[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND
NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN
SOUTH ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 16, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-148
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON PAUL, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
CONNIE MACK, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska DENNIS CARDOZA, California
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
DAVID RIVERA, Florida KAREN BASS, California
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
ROBERT TURNER, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State................ 6
The Honorable Nisha Desai Biswal, Assistant Administrator for
Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development................ 15
Mr. Daniel Feldman, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State......................... 22
Alexander Thier, Ph.D., Assistant to the Administrator and
Director, Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S.
Agency for International Development........................... 33
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Robert O. Blake: Prepared statement................ 9
The Honorable Nisha Desai Biswal: Prepared statement............. 17
Mr. Daniel Feldman: Prepared statement........................... 25
Alexander Thier, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 35
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 58
ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC
CHALLENGES IN SOUTH ASIA
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2012
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. Good afternoon, the subcommittee will come to
order. I want to welcome all of my colleagues to this hearing
of the subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. The
purpose of this hearing is to follow up on the recent full
committee hearing with the Secretary of State and the USAID
Administrator.
Last week we heard from administration officials on the
Middle East component of the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, and this
week we will focus on the South Asia component which includes,
notably, Afghanistan. Just over a year ago this subcommittee
heard testimony from the administration on our programming in
Afghanistan, and although much has changed on the ground since
then, our policy has not. Although the details continue to
change, the fundamental underlying policy seems to remain the
same and it is driven by one key objective, transition by the
end of 2014 by any means necessary.
In the President's recent speech at Bagram airbase,
President Obama tried to lay out what he believes is the path
forward. Reading that speech, however, it seems to me that it
was more of a victory lap than a statement of strategy or
objectives. Indeed, there is an inherent tension in President
Obama's remarks. On the one hand, he makes very clear that our
objective is to deny al-Qaeda a safe haven, nothing more. On
the other hand, he acknowledges how tenuous the gains we have
made are and that if, as he says, we do not offer ``Afghanistan
the opportunity to stablize, our gains could be lost and al-
Qaeda could establish itself once more.''
While the much-celebrated recently signed Strategic
Partnership Agreement is certainly a move in the right
direction, it is more of a broad commitment toward a similar
future than a road map of how to get there. Clearly, in order
to sustain these goals we must, as President Obama notes, work
to stabilize Afghanistan. But what does a stable Afghanistan
entail? And as important, how do we and the Afghans plan to get
there? We now have this agreement but we have no specifics. We
have the transition plan on the ground, but handing the keys
over is hardly in and of itself a measure of success. How do
our aid programs fit into an overall political strategy? We
have a reconciliation process, but the process is stalled and
by all reasonable assessments is going nowhere. As former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently noted, ``If you
negotiate while your forces are withdrawing, you are not in a
great negotiating position.''
I hope our witnesses will explain today what kind of
Afghanistan we want to see post-2014, and how the policies that
are being implemented get us there. I will confess that my fear
is that the administration has no real comprehensive plan, at
least not on the civilian side. Before we start patting
ourselves on the back too much over the Strategic Partnership
Agreement, we should remember that shared intent is not shared
policy. The devil, as they say, is in the details.
Just to the south in Pakistan, continued sanctuary offered
to insurgents has been one of our largest challenges on the
ground, and regrettably, I fear it will not disappear anytime
soon. To that point, the Department of Defense's most recent
report to Congress notes flatly that, ``The Taliban insurgency
and its al-Qaeda affiliates still operate with impunity from
sanctuaries in Pakistan'' which ``remain the most critical
threat'' to the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan. At its core,
Pakistani sanctuary is really a symptom of a larger problem.
Our strategic objectives in Afghanistan are fundamentally
incompatible with Pakistan's. While we seek a sovereign and
independent Afghanistan, Islamabad vies for a neighbor that can
be easily influenced and controlled. And as serious of a threat
as Pakistani-based insurgent groups pose now, they have the
potential to spiral post-2014 and place Afghanistan once more
in the center of a dangerous regional conflict. I wish this
were the only challenge in our bilateral relationship with
Pakistan, but the 14-point guidelines approved by Pakistan's
parliamentary review of the country's relationship with the
U.S. ensures that more bumps are surely ahead, particularly as
we approach transition in Afghanistan. I hope the
administration is considering how our policy should adjust to
accommodate a shift in our interests vis-a-vis Pakistan post-
2014.
To the southeast of Pakistan, things happily look
significantly better. The U.S.-India relationship has come a
long way in the past 20 years. The U.S. and India are united
not only by shared interests, but by shared values such as a
belief in democracy. And as one of India's leading trading and
investment partners, the United States strongly supports New
Delhi's economic reforms and strongly encourages the Indian
Government to continue along this path. It is no secret,
however, that to date the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
hasn't met U.S. commercial expectations due to the nuclear
liability law passed by the Indian Parliament which essentially
shuts out U.S. companies. I hope our witnesses here today will
discuss what actions are being taken to resolve this.
And finally, I hope our witnesses will address the status
of post-conflict reconciliation in Sri Lanka. I had the
opportunity to travel to Sri Lanka recently, and I am
particularly interested in how Colombo is building on the
recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
Commission. And I might note that the foreign minister, or the
Minister of External Affairs, was here today, and a number of
Members of Congress, including myself, met with him and the
delegation that they brought. We had a very good meeting, I
thought.
Unlike in some places, U.S. national security interests in
South Asia are both dire and immediates. As we approach what
will be a critical time of transition in the region, I hope the
administration crafts its policy with a careful eye toward the
future in order to sustain the gains that have been so hard-
won.
And at this time I would like to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from New York, and my colleague, the
ranking member, Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just as we
examined priorities in the Middle East last week, this week we
are covering the other half of the subcommittee's jurisdiction,
South Asia. Last week I complimented the Obama administration
for proposing, wisely in my view, a significant increase in
American foreign assistance to the Middle East. This week there
will be no such compliments to the administration, which has
requested more money for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which
are far and away the biggest aid recipients that we have in the
region.
Pakistan is like a black hole for American aid. Our tax
dollars go in, our diplomats go in sometimes, our AID
professionals go in sometimes, our hopes go in, our prayers go
in, nothing good ever comes out. Since Fiscal Year 2002, we
have sunk $24 billion in foreign assistance to Pakistan. It is
hard to fathom how so much money can buy so little. Waste at
this scale requires not only an oblivious body politic and
Congress, but a large cadre of government professionals and
horde of contractors. Pakistan's Government, civil-military
relations and economy are not an iota less dysfunctional than
they were 10 years ago, and in some respects are probably
worse.
Pakistan continues to pursue its national interests at our
expense and that of our actual allies. Pakistan continues to
shelter, directly support and sponsor terrorists. Officially
acknowledging this indisputable fact might be grossly
impolitic, but that does not make it less true. American
standing in the Pakistani public opinion is terrible and it is
getting worse. When polled last year, three out of every four
Pakistanis regard the United States unfavorably and more than
half hold it to be a bad thing that Osama bin Laden sleeps with
the fish. Does anyone think another 10 years and another $24
billion will turn things around?
