[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-119]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION
PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 20, 2012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama BILL OWENS, New York
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio JACKIE SPEIER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 20, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 Navy, Marine Corps and
Air Force Tactical Aviation Programs........................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 20, 2012.......................................... 23
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION
PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 2
WITNESSES
Holmes, Maj Gen James M., USAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force; and Maj
Gen John D. Posner, USAF, Director of Global Power Programs,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition.................................................... 19
Kendall, Hon. Frank, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Office of the Secretary
of Defense..................................................... 5
Skinner, VADM W. Mark, USN, Principal Military Deputy Director to
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition), U.S. Navy; LtGen Terry G. Robling, USMC, Deputy
Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps;
and RADM Kenneth E. Floyd, USN, Director of the Air Warfare
Division, U.S. Navy............................................ 17
Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 10
Van Buren, David M., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force................................ 7
Venlet, VADM David J., Program Executive Officer for the F-35
Lightning II Program, U.S. Department of Defense............... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G...................................... 27
Holmes, Maj Gen James M., joint with Maj Gen John D. Posner.. 112
Kendall, Hon. Frank, joint with David M. Van Buren and VADM
David J. Venlet............................................ 33
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 29
Skinner, VADM W. Mark, joint with LtGen Terry G. Robling and
RADM Kenneth E. Floyd...................................... 76
Sullivan, Michael J.......................................... 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Attachment 1: Prior GAO Reports and DOD Responses............ 131
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Turner................................................... 135
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 139
Mr. Critz.................................................... 179
Mr. Jones.................................................... 171
Mr. LoBiondo................................................. 176
Mr. Turner................................................... 177
Mr. Wilson................................................... 176
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 20, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:27 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Bartlett. Good afternoon. Our hearing will come to
order. The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force budget request for tactical
aircraft programs for fiscal year 2013.
We have a number of issues to cover today, but my opening
remarks will focus on the F-35 program. The F-35 program is
what has been called the centerpiece of DOD's [Department of
Defense] long-term tactical aircraft planned force structure,
with a major commitment of the Department's projected budget
dedicated to F-35 acquisition and operations.
To date, significant technology and manufacturing
capabilities have been demonstrated. Yet, after having already
made a major commitment of resources to the program, progress
in the development and early procurement of the F-35 has fallen
significantly short of expectations.
Since the beginning of the final phase of development in
2001, the projected cost of the total research and development
and procurement program has grown from $233 billion to nearly
$400 billion. Compared to the currently approved baseline,
full-rate production had been delayed 5 years.
The committee has supported, and continues to support, the
F-35 program because of the high priority placed on the program
by the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, and the recognition
that a fifth-generation fighter is required to operate and
achieve the effects necessary in the projected future threat
environments.
However, early on in the F-35 program the committee had
concerns with the acquisition strategy. In 2005, we disapproved
the Department's request for the first procurement funds for F-
35s, citing the request as premature, given the maturity of the
development program. Each year, we have continued to express
concerns regarding rushing into procurement too soon and
planning an aggressive increase in annual production before
required technology was demonstrated, design stability was
achieved, and flight testing was complete.
Unfortunately, the committee's and others' concerns
regarding the program were well justified. As the Government
Accountability Office reports, because of delays in research
and development, and flight testing, the Department of
Defense's projected request for procurement of F-35 aircraft
through 2017 have been reduced by approximately 75 percent
compared to the original schedule when the program began in
2001.
Compared to last year, the Department has removed
procurement of 179 F-35 aircraft from its budget plan for
fiscal years 2013 to 2017. Expectations for the F-35 program
remain very high. There has been a significant commitment of
this Nation's resources to the F-35 program, with major
financial commitments required in the future.
Much of the promised capability of the F-35 has yet to be
demonstrated and, consequently, the future performance of the
F-35 acquisition program remains of major concern. Our
witnesses have an extraordinary challenge and responsibility in
the execution of the F-35 program, and we appreciate their
personal commitment--professional commitment to the task.
Before we begin, let me call on the ranking member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Reyes, for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, welcome
this afternoon to this very important hearing.
Today's hearing on Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
tactical aviation programs will focus on some, as the chairman
just articulated, very challenging issues. First among these
issues is how to keep the F-35 program on track, while we also
modernize the rest of our tactical aviation fleet.
However, I think that keeping the big picture in
perspective is also important. Despite the recent round of
proposed reductions, it appears to me that the United States
will remain the world's undisputed leader in military aircraft
capability for many years to come. We retain that lead not just
because of the aircraft that DOD buys, but also because of the
decades of knowledge our aviation industrial base has with
respect to building sensors, advanced weapons, stealth
capability and other aircraft features that other nations can
only hope to some day have available.
We also retain this lead because of the quality of our
personnel, both in the air and also on the ground. A final
reason we remain the preeminent military aviation power is the
quality of our training, the quality of which is far beyond
anything other nations even try to achieve. Simply put, we hold
ourselves--as I think we should--to a very, very high standard.
As a result, the challenges that we face in producing,
manning and maintaining combat aviation capability must be put
in the proper context. Overall, although I have some
reservations about a few proposals, I believe that the budget
request before the subcommittee will allow the United States to
maintain its current dominance in the air for the foreseeable
future.
With respect to the topic of the first panel of witnesses
here before us, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, I think it is
important to keep a few critical issues in mind as Congress
considers a way forward. For any major program, there is a
constant balance to be struck between the urgency of the need
for that program, the technical risks of the program and also,
of course, the cost of the program.
For the F-35, I think the need for the program is
absolutely clear. The aircraft that we build in the next 10
years will be fighting the wars of the future. We have to think
about the long term. Given the likely dispersion of various
antiaircraft systems over the upcoming decades, it seems clear
to me that unless the United States maintains its edge in
stealth and other technologies that we simply won't be able to
project power, to deter aggression, and protect allies in the
future.
In short, to deter future enemies and win the wars of the
future we need a large number of fifth-generation fighter
aircraft, and the F-35 is the only program that we have to
accomplish this goal. The second and third issues--technical
risk and cost--can be summed up in the much talked about issue
of concurrency, which refers to the simultaneous large-scale
production and flight testing of the F-35 aircraft.
While many Members are frustrated with the added costs of
this approach to production and testing, it is important to
point out that many of the decisions that led DOD to the
current situation were made more than a decade ago. And
significantly, over many years these decisions were, to a large
degree, underwritten and endorsed by Congress.
In my view, these decisions cannot now be undone without
fundamentally breaking the program. However, much can be done
to put the program on a better path. DOD has already cut back
production of the F-35 dramatically in an effort to reduce the
concurrency many Members here are worried about. Of course,
this is also a limit to how far that F-35 production can be
reduced before the program's production effort begins to
unravel.
DOD's current plan appears to be a good compromise between
reducing concurrency and keeping production at a viable rate.
While I would like to see higher production rates, I think that
this plan is a responsible one and I intend to support it.
However, while I support the need for the program, and
DOD's concurrent effort to fix the problems that it is
encountering, I do not believe the F-35 program deserves what
is commonly referred to as a blank check. This program has
changed dramatically. As an example, it is important to
remember that according to the original schedule for the F-35
we should be procuring 200 F-35s in fiscal year 2012, but
instead we are procuring just 29.
The program also faces significant challenges in terms of
meeting critical technology requirements, keeping software
development on time and on schedule, and reducing production
costs. Overall, costs must be reduced, development must stay on
schedule, and the government and the contractor must work
together in a constructive manner in order to keep the program
on track.
For the many other programs we will cover in today's
hearing, after reviewing the budget proposals I think the
aviation programs for the Navy and Marine Corps are in
relatively good shape. The Marines are on track to continue V-
22 production at slightly lower rates, and continue upgrades to
Harriers and F-18s, while also continuing to invest in the
future, with various unmanned aircraft R&D [research and
development] efforts.
The Navy's aviation portfolio also appears healthy, with
fighter aircraft, helicopter and UAS [unmanned aerial systems]
development and production remaining on track, when compared to
last year. The Air Force, on the other hand, has proposed some
changes that I am not yet fully convinced are in the Nation's
best interest.
Chief among those changes is the decision to mothball a
practically new, brand-new, fleet of Global Hawk Block 30
aircraft, each of which was procured at a cost in excess of
$100 million. Just a few months ago, Congress was told that the
Global Hawk Block 30 was a program critical to protecting our
Nation, and that they were no--that there were no alternatives
to achieve its requirements at a lower cost.
We are now being told precisely the opposite, largely based
on just a few changes to operational requirements which appear
to be on shaky ground in terms of real-world needs. A change
this dramatic, in such a short time, suggests a purely budget-
driven decision rather than one that reflects the appropriate
balance of budget reality and operational requirements.
Regardless of how the decision was reached, in my view no
matter what the future holds, we will need more intelligence
gathering capability and not less. If the United States does
not reduce its forces in Afghanistan it will need even more ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability to
hunt for terrorists and deter potential enemies, and give our
combat commanders the intelligence they need to properly advise
the Commander in Chief. Given this high demand for ISR assets,
I think a more gradual approach to the Global Hawk program may
be required.
So I look forward to today's testimony to seek further
information on this and many other issues. And with that, Mr.
Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing, and I yield back
my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. We have two panels of witnesses
this afternoon. The first panel will provide testimony on the
F-35 program. The second panel will include Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force acquisition and requirements officials to provide
testimony on their respective tactical aircraft programs. We
welcome our witnesses today.
We have an administrative challenge in our hearing today.
We just finished a series of votes. In a little more than an
hour we expect them to call another series of votes. That will
be the last series of votes. It will last for roughly an hour.
And after that, there is an off-the-Hill event that will take
at least half of the members away from our committee.
So we will--without objection, your written testimony, of
course, is a part of the permanent record. We will proceed with
your oral testimony. We will abbreviate our questions and, with
your permission, we will give you questions for the record
because there are questions which we must have answered in our
oversight responsibility.
We will submit those for the record, and then we will
proceed with the second panel so that we can get their
testimony on the record and some abbreviated questions before
the expected votes in a little more than an hour.
Panel one, the Honorable Frank Kendall, Acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics;
Mr. David M. Van Buren, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition; Vice Admiral David Venlet, a Program
Executive Officer for the F-35 aircraft program; and Mr.
Michael J. Sullivan, Director of Acquisition Sourcing and
Government Accountability Office.
Gentlemen, you may proceed. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS, OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Kendall. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes,
members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity for
the Department to testify today on the Joint Strike Fighter
program. I am Frank Kendall, Acting Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
With me, of course, are Mr. David Van Buren, as you
mentioned the Air Force acquisition executive, who currently
serves as the acquisition executive for the Joint Strike
Fighter program; and Vice Admiral David Venlet, the Program
Executive Officer for Joint Strike Fighter.
I would like to mention that next week Dave Van Buren will
depart the Department of the Air Force after 4 years of
incredibly valuable service in the Air Force's acquisition
leadership. We in the Department are tremendously thankful for
the contributions Dave has made across the board in
strengthening Air Force acquisition, by bringing strong
professional technical management and business skills and
acumen to everything that he does.
Dave will be greatly missed, and the Department and I are
very thankful for his service to the Nation. Vice Admiral
Venlet came on board to run the Joint Strike Fighter program
early in 2010, and we are also deeply grateful for his
leadership on this program.
The Joint Strike Fighter is the centerpiece of our future
tactical aviation capability, and a key to implementing our
recently published strategic guidance. Last fall, the
Department engaged in a strategy and budget review in which
everything, and I do mean everything, was on the table. After a
careful look at the Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] program, the
Department determined that we do need the JSF, that we need all
three variants of the fighter, and that we need the planned
inventory of 2,443 jets.
It is essential for the Department to deliver a program
that both meets these needs and is also affordable. 2011 was a
year of strong progress in the Joint Strike Fighter test
program. The program made continued progress in technical and
production maturity. However, you must recognize that there is
still a long way to go for JSF.
The flight test program is approximately 20 percent
complete, and many of the more challenging elements of flight
test are still ahead of us. Our focus is reflected in the
written testimony. It is on managing risk and controlling
program production and sustainment costs. The JSF program is
undergoing the critical transition from development to
production.
Historically, this is always a difficult phase for any
program, but particularly so for a high-performance aircraft.
The JSF, however, has been more difficult because the program
began production very early, as was mentioned when we discussed
concurrency, well before flight testing had begun.
This decision resulted in an unprecedented level of
concurrency, which has subsequently driven the need for
significant changes in the program. With this year's budget, I
believe we are now set on a course for program stability. The
JSF program is now operating on a baseline that does account
for the risk of additional design changes.
The technical baseline review has given us a devolvement
program that is realistic and includes margin to deal with
unknown issues that may, and are likely to, arise. The
production adjustments in the fiscal year 2013 budget give us a
procurement profile that balances production efficiency to
concurrency risk and delays production ramp-up until testing is
more complete.
The decision to adopt this profile was based, in part, on a
quick-look review, which I commissioned last fall, and looked
in detail at the concurrency risk in the program and the
knowledge points that we need to achieve to retire that risk.
Another step we are taking to manage that risk is that for
production lots 6 and 7 we have developed a contracting
approach that allows us to make event-based production
commitments.
Our contracting strategy also provides strong incentives
for Lockheed to accelerate the incorporation of concurrency
changes and retire concurrency risks as soon as possible, by
ensuring that they share in concurrency costs starting in the
fifth production lot. David Van Buren will go into more detail
on our contracting approach in his statement.
In 2012, we are continuing to increase our focus on
sustainment costs, which will ultimately be the largest element
of cost in the program. The program office, my staff, and the
services began to tackle this issue over the last year,
carrying out an initial review of the O&S, operation and
support, costs. This effort focused on flying hours, repair
parts, manpower and depot-level repairable items and
consumables.
The Air Force is also currently reevaluating its basing
plans for F-35, another significant cost driver. This year, we
will complete the business case analysis for sustainment, and
take additional action to reduce costs. We will continue to
attack Joint Strike Fighter operations and support costs
throughout the program's full life cycle.
Let me close by saying that I appreciate the work this
subcommittee has done in providing oversight to the Joint
Strike Fighter program. We deeply appreciate the support you
give to the men and women of the armed services and to the
Department generally day in and day out.
With your permission, I would like to ask Mr. Van Buren to
briefly discuss our contracting strategy, and Admiral Venlet to
discuss the status of the development and production elements
of the program.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Kendall, Mr. Van
Buren, and Admiral Venlet can be found in the Appendix on page
33.]
STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE
Mr. Van Buren. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reyes, members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address this
committee again regarding the F-35. Mr. Chairman, I would also
like to thank you for your leadership in support of small
business forums in which I was privileged to participate while
I was in my position.
Events such as these are vital for our national economy. I
would like to echo Mr. Kendall's comments regarding the
importance of the F-35 program. Having been the F-35
acquisition executive since 2009, I believe the Department has
taken numerous proactive steps in the management of the
program.
These modified business strategies over this time period
include the following: number one, a complete restructure of
the remaining development fee to be paid only when on-schedule
accomplishment by the industry team is accomplished; number
two, a change from a cost-plus incentive fee to a fixed-price
incentive fee in LRIP [low-rate initial production] contract
number four, which was 2 years earlier than had been planned.
That new contract structure included a 50-50 share line and
a tight, 120 percent ceiling. Number three, in December of last
year contracts for Lot 5 were initiated via undefinitized
contract actions, or UCAs, which will be definitized as fixed-
price incentive fee contracts.
In addition, the government's cost risk is being mitigated
by transferring some responsibility for concurrency cost risk
to the prime contractor for the first time. Number four, the
Department's Director of Defense Pricing led an LRIP-5 should-
cost review of the contractor's submitted proposal. This effort
has proved essential in informing Lot 5 negotiations.
We hope to definitize this contract in the first half of
the year. Five, the Department is implementing an event-based
contracting strategy for LRIP Lot 6 and 5 that buys aircraft
production quantities based upon development and test progress.
First, we will award 25 aircraft in Lot 6 out of 31 authorized
and appropriated in fiscal year 2012.
Second, we will provide a means to procure anywhere from
zero to six of the remaining fiscal year 2012 funded Lot 6
aircraft, concurrent with the Lot 7 contract award in 2013. We
will link the total aircraft quantity ultimately procured in
Lot 6 to Lockheed's development performance and concurrency
cost risk reduction efforts.
Number six, the initial Lot 6 contract award for 25
aircraft will require a UCA to ensure that the production flow
is not disrupted. However, the Department does not intend to
award the Lot 6 UCA for 25 aircraft until essential agreement
is reached for Lot 5. The Department intends to award the
remaining Lot 6 variable quantity aircraft, as well as Lot 7
aircraft, through fully definitized contract actions in fiscal
year 2013.
It is important that the industrial team demonstrate
performance and help us to further confidence in the execution
and affordability of the program. From my perspective,
affordability for both production and sustainment of the F-35
has our greatest attention to ensure that the warfighters have
a force structure that meets operational needs.
Thank you, and I will look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren, Mr.
Kendall, and Admiral Venlet can be found in the Appendix on
page 33.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Admiral Venlet.
STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID J. VENLET, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER
FOR THE F-35 LIGHTNING II PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Venlet. Thank you, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking
Member Reyes, and members of the committee for inviting me to
appear before you today on the F-35. It is my great honor to
serve as the program executive officer with an outstanding Air
Force, Navy, Marine, and international program team and
supported by the world's best technical knowledge workforce
found in the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center at Dayton,
Ohio, and Naval Air Systems Command at Patuxent River,
Maryland.
That support, integrated into the daily actions of the
joint program office team, made it possible to create the
adjusted, realistic program plan and is critical to future
dependable program performance. The performance of the F-35
industry team for the Department of Defense and our allies in
engineering and testing fundamentals, in business fundamentals,
and in sustainment will be successful to the degree our
government technical knowledge workforce remains intimately
involved in the program every step of the way.
I carry within me an understanding that what people believe
about the F-35 is affected, and depends in some measure, upon
what I believe and what I transparently communicate about the
program. So let me begin with what I believe about the F-35.
I believe the F-35 is a critical presence in the combined
force battlespace. It makes many other systems and capabilities
and effects better because of the presence of the F-35 sensors.
It is a critical presence in many nations as a powerful
combined force capability to act and protect like-minded
nations that want their people to live safe from aggression in
freedom and opportunity.
I believe the F-35 is a bond of joint strength across all
our services. It is a bond of capability and a bond
economically across many nations that raises the level of
technology benefit in our militaries and our industries. I
believe the F-35 is an assurance of powerful effectiveness, it
is an assurance of immediate powerful effectiveness as soon as
it is initially fielded, and it is the best possible growth
platform to incorporate future advances in weapons sensors and
networks for the next decades ahead.
It is an assurance for the men and women in all our
services, and those we are still raising who will volunteer to
serve something greater than themselves that they will succeed
in every mission and return home safely to their loved ones.
With that context, it is less what keeps me awake at night and
more what makes me eager to be at work every day.
The F-35 has schedule and budget realism now, going
forward. It is transparent in the discovery and correction of
issues arising in tests that are typical in all fighter
aircraft development. The service systems commands are closely
involved and contributing to the correction of issues in view
now and that will arise in remaining tests.
That creates confidence in delivering required capabilities
suitable and effective from the sea and around the world. There
is data and demonstrated performance in hand that gives
confidence the F-35 basic design is sound and has clear
potential to deliver the capability we expect. There is a lot
of tests ahead.
Integrating the systems and sensors and expanding the
envelope will bring discovery that sound systems engineering
will solve. There has been very good engine and airframe
contractor responsiveness and progress in many areas since we
appeared before your committee last year. STOVL [short take-
off/vertical landing] flight tests met plans and expectations,
and completed a highly successful initial sea trial aboard USS
[United States Ship] Wasp.
In addition to the impressive stability, control and
performance of the STOVL in slow flight and vertical landing,
the F-35 has flown to its maximum speed and hardest turn
limits. It is a testimony to the very effective and impressive
marriage of engine and airframe.
Three leading program issues occupy my focus for 2012.
Technical and cost issues and challenges all certainly exist;
all are being worked. I mention here what are the critical and
significant few that, if successfully advanced, will bring
beneficial tailwind for the entire program and genuine value
for the Department and our partner nations.
First, software development and performance, and its
dependable delivery of capability. Second, concurrency-changing
corporation improvement and delivery of affordable full service
life jets. Third, production quality, and its ultimate result
on affordable price for the U.S. and our allies.
All three have a common fundamental that will advance the
external result and performance, and keep reality clearly in
view. Systems engineering-based, close-loop analysis and
corrective action will be required in steady and committed
execution throughout the industry team, primes and suppliers.
Rigorous management control by the joint program office,
supported by the service systems commands, will be applied with
a development dial-in production, reality and database
negotiations and focus on affordable delivered capability,
which is our only meaningful external result.
Presently, in the program, performance is all that matters.
I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Venlet, Mr.
Kendall, and Mr. Van Buren can be found in the Appendix on page
33.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
And now Mr. Sullivan from the Government Accountability
Office. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Sullivan. Good afternoon, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking
Member Reyes, members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to
be here today to discuss the status of the F-35 acquisition.
Everyone is aware of the past history of the program. The
chairman related additional costs and schedule growth on this
program since its inception. Seventy percent cost growth since
2001, a full-rate production date that has been delayed by
about 6 years. The program has been beset with problems as a
result of concurrent development, testing and procurement.
Rather than dwell on how we got here for this statement, I
would like to make a few points about what we believe the road
looks like moving forward. The Department has taken positive
steps to restructure the program over the past few years, and
we believe the new strategy has reduced risk from the effects
of concurrency by reducing the number of aircraft that we will
buy while it is still testing.
The original strategy would have had almost 1,600 aircraft
on contract by the end of flight testing in 2017. The new
strategy has reduced that number to 365. While this delays
capability to the warfighter, it also reduces the risk of
incurring additional modification and retrofit cost to the
aircraft and to the taxpayer.
In addition, the revamped test program has gained much
momentum in the past year, and has now completed about 20
percent of its flight testing. While we are encouraged by these
signs of momentum, plenty of risk remains as the program moves
forward with concurrent testing and production.
We have identified five areas of concern that we believe
are most important at this point. First, software development
is behind schedule. The software complexity on this program has
no rival. The lines of code now needed to achieve full
capability is estimated at $24 million, three times that of the
F-22 Raptor. And delivery of the final block of software--that
which gives the aircraft most of its advanced capabilities--is
still very much at risk.
Second, engineering changes from flight testing continue to
be abnormally high for this point in production, which
continues to put pressure on both development and procurement
costs. The program will not know the true cost to produce the
F-35 until these changes tail off and the manufacturing
processes can stabilize.
Third, funding assumptions for the program now average
about $13 billion per year for the next 23 years. This, during
a time of extreme budgetary pressure. Fourth, mission system
development is only about 4 percent validated at this point,
and two critical systems--the helmet-mounted display and the
logistic known as ALIS [Autonomic Logistics Information
System]--are continuing to be problematic for the program.
And fifth, the supplier base for the F-35 is large, global,
and complex. It will continue to challenge the program's
management capacity as production ramps up in the future. The
restructured program has already calculated the impacts of
concurrency on cost and schedule so far.
Cost overruns on the first four annual procurement
contracts now total more than $1 billion, $673 million of which
is the government's share. This adds about $11 million to the
price tag of each of the 63 aircraft purchased under those
contracts. In addition, the program now estimates the cost to
retrofit aircraft produced before the completion of flight
testing is about $373 million.
