[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
NATO: THE CHICAGO SUMMIT AND U.S. POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 26, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-166
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey--
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California deceased 3/6/12 deg.
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
RON PAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CONNIE MACK, Florida ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID RIVERA, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
ELTON GALLEGLY, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
TED POE, Texas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 8
Mr. James Townsend, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European and NATO
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 20
Mr. Damon Wilson, executive vice president, The Atlantic Council. 41
Mr. Luke Coffey, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation..................................................... 50
Stephen Flanagan, Ph.D., Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy
and National Security, Center for Strategic and International
Studies........................................................ 67
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and
Eurasia: Prepared statement.................................... 5
The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow: Prepared statement............... 11
Mr. James Townsend: Prepared statement........................... 22
Mr. Damon Wilson: Prepared statement............................. 44
Mr. Luke Coffey: Prepared statement.............................. 52
Stephen Flanagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 70
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 88
Hearing minutes.................................................. 89
Written responses from the Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow to
questions submitted for the record by:
The Honorable Gus Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida......................................... 90
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York........................................ 92
NATO: THE CHICAGO SUMMIT AND U.S. POLICY
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THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2012
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jean Schmidt
presiding.
Ms. Schmidt [presiding]. Now I would like to open the
subcommittee hearing on Europe and Eurasia. Since I have
already given an opening statement, I am not going to say
basically the same thing again, but echo that belief that we
need to expand the membership in NATO to many of the countries
that were mentioned here today.
But now I would like to ask Mr. Meeks if he has an opening
statement.
Mr. Meeks. I do. Since I gave mine, basically, on the
Georgian markup and resolution, I do want to make some comments
specifically about NATO and the Chicago Summit and U.S. policy.
I want to thank, again, Chairman Burton, for scheduling
this hearing. It is very timely, as it is leading up to the
Chicago Summit.
NATO remains the United States' premiere defense alliance
and an essential instrument for peace, in my estimation. The
Chicago Summit will take place this year as allied leaders
grapple with severe budgetary constraints, wind down the ISAF
presence in Afghanistan, and develop the capability to respond
to increasing threats to global strategic stability and peace.
Contemplating these challenges, it is useful to look at the
continuum of NATO policymaking or at least at recent history.
At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO adopted a new strategic concept
which outlines NATO's vision for the coming decade. Realization
of this strategy will enable the alliance to respond to a full
range of evolving threats, including to energy and cyber
security and migration, and will provide stability beyond the
geography of the alliance.
But I mentioned constraints. In implementing this strategy
and in anticipating, confronting, and eliminating threats to
peace and stability, NATO must do more with less. In this age
of austerity on both sides of the Atlantic, defense budgets,
all budgets, are under pressure. Defense expenditures as a
percentage of GDP vary from 4.8 percent in the United States to
0.8 percent in some member states, and raises the questions of
readiness of NATO assets. This is a concern that must be
addressed.
Some alliance members, for example Latvia, are working
toward meeting the commitment despite financial difficulties.
As they chart their way out of the financial crises, their
long-term budget planning will raise defense spending to 2
percent of GDP by 2020. State Secretary of Latvian Ministry of
Defense, Mr. Janis Sarts, recently stated that, ``the current
defense budget was appropriate for the time of the crisis, and
we were able to do it thanks to the understanding of other NATO
member states. But we should not expect that we will be able to
live on the account of others in the future.''
Since the Cold War, NATO has expanded from 16 to 28
members, a fact that has been a driver for reform and generated
stability throughout Europe. The alliance vision for a Europe
whole, free, and at peace remains unrealized. The goal is
attainable; integration into Euro-Atlantic structures of all
European countries that so desire is the path, the correct path
toward it, in my estimation.
NATO allies Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and
Montenegro have expressed their aspirations to join NATO, and
alliance leaders recognized their aspirations at the Bucharest,
Strasbourg/Kehl, and Lisbon Summits.
Passing complex reforms, maintaining high levels of public
support, and, above all, committing troops, expertise, funding,
material, and political support to critical operations in
Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya, these nations have repeatedly
asserted NATO membership as a strategic policy goal. We, the
NATO member states, must acknowledge these gestures by
providing these countries roadmaps to membership.
Two issues concern me, though, about NATO's enlargement
prospects. My concern is that there is an apparent lack of
cohesion within the alliance regarding Georgia becoming a
member of NATO, and whether perception or politics, it is
unhealthy for the future of NATO and the future of Georgia to
let this question linger. I hope that the Chicago Summit will
bring some clarity there.
My other concern relates to bilateral conflicts playing out
within NATO. Today we are seeing bilateral conflicts between
alliance members, aspirant countries, and partners; notably,
Greece and Macedonia's disagreement over the name issue that
keeps Macedonia out of NATO; Turkey and NATO-partner Israel's
multidimensional discord that led to Turkey preventing Israel
from attending partnership meetings at the NATO Summit.
I am troubled that these unresolved issues undermine core
NATO values and hamper alliance functions and capabilities. I
urge all parties, NATO members and non-NATO members, to
consider the broader ramifications of using NATO as a venue to
gain leverage in bilateral disputes. I call on my congressional
colleagues and the administration to convey this message to all
of the relevant parties.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely
hearing. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' thoughts on
how we can maintain a NATO as the essential forum for allied
security consultations, decisions, and action.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
I apologize for my temporary absence. We had a bunch of
votes in another committee, but it is good to be back.
In less than a month, leaders of NATO member states will
converge, as my colleague said, in Chicago for the Chicago
Summit. As are my colleagues, I am a strong supporter of NATO.
Based on the bedrock of the common principles of democracy,
individual liberty, and the rule of law, over the course of the
63 years of its history, the alliance has evolved to protect
the freedom and security of all of its members.
Is that call from the President for me? [Laughter.]
NATO will evolve through the Chicago Summit as it has done
through the past Summits, including Riga, Bucharest, and
Lisbon. We are here to discuss how NATO will evolve.
It is clear that the Summit will address Afghanistan and
NATO's commitment through 2014 and beyond. The alliance should
also take this opportunity to begin to formulate a coherent
strategy toward the Middle East and North Africa, including
Libya, Syria, and Iran, that works with and develops the
alliance's partners in the region.
I was critical of the military action in Libya. As we have
learned, once the military goes in and does its job, the next
step often remains unclear as to what we do and not fully
understanding the internal political dynamics of the countries
that we are trying to help. The resulting instability can lead
to greater threats and further instability. NATO needs to think
beyond the military stage and prepare for the political
realities after fighting.
Toward that end, a number of us have made statements on the
Floor about the United States being involved in these affairs
without Congress passing resolutions dealing with those things.
I have stated in numerous articles that Congress needs to be
involved in the decision making process and that neither the
President nor one or more Senators should unilaterally make
decisions to involve us in military conflicts without the
consent and the support of Congress.
I am concerned with the effects of the European financial
crisis on NATO. As I have previously stated, I am skeptical of
the steps Europe has taken to solve the crisis and feel that
the crisis is not over. Clearly, this ongoing crisis has
impacted, and will continue to impact, the resources that the
alliance's European members are willing and able to invest in
defense. Of the 28 NATO members, only three currently meet the
common commitment to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense.
At the same time, further cuts are expected, and that is
something that we ought to all be concerned about.
I agree with the concerns then-Secretary Gates voiced last
summer in Brussels; there will be growing difficulty for the
U.S. to sustain its current support for NATO if the American
taxpayer continues to carry the bulk of the burden of the
alliance. NATO must always work to improve cooperation and
coordination among its members; however, such actions are the
very essence of what it means to participate in an alliance and
are not a replacement for adequate funding. While I understand
and embrace the need for austerity and reduced government
spending on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly here, I
urge all members of the alliance to incorporate the 2 percent
commitment in their long-term budgetary goals. I hope that is
discussed very thoroughly in Chicago.
However, at the same time, I urge the administration to
make it clear that, despite the need for increased focus on
Asia, the United States remains committed to achieving and
maintaining the longstanding goal of a Europe: Whole, free, and
at peace.
The concerns that I have just raised are based on my
steadfast support of NATO. The alliance stands with the U.S.-EU
economic cooperation as a cornerstone of global stability. The
alliance must increase cooperation with key partners around the
globe to better leverage transatlantic leadership in the face
of diverse challenges. However, NATO must also remain committed
to enlargement by providing paths for qualified aspirant
countries that embrace the alliance's common values to enter
the ``open door.'' As we have seen in Afghanistan, such
countries already provide the alliance with important
capabilities.
If we do not provide clear pathways toward future admission
into the alliance, and, thus, the transatlantic community, we
create conditions where these countries can slide backwards,
away from Europe and further away from democracy and stability.
Although the Summit would be far more productive if held in
Indianapolis--that is my hometown--or Little Rock, as my
colleague just said. Little Rock? Is that in America, Little
Rock? [Laughter.]
Chicago will present an important opportunity for the
alliance's leadership to solidify a final strategy for
Afghanistan, formulate a coherent strategy for supporting
stable democratic development in the Middle East and North
Africa, and establish a unified vision for NATO's future that
reaffirms its members' support for maintaining a robust
alliance while enhancing cooperation with key global partners
and maintaining a responsible open-door policy.
I am very eager to hear the testimony from our witnesses
today and learn more about NATO's future.
Do we have any other members who would like to make an
opening statement? The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]
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Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to make a
short opening statement to add to what I said before.
I think it is very important. You know, when the Soviet
Union fell, and I was a member of this committee way back then,
as you were, Mr. Chairman, I called for expansion of NATO as
quickly as possible because I really believe that you strike
while the iron is hot.
We now see that, since it is so much later and that Russia
has to some degree regained its footing, it is opposing
expansion of NATO as somehow a perceived threat to them, but it
isn't.
I still believe that NATO should expand and that countries
that want to get into NATO ought to become members of NATO.
Georgia, the Ukraine, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia
ought to become members of NATO. They want to, and we should
welcome them with open arms. I think it is very, very
important.
I know that I am eagerly awaiting the testimony of
Ambassador Kaidanow, who I know served in Pristina, Kosovo, as
our Ambassador. I am anxious to hear what she has to say about
that as well.
I finally want to, again, reiterate what I said before. I
think it is an absolute disgrace that Turkey is, as of now,
blocking Israel from participating in the NATO meeting. Israel
has participated in many NATO meetings before. I want to
condemn it and hope that the government in Ankara changes its
attitude.
With that, I want to say that I agree, essentially, with
everything that has been said by all my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Griffin [presiding]. Do any of the members want to make
opening statements? Would you like to?
[No response.]
Okay. Then, I would like to introduce the witnesses. Thank
you all for being here with us today.
Testifying on the first panel, on behalf of the Department
of State, is Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Europe and Eurasia.
Ambassador Kaidanow assumed her current position on July 1st,
2011. Previously, she served as the Bureau's Deputy Assistant
Secretary responsible for issues related to Greece, Turkey,
Cypress, and the Caucuses. Previously, Ms. Kaidanow served as
the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Kosovo. A career member
of the U.S. Diplomatic Service, Ambassador Kaidanow has served
in a variety of positions focused primarily on Southeastern
Europe at the Department of State and the National Security
Council.
Ms. Kaidanow holds a bachelor of arts and master of arts
degree from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of
philosophy degree in political science from Columbia University
in New York.
Representing the Department of Defense is Mr. James J.
Townsend, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
European and NATO Policy. In this position, Mr. Townsend is
responsible for managing the day-to-day defense relationship
between the United States, NATO, the EU, and the nations of
Europe.
Before taking up his current position, which represents a
return to the Pentagon, Mr. Townsend was Vice President of the
Atlantic Council of the United States and Director of the
Council's Program on International Security.
Mr. Townsend has previously served as Principal Director of
European and NATO Policy and Director of the Defense Plans
Division at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium,
among other positions, including the office of Congressman
Charles Edward Bennett.
