a lot of emerging economies, we
have a tremendous opportunity right now.
Mr. Zumwalt. I agree with you. We do have a tremendous
opportunity. Another area where I think the U.S. economy will
benefit is, I think we will be successful at attracting
additional investment into the United States because of the
additional opportunities that KORUS provides. I was just
talking with a third-country company and they are investing in
pork production in the United States, partly to export to their
home market, but also, they see the benefits of KORUS, and see,
potentially, the U.S. as a place from which to export to Korea
as well. So I think there will be benefits, also, in the area
of investment as well as trade.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. Excellent. Thank you. I am going to yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. You know, I sometimes wonder why we even talk
to these guys. We talked years ago with Mengistu in Ethiopia, I
don't know if you remember him or not, and we sent truckloads,
tons, and tons, and tons of food, and he couldn't distribute
the food to the people who were starving to death there. Well,
he could, but he didn't. So because he couldn't distribute it
the way he wanted to, we gave him the trucks to distribute the
food, and then he sold it, and the people just starved. You
can't trust these tin-horn dictators.
And what really bothers me about our negotiations with
South Korea is like that--or North Korea rather, this food aid
program that we had last year. It smacks of the same thing. You
give them the food aid, and it goes through the government, and
Lord only knows where it goes; certainly, probably doesn't get
to the people it is intended to help. And these negotiations
with them really bothers me.
You know, back in the Clinton administration, we negotiated
with them on some nuclear reactors and they were going to
curtail their nuclear program and they didn't. They lied again.
And we keep negotiating with them. I just don't understand it.
It seems like we ought to draw a line in the sand and say, this
is it. We are not going to negotiate anymore. Here is what you
got to do and if you don't want to do it, you know, you take
the initiative and we will respond, and we will respond very
strongly.
But it seems like that is the way politicians and leaders
do anymore. We negotiate, negotiate, negotiate, like
Chamberlain, until something like 50 million or 60 million
people get killed, then we say, oops, we made a little mistake
there. You can't negotiate with these dictators; these tyrants.
You got to let them know that you are not going to go any
further with them.
And then North Korea, with their new constitution, this
revised constitution which proclaims their country as a nuclear
armed nation. They no longer try to veil it. They are now
saying, we are a nuclear armed nation. So this facade that we
have dealt with all these years that they were going to start
cutting back on their nuclear program was just a wasted amount
of time.
So let me just ask one question, I don't have a lot, I have
already got my opinions made, so you are not going to change
them, I don't think. I don't like those Communists. I never
have. I think they destroy everything, but have we thought
about, and some people have talked about this, or have we
talked to anybody in the South Korean Government about us
putting some of our nuclear weapons on the South Korean
Peninsula as a deterrent, under our control, or have we
negotiated with them at all in their potential ability to
develop weapons of their own?
I just like to know what the administration's position is
on that and what you think about it.
Mr. Zumwalt. Thank you very much and I realize I may not
change your mind, but I would agree with you that we don't want
to talk to North Korea just for the sake of talk. And so,
unless we see a change of policy on the part of North Korea, we
are not interested in negotiations just for the sake of a
negotiation. So I would agree with that comment. Concerning the
deterrent, one of the purposes of our alliance is to deter
North Korean provocation. And obviously, the deterrent that we
provide, including the full range of possibilities on the part
of the U.S., is very important to us.
I don't believe we have had discussions about nuclear
weapons on the Peninsula because I think the deterrent and the
commitment we have made to South Korea is very clear, and we
are able to meet our security alliance commitments with the
present array that we now have. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Make one more comment real quick. We have been
talking to, off and on, the tyrants in Tehran, and it isn't
working, and it is not going to work. They just buy more time.
And I can't remember any place where we worked and talked with
tyrants we ever achieved a great deal and I don't think we are
going to there either. I think at some point you have to show
strength and just say, hey, that is it. You want to mess with
us, you are going to be in big trouble. I know that is a hard
line and I know that most people wouldn't agree with that.
I mean, you have got to be diplomatic. I just don't think
it is going to work.
Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things that
is changing in North Korea are the attitudes of people as a
result of watching the DVDs, this influx of DVDs that you have
heard about, and that brings up this issue of public diplomacy.
As people watch these South Korean DVDs, we already here the
reports from studies that show the North Korean Government now
has to back away from the--you know, they say, well, you live
in a worker's paradise and everything is really, really bad in
South Korea.
And now, people know that that is the opposite of being
true. They know that things are really rough. I have been in
North Korea. Things are really rough in North Korea, but in
South Korea, the standard of living is quite high. And so it
shatters the myth and this gives people second thoughts about
the regime they are living in. And they are also, of course,
learning about what is going on in China, the changes in China,
but the hermit kingdom is not going through any of this.
How can we better use technology to bring information to
North Koreans? I know that Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel both
said that it was the radio broadcasts that they and their
people were listening to in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, that
created this change in attitude where, after some months of
sort of changed approach that occurred under the Reagan
administration, the reports back that I have gotten from those
that were involved at the time were that, people just changed
their attitude, and it was time for change, and time for
evolution. How do we tap into that?
Mr. Zumwalt. I agree with you that the more contact that
citizens in North Korea have with the outside world, the more
likely that you will see change occurring. You had mentioned
the advent of DVDs and people watching DVDs. I think two other
noteworthy developments are the increase in the use of cell
phones, some of which have some contacts with ethnic Koreans
living in China, for example. And the other important vehicle
may be medium-wave radio broadcasting and----
Mr. Royce. And RFA and VOA, we need to do more in terms of
medium-wave and we need to be a little more provocative,
because if you will notice, we changed our approach in Eastern
Europe when we decided it was time to really let people know
the truth about what was going on and to try to change those
regimes.
And with all the information we are getting from defectors
now about conditions in the concentration camps, or work camps,
whatever you want to call them, getting that information about
the regime in real time, and the mistakes being made by the
regime, as kind of a surrogate news broadcasting service, is
really crucial in terms of waking people up about the
conditions they are living under, and the opportunity to change
those conditions.
