[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
HALTING THE DESCENT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN
IRAQ
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 21, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-134
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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73-457 WASHINGTON : 2012
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey--
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California deceased 3/6/12 deg.
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
RON PAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CONNIE MACK, Florida ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID RIVERA, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
ROBERT TURNER, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired (former vice chief of staff of
the United States Army)........................................ 6
Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Retired, senior fellow,
Institute for the Study of War................................. 19
Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D., president, Institute for the Study of War. 27
Colin H. Kahl, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for a New American
Security....................................................... 34
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired: Prepared statement............. 9
Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Retired: Prepared statement. 22
Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 30
Colin H. Kahl, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 37
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
HALTING THE DESCENT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN
IRAQ
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2012
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. The committee will come to order.
I'd like to take just a moment, if I may, to comment on the
decision by our esteemed ranking member, the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Ackerman, who has announced that he will be retiring
at the conclusion of this session of Congress.
I've enjoyed working with the gentleman a great deal over
the years, during his service as chairman and ranking member of
this subcommittee and on the full committee as well, and other
capacities in the Congress. He's one of the more articulate
members of this body, and has brought with him wisdom to our
debates, as well as a healthy dose of sarcasm, I would say,
when needed, sometimes maybe not necessarily needed, but
usually it's a very good thing. But, I've always enjoyed his
contributions.
I guess we have plenty of time over the next,
approximately, a year, a number of months yet in this Congress,
to pay tribute to Mr. Ackerman. In fact, I'm sure we'll
probably do nothing more than that for a long time, and that
would not be enough, I'm sure, that the gentleman would
probably think, before he walks off into the sunset. But, in
the wake of his recent announcement, I thought it fitting to at
least say something at least briefly now, and I know we all
look forward to working with the gentleman for the rest of this
Congress, and I know the rest of the members of the
subcommittee and the full committee wish him well. So, we look
forward to working with him in the balance of this Congress.
Thank you very much.
I want to thank the members who are here and the ones that
will be coming, and the folks in the audience, and, especially,
our distinguished panel here this afternoon.
This hearing is being called to assess the current
situation in Iraq and how U.S. policy should address it. Since
the withdrawal of all U.S. Armed Forces from Iraq at the end of
2011, the situation on the ground has, in my view, degenerated
significant, in no small part due to a sectarian political
crisis which has been triggered by the actions of Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Shortly after the last American
convoy left Iraq, Maliki issued an arrest warrant for the Iraqi
Vice President, Tareq al-Hashimi, currently the country's most
senior Sunni official. This was followed by another provocative
and divisive decision by Maliki to remove Saleh Mutlaq, Iraq's
Sunni Deputy Prime Minister, without taking the appropriate
constitutionally-mandated steps.
Maliki's actions have been widely interpreted as part of a
brazen effort to consolidate his power by weakening Sunni
politicians whom he considers to be threats. And these
incidents, along with a recent uptick in violence, have set off
a crisis which, if not checked, has the potential, in my view,
to sink the entire country back into widespread sectarian
conflict that so many of our best men and women spent years
working to contain. Just this morning, al Qaeda in Iraq took
responsibility for a recent wave of attacks that have claimed
the lives of over 40 people, and that's just recently.
Any of these incidents viewed in isolation could perhaps be
written off as happenstance. When viewed together, however, and
when viewed in the context of the withdrawal of all U.S.
military personnel, it is difficult to deny at least some
causal link. For over 8 years, U.S. servicemen and women have
labored in Iraq and sacrificed beyond comprehension to achieve
real tangible gains.
Despite this, Iraq remains in a precarious position, and it
seems painfully clear to me, and to many analysts, that Iraq
requires a greater American investment than this administration
appears willing to make. Although the Iraqi army has progressed
remarkably from where it once was, it is plainly clear that
Iraq is not yet prepared to defend itself from the threat posed
by its nefarious neighbor to the east. And although Iraqi
democratic institutions have certainly come a long way over the
past years, the current political crisis makes it all to clear
that the work is not yet finished. Many of us in Congress
warned long before that last convoy left that country of what
would likely come to pass, and yet the administration failed to
heed any of the obvious warning signs.
It is with these concerns in mind that the U.S. and Iraq
labored to negotiate an agreement which would maintain a small
U.S. troop presence into 2012. For months the administration
had allayed Congressional concerns of potential backsliding by
offering reassurance that the U.S. and Iraq would be able to
resolve the outstanding differences. Unfortunately, these
negotiations failed and it is my belief that they failed due to
mismanagement by the White House.
Amazingly, however, the White House is now trying to tout
the lack of agreement as a success, insofar as it has met a
promise President Obama made as a candidate while campaigning,
and it is now trying to downplay the current crisis. Saying
that Iraq is ``secure, stable and self reliant,'' as Deputy
National Security Advisor Denis McDonough recently did, does
not make it so. And to borrow a quote from then-Senator
Clinton, it requires ``the willing suspension of disbelief'' to
believe that our strategic interests are advanced by
withdrawing our forces from Iraq at a time when Iranian agents
seek to harm at every turn our country and its allies. Although
I understand that Iraq is a sovereign country, I believe there
is much more we could have done to secure a larger troop
presence beyond the end of this year. And as a result of our
inaction, we are left with greatly diminished influence over a
country that we all had once hoped would be a beacon of
democracy for the Arab world and a stalwart against the
repressive regimes which surround it.
With Iran looming to the east and Syria collapsing to the
west, Iraq sits in the middle of a dynamic, dangerous, and
deteriorating region. Iraq is, however, a developing democracy
and one which the U.S. has a profound interest in assisting.
This is a time not for us to carelessly cast aside allies, but
rather to consolidate gains in a region which is being shaken
to its very foundations. I fear, however, that this White House
places too high a priority on expediency and convenience, and,
as a result, we may indeed snatch defeat from the jaws of
victory.
I would now like to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and,
especially, thank you for those very kind words. I look forward
to working with you under your guidance and the rest of the
committee for the bulk of this year. I don't know what I am
going to do when I leave here, but one thing is for sure, I
certainly will miss all of you.
A strange narrative has taken root in some circles
regarding Iraq. In this telling of events, the colossal failure
and unmitigated disaster that was the war in Iraq was just
about to turn out to be a huge win for America, until the
terrorist-appeasing, freedom-hating, socialist Muslim Barack
Obama snatched bitter defeat from the jaws of victory.
This tale is untrue. From first to last, it is a lie. Such
a lie has to be admired for its audacity, but it remains
untrue, not only in the fervid imaginations of the ideological
zealots committed to defending the appalling wasteful, stupid
tragedy that was America's decade of misadventure in Iraq is
any part of this perverse claim true.
The very same hucksters of easy glory and empire on the
cheap are now selling this bundle of lies to expunge their own
responsibility and hang it instead around the neck of the
President, who more wisely than many, including myself, opposed
the misadventure in Iraq from the first place.
For my part, I can only say that after 9/11, as a New York
City Congressman, I was too ready to believe the Bush
administration's warning of an imminent and terrible threat. I
was, to be blunt, not prepared to accept that the President and
his principal advisors would lie, misrepresent, and deceitfully
spin about an undertaking of such magnitude and consequence,
but they did.
And much worse than the decision to go to war was the
tragic, unforgivable ineptitude of both the occupation and the
initial counter insurgency effort. All the many warnings of
danger from actual experts on Iraq, and post combat
reconstruction, both in and out of government, that were
blithely dismissed in the rush to war, came back to haunt us as
one by one they came to disastrous fruition.
We went to war deliberately ignorant and utterly unprepared
for the aftermath, and thousands upon thousands of Iraqis have
suffered the consequences of our foolish misadventure. Hundreds
of thousands became refugees. Thousands were murdered by their
own neighbors, and vicious ethnic cleansing thousands were
internally displaced and thrust into bitter poverty. These
tragedies, though unintended, lie on our Nation. We are
responsible.
Iraq, before the war, was an awful place, and SAddam
Hussein was a vicious, bloody-handed tyrant, whose death should
not be mourned by none. But, our decision to up end, and upon
ourselves no less, the seething cauldron of Iraq's sectarian
animosity, religious zealotry, and ethnic separatism, has to
rank as one of the stupidest decisions of American foreign
policy.