So apart from the need to secure the minimum cooperation
necessary for us to continue to kill as many terrorists as we
can identify and to keep the supplies flowing to our American
troops in Afghanistan, it is hard to imagine a less productive,
more dysfunctional bilateral relationship anywhere in the
world. Budget cutters, here is a fat and truly deserving
target.
And there is another right next door in Afghanistan. If
money and effort and hope simply disappear into the black hole
of Pakistan, then Afghanistan is the equivalent of a
theoretical wormhole. Money goes into Pakistan and by a miracle
of metaphysics or perhaps just electronic fund transfers, it
emerges in bank accounts in the Gulf. A former advisor to
General McChrystal once told me, in Dubai there is a running
joke that at the banks anyone depositing less than $1 million
in cash has to wait in line. It is a good one, but the joke is
on us. We are the chumps who have poured more than $83 billion
in foreign assistance down the world's biggest rathole. And
between the fall of the Taliban and today, other than killing
Osama bin Laden and nearly destroying al-Qaeda, we have
scarcely a single, significant, durable nation-building
achievement to claim despite the extraordinary efforts that we
have made in Afghanistan.
What I really hope is behind the current plan for
transition to Afghanistan's security responsibility in 2014, is
a cold, disspassionate recognition that a country as ruined and
dysfunctional as Afghanistan and that a government so
thoroughly corrupt and ineffectual as Hamid Karzai's cannot be
saved by our efforts. Instead of providing the requested $9.2
billion in military spending and foreign aid in Fiscal Year
2013, we need to put this program on a glide path toward
something much smaller and more sustainable. How small should
it be? I would suggest this rule of thumb. Our support should
never total more than the Government of Afghanistan spends on
itself. Last year that number was $3.3 billion. That would be a
good start.
American interests in South Asia are larger than Pakistan
and Afghanistan, and I apologize for not giving in this a lot
of time the many other countries in the region especially India
that merit attention. But unless we rebalance our policy and
spending priorities in the region away from the expensive,
failed sinkholes and toward building stronger partnership with
the governments and nations that are seizing control of their
own futures, we are going to lose much more than just money.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. At this time, the members
who would like to have 1 minute to make an opening statement
can do so. And we will yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California, Mr. Rohrabacher, who is the chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee on Oversight and Investigations.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
just note that I was a strong supporter of efforts that back
after 9/11 that have failed. And was I wrong for supporting
them? I don't know, maybe I was, maybe I wasn't. Those policies
have failed and we should recognize that after we foisted a
government upon the people of Afghanistan after 9/11 that is
overly centralized, totally inconsistent with their traditions
and has become a captive of corrupt leaders like President
Karzai, who has his own marching orders being given not by the
Afghan people but by the Pakistani Government. In Pakistan
billions of aid has been given to the Paks since then, billions
of aid, while they at the same time have terrorized their
neighbors and repressed their own people. Their own people like
at the Balochs, who are now fighting and struggling for their
freedom there. We should cut Pakistan off of every cent because
it is being used for evil purposes and it has even been used to
kill Americans. It is time we face reality, admit our mistakes
and cut our losses and quit supporting failed policies and
corrupt dictators.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognized for 1
minute if he would like to make a statement.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member. I think I will condense my remarks to Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Pakistan is difficult country with a long history
of instability, military coups and the harboring of jihadists
and other violent enemies of the West and basic democratic
values. In light of recent tensions between Pakistan and our
Government, I think we should carefully reevaluate the nature
of what has been a fundamental foreign policy relationship and
its benefit to us. The President has requested over $2.2
billion in assistance, a 100-million increase over last year.
I, for one, am concerned about how this money is being spent by
this government that has been openly hostile to our interests
and our values.
Finally, everyone in this committee is familiar with the
situation in Afghanistan. With the President having set a 2004
withdrawal date, there is growing concern among many in both
Washington and across the country that the fragile institutions
which we attempted to build in that country will quickly
disintegrate. The President has asked for $928 million in total
aid for Afghanistan. I would like to know what metric we will
have to judge the success of our policies and our
contributions. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would like to introduce the panel here this afternoon. I
will begin with Ambassador Robert Blake who is the Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Affairs at the U.S. Department
of State. As Assistant Secretary, he oversees U.S. foreign
policy with India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives,
Bhutan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and
Tajikistan. He previously served as Ambassador to Sri Lanka and
the Maldives from 2006 to 2009, and as deputy chief of mission
at the U.S. mission in New Delhi, India, from 2003 to 2006.
Since he entered the Foreign Service in 1985, he has served at
the American Embassies in Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Egypt.
And if I might, I would also like to take a moment to thank
you, Ambassador Blake, for the assistance you and your team
have provided the subcommittee over time. Since becoming
chairman I have tried to visit as many of the countries in the
South Asian region as I could and meet with the leaders there,
as well as in the Middle East, and you and your staff and our
diplomats in the region have helped to make those visits very
productive for myself and I know other members as well. We have
some great folks on the South Asia desk and on the ground over
there and we appreciate all your efforts, and I would just like
to publicly thank you for that.
Next, I would like to recognize Nisha Desai Biswal who is
USAID's Assistant Administrator for Asia. Prior to her
appointment she served as the majority clerk for the State
Department and Foreign Operations Subcommittee on the House
Committee on Appropriations. She also served on the
professional staff of the House International Relations
Committee where she was responsible for South and Central Asia
policy as well as the oversight of the State Department and
USAID. Ms. Biswal has worked at USAID for 4 years and has
served as special assistant to the administrator and has worked
in the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and the
Office of Transition Initiatives. We welcome you here this
afternoon.
And next I would like to introduce Daniel F. Feldman who is
one of two deputies to the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan. He previously served as a partner in
the International Corporate Social Responsibility Group at the
law firm of Foley Hoag LLP. He has also served as director of
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security
Council in the Clinton administration, and is counsel and
communications advisor to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee. He acted as senior foreign
policy and national security advisor to the Kerry Presidential
campaign in 2004. And we welcome you here this afternoon, Mr.
Feldman.
And last but not least, we have Alexander Thier who is the
Assistant to the Administrator for the Office of Afghanistan
and Pakistan Affairs at the U.S. Agency for International
Development USAID. Prior to joining USAID, Thier served as
director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of
Peace, and chair of the Institute's Afghanistan and Pakistan
working groups. Thier was also legal advisor to Afghanistan's
constitutional and judicial reform commissions in Kabul, and as
U.N. and NGO official in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the
countries' civil war.
And again, we have a very distinguished panel here this
afternoon. We want to thank you for being willing to testify.
And as you know we have the 5-minute rule, and there is a
lighting system. The yellow light will warn you that you have 1
minute to hopefully wrap up, and when the red light comes on we
would appreciate it if you would cease at that point or very
closely within that. And I do have a gavel but I am sometimes
relatively free with it. Not throwing it at people or anything,
but free at it in maybe giving you a few extra seconds. I am
progressive with the gavel.
