[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-132]
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 19, 2012
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana BILL OWENS, New York
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM RYAN, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHRIS GIBSON, New York HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JOE HECK, Nevada COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, April 19, 2012, Recent Developments in the Middle East:
The Security Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic............. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, April 19, 2012......................................... 31
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 2012
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 5
Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Dempsey, GEN Martin E........................................ 42
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 35
Panetta, Hon. Leon E......................................... 39
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Attachment To Accompany Letter from International Assessment
and Strategy Center........................................ 53
Letter from International Assessment and Strategy Center to
Mr. Turner................................................. 51
Letter from Mr. Turner to Secretary Clinton (Department of
State) and General Clapper (ODNI).......................... 49
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 61
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 61
Ms. Speier................................................... 62
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 19, 2012.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I was just
informed that first votes could happen between 10:10 and 10:25.
The Secretary has a hard close time at 12:30, so we are going
to be as expeditious as we possibly can here.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed
Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
security situation in Syria from the Secretary of Defense, the
Honorable Leon Panetta, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Martin Dempsey. Gentlemen, thank you for your
distinguished service to our Nation and thank you for being
here today.
The Syrian conflict is now in its second year and the
situation remains both uncertain and dire. As we convene, a
tenuous ceasefire is in place. It comes on the heels of
horrifying violence at the hands of the Assad [President Bashar
al-Assad] regime, yet even though Assad has committed the
ceasefire, reports indicate that he continues to inflict
violence on the Syrian people. President Assad's fierce
crackdown has been ruthless, including flagrant human rights
violations, extra judicial killings, use of force against non-
combatant civilians, including children, and interference with
the provision of medical aid and humanitarian assistance. To
date, the United Nations estimates the death toll from the
crisis at 9,000, while other estimates put the death toll as
high as 12,000.
Just over a year ago, in the midst of the Arab Spring, the
Syrian people peacefully took to the streets calling for the
opportunity to elect their leadership through a free and fair
democratic process. This desire for freedom and justice from an
oppressive regime embodies the essence of what is driving the
opposition, and is one that we can relate to and should
support. The President has stated that the violence in Syria
must end and that Assad must go. But it remains completely
unclear how the President will accomplish these goals.
In addition to the humanitarian concerns that I believe we
all share, I am very concerned about the implications for
regional conflict. As recently as April 10th, Assad-backed
military units shot across the border into Syrian refugee camps
in Turkey, killing five individuals. Additionally, violence has
spilled into Lebanon and Iraq could begin to behave erratically
as it considers the prospect of a Sunni-controlled government
succeeding the Assad regime and its western border or alliances
forming between Syria's Sunni population and Iraq's own Sunni
population.
Moreover, the situation presents a strategic opportunity to
deal a blow to known supporters of terrorism in the region as
Iran continues to back the Assad government and groups such as
Hezbollah have enjoyed support and residence in Syria. On the
other hand, there is much we do not know about the opposition.
Syria also maintains robust air defenses that limit military
options.
Therefore I am not recommending U.S. military intervention,
particularly in light of our grave budget situation unless the
national security threat was clear and present. Nevertheless,
these reflections lead me to wonder what the United States can
do to stem the violence and hasten President Assad from power.
We also need to understand what we are doing to insure the
security of one of the world's largest stockpiles of chemical
and biological weapons. To paraphrase General Petraeus, how
does this all end? I look forward to your insights into the
security situation and our way forward in Syria.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of
time, let me just say that I agree completely with the
chairman's opening remarks. The Assad regime has made a clear
and awful choice to simply kill as many of its own people as he
can to maintain power. It is an international outrage that
should be condemned by all nations. I applaud both the
Department of Defense and the Secretary of State and our U.N.
[United Nations] representative for their work to call
attention to this outrage and try to build international
support to stop it. I think we need greater support in nations
like Russia and China should rise to the challenge and work
with us to find a solution to this problem and they clearly
have not done enough.
I also agree with the chairman, the fact that I don't see a
military option for us in this area for a wide variety of
reasons, I have a longer statement which I will submit for the
record that explains that, but we should look at every possible
option for how we can stop this. I also agree that it has
profound impacts for a region that was already unstable in many
ways.
So I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses today
to hear what our best options are going forward to try to
contain this and to give this committee a full briefing on
where the situation is at, and where they see it going as
difficult as that prediction might be. I thank the chairman and
I thank both of our witnesses for their leadership of our
country and for being before us today, and with that, I yield
back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Panetta.
STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative
Smith, Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity
to be able to discuss what is obviously a very tense and fluid
situation in Syria.
Widespread demands for political change in Syria started
more than a year ago, emerging out of the Arab Spring that was
impacting on other countries, and it obviously then hit Syria
as well. But rather than trying to meet the legitimate demands
of the people, the regime of Bashar al-Assad turned instead to
violence against its own people. That violence has been brutal
and it has been devastating. It has put the Syrian people in a
desperate and difficult situation. It has outraged the
conscience of all good people, and it has threatened stability
in a very important part of the world.
The United States has made clear that the Assad regime has
lost its legitimacy, and that this crisis has no effective
solution without Assad's departure. As the President has
stated, Assad must go. Recent days are testing whether the
Assad regime will live up to all of its responsibilities to the
Syrian people and to the international community. Restoring
calm to the cities and towns across Syria is just one test for
Assad in the days ahead. Assad is responsible for fully abiding
by the transition plan that has been outlined by the Joint
[U.N.-Arab League] Special Envoy, Kofi Annan.
He also faces deep skepticism about his motives, a
skepticism based on a long train of Assad's deceitful actions
to date, including broken promises to his own people and to the
international community. The United States is committed to
holding the Syrian regime to its obligations. We are leading an
international effort to help stop the violence and support a
peaceful, political transition in Syria. Even as we speak,
Secretary of State Clinton is meeting with our international
partners in Paris to determine what additional steps should be
taken to make that happen. We know achieving that end is a
tough task. From every angle, the situation in Syria is
enormously complex. There is no silver bullet. I wish there
was, but there isn't.
At the same time the situation is of grave consequence to
the Syrian people. There are many others who are affected by
what happens in Syria as well, including Syria's neighbors,
Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and all nations with a
vital interest in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, it is fair to say that Iran is Syria's only ally
in the region. No other country stands to lose more than Iran
from the eventual fall of the Assad regime, which is why Iran
is supporting the regime with material, financial, and
technical assistance. We also know that the complex problems in
Syria cannot all be solved through the unilateral actions of
the United States, or for that matter, any other country. They
demand a coordinated, international response that is uniquely
tailored to the situation we are confronting in Syria.
There are, however, certain principles that have guided the
Administration's response to unrest across the Middle East.
These basic principles have shaped our responses in Tunisia, in
Egypt, in Libya, and now in Syria.
First, we oppose the use of violence and repression by
regimes against their own people. Second, we support the
exercise of universal human rights. And third, we support
political and economic reforms that can meet the legitimate
aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region. Our
policy in Syria is very clear: We support a political and
democratic transition that fulfills the Syrian people's
greatest aspirations. To support that objective, the United
States is leading international efforts along five tracks.
First, we are supporting efforts to maintain international
pressure and advance transition, political transition in Syria.
We join with our partners in the U.N. Security Council
including now Russia and China in calling for the urgent
comprehensive and immediate implementation of all aspects of
the Annan plan.
Second, we are further isolating the Assad regime, we are
encouraging other countries to join the United States, the
European Union, and the Arab League in imposing strong
sanctions against it. These sanctions are putting Assad under
greater pressure than ever before. We are undermining the
financial lifelines of the regime; three United States
executive orders have targeted senior leadership, Commercial
and the Central Bank of Syria. The result is that 30 percent of
the regime's lost revenues have occurred as a result of those
sanctions. The U.S. and the EU [European Union] have imposed a
strong oil embargo, the exchange rate has depreciated by more
than 50 percent and their GDP [Gross Domestic Product] has been
in a serious decline, approaching almost a minus 8 percent in
2011 and more now.
Third, we are strengthening and unifying the nonviolent
political opposition in Syria. The United States is in the
process of providing direct nonlethal support, including
communications and medical equipment to the civilian lead
opposition. We are taking these actions in concert with similar
steps taken by the friends of Syria and other international
partners to assist the opposition.
Fourth, we are providing emergency humanitarian assistance
to the Syrian people. With the total commitment so far in
excess of $25 million, food rations, medical supplies, water,
and other relief supplies have been provided.
And lastly, we are reviewing and planning for a range of
additional measures that may be necessary to protect the Syrian
people. By acting along these lines, we are increasing pressure
on the Assad regime every day. Make no mistake, one way or
another, this regime will ultimately meet its end. There are
legitimate questions about what steps are necessary to achieve
this end, with some arguing for an approach similar to the one
we took in Libya. The fact is that our recent experience in
Libya is helping to inform the approach that the United States
is taking towards Syria. First, our efforts are strengthened,
strengthened by multilateral international consensus, that is
extremely important to our ability to keep maximum pressure on
the Assad regime.
