[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-124]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2013 DOD ROTORCRAFT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 27, 2012
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-796 WASHINGTON : 2012
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS.#13
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama BILL OWENS, New York
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio JACKIE SPEIER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 27, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 DOD Rotorcraft
Modernization Programs......................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 27, 2012.......................................... 25
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 DOD ROTORCRAFT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 2
WITNESSES
Crosby, MG William T., USA, PEO Aviation Headquarters, U.S. Army. 5
Kane, Maj Gen Robert C., USAF, Director, Global Reach Programs,
U.S. Air Force; and Maj Gen Noel T. Jones, USAF, Director,
Operational Capability Requirements, U.S. Air Force............ 7
Robling, LtGen Terry G., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation,
U.S. Marine Corps; RADM William F. Moran, USN, Director, Air
Warfare Division, U.S. Navy; and Richard Gilpin, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Air Programs Office............ 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G...................................... 29
Crosby, MG William T......................................... 46
Kane, Maj Gen Robert C., joint with Maj Gen Noel T. Jones.... 62
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 31
Robling, LtGen Terry G., joint with RADM William F. Moran and
Richard Gilpin............................................. 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 79
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 83
Mr. Cooper................................................... 94
Mr. LoBiondo................................................. 92
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 95
Mr. Rooney................................................... 94
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 94
Mr. Turner................................................... 93
Mr. Wilson................................................... 90
FISCAL YEAR 2013 DOD ROTORCRAFT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 27, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m. in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Bartlett. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
afternoon. Thank you all for joining us. I would like to
welcome our witnesses, Lieutenant General Terry Robling, Deputy
Commandant for Aviation U.S. Marine Corps; Rear Admiral William
Moran, Director, Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy; Mr. Richard
Gilpin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Air Programs
Office; Major General William Crosby, Program Executive Officer
Aviation, U.S. Army; Major General Noel Jones, Director,
Operational Capability Requirements, U.S. Air Force; and Major
General Robert Kane, Director, Global Reach Programs, U.S. Air
Force.
Thank you all for being here and for your service to our
Nation.
The use of helicopters has dramatically changed warfare
doctrine from the time of their introduction during the Korean
War, followed by development prior to Vietnam, use during
Vietnam as a mobility platform and current rotorcraft aviation
operations. The helicopter is now a platform of maneuver used
for multimissions, to include resupply, medical evaluation,
reconnaissance, air assault, and attack operations.
The U.S. Armed Forces currently have approximately 7,000
helicopters. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have put an
even greater reliance on rotorcraft support as a result of
improvised explosive devices, which have restricted ground
movement. Based on current planned force structure reductions,
the demand for rotorcraft capability will even be more critical
in the future. Maintaining a healthy fleet of rotorcraft
equates to the total force having the ability to cover the wide
area battle space as referenced in the national security
strategy.
The purpose of this hearing is to get an update from each
Service as to the condition of their respective current
rotorcraft fleet and plans for future upgrades and
modernization. In addition to various platform updates, the
committee hopes to learn how the Services are utilizing
research and development dollars to develop the next generation
of rotary wing systems and subsystems. And finally, given the
likelihood that there will be a continued or even greater
dependence on rotorcraft in the future and the likelihood that
rotorcraft will have to operate in greater threat environments
than they currently do in Afghanistan, the committee expects to
learn what each Service is doing in regard to aircraft
survivability equipment and how they are working together to
maximize resources.
Again, I thank all of you for your service to our country
and for being here. I look forward to your testimony.
And now to my good friend from Texas, the ranking member,
Mr. Reyes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me add my welcome to all of you. Thanks for being
here and thanks for your service.
Today's hearing on DOD [Department Of Defense] rotorcraft
programs is the first Tactical Air Land Forces hearing
specifically covering these programs, I believe, in many years,
and based on the budget request for fiscal year 2013, a hearing
is definitely warranted for several reasons.
One major issue is the cost of these rotorcraft programs
and how they impact other areas of military service budgets.
The Army 2013 request, for example, includes $4.3 billion for
procurement of upgraded and new rotorcraft, including Black
Hawk, Chinook, Apache, Kiowa, and Lakota helicopters.
By comparison, the Army's request for weapons and tracked
combat vehicles in 2013 is only $1.5 billion, less than half as
much.
The Marine Corps' request for rotorcraft programs totals
$1.4 billion for just two major programs, the new AH-1Z and the
UH-1Y helicopters and CH-53K development programs. If one adds
the V-22 program to that amount, the total for the Marine
Corps' request is more than $3 billion. This $3 billion total
exceeds the Marine Corps' entire ground equipment procurement
budget, which is about $2.5 billion.
The many--the other two Services have somewhat lower
requests, with the Navy's request at $1.2 billion and the Air
Force coming in somewhere around $500 million. If one totals up
the Service requests for rotorcraft programs, you get around $9
billion, with the vast majority of that funding being
procurement of new or upgraded aircraft.
So it is clear that rotorcraft programs are a priority for
all the Services and, in particular, of course, the Army and
the Marine Corps. Overall, this strong investment in updating
and replacing the services of rotorcraft fleets, I think, is a
very good thing.
However, one concern that I also have is how skewed this
funding request may be in favor of production of new manned
rotorcraft as opposed to research and development of new
rotorcraft for future use. This imbalance is in part the result
of termination of almost every new manned rotorcraft program
DOD has tried to start in recent years. As an example, the Army
has little funding for R&D [Research and Development] of new
rotorcraft after the termination of the Comanche and Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter programs. The program intended to
follow those two efforts remains mired in seemingly endless
analysis of alternatives with, from our perspective, no clear
path forward.
Likewise, the Air Force cancelled the CSAR-X combat rescue
helicopter program in 2009, and this year cancelled its program
to replace the aging U-1 Huey helicopters. Both have yet to
restart.
The Navy continues to struggle with defining requirements
for the new Presidential helicopter almost 3 years after
termination of the VH-71 program, again in 2009. Only the
Marine Corps has a large-scale and so far successful R&D
program underway with the CH-53K heavy lift helicopter program.
Another concern that I have is the lack of commonality in
some mission areas between our respective Services. The Army,
Navy, and Air Force all fly variants of the UH-60 helicopter,
which produces significant savings in both production and
support costs. The Marine Corps, in contrast, is fielding
rotorcraft unique in DOD, including the upgraded AH-1Z Cobra
and the UH-1Y Huey and, of course, the CH-53E Super Stallion.
This does not mean that the Marine Corps programs should be
stopped or reduced, but I do believe that it does raise the
issue of how in the future, at least for the next generation of
rotorcraft, DOD can better achieve truly joint solutions.
Finally, with respect to the unmanned rotorcraft, there are
several promising research and development efforts underway,
with the Navy and Marine Corps leading the way with the MQ-8
and the Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aerial System. While funding
for these efforts is relatively small at this point compared to
our manned rotorcraft programs, they could be important
waypoints toward future efforts.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the
testimony from our guests, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Without objection, all witnesses' prepared statements will
be included in the hearing record. It is my understanding that
there will be three oral statements, one representing the Navy
and Marine Corps; second, the Army; and third, the Air Force.
The first testimony is from General Robling, representing the
Navy and Marine Corps.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN TERRY G. ROBLING, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; RADM WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN,
DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE DIVISION, U.S. NAVY; AND RICHARD GILPIN,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY AIR PROGRAMS OFFICE
General Robling. Chairman Bartlett and Ranking Member
Reyes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is our
honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of
the Navy's rotorcraft modernization programs.
Testifying with me today are Mr. Rich Gilpin, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Programs, and Rear
Admiral William Moran, the Navy's Director of Air Warfare.
And as you stated, Mr. Chairman, I will keep our oral
remarks brief, and I will submit our combined statement for the
record, including the questions requested by the subcommittee.
I would like to begin by thanking the members of the
subcommittee for your support of our programs and our marines
and sailors. Eleven years into sustained combat operations, we
continue to see marines and sailors perform magnificently. They
could not perform their missions without the tools of their
craft. The vertical lift capability of the Department's
rotorcraft platforms is one of the key enablers in combat.
Last year we embraced our past history, as Naval aviation
celebrated its centennial. This year, Marine Corps aviation is
doing the same. It was nearly 66 years ago, in 1946, when Major
Armand Delalio was designated as the first Marine helicopter
pilot. Our workhorse of the fleet, the CH-53, flew its first
flight in October of 1964. The CH-53 Delta has recently flown
its last flight on U.S. soil, but it continues to provide
expeditionary heavy lift, as it has since its beginning in
combat. This final deployment will retire those aircraft in
place in Afghanistan later this summer.
While the requirement to accomplish our missions have not
abated, we recognize that today our Nation faces immense
challenges. The budget reductions necessitated by the Budget
Control Act remind us of the unquestioned need to be good
stewards of our resources and to be prudent in our spending. We
continue to actively manage our current rotary craft inventory.
The MV-22 cost per flight hour decreased 13 percent in fiscal
year 2011, and the program received the prestigious David
Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award, which recognized
exemplary performance and innovation acquiring and delivering
products and capabilities to the warfighter.
We will begin our AH-1 Zulu build new procurement strategy
in fiscal year 2013, which eliminates the AH-1W remanufacture
process and enables a faster recovery from the USMC's current
attack helicopter shortfall. The VH-3 Delta and the VH-60
November continue to provide seamless vertical lift for the
President and the Vice President of the United States, while
the Presidential helicopter replacement aircraft effort focuses
on completing the update to the analysis of alternatives and
continues to develop an acquisition strategy that targets
affordability, cost control, and reduction of risk prior to the
awarding of any major contracts.
We must persist in modernizing and recapitalizing our Naval
aviation forces by the most affordable means possible. With
your assistance, we are leveraging our buying power with
successful multiyear procurements on the V-22 and H-60,
achieving substantial procurement cost savings. The H-1
upgrades program has seen aircraft delivered ahead of the
contracted schedule and on budget. We have increased our
lethality with such low-cost weapons as the Advanced Precision
Kill Weapon System II.
Upgrades to the MH-60 Romeo and MH-60 Sierra have
significantly improved the antisubmarine warfare and surface
warfare capabilities of the fleet. Still in development is the
CH-53K, which will have nearly triple the lift capability of
the current CH-53 Echo. The CH-53K program was recently awarded
the Robert L. Pinckney Award from the American Helicopter
Society International. This award is given in recognition of
notable achievement in manufacturing research and development
of rotorcraft or rotorcraft components.
Finally, the Department of the Navy is looking toward the
future, and we are actively participating with the other
Services in the DOD-led future vertical lift initiative. I
would like to thank you once again for the opportunity to speak
here today, and we welcome your questions on the Department of
the Navy's rotorcraft modernization programs.
[The joint prepared statement of General Robling, Admiral
Moran, and Mr. Gilpin can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Now General Crosby from the Army.
STATEMENT OF MG WILLIAM T. CROSBY, USA, PEO AVIATION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY
General Crosby. Good afternoon, sir.
Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for calling this
hearing.
I am pleased to be here today to discuss Army aviation and
welcome this opportunity to testify before you. On behalf of
our great Army, I appreciate the tremendous and ongoing support
this committee has provided to our soldiers stationed around
the world. I know you all will be able to agree that our
soldiers have performed magnificently and their families have
sacrificed much for our Nation over this past 10 years.
You specifically asked that the Army address several
concerns on the Army aviation modernization. Army aviation is,
without a doubt, the best in the world, employing cutting-edge
technology that provides an invaluable capability, making it
indispensable on the battlefield. This capability is only as
good as the aviation soldiers who operate and maintain these
great systems worldwide.
Our relationship with the ground force is the best that it
has ever been in Army aviation's history. Achieving such a high
level of professional excellence took years of hard work by a
new generation of air and ground warriors, who fully respect
the warfighting accomplishments of each other. It is our
dedication to supporting the ground commander that helped
establish a collaborative environment among the various members
of the aviation enterprise over the past several years and will
serve as the foundation for our future success.
The Army recognizes that in our current fiscal environment,
we must share in the responsibility of finding new and
innovative ways of acquiring and sustaining our Army aviation
weapons systems, smarter, faster, cheaper, and more
effectively. As such, we have taken a proactive approach to
aviation modernization plan that ensures the balanced long-
range approach. We recognize that we must adapt our plan while
avoiding the natural tendency to cut our investment programs to
meet short-term mandates. Our plan accepts risk in some
modification improvements, minimizes the impacts to our
industrial base by preserving our multiyear contracts and
increases the production plan by 3 to 5 years in the long term,
which means we would reduce quantities in the near term.
We have done this to preserve our science and technology
investments in a future vertical lift, maintain our path to
address the deficiencies in the Scout mission area, and
continue our procurement and modernization of our current
platforms and our unmanned aircraft systems.
My written testimony outlines in more detail our plan in
maintaining and sustaining Army aviation and modernization
plans and addresses your specific concerns. With the current
resource environment, we are going to have to take the best
solution we can with the best potential for success without
compromising safety, identity--excuse me, identify what those
impacts are early, and determine the best course of action to
give our soldiers what they need at a price that we can afford.
As our Army cares for its aging fleet, we will continue to
support the development and execution of a new investment
strategy that will provide for new platforms ready to field in
the 2025 timeframe and beyond. The joint future vertical lift
aircraft is an integral part of our long-range plan, and part
of our balanced approach to maintain our investments; 2030 is
the aim point for a new system to replace our aging fleets, and
our initial effort will be focused on the attack and utility
mission areas, which comprises about 75 percent of our current
fleet.
Science and technology investments today in subsystems like
the improved turbine engine program and the other identified
and enabling technologies are critical to maintain our planned
schedule. In continuing to modernize our fleet, our investments
have produced a healthy inventory of aircraft that are still
high in demand in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places in the
world where our soldiers have answered our Nation's call. We
will need a faster and more survivable aircraft after 2030 to
remain effective.
Additionally, we continue to execute our multiyear
contracts, which have gained our taxpayers significant savings
over the prices that would have result in the Army-awarded
single-year contracts.
Army aviation programs and their foundations are solid, and
we have a modernization strategy for the future. Our aircraft
and equipment are the best America can provide and that have
displayed readiness in flying hour OPTEMPO [Operations Tempo]
rates that far surpassed expectations.
More importantly, we have answered the calls to integrate
our capabilities with various combined arms teams, sustaining
forces and joint agencies.
The fiscal year 2013 President's budget is supportive and
representative of Army aviation priorities. While we desire to
field our modernized aircraft as quickly as possible, a balance
among other Army priorities has been accomplished in this
fiscal year 2013 budget request. Your committee has been very
supportive of Army aviation budget requests in the past. I am
confident you will conclude the Army has optimized an aviation
modernization, given the fiscal realities within the Army's top
line budget.
Again, the credit for Army aviation's success and continued
support from senior leaders belongs to the soldiers on the
ground who will always be our utmost priority. Whatever we do,
we cannot allow our tremendous relationship in supporting the
ground force commander to degrade. It is this strong
relationship that will be the lens by which we look towards the
future and the benchmark by which we will measure success. As
we move ahead, Army aviation will continue to ensure we reduce
the burden on the soldier.
The next several years will be pivotal for Army aviation.
The resources provided to the Army to conduct aviation
operations while modernizing for the next generation of
aviation capabilities will determine the Army's ability to
continue to accomplish its mission and be postured to meet
future commitments. To execute these plans, we need your
continued leadership and support and provide full, timely, and
sustained funding so we will be ready for current and future
challenges. I am ready to address any questions you may have,
sir. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Crosby can be found in
the Appendix on page 46.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
And finally, we have General Kane from the Air Force.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN ROBERT C. KANE, USAF, DIRECTOR, GLOBAL
REACH PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE; AND MAJ GEN NOEL T. JONES,
USAF, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR
FORCE
General Kane. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to update you on key Air Force rotorcraft
acquisition programs and modernization efforts. I would like to
briefly highlight our special operations, personnel recovery,
nuclear security, and continuity of Government missions and
platforms.
