[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
LRA, BOKO HARAM, AL-SHABAAB, AQIM AND OTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN
AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 25, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-142
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey--
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California deceased 3/6/12 deg.
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
RON PAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CONNIE MACK, Florida ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID RIVERA, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 7
The Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator
for Counterterrorism, Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 29
Ms. Amanda J. Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 42
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 2
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: Prepared statement.................... 4
The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement............. 9
The Honorable Daniel Benjamin: Prepared statement................ 31
Ms. Amanda J. Dory: Prepared statement........................... 44
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 68
Hearing minutes.................................................. 69
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 71
Written responses from the Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto to
questions submitted for the record by:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.............................. 75
The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California...................................... 96
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Missouri........................................ 98
Written responses from the Ms. Amanda J. Dory to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.. 100
Written responses from the Honorable Daniel Benjamin to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable David Rivera, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Florida........... 104
LRA, BOKO HARAM, AL-SHABAAB, AQIM AND OTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN
AFRICA
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2012
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order. We
are here today to examine the instability on the African
Continent caused by the Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, led by
wanted war criminal Joseph Kony; also Boko Haram; also al-
Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; and to conduct
critical oversight of U.S. Counterterrorism efforts in the
region.
The ranking member, Mr. Berman, and I are forgoing opening
statements and submitting them for the record for today's
hearing, and I have asked our members to do the same so that we
may receive testimony, conduct member questioning, and be able
to adjourn today's hearing by 10:45 at the latest in order to
quickly go over to Statuary Hall and be able to participate in
the memorial service for our friend and departed colleague, the
late Don Payne. And that is all right with you, Mr. Berman?
Mr. Berman. Yes.
[The prepared statements of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Mr.
Berman follow:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And I know, Mr.
Smith, you will be speaking at the memorial service as well.
So the chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. First we
would like to welcome Donald Yamamoto. He is the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. He previously
served as U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia from 2006 to July 2009; Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State in the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006; and
U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti from 2000 to 2003. We welcome you,
Mr. Ambassador.
Next we would like to welcome Daniel Benjamin. Ambassador
Benjamin is the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Bureau
of Counterterrorism. Prior to his appointment he served as the
Director of the Center of the United States and Europe, and as
a senior follow in foreign policy studies at The Brookings
Institution from December 2006 to May 2009. For 6 years he was
senior fellow in the International Security Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, from 1994 to
1999, and he served on the National Security Council staff.
Thank you, Ambassador.
And last but certainly not least, I would like to welcome
Amanda Dory. She is currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. Prior to her appointment she served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy from 2008 to 2011
and Principal Director for Policy and Planning from 2007 to
2008, and as a strategist from 1999 to 2002.
Without objection, the written statements of our panelists
will be made a part of the record and we ask that you summarize
your remarks. Without objection, we will begin with you, Mr.
Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Yamamoto. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and
members of the committee. In the face of terrorist threats and
insecurity in Africa, military solutions in the first instance,
while important in some cases, may prove counterproductive if
not implemented and addressed in the context of other measures.
We must therefore consider addressing the wide range of
economic, political, and social factors that heal conflict and
insecurity and take a comprehensive, holistic long-term
approach.
The situation in Mali for instance, represents a microcosm
of the complex problems challenging Africa and the need to
address security concerns within a wider context. There are
four distinct yet interrelated crises facing Mali which must be
managed separately yet simultaneously. First, a return to
civilian authority and the reaffirmation of democratic
institutions will ensure a strong, united country able to
address other crises.
Second, a democratic government must reach out and engage
and dialogue with the Tuareg people of the north, addressing
their concerns.
Third, Mali faces a humanitarian crisis of well over
190,000 internally displaced as well as refugees in neighboring
countries.
And fourth, Mali and its neighbors together have a stake in
confronting the challenges posed by AQIM and other splinter
groups such as Ansar al-Din.
These challenges cannot be addressed in isolation but as
interrelated issues. Security is fostered by the establishment
of sound leadership, accountability to the people, transparent
and democratic processes addressing the needs of the
population.
We look to security challenges through a wide lens, and
that includes the five pillars articulated by the President in
Ghana in 2009. Those five are: Strengthening democratic
institutions, fostering broad-based sustainable growth,
combating disease, improving public health and education,
mitigating armed conflict, and helping Africans with
transnational threats.
Whether it is AQIM, al-Shabaab, or Boko Haram, extremist
ideology, even those masquerading in religious terms, are
antithetical, illegitimate and repulsive to the vast majority
of Africans. Extremism is a violent cancer that exploits porous
borders, capitalizes on human suffering, and feeds in
undemocratic environments. Our engagement will be difficult but
necessary, and must be based on several fundamental principles.
First, regional ownership. Leaders must inspire their
people and countries must own the process to address the
challenges effectively. Our African partners have consistently
said African security is Africa's responsibility.
Second, promotion of good governance. Our security
engagements cannot be separated from our long-term goals of
good governance, civilian control of security forces, and
respect for human rights. Extremist ideology takes advantage of
political and economic vulnerabilities. They destroy lives and
strengthen instability. Building credible government
institutions at all levels and assisting legitimate authorities
to respond to the needs of their people are vital objectives.
And three and final, the development and economic
opportunity. Investing in economic and social development is
crucial for improving the security environment in Africa.
Efforts to address insecurity are often hampered by poor
infrastructure and the inability of national or local
authorities to provide adequate services, educational and
vocational opportunities.
The road that we face will be long. It will be hard. It
will be difficult. But through patience, hard work,
coordination with our African partners, and promotion of
democratic values, human rights, and opportunities will make a
significant difference in the lives of Africans and for future
generations.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And I would like to tell our
wonderful panelists that you will notice that not many members
are here right now. But as I explained to you, at this time
from 9 o'clock to 10 o'clock we have our party conferences, so
all of the members are elsewhere. But we have got the committed
crew here.
Thank you. Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL BENJAMIN, AMBASSADOR-AT-
LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, BUREAU OF
COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Benjamin. Madam Chairman, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I join my colleagues, Ambassador Yamamoto and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Dory, in welcoming the
opportunity to discuss terrorism in Africa. I submitted
testimony for the record that provides additional information
about the Counterterrorism Bureau's programs and initiatives in
Africa.
Terrorism is a real threat in Africa and we have a whole-
of-government strategy to diminish that threat by building the
capacity of our partners that have the will to take effective
action and work cooperatively with their neighbors to deny
terrorists the ability to move among their countries. This will
require a sustained engagement, but we are already seeing
positive results.