Second, we should maintain clear regional support from the
Arab world itself. Nations of the Arab world are outraged at
the regime and what they are doing to the Syrian people.
Third, we should offer substantial U.S. contributions where
we can bring unique resources to bear.
Fourth, we should have a clear legal basis for our approach
there. And that clearly involves close consultations with
Congress.
And fifth and finally, our approach must keep all options
on the table, all options on the table. While recognizing the
limitations of military force, we must be prepared to take
whatever action is required. But let me also say that the
situation in Syria is different from the one in Libya, in some
very important ways; this is not Libya. In Libya, there was
widespread international support in the Arab world and
elsewhere in a clear Security Council authorization for
military intervention. And NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] was authorized to act on that. No such consensus
currently exists regarding Syria.
The opposition is also not as well organized and does not
control territory is what we saw in Libya. There are almost 100
different groups. On the one hand that indicates that this is
an insurgency that is broad based, but on the other hand, it
makes it difficult to determine who to help if they cannot come
together and organize as a single opposition force.
We must also be mindful, as Secretary Clinton has noted, of
the possibility that outside military intervention will make a
volatile situation even worse and place even more innocent
civilians at risk. The United States has made clear that we are
on the side of the Syrian people and they must know that the
international community has not underestimated either their
suffering or their impatience. The Defense Department, as we
always do, is reviewing and is continuing to review plans for a
variety of possible scenarios should the President determine
that further steps are necessary. In the meantime, our only
clear path is to keep moving diplomatically through the
international community in a resolute and deliberate manner to
find a way to return Syria to the Syrian people. If we remain
dedicated to that effort I think we ultimately can prevail.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta can be found
in the Appendix on page 39.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Dempsey.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman
Smith and other distinguished Members of this committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and
discuss the evolving situation in Syria. The situation is
tragic for the people of Syria and for the region. Real
democratic reforms should have been the Assad regime's response
to last year's peaceful protest. Instead, the regime responded
with brutality. Syria's internal convulsions are having
consequences for a region already in turmoil. Refugees are
fleeing, spillover into neighboring countries is an increasing
concern, and of course, we also need to be alert to
opportunistic extremists who may seek to exploit the situation,
as well as the need to be especially alert to the fate of
Syria's chemical and biological weapons, they need to stay
exactly where they are.
With other conscientious nations, the United States is
applying diplomatic and economic pressure on the regime to
compel Assad and his accomplices to stop the killing their own.
Our military's role to this point has been limited to
sharing information with our partners, our regional partners,
but should we be called on to help secure U.S. interests in
other ways, we will be ready. We maintain an agile regional and
global posture. We have solid military relationships with every
country on Syria's border. Should we be called, our
responsibility is clear--provide the Secretary of Defense and
the President with options, and these options will be judged in
terms of their suitability, their feasibility, and their
acceptability.
We have a further responsibility to articulate risk and the
potential implications to our other global commitments. In
closing, I want to assure you and the Nation that America's
Armed Forces are ready to answer the call, wherever that takes
us. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey can be found in
the Appendix on page 42.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We--the vote has been
called. We are 5 minutes into the vote. I will ask questions
and get as much done as we can before, and we will break. Those
of you who desire to leave earlier to get over there to vote, I
would encourage you, I think there are three votes, to return
as quickly as we can so we can keep this moving forward.
Mr. Secretary, according to media reports this morning, the
French President stated that action should be taken to
establish humanitarian corridors. What are your views on this
option? Have you been aware of that?
Secretary Panetta. Mr. Chairman, we have looked at a
variety of options as to what could be done, including the
possibility of developing humanitarian corridors. And again, we
are prepared to do whatever the international community
ultimately agrees ought to be done. But clearly, we have made
plans along those lines.
The Chairman. General Dempsey, you stated that Syria's
chemical and biological weapons need to stay exactly where they
are. What can be done and what is being done to ensure that
Syria's chemical and biological stockpiles are secured?
General Dempsey. At this point, Chairman, we are, as I
mentioned in my statement, sharing information and intelligence
with our regional partners. And in the aggregate, we feel like
we have a good understanding of the disposition, the current
disposition of Syria's chemical and biological weapons.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess one of my
concerns is, it's been said for a long time since the uprising
has started that Mr. Assad's days are numbered, and he can't
long last, but I have been worried about that ever since I was
in Israel last summer and had some conversations about that.
What is the path for that happening? Because as I said in my
opening remarks, the Assad regime has sort of decided they
don't care what the international community thinks. They are
going to kill as many people as they need to kill to stay in
power. Regrettably they are getting at least some sort of tacit
support from important nations like Russia and China, and much
more direct support from Iran and that makes them clearly
different than Qadhafi and Libya. Qadhafi had no friends
anywhere, he couldn't get that assistance.
With that support, what are the mechanisms that we--the
levers we need to pull to make sure the Assad regime, in fact,
goes, or might that support not be enough to let them stay as
violently as they need to?
Secretary Panetta. I think the concerns that you have
indicated, Congressman, are the concerns that we all share,
that part of the problem here is that Assad still seems to
maintain the loyalty of the military even though there have
been significant defections, that the military still seems
loyal and they continue to strike back at the Libyan people,
even as this effort to try to achieve a ceasefire and try to
reduce violence there, we still see continuing artillery
barrages violating the whole effort.
Mr. Smith. If I could focus on--what hope is there to get
Russia and China to change their stance and actually be more
aggressive about pressuring the Assad regime?
Secretary Panetta. I think the fact that--obviously, that
was a concern when they initially voted against the Security
[Council] Resolution that would have taken action here, but
they have come around, they have supported the resolution that
was adopted, supporting Annan and his effort to try to achieve
a ceasefire, and diplomatic pressure is being brought on both
Russia and China, particularly Russia has had a longstanding
relationship in that part of the world with Syria, to bring
pressure on them to exercise whatever influence they can to try
to ensure that they abide by the Annan plan.
So there is some progress being made on that front. The
additional steps that are important is that the international
community continues to be very unified in taking action against
that regime. There are additional sanctions that can be
applied. We applied some very significant sanctions, they are
having--they are putting great pressure on the regime itself.
That pressure needs to continue.
The third thing that I would indicate is that this is a
broad-based insurgency, and I think it is fair to say that the
Intelligence Community feels that because it is a broad-based
insurgency, yes, he can strike back, and yes, he can try to
continue to hold on, but ultimately his days are numbered and
ultimately he will be taken down.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all
I have.
The Chairman. The committee will recess now until we are
able to return after the votes. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, in your oral
testimony, you noted that the Administration has publicly
committed to sending communications equipment to Syrian
opposition groups and humanitarian organizations. I am aware of
American companies that can provide the necessary hardware to
the Syrian opposition groups and humanitarian efforts. What
steps is the Administration taking to ensure the allocated
funding and potential future allocations are dedicated to the
procurement of U.S.-manufactured equipment? What steps are
being taken to ensure American-made technologies are being
reviewed and properly vetted?
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, I think I will yield to
General Dempsey on this as well.
Secretary Panetta. But my sense is that most of the
communications gear that we are talking about is made in this
country, and that is primarily the communications gear that we
would be transferring to the opposition leaders.
General Dempsey. I have nothing further to add to that,
Congressman. That program is being supervised by the Department
of State.
Mr. Bartlett. The State Department, other than the Office
of Political Military Affairs, is typically not charged with
providing communications equipment to besieged areas. And it is
my understanding that the political and military affairs
personnel at stake are not actively involved in determining the
nature of what equipment should be distributed to Syria. Seeing
as how the Department of Defense would have more precedent in
such a role, what interagency coordination is occurring between
the Department of State and Department of Defense?
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, there is ongoing
coordination with the Department of Defense, or with the
Department of State, on this issue. We do have a liaison that
is there and working with them, but let me give you a more in-
depth report as to what the level of that relationship is like.
But there is--there is a military liaison that is working with
the State Department on this issue.
General Dempsey. I have nothing to add, Congressman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
gentlemen, for being here once again and for your service to
our country. As you know, Russia has not been very cooperative
in moving the U.N. closer to authorizing some form of action in
Syria. And I know a lot of us have been disappointed in trying
to move something. Some Members have suggested that we use some
sort of pressure on Russia to help convince them to be more
helpful. For example, we could fence Cooperative Threat
Reduction funds. Do you believe that is a good idea? Why or why
not?
Secretary Panetta. You know, at this stage, obviously the
State Department is the one that is taking the lead in dealing
with Russia, so I am not going to kind of prejudge what the
State should or should not use as leverage with Russia. At this
point, I would have to say that Russia has been cooperative
with regards to enacting support for Annan's effort at a
ceasefire. They seem to be working with the international
community in trying to advance that ceasefire and getting it in
place.
The most important leverage, frankly, for Russia, is to try
to make sure that they understand that, in fact, their
interests are served by taking these steps, because once Assad
goes, the interests that they have in Syria are going to go
away unless they participate with the international community.