I am not just talking about people who are farmers. It has
a marked impact on civil service and on the military. I have
talked to colonels who have defected and senior civil service
who have defected as a result of listening to these broadcasts.
But it takes a certain change in attitude about what we are
going to be willing to push and it takes using ex-pats from
North Korea and getting them, like Mr. Shin, up on the air
talking about what they have experienced and contrasting that
with what they are seeing with their eyes in China and South
Korea today in order to get people to recalibrate their
thinking. Could more of that be done?
Mr. Zumwalt. I think you point out a very good opportunity,
both government broadcast, like VOA, but also, as you point
out, they are in South Korea. There are many non-governmental
organizations who are also doing broadcasts about information
from North Korea. And so I think both of those avenues are very
important and things that we should continue to support.
Mr. Royce. And how could you help advance that?
Mr. Zumwalt. I think, obviously, that is a very important
area that we need to consider how we can advance more because I
do think that radio broadcasting is one of the most promising
channels for getting more information to people inside North
Korea.
Mr. Royce. Yes. Maybe we can talk later about some
additional ideas. Maybe you all could come up with some. Maybe
go back and talk to some of the people that handled Eastern
Europe, and see how they did it, and come up, maybe, with a
little bit more aggressive plan for communication with people,
and for more DVDs; ways to get those into the country in order
to enlighten people in North Korea. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Mr. Royce. Thank you, Secretary
Zumwalt; I appreciate it.
If we could have the staff get the next three witnesses and
while they are being seated I am going to read their
biographies. Dr. Victor Cha is Director of Asian Studies, holds
the D.S. Song Chair in the Department of Government and School
of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. In 2009, he was
named as senior advisor and the inaugural holder of the new
Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington.
He left the White House in May of 2007 after serving as
Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council
since 2004. At the White House, he was responsible, primarily,
for Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Australia, New Zealand, and
the Pacific Islands national affairs. Dr. Cha is also the
Deputy Head of Delegation for the U.S. at the six-party talks
in Beijing and received two outstanding service commendations
during his tenure at the NSC.
Mr. Dan Lipman assumed his position in September 2009 as
senior vice president of operation support at Westinghouse
Electric Company. He's responsible for corporate operating
groups, which includes the global supply chain, quality
assurance, and continuous improvement, IT, corporate strategy,
risk management, environmental health and safety,
sustainability, and anything else that has to be done at
Westhinghouse. From 2005 to 2009, Mr. Lipman served as senior
V.P. of nuclear power plants, responsible for managing the
global deployment of new power plants. He has served as
president of Westinghouse Asia, with regional duties for China,
South Korea, and Taiwan.
Dr. Mark Peters is the deputy laboratory director for
programs at Argonne National Laboratories. His responsibilities
include management and integration of the lab's science and
technology portfolios, strategic planning, the Laboratory
Directed Research and Development program, and technology
transfer. His duties also include technical support to the
Department of Energy Fuel Cycle R&D Program, where he was
previously national technical director for used fuel
disposition.
Prior to his current position, Dr. Peters served as the
deputy associate lab director for the Energy Sciences and
Engineering Directorate. The responsibilities of this position
included the management and integration of the lab's energy R&D
portfolio.
We are going to start with Dr. Cha. Dr. Cha, I understand
you have a train that leaves at 4 o'clock, and so any time that
you want to leave to catch that train you can feel free to get
up and leave. How does that sound? Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF VICTOR CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (FORMER DIRECTOR FOR ASIAN
AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL)
Mr. Cha. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Faleomavaega, members of the committee, it is an honor to be
here with you today. I have submitted a statement for the
record and I will offer a brief summary of my remarks. I have
testified before this committee before, and I would say without
hesitation, the challenges of dealing with Korea remain quite
difficult. But in terms of the alliance, which we are here to
talk about today, as you have said, it is at an all-time high.
The relationship between the Presidents could not be any
better.
The tone in the relationship is very good, but it is not
just the personalities that are involved, it is the issues.
South Korea has really stepped up to be a global player,
whether the issues have to do with climate change, or non-
proliferation, or overseas development assistance. Korea has
really become a big player and that has been very important for
the overall relationship. The North Korea threat has also
brought the two leaders much closer together and the two
governments much closer together.
With regard to the future, I would hazard a guess as to say
that, you know, with elections, we have elections here, but
there are also elections in Korea. Congressman, you were there
a couple of weeks ago and saw what the atmosphere was like over
there; quite intense politically. But I think in terms of the
overall alliance relationship, it is going to be okay. I think
the outer bounds, whether it is the progressives or the
conservatives that get elected, the outer bounds of the agendas
in which the two sides could go, I think, has narrowed quite a
bit and moved much more to the center.
The tone won't be as superlative as it is today and I think
that is just politics. As a new administration comes in they
are going to want to distance themselves from the previous
administration, so the tone will go back to normal, but
overall, I think it will be okay. Having said this, I do think
we need to think about a new framework for the alliance as we
go forward.
I was in Seoul a couple of weeks ago, as you were in Seoul
a couple of weeks ago, and the South Koreans were pressing on
issues, but they are outside of a broader framework. And I
think we really need to think about the broader framework as we
contextualize these different negotiations. So what I would
offer; three things.
The first is, I think we need to think about this alliance
in terms of its global scope. The U.S. and Korea not only deal
with issues on the Peninsula, they operate in the world
globally, and both of them contribute to the public goods of
the international system, whether that is climate change, G-20,
nuclear security, proliferation security initiative, all these
sorts of things, Korea and the United States are working
together. And I think it is in this context that they should
work together and think about how they can, together, help to
promote a global civil nuclear energy regime that is
transparent, that is accountable, but one in which South Korea
can be a leading supplier of global nuclear energy.
Second would be the regional role. And here, the alliance
and its main mandate is try to shape a region in which China
will make the right choices. South Korea, in many ways, is the
frontline state. It is the only real ally of the United States
that is connected to the continent and Asia has always been a
maritime relationship and a continental relationship. And Korea
has always been sort of the frontline continental state for us.