Mr. Townsend earned a BA from Duke University and an MA
from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
in international economics and American foreign policy.
Thank you both for being here today.
Ambassador Kaidanow, if you would like to start?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TINA S. KAIDANOW, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Kaidanow. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Meeks, and members of the committee, thank you all for inviting
us here today to discuss the NATO Summit, which the United
States is proud to be hosting in Chicago on May 20th and 21st
of this year.
Our hosting of the Summit is actually a tangible symbol of
the importance of NATO to the United States, as well as an
opportunity to underscore to the American people the continued
value of this alliance to the security challenges that we face
today.
With your permission, I would like to submit my full
statement for the record and provide just a brief summary at
this point.
Mr. Griffin. Without objection.
Ms. Kaidanow. Thank you.
At NATO's last Summit in Lisbon nearly 18 months ago,
allies unveiled a new strategic concept that defines NATO's
focus in the 21st century. Building on the decisions taken in
Lisbon, allies have three objectives for this Summit, and I
would characterize them as Afghanistan-related, capabilities,
and partnerships.
On Afghanistan, the ISAF coalition, which is comprised of
90,000 U.S. troops serving alongside 36,000 troops from NATO
allies and 5,300 from partner countries, has made significant
progress in preventing the country from serving as a safe haven
for terrorists and ensuring that Afghans are able to provide
for their own security. These are both necessary conditions to
fulfill the President's goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al-Qaeda.
At Chicago, the United States anticipates three major
deliverables. One, an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013
when ISAF's mission will shift from combat to support for the
Afghan National Security Forces, the ANSF. Second, an agreement
on the cost, size, and sustainment of the ANSF beyond 2014. And
third, a roadmap for NATO's post-2014 role in Afghanistan.
On capabilities, NATO's ability to deploy an effective
fighting force in the field makes this alliance unique.
However, its capacity to deter and to respond to security
challenges will only be as successful as its forces are able,
effective, interoperable, and modern.
In the current era of fiscal austerity, NATO can still
maintain a strong defense, but doing so requires innovation,
creativity, and efficiencies. The United States is modernizing
its presence in Europe at the same time that our NATO allies
and NATO as an institution are engaged in similar steps. This
is a clear opportunity for our European allies to take on
greater responsibility. The United States continues to
encourage allies strongly to meet the 2 percent benchmark for
defense spending and to contribute politically, financially,
and operationally to the strength of the alliance.
In addition to the total level of defense spending, we
should also focus on how these limited resources are allocated
and for what priorities. NATO has made progress toward pooling
more national resources or what NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen has described as ``smart defense.'' These efforts are
exemplified through the capabilities package that the United
States anticipates leaders will endorse in Chicago, which
includes missile defense, alliance ground surveillance, and
Baltic air policing.
Finally, the Chicago Summit will highlight NATO's success
in working with a growing number of partners all across the
globe. Effective partnerships allow the alliance to extend its
reach, to act with greater legitimacy, to share burdens, and to
benefit from the capabilities of others.
Allies will not take decisions on further enlargement of
NATO in Chicago, but they will, nevertheless, send a clear and
positive message to aspirant countries in support of their
membership goals. The United States has been very clear that
NATO's door remains open to new members that meet the
alliance's standards. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,
Montenegro, and Georgia are all working closely with allies to
meet NATO criteria, so that they may enter the alliance.
Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO
members and has contributed to regional and to global security.
The United States fully supports the U.N. process, led by
Ambassador Nimitz, and regularly engages with both Greece and
Macedonia in order to find a mutually-acceptable solution to
the name dispute in order to fulfill the decision taken at the
NATO Summit in Bucharest and extend a membership offer to
Macedonia.
In the case of Montenegro, the United States is assisting
reform efforts by taking steps to embed a Defense Advisor in
the Ministry of Defense. We encourage other allies to consider
similar capacity-building measures.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the recent agreement on
registering defense properties is a significant step forward
toward fulfilling the conditions laid out at the NATO Foreign
Minister's meeting in Tallinn in April 2010. NATO should spare
no effort in assisting the Bosnian Government's implementation
of this decision, which would allow them to submit their first
Annual National Program this fall.
With regard to Georgia, U.S. security assistance and
military engagement support the country's defense reforms,
train and equip Georgian troops for participation in ISAF
operations, and advance its NATO interoperability. In January,
President Obama and President Saakashvili agreed to enhance
this cooperation to advance Georgian military modernization,
defense reform, and self-defense capabilities.
U.S. assistance programs provide additional support to
ongoing democratic and economic reform efforts in Georgia, a
critical part of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, where
they have made important strides. U.S. support for Georgia's
territorial integrity within its internationally-recognized
borders remains absolutely steadfast, and our non-recognition
of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will
not change.
Finally, let me say a word about NATO's relationship with
Russia. 2012 marks the 15th anniversary of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act and the 10th anniversary of the NATO Russia
Council. We commemorated those anniversaries at a NATO-Russia
foreign ministers meeting last week in Brussels.
The NRC is founded on our commitment to cooperate in areas
of mutual interest and address issues of disagreement. The best
example of cooperation is our joint efforts in Afghanistan,
where Russia's transit support has been critical to the
mission's success. At the same time, NATO continues to seek
cooperation with Russia on missile defense in order to enhance
our individual capabilities to counter this threat.
While we strive for cooperation, we have also been frank in
our discussions with Russia that we will continue to develop
and deploy our missile defenses irrespective of the status of
missile defense cooperation with Russia. Let me be clear. NATO
is not a threat to Russia, nor is Russia a threat to NATO.
It is no secret that there are issues on which allies and
Russia differ. Russia has been critical of NATO's operation in
Libya. We also disagree fundamentally over the situation in
Georgia. Since 2008, NATO has strongly supported Georgia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
As we look to Chicago, these three Summit priorities that I
mentioned, defining the next phase of the transition in
Afghanistan, outlining a vision for addressing 21st century
challenges in a period of austerity, and expanding our
partnerships, all show just how much NATO has evolved since its
founding six decades ago.
The reasons for the alliance's continued success are very
clear. NATO has over the last 63 years proven to be an
adaptable, durable, and cost-effective provider of security. In
Chicago, the United States will work with its allies and its
partners to ensure that the alliance remains vibrant and
capable for many more years to come.
With that, I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kaidanow follows:]
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Mr. Griffin. Thank you.
Mr. Townsend?
STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES TOWNSEND, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member Meeks,
and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here
today to discuss the NATO Summit, which the United States will
host in Chicago in May.
I will describe for the committee what we hope to achieve
at the Summit from the Defense Department point of view and its
relevance for U.S. national security. I particularly look
forward to hearing the committee's views on the Summit and the
priorities you have for its outcome.
I would like to submit my full statement for the record and
give you a summary of my statement this afternoon.
Mr. Griffin. Without objection.
Mr. Townsend. NATO heads of state and government come
together at a Summit every few years not only to approve
important pieces of alliance business, but also to renew at the
highest level the commitment allies have made to one another in
the North Atlantic Treaty. This commitment to come to one
another's defense, as expressed in Article 5 of the Treaty, is
a solemn one that has only been invoked once--after the United
States was attacked on September 11th, 2001.
This commitment was critical during the Cold War to help
deter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from attacking the
United States and our allies. Even with the end of the Cold
War, this Article 5 commitment remains the core of the
alliance. NATO serves as the organizing framework to ensure
that we have allies willing and able to fight alongside us in
conflict, and provides an integrated military structure that
puts the military teeth behind alliance political decisions to
take action. In addition to ensuring the interoperability of
our allies, NATO serves as a hub and an integrator of a network
of global security partners.
The NATO air and maritime operation in Libya illustrates
this point. The operation began as a coalition of the willing,
involving the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
However, when NATO answered the U.N.'s call to protect the
Libyan people, it was able to take on the mission and execute
it successfully. Had NATO not been there, or had NATO been too
weak an institution to take on such an operation, the coalition
would have had to carry on alone.
Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is
critical to ensuring NATO is ready when it is needed. This has
been true for the past 20 years, when the turbulence of the
international system has demanded that NATO respond nearly
continuously to crises throughout the globe.
Today, for example, NATO forces are in Afghanistan, in the
Balkans, countering pirates in waters off Somalia, and have
concluded operations in Libya. Looking out into the future,
challenges to the United States and our allies can come from
ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, as well as from the instability
that can come from turbulence in the Middle East, North Africa,
and elsewhere. We must be ready to meet emerging threats, and
we would prefer to meet these challenges together with allies,
and not alone.
So, the strategic context for the Summit, and for our work
at NATO every day, is: How can we keep NATO and the allies
ready and able to meet the challenges of today and in the
future? This is especially complex today, as the European
economic crisis compels allies to cut defense spending and
force structure in order to reduce their debt and decrease
government spending.
Allies, too, have different views and priorities regarding
perceptions of the threat and the traditions of their own
military forces. Not every ally sees the world and their role
in it the way we do. But one thing we all agree on is that we
need the alliance to be unified and strong. Allies look to the
United States to lead the way in keeping NATO strong, capable,
and credible.
That is where we come to the Summit. At Chicago, heads of
state and government will agree or approve work that we
committed to at the last Summit at Lisbon 18 months ago.
At Chicago, this work will focus on three areas: No. 1, an
agreement on a strategic plan for Afghanistan. No. 2, military
capabilities and how we can achieve and make certain of these
capabilities in this time of austerity. And the third area is
NATO partnerships.
The United States has three Summit objectives: No. 1,
charting a clear path for the completion of transition and
reaffirming NATO's commitment to the long-term security of
Afghanistan. No. 2, maintaining NATO's core defense
capabilities during this period of austerity and building a
force ready for future challenges. And, No. 3, deepening the
engagement of NATO's partner nations in alliance operation and
activities.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to complete my statement here,
as I said, submit my complete statement for the record, and go
straight to questions.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before
you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:]
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Mr. Poe [presiding]. The chair will reserve its right to
ask questions. I will turn to the ranking member, Mr. Meeks,
for his questions.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start out with this: One of the questions that I am
most frequently asked when I travel abroad, or am meeting with
European officials or parliamentarians, relates to the
administration's so-called ``pivot to Asia.'' They have a
concern, you know, those that I speak with. They ask about,
what does that mean? Does pivoting to Asia mean moving away
from Europe?
So, I would like to put that question to you. What does it
mean, and how is the concept of a pivot playing out in NATO?
How are NATO members approaching the issue with the
administration as we get ready to go to Chicago?
Ms. Kaidanow. Thank you, Congressman. I think that is a
very important question, and you are right, it is important to
address it very forthrightly.
What I would say is, first of all, that Europe remains a
central preoccupation of the United States. Its security is
essential to us, as well as its cooperation as a partner in
terms of global endeavors. Pretty much everything we do
globally, the Europeans are right there by our side. I think it
is important to establish that right away. Our commitment to
Article 5, which is the enduring commitment to European
security, is very, very strong.
I would say that the notion of a pivot to Asia is really a
mischaracterization in many ways. It is not a pivot away from
Europe to Asia. I think what our strategic defense review was
attempting to do--and my colleague can speak to this even more
than I can--was to posit that we have now emerged from a decade
or more of war, essentially, conflict. And in that decade,
perforce, we had to devote our time, our attention, our energy,
and our resources in many ways to Afghanistan, to Iraq, to
other things. Thankfully, we are now emerging from some of
that.
The question of how we utilize resources in the era after
that is a salient one, it is important, and whether we are able
to conserve some of those resources. So, I think the question
for us now is really, how do we smartly, intelligently retool a
bit, so not pivot to Asia from Europe, but maintain our
commitment to Europe, which is just as strong as it ever was,
but also take into account the impact of Asia and the Asia
Pacific region as an increasingly-important part of what we do?
So, I think we are doing both of those things very
successfully.