We are also working with the nations of the region to
counter violent extremism, thereby denying terrorists new
recruits. We use all the instruments available to us:
Diplomatic, development, law enforcement, military and
intelligence. And we work bilaterally, regionally, and
multilaterally through organizations like the Global
Counterterrorism Forum.
In considering the various terrorist threats across East
and West Africa, the challenge can appear daunting. The great
expanses of desert, porous borders, under resourced
governments, all of these create an environment that offers
many advantages to terrorists. We also remain concerned by
reported communications, training, and weapons links between
AQIM, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian
peninsula. These may have strengthened Boko Haram's capacity to
conduct terrorist attacks; however, the lack of resonance of
the al-Qaeda ideology within those communities and the
commitment of the regional governments to join forces to
counter the terrorist threat have helped contain these groups.
If continued, these efforts will ultimately lead to their
marginalization.
That said, a number of different factors have converged in
recent years to create a new and worrisome set of openings for
terrorist organizations, particularly in the Sahel, West
Africa, and the Horn of Africa. The turmoil associated with the
ousting of the former Libyan regime has profoundly affected
parts of West Africa and East Africa. Loose Libyan weapons and
the return of refugees and mercenaries to their countries of
origin across the Sahel has greatly increased the internal
pressures faced by these countries.
The current Tuareg rebellion and subsequent coup in Mali
was spurred by these events and they have created a vacuum in
the north of that country that has provided AQIM with greater
freedom of movement. AQIM has historically being the weakest of
the AQ affiliates. Yet recently the group has managed to fill
its coffers with ransom money from kidnappings. These new found
resources, the arms and the money together, along with the
recent instability in Libya and Mali, have raised concern about
this group's trajectory.
In Nigeria, longstanding political and socioeconomic
grievances in the north led to the creation of Boko Haram in
2001. The group's attacks in the north, including one in August
against the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, signaled its
ambition and its capability to attack non-Nigerian targets.
U.S. Counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria is closely linked to
the broader strategy of support for the Nigerian Government's
reform efforts and increased respect for human rights. We are
providing limited law enforcement training assistance to the
Nigerian Government while also working to accelerate diplomatic
efforts to convince them of the need to change their strategy
with regard to Boko Haram from a primarily military response to
one that also addresses the grievances felt by many in northern
Nigeria.
Al-Shabaab also continues to threaten countries in East
Africa. In February, al-Shabaab and AQ released a joint video
to formally announce the merger of the two organizations. And
while it has demonstrated a willingness and ability to conduct
attacks elsewhere in the region, as we saw with the July 2010
attack in Uganda, al-Shabaab's attacks have primarily focused
on targets inside of Somalia.
With the assistance of both the African Union mission in
Somalia, AMISOM, and Somalia's neighbors, the Transitional
Federal Government has made significant gains in degrading al-
Shabaab's capability and liberating areas from al-Shabaab
administration over the last year. Yet much work remains to be
done in the region to further reduce the threat of terrorism,
while working to safely provide humanitarian assistance,
including to those inside al-Shabaab-controlled territories who
are denied access to outside aid.
The Department of State has a number of Africa programs to
address the various emerging threats presented by these
terrorist groups and other drivers of instability. And in this
vein, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and
the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism
(PREACT) are designed to strengthen the capacity of regional
governments to combat terrorist threats and counter violent
extremism while also fostering regional cooperation and
building lasting partnerships.
We believe we are making progress with a number of
partners. Algeria, Mauritania and Niger have achieved real
results against AQIM in the last year; for example, with the
defeat of AQIM twice in the Ouagadou Forest on the border of
Mauritania and Mali, the defeat of AQIM in the Mauritanian town
of Bessikinou, and the capture of arms convoys transiting from
Libya by joint Algeria-Niger operations.
In the interest of time I am going to conclude my remarks
here. Additional information on our various programs in Africa,
including antiterrorism assistance, countering violent
extremism, and counterterrorist financing are provided in my
written testimony. Thank you very much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Ms. Dory.
STATEMENT OF MS. AMANDA J. DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Dory. Thank you. Good morning, Madam Chairman, members
of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with
you today about the sources of instability in Africa.
I would like to begin by acknowledging the loss to the
Nation and the committee of Congressman Payne.
At the outset, I would like to note that African states and
regional organizations are making significant progress in
developing the ability to address security concerns and sources
of instability on the continent. We are seeing this dynamic
reflected in the robust role of the African Union mission in
Somalia, or AMISOM, as well as in the African Union's leading
role in facilitating negotiations between the Sudan and South
Sudan, and in the economic community of West African states'
work to facilitate a settlement in response to the recent coup
in Mali. Nonetheless, our partners in Africa still lack key
capabilities to address all the varying sources of instability
across Africa.
Given this reality, the Department of Defense in
conjunction the Department of State continues to assist our
partners on the continent with building their capacity to
respond to security threats. Our efforts in this respect take
multiple forms, including security assistance, exercises,
rotational presence, advisory efforts, and training and
equipping, as I will discuss in the context of specific
threats.
By assisting capable and willing African partners to
address threats like the Lord's Resistance Army, al-Shabaab,
al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and Boko Haram, we help our African
partners to create the space necessary to continue developing
political and economically, which benefits both Africa and the
United States.
DoD's efforts are implemented in accord with two tenets
from the recently released Defense Strategic Guidance. The
first one is that acting in concert with other means of
national power, U.S. military forces must continue to hold al-
Qaeda and its affiliates under constant pressure wherever they
may be. The second tenet is that wherever possible we will
develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to
achieve our security objectives on the African continent,
relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory
capabilities.
For example, in the operation to counter the Lord's
Resistance Army, a small number of U.S. forces are supporting
regional military forces in an advisory capacity and seeking to
enhance our partners' capabilities to achieve their objectives
against the Lord's Resistance Army. Elsewhere in East Africa,
in response to the terrorist threats posed by al-Shabaab, DoD
has provided training and equip support to African forces
deploying as part of AMISOM, using section 1206 funding.
In the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act,
Congress provided DoD with an additional important tool through
an East Africa-specific train and equip authority, section
1207(n). There is focus on building the capacity of the
counterterrorism forces in the East Africa region.
These authorities complement the program goals and
objectives of State Department's Partnership for Regional East
Africa and Counterterrorism, PREACT, that Ambassador Benjamin
has just referred to.
In the Maghreb and Sahel, DoD worked closely with the State
Department to plan and implement the trans-Sahara
counterterrorism partnership to address the threat posed by
AQIM. DoD's military-to-military activities under the TSCTP
seeks to build the counterterrorism capacity of key partners in
the region. These include section 1206 authorities to train and
equip partner nations as well as joint combined exchange
training events and an annual counterterrorism focused exercise
on a regional basis, Exercise FLINTLOCK.