In that sense, it is critical. And so I think in this regard,
it is very important for the United States and Korea to work
with Japan, the three countries together, in terms of shaping
an environment that helps to make China make the right choices.
Specifically here, more cooperation between Japan and Korea
on certain security agreements that they are now working on, a
military information sharing agreement, and a couple of other
agreements that should be finished, because I think that is
good for both countries as well as good for the United States.
Finally, the third aspect would be the Peninsula scope of
the alliance. And here, the critical issue, of course, is how
the alliance deals with a nuclear North Korea. It is a U.S.
responsibility that as it goes through military transformation
on the Peninsula, to create a force presence and an alliance
that fits with dealing with the new challenge of a nuclear
North Korea. And again, it is in this context that I think the
United States and Korea should look at the NMG, the new missile
guidelines, and come up with a solution that will help to
enforce and ensure deterrence on the Peninsula to deter a
nuclear North Korea. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cha follows:]
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Mr. Manzullo. Congressman Faleomavaega. Oh, I am sorry.
Forgive me.
Mr. Lipman.
STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL S. LIPMAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Mr. Lipman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Faleomavaega,
members of the subcommittee, and of course, subcommittee staff.
I am pleased to be here today. Unlike Dr. Cha, this is my first
time testifying before Congress, so forgive me in advance if I
am a little tense. I would say that I am not at all anxious,
however, in forthrightly testifying in support of the U.S.-
Korean 123 Agreement. I consider it a vital part of the
strategic relationship with benefits that, of course, relate to
jobs, but also, in the areas of nuclear safety and strategic
partnership.
It is important that we allow this 30-year technical
cooperation to continue uninterrupted. I think commercial
nuclear trade between our two countries has been very
significant. Nineteen of the 23 reactors in Korea are based on
Westinghouse technology. I find it helpful to characterize the
nuclear trade in, sort of, three main areas. The first would be
exports that come directly from the United States to Korea.
That has been a very healthy export trade.
The second area that has really emerged, only in the last
decade, have been Korean exports into the American nuclear
program. I know you are aware of nuclear power plants being
built now in South Carolina and the State of Georgia. Those do
have many manufactured goods, large nuclear components, that
are fabricated in Korea. A very important part of the nuclear
renaissance is our partnership with Korea and Korean companies.
And the third aspect is something that was touched on
before, it is kind of new twist in the relationship, and it
involves third countries. So this would be countries other than
Korea and the United States where we partner with Korean
companies to take advantage and derive value out of those
export markets. Deputy Assistant Secretary Zumwalt mentioned
the United Arab Emirates. That was a contract won by KEPCO, but
there is very significant American scope in that contract in
the United Arab Emirates.
There are approximately 1500 full-time jobs in 14 different
states involved in manufacturing, and engineering, and other
technical jobs that will continue for 6 or 7 years. To me, that
is a trade and a value worth keeping.
Finally, I think one other impact well beyond the trade
agenda has to do with nuclear safety. This is a non-partisan
issue. Certainly, in the post-Fukushima environment, nuclear
safety is on the top of everyone's agenda. And really, allowing
Korea, but also other markets, access and continued access to
American nuclear technology, which in my view, is the most
advanced, the safest, with the best operating practices, is
something that is very important to continue to reinforce.
In summary, I think the 123 Agreement is something that
needs to be focused on, that needs to be expeditiously
negotiated in Korea, and of course, I think this subcommittee
will hear, in the coming months and year, about other nuclear
cooperation agreements in the region as well. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipman follows:]
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Mr. Manzullo. Thank you.
Dr. Peters.
STATEMENT OF MARK PETERS, PH.D., DEPUTY LABORATORY DIRECTOR FOR
PROGRAMS, ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Chairman Manzullo, Ranking Member
Faleomavaega, and the distinguished members of this
subcommittee for your invitation to testify here today. My name
is Mark Peters and I am the Deputy Laboratory Director for
Programs at Argonne National Laboratory, however, today I am
speaking on behalf of the American Nuclear Society. Mr.
Chairman, I ask that my full written testimony be entered into
the record and I will summarize it briefly here.
I appreciate this opportunity to present the views of the
American Nuclear Society, or ANS, on used nuclear fuel
recycling as a means to achieve an integrated solution to
energy and waste management policy. The ANS is a not-for-profit
international scientific and educational organization with
nearly 12,000 members worldwide; our core purpose being to
promote awareness and understanding of the application of
nuclear science and technology.
We also wish to acknowledge our longstanding professional
collaboration with the Korean Nuclear Society. For more than 40
years, our two organizations have worked together to promote
the safe and secure use of nuclear technology and materials.
For decades, the United States has grappled with the multiple
challenges of crafting a long-term solution for the management
of used nuclear fuel. These persistent challenges have taken on
new urgency in the wake of the accident at Japan's Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which has focused international
attention on used nuclear fuel storage.
Although the challenges of waste management require close
scrutiny, these issues are most effectively considered within
the context of a integrated policy for nuclear energy and
nuclear waste management. Unfortunately, the United States is
unique in its lack of such an integrated policy. Most other
nations that rely on nuclear energy, including France, Russia,
China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, have policies in
place, or a plan, that promote development of used fuel
recycling and advanced fast reactors in order to ensure the
long-term sustainability of their nuclear investments.
We must consider our nuclear energy technology
collaborations and partnerships within this global context. At
present, the United States' strategic investments in advanced
nuclear energy technologies are lagging. As a result, we rely
increasingly on collaborative arrangements with foreign
research institutions to conduct research in these areas. These
collaborations provide advantages to both parties and the
United States has benefitted from them.
However, close alignment between the government and nuclear
industries in these nations speeds the international deployment
of these cooperatively developed technologies, such as used
fuel recycling and fast reactor technologies, while the United
States has moved much slowly in its option. The Republic of
Korea has publicly expressed its interest in incorporating
electrometallurgical reprocessing technology, commonly known as
pyroprocessing, into its long-term nuclear fuel cycle plans.