You noted that you hear from some of our allies. Well, of
course, we have been talking to our allies extensively about
our force posture in Europe, and so forth. We will maintain a
very strong posture in Europe. We actually are deploying new
capabilities--again, my colleague can speak to that as well--
but an aviation detachment in Poland, missile defense assets in
Poland, Romania, Turkey, elsewhere. These are the kinds of
things that I think are elements of a new approach and a new
response to threats that are emerging over time.
I think our European allies have been very cognizant of the
reasons for that. I think they agree that, whereas once upon a
time it might have made sense to keep four heavy brigades,
heavy combat teams in Europe, that doesn't really make sense
anymore. What makes sense now is this new approach that I
outlined, including rotational elements from the United States
that might help to augment NATO's response force and also train
together with our European colleagues such that we have greater
interoperability for the inevitable operations that will come
our way.
So, there is, I think, good understanding among our
European allies as to why we are doing a number of the things
we are doing. We have talked to them extensively. We will talk
to them more, of course.
Just recently, of course, Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Panetta were there for the joint foreign and defense
ministerial meeting to make this point, as they did in Munich
earlier, and so forth.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. Because we know that, when we look at
our values and where there are shared interests, the ones we
turn to first and on whom we count on most in a crisis is our
European allies.
Let me ask Mr. Townsend in the little time we have left.
Another issue that I have been looking at is that in the past
NATO leaders have recognized the importance of energy security,
and energy security is important to me. At previous Summits,
they committed themselves to addressing these issues as an
alliance.
But there appears, however, to be a lack of an agreement on
the importance of the Southern Corridor, the significance of
the North Stream Pipeline, and the reliance or dependence of
some NATO members on Russian energy resources.
And so, I was just wondering, has NATO ceased to pursue the
goal of energy securance as an alliance? I know I am out of
time, but I am trying to sneak that in, and we will come back.
Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Chairman. That is a great
question, as was your first question that Ambassador Kaidanow
so ably addressed, and that we can certainly come back to as
well.
But on energy security, this is something that the alliance
has been working on for at least 10 years now and grappling
with. It is a tough question. It is not just a military
question or a defense-related question. It involves economies,
finance, geography, and business. It is something that, in
terms of finding a home, is difficult. NATO talks about this
because it involves security and the security of allies. And
so, those discussions we have quite a bit within the alliance,
as we look at future challenges and what NATO can do.
Energy security is discussed at the European Union as well,
which certainly plays a large role in this. Nations themselves
recognize that energy security is a security issue of the
future that they need to grapple with now in terms of
diversification, in terms of how can they meet their security
needs in other ways. And so, it is something that is part of
the context that we have to work within as we look into the
future. We talk about future challenges in terms of ballistic
missile proliferation or WMD. We look at it in terms of
terrorism. But energy security is in there as well.
The NATO role in energy security is probably more limited
than it is in these other areas, but it is something that is
important as planners at NATO think about future areas of
instability, what happens if energy is denied a nation, what
role might come to the alliance, what role might come to the
European Union or to that particular nation, how might we have
to help out in terms of the nation trying to handle the results
of something coming out of an energy crisis.
So, it is part of the context. It is something that, as the
years go on, we are going to have to work very closely with the
European Union and with nations to make sure we are provided
for in facing this kind of challenge.
Mr. Poe. The chair will recognize the gentlewoman from
Ohio, Ms. Schmidt.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is a question to both of you. As we approach the
Chicago Summit, I believe it is important to send a strong
message to the nations aspiring to have NATO membership that
the United States remains committed toward that end.
As you both know, NATO's new strategic concept adopted at
the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 reaffirmed the alliance's
longstanding commitment to keep NATO's open door to any
European country in a position to undertake the commitments and
obligations of membership and contribute to the security of the
Euro-Atlantic area. However, NATO hasn't added any members
since 2009, despite the many contributions of our non-NATO
partners such as Macedonia, Montenegro, Georgia, Bosnia,
Herzegovina to the operations and stability of NATO.
So, it is a three-part question. First, does NATO
enlargement remain a priority to this administration? And if
so, why isn't it on the Chicago agenda?
Two, in recent remarks at the Heritage Foundation, former
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke strongly in favor of
NATO expansion and stated that, in her opinion, Macedonia is
ready for full membership. Would you agree with her assessment?
And if not, why?
And three, in what ways is the United States assisting
those countries, Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia, to
prepare them for NATO membership?
Ms. Kaidanow. Thank you.
Congresswoman, I don't think we can agree strongly enough
with you that keeping NATO's door firmly open is in U.S.
interest as well as in the interest of the alliance. We have
seen over the years the incredible stabilizing impact of the
enlargement of NATO and the inclusion of countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. I anticipate that that process will, in
fact, continue, and we are very committed to it.
You asked whether this will be addressed on the Chicago
agenda. In fact, it will. We didn't speak to it in my opening
remarks, but I anticipate, and we have been very strongly
supportive of, a ministerial-level that will likely be held
with the four aspirant countries, to again underscore how
important we believe the process of enlargement is, to make
sure that everyone understands that that process will continue.
And I am sure we will find other ways as well to highlight
enlargement and to look----
Ms. Schmidt. So, you are going to be speaking to the four
countries, but what about to NATO members as well, to open it
up and have the question----
Ms. Kaidanow. Right.
Ms. Schmidt [continuing]. Will we accept or not accept?
Ms. Kaidanow. Such a meeting, if it is held--and I would
anticipate that it will be, but NATO has not yet made final
decisions--would include all allies. So, it would be the allies
as well as the aspirants. But I think, again, the point here is
to make sure that, both in word and in deed, we are doing
everything we can.
Your third question, which I will skip to, is about our
assistance to those aspirants, which I think I detailed at some
length in my opening remarks is fairly extensive. In each of
those cases, we have worked very, very closely with the
aspirant countries, both on democratic and economic reforms,
which are also a precursor to NATO membership, but as well on
defense reform, defense modernization, and so forth.
You asked specifically about Macedonia. So, I will address
that briefly. We have said, and as you articulated, I think
former Secretary of State Rice also mentioned, that we believe
Macedonia is ready for NATO membership. We saw at Bucharest
that the alliance articulated that, subject to resolution of
the name dispute with Greece. It is our deep desire and hope
that they will, in fact, resolve that name dispute as soon as
possible. And we very strongly support the process that has
been undertaken by U.N. Special Envoy Nimitz, who has been
engaged in this intensively.
It is our hope that that will happen as quickly as
possible, although NATO is a consensus-based organization. And
therefore, it will take that decision as an organization. And
so, we will invest every diplomatic effort we can in trying to
see that that dispute is resolved.
Mr. Townsend. Thank you for the question, which, along with
Ambassador Kaidanow, I have to say that from the Department of
Defense view and my own personal view, having worked with these
nations from the very beginning of Partnership for Peace and
the whole enlargement process back in the mid-nineties, we on
an everyday basis in the Pentagon as well as at NATO are
working with these nations in terms of helping them in their
defense reforms, in mil-to-mil, if you will, military-to-
military channels, working specifically with their militaries
to get them ready for membership, make sure they are able,
interoperable, and a very credible candidate when their time
comes to come into the alliance.
I want to say that, as far as Georgia is concerned, we have
been very pleased with the kinds of work that Georgia has been
able to do on its defense side. It was pointed out earlier that
they are doing some very good work in Afghanistan, in a very
tough area of Afghanistan. Our military, our Marines, have been
working with them. Secretary Panetta, in fact, has talked and
visited with Georgians as well.
So, this is something that, as the Ambassador said, we have
taken----
Mr. Poe. Summarize your statement there, Mr. Townsend.
Mr. Townsend. Okay. Thank you.
We take it very seriously and we take it almost on a daily
basis.
Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The chair recognizes Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Kaidanow, could you please tell me that the
administration is working actively to get Turkey to reverse its
position on blocking Israel from attending the Summit?
Ms. Kaidanow. Congressman, just to say, first of all,
Israel is an active and a valued partner for the alliance and
for the United States, but for the alliance, through what is
know as the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Mediterranean Dialogue
is essentially a grouping of seven countries from that region.
There has been no contemplation of a Mediterranean Dialogue
Summit-level meeting at Chicago. So, I think we ought to be
clear on that.
However, let me restate and say again how important and
valued a partner Israel is for NATO. The United States is
strongly supportive of that partnership. We hope that that
partnership will continue and, in fact, we are very much
engaged in Mediterranean Dialogue events. There was a meeting
in Morocco in March to which we sent a representative from the
State Department as well as other representatives. So, we are
very committed to the NATO/Israel partnership, and we will
continue to be.
Mr. Engel. But what is Turkey objecting to, then, if there
are no plans to meet and discuss this?
Ms. Kaidanow. Again, the meetings that have been
contemplated for Chicago are ISAF meetings--ISAF meetings are
important, but Israel is not a contributor to ISAF--as well as
an operational partners' meeting, which is also not something
that Israel has been involved in.
So, I can't speak to what it is the Turks are speaking to,
but I can tell you exactly what is the case, which is, again,
that Israel is an incredibly valuable partner for NATO and we
are strongly supportive of that.
Mr. Engel. Are we telling Turkey to knock it off?
Ms. Kaidanow. We have been very clear with all of our
alliance partners, including the Turks, about our feelings with
respect to Israel as a valued partner.
Mr. Engel. Okay, but it is not a matter of Israel being a
valued partner. It is a matter of Turkey, out of the blue,
because of some kind of personal dispute, in my estimation, not
acting like a country that tries to do what is good for the
alliance, but acting like a petulant child trying to use the
alliance for its own purposes. I think that is important.
Ms. Kaidanow. Congressman, we have been very sorry, very
regretful to see the deterioration in relations between Turkey
and Israel. And it is our view that these are two important and
valuable partners to us, and we would like to see them repair
that relationship as quickly as possible.
Mr. Engel. All right. Let me ask you this, Ambassador: You
know Kosovo as well as anybody here. As a former Ambassador,
you are very much aware of--you and I have had many discussions
about how much they want to join the key Euro-Atlantic
institutions, including both NATO and the EU. They are making
that progress toward that end. Yesterday, Brunei, the 90th
country, recognized them. But the progress is very slow.
When Serbia became an EU candidate country, the EU
immediately began a study on whether Kosovo should get a
Stabilization and Association Agreement. While Serbia has been
granted visa liberalization by the EU, Kosovo has not even been
presented a roadmap for visa liberalization.
Likewise, Kosovo aspires to eventual NATO membership, but
the future is unclear. All of the other Balkan countries are
either in NATO or members of the Partnership for Peace, not
Kosovo. So, I think it is time for Kosovo's second-class status
to end.
I am wondering if you could comment on that. Please
describe whether Kosovo has a future in NATO. What is her path
to eventual NATO membership? When can she join the Partnership
for Peace and other NATO programs for other aspirants? And are
there ways the Kosovo Security Forces can partner with U.S.
forces?
Ms. Kaidanow. Thank you, Congressman.
I would say several things. First of all, I think you know
that the United States has been incredibly supportive of
Kosovo's territorial integrity, its sovereignty, its
independence. We are strongly in favor of supporting Kosovo's
Euro-Atlantic future.
It is important, I think, in terms of regional stability as
well as European stability more broadly, that Kosovo continue
down a path toward both EU integration and eventually toward
NATO accession as well, although that is a far distance away.
The one thing I would say, though, is we do have the
institutional issue of some non-recognizers of Kosovo in the
alliance. That presents certain obstacles that we do have to
contend with.
I will say this: The United States is incredibly and
strongly supportive of a future relationship between NATO and
the Kosovo Security Force, the KSF. We think that there is an
appropriate role for NATO to continue to help train the KSF
within its mandate, which has been clear. And I think that
there is room there for activity and for further kinds of
interaction. We will continue to be supportive of that at NATO.
The rest of the things will follow. But I think, again, for
now, we have a path forward and we want to pursue it.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
If I might be able to slip in one more question, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. Poe. Yes.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you.
