[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-114]
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GROUND SYSTEM MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 8, 2012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS.#13
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama BILL OWENS, New York
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio JACKIE SPEIER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, March 8, 2012, Army and Marine Corps Ground System
Modernization Programs......................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, March 8, 2012.......................................... 33
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GROUND SYSTEM MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 3
WITNESSES
Lennox, LTG Robert P., USA, Deputy Chief Of Staff, G-8, U.S.
Army; and LTG William N. Phillips, USA, Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology),
U.S. Army...................................................... 5
Mills, LtGen Richard P., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration, U.S. Marine Corps; BGen Frank L.
Kelley, USMC, Commander, Systems Command, U.S. Marine Corps;
and William E. Taylor, Program Executive Officer for Land
Systems, U.S. Marine Corps..................................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G...................................... 37
Lennox, LTG Robert P., joint with LTG William N. Phillips.... 42
Mills, LtGen Richard P., joint with BGen Frank L. Kelley and
William E. Taylor.......................................... 57
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 40
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Speier................................................... 73
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 77
Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Shuster................................. 83
Mr. Critz.................................................... 87
Mr. LoBiondo and Mr. Rooney.................................. 84
Mr. Owens.................................................... 86
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 87
Mr. Rooney................................................... 86
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 85
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 86
Mr. Turner................................................... 84
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GROUND SYSTEM MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 8, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Bartlett. Good morning. Because of the importance of
today's hearing, I apologize that my opening statement will be
a little longer than usual.
The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today
to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2013 budget request for
the Army and Marine Corps ground system modernization programs.
We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: Lieutenant
General Robert Lennox, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-8;
Lieutenant General William Phillips, Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology; Lieutenant General Richard Mills, United States
Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and
Integration; Brigadier General Frank Kelley, United States
Marine Corps, Commander, Systems Command; and Mr. William
Taylor, United States Marine Corps, Program Executive Officer
for Land Systems.
Thank all of you for being here and for your service to our
Nation.
Based on the fiscal year 2013 budget request, the
subcommittee hopes to determine: one, the risk associated with
the Army and Marine Corps' ability to meet the national
security needs of this Nation; two, how this budget request
impacts Army and Marine Corps ground systems modernization
programs and their associated industrial bases; and, three, the
best estimate of what program adjustments would have to be made
and additional risk assumed if sequestration were to take
effect.
We know that our witnesses support this budget as
appropriate for the new defense guidance, but we need our
witnesses to provide more detail on the modernization and
investment risks and the critical assumptions behind these
risks given the fact that the Nation is still engaged in major
combat operations.
There are two significant concerns that I have that are
associated with Army and Marine Corps ground systems
modernization: one, the quality and effectiveness of the
equipment that will be relied upon by a smaller combat force as
a result of reductions in force structure and end strength;
and, two, the effect on the industrial base of ending major
current programs and anticipating the ability to begin new
production 3 to 5 years into the future.
I have concerns over the impact of this budget on the
defense industrial base at the prime-contractor and vendor-base
level. Based on this budget request, the industrial base that
supports the Marine Corps at the battalion level and the Army
at the brigade-combat-team level is going to have a 3- to 5-
year production break. Both the Marine Corps and the Army plan
on procuring major platforms into the 2017 or 2018 timeframe.
At the prime-contractor level, the ranking member and I
have visited many of these facilities. The workers are well-
trained, very qualified, and extremely patriotic. As you know,
it can take many years to train a qualified machinist or
welder. Many of them have served in the military and have
families and friends that are currently in the military.
However, if these production lines go completely cold for
multiple years, these workers will have no choice but to switch
career fields so that they can take care of their families.
So the question becomes, what workforce does the Marine
Corps and the Army expect to have or need in 2017 and 2018 to
produce these new platforms? What impact would this industrial-
base policy have on the industrial base's ability to surge
production in response to a future threat or conflict?
The vendor-base level is even more problematic. These are
the companies that provide the transmissions, engines, and
widgets to the prime contractors. In some cases, it can take
over a year for a vendor to get qualified in order to supply
critical parts to the prime contractors.
Once the production lines go cold, these companies will
simply go away or be forced to increase prices for these
components and parts. If they do, what will be the impact to
current fielded ground modernization system programs? And in
2017, will the prime contractors be forced to go overseas to
fill this void? Our prime contractors and vendors are trying to
sustain themselves at a minimum economic quantity level. This
may not be affordable given the current budget environment.
As I have stated before, major reductions in the Federal
budget need to be a major element of correcting the Federal
deficit. The Department of Defense must share in a fair and
balanced way in these reductions, and that process is already
taking place under the Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly
$500 billion in cuts planned for DOD [Department of Defense]
over the next 10 years. But we must achieve a balance, to the
degree that it is possible, if we hope to have a capable
military in the future. Allowing certain major prime
contractors and vendor production lines to go cold may not be
in the best interest or economically prudent to our national
defense.
Is a balance possible? What skilled workers and what vendor
base do we need in order to produce the innovative weapons
systems we will require in 2017? How do we incentivize the
industrial base to promote innovation during this economic
downturn?
There have been discussions of this issue, but I have not
seen any substantive analysis to date that would help us with
this problem. I agree that foreign military sales may help to
mitigate some of this risk, but this will not be enough to fix
this near-term issue.
We have lost over 6,300 Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and more than 47,000 have been wounded since September 11,
2001. In order to perform their missions, whether home or
abroad, our military must be adequately equipped with the right
equipment to maximize their combat effectiveness and provide
for their protection.
Again, I thank all of you for your service to our country
and for being here. I look forward to your testimony.
I would now like to turn to my good friend and colleague
from Texas, Silvestre Reyes, for any comments he may like to
make.
Mr. Reyes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me add my thanks, gentlemen, for being here and
also appreciation for your service and dedication to our
country.
The Army and Marine Corps budget request for modernization
comes at a significant transition time for both Services. At
this time last year, the Army still had 40,000 troops in Iraq;
today there are almost none. At this time last year, both the
Army and Marine Corps were planning on very gradual reductions
in end-strength, but today both Services are on a much steeper
ramping-down and significant cutting in the end-strength and
force structure. And, finally, at this time last year, there
was no such thing as the Budget Control Act of 2011, so today
both Services are living with major budget reductions mandated
by this law.
For the Marine Corps, the budget request for ground
equipment modernization is relatively small compared to recent
years, and it follows a very conservative and very careful
path. One clear trend is that the Marines intend to lighten up
the force with a shift back to emphasizing expeditionary
maritime-based forces. On that issue, it is important for the
committee to understand how the Marines plan to continue to
meet force-protection requirements as the equipment gets
lighter in weight. Otherwise, aside from upgrades to Light
Armored Vehicles and continued investment in JLTV [Join Light
Tactical Vehicle], the Marine Corps ground vehicle plans remain
unclear, and pending several ongoing studies on the future
needs of the Marine Corps.
With regard to the Army's budget request, at this time last
year, the Army had a plan to emphasize investments in network
communications and aviation while accepting slight risk in
other areas. At the time, I stated that the Army's plan was a
solid path forward with perhaps only a few exceptions.
Unfortunately, the fiscal year 2013 budget request shows a
significantly different picture for Army modernization.
First, on the positive side, the Army's request continues
strong investments in network communications and aviation.
These are both areas of modernization critical to increasing
the capability of our troops in Afghanistan, so I strongly
support the Army's choice to protect this funding.
For example, while today's hearing is focused on ground
equipment, the Army's helicopter production request for CH-47
Chinooks, UH-60 Black Hawks, and AH-64 Apaches continue at a
very healthy level. Unmanned systems also see strong
investments, with the Army continuing production of the Grey
Eagle UAS [Unmanned Aerial System] and upgrades to the Shadow
UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] fleet. In the area of network
communications, there is substantial production funding for
both the WIN-T [Warfighter Information Network-Tactical] and
Joint Tactical Radio System.
On the other hand, while the Army last year was accepting
some risk to the industrial base in a few select areas, in this
year's budget this risk has spread across many more critical
elements of the industrial base that the Nation needs to ensure
modern, capable ground force equipment. For example, where last
year only the M1 Abrams production line looked like it was on a
definite plan to a long-term shutdown, it now appears that the
Army plans to simultaneously shut down the production lines for
Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Stryker vehicles,
medium trucks, heavy trucks, and light wheeled vehicles.
While the Army plans to restart several of these production
lines in the future, these multiyear line shutdowns could have
a substantial impact on the future ability of the United States
to build and maintain sophisticated military combat vehicles.
As an example, there are only two producers of tracked combat
vehicles left in the United States. If both of these lines are
shut down for 3 or more years, who will be available to build
the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle? If both of these lines are
shut down, will the second-level suppliers for major
components, such as transmissions and thermal imaging sights,
be able to stay in business?
If they go out of business, where will the Army get these
major components for the future? Perhaps foreign suppliers? A
very dangerous proposition. While Secretary McHugh and General
Odierno pointed to possible foreign military sales as a way to
bridge these production line shutdowns, so far the committee
has not received any solid information indicating that foreign
military sales can truly be counted on to maintain these vital
production lines.
Overall, while it is clear that the U.S. Army will get
smaller, it is vitally important that this is done in a right
and measured manner. In my view, the path forward must include
a viable plan to maintain the critical elements of the U.S.
industrial base necessary to design and build combat vehicles
and other equipment that the Army of the future will require.
While it is possible to outsource production of some items to
our allies, it would be a major change in Department of Defense
policy if the Army is forced to turn to foreign sources for our
major ground combat vehicles, both wheeled and tracked.
If the Army and DOD have deliberately chosen to accept the
risk of these line shutdowns, then the Congress needs a full
and complete explanation for the possible impacts to our
economy and our future ability to produce the equipment that
our ground forces will need. As of now, we don't have that
information, but I look forward to getting some more
information on this critical issue in today's hearing.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Bartlett. We will now proceed with the panel's
testimony, and then we will go to questions. We expect votes at
about a quarter after. It is my understanding that there will
be a single testimony from each Service. Thank you all very
much for being here. Your prepared testimony, all of it will--
without objection, all of your prepared testimony will go into
the record.
We will now begin with General Mills--I am sorry, with
General Lennox, followed by General Mills.
STATEMENT OF LTG ROBERT P. LENNOX, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
G-8, U.S. ARMY
General Lennox. Well, good morning, Chairman Bartlett,
Ranking Member Reyes. I will abbreviate my comments.
Members of the committee, first let me thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of acquisition and
modernization for the United States Army. On behalf of the
Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army, we
want to thank you--sincerely thank the members of this
committee for your steadfast support and shared commitment to
our soldiers, both today and tomorrow. And you have
demonstrated that time and again.
The really important aspects of the Army's modernization
have to do with winning today's fight and then preparing for an
uncertain future. And I would like to talk a little bit about
each.
As far as winning today's fight, I want to assure the
members of this committee that this is, first and foremost, our
number-one priority in the United States Army.
General Phillips and I had the opportunity to get to
Afghanistan last month. I found out that sometimes the
testimony is broadcast on the Armed Forces Network. So, in the
case that it is, I just want to reinforce to the soldiers and
airmen and marines and sailors that are deployed the support of
everyone on this panel, and I know Congress shares that
support.