Pyroprocessing offers several potential benefits over current
aqueous recycling techniques, such as the PUREX process being
used in France and Japan today.
These include the ability to recover minor actinides, which
otherwise contribute significantly to long-term radiotoxicity
in used nuclear fuel, fewer releases of fission gases in
tritium, and the lack of production of pure plutonium, which,
with proper integration of safeguards, helps to address
proliferation concerns. Clearly, there will be engineering
challenges inherent in the development of pyroprocessing
technology, as there are with any advanced manufacturing
process. However, these challenges can be addressed through
joint research and development activities, and solving these
challenges will have important implications for the United
States as well as the Republic of Korea.
The American Nuclear Society believes that nuclear fuel
recycling has the potential to reclaim much of the residual
energy in used fuel currently in storage as well as used fuel
that will be produced in the future, and that recycling offers
a proven alternative to direct disposal of used fuel in a
geologic repository. In other nations, recycling nuclear fuel
with proper safeguards and materials controls, under the
auspices of the IAEA, has demonstrated that high-level waste
volumes can be reduced safely and securely while improving the
sustainability of energy resources.
It is the opinion of the ANS that the United States should
begin planning a thoughtful and orderly transition to nuclear
fuel recycling in parallel with the development of a geologic
repository. Recycling would enhance the repository's
efficiency, eliminating the need for more complex and expensive
engineering barriers, and reducing the time frame of concern
from more than 100,000 years to a few hundred years. The ANS
also believes that the United States should accelerate
development of fast spectrum reactors, which are uniquely
capable of generating energy while consuming long-lived waste.
Six decades ago on December 20, 1951, scientists and
engineers from Argonne National Laboratory started a small
electrical power generator attached to an experimental fast
reactor, creating enough energy to power four 200 watt
electrical bulbs. That historic achievement demonstrated the
peaceful use of nuclear energy and launched today's global
commercial nuclear industry. It should not be overlooked that
the first electricity generated through nuclear energy was
produced using a fast reactor.
In closing, let me reiterate that the ANS believes that
nuclear energy has a significant role to play in meeting the
global energy demands of the 21st century and the global
expansion of nuclear energy can be achieved safely and
securely. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Peters follows:]
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Mr. Manzullo. Thank you.
Now we are ready for Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Cha, I noted
with interest you made a very interesting observation about
thinking outside the box as you had suggested. And you
mentioned three areas about global scope of the U.S.-Korean
alliance, the importance of, also, the regional geopolitical
impetus of this whole thing, am I correct in reading that,
currently, our South Korean neighbors are only allowed to fire
missiles that can go only a distance of 123-something miles,
and in the meantime, North Korea is capable now of firing
missiles that can 2500 miles?
Our we willing to help South Korea to give a deterrent
capability in that regard or is South Korea totally dependent
on the U.S. for its security as well? I am a little fuzzy on
this.
Mr. Cha. Well, thank you for the question. I think that it
is a difficult issue between the two countries. It is a
difficult negotiation right now. And I think the South Koreans
do feel like, as you said, with the North Koreans pushing for
missiles in ranges of 2000, 3000 kilometers, the South Koreans
are limited by MTCR guidelines and seek some sort of exception
to that, not that they would export, but for their own defense
and deterrence. And so it is a problem in the sense that South
Korea wants a credible deterrent. As they move to OPCON
transition in 2015, they want a credible deterrent against
North Korea.
You know, I think the problem right now is that the issue
is just, we are at the end of two administrations, and so the
two sides are fighting over issues without putting them in a
broader contextual frame work, and I think that is what we
really need right now if we are going to move forward on NMG
guidelines between the two countries.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I had raised the question earlier with
Secretary Zumwalt about the idea that sometimes we have become
a little paternalistic, or what is another word, patronizing,
that we don't really share in a way that our Asian allies feel
that we are truly co-partners rather than just someone lesser.
The idea that we tend, sometimes, to talk down to these people
and not say, hey, you are just as important as we are. And am I
correct in, right now, the sense of the Korean people that, if
I am correct, 63 percent of the people said they are sick and
tired of the intimidations they get from North Korea and just,
somehow, they are not able to return the favor, so to speak, if
they keep making this intimidating conduct against the people
of South Korea. What do you think of that?
Mr. Cha. Well, I think at a military level, if there is
another North Korean provocation there is no doubt in my mind
that this time the South Korean military will respond
kinetically, point of origin, supporting systems and maybe even
command systems. I mean, I think after the events of 2010, it
is pretty clear that is what they are going to do. And so they
have a response to the next North Korean provocation, but for
various reasons, they feel the need to do things new on the
Peninsula that enhances their deterrence as the North Koreans
continue to push for more nuclear capabilities and more long-
range missile capabilities.
So in that sense, it is an understandable demand on the
part of the South Koreans. I think that one of the problems is,
is that, from a U.S. perspective, we want to see them, if they
want to have this capability they have to also have some of the
bridging capabilities in terms of intelligence, ISR, C4I,
command and control capabilities that would allow them to
efficiently operate these systems, and that if they were to
have such systems, they should be under some sort of joint,
sort of, command and control guidelines between the U.S. and
ROK within the alliance.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Lipman, I am interested that you
mentioned something about nuclear safety, and I am very
curious, how many nuclear reactors has Westinghouse built for
Japan as well as with South Korea; if there is that data
available?
Mr. Lipman. The earliest Japanese nuclear power plants that
were pressurized water reactors were built by Westinghouse
directly. Soon thereafter, that would be in the 1970s and '80s,
the Japanese began to take a Westinghouse design, Kansai
Electric Power Company----
Mr. Faleomavaega. I hate to interrupt you, but my time is
killing me. I just wanted to make an observation. We are
concerned about nuclear safety if we are to export in South
Korea, but isn't it just as important an issue that we can't
even find a place to put our own nuclear waste? Yucca Mountain
in Nevada and all the issues that we spent a $100 billion in
setting up this Yucca Mountain that we can't even export
nuclear waste to. Isn't that a very serious issue even within
our own country?