Let me ask Secretary Townsend, I would like to hear from
you, actually, also from Ambassador Kaidanow, that the U.S. has
no plans to reduce U.S. forces in KFOR in the foreseeable
future.
During the last few years, we and our European partners
have been reducing the number of troops in KFOR, but with
increased tensions with Serbia in northern Kosovo, that process
has been reduced. But I have heard that additional rapid-
reaction troops have recently arrived.
I personally think that we should increase by at least a
few battalions our force presence in Kosovo at least through
the end of the year. With Serbian elections raising the
temperature and continued lawlessness of criminality continuing
in northern Kosovo, we simply cannot be too careful.
So, I am wondering if either one of you, or both, could
describe plans for U.S. force commitments to KFOR now and for
the foreseeable future? Are there enough troops in KFOR to
handle likely threats to peace and stability? And will KFOR
work with UEX and Kosovo police to end the Serbian lawlessness
in northern Kosovo?
Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Congressman.
The situation in Kosovo, as we have been discussing right
now, is one that causes concern. We rely very much on the KFOR
commander and on SACEUR to advise us and to advise the alliance
on what he feels he needs.
Right now, the word we are getting is that he has got the
forces that he needs in terms of KFOR there. As you point out,
UEX is there. There are other actors in the field. The
situation on the ground will certainly dictate what the size of
KFOR and what the alliance actions will be there.
Right now, we feel that the KFOR size is right. I think for
the foreseeable future this will be the case. But we talk
frequently to the KFOR commander and to SACEUR to make sure
that, as things change, we are ready to take action.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I am going to center on two countries, Georgia and
Macedonia, and that is the two I want to address. Both of them
have troops in Afghanistan; Georgia, 950, I believe, going to
go up to a battalion level. And I want to talk about them
first.
I was in Georgia a week after the Russians invaded. It made
the international news for a couple of days and, then, nobody
is talking about it except the folks in Georgia. They still
don't like the Russians there.
I understand conflicting reports. But one reason Georgia
doesn't get into NATO is because the Russians are still there.
How does that factor in, if it does, in why Georgia is still
not in NATO? Then, I will address Macedonia.
Ms. Kaidanow. Thank you.
Let me state right away that it is our firm conviction that
no sovereign nation should be in any way circumscribed from
choosing its own alliances, and that, at the end of the day, it
is for every nation to decide on its own allegiances and
alliances. So, again, the Russian presence in the occupied
areas of Georgia are not an impact or don't have an impact on
our overall decisions with respect to Georgia.
The United States, again, has been very strongly supportive
of Georgian sovereignty, of Georgian territorial integrity, as
has NATO. I think we will continue to be in ways that are
demonstrable. I spoke to some of those in my opening statement.
Just recently, as I said, the Presidents of the United
States and of Georgia met here in Washington, had a very good
set of conversations. We anticipate that we will have further
conversations at high levels over the next little while. And
so, again, I think our commitment has been shown.
Mr. Poe. Madam Ambassador, I am certainly no diplomat. I
have been called a lot of things in my life, but diplomat is
not one of them.
The Russians are still there. I think they have occupied a
sovereign country. Twenty percent or twenty-five percent of
their nation is occupied, the Georgians. What is being done
about that, if anything, besides talking about it?
Ms. Kaidanow. I think, I mean, the reality of the situation
is that what we are doing is actually multiple aspects of what
we are doing on behalf of Georgia. What we have done
rhetorically is important. I think it continues to be important
that we assert our continuing support for Georgia's territorial
integrity and its sovereignty. That is not unimportant; it is
quite important.
But, in a practical sense, what we are doing, again, is we
are supplying support for Georgia's multiple efforts across the
board to sustain reform, democratic reform, economic reform,
all of which are important and where Georgia has made some
really significant and important strides.
You noted, Mr. Chair, that we are actually witnessing some
of the benefits of that because Georgia has now, again,
contributed in a very meaningful way in Afghanistan, continues
to so do, without caveats, by the way. So, we are recognizing
all of those things. We acknowledge them, and in ways that are
much more concrete even--again, we are assisting them. This
administration approved the final tranche of $1 billion worth
of assistance for Georgia. So, I think in all of those ways,
again, we have been very forthright and very forthcoming and
very appreciative of Georgia's efforts.
Mr. Poe. Let's turn to Macedonia. Macedonia, likewise with
Georgia, has troops in Afghanistan serving along with
Americans, NATO troops, or even some of our NATO troops, our
other NATO allies have not, in my opinion, shared the
responsibility that they have under NATO. They are not in NATO
because Greece continues or has blocked their admission into
NATO, which is their right under the fact that they are a NATO
member.
My understanding is that they blocked the membership of
Macedonia into NATO when Macedonia agreed to apply for
membership under the name the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. With that application, the Greeks then said no,
although in December of last year the International Court of
Justice ruled that Greece violated an agreement it had with
Macedonia when it vetoed that membership. How does that factor
into NATO membership of Macedonia with that International Court
ruling against Greece, if it does?
Ms. Kaidanow. Congressman, again, I think we have
articulated many times, and we will say it many more times,
that we are strongly supportive of Macedonia's accession to
NATO under the conditions that were laid out by the allies at
Bucharest. That means that, as soon as the name dispute is
resolved, we will be in a position to allow Macedonia into the
alliance.
Mr. Poe. Time is short.
So, the court ruling is irrelevant as to whether or not
they are going to get in, because the agreement is, if I
understand you correctly, that Macedonia and Greece have to
work out the name issue in spite of what the court ruled?
Ms. Kaidanow. I wouldn't say it is in spite of the court
ruling, and we do hope that the court ruling will provide the
impetus for them to find a resolution, to which, again, we will
invest some diplomatic effort. But the problem is that they
have to find a mutually-acceptable resolution. It is a
consensus-based organization, you are correct.
So, I think that is the ultimate point here, is we will
help. We can help in some ways, but, ultimately, the two sides
have to find a way forward.
Mr. Poe. You wouldn't have any ideas on how they could
resolve that, would you?
Ms. Kaidanow. We always have good ideas. But, again, it is
really up to them.
I do want to say that I think they have engaged themselves
in some productive discussions. We want to encourage that. I
think that we hope, certainly after the Greek elections, which
are nigh upon us, that we will see, again, another effort on
their part to actually engage.
Mr. Poe. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch?
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question now about Turkey again, just to follow up
on what my colleague, Mr. Engel, discussed with you. I
understand from your comments earlier that there are no
Mediterranean Dialogue-level talks planned for Chicago. Is the
reason that there are no Mediterranean Dialogue talks planned
because Turkey objected to having them at all?
Ms. Kaidanow. No. No. There just has not been contemplation
of a Summit-level--and, in fact, as far as I am aware, there
has never been a Summit-level dialog of the Mediterranean
Dialogue, in other words, a Summit-level meeting of the
Mediterranean Dialogue. It just hasn't occurred.
Mr. Deutch. I heard you explain that you don't know, since
there is no dialog planned, Mediterranean Dialogue-level
planned, you are not sure what it was Turkey was objecting to.
If I can refer back to the earlier plan earlier in the year for
Israel to contribute a missile ship to a NATO mission in the
Mediterranean Sea, Active Endeavour, my understanding there is
that that contribution was never made because Turkey objected
and blocked that.
Secretary Townsend, I can ask you as well.
Ms. Kaidanow. Maybe my colleague has more to offer on that.
I am not aware, actually, of that particular incident or that
particular issue, but we can certainly look at it.
Jim?
Mr. Townsend. Let us take that question. I am not aware of
that, either, but let us check into it and get back to you or
your staff.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. Just as you explore, my understanding
from reports just today is that that would have been the first
time that Israel actively participated in one of NATO's
military operations. If you could both look into that and let
us know if there are reports that they were asked not to
participate because of a decision by Turkey, that would be most
helpful for us to have that information.
Secretary, you also said in your exchange with Mr. Engel
that there has been an invaluable relationship between Israel
and NATO. Can you describe Israel's participation in NATO
activities and some of the benefits of that participation?
Ms. Kaidanow. The Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum,
essentially, for those countries in that region to come
together and discuss a number of different kinds of issues on
which, hopefully, again in the future we can find a little bit
more granularity and a way to progress.
In fact, in this meeting in Morocco in March, there were a
number of items on the agenda that were treated. I think Israel
has an interest in a lot of that because, again, it is looking
to expand its partnerships not just with NATO, but with some of
the other countries involved. I think there is a lot of scope
there for discussion. There has not necessarily been things
that I can point to concretely that have been done thus far,
but that is not to say that there isn't quite a lot of room for
other kinds of endeavors.
If you would like more information on that, we can provide
that as well.
Mr. Deutch. I would. I would like this.
Secretary Townsend, you mentioned earlier that you are
pleased with Georgia's progress on defense. Georgia, as you
know, has been the second-largest non-NATO contributor to ISAF
forces. If their NATO candidacy continues to stall, do you see
this affecting Georgia's strategic relationship with NATO,
other NATO countries, or the United States?
Mr. Townsend. Thank you.
Well, you know, in terms of its relationship with NATO,
there is a NATO Georgia Commission which meets to assist the
Georgians in making reforms and doing things to make sure that
they stay and continue to build as a very good candidate to
come into the alliance. So, there is already an institutional
link between NATO and the NATO allies and Georgia.
On a bilateral basis with the United States, I did say that
we have been very impressed with not just their own military
reform efforts, but also their abilities that we saw on the
ground in Afghanistan. So, this relationship between the United
States bilaterally, between our Defense Department and the
Georgians and our military will always be strong as well.
They work with other allies in Afghanistan, too. So, I
think when you talk to many allies and they think about Georgia
as a member of the alliance, they look at what the Georgians
have done, the work in the NATO Georgia Commission, I think it
is a very good story that we are all seeing. It is a matter of,
as the Ambassador said, going through and making sure that as
far as we are concerned on the defense side, that when they are
ready to come into the alliance, that they are at their very
best state.
Mr. Deutch. And if I could just ask a yes-or-no question,
Mr. Chairman, just one last point of clarification?
Secretary, on the Mediterranean Dialogue piece again, I
understand there are no Mediterranean-Dialogue-level talks in
Chicago at the Summit. I assume as well that, as a result,
since there won't be those talks, that they are no non-NATO
Mediterranean Dialogue members who will be coming to Chicago to
participate.
Ms. Kaidanow. That is not necessarily the case, again,
because some of these memberships in partnership organizations
are overlapping. So, in other words, it may be the case that
others that are members of the Mediterranean Dialogue would be
there, but for other reasons, either for ISAF or for the
operational partners' discussion.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. I would welcome some details in response
to that question as well.
Ms. Kaidanow. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.
I just have a couple of comments, and I apologize for my
tardiness. I had to do something for my spouse. She has a
little bit of a health problem. So, I apologize for not being
here for your whole testimony.
I have got two things I would like to mention. First of
all, NATO was very instrumental and helpful in Libya. As I
mentioned in my opening remarks, there are a number of us that
did not mind seeing Colonel Gaddafi leave the scene. But the
military attack on Libya with the help of the United States did
involve billions of dollars, at least a couple of billion
dollars of military funds. It also involved, I am confident,
some boots on the ground, although they didn't say that there
were any. I think it was there for probably intelligence
purposes.
But, nevertheless, I hope that it will be conveyed to this
administration, just like any other administration, that unless
it is compliant with the Constitution or the War Powers Act,
that the President does not have authority to take us into a
military conflict without the support of Congress, Democrats or
Republicans. I think it is extremely important that that
message be sent very clearly, especially during this NATO
meeting, because I know there will be people talking about
Syria and going in there and maybe going into someplace else
like the Sudan, where 400,000 people have been killed.
But before we go into conflict, the case needs to be made
to the American people through their congressional
representatives. I hope that message will be very clear, and I
hope you will convey that.