Our commitment is to give them the best possible equipment
as efficiently and effectively as possible so that they can
within today's fight. And there are many examples of that that
we can share and talk to you about during the testimony if you
would like.
Our second commitment it to be prepared for an uncertain
tomorrow, and we do that really with three tenets. And the
first one is to empower, protect, and unburden soldiers. And we
have done that in a number of ways--by improvements to sniper
weapons, our precision indirect fire systems, nine body-armor
improvements over the years, improvements to the helmet,
ballistic underwear, things like that--that help our soldiers
today and tomorrow.
The second tenet is to network the force, and we do that
with investments in WIN-T, our big pipe systems; in Nett
Warrior, our way to get the soldiers the tactical support they
need; and several other programs, such as JTRS [Joint Tactical
Radio System] and the Joint Battle Command-Platforms system.
And the third tenet is to deter and defeat hybrid threats
in the future. And we do that by replacing, improving,
transforming our combat vehicles, our aviation, and our light
tactical vehicles. And we recognize the concerns to the
industrial base that, Chairman, you mentioned and Ranking
Member Reyes mentioned, and we are prepared to talk about those
today.
One other point that I would like to make is that all of
Army modernization is committed to every component in the
United States Army--the Active Component, the United States
Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve. And
over the last 5 years, I think you will see that we have made
dramatic improvements to achieve parity, really, not only in
equipment on-hand in all COMPOs [components] but also in the
level of modernization in all COMPOs. We have taken
congressional advice and counsel on this in the past very, very
seriously, and we have moved out in that direction.
We have some challenges for the future. General Phillips,
in particular, is prepared to talk about acquisition
transformation. One of the big successes we have had over the
last year is our teamwork with the United States Marine Corps
on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. By looking at the
requirements, by getting the requirements under control, we
think we have saved both time and substantial dollars in that
program, and it is well on a path. Again, we will be happy to
answer those questions.
In closing, the Army goal is really to ensure soldiers are
equipped for the current fight and all future contingencies.
Although we are a force in transition during a period of
potentially declining resources, we must continue to provide
our warfighters with modernized and capable equipment so that
they can prevail on any battlefield, against any foe.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you
again for your steadfast and generous support for the
outstanding men and women of the United States Army, our Army
civilians, and their families. And I look forward to answering
your questions.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
[The joint prepared statement of General Lennox and General
Phillips can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Bartlett. General Mills.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN RICHARD P. MILLS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Mills. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is indeed an
honor to be here this morning. First let me start by saying, on
behalf of all marines, on behalf of their families, on behalf
of this team, thank you for your extraordinary support of your
Marine Corps.
As you know, the Marine Corps is the Nation's expeditionary
force in readiness. As such, we are prepared for all manner of
crises. We are prepared to ensure access to the joint force in
the interagency and, we believe, by being ready at all times,
to mitigate national risk, especially during a period of fiscal
retrenchment.
Over the past year, the forward presence and the crisis
response of America's marines has created opportunities and
provided decision space for our Nation's leaders. I would
remind you that your marines were first on the scene to provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the aftermath of
last year's monumental disasters in that country. We were the
first to fly air strikes over Libya. Marines evacuated
noncombatants from Tunisia; reinforced embassies in Egypt,
Yemen, and Bahrain. And while accomplishing all that, the Corps
continues to sustain combat and counterinsurgency operations in
Afghanistan.
This dynamic ability at a moment's notice to shape, deter,
defeat, and deny our enemies sanctuary is emblematic of the
crisis response capabilities that we will continue develop in
our current force and our future force.
This year, our unequivocal top priority is supporting our
30,000 marines currently forward-deployed around the world
defending our Nation's liberty, shaping our strategic
environment, engaging with our partners and allies, ensuring
freedom of the seas, and deterring aggression.
At the same time, here we will transition to our role as
the post-OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] expeditionary force
in readiness. In doing so, we will accept risk in extended
ground operations, and we will reshape the Corps for scalable
crisis response missions such as counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, disaster relief, security cooperation,
and reinforcing our allies. It will be enhanced by our critical
enablers, our special operators, and our cyberwarriors--all
necessary on the modern battlefield. We will rebalance our
force posture back to the Pacific, as well as remaining focused
on the Middle East. The Marine Corps will also be ever-mindful
of the traditional friction points in other regions and
prepared to respond as directed by the President.
Our judicious modernization strategy supports this force
while recognizing the current fiscal constraints. Our budget
focuses only on what is good enough and what is absolutely
required. The Marine Corps' entire budget, to include
supporting Navy accounts, is only 8 percent of the DOD's. Our
modernization priorities are the Joint Strike Fighter and the
MV-22 and an affordable Amphibious Combat Vehicle and then a
balanced ground combat and tactical vehicle portfolio, to
include the JLTV and the MPC [Marine Personnel Carrier].
This testimony addresses ground force modernization, which
is only 9 percent of our budget and only a fraction of the
DOD's. Our ground procurement account is approximately $2
billion a year. Because of our relatively small ground
procurement account, I would say that additional cuts would
have a disproportionate impact on your Marine Corps.
As I said, our top ground priority is the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle. Of more import to this committee, our second will be
our shortfall for selected light combat vehicles, which, in
fact, perform our most demanding missions. For our entire
portfolio--the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, the JLTV, and the
MPC--the Marine Corps has taken an aggressive and innovative
approach, distinguished by integrating mature technologies;
stressing affordability as a key performance parameter;
conducting comprehensive system engineering and cost analysis;
creating a transparent and open dialogue with industry, OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense], and Congress;
coordinating very carefully our requirements with the U.S.
Army; employing a streamlined acquisition process with an
emphasis on competition; and, perhaps most importantly, at the
very inception of the programs, creating an integrated
requirements and acquisition team that makes cost-informed
trades when dealing with requirements.
The acquisition requirements team testifying before you on
behalf of the Marine Corps works together on a daily basis and
at every step along the process. We are completely integrated.
We ensure best value for the Nation to ensure for our essential
capabilities.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
[The joint prepared statement of General Mills, General
Kelley, and Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page
57.]
Mr. Bartlett. As is my practice, I will defer my questions
until the end, hoping that they will have been asked. If so, I
will simply thank you for your testimony and adjourn the
subcommittee hearing.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is on the Abrams tank production. The
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, recently testified
that the Army can't afford to keep the Abrams tank production
going at 70 tanks a year. However, that statement seems to not
address foreign military sales. In short, the United States may
not have to pay the entire bill to maintain the Abrams
production line.
So my question is, General Phillips, isn't it true that
what is really needed is a combination of U.S. tank production
and foreign military in the area of sales and production that
reaches a minimum sustaining rate for Abrams tanks? And the
second question is, does the United States have to pay all of
the cost of keeping this program line open?
General Phillips. Ranking Member Reyes, up front I must say
that we have faced some really tough choices in this tough
fiscal environment. The Army has had to make some tough
choices, which is the budget that you see before you today.
Some of those tough choices are looking at all our systems
across all our portfolios and making tough decisions on what is
necessary to make sure that this Army is prepared to fight,
survive, and win on the field of battle.
In the case of the Abrams tank, we have the world's
greatest tank. None better in the world today. If you look at
the average life of a tank--and I completely agree with General
Odierno, our Chief of Staff--if you look at the average age of
the tank, it is about 2\1/2\ years. So the modernization that
we have done over several years, with the great help from
Congress, has helped us to get into the position that we are in
today.
You mentioned foreign military sales, I believe, after your
first question, sir. That certainly is what I perceive to be a
key aspect of how to sustain the critical skills and capability
that was mentioned in the opening statements. Certainly, it is
not a complete fix, and you can't rely solely upon the FMS
[Foreign Military Sales] buys. But I believe the Chief of Staff
and the Secretary, Secretary McHugh, have mentioned that we are
teamed with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in particular, to be able
to continue to pursue some production of tank capability at
Lima, Ohio. There is the potential for others that have come in
with cases. None of them--the other ones have not been
finalized yet. Some of them look more promising than others.
But I guess I would go back to my experience with aviation,
sir, having worked that for many years. In aviation, in every
major platform that we have had over the last 20 years or so,
foreign military sales has played a key role in sustaining the
critical skills and the industrial base for aviation. I think
the FMS, if you look back on the history of the Abrams tank,
has certainly played a critical role in that, as well.
Mr. Reyes. Is there any way that anyone can potentially
guarantee that FMS will be sufficient in order to keep the
production line open until, say, 2017?
General Phillips. Sir, I don't think there is anyone who
could guarantee that FMS would certainly do that. And I would
not guarantee that.
But I think what is important is that, as we focus on the
skills that are necessary, in particular Lima, Ohio, with
General Dynamics as the facility operator for us, to operate
the Government-owned, contractor-operated plant, that we retain
the critical skills that are necessary for us to revamp
production in fiscal year 2017 or 2018 after we have had a
shutdown for a period of time to make sure that it is minimal
to be able to restart. And we think that is somewhere around
18, 24 months to be able to accomplish that.
In particular skills, there are about 49 very important
skilled workforce that work for General Dynamics that we have
to retain. Beyond those 49, there are others that work in
armor, looking at developing the next generation of armor that
will help vehicles today, like Bradley and Abrams, as well as
prepare for armor solutions for future vehicles, like GCV
[Ground Combat Vehicle], maybe others. We have to retain those
skills. Our plan is to make sure that we do that.
And beyond that, there are some highly skilled productions,
assembly-line workers that also will help us accomplish this,
as well.
But, sir, we have the world's greatest tank, and the
average age of that tank is such that we believe that we have
bought all the tanks that we need to buy, including the 42 that
you funded for us in last year's budget, sir.
Mr. Reyes. All right. Thank you.
I have more questions, Mr. Chairman, but I--in order to
have Members ask questions, I will submit those for the record
if we don't have time.
Thank you, General.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
As required by committee rules, the Members will be
recognized, those who were here at gavel-fall by their
seniority on the committee and those that come in after gavel-
fall by the time of their appearance at the subcommittee
hearing.
So we now recognize Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Very good. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate that.
Well, I want to follow on the issues of--I appreciate your
statement of the importance of the Lima tank plant. Being from
Ohio and, of course, having toured it and toured it with the
chairman, we know the importance of the facility and the
specialized nature of the facility. And my question guess to,
obviously, some of the policy decisionmaking with respect to
being able to sustain that specialized capability that you just
mentioned.
So I would like to spend some time exploring the idea of
reversibility and the strange notion that we can just turn
fundamental national security programs off and then turn them
back on without assuming an unacceptable level of risk and
incurring tremendous costs.
The President's strategic guidance states, quote, ``The
concept of reversibility--including the vectors on which we
place our industrial base, our people''--I want to emphasize
that word again--``our people, our Active/Reserve component
balance, our posture, our partnership emphasis--is a key part
of our decision calculus.''
Secretary Panetta explained that this means reexamining the
mix of elements in the Active and Reserve components; it means
maintaining a strong National Guard and Reserve; it means
retaining a healthy cadre of experienced NCOs, noncommissioned
officers, and mid-grade officers; and preserving the health and
viability of the Nation's industrial defense base.