Mr. Lipman. I think, certainly, the U.S. domestic nuclear
program would benefit greatly if there were a waste repository
in America, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I just
wanted to mention to Dr. Peters, you have Three Mile Island,
you have got Chernobyl, you got Fukushima, and I wanted to ask
ten more questions about that, but I will forego my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Chairman. And I want to direct most
of my questions to Mr. Lipman because I am very familiar with
Westinghouse. In fact, I have some slides that I would like
people to take a look at. This is an area in Western
Pennsylvania. I think the footprint is about 104 acres, 105
acres, Mr. Lipman, and if you were to see it today, and I think
we can show it today, what the end product was, this is the new
Westinghouse facility in Cranberry Township just north of
Pittsburgh.
And so my point is, we talk about the global economy, we
talk about global opportunities, we talk about our energy
strategy, we talk about all these things, but I think to the
average American, they don't understand what we are talking
about because opportunity is only there for so long and you
either win the prize or you come in second, and nobody gets an
award for second place. So, Mr. Lipman, I have watched
Westinghouse over the years, and the impact that it has had,
and the global opportunities. And in a country that now is so
desperately looking for jobs and looking for opportunities.
Maybe you can just take a few minutes to tell people the
importance of our relationship with the Republic of Korea, and
the expiration of Section 123, and the fact that it takes so
long for us to get things done, and time is of the essence. And
I would agree that, you know, it is good to talk about it, and
it is good to vet it, and it is good to get it out there for
everybody to have a chance to talk, but in the meantime, you
don't compete--I am an automobile dealer, so I compete against
the guy next door to me, or the guy down the street, you
compete against countries.
Your company, Westinghouse, competes against Russia,
competes against France, and until we begin to understand the
relationship that we better start to have, and understand who
it is that we are competing against, because quite frankly, I
don't want to be in a fair fight with anybody. I want to make
sure that we win and we have everything right now at our
disposal. If you could just talk a little bit about
Westinghouse, and what Westinghouse has done, and the
tremendous global opportunities for a country that is aware and
has a strategy to aggressively go after what is out there.
Mr. Lipman. Thank you, Congressman. And in fact, those
pictures you saw, it dawned on me that, we built that
headquarters because we beat the Russians and we beat the
French in an open competition in China, okay? We would not have
built that facility, we would not have moved, and we would not
have hired several thousand new employees, both young folks and
mid-career folks, had we not won in China. And the point that
you make is germane, not just to Westinghouse, Congressman, but
to all of the nuclear industry, which is, we can never forget
that, as private companies in America, this is, what I would
simply call, smashmouth international competition.
We are against the Russians. We are against the French. We
will be against the Chinese some day. And everything that we
can do as a country to coordinate our international export
policies, to put in place concerted government effort for
advocacy in these export markets, to leverage our technology,
to put in place these agreements, not just this Korea
agreement, but the other agreements to which I referred, which
may be coming up in front of this subcommittee for Taiwan, for
Malaysia, for Vietnam, the latter two being new markets,
getting in place an export control policy, which is the purview
of the Department of Energy, that is not as complex, that makes
it easy for American companies to participate, and also,
supporting nuclear liability regimes for insurance and so
forth.
This is a global nuclear industry. This is not like the
Cold War where two countries had nuclear power and basically
could sell and stipulate conditions whenever and to whomever
they wished. This is a highly dynamic market. If this agreement
is allowed to lapse, or if we cannot conclude agreements with
other countries for one reason or another, other countries will
step in and take that. It will be like taking food out of our
mouths.
And so the kinds of policies that we need involve
significant U.S. Government coordination, the use of financing
and other strategies, and the best advocacy that we can put
together or we won't be having that kind of economic
development in this country. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly. I appreciate your comments, but listen, we are
in a battle, globally, and would you want to just explain the
global market to Westinghouse. Where is your market right now;
percentage-wise?
Mr. Lipman. Sure. We have gone from being a, what I would
say, purely domestically-oriented company where 80 percent of
our work was derived here in the United States to we are
approaching just the converse. That is to say, three quarters
to 80 percent of our business come from outside the United
States, by the way, not all in new plants, but we sell nuclear
fuel. We provide nuclear services and engineering in Europe,
and Latin America, and in other parts of Asia, and frankly,
that is where the growth is going to be.
The growth in electricity demand is much more outside the
United States, sir, than inside. And any company wants to
position itself to where the market growth is. So this is
really about international competition and international growth
driving the health of American companies.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. Thank you. And we are much too close to
midnight to debate this much longer. We have got to get this
taken care of, and get the 123 back on the board and ready to
go. Thank you so much. Could I have time? Is that possible?
Mr. Manzullo. I will recognize Mr. Burton then you can
yield.
Mr. Burton. I would be happy to yield some time to my
colleague.
Mr. Kelly. Well, I appreciate that because, again, and I
apologize to the other two witnesses, but a lot of times we
talk down here. And the talk that we have may make sense to
very few people in the room because that is what you do every
day, but the American people are looking for jobs right now.
And we are looking for jobs everywhere possible and we are
looking for markets that are open to us and that we can lead
in. And I really think when you talk about nuclear safety, when
you set the pace, you also set the standard. And so the rest of
the world has to keep pace with you.
They can't come out with an inferior product and say, well,
we are going go ahead and push this out. So I think the
criticalness of everything that we are doing right now and the
alliance that we have, right now, with South Korea is so
critical both from a business standpoint and a geopolitical
standpoint, and my worry, constantly, is that sometimes we miss
the bigger picture. We concentrate on one small thing and we
think, this is the thing that really is the driver behind it
and we forget about where our success would be, and it is the
world. It is the world.
And domestically, I think we have kind of looked beyond
that, but we do have an opportunity right now in this
relationship that we have had with the Republic of South Korea
is so strong and so important. And I think that this
opportunity is like this, when you can shed a light on that and
the American people can understand, and when you bring that
together, you know, American innovation and American
leadership, the upside of this is so phenomenal. There is no
reason for this country, ever, to be in second place to
anybody, anywhere in the world.