We sent 4,486 of our bravest men and women to their death
in this farce. More than 32,000 have come home injured,
crippled, or partially dismembered. The war in Iraq has cost us
more than $800 billion and the tab is still running with the
President asking for some $2 billion in FY 13 to continue our
efforts to help Iraq get back on its feet, as a unified,
independent, minimally-functioning state. Our financial
obligations to our veterans is also running in the billions,
and will not be fully paid for six or seven decades to come.
So, when I hear now the same cheerleaders for this immense
and ruinous disaster, lamenting the failures of the Obama
administration to firmly plant our military in Iraq's bosom,
when I hear then decrying this President's so-called failure to
understand Iraqi politics, and when I hear them expanding how
our righteous powers of coercion could readily set things right
in Iraq, without cost of complication, I know these ghastly
lies for what they are.
Iraq's future is in great doubt, and the failure of Iraq's
sectarian leaders to forge a more balanced and more viable
system for sharing power and resources, will continue to
produce conflict and stagnation until resolved. I believe we
can and should help them where appropriate, and consistent with
our own national interest and constrained resources, but,
ultimately, Iraq's affairs are not ours to arrange, and they
never rightfully were.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
I'd like to introduce our distinguished panel here now this
afternoon. First, we have General Jack Keane, a Four-Star
General, completed 37 years in public service in December,
2003, culminated as acting chief of staff and vice chief of
staff of the U.S. Army. As the chief operating officer of the
Army for 4\1/2\ years, he directed 1,500,000 soldiers and
civilians in 120 countries, with an annual operating budget of
$110 billion.
General Keane played a key role in formulating the surge
strategy in Iraq and continues to advise senior government
officials on national security and the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
General Keane is a career infantry paratrooper, a combat
veteran of Vietnam, decorated for valor, who spent much of his
military life in operational commands. He holds a bachelor of
science degree from Fordham University, and a master of arts
degree from Western Kentucky University, and we welcome you
here this afternoon, General.
And next will be General James Dubik, Lieutenant General
James M. Dubik, a senior fellow at ISW, currently conducts
research, rights and briefs on behalf of the Institute. General
Dubik assumed command of Multinational Security Transition
Command-Iraq on June 10, 2007.
During this final command, he oversaw the generation and
training of the Iraqi security forces. General Dubik has held
numerous leadership and command positions with Airborne, Ranger
and Light and Mechanized Infantry Units around the world. He
holds a bachelor of arts degree from Gannon University, a
master of arts degree from Johns Hopkins University, and a
master of military arts and sciences degree from the United
States Army Command and General Staff College.
His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense
Superior Service Medal, four awards of the Legion of Merit,
five awards in the Meritorious Service Medal, and numerous Army
commendation and achievement medals.
And again, thank you, General, for being here.
Next I'd like to introduce Dr. Kimberly Kagan, who is the
founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War.
She is a well-published military historian, who has taught at
the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale University,
Georgetown University and American University.
Dr. Kagan previously served as a member of General Stanley
McChrystal's Strategic Assessment during his campaign review in
June and July, 2009. She conducted nine battlefield
circulations of Iraq, and is a recipient of the Distinguished
Public Service Award, the highest honor the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff can present to civilians, who do not work
for the Department of Defense.
Dr. Kagan held an Olin Postdoctoral Fellowship in Military
History at Yale, and was a national security fellow in
Harvard's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. She received
her B.A. in classical civilization and her Ph.D. in history
from Yale University.
Thank you for being here, Doctor.
And, our fourth and final witness will be Dr. Colin Kahl.
Dr. Colin H. Kahl is a senior fellow at the Center for a New
American Security, focusing on Middle East security and defense
policy, and an associate professor in the Security Studies
Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service.
From February, 2009, through December, 2011, Dr. Kahl
served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
Middle East. In this capacity, he played a lead role in
designing and overseeing the draw down and transition strategy
in Iraq, and shaping the Pentagon's efforts to counter Iran's
nuclear weapons ambitions.
In June, 2011, Dr. Kahl was awarded the Secretary of
Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service by Secretary
Robert Gates. Dr. Kahl holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University
and a B.A. from the University of Michigan.
And, we welcome you here as well, Doctor.
As I said, we have a very distinguished panel here this
afternoon, and each witness will have 5 minutes. There will be
a yellow light that should be displayed when you have 1 minute
to wrap up. The red light will come on. We would appreciate it
if you would complete your testimony by that time.
And, General Keane, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED (FORMER VICE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY)
General Keane. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority,
congratulations, Mr. Ackerman, on your distinguished career,
and members of the committee thank you for inviting me to
testify today.
It is always an honor to join you, as it is to be with my
distinguished colleagues whom I greatly admire, General Retired
Jim Dubik, a true American patriot, continues to serve so
admirably, and Dr. Kim Kagan, who I spent many weeks with in
Iraq conducting assessments for General Petraeus, and who
provides truly outstanding leadership as President at ISW,
directing their unique and significant contributions. I am also
delighted to be here with Dr. Kahl, although I don't have the
pleasure of knowing him as well as I know my other two
associates.
My remarks today are intended to provide incite to the
current state of play in Iraq, and what the implications are
for the United States.
First and foremost, Iraq is a country of strategic
consequence, with an educated class of people, rich in oil
reserves, and one of only two Arab/Muslim countries that elects
its own government.
It is a tragic foreign policy blunder that the United
States forfeited our hard-earned influence in Iraq by not
leaving a residual military force in place. The purpose of this
force was to preserve and strengthen a fledgling democracy, to
continue to assist the growth and development of the Iraq
security forces, and most importantly to counter the Iranian
influence.
The precedent for such a residual force was successfully
demonstrated in post conflict Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea.
The origins of this blunder began with the arrival of our
U.S. Ambassador, who succeeded Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who had
just completed a 2-year successful assignment during the
critical surge period from 2007 to 2009. Almost immediately,
our envoy began to put the Maliki government at arms length,
despite the fact that the Iraq Government the previous year
initiated, and insisted on, a strategic framework agreement of
what was, in fact, an enduring strategic partnership with the
United States.
The United States Government rhetoric, particularly, from
the President of the United States, emphasized ending the war
and pulling out the troops, despite a very successful, first
ever, provincial election in January in 2009, where all
previously appointed governors were defeated, overwhelmingly
secular candidates were elected, and Iran surrogates suffered a
stunning defeat. This major political achievement was largely
ignored by U.S. policymakers.
In time, Prime Minister Maliki, I am confident, came to
recognize that his relationship with the United States
Government had change dramatically from what was previously his
experience under the Bush administration. This came to a head
when General Lloyd Austin, the Commander of Multinational Force
Iraq, recommended a residual force of 26,000, while the
administration's negotiating team, who came to Iraq, put a
force of 10,000 on the table.
Prime Minister Maliki, who was always a handful, and is a
bit of a nefarious caricature, instinctively knew this was not
a serious proposal with real capabilities and results, and we
are painfully aware that no residual force remained.
So, where are we now? Not surprising, the country with the
most influence on Iraq's leadership is no longer the United
States. It is sadly Iran. Meanwhile, these are the major
trends. Prime Minister Maliki has consolidated power and
cracked down on his major opposition party, Iraqiya. Iraqiya is
overwhelmingly Sunni. He does not want the Sunnis without some
political influence, he just wants them to be the Sunnis he can
manage and control.
Prime Minister Maliki, while opposed to calls for
federalism in principle, is not opposed to Sunni control of
Anwar and Nineweh Provinces, but he is opposed, and will
continue to block, any such movement in the Sunni/Shia
provinces Diyala and Saladin. He knows full well this can
spread to the southern Shia Provinces if he permitted them to
get away with it.
While Muqtada Al-Sadr was the critical support Maliki
needed to form a government, they are, in fact, political
enemies. Maliki sees him as a greatest long-term political
threat, and, thus, is trying to modulize Sadr while encouraging
other Shia factions. Sadr is pushing back by claiming the
Maliki government is incompetent and threatening that he will
pull out of the government.
The Kurds are weakened politically, and any opportunity
they may have to entertain to seize Kirkuk has past. They share
17 percent of the oil revenue and are dependent on Baghdad.