As you are aware, this subcommittee has expressed concern
about the Army's decision to shut down Abrams production only
to ramp up production in 2016. This vital aspect of our
national security industrial base is highly specialized and is
not something that can just be turned off and then turned back
on. We only have one facility with the capability to produce
the Abrams tank. If production stopped, those highly skilled
workers will leave, and the parts manufacturers that supply
this capability could dry up. That is why we authorized, last
year, funding for the program.
So please explain to me this concept. If a particular parts
manufacturer goes out of business and they were the only
producer of that part, how does reversibility take this into
account? In some cases, depending upon the complexity of the
part, it can take over a year for a prime contractor to get
another qualified vendor. What is the risk of increasing our
vulnerability from an industrial-base perspective? Will we be
forcing our prime contractors to depend on foreign sources to
supply critical parts? How does shutting down this production
line preserve the health and viability of the Nation's defense
industrial base?
And I want to put one more caveat on all of this. You know,
the concept of us not needing any more of a particular item,
where we are the sole customer of a facility that we are an
integral part of, doesn't take into consideration the backwards
management of supply and acquisition. I mean, someone ought to
have a calculator and a calendar and a piece of paper and a
pencil and say, now, what is the level at which we need to
sustain this level of manufacturing for its capability? To
merely say, ``We are done, and we will be back to you all in
2016,'' seems not only irresponsible but, as I described in my
question, risky.
And who would like to comment on that? General?
General Phillips. Sir, I will take that for about 1 minute
and then turn it over to General Lennox for his comments.
Sir, up front, thank you for your question. Great question.
We are working with OSD in terms of a sector-by-sector--for us,
that means by portfolio, essentially--tier-by-tier analysis of
the industrial base. And the one that is the biggest concern
that we are talking about today is the combat vehicle
industrial base. And we are looking at not just tier-one
suppliers but tier-two and below, like, in the case of Abrams,
Allison, who builds the transmissions for the Abrams.
Our program executive officers and their PMs are engaged
with our industry partners, in this case General Dynamics, to
make sure that we understand the concerns not just at the prime
level but, more importantly, as you described, at the sub-tier
level, so we understand the issues related to sub-tier vendors
so we can take appropriate actions to seek resolution and keep
those businesses viable that are necessary in case we restart
that plant.
Again, sir, up front, I believe that we have the right
analysis. RAND has validated----
Mr. Turner. Did you just say ``in case''? Because my
understanding was that it was an expectation that of course it
would restart.
General Phillips. Actually, we haven't approved
engineering. I should have said we will. We have an approved
strategy to actually begin in fiscal year 2017, fiscal year
2018 to restart the line in terms of engineering change
proposals, ECPs, that we would apply to the production line
itself.
And, sir, I will turn it over to General Lennox for any
comments he may have.
General Lennox. I don't know if time permits, Congressman.
I will give it a shot.
These are tough choices for the Army. And it is not that--
so it is a choice, do you build more Abrams tanks when you have
enough and where the Army size is coming down by 80,000
soldiers so there is a good chance you may, in fact, have extra
tanks? Do you now go out and do that at the cost of buying some
of the aviation and networking priorities that are essentially
higher for us? And it is not only among modernization items; it
is actually among choices of soldiers. We are coming down
80,000 soldiers. To put more into investment, do you give up
more soldiers?
So these are some of the aspects that the Army took into
account in making this decision. It was not done lightly. It is
a very, very serious decision. We know that there are
ramifications. And so it is a choice of where you want to take
your risk, Congressman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals, for being here and for your service to
this country.
As you know, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle modernization
line is going to go cold at the end of 2012. And last October I
expressed my concern to you about the replacement vehicle for
the heavy combat team for the M113, as well. And I asked if the
Army could adopt a Stryker-type acquisition so that the Army
could award a contract like they did for the Stryker 13 months
after General Shinseki announced the Army's desire. I also
asked if there was anything that we could do to be helpful in
moving this program along more rapidly.
So the Armed Services conference report expressed concerns
about the fact that many of the current tracked or wheeled
vehicles currently in production are scheduled to end before
2016. Furthermore, the conference report expressed its support
for AMPV [Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle], stated concerns over
the long timelines, and offered suggestions on how to
accelerate the program. As such, I was very disappointed to
learn that the Army now doesn't plan to reach Milestone C and
LRIP [Low Rate Initial Production] until 2017--a full year
later than was proposed last October.
So my question is, does the Army plan to replace the M113
and the heavy brigade combat team with a variant of a vehicle
that is currently in the Army's inventory?
General Lennox. Congressman Critz, thanks for your support
of the facilities there and the production at York,
Pennsylvania. We are committed to that, too.
What we have tried to do is to mitigate in our strategy
this year some of the issues at York, Pennsylvania, by the
building of more M88-A2 Hercules vehicles, the recovery
vehicles. It is important for our future. That is something
that we know we do need for the future, and that was our
attempt to mitigate some of the production gap concerns. And I
understand now that we perhaps didn't do it fully for fiscal
year 2013, but I think we have done a pretty good effort at
doing that.
We are seriously looking at how to accelerate the Armored
Multipurpose Vehicle, as you said. We don't have a way ahead to
use that, frankly, to completely close the production gap
concerns there at York. But it is an area that we have looked
at and we continue to look at.
General Phillips. Sir, could I add one comment to that?
We have learned a lot in agile acquisition over the last
couple years since I have been in this job--JLTV, GCV, and how
we work Nett Warrior and others. We are applying the same
principles to AMPV.
The Milestone C decision that you mentioned in fiscal year
2017, we are really looking to accelerate that. And we think we
can really cut that time down by up to maybe 24 months by doing
things in parallel reference instead of doing them in
sequential activity. So, we are working on that strategy today
with AMPV to try to accelerate it to get Milestone C much
earlier that what you just described, sir.
Mr. Critz. Well, that is good to hear. And as I asked
months ago, is there anything that Congress can do to direct
the Army to accelerate the replacement of this 50-year-old
vehicle?
General Phillips. Sir, we thank Congress for what you have
done to listen to the Department and listen to the Army and our
concerns in the past. And as we have worked changes to
statutory law and worked policy changes internal to the
Department itself, I think Congress has been very helpful for
us.
In my own opinion, in terms of the process itself, the
acquisition process, I think sometimes we blame what I might
call or some might call the bureaucracy for our failure to use
the authorities that we have in the appropriate way to expedite
the process. So what we are doing inside the Army is trying to
change the paradigm on the way that we think so we can use the
authorities that Congress has given us and our policies and
regulations inside the Department to do things a little bit
better. JLTV, we did that.
Mr. Critz. Yeah.
General Phillips. And, sir, I think we will do the same on
AMPV. So thank you for listening to us.
Mr. Critz. Well, good, good.
I have another question, and it involves a remote weapon
station. And this is both for the Army and the Marine Corps.
What are the respective Services' strategies to support the
acquisition, employment, and deployment of key ground systems
survivability enablers, such as the remote weapon system, which
have a proven history of injury reduction on the battlefield?
General Mills. Sir, thank you for that question.
From the Marine Corps perspective, we have looked at it,
and at this point we are not going adopt it. However, we are
looking at our future vehicles, to be able to expand their
capabilities in the future should the requirement arise and the
money be available for those types of systems.
General Lennox. Congressman, it is an option on things like
the Ground Combat Vehicle. As we go to the future, we will
sustain the ones that we have, but there is no separate program
to develop that as a standalone capability.
Mr. Critz. Okay. All right.
General Mills and Kelley, as a survivability enabler, has
the Marine Corps been successful in fielding the improved
weapons loader station for the Marine Corps armored community?
General Mills. Sir, if that question specifically regards
the LAV [Light Armored Vehicle], the 25-millimeter issue that
we had, we have taken several steps to resolve that issue.
One of them we found was simply a training issue, that the
loading problems were a result of poor procedures by the
gunners to make sure the individual round, for instance, the
initial round was well-seated into the tray before it was
fired.
We have also done some low-level modifications of the
feeder system to overcome that problem. At this point, we think
we have it well under control, and we don't believe it is a
long-range problem for the system.
Mr. Critz. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your
leadership and letting junior Members ask questions.
I am really honored to be here with all of you. Thank you
for your service. I am very grateful to represent Fort Jackson
and Parris Island, and I am right next-door to Fort Gordon. So,
hey, I am in a good place.
General Mills, I understand the 25-millimeter cannon system
may have feed problems that could lead to jamming. What is
being done to address this?
General Mills. Yes, sir, with the 25-millimeter chain gun
system, there were some jamming problems. But we found it,
again, to be a combination of two things. One was to improve
TTPs [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures] training, for the
crew to ensure that the initial rounds were seated into the
weapon correctly so they did not cause a jam when the weapon
was engaged. The second was, we found that the tray feeder
system itself needed some minor modifications to better allow
the crew to properly seed the weapon, prepare it for shooting,
and do it.
So, at this point, as I said, we don't think that is a
long-range problem with the system. We are happy with it in
combat. It is performing very well in the southern Helmand
province, and we are satisfied with the condition of the
weapon.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much. And we are aware of
the Marines' success in southern Afghanistan, so this is
terrific.
For General Lennox and General Mills, I am concerned about
the consequences of sequestration. And I am very pleased that
Secretary Panetta has been very clear, raising the alarm of the
consequences.
I would like--and I believe the American people need to
know what the consequences would be. And, sadly, just the term
``sequestration'' actually puts people to sleep. And so I would
like to hear both of you comment on what you feel the
consequences would be.
General Lennox. You know, as Secretary Panetta said, sir,
the Department hasn't done any detailed planning. I don't think
you have to do a lot of detailed planning to know that this
would have a devastating impact. We would not be able to reduce
the number of soldiers in time to correspond with the
requirements of sequestration, so there would be a bill in that
sense. We would not be able to close installations in a very
quick period of time, so there would be an added bill.
Those bills then would be borne somewhere else in the
Department and would fall disproportionately--and it is just
mathematics--on modernization and training. So it would have an
immediate, I believe, my opinion, devastating impact on
modernization and training of the force.
General Mills. Sir, I concur with the General's comments. I
would just add that, as the force in readiness, the Marines
would be concerned about its immediate impact on our readiness.
General Amos testified yesterday and talked about the potential
for a hollowing out of the force. We would be very concerned
about that.
Our intent now, even as we reduce the size of the Marine
Corps, is to maintain our readiness at the very highest levels.
Sequestration would have a dramatic impact on our ability to do
that, both from, I think, a training perspective, a maintenance
perspective, and a manning perspective.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you both.
And, General Phillips, could you please elaborate on the
Army's strategy for procuring a new carbine and for improving
the current carbine? I understand it is a dual-path strategy.
Are the strategies affordable? And is there adequate funding in
fiscal year 2013 and out-years?
General Phillips. Sir, up front, the funding is adequate
for the strategy that we have in place. And, as you just
described, it as a dual strategy.
The M4A1, the M4 carbine is a world-class weapon. Up front,
what we are seeing, feedback from soldiers and commanders down
range, we are seeing that it is five or six times the
reliability that we originally put into the requirements for
the M4 carbine itself. We are seeing reliability up to 3,500
rounds between failure, and the requirement is 600. So the
weapon itself is performing very well.
Having said that, we have done over 60 improvements to the
M4A1. Our strategy is to continue those improvements. We will
implement an ambidextrous trigger. We will also implement a
heavier barrel on the M4A1.
But along with that strategy, we want to make sure that we
have the world's greatest carbine in the hands of our soldiers.