As I said earlier, this retrofit cost will grow as
information from flight testing creates additional engineering
changes that must be absorbed by a manufacturing process that
is struggling for stability. The planned completion of flight
testing is now set for 2017. This means four more years of
potential engineering changes.
So we believe the Department has improved the outlook for
the program to deliver aircraft more predictably in the past 2
years by adding time and money, and by reducing near-term
purchases of the aircraft. However, there are still significant
risks owing to the F-35's complexity, remaining concurrency
between testing and production, and its requirement for large
amounts of funds on an annual basis moving forward.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I look
forward to questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much for your statements.
As is my custom, I will reserve my questions until others
have had a chance to ask theirs, hoping they will have asked
the ones I would have asked.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a number of
questions that I want to include for the record, but I did want
to start maybe with a question to Mr. Sullivan. You know, given
the complexity of the technologies incorporated into the F-35
program, would it be reasonable for anyone to think that this
program could conceivably have a normal testing period?
And specifically, what are the chances that it won't be
completed by 2017, as you just testified to?
Mr. Sullivan. I think, given the complexity of the
technologies they are trying to bring together, I would say
that probably the program has been through most of the--the
real tough discovery in terms of technologies that they have
had to integrate. So as I said in my statement, past history
has been tough on this program.
I probably am a little optimistic that they have been
through an awful lot of that. And I would focus most of the
problem now on software. I think software--the development of
the software that they need to make this aircraft fully combat-
capable--is still as complex as anything on earth, I think it
is going to drive the test program. The test program still has
risk in it, as a result of that. The mission systems that are
laden with software, as well, are driving the test program. The
program has to stay on top of software and these mission
systems in order to make sure the test can complete in a timely
fashion.
It is still very risky, I think.
Mr. Reyes. From your viewpoint and your experience, is
there any kind of--or is there a way to compare this to past
programs, for instance the F-22 program? Did it ever, in terms
of comparison, have the same kinds of challenges and----
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, oh yes. I think there are comparisons
you could make to the F-22. I would say the F-22, in many ways,
was more complex than this program. I think this program
probably started with more mature technologies across the
board.
But again, I will go back to the software on this program
that I think is more complex than the F-22. And I think that
typically what happens on these big programs, like the F-22 and
the JSF, if this concurrency that you run into, you have
concurrent flight testing as you are trying to ramp up
production.
The manufacturing process just are never able to get stable
because there is so much information coming in from testing and
so many engineering changes that are going on. That, on this
program, is very similar to what took place on, for example,
the F-22.
Mr. Reyes. Of the five concerns that you raised, I was
mostly struck by the supplier base being large, global and
complex. Did you give those issues to us in rank order of
concern, or were they just five issues that you have----
Mr. Sullivan. They were--you know, I didn't think of it
quite--I would say that software is number one.
Mr. Reyes. Number one, right?
Mr. Sullivan. It is probably in some rank order there. I
would say that the supplier base is a concern, but maybe the
fifth one of those. Yes, it is a very complex global system.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Van Buren, in my district is Barksdale Air Force
Base, which is a long-range bomber. So I am going to take this
opportunity to ask you a couple of questions about that, if it
is okay. I am encouraged by the support in the fiscal year 2013
budget request to continue development of the long-range
bomber.
I want to help make the Department, make this program, a
success, and invite you to stay in touch, as we are very
interested in what is going on with that. In recent years, we
have heard a variety of thoughts from the Air Force on this
bomber. It may be manned, unmanned, or both; maybe nuclear-
maybe conventional-capable, or both.
And it will have penetrating capabilities for anti-access
environments. It may have a significant intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance capability. The Secretary of
Defense has mentioned figures of 80 to 100 aircraft, at a unit
cost of $550 million, with a target delivery for the mid-2020s.
He also mentioned the program would allow a streamlined
acquisition process. My question is, can you share with the
committee your level of confidence that a new bomber will be
designed in such a way to minimize risks and to avoid
requirements creep?
Mr. Van Buren. At this particular stage of the development,
the program is on track. As you well know, sir, many of the
details of the development activity are classified. What is not
classified is the overall funding level for the 5-year defense
plan is roughly $6.3 billion.
I have every confidence that the way we are proceeding on
this would not--taking on too much risk gives the program a
much higher probability of success in achieving the goals that
Secretary Gates wrote when he wrote that guidance in the
beginning of last calendar year.
So at this particular point, I would have to defer to
another venue for more details on the program. But I have
confidence in the way the program is being currently run.
Dr. Fleming. You know, 80 to 100 bombers, at $550 million.
That really sounds good. But, you know, in the past, with the
B-2 and other programs, we have had requirement creeps which is
sort of a pejorative, where we start in one direction and we
begin adding on more capabilities, or attempt to, and then the
costs go out of sight.
Do you have reassurance that that is not going to happen in
this case?
Mr. Van Buren. I believe the Department has been much more
proactive and disciplined with regard to requirements. As you
probably know, I worked on the B-2 for 9 years. I can say that
an evidence of that is with regard to the KC-46A tanker which,
since contract award a little bit more than a year ago, has had
zero contract changes due to requirements changes.
And so I feel good about where we are with the development
and the stability of our current design approach.
Dr. Fleming. And the number 80 to 100, do you agree with
that number?
Mr. Van Buren. That is the guidance from the Secretary, in
which we embarked on the program.
Dr. Fleming. Okay, well, again I would love to stay in
touch with your office on this. We want to monitor this.
Obviously, we have an aging B-52 fleet which is a wonderful
bomber, but it is being flown by the grandsons of the builders.
And someday it will have to be replaced. And even if we start
today, it will be another decade at least.
So we definitely want to keep helping this along to make
sure it stays on target.
Mr. Van Buren. Yes.
Dr. Fleming. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. As per committee rules, those
present at gavel fall are recognized in the order of their
seniority on the committee. Those arriving after gavel fall, in
their order of appearance in the committee.
Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few questions
for Assistant Secretary Van Buren. What major weapons systems
have you successfully procured over the last 10 years?
Mr. Van Buren. I have been in the position in the
government for 4 years. I would say the procurement of the
tanker, the development of the tanker, a success. I would say
the JASSM [Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile] missile is
running well now, after some production difficulties.
I would say that the Project Liberty aircraft, 37 aircraft,
were procured for the warfighter in a span of 22 months. Of the
Predator and Reaper, we currently have 120 Reaper aircraft in
high-rate production. Obviously, the MQ-1/MQ-9 fleets are
around the world doing ISR missions on a daily basis. Those
would be some.
Mr. Runyan. And how many of them have been at cost and on
time?
Mr. Van Buren. Project Liberty was certainly on time, even
at accelerated rate. The cost-effectiveness of MQ-1 and MQ-9, I
think, are very, very good. In fact, at certain times the
manufacturer has been producing aircraft ahead of schedule. The
production of the air vehicles are not a limiting factor.
And there have been others. BACN [Battlefield Airborne
Communications Node], a platform based on the Global Hawk Block
20, was a JUON [joint] urgent operational need, which went to
field in a span of approximately 8 months.
Mr. Runyan. So I just really asked those questions not only
for the Air Force, but many other branches also. That there is
a systemic procurement problem in the Department and throughout
each branches. And it is, frankly, not being addressed. We kind
of take it as this is how we are going to conduct business.
And at the end of the day, our responsibility and the
oversight that we have to the taxpayers is, I think many of us
feel, being ignored. As you said there, even being the on-cost
and on-time, that list is nowhere near the original procurement
list that you gave me.
And it is something that I know needs to be addressed, and
I just wanted to put that out there. Because it gets
frustrating, day in and day out.
I guess, Chairman, I am going to actually yield back so we
can move on. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Doctor Kendall, the Department of Defense, DOD, has been
the catalyst in the development of the unmanned aerial aircraft
system, UAS, and it's certainly its market. The volume of UAS
flights for commercial and governmental non-military
applications could equal those being flown by military
operations.
Future growth of the civilian UAS market is dependent on
the ability of non-military UAS proponents to operate their UAS
systems in the National Airspace System. As such, there is a
strong innovative growth market for testing, research and
development.
Inability to adhere to the FAA [Federal Aviation
Administration] regulatory requirements is the major problem
facing the military and commercial UAS sector in operating in
domestic U.S. space. More specifically, flight rule 14 requires
a sense-and-avoidance capability. Manned aircraft systems
operating with specified FAA-controlled--within FAA-specified
control areas, or with sense-and-avoid equipment, are able to
adhere to this rule.
Since UASs do not have pilots on board or collision and
avoidance technology, they are not currently able to adhere to
FAA rules. Congress has placed the requirement on FAA
administrator to develop plans to accelerate the integration of
unmanned aerial systems into the National Airspace System.
Currently, the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
budget request contains $34.6 million for sense-and-avoidance
development to further UAS operations in the National Airspace
System.
Dr. Kendall, do you believe that the FAA has articulated
and documented the sense-and-avoid technology requirements in
sufficient detail to allow the DOD to develop a solution that
will allow UAS operations in these new airspaces? In other
words, is the $34.6 million being spent on sense-and-avoid
technologies going toward the fulfillment of a documented FAA
requirement with a defined acceptable solution?
Given the current FAA safety of flight requirements, sense-
and-avoid requirements, and our technological capabilities, how
long do you think that it might take before we would be able to
integrate UAS into the National Airspace System, and do you
also similarly have concerns as to the coordination between DOD
and the FAA with respect to our National Airspace System and
UAS integration?
Thank you.
Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Congressman Turner. I am going to
have to take a lot of that for the record because I wasn't
prepared to testify on that today. But I can tell you that we
are aware of the statutory requirements and the Department is
working closely with the FAA to address the issues that you
described.
But I am going to have to get the details back to you for
the record, if that is all right.
Mr. Turner. That is fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 135.]
Mr. Bartlett. Mrs. Hartzler.
Voice. She is gone.
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, she is gone? Okay. She is back. Okay,
there you go.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry.
I appreciate the work that you are doing there. I know
everyone has been kind of frustrated with the development of
the F-35 and its hitches along the way. I just wanted to
clarify, when do you anticipate that they will be operational--
2017, is that----
Admiral Venlet. The IOCs [initial operational capability]
are not declared in our program baseline, but the production
will proceed to deliver a number of jets. The Block 2 initial
warfighting capability in our current plan is projected to be
released to the fleet for all three variants in 2015. And Block
3, in our schedule, will be released to the fleet in 2017.
There will be the detailed initial operational tests to go
on after that, but the production will produce a significant
number of aircraft with those capabilities in those years.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. What are the key issues in
deficiencies in the aircraft and engine manufacture that need
to be addressed in order to ramp up production?
Admiral Venlet. The principal benefit we are getting from
these years of level quantities that Mr. Sullivan spoke about,
I believe, are a base camp time that are going to bring the
benefit of getting that supplier base to perform dependably.
There is the need to get world-class quality aspects to emerge
in the aircraft production side.
It is doing much better in the engine side. I don't have
any concerns with the engine production or quality at this
point. And I don't have deep, long-term concerns, but it needs
to appear quicker on the aircraft side. And I believe this
range of level quantity in this--about 30 for these next couple
years--will help that.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. What are contractors and suppliers
doing to improve, and what time frame are we looking at?
Admiral Venlet. They are addressing the--particularly,
software is important to production. We need to produce
productionized, fleet-releasable software each year because we
are accepting production aircraft. So that adds a complexity to
the development.
You just don't work on your software for the test program.
You have to do it for production acceptance, as well. So that
is being worked on. The software also in the off-board system,
called ALIS that Mr. Sullivan mentioned, that is the ground
maintenance information system that is not present in any
aircraft system in the fleet today.
It is critical to F-35. Those would be the most important
things.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Mr. Sullivan mentioned that some of
the suppliers are global, and that kind of caught my attention.
What aspects of the F-35 are being supplied by foreign
companies?
Admiral Venlet. The most visible, when you look at the
aircraft, is the aft fuselage by BAE [British Aerospace
Industry] Systems. And there are smaller components--the
ejection seat, also, from Martin-Baker in the United Kingdom.
Turkey is contributing to center fuselage to Northrop Grumman.
Alenia in Italy is commencing early work on wings, just to name
a few of the more significant ones.
Mrs. Hartzler. What is the policy of our country towards
making sure that our suppliers are American-based?
Admiral Venlet. That is a very much important part of the
program. This program was conceived and initiated with eight
other partner countries at the outset. And there is not a work-
share. There is a concept of best value from the source of
supply to produce the end airplane.
So I do not speak to industry about sharing the work around
our partner countries. I speak to them on the basis of the best
price and the best quality, and leave that to them to deal
with.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
There are several additional questions that we need to ask.
In the interest of time, since there are going to be votes
fairly quickly, we will ask those questions for the record.
I just have one request. What we do here seems to fit
Albert Einstein's definition of insanity. I have been here
nearly 20 years now, and every program--essentially every
program--I have watched here has run over in both time and
dollars, sometimes monstrously.
I hope that when you are pursuing this program that you
will keep your records so that when we do a post mortem when it
is finished it will have a prescription so as how not to do
this in the future.
Thank you very much, and now we will take a brief recess
while we excuse you and we empanel our next set of witnesses.
Admiral Venlet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Recess.]
Mr. Bartlett. Our subcommittee will come to order again. We
will now have our second panel of witnesses. Vice Admiral Mark
Skinner, USN [United States Navy], Principal Military Deputy to
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development
and Acquisition.
Lieutenant General Terry Robling, Deputy Commandant of the
Marine Corps for Aviation; Rear Admiral Kenneth Floyd, Director
of the Air Warfare Division of the U.S. Navy; Major General
James Holmes, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff Operations,
Plans and Requirements; and Major General John Posner, Air
Force Director of Global Power Programs.
Without objection, all witnesses prepared statements will
be included in the hearing record.
And we will now begin the testimony with Admiral Skinner.
STATEMENT OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER, USN, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION), U.S. NAVY; LTGEN TERRY G.
ROBLING, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR
AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND RADM KENNETH E. FLOYD, USN,
DIRECTOR OF WARFARE INTEGRATION, U.S. NAVY
STATEMENT OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER
Admiral Skinner. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is our honor to
appear before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy's
tactical aviation procurement programs. Testifying with me
today are Lieutenant General Terry Robling, Deputy Commandant
for Marine Corps Aviation, and Rear Admiral Kenneth Floyd, the
Navy's Director of Warfare Integration.
With the permission of the committee, I will keep our oral
remarks brief. The fiscal requirement in the Budget Control Act
of 2011 required hard choices to be made. In response, the
Department of the Navy deferred procurement of F-35s, P-8s, E-
2Ds,
F/A-18Es-Fs and MV-22s, and terminated the MRMUAS [Medium Range
Maritime Unmanned Aerial System] program and JAGM [Joint Air-
to-Ground Missile] investment in this President's budget
request.
We are facing tremendous challenges--the budget reductions
necessitated by the Budget Control Act, and aging aircraft
inventory and significant threats. During these austere times,
we must persist in modernizing and recapitalizing our naval
aviation forces and increase our capability through force
multipliers such as Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
and using the should-cost/will-cost methodology to bring more
affordable systems to our warfighters.
Affordability will be our business focus over this FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program] so we can continue to deliver
capabilities and meet the warfighters' needs. With your
assistance, we are leveraging our buying power with successful
multi-year procurements on the F/A-18, B-22 and H-60. And
together, we are saving the taxpayers over $1.5 billion.
Last year, we embraced our past history as naval aviation
celebrated our centennial. This year, Marine Corps Aviation
will do the same. New history was also written this past year,
when we conducted the first F-35 shipboard operations very
successfully aboard the USS Wasp.
We deployed the first EA-18G Growler expeditionary squadron
to Iraq in November of last year, and then successfully
redeployed the squadron on short notice to support Operation
Odyssey Dawn. We commenced E-2D advanced Hawkeye initial
operational tests and evaluation, while the V-22 fleet reached
130,000 flight hours.
And we delivered the first P-8 Poseidon and the 500th Super
Hornet and Growler on cost and on schedule. The Naval Air
Systems Command hired 155 wounded warriors into the acquisition
workforce ranks. We also continued to actively manage our
TACAIR [Tactical Aviation] inventory.
The first Hornet will be inducted into SLEP [Shelf Life
Extension Program] late on this year, and both SLEP and future
aircraft procurements must continue on schedule to mitigate the
Strike Fighter shortfall with manageable risk through 2028. The
Navy will transition three Navy F-18 Charlie squadrons to F-18
Echo squadrons.
And the Marine Corps will reduce their force structure by
four squadrons and delay the retirement of the AV-8B until
2030. And this year, we will begin an analysis of the Super
Hornet's replacement, the F/A-XX, to ensure we have sufficient
and viable TACAIR forces beyond 2028.
Thank you, and we welcome your questions on the Department
of the Navy's Tactical Aviation Procurement programs.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Skinner, General
Robling and Admiral Floyd can be found in the Appendix on page
76.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. They have not supplied
us with the world's best microphones. If you will turn them on
and pull them closer it will be helpful.
General Robling.
General Robling. Sir, we are going to--that was a dual
statement for the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay.
General Holmes.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES M. HOLMES, USAF, ASSISTANT DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR
FORCE; AND MAJ GEN JOHN D. POSNER, USAF, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL
POWER PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE FOR ACQUISITION
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES M. HOLMES
General Holmes. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to provide an update on the Air Force's
tactical, remotely piloted, and intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance aviation programs.
I am joined this afternoon, as you said, by Major General
Posner, the Director of Global Power Programs for the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in Acquisitions.
Today, the Air Force is fully engaged in operations across the
globe, supporting combatant commander requirements while
maintaining our ability to defend the homeland.
Our airmen continue to excel on the battlefield with
exceptional results. As you are well aware, the Air Force made
cuts in response to both new strategic guidance and budget
reductions directed by the 2011 Budget Control Act. Although we
will become a smaller force, we are committed to maintaining
the agility, flexibility and readiness required to engage a
full range of contingencies and threats.
We continue to provide the joint force and its commanders
unparalleled support for strike and ISR through our weapons
system programs, and the phenomenal dedication and
professionalism of our total force airmen. Thank you for your
time and for your continued support of our Air Force and our
teammates in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps.
And we stand by for your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Holmes and General
Posner can be found in the Appendix on page 112.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much for your testimony.
For those who have not testified, thank you for your
preparation and your willingness to be here to answer our
questions. Again, as is my custom, I will reserve my questions
so others have had a chance to ask theirs.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen
for being here.
The budget request includes a plan to mothball the current
fleet of 14 Global Hawk Block 30s as well as the 4 Block 30s
that are still in production. With these aircraft procured at a
cost of more than $100 million each, this seems like an odd
decision.
As an aside, from the potential loss of ISR capability, it
is DOD decisions like this that reflect to people, including
Members of Congress, the waste of millions of dollars, and can
make it a challenge for Members who want to support more
defense spending. The committee understands that up until this
year the Air Force planned to operate both the Global Hawk
Block 30 and the U-2 through the end of fiscal year 2014.
My question, General Holmes, is--well, several questions.
One, why not continue with that plan, and defer a decision on
retiring the Global Hawk Block 30 fleet? Secondly, are there
other options beyond putting these brand-new $100 million
aircraft into storage? Has there ever been a precedent for
moving aircraft directly from TAC reproduction, literally from
the production line, into storage?
And how much would it cost for the Air Force to continue
Global Hawk Block 30 through fiscal year 2013 as it was
originally planned?
General Holmes. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. The decisions
that the Air Force made this year on force structure cuts, we
tried to balance the force structure, we tried to balance our
modernization accounts, our readiness accounts, and then take
care of our airmen through the personnel accounts.
Faced with a bill of about $50 billion over 5 years, we
believed we needed to save about $8.7 billion in force cuts.
And the cuts to the Global Hawk program account for more than
$2 billion of that $8.7 billion over the FYDP. We built systems
to meet the joint requirement as established by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC.
And in this case, the JROC adjusted that requirement. And
the requirement is set for sensor capability, for the distance
that you have to fly to a station, and for the number of caps.
The adjustment they made is classified, and we can come talk to
you in person in a smaller group and go through that in detail
at your convenience.
But under that new requirement, and under the pressure of
the fiscal guidance, we believe that it was more cost effective
to fly the U-2 and not fly both airplanes at the same time. And
that we can meet the JROC requirement with the U-2 through the
FYDP.
Mr. Reyes. So is there any precedent to this decision,
other than for budgetary issues?
General Holmes. Well, with a history degree, Congressman, I
think there have been times in our high times where we were
buying airplanes more than we needed and we sent them almost
directly into storage. I can't think of a recent precedent.
As we put the aircraft into storage, as you know there are
several classes of storage. And the aircraft that we are
retiring we have programmed to put them initially into Class
1000 storage, which means that they are returnable to action if
we need to reverse the decision.
We will make decisions about exactly how many of the
aircraft that are cut, then we will transition quickly into
other forms of storage. But we initially programmed to put them
into the storage class. It is the most easily reversible. And
the savings that we achieve over the FYDP by retiring the Block
30 Global Hawk are more than $2 billion worth.
Mr. Reyes. A little over $2 billion?
General Holmes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. I have got another question, but I will
wait for the second round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. Thank you very much.
We have almost 7 minutes remaining in the vote, so there is
time for questions from Mr. Critz. And then we may have to give
the rest of our questions to you for the record.
I want to apologize for the inconvenience. We do not
control votes from our level. Thank you all so much for your
attendance here and your preparation. And be sure that your
prepared testimony, your oral testimony, and your answers to
our questions, will be part of a record that will be pored over
by a number of people for a long time.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Holmes, the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile, AMRAAM, production. The AIM-120D missiles experienced
significant production delays. And from what I am told, it is
mostly due to rocket motor production. As a result, the budget
request for fiscal year 2013 and beyond has been substantially
reduced.
However, the capability the AIM-120D will bring to the Air
Force and Navy appears to be very important, given the air-to-
air threat. Can you give me an update, give us an update, on
the production? What steps are being taken to get production
back on schedule?
And then when will the Air Force and Navy have this weapon
in the field?
General Holmes. Thank you, Congressman. You are exactly
right that the AIM-120D is a very important requirement. And
from an operator's perspective, it is key to our ability to
operate in the anti-access and area denial threat that we
expect to face in the future.
With your permission, I am going to hand that question off
to General Posner.
Mr. Critz. Sure.
General Posner. Thank you, Congressman. With respect to
your question, you are exactly right. The AMRAAM has suffered
some production problems. These problems are specifically
related to the rocket motor. There has been a very aggressive
initiative on the part of the companies to try and solve that
particular problem.
I think it is important to note that the front end of the
missile, the guidance and navigation and all the electronics
continuing to be built, those production pieces are in storage
awaiting mating to the rocket motors when those problems in the
rocket motor are identified and solved.
Currently, we have 359 missiles versus the 552 that are on
contract. So we are about 193 behind. In that regard, the
contractor, Raytheon, has worked very, very diligently to come
up with several options to work solutions towards this
particular problem.
They have now provided a plan to recover. We are satisfied
with the plan, and we will monitor them closely to make sure
that the performance for the rocket motors matches the plan. We
hope to solve the problem with the rocket motors quickly.
It should be a fairly simple matter, once the rocket motors
are certified as operational, to get them mated to the front
ends. And we hope to see recovery to the production schedule
quickly.
Mr. Critz. Who makes the motors? It is not Raytheon, is it?
General Posner. No, sir. That is a subcontractor, ATK.
Mr. Critz. ATK.
General Posner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Critz. Thank you.