Ms. Sanchez. General.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Congresswoman. Just if I could
broaden the aperture a bit and point out the places where we
are cooperating with Russia in a very positive way.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. I am not suggesting that I am one of
those but do I hear from my colleagues we should----
General Dempsey. Sure, yeah. And I guess my point would be
we have to understand it in the context of the entire
relationship, not this particular issue in isolation because we
have terrific cooperation with them on the northern
distribution network out of Afghanistan, counterterror,
counterpiracy, counternarcotics. So I think we have to
understand the entire thing in context and deal with them as we
would other nations with whom we have a variety of
relationships.
Ms. Sanchez. Gentlemen, some have said that if we would
just, and I quote this very loosely, ``handle Syria,'' that
that would help us in what is brewing with respect to Iran,
that one of the effects of military is that, of course, Assad
has one of the largest army ground troops in the area and that
that sort of buttresses Iran's, you know, some have called it
bullying in the area. What do you say to that? That somehow
Syria--that if we would get involved in Syria and we could help
the people there move on to a more democratic or different type
of government, that it would help us to bring the threat of
Iran down in the neighborhood?
Secretary Panetta. There is absolutely no question that if
the Assad regime comes down that the one country in that part
of the world that is even going to be further isolated is Iran.
And Iran knows that and that is the reason they continue to
provide some assistance to Assad is because they know that
their interests are in maintaining the Assad regime, not in
seeing it go down.
General Dempsey. The other thing I think I would add,
Congresswoman, is the fall of the Assad regime would be a
serious blow to Iran, and I think General Jim Mattis has
testified before this body to that effect. But saying that it
is the key would be analogous to saying you are going to solve
a Rubik's cube puzzle by lining up one side and neglecting the
other three. This is a very complex region of the world and
there are no, as the Secretary said in his opening comments,
there are no silver bullets out there.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Secretary, are there any circumstances
under which the United States would get involved militarily?
For example, what if Turkey invoked Article 5 of our NATO
charter?
Secretary Panetta. I think it is clear that the only way
that the United States would get involved militarily is if
there is a consensus in the international community to try to
do something along those lines and then obviously ensure that
the international community is able to get the authorities
required in order to make that happen. The one area with
regards to Article 5 in Turkey, Article 5 has only been enacted
once after 9/11, as I recall. But they would have to make clear
that what is happening there really does truly represent a
direct threat to Turkey. And I think at this point that is
probably a stretch.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
the time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and Mr.
Secretary, General Dempsey, thank you for being here today. And
Mr. Secretary, if the situation changes, and you believe that
use of force in Syria becomes necessary, will this
Administration seek authorization from Congress before taking
action?
Secretary Panetta. We will--we will clearly work with
Congress if it comes to the issue of the use of force. This
Administration wants to work within the War Powers provision to
ensure that we work together, and not separately.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, as a former Member of Congress, I
have the biggest concern, and this has not pointed at this
Administration, it could be at any administration that they
seem to want to take the authority to decide whether or not
they need to go into a country that is not been a threat, they
might have evil dictators, they might have problems in those
countries. But I have been very concerned. I actually went to
the Federal courts with Dennis Kucinich and two other
Republicans and two other Democrats. We went to the courts
because of the decision and how it was made--I realize you were
not there at the time--about Libya. I continue, and the
American people seem to agree, that we in Congress have not
exerted our Constitutional responsibilities when it comes to
war. And I hope that if there is a decision including Iran as
well as Syria, if the decision is made to commit American
forces, that the President would feel an obligation to the
American people, not to Congress necessarily, but the American
people to explain and justify why we would take that kind of
action.
And again, I am talking about a situation where we are not
being attacked, we just see things happening in other countries
that we don't approve of. And I would hope, and I think you did
give me this answer, but if you would reaffirm that if we have
to use military force and as we are going to initiate that
force, was it going to be our initiation that causes that force
that the President, any President would come to Congress and
the American people and justify the need to attack.
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, as you understand, this
President as other presidents will operate pursuant to the
Constitution. The Constitution makes clear that the Commander
in Chief should act when the vital interests of this country
are in jeopardy. And I believe this President believes that if
that, in fact, is the case he would do that in partnership with
Congress in terms of taking any action.
Mr. Jones. Well, I will make another statement and then I
will work toward a closing, Mr. Chairman. I remember my good
friend, Randy Forbes from Virginia, asked Secretary Gates when
we went in and it seemed like the Administration if they called
the leadership of the House and Senate, it must have been one
call each House, each Senate. And Mr. Forbes asked Mr. Gates if
the Libyans fired missiles in New York City, would that be an
act of war? And I will have to say, because my friend from
Virginia is a very articulate and a very intelligent gentleman,
that he never got a straight answer.
So I hope that you will prevail upon the Administration not
to take those kind of actions as they did in Libya, whether it
was justified or not. We won't get into that debate, but in my
opinion that was really kind of a snub of Congress and the
responsibility of Congress based on the Constitution.
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, what I can assure you of is
as long as I am Secretary, we won't take any action without
proper legal authority.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. And with
that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my 39 seconds.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you Mr.
Secretary and Chairman, your service is both an inspiration to
us and a blessing to our country. We thank you very much for
it.
I want to congratulate the Administration on your success
with Russia and China, moving them to a very different place on
this issue as compared to where they were just a few weeks ago.
And Mr. Secretary, I think that the data you gave us about the
exchange rate for the Syrian currency and the GDP are a
reflection of the effectiveness of that coalition. But you also
note that we do not yet have the level of consensus in the Arab
world that existed for the Libyan problem. What do you see as
the principle obstacles to achieving that kind of consensus
with respect to Syrian regime?
Secretary Panetta. I think the Arab world is struggling
with the same issues that the whole international community is
struggling with which is, in order to take additional actions,
what in fact does make sense? You know, who is the opposition?
How can we best assist the opposition? How do we best provide
the kind of help that the Syrian people need in order to
overcome the situation? What kind of pressures would best be
placed on Assad in order to force that regime downward?
All of those same difficult complex issues that the whole
international community is dealing with, the Arab community is
confronting as well. In Libya, that all came together; in
Syria, it is still a difficult challenge to try to put those
pieces together.
Mr. Andrews. Do you suppose, this is a hypothesis, that the
cohering factor in the Libyan situation was a sense that
Qadhafi had completely lost the support of his own people, and
no one wanted to be associated with a regime that was
illegitimate in that sense? Do you think that Assad has simply
not reached that point with his own people yet or is there some
other factor that is diverting us from that consensus?
Secretary Panetta. I think it is the factors that I pointed
out in my testimony make this different from Libya. The fact
that number 1, he does still enjoy, as I said, the loyalty of a
good chunk of the Army and the military, and that makes it more
challenging in terms of trying to undermine the regime.
Secondly the opposition is dispersed, there are a lot of groups
there that represent the opposition. In Libya, there were some
different tribal groups that made up the opposition, they were
holding territory. We knew who they were, we could define what
the opposition was that needed assistance. This is much more
difficult, there aren't geographic areas that are being held by
the opposition, it is much more of an insurgency kind of
opposition.
Mr. Andrews. Mr. Secretary, if I may, taking off on that,
you mentioned the phrase ``vital national interest'' a few
minutes ago. Do you agree with the proposition that it is a
vital national interest to the United States to discourage
regimes which could serve as an incubator for asymmetric
warfare against the United States?
Secretary Panetta. I think that would, you know, obviously
have to be debated on the issue of does it directly impact our
vital interest? I guess an argument could be made along those
lines. I would think in this case, it is really important for
the international community. If we are going to continue to
work with the international community, if we are going to be a
partner with them in deciding what additional actions ought to
be taking place, that it ought to be within the international
context that decisions for action ought to be taken.
Mr. Andrews. How would you characterize the public record
of the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah?
Secretary Panetta. The public record, and more importantly,
the intelligence record that we have is that there is always
been a close relationship between Syria and Hezbollah, and that
Hezbollah has always had some level of protection.
Mr. Andrews. Do you agree with the proposition that the
weaker Hezbollah is, the better the United States is?
Secretary Panetta. Hezbollah, in our book, is a terrorist
organization, they have spread terror not only in that region,
but elsewhere, and anything--anything done to weaken a
terrorist group is in our interest.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank
you for being here and General Dempsey, we thank you for your
service, you are both good men, you have served your country
well, and we just are honored that you would be here and share
your thoughts with us here today. We know you have a tremendous
challenge, and the risk to the country out there is huge today.
And when we talk about vital national interest, probably there
is no greater vital national interest that we have than the
rule of law. So sometimes we have to just ferret that out and
see what that is.
And as I understand what you have indicated to this
committee, Mr. Secretary, and correct me if I am wrong, you
believe that before we would take military action against
Syria, that it would be a requirement to have a consensus of
permission with the international community before that would
happen. Is that a fair statement, and if not, would you tell me
what the proper----
Secretary Panetta. I think that is a fair statement.
Mr. Forbes. If that is fair, then I would like to come back
to the question Mr. Jones asked, just so we know, I know you
would never do anything that you didn't think was legally
proper, and you said that the Administration would have proper
legal authority before they would take any military action. So
my question is what is proper legal authority? And I come back
to, as Mr. Jones pointed out with the War Powers Act, it is
unlikely we would have a declaration of war, but that would be
one of the things. Certainly we know if there was a national
attack, that would be one of them.