U.S. Special Operations Command uses the CV-22 Osprey to
provide long-range insertion, extraction, and resupply of
Special Operations Forces in hostile, denied, or politically
sensitive airspace. In order to successfully meet its CV-22
taskings, the Air Force continues to fully support the program
of record of 50 aircraft. The current CV-22 fleet stands at 23
aircraft, with the final buy of 7 aircraft scheduled in fiscal
years 2013 and 2014. Declaration of full operational capability
will be made following the delivery of the last CV-22 in fiscal
year 2016.
Under the current fiscal constraints, it is important to
note that the CV-22's capabilities, reliability, and
availability are increasing, while operating costs are
decreasing. Future modifications and improvements to the CV-22
will make the aircraft even more effective, reliable, and cost-
efficient. For example, we have begun CV-22 Block 20 baseline
production as well as retrofit modifications to improve
operational safety and effectiveness. Notably, these
enhancements will improve line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-
sight communication systems to rein in crew situational
awareness capabilities and defensive systems.
In terms of current operations and sustainment, our five
deployed CV-22s executed 635 sorties and 1391 hours between May
of 2011 and January 2012 with an almost 75 percent mission
capable rate. This includes some recent engine time-on-wing
improvements that have increased time between engine removals
by 173 percent. Beyond improved capability, this translates
into an estimated $16 million in savings per year.
Additionally, the Joint Program Office is investigating
modifications to the engine inlet geometry, engine blade
coatings, and the high-power turbine case design to further
improve engine time on wing. While the CV-22 aircraft
procurement phase nears completion, we are moving to address
HH-60G fleet availability issues. Our HH-60G combat search and
rescue platform is a low-density, high-demand asset. During the
past 10 years, our heroic crews have rescued over 12,000
military and civilian personnel. This past year, HH-60G crews
performed 16 combat search-and-rescue missions and 2,100, over
2,100 casualty evacuation missions.
This high demand has taken a toll. Only 99 of the original
112 aircraft still exist. Of those 99, only 93 are currently
flyable. Major structural cracks have been found on 66 of the
99 aircraft, with 49 sustaining battle damage in the last 2
years. Aircraft availability is approximately 60 percent and
expected to decrease to 50 percent by 2015 due to continued
component obsolescence and structural issues.
The Air Force is taking a three-step approach to address
this shortfall. First, we are modifying the existing HH-60G
helicopters to keep them viable until the Air Force can fully
recapitalize the fleet. Second, the Air Force has implemented
the operational loss replacement program to return the HH-60G
fleet to numbers capable of meeting our operational
requirements. This is only a temporary bridge to a final
solution, which is to replace the entire fleet.
To this end, the Air Force released a draft request for
proposal for a full and open competition on 16 March of this
year, with the final RFP planned for release in May. Contract
award is planned for spring of 2013, with initial operational
capability in 2018. With these combined efforts, the Air Force
will be able to maintain its commitment to personnel recovery,
a moral imperative for supporting our men and women on the
front lines.
The Air Force also has two other critical vertical lift
missions, National Capital Region support and nuclear security.
The current UH-1N fleet, which entered the Air Force in 1970,
cannot fully meet the requirements of these missions, lacking
sufficient range, speed, payload, endurance, survivability, and
number of aircraft. The 2013 President's budget terminated the
common vertical lift support platform program, which was
intended to replace the UH-1N fleet.
Until a long-term replacement is possible, the Air Force
will consider other strategies to mitigate aircraft safety and
capability gaps. In the near term, we are evaluating safety and
capability improvements, specifically the installation of
crashworthy seats and night-vision-compatible cockpits.
In addition to these modifications, we are considering
upgrades to training systems that would lower training costs,
decrease the UH-1N flying hour requirement and extend, and
hopefully extend the useful life of these airframes.
Finally, the Air Force is pursuing the transfer and
appropriate modifications of up to 22 UH-1Ns from the Marine
Corps while we develop a long-term solution.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee.
I appreciate your strong support for the Air Force and our
rotorcraft programs, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Kane and General
Jones can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much for your service and
your testimony. As is my practice, I will reserve my questions
until last.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
And, you know, having had the opportunity to be at the
initial stages of the rotorcraft, the helicopter being used in
combat in Vietnam, this is an area that I am very much
personally interested in, and so it is hard for me, based on
what we are understanding from the committee, to see that to
one degree or another, the Services seem to lack a clear
understanding or idea of what they want for the next generation
of rotorcraft. As a result, there have been numerous delays in
the getting new rotorcraft R&D programs on track with, I am
being told, the last five major service programs being
terminated. Those were the Comanche, the VH-71, the ARH [Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter], the CSAR-X [Combat Search and
Rescue], and the CVLSP [Common Vertical Lift Support Platform].
So the questions I have regarding this are why have we seen
so many failures in the new rotorcraft R&D efforts? What is
each of the Services doing to better define what they will need
or what they will want, what kind of capabilities you will want
for future operations? And what specific R&D investments are
each of you prepared to make in order to better understand the
rotorcraft technology of the future? So if any or all of you
are willing to take a shot at that, I would appreciate it.
General Robling. Sir, I will take the first shot at that.
So thanks for that question.
I think, you know, the Marine Corps, we are into our future
vertical lift programs right now. We are into them, and we
started 10 to 12 years ago starting to downsize the Marine
Corps' type model series, both fixed wing and helicopter, into,
you know, six or seven type model series. We are flying
aircraft right now, the CH-46, the H-3, that are over 40 years
old, in some cases, still flying, over 40. So we buy those on a
20-year or 30-year program, and we have stretched them to 40
years, and in some cases, the, you know, CH-46 is at 80 percent
readiness levels. Right now, our CH-53 is, in 2014, will be,
the Echo will be 30 years old. Some of those aircraft will fly
another 10 years. We will require that to do that until we get
the 53K online.
So you are asking me about our future vertical lift, that
is our future vertical lift, heavy vertical lift, is the CH-53K
that we expect once we get IOCed [Initial Operational
Capability] and get their full eight squadrons, that we will
probably be flying that aircraft another 40 years. We have
taken the UH-1 November, which very old aircraft in the
Whiskey, and bought the or looking to procure the Yankee and
Zulu. The UH-1 November, when I went to OIF-1 [Operation Iraqi
Freedom] with General Amos as the wing commander and I was his
assistant and then Major General Mattis was his First Division
Commander, when General Mattis wanted a route recon aircraft to
route recon his area, I couldn't put him in a UH-1 aircraft. If
I put two marines in the back with 50 cal machine guns, I
didn't even have enough room for an ice chest or cold drinks,
and so we had to stick him in a CH-46. You can imagine that
made him pretty happy.
So we are getting to the end of the life of those aircraft,
and the moneys that we put into both R&D, in this case the H-1,
this year, $31 million in R&D to upgrade those aircraft and
continue to buy them and, as you pointed out, $824 million to
buy at least the 15 Yankees and the 13 Zulus that we are going
to buy in this FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. And of
course, we do have $606 million across the FYDP in R&D for the
CH-53K, which we are hoping to IOC in fiscal year 2019. So
while we are looking forward, I think the Marine Corps is in
its future vertical lift right now. We are participating in
OSD's [Office of the Secretary of Defense] future vertical lift
program. We are putting money toward that with the rest of the
Services as we look ahead to aircraft that are coming off the
shelf that may provide, you know, technologies that provide us
faster aircraft, always looking to go faster, carry more people
with less cost and those kind of things, and so I think the
answer to that, at least for the Marine Corps, is we are
involved.
Mr. Reyes. The 46 is a Sea Knight, right?
General Robling. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Reyes. When I got to Vietnam in March of 1967, the
Marines were flying CH-34s, the big radial engine lumbering. So
that is why we are very much interested in making sure we have
these programs that will advance our capabilities into--and
turn R&D programs into rotorcraft that would provide the needs
of, you know, future marines, sailors, Army, and Air Force.
Anybody else want to comment on that?
Mr. Gilpin. Yes, sir. I wanted to thank you for your
question relative to Presidential helicopter; I wanted to give
you a sense of where we are going with that. You were right
when you mentioned that getting clarity on requirements is
probably critical to what we need to do and probably one of the
shortcomings we faced as we face the challenge on the VH-71
program. So we are taking some time to make sure we get the
requirements well understood, well coordinated between what is
required for the marines that operate those helicopters as well
as our customer, the White House in this case, and working very
hard to do that.
Our analysis of alternatives is nearly complete. In the
meantime, we are sustaining the current fleet of helicopters,
making some improvements to those, updated communication suite,
updated vulnerability improvements and the like, and those
technologies will be used to, as a starting point when we go
into the VXX [Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program]
program.
So we are developing an acquisition strategy, taking
advantage of leveraging that new technology and to developing
the future helicopter, and we should have a solution that is
quicker to service and at an affordable price.
General Crosby. Sir, I would like to pile on to that if I
could.
During your time in Vietnam, we were flying--the same CH-
47s that you saw there; we are still flying them today. So they
have been upgraded a little bit, thanks to you all's help, but
we are still flying them.
We are looking at this in kind of a balanced approach. You
know, the normal tendency in a constrained environment is to
cut your investments, and I think your comments have shown or
reemphasized to us what we already believe, that you have got
to look at it as a balanced approach because if you cut off
your investments 10 years down the road, we have no new
program.
So we are looking to, if you will, sustain what we have
currently today to modernize, which is more of a challenge
today than in the past because technology is turning over so
fast, and then the third one is to put those S&T [Science and
Technology] dollars towards developing that long-range plan.
My Marine Corps brothers mentioned the future vertical
lift. There is a study that has been done; I know you all are
anxiously awaiting the release of that. Our Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs has it on his desk now. Then it will go to the
DEPSECDEF [Deputy Secretary of Defense] for approval and then
released to you.
It lays out a road map for all of us, the Services together
looking forward, and it identifies kind of a scalable
architecture of rotary wing or future vertical lift platforms,
a reconnaissance or a light; a medium, which is attack utility;
a third is kind of a cargo heavy lift; and then the fourth
would be an ultra, so a scalable, where you can have similar
technologies across the power to train in those systems. The
one that we have elected to go after first for the best return
on our investment--we are the biggest parade on rotary wing in
the Army, but 75 percent of my fleet is in the attack utility
variant. So what that means is, in a limited budget
environment,that means we are going to have to take some risk
in some other areas in our portfolio. So when I mention
sustainment and I mention upgrades, we are going to have to
focus on balancing those; the Scout area is one where we can
accept some risk, and I expect to get another question on that
here in a little bit. But we will accept some risk in those
areas to focus on that long-range investment to get a medium-
lift variant. And, you know, the medium lift is a utility which
we buy all across here is all common in the Black Hawk or the
variants of it for the Services.
So we see that as the next generation, and all my brothers
to my right and left are participating in that. So we see a lot
of potential for a joint variant coming out of that effort.
General Kane. Thank you, Congressman Reyes, for the
question.
We agree with General Crosby in his assessment of the
future vertical lift efforts and our participation in that, but
currently, the Air Force is pursuing, for the most part, off-
the-shelf technologies. And R&D efforts are primarily aimed at
integrating, again, commercial or not commercial off-the-shelf
but currently available off-the-shelf systems into the combat
rescue helicopter, and that would have been the same in the
case of the CVLSP that was cancelled this year.
Our R&D, this effort, then, in developing off-the-shelf
capabilities and the integration will take us through the
capabilities gaps into the 2030 timeframe, which brings us into
that timeframe of the future vertical lift strategy.
The Air Force is investing in several, in particular,
degraded visual environment technology solutions, and we are
leading the way in 3D landing zone technology development. One
of the points I would have to make is that we only have 5
percent of the rotary wing fleet in the Air Force, and as such,
our contributions to that R&D effort are not quite as great as
the other Services. And we definitely capitalize on the efforts
of our brothers down the table.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the panel for being here today. I would like to
talk first about the common vertical lift support platform.
And I guess General Kane, the fiscal year DOD budget
included $52.8 million in funding for this program and proposed
no money in fiscal year 2013. We now understand that the common
vertical lift support platform will not go forward. And the Air
Force has, instead, decided to take used Marine Corps UH-1Ns
destined for the ``boneyard'' and use the common vertical lift
support program funding to recondition these aircraft, which
some say are just unable to meet the requirements as the Air
Force needs them.
The question is, wouldn't it be better use of the almost
$53 million of the common vertical lift support platform
funding to introduce an aircraft that can meet your
requirements of the mission, even if it is limited quantities
for now but considering the future. And the second part of that
is additionally, without the acquisition resources available to
satisfy this urgent and compelling need, as many of us see it,
has the Air Force considered any more affordable alternatives,
such as leasing aircraft to accomplish this mission?
General Kane. Thank you for the question, sir.
Basically, the requirement for the helicopter, for the
common vertical lift support platform, for both the nuclear
mission and the continuity of Government mission here in the
NCR [National Capital Region] has not changed; the requirement
remains the same. So the current platforms still lack in
capacity, speed, range, endurance, force protection,
survivability capabilities.
What we are doing right now is the Air Force, because of,
frankly, some of the budget issues; we are taking a, what we
are calling, an acquisition pause. And it is going to give us
an opportunity to take a look at potentially more cost-
effective ways of filling the requirements for this important
mission. What we are doing is looking at--we have started by
looking at things like enhancing the security at the missile
sites by enhancing hardening and surveillance capabilities.
We are looking at the potential for changing the way the
mission in the NCR is tasked, and we are looking at exploring
other excess defense articles that might be modified into a
platform that could satisfy that requirement better.
In terms of the Marine Corps UH-1Ns, the 22 that you have
spoken about, we currently do not have a plan to spend that
CVLSP money, the $50 million, on modifying those airplanes. We
are going to, when we accept those airplanes between 2012 and
2014, we will put them into a storage condition. And we are
going to have to study them to determine what sort of
modifications would be necessary to either make them viable to
participate in the mission, to be used for spare parts or what
other disposition we would determine.
In terms of the CVLSP money, we do have, we will have some
potential requirements, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
to do safety, obsolescence. And then there will be some
equipment availability or diminishing manufacturing sorts of
issues with the current fleet that will have to be mitigated,
and that is still open for decision in terms of whether some of
that money might be used for the current fleet, but not to
modify the aircraft that are being transferred from the Marine
Corps.
Mr. LoBiondo. So there is no discussion about leasing?
General Kane. No, sir, I don't recall any discussions from
the program office in terms of leasing as one of the options,
but there is nothing to say that we couldn't explore that as an
option along with all the others for meeting this in a more
cost-effective way.
Mr. LoBiondo. So, essentially, the money for the common
vertical lift support platform, that almost $53 million, is not
going to go towards operational needs of the Air Force. It is
going to, just to wind down the program; is that what I am
hearing?
General Kane. The $53 million would be either rescinded or
returned to the Air Force for other operational requirements at
this point, but as I mentioned, we are creating a proposal for
use of some of the funding that could--crashworthy seats,
night-vision-capable cockpit equipment--that could enhance the
capabilities of the current fleet in the short term. Decisions
on that have not been made.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay, thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your service to
our country.
General Crosby, based on the elimination of the Sherpas and
the C-27Js, with the move to the Air Force and then for close
support, now we are only going to be using C-130s, has the Army
adjusted or taken into account in your vertical lift plan or in
this budget request any changes that will be made because now
the Black Hawks will be used? Is there any changing in the plan
and usage of Black Hawks due to this loss of the close support?
General Crosby. No, sir. The changes--when we had the C-27
program, we, the Army resourced that, and the program office,
of course, was under my control to procure that system to do
that immediate mission for the Army. The senior leadership of
the Army and the Air Force got together and made a decision;
that was the Air Force mission. The Air Force agreed to take
it, so we transferred that program to them. At that point
there, was no funding or plan for the Black Hawk and Chinook to
do any additional because we were going to have the C-27 to do
the mission.