Well, considering our time allotment, Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Thank you very much. And let me
apologize again for the shortness of the time, and to thank you
for your preparation. We will have a number of questions for
the record in our oversight responsibility, and be assured that
we will be looking at those, and a number of others looking at
those, for a long time.
Thank you all so much for your preparation, your attendance
here. And we now stand in adjournment.
[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 20, 2012
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 20, 2012
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?
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 20, 2012
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.eps?
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 20, 2012
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Kendall. The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing
standards and safety case analyses to develop and field ground and
airborne unmanned aircraft system (UAS) sense-and-avoid technology. In
the short term, the Department is actively engaged with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve incrementally UAS access to
the National Airspace System (NAS) through changes to policy and
procedures. While the FAA has not articulated and documented sense-and-
avoid requirements, the Department, as a public agency, has the
authority and proven ability to self certify aircraft and systems for
safe operations. The sense-and-avoid funding in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 allows the Department to
continue its Sense and Avoid (SAA) standards and technology
development. The Department is sharing the results of its SAA standards
and technology development with the FAA and other public agencies so
that they can leverage our work while developing sense-and-avoid
technology requirements for the civil community.
The Department has made measured progress in increasing public UAS
access to the NAS through the UAS Executive Committee and changes to
the FAA's policies and Certification of Waiver or Authorization
processes. The Department is also working with the FAA on updating the
DOD-FAA UAS Memorandum of Agreement for Operations of UAS Systems in
the NAS to increase access for specific operations, particularly for
small UAS which make up the predominance of DOD UAS. DOD is also
currently working with the FAA through the UAS Aviation Rulemaking
Committee and the Next Generation Air Transportation System Joint
Planning and Development Office to develop the congressionally directed
FAA Civil/Public UAS NAS Integration Roadmap and Comprehensive Plan to
safely integrate civil UAS into the NAS. The roadmap and plan will
provide a timeline for the phased in approach to UAS integration into
the NAS. [See page 15.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 20, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. Just 7 months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified
in writing to the Congress that the Global Hawk system was ``essential
to national security,'' there was no other acceptable capability to
meet the requirement, and the Global Hawk was $220M cheaper per year to
operate than the U-2. Then the recommendation to terminate Block 30 is
a complete reversal of the USAF position just 7 months ago. Please
explain how an asset can be critical to national security and cost less
than the alternative, but just 7 months later be terminated?
Mr. Kendall. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220-million less expensive per year to
operate that the U-2. However, the DOD Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation office based this analysis on a high-altitude orbit 1,200
miles from the launch base. During the most recent analysis done in
support of the FY 2013 budget review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and
U-2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled
with the fact that the cost-per-flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is
roughly equivalent at $32 thousand per hour, per information contained
in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer
a cost advantage over the U-2 in the FY 2013 budget review.
After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that, in the context of all space-based and airborne Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, conventional high
altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further
determined the U-2, properly resourced, will remain viable until at
least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between the
RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their normal operating locations and
the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8-billion savings.
Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block
30, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2
through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of
$2.5 billion.
Mr. Bartlett. Global Hawk was the first intelligence asset to the
Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami Relief effort and first to Libya, and by
all accounts it performed very well. In both of these cases, the Global
Hawk was able to fly into areas too risky for manned aircraft (an
active Surface to Air Missile site in Libya and a nuclear environment
in Japan). How will the USAF compensate for losing this
transformational capability?
Mr. Kendall. The Air Force will continue to address the operational
needs of the Combatant Commands through the Global Force Management
Process. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council adjustment affirms
the modified high-altitude Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance requirement is sufficient to address most future
contingencies.
Mr. Bartlett. The Department's combatant commanders have an
insatiable need for ISR. Intelligence data is routinely the number one
unmet requirement. While budget pressures require tough choices, the
decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft out of the active
inventory seems short-sighted. I question the proposal to scrap
aircraft currently providing intelligence support to our warfighters,
including those purchased as recently as last year. Can you tell me why
it is necessary to take these assets out of commanders' hands and
instead send them to the desert to rust?
Mr. Kendall. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that, in the context of all space-based and airborne
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities,
conventional high altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air
Force further determined the U-2, properly resourced, will remain
viable until at least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national
security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced
force structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given that the U-2 meets the new requirement and the
significant reduction in the Department's budget. This drove the
decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8
billion savings, through the FYDP; $1.3 billion, however, was needed to
continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP, resulting in
a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5 billion. Finally, some of the $4
billion investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the Block
20 BACN and Block 40/Multi Platform Radar Technology Insertion
Programs, as well as NASA Block 10, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance,
and Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance programs.
A modified requirement where the U-2 is sufficient and a reduced
budget where the Department could no longer afford to keep investing in
RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 drove the retirement decision.
Mr. Bartlett. Congress has provided funds for 21 Global Hawk Block
30 aircraft at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of these
aircraft have been built and are flying operational missions. My
understanding is that this budget proposes to eliminate the funding for
future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these relatively new
aircraft in favor of a Cold War-era system. Can you explain why the DOD
is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these
aircraft that are currently providing valuable intelligence to the
warfighter?
Mr. Kendall. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that, in the context of all space-based and airborne
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities,
conventional high altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air
Force further determined the U-2, properly resourced, will remain
viable until at least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national
security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced
force structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the
decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8-
billion savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest
Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate
and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to
the taxpayer of $2.5 billion.
Furthermore, the decision to sustain the U-2 leverages $1.7 billion
that has been invested to modernize the weapon system. The U-2 f1eet in
its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours (2040 and
beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new engines in
1994-1998, the entire fleet has completed new power distribution
(wiring), 21st century glass cockpit and modern avionics processor
upgrades. The U-2s are currently on a 4000-hour programmed depot
maintenance cycle included in the budgeted operating costs.
Finally, some of the $4-billion investment made in Block 30s will
continue to benefit the Block 20 Battlefield Airborne Communication
Node and Block 40/Multi-Platform-Radar Technology Insertion Programs,
as well as NASA Block 10, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance, and Navy
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance programs.
Mr. Bartlett. A recent CSBA report said that eight manned aircraft
with otherwise identical characteristics to a Global Hawk would be
necessary to maintain the same orbit as three unmanned Global Hawks. If
this is the case, how can it be that you determined the manned aircraft
to be the most cost-efficient solution? How does the Global Hawk Block
30 compare to the U-2 on a cost-per-ISR-hour basis?
Mr. Kendall. The operating characteristics of the U-2 are not
identical to those of the Global Hawk, including operating altitudes,
sensor capabilities, stand-off ranges, and mission effectiveness. A
nominal RQ-4 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) is four aircraft, and a nominal U-
2 CAP is five aircraft.
The Global Hawk Block 30 has not matured to the point where a true
comparison of operational costs is possible. Nevertheless, the
Department conducted an analysis during the FY 2013 budget review using
data from previous Air Force and Department efforts. The Air Force
Total Ownership Cost database figures in FY 2011 show both the U-2 and
RQ-4 at $32 thousand per hour. The Air Force did not begin flying the
RQ-4 Block 30 until March 2011, so there is only 6 months of
representative flying hour information in the database. Also, the Air
Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with the signals intelligence
(SIGINT) sensor in 2011. The Air Force began flying with this payload
in April 2012, and updated costs including SIGINT are not currently
available.
Given comparable flying hour costs and the large investment
required for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30
program and save a net of $2.5 billion.
Mr. Bartlett. How have the Department's decisions to reduce Block
30 quantities while at the same time increasing requirements
(increasing the number of simultaneous sensors required) contributed to
the increased system cost of Global Hawk?
Mr. Kendall. The Air Force decision to terminate the Block 30
program was based upon a reduced requirement rather than an increased
requirement. The requirement for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft is
to simultaneously execute electro-optical/infrared, synthetic aperture
radar, limited moving target indicator, and signals intelligence
missions.
In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council
reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that,
in the context of all space-based and airborne Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, conventional high
altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further
determined the U-2, properly resourced, will remain viable until at
least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Continued investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given a
significant reduction in the Department's budget and an alternative
system, the U-2, is still operationally viable at considerably lower
total cost over the FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership
Cost data for U-2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per
operational hour (that is, the cost per hour executing missions) for
Global Hawk is lower than U-2. This seems to be a much more relevant
number than cost per flying hour. How does this square with your claim
that Global Hawk operating costs are higher?
Mr. Kendall. We have looked at costs per operational hour and still
find the Global Hawk Block 30 and U-2 roughly equivalent. More
importantly, the total cost of keeping the Global Hawk and continuing
the investment was more expensive than keeping the U-2. As a result,
the Department chose to save $2.5 billion across the Future Years
Defense Program in a reduced budget environment since the U-2 is
sufficient to meet the requirement and remains viable through 2040.
Mr. Bartlett. What is the cost comparison for operating U-2
compared to Global Hawk? What is the difference in the cost per mission
for each? How much of the U-2 fleet is available to perform all ISR
missions?
Mr. Kendall. The cost per flight hour is the same. The U-2 costs
$320 thousand per 10-hour multi-intelligence mission and the RQ-4 costs
$640 thousand per 20-hour single-intelligence mission. There are 27 U-2
``single seaters'' of which 3-5 are rotating through depot-level
maintenance, and two utilized as test birds (capable of flying missions
but not typically utilized for that purpose). Thus, there are typically
22 mission-capable U-2 aircraft at any given time.
Mr. Bartlett. If the U-2 is extended until 2025, and the system
that was slated to replace it is cancelled, what is your plan for
replacing the U-2? How much will it cost to modernize and maintain the
Cold War-era U-2 for another 15 years?
Mr. Kendall. There is no projected U-2 retirement date. The U-2
weapon system, properly resourced, remains viable until 2040 and meets
all sensor requirements currently tasked by the Combatant Commands. The
Air Force will invest approximately $60-80 million per year in
sustainment and enhancement modifications to ensure platform
modernization and maintenance.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand the Department's Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) performed a detailed cost analysis associated
with the decision to terminate and mothball the Global Hawk Block 30
program. Please share this analysis with the Congress so it can better
understand the analytical foundation of this decision. Provide a
detailed cost assessment including the basis of costs for both
sustainment and procurement through 2025.
Mr. Kendall. CAPE has provided their analysis, covering the time of
the Future Year Defense Program (FY 2013-FY 2017), to the House Armed
Services Committee during a previous briefing in March of this year.
This analysis is the most detailed and complete information available.
Mr. Bartlett. Given our alarming and unsustainable national debt,
American taxpayers expect and deserve that Congress will make the
difficult decisions to restore fiscal responsibility. However, these
decisions cannot be short-sighted or made at the expense of our long-
term budget or national security needs. Please detail how terminating a
new cutting-edge platform, Global Hawk Block 30, is less expensive than
extending the life of an aging platform, U-2, which will require
increased investments in coming years is a fiscally responsible
decision over the next decade.
Mr. Kendall. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that, in the context of all space based and airborne
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities,
conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air
Force further determined the U-2, properly resourced, will remain
viable until at least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national
security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced
force structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement and the significant
reduction in the Department's budget. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8-billion savings.
Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block
30, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2
through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of
$2.5 billion. Finally, some of the $4-billion investment made in Block
30s will continue to benefit the Block 20 Battlefield Airborne
Communication Node and Block 40/Multi-Platform-Radar Technology
Insertion Programs, as well as NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO Alliance
Ground Surveillance, and Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
programs.
Mr. Bartlett. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the
efficiency for every program. At a macro level it is clear that an
unmanned system can fly longer and further than a manned system. A
recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail how unmanned systems
feature one-third the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it
is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our
nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing
exceptionally well in theater for a five-decade-old manned system.
Mr. Kendall. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220-million less expensive per year to
operate than the U-2. However, the DOD Cost Assessment Program
Evaluation office based this analysis on a high-altitude orbit l,200
miles from the launch base. During the most recent analysis done in
support of the FY 2013 budget review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and
U-2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled
with the fact that the cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is
roughly equivalent at $32 thousand per hour, per information contained
in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer
a cost advantage over the U-2 in the FY 2013 budget review.
After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that, in the context of all space-based and airborne Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, conventional high
altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further
determined the U-2, properly resourced, will remain viable until at
least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30, was not
prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between the
RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their normal operating 1ocations and
the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8-billion savings.
Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block
30, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2
through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of
$2.5 billion.
Mr. Bartlett. Can you please provide us details on how the Global
Hawk has been used to support operations worldwide over the past year?
Please provide both classified and unclassified details of how Global
Hawk is being used
Mr. Kendall. In Libya, Global Hawk provided electro-optical,
infrared, and synthetic aperture radar data and was used in a
traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) role
with dynamic responsiveness due to its enhanced duration/dwell time and
the ability to fill gaps between other ISR collects. Overall, Global
Hawk was successful in Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and in its continued
support for Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Assessment details can be made
available at a higher classification.
In the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) theater, Global Hawk
continues to support the Combatant Command with both theater and
tactical ISR. To date, RQ-4 has flown more than 50,000 combat hours in
support of USCENTCOM operations.
In a humanitarian/disaster relief support role, Global Hawk
leveraged its range and endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following
the Haiti earthquake, Global Hawk executed a response mission in 12
hours, effectively providing initial situational awareness information,
highlighting earthquake damage and the status of critical
infrastructure, and identifying food/aid drop zones and indicators of
mass population migrations. Eight missions were flown, satisfying 2,621
targets.
In Japan, Global Hawk capitalized on its range and endurance to be
overhead in 21 hours. Imagery products were provided to the Secretary
of State within 40 minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure
damage assessment, supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of
evacuation support, Global Hawk collection focused on the Fukushima
nuclear power plant. Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, Japan
allowed the U.S. Pacific Command to use the Global Hawk within the 20-
kilometer nuclear engagement zone. Infrared imagery taken directly over
the top of the reactors allowed engineers to frequently monitor core
temperature levels. In 21 missions and 300 on-station hours, Global
Hawk collected more than 3,000 images.
Mr. Bartlett. The Department based its Global Hawk Block 30
divestment decision on it being more expensive to operate than the U-2.
Can you explain how the Department determined these costs?
Mr. Kendall. The Department of Defense conducted an analysis during
the FY 2013 budget review using data from previous Air Force and DOD
efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost database figures in FY 2011
show the U-2 at $32 thousand per hour and the RQ-4 also at $32 thousand
per hour. However, costs for the U-2 included signals intelligence
(SIGINT) sensors, but the Air Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with
its SIGINT sensors in 2011. The Air Force began flying Global Hawk
Block 30 with SIGINT sensors in April 2012. Data to determine long-term
flying hour costs for Global Hawk have not yet been collected. Given
comparable flying hour costs and the large investment required for the
RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and save a net
of $2.5 billion.
Mr. Bartlett. General Schwartz mentioned Operations and Support
costs are issue for the Global Hawk program. When the decision was made
to retire the U-2 a few years back, specific costs (base support,
infrastructure and indirect support) were allocated to Global Hawk. As
a result, these costs have inflated the Global Hawk cost per flight
hour while the U-2's cost per flight hour has decreased. Did the USAF
look at doing an apples-to-apples comparison of costs for both systems?
If not, why not?
Mr. Kendall. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducted an analysis
during the FY 2013 budget review using data from previous Air Force and
DOD efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost database figures in FY
2011 show the U-2 at $32 thousand per hour and the RQ-4 also at $32
thousand per hour. However, costs for the U-2 included signals
intelligence (SIGINT) sensors, but the Air Force did not fly the RQ-4
Block 30 with its SIGINT sensors in 2011. The Air Force began flying
Global Hawk Block 30 with SIGINT sensors in April 2012. Given
comparable flying hour costs and the large investment required for the
RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and save a net
of $2.5 billion.
Mr. Bartlett. The Department has committed a significant portion of
its planned budget for aircraft procurement to the F-35 program. In the
case of the Air Force, major expenditures are planned on the F-35 while
at the same time the Air Force seeks to acquire a new airborne tanker
and a bomber aircraft. Given the budget environment faced by the
Department, are you at all concerned that what you are proposing is
doable?
Mr. Kendall. I am concerned that future budget projections will
make much needed modernization efforts unaffordable. My job is to
ensure that our acquisition programs are as affordable as possible so
that the Services have the flexibility and available options to make
the appropriate decisions in determining how to meet their
requirements. Therefore, I have directed the incorporation of
procurement and sustainment affordability targets for all programs. In
the case of the F-35 program, we are actively addressing the costs due
to concurrency. As the program completes more testing, we are
progressively reducing concurrency risks. This is a direct result of a
more mature design through incorporation of discovery based design
changes. Earlier aircraft are open to a greater need for changes, and
as succeeding Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lots are built, their
cumulative requirements for retrofit modifications decline.
Additionally, the flattening of the production ramp in the coming years
will minimize the cost of upgrading these early LRIP aircraft. The
Department is also pursuing a strategy regarding LRIP 6 and 7
negotiations that incentivizes Lockheed Martin to reduce concurrency
costs by holding back the purchase of six LRIP 6 jets until the
contractor can prove performance. In addition, the program and the
Department are working diligently to reduce F-35 life-cycle costs.
Based on maturation of the technical baseline and focused affordability
initiatives, the Department expects greater accuracy in the O&S portion
of the cost estimate. Potential areas for reductions include: revised
bed-down plans; improved spares pricing; detailed reviews of manpower
requirements; technical refresh strategies; and future Service training
requirements, such as the number of annual flight hours per aircraft.
The cost risks in the tanker and bomber programs have also been
addressed, in the case of the tanker, through use of a competitively-
awarded fixed price contract.
Mr. Bartlett. Earlier this year, you labeled the concurrency of the
F-35 program as ``acquisition malpractice.'' Why did you choose those
words, and what action has been taken by the Department taken to
address your concerns?
Mr. Kendall. The decision to begin production well before testing
began was a clear departure from well-established principles of sound
program management. I have taken several steps to improve
accountability in the acquisition system, encourage well-informed
decisions, and improve the process in order to make sure we make better
decisions moving forward. I chartered a Quick Look Review that assessed
the risks in upcoming production decisions given the high degree of
concurrency associated with the F-35 program. Those results aided the
January 2012 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) initial review of the post
Nunn-McCurdy baseline. The DAB will continue to conduct annual Interim
Progress Reviews to assess how risk is being mitigated and provide
additional guidance. Additionally, the flattening of the production
ramp in the coming years will minimize the cost of upgrading these
early Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft. The Department is
also pursuing a strategy regarding LRIP 6 and 7 negotiations that
incentivizes Lockheed Martin to reduce concurrency costs by holding
back the purchase of six LRIP 6 jets until the contractor can prove
performance.
Mr. Bartlett. Your predecessor, Dr. Carter, stated that the JSF
program--both the government and contractor--lost its focus on
affordability and that getting back that focus is paramount to
improving the JSF program as it moves forward. From your perspective,
did the program lose its focus on affordability? What were the main
indicators of problems that were overlooked and what finally brought
them to light? What are the key steps to regaining and sustaining a
strong focus on affordability? What initiatives are underway to drive
down JSF operations and support costs? Assuming the latest projections
will show that the JSF will cost more to operate and maintain than
legacy fighters, what implications does this have on future budgets and
how the military services will pay this future bill?
Mr. Kendall. I do believe that the F-35 Program--both Government
and contractor--lost the focus on affordability. The program was
initiated with a high degree of concurrency, and the risks and costs
due to concurrency were not accurately predicted nor planned. The
Department has taken steps to minimize the risks and reduce the costs
associated with concurrency. We have done this through reduced
procurement of aircraft while concurrent development and test
continues. Additionally, we initiated the transition to fixed-price-
type procurement contracts and are ensuring that costs associated with
concurrency are shared more between the Government and contractor. The
F-35 program and the Department are working diligently to reduce F-35
operations and support costs. Based on maturation of the technical
baseline and focused affordability initiatives, the Department expects
greater accuracy in the operations and support portion of the cost
estimate. Potential areas for reductions include: revised bed-down
plans; improved spares pricing; detailed reviews of manpower
requirements; technical refresh strategies; and future Service training
requirements, such as the number of annual flight hours per aircraft.
Recently, I directed procurement affordability targets that will help
ensure that, as the F-35 program reaches the point that it is ready for
Full-Rate Production; the Department will be able to afford to procure
the quantities it needs.
Similarly, I established sustainment affordability targets that
will allow us to communicate expectations to the contractor so we can
control the cost to operate each aircraft, the annual costs to the
Services, and how much investment will be required over the total
lifecycle of the F-35 program. These affordability targets and, more
importantly, the actual costs that we realize over the coming years
will provide us a better understanding of whether we can afford to buy,
fly, and sustain the current total requirement. An affordable F-35
program will allow the Department to replace legacy aircraft with
fewer, more capable, multi-role strike fighter aircraft well suited to
meet the leaner requirements of the new strategic guidance.
Mr. Bartlett. The Department took the STOVL off probation after one
year. Why do you think it was appropriate to end probation? What
specifically did the STOVL accomplish in 2011 that gives you confidence
about its future? What do you feel are the primary risks remaining with
the STOVL development?
Mr. Kendall. Based on the assessment that the F-35B had made
sufficient progress in development, test, and production, such that no
uniquely distinguishing issues required more scrutiny than the other
two variants of F-35, I believe it was appropriate to remove the F-35B
from ``probation'' status.
Successful F-35B performance ashore and at sea has very positively
advanced the state of demonstrated capability in 2011. The F-35B is
making good progress in flight test metrics, resolving technical
issues, and meeting performance requirements.
In October 2011, the F-35B satisfactorily executed a limited
demonstration of ship suitability when two aircraft completed the
initial sea trials on the USS WASP. Testing included flight envelope
expansion, airborne and deck handling qualities, and the aircraft
effects on the shipboard environment. The sea trials were very
successful. Flight deck heating and exhaust jet blast velocity
demonstrated satisfactory results.
In 2011, the F-35 System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
program baseline was restructured and resourced with adequate margin to
accommodate current known and future unknown technical challenges and
changes across all variants. Anticipated developmental costs associated
with unique F-35B technical challenges and changes have been addressed
in the program restructure. In addition, the Department reduced F-35B
production in FY12 to accommodate the time it takes to complete
engineering solutions, produce the necessary hardware, and assess the
operational impact of the changes. This reduction in quantity balances
the risk of retrofit costs with the need to ensure continuity in the
engineering workforce involved in assembly of the F-35B in Fort Worth;
and to sustain the supplier base of F-35B unique parts.
F-35B weight has changed in very small amounts since January 2011
and remains essentially stable. In addition, engine performance data
collected has allowed credit for better lift performance and the
Vertical Landing Bring Back Key Performance Parameter has maintained
consistent positive margin.
In 2011, the F-35B performed on or ahead of the test plan. Total
flights planned versus actual were 293/333, and total test points
planned versus actual were 2272/2636. Additionally, the F-35B
accomplished 268 Vertical Landings, 395 Short Take Offs, and 156 Slow
Landings.
The FS 496 bulkhead has been redesigned for production beginning
with Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 4, with fixes identified for
retrofit as needed. F-35B fatigue testing (also known as durability
testing) resumed in the 1st quarter of 2012. The test was halted for
new bulkhead fabrication and instrumentation and test article
reconstruction in November 2010.
The redesigned upper auxiliary air inlet door hardware began flight
testing in December 2011. Analyses of the results from early test
flights are promising. Weather and the pace of flights will determine
when this is complete. Additionally, ordering of modification kits for
aircraft retrofit began in parallel with this testing in order to gain
clearance for fleet STOVL mode operation as soon as possible.