So in any event, without further ado, Ambassador Blake, you
are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT O. BLAKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Blake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first let me thank
you for your very kind words about our great team in the field
and our great team in Washington. We really appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure
to be back here to discuss with you the priorities of my
bureau, the South and Central Affairs Bureau. I have longer
written testimony that I will submit for the record, and let me
just briefly summarize what I have to say.
First, let me start by talking about the SCA Bureau's
highest priority which is advancing regional economic
integration both within and between South and Central Asia.
Both regions remain among the least integrated in the world,
and the true economic development potential of the region
particularly of Afghanistan and Pakistan will not be realized
without greater connectivity to the fast growing economies of
South Asia.
Last summer in Chennai, Secretary Clinton outlined her New
Silk Road vision that foresees a network of economic and
transit connections throughout South and Central Asia, with
Afghanistan at its heart. We are starting to see regional
ownership and some momentum in this effort, and our budget
request includes resources to facilitate this. We are also
seeing other countries such as Bangladesh recognize the
importance of tightening the linkage between South and Central
Asia.
The United States is extremely encouraged by the positive
recent steps taken by the Governments of India and Pakistan to
normalize trade and commercial ties. This process of
normalization in both directions could lead to at least a $10-
billion increase in trade, not to mention expanded economic
opportunity and stability for the wider region.
In India we continue to advance our strong partnership.
Secretary Clinton just returned from a very positive and
productive visit to New Delhi and Kolkata. We anticipate that
bilateral goods and services trade will surge beyond $100
billion this year, which represents a quadrupling of trade
since 2000. Meanwhile our security relationship has hit an all-
time high with an approximately $9 billion in U.S. defense
sales to India, and a continuing robust bilateral military
exercise program.
Let me also note continuing progress on civil nuclear
cooperation. As you said, Mr. Chairman, there is more work to
be done on both sides to create the level playing field
necessary for U.S. companies to fully participate in India's
civil nuclear market. In the interim we continue to have
constructive dialogue with the Indian Government on these
issues and we are pleased that U.S. companies are finding ways
to move forward now with commercial negotiations. Finally,
India shares our goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon, and to that end has taken steps to reduce its
imports of crude oil from Iran.
In Bangladesh, Secretary Clinton announced on her trip the
establishment of a partnership dialogue to maximize our
bilateral cooperation on a wide range of issues that are
important to us. We continue to voice our concerns to the
government on issues like labor rights, Grameen Bank, and the
importance of preserving and widening the space for civil
society. We have also urged Bangladesh's leading political
parties to work together for the good of the country, to agree
on a formula for the next national election scheduled for late
2013 or 2014.
In the past year, Nepal has made remarkable strides toward
concluding its peace process and resolving post-conflict
issues. Today, all but 3,000 of the approximately 19,000 former
combatants have departed the cantonments and have begun
integrating into civilian life, and all of the former
combatants' weapons have been turned over to the Nepalese Army.
With this progress in mind, the Department of State is
currently undertaking a review of the Maoists' status on two
terrorist lists, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation has
begun discussions with the government on a threshhold program.
In Sri Lanka the government has resettled over 95 percent
of those displaced during the final phase of its 26-year
conflict, released many former LTTE combatants and undertaken
important infrastructure and other economic development
projects, but there is much that remains to be done. The United
States led successful efforts to win support for a U.N. Human
Rights Council resolution in March that calls for Sri Lanka to
implement its own Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee
report, take action on accountability and allow U.N. special
rapporteurs to visit Sri Lanka, report on their findings and
offer relevant technical assistance. Mr. Chairman, Secretary
Clinton will see Foreign Minister Peiris on Friday to discuss
further all of these matters.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, South Asia's strategic
importance in the region and world affairs will only continue
to grow. And it is my pleasure now to turn this over to my good
friend and colleague, Nisha Biswal, to discuss the vital role
that USAID is playing to support our foreign policy priorities.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blake follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thanks very much, Mr. Ambassador. You were
right to the second on that. That is very impressive, very
impressive.
And Ms. Biswal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NISHA DESAI BISWAL, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Biswal. That is why he is at the State Department, sir.
Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, members of the
committee, thank you again for the invitation to testify today.
I will summarize briefly my opening statement and ask that my
full statement be submitted for the record.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Biswal. This afternoon I wanted to share with you my
perspective on the vital role that U.S. foreign assistance
programs are playing in this important, dynamic and
increasingly democratic region, and in support of the foreign
policy priorities that Ambassador Blake outlined.
The diverse but densely populated subcontinent is home to
nearly one-fourth of the world's population and we are
confronting daunting challenges of disease, deprivation,
natural disasters and environmental degradation. Yet this is
also a region that has shown significant progress and one that
holds even greater promise for the future. And the American
people can take a degree of pride in the role that our
partnership and our assistance has played in this progress such
as the recent success in India on polio eradication.
As Assistant Secretary Blake noted, our investments in the
region have also yielded significant benefits for the American
people. In fact, U.S. exports to developing countries overall
have grown six times faster than exports to developed
economies, and today they represent roughly half of all goods
and services that the United States sells abroad. We know that
the markets of the future will be in these expanding economies
of South and East Asia, and USAID is committed to helping
develop these further.
Finally, under the leadership of Dr. Rajiv Shah, USAID is
reforming the way that we do business by broadening our partner
base making in easier for small businesses, local institutions
and donors to partner with us. We are making better use of
science and technology, strengthening our evaluation capability
and partnering much more effectively with the private sector to
leverage the knowledge, the expertise and the resources of the
American businesses to solve critical global challenges.
The President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget requests $362.3
million for USAID programs in South Asia. The majority of AID
assistance in South Asia is concentrated on the two poorest
countries, Bangladesh and Nepal. About 69 percent of our
assistance goes to these two countries. Nearly 40 percent of
all Bangledeshis today still live on less than $1 a day, and
malnutrition rates in this country continue at an alarming rate
of about 41 percent for children under five. So in Bangladesh
we are addressing food insecurity and malnutrition through our
Feed the Future program, improving health outcomes through a
focus on infectious diseases, family planning, maternal and
child health, and addressing the impact of weather-related
disasters.
Similarly, Nepal faces development challenges and
simultaneously is emerging from a 13-year conflict. AID is
strengthening that fragile transition to peace by supporting
the integration and rehabilitation of thousands of former
combatants into civilian life. We are also working with civil
society and the government to improve the delivery of essential
social services, scale up health interventions and address food
insecurity and build disaster resilience.
In Sri Lanka, USAID has focused on the war-affected
populations in northern and eastern parts of the country to
support reconciliation between the ethnic groups and to
increase economic opportunities for the victims of conflict.
In the Maldives we are supporting efforts to enhance
climate resilience and water security in this incredibly
vulnerable island nation.
And finally, in India, the United States has embarked on a
strategic partnership with the government to harness the
capabilities of both countries to address poverty and hunger
not only in India but around the world. As India steps up its
own engagement and assistance programs globally, it provides a
powerful example of democratic governance and economic growth.