So again, I thank you for your leadership and I thank you
for the aggressiveness of your company. And any way that I
think that we can be helpful, just let us know. I think
sometimes we get caught up in the minutia. We forget about, at
the end of the game, we want to win. So thank you again. And I
yield back. Thanks, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Kelly, I like the way you talk. A kinetic
response. You know, a lot of people in the audience are
wondering, what in the hell is he talking about? So why don't
you define a kinetic response?
Mr. Cha. Well, as you know very well, in 2010, the North
Koreans sunk a South Korean Naval Vessel----
Mr. Burton. Oh, I know all that. Yes.
Mr. Cha [continuing]. On a South Korean island.
Mr. Burton. Yes.
Mr. Cha. And the South Koreans have basically done a
complete bottom-up review of how they respond militarily to
these things. And basically, they are going to strike back.
Mr. Burton. Well, I know, but I want you to define the
kinetic response. I mean----
Mr. Cha. They are going to blow up stuff.
Mr. Burton. There you go. There you go. We appreciate that.
I just want to make sure everybody understood what you were
talking about.
Mr. Kelly. And I like the way you talk, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Some of these people around here don't have a
Ph.D. in physics and stuff, so you know. Let me ask you this,
about a week ago, I was up at Panmunjom on the 38th Parallel up
there, and the Communist soldiers came out of that building up
there, and came sticking their nose in the window, and trying
to take pictures of all of us. I don't know why. I don't think
I look that good anyhow. But nevertheless, they were taking
pictures, and glaring at us, and making signs, and everything,
and we understood we couldn't make a sign back. We might start
a war. So it was kind of interesting.
But what do mean by a credible deterrent? They are 40 miles
from Seoul and by the time Seoul could respond, they could have
half the city destroyed and those people are crammed together
in that city in these high-rise apartments like you wouldn't
believe. It is very densely populated. What I would like to
know is, how can South Korea defend itself and respond if there
is another movement like we saw with the ship and the other
land?
Mr. Cha. Well first, the core of deterrents has been the
U.S.-ROK alliance and in that sense, the North Koreans have
attempted these small-scale provocations, but they have not,
since 1950, tried another all-out invasion. And I think that is
largely because they know that if they tried an invasion like
that, they could do a great deal of damage to Seoul, but this
would be a war they would lose.
Mr. Burton. Yes. Well, but, you know, you talk about a
credible deterrence, and I am not sure you can answer this, but
I would like to know what you think, and that is, you know,
they attacked the ship, they have made a couple of attacks,
they have killed a number of people, and there hasn't been much
of a response other than, you know, if you do it again we are
going to poke you in the nose. And that usually doesn't sit
well with those people. Like I said before, tyrants like that
only react to strength. And we had a peace through strength
under Reagan.
And I just wondered, you know, what would be something that
would deter them from doing that again? They have done it
twice. They have got this new young guy up there who is 20-
something years old. I would just like to know what, in your
opinion, would be a credible deterrent to really stop them from
doing that sort of thing that would provoke and cause another
exchange?
Mr. Cha. Well, I think the most credible deterrent would be
to punish them for the next time that they do it. Short of
that, I think very credible deterrents are things like ASW
exercises, anti-submarine warfare exercises, in that part of
the region, better counterfire artillery on the part of the
South Koreans, and all these things have been developed between
the U.S. and the ROK since the provocations of 2010.
Ultimately, the test of deterrence, really, is their
behavior. And if they don't do anything, then we can say
deterrence succeeded. But if they do take another action, the
only way to uphold deterrence is to punish them.
Mr. Burton. Well, okay. I think that at least was an
attempt to answer my question, so I appreciate it. Thank you.
Mr. Manzullo. Punish them kinetically.
Mr. Cha. Kinetically.
Mr. Manzullo. Kinetically. Mr. Sherman from Sherman Oaks,
California.
Mr. Sherman. It is, indeed, America's best named city. I am
hearing reports of goods being manufactured in Kaesong in North
Korea, and being shipped to South Korea for relabeling, and
then designed for export to the United States. What systems do
we have in force that would even catch that? I don't know if
any of our witnesses has a response.
Mr. Cha. Congressman Sherman, you know the KORUS agreement
better than I do. I think what was intended by the KORUS
agreement was if there are activities related to Kaesong that
are being sent to the United States, that would have to come
under review as a part of the deliberation mechanism if either
of us have problems with the implementation of KORUS. My
understanding is that there may be--I mean, in Kaesong, there
may be some packaging that is done by these workers in Kaesong
of South Korean products, but I don't know where the ultimate
export destination for those products go.
Mr. Sherman. Would they be eligible for favorable treatment
under the trade agreement if the packaging work, or any other
work on the product, was done in Kaesong?
Mr. Cha. I don't have an answer to you for that question.
Mr. Sherman. Got you. There is a lot of press coverage of
this, but which gentleman here can describe how powerful is the
current arsenal of nuclear weapons of North Korea according to
unclassified information, and the weapons they have tested, how
do they compare with the two weapons that were used in anger;
Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
Mr. Cha. I think the unclassified's assessment is that they
have enough plutonium for, maybe, 8 to 12 weapons. The first
test, October 2006, was, I think, technically described as a
fizzle.
Mr. Sherman. There was a detectable explosion. I don't know
enough about nuclear physics to know how you have a nuclear
explosion that is a fizzle, but that is the description I have
had.
Mr. Cha. That is the description. Yes. And the second one
was more than a fizzle. I mean, there are aspects of this that
we can talk about. We can't talk about it in this forum.
Mr. Sherman. Got you.
Mr. Cha. But the second one was more than a fizzle and was
determined to be a nuclear test as well.
Mr. Sherman. Do you see North Korea as developing its
nuclear weapons for its national security or as a lever to get
aid and benefits from the Western World?