The second thing I would like to say is that I have been
over to Europe, along with my colleague, Mr. Meeks, and others.
We were there very much concerned about the economic problems
that Europe faces because it will have an impact on us, without
any doubt, if everything goes south over there. So, we are very
concerned about that.
Even though these countries that are having some
difficulties right now are facing many of the problems we are,
they still need to pony-up their 2 percent of GDP, as Secretary
Gates said, to help us. We can't bear the burden of military
action or supporting NATO without the help of our NATO allies.
And there are only three of them that I think are doing that
right now.
So, I hope that gets to them loud and clear. I don't know
if any media is here or not. But it is extremely important that
our NATO allies, even though I know there are economic problems
over in Europe, that they are willing and ready and able to
support NATO with their 2 percent contribution.
If you have any comments on that, that is fine.
Ms. Kaidanow. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that we
understand the importance of the commitments that allies make.
They understand the importance of those commitments, too, I
would say.
I recognize that not all of them have met their 2 percent
benchmark, and that is something we continue to press for. But
I would also say that we are really struck by, even in a time
of fiscal austerity and a time of difficulty in terms of
financial crisis, a number of our colleagues and a number of
our allies have really stuck to their commitments, particularly
with respect to Afghanistan. They are very committed to the
2014 timeline that was outlined in Lisbon. I think we have seen
really good solidarity in terms of their willingness to stick
in with us. We should acknowledge that.
Mr. Burton. Well, I think that is great, and I do
appreciate that. I know that they are there, a number of those
countries. But we have a $15 trillion, almost $16 trillion
national debt right now.
Ms. Kaidanow. Agreed.
Mr. Burton. And the country faces fiscal problems. And so,
if we are going to do our part, and we want to do our part, we
need to make sure that, even though they are having some of
these problems, they know that they need to do it as well.
I yield the balance of my time to my good buddy, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. I just wanted to follow up real quick on
something that you just indicated. I know that Secretary
General Rasmussen has been clear that NATO has not discussed or
begun even a preliminary planning for a possible intervention
in Syria. But the debate is raging still here, whether you talk
to Senators Lieberman or McCain, who believe that NATO should
at least be actively considering the possibility.
And so, I was just wondering. I mean, I think that Mr.
Burton indicated that we know that that possibility is going to
come up. Well, people are talking about it.
I would just like to get your thoughts on whether or not
NATO should be considering the lives that are being lost. I
know the justification for going into Libya. I wonder what your
thoughts are. Should we at least be discussing it?
Ms. Kaidanow. Congressman, I think it is still our deep
desire to try to resolve the issues in Syria in a peaceful
manner that allows for a transition away from the Assad regime
to something else that will cause less bloodshed rather than
more.
I think we are all watching the situation there very, very
carefully. It is not an easy one, obviously. We are still
weighing the best way to address this, and we are doing it in
cooperation with a number of our partners, European partners,
in particular.
I don't want to speculate necessarily on what NATO's role
should or should not be. I will just say, again, that we are
all watching it very, very carefully, particularly, obviously,
those countries that are bordering on Syria, including Turkey,
including some others. So, we want to just keep an eye on it
and do everything that we can as the U.S. Government, again, to
ensure a peaceful transition and to make sure that we end the
bloodshed as quickly as possible.
Mr. Burton. I want to follow up on that real quickly, and
then we will go to our next panel. That is, NATO does not
represent the Congress of the United States. I mean, the
Congress of the United States represents the American people.
If the case is to be made that NATO should take some action,
then the case has to be made to the Congress of the United
States, so that the people's representatives will pass a
resolution to take action.
In previous administrations, almost without exception, we
have not taken any military action without the consent and
support of the Congress. That is in compliance with the
Constitution and the War Powers Act.
And so, the President, to his credit, has been reluctant to
take any action and has not talked to Congress about it. But I
hope it is conveyed to him very clearly that, if he thinks it
needs to be done, if our NATO allies think it needs to be done,
they need to come to Mr. Meeks, myself, and other Members of
Congress and make the case, and for us to pass a resolution to
give the President the authority under the Constitution and the
War Powers Act.
Thank you very much.
We will go to our next panel.
We really appreciate your being here.
Ms. Kaidanow. Thank you.
Mr. Townsend. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. The next panel consists of Damon Wilson. He is
the Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council, where his
work is committed to advancing a Europe whole, free, and at
peace. From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Wilson served as a Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director of European
Affairs at the National Security Council. Mr. Wilson has
previously served as the Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff
at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and as Deputy Director of the
private office of the NATO Secretary General, among other
positions.
Mr. Wilson received his BA in political science from Duke--
you have got a good basketball team there usually--and his MA
from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School for Public
and International Affairs.
Mr. Luke Coffey studies and writes on U.S./UK relations as
the Margaret Thatcher Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He
focuses, in particular, on defense and security matters,
including the role of NATO and the European Union in
transatlantic security.
Before joining Heritage, the Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom, in 2012, Mr. Coffey served at the UK Ministry of
Defense as a Senior Special Advisor to then-British Defense
Secretary Liam Fox. He was the only non-UK citizen appointed by
Prime Minister David Cameron to provide advice to senior
British ministers.
Mr. Coffey's work in British politics followed his service
to the United States as a commissioned officer in the U.S.
Army's Military Police Corps. He spent his entire time on
active duty overseas and was stationed in Italy with the Army's
Southern European Task Force. In 2005, Mr. Coffey deployed to
Afghanistan for a year. He is responsible for developing
theater-level policies for enemy detainees in U.S. custody and
support of counterinsurgency strategy.
Mr. Coffey received his MS in politics and government at
the European Union from the London School of Economics, and he
also holds a BA degree in political science from the University
of Missouri, St. Louis, and has an associate arts degree in
military science from Wentworth Military Academy in Lexington,
Missouri.
Dr. Stephen Flanagan holds a Henry A. Kissinger Chair in
Diplomacy and National Security at CSIS. Before joining CSIS in
2007, he served as Director of the Institute for National
Strategic Studies and Vice President for Research at the
National Defense University for 7 years. He held several senior
positions in government between 1989 and 1999, where he helped
develop U.S. strategy for the post-Cold War era. In 2009 and
2010, he served as lead advisor to former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright in her capacity as chair of the group of
experts that developed the foundation for NATO's strategic
concept.
Earlier in his career, he was a professional staff member
of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and he
also held faculty and research appointments at Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government, the National War
College, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and
the Council on Foreign Relations.
He earned his BA in political science from Columbia
University in 1973 and his PhD in international relations from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in
1979.
You guys have great credentials. I am very impressed with
that.
So, first, we will just start with you, Mr. Wilson. If you
could keep your opening remarks to 5 minutes, it would be
great. We will try to be liberal, if necessary. Oh, excuse me,
conservative but liberal. [Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF MR. DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, THE
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Burton, Ranking Member
Meeks. It is a pleasure to be with you today.
As NATO leaders gather in Chicago next month, they will
seek to achieve consensus on a difficult mission in Afghanistan
to protect military capabilities in a time of deep budget cuts
and to forge more meaningful partnerships with allies in Asia
and the Middle East. I would like to make the case that in
Chicago NATO should also make room for a serious discussion, a
future enlargement, and pursue a more ambitious partnership
agenda. Furthermore, I believe the major allies must look
beyond Chicago and focus on their own commitments within the
alliance to ensure NATO's health into the next decade. I will
briefly address these three themes and submit my full testimony
for the record.
First, enlargement. NATO says that Chicago will not be an
enlargement Summit. Indeed, the allies are not prepared to
offer invitations to candidate nations. However, it would be a
mistake not to use Chicago to give a boost to future
enlargement.
First, the aspirants have earned it. Each has demonstrated
it is able to contribute to security, including by providing
forces to Afghanistan.
Despite economic challenges, allies should remember that
enlargement makes Europe more stable and NATO stronger. In
Chicago, leaders can make clear that NATO's open-door policy
remains a cornerstone of the alliance's strategy.
Specifically, the alliance should underscore the urgency of
resolving Macedonia's only obstacle to membership, the dispute
with Greece over Macedonia's name; recognize Montenegro's rapid
progress and uniquely-good relations with all its neighbors;
make clear that NATO's commitment that Georgia will become a
member is genuine, and agree that Georgia's path to membership
is through the NATO Georgia Commission, and welcome Bosnia/
Herzegovina into the membership action plan, as it meets a key
final benchmark.
Chicago should also announce that all nations of the
Western Balkans who desire membership and are prepared to meet
alliance obligations will be welcomed into NATO as they
qualify, to include Serbia and Kosovo. And NATO leaders could
commit to take decisions on enlargement at their next Summit in
2014. Such a statement would signal NATO's intention to enlarge
and further incentivize candidates to implement tough reforms.
In conjunction, Washington, Paris, and Berlin should launch
a concerted serious strategy to resolve the Macedonia name
issue once and for all. With this approach, NATO can ensure
that the lack of invitations does not signal that the
enlargement process is stalling.
Second, ambitious partnership initiatives. Countries such
as Australia, Sweden, the UAE, and Jordan have been crucial
partners in Libya and Afghanistan. For NATO to remain effective
in an era of borderless threats and emerging powers, it will
have to develop stronger global partnerships. Chicago will
spotlight the role of these partners, but a Summit can achieve
more.
First, the Partnership for Peace should end its geographic
limitations and open up its charter and programs to any nation
that seeks to cooperate with the alliance, regardless of
geography.
Second, the alliance should introduce a program for those
who desire closer interoperability with NATO, short of
membership, such as Sweden. These partners should be able to
complete a process to qualify as NATO interoperable armed
forces and, as such, be eligible for special access to alliance
structures, including participating in decisions for operations
in which their forces are deployed.
Third, NATO allies should help transformations in the
Middle East and North Africa succeed by opening up the toolkit
that proved so effective in assisting the transitions of
nations in Central and Eastern Europe.
And finally, rather than pivot from Europe to Asia, the
United States should consider an initiative that binds our
European and Canadian allies with America's specific allies as
a precursor to ultimately forging alliances with the alliance.
Finally, preparing for the next decade. Beyond the formal
agenda in Chicago, I believe leaders must begin to repair a
growing rift within the alliance. NATO's credibility is
threatened by the debt crisis and major cuts in defense
spending. The crisis has weakened Europe's military
capabilities, sapped its ambitions for global leadership, and
called into question U.S. leadership within the alliance.
An alliance adrift would be an historic, strategic setback
for the United States. NATO remains home to the United States'
most capable and willing allies. They serve as force
multipliers for the United States foreign policy worldwide. The
best example is 40,000 troops in Afghanistan.
Therefore, for NATO to thrive, the United States will have
to demonstrate strong leadership of the alliance and Europe
will have to maintain its global ambitions. If the U.S.
disengages, it will find Europe less willing to act with us
globally. So, as we draw-down forces and begin to end over a
decade of continuous operations, the U.S. military must
redouble its efforts to train with allied forces to preserve
their ability to fight together.
But U.S. leadership is no substitute for European political
ambition. All allies have a responsibility to strengthen NATO,
but France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey will
determine whether Europe remains our top global partner. France
needs to continue President Sarkozy's approach of cooperating,
rather than competing with the United States. The United
Kingdom must maintain the ambition and the defense investments
necessary to preserve its special relationship with Washington.
And Germany must begin to show the same level of ambition to
influence global events as it does for its economic leadership.
And Turkey, NATO's only member growing in influence, should
be challenged to act more responsibly within NATO by offering
it a position of leadership in the alliance commensurate to the
leading role it plays in the emerging Middle East.
With the right mix of U.S. leadership, European ambition,
and stronger global partnerships, NATO and Chicago can begin to
trade its dim and dismal future that Secretary Gates warned of
for another decade of success.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Coffey?
STATEMENT OF MR. LUKE COFFEY, MARGARET THATCHER FELLOW, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Coffey. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the
committee, I am honored to speak before your esteemed committee
about the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my
full statement that I would like to submit to the record.