Mr. Critz. Right.
General Crosby. Now, having said that, we have always
counted on our utility aircraft and our cargo aircraft to go
into those air fields where a fixed wing can't get to. There
are many places in Afghanistan that it doesn't matter whether
it is a Sherpa or a C-27 or C-130, they are not going to get
there. So some of that resupply is going to continue to be done
with our Black Hawks and Chinooks, and that has always been
part of the plan, so, no adjustment there.
There are some air fields, a small number, that the C-27
could get to that the C-130 can't, about 1 percent I think,
which is very negligible across Afghanistan. I will let my Air
Force brothers talk to more detail of that. But the bottom line
is there are C-27s there today. There are C-130s there today
doing that time-sensitive mission for us, but I am not going to
blow smoke, there are also missions over there that are being
done by those Chinooks and Black Hawks because no fixed wing
can get there.
General Jones. Congressman, I will just add to General
Crosby's remarks that the Air Force is committed to providing
the resources required, as asked for and tasked by the
combatant commander. And we believe the C-130 is capable of
doing that mission. In some environmental conditions, we
believe it is better than the C-27, from a capacity standpoint,
from a power pad standpoint. As General Crosby mentioned, there
are a very small number of fields that the C-27 can get to that
the C-130 cannot, but we believe that we can meet any
requirement and are standing by for any additional tasking from
the theater as required.
Mr. Critz. Okay, so if I understand correctly, there is not
any--no one sees any change in the tempo of usage of Black
Hawks and Chinooks to backfill where C-27 may have been able to
get in?
General Crosby. No, sir. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Critz. Okay, thank you. A couple years, 2\1/2\ years
ago Department of Defense acquisition technology and logistics
leadership asked industry to self-form the Vertical Lift
Consortium. Based on the Department's experiences over the last
2\1/2\ years, can any of you comment on what the results of
this partnership are and how the VLC will be utilized for
future vertical lift initiatives?
General Crosby. Sir, I will jump on that one because the
Army has been very heavily engaged in that. The consortium, as
I understood it, when we stood that thing up, was because we
see duplication out there, I mean, industry have been great
partners. They have got independent research and development
dollars, they have, we have our S&T dollars.
What we were trying to preclude is duplication where we had
a bunch of people going after the same technologies. The other
thing is we in the Government, we don't do a lot of
development, cutting-edge technology development. Our partners
in industry, that is what they do, so we were willing to bring
them on to be advisers to guide us as we look at these enabling
technologies we needed to go to the future to prevent us from
going down a rat hole and getting after something that really
wasn't achievable.
So we brought them to be as an advisory panel. There was no
commitment to award contracts of scope or anything like that.
It was more of an advisory panel. In that, in this future
vertical lift group that we have that meets--and we are going
to meet again; we are supposed to meet this week; it has been
delayed a week--we are looking at that joint vertical lift
medium that I mentioned. Those team members from the consortium
sit on and participate as part of that team. This is not a
Government-only thing. It is a joint and industry team that
sits and advises, and they brief each time we get together as
part of that. We consider that very critical, especially as S&T
dollars get even shorter, so that we can encourage them to
invest their IR&D [Internal Research and Development] towards
those same, because I am not going to be able to go after all
the enabling technologies we need. Hopefully, they will be able
to pony up in some areas and help as well to get us towards
that next hurdle, if you will. Does that answer your question,
sir?
Mr. Critz. Yes, and just to go one step further, we are
2\1/2\ years in. Is there anything that can be identified as
deliverable at this point that has been generated through this?
General Crosby. As a result, I believe this summer, we will
have a result. We have funded a couple of demos that are going
to give us as a result of their help and the actual contract
effort, we should come out with a performance specification of
what we think this aircraft should be. We don't know. Some
people are saying that, you know, it is going to be rotary
wing. We don't know that. It may be a vertical lift. It may be
a tilt rotor of some sort that we are going to go to, but based
on the wind tunnel studies and the demonstrators that we have
done and the input of this team, including the consortium, we
hope to have a deliverable this summer of a specification that
will guide us toward what our next step will be that we are
going after. Does that make sense?
Mr. Critz. Yes. Thank you. So you said this summer?
General Crosby. This summer.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Changing gears but again for you, General,
the Army's budget request, $272 million for 34 Lakota light
utility helicopters. As I understand it, the Army's current
policy doesn't permit these helicopters to be deployed in
nonpermissive environments because of the 72's lack of
defensive protection. Is the Army reconsidering this
restriction on the Lakotas? And why not use them somewhere
overseas like the Balkans or where the threat is low?
General Crosby. Sir, that is a great question and it is one
that is asked a lot by our industry partners. The LUH [Light
Utility Helicopter], as you know, was bought, and it is what we
consider a noncovered system. Therefore, we did not apply any
aircraft survivability equipment to it. We did not do live
fire, and the first question that comes in our mind of whether
we allow this thing into a nonpermissive environment is the
safety of that air crew.
Mr. Critz. Right.
General Crosby. And because we have not provided all those
safety provisions, now we know what it would cost to do that,
we have estimated it if the decision is made to go do that, but
my understanding as an acquisition guy that procures and
maintains and sustains these systems, the Army is not
entertaining at this time any option to go forward and put it
in a nonpermissive environment. We are putting it in some
pretty complex missions as far as doing the Border Patrol and
working with the National Guard and Reserves doing that
mission, but that is not considered a nonpermissive
environment. So my understanding right now, the Army position
is we are not pursuing to put this aircraft in anything but as
agreed to initially in the permissive environment.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you
for being here today.
And, General Crosby, I think because you are sitting in the
middle, all the questions are coming your way, but I am
concerned about the issue of American tax dollars being spent
to procure Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghani and
Iraqi air forces. As colleagues in the Senate have pointed out,
we are purchasing these from--aircraft from a Russian company,
Rosoboronexport, which is actively engaged in selling arms to
the Syrian Government, which is in the midst of a murderous
campaign that has already claimed nearly 9,000 lives.
Why are we continuing to purchase the Mi-17 instead of an
American helicopter with two alternatives? First, I understand
it is not complicated to teach a pilot to fly a similar
aircraft. Why would we not purchase a similar American-made
aircraft, such as the S-61? And, secondly, with the large
amount of alpha model UH-60s still in the American fleet, what
is preventing us from transferring some of these aging aircraft
to the Afghani and Iraqi air forces?
General Crosby. Sir, if I stall, can I cut my time down? I
am kidding.
Mr. Wilson. Hey, you are still in the middle, but, anyway,
good luck.
General Crosby. Sir, that is a very tough question, I know
one that everybody is wrestling with. We have to remember that
the task that we have been given in Afghanistan and Iraq is to
train those folks and equip them so that they can maintain and
sustain their own military mission. The Afghanis have over 30
years of experience in Mi-17s. For us to bring--so this was a
decision that was waylaid to us; it was a decision to look at
how much time, cost, and effort would it be to introduce an
American-made system.
Part of the responsibilities that you charter me with as a
PEO [Program Executive Officer] is to maintain and watch over
the industrial base of this country, so I do wrestle with that
question, but the task was not to procure a utility aircraft
that would work at that altitude; it was to buy an Mi-17
because that is what they are already trained. We have to
remember the folks that we are training and equipping and
working with over there, many of them can't read and write, and
to introduce and bring the complex systems that we have, and
while the SH-61 and the UH-60 alpha may seem pretty simple to
us, compared to an Mi-17, they are pretty complex. The
sustainment, the training base, all of those things associated
with it have to be introduced and new. So that was a decision
process.
Obviously, I didn't make that decision, but that was a
decision process that was gone through when the Department of
Defense and the State Department said go buy Mi-17s. Now I
understand the concern about dealing with the Rosoboronexport.
I will tell you that by us dealing directly with them, the
sanctions came down that we are dealing directly with them, and
you ask me, ``Knucklehead, why are you doing that?'' Simply,
sir, because we have U.S. soldiers flying in, in the back and
front of these airplanes, and we owe them the air worthiness
and safety cognizance, and the only way that we could get that
cognizance of those systems is to deal with them.
If the decision is made by the leadership of this country
not to do that, then we will adjust, but that is the, that was
the thought process of why we are where we are. We think we
have made great strides in providing safe systems for those
soldiers to fly in and to train our allies in to fly that
system. I hope that has answered your question. It is still one
tough to wrestle with.
Mr. Wilson. It does, but from new allies that we have,
whether it be the former East Germany, the Slovakia, Poland,
Bulgaria, Vietnam, hopefully they might have access. Anyway, I
just urge you to look at that.
A final question is I had the opportunity, the Marines gave
me a really extraordinary flight on an MV-22 Osprey, and on a
visit to Iraq, we landed on a soccer field in downtown Haditha.
We were greeted by the mayor, the chief of police, city
officials. It was extremely impressive for our allies. And also
I think a message to the other people, too, that we have
capabilities. And I am also aware that the MV-22, the V-22,
that the speed could be very helpful for wounded troops to give
added capability for recovery. Is the Army planning to
introduce V-22 Ospreys into the fleet?
General Crosby. At this time, sir, no. The Army is not
planning to buy any MV-22s. The Air Force and their Special Ops
do have some that provide a lot of that rapid response
capability, in the CSAR role. We use--our MEDEVAC [Medical
Evacuation] was the UH-60 and the HH-60 in the MEDEVAC role.
And you know the hour that we have, that magical mile that we
do to take care of those soldiers, we have been able to exceed
that with the systems that we have. A little bit different
focus, a little bit different mission for us than the Marine
Corps. We can buy many more Black Hawks than we can for the
cost of one MV-22. That is not a criticism of the MV-22. For
what it does, it is absolutely the best one out there. It just
doesn't fit in the mission set of what the Army does today.
Mr. Wilson. Well, as a military parent with four sons
serving in the military, I just want the best equipment. It
surely impressed me that we can land on any soccer or football
field in the world and how that projects our military
personnel.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here to testify. As I have been
to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is in my experience to fly on some
of these rotorcraft, so it makes this discussion all the more
real to me. But I have a question for I think anyone who wants
to take it, and maybe that is all of you, but can you talk
briefly about how our rotorcraft countermeasures are
performing, and I can remember distinctly being in a Black Hawk
in the sort of deep concentration that those who were tasked
with flying it were engaged in to make sure we were safe, but
can you talk about how these countermeasures are performing in
Afghanistan, and in terms of R&D, what will be the game changer
in developing the next generation of countermeasures to meet
whatever threats we may be facing in the future? Who wants to--
--
General Robling. I will give General Crosby a break here,
he is probably getting thirsty. Ma'am, right now, our
countermeasures are working very well. We are equipping, of
course, the forward deployed 53s and the 46s with the most
capable AIRCMM [Advanced Infrared Countermeasure Munition]
system that we have got now, but all of the systems that we
look to putting on our aircraft, both forward-firing flares,
expandable chaff, radar-warning receiver capabilities, I think
that the systems that we have now are working very well. We
have R&D money against each of these aircraft to upgrade those
systems as we pace the threat to include CIRCM [Common Infrared
Countermeasures] and the JTS [Joint Tactical Simulation] system
that is being developed by the Department of the Navy, which is
another two-color system that is both IR and HIF [Hypoxia-
Inducible Factors] radar warning.
So I think we are, the systems that we have got now are
working, the systems that we are looking at in the future are
probably what are going to be the game changers, and I think
the game changer, if you will, for us is it is systems now that
can be upgraded via software cost-effectively that pace the
threat, and I think that is the most important thing for us.
General Crosby. Ma'am, if I could add to that, General
Robling is absolutely right, but the one that keeps me awake at
night is that hostile fire, the simple systems, the RPGs
[Rocket-Propelled Grenade] and the small arms. Those are the
ones, the things he just talked about with the CIRCM and the
ATIRCM [Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures] and the CMWS
[Common Missile Warning System], those are okay, those do a
great job, and those, as he said, we need to be upgrading
because the threat is going to continue to evolve. But the one
that makes us so vulnerable in the rotary wing because we are
operating in such close proximity to those soldiers are those
unsophisticated things like rocket-propelled grenades and small
arms fire, so we are pursuing and I think the game changer is
when we are going to be able to give the soldier and put on
that aircraft something that identifies where that small arms
is coming from, either--and we are looking at a couple of
different technologies. One is an acoustic and one is a flash
that will allow us to cue on it and, if nothing else, suppress
it, which protects that air crew long enough to get out of that
vulnerable spectrum.
When we can do that and put something reliable in their
hands, that I think will be the next step, augmented with what
General Robling already talked about.
Ms. Tsongas. And where do you think we are in that process?
General Crosby. Very well along, ma'am. Frankly, we have
got one that is a flash that we are demoing, I have got it on
the Apaches that are going in on this next rotation, and if
that proves out, then we will have something that I think
really will help protect them. The acoustic one is not quite as
mature but is not far behind it.
Ms. Tsongas. Great. Thank you.
General Kane. Congresswoman, the Air Force HH-60Gs and the
CV-22s are some of the most survivable rotorcraft in DOD, from
our perspective. Our efforts to focus on radio frequency and
infrared countermeasures, chaff and flares, and maybe most
importantly the integration piece of sensor and intelligence
data in its presentation to the crew that allows it to do, to
avoid the threats in the first place. So I think that is one of
the most important pieces in terms of game-changing
capabilities.
In terms of both platforms, we continuously pursue
upgrades. We are implementing a hostile fire indicator on the
HH-60, and anytime we have an opportunity to work jointly, we
participate with the other Services. A good example would be
our LAIRCM [Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures] program,
participating with the CIRCM in terms of lessons learned and
technology transfer.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you all for your testimony.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Miss Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
being here today, and General Crosby, as you know, my district
is the home of Fort Rucker, and the U.S. Army Aviation Center.
And the issues that we are here talking about today are
certainly vital to what is happening, not just in my district,
but the Army's Program Executive Office for Aviation, located
at Redstone.
So thank you for being here.
And my first question is regarding, General Crosby, mission
planning, and I am aware that the helicopter incidents were the
third leading cause of fatalities in Iraq, in the Iraq war. And
in Afghanistan, in 2008, helicopter-related losses were the
number one cause of deaths, and so weather-related issues,
disorienting brownout conditions, engine failure, wire strikes,
and flying into the terrain, of which the pilot was unaware,
accounts for 80 percent of the losses. So what efforts is the
Army and other Services, if anybody else wants to weigh in,
executing to improve the mission planning performance for
rotary wing operations?
General Crosby. Thank you, ma'am.
I appreciate the question. What you just described, is
operations of what is causing those problems, is operating in a
degraded visual environment; what we called DVE, and anything
we can do to minimize that impact. I will tell you the
challenge within the mission planning, there are some that will
tell you that we should use DTED [Digital Terrain Elevation
Data] data and GPS in order to do that--global positioning
system, but their probable errors, combine those two together
and you can be as much as 30 to 35 feet off. And when you are
going into a landing zone with rocks; that is not good enough.
So what we are pursuing is some other technologies. I will tell
you that within the Army, the three platforms that we don't
worry about now is the Block III Apache, the F model Chinook,
and the M model Blackhawk because we have integrated in their
digital cockpits a degraded visual environment capability. And
you see that the incidents with those aircraft have come way,
way down.
So our focus right now is on those legacy platforms. The A
model, L model Blackhawks, the Block II Apaches, the Kiowas,
and the D model Chinooks. And each of those we are looking at,
one of them is an autonomous landing system called--it is
called HALS--that we are looking at embedding, and it is kind
of a strap-on system that we put on the aircraft to automate
that system to give them some cues. There is also a radar that
we looked at that actually we can apply that looks through the
sand and gives them the visual cues they need to land the
aircraft. But the key of all of this, there was a great
learning curve when we were first in. It is not all materiel;
there is also training and experience, and how do you mitigate
things like this and how do you prepare and set up and do roll-
on landing those kinds of things to mitigate. All of those
together is what is going to get rid of this issue. It is a mix
of the training, and of the degraded visual improvements.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you so much, General.