So what we have done is implement the improved carbine
strategy, and what that has allowed us to do is to go out and
get feedback from industry. We have completed phase one of the
strategy itself, and we are learning from industry in terms of
what is available out there in terms of a potential new
carbine.
What is most important is the business case analysis that
we will do between now and fiscal year 2013 in terms of looking
at, is the new, improved carbine right for the Army, or is the
M4A1 carbine really good enough? And that analysis is going to
lead us to the right decision, we think, on the path forward.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And good morning to all of you.
I would like to raise the issue of body armor. I have noted
in this subcommittee several times over the past few years how
soldiers deployed in Afghanistan are outfitted with body armor
that weighs as much as 40 pounds. When combined with the gear
that troops must carry in the field, the total weight our
soldiers carry can exceed 120 pounds. As we all know, this
leads to long-term musculoskeletal injuries and creates a well-
documented risk that service members may remove their armor in
the field because of discomfort and a lack of mobility.
And I am not alone on this committee in my concern. I know
that Chairman Bartlett shares this concern as well, as do other
Members.
I would urge the Department to do everything in its
modernization efforts to incentivize lighter-weight body armor
in its acquisition process--lighter-weight while still matching
the necessary threats.
In recent conversations I have had with experts on the
issue, the consensus seems to be that in the short term it
should be possible to develop Enhanced Small Arms Protective
Inserts which are 10 percent lighter than existing models and
still meet the existing threats.
But I want to raise a particular issue around this, as
well. This issue poses particularly unique difficulties for
women in uniform, who now make up around 14 percent of the Army
and are estimated to grow substantially and, with their smaller
frames, are even more susceptible to challenges from the
excessive weight of the fielded body armor. And under the
Department's recent review of the role of women in combat,
which I support, an increasing percentage of women who are
deployed during contingencies will need to wear body armor in
theater in the years ahead.
So my question is, gentlemen, I understand that over the
past couple of years the Services have been looking into the
feasibility of developing body armor designed specifically for
women. While I understand there have been issues with the
science of conformal plates which better fit female soldiers
but to date can't provide the same level of protection as the
conventional plates, this is an issue I hope will continue to
be researched.
So my question is, can you give me an update on what
advances have been made on this over the past year?
General Phillips. Ma'am, I will take the first cut at that
and maybe ask General Mills to add his comments, as well.
We share your concern about the weight that soldiers are
carrying down range, ma'am. We are working hard on lightening
the soldier load. The key part of that is the body armor
itself, which is a heavy piece of what soldiers certainly are
carrying.
Most important is allowing commanders to have the option to
be able to outfit soldiers in a way that meets the threat
environment. So we have developed the Soldier Plate Carrier
System that can reduce weight by, on the average, about 10
pounds for soldiers that are working in the mountains of
Afghanistan, depending upon how the commander sees the threat
and how he wants to outfit his soldiers.
And we are working hard on a new requirement that is coming
forth from our TRADOC [U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command]
to be able to have the same level of protection for body armor,
yet reduce it by about 10 or 15 percent in weight, as you just
described, ma'am. So that work will continue.
And in reference to female soldiers, the best ideas really
come from soldiers. So we have gone out and we have listened to
a number of female soldiers. We engaged our Natick Labs in
Massachusetts. And since May of 2009 through June of 2010, they
actually went forth and started doing a lot of research into
body armor for female soldiers and how to make it more
adaptable for them.
And what they came up with was a Generation 2 Improved
Outer Tactical Vest that they could wear. And the 101st
soldiers, female soldiers, actually deployed into Afghanistan
with this new outer tactical vest. We just did surveys of
female soldiers in the 101st--very positive results. The vest
itself allows them to relax--the same body armor, but it allows
them to relax it in a way that is more comfortable for them.
So we got very positive feedback on that. But that is step
one. Step two, as you just described, is to continue research.
Natick Labs is doing that. So I think there will be more to
come on how we can do that better, ma'am.
Ms. Tsongas. General Mills.
General Mills. Yes, ma'am, I will echo what General
Phillips just said.
The difficulty, of course, with body armor, with any
protection, is to balance weight against protection. We are
very, very concerned, obviously, about the protection of our
marines in the field. We have worked to get a new helmet that
would be better protection for them. We have worked on groin
protection for our marines who are out on the front lines. And,
overall, we were concerned about the weight and have given the
individual commander on the ground the authority to remove
plates, to lighten the load based on the mission he has and
based on the threat that he is facing at the current time.
We have separated slightly from the Army in some of our
body-armor requirements due to some mission differences.
Regarding the females, again, we are very concerned about
that. As you know, there are no front lines in Afghanistan, so
even women who are not assigned directly to combat often face
an enemy threat, and we know we need to be--that they have to
have the protection they require. And we are working some
technical aspects of it.
I am going to turn this over to General Kelley here in a
second. But, again, as women being more and more involved in
the fighting, it is important that they receive the protection
they have and that they wear armor that not only protects them
but that they are able to function in, as well.
Ms. Tsongas. You know, I think we have run out of time. But
I just want to make this statement, that, as you all know,
Congress has established an individual budgetary line item for
body armor R&D [Research and Development] because we do want
development of innovative, effective, lightweight body armor to
remain a long-term priority of the Department. So I hope I can
get your commitment to continue evaluating this, both in
general for all our soldiers, in particular for our women, even
as we begin to draw down from Afghanistan.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
General Kelley, we will have a second round. You will have
an opportunity to contribute. Thank you very much.
Now Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your service and your
testimony today.
I have one question relating to what Ms. Tsongas was
talking about. Not only the body armor aspect--and this is for
you, General Mills--I am talking about lightening the load for
your marines overall and how committed you are to that. And is
there enough funding to talk about not only body armor--you
know, obviously, we have initiatives for new helmets, new head
gear--and across the load of the whole payload they are
carrying, is there enough attention drawn to that and enough
funds there to make sure that happens?
General Mills. Sir, thank you for that question. Yes, and
you really hit the nail on the head. It is a holistic approach
to reducing the weight of the individual soldier or marine on
the battlefield that is important. We are looking at ways to do
that.
Probably the most effective is to reduce the load, for
instance, in batteries. In today's world, where there is a
tremendous number of radios and other systems on the ground
that require batteries, the individual marine carries an awful
lot of them. So we are looking at solar power, renewable
resources that would enable us to drop the battery load, allow
them to carry less weight in those kind of aspects.
Ammunition is another way in which, again, you can gain
ounces off a marine's back and off the load that he is
carrying. Water purification--again, water is probably one of
the heavier things that a marine has to carry as he moves out
on patrol. And his ability to use local water sources, to
purify them, again, reduces that load that he has to step out
the front gate of the FOB [Forward Operating Base] with.
So we are looking across the board at ways to reduce that
individual load of the marine. We are also looking at way to
reduce the overall weight of the Marine Corps, if you will,
through things like the JLTV, which will give us a vehicle that
will be very expeditionary in nature, one that we can fit on
board the ships, one that will be helicopter-transportable, and
will lighten the MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] as it
goes to war. So across the board we are looking for ways in
which we can lighten the load of the individual soldier but
also lighten the load of the unit as it goes to the point of
crisis in the future.
Mr. Runyan. Obviously--you used the term ``holistic.'' Are
we pushing it or just throwing the ideas out there and seeing
which one sticks?
General Mills. No, I think we are pushing it in a
structured way. We are looking at each piece, if you will, of
MAGTF and also each piece of the individual marine's load and
taking a look at it to lighten it.
Any marine coming back from combat, his first observation
is that the individual load of the marine, as Congresswoman
Tsongas pointed out, is simply getting too heavy. Reducing
radios, for instance--and we have new radios on the shelf that
we are using and experimenting with that will take three or
four radio systems and combine it into one platform. That would
reduce the load, again, of the individual marine. Some of the
improvements to the M16 that we have done can lighten the load
ounces, but all of that adds up to the heavy load that we
expect the combat marine to carry.
Mr. Runyan. Well, thank you for that.
With that, Chairman, I yield back.
General Kelley. Sir, if I could just add----
Mr. Runyan. Yes.
General Kelley. You know, you asked if there was a
commitment. So both General Mills and I had a chance to brief
the NRAC, which is the Naval Research Advisory Committee, and
we both emphasized the fact that we know how to target, if we
are going to lighten the load, looking at an individual marine,
how we are going to shave ounces off of certain pieces of
equipment, but then look at the whole MAGTF, is how we are
going to lighten the entire MAGTF and keep us expeditionary.
One of the things that we have learned is the logistics,
the theater logistics, the maturity of that logistics system
plays a huge part in how much we can lighten the load. And so
we did some studies with two battalions--one in 2008, one in
2010. In 2008, ma'am, you mentioned 121 pounds is about what we
saw back in 2008. As the logistics situation improved, we saw
that average load of our marines drop down to about 51 pounds.
So the TTP--which is the tactics, techniques, and
procedures--that our commanders in the field are employing are
doing a huge part in helping us lighten the load as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
And just a quick thought on the Marines looking at new
types of ways of lightening the load. I know that one
situation, there is a solar panel that you guys have looked at
that is non-glass, much lighter weight, non-reflective, very
durable. And you were willing to take that forward and test it
and move forward with that. And we appreciate that willingness
to look at some ideas maybe from some different places. And
thank you for that.
My question--and I am going to make this open-ended for
anybody to answer this. Obviously, in the combat situations we
have been in for the last 10 years, we have developed vehicles
like the MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle] because
of the asymmetrical type of warfare, the IEDs [Improvised
Explosive Device], where we have had to provide protection for
our troops in stationary situations, where we are in certain
parts of the world and we, therefore, have certain patterns
and, therefore, are subject to IEDs and this type of asymmetric
warfare. And so the vehicles we have come up with have been
responsive to that and, quite honestly, have become some large
vehicles, heavy-duty vehicles, but we are also talking about
the JLTV.
And so I am looking for where are we going with the JLTV,
in terms of what is the mission for the JLTV, and will it be a
vehicle that would be protective in the asymmetrical-type
warfare so that we don't develop a vehicle that we just simply
can't use if we get into this type of situation again? Which,
you know, this secret is out; this is a good way to combat
forces--you know, the IED.
So I am just curious about where are we going with the
JLTV, and will it be a vehicle that we will be protective of
our troops? And what are we going to do with the MRAP to make
sure we have that vehicle for these type of situations?
General Lennox. Congressman, one of the key areas that we
discussed with the Marine Corps as we were designing the
requirements and refining the requirements for the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle is that level of protection and its ability to
have add-on capabilities--start with a base capability and then
add on capabilities that protect against the very threat that
you have talked about.
So we think the vehicle does have that capability. It is a
tradeoff of light weight so it can be used aboard a ship or
used for certain missions and then be reinforced for certain
other missions. It will not be a cure-all; it won't replace
everything on the battlefield. But we think in the area of a
light vehicle we have made sure that the force-protection
aspects of it are adequate to fight in today's battlefield.
General Mills. I would just reinforce that the force-
protection aspect has been a critical capability that we have
looked at. We have balanced it carefully against the overall
weight of that vehicle to ensure that, again, it is an
expeditionary forward-deployable vehicle that can operate on
enemy terrain safely. As you know, the MRAP, very well designed
for the threat that we saw in Iraq, where there were hard-
surface roads and hard-surface terrain; a little less
effective, perhaps, if you went into softer areas.