Based on proliferation concerns following the regime change
in Libya, DoD has also incorporated Man Portable Air Defense
System, or MANPADS, awareness and mitigation training in our
mil-to-mil engagements.
In Nigeria, the expansion of Boko Haram's capabilities is a
source of increasing concern. In January 2012, DoD participated
in the inaugural meeting of a regional security working group
under the auspices of the U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission
with a focus on our cooperation in response to Boko Haram's
threat. Most recently our efforts are focusing on counter-IED
and civil military operations, but our engagement and
cooperation can support the usual goals of addressing Boko
Haram. We will continue to explore further areas to build
Nigerian counterterrorism capacities.
To sum up, in partnership with the State Department, the
Department of Defense is working to address the range of
sources of instability in Africa, from terrorism to piracy,
with our partners across the continent and beyond. Thank you
very much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you to each and every one of
you for your excellent testimony. We will begin our question-
and-answer period.
I wanted to ask about the Lord's Resistance Army. President
Obama announced, following the completion of the Nation
Security Council progress report, that the U.S. will continue
the deployment of a small number of U.S. military advisors to
assist regional forces of countries fighting the atrocities
committed by Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army.
Please describe the goals and the status of U.S. efforts to
counter the LRA and remove their operational capacity, the LRA
leadership, and how is this success being gauged?
Also, if you could describe the relationship between
private- and U.S.-funded efforts to establish local cell phone-
and radio-based monitoring and alert systems for LRA-affected
communities. What happens to nonleadership LRA defectors both
with regards to their intelligence value and the psychosocial
needs and the capacity to be integrated, if at all possible,
into their home communities? And finally, how frequent have
defections been since the initiation of the current program of
U.S. efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance Army? Thank you,
Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Yamamoto. First is the goals and objectives of the
teams--and I defer to Amanda Dory to give her explanations as
well--is to build interoperability and build up the training
programs of the 40 countries that are involved against the LRA.
Right now the goals and objectives are really fourfold in order
to isolate Kony and the other leaders, to support and assist
those who are leaving, also to help with rehabilitation and
reconciliation efforts.
One of the things that has been proven very effective is
what you just said, Madam Chairman, and that is the cell
phones. Not so much high-tech, but basic good work. The USAID
has provided about $100,000 to $200,000 worth of cell phones,
cell phone towers. What it does, it helps alert communities
when LRA groups are in area.
The other thing, too, is on the number of defections. We
have been working with the countries to do these--encourage
defections, but also reconciliation and rehabilitation. As you
know, in the beginning about 1.8 million to 2 million were
displaced in Uganda. We have about 385,000 in the Congo and
neighboring areas. The Ugandan forces themselves have spent
about $15 million just since reconciliation. We are doing the
same in those areas.
I think the success rate is good. The issue is that it is
only a matter of time. And we also want to thank you, Madam
Chairman, and this committee for the support on counter LRA
legislation and programs.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Ms. Dory?
Ms. Dory. To amplify Ambassador Yamamoto's comments, the
DoD deployment is in support of the broader counter LRA
strategy, the comprehensive one across the U.S. Government. The
first leg of that is focused on civilian protection. The
second, as he has referred to already, is on acquiring
defections and reintegrating LRA detainees back into society. A
third leg is providing humanitarian access. And then the
fourth--and this is where DoD is at the forefront--is working
to support the removal of Joseph Kony and key leaders of the
LRA from the battlefield.
So the advisory mission that DoD is engaged in is really
working with and through the local militaries, four different
military partners in the region. We have a variety of metrics
of success and benchmarks that we are using, looking across the
strategy, and it includes looking at the ability to provide
humanitarian goods at the level of our access over time. It
includes looking at the number of defections over time; the
captures, the number of captures from the battlefield.
From the DoD perspective some of the metrics that are
important to us: The building of trust and relationships with
each of the partner militaries, the access that is provided.
Things that we focus on are reducing the amount of time from
information that is garnered, whether through defections or
other means, to actionable intelligence for use by the tracking
teams, the Ugandan forces in particular, and looking at how we
shrink the time between the intelligence and information to
actual operations conducted. So that is a key metric as far as
we are concerned.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, very much. Thank you, and
please keep the pressure up. Thank you. Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much Madam Chairman, and I have
a bunch of questions. I would like the first couple to be real
quick answers, if possible, so I can get them in.
Ms. Dory, on the fourth objective can you--given 100
military advisors working with local militaries and military
partners, why haven't we been able to kill or capture Kony?
Ms. Dory. That is an excellent question. One of our biggest
challenges with the mission collectively is expectations
management. And I think that is what you are helping us focus
on. When you look at the operating terrain involved--and many
use the comparison to the size of the State of California--
heavily forested, very limited infrastructure, it is very
challenging terrain in which to find a small number of needles
in a haystack. So that is the terrain challenge that faces the
operating forces in the area.
Mr. Berman. This does remain one of our objectives there, I
take it?
Ms. Dory. Removing Joseph Kony from the battlefield, and
his key lieutenants, remains one of our objectives. A second
challenge relates to the level of logistics support for the
fielded forces. So given the terrain challenges, given that you
have four different regional militaries that are working in
collaboration together, is a very challenging operation.
Mr. Berman. Second, maybe Ambassador Yamamoto, the Dodd-
Frank legislation required the administration to provide a--
prepare a map of mining areas and rebel-controlled areas to
give us a sense of the relationship between--on the issue of
conflict mining and support for these rebels. Where is that
map?
Mr. Yamamoto. We will be getting the mapping soon. We have
been tracking all the mines and what type of materials are
being produced. As you know, Mr. Berman, the Congo produces
probably about 8 percent of all the minerals that are needed
for cell phones and other types of high-tech equipment that we
use in our daily lives.
Mr. Berman. Yes, but the map?
Mr. Yamamoto. And the map is coming out soon, sir.
Mr. Berman. Soon? Like--like?
Mr. Yamamoto. I have seen drafts and we worked on it. One
of the issues on the mapping is that these are artisan mines
that kind of spring up and then they close, et cetera. And
those very hard to calculate. But we do have mapping, et
cetera, ready.
Mr. Berman. So you think we will see that by the end of
May?
Mr. Yamamoto. Before.
Mr. Berman. Before. All right.
A larger question: How do our executive branch agencies
balance this desire to build cooperation on counterterrorism
with the desire to promote human rights, good governance,
civilian control of the military?