While Maliki's consolidation of power, and the purge of
Sunni opposition leaders is the most significant internal
development, the major external development is the influence of
Iran, and the United States is incapable of challenging Iran's
political pressure.
The Turks probably have more influence than the United
States sadly. No Iraq politician can take a step against Iran.
Their influence is on the rise, and Iraq and Iran's foreign
policy are aligned. Indeed, Iraq is supporting the Iranian
pressure on toppling the Bahrain monarchy with the stated
purpose of expelling the U.S. 5th Fleet.
The infamous Ahmed Chalabi is very outspoken in support of
it. And, of course, most ironic is Iraq's support of the Assad
regime, who facilitated the al-Qaeda transportation networks
through Syria into Iraq, and provided refuge for many of the
Iraq Sunni insurgent leaders and financial backers.
Iraq's support is more than just political and financial,
but provides Shia militia to assist the Iranian Quds force and
the Lebanese Hezbollah to kill the Syrian people and fight
against a free Syrian army.
Security in Iraq has deteriorated and is estimated to be
two to five times as high as reported. The reality is, the
United States has lost much of the intelligence eyes and ears
previously enjoyed.
As a result of these trends, certainly the United States'
relationship has changed dramatically, and Prime Minister
Maliki is playing a dangerous political game to enhance his
power, to diminish Sunni and Kurd influence, while not totally
disenfranchising the Sunnis, which could lead to a civil war.
Moreover, he will clash at some point with Sadr, which
could force a constitutional crisis, if Sadr pulls out of the
Coalition and Maliki refuses to form a new government or step
down, which is a likely outcome.
Let's face it. Maliki is manipulating the United States,
and nothing was more evident than a number of months ago when
he visited the United States and took a victory lap with our
President on the war being waged and being ended, and then
returns to Iraq and purges his political opponents.
So, what are the implications for the United States? First
and foremost, recognize that the character of the U.S.
relationship with Iraq has changed, and, therefore, so must our
means to influence. I believe we must move to much more of a
hands on, condition-based, and likely more confrontational
relationship.
For example, we just delivered the last M1 Abrams tank, No.
140, and we completed another foreign military sale to provide
F16s, despite the fact that Iraq is operating against U.S.
interests in Syria, Bahrain, aligning itself with Iran, and
deposing political opponents.
While we, the United States, no longer enjoy the political
clout a residential military force would provide, we are not
without influence. Where is the public condemnation by the
United States and the International Community, particularly,
those who shared in the sacrifice to free and stabilize Iraq?
Where is the condemnation and sanctions against Iraq for
supporting the killing of innocent Syria citizens, and
supporting the overthrow of the regime in Bahrain?
If Iraq is now aligned with our number one strategic enemy
in the region, Iran, our relationship must change despite the
extraordinary support we provided in liberating Iraq in 2003,
and stabilizing it against internal and external insurgency.
Facing up to this harsh truth now is, and must be, our first
priority. However, we must embrace Iraq on multiple levels
beyond the government-to-government relationship. Key to that
is the civil society relationship, which is our private sector,
non-government organizations, businesses, investment councils,
cultural and education exchanges.
Despite the fact the government, obviously, controls the
military, we should foster a middle to middle relationship,
which should include Iraq officers participating in education
and training opportunities in the States. Training assistance
visits to Iraq, and even opportunities for combined training
exercises in Iraq, should be part of our plan.
There is a next generation of officers who fought side by
side with us, who will eventually be the Iraq senior leaders,
and we should develop this relationship.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thank you, General.
And, now we'll hear from General Dubik.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES DUBIK, USA, RETIRED,
SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
General Dubik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ackerman, and
members of this distinguished committee. I'm very grateful for
the opportunity to speak about Iraq, specifically, the Iraqi
security forces.
I believe that while the situation in Iraq is complex, the
main issues with respect to the security forces are relatively
straightforward, and the solutions are also relatively clear.
My testimony derives from the fact that Iraq is an
important country to the United States. Our security goals
relative to Iraq are also important. As last stated by the
administration, those goals are listed in my written testimony.
The negative influence of Iran and the continue insurgence
attacks, the porous borders, the enduring presence of al-Qaeda,
all are threats to our interest, and to the Iraqi progress.
U.S. strategic inattention is also a threat. Though the
U.S. and Coalition part to the fighting is over, the war is
not, ending the fighting and ending the war are two related but
distinct activities. To end this war in a way to create a
better peace, and to secure our Nation's interest, we must
remain involved in Iraq.
Yes, in my view, a small U.S. footprint, low-cost approach,
is correct, and I do not advocate returning to large numbers
and large spending. But, a small footprint and low cost should
not mean inadequate relative to our own national security
objectives.
This year the trend in violence is increasing, and the
progression of attacks is even more disturbing, from isolated
individual attacks to isolated small-scale coordinated attacks,
to more frequent small-scale coordinated attacks, and now just
yesterday to a large scale nation-wide coordinated attack.
The next move along this continuum is sustained large-scale
coordinated attacks. This is not good direction. These attacks
are aimed at eroding Iraqi sovereignty, self-reliance,
increasing instability, creating more distance between the U.S.
and Iraq, and to prevent Iraqi economic growth. And, I think
the case can be made that these attacks will move Iraq closer
to Iran than to the United States. That is, these attacks are
directly countered to our security goals.
Granted that these are Iraq's problems to solve, and the
solutions are mostly political. Granted also, the Iraqi
security forces, military and police, have performed better
than many had predicted, but the Iraqi security forces still
need our help, and there are gaps in our current strategy.
The 150 plus members of the Office of Security Cooperation
in Iraq, and the current Department of State's approach to
police training, are unlikely to secure our interest. Both need
some modifications.
In the military side of things, we cannot execute our
current plan to use exercises in a rotational presence, without
some form of strategic framework agreement or status of forces
agreement. So, the first requirement is to be more aggressive
in negotiating the proper set of agreements so that our
security interests and the security interests of Iraq both be
achieved.
Even as this negotiation goes on, I believe there are five
important areas where we can advanced in the meantime. First,
intelligence. The U.S. should provide, in my view, in all the
right ways to protect that which needs protection, direct
support to the Iraqi police, military counterterrorist units.
Intelligence-based operations are key in all forms of war, more
important counterinsurgencies, and, perhaps, most important at
the end are the counterinsurgencies. The recent nationwide
coordinated attacks demonstrate that Iraqi intelligence is
deficient. Our goals would be better served if we provided
direct intelligence support.
Second, border security. The Iraqi borders are too porous.
A nation that cannot control its borders is less sovereign than
one that can. Not only would better border security contribute
to producing illicit trade and corruption, it would also
decrease various nefarious actors from crossing into Iraq, and
from Iraq into Syria. The Iraqis want to build this capability,
and we should do all we can to accelerate their desires.
Third, foreign military sales. The U.S. foreign military
sales program is too lethargic, too bureaucratic, to serve our
Nation's interests in Iraq. Three improvements are necessary.
First, during the surge period the Defense Department set up a
special task force to accelerate processing of cases and
delivery of equipment. This special task force should be
resurrected and placed once again directly under the Secretary
of Defense. Second, more case officers should be assigned to
the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq to help expedite
case development within the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
And third, Iraq should be granted a special status that allows
them to pay for their FMS cases, as those cases are executed.
Right now, they are still required to place 100 percent of the
cost of a case up front, even if this case is to be executed
over a number of years. Granting them this special status would
make purchase of U.S. equipment more attractive.
Fourth, police development. A better police force is linked
to each of the U.S. security interests. Yet, for whatever set
of reasons that are opaque to me, any objective assessment of
the current State Department plan to assist the Iraqi police
must be called inadequate. The Iraqi police are brave and
dedicated. True corruption remains too present, but we should
remember that the Iraqi police have suffered 9,000 casualties,
deaths, between 2003 and 2011, far more than any other
professional group. They remain one of the main insurgent
targets. The Iraqi police are trying desperately to make their
country safer. They are well on their way, but they still need
our help as well.