And then the second thing, of course, the joint--the War
Powers Act would be specific statutory authorization. Do you
feel that it would be a requirement to have proper legal
authority that if you did not have a declaration of war or an
attack on the United States, that you would have to have
specific statutory authority, in other words the permission of
Congress, before you take military action against Syria?
Secretary Panetta. We would not take action without proper
legal authority.
Mr. Forbes. And I understand, and in all due respect, I
don't want to put you in interrogation, but we are trying to
find out what exactly proper legal authority is, because that
is what we have to act under. And we don't have the President
here to chat with him or have a cup of coffee with him, and ask
him, you are the closest we get. And so we ask it from your
understanding and as Secretary of Defense, what is proper legal
authority? Would that require specific statutory authorization
from the United States Congress if we had not had a declaration
of war or an attack upon the United States?
Secretary Panetta. Well, again let me put it on the this
basis, this Administration intends to operate pursuant to the
War Powers Act, and whatever the War Powers Act would require
in order for us to engage, we would abide by.
Mr. Forbes. Again, Mr. Secretary, thank you for putting up
with me as I just try to stumble through this and understand
it. But as I read the War Powers Act, it has those three
requirements, are there any other requirements that you are
familiar with that I am leaving out or not reading?
Secretary Panetta. No.
Mr. Forbes. If that is the case, then again, I just come
back to if there is no declaration of war, no attack upon the
United States, and if we are going to comply with the War
Powers Act, would that require specific statutory authority by
Congress before we took military action?
Secretary Panetta. Again, under the Constitution, as I
indicated, the Commander in Chief has the authority to take
action, that involves the vital interest of this country, but
then pursuant to the War Powers Act, we would have to take
steps to get congressional approval. That is the process that
we would follow.
Mr. Forbes. You would have to take steps to get that
approval, but would the approval be required before you would
take military action against Syria?
Secretary Panetta. As I understand the Constitution and the
power of the President, that the President could, in fact,
deploy forces if he had to under--if our vital interest were at
stake, but that ultimately then under the War Powers Act, we
would have to come here for your support.
Mr. Forbes. So would you get the support of Congress after
you began military op----
Secretary Panetta. In that particular situation, yes.
Mr. Forbes. And then just one last thing and make sure I am
stating this correctly, it is your position that the
Administration's position would be that we would have to get a
consensus of permission from the international community before
we would act, but that we wouldn't have to get specific
statutory authority from Congress before we would act?
Secretary Panetta. Well, I think in that situation, if the
international action is taken pursuant to a Security Council
resolution, or under our treaty obligations with regards to
NATO that obviously we would participate with the international
community. But then ultimately, the Congress of the United
States, pursuant to its powers of the purse, would be able to
determine whether or not that action is appropriate or not.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, we certainly appreciate
your being here and all of your dedicated service.
I wanted to ask you more about the opposition groups. I
think you have been quite clear that it is a diverse group and
probably hard to read them in many ways. Are there several
issues where you see them fragmenting or coalescing and
particularly as it would relate to trying to broker any kind of
agreement with the Assad regime short of eliminating it?
Secretary Panetta. As I have indicated, there are a number
of groups that are involved in the opposition. It has not
always been easy to get those groups to be able to coalesce.
There are some outside Syrian groups that are making an effort
to do that.
There has been better progress by other countries that have
tried to, one way or another, provide assistance to try to urge
those groups to coalesce, and there has been a little more
progress on that front, but it is still a difficult challenge.
General Dempsey. What I would add, Congresswoman, is--and
it kind of threads back to an earlier question--why does it
seem so difficult to get the countries in the region to
coalesce around a single unifying idea here, I think it is
because they are extraordinarily cautious about what comes
next. To thread these two themes together, a different regime
or a different governance model in Syria will affect the
relationship of Ankara, Damascus, Cairo, Riyadh, Tehran,
Baghdad. It will. Now, that is not to predict some negative
outcome, but it will change. I think what they are circling
around here is can they get a little clearer idea of what might
happen on the other end of this. So these two thoughts are
linked, I think.
Mrs. Davis. In thinking as well about some of the efforts
that we have undergone there in terms of humanitarian missions,
how are we protecting those, if at all? What is happening in
that arena? And to what extent do we think it is going to have
a positive effect or helping to mobilize others and/or bring
the opposition groups together in any way? What effect does it
have?
Secretary Panetta. The humanitarian assistance, obviously,
the State Department is directing most of that assistance, but
it is going through programs like the World Food Program. There
is about $10.5 million that is being dispersed in food rations.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is providing medical
services and supplies, food and water, blankets, hygiene kits,
and heaters at about $8.5 million. And the International
Committee on the Red Cross is providing relief supplies under
their authorities at about $3 million. And there are some NGOs
[Non-governmental Organizations] that are providing some
additional assistance as well.
Most of that--I think it is fair to say, Congresswoman,
that a lot of it is probably being done in the refugee areas
where a lot of the refugees have gathered; and we have an
extensive number of refugees both on the Turkish and Jordanian
borders that have located there.
Mrs. Davis. So less so in cities, less so in areas where it
needs to be protected----
Secretary Panetta. I think that is correct.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. As it is going to the population.
Is there any perception through those efforts that we are
there to help the people of Syria? That we have ongoing
efforts?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, I think it has been made clear that
we are trying to do whatever we can to provide that help. We
are making efforts to try to do some outreach into Syria
itself, to try to assist those who have been harmed and try to
see what we can do to provide assistance there as well. It is a
much more difficult challenge.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Chairman Dempsey, thank you for your
service. I appreciate it as a veteran and also a very grateful
parent of a son serving in the military.
In the context of the instability that you are reviewing,
I'm very concerned about the sequestration of the defense
budget, which would be a reduction of 8-12 percent beginning
next January. You both have correctly warned of the hollowing
out of the military, but people are still confused because they
have heard and seen a $100 billion cut, a $487 billion cut, and
now a pending $600 billion cut. It is just total confusion.
What message do you have to the American people? What do
you want them to know about the effect of sequestration, Mr.
Secretary and General?
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, I tried to make clear time
and time and time again that sequestration and the cuts
involved in sequestration would be a disaster for the Defense
Department and would truly hollow out our force and weaken our
national defense.
We are already cutting close to half a trillion dollars
pursuant to the Budget Control Act. We have made those
proposals. They are part of our budget. We are doing that over
10 years. And that has been difficult. It has been a difficult
challenge to try to do it pursuant to a strategy and do it in a
way that protects our national defense.
Sequester, which is a whole other set of cuts that are out
there that are supposed to take effect in January, represent a
$500-600 billion across-the-board meat ax approach to the
budget that would impact every area of the defense budget,
regardless of policy, regardless of strategy, and blindly
strike at every area of the defense budget.
So for that reason, obviously, we have urged the Congress,
we have urged whoever we can to work together to make sure that
doesn't happen.
General Dempsey. I would add, Congressman, in terms of what
message to the American people, so I think, first and foremost,
that the military is not oblivious to the economic ills of the
Nation and have done our best to contribute as part of the
equation of national power, which includes economic,
diplomatic, and military power. All three have to be in
balance. Therefore, we have stepped up to the plate and done
our best to make better use of our resources.
Secondly, we adjusted our strategy after the lessons of 10
years of war and our projection on what the Nation would need
in 2020, and we mapped the '13-'17 budget to it, absorbing the
$487 billion cut. And that if we have to absorb more cuts, we
have got to go back to the drawing board and adjust our
strategy.
What I'm saying to you today is that the strategy that we
would have to adjust to would in my view not meet the needs of
the Nation in 2020 because the world is not getting any more
stable. It is getting increasingly unstable, for all of the
reasons we are talking about here today.
So, I think we've done as much as we can do, given what I
know about the future we are about to confront.
Mr. Wilson. I particularly appreciate your pointing out
this is not a peace dividend. The world is so dangerous, and so
thank you for emphasizing that.
Additionally, General, I am very concerned about the
National Guard. This year, the Administration has been
proposing a reduction in 100,000 personnel in the ground forces
in the Army and the Marines. But, fortunately, in a way for the
Guard, that is Active Duty. But I see a threat to the Guard. If
there was sequestration, a concern I have, or reduction in the
size of our Army Guard, that has already had an impact on the
Air Guard, which I think is not good, but the cuts, how large
will these be? A 50,000 reduction? A 100,000 reduction? What
could our governors, our TAGs [The Adjutant Generals], the
National Guard families see coming their way?
General Dempsey. Our job as the Joint Chiefs is to keep the
force in balance and have enough of it ready to go tonight and
a different amount of it ready to go in 30 days, 6 months, or a
year. And that is how we balance the force against
requirements.
The reason the Army--and I was the Chief at the time--
didn't take any of this reduction out of the Guard is because
we had grown the Active Force over the past 10 years by about
65,000. We had not grown the Guard. We had about 8,000. So when
we absorbed the cuts, we didn't take many of those cuts off of
the Guard because we hadn't grown the Guard. We wanted the
Guard to be about the size it was.