You take Uganda and Ethiopia. They are strong partners on
regional security, but neither of these governments are
tolerant of strong political opposition or civil society. They
are both hostile to a free press. How do you ensure in building
up the counterterrorism capabilities that we are doing no harm
to democracy and human rights, and the integration of the
different roles to rule of law programs, in coordination with
the security and capacity programs for the security forces?
Ambassador Benjamin. I will perhaps leave some of the
specifics on Ethiopia, a country that Ambassador Yamamoto knows
very well, and Uganda, to him. But I would say that an
interesting part of our antiterrorism assistance is always
human rights training. There is always a human rights component
to what we can do. Dory can address what is done by DoD in its
capacity-building efforts. And it is also an integral part of
our message to these countries that if they wish to diminish
radicalization that it is absolutely essential that they
observe human rights norms and ensure that that first contact
or the sustained contact between citizens and the agencies of
the state are benign ones and not ones that will in effect have
a radicalizing impact.
That is a core effort within what the CT Bureau is doing.
And we have any number of different programs going on that are
designed to underscore and promote human rights observance in
all of these contexts. Perhaps Ambassador Yamamoto might have
more details on this for you.
Mr. Yamamoto. Just a couple of areas. In Ethiopia we have
the NCO and officer training program, and what we have learned
now is that those trained troops are better troops, they are
bidding to civilian control, and they are very disciplined.
They are one of the main peacekeeping troops in Darfur and
Abyei and other places.
The second area, too, is that we have been working with
Prime Minister Meles and his government on various committees
and groups on how to----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. If you could turn on your
microphone.
Mr. Yamamoto [continuing]. On how to improve democracy,
good governance, and various other programs. And so therefore,
we are going to enter another program here in the United
States. We did another program in Addis last year. I think
these efforts and areas are getting the message out and we are
having a lot better coordination and cooperation.
Mr. Berman. My time has expired.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Smith is recognized. And if I could ask each of you to
hold that microphone really close.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
testimony to our very distinguished panelists and for your
service to our country.
Just again on Joseph Kony, if you could tell us what
priority is being given by the United States and by the
respective militaries in Africa to the killing or capture of
Joseph Kony. We all know it is a priority, but how high is it?
And how degraded is Kony's ability to murder and force young
people into child soldiering?
Mr. Yamamoto. Right now, in the coordination of the four
countries, the priority is very high. In our discussions with
President Bozize and his defense minister, who is his son, they
have been very high on the priority in trying to coordinate
with Ugandans, the DRC and others, Southern Sudan, in order to
cordon off his escape routes and try to capture him. So it has
placed a very high priority, and they have taken the leadership
and the ownership in that regard.
Mr. Smith. How degraded is his ability to wage his war of
terror?
Mr. Yamamoto. On Kony, we have been able to degrade his
forces. It is now down to about 150 or so. There are about 800
that are accompanying him, but the number of defections has
increased. The only problem, of course, in the last 3 months is
the number of attacks by Kony's groups has increased, but we
are trying to limit those areas of operation.
Mr. Smith. What is the reward or rewards for information
leading to his capture? And how is that information
disseminated?
Mr. Yamamoto. The information right now--again we thank the
Members of Congress on the Rewards for Justice. That is a good
program. What it has done is given more publicity and to really
advertise. And also the Invisible Children have done a great
job with their Kony 2012 to get the message out. And so there
is nowhere for him to hide, et cetera, so therefore we are
looking for much more publicity----
Mr. Smith. How is that information gotten out? Is it by
radio? And to whom do they bring the information to?
Mr. Yamamoto. Right. The average people in the areas. So
therefore they know how to work to coordinate, to cooperate,
and to further help in the capture of Kony.
Mr. Smith. Have we gotten credible leads as to his
whereabouts?
Ms. Dory. Could I add a few accompanying points? The
message in terms of encouraging defections and being able to
provide monetary compensation in response to information leads
is going out through leaflets that are dropped by air, it is
going out by radio, it is going out through linkages of the
forces and the civilians in the area. So it is kind of moving
along the different pathways of communication. The Intelligence
Community assessments as well as what our partners are telling
us in terms of how degraded is Joseph Kony, the common
assessment is that he has been significantly degraded and is in
a survival and evasion mode at this point and on the move on a
regular basis. So I think those are encouraging signs to us
that are shared with our partners.
Mr. Smith. Two final questions, because I am almost out of
time. In the late nineties I chaired a series of hearings on
the bombings in Tanzania as well as in Kenya, and I will never
forget when Admiral Crowe told us at the hearing right here in
this room how disappointed he was that while on the short term
there is a vigilance, that vigilance wears down. And with the
now-emerging threat of home-grown terrorist organizations, how
aware or vigilant are we to those threats?
And secondly, how has the consolidation of power by the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic parties in Egypt the
jihadist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa, the nexus between
Cairo and the south?
Ambassador Benjamin. Thank you very much, sir, for those
questions. On the issue of vigilance and home-grown or self-
starters, I think we are as vigilant as we possibly can be. It
is well-known that the challenge regarding the home-grown
threat is the collection. Intelligence collection is very, very
difficult if people are acting on their own initiative and
communicating very little, if at all, with others who share
their ideology. But we are extremely concerned about this and
we know, for example, that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in
its various publications is encouraging individual attacks,
people not coordinating and the like, and we certainly share
your concern on that and we are working as hard as we can on
it.
Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, I think it is important
to know that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has not been
associated with any violent attacks since the 1970s. In fact it
has engaged in a very, very, sort of virulent debate with al-
Qaeda over many years. It is certainly true that Egyptian
internal security has been challenged somewhat in the aftermath
of the revolutionary events in Tahrir Square and elsewhere, but
Egypt remains a close counterterrorism partner. As you know,
the Internal Security Service was essentially replaced and the
new one is being built. But we have not seen that the
developments in Egypt having any notable effect on AQIM or al-
Shabaab or others in one way or the other. And I don't think we
expect to see any.
Those groups may benefit from some of the turmoil in a
place like Libya, for example, because of loose weapons, but
not because of what is going on in Egypt.
And I would just say in closing that if anything, the
transition to democracy is a huge blow to violent extremist
groups because it demonstrates that change can come through
peaceful measures and not, as bin Laden and others always
communicated, only through violent change. So we view this
actually as a hopeful set of developments, not one without
bumps in the road, but nonetheless a very positive turn.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Ms. Bass is
recognized and she is now the ranking member on the
Subcommittee on Africa.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member.
Before I begin, I wanted to mention that Mr. Smith and I
tomorrow will hold a hearing on the current and escalating
crisis engulfing Sudan and South Sudan. It is clear that if we
are to see real lasting peace and security we must address some
of the underlying causes of unrest and discord, not merely in
Africa of course but around the globe.