Does anyone else want to weigh in?
General Robling. I will just pile on a little bit and just
say that the Marine Corps is looking at the same things, and
agree with General Crosby completely. It is not just the
equipment. It is TTPs [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures] and
how you train, and how you figure those out. V-22 is a good
example of how we have taken a system that really has been
difficult in brownout-type conditions because of the size of
those rotor blades on each side of the aircraft. And you go
into a landing zone that is dusty; it is fully enveloped. So we
have a GPS landing system in that aircraft you can, you know,
walk on to your intended landing point, hover to about 50-foot
and push a button and takes all the problems out, from the
pilot's point of view, and bring it right down to safe landing.
Other types of systems in the CH-53, not quite that
sophisticated, but all that help with brownout and we look at,
with all of the Services, on developing better systems in that
direction.
Mrs. Roby. Yes, sir.
General Jones. Congresswoman, I will add to the comments of
my colleagues here that the Air Force is the executive agent on
a Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration led by our Air
Force research's lab out at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
that is examining what we are calling a three-dimensional
landing zone capability that will provide a high-resolution
display integrated into the flight ware and display to the
pilots in the aircraft that will allow us to better navigate
through this degraded visual environment that we are discussing
here. So along with the other Services, we are actively
pursuing capabilities in that regard as well.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you all so much, and again, I appreciate
your time and being here and your service to our country.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Of the 20 questions that we needed to ask in discharge of
our oversight responsibilities, I am happy to report that 13 of
them have been asked, which is why I ask my questions last,
hoping they will all have been asked.
Mr. Critz asked some questions about the C-47, I would just
like to ask, General Crosby, one follow-up question, follow-up
question relative to that. Can you speak to the costs incurred
in the C-47 in the past for missions that should or could have
been executed by platforms, such as the C-27J? Are you
concerned that the burden on the Chinook and associated costs
will be increased with the divestment of the C-27J?
General Crosby. Sir, I cannot speak to you and tell you
what the cost differential is on the 47 today. I am sure we
could derive those numbers, but the mission, as I mentioned, is
very hard to differentiate, when that aircraft, as you know, as
a mission aircraft is doing air assaults, is doing resupply, so
many things, but it is going to areas that a C-27 or a Sherpa
couldn't get to anyway. So it is a cargo helicopter, and that
is what we bought it for. The C-27, as I said, is there today
and supporting us. I am confident that the leadership of the
United States Army and the United States Air Force have come
together, and the Air Force has said, Hey, this is our mission,
and we will support you. And I am--I have no reason to doubt
that think brothers in blue will be there when we need them.
Mr. Bartlett. Is not the 47 one of the most expensive
airplanes we have to fly per hour cost?
General Crosby. It is expensive, sir. It drinks fuel. It is
the biggest. It is the heaviest, but it is also, I think, very,
very reliable, especially with the new F model, and we have
driven down some of those costs. But yes, sir, it is probably
the most expensive of the ones we have.
Mr. Bartlett. So is it not true that every time we have to
use the 47 because the C-27J or a similar airplane was not
available, we have had considerably increased costs?
General Crosby. Yes, sir, but I can't look you in the eye
today and tell you what those numbers are and how many missions
we have done. The C-27s have not been there the whole time, so
we have been flying the Chinooks doing that mission, but since
they have been there, they have been executing that time-
sensitive, critical-cargo mission for us. So that has
eliminated some of that time, which that doesn't mean that
aircraft is sitting. We have not seen a reduction in OPTEMPO by
them doing that mission, and that aircraft is being used for
something else.
As you know, we are flying all of our aircraft at four to
six times the normal OPTEMPO of what we normally experience. It
is just a credit to our soldiers that they are able to maintain
and sustain that kind of readiness.
Mr. Bartlett. One of your fellow officers had noted that we
are, and I quote him, flying the blades off the CH-47. Would
you concur?
General Crosby. Sir, I would say we are flying the blades
off of all of them. I will tell you that the OPTEMPO plan for
these aircraft in peace time was about 14.7 hours a month. We
are flying in excess on the Kiowas over 100 hours a months. The
Chinooks and Blackhawks are in the 70 to 80--60 to 80 range. So
we are flying the blades out of all of them.
I have some concerns about the sustainability and the long-
term strategy of all the fleet, which I have got some studies
and some analysis looking at it. So I wouldn't say just the 47
needs to be looked at. I think we need to be concerned about
all of them.
Mr. Bartlett. NASA is the National Aeronautical and Space
Administration. It appears that most of their focus is on space
rather than aeronautical. One of their original chartered
responsibilities was R&D and rotorcraft. I am not aware that
they are doing much there. Have I missed something?
General Crosby. Sir, I will tell you that we do do some
studies, and some analysis with them. It is not a great deal.
It is--there is a team at Langley that we use that--in fact, it
is an old comrade of mine from my early acquisition days--that
we use and they participate in our Joint Vertical Lift
Consortium, and help us--guide us to the future. But are they
there present and every day in my engineering design? No, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. I would like to ask a question of the Navy.
As you look forward, which of your helicopters will you be
relying on primarily for search and rescue?
General Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we are going to see both the 60 Romeo and the 60
Sierra in that role. Sierra is our primary aircraft in search
and rescue at sea.
Mr. Bartlett. These are 60s, correct?
General Moran. Yes, sir, they are.
Mr. Bartlett. All right. Is not that plane pretty limited
in range and dwell time? Wouldn't that be much better done by a
medium-lift helicopter with considerably more range and dwell
time?
General Moran. We think the Sierra has, when we are talking
about search and rescue at sea, the Sierra is more than
adequate for that mission. We certainly will be working with
the future vertical lift as we look in the future to see if we
can make gains in that area.
Mr. Bartlett. As you look forward, which rotary-wing
aircraft will you be using primarily for medical evacuation?
General Moran. We continue to contribute with our HH-60s in
Iraq and Afghanistan on medical evacs when called upon in
support of SOF [Special Operations Forces].
Mr. Bartlett. Is it not true that the 60 is pretty limiting
in terms of range and size? It really doesn't even come close
to providing enough room for an emergency--aerial emergency
room, does it? Are we not using the 60 because we no longer
have a medium-lift helicopter that we should be using for both
of these missions?
General Moran. From the Navy standpoint, Mr. Chairman, I
would have to get back to you on why, but I think we will
continue to look at that as we look at future capabilities and
requirements for the medium lift.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 79.]
Mr. Bartlett. Because both of these critical missions would
be better accomplished with a larger aircraft, with more dwell
time, with more size, with the longer--with the longer range.
General Crosby, the Army Improved Turbine Engine Program
envisions significantly more fuel-efficient and powerful engine
for the Blackhawk and the Apache helicopter fleet as well as
the next generation of joint multiple role helicopters. Can you
please explain what measures the Army is taking in this
acquisition strategy to ensure there is competition between the
science and technology phase and into engineering,
manufacturing, development.
General Crosby. Yes, sir, I appreciate the question. That
is a great capability, and I am here to tell you, let me go on
record as stating that the demo thus far, is demonstrating 30
percent increase in power, and 25 percent reduction in fuel.
That is absolutely huge if you put that across the entire fleet
in the Army, and in our brothers in the Navy, and Marine Corps,
and the Air Force. Again, applicable to all of those fleets,
and looking to our future to be the power plant for our future
system. The acquisition strategy as we go forward and
transition this from S&T, to a materiel acquisition program, is
to encourage that competition in throughout the EMD
[Engineering and Manufacturing Development] phase. That is part
of our strategy. That is our plan. The only thing that will
affect us of course, is the affordability. If we aren't able to
garner sufficient funds to do, to maintain that through EMD, we
would have to down select earlier. But our plan right now is to
carry two vendors through the EMD phase.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Reyes, do you have additional questions
or comments?
Mr. Reyes. Just a couple, but I will take them for the
record.
Mr. Bartlett. You will take them for the record.
Okay, let me ask a question about the 53-K. Are we going to
have a period of time where we will not have a heavy-lift
helicopter available to us because of the timeline in
developing this helicopter?
General Robling. No, sir, 53-K right now is being developed
for an IOC of 2019, and I believe right now we continue to keep
CH-53 Echoes out to the end of that transition through fiscal
year 2023.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay, we decided that we can extend their
useful life until the K is ready?
General Robling. Yes, sir. There will be some risks there,
as in all legacy aircraft. And we may right now that plan is
for 8 squadrons of CH-53 Echoes at 16 aircraft per squadron,
and because we no longer make those aircraft, as we lose them
or the life of the aircraft goes down, what we will do is
reduce the PAA [Primary Assigned Aircraft] in the squadrons,
you know, down to 14 and then 12, but the answer to your
question is, we will have a heavy-lift helicopter while that is
being developed and transitioned.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Yeah, I just have one quick one for you, General
Crosby. The Army Improved Turbine Engine Program, which
envisions a significantly more fuel-efficient and powerful
engine for the Blackhawk and Apache helicopter fleet, as well
as the next-generation joint multirole helicopter. Can you
please explain what measures the Army is taking in the
acquisition strategy to ensure that there is competition beyond
the science and technology phase into the engineering and
manufacturing development?
General Crosby. Yes, sir. As again, what a great capability
and in the tech base, it is demonstrating all of the
improvements that we ask for. We are in the process right now,
the project manager, of taking this from S&T and we go through
what we call a materiel development decision, which lays out
the acquisition strategy for that program. Our intention, our
plan as we put that together is to carry two vendors through
the EMD phase, to promote that competition beyond the S&T
phase. The only thing that would restrict our ability to do
that would be affordability, whether we can garner enough funds
to do that.
Mr. Reyes. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
As we review your testimony and the question and answer
period, I am sure that we will have additional questions for
the record in discharge of our responsibilities for oversight.
Thank you all so such for your service and your testimony.
The subcommittee stands in adjournment.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 27, 2012
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 27, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett
Chairman, House Committee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 DOD Rotorcraft Modernization Programs
March 27, 2012
Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us.
I would like to welcome our witnesses:
LLieutenant General Terry Robling, Deputy
Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps;
LRear Admiral William Moran, Director, Air
Warfare Division, U.S. Navy;
LMr. Richard Gilpin, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Air Programs Office;
LMajor General William Crosby, Program
Executive Officer Aviation, U.S. Army;
LMajor General Noel Jones, Director,
Operational Capability Requirements, U.S. Air Force;
and
LMajor General Robert Kane, Director, Global
Reach Programs, U.S. Air Force.
Thank you all for being here and for your service to our
Nation.
The use of helicopters has dramatically changed warfare
doctrine from the time of their introduction during the Korean
War, followed by development prior to Vietnam, use during
Vietnam as a mobility platform, and current rotorcraft aviation
operations. The helicopter is now a platform of maneuver, used
for multimissions to include, resupply, medical evacuation,
reconnaissance, air assault, and attack operations.
The U.S. armed forces currently have approximately 7,000
helicopters. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have put an
even greater reliance on rotorcraft support as a result of
Improvised Explosive Devices which have restricted ground
movement. Based on current planned force structure reductions,
the demand for rotorcraft capability will be even more critical
in the future. Maintaining a healthy fleet of rotorcraft
equates to the total force having the ability to cover the wide
area battle space as referenced in the National Security
Strategy.
The purpose of this hearing is to get an update from each
Service as to the condition of their respective current
rotorcraft fleet and plans for future upgrades and
modernization. In addition to various platform updates, the
committee hopes to learn how the Services are utilizing
Research and Development dollars to develop the next generation
of rotary wing systems and subsystems. And finally, given the
likelihood that there will be a continued or even greater
dependence on rotorcraft in the future and the likelihood that
rotorcraft will have to operate in greater threat environments
than they currently do in Afghanistan, the committee expects to
learn what each Service is doing in regard to aircraft
survivability equipment and how they are working together to
maximize resources.
Again, I thank all of you for your service to our country
and for being here. I look forward to your testimony.
Statement of Hon. Silvestre Reyes
Ranking Member, House Committee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 DOD Rotorcraft Modernization Programs
March 27, 2012
Today's hearing on DOD rotorcraft programs is the first
Tactical Air and Land Forces hearing specifically covering
these programs in many years. And, based on the budget request
for fiscal year 2013, a hearing is definitely warranted for
several reasons.
One major issue is the cost of these rotorcraft programs,
and how they impact other areas of military service budgets.
The Army 2013 request, for example, includes $4.3 billion for
procurement of upgraded and new rotorcraft, including
Blackhawk, Chinook, Apache, Kiowa, and Lakota helicopters.
By comparison, the Army's request for Weapons and Tracked
Combat Vehicles in 2013 is only $1.5 billion--less than half as
much.
The Marine Corps request for rotorcraft programs totals
$1.4 billion for just two major programs--new AH-1Z and UH-1Y
helicopters and the CH-53K development program. If one adds the
V-22 program to that amount, the total for the Marine Corps is
more than $3.0 billion. This $3 billion total exceeds the
Marine Corps' entire ground equipment procurement budget, which
is about $2.5 billion.
The other two Services have somewhat lower requests, with
the Navy's request at $1.2 billion, and with the Air Force
coming in around $500 million. If one totals up the Service
requests for rotorcraft programs you get around $9.0 billion,
with the vast majority of that funding being procurement of new
or upgraded aircraft.
So, it is clear that rotorcraft programs are a priority for
all the Services, and in particular the Army and Marine Corps.
Overall this strong investment in updating and replacing the
Services' rotorcraft fleets is a good thing.
However, one concern I have is how skewed this funding
request in favor of production of new manned rotorcraft, as
opposed to Research and Development of new rotorcraft for the
future. This imbalance is, in part, the result of the
termination of almost every new manned rotorcraft program DOD
has tried to start in recent years. For example, the Army has
little funding for R&D of new rotorcraft after the termination
of the Comanche and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter programs.
The program intended to follow those two efforts remains mired
in a seemingly endless analysis of alternatives, with no clear
path ahead.
Likewise, the Air Force canceled the ``CSAR-X'' combat
rescue helicopter program in 2009, and this year canceled its
program to replace its ageing U-1 Huey helicopters. Both have
yet to restart.
The Navy continues to struggle with defining requirements
for the new Presidential Helicopter, almost three years after
termination of the VH-71 program in 2009. Only the Marine Corps
has a large scale, and so far successful, R&D program under way
with the CH-53K heavy lift helicopter program.
Another concern I have is the lack of commonality in some
mission areas between the Services. The Army, Navy, and Air
Force all fly variants of the UH-60 helicopter, which produces
significant savings in both production and support costs. The
Marine Corps, in contrast, is fielding rotorcraft unique in
DOD, including the upgraded AH-1Z Cobra, the UH-1Y Huey, and
the CH-53E Super Stallion. This does not mean that the Marine
Corps programs should be stopped or reduced, but I believe it
does raise the issue of how in the future--for the next
generation of rotorcraft--DOD can better achieve truly joint
solutions.
Finally, with respect to unmanned rotorcraft, there are
several promising research and development efforts under way,
with the Navy and Marine Corps leading the way with the MQ-8
and the Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aerial System. While funding
for those efforts is relatively small compared to manned
rotorcraft programs, they could be important waypoints toward
future efforts.
I look forward to the testimony from our panel.
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?
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 27, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Admiral Moran. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 22.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 27, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. There continues to be a tremendous demand for
rotorcraft support whether it's for troop transport, logistics,
surveillance or attack missions. Given these platforms will likely be
in even greater demand in the future and they will operate in
potentially increased threat environments--please discuss how each of
you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability
equipment. Are you working together for a common approach or is there a
necessity to come up with different solutions based on the mission
profiles of the various platforms?
General Robling. The Naval Aviation Enterprise and Marine Corps,
both have formal processes in place to incorporate lessons learned into
the development of future requirements. Where Marine aviation mission
sets overlap with other Services we certainly attempt a common
approach.