The MRAPs themselves, the Marine Corps has a little over
4,000 of them. We intend, as we come out of Afghanistan, to
retain about 2,500. Some of those will be put into a training
status so that our marines remain familiar with them, are able
to maintain them and operate from them. And some will be put
into a status of bubble wrap, if you will, to be used if the
need arises again for us to be able to use them, given the
terrain, given the threat, et cetera. And I will have----
Mr. Kissell. I am going to interrupt you for just 1
second----
General Mills. Sure.
Mr. Kissell [continuing]. Because you have answered my
question, but I wanted to make one more point in the few
seconds I have left.
General Mulholland with the Special Forces had recently
signed--publicly signed with NASCAR [National Association for
Stock Car Auto Racing] a joint understanding of developing
vehicles for Special Forces with the expertise that NASCAR can
bring to vehicles. When you can take a racecar and go into a
wall at 180 miles per hour and walk away, they have some
knowledge of how vehicles might could absorb energy.
I would encourage you all, as you move forward, to look at
what is happening here and perhaps, you know, reach out to
NASCAR also in your research and development, because no one
knows more about vehicles than they do in terms of how to get
speed and protect the people inside too.
So thank you so much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I would now like to welcome the newest member to our
subcommittee, Ms. Jackie Speier. When she came to Congress in a
special election, she was my neighbor for several months in the
next office.
Thank you. Welcome to our subcommittee. And you are
recognized.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I miss being your
neighbor.
I am new to this committee, so forgive me for my ignorance.
Hopefully, I will improve over the next few months.
Let me just ask a general question on body armor. I have
been in conversations with many veterans who have commented to
me that Dragon Skin, which is made available to Special Forces,
is very lightweight, is more expensive, but not available to
the general corps.
As I look at it, I don't know what the differential is in
cost. Maybe you can provide us with that information. But the
costs associated with muscular injuries for a lifetime through
the VA [Veterans Affairs] system could clearly justify making
Dragon Skin available, if, in fact, it is the optimal body
armor.
So if any of you could respond to that, I would appreciate
it.
General Phillips. Ma'am, I will take the first shot at
that.
Up front, I would tell you that we have the world's best
body armor today on our soldiers and our marines downrange,
hands down the world's best. It has been tested and retested--
probably the most tested body armor. We have made nine
improvements to the body armor since the war first started in
Iraq.
I don't have the exact data, but what I would offer, ma'am,
is we have the test data for the current body armor, and we
would be glad to come and sit down with you, as it compares to
Dragon Skin and what the results might be. And I don't have the
cost either, but we could certainly lay out the cost.
But what I want to leave you with is this: The body armor
that we have procured today that is in the hands of soldiers is
the world's best body armor. And those soldiers and marines out
there wearing that body armor is most critical. That will
protect them from any threat that is designed to defeat on the
battlefield----
Ms. Speier. No, I understand that. My issue is, if there is
something that is better and lighter that we make available to
Special Forces, maybe we should look at the costs associated
with having it today versus dealing with the long-term costs of
musculoskeletal problems for the next 30 years for these
veterans.
So I think that is--I am not trying to dispute that you
have quality body armor.
General Lennox. Ma'am, if I could, cost has never been an
issue for us in terms of body armor. It has always been about
effectiveness. And when the test results--effectiveness and
appropriateness for the missions has been primacy for us in the
area of body armor for our soldiers. And I am sure that is the
same for the Marine Corps
General Mills. Before I turn this over to General Kelley
for some technical data, I would just add that body armor is,
of course, critical to everybody on the battlefield. And there
are differences based on mission profiles. We have a slightly
different configuration that we wear than the Army does, based
on mission profile. Of course, Special Forces has a radically
different mission profile than any of our forces do on the
battlefield--all of which accounts for the slight variations
that you see.
General Kelley. Ma'am, I don't know specifically what the
parameters are for Dragon Skin. But, if I can, I can't
emphasize any more than what General Phillips talked about how
good the body armor is and the fact that we are allowing
commanders in the field to tailor which vests--in our case, it
is the Improved Modular Tactical Vest or the Plate Carrier,
which will actually reduce the weight by about 7 to 8 pounds,
depending on what the conditions are.
When we challenge industry, we have gone out to industry
and said, hey, we want a 20-percent reduction in weight at
comparable protection levels that we see today. So our short-
term plan right now is to lower the weight, and we will accept
some variability in the protection level. Long-term plan is to
get it lighter-weight and achieve the same protection levels
that General Phillips mentioned as being probably the best--no,
definitely the best body armor that our soldiers, marines,
sailors, and airmen have on the battlefield today.
Ms. Speier. All right. If I could just get that comparison.
If someone could make it their job to get me that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 73.]
General Phillips. Ma'am, we have the task. We will come
back to you.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
In my remaining time, Lieutenant General Mills, are you
located at the Marine Barracks? Is that where your offices are?
General Mills. My headquarters is at Quantico, 30 miles
south----
Ms. Speier. At Quantico.
General Mills [continuing]. Of Washington, D.C.
Ms. Speier. Okay. All right.
Then I will yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, each of you gentlemen, for your service and
the opportunity I have had to meet with several of you.
General Lennox, the double-V Stryker vehicles the Army
quickly manufactured and deployed to Afghanistan are, by all
accounts, providing much better protection, as we know, than
the rest of the flat-bottomed Stryker fleet. However, the
budget request includes no additional funds for the double-V
Strykers and shows all Stryker production coming to an end in
early fiscal year 2014. At the same time, the committee has
been informed that the Army has in access of $800 million in
unobligated funds for Stryker vehicle production and upgrades
from previous years' funding.
So the question that we are wanting to know is, if these
new Strykers provide much better protection, why not use some
of the almost $1 billion in funding already in hand to keep
producing the double-V Strykers to replace some of the flat-
bottomed Stryker vehicles that we have? And if not, then what
is the money being used for?
General Lennox. Congressman, thanks.
We are so proud of the teamwork between industry, Congress,
and the testing community, and the United States Army in the
production of these Stryker vehicles. They are saving lives
today in combat. General Phillips has all the numbers up to the
latest strike, and the results have been dramatic. So you ask a
very good question.
First, the prior uncommitted dollars are all committed
toward this task of fielding the two brigades that we have
requested that will both be employed in Afghanistan. We are
actually building a few more so that we have some additional
ones for training and a handful more for more thorough testing
that will take place in the next couple years.
Mr. McIntyre. When you say ``a few more,'' you mean of the
double-V Stryker?
General Lennox. Of the numbers for this brigade. It is
about 760 that we are buying, all told, sir. You probably 660
or 670 for the 2 brigades. So we have some extra for training
and a handful--18, 20--for testing as well.
So all that funding is going toward that purpose. We have a
little bit of funding in 2013 to buy Stryker NBC [Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical] reconnaissance vehicles that are
going to replace some really aged vehicles in our fleet.
Meanwhile, we want to see what the long-term plan is for
Stryker. And we are basing that on the sizes of our forces
overall, what is going to happen to the Army, what kind of
formations we are going to have in the future, and whether or
not we can afford to go further with the double-V hull. So we
can't use those funds, but the jury is still out on where we
are going to go in the future.
Mr. McIntyre. All right.
Did you want to add anything to that, General?
General Phillips. Sir, I would just add that it has been
truly remarkable. We have had 40 hits downrange in terms of
encounters with IEDs, and in most of those cases, with just a
few exceptions, soldiers walk away from the encounter.
And the other thing that I would share, sir, I just visited
the Stryker reset and battle-damage repair facility in Qatar
when General Lennox and I were in theater. Of those 40 that are
damaged, we think we can return 38 of the 40 and only wash out
2 of them. So the survivability of the hull itself is really
remarkable after it has been battle-damaged and then repaired
and returned back in. So it is exceeding our expectations, sir.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks to all of you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor, what question would you like us to have asked
that you might have answered?
Mr. Taylor. Sir, I will take anything you want to throw in
my direction.
Mr. Bartlett. Is there something that should be on the
table that is not there that you would like to have on the
record?
Mr. Taylor. Anything with respect to one of our big
programs--JLTV, ACV [Armored Combat Vehicle].
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
General Mills. Mr. Chairman, if I could make a
recommendation, Mr. Taylor could give you a quick update on our
JLTV efforts and our coordination with the Army. It is a very,
very important program to us, very critical, and we want to
ensure that the committee thoroughly understands both the
requirement and the plan.
Mr. Bartlett. Take a minute or 2 to do so, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.
Well, my view of the JLTV program is that the value of the
program has been misinterpreted, beginning with the technology
demonstration phase. Most individuals assumed that it was
supposed to deliver a ready vehicle capable of satisfying 100
percent of the requirements. Quite the contrary. The purpose of
the TD [technology demonstration] phase was to better inform
the requirements communities by allowing them to get a glimpse
of the realm of the possible with respect to those requirements
and what those requirements costed.
So that led to the cost-informed trades process that has
yielded where we are today, where we know where the trade space
is with respect to requirements and how much it costs. So we
have a firm handle on the program now by virtue of what we went
through, the trials and tribulations of that technology
demonstration phase.
This program has been a model in terms of doing everything
Congress and OSD have asked it to do, including trying to
streamline the timeline to get into production. Over the last
year, we have reduced that timeline to get to production by
half. And between the two services, we have cut the cost of the
proposed EMD [Engineering and Manufacturing Development] phase
in half. I believe the Marine Corps has reduced the cost of the
envisioned EMD program by $108 million, and I believe the Army
is in excess of $400 million.
So we have done everything that Congress and OSD have asked
us to do in regards to posturing this program for success.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
With reference to the question line of Ms. Speier, I sat
through the Dragon Skin hearings. There is no worse or better,
depending upon where you are sitting, example of yellow
journalism than there was with reference to Dragon Skin.
I will tell you that, from my many years on this committee
and this subcommittee, there has never been a time when our
marines and soldiers were not equipped with the best body armor
available. There were some questions relative to testing, and I
paid particular attention to that. As far as I know, there
never was a deviation from protocol that resulted in an
inferior product going to the fleet.
One of the examples was, if the first bullet that was shot
did not have enough velocity, they shot a second one and did
not remove the plate and put in a new plate. Wow, that was a
tougher test. That meant the plate was always somewhat damaged
by the first bullet of lower-than-expected velocity, so the
second one now added additional threat to it.
As far as I know, there never was a moment in time when our
troops ever had anything other than the best body armor out
there. And there was a lot of very bad journalism relevant to
this. I wanted to make sure that was on the record.
I have in front of me an article that was in today's clips,
``U.S. Army to Congress: No New Tanks, Please.'' When was the
last time we built a new tank? It was a long time ago, wasn't
it?
General Phillips. Sir, it was a long time ago. The Abrams
started, I believe, in the 1970s, late 1970s, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. When was the last new tank off the line? We
aren't talking about new tanks today, are we? Aren't we simply
talking about taking tanks that are analog and making them
digital?
General Lennox. You are exactly right, Congressman. It is a
rebuild of old hulls and refurbishing and upgrading those.