If you are asking me would a further reduction in our
budget authority result in an effect on the Army National
Guard, yes. I can't tell you today how deeply, because it would
depend on the depth of the cut. If we have to make more cuts
and if our responsibility remains keeping the force in balance,
it will affect both Active Guard and Reserve.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much for you concern. I just see
cuts of dramatic effect affecting American families and our
security. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your answers on the
sequestration. I think this is one of the most difficult issues
facing our defense. And we understand that defense has to be on
the table, and we have been there. These cuts that we are going
through right now are enormous. And the fact that defense
accounts for 20 percent of the budget and we have taken 50
percent of the savings out of defense is something that cannot
be overlooked.
What we really need to understand is we cannot solve our
Nation's financial difficulties on the backs of the military.
And the thing that we really need to keep in mind is if we
eliminated the whole discretionary budget, defense, all
discretionary spending, we would still be running a half-
trillion-dollar deficit. So what we really need to do is to fix
the mandatory spending side of the budget.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here today and your service.
We have talked about the differences between Syria and
Libya. We have talked about trying to identify the different
influences of the different folks within Syria and how tough it
is to predict an outcome and where this might go.
So I'm going to put you a little bit on the spot, Mr.
Secretary. We have seen sometimes democracy, when you give
people the choice, they don't always choose necessarily what we
would like for them to choose. So democracy can be
unpredictable, as we are seeing in some of the results of Arab
Spring heading in different directions as it plays itself out.
Scenarios for Syria, as you indicated, it is not a matter
of if but when this regime falls. What do we anticipate, maybe
best-case, worst-case outcome being? What kind of government,
what kind of relationships within Syria? What would be some of
the things we could look for?
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, at some point you probably
ought to sit down with our intelligence analysts to discuss
some of those possible options.
I will give you some sense. This can happen in a good way,
and it can happen in a bad way. If the Assad regime--if we can
do this pursuant to the Annan ceasefire and the reforms that he
is suggesting and it is done in a politically careful way in
terms of implementing the reforms that have to be done and you
can have Assad move out and try to develop, you know, a
government that would be able to take its place, that would be
subject to, hopefully, a vote of the people and implement the
kind of democratic reforms that ultimately the people deserve,
that would be the best way for it to play out. And it could be
done in a way that recognizes that there are divided
populations in Syria but that all of them would be brought into
that kind of government. That would be the best way for this to
move forward.
The worst way is that suddenly it comes down. Various
tribes, the various segments of that population that are there
begin to assert themselves and you have the beginnings of some
kind of civil war that takes place within there to try to
assert who should take charge. And that would probably be the
worst development.
Somewhere in between, hopefully, you can get some of the
reforms that need to take place. But, you know, it could take
us in a better direction. So there is a range of possibilities
that are there. But I think the bottom line is that anything
that takes the Assad regime down is a step in the right
direction right now.
What the international community has to assure is that, if
that happens, it happens in the context of legitimate reforms
that keep that country together and that serve the Syrian
people.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Dempsey, you mentioned that the relationship
between the government and the military is strong right now. Is
there a basis for that relationship being strong in terms of
maybe just the Generals saying we are going to stay with
whoever we think is going to come out on top? Is there a
situation, scenario, where that might change and the military
might withdraw some of that support and make some other things
possible?
General Dempsey. Yes, I think there are conditions. I would
like to think that the military leaders in Syria would
recognize that using the kind of violence they are using
against their own citizens is a fool's errand and that at some
point that will jeopardize them as an institution.
By the way, that could be one of the reasons they are
beginning to hold on tighter now, is that they have used this
violence and if now they return to garrison and allow a
referendum to occur, change government, I think they will feel
themselves to be at great risk.
I was going to say what we need to do, but this is best
solved by the regional actors with our support because, you
know, there is a scenario where, at the end of this, those that
are arrayed around Assad become the oppressed and, as the
Secretary described it, we end up in a situation that is a
prolonged civil war.
So, yes, I think there is reason to believe that the
military could come to understand that they are on a path to
their own destruction as an institution. But I think that case
has to be made by regional players, less so by us.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Chairman Dempsey, I want to thank you for
your strong statements this week on the issues of addressing
sexual assault in the military. I think your leadership is well
needed, and I appreciate your strong statements and your strong
action.
We had a meeting yesterday with General Amos. We
understand, General Dempsey, he is certainly echoing your
strong commitment. We appreciate the efforts of both of you. It
makes a big difference to the men and women who are serving.
General, you just said that the world is becoming
increasing unstable. And, Mr. Secretary, you have recently said
every day we are within an inch of war. I think as we look to
the issue of Syria we know that Russia and China have blocked
two United Nations Security Council resolutions with respect to
Syria, and certainly I think that takes us to an issue of, when
we look to the world and instability, of a question with regard
to Russia and China.
With regard to Russia, we have seen public reports that
they continue to arm the Syrian military, have sent Russian
advisors to Syria, and have deployed naval forces off the
Syrian coast. My first question is, Mr. Secretary, how would
you say that Russia is supporting Syria's military today?
Secondly, I want to switch to China, which unavoidably
takes us to the issue of North Korea. North Korea's recent
ballistic missile launch failed. Many people sighed with
relief, but I think that is probably misplaced relief in that
we know that North Korea continues its quest for missile
technology and most recently, in the observance of the 100th
anniversary of the birth of the founder of the dictatorship,
brought forward their new road-mobile missile. Secretary Gates
previously indicated that North Korea is becoming a direct
threat to the United States.
I recently wrote to Secretary Clinton and General Clapper--
and I ask that my letter be made a part of the record--over my
concern of what appears to be China's support for the new North
Korean missile that was unveiled.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on pages 49-57.]
Mr. Turner. Specifically, a transporter erector launcher
system for the new missile that appears to be of Chinese
origin.
So my second question then is, Mr. Secretary, can you tell
me your concerns over China supporting North Korea's missiles,
and is North Korea a direct threat to the United States? Is
that something that we are witnessing and have to be concerned
with China and their involvement?
Secretary Panetta. Look, there is no question that North
Korea's capabilities with regards to ICBMs [inter-continental
ballistic missiles] and their developing nuclear capability
represent a threat to the United States. For that reason, we
take North Korea and their provocative actions very seriously.
Regardless of the success or failure of that effort at the
launch--and it was a huge failure--the fact is it was a
provocation. Taking that step was condemned and should have
been condemned, and our hope is that they don't take any
additional provocative actions. The history is that they
usually turn somewhere else to try to do something provocative.
We hope they don't do that.
We are prepared from the Defense Department's point of view
to deal with any contingency. But there is growing concern
about the mobile capabilities that were on display in the
parade recently in North Korea. I have to tell you, we need,
frankly, to get better intelligence as to exactly what those
capabilities are, exactly what is real and what is not real
here in order to determine exactly what that threat represents.
But I think the bottom line is, if they in fact have a
mobile capability to be able to have ICBMs deployed in that
manner, that that increases the threat coming from North Korea.
Mr. Turner. Before the time is expired, the concern then is
China's involvement with North Korea being able to make these
advances, support for the systems, and then, of course,
Russia's involvement with Syria?
Secretary Panetta. We have made very clear to China that
China has a responsibility here to make sure that North Korea,
if they want to improve the situation with their people, if
they want to become a part of the international family, if they
in fact want to deal with the terrible issues that are
confronting North Korea, there is a way to do that. And China
ought to be urging them to engage in those kinds of diplomatic
negotiations. We thought we were making some progress, and
suddenly we are back at provocation.
Mr. Turner. The concern, obviously, is that, beyond just
diplomacy, if the equipment itself has trade and technology
exchanges.
Secretary Panetta. I am sure there has been some help
coming from China. I don't know the exact extent of it. I think
we would have to deal with it in another context in terms of
the sensitivity of that information. But clearly there has been
assistance along those lines.
With regards to Russia, Russia has a long history of having
provided military assistance and economic assistance to Syria.
The good news is that Russia is now working with us to try to
get a ceasefire and hopefully put that in place. They are, I
think, at least working with the international community right
now. But the reality is that Russia could have a much more
significant impact on Syria and on Assad if they were willing
to assert that.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General.
Let me ask, Secretary Panetta, violence has not abated. The
initiatives by U.N. Special Envoy Annan have been undertaken,
but when do we determine that they are not successful and move
on to plan B?
Secretary Panetta. I think that is what Secretary Clinton
is dealing with in Paris as we speak, which is to look at that
situation, to determine what the next steps are with regards to
the Annan initiative.
I think there is an effort to try to, obviously, deploy
monitors that can go in and determine whether or not those
violations are taking place. There is also consideration of
perhaps a peacekeeper initiative to try to back up the Annan
initiative with peacekeepers. What the final decisions are, are
going to rest with the international community.
Ms. Speier. In terms of arms flowing to Syria from Iran, do
we have credible estimates on what is flowing from Iran into
Syria?
Secretary Panetta. I think, to discuss that in depth, we
really ought to do it in the context of an intelligence
briefing.