RADM Moran has outlined the formal processes for capturing lessons
learned for the Naval Aviation Enterprise, which encompasses Marine
aviation. At the same time, the Marine Corps utilizes the Marine Corp
Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) as our internal and formal process
for the same historical and advancement documentation purposes for
lessons learned.
Examples of pursuing a common approach include:
Using technology developed from the Air Force's Large Aircraft
Infrared Red Countermeasure system (LAIRCM), the USN/USMC has developed
the DON LAIRCM AAQ-24 program. This program includes next generation
two-color Infrared (IR) sensors with an inexhaustible laser
countermeasure (CM) system and is currently employed on our forward
deployed CH-53E, MEU CH-46 fleet and future KC-130J aircraft leveraging
the Air Force's LAIRCM integration design. In order to meet the current
Hostile Fire Indication (HFI) requirement, we have invested funding
into the DON LAIRCM program and developed the Advanced Threat Warner
(ATW) system that includes two-color IR, laser, and HFI warning systems
with planned installations in the CH-53E in FY13. Those assets will be
re-capitalized and transferred to the CH-53K program.
The Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System IR Missile Warning
system (AAR-59) is being developed by the USN/USMC based on lessons
learned and performance limitations discovered during the recent
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The AAR-59 will provide advanced IR
missile warning capability and aircrew warning of laser based systems
and indications for small arms, rockets and unguided threats. The AAR-
59 has been designated the primary IR missile warning system solution
for all new DOD aircraft and any planned ASE upgrades. It is designed
to operate with all DOD aircraft and will interface with the Army led
Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) and Air Force led DON Large
Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) as part of an integrated
response to attacking infrared missiles.
The USN/USMC intends to procure the U.S. Army's CIRCM system that
is under development for smaller assault helicopters. This joint
program will ensure a common solution across all DOD's platforms. For
our larger assault platforms, the USN/USMC have purchased the LAIRCM
system.
Our APR-39B(V)2 Radar Warning Receiver is undergoing a Class 1
Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to correct obsolescence and
performance deficiencies. The ECP will re-designate the box to the APR-
39D(V)2 and provide an interface for AAR-59, CIRCM and ATW. The APR-
39D(V)2 will be used as the ASE suite controller on USMC aircraft which
will allow the onboard ASE systems to be upgraded without having to
break into the aircraft's Operational Flight Plan (OFP); realizing a
huge cost savings and turn-around time for software upgrades. The APR-
39D(V)2 ECP will provide the capability for an Integrated ASE (IASE)
capability to perform own-ship threat correlation and fusion and
prepare threat data to be off-boarded for sharing throughout the
digital battlefield. The APR-39D(V)2 system is currently undergoing
evaluation by the Army and could become a common solution for radar
warning across the Services.
Mr. Bartlett. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the
military services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based
warning systems versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system
operate better than the other in terms of false positive alarms, range
of detection, and detection fidelity, especially in a high clutter
environment?
General Robling. Among all current DOD users, there is no
disagreement with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based
warning systems versus IR-based systems. All DOD platforms are now, or
will in the future transition from UV sensors to IR sensors in order to
remain ahead of the advancements made by our enemies in both range and
capabilities of the MANPAD threats. The current UV based missile
warning systems (MWS) provide a higher number of false alarms in high
clutter environments. False alarm rates are the biggest distraction to
aircrew and the largest complaint we hear from our operators engaged in
combat operations. UV sensors are also limited in range of detection
and provide limited warning times due to its inability to declare at
long ranges. UV sensors are also not capable of providing an accurate
geo-location of the point of origin for exploitation. UV sensors
performance significantly degrades in high clutter (industrial)
environments. This is a critical lessons learned from combat operations
in OEF/OIF and has been a driving requirement to switch to IR
technology for increased survivability in high clutter areas.
Although UV sensors can provide a limited hostile fire indication
(HFI) capability it is rudimentary and is limited in its growth
potential due to lack of UV signatures emitted by ballistic weapons
(Small Arms through Heavy Machine Guns). Two-color IR sensors were
developed to meet the continuing multispectral threats and provide
longer range of detection and warning times. Two-color IR sensors also
provide a multifunctional capability with HFI. Two color IR also lowers
the false alarms rates and provides higher probability of detecting and
discerning between threat types. The current path of combining the MWS,
laser warning and the HFI capability will also reduce the weight
imposed on rotary winged aircraft of the current stand alone systems.
It has long been understood by the IRCM community that UV missile
warning are significantly challenged by missiles launched from ranges
near the threat kinematic limit and in industrial environment.
Generalities that can be concluded when UV missile warning systems
performance and IR missile warning system performance as follows:
(1) IR Missile Warning Systems detect threats launched from longer
ranges than UV Missile Warning Systems. (2) IR Missile Warning System
performance does not degrade in high clutter areas like UV Missile
Warning System do. (3) UV Missile Warning System performance degrades
when going from a rural to an industrial environment (increased
clutter). (4) The UV Missile Warning Systems have a higher false alarm
rate than IR Missile Warning Systems.
Mr. Bartlett. The committee is familiar with the findings from the
OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large
percentage of aircraft fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE) which includes three categories--brownout, control
flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What are the Services
doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability
fielded within each Service?
General Robling. The Marine Corps is working on several programs,
including Joint programs which seek to address DVE utilizing multiple
alternatives and will then integrate these systems into the aircraft.
The Marine Corps has already begun efforts to integrate day/night
heads-up displays (HUD) and modern cockpit displays into helicopter
cockpits. The Marine Corps has also begun to implement the Brown Out
Symbology Set (BOSS), developed by the Army, in Marine helicopters.
Further work continues with the Army to update and refine BOSS and to
integrate the symbology with other aircraft sensors. To address
brownout and wire-strikes, including uncharted wires, cables and
obstacles, the Marine Corps requires a ``see-through'' DVE solution.
Two technologies, a LASER based radar (LADAR) solution and a millimeter
wave (MMW) radar solution, offer the required capability. The LADAR and
MMW sensors are currently in the technology development phase and will
begin testing in FY13 aboard the USMC designated lead test platform,
the CH-53E. These technology demonstrations will facilitate assessment
on the maturity of brownout solutions aboard a representative platform.
By conducting an assessment based on technological maturity, platform
integration complexity, projected weight, and cost the Marine Corps
will develop a technological acquisition strategy for fielding a DVE
capability to Marine rotary wing platforms. The Marine Corps is also
monitoring a ``see-and-remember'' Pilot Vehicle Interface (PVI)
technology which would render 3-D terrain images of the environment
based on a pre-loaded terrain database. The intent is for the selected
technology to reduce pilot workload during brownout landings, and
ensure precision landing navigation of rotorcraft in DVE. Fielding will
depend on USMC's best balance between requirements and fiscally
constrained resources.
The Marine Corps is also working on capability programs addressing
CFIT prevention. For legacy aircraft, USMC is installing technologies
such as Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and Terrain Awareness
Warning System (TAWS) to provide pilots with alerts for impending
terrain collision. These technologies continue to advance with TAWS II,
which will provide obstacle avoidance in conjunction with either an
onboard obstacle database and/or data from an active sensor. TAWS II
IOC is planned for FY17. Additionally, a POR for Midair Collision
Avoidance Capability (MCAC) begins in FY14. This system will be based
on Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In and Out and
will use Government owned and developed software to prevent airborne
collisions.
Finally, the USMC has worked to implement non-material mitigation
through improved Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) in
conjunction with current technologies to minimize the risks of DVE.
Mr. Bartlett. There continues to be a tremendous demand for
rotorcraft support whether it's for troop transport, logistics,
surveillance or attack missions. Given these platforms will likely be
in even greater demand in the future and they will operate in
potentially increased threat environments--please discuss how each of
you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability
equipment. Are you working together for a common approach or is there a
necessity to come up with different solutions based on the mission
profiles of the various platforms?
Admiral Moran. Naval Aviation has a formal process in place to
incorporate lessons learned into the development of future
requirements. Where our mission sets overlap we work towards a common
approach.
Examples of this common approach include the Navy Enhanced Visual
Acuity Program (EVA), a pre-Milestone A program with an Initial
Operating Capability projected for FY18. The goal is to develop digital
vision devices that improve visual acuity in low/no light and brown-out
situations while maintaining the capability of the current analog night
system. PMA-202 is coordinating with the Army and Air Force on program
issues though the Aircrew Sub Systems Board (ASSB), which is a
subcomponent of the Joint Aircrew Commonality Group (JACG), on this
effort.
The Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System IR Missile Warning
system (AAR-59), being developed by the U.S. Navy/USMC based on lessons
learned and performance limitations discovered during the recent
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The AAR-59 will provide advanced
infrared missile warning capability and aircrew warning of laser based
systems and indications for small arms, rockets and unguided threats.
The AAR-59 has been designated the primary IR missile warning system
solution for all new DOD aircraft and any planned ASE upgrades. It is
designed to operate with all DOD aircraft and will interface with the
Army led Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) and Air Force led DON
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) as part of an
integrated response to attacking infrared missiles.
The USN/USMC intends to procure the U.S. Army's CIRCM system that
is currently being developed for smaller assault helicopters. This
joint program will ensure a common solution across all DOD's platforms.
For our larger assault platforms, the USN/USMC has purchased the LAIRCM
system that was developed and produced for the USAF to protect larger
aircraft.
Mr. Bartlett. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the
military services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based
warning systems versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system
operate better than the other in terms of false positive alarms, range
of detection, and detection fidelity, especially in a high clutter
environment?
Admiral Moran. Naval Aviation has chosen to incorporate the AAR-59
(Joint and Allied Threat Warning System) to address IR-based threats.
The two-color IR technology provides the benefit of lower false alarm
rate, longer range detection, and the ability to provide detection in
high clutter environments.
Mr. Bartlett. The committee is familiar with the findings from the
OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large
percentage of aircraft fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE) which includes three categories--brownout, control
flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What are the Services
doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability
fielded within each Service?
Admiral Moran. Requirement Officers and Program Managers are
working together to incorporate DVE software and an integrated
Helicopter Obstacle/Weather/Terrain/Traffic Awareness Warning System
(HTAWS) into fleet aircraft. No official timeline has been established.
Mr. Bartlett. The Marine Corps is currently developing the CH-53K
program in order to replace its 53E helicopters. And although the Navy
is also flying 53E helicopters, the Navy does not have a requirement
for the 53K. Clearly the MH-60 series rotorcraft is an excellent
platform, but will it be able to carry the same loads from a Vertical
Onboard Delivery (VOD) perspective than a 53E or 53K? Is there any
possibility that in a few years the Navy might change their minds and
validate a requirement for the 53K?
Admiral Moran. The MH-60S currently fulfills the Navy requirement
for Vertical Onboard Delivery despite not being able to carry the same
loads as the MH-53E.
Mr. Bartlett. There continues to be a tremendous demand for
rotorcraft support whether it's for troop transport, logistics,
surveillance or attack missions. Given these platforms will likely be
in even greater demand in the future and they will operate in
potentially increased threat environments--please discuss how each of
you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability
equipment. Are you working together for a common approach or is there a
necessity to come up with different solutions based on the mission
profiles of the various platforms?
Mr. Gilpin. Naval Aviation has a formal process in place to
incorporate lessons learned into the development of future
requirements. Where our mission sets overlap we work towards a common
approach.
Examples of this common approach include the Navy Enhanced Visual
Acuity Program (EVA), a pre-Milestone A program with an Initial
Operating Capability projected for FY18. The goal is to develop digital
vision devices that improve visual acuity in low/no light and brown-out
situations while maintaining the capability of the current analog night
system. PMA-202 is coordinating with the Army and Air Force on program
issues though the Aircrew Sub Systems Board (ASSB), which is a
subcomponent of the Joint Aircrew Commonality Group (JACG), on this
effort.
The Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System IR Missile Warning
system (AAR-59), being developed by the U.S. Navy/USMC based on lessons
learned and performance limitations discovered during the recent
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The AAR-59 will provide advanced
infrared missile warning capability and aircrew warning of laser based
systems and indications for small arms, rockets and unguided threats.
The AAR-59 has been designated the primary IR missile warning system
solution for all new DOD aircraft and any planned ASE upgrades. It is
designed to operate with all DOD aircraft and will interface with the
Army led Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) and Air Force led DON
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) as part of an
integrated response to attacking infrared missiles.
The USN/USMC intends to procure the U.S. Army's CIRCM system that
is currently being developed for smaller assault helicopters. This
joint program will ensure a common solution across all DOD's platforms.
For our larger assault platforms, the USN/USMC has purchased the LAIRCM
system that was developed and produced for the USAF to protect larger
aircraft.
Mr. Bartlett. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the
military services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based
warning systems versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system
operate better than the other in terms of false positive alarms, range
of detection, and detection fidelity, especially in a high clutter
environment?
Mr. Gilpin. Naval Aviation has chosen to incorporate the AAR-59
(Joint and Allied Threat Warning System) to address IR-based threats.
The two-color IR technology provides the benefit of lower false alarm
rate, longer range detection, and the ability to provide detection in
high clutter environments.
Mr. Bartlett. The committee is familiar with the findings from the
OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large
percentage of aircraft fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE) which includes three categories--brownout, control
flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What are the Services
doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability
fielded within each Service?
Mr. Gilpin. Requirement Officers and Program Managers are working
together to incorporate DVE software and an integrated Helicopter
Obstacle/Weather/Terrain/Traffic Awareness Warning System (HTAWS) into
fleet aircraft. No official timeline has been established.
Mr. Bartlett. There continues to be a tremendous demand for
rotorcraft support whether it's for troop transport, logistics,
surveillance or attack missions. Given these platforms will likely be
in even greater demand in the future and they will operate in
potentially increased threat environments--please discuss how each of
you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability
equipment. Are you working together for a common approach or is there a
necessity to come up with different solutions based on the mission
profiles of the various platforms?
General Crosby. To obtain common approaches across the Services,
the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Army have
established a Tri-Service Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)
working group that meets on a semi-annual basis. The Joint Capabilities
Integration Development System scours Service requirements for
opportunities to provide common solutions across the Services to meet
identified capability gaps, especially those relating to ASE.
Through the Army's ASE Program Office, the Army develops and
procures common survivability equipment for platforms wherever possible
to maximize capabilities through efficient use of research and
procurement dollars. The tenets of this effort include: sensor and
threat correlation; suite control; Modular Open System Approach (MOSA);
minimizing size, weight and power requirements; and enabling increased
situational understanding. The Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) is
one such system that provides capabilities across the majority of Army
platforms. Some platforms require mission specific solutions that do
not necessarily benefit the Army's entire fleet, though. The
requirements for a jammer and hostile fire detection are examples where
specific platforms may have unique requirements. Knowing the geo-
location of the origin of small arms fire is an example of a
requirement that may not be necessary on all platforms, but highly
beneficial to the armed platforms.
The Army is currently developing the Common Infrared Countermeasure
(CIRCM), which essentially defeats infrared seeking missiles with a
laser countermeasure. The CIRCM is being designed with a MOSA, so that
it can be interoperable with both the Army's CMWS and the Navy's
missile warning system, known as the Joint and Allied Threat Awareness
System. The Navy plans to leverage the Army's investment for Infrared
Countermeasures.
The Army is also working closely with the Navy as they develop a
next generation Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). The Navy has been able to
meet most of the Army requirements with no additional cost to the
receiver's development. To attempt to meet common inter-service
solutions, the Army participates in the Navy's RWR preliminary design
review.
Mr. Bartlett. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the
military services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based
warning systems versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system
operate better than the other in terms of false positive alarms, range
of detection, and detection fidelity, especially in a high clutter
environment?