The new partnership between the United States and India brings
together U.S. and Indian resources and partners with U.S. and
Indian businesses to identify and invest in innovative and
cost-effective solutions that can have a transformative impact
not only in India, but can also be adapted for addressing
global challenges.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I just want to reiterate my
commitment to ensuring that our assistance programs are
advancing vital U.S. interests in the region, are being
implemented in the most effective and efficient manner
possible. USAID's programs are a smart investment in our own
prosperity and security. I appreciate the opportunity to share
AID's programs in South Asia and welcome any questions that you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Biswal follows:]
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----------
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. You also nailed it as well
right on the second.
Ms. Biswal. I was 2 seconds off.
Mr. Chabot. Yes, very impressive. They set a big,
important, high standard----
Mr. Feldman. The bar is high.
Mr. Chabot. The bar is very high, it is. Now you might have
heard the bells there which is indicated that we do have votes
on floor. We have time to get in one, so we will take your
testimony and then we will come back and take Mr. Thier and our
questions then after that. We will be gone about \1/2\ hour or
so because we have four votes.
So Mr. Feldman, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL FELDMAN, DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Feldman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me in to discuss our Fiscal
Year 2013 request for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I, too,
have submitted a more detailed written statement which I would
like to ask be submitted for the record.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Feldman. Thank you. While the situation on the ground
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has been quite fluid over the
past year with some significant progress and also remaining
challenges, a constant in our approach is the sober
responsibility we take as stewards of the taxpayers' funds. We
have sought to carefully evaluate our efforts with our
interagency partners and request for Fiscal Year 2013 only the
core resources needed to accomplish and sustain our mission
successfully in this upcoming, very critical and transitional
year.
In Afghanistan the administration has implemented three
mutually reinforcing surges, military, civilian, and
diplomatic, to fulfill the national security imperative of
ensuring that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven
for al-Qaeda. We are committed to learning the lessons of
history and avoiding the kind of precipitous pullout that can
fuel instability. We are now in the execution phase of this
strategic trajectory that the administration outlined for you.
We expect some continuing challenges along the way but we are
doing what we said we would. We are achieving the goals we set
in each of these three surges, fighting, talking and building
at once.
Just 2 weeks ago, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, a Strategic
Partnership Agreement was signed that provides a comprehensive
framework for continued cooperation between the United States
and a sovereign Afghanistan. President Karzai just announced
this past weekend the third tranche of transition, after which
nearly 75 percent of Afghans will be living in areas where
Afghan forces are leading. The Afghan army and police have now
repeatedly demonstrated their enhanced capacity to defend the
Afghan people with minimal assistance from Coalition forces,
and by the end of 2014 the Afghans will be fully responsible
for security throughout the country.
In Chicago this weekend, our allies and partners will join
us in advancing a sustainable, effective Afghan security force
beyond transition. Key to achieving our security objectives is
improved Afghan civilian capacity and economic opportunity,
which requires not only sustained support from the
international community but also critically, Afghan action to
improve governance, fight corruption, promote private sector
investment and protect human rights. In July, the international
community and the Afghan Government will meet in Tokyo to
advance this mutual accountability, building on commitments
already made in a series of international conferences,
including in Istanbul and Bonn, over the past year. While we
will continue to face real challenges we have seen some
remarkable results. We have made significant progress in
bolstering womens' rights and education, expanding health
services to the Afghan people, advancing nascent democracy and
improving Afghan capacity.
We similarly have a clear national security interest in
Pakistan's stability with a population of 190,000 million
people in the second-largest Muslim-majority country in the
world, but with pockets of extremism and nuclear capability in
a tough neighborhood Pakistan is of critical importance to
regional stability and to our regional strategy. We share many
common interests with Pakistan including fighting the
extremists that plague us both, the benefits of a secure and
stable Afghanistan, and developing stronger regional trade
ties.
I want to be clear-eyed in acknowledging that the events of
the past year have posed significant challenges to our
bilateral relationship, but the U.S. and Pakistan have both
expressed and demonstrated a real commitment to getting this
relationship on firmer footing and working together
constructively on military intelligence and economic
cooperation. I have been witness to this personally on my two
visits to Pakistan in the last month alone both as part of
senior interagency delegations to work diligently through these
issues. A critical step must be Pakistan's contribution to the
U.S. and international efforts in Afghanistan through the
reopening of the groundlines of communication. A U.S. team has
been in place in Islamabad for the past 3 weeks, since my last
trip there to address these issues, meeting around the clock
including this evening. We are making progress and hope we can
come to resolution soon. We welcome NATO's invitation to
Pakistan to participate at this weekend's summit in Chicago.
Pakistan's cooperation on our key counterterrorism
priorities is vital. As President Obama said following the
death of Osama bin Laden, we have been able to kill more
terrorists on Pakistani soil than just about anyplace else. We
could not have done that without Pakistani cooperation. We
continue to work with Pakistan to restrict the capability of
extremist groups that pose a serious threat to Americans,
Afghans and ISAF forces and to the Pakistani people. In their
recent parliamentary review, the Pakistanis themselves mandated
that their territory shall not be used for any kind of attacks
on other countries and that all foreign fighters shall be
expelled from Pakistani soil. In this broader national security
context, U.S. assistance to Pakistan is designed to promote
stability and growth in civilian institutions and the private
sector. Though still fragile, Pakistan civilian institutions
have strengthened over the past year and shown great
resilience, and the country is now preparing for elections
which could bring the first handover of one civilian government
to another in the nation's history.
Our assistance is also designed to evolve the bilateral
economic relationship to one based on trade not just aid so
that we can begin the trajectory away from long-term civilian
assistance. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan we recognize that
our objectives cannot be met without regional support and
greater regional trade and economic integration. We applaud
unprecedented steps to improve Indian-Pakistani trade and
commerce in which will continue to advance the Secretary's New
Silk Road vision.
And in conclusion, in Fiscal Year 2013, and looking ahead
in Fiscal Year 2014, are both critical milestones in our
engagement. We look forward to continuing to work closely with
Congress to ensure that our efforts are appropriately resourced
to achieve our objectives.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldman follows:]
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----------
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. And at this time we will
be in recess for a half hour, and then we will have Mr. Thier,
and then question the panel. So we will be gone for
approximately a half hour, and we are in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Chabot. The committee will come back to order. We have
to have two members here at least in order to carry on
business, and we now have two members. So Mr. Thier, you are
recognized for 5 minutes. You might want to hit that mic there.
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER THIER, PH.D., ASSISTANT TO THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Thier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other distinguished
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to
appear today. My statement is also longer and I ask that it be
entered into the record.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Thier. Our civilian assistance to Afghanistan and
Pakistan is a critical component of our core U.S. national
security objectives in South and Central Asia. Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and consequently the region as a whole, present
enormous opportunities and enormous challenges. I began working
in the region 20 years ago when I served in Afghanistan and
Pakistan for nearly 4 years during the Afghan civil war. This
region, wracked with conflict for much of the last three
decades, remains one of the least integrated in the world, with
the vast majority of its human and economic potential untapped.
This does not have to be the case. However, it will take
fundamental changes by regional leaders to transform these
dynamics. Our U.S. civilian assistance programs can be an
essential catalyst and incentive for change, and our efforts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan today are delivering tangible,
measurable results. Our efforts to spur investment in small
Afghan enterprises, expand trade ties between Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India, and connect the restive tribal areas of
Pakistan to the economy and government are creating economic
opportunity, interdependence, better governance and increased
accountability.