Ms. Speier. All right.
General Dempsey, I'm concerned about the report that NATO's
assessment of the Libya air campaign found that there were
numerous problems with cooperation when it came to sharing
target information and sharing analytical capabilities. How are
we incorporating the lessons learned from Libya into our
current actions in Syria?
General Dempsey. I actually was encouraged that the lessons
learned were credible and transparent, because I was a bit
afraid that there was going to be this euphoria about Libya as
a template for future actions that would have taken us down a
path that probably would be ill-advised.
So I am alert to that. I'm actually going to Brussels next
week to meet with my NATO CHODs [Chiefs of Defense]. One of the
agenda items is, in fact, Operation Unified Protection.
What we have got to do is we have got to be candid with
each other--I can assure you I will be--about what they can
reasonably expect us to provide, what they need to provide in
terms of ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance],
the analysis fusion of intelligence and operations, and
investments that they need to make in order to close some gaps
that heretofore they relied almost exclusively on us to
provide. So I actually see this as a positive thing.
Ms. Speier. General, what do you think are the greatest
risks if the United States intervenes?
General Dempsey. In Syria?
Ms. Speier. Yes.
General Dempsey. First of all, on occasion I have been
portrayed as saying this would just be too hard, so let's not
do it. I want to assure you that is not the case. If asked to
do something, we absolutely have the capability.
But in terms of my concerns and how they would translate
into military advice, I would have to be very clear about the
military objectives that I was being asked to achieve, and I
would have to be clear about how those military objectives were
contributing to some outcome that we would all understand and
probably agree upon.
So what is the outcome? If it is just stopping the
violence, that is one outcome. If it is changing the regime,
that is another outcome. But the point is I can build from that
outcome. I can build military options.
My other responsibility is to balance the risk to the
mission. What would be the cost of doing this in lives and
equipment? And the risk to the force? Because it is a zero sum
game. We are deployed all over the world. If I am asked to do
something in Syria, if the Secretary turns to me and says, I
need this option developed, then my responsibility is to assure
that I understand the military objective, I build an option
that will deliver it, and that I articulate the risk, not just
to the mission we are talking about but to our global
responsibilities. And it is all an integrated part of my
advice.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, thank you for
joining us and thank you for your service to our Nation.
Secretary Panetta, I will begin with you. I want to follow
up on your scenarios of looking at U.S. engagement in Syria.
You spoke about engaging the international community, looking
at NATO partners, and making a decision about that particular
engagement. Do you envision a scenario where the U.S. would act
unilaterally? And do you also look at a situation where, in any
scenario, would the U.S. look at a broader combat perspective
on that? In other words, will we have boots on the ground
moving into a peacekeeping operation in that scenario? So I
want to get your perspective on that.
Secretary Panetta. At this point in time, Congressman, the
decision is that we will not have any boots on the ground and
that we will not act unilaterally in that part of the world.
Mr. Wittman. I just wanted to make sure that we were
looking at those particular scenarios.
General Dempsey, to get your perspective, we see what is
happening in Syria. We also see the Arab Spring. That has
unfolded in the Middle East over the last 18 months. As you
look at that scenario, are you concerned about the continual
expansion of the effort by Assad in Syria maybe moving to other
areas in the Middle East--Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq? What is your
perspective on what potentially this holds if this effort in
Syria continues?
General Dempsey. Again, speaking as the principal military
advisor to this body and the President's SecDef [Secretary of
Defense] and National Security Advisor, I don't see the Assad
model spreading. I think quite the opposite. I think the model
is that previously suppressed populations, seeing what is
happening around them, are beginning to rebel against the
traditional strongmen, who in many cases have been from the
minority side of the demographic equation.
That is why I agree with the Secretary that change in Syria
is inevitable. I don't know how long it will take for it to
occur, but it will occur. I have concerns about that. Because I
think long term we are all eager to see these populations that
have long not been reaping the benefits of the resources in
their country, have been suppressed politically, and in some
cases have been suppressed even in terms of their religious
freedoms and certainly women's rights.
I think that long term this will become a stabilizing
influence. But I think getting from here to there is going to
be a wild ride. So I think we are in for 10-15 years of
instability in a region that has already been characterized by
instability.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask you, too, on this line, General
Allen was here testifying before us last month talking about
operations in Afghanistan. I want to get, both Secretary
Panetta and General Dempsey, your perspectives.
His comments were this. He said that he saw the use of U.S.
power there extending past 2013. I want to get your perspective
on that and understand, do you agree with General Allen? Are
you looking to him as far as his guidance, his thought about
how we utilize our current forces there, as we are drawing
down? What is necessary past 2013?
Because I think all of these parts of what happens not only
in the Middle East but also there in Afghanistan and obviously
our efforts there in Iraq are all intertwined, so I want to get
your perspectives on that.
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, you bet we are listening to
General Allen. He is the best. He has exercised tremendous
leadership out there and tremendous dedication and, more
importantly, he has put together a very good plan for the
future with regards to Afghanistan.
As I have pointed out, 2011 was a turning point. We have
seen the Taliban weaken. They have not organized an effort to
regain any area that they have lost. They have engaged in these
sporadic hits. And we expect that they will continue. They are
resilient. But they have been weakened.
More importantly, the Afghan people themselves have
rejected them.
More importantly than that, the Afghan Army is beginning to
operate on its own. These events that took place in Kabul over
the weekend told us, told General Allen, that the Afghan Army,
the Afghan police, are in fact becoming an effective force to
achieve security in Afghanistan.
And more importantly, the transitions are working. We have
two tranches of transitions that have occurred. Fifty percent
of the population is now under Afghan security and control. The
third tranche, which is to take place this year, will put 75
percent of the people under Afghan security and control.
So the plan and the strategy that General Allen has
developed, and that NATO supports, is to proceed with that plan
to take us through 2013 and be able to complete the final
transitions and then draw down to the end of 2014. And then,
beyond that, to have an enduring presence there that represents
a continuing effort to provide support to the Afghans on
counterterrorism, on training, advice and assist and other
areas.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thanks for being here.
General Dempsey, earlier, before votes, you were answering
questions about chemical and biological weapons in Syria, and I
don't want to recharacterize your comments so I will say what I
thought I heard, and then you can recharacterize more
accurately.
Did you say that you thought we had sufficient transparency
into the security and location of the Syrian chemical and
biological weapons caches?
General Dempsey. I did. To recharacterize it, I believe we
have sufficient intelligence on their facilities related to
chemical and biological weapons in consultation with our close
allies in the region.
Mr. Larsen. The second part of that question is kind of the
``so what'' question. So what if we do? Does that mean that we
are in a position to do something about it if the circumstance
arises where we need to do something about it, and are we
willing to do that, and who makes that call?
General Dempsey. Well, let me start where you began, which
is the ``so what'' of it. As we watch these facilities and
monitor--if you are talking about what are our vital national
interests in that particular country, it seems to me that the
proliferation or the potential proliferation of chemical and
biological weapons, that is to say weapons of mass destruction,
would be right at the top of the list.
Mr. Larsen. I would agree with that. In terms of the
discussions we are having today about Syria and the resistance
and the violence in Syria, if Syria was going to use--if we
thought Syria was going to use these chemical and biological
weapons, what do we do?
General Dempsey. Again, because of the classification of
this setting, let me just assure you that we have planning that
is updated constantly on actions we could take in the event
that those weapons--and, by the way, the planning is being done
with our allies in the region.
Secretary Panetta. I just wanted to assure you on that last
point that we have made plans to try to deal with any
contingency involving those areas. Because we think that does
represent the most serious concern with regards to our
security.
Mr. Larsen. I understand the classification here, and
hearing that assurance is important. We can explore this later
in a different venue.
Secretary Panetta, I want to change the focus a little bit.
Folks have been asking about Afghanistan and China and Russia.
I want to ask about the story I read this morning about Yemen.
Because about 2 years ago, the current CIA [Central
Intelligence Agency] director was sitting about where you are
sitting as a CENTCOM [Central Command] telling us that we did
understand there is a difference between a civil war and what
is a counterterrorism national security interest that the U.S.
is trying to be supportive of in Yemen. A lot has changed since
then obviously with the Arab Spring, but I don't know that a
lot has changed in terms of the U.S. staying out of a civil war
versus the U.S. continuing to pursue a counterterrorism
strategy in Yemen.
The story this morning about joint strikes, whether it is
true or not--let's assume that it is just a story and we are
reading it--that the CIA is looking at changing their strategy
on how they conduct joint strikes and where they go, causes me
to question whether or not--is the CIA tail-wagging the DOD
[Department of Defense] dog or the State Department dog on this
issue? I will just put it out to you. We need to have that
answer, and you can't leave the dais until you answer that.
Secretary Panetta. Thank you.
First of all, with regards to the story in the paper, I
think those involved classified operations, and I guess I would
urge you to try to get what is behind that based on that kind
of classified briefing.