Airworthiness concerns with the lift fan clutch heating issue have
been mitigated by the incorporation of a temperature sensor that alerts
the pilot to take corrective action if a clutch exceeds acceptable
temperatures. At the same time, a detailed root cause investigation for
a permanent fix to eliminate clutch heating is underway.
The vertical lift propulsion system driveshafts are being custom
fitted with spacers to ensure the shaft can accommodate the airframe
thermal expansion and contraction. While this is currently a
maintenance burden, it eliminates the airworthiness concerns with the
current driveshaft design. A new driveshaft that can meet the actual
aircraft environmental requirements is in the early phases of the
design process.
The airworthiness risk associated with roll post actuator heating
has been mitigated by insulating the actuator with a thermal blanket. A
new actuator design that will eliminate the need for a thermal blanket
completed critical design review in January 2012.
Our observations and assessments over the past year give us reason
to believe the basic aircraft designs are sound and will deliver. The
remaining development is focused on testing and integration. Software
development, coupled with flight test execution, will remain the major
focus of the F-35B and the overall F-35 program execution in the coming
year and through the completion of SDD.
Mr. Bartlett. In the December 2011 F-35 Selected Acquisition
Report, we noted that F-35 airframe and engine costs increased about
$6.2 billion due to a slower near-term production ramp. How does this
increase compare with the increase in costs for expected concurrency
modifications if the production ramp were not changed from the
Department's position for fiscal year 2012?
Mr. Kendall. The $6.2 billion value quoted in the December 2011 F-
35 Selected Acquisition Report reflects the increase across 30 years of
production and inflation to include an additional 2 years of
production. In the FY 2013-2017 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), we
are satisfied the recommended production rate is the best use of the
Department's funding.
The concurrency costs for the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
Lot 7 aircraft in FY2013 range from $7 million per aircraft, if only
the ``must fix'' changes are incorporated, up to $15 million per
aircraft if all changes are incorporated. Importantly, while the
deferment of aircraft did result in a unit recurring flyaway cost
increase of approximately $10 million per aircraft in for LRIP 7, we
believe the realignment of the pace of production balances the need for
a stable industrial base with the realities of otherwise increasing
concurrency modification costs and a resource-constrained fiscal
environment.
Mr. Bartlett. Just 7 months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified
in writing to the Congress that the Global Hawk system was ``essential
to national security,'' there was no other acceptable capability to
meet the requirement, and the Global Hawk was $220M cheaper per year to
operate than the U-2. Then the recommendation to terminate Block 30 is
a complete reversal of the USAF position just 7 months ago. Please
explain how an asset can be critical to national security and cost less
than the alternative, but just 7 months later be terminated?
Mr. Van Buren. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than
the U-2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit
1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13
Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to be
from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the
cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at $32K
per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership
Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in
the FY13 Budget Review.
After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The
Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements
for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between the
RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their normal operating locations and
the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although
money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.
In September 2011 following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, the DOD
Joint Requirements Oversight Committee modified the high-altitude ISR
requirement where the U-2 was deemed sufficient to meet that amended
requirement. Coupled with the austere budget environment, the
Department decided it could no longer afford additional investment
required for the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30.
Requirement: The Air Force further determined the U-2
(which remains viable until at least 2040) was sufficient to meet the
reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in
the RQ-4 is required to field a comparable capability to the U-2 and
was determined to be unaffordable.
Budget: The Budget Control Act was passed in August 2011.
Additional investment in the RQ-4 is not warranted given a significant
reduction in the Department's budget and because the U-2 remains
operationally viable to satisfy the reduced JROC requirements at
considerably lower total cost over the FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. Global Hawk was the first intelligence asset to the
Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami Relief effort and first to Libya, and by
all accounts it performed very well. In both of these cases, the Global
Hawk was able to fly into areas too risky for manned aircraft (an
active Surface to Air Missile site in Libya and a nuclear environment
in Japan). How will the USAF compensate for losing this
transformational capability?
Mr. Van Buren. The Air Force will continue to satisfy the
operational needs of the Combatant Commands through the Global Force
Management Process. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council adjustment
affirms the modified high-altitude ISR requirement is sufficient to
address any such future contingency.
Mr. Bartlett. The Department's combatant commanders have an
insatiable need for ISR. Intelligence data is routinely the number one
unmet requirement. While budget pressures require tough choices, the
decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft out of the active
inventory seems short-sighted. I question the proposal to scrap
aircraft currently providing intelligence support to our warfighters,
including those purchased as recently as last year. Can you tell me why
it is necessary to take these assets out of commanders' hands and
instead send them to the desert to rust?
Mr. Van Buren. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given that the U-2 meets the new requirement significant
reduction in the Department's budget. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings where $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some
of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the
Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as NASA Block 10
aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. A modified requirement where the U-2
is sufficient and a reduced budget where the Department could no longer
afford to keep investing in RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 drove the
retirement decision. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military
strategy and determined that the high-altitude ISR requirement
structure could be modified. The Air Force further determined the U-2,
which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
reduced requirements. Continued increased investment in RQ-4 was
required to field a comparable capability to U-2 and was determined to
be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ-4 was
not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department's budget
and an alternative system, the U-2, still operationally viable at
considerably lower total cost over the FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. The Congress has provided funds for 21 Global Hawk
Block 30 aircraft at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of
these aircraft have been built and are flying operational missions. My
understanding is that this budget proposes to eliminate the funding for
future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these relatively new
aircraft in favor of a Cold War-era system. Can you explain why the DOD
is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these
aircraft that are currently providing valuable intelligence to the
warfighter?
Mr. Van Buren. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the
decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B
savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global
Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the
U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of
$2.5B. Furthermore, the decision to sustain the U-2 leverages $1.7B
that was has been invested to modernize the weapon system. The U-2
fleet in its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours
(2040 and beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new
engines in 1994-1998, the entire fleet has completed new power
distribution (wiring), 21st century glass cockpit and modern avionics
processor upgrades. The U-2s are currently on a 4000-hour programmed
depot maintenance (PDM) cycle included in the budgeted operating costs.
Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to
benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as
NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS.
Mr. Bartlett. A recent CSBA report said that eight manned aircraft
with otherwise identical characteristics to a Global Hawk would be
necessary to maintain the same orbit as three unmanned Global Hawks. If
this is the case, how can it be that you determined the manned aircraft
to be the most cost-efficient solution? How does the Global Hawk Block
30 compare to the U-2 on a cost-per-ISR-hour basis?
Mr. Van Buren. The operating characteristics of the U-2 are vastly
different than those of the Global Hawk including operating altitudes,
sensor capabilities, stand-off ranges and mission effectiveness. A
nominal RQ-4 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) is four aircraft, and a nominal U-
2 CAP is five aircraft. The Global Hawk Block 30 has not matured to the
point where a true comparison of operational costs is possible.
Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis during the FY13
budget review using data from previous Air Force and Department
efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in
FY11 show both the U-2 and RQ-4 at $32K per hour. The Air Force did not
begin flying the RQ-4 Block 30 until March 2011, so there is only six
months of representative flying hour information in the database. Also,
the Air Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with the SIGINT sensor in
2011. The Air Force will begin flying with this payload in April 2012
and expects the RQ-4 flying hour costs to be greater than those for the
U-2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment
required for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30
program and save a net of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. How have the Department's decisions to reduce Block
30 quantities while at the same time increasing requirements
(increasing the number of simultaneous sensors required) contributed to
the increased system cost of Global Hawk?
Mr. Van Buren. The Air Force decision to terminate the Block 30
program was based upon a reduced requirement rather than an increased
requirement. The requirement for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft is
to execute electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), synthetic aperture radar
(SAR), limited moving target indicator (MTI) and signals intelligence
(SIGINT) missions simultaneously. No change to the Block 30 requirement
factored into the decision to terminate the program. In September 2011,
the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent
adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-
altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance force structure
could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which
remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in
RQ-4 would have been required to field a comparable capability to U-2
and therefore, the RQ-4 was determined to be unaffordable. Continued,
increased investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given a significant
reduction in the Department's budget and an alternative system, the U-2
is still operationally viable at considerably lower total cost over the
FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership
Cost data for U-2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per
operational hour (that is, the cost per hour executing missions) for
Global Hawk is lower than U-2. This seems to be a much more relevant
number than cost per flying hour. How does this square with your claim
that Global Hawk operating costs are higher?
Mr. Van Buren. The total cost of keeping the Global Hawk Block 30
and continuing the investment to improve the RQ-4 to reach a comparable
capability with U-2 was more expensive than keeping the U-2. As a
result, the Department chose to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced
budget environment since the U-2 is sufficient to meet the requirement
and remains viable through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reduced the high-altitude ISR requirement, and the AF budget
reduced to where the Department could no longer afford to keep
investing in the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: In September
2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent
adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-
altitude ISR requirements could be modified. The Air Force further
determined the U-2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was
sufficient to meet these modified requirements. Continued increased
investment in RQ-4 was required to field a comparable capability to U-2
and was determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased
investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given a significant reduction in
the Department's budget and an alternative system, the U-2, is still
operationally viable at a considerably lower cost over the FYDP.
Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the U-2
is employed at its normal operational distance, shows the U-2 cost is
comparable to the RQ-4 cost. The latest actual CPFH data shows that
both platforms are operating at $32K per hour.
Mr. Bartlett. What is the cost comparison for operating U-2
compared to Global Hawk? What is the difference in the cost per mission
for each? How much of the U-2 fleet is available to perform all ISR
missions?
Mr. Van Buren. The cost per flight hour is roughly the same. The U-
2 costs $320K per 10-hour Multi-INT mission and the RQ-4 $640K per 20-
hour Single-INT mission. There are 27 U-2 ``single seaters'' of which
one is always rotating through depot level maintenance, and two
utilized as test birds (capable of flying missions, but not typically
utilized for that purpose). Thus, there are 24 mission-capable U-2
aircraft at any given time.
Mr. Bartlett. If the U-2 is extended until 2025, and the system
that was slated to replace it is cancelled, what is your plan for
replacing the U-2? How much will it cost to modernize and maintain the
Cold War-era U-2 for another 15 years?
Mr. Van Buren. There is no projected U-2 retirement date. The U-2
aircraft remains viable until 2040 and meets all sensor requirements
currently tasked by the Combatant Commands. The Air Force will invest
approximately $68 million per year in sustainment and enhancement
modifications to ensure platform modernization and maintenance.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand the Department's Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) performed a detailed cost analysis associated
with the decision to terminate and mothball the Global Hawk Block 30
program. Please share this analysis with the Congress so it can better
understand the analytical foundation of this decision. Provide a
detailed cost assessment including the basis of costs for both
sustainment and procurement through 2025.
Mr. Van Buren. In support of the FY13 President's Budget Request
(PBR), the USAF analyzed the operational output of both the RQ-4 and
the U-2 using existing CONOPS for both aircraft and determined that U-2
capability was sufficient for operational needs. When analyzed in this
context, the U-2 and RQ-4 operating costs were nearly equal. Given
comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required
for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and
save a net of $2.5B. The CAPE conducted their own independent cost
analysis based on three scenarios to come to the conclusion that the U-
2 was the more affordable option to meet the newly reduced requirement.
The Air Force will defer to CAPE to provide Congress the details of
their independent cost analysis.
Mr. Bartlett. Given our alarming and unsustainable national debt,
American taxpayers expect and deserve that Congress will make the
difficult decisions to restore fiscal responsibility. However, these
decisions cannot be short-sighted or made at the expense of our long-
term budget or national security needs. Please detail how terminating a
new cutting-edge platform, Global Hawk Block 30, is less expensive than
extending the life of an aging platform, U-2, which will require
increased investments in coming years is a fiscally responsible
decision over the next decade.
Mr. Van Buren. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement and the significant
reduction in the Department's budget. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although
money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some
of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the
Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as NASA Block 10
aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. The total cost of keeping the Global
Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ-4 to
reach a comparable capability with U-2 was more expensive than keeping
the U-2. As a result, the Department chose to save $2.5B across the
FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U-2 is sufficient to
meet the requirement and remains viable through 2040. The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude ISR
requirement, and the AF budget reduced to where the Department could no
longer afford to keep investing in the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30.
Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be modified. The
Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements.
Continued increased investment in RQ-4 was required to field a
comparable capability to U-2 and was determined to be unaffordable.
Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given
a significant reduction in the Department's budget and an alternative
system, the U-2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower
cost over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour
(CPFH) data, when the U-2 is employed at its normal operational
distance, shows the U-2 cost is comparable to the RQ-4 cost. The latest
actual CPFH data shows that both platforms are operating at $32K per
hour.
Mr. Bartlett. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the
efficiency for every program. At a macro level it is clear that an
unmanned system can fly longer and further than a manned system. A
recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail how unmanned systems
feature one-third the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it
is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our
nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing
exceptionally well in theater for a five-decade-old manned system.
Mr. Van Buren. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than
the U-2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit
1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13
Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to be
from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the
cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at $32K
per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership
Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in
the FY13 Budget Review. After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military
strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR
requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-
2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet
those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this
newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the
RQ-4 Block 30, which still needed approximately $800M in investment to
achieve sensor parity with the U-2, was not prudent given there is no
difference in the operating costs between the RQ-4 and U-2 when
operating from their normal operating locations and the U-2 meets the
new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk
Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with
the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to
continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted
in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. Can you please provide us details on how the Global
Hawk has been used to support operations worldwide over the past year?
Please provide both classified and unclassified details of how Global
Hawk is being used
Mr. Van Buren. In Libya, Global Hawk provided electro-optical,
infrared, and synthetic aperture radar and was used in a traditional
ISR role with dynamic responsiveness due to its enhanced duration/dwell
time and the ability to fill gaps between other ISR collects. Overall,
Global Hawk was successful in Operation Odyssey Dawn and in its
continued support for Operation Unified Protector. Assessment details
can be made available at a higher classification. In the CENTCOM
theater, Global Hawk continues to support the combatant command with
both theater and tactical ISR. To date, RQ-4 has flown over 50,000
combat hours in support of CENTCOM operations. In a humanitarian/
disaster relief support role, Global Hawk leveraged its range and
endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following the Haiti earthquake,
Global Hawk executed a response mission in 12 hours effectively
providing initial situational awareness information, highlighting
earthquake damage, status of critical infrastructure and identifying
food/aid drop zones and indicators of mass population migrations. Eight
missions were flown, satisfying 2,621 targets. In Japan, Global Hawk
capitalized on its range and endurance to be overhead in 21 hours.
Imagery products were provided to the Secretary of State within 40
minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure damage assessment,
supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of evacuation support,
Global Hawk collection focused on the Fukushima nuclear power plant.
Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, Japan allowed PACOM to use
the Global Hawk within the 20 km nuclear engagement zone. Infrared
imagery taken directly over the top of the reactors allowed engineers
to frequently monitor core temperature levels. In 21 missions and 300
on-station hours, Global Hawk collected more than 3,000 images.
Mr. Bartlett. General Schwartz mentioned Operations and Support
costs are issue for the Global Hawk program. When the decision was made
to retire the U-2 a few years back, specific costs (base support,
infrastructure and indirect support) were allocated to Global Hawk. As
a result, these costs have inflated the Global Hawk cost per flight
hour while the U-2's cost per flight hour has decreased. Did the USAF
look at doing an apples-to-apples comparison of costs for both systems?
If not, why not?
Mr. Van Buren. The Department of Defense conducted an analysis
during the FY13 budget review using data from previous Air Force and
DOD efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database
figures in FY11 show the U-2 at $32K per hour and the RQ-4 also at $32K
per hour. However, costs for the U-2 included SIGINT sensors, but the
Air Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with its SIGINT sensors in
2011. The Air Force will begin flying Global Hawk with SIGINT sensors
in April 2012 and expects the RQ-4 flying hour costs to become greater
than those for the U-2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given
the large investment required for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to
divest the Block 30 program and save a net of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. You recently proposed a change in the contracting
strategy for the fiscal year 2012 and 2013 procurement of F-35
procurement that would provide a means to have control on production
that is based prime contractor demonstrated performance in
developmental activities relative to the 2012 plan and concurrent risk
reduction. Can you describe your proposal, why you think it is
necessary, and the criteria you would use as a basis for executing the
proposed contract strategy?
Mr. Van Buren. The Department is implementing an event based
contracting strategy for low rate initial production (LRIP) Lots 6 and
7 that buys aircraft production quantities based upon development and
test progress. This strategy provides a means to have control on
production that is informed by demonstrated development performance
against the 2012 plan and concurrency cost risk reduction. The
Department will request Lockheed Martin provide a consolidated proposal
for LRIP Lots 6 and 7 based on an innovative structure. First, we will
award 25 aircraft in Lot 6, out of 31 authorized and appropriated in
FY12. Second, we will provide a means to procure from 0 to 6 of the
remaining FY12-funded Lot 6 aircraft concurrent with the Lot 7 contract
award in 2013. Lastly, we will link the total aircraft quantity
ultimately procured in Lot 6 to Lockheed Martin's development
performance and concurrency cost risk reduction efforts. The Department
will decide to award the additional aircraft based on progress expected
in 2012, as planned and resourced in the development program Integrated
Master Schedule. This schedule is executable, appropriately resourced,
includes sufficient margin for issues that are normal in a development
program, and has been agreed to by both Lockheed Martin and the F-35
program office. Specific decision criteria include, but are not limited
to, the following: 1) Planned 2012 System Engineering Technical Reviews
for Block 3 software 2) Lockheed Martin progress improving concurrency
change incorporation, both forward into production and back it post
delivery modification engineering 3) Planned 2012 progress in F-35A, F-
35B, and F-35C durability testing 4) Planned 2012 progress in flight
test 5) Planned 2012 line replaceable units (LRU) qualification
Currently appropriated FY12 funding is necessary to implement this
contracting strategy. The variable quantity of up to 6 additional Lot 6
aircraft will be paid for with the FY12 funds originally authorized and
appropriated for their purchase; however, these funds will not be
obligated on contract until FY13. The Department intends to award Lot 7
aircraft and the Lot 6 variable quantity aircraft through fully
definitized contract actions in FY13. The initial Lot 6 contract award
for 25 aircraft will require an Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) to
ensure production flow is not disrupted. However, the Department does
not intend to award a UCA for the 25 aircraft in Lot 6 until essential
agreement is reached for Lot 5. We believe our plan for negotiations
for LRIP 6 and 7 will allow us to control production quantity based on
the performance of the development program. It is important that
Lockheed Martin demonstrate performance and help us to establish the
confidence that the F-35 is a stable and capable platform.
Mr. Bartlett. What is the status of the lot 5 negotiations for the
fiscal year 2011 buy of F-35s? What are the major issues under
negotiation?
Mr. Van Buren. The contract for the low rate initial production
(LRIP) Lot 5 aircraft is still being negotiated. We expect the
negotiations to be completed by late spring 2012. Due to the sensitive
nature of the negotiations, we are not able to provide any details of
the negotiations. The Government negotiators are working to find the
right balance between best value for the taxpayers and adequate profit
for Lockheed Martin and its shareholders.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Secretary, the Congress has provided funds for 21
Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft at a cost of approximately $4 billion.
Fourteen of these aircraft have been built and are flying operational
missions. My understanding is that this budget proposes to eliminate
the funding for future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these
relatively new aircraft, four right off the production line. The Global
Hawk system was only declared operationally ready 8 months ago. Just 7
months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified in writing to the
Congress that the Global Hawk system was ``essential to national
security.'' Can you explain why the DOD is poised to waste the $4
billion we have already spent on these aircraft that are currently
providing valuable intelligence to the warfighter?
Mr. Van Buren. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the
decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B
savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global
Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the
U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of
$2.5B. Furthermore, the decision to sustain the U-2 leverages $1.7B
that was has been invested to modernize the weapon system. The U-2
fleet in its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours
(2040 and beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new
engines in 1994-1998, the entire fleet has completed new power
distribution (wiring), 21st century glass cockpit and modern avionics
processor upgrades. The U-2s are currently on a 4000-hour programmed
depot maintenance (PDM) cycle included in the budgeted operating costs.
Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to
benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as
NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Secretary, nine Global Hawk Block 30s are
currently supporting counterterror operations in three combatant
commands. While budget pressures require tough choices, the decision to
pull 18 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft out of the active inventory seems
short-sighted, when they are being used to support the warfighter. Can
you explain the rationale for grounding and storing these aircraft when
there is a demonstrated need by our combatant commanders for their
capabilities?
Mr. Van Buren. It is understood by the Air Force that this hearing
question was directly posed to Maj Gen Posner, Director of Global Power
Programs Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition. The Witness Panel did not include the Secretary of Defense
or the Secretary of the Air Force. In September 2011, the DOD Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military
strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR force
structure could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2,
which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
reduced force structure requirements. Approximately $800M is required
to field 18 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft with comparable sensor
capability to the U-2. Additionally, some of the $4B investment made in
the Block 30 program will continue to benefit the Block 20 BACN and
Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS
and Navy BAMS.
Mr. Bartlett. Can you describe the scope of the F-35 software
program relative to other currently fielded fighter aircraft, whether
the software schedule, based on the new technical baseline review
schedule, is being met, and whether needed capabilities are being
included in software deliveries?
Admiral Venlet. The scope of F-35 software is unprecedented. Taken
solely in terms of quantity, it is a large departure from previous
fighter aircraft. The F-35 is projected to utilize 9.3 million source
lines of code (MSLOC) on board the aircraft in its final configuration.
By comparison, the FA-18E/F (Block II with AESA radar) has
approximately 6.6 MSLOC onboard, and the F-22 has approximately 5.5
MSLOC. The main differences in F-35 scope compared to legacy aircraft
are tri-variant commonality, fully integrated software suite (FA-18 is
federated), Helmet Mounted Display System complexity, broader mission
capability (compared to F-22), increased number of data links, and
multi-level security. Additionally, the F-35 significantly expands on
the capabilities of legacy aircraft. In addition to on-board software,
the F-35 will have approximately 14.8 MSLOC of ground-based software to
support training systems, off-board mission planning, autonomic
logistics and ground based support equipment, and another 4.5 MSLOC of
non-deliverable software to operate labs, test stations, trainers,
simulators, and flight test support.
Relative to the 2011 re-baseline, Block 1B (supporting Low-Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) 3 aircraft) software delivery to verification
test is approximately 3 months behind schedule with only 75 percent of
the fully planned content across the air system being provided. LRIP 4
software content (Block 2A) is currently estimated to be 3 months
behind plan. Recommendations for the F-35 software program put forward
by the 2010 Technical Baseline Review have been implemented (e.g.
additional lab testing capacity, added resources for software rework
and integration). In addition, over the past 6 months, Lockheed Martin
has introduced several process and organizational initiatives to
improve its software development and address current schedule pressure.
Some of these initiatives have long-term implementation paths requiring
deep changes, although we are already seeing positive indications from
the efforts to date.
Prompted by the program office, Lockheed Martin initiated action to
track software development by capability to facilitate early warnings
on capability at risk. Block 2A is being closely monitored on a
capability by capability basis, with assigned JPO counterparts to
ensure government input on prioritizing needed capabilities. These
teams are actively working through all contracted Block 1B and 2A
capabilities to support the final Block 2A release to flight test.
Mr. Bartlett. What is the status of the software for the logistics
system to support F-35 maintenance so that the desired operational
capabilities can be achieved?