Mr. Cha. I don't think North Korea is building weapons to
give them up. I think they are building them to keep them and
to use them for coercive bargaining purposes. And we have been
engaged, really, since Ronald Reagan, in a dialog with North
Korea to try to get them to give up their nuclear weapons and I
don't think they are going to give them up.
Mr. Sherman. Now, one thing that the North Koreans had
wanted was a non-aggression pact with the United States. I
think they were rebuffed on the theory that the U.S. doesn't
sign non-aggression pacts. Is that something they still want
and why in the hell didn't we put that on the table as a
possibility in the negotiations?
Mr. Cha. In the last round of six party talks, we did put
on the table something called a negative security assurance, in
which we put in writing that the U.S. would not attack North
Korea with nuclear conventional weapons. A non-aggression pact
really doesn't solve any problems because, that negative
security assurance was the first time the United States has
ever given a negative security assurance to a country, and it
got us nowhere. The North Koreans simply pocketed that and
moved on to the next thing that they wanted.
Mr. Sherman. We didn't give it to them. We indicated we
might give it to them, so they weren't able to put it in their
pocket.
Mr. Cha. Well, it was in the text of the 2005 joint
statement, not a non-aggression pact, but the negative security
assurance.
Mr. Sherman. Yes, but a negative security assurance, with
all due respect to the Executive Branch of Government, is
pretty meaningless without it being a treaty. With that, I
yield back.
Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Yes, for Mr. Lipman. A South Korean consortium
recently signed a contract that will provide for commercial
nuclear reactors to the UAE and that consortium includes
Westinghouse. What factors helped South Korea win the UAE deal,
if I could ask?
Mr. Lipman. In other words, Congressman, why did they win
it?
Mr. Royce. Correct.
Mr. Lipman. Okay. And there was a bit of a discussion
before you walked in. They have a very aggressive commercial
diplomacy which puts nuclear exports at the forefront of their
foreign commercial policy. And that included visits by the
President of Korea to the United Arab Emirates to discuss this
deal with the Emirates. It included a very good financing
package, which the Korea Electric Power Company were able to
offer. I would also say that the Koreans have been very active
in the Middle East in conventional construction and
desalination. In other words, they have big footprint in the
region. Korean companies are very active, not just in energy,
but non-energy too.
So you put those things together and they had, also, U.S.-
origin technology. As I said earlier, their commercial reactor
offering is an older type of Westinghouse nuclear power plant.
And all things put together, it was a pretty powerful
commercial package which they were able to offer the Emirates,
which the Emirates took.
Mr. Royce. I see. I see. I was going to ask, also, Dr. Cha
a question. Thinking back to the time that you spent at the
White House in looking at this issue of trying to engage North
Korea, would you say more time was spent in negotiations, or
planning negotiations, with the North Koreans, or more time
spent trying to figure out how to get information into the
country that would change the regime? I am just trying to
figure out on the top of the to-do list, how much pure energy
is spent thinking outside the box in order to change the
equation versus how much time is just managing the crisis and
figuring out how to continue the negotiations?
Mr. Cha. Congressman, I would probably put the balance at
90 percent negotiations and 10 percent thinking out of the box
in terms of information input.
Mr. Royce. Because, since the '94 framework agreement, and
we were here for the '94 framework agreement, the same strategy
has been deployed, and yet, the reports that I hear from
defectors coming out of North Korea that indicate some hope for
change in the calculus, really, to go to some of the quotes
that we received from some of them.
One North Korean defector said,
``I like the dramas that we are now watching in North
Korea, because they depict everyday life in South
Korea. It is not that I am curious, but it is more that
you can see how much South Korea has developed. It is
easy to compare the living standards of North and South
Korea when watching these dramas. And this then, causes
people to rethink their support for the regime.''
Another quote we had from another North Korean defector,
``North Korea only shows beautiful images, but in South
Korean dramas, there is fighting and I think this is
realistic.''
I think he is talking about in a family setting here.
``This is realistic. There is also poverty. But in
North Korea, they only show you good things so it is
not real. It does not seem real.''
So there is a disconnect for people between what their
government is telling them about the society they are in and
they are now realizing the reality of what is happening
outside.
And yet, the amount of effort that I have ever been able to
uncover being invested in this, when we look at non-
proliferation, I just remember how effectively the North
Koreans managed to build that reactor on the Euphrates River
and attempt to give Syria nuclear weaponry. And that all went
on without us--we were sitting there in negotiations not even
understanding that, not only were they breaking their agreement
on that accord, but also, they were dual-tracking their weapons
program, and we were late to pick up to any of that.
But the fundamental answer would seem, to me, to be the one
deployed in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union in
Russia. It is to think outside the box and change the equation.
Would you say in retrospect that, going forward, that might be
where we want to put more of our energy?
Mr. Cha. I think that very well may be, Congressman. You
know, I think back now and I think I was maybe in a 100
meetings on six party related to de-nuclearization and maybe
two on getting information into the country. I think one of the
operational problems that we had is that, this has to be
something that your body and others push upon the agencies that
are responsible for this in the U.S. Government to take as a
serious issue rather than as a side project, because, when it
is a side project, the agencies that are in power to do these
things keep wanting to push it off of one another because they
don't want to handle it.
Mr. Royce. Well, if I could close, that is one of the
things that was communicated to me by some who were involved
during Reagan's tenure in the effort to have this impact in
public diplomacy. There was a single-minded focus from the
administration on down that we were going to get people the
information that changed their attitudes and changed the
balance in those societies. And it seemed to work like
clockwork.
Once the communication began to deliver the message that
really resonated. Once they got the pulse of Eastern Europeans,
and I was over there in Eastern Europe. I remember interviewing
people. I was in Eastern Germany. I remember the way that
caught on. I mean, in the polling, it shows how quickly the
society's attitudes changed. I would hope that we could rethink
some of this. Thank you very much to the panel.
Mr. Manzullo. I have a question. Mr. Cha, your train leaves
at 4 o'clock.
Mr. Cha. There are other trains.
Mr. Manzullo. All right. Thank you. I didn't want to be
responsible for you missing your train. I would call, Mr.