When last I spoke to the Deputy Minister of Interior, Adnan
Al-Asadi, he acknowledged his police need help in many areas,
and that he would like this help to come from the United
States. But, as he said publicly, the current plans are too
costly and deliver too little to what his police actually need.
Number five, military professionalization and leader
development. This is a generational challenge that has already
started, with the expansion of the US./Iraqi relations that
formed during the war. English language proficiency is a
limiting factor in expanding Iraqi attendance at U.S. or NATO
schools, but movement toward professionalization can be
accelerated by expanding capacities of schools in Iraq. Senior
Iraqi military officials would welcome this kind of
acceleration.
There are other areas in which the Iraqi security force
capacity is deficient, and I've listed them in my testimony.
But, the top five that I mentioned here are near-term security
force capabilities that are both in our Nation's interest and
can be largely paid for by Iraq.
We nearly lost this war once. Defeat was averted by
combined efforts of U.S./Iraqi and coalition security forces,
diplomats, U.S. and coalition Iraqi political leaders, and the
Iraqi people themselves, turned against insurgency. Following
the success of the surge period, we drew down our forces in a
responsible way, and although the US. coalition fighting is
over, our relationship should not end.
Thank you very much. I look forward to questions and
discussion.
[The prepared statement of Lt. General James Dubik
follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thank you, General.
Dr. Kagan, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KIMBERLY KAGAN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR
THE STUDY OF WAR
Ms. Kagan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member.
Iraq is not heading in a good direction. Administration
talking points attempt to deflect criticism by the President,
by comparing conditions today with conditions at the height of
violence and the height of the surge in 2007.
Vice President Biden, National Security Advisor Tony
Blinken, recently noted in a public speech that weekly security
incidents have fallen from 1,600 in 2007 and 2008 to 100 today.
He, and others, dismissed the notion that Iraq is heading
toward insurgency, terrorism and civil war. Reality is
different.
The discussion about security incidence is, in fact,
misleading. No one suggests that Iraq today is as bad as it was
at the very height of violence. Neither is it true, however,
that violence is continuing to fall.
Dr. Mike Knights, the Lafer Fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, recently noted that according
to an incident-based database that he produces at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, violence in February
was nearly double that of what it was in November, November,
2011.
Comparing violence today with violence in 2007 misses the
point. The fact is that violence has been increasing since the
Obama administration announced that it would be withdrawing
completely from Iraq, and the trends are getting worse.
These comparisons are also misleading, because they are not
apples to apples comparisons. You can see in my written
testimony for a fuller description of this problem, but the
violence trends that we are seeing today are now almost all
Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence, which is exactly the metric we need to
be looking at in order to see indications of incipient civil
war.
And, we can see such indications in the locations in which
violence is flaring. According to Dr. Knights, violence is
increasing in the areas that were traditional sectarian flash
points in Iraq, and bases for both al-Qaeda in Iraq and
Baathist insurgents. Diyala Province is increasingly unstable,
with violence in both Sunni and Shia areas.
Historical AQI bases in Fallujah, Taji and Abu Ghraib,
appear to be reactivating. Another traditional AQI base in
Suwayrah in northern Wasit Province, has been reactivated and
is being used to protect terrorism into the southern Shia
heartland. And, in what used to be known as the Triangle of
Death, we see, again, the re-emergency of a flash point and a
facilitation area for attacks into Baghdad.
This activity suggests that what we had predicted would
occur after the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces has, indeed,
begun. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, in the Islamic State of Iraq, which
had been badly damaged by Iraqi and Coalition operations during
the surge, are reconstituting in their historical safe havens.
We see a spectrum of violence, including ISI attacks, against
collaborators, so-called, and former Sons of Iraq, ISI attacks
against Iraqi Government and security officials, conflict with
Muqtada Al-Sadr's movement, and conflict along the Arab-Kurd
seams, particularly, in the disputed territory.
Three months after the withdrawal of American forces, it is
far too soon to declare that civil war is not coming to Iraq,
particularly, in light of the indications suggesting that it
is.
At least some of the instability is being driven by an
increasingly sectarian political struggle in Baghdad. Prime
Minister Maliki regained his premiership after failing to
secure a plurality of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary
election, by agreeing to a number of conditions that would
ceded some real power to a wider cross sectarian and cross
ethnic coalition, including the Iraqiya party, the party that
did win the plurality of votes, and the Kurds. This concord,
the agreement has been unilaterally stopped by Maliki, who has
refused to abide by its conditions or implement its provisions,
and is talking about a national dialogue or conference at some
time to come, in which this issue will come back to the fore.
More so, Maliki has accelerated a pattern of sectarian and
political purging within the security forces, and within the
highest level of the Iraqi Government. For example, the
movement of the Baghdad brigade against Vice President--Sunni
Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, and his home causing the Vice
President to lead into the Kurdish region, and right now Prime
Minister Maliki is preparing to try Vice President Tareq al-
Hashemi in absentia.
He subsequently deposed Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh
Mutlaq, and banned him from participating in the Council of
Ministers, even though he did not obtain a parliamentary vote
of new confidence as the constitution requires.
Maliki has promoted loyal Iraqi security force commanders
by appointing them in acting positions, avoiding the requisite
parliamentary approval, and at the same time he has fired or
arrested hundreds of current and former security force
personnel over alleged ties to Baathism or terrorism.
The Sunni Arab population in Iraq is now under great
pressure. Maliki disbanded the Awakening Councils and stopped
the efforts to incorporate Sons of Iraq into the government and
security forces, as U.S. forces were withdrawing. The
elimination of Hashemi law from the government strips the more
conservative and centrally located Sunnis of emblems of their
government representation. Increasing ISI and Baathist activity
have been met with increasing Iraqi security forces activities
in Sunni areas, including widespread arrests, targeted strikes,
sweeps, and the removal of local commanders in Anbar and
elsewhere.
Maliki has also attempted to weaken and fracture provincial
councils in Dayl and Saladin, prompting them to declare their
intention to seek Federal status, and Anbar has followed their
lead.
Maliki has denounced these attempts to exercise powers
explicitly granted to the provinces by the constitution, and
used force to prevent them from moving forward. In this
context, it is not surprising that elements of the Sunni
population may be feeling increasingly disenfranchised,
vulnerable to violent groups, and more susceptible to the
blandishments and intimidation of insurgents and terrorists.
This is exactly the Iraq that the United States did not
want to leave behind. Presidents Bush and Obama wanted an Iraq
that was no longer a safe haven for terrorists, but the
terrorists are returning. More still, AQI has begun projecting
violence from Iraq into Syria, reversing the historical rat
lines that its reported attacks against the U.S., and Iraqi
forces in Iraq.
The U.S. wanted an Iraq in which the Sunni minority felt
that its stake in government was safe and effective, and in
which elections mattered, and in which violence would not be
used to revise political settlements. Instead, the U.S. has
tolerated, and even encouraged, the overturning in electoral
result, and has stood by Maliki and his government, as it has
used force to revise political settlement it had agreed to.
Tony Blinken, Vice President Biden's National Security
Advisor, said that Iraq today is less violent, more democratic,
and more prosperous, and the U.S. more deeply engaged than at
any time in recent history. The fact that Iraq is less violent,
more prosperous, more democratic, and with more U.S.
engagements than it was under Saddam Hussein is the result of
the efforts of the previous administration, not this one. But,
Iraq is more violent, less democratic, and the U.S. less
engaged than it was 6 months ago, and it has poisoned the
knife's edge of a civil war. The United States has not achieved
its core national security objective in Iraq.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Kimberly Kagan follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Our final witness this afternoon will be Dr. Kahl. You are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF COLIN H. KAHL, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR A
NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Mr. Kahl. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for inviting me to talk to you
today, again, about the situation in Iraq. I was up here
frequently in my previous post, and I should reinforce the
point that I'm up here today in my individual capacity,
obviously.
Iraq is undeniably more stable, more sovereign, and more
self-reliant than it was 3 years ago, when the Obama
administration came into office. The country remains a highly-
imperfect experiment in democracy, and the security and
political environment remains turbulent. And, Iraqi leaders
must address lingering political challenges in the years ahead
to avoid back sliding toward greater instability.