The importance and impact of effective, accountable and
sustainable development assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan
is more essential than ever in this period of transition. The
stability of Afghanistan amidst the drawdown of our forces will
require sustained effort to cement the important development
gains that have been made and mitigate the economic
consequences of the reduction of our military presence. We have
seen the dire consequences of neglect and disengagement play
out in this region before, and the Obama administration is
committed not to repeat history.
Afghanistan has, in fact, made remarkable development
progress in the last decade with the support of U.S. and other
donor investments. None of these significant achievements was
foreordained. For example, the Afghan public health story is
nothing short of remarkable. It is an appropriate reminder this
week of Mother's Day that Afghanistan had the worst maternal
mortality rate in the world in 2002, and only 6 percent of
Afghans had access to even the most basic health care. Today,
thanks to an innovative partnership with the Afghan Ministry of
Public Health, access to basic health services has expanded to
over 60 percent, and life expectancy has risen 15 to 20 years,
the single largest gain in life expectancy anywhere in the
world in the last decade.
Improvements in education and economic growth tell a
similar story. But we have also learned the hard lessons in
what is one of the most challenging environments in the world,
and we have made critical corrections to the implementation of
assistance to enhance effectiveness, accountability and
sustainability. The path to sustainable stability in
Afghanistan requires continued commitment to civilian
assistance increasingly through efforts that will boost Afghan
self-sufficiency.
We have prioritized our assistance portfolio to make
foundational investments that will enable transition, ensuring
that Afghans have the skills and resources necessary to chart
their own future. However, this commitment is contingent on the
Afghans fulfilling their commitment to strengthen
accountability, transparency, oversight and the effectiveness
of government institutions.
Pakistan also remains a critical partner for the United
States. Their efforts to deal with rising militancy,
transnational terrorism and nuclear security are of paramount
importance to U.S. national security, and Pakistan's economic
and political stability is essential to achieving those
objectives. Despite the enormous challenges to the bilateral
relationship over the last 16 months, U.S. development work in
Pakistan has persevered and delivered important outcomes for
the United States and for Pakistan.
USAID has crafted a results-driven civilian assistance
strategy that is having a visible and measurable impact that
furthers our objectives there. Over the past 18 months we have
refocused our program in five key sectors, energy, economic
growth, stabilization, education and health, and I hope I will
have more opportunity to talk about those. We have also created
a network of public-private partnerships that will make those
gains sustainable.
In conclusion, development assistance is an important tool
in advancing key U.S. national interests, forging strong and
productive relationships with international partners, and
helping Afghanistan and Pakistan on a path to where our
assistance will no longer be required. Ultimately our
investments in a stable, self-reliant Afghanistan and Pakistan
provide security, economic opportunity, and basic services to
their citizens will enhance U.S. security and the long-term
stability of the region. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thier follows:]
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----------
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Thier. Your time has expired. We
will now have 5 minutes to ask questions. I recognize myself
for 5 minutes for that purpose, and I will begin on Afghanistan
with Mr. Ambassador. Any of the questions I have, anybody is
free to respond if you would like to.
The 6-month assessment team concluded that the Afghan
Public Protection Force, the APPF, was not on track to assume
private and security contract responsibilities by March 20th,
2012, and made six urgent recommendations with regard to
improving the APPF readiness standards. Have any of these
recommendations been implemented, and how many of the
transition readiness standards have been met by the APPF as of
this quarter? Whoever might want to--Mr. Thier?
Mr. Thier. Thank you. I can speak for the USAID portion of
that transition. The date of transition was on March 20th of
this year, and our implementing partners had identified that 34
of our programs in Afghanistan would require the services of
the Afghan Public Protection Force. Today 28 of those 34 have
signed contracts with the APPF. The APPF is at their program
sites and is functioning. The remaining six of those projects
are still negotiating the terms of the agreement under an
extension that was granted to them to do so.
So in specific response, while I do not have an update
assessment that directly tracks the one from last September,
what I can tell you is that for the vast majority of our
projects that require the APPF, the challenge has been met of
contracting with the APPF, the guards are now onsite and
performing the function to the satisfaction of our implementing
partners.
Mr. Chabot. Okay, thank you. My next question has to do
with aid to Pakistan. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
one of my main concerns regarding our current policy in
Afghanistan is the general lack of long-term strategy. I have
that same concern regarding our policy toward Pakistan. Foreign
assistance is a means not an end in and of itself. From looking
through the Fiscal Year 2013 budget proposal, however, it
appears to me that our assistance is not aimed in any larger
objective, they are just a series of disparate programs.
Could one of you explain to me exactly what we are trying
to achieve in Pakistan in particular with our aid? Whoever
would like to take that--Mr. Feldman?
Mr. Feldman. Sure, I will start on that. Alex and I can
split it. We have thought very long and hard about our civilian
assistance to Pakistan, and our request is split almost exactly
evenly between civilian assistance and security assistance.
That was done purposely so that there would be some equality
between those amounts. On the civilian assistance side in
particular, what we have continued to say is that we are trying
to support a long-term stable, civilian, democratic,
pluralistic, tolerant society, and we have prioritized our
assistance into the five key areas that Alex noted. Those are
all, particularly those top priorities of energy, economic
growth and stabilization along the border areas, to help to
build economic stability, build a middle class and ultimately
transition us away from assistance to a more trade-based
economy. And so on something like energy it is impossible to
create the type of middle class that can provide for the
economic stability when we are still dealing with 16-, 18-hour
brownouts. And so our efforts to get megawatts on the grid, to
build, to have economic growth programs in both urban and rural
areas, and then very tangible projects such as roadwork in the
border areas, which help us both on the security and stability
side as well as the economic stability side, are key to those
goals.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. I have only 1 minute left, so one thing I
would like to say is I heartily support the idea of moving to
more trade and less aid. I think that is a goal. We don't
always make it but we certainly ought to attempt to do that.
And finally, my question is about the impact of U.S.
withdrawal on India. Indian decision makers have become
discomfited by signs that the United States and its allies are
preparing to leave Afghanistan in such a way that would provide
a central role for Pakistan in mediating between Kabul and
Taliban elements perhaps even to include a role for the latter,
Pakistan, or Taliban in Afghanistan's governance. Such an
outcome stokes fears in Indian leaders who wish to limit
Islamabad's influence in a post-war Afghanistan.
To what extent are such Indian fears legitimate, and to
what extent, if any, does an Indian role in Afghanistan
represent a legitimate threat to Pakistan's security interests?
And whoever would like to take that--Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Blake. Let me just start on that and then maybe Dan can
chime in. Mr. Chairman, when Secretary Clinton was in India
last week, she talked a lot with the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Minister about what we are doing in Afghanistan and
particularly briefed them on our own Strategic Partnership
Agreement. I think the Indians were very reassured by that and
reassured by the long-term commitment that we are demonstrating
to Afghanistan. And indeed, the Indians themselves are doing a
lot to show their own long-term commitment. They have a $2-
billion assistance program. They have recently invested in a
very large iron ore project that is a multi-billion dollar
project at Hajigak, where they will not only be investing in
that but also the associated infrastructure.