Mr. Bartlett. So why do we have titles like--articles like
this, ``No New Tanks''? We are not suggesting any new tanks. We
are not building any new tanks. What we are doing is simply
taking some tanks that are now analog that cannot be involved
in the network when they are out there--and our Guard has those
tanks--and we are now converting those to digital tanks so that
they can fight with the rest.
What is wrong with a policy, going forward, that we use
foreign military sales, to the extent that they can keep the
lines warm, and that we simply supplement that with whatever
number of tanks that the Guard now has that they cannot fight
with--because they won't integrate with the network--and
converting those tanks from analog to digital? Why isn't that a
rational procedure, going forward?
General Lennox. Well, first, if I could, Congressman
Bartlett, the M1A1 AIMs tank, the one that the Guard has, is, I
would say, the second-best tank in the world. It is----
Mr. Bartlett. It is analog?
General Lennox. It is analog.
Mr. Bartlett. So, why wouldn't we want to make it digital
so that when they go into combat they can be a part of the
network?
General Lennox. It can be--first of all, it can be part of
the network and it is part of the network as an analog tank.
But it is a question of dollar tradeoff and what other
priorities would we not do in order to fund this.
Many of these tanks are very, very new. They are right off
the line at Lima, Ohio, I think as you know, Congressman. So,
we are not talking about older tanks. It is an older variant
but not an old tank. It is refurbished, it is up to date, it is
very, very effective.
So, the question is, what opportunity costs, what else will
we not do? And does it improve our aviation? That is a
tremendous demand. Or networking our soldiers, or the size of
our forces in order to be able to afford building more of these
that are replacing relatively new tanks that are there. These
are hard choices, choices we didn't take very lightly, but I
didn't think it was a choice, in the end, when we made our
recommendations.
Mr. Bartlett. I am not sure that we are convinced that
shutting down the lines and restarting them saves money. There
is only one brief, kind of quick and abbreviated analysis of
what this effect would be. We are very much concerned about the
industrial base. We no longer have the privilege in our country
of riding on a huge commercial industrial base. The industrial
base that is out there to do this kind of thing is our
industrial base, and we can't just stop using it and expect it
to be there when we want to use it again.
And so we hope that we can get additional studies, in
addition to the RAND study, which was--they are doing a little
bit more expanded one now. But we hope GAO [Government
Accountability Office] can look at it. We just need to know, in
fact, will we save any dollars by shutting down the lines,
letting them go cold, paying the cost of shutdown, paying the
cost to start up again. And I don't know that there is any
study out there that indicates that we will save money. And I
don't know how we reached the conclusion in the budget process
that we were going to save money when there is no study out
there that indicates we will save money.
And we know that we are going to run some huge risks,
particularly down the line with subcontractors and so forth, of
their not being there when we need them, and then we are going
to need to go--this year, the Chinese will graduate seven times
as many engineers as we will graduate. Would you like to be
going there for the parts for these vehicles in the future
because we shut down the lines and they have gone cold and we
have lost our second- and third-tier subcontractors?
We just don't know the answers to those questions yet, and
we hope that we can get enough information so that we can
intelligently decide what we need to do going forward.
I have just a couple of real quick questions. We are
cutting 80,000 troops from the--soldiers from the Army by 2017.
Did we factor this into what we are going to need for this new
Army when we are looking at our modernization?
General Lennox. Chairman Bartlett, in fact, that is one of
the calculations that we went through. We don't yet know the
final design of what the Army in 2017 will look like. We have
some ideas. And each time we do it, we evaluate whether or not
we are equipped to meet that target and, if not, what the costs
would be. So it is a big consideration in the final decisions
that the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the
Army will be making here in the near future.
Today we have 90 percent of our equipment on hand. So that
is our projection. At the end fiscal year 2013, with what is
programmed in fiscal year 2012 to be built, we will have about
90 percent of our equipment on hand in all COMPOs. So we are
not in danger of overbuying in the near term.
Mr. Bartlett. I have a general question relative to energy.
Oil today is something over $100 a barrel. There is a bit of a
fear factor in that. I think the legitimate price is about $100
a barrel.
There is nothing that we can do in our country, short term
or really medium, long term, that is going to affect the price
of oil. It is not determined by whether we build the Keystone
pipeline--which I want to do, by the way. There is going to be
an environmental impact wherever you build it. It is either
going to be down the Mississippi Basin to give us oil in
Houston, Texas, or it is going to go across Canada, through the
Rocky Mountains. I don't know how you do that without really
meaningful environmental impact. And then the oil is going to
go to China.
But, you know, oil is oil, and the price is determined on a
global basis. And so the price of oil will not be affected by
whether it comes here or whether goes to China. But the
availability of oil will be improved if it comes here, and so I
am a big supporter of the Keystone pipeline. And if there will
be environmental effects--it is not like they are not going to
dig a pipeline. They are going to dig one. It is either going
to be down here or it is going to be across Canada, through the
Rocky Mountains to the coast, and then they are going to ship
it to China. So I would like it to come here.
With the reality that the price of oil is just going to
probably go up in the future, what are we doing to accommodate
that in our planning for our ground vehicles, which use, I
think, about a third of all of the liquid fuels that we use?
General Phillips. Congressman Bartlett, great question.
Operational energy is absolutely critical for our Army. And
without energy, our soldiers wouldn't be able to fight,
survive, and then win on the field of battle. So getting the
energy to the point of the spear, to our soldiers, all the way
down to the battery that is on the back of the soldier, is
incredibly important.
And we are attacking this in a number of ways inside the
Army. There are three key strategies. One is soldier power.
General Mills mentioned some of the things that the Marines are
doing. We are doing a number of things: using solar panels tied
to a modular universal way that we can recharge any battery
that the soldier has. Soldiers today might carry up to 20
pounds of batteries, and this will help them reduce the
batteries that they carry.
Both the GCV--the second area is vehicle power, sir, that
you mentioned. Both the Ground Combat Vehicle and the JLTV have
requirements within the strategy that BAE [British Aerospace
Engineering] and General Dynamics both have in terms of field
efficiency.
When you look at what we are doing in Afghanistan and the
number of convoys on the road, over half of those are
associated with fuel or water. So when you can reduce fuel
consumption, whether it is in a base or whether it is in a
vehicle or whether it is in an aircraft, it is important that
we pursue those strategies that reduce fuel so we can get
convoys off the road.
Sir, you mentioned vehicles. I will talk about aircraft for
a second. We have been pushing the Improved Turbine Engine
Program for a number of years. And that is an engine that will
go inside our Black Hawk and our Apache aircraft, and that is
going to drive fuel efficiency, we think, by about 25 percent.
They are heavy users of fuel in Afghanistan, and, as you know,
they are a workhorse in that theater.
Along with 25 percent fuel reduction by the ITEP [U.S. Army
Improved Turbine Engine Program] engine, it will also increase
power by about 25 percent, which gives you additional lift
capacity.
So we are attacking this in a number of ways, sir: base
power, soldier power, vehicle power.
General Mills. Sir, I would just add, from the Marine
perspective, we have two experimental FOBs that we operate here
in the States each year--one on the east coast, one on the west
coast--that, again, encourages vendors to come and show us what
their solar ideas are and their fuel-efficiency ideas are. And
we take those ideas that we think are usable, get them out to
the fleet so that we can get verification on them. And that has
proven very successful.
Also, with our vehicles, we have used some onboard power-
generation systems, which then eliminate the need to bring
fuel-powered generators along behind.
So, as the general said, we are working together with the
Army and working toward more fuel-efficient vehicles with our
requirements that we are putting forward, but also other ways
in which we can save on the margins significant amounts of
fuel. Because fuel movement in combat is a very, very tough
tactical problem you have to overcome.
Mr. Bartlett. As the United States and the world faces a
crisis in, not energy generally, but in liquid fuels, I want to
commend the military, all of our services. You have been
considerably more forward-looking than the rest of the entities
in our country. Thank you very much for leading the way here.
Ms. Hartzler, you have joined us. Do you have a question or
observation?
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize. I missed the first part of hearing, so I hope
I am not asking a double question. If I do, please let me know,
and I will get it for the record.
But I had the opportunity to go--the Army presented over
here in the Rayburn Building a demonstration on some of the
robotics that are being employed. And that was very
encouraging, I think--a way to help identify IEDs and clear the
fields and that sort of thing. So I had a question about that,
as well as the V hulls.
Does the Army and the Marine Corps--and this is for General
Phillips or General Mills, I guess--do you see additional
opportunities for robotic systems, such as the remote weapon
systems or autonomous navigational systems, being incorporated
into the design of larger ground vehicles?
And I say that as a farm girl that also sells farm
equipment, and we have the, you know, systems now that run the
tractors without, you know, the operator sitting there.
So, go ahead.
General Mills. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that question.
We have several other systems that we are looking at. Of
course, robotics has been critical in the EOD [Explosive
Ordinance Disposal] area, you know, to relieve the threat of
the individual soldier or marine going forward, to take a look
at what may or may not be an IED and to disarm it. That is
proven technology which is useful on the battlefield.
We have expanded that in the area of the ground. We have a
platoon-level vehicle, the GUSS [Ground Unmanned Support
Surrogate], that we use to carry forward. It is unmanned. It
can carry--takes some of that weight off the individual marine
and help him on the battlefield.
Probably one of the more exciting systems is a robotic
helicopter that we are using right now in theater. We have two
of them that are operating. They have proven themselves, both
day and night and under bad weather conditions, to move
logistics, up to 6,000 pounds, from a FOB up to a location.
That is a GPS [Global Positioning System]-guided system which
has really, really proven its worth on the field.
So we think the--you know, robotics is exciting. It saves
manpower and, of course, reduces the threat to the individual
marine or soldier on the ground.
Mrs. Hartzler. I am glad to hear that.
Did you want to add anything, General Phillips?
General Phillips. Ma'am, just a couple of thoughts from a
Tennessee farm boy, as well, in my background and my
upbringing.
But we are excited about unmanned ground vehicles and
unmanned aerial systems. We have seen exponential growth.
We have done very well at the Small Unmanned Ground
Vehicle.
Mrs. Hartzler. Uh-huh.
General Phillips. You probably saw the SUGV [Small Ground
Unmanned Vehicle], which we have a number of those in
Afghanistan today. There are about 2,500 that are operating in
Afghanistan right now, Small Ground Unmanned Vehicles.
Where we have probably challenged is more of the larger
vehicles that would actually help support a squad or carry
squad equipment. We do have one system that is in Afghanistan
now--it is called the Workhorse--that is being fielded by--or
experimented on, with soldiers using it, that will carry a
squad amount of equipment.
I met with our testing team while I was in theater, who
were doing a forward operational assessment on that vehicle,
and we would certainly be glad to share that with you. But that
is an area, I think, that we have to continue to focus on.
And one final comment. We are teamed with the Marines on
this. There is the Robotics Systems Joint Program Office that
works under an Army PEO [Program Executive Officer], but he is
actually a Marine Corps officer, Colonel Dave Thompson, who
actually runs that office for us. So our teaming with General
Mills and our team partnership is pretty strong there.
Mrs. Hartzler. That makes sense. So that is encouraging. I
think there is a lot of potential there, not only to get things
done but to save lives, as well, in doing it.
Just a quick----
General Kelley. Ma'am, if I could?
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes.