Admiral Venlet. The current Autonomic Logistics Information System
(ALIS) software release (1.0.2E3) provides basic aircraft maintenance
and mission planning capabilities for both System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) and Low-Rate Initial Production aircraft. The
follow-on release (1.0.3), which is already developed and laboratory
tested with Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) testing
completed, constitutes the first instance of the integrated sustainment
support solution. This release has been delayed and changes are being
incorporated to address the findings from the IV&V. Introduction of the
updated ALIS release to SDD flight test sites is projected for the
third quarter of CY 2012 and to operational sites in the first quarter
of CY 2013. After this release is fielded, the program has two
additional major software releases (2.0 and 3.0) on schedule to bring
ALIS to full requirements capability.
Mr. Bartlett. Secretary Gates put the Marine Corps F-35B on
probation due to concerns over deficiencies in development. Secretary
has removed the probation. When will all of the recommended fixes to
the F-35B be complete and tested?
Admiral Venlet. The principal STOVL issues of concern in January
2011 were:
FS 496 Bulkhead Crack
Auxiliary Air Inlet Buffet Door Vibration
Lift Fan Drive Shaft
Lift Fan Clutch Heating
Roll Nozzle Actuator Heating
Fixes tested and implemented are as follows:
FS 496 Bulkhead Crack
Redesigned for production beginning in Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) Lot 4 for F-35B, with fixes identified for
retrofits as needed
Fatigue test (AKA durability testing) resumed on January
19, 2012
Durability testing (2nd life) will be complete in
December 2014
Depot retrofits are planned to begin in 2012 and
conclude in 2016
Auxiliary Air Inlet (AAI) Buffet Door Vibration
Redesigned upper AAI Door hardware began flight test in
December 2011
Early test flight results are promising; testing will
complete in 2012
New door design will be placed into production in
October 2013, with a first delivery forecast for March 2014
Retrofits on existing aircraft are planned for 2012
through 2014
Lift Fan Drive Shaft
Custom fitted spacers are being used to accommodate the
airframe thermal expansion and contraction (interim solution)
Qualification testing of new design will be completed by
January 2014
New design will be broken into production in LRIP Lot 7
Retrofits will be accomplished by attrition. The current
driveshaft with class spacers as an interim solution allows
safe operations throughout the flight envelope. The new
driveshaft will save weight, cost, and maintenance workload,
but does not warrant early replacement.
Lift Fan Clutch Heating
Interim solution is heat monitoring sensor; alerts pilot
when acceptable temperature is exceeded
Detailed root cause investigation for permanent fix is
underway
Testing for optimal spacing will be complete in August
2012
JPO has not determined when the production break-in will
occur (if required); retrofits will occur by attrition
Roll Nozzle Actuator Heating
Airworthiness risks mitigated by insulating actuator
with thermal blanket
Critical design review for new design was completed in
January 2012
Quality testing of the improved actuator will be
completed December 2012
New design will begin production break-in in LRIP Lot 7
Retrofits will be accomplished through attrition
Mr. Bartlett. We understand that significant development problems
occurred with the helmet mounted display, potentially affecting the
concept of operation of the F-35. Will you be able to resolve the issue
and when will the helmet mounted display be fully tested?
Admiral Venlet. There are three main technical issues identified
affecting the operation of the GEN II Helmet Mounted Display System
(HMDS). The technical issues are jitter, data latency, and acuity. The
HMDS program has been modified to incorporate technical changes which
are intended to solve these three issues. Accordingly, we are tracking
a HMDS program risk which tracks the burn down of these issues. The
program office plans to complete a Critical Design Review in late 2012
for these improvements. To further reduce risk, the program has
developed a second helmet using legacy technology to ensure there is
capability prior to Operational Testing.
Mr. Bartlett. The November 2011 Quick Look Review of F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter Concurrency recommended that further decisions about F-
35 production be event driven, based on the achievement of sufficient
test data demonstrating design maturity and well-controlled processes
for executing and minimizing design changes across concurrent
production. Going forward, what action does the program plan to take to
minimize risks of flight test and production concurrency and the
associated government exposure to additional costs on future
procurement contracts?
Admiral Venlet. The program is taking several actions to minimize
our exposure to additional costs on future procurement contracts. From
a contracting perspective, we have introduced cost-sharing for
concurrency changes that are discovered and known prior to a Low-Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) period of performance. This applies initially
to the LRIP 5 period of performance and is a 50-50 share ratio with
Lockheed Martin. In System Design and Development, we are implementing
an incentive fee directly related to the reduction in span time between
a declared deficiency and its corresponding implementation on the
production line. By shortening the span time to implement a change, we
will minimize the number of aircraft that will have to be modified in
the future.
During the Quick Look Review, the flight testing remaining and
those areas that exhibit potential for discovery (such as transonic
roll-off, high angle-of-attack, and buffet) that might have concurrency
impact if there is discovery were deeply analyzed. The test program is
executing the plan of record and has capacity to add test points to
allow for refly and discovery if additional test is necessary to
resolve anomalies.
The program is proactively participating in the concurrency change
process. JPO engineers participate with their Lockheed Martin
counterparts in Engineering Review Boards, convened on a weekly basis
to review and approve all change requests and culminating with the
implementation of the change in the production line after final
approval by the Configuration Control Board.
The program office is working with Lockheed Martin to improve the
end-to-end change implementation process. The program office, working
with Lockheed Martin, is collecting and tracking metrics to capture
change attributes to gain visibility and transparency into the change
process. Using data-driven metrics will allow a more in-depth
understanding of how deficiencies are reported and the span time
required to formally cut changes into production. This understanding
will improve management control by identifying process anomalies that
will become candidates for mitigation.
Mr. Bartlett. Are the F-35 production aircraft currently being
delivered by the contractor on schedule and with the capabilities
prescribed in the respective Lot contract?
Admiral Venlet. No. The F-35 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
delivery schedule was re-baselined in September 2010. Current LRIP
aircraft are being produced and delivered from the factory to the
flight line in Forth Worth approximately 1 month behind the re-
baselined schedule. Once delivered to the flight line there is an
additional average 6-month delay to Government acceptance (DD-250). The
additional 6-month delay is caused by:
Maturation of the final finishes processes;
Traveled work to field operations (including planned
Block 1B modifications for the first six LRIP 3 aircraft);
Quality issues;
Maintenance and repair of aircraft subsystems, and
Reconciliation and approval of major variances.
Since award of the LRIP contracts, the System Design and
Development (SDD) program was also re-baselined. As a result of the re-
baseline and the adjusted timing of capability delivery, some of the
capabilities that were expected to be qualified in SDD and delivered to
production aircraft are not available. This has prevented Lockheed
Martin Aeronautics from delivering F-35 production aircraft to the
originally contracted capabilities.
Mr. Bartlett. In his acquisition decision memorandum of March 28,
2012, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics tasked the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,
in collaboration with the Navy, Air Force, Joint Program Office, and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Material Readiness)
to develop a plan that identifies and quantifies opportunities to
reduce operating and support costs. From your perspective, what are the
primary drivers of F-35 support costs, and how is the F-35 development
program addressing these issues?
Admiral Venlet. The largest sustainment cost drivers are Unit Level
Consumption (primarily depot-level repairable and consumable) and
Manpower. The Joint Strike Fighter Program Office (JSFPO) is performing
a review of contractor manpower requirements to assess their
reasonableness and realism relative to achievable ramp up, steady state
scope, and appropriate skill mix. An additional area of investigation
continues to be the ground rules and assumptions associated with how
the Services plan to operate F-35 to ensure that the design of the F-35
air system and sustainment solution is maximized to drive efficiencies.
The JSFPO is currently implementing an affordability strategy that
includes a formal F-35 Affordability Management Plan (AMP). The AMP is
focused on: reducing the costs of support products such as support
equipment, spare parts and training devices; baselining requirements
with the Services and leveraging increased efficiency opportunities;
and addressing reliability and maintainability.
The JSFPO is executing the second phase of a formal Business Case
Analysis (BCA) and Targeted Affordability Program (TAP). Phase 1 of the
BCA and TAP produced sustainment labor rates and labor mix
recommendations that were captured in the FY11 annual estimate.
Additionally, the analysis produced alternatives for aircraft
utilization, deployment planning, and squadron manning that were
included in the cost reductions.
The 2012 phase 2 BCA and TAP efforts will build on the FY11 work
and focus on the following:
BCA--ALIS, Depot Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul & Update
(MRO&U) planning, support equipment, software management and training.
TAP initiatives--Matching Life Cycle Cost Estimate fee
assumptions and labor rates to the Phase 1 BCA findings, Manpower Basis
of Estimate's, ALIS and Training labor rates, Spare Parts Unit Database
deep dive, Global asset pooling, and contract structure/incentive fees
(initial focus on Supply Chain Management).
Mr. Bartlett. As you know, the JSF program has had a host of
problems over the past years resulting in significant cost growth,
schedule slips, and, most importantly, delays in fielding capabilities
to the warfighter. From your observations, what have been the primary
causes to the JSF's development problems and challenges to date? Has
the F-35 Joint Program Office been receptive to your past advice and
recommendations for establishing a knowledge-based acquisition process?
What future steps can the Department take to ensure the JSF program
does not repeat its mistakes from the past and achieve a more
predictable and successful outcome? What steps can be taken to place
bounds on the programs and to help improve management and oversight of
the program?
Mr. Sullivan. JSF development problems and challenges can largely
be traced to its extremely risky acquisition strategy, poor decisions
at key junctures, and a management environment that was slow to
acknowledge and address problems. JSF officials adopted a ``single
step'' acquisition strategy to develop and acquire full combat
capabilities on a very aggressive, risky schedule with substantial
concurrency among development, testing, and production activities. The
JSF program started system development before requisite technologies
were ready, started manufacturing test aircraft before designs were
stable, and moved to production before flight tests adequately
demonstrated that the aircraft design met performance and operational
suitability requirements. The late release of drawings--and continuing
high rate of changes--resulted in a cascading of problems in
establishing suppliers and manufacturing processes, which led to late
parts deliveries, delayed the program schedule, and forced inefficient
manufacturing processes to workaround problems. These issues are
lessening now but the impacts are still felt in higher costs, late
deliveries of test and production aircraft, and a much-delayed
development test schedule.
As part of its June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy certification to the
Congress, DOD provided a root cause analysis for cost and schedule
growth that identified similar factors. Specifically, the analysis
cites a very aggressive and concurrent development schedule,
unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, flawed and over-optimistic
assumptions, and management's reluctance to accept unfavorable
information, slowing down the ability of the contractor and government
to recognize and respond to problems.
For a number of years, the Department had not been very receptive
to our findings and recommendations. Starting in 2001 with a debate
about the initial business case for the F-35, defense officials have
often non-concurred with our recommendations and, even when somewhat
agreeable, did not usually fully implement them. For example, while
officials generally acknowledged the merits of knowledge-based
acquisitions and agreed that the JSF strategy was very risky, they
chose to continue moving forward with the intent to manage the risks.
They did not delay development start even though technologies were not
ready and did not delay or reduce procurement when designs were not
stable nor manufacturing processes mature. This attitude started
changing ca. 2009 after internal reviews leading into 2010
restructuring. Attachment 1 provides a listing of our recommendations
since 2001 and the department's response to those recommendations [see
Appendix pages 131-132].
Over the last two years, JPO and OSD management have been
significantly more receptive to our findings and recommendations than
in previous years. This is a welcome change. Defense officials lately
recognized numerous technical, financial, and management shortcomings
and significantly restructured the program, making changes we support
and, in quite a few cases, had earlier recommended. Restructuring
actions were supported by a comprehensive, bottoms-up systems
engineering review, which is a key knowledge-based practice. This
recognized the need to spend more time and money to fix design and
manufacturing processes and more thoroughly flight test aircraft before
accelerating production further. Also, an OSD concurrency study
corroborated our concerns about the immature design and the concurrency
costs DOD is incurring as a result of the highly risky acquisition
strategy not in compliance with knowledge-based practices.
A new and sustained focus on affordability, effective
implementation of restructuring actions, successful mitigation of
design and manufacturing risks identified by independent panels, and
more active and involved oversight by OSD and military services should
lead to more predictable and achievable outcomes. Regaining and
aggressively pursuing affordability--both in terms of the investment
costs to acquire the JSF and the continuing costs to operate and
maintain it over the life-cycle--will be very challenging, but is
paramount to future success. Restructuring actions include the adoption
of more realistic cost and schedule estimates, a more robust flight
test program, and directed implementation of critical improvements
needed in the aircraft and engine manufacturing and supplier management
processes. Officials need to hold the line on annual procurement
quantities and only ramp up production rates upon firm and confirming
evidence from test results and performance indications that the
production process is mature.
Implementing the ``system maturity matrix'' we recommended in March
2010 would provide a forcing tool to help senior defense officials and
the Congress make annual budget and aircraft quantity decisions based
on actual progress in building and testing the aircraft. The matrix is
designed to provide criteria and conditions for comparing documented
test and manufacturing results to expected progressive levels of
demonstrated weapon system maturity in relationship to planned
increases in future procurement quantities. This would help justify a
ramp up of procurement quantities and corresponding funding levels
leading up to full-rate procurement, now planned for 2019.
OSD's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look Review,
dated Nov. 29, 2011, makes a similar recommendation. The report
determined a lack of confidence in design stability and concurrency
costs of required fixes supported serious reconsideration of
procurement and production planning. It recommends that further
decisions about F-35 concurrent production be event driven, based on
the achievement of sufficient test data to support increased confidence
in design maturity and of a well-controlled process for executing and
minimizing design changes across concurrent production.
If the program's development costs continue to grow under the
cascading effects of late drawings, design changes, and labor
inefficiencies, the Department or Congress may need to consider, at
some point, the idea of limiting any additional funding for
development. The current funding levels of the F-35 are already testing
the limits of realism. Any additional cost growth during development
should be absorbed by the program, rather than add to the taxpayer's
burden.
Mr. Bartlett. DOD has been engaged in a comprehensive restructuring
of the program for the past 2 years. In testimony last year before this
Subcommittee, you said that GAO supports these actions. Do you still
support the restructuring efforts, including the most recent ones added
by the Secretary in January 2012? Have you seen concrete examples of
improvements from these actions?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, we still support the restructuring actions,
although we continue to be concerned about the viability of future
annual funding rates. Starting in January 2010, restructuring actions
by the Department have placed the JSF on a more achievable course,
albeit a lengthier and more expensive one. The Department has
progressively lowered the production ramp-up rate and cut near term
procurement quantities; fewer aircraft procured while testing is still
ongoing lowers the risk of having to modify already produced aircraft.
The new development flight test schedule is more realistic and better
resourced, using more conservative assumptions about fly rates and test
point achievements and providing for more flights and more test assets.
This has paid off with relatively good test flight performance in 2010
and 2011. Undergirding restructuring actions was the technical baseline
review done by the program office--a needed and comprehensive systems
engineering review of the entire program that identified numerous
disconnects in functions and information. In addition, several positive
accomplishments by the prime contractor may spur improved future
performance. Lockheed Martin implemented an improved and comprehensive
integrated master schedule, loaded the new data from restructuring, and
completed a schedule risk assessment, as we recommended several years
ago. Also, DCMA and program officials believe that Lockheed has made a
concerted effort to improve its earned value management system in
compliance with federal standards. Initial reviews of the new
procedures, tools, and training indicate that the company is on track
to have its new system and processes approved in 2012.
Mr. Bartlett. As you know, the JSF acquisition program is expected
to still require over $300 billion to complete the acquisition.
How do you view affordability as a challenge for the program?
Mr. Sullivan. Overall program affordability--both in terms of the
investment costs to acquire the JSF and the continuing costs to operate
and maintain it over the life-cycle--remains a major risk. The long-
stated intent that the JSF program would deliver an affordable, highly
common fifth generation aircraft that could be acquired in large
numbers could be in question. Total U.S. investment in the JSF is now
estimated at $395.7 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft over
several decades and will require a long-term, sustained funding
commitment. As the JSF program moves forward, unprecedented levels of
funding will be required during a period of more constrained defense
funding expectations overall. As the program continues to experience
cost growth and delays, projected annual funding needs are
unprecedented, averaging more than $12.5 billion a year through 2037.
The Air Force alone needs to budget from $6 to $11 billion per year
from fiscal year 2016 through 2037 for procurement. At the same time;
the Air Force is committed to other big-dollar projects such as the KC-
46 tanker and a new bomber program.
In addition, current JSF life-cycle cost estimates are considerably
higher than the legacy aircraft it will replace; this has major
implications for future demands on military operating support budgets
and plans for recapitalizing fighter forces. The most recent estimate
by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation projects
total U.S. operating and support (O&S) costs of $1.1 trillion for all
three variants based on a 30-year service life and predicted usage and
attrition rates. Defense leadership stated in 2011 that sustainment
cost estimates of this magnitude were unaffordable and simply
unacceptable in this fiscal environment. Our military services and the
international partners have all expressed concerns about long-term
affordability. The program has undertaken efforts to address this life-
cycle affordability concern, however, until DOD can demonstrate that
the program can perform against its cost projections, it will continue
to be difficult for the U.S. and international partners to accurately
set priorities, establish affordable procurement rates, retire aged
aircraft, and establish supporting infrastructure.
Mr. Bartlett. DOD has been engaged in a comprehensive restructuring
of the program for the past 2 years. In testimony last year before this
Subcommittee, you said that GAO supports these actions. Several actions
seem the same or similar to GAO's recommendations from years ago. What
are some of these and why did the Department not previously implement
your recommendations?
Mr. Sullivan. Several actions are similar:
Our March 2008 report criticized the ``Mid-Course Risk Reduction''
effort that cut flight test assets and reduced the number of
development flights. We recommended that DOD revisit this effort to
address our concerns about testing, use of management reserves, and
manufacturing deficiencies. Instead, DOD replenished management
reserves from within the program baseline and did not revise its plan,
nor fix the problems. Consequently, management reserves were again
depleted. Recent restructuring actions since 2010 added more test
resources, increased the number of flight tests, and extended the
schedule, effectively reversing the mid-course plan.
Also in 2008, we determined that the program cost estimate was not
reliable and likely underestimated and recommended that a new
comprehensive independent cost estimate and schedule risk assessment
are needed. We reiterated these concerns in subsequent reports,
including the need to make a better projection of life-cycle operating
and support costs. DOD's joint estimating team did provide better cost
estimates in the interim, but it was not until this year (and after a
Nunn-McCurdy cost breach) that a comprehensive independent cost
estimate for the program to completion were completed. The CAPE's
independent cost estimate and a new estimate by the JPO supported a new
acquisition program baseline that is substantially larger than the
previous baseline and which delays key milestones. The CAPE also
provided a new estimate of military construction costs and projected
O&S costs of $1.1 trillion over 30 years given certain assumptions.
Since 2006, we have consistently warned against procuring
quantities of aircraft much ahead of testing results and the
demonstrated ability of the manufacturing process to produce at higher
rates. For example, in 2009 we reported on the risks posed by DOD plans
to further accelerate procurement and to do so on cost reimbursement
contracts. DOD responded that planned procurement rates were efficient
and feasible and also declined to establish a firm plan for
transitioning to fixed-price contracts. We were gratified when Defense
leadership substantially reduced near term procurement, decreased ramp
rate from one year to the next, and awarded the first fixed-price
production contract. DOD has now reduced near-term procurement 3 times
in the last 3 years in recognition of the need to stabilize design and
fix deficiencies found in testing before ramping up production.
More recently, we recommended comprehensive schedule risk
assessments, independent software studies, and moving to fixed-price
contracts for production. The Department implemented the latter in its
first stage of restructuring ca. February 2010 and recently completed
the first two.
For years, program leadership was slow to recognize problems and
was generally unresponsive to other DOD organizations as well as us.
For example, the CAIG and DOT&E also warned against cutting flight test
resources. Rather than implementing ours and other recommendations,
defense officials usually acknowledge the concerns, but stated they
were managing the risks.
Mr. Bartlett. DOD has been engaged in a comprehensive restructuring
of the program for the past 2 years. In testimony last year before this
Subcommittee, you said that GAO supports these actions. Going forward,
what critical challenges remain for the program from a cost and
schedule standpoint?
Mr. Sullivan. As I stated at the hearing, I see 5 areas of concern
moving forward. These are: software development; continued engineering
changes emanating from flight test; funding assumptions that average
about $12.5 billion per year through 2037; mission systems development,
most significantly the helmet mounted display; and the contractor's
ability to manage a large, global supply chain. Contract cost overruns,
delayed aircraft deliveries, and continued concurrency costs are
expected to continue for several more years. The program has not yet
demonstrated a stable design and manufacturing processes capable of
efficient production. Engineering changes are persisting at relatively
high rates and additional changes are likely as testing continues.
There is risk of future cost growth from test discoveries driving
changes to design and manufacturing processes. Until manufacturing
processes are in control and engineering design changes resulting from
information gained during developmental testing are reduced, there is
risk of more cost growth. Manufacturing processes and performance
indicators show some progress for improved performance. Even with the
substantial reductions in near-term procurement quantities, DOD is
still investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft while
flight testing has years to go.
Software development and integration--essential to JSF
capabilities--will continue to be major factors driving JSF costs and
schedule. JSF software development is one of the largest and most
complex projects in DOD history, and it has grown in size and
complexity, and is taking longer to complete than expected. Developing,
testing, and integrating software, mission systems, and logistics
systems are critical for demonstrating the operational effectiveness
and suitability of a fully integrated, capable aircraft and pose
significant technical risks moving forward. In attempting to maintain
schedule, the program has deferred some capabilities to later blocks.
Deferring tasks to later phases of development adds more pressure and
costs to future efforts and likely increases the probability of defects
being realized later in the program, when the more complex capabilities
in these later blocks are already expected to pose substantial
technical challenges.
Going forward, Lockheed Martin's and Pratt & Whitney's abilities to
manage an expanding global supplier network are fundamental to meeting
future production rates and throughput expectations. DOD's Independent
Manufacturing Review Team in 2009 identified global supply chain
management as the most critical challenge for meeting production
expectations. The cooperative aspect of the supply chain provides both
benefits and challenges. The international program structure is based
on a complex set of relationships involving both government and
industry from the United States and eight other countries. Overseas
suppliers are playing a major and increasing role in JSF manufacturing
and logistics. For example, center fuselage and wings will be
manufactured by Turkish and Italian suppliers, respectively, as second
sources. In addition to ongoing supplier challenges--parts shortages,
failed parts, and late deliveries--incorporating international
suppliers presents additional challenges. In addition, the program must
deal with exchange rate fluctuations, disagreements over work shares,
technology transfer concerns, different accounting methods, and
transportation requirements that have already caused some delays. Also,
suppliers have sometimes struggled to develop critical and complex
parts while others have had problems with limited production capacity.
Mr. Bartlett. Regarding manned and unmanned intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance programs, has the Navy completed a
comparative analysis of life cycle cost and operational effectiveness
of manned and unmanned systems like the P-3, P-8 and Broad Area
Maritime Surveillance aircraft?
Admiral Skinner. The P-3 aircraft has been flying for over 50 years
and is the baseline for measuring Life Cycle Cost and Operational
Effectiveness of Navy's new ASW/ISR platforms (P-8 and BAMS). Predicted
cost and effectiveness was fully evaluated during the Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA), completed for P-8 in 2002 and BAMS in 2003.
Mr. Bartlett. The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Program
had assumed cost savings in production and operations and maintenance
because of Global Hawk program shared overhead, training, basing costs,
and other operations and sustainment costs. In addition, there is the
possibility of a break in the production line, with Global Hawk Block
30 termination, given the current BAMS production schedule. Do you know
what these costs will be?