So I had a couple of questions I wanted to pose in this
regard. How are our development and diplomacy efforts at USAID
and the State Department directly addressing some of the root
causes to strife and unrest, and what good governance and
democracy promoting programs are having real success?
Mr. Yamamoto. Thank you very much. I know that at your
hearing tomorrow you will have Princeton Lyman and Errol Gass
and they can address those in greater details. But generally we
have been working nonstop on the diplomatic side, working with
countries like the Arab League and China to disengage the
forces between the north and the south, particularly on Heglig,
et cetera, to bring stability to that region in the Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile region.
In the area the USAID is continuing--it is our largest
humanitarian assistance program in Africa, and we will continue
to address not only the humanitarian assistance issues but also
development, the education and the health-care programs. And I
think tomorrow you will get great details on the projects.
Ms. Bass. Great, thank you very much. Anybody else?
Ambassador Benjamin. I would just add to that and say,
broadly speaking, we in the Counterterrorism Bureau view our
mission as being focused to a large extent on the strategic
dimensions of counterterrorism, and by that I mean that we are
looking at the upstream factors. We are looking at those
drivers of radicalization and trying to figure out what we can
do to blunt them and to diminish the likelihood of there being
more recruits. We are involved in quite a number of different
rule-of-law efforts and in countering violent extremism efforts
that are trying to provide alternatives, for example, threat
risk populations, particularly youth. And we also are involved
in the messaging side of things, and have been deeply engaged
in the standup and the operations of the Counterterrorism
Strategic Communications Center, which was created by an
Executive order by the President, within the State Department.
It is an interagency effort and we have great support from DoD
and from others in the interagency that have meant to
essentially challenge the vast amount of propaganda that is out
there, especially from al-Qaeda-related groups, and try to
prevent people from embracing the ideology and turning to
violence.
Ms. Bass. Could you expand a bit more on what you were
saying about the youth in terms of how you are specifically
addressing the youth?
Ambassador Benjamin. Well, we would be happy to give you a
lengthier briefing on that. There is an awful lot going on. But
we recognize that the people who are most at risk of becoming
radicalized are the young. We are conducting programs that
complement what AID does in the sense that they are doing the
longer-term development work that is meant to provide key
social services that obviously ameliorate the grievances that
lead to radicalization.
We are looking at hot spots, areas where we see
particularly intense areas of radicalization, and trying to
figure out what we can do there on the level of a state, a
city, even a neighborhood, and figure out what it is that is
driving radicalization there and what we can do to provide
alternatives, often working with civil society organizations
that are going to be better interlocutors with these young
people and will be more credible with them and steer them away.
So there may be leadership programs for young people, other
kinds--could even be sports. It could be something that is
bringing them together to establish a better relationship with
law enforcement----
Ms. Bass. Before I run out of time, I would appreciate it
if you would give me more information at another time. Thank
you very much.
Ambassador Benjamin. We will.
Ms. Bass. I wanted to ask a couple of questions with regard
to the Reward for Justice program. And as Mr. Smith was asking
questions about the reward for the capture of Kony, I was just
wondering in terms of defections, have you been able to have
some of his major lieutenants defect? Have people been
responsive to the rewards program?
Mr. Yamamoto. That is correct. And there have been
defections especially of the lieutenants and other groups
coming in and providing information about where locations--for
example, Kony is such an elusive character and he travels very
stealthily and it is very difficult. And they also do small
groups.
Ms. Bass. When you mentioned he has stepped up efforts and
attacks, has some of it been in retaliation of our efforts in
terms of the cell phones where the leaflets have been dropped?
Has he been attacking those specific areas?
Mr. Yamamoto. I think that needs further assessment but it
is just basically random violence right now in areas.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Bass. Mrs. Schmidt of
Ohio is recognized.
Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you. I have three questions. The first
is it how is State and DoD coordinating with resources to
combat threats throughout the region?
Ambassador Benjamin. I think we have very close
coordination from the working level on up to the Situation
Room, particularly through two comprehensive programs, the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which deals
primarily with the Maghreb and the Sahel, and also the PREACT
which is its corollary in East Africa. Our staffs work very
closely to identify needs and important programs that can
address those needs, both on the military and the civilian
side. And we feel that there is really an excellent give-and-
take on these issues. Perhaps Amanda has something else to add
on that.
Ms. Dory. Just briefly to amplify from a DoD perspective
what Africa Command has been able to do is develop crosscutting
regional campaign plans that are part of the DoD approach to
engagement and long-term planning. So we have a Northwest
Africa campaign plan, for example, that fits and aligns with
the State Department TSCTP.
Similarly, in East Africa there is an East Africa campaign
plan that aligns with the PREACT countries. All of those
benefit from State Department input but are written and
promulgated in DoD'ese so they are able to be understood and
cascaded within the DoD structure.
Mrs. Schmidt. I know that AFRICOM is in parts of the
continent of Africa. Where does it come in on stabilizing the
region? AFRICOM, our military presence to help certain
countries make their military more professional and it is a
partnership and they--where is that coming in in all of this?
Ms. Dory. Sure. I can respond both in the mission space and
then organizationally. From the organizational perspective what
you see are three different nodes where the Department of State
and Department of Defense are interfacing and developing the
strategies and policies. So here in Washington clearly is one
location. The second location is at AFRICOM headquarters in
Stuttgart, where you have a very heavy interagency presence to
include a State Department deputy to General Ham, alongside a
military deputy and many State Department and AID personnel;
and thirdly at the country team level, Ambassador-led, you have
the senior Defense officials who are engaged with State
Department officials there. So we have something of a three-
legged stool.
Mrs. Schmidt. How are you measuring success, AFRICOM's
success?
Ms. Dory. AFRICOM's success in the first instance is to
prevent the threat of attacks against U.S. interests, against
the U.S. homeland, against Americans overseas. By that metric I
think we have a fair degree of success to report, but remain on
guard and ever vigilant.
The next mission for the command is to focus on
contributing to partner capacity to be able to extend regional
stability. That is really where we are focused in the hearing
today when we look specifically at terrorism. And I think
capacity-building is one of those long-term objectives where
you measure your inputs in terms of the training hours that you
provide, the equipment that you provide, the advisory services
that you provide, and then you look at security outcomes.
Some of the ones that we talked about in the opening
statements include regional partners stepping up and acting in
the threat. When faced with insecurity such as the Amazon
mission in Somalia clear evidence, this is where we are able to
successfully contribute and support our partners on the
continent.