With regards to the larger issue--and I understand the
implications of what you are asking--from DOD's perspective,
and I think it is, frankly, true for Intelligence, our target
there represents those terrorists--those Al Qaeda terrorists
that involve a threat to this country. And there are very
specific targets. This is not broad based. We are not becoming
part of any kind of civil war disputes in that country. We are
very precise and very targeted and will remain pursuant to
those kinds of operations.
Mr. Larsen. That is great from a DOD perspective. I guess
we need a little clearer idea about the Administration's
perspective, if they are changing their view about Yemen or not
over the last couple of years.
Secretary Panetta. Again, without going into specific
details here, the position of the administration is that our
interest in Yemen is the same interest we had in the FATA
[Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and we have in Somalia,
which is to go after those terrorists--those al Qaeda
terrorists who are involved in planning attacks on this
country. No more, no less.
General Dempsey. If I may add, that is on what we are doing
kinetically. But I also want to point out that we are working
very closely with the military in Yemen, notably their special
forces, to increase their capabilities as a building-partner-
capacity endeavor. So I think it is important not to see this
as we are only doing one thing and not the other. We are
actually trying to round it off.
Mr. Larsen. I appreciate that. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again for
you guys being here today.
Just real briefly, over the next 3 months, can you just
explain to us how you see the opposition? Do you see it
fragmenting or do you see it coalescing? How do you see this
playing out over the course of the next 3 months?
Secretary Panetta. In Syria?
Mrs. Roby. Yes. Sorry. Back to the topic.
Secretary Panetta. If I could give you a firm answer as to
what we saw happening, I probably wouldn't be in this job. I
would be somewhere else.
It is a tough thing to try to look at the elements at play
here and try to determine just exactly how this will play out.
Obviously, Intelligence has provided its perspective on this.
I think the best thing that we can see is that, as a result
of this broad-based insurgency, as a result of the
international community's unified approach to dealing with
Syria and applying the sanctions, applying the pressures, and
continuing to indicate that Assad must step down, as a result
of what the U.N. is doing now in implementing a ceasefire where
you now have the support of Russia and China, there is a whole
series of efforts here that I think are putting incredible
pressure on the Assad regime to do the right thing. This may
continue to play out. Assad will continue probably to resist
these efforts, but I think it is just a matter of time before
he is brought down.
General Dempsey. I have nothing to add, Congresswoman.
Mrs. Roby. I guess, playing off of that, the Department of
Defense's assumptions around this, how have our plans evolved
specifically over the last year since we have seen the Syrian
revolution commence?
Secretary Panetta. What we do and what General Dempsey does
with the service chiefs is to develop all of the plans
necessary for any contingency. And whatever the President
ultimately decides, we will be prepared to implement.
General Dempsey. Just to kind of give you the view of the
region writ large, we are a NATO partner with Turkey. We have a
very strong relationship with Jordan. Obviously, Israel. We are
still 200-300 military strong in Iraq. And of course Iraq has a
piece of this as well on their western border.
We have been meeting with leaders throughout the region.
The Secretary met with President Barzani from the Kurdish
region, and they have a huge interest. There are Kurd
populations in northeastern Syria, in eastern Turkey, in
western Iran, and in northern Iraq. And these issues are all
intertwined. So, right now, we are in the business of sharing
intelligence, sharing information, building partner capacity
where we can, and having the credible thread of military
capability to undergird our diplomatic and economic efforts.
Mrs. Roby. I guess what I would just add to that is, based
on comments that have been made from my colleagues in their
previous questioning as it related to what happened in Libya
and maybe the concerns regarding the War Powers Act and how we
proceeded in that action that, of all of the conflicts that we
have dealt with over the past years, that the one lesson
learned is end game and that there needs to be a clear defining
of the mission on behalf of our troops, our military families,
and also Americans. So it is my hope, and echoing the
sentiments of my colleagues, that as we move through this, as
you continue to share information with us, as we act in our
congressional oversight role, that there will be clear lines of
communication on behalf of our military families and the
American people.
Secretary Panetta. I appreciate that concern. I want to
assure you that I think General Dempsey and I are unified with
regards to not proceeding with any military action unless there
is a clear objective, unless we know what it is going to take
to achieve that objective, how long is it going to take, and
ultimately do we have a legal authority to in fact accomplish
what we are being asked to accomplish. And that would involve
very close consultations with Congress.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you both so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you for being here.
General Dempsey, it looks like it is a real possibility
that a post-Assad government might potentially be dominated by
the Muslim Brotherhood, as seems to be coming to pass in Egypt.
What do you think the major likely impacts will be on the
security of Israel and other U.S. interests in the region if
that occurs?
General Dempsey. Yeah, I wouldn't personally predict it
would be Muslim Brotherhood. But what we do know for a fact,
just demographically, is that 70 percent of the Syrian
population is of the Sunni confessional of Islam. And,
therefore, you would have a pretty dramatic shift from a
minority government and a majority out of power to the majority
in power.
I think there will be some combination of conservative
Islamic party's secular--Syria has quite a tradition of
secularism that I wouldn't discount. And among the minority,
the Kurds, the Druze, and the Christians, who have been
supported by the Assad party, but I think they could be
persuaded to become part of the government. And that's the
point, I think, is that in terms of looking toward helping
identify the opposition but then also holding them accountable
before we support them, to committing themselves to a
representative, shared government at the end of this thing so
that we don't end up creating the conditions for a civil war.
Mr. Franks. I think that sounds good. I guess my concern
is, of course, you know, in Egypt, Egypt was a fairly moderate
government as far as the Arab world goes. And with their
elections, they brought in about 40 percent Muslim Brotherhood,
in their parliamentary elections about 20-some plus Salifis,
and that is a fairly frightening coalition.
I suppose the question then should be asked: What are we
doing and what more can we do to ensure that Syrian Kurds,
Christians, any of the Jewish population, and other minorities
there are fully protected and will have meaningful roles in
building at least a religiously and ethnically tolerant
democratic Syria, should the Assad regime be eventually
overthrown?
We tried to do that in Iraq. Many of us were quite
concerned about religious freedom there. That was not achieved,
and there is a terrible purging, especially of the Christian
population in Iraq now. It is a frightening thing, I think, to
a lot of us. What can we do to try to prevent that dynamic from
occurring in Syria in a post-Assad regime?
I direct that to either of you.
Secretary Panetta. The things you have pointed out are
truly legitimate concerns. You know, I guess the response is
that if we can build democratic institutions into these
countries, and to some extent we even see it--we see it in
Iraq. We are beginning to see it in Egypt. We certainly see it
in Libya. Which is that once you build some of these
institutions where parties have to participate in governing and
they have to look at how they can build coalitions and try to
meet their responsibilities to the people, that, whether you
like it or not, it does have some kind of moderating impact.
Even in Egypt, where I understand your concerns, the fact
is that the Brotherhood, there are various segments of the
Brotherhood. Some are now trying to understand that they are
going to have a bigger responsibility there. They are going to
have to exercise leadership with regards to every aspect of
governing there.
And in Iraq, every time it looks like it is headed in one
direction, the fact is that the Kurds and others that are part
of that government continue to bring pressure on the president
to try to stay in the right path. It doesn't always work as
crisply as we would like, but the fact is it does impact on
that. We are seeing some of that in Libya.
There are a lot of forces. As a result of the Arab Spring,
we have unleashed a lot of forces here. But one thing I don't
think we ought to lose sight of is that, as a result of all of
this, we can direct and help direct those countries in a better
direction than where they were. We have to stick to that.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Secretary, if I could try to squeeze in one
last--because you're on the right track here. I guess I'm
hoping that we might be able to involve some of the religious
and ethnic minorities, at least in northern Syria. Because it
seems to me if we do that ahead of time, we have a chance of
ameliorating the issue.
And, of course, we should probably be pretty thankful to
Israel for taking out the nuclear plant at this point, if the
Muslim Brotherhood does gain control of Syria.
Any thoughts you may have?
Secretary Panetta. No, I agree with what you just said.
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Franks.
It is very fitting as we conclude with Congressman Chris
Gibson of New York, who himself is a distinguished veteran of
service in the Mideast and in Central Asia. Congressman Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
strong leadership in the Department of Defense of both
distinguished careers of the gentlemen with us today.
I will talk about Syria in a second, but while I have the
Secretary, I am very curious to hear his feedback. So I am
recently back from Fort Bragg, visiting with one of the
subordinate commands of the Special Operations Command. In
previous work with General Clapper and the Intelligence
Community--and let me say up front that it is remarkable the
level of teamwork that is going on out there, but yet I feel
that we are lacking in terms of systemic codification of some
of the very encouraging developments over the past decade.
I am still hearing that it is not very often but it can
happen that the Intelligence Community may be working a line of
operation, Special Operations Command may be working a line of
operation, and figuratively they will bump into each other. I
know there are efforts to bring stronger collaboration in terms
of information-sharing, but, given your recent history and
work, I would be very curious to know now in your current
capacity what your thoughts are in terms of reform to bring a
closer collaboration between the Intelligence Community and the
Department of Defense?
Secretary Panetta. I would yield to General Dempsey on this
as well, but from my own experience as director of the CIA and
now as Secretary of Defense, at least in the history that I
have been in this town, I don't think there is a better
relationship between the intelligence and the military
operations, special operations forces, than there is today.