But, Iraq is not nearly as fragile as some of the other
witnesses on this panel suggest. There has been a discernible
uptake in high-profile attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq since
December. It is not yet clear whether this represents a short-
term spike or a new steady-state reality in the face of
diminished pressure against AQI networks.
However, it is important to remember that these types of
attacks occurred even when we had 150,000 troops in the
country, or when we had 50,000 troops in the country, and
likely would have continued to occur even if we had had 5,000,
10,000 or 20,000 troops left in the country after 2011.
Moreover, although the attacks clearly demonstrate that AQI
remains a deadly terrorist organization, they are not, as Dr.
Kagan asserts, a nationwide insurgency. They hold no territory.
They do not have widespread popular support among Sunni Arabs,
and nor have AQI attacks sparked the type of militia
mobilization or tit-for-tat sectarian bloodshed so common in
the 2006-2007 period.
The Iraqi security forces continue to enjoy substantial
overmatch, vis-a-vis AQI and other Sunni militant groups. As
such, it remains the assessment that these groups do not
currently represent a strategic threat to the viability of the
Iraqi state.
The increase in AQI activity since December
notwithstanding, open source reporting that's used by the U.S.
intelligence community suggests that overall levels of violence
do not appear to have significantly increased, and remain at
much lower levels than they did during the 2005-2007 period,
contradicting the statistic that Dr. Kagan cites.
In particular, Shia militant attacks are down
substantially, in large part due to the withdrawal of U.S.
forces. Levels of violence remain intolerable and unacceptable
to the Iraqi populous, but Iraq is not on the cusp of falling
back into civil war.
Political tensions have also been running high in recent
months. Since December, several moves by Prime Minister Maliki,
noted by our witnesses and by the chairman, most notably
accusations that Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi was running a
death squad out of his office, haven't seen its attempts to
side line prominent Sunni members of the Iraqiya political
block.
However, with the active involvement of U.S. diplomats in
Iraq, and the Vice President's office, the political crisis has
abated, with Iraqiya ending its boycott of the Council of
Representatives and Council of Ministers, and with President
Jalal Talabani putting in place a senior leader process that
aims to address the broader set of power sharing arrangements
animating crisis. This is good news.
So long as Iraq's major factions remain committed to the
political process to resolve their disputes, political crises
like these are unlikely to lead to Iraq's unraveling. Still,
these crises are symptoms of deeper political challenges that
have to be overcome.
Outstanding requirements for lasting stability include,
reining in extra-constitutional powers accrued to the Office of
Prime Minister, and fully implementing power sharing
agreements, resolving lingering Arab/Kurd disputes, addressing
endemic corruption and problems with essential services, and
improving protections of human rights and the commitment to the
Rule of Law.
The United States must continue to help Iraqis find
solutions to these challenges. Our Embassy in Baghdad is, and
should remain, deeply involved in helping Iraqi leaders
navigate their unresolved political challenges.
Although we cannot dictate terms to the Iraqis, we should
criticize abuses of power when they occur, and we should use of
considerable relationships with all sides to act as a convener,
facilitator, and honest broker, helping to identify and push
political compromises.
I now want to say a few things about Iranian influence.
When U.S. forces departed in December, there was considerable
anxiety in Washington, and, apparently, still on this panel,
and in the region, that Iran would fill the void left by our
forces. In actuality, that hasn't happened. To be sure, Tehran
enjoys considerable influence in Iraq, as we do, but the
narrative of Iranian domination is widely exaggerated.
A profound sense of Iraqi nationalism, lingering grievances
from the Iran/Iraq war, and competition between the religious
establishments in Najaf and Qom, as well as the desire among
Iraqi leaders, including most Shia politicians, for strategic
partnership with the United States and positive relations with
other countries in the region, put fundamental limits on
Baghdad's willingness to do Tehran's bidding.
Signs of independence from Iran can be seen even in areas
where Tehran has exerted extraordinary pressure. Last summer,
Maliki's government sent clear messages to Iran demanding that
they curtail support for Shia militants attacking our troops.
More recently, Syria, actually, provides an example of this
as well. Iran has pressured Iraq to support Bashar al-Assad
battle regime in Syria, but Iraq has come around to supporting
the Arab League's position calling for Assad to step down, and
Maliki did not invite Syrian representatives to the upcoming
Arab League Summit in Baghdad.
According to media reports, Iraq has also asked Iran to
stop using Iraqi air space to ship weapons to Assad's regime,
although Iraq has limited ability to enforce their air space
violations.
There will certainly continue to be times when Iraq
cooperates with Iran in ways that we don't like, but Iraq is
not, and will not, be a puppet dangling at the end of Iran's
strings. Withdrawing of U.S. forces did not represent the end
of our security relationship with Iraq. It represents instead a
beginning of a new phase in that relationship. The Obama
administration continues to be committed to a long-term
security partnership with Iraq, and I urge Congress to be
supportive of U.S. and Iraqi Government efforts to cement that
relationship.
Contrary to the assertions of some critics, the inability
to reach a follow-on security agreement in 2011 is not due to
administration political considerations and absence of U.S.
political will or negligence. Indeed, at great political cost
President Obama signaled his willingness to leave a modest
training force in Iraq beyond 2011, upon the request of the
Iraqi Government, and the administration invested a lot of
energy in that effort.
The inability to reach an agreement stems from Iraqi
domestic political concerns, not ours, and the unwillingness
among all of Iraq's factions to submit an agreement to the
Council of Representatives to ensure binding legal protections
for our forces, something that everybody in the administration,
and I believe most Members of Congress, agreed with.
Despite the absence of a follow-on accord, the
administration has established a sizeable Office of Security
Cooperation, to ensure a robust long-term security
relationship. The Office of Security Cooperation oversees
nearly $10 billion in foreign military sales, making iraq the
fourth largest FMS customer in the region and the 9th largest
in the world. And, this alone guarantees a close relationship
with the U.S. military for decades to come.
The OSCI and the U.S. Central Command are also committed to
maintaining active engagement with the ISF, aimed at deepening
security cooperation and addressing some of the gaps that
General Dubik pointed to.
U.S. forces may have departed Iraq, but the Obama
administration remains thoroughly engaged and committed to
helping Iraqis build a more peaceful and prosperous future. It
is imperative that we, as a Nation, share this commitment.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Colin Kahl follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Doctor.
We do have a series of votes on the floor for, my guess is
we are looking at 40 minutes, 45 minutes, and we have to go
over and vote. And then, we will be right back, and then the
panel members will ask questions.
So, we will be in recess here for a little bit. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Chabot. The committee will come back to order. I want
to thank the witness panel and members of the audience for your
patience. We are now finished with votes on the floor, and so
we are back in session here.
I'd like to address the first question to you, General
Keane. I would welcome the comments from any of the other panel
members to this question, too.
In your testimony, you stated, and I quote,
``It is a tragic foreign policy blunder that the U.S.
forfeited our hard-earned influence in Iraq by not
leaving a residual military force in place. The purpose
of this force was to preserve and strengthen a
fledgling democracy, to continue to assist the growth
and development of the Iraq security forces, and most
importantly to counter the Iranian influence.''
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, this is a fear that I
have had for a long time, and I am really amazed that anyone is
surprised by the recent backsliding in Iraq, when you consider
the fact that our troops are now out.
Do you believe that the current crisis in Iraq could have
been averted had the U.S. maintained a relatively small or
whatever number, I don't know if it was 20,000, or 10,000, or
30,000, but if we had maintained some troop presence do you
believe that we could have averted some of the problems that we
are seeing there now?
General Keane. Well, I honestly don't know for sure, but
this much I do know. We kept our forces post conflict, you
know, in World War II and the Korean War, because we clearly
wanted to maintain influence. And, that is what this was about.
It was about maintaining influence.
And, the influence we had with Prime Minister Maliki, as I
said before, he always was a handful, and he has a dark side to
him, to be sure. And, left to his own devices, that dark side
manifests itself.
But, we were all in with Maliki. Obviously, we had lots of
forces there, and we had the extraordinary capacity of Ryan
Crocker to shape and influence him. Maliki, by and large, was
moving in the right direction, even though at times he would
frustrate us.