Admiral Skinner. With regard to operations, maintenance, training,
and basing costs, the BAMS UAS Program as reflected in the President's
Budget request for FY13 accounts for the cost of continuing as a Navy-
only acquisition. BAMS operations, maintenance, training, and basing
are independent of the Global Hawk support structure. The procurement
cost estimate is similarly based on proceeding without concurrent USAF
Global Hawk production. At Milestone B, the BAMS Program was estimated
forward without shared savings, assuming a transition of the Q4
production line from Air Force RQ-4 UAs in FY13 to Navy-only quantities
of MQ-4C UAs in FY14. Since the estimate assumed stand-alone
production, a decision to continue Global Hawk production beyond FY13
could have resulted in savings of up to $150M across the FYDP. Those
savings did not materialize because Global Hawk Block 30 production was
terminated. The estimate did assume savings based on reuse of existing
tooling and special test equipment; these efficiencies will still be
captured since the necessary equipment will transition to Navy custody
as required to support the ongoing BAMS UAS acquisition. The residual
risk to production continuity is related to terminating Global Hawk
Block 30 after Lot 10, since this invalidates the BAMS UAS estimate of
a seamless production transition from USAF RQ-4B Global Hawk to MQ-4C
BAMS UAS. A production break created by Air Force Global Hawk Block 30
termination is estimated to cost approximately $42 million. This value
assumes that NATO AGS awards as scheduled and the resulting gap
requiring coverage is 3.5 months.
Mr. Bartlett. Can you describe the Navy and Marine Corps program
and funding of unmanned aircraft vehicle sense and avoid programs to
further operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the National Airspace
System?
General Robling. The Marine Corps' Ground Based Sense-And-Avoid
(GBSAA) initiative is in direct support of Marine Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle Squadron 2 (VMU-2) based at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry
Point. Current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations limit
DOD unmanned aircraft (UA) operations to Restricted Airspace unless the
UA are operating under a Certificate of Authorization (COA) issued by
the FAA. Currently, FAA internal guidance requires visual observers or
chase planes as a condition for approving a COA for an 11 miles transit
to the nearest Restricted Area. The result is reduced training
opportunities due to the inability to directly access training areas
from its home station. While ground embarkation and transport of VMU-2
aircraft and equipment into local Restricted Areas has been employed as
an alternate solution, this method is costly, time consuming, and
increases wear on all components. The Cherry Point GBSAA program was
funded by the OSD (AT&L) UAS Task Force as a solution to VMU-2 training
deficiencies, and as a charter initiative to demonstrate capabilities
in support of DOD National Airspace System UAS integration efforts. If
approved for use, the system will utilize an existing radar feed to
sanitize narrow corridors of airspace between Cherry Point and local
Restricted Areas to allow the safe airborne transit of VMU-2 unmanned
aircraft. All GBSAA equipment has been installed at MCAS Cherry Point,
certified by DOD for its intended use, and has been demonstrated in an
operationally relevant environment using trained USMC operators.
Discussions are ongoing with the FAA regarding this system providing a
sense-and-avoid capability as a condition of FAA granting the required
COA. OSD provided $3.1 million of RDT&E funding (FY 2012-FY 2012) for
this effort. Formal requirements development based upon the
demonstrated Cherry Point capability, other DOD airspace integration
efforts, as well as anticipated USMC future operational needs are
underway in support of resourcing decisions. Specific information on US
Navy sense and avoid programs can be provided by appropriate Navy
staff.
Mr. Bartlett. In your statement you note that F-35B and F-35C
initial operational capability (IOC) dates have not been determined by
leadership but you describe capabilities for IOC such as 10 F-35B
aircraft with software block 2B for the Marine Corps, and 10 F-35C
aircraft with software block 3F for the Navy. Based on the current F-35
development and procurement schedule, can you estimate what year the F-
35B and F-35C will be declared IOC?
General Robling. The IOC date for the F-35B and F-35C has not yet
been determined by the CMC or CNO. The Navy and Marine Corps require
Service specific operational capabilities as defined in the F-35
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) prior to considering
declaration of IOC. Achieving these capabilities are event driven and
dependent upon the progress of the re-baselined JSF Program. Based on
the current JSF Program Office development plans we anticipate an F-35B
IOC in 2015 and an F-35C IOC at the completion of Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation in 2018.
Mr. Bartlett. Can you describe the Navy and Marine Corps program
and funding of unmanned aircraft vehicle sense and avoid programs to
further operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the National Airspace
System?
Admiral Floyd. The Navy is funding on the order of $175M for
development and hardware procurement efforts associated with
integrating the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) aircraft into
the National Airspace System (NAS). These efforts include the BAMS
Program development of a Pilot-in-the-Loop Due Regard capability
providing a first generation Sense-and-Avoid system to be deployed
operationally in international airspace beginning in FY 2015. The Navy
is also leading a Central Test Evaluation and Investment Program
(CTEIP), developing a DOD-wide common Modeling and Simulation and Test
& Evaluation infrastructure for UAS programs. Additionally, the Navy is
working in coordination with NASA, the FAA, and other Services in the
development of standards and procedures for integrating UAS into the
NAS.
Mr. Bartlett. In your statement you note that F-35B and F-35C
initial operational capability (IOC) dates have not been determined by
leadership but you describe capabilities for IOC such as 10 F-35B
aircraft with software block 2B for the Marine Corps, and 10 F-35C
aircraft with software block 3F for the Navy. Based on the current F-35
development and procurement schedule, can you estimate what year the F-
35B and F-35C will be declared IOC?
Admiral Floyd. Not at this time. F-35B and F-35C IOC will be based
on the development and test program performance (in addition to how the
Department of the Navy defines IOC as discussed in your question
above). The Department is pleased with the F-35 progress in 2011, but
we require more definition in the program schedule, to include
operational test dates, before targeting a timeline with a specific IOC
date.
Mr. Bartlett. Just 7 months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified
in writing to the Congress that the Global Hawk system was ``essential
to national security,'' there was no other acceptable capability to
meet the requirement, and the Global Hawk was $220M cheaper per year to
operate than the U-2. Then the recommendation to terminate Block 30 is
a complete reversal of the USAF position just 7 months ago. Please
explain how an asset can be critical to national security and cost less
than the alternative, but just 7 months later be terminated?
General Holmes. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than
the U-2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit
1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13
Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to be
from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the
cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at $32K
per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership
Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in
the FY13 Budget Review.
After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The
Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements
for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between the
RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their normal operating locations and
the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although
money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.
In September 2011 following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, the DOD
Joint Requirements Oversight Committee modified the high-altitude ISR
requirement where the U-2 was deemed sufficient to meet that amended
requirement. Coupled with the austere budget environment, the
Department decided it could no longer afford additional investment
required for the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30.
Requirement: The Air Force further determined the U-2
(which remains viable until at least 2040) was sufficient to meet the
reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in
the RQ-4 is required to field a comparable capability to the U-2 and
was determined to be unaffordable.
Budget: The Budget Control Act was passed in August 2011.
Additional investment in the RQ-4 is not warranted given a significant
reduction in the Department's budget and because the U-2 remains
operationally viable to satisfy the reduced JROC requirements at
considerably lower total cost over the FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. Global Hawk was the first intelligence asset to the
Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami Relief effort and first to Libya, and by
all accounts it performed very well. In both of these cases, the Global
Hawk was able to fly into areas too risky for manned aircraft (an
active Surface to Air Missile site in Libya and a nuclear environment
in Japan). How will the USAF compensate for losing this
transformational capability?
General Holmes. The Air Force will continue to satisfy the
operational needs of the Combatant Commands through the Global Force
Management Process. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council adjustment
affirms the modified high-altitude ISR requirement is sufficient to
address any such future contingency.
Mr. Bartlett. The Department's combatant commanders have an
insatiable need for ISR. Intelligence data is routinely the number one
unmet requirement. While budget pressures require tough choices, the
decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft out of the active
inventory seems short-sighted. I question the proposal to scrap
aircraft currently providing intelligence support to our warfighters,
including those purchased as recently as last year. Can you tell me why
it is necessary to take these assets out of commanders' hands and
instead send them to the desert to rust?
General Holmes. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given that the U-2 meets the new requirement significant
reduction in the Department's budget. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings where $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some
of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the
Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as NASA Block 10
aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. A modified requirement where the U-2
is sufficient and a reduced budget where the Department could no longer
afford to keep investing in RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 drove the
retirement decision. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military
strategy and determined that the high-altitude ISR requirement
structure could be modified. The Air Force further determined the U-2,
which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
reduced requirements. Continued increased investment in RQ-4 was
required to field a comparable capability to U-2 and was determined to
be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ-4 was
not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department's budget
and an alternative system, the U-2, still operationally viable at
considerably lower total cost over the FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. The Congress has provided funds for 21 Global Hawk
Block 30 aircraft at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of
these aircraft have been built and are flying operational missions. My
understanding is that this budget proposes to eliminate the funding for
future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these relatively new
aircraft in favor of a Cold War-era system. Can you explain why the DOD
is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these
aircraft that are currently providing valuable intelligence to the
warfighter?
General Holmes. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the
decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B
savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global
Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the
U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of
$2.5B. Furthermore, the decision to sustain the U-2 leverages $1.7B
that was has been invested to modernize the weapon system. The U-2
fleet in its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours
(2040 and beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new
engines in 1994-1998, the entire fleet has completed new power
distribution (wiring), 21st century glass cockpit and modern avionics
processor upgrades. The U-2s are currently on a 4000-hour programmed
depot maintenance (PDM) cycle included in the budgeted operating costs.
Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to
benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as
NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS.
Mr. Bartlett. A recent CSBA report said that eight manned aircraft
with otherwise identical characteristics to a Global Hawk would be
necessary to maintain the same orbit as three unmanned Global Hawks. If
this is the case, how can it be that you determined the manned aircraft
to be the most cost-efficient solution? How does the Global Hawk Block
30 compare to the U-2 on a cost-per-ISR-hour basis?
General Holmes. The operating characteristics of the U-2 are vastly
different than those of the Global Hawk including operating altitudes,
sensor capabilities, stand-off ranges and mission effectiveness. A
nominal RQ-4 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) is four aircraft, and a nominal U-
2 CAP is five aircraft. The Global Hawk Block 30 has not matured to the
point where a true comparison of operational costs is possible.
Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis during the FY13
budget review using data from previous Air Force and Department
efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in
FY11 show both the U-2 and RQ-4 at $32K per hour. The Air Force did not
begin flying the RQ-4 Block 30 until March 2011, so there is only six
months of representative flying hour information in the database. Also,
the Air Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with the SIGINT sensor in
2011. The Air Force will begin flying with this payload in April 2012
and expects the RQ-4 flying hour costs to be greater than those for the
U-2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment
required for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30
program and save a net of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. How have the Department's decisions to reduce Block
30 quantities while at the same time increasing requirements
(increasing the number of simultaneous sensors required) contributed to
the increased system cost of Global Hawk?
General Holmes. The Air Force decision to terminate the Block 30
program was based upon a reduced requirement rather than an increased
requirement. The requirement for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft is
to execute electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), synthetic aperture radar
(SAR), limited moving target indicator (MTI) and signals intelligence
(SIGINT) missions simultaneously. No change to the Block 30 requirement
factored into the decision to terminate the program. In September 2011,
the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent
adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-
altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance force structure
could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which
remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in
RQ-4 would have been required to field a comparable capability to U-2
and therefore, the RQ-4 was determined to be unaffordable. Continued,
increased investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given a significant
reduction in the Department's budget and an alternative system, the U-2
is still operationally viable at considerably lower total cost over the
FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership
Cost data for U-2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per
operational hour (that is, the cost per hour executing missions) for
Global Hawk is lower than U-2. This seems to be a much more relevant
number than cost per flying hour. How does this square with your claim
that Global Hawk operating costs are higher?
General Holmes. The total cost of keeping the Global Hawk Block 30
and continuing the investment to improve the RQ-4 to reach a comparable
capability with U-2 was more expensive than keeping the U-2. As a
result, the Department chose to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced
budget environment since the U-2 is sufficient to meet the requirement
and remains viable through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reduced the high-altitude ISR requirement, and the AF budget
reduced to where the Department could no longer afford to keep
investing in the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: In September
2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent
adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-
altitude ISR requirements could be modified. The Air Force further
determined the U-2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was
sufficient to meet these modified requirements. Continued increased
investment in RQ-4 was required to field a comparable capability to U-2
and was determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased
investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given a significant reduction in
the Department's budget and an alternative system, the U-2, is still
operationally viable at a considerably lower cost over the FYDP.
Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the U-2
is employed at its normal operational distance, shows the U-2 cost is
comparable to the RQ-4 cost. The latest actual CPFH data shows that
both platforms are operating at $32K per hour.
Mr. Bartlett. What is the cost comparison for operating U-2
compared to Global Hawk? What is the difference in the cost per mission
for each? How much of the U-2 fleet is available to perform all ISR
missions?
General Holmes. The cost per flight hour is roughly the same. The
U-2 costs $320K per 10-hour Multi-INT mission and the RQ-4 $640K per
20-hour Single-INT mission. There are 27 U-2 ``single seaters'' of
which one is always rotating through depot level maintenance, and two
utilized as test birds (capable of flying missions, but not typically
utilized for that purpose). Thus, there are 24 mission-capable U-2
aircraft at any given time.
Mr. Bartlett. If the U-2 is extended until 2025, and the system
that was slated to replace it is cancelled, what is your plan for
replacing the U-2? How much will it cost to modernize and maintain the
Cold War-era U-2 for another 15 years?
General Holmes. There is no projected U-2 retirement date. The U-2
aircraft remains viable until 2040 and meets all sensor requirements
currently tasked by the Combatant Commands. The Air Force will invest
approximately $68 million per year in sustainment and enhancement
modifications to ensure platform modernization and maintenance.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand the Department's Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) performed a detailed cost analysis associated
with the decision to terminate and mothball the Global Hawk Block 30
program. Please share this analysis with the Congress so it can better
understand the analytical foundation of this decision. Provide a
detailed cost assessment including the basis of costs for both
sustainment and procurement through 2025.
General Holmes. In support of the FY13 President's Budget Request
(PBR), the USAF analyzed the operational output of both the RQ-4 and
the U-2 using existing CONOPS for both aircraft and determined that U-2
capability was sufficient for operational needs. When analyzed in this
context, the U-2 and RQ-4 operating costs were nearly equal. Given
comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required
for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and
save a net of $2.5B. The CAPE conducted their own independent cost
analysis based on three scenarios to come to the conclusion that the U-
2 was the more affordable option to meet the newly reduced requirement.
The Air Force will defer to CAPE to provide Congress the details of
their independent cost analysis.
Mr. Bartlett. Given our alarming and unsustainable national debt,
American taxpayers expect and deserve that Congress will make the
difficult decisions to restore fiscal responsibility. However, these
decisions cannot be short-sighted or made at the expense of our long-
term budget or national security needs. Please detail how terminating a
new cutting-edge platform, Global Hawk Block 30, is less expensive than
extending the life of an aging platform, U-2, which will require
increased investments in coming years is a fiscally responsible
decision over the next decade.
General Holmes. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement and the significant
reduction in the Department's budget. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although
money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some
of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the
Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as NASA Block 10
aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. The total cost of keeping the Global
Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ-4 to
reach a comparable capability with U-2 was more expensive than keeping
the U-2. As a result, the Department chose to save $2.5B across the
FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U-2 is sufficient to
meet the requirement and remains viable through 2040. The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude ISR
requirement, and the AF budget reduced to where the Department could no
longer afford to keep investing in the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30.
Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be modified. The
Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements.
Continued increased investment in RQ-4 was required to field a
comparable capability to U-2 and was determined to be unaffordable.
Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given
a significant reduction in the Department's budget and an alternative
system, the U-2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower
cost over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour
(CPFH) data, when the U-2 is employed at its normal operational
distance, shows the U-2 cost is comparable to the RQ-4 cost. The latest
actual CPFH data shows that both platforms are operating at $32K per
hour.
Mr. Bartlett. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the
efficiency for every program. At a macro level it is clear that an
unmanned system can fly longer and further than a manned system. A
recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail how unmanned systems
feature one-third the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it
is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our
nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing
exceptionally well in theater for a five-decade-old manned system.
General Holmes. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than
the U-2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit
1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13
Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to be
from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the
cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at $32K
per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership
Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in
the FY13 Budget Review. After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military
strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR
requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-
2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet
those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this
newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the
RQ-4 Block 30, which still needed approximately $800M in investment to
achieve sensor parity with the U-2, was not prudent given there is no
difference in the operating costs between the RQ-4 and U-2 when
operating from their normal operating locations and the U-2 meets the
new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk
Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with
the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to
continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted
in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. Can you please provide us details on how the Global
Hawk has been used to support operations worldwide over the past year?
Please provide both classified and unclassified details of how Global
Hawk is being used
General Holmes. In Libya, Global Hawk provided electro-optical,
infrared, and synthetic aperture radar and was used in a traditional
ISR role with dynamic responsiveness due to its enhanced duration/dwell
time and the ability to fill gaps between other ISR collects. Overall,
Global Hawk was successful in Operation Odyssey Dawn and in its
continued support for Operation Unified Protector. Assessment details
can be made available at a higher classification. In the CENTCOM
theater, Global Hawk continues to support the combatant command with
both theater and tactical ISR. To date, RQ-4 has flown over 50,000
combat hours in support of CENTCOM operations. In a humanitarian/
disaster relief support role, Global Hawk leveraged its range and
endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following the Haiti earthquake,
Global Hawk executed a response mission in 12 hours effectively
providing initial situational awareness information, highlighting
earthquake damage, status of critical infrastructure and identifying
food/aid drop zones and indicators of mass population migrations. Eight
missions were flown, satisfying 2,621 targets. In Japan, Global Hawk
capitalized on its range and endurance to be overhead in 21 hours.
Imagery products were provided to the Secretary of State within 40
minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure damage assessment,
supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of evacuation support,
Global Hawk collection focused on the Fukushima nuclear power plant.
Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, Japan allowed PACOM to use
the Global Hawk within the 20 km nuclear engagement zone. Infrared
imagery taken directly over the top of the reactors allowed engineers
to frequently monitor core temperature levels. In 21 missions and 300
on-station hours, Global Hawk collected more than 3,000 images.
Mr. Bartlett. The Department based its Global Hawk Block 30
divestment decision on it being more expensive to operate than the U-2.
Can you explain how the Department determined these costs?
General Holmes. The Department of Defense conducted an analysis
during the FY13 budget review using data from previous Air Force and
DOD efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database
figures in FY11 show the U-2 at $32K per hour and the RQ-4 also at $32K
per hour. However, costs for the U-2 included SIGINT sensors, but the
Air Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with its SIGINT sensors in
2011. The Air Force will begin flying Global Hawk with SIGINT sensors
in April 2012 and expects the RQ-4 flying hour costs to become greater
than those for the U-2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given
the large investment required for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to
divest the Block 30 program and save a net of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. General Schwartz mentioned Operations and Support
costs are issue for the Global Hawk program. When the decision was made
to retire the U-2 a few years back, specific costs (base support,
infrastructure and indirect support) were allocated to Global Hawk. As
a result, these costs have inflated the Global Hawk cost per flight
hour while the U-2's cost per flight hour has decreased. Did the USAF
look at doing an apples-to-apples comparison of costs for both systems?
If not, why not?
General Holmes. The Department of Defense conducted an analysis
during the FY13 budget review using data from previous Air Force and
DOD efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database
figures in FY11 show the U-2 at $32K per hour and the RQ-4 also at $32K
per hour. However, costs for the U-2 included SIGINT sensors, but the
Air Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with its SIGINT sensors in
2011. The Air Force will begin flying Global Hawk with SIGINT sensors
in April 2012 and expects the RQ-4 flying hour costs to become greater
than those for the U-2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given
the large investment required for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to
divest the Block 30 program and save a net of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. Can you describe the Air Force's program and funding
of unmanned aircraft vehicle sense and avoid programs to further
operation of unmanned aircraft vehicles in the National Airspace
System?
General Holmes. The United States Air Force and Department of
Defense (DOD) are developing near term Ground Based Sense and Avoid
(GBSAA) and long term Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) solutions to
further remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) access to the National Airspace
System (NAS). However, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
not yet defined performance parameters for critical flight safety
aspects including FAA Part 91 Code of Federal Regulations requirements
for ``well clear'' and ``see and avoid''. Currently, Air Force/DOD
GBSAA and ABSAA solutions are being developed to meet DOD's
interpretation of flight safety requirements. The Air Force is working
prototypes of both systems and continuing research in human factors
systems and terminal area operations.
Funding Summary: Required/Programmed ($M)
GBSAA funding data: FY09-FY11: $4.7/$4.7; FY12: $4.175/$4.175;
FY13: $1.07/$1.07; FY14: $ .1/$ .1
The first prototype GBSAA system is expected to be operational by
Fall 2012 and is currently being tested at Gray Butte range (near
Edwards AFB) and Cannon AFB. Once the proof of concept and prototype
are validated, the system will be fielded and installed at these RPA
bases to facilitate access to the NAS: Grand Forks AFB, Ft Drum
(Syracuse), Beale AFB, Anderson AFB Guam, and Southern California
Logistics Airport.
Funding Summary: Required/Programmed ($M)
ABSAA funding data: FY09-FY11: $28/$28; FY12: $9/$9; FY13: $19/$19;
FY14: $45/$45
ABSAA is a multiphase program. Common ABSAA Phase 1(a) provides the
foundation for autonomous ABSAA capability for Global Hawk, Broad Area
Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) and other medium altitude RPA. A program
completion timeline is not yet available.
Mr. Bartlett. In your statement you describe a decreased fighter
force structure of 1,900 total fighter aircraft as ``an increased
risk'' to carry out the National Military Strategy, compared to last
year's 2,000 fighter aircraft inventory as ``some risk.'' Please
describe the increased risks in terms of meeting military objectives.
What actions is the Air Force taking to reduce this risk? What actions
can the Congress take to reduce this risk?
General Holmes. The Budget Control act drove the Air Force to
assume more risk to meet fiscal guidance. The new strategy states the
force ``will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged
stability operations.'' As a result, reduced demand on the force,
combined with the assumption of increased risk, requires fewer
aircraft. Increased risk means objectives may take longer to
accomplish, and the force may have higher potential losses. The Air
Force is constantly assessing how to balance risk across all of its
portfolios so as to best utilize its resources and assets while
optimizing needed combat capability. As far as actions Congress can
take, fully funding the President's Budget helps reduce uncertainty and
therefore risk.
Mr. Bartlett. Just 7 months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified
in writing to the Congress that the Global Hawk system was ``essential
to national security,'' there was no other acceptable capability to
meet the requirement, and the Global Hawk was $220M cheaper per year to
operate than the U-2. Then the recommendation to terminate Block 30 is
a complete reversal of the USAF position just 7 months ago. Please
explain how an asset can be critical to national security and cost less
than the alternative, but just 7 months later be terminated?
General Posner. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than
the U-2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit
1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13
Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to be
from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the
cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at $32K
per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership
Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in
the FY13 Budget Review.
After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The
Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements
for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between the
RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their normal operating locations and
the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although
money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.
In September 2011 following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, the DOD
Joint Requirements Oversight Committee modified the high-altitude ISR
requirement where the U-2 was deemed sufficient to meet that amended
requirement. Coupled with the austere budget environment, the
Department decided it could no longer afford additional investment
required for the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30.
Requirement: The Air Force further determined the U-2
(which remains viable until at least 2040) was sufficient to meet the
reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in
the RQ-4 is required to field a comparable capability to the U-2 and
was determined to be unaffordable.