They are truly working together.
Whether those operations are taking place in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, in Yemen, in Somalia, other parts of the world,
they are unified in the approach. They are working off of
strong intelligence resources that are being shared. The
operations that are developing, whether they are done on a
covert basis or an overt basis, are basically worked out in the
operations centers that have developed in each of those areas.
There is very close coordination. There isn't a target that is
taken on that doesn't involve the participation of both the
intelligence and military operations, and they are doing it
very effectively.
I do think that we need to learn the lessons. I think you
are right that we need to put in place probably the kind of
lessons learned so that we can make sure that the kind of
cooperation that is going on now is one that continues. That is
probably my biggest concern, is that it is working well now. We
are facing Al Qaeda and we are facing terrorism together. But
as we are able to achieve some success there, there may be a
danger that both of these may go off and try to do their own
thing. That is what we have to pay attention to.
General Dempsey. Yes. I would only add that the sort of
game-changing lessons learned over the last 10 years are the
integration of ISR, SOF [Special Operations Forces], and cyber,
by the way. So I think where you are seeing us move with our
new strategy is we call it a global networked approach to
warfare. Global and networked are the operative words.
Think of it this way: Most of our adversaries, in fact even
state actors, are not confronting us directly. They are
confronting us through networks of surrogates and proxies and
asymmetrically. So to defeat a network, we have to be a
network.
It gets right at what you said, Congressman. We have to
find ways to network our capabilities internal to the
interagency of government--DHS [Department of Homeland
Security], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], DOD, CIA, and
all of those--as well then with our international partners in
ways that we haven't had to do before. But we are on it. We are
working it.
Mr. Gibson. I concur with the assessment. And, of course,
as we go forward, we don't want to overcodify to the point that
we stifle initiative. But I am also concerned and I think I
hear the same thing that much of this is based on
relationships. It is forged in the crucible. And to the extent
that we can codify that, that it wouldn't come to an end in the
event that two individuals, very strong willed, may not get
along, we still need this to work. So much to do.
Just one specific question--I see my time is getting short
here. But with regard to the unrest in Syria, have there been
any adverse implications, ramifications in Anbar and in Nineveh
Province?
General Dempsey. No, not coming from Syria in. One of the
biggest tribes in the Arab world, and you probably know this
having served there, but it runs from northern Saudi Arabia
through western Iraq and up into Syria, and there is assistance
being provided on the basis of tribal relationships flowing
into Syria. It is another one of the complications I mentioned.
But we haven't seen any kind of backwash coming back the other
way.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Gibson.
As we conclude, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here
today. Thank you for your service.
Chairman Dempsey, thank you again for your service and your
commitment to our troops, military families, and veterans.
We shall be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 19, 2012
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 19, 2012
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 19, 2012
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 19, 2012
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. As you know, Russia has not been cooperative in moving
the UN closer to authorizing some form of action in Syria. Some members
have suggested that we use some sort of pressure on Russia to help
convince them to be more helpful. For example, we could fence
Cooperative Threat Reduction funds. Do you believe that this is a good
idea? Why or why not?
Secretary Panetta. Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, such as the
Department's Nunn-Lugar program, typically deal with weapons of mass
destruction issues on which the U.S. and Russia have cooperated
successfully. These programs are important to both governments and the
international community writ-large.
The U.S. continues to engage with Moscow at the highest levels on
Syria in an effort to persuade them that continued support of the Assad
regime, including through weapons transfers, is not in their long-term
strategic interests. We believe that continued engagement with Russia--
rather than threatening decades-old programs that benefit both sides--
offers the best chance of impacting Russian calculations on this issue.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Secretary Panetta, to the greatest extent that you
can, given the unclassified environment of this hearing, please share
with us your views on the stability of the ``cessation of violence''
and the most likely end-game scenarios in Syria.
Secretary Panetta. The U.S. Government policy is to hasten the fall
of the Asad regime and push forward with a stable and democratic
transition.
As UN/Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan recently reported,
the Asad regime has, so far, failed to comply with key obligations. The
Asad regime's forces have not pulled back from population centers, and
a heavy military presence still poses a significant threat to the
Syrian people. It remains to be seen if the Asad regime will maintain
its pledge to permit peaceful demonstrations, open access for
humanitarian aid and journalists, and begin a political transition.
Mr. Langevin. Recent news articles have reported that Turkey is
seriously considering the creation of an exclusion zone inside Syrian
borders. Can you provide an assessment of the feasibility and
likelihood of such an undertaking, as well as the effect that it would
have on the security situation? How would such an action affect our
NATO treaty responsibilities?
Secretary Panetta. Turkey is rightly concerned about the brutality
of the Asad regime, the resulting in-flow of Syrian refugees into
Turkey, and incidents of violence along and across the Turkey-Syria
border. As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has stated that the
Alliance is closely monitoring the situation along the Turkish-Syrian
border.
As the international community works to find a way to end the
violence in Syria, the United States is conducting planning for a range
of scenarios, including how to support partners and Allies that border
Syria. Turkish officials have also said that they have their own
planning for a possible exclusion or buffer zone. Turkey has a modern
force and would likely be capable of establishing and maintaining an
exclusion zone inside Syrian borders, whether opposed or unopposed.
However, since Turkey has not formally approached the United States or
NATO to discuss the details of its planning, it is difficult to assess
the feasibility or likelihood of a Turkish exclusion zone inside Syria.
As a NATO member, Turkey has the right to assess that the violence
along its border with Syria warrants consultations with Allies under
Article 4, which stipulates that Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
may consult whenever, in the opinion of any Ally, the territorial
integrity, political independence, or security of an Ally is
threatened. If Turkey were to approach Allies under Article 4 with
concerns about its border, the United States and all Allies are obliged
to determine if the Turkish situation warrants an Alliance response to
restore and maintain security in the region--an obligation I take
seriously.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. Secretary Panetta, how should Congress measure whether
the Annan plan is working in Syria? What options are on the table
moving forward?
Secretary Panetta. As UN/Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan
recently reported, the Asad regime has, so far, failed to comply with
key obligations. The Asad regime's forces have not pulled back from
population centers, and a heavy military presence still poses a
significant threat to the Syrian people. It remains to be seen if the
Asad regime will maintain its pledge to permit peaceful demonstrations,
open access for humanitarian aid and journalists, and begin a political
transition.
We continue to work with our international partners to come to a
political solution that ends the violence in Syria and prepares the
groundwork for a stable transition in which Asad leaves.
However, we are also attuned to efforts by the Asad regime to
forestall international action by making additional empty promises or
taking half steps. We therefore maintain close contact with our allies
and partners regarding potential cooperative measures that could be
taken to support the UN monitoring mission in Syria.
Ms. Speier. Secretary Panetta, some argue that the perceived
absence of international support is making the armed opposition more
jihadist in nature. In your opinion, is there any validity to this
concern?
Secretary Panetta. Based on what is known, extremist elements--and
foreign fighters in particular--still appear to have a relatively small
role in relation to the armed Syrian opposition. The United States will
continue to monitor extremist groups closely and work with allies and
partners to disrupt flows of terrorist financing and foreign fighters.
Ms. Speier. General Dempsey, in its quarterly report to Congress,
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated that Iraq
cannot defend its air space if Iran violates it to provide arms to
Syria. Recognizing that this is an unclassified forum, to what degree
can Syria's other neighbors prevent arms flows to support the regime
through Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon?
General Dempsey. Internal politics, a lack of resources, and an
expansive border make it difficult for Jordan and Lebanon to
effectively secure their territories. Amman is dealing with an influx
of Syrian refugees and Beirut is divided along pro- and anti-Syrian
lines. However, both countries have increased border security through
the continued deployment of troops and equipment, as Amman and Beirut
fear weapons smuggling and movement of fighters would increase the
potential for violence to spill across the border. Turkey has numerous
means to prevent arms shipments into Syria, including routine customs
enforcement procedures, diplomatic and economic pressure, and military
options. Turkish military and Jandarma forces frequently patrol
mountainous and desert terrain along Turkey's borders, making such
routes unreliable for smuggling large shipments and heavy weapons.
Turkey has not closed its border or ceased trading with Syria, however,
and the large volume of traffic originating from and transiting Turkey
prevents Ankara from inspecting all trucks, aircraft, and ships bound
for Syria.
Ms. Speier. General Dempsey, former U.S. envoy to Bosnia Daniel
Serwer recently argued that the presence of observers is tamping down
the violence, but that there are insufficient numbers of observers on
the ground. In your assessment, how many observers would be necessary
to meaningfully decrease the violence? To end it?
General Dempsey. It is difficult to determine the number of
observers necessary to decrease violence or make it end. UN observers
provide a monitoring function that does not involve direct intervention
to stop violence. We support UNSCR 2043 that mandates 300 UN Military
Observers (unarmed) on the ground in Syria. These observers will
provide substantial distributed monitoring capacity. We believe this
force will be in place by the end of May and it will take some time to
assess the effect their presence is having both on Regime and
Opposition actions.
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