I think Maliki, because we stood apart from him very
quickly when the new administration came in, he quickly
realized that he had a different relationship with us. What was
so astounding about that is, it was Maliki that insisted on the
strategic framework agreement, not us. We began to negotiate
over a status of forces agreement. It was Maliki that said, no,
I want a long-term strategic partnership with the United
States, that's the first thing I will negotiate, not force
levels. This was 2009, and we hammered out that agreement. I
was there for part of those negotiations. So, that was
extraordinary. It was a pleasant surprise that that's what they
wanted.
But, certainly, in 2009--that was 2008, excuse me, 2009,
that relationship deteriorated gradually over time, and it was
accented when General Austin had requested the 26,000 forces to
meet all the requirements he had, and the President's
negotiation team came in with 10,000. Maliki knew right then
and there that this force would not have the capabilities that
they needed, and that there was a different agenda on the
table.
Now, people want to blame the Iraqi Government and Maliki
for us winding up with no force levels, and the degree of
immunity surrounding our forces. I believe those are false
issues. What really took place is a relationship that grew
apart over a 2-year period, that's so deteriorated that we
wound up with no force levels at all. And, certainly, the
activity that Maliki has been exercising since that level is
dramatically different than what was taking place prior to
2009, when we did have that kind of influence over him.
I believe we would have continued to have some influence to
shape his geopolitical thinking, if we had a residual force.
But, equally important, had an administration that was focused
on the strategic partnership and it wanted to advance that
partnership, was as important as the forces themselves.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
I've only got about 30 seconds left.
Dr. Kagan, why don't we go to you at this point. I have a
short period of time.
Ms. Kagan. Thank you very much.
Of course, we cannot tell how Iraq would have been
different because that's a counterfactual question. What is
certain, and very important here, is that the United States has
chosen not to use influence that it has, or had I should say,
with the Iraqi Government over the course of 2009, and 2010,
and 2011. And, as General Keane said, therefore, found itself
with less leverage than it needed to have in negotiating a
long-term presence of troops.
Secondly, I think it is also important to note, and to ask,
whether it is really technically necessary for a Council of
Representatives of any country to approve immunities and set up
force agreements between the United States and their countries.
I am not aware that that is a standard that we hold all
administrations, governments and regimes to, and, therefore, in
a certain sense the constraints that the administration placed
on itself exacerbated the crisis within Iraqi politics that,
ultimately, caused the Iraqis to decide, and the administration
to decide, to pull forces out.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. If I heard you right, I
think, perhaps, it was used as an excuse rather than something
legally that we were bound by. But, I am out of time, so I will
yield for 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am somewhere in between the Beatles and Alice and
Wonderland right now. I am hearing the rewriting of a song, and
it seems to be coming out give war a chance, and I am viewing
the whole thing through the looking glass, and everything is
coming in back upside down and backwards.
I just head two different things. One, ``that is was always
about exerting influence.'' I remember voting to give the
President the authority to go after terrorism, because of
weapons of mass destruction. I did not vote to kill 4,300 or
have killed 4,300 and change American men and women to exert
influence. It was to protect the United States against an
eminent threat of danger.
I remember the President, President Bush, who I voted to
give him the authority to do all this, landing on a ship,
aircraft carrier, with the banners and the band, that the
mission was accomplished. I do not know how this continues to
go on, the band plays on.
It is often attributed to President Obama, and I just heard
it just again from the good Doctor, but it is really President
Bush and his administration, under that administration, that,
actually, negotiated the withdrawal of forces, under two
separate treaties that were signed on November 17, 2008. It was
not this administration. That strategic framework agreement
specified Bush specified, President Bush specified, we signed
it under his leadership, that the United States may not ``seek
or request permanent bases or permanent military presence in
Iraq.'' The security agreement established a deadline of
withdrawal for all U.S. forces. That's President Bush, not
President Obama. They are pinning the tail on the wrong donkey.
Maybe you can help us out on that, Dr. Kahl.
Mr. Kahl. Well, I will defend the donkey that I rode on for
three--the democratic donkey I guess in this case.
You know, I took 16 trips to Iraq in the last 3 years. I
sat where I met with all of our officials there, all the senior
Iraqi officials involved in these negotiations. I sat in
countless meetings in the situation room at the deputies and
the principals level, and met with our senior military
commanders on a weekly basis on this issue. So, I think I can
speak with a fair amount of authority about what has been
described up here. I just cannot agree with the reality as
portrayed with the rest of the witnesses.
It is true that General Austin proposed a range of options,
the highest one being 23,000, not 26,000, but a range of
options, including a number of options that were much lower.
So, let us think that clear.
It is also true that the larger options largely envisioned
a very robust mission set in northern Iraq, which proved,
actually, something that the government in Baghdad was not
interested in. By July and August they were not interested in
having that large of a mission up north, which I think belies
or goes against the criticism that somehow if we had offered
more troops it would have been easier for the Iraqi domestic
political environment to accept them.
Then the question becomes whether we, basically, set
ourselves----
Mr. Ackerman. How many troops would they have accepted?
What did they want?
Mr. Kahl. It was not about troop numbers. At the end of the
day, the fundamental issue was about our requirement for legal
immunities for our troops that were put in Article 12.
Mr. Ackerman. Right, under the Status of Forces Agreement.
Mr. Kahl. Correct.
So, under the current security agreement, or under the
security agreement that the Bush administration negotiated,
that you made reference to, it called for our forces to be out
by the end of 2011.
Under Article 12 of that agreement, we had a certain level
of protection for our forces, jurisdictional protection. All
the Obama administration asked is, that if there was going to
be a follow-on agreement it had the same article in it. That is
it. It was not an unreasonable request. It was the same request
of the Bush administration.
Mr. Ackerman. President Obama was trying to protect the
security of our troops.
Mr. Kahl. And, in fact, had he done anything otherwise,
this body and most of the folks on this panel, would have
crucified him for doing it.
Mr. Ackerman. Did we or did we not have an obligation under
international law for this administration to follow what the
previous administration obligated us to?
Mr. Kahl. Well, there is two things. Under Iraqi--there was
a consensus in the U.S. Government's interagency to include
folks who were in the Bush administration before, that it was a
legal requirement for protections to go through the Council of
Representatives if they were going to be binding under Iraq's
constitution. That was our legal communities' views, not the
Pentagon, State Department, the White House, but also Prime
Minister Maliki's legal advisors' views, and there was nobody
in Iraq that contradicted it.
And, the last agreement went through the Council of
Representatives. So, contrary to Dr. Kagan's point that there
was no reason it had to go through the Council of
Representatives, there was every reason that it had to go
through the Council of Representatives, because the previous
agreement did.
So, the Obama administration did not manufacture some
hurdle that was new and came out of no where, it simply said,
if you want forces to remain in the country you have to give
them the same protections you gave them before. And, that
proved politically untenable for the Iraqis.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrbacher, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrbacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me see if I can poll the witnesses here on a yes or no,
if possible.
Given what we know now, and what has happened in Iraq, was
the decision to send U.S. forces to liberate Iraq from the
Saddam Hussein dictatorship, was it the right decision, with
all that we know now? Just a yes or no, or if you cannot answer
that is fine.
General? Was it the right decision?
General Keane. Yes.
Mr. Rohrbacher. All right.
General Dubik. I would have to say for myself, I am
ambiguous.
Mr. Rohrbacher. Ambiguous? Okay.
Ms. Kagan. I do not think that the question can be
answered, because the decision makers at the time knew what
they knew at the time.
Mr. Rohrbacher. No, no. I am asking you, knowing what you
know now, was it worth it?
Ms. Kagan. I am not sure that that question can be
answered.
Mr. Rohrbacher. Okay. So, we have, yes, and two ambiguous,
and, Doctor?
Mr. Kahl. Not based on the premises for which the war was
originally justified, and probably not worth $1 trillion and
4,500 American dead.
Mr. Rohrbacher. But, knowing what we know now, was it worth
it going in with U.S. troops?
Mr. Kahl. Not based on the premise for which the war was.
Mr. Rohrbacher. Okay. We have a no, yes, and two ambiguous.