And then we really see India as kind of the lynchpin of the
New Silk Road vision, because they are going to be the largest
market in the region. So they are really so important to
developing a lot of these regional projects like the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, and many,
many other things like that. And of course they have been
making a lot of progress with Pakistan on the bilateral trade
side which is very, very important to this vision that you
talked about of trade. If we are going to create a trade-based
economy in Afghanistan, a very important part of that will be
to open up those trade routes to India.
Mr. Chabot. Okay, thank you very much. And my time is
expired. I will yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Connolly, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will ask
first, unanimous consent to my full statement be entered into
the record?
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. Ambassador Blake, I think
this may be a question for you, but it may be for Mr. Feldman.
The United States and Pakistan seem to have been on different
paths when it comes to the Haqqani network. Can you comment on
where we are in our discussions with the Pakistani Government
with respect to this very troubling issue?
Mr. Feldman. As I noted in my opening statement, core among
the shared interests that the U.S. and Pakistan have is our
commitment to fighting extremism and it has taken many forms.
And I noted the President's statement, which is in my written
statement as well as some specific examples, of continued
coordination on the counterterrorism side over the last year.
On the Haqqani network in particular, I can echo Secretary
Clinton's own comments when she was there last in October, when
she talked about how terrorism is mutual threat to all of us.
And at that point she noted the efforts to squeeze the Haqqani
network both from the Afghan side of the border, which was
going on with military operations, as well as from the
Pakistani side. And we have listed some specific steps that we
have ongoing intelligence channel conversations with the
Pakistanis about on continued ways to do that including and
ensuring----
Mr. Connolly. But Mr. Feldman----
Mr. Feldman [continuing]. Intel sharing on financial----
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Hold on just for a second. There
is convincing evidence that elements of the Pakistani
Government have protected the Haqqani network within the
borders of Pakistan. What are we doing to change that?
Mr. Feldman. Yes, sir. We are working jointly with the
Pakistanis on targeting Haqqani very, very explicitly. We have
targeted them through listings specifically and individually.
We continue to work with the Pakistanis on ways that we can
confront this not only through military effort but through a
range of efforts that the civilian government, the intelligence
channels and others can take for part of our conversation----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Feldman, is it your testimony to this
subcommittee that the Pakistani Government and all of its
elements including the ISI are in full cooperation with the
United States in trying to suppress the Haqqani network as a
terrorist organization?
Mr. Feldman. We continue to work with the Pakistanis very
closely on all extremist threats posed to both the U.S. and
Pakistan----
Mr. Connolly. That is not my question, Mr. Feldman.
Mr. Feldman [continuing]. Including the Haqqani network.
Mr. Connolly. My question is, do we have the full
cooperation of the Pakistani Government in this matter? It is
not a complicated question.
Mr. Feldman. And I would say we are coordinating very
closely with the Pakistani Government.
Mr. Connolly. And I would say you just didn't answer the
question, Mr. Feldman.
Mr. Feldman. Sir, our counterintelligence efforts are core
to our shared interests here, and the Haqqani network is chief
amongst them. There are key Haqqani targets who have been
killed in Pakistan over the last year both through our own and
shared efforts, and there are a range of other alternatives
that we are taking to try to continue to target them.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I think in this Congress in a
bipartisan basis, there is very troubling evidence of the lack
of cooperation with the Pakistani Government on this matter and
the Haqqani network is a very dangerous, potent network that
has been listed as terrorist. And if we are going to have a
partnership or a collaboration with the Pakistani Government
that is the least we can expect of them. And the idea that they
actually harbor the Haqqani in Pakistan is extremely troubling,
Mr. Feldman. The fact that we make representations to the
Pakistani Government is not sufficient.
Ambassador Blake, we just saw an assassination of somebody
who was sort of playing interlocutor with the Taliban with the
idea toward enticing some elements of the Taliban to negotiate
with the United States Government with the Government of
Afghanistan. That seems not to bode well for any prospect of
negotiating with such an extremist Islamic element like the
Taliban. Would you comment?
Mr. Blake. I am handling India and all the countries
around----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Blake, we can't hear you. I'm sorry, Mr.
Ambassador, we can't hear you.
Mr. Blake. Let me defer to Dan again on that one.
Mr. Connolly. You are back, Mr. Feldman.
Mr. Feldman. I am here to talk about----
Mr. Connolly. You are going to tell me again with marbles
in your mouth, we are cooperating very closely with----
Mr. Feldman. Sir, I think as Chairman Mullen noted when he
testified last fall, there is no solution in the region without
Pakistan and there is no stability in the region without
Pakistan. And core among our chief interests which are
continuing to work and to evolve and where we have a very
robust, ongoing relationship through intelligence channels,
through military channels and through civilian channels, this
is chief amongst our commitments. We talk to the Pakistanis
constantly about the need to continue to target even more
robustly Haqqani network.
Mr. Connolly. Okay, so you were putting closure on the
previous question. I just asked a question about the Taliban.
Mr. Feldman. Yes.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired, but the
gentleman is yielded 1 additional minute.
Mr. Feldman. On the most recent assassination we don't have
any specific intelligence on where that originated from.
Obviously, the reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan are part
of our core interests. The diplomatic surge is one of the three
surges. The High Peace Council is key among those, and there
are those to seek to undermine the reconciliation process who
are targeting specific members of the High Peace Council. But
we don't have any intelligence at this point in terms of who
ordered that.
Mr. Connolly. But--Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge just
one follow-up. My question really wasn't so much what
intelligence we have as asking you to react to the idea that it
calls into question, if you will, the efficacy of trying to
engage the Taliban in reconciliation at all, and in a tragic
way this assassination perhaps puts the exclamation point on
that. You may not share that view, and I am inviting you to
tell us whether you do or don't, or----
Mr. Feldman. Sir, I would say that we have long said
through both military and civilian leadership that this
conflict would not end through military means alone. It has to
end, as most insurgencies end, through some sort of political
resolution and reconciliation. That is why we are continuing to
try to pursue all possible channels on reconciliation in
conjunction with continuing our military and civilian efforts
as well. I think this assassination indicates that there is
actually great divisions within the Taliban, and that there may
well be some who are seeking to reconcile and others that are
not. And in as far as it may be a signal of conflict and chaos
within the Taliban that is not a bad thing for our interests.
Mr. Connolly. And to your point, and the U.S. Government's
position is there are some elements worth trying to reconcile
with?
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. Did you want
to respond to that quickly?
Mr. Feldman. Yes, sir. That is part of our fundamental
strategy that we would have these three surges simultaneously,
military, civilian and diplomatic, and reconciliation is the
core piece of that diplomatic strategy.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In following up with
my good friend from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, Chairman Mullen,
himself, stated that the Haqqani network is operating with
Pakistan support. Secretary Clinton warned the President of
Pakistan about this. Recently I was in Pakistan, last November,
we talked to President Zardari about this. But in his terms he
said, we don't pick and choose between terrorist organizations,
we go after them all. So I see a bit of a conflict. And of
course when we get briefed on this they say, well, they have
the terrorists that are in the good bin and those in the bad
bin, and so where does the truth lie? I guess, Mr. Feldman, you
are the man of the hour.