Lipman, your attention to Page 4 of your testimony, if you want
to take a quick look at it, where it talks about benefits of
the 123 Agreements, and ask you the question, what happens if
the United States and Republic of Korea do not come together on
an agreement? What is the impact?
Mr. Lipman. So I was very heartened to hear Deputy
Assistant Secretary Zumwalt say that they were committed to
closing the agreement, more or less, on time.
Mr. Manzullo. They have had one round.
Mr. Lipman. Yes. So I am a nuclear guy, so we always think
about what goes wrong. So on the assumption that the agreement
goes on, what could go wrong? What would happen? My view, even
if he indicated that it won't go uninterrupted, I thought he
said, but my response would be this. Many of the things that
are subject of nuclear trade are long-lead items. What does
that mean? That means you have to identify them, and order
them, and put a contract in place, often, a few years in
advance.
So I worry, I could be concerned that as the deadline
approaches, that there could be lost business opportunities.
There could be contracts which are under negotiation, or could
be under negotiation, that might not be consummated based on
this agreement not being renewed.
As I mentioned, one of the most fruitful parts of our
cooperation with Korean companies has been in third markets. So
when, as there are right now, potential deals out in the
international marketplace, it could be that there is a desire
to move away from American companies, not just Westinghouse,
but away from American companies because we don't have an
overarching treaty which would govern commercial nuclear trade.
Those are some of the things that, potentially, could go wrong.
I also wonder, I mentioned the importation of Korean
nuclear equipment to U.S. projects, I actually don't know what
the absence of a treaty would do to those imports. That would
be something I would be keen to look at. So the bottom line is,
there could be, as you say in this town, unintended
consequences of this treaty not being renewed, and so I urge
its rapid conclusion.
Mr. Manzullo. Dr. Cha or Dr. Peters, do either of you want
to comment on that?
Mr. Cha. I will speak about it from the perspective of the
alliance. I think it would be a disaster for the alliance,
because it would send the message, one, that we, the U.S.,
don't trust the Koreans, and it would cause the Koreans to feel
like they are a second-class ally when they have been stepping
up all over the world; hosting the G-20, hosting the Nuclear
Security Summit, sending troops to Afghanistan, really, in many
ways, replacing Japan as sort of the key country in the region.
So I think, from an alliance perspective, it would be a
real disaster, and although this is not my area, I think it
would also, basically, leave the field open to China, and
Russia, and other countries, to basically, define the terms of
the global civil nuclear energy regime, which we don't want to
happen.
Mr. Manzullo. Dr. Peters?
Mr. Peters. I can't comment on the policy aspects, but I
would stress the importance of the cooperative R&D that we are
talking about between the Republic of Korea and the United
States, and that----
Mr. Manzullo. Could you expand upon that, please?
Mr. Peters. Yes. So there is currently a cooperative
project in pyroprocessing, which is a particular kind of
reprocessing where you actually are looking at taking spent
fuel that comes out of a reactor and reprocessing it using an
electrochemical process where you have molten salt, you chop up
the fuel, it goes into the solution in the salt, and you do
chemistry, and you are actually able to extract uranium,
plutonium, and higher actinides, and make new fuel for
recycling in reactors, and then take the residual waste and
dispose of it in a repository.
And the Koreans have been interested in exploring
pyroprocessing, as I said in my summary, and there is a joint
study between the United States, DOE, and the laboratories in
the United States, Argonne and Idaho in particular, and KAERI,
within the Republic of Korea, on a joint fuel cycle study. So
that started, but the sensitive nuclear technology agreements
and associated things with the renewal of the 123 would impact
that if it didn't continue.
Mr. Manzullo. So there are two tracks going on. One is the
diplomatic track with the 123 and the other one is, what would
be the outcome of the 10-year study with the Republic of Korea
and the U.S.; the study being carried by Argonne and the Idaho
nuclear lab? The Koreans obviously want to be in the same
position as the Japanese, with the ability to reprocess their
spent nuclear rods. My understanding is that it is possible
there could be a diplomatic agreement restructuring the 123
with an open door for a possible change in the event that the
10-year study comes up with a new method of disposing of the
fuel. Would that be correct, Dr. Peters?
Mr. Peters. I can't speak to that directly, because I am
just not in the know on the----
Mr. Manzullo. That is a diplomatic question. Dr. Cha, did
you want to answer that?
Mr. Cha. I think that has been the U.S. proposal.
Mr. Manzullo. Is that viable? Is that acceptable to the
Koreans?
Mr. Cha. As far as I understand it, it is not acceptable to
the Koreans. The Koreans are pushing very hard, basically, for
advanced consent for ENR, uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
They want it; we don't want to give it to them. And that is
where we are deadlocked.
Mr. Manzullo. But yet, are we not dependent upon South
Korea with regard to certain components? Is that correct, Mr.
Lipman?
Mr. Lipman. It is. There are components for nuclear plants
here in the United States which could be impacted, I don't know
the legalities, frankly, to comment completely, if the treaty
goes into abeyance or goes away, but Dr. Cha mentioned
something very critical, which is, you really lose leverage.
You lose market opportunities, which countries such as France,
and Russia, and eventually China, are going to fill with--by
the way, I think, you know, much less emphasis on areas of
nuclear safety and nuclear security of the type that we have
and is covered in these agreements.
Mr. Manzullo. Dr. Peters?
Mr. Peters. Mr. Chairman, one thing on the technical
aspects, you correctly pointed out that the fuel cycle study
that I referred to is looking at options. So it is looking at a
variety of different options within the pyroprocessing
flowsheet, I will call it, for different ways of treating the
waste. And so there will be a technical outcome at the end of
10 years that will provide some options for policy
consideration.
Mr. Manzullo. Okay. Well, very interesting and very
fruitful discussion this afternoon. I want to thank each of you
for coming. As I said before, your entire written statements
will be made part of the permanent record and this subcommittee
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned at 3:50 p.m.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Mike Kelly, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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