Let me just say that I have been around for a while, 24
years now here in Congress, and worked in the Reagan White
House for 7 years in Washington. A lot of these decisions had
to be made, and I will say the worst decision, foreign policy
decision, that I have seen in my 30 years of service at high
levels in Washington, this was the worst decision.
I am sorry, General. Over 4,500 American troops are dead,
and tens of thousands wounded, $1 trillion of added debt to our
country, and from what I can see the people of Iraq are not
even appreciative of what we have done.
I think that was, it is beyond, there is not even anything
that comes close to how bad that is. And, for us not to be able
to say that outright, and understand that the American people
are so war weary now, that we will not be able to do other
commitments that might be really important for our national
security.
Keeping Saddam Hussein in power might have been the best
deal for our national security, considering that the mullah
regime in Iran is the regime that we have to fear the most, in
terms of our own national security interest in that part of the
world.
And, when you think of that, and then you think that we
lost all of these lives, well, I think that we ought to do some
soul searching, all of us Americans who are engaged in policy,
and I went along with it. I mean, I did not listen to Gary
Ackerman, I went along with it, and the President, it was after
9/11, and I was going to support our President in this war
against radical Islam, and this had nothing to do with the war
in radical Islam. It had everything to do with something, and I
still do not know what it is, that drove us to say that we had
to get rid of that dictatorship, because there are lots of
dictators around the world.
And, let us just note this other thing for the people on
the other side of this issue. I am sick and tired of also
hearing that all of these casualties that were caused by
America's intervention, Saddam Hussein murdered 100,000 of his
own citizens prior to our liberation. There are mass graves
that were found.
Now, we do not have, there is no reason in the world we
should be trading American lives to stop every dictator who is
slaughtering his own people. But, those people who would like
to suggest that the United States troops in some way were
responsible for a higher level of killing of innocent civilians
are wrong. They are wrong as well, and they are wrong because
the killing that took place after we liberated that country
from Saddam Hussein, most of it was done by interfaith Muslim-
on-Muslim killing each other, not American troops going into
neighborhoods and shooting up neighborhoods because we wanted
to exert our influence.
So, I find a little bit of an inability on both sides of
this issue looking back, the ability on both the left and the
right, to be able to look very honestly at this issue. And, I
would implore my fellow Members of Congress, and those of you
who testify before Congress, and are influenced--have influence
here in Washington on decision makers, to do some soul
searching on this. I am trying to be honest about it, and I
think it behooves us to remember those 4,500 men who gave their
lives, and all those tens of thousands whose lives are probably
ruined because of this, and what we got out of it. It is not
even close, that was not worth their lives.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Chabot. His time has expired.
Mr. Ackerman. The gentleman invoked my name, if I could
just interject for 30 seconds.
Mr. Chabot. All right. The gentleman is recognized for 30
seconds.
Mr. Ackerman. I just want to say to the gentleman, despite
your years of experience that you've echoed my word sand
sentiments exactly. I did mean culpa during my opening
statement, following President Bush so blindly into this, and
expressed the same sentiments, and almost the same words. I'll
share them with you later.
I want to thank you for your honesty as always.
Mr. Chabot. We will go into a second round at this point,
and I yield myself 5 minutes.
Just commenting on the gentleman from California, who I
have great respect for, and I have to agree a bit, but mostly
disagree with his statement. I don't know that it's fair to say
knowing what we know now would you have gone in, et cetera, you
are free to ask that question.
But, the answer to that question is complicated, I believe,
by the fact that this administration pulled out American
troops, all the troops out here, which was not anticipated or
expected by our military or anybody, really, or the Iraqis or
anybody else, until it actually happened. That was not
expected. That's not what we did in Korea. That's not what we
did in Bosnia. That's not what we did in a whole range of other
places where we had troops.
The idea of they would be there to maintain the peace, to
maintain our influence, to, actually, make sure that that blood
and treasure that we expended did mean something.
But, I would argue, by pulling those troops out, by,
essentially, indicating to Maliki right at the end there that
that's what we were going to do, as the General said when we
said 10,000, and then not 10,000 but zero, that sent the
message out, the United States is getting the heck out. And so
then, they had to scramble and do whatever they needed to do to
survive. And, that's where the Iranian influence is coming
through in spades there at this point, I mean, huge influence.
And, that's about the last thing that's in the best interest of
our country, or the region, or the Iraqi people.
I think they had a chance. Maybe they still do. I am not
sure about that at this point. I don't know if they are going
to be able to make it with our folks, essentially, out of
there. How in the world, you know, they turned over to the
State Department, how are the State Department people supposed
to be out there and dealing with folks, they can not leave the
compound now because there is no military folks there to
protect them.
And then, we rail against Black Water or the folks that
have followed in their footprints at this point. I mean, so we
made it an impossible situation. I would argue this
administration did that to maintain, to keep a campaign
promise, and that was a terrible mistake in my view.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Chabot. I have two more things I have--okay, I yield,
just briefly, because I have two questions I want to ask.
Mr. Ackerman. Just on that point.
Mr. Chabot. Yes.
Mr. Ackerman. This administration did not do that to keep a
campaign promise, although it kept it. This administration did
it to keep President Bush's word, and the word of the United
States, that by December 31, 2011, all, all, all, 100 percent,
said President Bush and signed it, of our troops would be out.
This should not come, as you said, a surprise to us.
Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, I mean, it was understood,
and the excuse given at the end was, we could not get the
Iraqis permission for the indemnification of our troops.
Mr. Ackerman. No, President Bush could not get it.
Mr. Chabot. I think it was a lackadaisical effort that was
made in order to attain that permission of Iraq for our folks
to be there without being prosecuted, et cetera. But, let me
flip into two other quick questions here.
One, Dr. Kagan, there is a bit of confusion here that I
think Dr. Kahl raised here, relative to your statement about
the security in Iraq, that it is deteriorating. Dr. Kahl raised
some doubt about your data. How do we know what is actually
occurring on the ground there? What level of confidence do we
have that our information and our intelligence is good? And,
what are the sources of your data?
And then, one other quick point, and any of the members can
do this, how does the PKK's presence in northern Iraq affect
our interests, and what are we doing about that?
So, Dr. Kagan on the one, and then any of the other
witnesses who would like to take the other one quickly. I've
got not too long on either one.
Ms. Kagan. On the subject of our data, of course, when the
U.S. military had a large presence within Iraq it had and
created its own sources of data through its refined and
granular knowledge of what was going on on the ground in Iraq,
because it was disbursed throughout the country.
As we pulled out our troops, we lost situational awareness,
because every soldier is a sensor, and if you were a soldier
you had less situational awareness.
Right now, the data that I am using, as I said, is the data
of Dr. Michael Knights, the Lafer Fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. He has retained and maintained
a database for years, and his data is accrued from both Iraqi
security forces and open sources, and sources throughout the
country.
What I think is, actually, interesting about his data that
I think is probably not reflected in all of our data is that he
has excellent sources in southern Iraq, and it is in southern
Iraq where we do see Shia-on-Shia violence actually re-
emerging. The re-emergency of Shia militant groups, likewise a
clerical struggle in Najaf that really does put into doubt
whether or not the Iraqis will be able to retain their
religious independence from Iran.
The point is that our situational awareness should come
from competing data sources right now, rather than being
reliant on a single assessment.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Could I have unanimous consent to yield
myself an additional minute here, just--would anyone like to
comment on the PKK question?
Okay, if not, I will yield back that time, and Mr. Ackerman
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. I would ask Dr. Kahl to comment on that, but
first I want to ask a question of General Keane, if I may.
Try as he might, President Obama could not get an extension
of the deal with the change to protect the American troops.
Should he have left the American troops in Iraq, without being
able to get the guarantee that we needed?
General Keane. In my judgment, no. Also, but I would like
to correct something that you said. It is a fact that the Bush
administration negotiated the Status of Forces Agreement, and
that Status of Forces Agreement terminated our involvement with
forces by the end of 2011. That is a fact.
But, it is also a fact that no Iraqi politician could
participate in that agreement who was facing an upcoming
election, and the wink and the nod that was very well
understood with the Iraqi Government, its highest officials,
and our Ambassador and our senior military commanders, that
after their election we would renegotiate what the size and
capability of a force would be in Iraq.
Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Kahl?