Mrs. Schmidt. Focusing on Boko Haram and the terrorism
situation, I know that Representatives King and Meehan wrote
Secretary Clinton requesting that the State Department list
Boko Haram as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and Executive order 13224. What
is the status of the request and what criteria haven't been met
to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization?
Ambassador Benjamin. We are very concerned about Boko Haram
and are addressing this issue through a number of different
means in terms of our engagement with the Nigerians and the
like. But the State Department, as a policy, doesn't comment on
potential or perspective designations. So I am afraid I can't
give you any more insight into that right now.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Ms. Schmidt. Ms.
Wilson, my Florida colleague is recognized.
Ms. Wilson of Florida. Thank you, Madam Chair. The video,
The Invisible Children, really captured the people of America,
especially the child soldiers and all of the devastation that
is happening. And it had me so upset I offered a resolution. I
was just astounded.
And I am just wondering, last year we authorized--Congress
authorized up to $35 million per year in the budget for 2012
and 2013 for increased support to regional counter-LRA efforts
in the 2010 NDAA.
Does the DoD intend to obligate the full authorized amount?
If not, how much? And to what extent will this funding offset
State Department payments for logistics, or will it expand
activities beyond the current State Department-funded logistics
support package?
Ms. Dory. Thank you. The Department of Defense appreciated
the authority provided under 1206 that is focused on countering
the Lord's Resistance Army. The Department does intend to use
the authority. It was not accompanied by an appropriation, so
we are in the process of identifying the possibilities in order
to fund the authority.
What we have at this point is well-defined requirements
provided to us via Africa Command. I think we have agreement
between the two Departments. As you know, this is a dual-key
authority that requires the concurrence of both the Secretary
of Defense and Secretary of State. Our intent is to use the
authority to provide logistics support to the regional partner
military forces. This is something that the State Department is
currently undertaking using peacekeeping operations funds. As
DoD takes over that logistics support contract, we intend to
increase the level of logistics support to the partner
militaries.
The other thing we intend to use the authority to do is to
provide additional supplies to the different operations fusion
centers that have been set up with the partner militaries by
the deployed U.S. forces.
Ms. Wilson of Florida. Just a follow-up, Madam Chair. We
saw The Invisible Children in America and it was riveting. How
many people do you think in the affected areas actually were
exposed to that video to help them understand what was
happening with their own families, their own surroundings,
neighbors? How do we get that to them so that they can see and
understand what is happening with Mr. Kony?
Mr. Yamamoto. We were just talking to Ben Keesey, and on
The Invisible Children, it is really--it galvanized the United
States and people in Europe. If you talk to the people in the
affected areas, they live it, they understand it. Sixty-six
thousand, as you know, Representative, 66,000 kids have been
abducted. You are talking about 2 million nearly displaced. And
so the terror that Kony has launched in those areas are very
much understood very well by the people.
And going back to your previous question as well: How do
you measure success, how do you go after Kony? And the answer
comes in is that the Africans themselves, they know. They have
taken the ownership. They are going after Kony. They are taking
the lead. And they are taking ownership of all of these
programs to help coordinate and cooperate. The issue is how can
we help them with interoperability, communications
coordination? You know, militaries of the CAR are probably less
than what it is in Uganda. How do you bring those to the same
level in cooperation?
To answer your first question, Representative, the people
in these affected areas know very well, and they are very
thankful to the United States for this effort, thankful to the
Congress for doing legislation. And so what you are doing here
in the House really resonates very well among the citizens in
Africa.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ms. Wilson. Mr.
Duncan of South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for having
this hearing.
You know, I first off want to give kudos to the group
Invisible Children, and raising global awareness, really, about
the plight in Africa, in the Lord's Resistance Army and what it
is and what Joseph Kony has done. And I understand our efforts
from the United States to address those as well.
I guess I am concerned about what I see with Sudan, with
what I continue to see with al-Shabaab and the radicalization
efforts. I know this committee and Homeland Security have
talked numerous times over the last Congress about
radicalization and al-Shabaab's recruitment here in the United
States.
And so I guess, Ms. Dory, the question for you--and this is
going to be my only question today because I am interested in
listening more than I am in interrogating you guys--but what
types of U.S.-supported counter radicalization efforts have
been most successful in your opinion?
Ms. Dory. I would be glad to start, and I know Ambassador
Benjamin has ideas as well.
Mr. Connolly. Madam Chairman, could I please ask the
witness to speak more loudly?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. This is about my fourth request.
Please, please, please. We are going to give you a
multivitamin. Please speak right into the microphone. It makes
for a better hearing if we can all hear you.
Ms. Dory. Can you hear me? Thank you.
I can give you a few insights from DoD perspective and I
think State Department will have some to add as well. I think
when we look at the counterterrorism mission space, recognizing
the complex roots of the terrorism problem in the first
instance, DoD has some very effective tools, as you are aware,
to focus on training and equipping partner counterterrorism
forces and to undertake counterterrorism missions directly
ourselves. They complement those through efforts to counter
violent extremism, counter radicalization, some of the things
that Ambassador Benjamin has been referring to in terms of
information operations, for example, and other efforts to
outreach and engage.
I think it is a complex space, and to be able to identify
any particular element as the particular piece that is the most
effective is a challenging thing to do, given our limited
understanding of how terrorism operates and expands over time.
But my short answer to you would be it is the
complementarity of the different types of trying to focus on
terrorist leaders and reduce them over time, and focusing on
drying up the pool of recruits and prospects to diminish those
who enter onto that path in the first place.
Mr. Duncan. Ambassador Yamamoto, do we see other countries
in the region assisting us at the level I think that Americans
would expect other countries to assist us in the
antiradicalization efforts, our fight against al-Qaeda, and
world threats?
Mr. Yamamoto. I think it is in different terms. Commitment?
Yes, they are committed. But how--going back to your first
question is how do you reduce radicalization in Africa and so
many areas? And we can have all the programs in the world. What
is going to be important is, A, are those countries addressing
and meeting the needs of the people? Look at Nigeria, Mali, and
other countries. We have problems of instability because of
clans and groups, et cetera. And the issue is, can we work with
government to address the needs of people who feel they are
disadvantaged?
The other issue is education and health care. You know,
living in Africa on a good day in East Africa, one out of every
ten children will die before the age of 5. And if that is a
concern for parents, a concern for kids themselves, then that
is a concern for us. And working with these governments to
address those needs, that has been important.
The other issue, too, is education there. If you talk about
70 percent of Africa's 1 billion people now are under the age
of 30, and most of them are under the age of 25, is education
is a big issue, and also job creation and economic development.