Mr. Feldman. I am the man of the hour. Sir, as Chairman
Mullen said and as I was attempting to try to say before, he
expressed the administration's view that continuing safe havens
are extremely troubling and we have to see action taken against
them. But he also emphasized in that exact same testimony that
we need to continue to stay engaged to be able to do that and
he cautioned against signs of disengaging with Pakistan.
Mr. McCaul. Well, then and also the report came out that
Haqqani was behind the Afghan attacks against the U.S. envoy
just last, well, in April of this year.
Mr. Feldman. Yes.
Mr. McCaul. They are killing our soldiers. And the idea
that the Pakistanis could be complicit and working with them,
which I personally believe is true, is very troubling to
policymakers like ourselves, and particularly when it comes to
foreign aid. Could the Secretary certify today that the
Pakistani Government is in no way working with the Haqqani
network?
Mr. Feldman. Well, that is one of the certifications that
we are working through right now on a staff level and we don't
have an answer for you at this point. But we are taking that
certification, which I know you have been quite involved with
very seriously, and trying to look at it as soberly as
possible. Look, we need to be in a position where in every
engagement with the Pakistanis we can continue to show the need
for increased cooperation on extremists including among the
Haqqani network which pose a threat to both of us. And there is
clearly more that could be done, but the way that we continue
to try to get this done is to increase engagement. And as
Secretary Clinton said when she was there last, it is through
issues like the financing networks, on intelligence sharing, on
working with law enforcement personnel to deny safe haven, and
we raise this at every opportunity at every level in all of our
engagement.
Mr. McCaul. And I totally agree with the engagement issue.
I just think again when it comes to being able to certify
whether or not Pakistan, ISI or government at any level is
working with Haqqani, it sounds like this is a work in progress
within the administration in terms of whether or not they can
certify that question.
Mr. Feldman. It is indeed a work in progress. But I can
tell you very honestly it is still happening at the staff level
where we are collecting all the data, and in looking at the
range of criteria----
Mr. McCaul. Are you aware of any evidence that they are
cooperating and working together----
Mr. Feldman. There is a range of evidence, and depending on
the certification for the steps that they have taken countering
extremism and terrorism including on Taliban, including on
Quetta Shura and last on the Haqqani network, but continued
efforts to try to encourage joint----
Mr. McCaul. Well, encourage to continue that pressure. I
know the Secretary is very good at that. She is smart. I know
she is putting that pressure on.
Want to echo the chair's comments about trade. When we met
with President Zardari, and I just want to pass this along, he
said, really what I want is more trade not aid. And we had
dinner with some Pakistani businessmen who were working with
the Indians, and there are actually now some pretty closer
business ties between Pakistan and India which I think long-
term will resolve a lot of this tension between the two
countries that has caused so many problems for us here as well.
Last question I want to ask Ms. Biswal. In Herat there has
been kind of an experiment going on with five different things,
health care, water, food, job training, and education too, kind
of have a more holistic approach to our aid to that area in
Afghanistan. USAID, there have been a lot of problems with the
way it has, I think, functioned in Afghanistan. This has been a
sort of joint project with USAID and the NGOs. And I would ask
that you look at what is going on in Herat as a potential model
for the rest of the country. I don't know if you are familiar
with what is going on there or not, or if you can comment on
that.
Ms. Biswal. I would defer to my colleague, Alex Thier, on
that.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. Mr. Thier?
Mr. Thier. Yes, hi. Thank you. I am not obviously certain
which project you are referring to. I have been to Herat
recently, and if you have been, Herat is the place in
Afghanistan when you visit you think if the rest of the country
could look like this in a decade we would be doing well. So I
fully endorse the notion that there have been some very
successful programs there. And I want to link it to this
broader issue which is that Herat is a trading city. It has
always been a trading city, and its strength is drawn from the
fact that they have very successfully, in the last 10 years,
rebuilt trade relations going in every direction, which I think
is contributing to the prosperity of the city. And one of the
things that we are really trying to do in Afghanistan in that
part as well as other parts is to really provide these tools of
self-sufficiency so that more Afghans are building their own
sustainable livelihoods rather than depending on----
Mr. McCaul. I would ask that you look at that model and see
what they are doing there to just work. Even some Taliban
members are coming back to the village saying, we want to join
you because we don't like--they are doing it just for $5 a day,
a lot of these guys, and they don't want to be with the
Taliban. Now the top leaders, they are who they are, but I
think we can win back a lot of the Afghan people through that
kind of model.
I know my time is expired.
Mr. Chabot. Yes, great. The gentleman's time has expired.
We will go to a second round now and I recognize myself for 5
minutes. I would like to shift a little bit here to Sino-Indian
relations. The simultaneous rise of the two world's most
populous countries has elicited anxieties in both New Delhi and
in Beijing. The dynamics of the triangular U.S.-India-China
relationships are likely to be critical to fostering global
stability and prosperity in the 21st century.
How do you see these things progressing in coming years?
And additionally, anti-Indian rhetoric has become more common
in China's state-run media. Some hawkish Indian analysts assert
that China's newly muscular stance toward India is a direct
result of the U.S.-India strategic partnership. To what extent,
if any, do you agree with that particular assessment? Whoever
would like to take it on--Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Blake. Mr. Chairman, let me just say, first of all,
that both the United States and China have continuously
stressed that our expanded strategic engagement is not coming
at the expense of China and that neither one of us are seeking
to contain China. On the contrary, both of us are seeking to
engage China wherever possible. In my own case, I have very
productive dialogues with my Chinese counterparts both on South
Asia and on Central Asia to try to encourage more cooperative
efforts between us and at least understand what each of us are
trying to get accomplished in each of these important regions
for us. And I must say that the quality of those dialogues has
really improved over the last several years. I think another
kind of important factor to note is that Sino-Indian trade has
grown very, very fast, so that has given both of those
countries an enormous stake in each other's success, and I
think has helped to give them incentive to work through some of
the very tough border and other issues that they have.
So I think both of our countries are going to continue to
try to engage China, to be clear when we have differences, but
also to look for opportunities where we can work together. We
have actually proposed a trilateral U.S.-China-India dialogue,
and I think that the Chinese are seriously considering that
now. We hope that they will agree to that. And one of the most
interesting early topics for discussion would be Afghanistan,
because we believe there are ways that we could work together
in that country.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Staying on India but a related
issue, the relations between the U.S. and India have been
somewhat strained due to India's continued import of Iranian
oil. This dynamic was the focus of Secretary Clinton's recent
trip to India where she said, ``We are encouraged by what we
have seen the Indian Government being able to do. We want to
keep the pressure on Iran.'' India said on Tuesday that it
would cut purchases of Iranian oil by 11 percent. And we had a
meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister awhile back, and I
think in a bipartisan manner we all emphasized how important
this was to us.