General Kelley. I just wanted to let you know that Dave
Thompson, just so you don't go there one day and find Dave not
there, that job is getting ready to turn over. We are sending
another colonel select up there.
And I just wanted to let you know that his previous job was
in the unmanned aircraft system environment. So now we have a
young Marine colonel who we have groomed in the unmanned
aircraft system, now he is going to work on the unmanned ground
systems. And this is really going to help us in terms of
interoperability and ease the training burden on folks, marines
and soldiers, that have to actually operate these systems out
in theater.
Mrs. Hartzler. Sounds good.
Well, my time is almost over, and I see that we are voting,
so I will save my question for later. But thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Critz has a question.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the second round.
General Phillips, you mentioned that lessons learned, the
acceleration of the AMPV program, that there is a possibility
that you could accelerate it by 24 months. What I would ask is
that, if you can keep my office updated maybe on a quarterly
basis as to where you are. Because I think we had this
conversation about 6 months ago, and the budget request doesn't
really reflect what I think is an accelerated program. So if
you could just keep us updated.
And just one quick comment. As you have heard from the
committee, there are a lot of us that are very concerned about
the industrial base, the ramping-down of Bradley, the ramping-
down of Abrams. And what we are hearing from you is that it is
not going to be an issue if it goes cold. What we are hearing
from industry is that there is a huge issue and a huge expense.
So, obviously, on your side of the equation, there have
been some assumptions made on ramping back up. And I would be
curious to see what those assumptions are, as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Wilson, do you have a question?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, Chairman, very brief, one question.
And that is, I am delighted to see efforts at modernization
of the tactical communications system--Handheld, Manpack, and
Small Form Fit.
When I trained at Fort Irwin several years ago, the radio
equipment we had was just not sufficient. We were told not to
use our cell phones. And I need to let you know that the cell
phones worked. So I am delighted to see change.
So how is that coming along?
General Phillips. Sir, I would just say up front that we
are incredibly excited about what we are doing in the network.
The network is the most important program for the Army. And we
teamed effectively with the requirements community, the
acquisition community, the resourcing community that General
Lennox has worked so hard to resource the programs that you
just mentioned. And we have also brought our test community
inside the circle with us. And it is all happening at White
Sands Missile Range, where we are testing the network in an
operationally relevant environment.
What we are doing today, which is what was different than
you saw at Fort Irwin, is we are building a network that is
based upon Government solutions and programs of record and
asking industry to come and help us improve the network based
upon a common operating environment and open standards and
specifications, that we can bring those commercial solutions
and integrate them inside.
Some of the key aspects of the network are WIN-T, which is
our long-haul communications. General Lennox mentioned that up
front. That is critical for connecting theater down to brigade
battalion level. With WIN-T Inc. 3, it will connect down to
company.
The JTRS radios, HMS [Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit]
Rifleman radio that you mentioned, as well, sir, are critical
inside the brigade, being our mid-tier and lower-tier level,
connecting soldiers to platoon and company and battalion and
higher.
So we are excited about how we are building network at
White Sands. And in fiscal year 2013 we will deploy that
network with about eight brigades downrange.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I am delighted to see the modernization.
General Kelley. Sir, if I can, it is another great example
of the Army and the Marine Corps working together. We
participate in the Network Integrated Evaluation that General
Phillips just mentioned. We were able to participate last year,
this past fall, and we will continue our participation in the
spring.
One of the great things for us is that we were actually
able to set up a simulated battalion-and-below constructive
force out at our Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity
out in Camp Pendleton, California. And we were able to, over
the defense research network, we were able to link to Fort
Bliss, Fort Hood, and White Sands Missile Test Range. And that
participation is going to help influence the decisions that
General Mills is going to have to make on where we go with the
Joint Tactical Radio System.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much.
And I want to echo the concerns of our chairman about the
reduction of the Army by 80,000 troops and the Marines by
20,000. I read in a report today that North Korea has called
its troops into high alert. And I think that by reducing our
forces we are actually putting our allies at risk, whether it
be South Korea or Israel. And I am just hopeful that we can
make some changes. And I appreciate the leadership of our
chairman.
Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I know that your leaders have not asked you to do any
definitive planning for the eventuality of a sequester. It may
be in a lame-duck Congress after the next election before we
address that. Because we are irresponsible in the Congress
doesn't mean that you have to be irresponsible, and so I would
encourage you to look at the most rational way to draw down if
you have to. If you are forced to do this in a panic, after the
November elections, it will not be done anywhere near as
efficiently as it could be done if you had forward-planned it.
So, we hope that, without the request from your superiors
that, you will nevertheless do the rational thing, and that is
the what-if planning, what if it occurs, what would you do to
do the least harm to our Services in the eventuality of a
sequester. The probability of sequester nowhere near approaches
zero.
I want to thank you all very much for your service to your
country and for your testimony today.
And unless there is another question from our Members, the
subcommittee stands in adjournment.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 8, 2012
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 8, 2012
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Statement of Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett
Chairman, House Committee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Hearing on
Army and Marine Corps Ground System Modernization Programs
March 8, 2012
Good morning. The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee
meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2013 budget
request for Army and Marine Corps ground system modernization
programs.
We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses:
LLieutenant General Robert Lennox, Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Army, G-8;
LLieutenant General William Phillips, Military
Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology);
LLieutenant General Richard Mills, United
States Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration;
LBrigadier General Frank Kelley, United States
Marine Corps, Commander, Systems Command; and
LMr. William Taylor, United States Marine
Corps, Program Executive Officer for Land Systems.
Thank you all are for being here and for your service to
our Nation.
Based on the fiscal year 2013 budget request, the
subcommittee hopes to determine:
LThe risk associated with the Army and Marine
Corps' ability to meet the national security needs of
this Nation;
Lhow this budget request impacts Army and
Marine Corps ground system modernization programs and
their associated industrial bases;
Land the best estimate of what program
adjustments would have to be made and additional risks
assumed, if sequestration were to take effect.
We know that our witnesses support this budget as
appropriate for the new defense guidance. But we need our
witnesses to provide more detail on the modernization and
investment risks and the critical assumptions behind these
risks, given the fact the Nation is still engaged in major
combat operations.
There are two significant concerns that I have that are
associated with Army and Marine Corps ground systems
modernization: (1) the quality and effectiveness of the
equipment that will be relied upon by a smaller combat force as
a result of reductions in force structure and end strength and
(2) the effect on the industrial base of ending major current
programs, and anticipating the ability to begin new production,
3-5 years into the future.
I have concerns over the impact of this budget on the
defense industrial base at the prime contractor and vendor base
level. Based on this budget request, the industrial base that
supports the Marine Corps at the battalion level and the Army
at the brigade combat team level--is going to have a 3- to 5-
year production break. Both the Marine Corps and the Army plan
on procuring major platforms in the 2017 or 2018 timeframe.
At the prime-contractor level, the Ranking Member and I
have visited many of these facilities. The workers are well
trained, very qualified, and extremely patriotic. As you know
it can take many years to train a qualified machinist or
welder. Many of them have served in the military or have family
and friends that are currently in the military. However, if
these production lines go completely cold for multiple years,
these workers will have no choice but to switch career fields
so that they can take care of their families. So the question
becomes what work force does the Marine Corps and the Army
expect to have or need in 2017 or 2018 to produce these new
platforms? What impact would this industrial base policy have
on the industrial base's ability to ``surge'' production in
response to a future threat or conflict?
The vendor-base level is even more problematic. These are
the companies that provide the transmissions, engines, and
widgets to the prime contractors. In some cases it can take
over a year for a vendor to get qualified in order to supply
critical parts to the prime contractors. Once the production
lines go cold, these companies will simply go away or be forced
to increase prices for these components and parts. If they do,
what will be the impact to current fielded ground modernization
system programs? And in 2017, will the prime contractors be
forced to go overseas to fill this void?
Our prime contractors and vendors are trying to sustain
themselves at a minimum economic quantity level. This may not
be affordable given the current budget environment. As I have
stated before, major reductions in the Federal budget need to
be a major element of correcting the Federal deficit. The
Department of Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in
those reductions, and that process is already taking place
under the Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly $500 billion
in cuts planned for DOD over the next 10 years. But we must
achieve a balance to the degree that is possible, if we hope to
have a capable military in the future. Allowing certain major
prime contractors and vendor production lines to go cold may
not be in the best interests or economically prudent to our
national defense. Is a balance possible? What skilled workers
and what vendor base do we need in order to produce the
innovative weapon systems we will require in 2017? How do we
incentivize the industrial base to promote innovation during
this economic downturn? There have been discussions of this
issue, but I have not seen any substantive analysis to date,
that would help us with this problem. I agree that Foreign
Military Sales may help to mitigate some of this risk, but this
will not be enough to fix this near-term issue.
We have lost over 6,300 Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan
and more than 46,000 have been wounded, since September 11,
2001. In order to perform their missions, whether home or
abroad, our military must be adequately equipped with the right
equipment to maximize their combat effectiveness and provide
for their protection.
Again, I thank all of you for your service to our country
and for being here. I look forward to your testimony.
Statement of Hon. Silvestre Reyes
Ranking Member, House Committee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Hearing on
Army and Marine Corps Ground System Modernization Programs
March 8, 2012
The Army and Marine Corps' budget requests for
modernization come at a time of significant transition for both
Services. At this time last year, the Army still had 40,000
troops in Iraq. Today there are almost none. At this time last
year, both the Army and Marine Corps were planning on very
gradual reductions in end-strength, but today both Services are
on much steeper ramps down to significant cuts in end strength
and force structure. And finally, at this time last year there
was no such thing as the ``Budget Control Act of 2011,'' and
today both Services are living with major budget reductions
mandated by this law.
For the Marine Corps, the budget request for ground
equipment modernization is relatively small compared to recent
years, and it follows a very conservative, careful path. One
clear trend is that the Marines intend to ``lighten up'' the
force, with a shift back to emphasizing expeditionary,
maritime-based forces. On that issue, it is important for the
committee to understand how the Marines plan to continue to
meet force protection requirements as its equipment gets
lighter in weight. Otherwise, aside from upgrades to Light
Armored Vehicles and continued investment in JLTV, the Marine
Corps' ground vehicle plans remain unclear pending several
ongoing studies on the future needs of the Marine Corps.
With regard to the Army's budget request, at this time last
year the Army had a plan to emphasize investments in network
communications and aviation, while accepting slight risk in
other areas. At the time, I stated that the Army's plan was a
solid path forward, with only a few exceptions. Unfortunately,
the fiscal year 2013 budget request shows a significantly
different picture for Army modernization.
First, on the good side, the Army's request continues
strong investments in network communications and aviation.These
are both areas of modernization critical to increasing the
capability of our troops in Afghanistan, so I strongly support
the Army's choice to protect this funding.
For example, while today's hearing is focused on ground
equipment, the Army's helicopter production request for CH-47
Chinooks, UH-60 Black Hawks, and AH-64 Apaches continue at very
healthy levels. Unmanned systems also see strong investments,
with the Army continuing production of the Grey Eagle UAS and
upgrades to the Shadow UAS fleet. In the area of network
communications, there is substantial production funding for
both the WIN-T and Joint Tactical Radio System.