Budget: The Budget Control Act was passed in August 2011.
Additional investment in the RQ-4 is not warranted given a significant
reduction in the Department's budget and because the U-2 remains
operationally viable to satisfy the reduced JROC requirements at
considerably lower total cost over the FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. Global Hawk was the first intelligence asset to the
Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami Relief effort and first to Libya, and by
all accounts it performed very well. In both of these cases, the Global
Hawk was able to fly into areas too risky for manned aircraft (an
active Surface to Air Missile site in Libya and a nuclear environment
in Japan). How will the USAF compensate for losing this
transformational capability?
General Posner. The Air Force will continue to satisfy the
operational needs of the Combatant Commands through the Global Force
Management Process. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council adjustment
affirms the modified high-altitude ISR requirement is sufficient to
address any such future contingency.
Mr. Bartlett. The Department's combatant commanders have an
insatiable need for ISR. Intelligence data is routinely the number one
unmet requirement. While budget pressures require tough choices, the
decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft out of the active
inventory seems short-sighted. I question the proposal to scrap
aircraft currently providing intelligence support to our warfighters,
including those purchased as recently as last year. Can you tell me why
it is necessary to take these assets out of commanders' hands and
instead send them to the desert to rust?
General Posner. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given that the U-2 meets the new requirement significant
reduction in the Department's budget. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings where $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some
of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the
Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as NASA Block 10
aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. A modified requirement where the U-2
is sufficient and a reduced budget where the Department could no longer
afford to keep investing in RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 drove the
retirement decision. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military
strategy and determined that the high-altitude ISR requirement
structure could be modified. The Air Force further determined the U-2,
which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
reduced requirements. Continued increased investment in RQ-4 was
required to field a comparable capability to U-2 and was determined to
be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ-4 was
not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department's budget
and an alternative system, the U-2, still operationally viable at
considerably lower total cost over the FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. The Congress has provided funds for 21 Global Hawk
Block 30 aircraft at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of
these aircraft have been built and are flying operational missions. My
understanding is that this budget proposes to eliminate the funding for
future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these relatively new
aircraft in favor of a Cold War-era system. Can you explain why the DOD
is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these
aircraft that are currently providing valuable intelligence to the
warfighter?
General Posner. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the
decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B
savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global
Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the
U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of
$2.5B. Furthermore, the decision to sustain the U-2 leverages $1.7B
that was has been invested to modernize the weapon system. The U-2
fleet in its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours
(2040 and beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new
engines in 1994-1998, the entire fleet has completed new power
distribution (wiring), 21st century glass cockpit and modern avionics
processor upgrades. The U-2s are currently on a 4000-hour programmed
depot maintenance (PDM) cycle included in the budgeted operating costs.
Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to
benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as
NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS.
Mr. Bartlett. A recent CSBA report said that eight manned aircraft
with otherwise identical characteristics to a Global Hawk would be
necessary to maintain the same orbit as three unmanned Global Hawks. If
this is the case, how can it be that you determined the manned aircraft
to be the most cost-efficient solution? How does the Global Hawk Block
30 compare to the U-2 on a cost-per-ISR-hour basis?
General Posner. The operating characteristics of the U-2 are vastly
different than those of the Global Hawk including operating altitudes,
sensor capabilities, stand-off ranges and mission effectiveness. A
nominal RQ-4 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) is four aircraft, and a nominal U-
2 CAP is five aircraft. The Global Hawk Block 30 has not matured to the
point where a true comparison of operational costs is possible.
Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis during the FY13
budget review using data from previous Air Force and Department
efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in
FY11 show both the U-2 and RQ-4 at $32K per hour. The Air Force did not
begin flying the RQ-4 Block 30 until March 2011, so there is only six
months of representative flying hour information in the database. Also,
the Air Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with the SIGINT sensor in
2011. The Air Force will begin flying with this payload in April 2012
and expects the RQ-4 flying hour costs to be greater than those for the
U-2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment
required for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30
program and save a net of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. How have the Department's decisions to reduce Block
30 quantities while at the same time increasing requirements
(increasing the number of simultaneous sensors required) contributed to
the increased system cost of Global Hawk?
General Posner. The Air Force decision to terminate the Block 30
program was based upon a reduced requirement rather than an increased
requirement. The requirement for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft is
to execute electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), synthetic aperture radar
(SAR), limited moving target indicator (MTI) and signals intelligence
(SIGINT) missions simultaneously. No change to the Block 30 requirement
factored into the decision to terminate the program. In September 2011,
the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent
adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-
altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance force structure
could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which
remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in
RQ-4 would have been required to field a comparable capability to U-2
and therefore, the RQ-4 was determined to be unaffordable. Continued,
increased investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given a significant
reduction in the Department's budget and an alternative system, the U-2
is still operationally viable at considerably lower total cost over the
FYDP.
Mr. Bartlett. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership
Cost data for U-2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per
operational hour (that is, the cost per hour executing missions) for
Global Hawk is lower than U-2. This seems to be a much more relevant
number than cost per flying hour. How does this square with your claim
that Global Hawk operating costs are higher?
General Posner. The total cost of keeping the Global Hawk Block 30
and continuing the investment to improve the RQ-4 to reach a comparable
capability with U-2 was more expensive than keeping the U-2. As a
result, the Department chose to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced
budget environment since the U-2 is sufficient to meet the requirement
and remains viable through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reduced the high-altitude ISR requirement, and the AF budget
reduced to where the Department could no longer afford to keep
investing in the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: In September
2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent
adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-
altitude ISR requirements could be modified. The Air Force further
determined the U-2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was
sufficient to meet these modified requirements. Continued increased
investment in RQ-4 was required to field a comparable capability to U-2
and was determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased
investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given a significant reduction in
the Department's budget and an alternative system, the U-2, is still
operationally viable at a considerably lower cost over the FYDP.
Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the U-2
is employed at its normal operational distance, shows the U-2 cost is
comparable to the RQ-4 cost. The latest actual CPFH data shows that
both platforms are operating at $32K per hour.
Mr. Bartlett. What is the cost comparison for operating U-2
compared to Global Hawk? What is the difference in the cost per mission
for each? How much of the U-2 fleet is available to perform all ISR
missions?
General Posner. The cost per flight hour is roughly the same. The
U-2 costs $320K per 10-hour Multi-INT mission and the RQ-4 $640K per
20-hour Single-INT mission. There are 27 U-2 ``single seaters'' of
which one is always rotating through depot level maintenance, and two
utilized as test birds (capable of flying missions, but not typically
utilized for that purpose). Thus, there are 24 mission-capable U-2
aircraft at any given time.
Mr. Bartlett. If the U-2 is extended until 2025, and the system
that was slated to replace it is cancelled, what is your plan for
replacing the U-2? How much will it cost to modernize and maintain the
Cold War-era U-2 for another 15 years?
General Posner. There is no projected U-2 retirement date. The U-2
aircraft remains viable until 2040 and meets all sensor requirements
currently tasked by the Combatant Commands. The Air Force will invest
approximately $68 million per year in sustainment and enhancement
modifications to ensure platform modernization and maintenance.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand the Department's Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) performed a detailed cost analysis associated
with the decision to terminate and mothball the Global Hawk Block 30
program. Please share this analysis with the Congress so it can better
understand the analytical foundation of this decision. Provide a
detailed cost assessment including the basis of costs for both
sustainment and procurement through 2025.
General Posner. In support of the FY13 President's Budget Request
(PBR), the USAF analyzed the operational output of both the RQ-4 and
the U-2 using existing CONOPS for both aircraft and determined that U-2
capability was sufficient for operational needs. When analyzed in this
context, the U-2 and RQ-4 operating costs were nearly equal. Given
comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required
for the RQ-4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and
save a net of $2.5B. The CAPE conducted their own independent cost
analysis based on three scenarios to come to the conclusion that the U-
2 was the more affordable option to meet the newly reduced requirement.
The Air Force will defer to CAPE to provide Congress the details of
their independent cost analysis.
Mr. Bartlett. Given our alarming and unsustainable national debt,
American taxpayers expect and deserve that Congress will make the
difficult decisions to restore fiscal responsibility. However, these
decisions cannot be short-sighted or made at the expense of our long-
term budget or national security needs. Please detail how terminating a
new cutting-edge platform, Global Hawk Block 30, is less expensive than
extending the life of an aging platform, U-2, which will require
increased investments in coming years is a fiscally responsible
decision over the next decade.
General Posner. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and
determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be
reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable
until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security
requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force
structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was
not prudent given the U-2 meets the new requirement and the significant
reduction in the Department's budget. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although
money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some
of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the
Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP-RTIP programs, as well as NASA Block 10
aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. The total cost of keeping the Global
Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ-4 to
reach a comparable capability with U-2 was more expensive than keeping
the U-2. As a result, the Department chose to save $2.5B across the
FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U-2 is sufficient to
meet the requirement and remains viable through 2040. The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude ISR
requirement, and the AF budget reduced to where the Department could no
longer afford to keep investing in the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30.
Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be modified. The
Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements.
Continued increased investment in RQ-4 was required to field a
comparable capability to U-2 and was determined to be unaffordable.
Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ-4 was not warranted given
a significant reduction in the Department's budget and an alternative
system, the U-2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower
cost over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour
(CPFH) data, when the U-2 is employed at its normal operational
distance, shows the U-2 cost is comparable to the RQ-4 cost. The latest
actual CPFH data shows that both platforms are operating at $32K per
hour.
Mr. Bartlett. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the
efficiency for every program. At a macro level it is clear that an
unmanned system can fly longer and further than a manned system. A
recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail how unmanned systems
feature one-third the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it
is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our
nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing
exceptionally well in theater for a five-decade-old manned system.
General Posner. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than
the U-2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit
1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13
Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to be
from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the
cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at $32K
per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership
Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in
the FY13 Budget Review. After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint
Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military
strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR
requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-
2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet
those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this
newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the
RQ-4 Block 30, which still needed approximately $800M in investment to
achieve sensor parity with the U-2, was not prudent given there is no
difference in the operating costs between the RQ-4 and U-2 when
operating from their normal operating locations and the U-2 meets the
new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ-4 Global Hawk
Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with
the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to
continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP. This resulted
in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. Can you please provide us details on how the Global
Hawk has been used to support operations worldwide over the past year?
Please provide both classified and unclassified details of how Global
Hawk is being used
General Posner. In Libya, Global Hawk provided electro-optical,
infrared, and synthetic aperture radar and was used in a traditional
ISR role with dynamic responsiveness due to its enhanced duration/dwell
time and the ability to fill gaps between other ISR collects. Overall,
Global Hawk was successful in Operation Odyssey Dawn and in its
continued support for Operation Unified Protector. Assessment details
can be made available at a higher classification. In the CENTCOM
theater, Global Hawk continues to support the combatant command with
both theater and tactical ISR. To date, RQ-4 has flown over 50,000
combat hours in support of CENTCOM operations. In a humanitarian/
disaster relief support role, Global Hawk leveraged its range and
endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following the Haiti earthquake,
Global Hawk executed a response mission in 12 hours effectively
providing initial situational awareness information, highlighting
earthquake damage, status of critical infrastructure and identifying
food/aid drop zones and indicators of mass population migrations. Eight
missions were flown, satisfying 2,621 targets. In Japan, Global Hawk
capitalized on its range and endurance to be overhead in 21 hours.
Imagery products were provided to the Secretary of State within 40
minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure damage assessment,
supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of evacuation support,
Global Hawk collection focused on the Fukushima nuclear power plant.
Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, Japan allowed PACOM to use
the Global Hawk within the 20 km nuclear engagement zone. Infrared
imagery taken directly over the top of the reactors allowed engineers
to frequently monitor core temperature levels. In 21 missions and 300
on-station hours, Global Hawk collected more than 3,000 images.
Mr. Bartlett. Regarding medium altitude manned and unmanned
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs, has your office
completed a comparative analysis of life cycle cost and operational
effectiveness of manned and unmanned systems such as the MC-12 aircraft
and the Predator and Reaper UAVs?
General Posner. Such a study has not been completed. The Air Force
inventory of ISR assets is envisioned to be complementary. Although
there is some degree of overlapping capability among these assets each
one brings unique capabilities to the force mix. The ISR force includes
the space based assets as well as the manned and unmanned airborne
platforms. We are continually evaluating costs and capabilities in a
constrained fiscal environment but there is not an effort to evaluate
manned vs. unmanned platforms because each of these classes of assets
brings complementary capabilities to the force mix.
Mr. Bartlett. The cost savings estimates for termination of Global
Hawk Block 30 did not fully consider additional costs to the Navy's
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program, which was going to benefit
from a shared production line, training and common basing.
Further, in citing cost savings of $2.5 billion in termination of
the Global Hawk Block 30 program, the Air Force doesn't provide comment
on the loss of operational capability.
Global Hawk Block 30s are currently flying operational missions in
Central, European, and Pacific Commands. These aircraft will be
returned to the U.S. by the end of this year and stored. The Global
Hawk has significant range and endurance advantages over the U-2. The
Global Hawk has near real-time sensor relay on all its aircraft, versus
a limited number of U-2 aircraft capable of beyond line-of-sight
intelligence data relay. What operational costs and risks are assumed
with the termination of the Global Hawk Block 30?
General Posner. The Air Force has provided resources to cover the
cost of the line closure. The actual cost increases are variable and
dependent on the length of time the line is closed. The Department of
Defense continues to work with the Air Force, the Navy, and the prime
contractor to capture the impact of termination. In September 2011, the
DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in
military strategy and determined that the high-altitude ISR requirement
could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2, which
remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
modified requirements. As a result, there will be no impact to
warfighting capabilities and peacetime support will be managed by the
current Global Force Management Process.
Mr. Bartlett. The Air Force reduces its procurement in the budget
request from 48 to 24 Reaper UAVs, from that projected last year. Why
is this being done?
General Posner. There are multiple planning factors that changed
for the MQ-9 program between the FY12 PB and the FY 13 PB. First, the
current attrition rates of both the MQ-1 and MQ-9 are lower than the
Air Force originally estimated in FY12 PB. The original estimate was
based on MQ-1 data. We have since accumulated significant flight hours
on the MQ-9 system with significantly lower than forecast losses. The
Air Force modeling experts have since applied actual MQ-9 data and
updated the estimate. Specifically, the Air Force projected it would
lose 77 MQ-9s across the FYDP but now projects it will only lose 11.
Additionally, the MQ-1 fleet is now planned to be operational until at
least FY23 instead of retiring in FY17. These factors, coupled with the
FY12 MQ-9 buy which delivers 48 aircraft in FY14, enable the Air Force
to achieve 65 combined MQ-1/9 Combat Air Patrol (CAPs) by 3QFY14 and
sustain them with the production profile contained in the FY13 PB. The
FY13 PB production profile eases the strain on the aircrew training
pipeline and enables orderly and efficient aircrew force structure
management as the Air Force transitions to an all-MQ-9 medium altitude
RPA fleet. The lower attrition rate allows for a lower production rate
of 24 aircraft per year while still reaching the 65 CAP capabilities on
time, in FY14. Ultimately, the FY13 PB is the best way to meet Air
Force requirements in this budget-constrained environment.
Mr. Bartlett. In late February, the Air Force informed the
committee that it planned to cancel the Light Air Support (LAS)
contract effective March 2, 2012. What is the new way forward to meet
the requirement of 20 LAS aircraft for the Afghanistan Air Force?
General Posner. The Air Force decided to issue an amendment to the
Light Air Support (LAS) Request for Proposal (RFP) to both offerors.
Air Force officials have met with both original offerors, Sierra Nevada
Corporation (SNC) and Hawker Beechcraft Defense Corporation (HBDC),
individually to review the amended RFP changes line-by-line. Both will
have time to submit comments on the draft RFP amendment, after which
the Air Force expects to release the final amended RFP on approximately
April 30. While the decision process will be event-driven, the Air
Force targets a source selection decision in early calendar year 2013.
This would allow first aircraft delivery to Afghanistan in third
quarter 2014.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
Mr. Kendall. The F-35 Program of Record (POR) does not contain any
capability to send video to a ground station. Video Down-Link, similar
to the capability recently added to legacy platforms, is a candidate
for Block 4 Follow-On Development. Within the F-35 POR, there is the
capability to send an image over the three datalinks (Link 16, Variable
Message Format and Multifunction Advanced DataLink). A ground station
properly equipped to receive information over these datalinks could
receive a still image from the F-35 in this manner.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
Mr. Kendall. Infrared pointer (``sparkle'') capability is not an F-
35 Program of Record capability. This capability is being considered as
a Block 4 Follow-on Development candidate.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
Mr. Kendall. The internal targeting pod, known as the Electro-
Optical Targeting System, has a field of view (FOV) of 3.54 degrees in
Wide FOV and 1.49 degrees in Narrow FOV. It can provide an additional
4x virtual zoom through digital processing. The FOV can be slewed
circularly around the aircraft's horizon and from 10 degrees above the
relative horizon to 90 degrees below the horizon, providing visibility
throughout the lower hemisphere subject to airframe and external stores
masking. The program of record for the F-35 includes an AN/A49 E-21
external missionized gun pod to be mounted on station 6 (centerline
station) of the STOVL and CV variants. The external gun pod is a fixed,
forward-firing system. The gun is not stored internally on the STOVL
and CV variants (there is an internal gun on the CTOL variant) due to
Service-specific mission requirements for increased fuel capacity and
mission range. The missionized gun pod attaches to the centerline
carriage location (station 6) which is currently only designed to carry
the gun pod and therefore has no impact on the specified F-35B or F-35C
weapons carriage capability.
Based on the December 2011 F-35 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR),
the cost per flight hour is $31,923 (BY 2012). This cost is based on
total system costs, such as mission personnel, contractor support,
depot overhaul, training, etc. that cannot be allocated to specific
subsystems. Consequently, the cost per flight hour of the gun cannot be
specifically identified.
The cost per flight hour estimate for the Joint Strike Fighter is
built upon a variety of mission profiles and weapons load
configurations. Additional limitations to annual aircraft flight hours
(other than cost) are the ability to generate sorties based on
personnel, equipment, and aircraft availability.
The program is in the midst of a 2-year ``should cost'' effort on
the O&S cost. This effort will continue through 2012. Over the next 12
months, the program will complete an F-35 Business Case Analysis (BCA)
and the results from the BCA will assist the Program Executive Officer
in refining the current F-35 support strategy. The BCA will also
identify the best mix of existing Service/Partner Organic capabilities
with that of the Industry team to develop the optimum long term best
value F-35 support solution. The Services, working in concert with the
program office, will continue to analyze options outside of the program
office's purview to reduce operating costs, such as reviewing basing
options and the sequencing of those actions, unit level manpower/
squadron size and discrete sustainment requirements. In addition, the
program has identified a number of Affordability Initiatives to help
drive down sustainment costs.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
Mr. Van Buren. Full Motion Video is a candidate for inclusion in
Block 4 follow-on development, approximately 2020.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
Mr. Van Buren. An IR Marker is a candidate for inclusion in Block 4
follow-on development, approximately 2020.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
Mr. Van Buren. The field of view of the Electro Optical Targeting
System (EOTS) in elevation is +5 degrees looking forward to -145 degree
looking aft. The azimuth field of view is 60 degrees in either
direction, for a total of 120 degrees. The gun was not put internally
because the USN/USMC felt it was more important to have 1,100 lbs more
bring-back potential for boat operations that to have an internal gun.
There are no current limitations on the program of record SDD weapons
when carrying a gun pod.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
Admiral Venlet. The F-35 Program of Record (POR) does not contain
any capability to send video to a ground station. Video Down-Link,
similar to the capability recently added to legacy platforms, is a
candidate for Block 4 Follow-On Development. Within the F-35 POR, there
is the capability to send an image over the three datalinks (Link 16,
Variable Message Format and Multifunction Advanced DataLink). A ground
station properly equipped to receive information over these datalinks
could receive a still image from the F-35 in this manner.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
Admiral Venlet. Infrared pointer (``sparkle'') capability is not an
F-35 Program of Record capability. This capability is being considered
as a Block 4 Follow-on Development candidate.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
Admiral Venlet. The internal targeting pod, known as the Electro-
Optical Targeting System, has a field of view (FOV) of 3.54 degrees in
Wide FOV and 1.49 degrees in Narrow FOV. It can provide an additional
4x virtual zoom through digital processing. The FOV can be slewed
circularly around the aircraft's horizon and from 10 degrees above the
relative horizon to 90 degrees below the horizon, providing visibility
throughout the lower hemisphere subject to airframe and external stores
masking. The program of record for the F-35 includes an AN/A49 E-21
external missionized gun pod to be mounted on station 6 (centerline
station) of the STOVL and CV variants. The external gun pod is a fixed,
forward-firing system. The gun is not stored internally on the STOVL
and CV variants (there is an internal gun on the CTOL variant) due to
Service-specific mission requirements for increased fuel capacity and
mission range. The missionized gun pod attaches to the centerline
carriage location (station 6) which is currently only designed to carry
the gun pod and therefore has no impact on the specified F-35B or F-35C
weapons carriage capability.
Based on the December 2011 F-35 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR),
the cost per flight hour is $31,923 (BY 2012). This cost is based on
total system costs, such as mission personnel, contractor support,
depot overhaul, training, etc. that cannot be allocated to specific
subsystems. Consequently, the cost per flight hour of the gun cannot be
specifically identified.
The cost per flight hour estimate for the Joint Strike Fighter is
built upon a variety of mission profiles and weapons load
configurations. Additional limitations to annual aircraft flight hours
(other than cost) are the ability to generate sorties based on
personnel, equipment, and aircraft availability.
The program is in the midst of a 2-year ``should cost'' effort on
the O&S cost. This effort will continue through 2012. Over the next 12
months, the program will complete an F-35 Business Case Analysis (BCA)
and the results from the BCA will assist the Program Executive Officer
in refining the current F-35 support strategy. The BCA will also
identify the best mix of existing Service/Partner Organic capabilities
with that of the Industry team to develop the optimum long term best
value F-35 support solution. The Services, working in concert with the
program office, will continue to analyze options outside of the program
office's purview to reduce operating costs, such as reviewing basing
options and the sequencing of those actions, unit level manpower/
squadron size and discrete sustainment requirements. In addition, the
program has identified a number of Affordability Initiatives to help
drive down sustainment costs.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
Mr. Sullivan. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer
this question.
Mr. Jones.When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
Mr. Sullivan. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer
this question.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
Mr. Sullivan. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer
this question.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
Admiral Skinner. The F-35 Program of Record (POR) does not contain
any capability to send video to a ground station. Video down-link
(VDL), similar to the capability recently added to legacy platforms, is
a candidate for Block 4 Follow-On Development. Within the F-35 POR,
there is the capability to send an image over the three datalinks (Link
16, Variable Message Format (VMF) and Multifunction Advanced DataLink
(MADL)). A ground station properly equipped to receive information over
these datalinks could receive a still image from the F-35 in this
manner.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
Admiral Skinner. Infrared pointer (``sparkle'') capability is not
an F-35 Program of Record capability. This capability is being
considered as a Block 4 Follow-on Development candidate.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
Admiral Skinner. The internal targeting pod, known as the Electro-
Optical Targeting System (EOTS), has a field of view (FOV) of 3.54
degrees in Wide FOV and 1.49 degrees in Narrow FOV. It can provide an
additional 4x virtual zoom through digital processing. The FOV can be
slewed circularly around the aircraft's horizon and from 10 degrees
above the relative horizon to 90 degrees below the horizon, providing
visibility throughout the lower hemisphere subject to airframe and
external stores masking. The program of record for the F-35 includes an
AN/A49 E-21 external missionized gun pod to be mounted on station 6
(centerline station) of the STOVL and CV variants. The external gun pod
is a fixed, forward-firing system. The gun is not stored internally on
the STOVL and CV variants (there is an internal gun on the CTOL
variant) due to service specific mission requirements for increased
fuel capacity and mission range. The missionized gun pod attaches to
the centerline carriage location (station 6) which is currently only
designed to carry the gun pod and, therefore, has no impact on the
specified F-35B or F-35C weapons carriage capability. Based on the
December 2011 F-35 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the cost per
flight hour is $31,923 (BY2012). This cost is based on total system
costs, such as mission personnel, contractor support, depot overhaul,
training, etc. that cannot be allocated to specific subsystems.