General Crosby. Each sensor system, regardless of the spectrum it
detects, has unique pros and cons. Primarily, the trade space regarding
missile warning involves probability of detection, clutter rejection,
cost and reliability. What works best for operating at 30,000 feet is
not necessarily what works best at 1,000 feet and in situations used
for Army aircraft. It is not so much a choice of ``good,'' ``better,''
or ``best'' between Ultraviolet (UV)-based sensors, Infrared (IR)-based
sensors or hybrid sensor solutions, but what best mitigates the threat
in the situations most common to each Service.
Upon extensive analysis, the Army invested in UV-based sensor
solutions nearly 10 years ago. This investment continues to meet Army
requirements at an affordable cost. The primary advantages of the
Army's UV-based systems versus acquiring a new IR based systems are:
the Army's UV system meets all its operational requirements for
probability of detection and reliability; UV is considered solar blind,
thus reducing susceptibility to solar radiation and natural clutter
sources; and un-cooled UV sensors are relatively low cost compared to
cooled IR sensors. The Army's UV sensors' mean time between failures
exceeds threshold and objective requirements, and further reduces total
life cycle costs.
The Army has invested in a UV-based system over the course of the
past 10 years, and has accumulate over two million combat flight hours
with the current UV-based system. The Army has improved the UV sensor
performance for missile warning to where its false positive rate is
lower than the Army's performance requirement, and its operation in
high clutter environments is comparable to, or greater than, the
performance of the currently available IR systems. In order to maximize
the Army's significant investment in its UV-based missile warning
system, the Army continues to seek opportunities to improve its suite
of sensors' performance through incremental, economical improvements.
Adding economical IR capability to existing survivability sensors is
something the Army will continue to research.
Mr. Bartlett. The committee is familiar with the findings from the
OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large
percentage of aircraft fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE) which includes three categories--brownout, control
flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What are the Services
doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability
fielded within each Service?
General Crosby. Based upon the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
validated Aircraft Survivability Initial Capabilities Document, the
Army is establishing a formal DVE acquisition program to provide the
Army aircrews with a capability to safely perform flight operations
during conditions where man-made and natural atmospheric obscurants
restrict or limit flight visibility.
The Army is actively participating with Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency, United States Air Force and the Navy on potential DVE
technologies. The types of missions and tactics employed by each
Service will dictate specific requirements for possible DVE materiel
solutions.
Ongoing Army Aviation modernization programs are integrating
technologies such as digital maps and development of improved handling
qualities in our modernized airframes. In addition, we are looking at
focused solutions including active radar penetrating sensors to address
DVE operations in the legacy platforms in support of current operations
as well as a bridge to an end-state modernized fleet.
In regard to when the capability will be fielded, the Army, in
response to the Central Command (CENTCOM) DVE Operational Need
Statement (ONS), is preparing for a limited fielding of an obscurant
penetrating capability either in April or May of Second Quarter Fiscal
Year 2014. In parallel with responding to the CENTCOM DVE ONS, the Army
is moving forward with the DVE acquisition program, and expects a
Materiel Development Decision in late 2012.
Mr. Bartlett. The Army National Guard operates more than 800 Black
Hawks, which represents about 45% of the Army's Black Hawk fleet. And
as you know, the oldest UH-60A series Black Hawks, many more that 34
years old are operated by Guard units. Until recently, the rate of
Guard Black Hawk modernization was keeping pace with the rate of the
Active Army. However, the FY13 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopter funding has
been reduced by more than 17% over last year's budget down to a rate of
59 aircraft per year, and it appears that the cuts have resulted in
delayed fieldings to Army National Guard units. Can you explain what
the impact of the FY13 budget request will have on the ability to
modernize the National Guards Blackhawk fleet? What is the Army's plan
to replace the older UH-60A platforms?
General Crosby. The Army is addressing the Army National Guard ARNG
modernization in three ways: procurement of new UH/HH-60Ms, cascading
UH-60Ls model from the active forces to ARNG and, finally, A-L RECAP
(converts UH-60A model aircraft to UH-60Ls) of ARNG aircraft. The
recent Army decision to go to a nine-month deployment cycle
necessitated all Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) and FY13 UH-60M procurement
funding go to modernizing two Active component Combat Aviation Brigades
(CAB) thus delaying one ARNG Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB) by two
years. Fielding of new UH/HH-60Ms will begin in FY15 for this ARNG AHB
and will be followed by an additional ARNG CAB. The ARNG is scheduled
to receive 11 UH-60M and two HH-60M aircraft during the FY12-16
timeframe. Six of the 11 UH-60Ms will be procured on the Multi-Year
VIII contract. After the buildup of the 13th CAB in FY13 and FY14, all
cascaded UH-60L model aircraft from the active forces will go to ARNG,
resulting in greater retirements of UH-60As. Finally, the Army A-L
program converts UH-60A model aircraft to UH-60Ls. This program began
in FY08; the first ARNG conversion was done in FY11. The current plan
is to continue the conversions at a rate of 38 per year through FY15.
Mr. Bartlett. The Army National Guard UH-72A Lakota helicopters are
performing well in support of security missions on our Southwest border
where there is an ever-increasing threat of hostility. Are you aware if
the National Guard is supportive of utilizing the UH-72A for other
missions such as the Balkans in order to relieve pressure on high
demand rotary wing platforms and save operational funding? Has the Army
consulted with the National Guard to identify opportunities for
expanding the mission envelope of the UH-72A? Are you aware if the Army
is working cooperatively with industry to explore potential UH-72A
survivability modifications, such as establishing a Cooperative
Research & Development Agreement (CRADA)?
General Crosby. The Army is aware that the National Guard Bureau
(NGB) is interested in expanding the operational spectrum of the UH-72A
Lakota. The Army has not consulted with the NGB to identify
opportunities for expanding the operational envelope. The UH-72A Lakota
was procured to accomplish missions in a permissive environment that
were once accomplished with the legacy light utility UH-1 and OH-58
fleets. The intent was for the UH-72A Lakota to accomplish these
missions, freeing UH-60 Blackhawks to accomplish combat missions in
uncertain or hostile environments. As a result, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Operational Test and Evaluation Directorate
concluded that the UH-72A Lakota was not required to undergo
survivability testing and certification and was granted a waiver for
this statutory requirement. The estimated cost of testing and modifying
the Lakota to meet the survivability and certification requirements
would be $793 million for the fleet. This cost includes: hardening
navigation and communication systems against electromagnetic radiation,
live fire test and evaluation, survivability testing, sustainment costs
in non-permissive environments and dynamic component upgrades. The Army
is not presently engaged with industry to establish a cooperative
development program to develop survivability modifications for the UH-
72A Lakota.
Mr. Bartlett. There continues to be a tremendous demand for
rotorcraft support whether it's for troop transport, logistics,
surveillance or attack missions. Given these platforms will likely be
in even greater demand in the future and they will operate in
potentially increased threat environments--please discuss how each of
you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability
equipment. Are you working together for a common approach or is there a
necessity to come up with different solutions based on the mission
profiles of the various platforms?
General Kane. The Air Force participates in the Joint Helicopter
Survivability Task Force, which provides a forum to discuss current and
future threats, lessons learned, and available and future technologies.
We continue to pursue defensive system upgrades and seek to capitalize
on other service lessons learned. The Air Force leverages common
solutions when able, but due to the high threat mission profiles the
Air Force flies, independent solutions are sometimes required.
Mr. Bartlett. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the
military services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based
warning systems versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system
operate better than the other in terms of false positive alarms, range
of detection, and detection fidelity, especially in a high clutter
environment?
General Kane. UV and IR systems each have their strengths and
weaknesses. The combined survivability systems (UV and IR) on Air Force
platforms allow for a high level of survivability against a wide array
of threats. The Air Force continues to balance current technology,
capability, and affordability to achieve a high level of defensive
capability. As new technology becomes available the Air Force evaluates
the new systems for reliability, fidelity, and effectiveness.
Mr. Bartlett. The committee is familiar with the findings from the
OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large
percentage of aircraft fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE) which includes three categories--brownout, control
flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What are the Services
doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability
fielded within each Service?
General Kane. The Air Force is pursuing several capabilities to
improve survivability in degraded visual environments (DVE) for our
rotary wing assets. The CV-22 currently has a robust enroute DVE
capability, which includes moving maps with digital terrain and
elevation data (DTED) and a terrain following radar. In FY12, we start
installing an improved hold and hover system and moving maps with DTED
on the HH-60G. The improved hold and hover system provides a coupled
approach to the ground capability which helps pilots maintain the
landing flight path during brownout conditions. The moving maps with
DTED provide visual and audible warning for terrain avoidance. Starting
in FY13, we will install a commercial off-the-shelf based helicopter
terrain awareness and warning system (HTAWS) on the UH-1N.
Additionally, the Air Force is participating in the Three
Dimensional-Landing Zone (3D-LZ) Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD). The 3D-LZ JCTD will demonstrate and assess
technologies which display high-resolution three-dimensional imagery,
integrated with flight symbology, to enable safe landing in DVE,
provide cable warning and obstacle avoidance, and provide HTAWS
functionality. Flight test is scheduled for FY14.
Mr. Bartlett. There continues to be a tremendous demand for
rotorcraft support whether it's for troop transport, logistics,
surveillance or attack missions. Given these platforms will likely be
in even greater demand in the future and they will operate in
potentially increased threat environments--please discuss how each of
you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability
equipment. Are you working together for a common approach or is there a
necessity to come up with different solutions based on the mission
profiles of the various platforms?
General Jones. The Air Force participates in the Joint Helicopter
Survivability Task Force, which provides a forum to discuss current and
future threats, lessons learned, and available and future technologies.
We continue to pursue defensive system upgrades and seek to capitalize
on other service lessons learned. The Air Force leverages common
solutions when able, but due to the high threat mission profiles the
Air Force flies, independent solutions are sometimes required.
Mr. Bartlett. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the
military services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based
warning systems versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system
operate better than the other in terms of false positive alarms, range
of detection, and detection fidelity, especially in a high clutter
environment?
General Jones. UV and IR systems each have their strengths and
weaknesses. The combined survivability systems (UV and IR) on Air Force
platforms allow for a high level of survivability against a wide array
of threats. The Air Force continues to balance current technology,
capability, and affordability to achieve a high level of defensive
capability. As new technology becomes available the Air Force evaluates
the new systems for reliability, fidelity, and effectiveness.
Mr. Bartlett. The committee is familiar with the findings from the
OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large
percentage of aircraft fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE) which includes three categories--brownout, control
flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What are the Services
doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability
fielded within each Service?
General Jones. The Air Force is pursuing several capabilities to
improve survivability in degraded visual environments (DVE) for our
rotary wing assets. The CV-22 currently has a robust enroute DVE
capability, which includes moving maps with digital terrain and
elevation data (DTED) and a terrain following radar. In FY12, we start
installing an improved hold and hover system and moving maps with DTED
on the HH-60G. The improved hold and hover system provides a coupled
approach to the ground capability which helps pilots maintain the
landing flight path during brownout conditions. The moving maps with
DTED provide visual and audible warning for terrain avoidance. Starting
in FY13, we will install a commercial off-the-shelf based helicopter
terrain awareness and warning system (HTAWS) on the UH-1N.
Additionally, the Air Force is participating in the Three
Dimensional-Landing Zone (3D-LZ) Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD). The 3D-LZ JCTD will demonstrate and assess
technologies which display high-resolution three-dimensional imagery,
integrated with flight symbology, to enable safe landing in DVE,
provide cable warning and obstacle avoidance, and provide HTAWS
functionality. Flight test is scheduled for FY14.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self
form into the ``Vertical Lift Consortium'' (VLC). I understand the goal
was to utilize the VLC to more effectively define requirements to
streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program
success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum
would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift
Community with emphasis on improving communication and teaming with
non-traditional defense companies and small businesses. This DOD
initiative embodies the objectives of the Weapons Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement and acquisition
processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition and
more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars.
Based on the Department's experiences over the last 2\1/2\ years, what
are the results of this partnership and how will the VLC be utilized
for future vertical lift initiatives?
General Robling. 1. What are the results of this partnership? It's
important to note that more than 90 representatives of the vertical
lift industry and academia self-formed into the Vertical Lift
Consortium (VLC) in an effort to partner with the DOD. The most recent
Executive Steering Group (ESG) held in February marked the ninth time
VLC leadership attended and participated in Future Vertical Lift (FVL)
strategic planning. This type of integrated collaboration offers
opportunities to leverage both DOD and Industry resources through unity
of effort.
2. How will the VLC be utilized for future vertical lift
initiatives? The Marine Corps remains an active participant within the
FVL Integration Group, whose aim is to team with the VLC for strategic
development and implementation of future generations of vertical lift
capabilities. Our goal as a group is to ensure we design, develop, and
deliver the next generation of vertical lift aircraft with advanced
capabilities to the Joint Warfighter. This collaborative effort allows
the VLC to provide the FVL ESG early insight into future capabilities
that are in development by industry. Equally important, this team
approach allows the ESG to provide Industry insight into the aircraft
capabilities direction that DOD requires. Cooperation, collaboration,
and teaming with the VLC allows DOD to accelerate and leverage the
development of contributing technology and transition that technology
into practical applications in an expedited and lower cost fashion.
Mr. Wilson. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self
form into the ``Vertical Lift Consortium'' (VLC). I understand the goal
was to utilize the VLC to more effectively define requirements to
streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program
success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum
would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift
Community with emphasis on improving communication and teaming with
non-traditional defense companies and small businesses. This DOD
initiative embodies the objectives of the Weapons Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement and acquisition
processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition and
more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars.
Based on the Department's experiences over the last 2\1/2\ years, what
are the results of this partnership and how will the VLC be utilized
for future vertical lift initiatives?
Admiral Moran. The VLC has had a positive impact on the Future
Vertical Lift Initiative; the VLC has been involved and will continue
to be involved to the maximum extent that DOD policy allows. The VLC
has provided an opportunity to define and develop specific maritime
requirements. The most significant impact the VLC will have on this
OSD-led program will occur during the Material Solutions Analysis
Phase; this scheduled to begin by the Army in late FY13.
Mr. Wilson. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self
form into the ``Vertical Lift Consortium'' (VLC). I understand the goal
was to utilize the VLC to more effectively define requirements to
streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program
success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum
would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift
Community with emphasis on improving communication and teaming with
non-traditional defense companies and small businesses. This DOD
initiative embodies the objectives of the Weapons Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement and acquisition
processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition and
more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars.
Based on the Department's experiences over the last 2\1/2\ years, what
are the results of this partnership and how will the VLC be utilized
for future vertical lift initiatives?
Mr. Gilpin. The VLC has had a positive impact on the Future
Vertical Lift Initiative; the VLC has been involved and will continue
to be involved to the maximum extent that DOD policy allows. The VLC
has provided an opportunity to define and develop specific maritime
requirements. The most significant impact the VLC will have on this
OSD-led program will occur during the Material Solutions Analysis
Phase; this scheduled to begin by the Army in late FY13.
Mr. Wilson. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self
form into the ``Vertical Lift Consortium'' (VLC). I understand the goal
was to utilize the VLC to more effectively define requirements to
streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program
success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum
would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift
Community with emphasis on improving communication and teaming with
non-traditional defense companies and small businesses. This DOD
initiative embodies the objectives of the Weapons Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement and acquisition
processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition and
more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars.
Based on the Department's experiences over the last 2\1/2\ years, what
are the results of this partnership and how will the VLC be utilized
for future vertical lift initiatives?
General Crosby. The Department of Defense (DOD) previously
submitted a report to the congressional defense committees on the
future development of vertical lift aircraft, as directed by the United
States Congress in section 255 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09), Public Law 110-417. That
report included a preliminary technology roadmap. The Department is
working to update the roadmap and to identify and address the critical
enabling technologies for future program success; among those
activities was the award of an Other Transaction Agreement (OTA) under
the authority of section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for FY94, Public Law 103-160 (as amended) by the Army with the Vertical
Lift Consortium (VLC) to develop technologies for vertical lift
aircraft. Section 845 OTAs are tailored to non-traditional contractors,
which was consistent with the Department's intent to stimulate
increased contractor participation and new ideas.