Mr. Kahl. Well, if there was a wink and a nod between the
Bush administration and the Maliki government, nobody told
either the Bush administration or the Maliki government,
because, actually, the negotiations led up by the Obama
administration were led by Ambassador Jeffrey, a Bush
administration official, and Brett McGurk, a Bush
administration official, negotiating with the same leaders that
General Keane referenced, supposedly were in on this secret
agreement to extend the troop presence beyond 2008.
The reality is, the same political pressures that the Iraqi
politicians faced in the fall of 2008, which required the time
line for the departure of U.S. forces, also was the reason why
on October 4th they were unanimous in not being willing to send
a follow-on agreement to the Corps, with adequate legal
protections, which General Keane admits, you know, was required
for us to leave forces behind.
And, by the way, it is a view that was shared by the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Gates,
Secretary Pannetta, and the President of the United States.
All we were asking for was the same protections that they
had under Article 12 of the existing agreement. It was not
domestically possible for the Iraqis, so we are where we are.
I want to say one thing about the data. All the data is
suspect for some of the reasons that Kim points out, that Dr.
Kagan points out, which is that we don't have high visibility
so we are relying on various open source materials, although
that visibility of reduction was a result of us leaving largely
the cities in the summer of 2009 under the security agreement,
not the departure of our forces from the country.
I do think we can say a couple things about the data. One,
there has been an uptick in AQI activity, nobody is disputing
that.
Second, there has been a decrease in violence in the south,
in fact, the data that Dr. Kagan references shows that, and
largely Shia militant activity has gone down.
And lastly, overall our intelligence community looking at
the Knights' data that Dr. Kagan references, and comparing it
with that data and other open source material, concludes that
the overall levels of violence have not actually gone up since
the departure of U.S. forces.
So, I do not know which is right, although that strikes me
as a more comprehensive assessment, and our intelligence
community, you know, has, basically, concluded that overall
level of violence has not gone up, even as AQI activity has
ticked up.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
General, I am curious, was there anything else to this
secret wink and nod agreement that the Bush administration had
with the Iraqis?
General Keane. I mean, in terms of it being secret, I would
not go that far. I mean, it was well documented in the media. I
am confident, I do not want to speak for him, but Ryan Crocker
was here he would flat tell you that we all knew that is what
had been discussed.
Mr. Ackerman. Without the agreement, can you enforce a wink
and a nod if somebody picked up American troops and decided to
prosecute them, to say to the Iraqis, didn't we have a wink and
a nod agreement?
General Keane. No, no.
Mr. Ackerman. Or, would they rely on the written documents?
General Keane. What that--what the so-called other official
agreement actually was, is that they would renegotiate a new
Status of Forces Agreement that would permit a residual force
to stay post 2011, to extend that document beyond what the
current document did. That is all that--that is all that was
intended to be.
Mr. Ackerman. And, would it have----
General Keane. It was a common understanding that the
government wanted that force to stay, and so did we.
Mr. Ackerman [continuing]. Would it have been under the
terms that the Iraqis wanted it?
General Keane. Yes, absolutely they wanted it.
Mr. Ackerman. Not the terms that we wanted?
General Keane. We both wanted it.
Mr. Ackerman. Same terms?
General Keane. Well, the terms would have been negotiated.
They both wanted a force.
Mr. Ackerman. But, the negotiation up until that moment
failed, that is why we did not have an agreement.
General Keane. The fact of the matter is, negotiations
broke down, I think, as I tried to indicate, I think at some
point the Maliki government realized it was in a totally
different relationship with this administration.
Mr. Ackerman. But, they had the same agreement that they
had with the Bush administration.
General Keane. Certainly the Bush administration agreement,
the SOFA----
Mr. Ackerman. That was a legal agreement.
General Keane [continuing]. That was a legal document that
was in place at the time. It ended in 2011, correct.
Mr. Ackerman. But, that was President Bush's agreement.
General Keane. That is correct.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California is recognized, Mr.
Rohrbacher, who, by the way, is the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight.
Mr. Rohrbacher. Let me just suggest that all of this, you
know, back and forth on whether or not Maliki was going to
allow us to leave our forces there or not, I found--frankly, I
find it totally irrelevant. It is assuming that people--that it
is in the interest of the American people to have our forces
there.
The bottom line is, once we had decided that the people of
Iraq were going to defend themselves, the sooner we got out of
there the better. And, if we lose 50 more, 100 more, or 200
more, or 500 more American lives, what for?
Just, I mean, this is absurd. Oh, we are going to negotiate
so we can keep our guys in jeopardy. Who is watching out for
the American soldier, the Marine out there giving his life? We
should be caring about him. That is who we should be caring
about, and I was raised in a Marine family, and I remember
going to breakfast with my Dad when I was 7 years old. And, we
had two 19-year-old young Marines with us, and they both had no
legs. They just got back from Korea. I often wondered what
happened to those guys, whether or not they have families,
whether or not they had a decent life, like they gave to all of
us.
I do not think that a lack of forces is what has driven a
Shiite population, a majority Shiite population, toward a
better relationship with the mullahs. I do not believe that
that is what is driven there, and what we have seen is a fight
in the Muslim world between two sects that are, you know, at a
blood feud with one another. I do not see Maliki, and the
Sunnis in his country, after we would leave no matter when that
was, would not re-establish a closer relationship with the
mullahs.
And now that we have this pro-mullah regime, am I still
hearing that you fellows think that we should be pouring more
money into this? I mean, training, we are going to provide
training, there is a proposal to spend $900 million dollars, to
train the Iraqi police force. So, we are borrowing $900 million
from China to train the police force of a country that is
headed by people who were demonstrably anti American? Is that
what we should do?
I ask the panel, should we be spending $900 million
training their police force?
General Dubik. I would be happy to answer that, Mr.
Representative. The answer is no, as I said in my remarks. The
current State Department plan for training police is not the
plan we should follow. We do not need to spend that much money,
but we do need to be involved with the development of the
police department, and the police forces, as well as the
security forces, for our interest.
Mr. Rohrbacher. Should we be giving them credit after $1
trillion that we have already borrowed from China?
General Dubik. We should be giving them lots of credit.
Mr. Rohrbacher. Okay.
General Dubik. You are talking about money credit, I am
talking about credit for what they have achieved.
Mr. Rohrbacher. No, no, I am talking about budget credit
here. I mean, we have borrowed, and we demonstrably have
borrowed 1 trillion extra dollars in order to deal with them,
not to mention all the other sacrifices that we have made in
blood.
Should we be borrowing hundreds of millions of dollars more
now? It is my understanding, my understanding, I went to Iraq
and they kicked me out of the country, because I had the
timidity to accept and suggest that maybe when the oil and gas
money comes in they might start repaying us. And, there answer
was, get the hell out of my country. And, Maliki gave me about,
you know, 1\1/2\ hours to get out. Well, that is fine. I mean,
he is in charge of his country.
He is not in charge, he would not be in charge, except for
all the American lives that have been lost getting him there
and getting rid of Saddam Hussein. And again, no one should
ever, and this is what really gets me mad about the left, is
they are always talking about, yes, Americans came in and all
these lives were lost. Saddam Hussein was a bloody, vicious
dictator, and it is good that he was gone, and, actually, he
was probably costing more Iraqi lives than during the
liberation. But, that is not America's business to be spending
thousands and thousands of American lives and trillions of
dollars of our wealth all over the world.
As it has resulted, we now are less respected everywhere in
the world. We, actually, when we took a step too far, we have
ended up with less respect than had we not gone in in the first
place.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Whereas, the panel up here does not necessarily agree on
all these things, I think one thing we do agree on is that
there was tremendous sacrifice by the men and women from this
country that went over there, some who lost their lives, some
who lost limbs, and some are in hospitals around the country.
We need to do everything humanly possible to take care of those
people, and make sure that they have the best quality of lives
that can possibly happen. That should be our number one
concern, I think, at this point. I think we would all agree on
that.
I want to thank the distinguished panel here for their
testimony this afternoon, thank the members that are here this
afternoon, and with unanimous consent the members will have 5
days to supplement their statements, ask questions, and submit
to the panel.
If there is no further business to come before the
committee, we are adjourned.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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