So in those contexts I think if you want to reduce
radicalization, those are the areas: Holding governments
accountable to their people; making sure that they are
addressing those needs. And, two, working systematically with
us on education and health care. And I think a lot of countries
around the world are doing that and I think we are making a lot
of good inroads.
Mr. Duncan. Ambassador?
Ambassador Benjamin. If I may add to that a bit. As Deputy
Assistant Secretary Dory said, the variety of pathways to
radicalization is enormous. And so we find someone like an
Abdul Matalib, who was educated in elite schools, being
radicalized. We find people in poor villages where they are
subject to inadequate education and extreme ideology being
radicalized. There are really countless different pathways.
Ambassador Yamamoto is exactly correct that the high road
to counter radicalization is putting pressure on governments
and enabling them to provide services to their people. That
will obviously diminish a lot of radicalization. Good
governance and democratic institutions will make a big
difference, the rule of law and the like. We can certainly talk
at much greater length about this.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. Mr. Connolly
of Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. And I have got to say, I met with a
number of young people from my district earlier this week on
the subject of Joseph Kony and the LRA, and I was very
impressed and remain impressed at the mobilization online that
has occurred throughout this country and indeed throughout the
world on what otherwise might be an obscure African issue far
away. And I have to believe that, frankly, the mobilization of
our young people on such an issue, focused on human rights,
focused on the tragedy that has occurred in East Africa I think
can only be to the good. And shades of my own youth in college
on getting involved in Biafra and Bangladesh, I am on showing
my age. But I think it is a great thing.
I met with one young man who is from Uganda and whose
village was targeted by Kony and the LRA, and his brother was
indeed abducted. He managed to flee into the bush, but one of
the points he made was there was no protection.
Ambassador Yamamoto, you have mentioned, correctly, that
there is a level of awareness through radio and other means,
that certainly the word has gotten out about the need to avoid
the occasion of trouble. But frankly, his point was there was
no protection. The government isn't functional in large swaths,
or wasn't at his time. He is not that old.
And so I want to focus on that. What about institution
building? What about the capacity of the Ugandan Government to
expand its writ and protect its citizens from these kinds of
tragic deprivations?
Mr. Yamamoto. And that is the heart of a lot of the issues
that we are trying to work on. This person probably--the LRA,
of course, started out of the Ocoee region of northern Uganda
where you had over 1. 8 million people displaced, and how was
the government coping with those really staggering numbers? And
those are issues that we have been trying to help with capacity
building. I know Ambassador Benjamin and his group have been--
--
Mr. Connolly. If I can, Mr. Ambassador, that is already
sort of a consequence of the failure of the government. You
don't have displaced people if the government has the capacity
to in fact protect people and provide law and order.
Mr. Yamamoto. And that is the issue, how to build capacity.
That is one----
Mr. Connolly. Well, how are we doing it?
Mr. Yamamoto. I think we have made tremendous progress in
the last decade through a lot of programs and projects to build
institutions, to build training programs. We have INL programs
to train police; have military being more responsive; doing
better coordination and cooperation. I think those are areas
that we have done.
Mr. Connolly. Those are all good metrics for our inputs,
but what about the output? Is the Ugandan Government in your
view showing--and other governments in the region--in fact more
resilience, more efficacy, in providing protection and in
deterring the ability of the LRA to operate.
Mr. Yamamoto. That is right. Well, the LRA is not operating
in Uganda anymore. They are now in Congo. But those troops from
Uganda are in the CAR and other areas to help coordinate with
those military forces to go after the LRA. And then its context
is how to build up security in Uganda.
As you know, Congressman, Ugandan troops are also in
Somalia, helping their stabilization. They have done a
tremendous job in the last decade.
Mr. Connolly. Part and parcel of this conversation also is
building our partnership capacity efforts throughout Africa. We
put a lot of money through 1206 into countries like Mali. Is it
your same assessment that they have also proved to be
effective?
Mr. Yamamoto. Mali was a greater disappointment because
this was a country that was on the right track and the coup
basically set it back a great deal. So now we are starting from
scratch to do rehabilitation and restore good governance. But
there are people in place who can fill the void, but we are
going to give them the opportunity.
Mr. Connolly. A great disappointment. The coup leader in
Mali was in fact trained by the United States, was he not?
Mr. Yamamoto. That is right.
Mr. Connolly. With funds under this program.
Mr. Yamamoto. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. So does that cause us to assess our own
effectiveness in this program.
Mr. Yamamoto. I think that one person does not detract from
the overall goodness of the program.
Mr. Connolly. Well, that one person overthrew an elected
government.
Mr. Yamamoto. That is right. Just look at throughout
Africa. We now have over about 200,000 trained troops through
these programs, through INET, FMF, et cetera, and 80,000 are
now in peacekeeping operations doing great jobs. So we cannot
judge on Captain Sanogo and his insanity and what he did.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I think you will forgive the American
people for wondering a little bit about how effective their tax
dollars have been invested when that is the outcome, even if it
is one guy. He sure did have a big impact on the country and,
as you point out, set back in many ways many of the investments
that were made since 2006.
My time is up, Madam Chair, thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher is
recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know, Madam Chair, I believe that Mr.
Royce was here before me.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. So sorry, I didn't see you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But I appreciate your consideration.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Sorry, he was not in my sight line.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I also appreciate your Cuban coffee.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Royce is recognized.
Mr. Royce. I thank my colleague in California and thank
you, Madam Chair. Going back to the point of 800,000 people who
are displaced in northern Uganda, there is a reason they are
displaced. It is one man and one war lord. And when we think
about what could be done to bring Joseph Kony to justice, one
of the most important things is apprehending him.
Tomorrow, a very important event occurs, and that is the
verdict from the War Crimes Tribunal is going to be read with
respect to Charles Taylor. That is an issue that this committee
worked for years on how to get him apprehended and then turned
over to the bar of justice. Because no matter how much money we
have spent in Sierra Leone, in Liberia, in the region, across
West Africa, there was no way to keep up with the mayhem he was
able to cause. And certainly between now and tomorrow, there is
going to be a lot of people in West Africa hoping--hoping that
this decision tomorrow will see him put away for life.
But in terms of the apprehension of Joseph Kony, I have
legislation, H.R. 4077, to allow for a rewards program. It has
bipartisan support. Our military is interested in having it put
into action soon. So I just mention that in the hopes that we
can help move this legislation, get your views on that.
Also I wanted to ask about how involved al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb is in terms of the drug trade, because one of
the things we found in terms of the nexus with Taylor was his
willingness to be engaged in the blood diamonds trade and these
types of activities to get his hands on hard currency. So if I
could ask that question as well.