The VLC is a non-profit organization and membership is open to
industry, including non-traditional contractors. Orders under the OTA
are awarded to individual members of the VLC after publication of a
request for proposals and using competitive methods for selection.
While implementing the OTA, a vigorous and valuable dialogue with the
collective organization that represents much of industry has provided
positive feedback to the Army, the Department and the Services.
While the Department's budget request for FY13 does not
specifically identify funding activities under this OTA, the Department
has allocated about $1.4 million from funding accounts in the current
year for this purpose; contract orders are anticipated this Spring that
will use the OTA as a transaction award instrument for the development
of vertical lift technologies.
Mr. Wilson. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self
form into the ``Vertical Lift Consortium'' (VLC). I understand the goal
was to utilize the VLC to more effectively define requirements to
streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program
success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum
would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift
Community with emphasis on improving communication and teaming with
non-traditional defense companies and small businesses. This DOD
initiative embodies the objectives of the Weapons Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement and acquisition
processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition and
more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars.
Based on the Department's experiences over the last 2\1/2\ years, what
are the results of this partnership and how will the VLC be utilized
for future vertical lift initiatives?
General Kane. The Vertical Lift Consortium has been an active
participant in the Future Vertical Lift Executive Steering Group. The
Air Force, along with sister Services, through the Future Vertical Lift
program, maintains partnerships and information sharing efforts to
connect Science and Technology, Acquisitions, and Requirements. The Air
Force continues to realize value in the partnering relationship
developed through the VLC.
Mr. Wilson. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self
form into the ``Vertical Lift Consortium'' (VLC). I understand the goal
was to utilize the VLC to more effectively define requirements to
streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program
success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum
would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift
Community with emphasis on improving communication and teaming with
non-traditional defense companies and small businesses. This DOD
initiative embodies the objectives of the Weapons Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement and acquisition
processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition and
more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars.
Based on the Department's experiences over the last 2\1/2\ years, what
are the results of this partnership and how will the VLC be utilized
for future vertical lift initiatives?
General Jones. The Vertical Lift Consortium has been an active
participant in the Future Vertical Lift Executive Steering Group. The
Air Force, along with sister Services, through the Future Vertical Lift
program, maintains partnerships and information sharing efforts to
connect Science and Technology, Acquisitions, and Requirements. The Air
Force continues to realize value in the partnering relationship
developed through the VLC.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBiondo. As the Committee has reviewed the Fiscal Year 2013
out-year procurement requests, we note that the Department of Defense
has taken 24 V-22 aircraft out of the next five years--going from 122
aircraft down to 98. Can you discuss the Department's plan on buying a
full program of record on the V-22?
General Robling. The decision to delay the purchase of 24 MV-22s
until FY18 and FY19 was based on budget pressures currently being faced
by the Department of the Navy. The Marine Corps remains fully committed
to completing the Program of Record for a total of 360 aircraft and
plans to submit budget requests accordingly.
Mr. LoBiondo. What are the benefits of a multiyear contract for the
V-22? What is the projected cost savings of this multiyear?
General Robling. The proposed V-22 MYP II contract presents a
substantial cost avoidance of greater than $800M in comparison to
single year procurement. The benefits of this multiyear contract
include:
-- Stable and continuous production resulting in lower overhead
rates.
-- Enhanced workforce stability resulting in lower labor costs.
-- Long Term Agreements (LTAs), Economic Order Quantity (EOQ)
buys, and reduced setup costs resulting in lower material costs.
-- Broadening the competitive base with opportunity for
participation by suppliers not otherwise willing or able to compete for
single year procurements.
-- Meeting minimum-order quantities on many components.
-- Minimizing parts obsolescence.
-- Reducing the cost associated with annual proposal preparation
and negotiation.
-- Lowering the percentage of profit relative to total costs.
Mr. LoBiondo. The Navy has stated that it intends to replace the
aging C-2 Greyhound, the current Carrier OnBoard Delivery (COD)
aircraft. As the Navy plans for its future Airborne Resupply/Logistics
for Seabasing (AR/LSB) capability, does it not make sense to use an
airplane that is currently in the DOD inventory that is much more
efficient to use, such as the V-22 Osprey?
Mr. Gilpin. The Navy is currently updating the AR/LSB Analysis of
Alternatives which will evaluate the relative cost and technical
advantages of various alternatives. The AoA Update is looking closely
at the V-22. The AoA Update should be complete in the May timeframe.
Mr. LoBiondo. What are the benefits of a multiyear contract for the
CH-47? What is the projected cost savings of this multiyear?
General Crosby. The Army defers to the U.S. Marine Corps as they
are responsible for the fielding of the V-22.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. One of the major themes aside from the declining
procurement rates of military equipment is the impact on the strategic
industrial baseline. There have been numerous GAO studies which have
concluded that the current defense industrial baseline is not only
unbalanced but that the industrial baseline prior to the 2012 Budget
Control Act was incapable of surging production rates in times of
crisis. Additionally the U.S. has become increasingly dependent on
foreign sources of supply. Limiting our discussion to the H-60 Black
Hawk helicopter for the Army National Guard, not only have procurement
rates dropped 17% but the latest estimates now indicate that the last
Army National Guard UH-60A will not be retired until 2027 which will
make the helicopter more than 37 years old. Military weapon systems
have become so technologically complex that even with an industrial
baseline available, expediting production is extremely difficult. For
example on the UH-60 and MH-60 there are five critical components
dealing with the rotor which is made by only one manufacturer; Main
Rotor Spherical Bearing, Tail Rotor Pivot Bearing, Main Rotor Pitch
Link Rod Ends, Tail Rotor Pitch Link Rod Ends and the Main Rotor CF
Bearing.
How much consideration have you given toward the retainment of the
Industrial Baseline? What steps have you taken or currently taking to
ensure an available supply of these critical components? Have the
Services accomplished any strategic thinking on a continued
consolidation of the supply market and the eventuality that we are
reliant on overseas replacement components? Is this an issue which has
been conveyed to OSD? If so, what is their response?
General Kane. The Air Force depends on a reliable, responsive
industrial base to produce and sustain the capabilities needed to fly,
fight and win across the air, space and cyber domains. There is
emerging across the Department of Defense a shared sense of concern
over the impact of the forthcoming reduced demand signal on the
domestic industrial base, particularly at the lower tiers. To identify
these risks and, where appropriate, develop mitigation actions, the
Service staffs are working closely with each other and with their
counterparts on the OSD staff. Some of these interactions leverage
long-established groups such as the Defense Acquisition Board; in other
areas, OSD has helped to facilitate new discussions among the
components on shared concerns, such as energetic materials. Across the
Air Force, our senior leaders fully recognize the strategic challenge
of sustaining critical domestic industrial base capabilities during a
period of fiscal austerity. Each day, our managers within the
acquisition and sustainment communities successfully respond to these
types of challenges ensuring the readiness of the Air Force. The Air
Force will continue to work closely with the other Services and with
OSD on all levels to sustain our capability to fly, fight and win.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. The Army National Guard operates more than 800 Black
Hawks, which represents about 45% of the Army's Black Hawk fleet. And
as you know, the oldest UH-60A series Black Hawks, many more that 34
years old are operated by Guard units. Until recently, the rate of
Guard Black Hawk modernization was keeping pace with the rate of the
Active Army. However, the FY13 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopter funding has
been reduced by more than 17% over last year's budget down to a rate of
59 aircraft per year, and it appears that the cuts have resulted in
delayed fieldings to Army National Guard units.
What is the Army's plan to replace the older UH-60A platforms? What
is the timeline for when all UH60-A platforms are upgraded?
General Crosby. The Army is addressing the Army National Guard
(ARNG) modernization in three ways: procurement of new UH/HH-60Ms,
cascading UH-60Ls model from the active forces to ARNG, and, A-L RECAP
of ARNG aircraft. The recent Army decision to go to a nine month
deployment cycle necessitated all Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) and FY13 UH-
60M procurement funding go to modernizing two Active component Combat
Aviation Brigades (CAB), thus delaying one ARNG Assault Helicopter
Battalion (AHB) by two years. Fielding of new UH/HH-60Ms will begin in
FY15 for this ARNG AHB and will be followed by an additional ARNG CAB.
The ARNG is scheduled to receive 11 UH-60M and two HH-60M aircraft
during the FY12-16 timeframe, six of the 11 UH-60Ms will be procured on
the Multi-Year VIII contract. After the buildup of the 13th CAB in FY13
and FY14, all cascaded UH-60L model aircraft from the active forces
will go to ARNG resulting in greater retirements of UH-60As. Finally,
the Army A-L program converts UH-60A model aircraft to UH-60Ls. This
program began in FY08; the first ARNG conversion was done in FY11. The
current plan is to continue the conversions at a rate of 38 per year
through FY15.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. Air Combat Command (ACC) is responsible for training
and equipping rescue forces. The command announced last month that they
are considering acquiring used helicopters from the United States Army
in lieu of purchasing new, replacement HH-60M aircraft. There has been
no public release announcing a change to the Operational Loss
Replacement program and it is not known how the negotiations with the
Army are proceeding. The Army is currently modernizing its fleet with
HH-60M aircraft.
Has the Air Force adopted a new acquisition strategy in lieu of
purchasing new helicopters? If so, how does the new strategy improve
upon the command's ability to execute the rescue mission? What are the
risks associated with the new strategy?
General Jones. The HH-60G Operational Loss Replacement program
delivered the first two minimally modified UH-60M aircraft in September
2011, with the third scheduled for May 2012. Aircraft #4 will be
modified to an HH-60G like configuration. The Air Force is considering
multiple options on how best to modify H-60 aircraft to get the most
capability to the warfighter in the shortest time, including modifying
the UH-60M or low hour UH-60Ls from the Army. The decision is currently
in its final stages and modifications will begin in late 2012 with
delivery beginning late 2013 and completing in 2015.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROONEY
Mr. Rooney. I have been told that the CH-53K program is only
rotorcraft program currently in development for any of the Services and
that it will deliver three times the lift capability, provide fly-by-
wire technology, incorporate the latest survivability techniques
including a composite airframe l. Given the difficulties you have had
fielding a new amphibious vehicle, I assume this program becomes even
more important for ship to shore operations? What can we do to help you
accelerate or at least highlight the importance of this asset?
General Robling. The CH-53K Program is the only ACAT 1D
developmental rotorcraft program within DOD and is currently under a
Engineering and Manufacturing Demonstration (EMD) contract.
The CH-53K is a new build helicopter that evolves the CH-53E design
to improve operational capability, reliability, maintainability,
survivability, and cost of ownership. The CH-53K is a critical enabler
of the MEB 2015 concept as it is the only shipboard-compatible
rotorcraft capable of lifting 100% of the air-transportable equipment
in the Marine Corps' ``Middle Weight Force'' vertical MAGTF in support
of current and future warfighting concepts. The CH-53K is designed to
transport 27,000 lbs of external cargo under Navy high/hot conditions
out to 110nm (nearly three times the CH-53E), vastly improving Ship-to-
Objective Maneuver (STOM).
The CH-53K Program has met all Obligation & Expenditures (O&E)
benchmarks since FY08, is on schedule, stands on a solid technical
foundation with critical technologies maturing to plan, and continues
to meet or exceed all Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).
Accelerating CH-53K:
Current year: An additional $32.1M of R&D funds in FY-13 would
result in an acceleration of IOC from Q1 FY-19 to Q4 FY-18 enabling
more efficient program execution and reduce out-year R&D funding
requirements.
Furthermore, additional APN1 funding in FY16-18 could increase the
CH-53K procurement ramp, by leveraging Sikorsky's additional production
capacity, thereby accelerating delivery of CH-53K to the Fleet Marine
Forces.
Mr. Rooney. With the capabilities that the CH-53K helicopter will
bring to the Marine Corps, and their need for this type of heavy lift,
this program is a no-brainer. What I want to understand, however, is
what is the Navy's plan for heavy lift and why are you not playing in
this program? I understand that the Navy's current fleet of vertical
lift platforms cannot even transport the F135 engine from ship to ship.
Is this correct?
Mr. Gilpin. The MH-60S currently fulfills the Navy requirement for
vertical lift. Regarding transport of the JSF engine, the JSF whole
engine and the engine shipping system (ESS) was not designed for
VERTREP. The MH-53E, CH-53E and MV-22 can externally transport the F135
engine modules.
Mr. Rooney. I understand that the Army will soon host a ``fly-off''
for potential candidates in the Armed Aerial Scout program which is
intended to replace the Kiowa Warrior. I understand the need to replace
these aging venerable aircraft and I understand the long sordid history
of attempting to do so from Comanche to the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter. My worry, however, is that by hosting this ``fly-off'' the
Army is considering taking the easy way out of a troubled history and
settling for a platform that brings no new capability to the fight. The
Services have long neglected funding for rotorcraft R&D but there is
new technology out there that could be game-changing. If one
consideration for the Army is to once again, SLEP the Kiowa for a while
longer in order to bring on this new technology out there, then I would
advocate you take such a path. Why would the Army even consider current
aircraft bringing no new capability to the warfighter?
General Crosby. The Army is conducting market research by releasing
a Request for Information, conducting discussions with industry, and
giving industry an opportunity to demonstrate potential solutions to
help determine what technologies are available from industry that may
contribute to a material solution option. The Army will not compare
individual results, but rather assess their capability against the
capability gaps identified in the initial capabilities document. The
end state is to identify an affordable, achievable, moderate risk
material solution option based on the current state of technology in
the market. If the results of the voluntary flight demonstration(s)
determine that a materiel solution option that delivers greater
capability is not affordable, then the Army will consider pursuing a
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) of the Kiowa Warrior fleet.
Affordability will be a major factor in the capabilities determination
decision at the end of the market research effort.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we
heard about what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE). I would like to hear more about what the Army and
other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing
operation. I've been briefed by a constituent that is developing a tool
that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, and
aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of
landing zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning
is the initial step to reducing risk, would having the capability to
identify more favorable areas prior to actual execution that decrease
the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same context, would the
capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary
performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of
aircraft mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking
process and create greater situational awareness prior to crews
encountering these conditions?
General Robling. Landing Zone (LZ) selection during the mission
planning process is influenced by numerous factors. Intelligence
imagery analysts provide a list of LZs, the Ground Combat Element and
Air Combat Element (GCE/ACE) planners select the best zones to support
the mission, and Meteorology and Oceanographic (METOC) support provides
a forecast of the environmental conditions. While this planning
provides an accurate prediction of suitable LZ's, it does not account
for real-time changes in environmental conditions that can contribute
to DVE.
The calculation of power requirements are a critical part of
mission planning. During mission planning, power requirements are
determined by what type of approach/landing may be required, obstacles
surrounding the zone, zone constitution, wave off lanes, possible
threat, and environmental conditions.
In both instances, having a planning tool for DVE and power
management would contribute to safety and situational awareness. The
tools would compliment rotary wing requirements for an in-flight ``see-
through'' capability designed to mitigate the effects of a DVE
(brownout, white-out (snow), fog, rain, smoke, night, etc.).
Mrs. Roby. It is my understanding that the Navy has chosen to defer
funding for five MH-60R helicopters, cutting the longtime steady
procurement rate of 24 per year to 19 per year for FY13. In addition, I
understand the out-year procurement goes from 19 aircraft in FY14 to 38
aircraft in FY16. I can tell you that from a contractor perspective,
these wild swings in procurement rates are extremely difficult to
manage in terms of suppliers and workforce. While I understand it might
make sense for the Navy to do this from a budget perspective, was there
ever any thought to what it might do to the businesses, particularly
the small businesses, who might have to handle this as well as the
impact it will have on Navy's future budget?