And so my question is, is this move big enough to avert
U.S. sanctions, and how will this move affect U.S.-Indian
relations? Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Blake. Thank you for that important question, Mr.
Chairman. As you say, when Secretary Clinton was in India last
week she welcomed the progress that India is making, and she
noted that the United States and India both show the same goal
which is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. So
India has been really terrific in their support in four
different votes in the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, on this subject. Prime Minister Singh has said publicly
many times, it is not in India's interest to have another
nuclear weapon state in the region. So I think we are in pretty
good convergence on this. We continue to urge India to make
progress in continuing to reduce its imports of oil from Iran
as we do with all of our other partners. And as the Secretary
said, there is progress but we need to see continued progress
from them and other countries.
Mr. Chabot. And then finally, in the short time that I have
left there, it is no secret that to date, and I had mentioned
this in my opening statement, that the U.S.-India civil nuclear
agreement hasn't met U.S. commercial expectations, and a key
impediment has been the nuclear liability law passed by the
Indian Parliament which essentially, as I mentioned, shut down
U.S. companies in being involved there. I understand that the
Department has been in some discussions with the Indians about
the implementation of this law. What is the current status of
that liability law?
Mr. Blake. Well, again, Secretary Clinton discussed this on
her visit last week with senior Indian leaders. She noted that
we continue to have a very strong interest in supporting our
companies' interests in moving ahead, particularly Westinghouse
and General Electric. She was pleased to hear from India that
they have restated their commitment to ensuring a level playing
field for our companies. We have had a very strong dialogue on
the liability legislation. That dialogue has relieved some of
our concerns but not all of our concerns, and I think our
companies still feel that there are impediments to moving ahead
with the current law, so we will continue to work through that.
But in the meantime we are focusing on trying to support
our companies' efforts to sign early commercial agreements,
things that do not require or they are not impeded in any way
by the existing liability legislation. Things like early
engineering and other contracts that would be the kind of
precursors to a wider reactor contract. So there has been
progress on that and we hope that we can see some early
conclusion to some of those contracts that would be quite
important to our companies.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired. The gentleman
from Virginia is once again recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. Mr. Ambassador, following
up on the chairman's question about India's cooperation in our
sanctions and other policies with respect to Iran. We had a
dinner with the new Indian Ambassador here in Washington, and
she made the point that India is heavily reliant on Iran as a
source of oil. I want to say 15, 20 percent, something in that
range. I assume that was the subject of ongoing discussions
between the Secretary and Indian leadership when she was there.
What is the sense of progress we are making in helping the
Indians to lessen their reliance on Iran as a source of fuel?
Mr. Blake. As the Secretary said and as I said earlier, Mr.
Connolly, I think progress is being made. To be clear, India is
making this progress not because of our own bilateral urgings,
but I think they are making progress because they say that this
is because of financial and commercial considerations. Most of
the Indian companies that have been working in Iran are pulling
out for their own reasons, again, looking at market
considerations. That is certainly a welcome development from
our perspective. So we have had a good dialogue on this, and
again we welcome the progress. And that percentage is steadily
going down even as India's energy needs----
Mr. Connolly. Consumption, yes.
Mr. Blake [continuing]. Are growing quite substantially.
Mr. Connolly. One can't be unsympathetic with the Indian
plight. It is not that easy to radically alter, especially in a
big country like India, as you say with growing consumption,
growing demand, to easily just change your supply pattern. Are
we assisting the Indian Government in identifying alternative
suppliers?
Mr. Blake. We are. And we are really assisting all of our
friends that are in this same predicament. In the Indian case
they have actually had a long-term policy to source more from
Saudi Arabia that has been going on for several years, so you
will see the percentage from Saudi Arabia has been growing
rapidly. A more recent important source for them is Iraq which
itself has been increasing its own production and so that also
has become quite an important source for India.
Mr. Connolly. Maybe the Keystone Pipeline will help India
with its energy independence too. I am surprised that claim
hasn't been made.
Ms. Biswal, when I was in Afghanistan, AID was ramping up
big-time, several years ago, and so was DEA. Recent report
about poppy production seems to suggest that actually we have
lost ground in that respect, 17 out of 34 provinces now poppy
producers, three of which had been previously declared as
poppy-free. That sounds like all of the aid we are providing
through your agency and through DEA does not seem to have had
the desired effect. Your comment?
Ms. Biswal. I am going to again defer to my colleagues,
Alex Thier and Dan Feldman, on this.
Mr. Feldman. Yes, Mr. Connolly, we would be happy to get
back to you with a briefing specifically on counternarcotics.
There have been reports on several of the districts that have
gone from poppy-free to some production, but that production is
still relatively minimal, and I am not sure whether the overall
trends agree with your supposition that the overall amount is
down. What we can talk about is what USAID and other of our
civilian assistance is doing in agricultural production to
create livelihoods and to create more economic stability in the
countries, specifically focused on poppy-producing regions.
I don't know if you wanted to say anything more on that?
Mr. Thier. So there is obviously two components to this
program. The State Department INL works mostly on the
eradication and prosecution and so on side of their narcotics
control element and USAID focuses on what we call alternative
livelihoods, creating a way for farmers who are in the poppy to
get out of it and to get out of it sustainably. We have seen,
really pretty dramatic in the last couple of years, increases
in crop yields in Afghanistan and specifically in some of those
areas that are targeted to try and replace poppy cultivation
with cultivation of wheat and horticulture. So that is
improving. What we are really now working on is trying to get
them better market access, because you can plant one thing one
season and then if the prices change plant a different thing.
And what we need to do is to be able to take the success we
have had in agricultural production and make that long-term by
creating more sustainable access to markets.
Mr. Connolly. Two observations if I may. One is,
interestingly, one of the great consumers of Afghan poppy
production is actually Iran, and there may be an opportunity
there for cooperation. Secondly, in my previous life up here,
on the Senate, in my portfolio was international narcotics
control. And the observation I have in looking at many
countries that are producers of various substances is that we
have the disadvantage that many food crops or other kinds of
agricultural production simply don't compete economically,
unfortunately, with the drug of choice or the precursor to that
drug of choice. And that is what we are up against. I mean how
do you disincentivize a farmer who is poor and wants to feed
his family from growing a cash crop that is highly lucrative
and easily brought to market, and we are offering them, grow
some food crops that are a fraction of the cash value of that
crop? And I think that has got to be a dilemma including in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. Did anybody
want to comment on that? If not, I would just comment, myself,
and then we are going to wrap this up. One area that I think
has been a dismal failure is our ability to influence
Afghanistan relative to the poppy. Opium production in the
world, 90 percent of it is coming from Afghanistan, and we are
supposed to have some influence there and have spent billions
and billions and billions of dollars. But to think that 90
percent of the world opium production comes from Afghanistan
means that we haven't even scratched the surface in being
successful on that front.
But in any event, I would like to thank the panel for their
testimony here this afternoon. We appreciate it greatly.
Members will have 5 days to supplement their statements and
remarks or offer additional questions. And if there is no
further business to come before the committee, we are
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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