Having lived and worked in Europe before joining the
Heritage Foundation, I have firsthand understanding why a
strong transatlantic relationship is a necessity for America
and not just a luxury. This is why the Summit in Chicago will
be so important.
The top three items on the Summit's agenda will likely be
Afghanistan, Smart Defense, and NATO partnerships. Mr.
Chairman, I would like to take these in turn.
First, Afghanistan. For the Chicago Summit to be considered
a success, two outcomes regarding Afghanistan must be realized.
First, even as more of the country is transitioning from ISAF
to Afghan security lead, this cannot be used as an excuse for
our NATO members to leave the country prematurely. Any
withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan should be based on
improved security conditions on the ground and on sound
military advice. When these security conditions are met, NATO's
eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan should be a phaseout and
not a walkout. There should be no rush to the door.
Supporting this, the conditions-based language that was
used in the 2010 Lisbon Summit declaration should also be used
in the Chicago Summit declaration. Secondly, there must be a
clear commitment made by NATO to Afghanistan post-2015, in
particular, regarding the financial support for the AMSF. So
far, the United Kingdom, with the third largest GDP in NATO,
has been the only country to publicly commit funds for the AMSF
after 2015. However, with the budgetary requirements of $4
billion per annum, the $110 million that the UK has pledged
will pay for the first 10 days of the year. So, in this area,
NATO has a long way to go.
After Afghanistan, Smart Defense will feature on the
Summit's agenda. Smart Defense aims to encourage allies to
cooperate in developing, acquiring, and maintaining military
capabilities in a more economically-efficient manner in this
age of austerity. At the Summit, we expect NATO to agree to a
number of Smart Defense measures. While the aims of Smart
Defense are noble, I fear that the initiative is likely to
amount to little beyond a list of aspirations if there is no
new funding attached to these proposals.
As Libya pointed out, Europe relies too much on the U.S. to
pick up the slack when key enablers are required for alliance
operations. This is a result of a decrease in defense spending
across Europe combined with a lack of political will to use
military capability when and where it may be needed.
Mr. Chairman, as you have already pointed out, only three
of the 28 NATO members meet the 2 percent mark of GDP spending.
As expected, France fell below the 2 percent mark in 2011.
Spain, with the world's 12th largest economy, was only able to
spend less than 1 percent of GDP on defense.
To put this into perspective, with an annual budget of $4.5
billion for the NYPD, New York City spends more in policing
than 13 NATO members spend on their defense. Spending on EU
defense initiatives also exacerbates the dire financial
situation since it can divert scarce resources away from NATO.
Every euro or pound that is spent on EU defense is one less
that can be invested into the NATO alliance.
For this reason, the U.S. should send a clear message that
it does not support deeper EU defense integration. The language
describing Smart Defense may read well in a Summit declaration,
but until there is real money backing up real investment,
delivering real capability to the battlefield, Smart Defense
will be meaningless to the men and women serving on the
frontlines.
Finally, the issue of NATO partnerships. In light of the
2011 popular uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East,
there is a renewed focus on how NATO works with regional
partners. NATO has done little to enhance the Mediterranean
Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This needs to
change.
A step in the right direction out of Chicago would be a
formal invitation for Libya to join the Mediterranean Dialogue.
Building on lessons learned, working with Gulf states during
the Libya operation, there could be more concrete proposals to
enhance the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative by expanding its
membership or agreeing to individual partnership and
cooperation programs with the Gulf states.
Another aspect of NATO's partnerships is enlargement or, in
the case of Chicago, the lack thereof. Regarding enlargement,
there are two specific issues I would like to highlight. The
first is Georgia. Georgia spends approximately 4 percent of GDP
on defense and, as was already mentioned, will soon become the
largest per-capita troop contributor to the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan. The Summit declaration must include strong and
clear language reaffirming NATO's commitment to Georgia's
eventual membership to the alliance.
Secondly, Macedonia should have been given full membership
4 years ago and should be given membership at Chicago. It is an
absurdity that the Greeks, who, frankly, relied heavily on the
financial goodwill of their European neighbors, continue to
veto Macedonia's membership because of a name dispute. And the
U.S. should apply more pressure to the Greeks to agree to a
compromise with Macedonia.
In conclusion, it is in America's interest to see a
successful Summit. With the perception that the administration
is shifting its defense priorities from Europe to Asia,
America's NATO allies should not be forgotten. NATO has done
more to promote democracy, peace, and security in Europe than
any other multilateral organization, including the European
Union. It is essential that the United States continues to be
an active participant in the alliance's future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to taking your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Coffey.
Mr. Flanagan?
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN FLANAGAN, PH.D., HENRY A. KISSINGER CHAIR
IN DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Flanagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be
here before you today, and, Mr. Meeks, coming back.
I have a prepared statement that reviews the political and
strategic context of the Chicago Summit and offers some
perspectives from the vantage point of U.S. interest in each of
the three principal elements of the Summit agenda: Afghanistan,
military capabilities, and partnerships. I also comment on some
of the missing elements of the agenda that we have touched on
already today: Enlargement and the further development of
partnerships, but also the Nuclear Posture Review, the Defense
and Deterrence Posture Review, which we haven't touched on yet
today.
But I would ask that my prepared statement be made
available for the record, sir.
The vision and the mission statement articulated in the
2010 Lisbon Summit, the strategic concept which articulated a
notion of active engagement and modern defense remains valid. I
think the Chicago Summit needs to illustrate that the alliance
is actually implementing and delivering on those Lisbon
decisions, particularly on Afghanistan.
But, given the dramatic changes in the international
environment and in the fiscal situation in both Europe and the
United States, the Obama administration and other allied
governments I think have rightly chosen to make this more than
an implementation Summit and to demonstrate that they are
adjusting and adapting NATO's strategy to cope with these
developments.
The Chicago Summit, on a political basis, also needs to
reaffirm both sides of the transatlantic commitment. We have
touched on some of this already, as members of the committee
know.
You need no reminder on the whole question of inequitable
burden-sharing and the continued slide in European defense
spending. And indeed, the sad news is that even the NATO
figures early this month have now reduced to only two countries
meeting the 2 percent target goal, the UK and Greece. France
has just slipped below 1.9.
American leaders, rightly, should have the expectation that
Chicago should come up with some kind of a credible plan to
redress this imbalance. Smart Defense and other military
capabilities initiatives expected to be endorsed at Chicago
have the potential to at least staunch the erosion of European
military capabilities by assuring allocation of their
remaining, and still considerable, defense resources is done
more wisely.
At the same time, and we have touched on this earlier in
the discussion today, a number of European leaders are
concerned--and, Mr. Burton, you raised it earlier; it was Mr.
Meeks, I am sorry, that raised it--hearing a number of
Europeans concerned about how committed the U.S. is in the
context of this realignment of our engagement and military
assets toward East Asia and the Pacific, and the sense that
perhaps Europe is going to be left to its own in future crises
or more in the lead, with the U.S. in a supporting role.
So, I think President Obama and others would do well to
affirm in Chicago what he noted on the eve of the Lisbon Summit
and several times since: That the United States does not have
any other partner in any other region of the world like our
European allies, and that we will continue and remain committed
to European security and to working with our European allies to
maintain our interests around the world in a more effective
partnership.
Now, to talk a bit briefly about some of the successful
outcomes, I think there are three, and we have touched on most
of them already today. First of all, there has to be a credible
commitment for assisting Afghanistan in maintaining its
security through the transition to an Afghan lead in 2014 and
beyond.
Secondly, I think we need a long-term strategy for allied
defense planning and integration with some flagship initiatives
and a detailed implementation plan to ensure that NATO has the
critical military capability it needs for collective defense in
addressing emerging security challenges.
There needs to be greater transparency in national defense
spending and planning, so that allies can have a better sense
of how their national decisions that are being made on an
annual basis are having an impact on the overall capability of
the alliance in various future contingencies.
Concrete steps also need to be taken, I think, for
strengthening NATO's diverse networks of partnerships. These
would include measures to engage some of the key contributors
to alliance operations more effectively, but also I think, as
we have touched on earlier today, to enhance our engagement
with some of the countries in the Mediterranean Basin.
Now we can talk about the effectiveness and the viability
of all of these commitments I think perhaps in the questions
and answers. But let me just talk a little bit about a couple
of the missing elements of the agenda.
Since the Lisbon Summit, we have made progress on what is
called the Berlin Partnership Package in the alliance. That is
to allow NATO to work more flexibly and more nimbly with all of
its allies, to open up the entire partnership tool-kit to
various partners according to their interests and level of
capacity. But, still, this partnership agenda seems to be the
least-developed element of the Chicago agenda.
Of course, one of the big missing elements has been any
kind of progress on the partnership with Russia, which of
course has been hampered by progress on the missile defense
dialogue, even though cooperation on Afghanistan has continued.
So, there won't be a NATO Russia Council meeting in Chicago,
but there is hope that Russia will come to the ISAF
contributors' meeting. I think we still do need and should
welcome Russia's support on some of those elements of our
operations in Afghanistan.
Under consideration, as I said, is this issue of how to
deal more effectively with the key contributors to our current
operations and how to do that in a way that gives recognition
and gives them some sense of a stake in some of these
operations that they are contributing to in very effective
ways.
But, as I say, there is also an opportunity to leverage
some of the gains that we have made both with a number of Arab
countries after the Libyan operation, but also the
Mediterranean cooperation that we have had, particularly in the
area of maritime security, to continue to enhance that
capability, so that we can deal with a number of potential
contingencies and instabilities in the Mediterranean Basin, but
also to try to help advance the security sector reform in those
areas.
As I said, there are two big issues that are out of the
agenda that perhaps we can come back to in the discussion and
question and answer. The whole question of enlargement, I do
think that the Summit can set the framework for further
decisions, reaffirm the commitments that have been made already
in previous Summits going back to Bucharest and since, but also
to set the stage for 2014, when the next Summit will be held,
to actually move ahead with the membership of a number of the
four--and, hopefully, one will be sooner; that is Macedonia--
that those four recognized aspirant countries will go forward.
But, lastly, the alliance does need to come up with a clear
strategy for maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear forces,
conventional, and missile defense in our overall alliance
strategy. There has not been a consensus, particularly over
some of the aspects of the nuclear question, within the
alliance to achieve that. That was one of the Lisbon Summit
taskings. It didn't have any specific timeline, but it is one
that I think still warrants being addressed in the coming
years. But, in the interim, there are some other steps that we
can take to enhance that dialogue and, also, the discussions
with the Russians over enhancing regional stability.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Meeks. I look forward
to the questions and answers.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Flanagan follows:]
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Mr. Burton. I don't think you heard me a while ago when I
mentioned you couldn't remember who asked the question or made
the comment. I said Mr. Meeks and I look an awful lot alike, so
I can understand the confusion.
Mr. Meeks. He is my dad. [Laughter.]
Mr. Burton. He is my buddy.
I want to be serious for a moment. I was shaving the other
morning, and before I ask questions, I want to mention
something. I was shaving and I had the television on. I heard
them say something about a young man who was injured in
Afghanistan with an IED. And I walked out and I saw a picture
of him with his wife and his child. You talk about a good-
looking American family; this was it. He lost both of his arms
and both of his legs. It is a human disaster that I can't
hardly fathom.
And the reason I bring that up is we have so much
technology now and so many war materials and systems that we
can actually, from a satellite and a guy sitting at a computer
1,000 miles away, we can put a missile right down somebody's
chimney and blow them all to hell.
I am probably one of the biggest supporters of the military
and of strong defense, and a big supporter of NATO. And I don't
know that anybody at NATO is going to hear what I am going to
say, but I really believe that we ought to take a different
look at how we conduct wars. With the technology we have and
the satellites that we have, it seems to me that we could
pinpoint, maybe with some observers on the ground and some
intelligence people on the ground, we could pinpoint the
figures that we have got to knock out and do it without putting
ground troops in that are going to come back in pieces.