Admiral Moran. Budgetary constraints and considerations drove the
reductions in MH-60R procurement totals in FY 2013 and 2014. The
Foreign Military Sale of 24 MH-60Rs to Australia in conjunction with
the Navy's MH-60R procurement schedule is working to level industry
production schedules. The increase in MH-60R procurement in FY 2016 is
designed to complete the program of record (POR) purchase on timeline
in order to support Fleet Squadrons' transitions, stand-ups, and
operations. The increase in FY 2016 procurement is tempered for
industry by an aircraft delivery schedule phased through the beginning
of FY 2019. The Navy expects the signing of the multiyear contracts to
procure the remaining MH-60R POR to realize considerable cost savings,
positively impacting future budgets.
Mrs. Roby. I understand that the Navy is within a few years of
ending production of both the MH-60S and MH-60R. I am also aware that
the Naval Aviation Requirements Group has identified a number of
Seahawk airframe upgrades that are currently not funded in the out-
years but are critical investments in the airframe as performance
requirements and weight grows on the aircraft. The MH-60S and MH-60R
have been in the Fleet since 2001 and 2006 respectively and are
expected to remain in service as critical Battle Group capability until
at least 2030. Investing in keeping them current and relevant is
important to future operational effectiveness and success. Could you
tell me what the Navy's plan is with regard to these key improvements
as well as others not yet identified?
Admiral Moran. The MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters are both
multimission helicopters with steadily increasing capabilities, which
tends to increase the gross weight of the airframe. As the helos become
heavier, their ability to perform in high/hot environments degrades.
There are often operational risk mitigators that can be implemented to
enable mission completion (reduce fuel loading, reduced ammunition,
reduced passengers), but sometimes there are not, and airframe upgrades
(engines and rotor blades) are the most effective way to maintain
acceptable performance margins in challenging environmental conditions
at high gross weights.
The MH-60 program office, PMA-299, has conducted non-recurring
engineering to develop incremental engine performance and reliability
upgrades that ``buy-back'' the critical performance margin. As the
aircraft continue to age, they will receive the necessary performance
upgrades to enable mission success.
Mrs. Roby. I am also curious on what would be different in FY16
that would allow the Navy to handle the procurement of 38 aircraft or,
will this number come down in next year's budget submit causing a break
in the Navy's portion of the multiyear contract? Would it not be easier
to go back to the steady-state of 24 aircraft per year?
Admiral Moran. In FY 2015 the combined purchase of MH-60R and MH-
60S totals 39 aircraft. In FY 2016, the first year following the
completion of MH-60S purchases, the Navy plans to procure 38 MH-60R
aircraft in order to sustain overall H-60 procurement rates and to
complete the program of record (POR) purchases on a timeline required
to support Fleet MH-60R Squadron transitions, stand-ups, and
operations. No change in procurement and POR numbers is planned which
would break the Navy's multiyear contracts. A return to a steady-state
procurement rate of 24 aircraft per year would not deliver MH-60R
aircraft at a rate able to support the current transition, stand-up,
and operations timeline.
Mrs. Roby. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we
heard about what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE). I would like to hear more about what the Army and
other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing
operation. I've been briefed by a constituent that is developing a tool
that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, and
aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of
landing zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning
is the initial step to reducing risk, would having the capability to
identify more favorable areas prior to actual execution that decrease
the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same context, would the
capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary
performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of
aircraft mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking
process and create greater situational awareness prior to crews
encountering these conditions?
Admiral Moran. The ability to identify more favorable landing areas
during mission planning would be beneficial; however, the majority of
navy helicopter operations are overwater. The USN and USMC are
investing in the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS) to provide more
efficient mission planning.
Mrs. Roby. It is my understanding that the Navy has chosen to defer
funding for five MH-60R helicopters, cutting the longtime steady
procurement rate of 24 per year to 19 per year for FY13. In addition, I
understand the out-year procurement goes from 19 aircraft in FY14 to 38
aircraft in FY16. I can tell you that from a contractor perspective,
these wild swings in procurement rates are extremely difficult to
manage in terms of suppliers and workforce. While I understand it might
make sense for the Navy to do this from a budget perspective, was there
ever any thought to what it might do to the businesses, particularly
the small businesses, who might have to handle this as well as the
impact it will have on Navy's future budget?
Mr. Gilpin. Budgetary constraints and considerations drove the
reductions in MH-60R procurement totals in FY 2013 and 2014. The
Foreign Military Sale of 24 MH-60Rs to Australia in conjunction with
the Navy's MH-60R procurement schedule is working to level industry
production schedules. The increase in MH-60R procurement in FY 2016 is
designed to complete the program of record (POR) purchase on timeline
in order to support Fleet Squadrons' transitions, stand-ups, and
operations. The increase in FY 2016 procurement is tempered for
industry by an aircraft delivery schedule phased through the beginning
of FY 2019. The Navy expects the signing of the multiyear contracts to
procure the remaining MH-60R POR to realize considerable cost savings,
positively impacting future budgets.
Mrs. Roby. I understand that the Navy is within a few years of
ending production of both the MH-60S and MH-60R. I am also aware that
the Naval Aviation Requirements Group has identified a number of
Seahawk airframe upgrades that are currently not funded in the out-
years but are critical investments in the airframe as performance
requirements and weight grows on the aircraft. The MH-60S and MH-60R
have been in the Fleet since 2001 and 2006 respectively and are
expected to remain in service as critical Battle Group capability until
at least 2030. Investing in keeping them current and relevant is
important to future operational effectiveness and success. Could you
tell me what the Navy's plan is with regard to these key improvements
as well as others not yet identified?
Mr. Gilpin. The MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters are both multimission
helicopters with steadily increasing capabilities, which tends to
increase the gross weight of the airframe. As the helos become heavier,
their ability to perform in high/hot environments degrades. There are
often operational risk mitigators that can be implemented to enable
mission completion (reduce fuel loading, reduced ammunition, reduced
passengers), but sometimes there are not, and airframe upgrades
(engines and rotor blades) are the most effective way to maintain
acceptable performance margins in challenging environmental conditions
at high gross weights.
The MH-60 program office, PMA-299, has conducted non-recurring
engineering to develop incremental engine performance and reliability
upgrades that ``buy-back'' the critical performance margin. As the
aircraft continue to age, they will receive the necessary performance
upgrades to enable mission success.
Mrs. Roby. I am also curious on what would be different in FY16
that would allow the Navy to handle the procurement of 38 aircraft or,
will this number come down in next year's budget submit causing a break
in the Navy's portion of the multiyear contract? Would it not be easier
to go back to the steady-state of 24 aircraft per year?
Mr. Gilpin. In FY 2015 the combined purchase of MH-60R and MH-60S
totals 39 aircraft. In FY 2016, the first year following the completion
of MH-60S purchases, the Navy plans to procure 38 MH-60R aircraft in
order to sustain overall H-60 procurement rates and to complete the
program of record (POR) purchases on a timeline required to support
Fleet MH-60R Squadron transitions, stand-ups, and operations. No change
in procurement and POR numbers is planned which would break the Navy's
multiyear contracts. A return to a steady-state procurement rate of 24
aircraft per year would not deliver MH-60R aircraft at a rate able to
support the current transition, stand-up, and operations timeline.
Mrs. Roby. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we
heard about what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE). I would like to hear more about what the Army and
other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing
operation. I've been briefed by a constituent that is developing a tool
that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, and
aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of
landing zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning
is the initial step to reducing risk, would having the capability to
identify more favorable areas prior to actual execution that decrease
the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same context, would the
capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary
performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of
aircraft mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking
process and create greater situational awareness prior to crews
encountering these conditions?
Mr. Gilpin. The ability to identify more favorable landing areas
during mission planning would be beneficial; however, the majority of
Navy helicopter operations are overwater. The USN and USMC are
investing in the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS) to provide more
efficient mission planning.
Mrs. Roby. What is the projected weight and cost impact of the Army
efforts to correct the ``operationally unsuitable'' (Army quote) H-60M
crashworthy troop seat? What are the Army's alternate plans if the seat
cannot be corrected within reasonable weight and cost thresholds
(relative to the existing acceptable seat used in the legacy H-60A/Ls)?
Why hasn't the Army actively evaluated other solutions through their
Continuous Technology Refreshment (CTR) program that may provide
significant reductions in weight and cost?
General Crosby. Planned improvements to the Troop seat include
contoured seat pan with pad, reduced side webbing to improve passenger
egress and ingress times, and changes to the attaching mounts to make
the seat easier to install. The targeted weight increase associated
with these changes is one pound or less per seat. The projected cost of
these changes has not been negotiated, but may add approximately $500
to the cost of each seat. We have every reason to believe that the
seats can be improved to the satisfaction of the user. If we get to a
point where the seat cannot meet user expectations, use of the legacy
seats or a new program start will be investigated. Note that the legacy
A-L seat was qualified to a lower G rating than the existing M model
seat. A Continuous Technology Refreshment program for hardware has only
recently been awarded. While weight and cost are important, they are
not the only requirements that must be evaluated when considering seat
designs for the H-60. The Program Management Office is not aware of an
existing seat design that better meets our current specification
requirements.
Mrs. Roby. Boeing recently down-selected several organizations'
seats for the Army's effort to implement crashworthy troop seating on
the H-47F. What are the weights and costs of these contenders? And, how
do they compare to the 10-pound threshold and $2,300 unit cost of a
seat being evaluated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense?
General Crosby. The notional crashworthy troop seat evaluated by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense was a representative seat
employed to support their analysis of potential passenger safety
improvements. The seat is not compatible with the current configuration
of the CH-47F Chinook. Boeing is conducting an evaluation of potential
candidate seats. They are early in the evaluation process and have not
yet presented their findings to the program office.
Mrs. Roby. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we
heard about what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE). I would like to hear more about what the Army and
other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing
operation. I've been briefed by a constituent that is developing a tool
that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, and
aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of
landing zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning
is the initial step to reducing risk, would having the capability to
identify more favorable areas prior to actual execution that decrease
the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same context, would the
capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary
performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of
aircraft mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking
process and create greater situational awareness prior to crews
encountering these conditions?
General Crosby. Currently, the Aviation Mission Planning System
(AMPS) is utilized by almost every aviation platform as a mission
planning and mission rehearsal tool prior to a flight. It uses maps and
other geo-referenced imagery and databases correlated with Digital
Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) data to depict terrain features and man-
made obstacles which optimize the planning process. AMPS software
additionally takes into account aircraft type and performance
attributes as well as forecasted environmental conditions to determine
expected performance characteristics for the proposed mission. AMPS
currently provides no tool that fuses all of this data together for the
express purpose of qualitatively assessing a helicopter landing zone
with respect to the potential for Degraded Visual Environment (DVE).
While a qualitative assessment of a landing zone based on accurate
and up-to-date data could be useful in determining if it is safe to
land a rotary-wing aircraft, such an assessment performed in a mission-
planning function would not necessarily decrease the impact of the DVE
problem due to two major issues: the age and accuracy of the data, and
the accuracy of Global Positioning System (GPS) systems. First, the age
of database terrain and environmental data may result in substantial
errors when relied upon during DVE, due to the fact that the terrain
itself may have changed, or buildings, vehicles, and other obstacles
may be in the landing zone. These changes would not appear in a
database that is not often updated. Additionally, the typical DTED
error is plus or minus 3.5 meters (m). Second, the relation of the
aircraft to the ground in a DVE is determined solely by GPS. The
accuracy of current military GPS systems is approximately plus or minus
6.5m. This could result in a total error of plus or minus 10m. While an
error of 10m might not seem significant, it is considerable for an
aircraft at low altitudes or transitioning to land. Mission planning
represents a snap shot in time, and the available information at the
time of planning may not represent the true nature of the landing
environment for a number of reasons. Mission planning is critical in
reducing risk, however, DVE is a real-time problem, and a pilot cannot
be expected to rely solely on planning products during low-altitude
operations in a DVE. The United States Army Program Executive Office
Aviation Report and Recommendations on Terrain Awareness Aspects of
Rotorcraft Mishaps in DVE speaks directly to these issues in section V
paragraph C. on page 47.
Mrs. Roby. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we
heard about what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE). I would like to hear more about what the Army and
other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing
operation. I've been briefed by a constituent that is developing a tool
that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, and
aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of
landing zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning
is the initial step to reducing risk, would having the capability to
identify more favorable areas prior to actual execution that decrease
the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same context, would the
capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary
performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of
aircraft mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking
process and create greater situational awareness prior to crews
encountering these conditions?
General Kane. Due to the dynamic nature of rotary-wing operations,
specifically time-sensitive Special Operations, Personnel Recovery and
Nuclear Support missions, aircrews land at unsurveyed and unimproved
landing zones where Degraded Visual Environment conditions may be
encountered. To mitigate this risk, the Air Force is pursuing several
Service and Joint efforts to improve the Degraded Visual Environment
and survivability for our vertical lift aircraft. Air Force efforts are
focused across the spectrum from pre-mission planning tools to
aircraft-specific systems that enable dynamic terminal area operations
to unplanned landing zones. For the HH-60G we are installing an
improved altitude hold and hover system and moving maps with digital
terrain and elevation data. Additionally, flight testing will start in
FY 14 for a 3D-Landing Zone technology that will ``see-through'' dust
during take-offs and landings. The CV-22 currently has a robust enroute
Degraded Visual Environment capability that includes digital terrain
maps, heads-up displays, forward looking infrared (FLIR), automatic
flight control approach, hover system, and a terrain following radar.
Both the HH-60G and CV-22 have on board integrated systems that allow
aircrew members to compute real-time power management calculations that
incorporate aircraft performance parameters prior to take-off and
landing. These systems allow aircrew to reconfirm and or update pre-
mission data. For the UH-1N we are planning a commercial-off-the-shelf
terrain warning system.
A robust and thorough mission planning system, landing zone
assessments and real-time mission management, coupled with Service and
Joint collaboration, has significantly improved mission effectiveness
and aircrew situational awareness.
Mrs. Roby. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we
heard about what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE). I would like to hear more about what the Army and
other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing
operation. I've been briefed by a constituent that is developing a tool
that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, and
aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of
landing zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning
is the initial step to reducing risk, would having the capability to
identify more favorable areas prior to actual execution that decrease
the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same context, would the
capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary
performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of
aircraft mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking
process and create greater situational awareness prior to crews
encountering these conditions?
General Jones. Due to the dynamic nature of rotary-wing operations,
specifically time-sensitive Special Operations, Personnel Recovery and
Nuclear Support missions, aircrews land at unsurveyed and unimproved
landing zones where Degraded Visual Environment conditions may be
encountered. To mitigate this risk, the Air Force is pursuing several
Service and Joint efforts to improve the Degraded Visual Environment
and survivability for our vertical lift aircraft. Air Force efforts are
focused across the spectrum from pre-mission planning tools to
aircraft-specific systems that enable dynamic terminal area operations
to unplanned landing zones. For the HH-60G we are installing an
improved altitude hold and hover system and moving maps with digital
terrain and elevation data. Additionally, flight testing will start in
FY 14 for a 3D-Landing Zone technology that will ``see-through'' dust
during take-offs and landings. The CV-22 currently has a robust enroute
Degraded Visual Environment capability that includes digital terrain
maps, heads-up displays, forward looking infrared (FLIR), automatic
flight control approach, hover system, and a terrain following radar.
Both the HH-60G and CV-22 have on board integrated systems that allow
aircrew members to compute real-time power management calculations that
incorporate aircraft performance parameters prior to take-off and
landing. These systems allow aircrew to reconfirm and or update pre-
mission data. For the UH-1N we are planning a commercial-off-the-shelf
terrain warning system.
A robust and thorough mission planning system, landing zone
assessments and real-time mission management, coupled with Service and
Joint collaboration, has significantly improved mission effectiveness
and aircrew situational awareness.
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