Ms. Dory. If I could start on the Rewards for Justice
program, just to express the support of the Department of
Defense and General Ham at Africa Command's endorsement.
Mr. Royce. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Ambassador Benjamin. Good to see you again, Mr. Royce. On
the issue of the drug trade and AQIM, AQIM has managed to fill
its coffers quite effectively with kidnapping for ransom. In
the last few years they have really acquired millions and
millions of dollars through this practice.
Now, AQIM does operate in the same area that some of the
smuggling and drug trading lines run through, and they may--
there may be some racketeering, essentially, some effort to
shake down the drug traders and extort rents from them to
operate in those areas. But by and large, we haven't seen AQIM
turned into a drug cartel or a drug organization.
Mr. Royce. Let me ask you another question, then. This will
go to Boko Haram in Nigeria. We saw the first suicide attacks
there recently. And those are the first in Nigerian history.
But if we look back at al-Shabaab as it began to morph, it
launched its first suicide attacks back in 2006. And recently,
you have got the full strategic alliance with the announcement,
the public declaration recently that they are joining forces
with al-Qaeda, that they are part of al-Qaeda. How similar is
the fact that now we are seeing this change in tactics by Boko
Haram?
I know a governor from northern Nigeria who has told me
that he sees the Gulf State influence there in terms of radical
ideology in some of the immans teaching locally and changing
the culture to the type of culture that we saw with al-Shabaab
being driven--being driven by radical ideology.
Tell me--I am trying to gauge where we are in this process,
but what can we expect in a few years from Boko Haram in your
opinion?
Ambassador Benjamin. Well, I don't have a crystal ball. I
would say that it is clear that Boko Haram has gotten some
training and adapted some of the tactics that are common to the
AQ affiliates, and we believe that that happened principally
from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb, not from al-Shabaab,
although there are sporadic contacts there as well.
We have also seen Boko Haram has adopted--or has shown its
ability to target non-Nigerian targets, as it did with the
U.N., and that is a worrisome sign.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Ambassador Benjamin. But it is a still a heterogeneous
group.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I would like to ask the Ambassador--it is nice to see you
again, Mr. Ambassador. We have over the years had several major
little confrontations of our own. I would like to ask you, do
you believe that a lack of democracy and human rights feeds
radicalism and terrorism? And is that so in Africa?
Mr. Yamamoto. There are always--I think fundamentally the
issue is if a government is not accountable to its people, then
that really goes against President Obama's first pillar, which
is good governance, democracy, and institutions. And so the
issue comes in as yes; without those accountability and
democratic institutions, then you have problems.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And I remember that we had some concerns
earlier, the two of us--but just for the record you were
Ambassador to Ethiopia from 2006 to 2009, and during that time
period there were some major human rights issues in Ethiopia.
Can you tell us what the--my recollection is that the
government got away with murder in Ethiopia and we let them get
away with that. Did that in some way--has that in some way fed
the radicalism of Africa today as compared to people who, if
you would have had an honest democratic government in that huge
country of Ethiopia, it might have been more of an example, a
positive example, rather than something that fed terrorism?
Mr. Yamamoto. I think Ethiopia, and specifically Africa in
general, are different issues. But on the Ethiopia issue, we
went in and had heart-to-heart talks. I met with all the NGO
groups, the local communities, with all the opposition groups.
We worked very hard behind the scenes. As you know, we had 21
of the people who were placed in jail, the political prisoners,
released. That took a long time but we did it.
The other issue is that we started now intergovernment,
intragovernmental issues, discussions with Ethiopia and the
United States. We are heading to discussions this summer, and
the topics are on democratic values and how we expand
institution building and how we develop this relationship.
Because, again, Ethiopia is an important country not only on
counterterrorism issues but also as a symbol for what is the
stability for that region. And one of the stability issues, you
said Congressman, you have been a great advocate, is democratic
values.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would hope that pressure from Congress
and perhaps from this committee actually assisted you in having
those prisoners released. And I would hope that our Government
makes it clear to people like those who govern Ethiopia that we
take this very seriously, and the corruption level and the
repression level in that country and in other countries in
Africa is unacceptable.
Let me ask a little bit about the financing of this, as my
colleague has mentioned, blood diamonds. I saw that movie, it
was a perfect film. But I tend to believe that perhaps there
are other people to focus on in terms of the financing of these
radical and monstrously violent groups that are marauding
around Africa.
What role does--I mean, if we are talking about al-Qaeda
and that in Africa, are the Saudis playing a role in financing
this as they have in other parts of the world? And is China
playing any role, positive role, a positive role at all, or are
they playing a negative role in confronting these types of
horrible attacks on decent government in Africa? To the whole
panel. That would be fine.
Ambassador Benjamin. Thank you, sir. The primary finances
for the radical groups that we are concerned with come from
kidnapping for ransom and crime, different kinds of fraud,
theft, you name it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. No evidence that the Saudis are coming
from the outside.
Ambassador Benjamin. With al-Shabaab, it is also such
things as the charcoal trade and their control of the Port of
Kismayo and the attacks they put on that port. There may be
external donors, but it is a small part of the overall funding
picture.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Well, thank you very much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And our last questioner
will be Mr. Rivera, another one of my Florida colleagues.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I will
probably direct my questions to Ambassador Yamamoto and
Ambassador Benjamin as well. It is my understanding that
Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria have become a recruiting
ground for al-Qaeda in Morocco, a hub for opportunistic
Polisario drug traffickers, and a threat to the region and the
reforms--some of the reforms that we saw in the Arab Spring.
Since 1990, international support for the camps has
exceeded $1 billion is my understanding, and that USAID exceeds
$300 million for the camps. So it appears that the U.S.
taxpayer is being called upon to partly fund the operation of
camps that are being increasingly exploited by regional
terrorist groups. So how is the administration dealing with
this appearance at least?
Ambassador Benjamin. Sir, I have seen reports of al-Qaeda
involvement in Polisario camps, and whenever we have dug deeper
we have found that those reports were spurious. I am happy to
go back and have a look again and see if there is anything new
that has come in on this. But on a number of occasions we have
investigated these allegations in the past and found that there
was no substance to them. But why don't we get back to you on
that to ensure that we have up-to-date information?
Mr. Rivera. Ambassador Yamamoto, do you have anything to
add? Okay. That is all, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And I would be interested in that
information as well. Thank you so much.
We would like to remind the panelists and the audience and
the members that at Statuary Hall at 11 o'clock, we will be
walking from here to there for a memorial service in
celebration of our departed colleague, Don Payne's life, and I
know that he was a very important person to each and every one
of you.
So thank you very much. And with that, the committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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