It is just tragic. We have been there 10 years. This young
man's life is ruined. His wife's life is ruined. His children's
life is, I am sure, going to be affected adversely.
I started thinking about World War II. You guys are too
young to remember it, and I was just a kid, a baby. But we
invaded Europe and we went after Japan. We used whatever
technology we had to limit the casualties. We did that by
firebombing Dresden, Germany, and firebombing Berlin, and
hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians were killed. In
Japan, hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians were killed.
But we probably saved 0.5 million American lives and allied
lives by not invading the island of Japan.
Now the reason I mention this is--this is just one man's
perspective--we need to evaluate how we conduct military wars
in the future. We don't need to send 100,000 or 150,000 young
men and women into combat and have them come back in pieces
when we have the technology that we have.
We see bad guys, bad regimes, and we want to get rid of
them. We could do it like that. And I don't want to see any
more young men come back with no arms and no legs. I am so sick
of this.
When I hear people talk about NATO and about our allies and
about war, and everything, it is always the troops. And, Mr.
Coffey, I understand what you are saying; we don't want to have
a unilateral pullout right now. We don't want to let the
Iranians and the Taliban and al-Qaeda know that we are pulling,
stopping, and running and leaving.
But, at the same time, we need to start realizing that
there is no antiseptic war. There are going to be civilian
casualties. We saw that in World War II to the tune of about
40- or 50 million people.
When it comes to allied forces and American young men and
women, I want to start using the technology that we have so we
don't put them at any more risk than is absolutely necessary.
The bad guys, I want to kill them. I don't want to see
Americans killed any more than has to happen.
This idea that we are going to have an antiseptic war, and
we are going to put hundreds of thousands of troops in there,
when we know we have the technology to knock out most of the
bad guys by just using the technology we have, I just don't
understand it.
So, that is just my little tirade today. I hope somebody is
listening out there because, if we are going to go after bad
regimes and bad guys, and we make a collective decision to do
it, then do it. Then do it with what we have without risking
any more lives than are necessary.
Now I just have one question, and you can all answer this.
You may not agree with me; Mr. Meeks may not agree with me. I
don't know.
But when we go to that NATO meeting in Chicago, as you
said, there are only two countries now that meet the 2 percent.
I think we do, more than do that. But there are only two
countries.
The allies that are putting up the money and the resources
need to be very firm and say, ``Look, if Greece can reach 2
percent and they are bankrupt, then, by golly, the others can
cough up that money.'' I hope that gets in the paper someplace.
If Greece can do it with all the fiscal problems they are
having, then the others ought to be able to do it as well.
If you have any comments here, you are welcome to make
them.
Mr. Coffey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On the point about the lack of spending by our European
allies, I couldn't agree with you more. What I think that the
administration needs to do more of is to publicly point out and
make this point and press this point home.
I had a unique experience working in British politics and
seeing things many times from the other side, from maybe more
of a European point of view, how American policy can impact our
allies in Europe and our special relationship in the UK.
I can tell you that at the many NATO ministerial meetings I
attended, or even the NATO Summit in Lisbon, I saw how
effective American leadership can be when it is used, and how
many of our European allies value the leadership attributes
that America brings to the table.
When former Secretary Gates gave his farewell address in
Brussels, it sent shockwaves through many European capitals. It
was talked about in bilateral meetings. It was talked about in
the press, the commentators, the editorials. It was major news
in the defense world.
But, then, when he left, that sort of drive to really focus
this issue and not be scared to name and shame kind of went
away. When Secretary Panetta gave his first speech at Brussels,
everyone was on edge--I remember this--about what Secretary
Panetta is going to say. Is he going to pick up where Secretary
Gates left off? And his speech was much more tame. Now it could
be because he was new and he wanted to be polite the first time
at a NATO ministerial. But it was noticed. So, I don't think we
should underestimate the effect American leadership can have
when we raise these issues publicly. That is my first point.
The second point I would like to point out is sometimes in
the U.S. we fail to realize the lack of importance attached to
the ministries of defense in Europe relative to the importance
we attach to the DoD in the U.S. or the MOD in the UK. In many
European countries, the ministry of defense has a lower stature
in terms of Cabinet ranking.
So, we can talk until the cows come home to defense
ministers in European capitals, but if you really want to start
to unlock this, you are going to have to start addressing this
issue at the foreign ministerial level and, better yet, at the
head-of-government level.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Anybody else?
Mr. Wilson. If I might just add to your first point, I just
want to thank you for your powerful opening remarks there. I
had the opportunity to serve in Iraq as a diplomat at our
Embassy and in Afghanistan with NATO, and I understand where
you are coming from with your poignant remarks.
I think it really puts an emphasis on two things,
technology and tactics. If you think about what we need to be
able to do with our allies, in the Kosovo air campaign the air
campaign was 90 percent U.S., 10 percent Europeans, because
they weren't up-to-speed with precision-guided munitions, the
kind of technology that is required in modern warfare to
minimize civilian casualties.
The reality is in Libya it was the reverse, 10/90, where we
had pushed our European colleagues to be able to fight in all
weather environments, using precision-guided munitions. It
wasn't perfect and there are still real challenges, but I think
this puts an imperative on keeping our allies with us as we
move forward on technology. That is why the alliance
acquisition of UAVs and precision-guided munitions remain a top
priority in the capabilities package.
But it is also the tactics. We are in 10 years of
Afghanistan, but we just have completed the Libya operation
without troops on the ground with no casualties, with probably
the most minimal civilian casualties of the modern military
operation. It is fairly remarkable.
And then, finally, I think your comments inform NATO
strategy and Afghanistan post-2014. If the alliance is going to
remain in a training capacity, the real issue is how do we
continue to have counterterrorism capabilities that can use
more modern technology, more pinpointed strikes, that de-
emphasize the importance of ground troops. I think that is a
key part of what role the alliance will play post-2014.
Finally, on defense spending, I would say we should give a
nod to some of our allies. Norway and Estonia are two of the
smaller allies that are keeping up on the defense-spending
side. But the reality is that American haranguing on the 2
percent hasn't produced results. Part of what the challenge is,
is that political ambition of our European allies is going to
drive their decisions on defense. So, we have to bring them
with us to feel a sense of responsibility and ownership for the
challenges we are facing on the global agenda. This is why you
take our European allies with us as we pivot to Asia. We don't
pivot away from Europe to Asia. We have to bring them with us
to underscore that our European partners are our go-to partners
in solving any problem. And therefore, a sense of ownership and
political ambition will help drive defense spending.
In the near-term, they are dealing with budget crises. And
so, I think our expectations should be for them to develop, if
not to see in the budget today, for us to see them with plans
that show over the next coming years, as their economies
recover, that they have a plan to restore spending, so that
they get back up to 2 percent. If not in 1 year, we see the 5-
year plan.
Mr. Flanagan. Mr. Burton, I just had two other perspectives
on your very compelling statement about the nature of warfare
in recent years. I think that Libya is actually an example of
the way in which the U.S. conducted that operation and
addressed your concerns in two ways. First of all, it did apply
technology. It was precision-guided munitions that a number of
allies had, including a number of smaller allies who were quite
successful with this. Support was provided and refueling and
target acquisitions by the United States, but, nonetheless, a
number of these allies did. Of course, you had the results that
were alluded to earlier of relatively limited civilian
casualties with enormous damage to the capacity of Gaddafi
forces to go after innocent civilians and to wreak the kind of
slaughter in Benghazi and other cities that were in the
horizon.
But, secondly, I think the decision to--and there were a
number of reasons motivating this--but the decision to let two
willing and capable European allies, the UK and France, coupled
with a number of other very capable smaller allies, to play the
leading role in some of the actual conduct of strike missions,
with the U.S., again, completely embedded in the operation and
supporting, but not playing a leading role, once again, in yet
another operation in the Arab Middle East, I think this was a
way to encourage Europeans and to show them that--and it
certainly wasn't pretty and there were many shortcomings, but
it did show that Europe could play a leading role in dealing
with a relatively-simple contingency on their periphery with
some U.S. support.
Again, I wouldn't say this is a model for all future
operations, but there are instances where Europe has taken
action somewhat independently along its periphery, lesser
operations in the Balkans and elsewhere. I think we should be
encouraging that at a time when the U.S. is going to be feeling
a heavy sense of demand on engagement in the Far East and other
areas of the world.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Meeks?
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I sit here and listen, I am reminded more and more why
this alliance is so important. Being a New Yorker, of course,
9/11 was significant. The day after 9/11 was the first, and I
believe the only, time that NATO invoked Article 5, emphasizing
the point of an attack against one of us was an attack against
all of us. That is so significant as I listen and think.
I agree with Mr. Burton in that no one wants to see our
young men and women coming back maimed and hurt and families
disseminated as a result of war. If we have technologies to
prevent such, we want to do so.
I just want to add--and I am pretty sure Mr. Burton would
agree--that not only am I talking about American casualties and
innocent individuals, but our allied casualties and civilians,
innocent civilians. We don't want the loss of innocent lives,
because all of us are human beings. We want to save as many
people as we possibly can, civilians, those that are not
committing heinous acts, those who are not the bad guys.
We want to go after the bad guys and save as many of the
good guys, because oftentimes that is the reason why we go to
war. That is the reason why we went to war in Libya. We wanted
to help the good guys and help save civilian lives, and not
have innocent people die. Surely, if we can do something to
prevent our young men and women from being victims during war,
I think that we should move in that direction.
My question, I guess, that I throw out first, because there
is this great need, I think, of having NATO. Dr. Flanagan, you
just talked about the model that was used in the Libya mission,
which I pretty much agreed with. The only concern that I have
is that the threat perceptions or the cost/benefit analysis
looked different within the alliance.
You mentioned how we let Britain and France take the lead,
and it was a successful operation because we also had Sweden
and the Gulf states involved. But there were other partners
that stayed out.
That raises the question of, what about future operations?
Will it increasingly be, say, the coalitions of the willing
within the alliance? If that is so, then what does that mean
for the future of NATO?
Again, I stress I think that these are important, but one
of the concerns that I have, just now analyzing what took place
in Libya and thinking about the future. So, I would love to get
your response on that.
Mr. Flanagan. Yes, Mr. Meeks, I think that is very good
insight. I do think that is a challenge that the alliance is
going to confront. Among an alliance of 20 countries, you don't
have the common assessment. There wasn't certainly the sense
that some of the Northern European allies had, particularly one
big one, Germany, had about the situation in Libya and how it
affected their security.
What I think is important is the key thing is what enabled
the alliance to move forward so effectively was the degree of
integration and interoperability that developed through the
unified military structure. It is important to maintain that.
And this is going to be important in the context of a Smart
Defense debate because of this whole notion of if countries
move toward specialization, and they don't have certain
capabilities, are they going to be available to them from other
allies when they need them, when the alliance as a whole wants
to put together either a coalition of the willing under an
alliance framework or even some other kind of ad hoc operation
that would still benefit from the levels of military
integration that exist? So, I think it is important that we not
encourage this to be the preferred option, but I think we have
to live with the reality that it may be the option because not
all allies will see as much urgency on certain operations.
But, to me, the key thing is to maintain the integration
that exists within the military structure to continue, and
particularly with our residual presence in Europe, to maintain
the kind of training and interaction with European forces after
our withdrawal from Afghanistan, to ensure that we can work
effectively with all of our European partners to deal with a
range of different contingencies; and that even if it is not
full-blown, it is not all 28 countries contributing, as we have
seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere before, still, it can be an
effective and a more legitimate operation, blessed by the
entire alliance, even if it ends up being sort of this notion
of a less-than-full contribution by all member states.