Consequently, the cost per flight hour of the gun cannot be
specifically identified. The flight hour profile that the JSF costs are
built upon is representative of a variety of mission profiles and
weapons load configurations. Additional limitations to annual aircraft
flight hours (other than cost) are the ability to generate sorties
based on personnel, equipment, and aircraft availability. The program
is in the midst of a two-year ``should cost'' effort on the O&S cost.
This effort will continue through 2012. Over the next 12 months, the
program will complete an F-35 Business Case Analysis (BCA) and the
results from the BCA will assist the Program Executive Officer in
refining the current F-35 support strategy. The BCA will also identify
the best mix of existing Service/Partner Organic capabilities with that
of the Industry team to develop the optimum long term best value F-35
support solution. The Services, working in concert with the program
office, will continue to analyze options outside of the program
office's purview to reduce operating costs; such as reviewing basing
options and the sequencing of those actions, unit level manpower/
squadron size and discrete sustainment requirements. In addition, the
program has identified a number of Affordability Initiatives to help
drive down sustainment costs.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
General Robling. Full Motion Video is a candidate for inclusion in
block 4 follow on development, approximately 2020.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
General Robling. An IR Marker is a candidate for inclusion in block
4 follow on development, approximately 2020.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
General Robling. The field of view of the Electro Optical Targeting
System (EOTS) in elevation is +5 degrees looking forward to -145
degrees looking aft. The azimuth field of view is 60 degrees in either
direction, for a total of 120 degrees. The gun was not put internally
because the USN/USMC felt it was more important to have 1,100 lbs more
bring-back potential for boat operations than to have an internal gun.
There are no current limitations on the program of record SDD weapons
when carrying a gun pod.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
Admiral Floyd. The F-35 Program of Record (POR) does not contain
any capability to send video to a ground station. Video down-link
(VDL), similar to the capability recently added to legacy platforms, is
a candidate for Block 4 Follow-On Development. Within the F-35 POR,
there is the capability to send an image over the three datalinks (Link
16, Variable Message Format (VMF) and Multifunction Advanced DataLink
(MADL)). A ground station properly equipped to receive information over
these datalinks could receive a still image from the F-35 in this
manner.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
Admiral Floyd. Infrared pointer (``sparkle'') capability is not an
F-35 Program of Record capability. This capability is being considered
as a Block 4 Follow-on Development candidate.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
Admiral Floyd. The internal targeting pod, known as the Electro-
Optical Targeting System (EOTS), has a field of view (FOV) of 3.54
degrees in Wide FOV and 1.49 degrees in Narrow FOV. It can provide an
additional 4x virtual zoom through digital processing. The FOV can be
slewed circularly around the aircraft's horizon and from 10 degrees
above the relative horizon to 90 degrees below the horizon, providing
visibility throughout the lower hemisphere subject to airframe and
external stores masking. The program of record for the F-35 includes an
AN/A49 E-21 external missionized gun pod to be mounted on station 6
(centerline station) of the STOVL and CV variants. The external gun pod
is a fixed, forward-firing system. The gun is not stored internally on
the STOVL and CV variants (there is an internal gun on the CTOL
variant) due to service specific mission requirements for increased
fuel capacity and mission range. The missionized gun pod attaches to
the centerline carriage location (station 6) which is currently only
designed to carry the gun pod and, therefore, has no impact on the
specified F-35B or F-35C weapons carriage capability. Based on the
December 2011 F-35 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the cost per
flight hour is $31,923 (BY2012). This cost is based on total system
costs, such as mission personnel, contractor support, depot overhaul,
training, etc. that cannot be allocated to specific subsystems.
Consequently, the cost per flight hour of the gun cannot be
specifically identified. The flight hour profile that the JSF costs are
built upon is representative of a variety of mission profiles and
weapons load configurations. Additional limitations to annual aircraft
flight hours (other than cost) are the ability to generate sorties
based on personnel, equipment, and aircraft availability. The program
is in the midst of a two-year ``should cost'' effort on the O&S cost.
This effort will continue through 2012. Over the next 12 months, the
program will complete an F-35 Business Case Analysis (BCA) and the
results from the BCA will assist the Program Executive Officer in
refining the current F-35 support strategy. The BCA will also identify
the best mix of existing Service/Partner Organic capabilities with that
of the Industry team to develop the optimum long term best value F-35
support solution. The Services, working in concert with the program
office, will continue to analyze options outside of the program
office's purview to reduce operating costs; such as reviewing basing
options and the sequencing of those actions, unit level manpower/
squadron size and discrete sustainment requirements. In addition, the
program has identified a number of Affordability Initiatives to help
drive down sustainment costs.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
General Holmes. Full Motion Video is a candidate for inclusion in
Block 4 follow-on development, approximately 2020.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
General Holmes. An IR Marker is a candidate for inclusion in Block
4 follow-on development, approximately 2020.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
General Holmes. The field of view of the Electro Optical Targeting
System (EOTS) in elevation is +5 degrees looking forward to -145 degree
looking aft. The azimuth field of view is 60 degrees in either
direction, for a total of 120 degrees. The gun was not put internally
because the USN/USMC felt it was more important to have 1,100 lbs more
bring-back potential for boat operations that to have an internal gun.
There are no current limitations on the program of record SDD weapons
when carrying a gun pod.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground
station (e.g. JTAC with a video receiver)?
General Posner. Full Motion Video is a candidate for inclusion in
Block 4 follow-on development, approximately 2020.
Mr. Jones. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match
Sparkle with Infra-Red energy?
General Posner. An IR Marker is a candidate for inclusion in Block
4 follow-on development, approximately 2020.
Mr. Jones. What is the field of view of the internal pod?
Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what
affect does that have on carrying weapons?
What will it cost per hour to fly?
Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the
aircraft can fly annually?
General Posner. The field of view of the Electro Optical Targeting
System (EOTS) in elevation is +5 degrees looking forward to -145 degree
looking aft. The azimuth field of view is 60 degrees in either
direction, for a total of 120 degrees. The gun was not put internally
because the USN/USMC felt it was more important to have 1,100 lbs more
bring-back potential for boat operations that to have an internal gun.
There are no current limitations on the program of record SDD weapons
when carrying a gun pod.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. The Air Force has announced its intention to reduce the
number of bases that will receive the Air Force variant of the F-35 in
order to reduce sustainment costs. Does the Marine Corps intend to
reduce the number of air stations that all will receive the F-35B? Has
the announced list of Marine Corps Air Stations scheduled to receive F-
35Bs changed in anyway?
General Robling. The Marine Corps completed the Environmental
Impact Studies EIS for JSF East Coast and West Coast basing in December
2010. The EIS' optimized the Joint Strike Fighter beddown locations and
validated the 4 CONUS air stations we currently have are sufficient and
any decrease in the number of air stations would have a detrimental
effect on the surrounding populations, operation, and mission
readiness. In addition to participating in Joint JSF training at Eglin
AFB, the Marine Corps plans to execute a rolling JSF transition of 4
air stations starting in 2012 with MCAS Yuma, AZ, followed in sequence
with MCAS Beaufort, NC, MCAS Miramar, CA, and MCAS Cherry Point, NC.
The transition is designed to retain operational capability of our
legacy aircraft, optimize MilCon efficiencies, and distribute the F-35
aircraft to support the training and deployments of the Marine Air
Ground Task Force.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBiondo. In your combined opening statements, you focused on
the importance of the Legacy Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and
the Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suites (CAPES) program for our
F-16 Block 40s through 52s fleet. While I agree that these programs are
key to keeping these aircraft relevant until the F-35 replaces them, my
concern is on the Block 30 inventory in the Air National Guard,
particularly those that maintain the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA)
mission.
The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey is currently the only Air
National Guard Fighter Wing flying ``Little Inlet'' Block 30s. I am
sure you both know that I have consistently pushed the Air Force and
Air National Guard to replace those aging aircraft with some next
generation fighter.
With that said, my concern has to do with the issue of ``fleet
commonality.''
Since the Air Force has proposed to re-classify or retire one
entire Block 30 ``Big Inlet'' squadron, are there any plans to shuffle
the Air National Guard fighter jet inventory with those F-16s to ensure
``fleet commonality,'' specifically for the 177th so they are no longer
the ``odd man out''?
Additionally, can both or one of you commit to providing me and my
staff with a briefing by the end of April 2012 to alleviate my concern
that the 177th will not succumb to future combat AOR limitations based
on their current iron inventory and to address where the 177th fits
into the roadmap to receive updated or next generation fighters?
General Holmes and General Posner. The Air Force addresses force
structure holistically across all of its components and missions which
include the Air National Guard. The Air Force's oldest F-16s remain
viable through the end of this decade, and as airframes retire newer
airframes will flow to support the Total Force. The Air National Guard
leadership has been and will continue to be active participants to
determine the best way forward and, as force structure and strategic
basing decisions are made, the Air Force will be happy [to] brief you
and your staff. Aircraft will be moved as necessary to ensure mission
requirements are met to support the National Military Strategy.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been the catalyst
in the development of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) market. The
volume of UAS flights for commercial and governmental non-military
applications could equal those being flown for military operations.
Future growth of the civil UAS market is dependent on the ability of
non-military UAS proponents to operate their UAS' in the National
Airspace System (NAS). As such, there is a strong innovative growth
market for testing, research and development. Inability to adhere to
FAA regulatory requirements is the major problem facing the military
and the commercial UAS sector. More specifically, Flight Rule 14
requires sense and avoid. Manned aircraft systems operating with
specified FAA control areas or with sense and avoid equipment are able
to adhere to this rule. Since UAS' do not have pilots on board or
collision and avoidance technologies, they are not currently able to
adhere to FAA rules. Congress has levied the requirement on the FAA
Administrator to develop plans to accelerate the integration of
unmanned aerial systems into the National Airspace System. Currently
the NDAA budget request contains $34.6 million for sense and avoid
technology development to further UAS operations in the National
Airspace System. Dr. Kendall, do you believe that the FAA has
articulated and documented the sense and avoid technology requirements
in sufficient detail to allow the DOD to develop a solution that will
allow UAS operations in these new airspaces? In other words, is the
$34.6M being spent on sense and avoid technologies going towards
fulfilling a documented FAA requirement with a defined acceptable
solution? Given the current FAA safety of flight requirements, sense
and avoid requirements and our technological capabilities, how long do
you anticipate it will take before we will be able to integrate UAS
into the National Airspace System?
Mr. Kendall. The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing
standards and safety case analyses to develop and field ground and
airborne unmanned aircraft system (UAS) sense-and-avoid technology. In
the short term, the Department is actively engaged with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve incrementally UAS access to
the National Airspace System (NAS) through changes to policy and
procedures. While the FAA has not articulated and documented sense-and-
avoid requirements, the Department, as a public agency, has the
authority and proven ability to self certify aircraft and systems for
safe operations. The sense-and-avoid funding in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 allows the Department to
continue its Sense and Avoid (SAA) standards and technology
development. The Department is sharing the results of its SAA standards
and technology development with the FAA and other public agencies so
that they can leverage our work while developing sense-and-avoid
technology requirements for the civil community.
The Department has made measured progress in increasing public UAS
access to the NAS through the UAS Executive Committee and changes to
the FAA's policies and Certification of Waiver or Authorization
processes. The Department is also working with the FAA on updating the
DOD-FAA UAS Memorandum of Agreement for Operations of UAS Systems in
the NAS to increase access for specific operations, particularly for
small UAS which make up the predominance of DOD UAS. DOD is also
currently working with the FAA through the UAS Aviation Rulemaking
Committee and the Next Generation Air Transportation System Joint
Planning and Development Office to develop the congressionally directed
FAA Civil/Public UAS NAS Integration Roadmap and Comprehensive Plan to
safely integrate civil UAS into the NAS. The roadmap and plan will
provide a timeline for the phased in approach to UAS integration into
the NAS.
Mr. Turner. There is no doubt that 5th generation fighters are
complex but critical to ensuring air dominance in any theater. In 1992,
the F-22 program unit cost was estimated to be $125M. There are some
estimates, including a GAO study to suggest that the F-22 unit costs
were $177M per aircraft. There are some in the aerospace industry who
would suggest that one of the reasons the F-22 fly away costs were so
high were due to the Air Force's ability to capture on economies of
scale. Initially, the Air Force wanted to procure 750 advanced tactical
fighters. The total number procured of which the last one being
delivered this year was 187. In all manufacturing sector, there is an
economy of scale to be achieved in the area of quantities of
production. Currently, the F-35 is being built at a rate of 2 aircraft
per month while the capacity is 18-20 aircraft per month. Based on the
economies of scale, this would suggest that we are paying a higher
capital per unit cost per aircraft. While I understand the significant
budget constraints which have been placed on the services, I also have
a responsibility to ensure that the American tax payer gets the best
available weapon system at an affordable cost. We may not be able to
afford a production schedule of 20 F-35s per month but there should be
some ``sweet spot'' in defining yearly quantities produced. What
actions is the Department currently taking to determine this ``sweet
spot'' and ensuring this does not become another F-22? What production
rate would you like to see to ensure we reduce the per unit cost of
this airplane?
Mr. Kendall. We have reduced Low-Rate Initial Production rates to
reduce concurrency with development and test until the design maturity
improves. While ramping to Full-Rate Production quickly would optimize
the production learning curve, it would likely not lead to the lowest
unit costs in the long-term due to required changes, modifications, and
retrofits. The procurement rates for the next few years are a balance
designed to continue to exercise the global supply chain and
manufacturing processes while at the same time avoid procuring too many
aircraft that will have to be retrofitted and modified following
continued discovery of changes. I believe our current strategy provides
that appropriate balance. As the program continues with testing, we are
progressively reducing concurrency risks. Concurrency should begin to
recede significantly in the 2015 timeframe, and we anticipate entering
Full-Rate Production in the 2019 timeframe. At that time, we anticipate
that the annual production rates, which will include U.S and foreign
buys, to be at economies of scale that result in more affordable unit
costs.
Mr. Turner. Numerous GAO reports highlight that the Department of
Defense continues to face a gap between its need to suppress enemy air
defense and its capabilities to do so. There are not enough existing
suppression aircraft to meet overall requirements. While the Navy is
currently procuring the EA-18G Growler as the electronic attack variant
of the F/A-18 services, the Growler is the only electronic attack
aircraft being procured by any service at this time. If the Air Force
is called to fight a peer competitor in the electronic warfare arena,
do you believe there are sufficient resources available? What is the
Air Force's plan to mitigate resource limitations on the electronic
warfare arena?
Mr. Kendall. The Department would utilize all the assets of the
joint force in a conflict with a peer competitor, not just Air Force
resources. As outlined in the Department's 30-Year Aviation Plan
released in March 2012, DOD is acquiring 5th generation fighter/attack
aircraft while maintaining sufficient legacy aircraft inventory
capacity, in addition to investing in enabler capability and capacity
such as electronic warfare. While the FY 2013-FY 2042 aviation plan
meets the national military strategy of the United States, the
Department continues to assess risk and the optimum investment strategy
as part of the FY 2014 budgetary and capabilities review process.
The Department's joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) forces,
including EA-18G, are a portion of the Joint concept of operations to
counter enemy air defenses. The Air Force's electronic attack
contributions to joint AEA forces include EC-130H Compass Call,
Miniature Air Launched Decoy Jammer, and self-protection capability for
strike forces. The combination of electronic protection capability for
airplanes, radars, and weapons systems that use the electromagnetic
spectrum coupled with stealth capability--like those of the F-22, F-35,
and the B-2--creates an effective integration of kinetic and non-
kinetic capabilities that will help mitigate the challenges and enhance
the joint effort in suppressing enemy air defenses.
Mr. Turner. Numerous GAO reports highlight that the Department of
Defense continues to face a gap between its need to suppress enemy air
defense and its capabilities to do so. There are not enough existing
suppression aircraft to meet overall requirements. While the Navy is
currently procuring the EA-18G Growler as the electronic attack variant
of the F/A-18 services, the Growler is the only electronic attack
aircraft being procured by any service at this time. If the Air Force
is called to fight a peer competitor in the electronic warfare arena,
do you believe there are sufficient resources available? What is the
Air Force's plan to mitigate resource limitations on the electronic
warfare arena?
Mr. Van Buren. The Department would utilize all the assets of the
joint force in a conflict with a peer competitor, not just Air Force
resources. As outlined in the Department's 30 Year Aviation Plan
released in March 2012, DOD is acquiring fifth-generation fighter/
attack aircraft while maintaining sufficient legacy aircraft inventory
capacity in addition to investing in enabler capability and capacity
such as electronic warfare. While the fiscal year 2013-2042 aviation
plan meets the national military strategy of the United States, the
Department continues to assess risk and the optimum investment strategy
as part of the fiscal year 2014 budgetary and capabilities review
process. The Department's joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)
forces, including EA-18G, are a portion of the Joint concept of
operations to counter enemy air defenses. The Air Force's electronic
attack contributions to joint AEA forces include EC-130H Compass Call,
Miniature Air Launched Decoy Jammer and self-protection capability for
strike forces. The combination of electronic protection capability for
airplanes, radars and weapons systems that use the electromagnetic
spectrum coupled with stealth capability--like those of the F-22, F-35
and the B-2--creates an effective integration of kinetic and non-
kinetic capabilities that will help mitigate the challenges and enhance
the joint effort in suppressing enemy air defenses.
Mr. Turner. It would appear as though the Air Force has a history
of maintaining the integrity of source selection and have had a number
of problems in this area. The selection of Boeing to build the next
generation of Air Refueling tankers marked the end of a procurement
process that dragged on for nearly a decade. More recently, the Air
Force informed the committee that it planned to cancel the Light Air
Support (LAS) contract. The Secretary of the Air Force said that the
Service Acquisition Executive was not satisfied with the quality of the
documentation supporting the award decision. This was after the Air
Force had expressed confidence in the merits of the contract award. The
Defense Business Board has also been critical of the Dept of Defense's
acquisition corp. The board has suggested the Pentagon should either
``professionalize'' the acquisition corps or ``civilianize'' program
leadership. What specific steps is the Air Force taking to ensure we
don't have a repeat of the KC-X tanker procurement or the Light Air
Support contact?
Mr. Van Buren. The Air Force continues its steadfast commitment to
``Recapture Acquisition Excellence.'' In 2011 we completed the
Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) chartered in 2009. This was the
largest and most significant acquisition reform launched by the Air
Force in the last decade. The AIP completed more than 170 process
improvements and of particular interest to your question, concentrated
on improving our source selection process by strengthening source
selection governance, improving source selection training, requiring
Multi-functional Independent Review Teams, establishing on-call source
selection augmentation, identifying/tracking personnel with source
selection experience, updating the acquisition planning process, and
simplifying the source selection process. Success was evident in the
fact that during 2011, the Air Force accomplished 209,500 contracting
actions with only one sustained protest. Furthermore, in November 2011,
Secretary Donley approved a follow-on effort to AIP called Acquisition
Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) 2.0, which will further our
efforts to improve the capabilities of our acquisition workforce. Among
other efforts, CPI 2.0 continues improving our source selection process
by re-engineering the competitive award process, implementing a more
effective contract award process and increasing source selection
experienced personnel. Once the LAS report is finalized and released,
we will incorporate any lessons learned into our CPI 2.0 effort.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ
Mr. Critz. The AF uses a mix of tactical aviation assets to meet
both service specific goals and national goals and objectives. Many of
the aircraft in the AF fleet are aging and require significant O&M
investments. Increased O&M costs cut into the service's ability to
procure new F-35. That is, reducing O&M costs will free up funds for
the procurement of next generation aircraft like the F-35. For legacy
tactical aviation aircraft, outdated materials and components must be
replaced to sustain mission availability and reduce O&M costs. Rather
than manufacturing replacement parts and components in a manner for
which they were first fabricated, which now has become increasingly
more expensive and sometimes not even possible, the AF should be
looking to leverage advances from the commercial aviation world when it
comes to maintaining its existing aging fleet of tactical aviation
assets. For example, through their influence on platform weight and
cost, materials are a key driver of legacy aircraft viability and the
affordability of sustained operations of the aging aircraft fleet. The
vast majority of material used in legacy aircraft aerostructures is
aluminum. Optimizing aluminum performance and affordability within the
existing fleet of aircraft is critical to meeting readiness,
sustainability, and affordability requirements.
1. Can you explain those efforts the AF is undertaking to leverage
past investments made by the commercial aerospace industry and the
domestic aluminum industry to sustain its fleet of aging tactical
aviation aircraft?
2. Is the AF working directly with those elements of industry that
have strong material expertise, strong design capabilities, and strong
advanced manufacturing processes to sustain the AF's fleet of aging
tactical aviation aircraft?
3. To what extent are elements such as the AF Research Laboratory
and AF Air Logistics Centers working with industry to address platform
costs, platform performance and life cycle costs?
Mr. Kendall. [The information referred to was not available at the
time of printing.]
Mr. Critz. The AIM-120D missile has experienced significant
production delays, mostly due to rocket motor production. As a result,
the budget request for Fiscal Year 2013 and beyond has been
substantially reduced. However, the capability the AIM-120D will bring
to the Air Force and Navy appears to be very important, given current
air-to-air threats.
1. Can you provide an update on the status of AIM-120D production?
2. What steps are being taken to get production back on schedule?
3. When will the Air Force and Navy get this weapon in the field?
General Posner. 1. As of 31 March 2012, 364 AIM-120D out of 552
contracted have been delivered (-188 to contract). Deliveries of the
Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs) are on schedule with 209
delivered out of 200 contractually required. In addition, Raytheon
Missile Systems is continuing to produce guidance sections (front end
of missile; 95% of work content) at rate with 201 awaiting rocket
motors. No AIM-120D All Up Rounds (AURs) have been delivered since
November 2011, due to the current challenges with rocket motor
production.
2. Rocket motors are the sole reason the AIM-120D program is
experiencing production delays, but several promising actions are being
taken to get production back on schedule. First, in 2009, a second
rocket motor source (Nammo) started qualification for the AMRAAM
program. Qualification is on track and the first rocket motors are
expected in July 2013. Second, an ATK (casing) and Nammo (propellant)
Limited Production Configuration (LPC) is being qualified as a near-
term solution to the rocket motor production issue. Qualification is on
track and rocket motors are expected in July 2012. Third, ATK
(currently the sole-source provider of AMRAAM rocket motors) is
continuing to investigate the root cause of the rocket motor failures
and is implementing process improvements. ATK's goal is to resume
rocket motor production in June/July. Raytheon is pursuing all three
options at the same time, and the AIM-120D could return to the
contracted delivery schedule as soon as February 2013.
3. The planned fielding date of the AIM-120D is 1QFY14. Dedicated
operational testing is on track to begin in June 2012.
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