We have never had, even in the old defense of the central
region, we never had a fully equitable contribution by all
allies in defense of the alliance or in the conduct of some of
those preparations. But the key thing is to have that sense
that there is resolve and commitment of all allies to any
operation that the alliance undertakes.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Congressman Meeks, if I might add to that, I
was working at NATO headquarters on 9/11, working for Secretary
General Lord Robertson. I was watching on the TV in his office
as the second plane hit the second tower in New York. As an
American at NATO headquarters, on the one hand, I felt a sense
of frustration and helplessness that I couldn't do anything,
that I wasn't in the United States, that I wasn't able to help
respond.
As the alliance went into action that day and began to
consider invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history,
it underscored to me how solemn this commitment is and the
extent of this degree of solidarity, and how unique this
alliance is. At a time of our nation under attack, these
countries are willing to say that they will consider it an
attack on themselves and be there with us.
If you think about Afghanistan and the casualties that our
allies have suffered in Afghanistan, on September 10th, 2001, I
never would have guessed that you could imagine our European
partners would have deployed to us in combat 3,000 miles away
in Afghanistan for a decade. It was inconceivable. And yet,
despite all the flaws and problems and caveats, that is what
they have done. It is a pretty remarkable feat.
First and foremost, most of them have done it out of a
sense of solidarity with us. I think it is easy to take that
for granted. So, I value your comments.
On the Libya point, I think part of NATO's strength is its
adaptability, its flexibility. That is good for us. That is
good for the alliance. But, at the end of the day, the reason
NATO is enduring is because of the sense of solidarity that we
felt on 9/11. It really is about trust among allies and
partners.
And so, this issue of some of the allies not contributing
to Libya is a serious issue. Now some of the smaller ones
didn't really have assets that would have been applicable in an
air campaign over Libya. But Germany, Poland, they did. I think
as we think about the alliance and the way forward, while its
flexibility is a strength, and while there should be allies
that can step up and step back in certain operations, it is
something that we have to constantly work at because it is a
sense of trust and solidarity that at the end day makes sure
that Article 5 itself is actually credible. And so, we can't
take that for granted.
While I think Libya was a success in many regards, it is a
warning bell, I think as you have said. If you let this go too
far--in fact, some allies told us that, because they sensed
that Libya wasn't a first-order priority of the United States,
because it wasn't important enough to us, that maybe it wasn't
going to be important enough for them to commit forces. I think
that is a potentially corrosive trend over the long-term and
something that we have to guard against.
Mr. Coffey. Congressman Meeks, I cannot agree with you more
and with my two colleagues here around the table, the value
NATO brings in terms of solidarity with the United States. I
want to see NATO as an alliance succeed. I want to see it
transformed. I want to see it ready to take on 21st century
threats.
While I will point out the positives, and there are many,
as Damon said, about 10 years later, imagining so many European
troops fighting in Afghanistan, I will also not make excuses
for my friends, because I don't think that is what friends do.
Friends help friends.
In that regard, with Libya, I think Libya was a success
insofar as NATO was able to quickly stand up the command
structure to allow the operation----
[The microphone shuts off.]
Mr. Meeks. Try the button.
Mr. Coffey. I will speak loudly.
Mr. Meeks. Hit the button. The button didn't get hit by
accident?
Mr. Coffey. As was pointed out, only half of NATO members
actually contributed anything to the operation. I think only
seven actually conducted air-to-ground strike operations.
There were some notable surprises, especially with the
Norwegians, the Danes, and the Belgians, who at the time were
at about the 2-year mark without having government, which
probably says something.
But I think that we should really focus on how we can learn
lessons from Libya and how to improve similar operations in the
future. But I would caution against comparing Libya to other
campaigns such as Afghanistan or other NATO contingency
operations in the past because it was on a completely different
scale.
For example, well, every day there are roughly about 200
air sorties flown in Libya. Compare that to, roughly, 2,000
that were flown every day in the opening days of Iraq. So,
again, a completely different scale.
Compared to what we are trying to achieve in Afghanistan,
which is basically trying to train-up an indigenous force, the
Afghan National Security Forces, to take over an insurgency,
again, that is completely different from what we were
experiencing in Libya.
I would like to conclude by going back to Afghanistan and
say that we have all been touched. I would say most Americans
have been touched in one way or the other, by losing
colleagues, friends, or family members in Afghanistan, in Iraq,
and other wars. But we need to make sure that we set clear
objectives for what we are trying to achieve.
In Afghanistan, the standard for NATO should be a pretty
low standard. It should be simply to create the conditions
where the Afghans can take over the counterinsurgency mission,
so western troops can leave. The AMSF are the ticket out for
western troops. It is their country. It is their fight. It will
ultimately impact on our security if they don't get it right.
That is why we have to help them. But that is where we need to
be.
By 2014-2015, we need to see an AMSF that is capable of
carrying on with the counterinsurgency campaign. And by 2015,
there will be an insurgency in Afghanistan. We should prepare
the public for that now. But India, with the largest democracy
in the world, still fights two insurgencies inside its borders.
So, it doesn't mean that we have failed.
I think maybe that is another aspect of Chicago that will
be important that I failed to mention, is that we should start
preparing the public for what we should eventually expect out
of Afghanistan when western troops withdraw.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Let me just ask one real quick question
regarding Libya. As I understand it, the NATO treaty is, if
there is an attack on one, it is an attack on all and they all
respond collectively to the threat. That was not the case in
Libya. There was no attack on any NATO ally. There was a
decision made by some of the leaders, France and the United
States as well as some others, that there were humanitarian
tragedies going on, and that Muammar Gaddafi was a tyrant and
should be replaced. There was no threat to any country that I
know of.
And so, since there was no attack on anyone, I can
understand why Germany and other countries might say, ``Hey,
wait, why are we getting into this thing?'' So, I think that
needs to be made very clear. NATO was designed, as I understand
it, to be a defense mechanism against attacks on any one of the
NATO allies. But if there is no attack, obviously, there is a
question about whether there is an obligation for all of the
NATO allies to go in and attack a country because one or two
countries may say, ``Hey, this guy has got to go.''
Real quickly, yes, sir?
Mr. Coffey. I will quickly comment on that, Mr. Chairman.
You are right that it wasn't an Article 5 mission. In fact,
as was already pointed out, there has only been one Article 5
declaration since the beginning of NATO. But, actually, the
Article 5 declaration isn't for ISAF and Afghanistan. It was as
a result of September 11th. Those were Operation Eagle and
Operation Active Endeavour.
There have been many NATO operations in the past that
have--well, in fact, by definition, since it has only been
invoked once, Article 5, every other NATO operation has been a
non-Article 5 operation. So, I wouldn't say that, just because
something isn't a direct threat to the alliance, that the
alliance shouldn't act.
But I would certainly agree with you. Actually, I was one
of the ones who was very cautious and skeptical in the
beginning about intervening in Libya. I would agree with you
that NATO needs to be very selective when and where it
intervenes and how it intervenes, because Libya is not a closed
book, and there is still a lot to be said for what is going to
happen with Libya.
Thank you.
Mr. Meeks. Let me just real quick, again, just feeding off
of you a little bit, because it is compelling and history makes
you think. When do you get involved? When don't you? I think of
the innocent lives in Rwanda. Should we have gotten involved in
the Sudan? Could we have saved thousands, hundreds of
thousands, of Jewish lives if we had gotten involved earlier
during the Holocaust?
What are our responsibilities as countries and as human
beings? So, all of that has a play in this. Sometimes, I guess,
when you get involved, you don't know what the outcome, what
the recording of history will say, whether you acted too late,
as I believe we did with reference to the Holocaust, and we
didn't do much of anything in Rwanda. Or whether you interceded
when you should not have. I mean, that is something that I
think that is all part of our decisionmaking process as we move
forward, which is a very challenging and difficult thing for
any country to make a decision.
I would hope that that is why the alliance is built, so
that we can have those kinds of conversations and trying to
make those kind of collective decisions and not leave it just
to one country to make that decision, but let's try to work
together for our united selves to make that decision, which I
think, then, would put us in a better place as we move down the
road. Another reason why I just think that the alliance is so
important, so important.
Let me just get off this topic because we have been here
long enough. But I do want to ask one, because we asked a lot
of questions of the administration in regards to Georgia's
aspirations to join NATO. I would just like to know from you
whether or not you think that, without government control of
the Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
how would NATO's Article 5 apply to those occupied territories?
I would just like to get your thoughts on that.
Lastly, I think, Dr. Flanagan, you were there this morning,
a meeting; the EU delegation is hosting a big symposium today
about the EU's common security and defense policy and NATO/EU
cooperation. I would just like to get your assessment on this
cooperation.
Mr. Wilson. If I might start on Georgia, if the alliance
said that Georgia could not enter NATO until Russia withdrawal
from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we, by default, would be
giving Russia a veto over our decisions about enlargement. That
is a path the alliance can't go down, shouldn't go down. So,
this is a complicated and difficult issue. But we brought
Germany into the alliance when it was divided.
I think that part of the resolution of this difficult
situation in the South Caucasus in Georgia will be clarity on
the part of the alliance that its commitment at Bucharest that
Georgia will be a member, that we demonstrate that that is
genuine. And it would continue to work with Georgia through the
NATO Georgia Commission to help it both with defense reforms,
internal political reforms, to better prepare it, and that, as
it prepares, we are serious about bringing it into the
alliance.
This will have to create and force the dynamic that creates
a more auspicious environment for the negotiations over
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But if we back up and lead and say
we can't touch Georgia until Russia withdraws, we basically
have acceded the turf to a decision in Moscow, and we can't go
down that path in my view.
Mr. Coffey. Following up quickly on Georgia before Dr.
Flanagan goes on to talk about CSDP, I think that the Georgians
actually need to make clear that they are happy for there to be
some sort of compromise or arrangement with eventual Georgian
membership into NATO that excludes South Ossetia and Abkhazia
for the time being, until that situation is peacefully resolved
with Russia.
I believe this is the stated policy of the Georgian
Government. I don't believe that they have done a very good job
of convening this message to NATO allies. But President
Saakashvili has made a non-use-of-force pledge on regaining the
two occupied territories. So, by definition of pledging not to
use force, he has automatically implied that he sets aside
NATO's Article 5 commitment if Georgia was to become a member
of NATO.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. I might just add real quickly here that
Russia's accession into the WTO could have been stopped by
Georgia. And so, Georgia has already acceded to one aspect of
the problems that they face in those occupied territories.
I think you are absolutely right, it will be the same
thing.
Mr. Coffey. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Actually, that
decision, the agreement made between Georgians and the Russians
over this issue of Russia's membership in the WTO actually
shows that President Saakashvili is willing to take a pragmatic
stance when it is required.
Thank you.
Mr. Flanagan. Mr. Meeks, yes, with regard to the CSDP, the
Common Security and Defense Policy, I think the theme of some
of this morning was that, well, some had declared that perhaps
it was, if not dead, nearly dormant. But I think we heard that
there are important operations still underway, some not very
prominent in Central Africa, and helping Sudan and others. But
some actually quite significant, including the Atalanta anti-
piracy operation which is working with both NATO and the U.S.
task forces that are operating out there in that region.
The EU has not set up lots of duplicative structures, as
many had feared. They don't have the resources to do it. I
think one of the strengths that the EU can bring to these kinds
of operations, in particular, in their mission in the Horn of
Africa, they have also been providing some financial support to
assisting the Somalians with enhancing their security, with
some of the legal elements of going after some of the piracy
money and finances.
So, the notion that the EU can bring, because of the other
elements of the EU institutions that can bring along some of
the areas of civilian capacity, together with the European
military capacity, I think is some of the kinds of things we
should encourage.
Again, not big and duplicative missions that should be
focused on NATO, but some of these lesser activities where, in
showing that Europe is building the Union in all of its
dimensions, that this is something that I think in the end
provides net benefit to the United States and to all of the
allies.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been a
very informative panel. I am sorry we kept you so long, but it
was worth the wait, I think. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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