On the other hand, while the Army last year was accepting
some risk to the industrial base in a few select areas, in this
year's budget this risk has spread across many more critical
elements of the industrial base the nation needs to ensure
modern, capable ground force equipment. For example, where last
year only the M1 Abrams production line looked like it was on a
definite plan to a long-term shutdown, it now appears that the
Army plans to simultaneously shutdown the production lines for
Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Stryker Vehicles,
Medium Trucks, Heavy Trucks, and light wheeled vehicles.
While the Army plans to restart several of these production
lines in the future, these multiyear line shut downs could have
a substantial impact on the future ability of the United States
to build and maintain sophisticated military combat vehicles.
For example, there are only two producers of tracked combat
vehicles left in the United States. If both of these lines are
shut down for 3 or more years, who will be available to build
the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle? If both of these lines are
shut down, will the 2nd-level suppliers for major components,
such as transmissions and thermal imaging sights, be able to
stay in business?
If they go out of business, where will the Army get these
major components from in the future? Foreign suppliers? While
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno pointed to possible
foreign military sales as a way to ``bridge'' these production
line shutdowns, so far the committee has not received any solid
information indicating that foreign military sales can truly be
counted on to maintain these vital production lines.
Overall, while it is clear the U.S. Army will get smaller,
it is vitally important that this is done in the right way. In
my view, that path forward must include a viable plan to
maintain the critical elements of the U.S. industrial base
necessary to design and build the combat vehicles and other
equipment the Army of the future will require. While it is
possible to ``outsource'' production of some items to our
allies, it would be a major change in DOD policy if the Army is
forced to turn to foreign sources in the future for our major
ground combat vehicles, both wheeled and tracked.
If the Army and DOD have deliberately chosen to accept the
risk of these line shutdowns, then the Congress needs a full
explanation for the possible impacts to our economy and our
future ability to produce the equipment our ground forces need.
As of now, we don't have that information, but I look
forward to getting some more information on this critical issue
in today's hearing.
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 8, 2012
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
General Phillips. Cost and affordability do not determine the items
procured to protect Soldiers. Neither the Army nor Special Forces use
Dragon Skin body armor. Testing has proven that Pinnacle's Dragon Skin
body armor is not lighter and does not provide Soldiers with the level
of protection necessary to defeat current small arms ballistic threats
in theater. All body armor worn by Soldiers today is rigorously tested
in accordance with a Department of Defense-wide test protocol. Dragon
Skin body armor has been tested on several occasions by the United
States Army. In May 2006, H.P. White Laboratory, an independent test
facility certified by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) for
ballistics testing, conducted ballistic tests on Dragon Skin using the
same test protocols that were used for the Interceptor Body Armor
system at the time. Dragon Skin body armor suffered 13 of 48 first or
second round shot complete penetrations and was deemed inadequate for
Soldier protection. Additionally, in 2007, the Army conducted a Full
and Open Competition for the next generation body armor. Two Dragon
Skin designs were submitted and tested at Aberdeen Test Center as part
of the competition. Both Dragon Skin submissions again suffered
catastrophic ballistic failures. Lastly, the size large Dragon Skin
system weighs 47.5 lbs. This is 40% heavier than the 33.95 lb size
large IBA (Improved Outer Tactical Vest with plates and components)
worn by Soldiers today. Due to these factors, the body armor currently
worn by our military offers more effective protection than Pinnacle's
Dragon Skin body armor. [See page 22.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 8, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. Regarding the industrial base, the current hope seems
to be that foreign military sales can compensate at least in part for
decreased U.S. demand. As often is the case there remains significant
risk with the foreign military sales market. Is there a risk that loss
of design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial
base could undermine the idea of ``reversibility'' emphasized by
Secretary Panetta? If so, which areas of the industrial base are the
greatest areas of concern? For example, at the vendor base level both
the Army and the Marine Corps are dependent upon one Transmission
Company for many of their platforms. If based on current funding
profiles this company were to close down or leave the defense industry
what would be the impact to current and future Army and Marine Corps
vehicle programs?
General Lennox. The concept of reversibility allows the Army to
quickly change its course of action to focus on a new set of
priorities. To meet the challenge of reversibility in a climate of
declining budgets, the Army will continue to examine the capabilities
and capacities in its organic base and among its suppliers in the
commercial industrial base to ensure it can quickly adapt to changing
priorities through periodic reviews, such as the Organic Industrial
Base Capabilities Portfolio Reviews.
Loss of design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the
industrial base would present a serious challenge to the Army's ability
to quickly reverse its course of action. However, the Army is
undertaking or participating in initiatives to help ensure that design
and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial base
remains strong. The Army is participating in a Department of Defense-
wide effort to assess the health of and risk to the industrial base on
a Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) basis. The S2T2 analysis seeks
to identify critical areas that could constitute single points of
failure and develop strategies to mitigate the risks identified. The
Army is also incorporating mitigation strategies involving the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) program to address identified risks. The FMS
program allows our vendors to diversify and balance military with
commercial business so they can weather the lean years and be in
position to compete when we start investing in the next generation of
products or recapitalize current platforms. FMS sales also help sustain
highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial base by maintaining and
extending production lines, thereby strengthening reversibility.
The impact of a sole-source, commercial sector supplier leaving the
Defense industry could be significant; however, as indicated above, the
Army is taking measures to help ensure that the risk associated with
such an occurrence would be minimal.
Mr. Bartlett. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 required that the GAO conduct a report on the health of the
tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base, and upon further review of
the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) budget accounts in the FY 2013
budget request, this report could not be more relevant. All new
production will cease beginning in FY 2013 and FY 2014. The only major
acquisition effort by DOD in the tactical wheeled vehicle sector for
the foreseeable few years will be JLTV, which is designed to replace
roughly \1/3\ of the current HMMWV fleet. How then do you gauge the
future health of this sector of the defense industrial base in light of
these significant reductions?
General Lennox. The Army gauges the future health of the Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle sector of the defense industrial base as moderate; the
reasons are several. This sector has suffered primarily because of
lower production requirements for light/medium/heavy tactical trucks
and the cessation of new vehicle production. Disruptions in the sub-
tier supply chains for Oshkosh, AM General, and Textron may negatively
affect overhaul/rebuild operations at Red River Army Depot. In
particular, AM General's potential closing of its assembly facility for
the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) may cause
significant supply chain disruptions for overhaul/rebuild operations at
Red River Army Depot.
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is currently in the
Technology Development phase of the Defense Acquisition Life Cycle and
may alleviate some of the adverse impacts affecting the lightweight
tactical vehicle industrial base (i.e., maintaining critical skill sets
and critical OEMs/supply chain, etc.).
The Army will continue to assess OEM/critical component suppliers,
their MSR levels, obsolescence issues, and cyclic production to
identify adverse impacts and develop mitigation strategies to ensure
continued life cycle sustainment is maintained.
The Army will continue establishing partnerships to improve the
overall health of this sector. For example, ANAD has established key
partnerships with BAE Systems for the M113 FOV Overhaul & Conversion,
M88A1 Recap, M88 Repair Components, and Test Track Usage. Other
partnership examples are: (1) Honeywell for the Tiger Engine,
Recuperator, Egyptian AGT 1500 Engine, and PROSE; (2) General Dynamics
for the MRAP--Cougar, AIM XXI, M1A2 SEP, Stryker--Reset and Combat &
Battle Damage Repair, Fox Upgrade, Test Track Usage, Gunner's Primary
Sight, Logistic Support Contract, and TUSK; and (3) Raytheon for the
USMC M1 Support.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand the Army has indicated that it intends
to keep a higher amount of M939 5-ton medium tactical vehicles and
similar medium weight trucks, to be reset at Army depots. The majority
of the M939 fleet was produced in the 1980s and early 1990s. The newest
vehicles are being produced as part of the Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicle (FMTV) program. Could you describe how you allocate medium
tactical vehicles to the Active and Guard/Reserve Components? Which
component gets priority for the allocation of FMTVs?
General Lennox. The Army attempts to address all component
allocations equally based on requirements and levels of fill. We have,
however, attempted to prioritize allocations over the last five years
(FY 8-FY 12) to the Reserve Components with the intent to improve their
modernization levels. Over the past five years (excluding National
Guard & Reserve Equipment Appropriation) the Reserve Components have
received 74% of the 15,600 FMTV's (47% Army National Guard 27% United
States Army Reserve) placed on contract. In addition, once these
appropriations are placed on contract, they remain component specific
and those allocations are provided to each component to be fielded
based on either the Dynamic Army Resourcing Priority List or internal
component specific priorities.
Mr. Bartlett. The need to supply U.S. ground forces with immense
volumes of fuel, in particular, imposes significant costs upon U.S.
ground forces. Ground vehicles are responsible for approximately one-
third of the fuel demand of ground forces engaged in combat. What do
the Army and Marine Corps plan to do to reduce this demand as they
modernize their vehicle portfolios?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The U.S. Army takes
operational energy costs very seriously and is taking steps in our
Fiscal Year 2013 Budget to reduce fuel costs and the logistical
footprint that supports our ground vehicles. Both the U.S. Army and the
U.S. Marine Corps expect the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, which will
replace a portion of our High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) fleets, to be more efficient in terms of payload-ton miles per
gallon than the HMMWVs that they replace. In addition, the fleet
managers for Heavy and Medium tactical vehicles have developed a
detailed fuel efficiency cost model to assist in the evaluation of
modifications to those fleets for fuel economy improvements. Moreover,
the Army plans to improve our Abrams and Bradley fleets, with a goal to
make these fleets about three percent more efficient though the
incorporation of more efficient transmissions, cooling systems,
alternators, and, in the case of the Abrams, an improved auxiliary
power unit. The Army is also investing in next generation technologies
to reduce overall fuel consumption by developing onboard vehicle
electric power that provides increased electrical power generation,
electrifies some vehicle loads and enables export power from the
vehicle. Furthermore, the Army is evaluating technologies that provide
energy efficiencies (such as lubricants, cooling systems, waste heat
recovery, etc) for inclusion in future fleet upgrades.
Mr. Bartlett. How comfortable are you with the current state of
modernization for ground combat and tactical wheeled vehicles? What
concerns do you have regarding the industrial base?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The Army has a relatively
young combat vehicle fleet. While these vehicles are relatively young,
they suffer from Space, Weight, and Power-Cooling (SWaP-C) deficiencies
due to the protection, communication and detection devices we have
added to these platforms over the past 10 years. The Army is continuing
to invest in Abrams and Bradleys through Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) programs to overcome SWaP-C challenges. We are also investing in
the replacement of our Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) with
the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and the replacement of M113 Family of
Vehicles (FOV) with a more protected and capable Armored Multi Purpose
Vehicle (AMPV). To meet the Army's combat vehicle modernization
strategy, the Army fully supports maintaining an industrial base. We
are continuing to assess options to sustain critical industrial base
capabilities short of procuring additional Abrams tanks and Bradley's
that are not required.
The Sustainment (Transport) portfolio modernization efforts support
the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) strategic priorities to provide
protected mobility for our Soldiers in all missions, and maintain an
appropriately sized, high quality TWV fleet. The FY13 budget submission
supports Army objectives to fund Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
RDT&E requirements to support the Milestone B decision, completes
funding for requirements of the Family of Medium Tactical Wheeled
Vehicle (FMTV) fleet by the end of FY14 and continues to modernize the
Heavy Tactical Wheeled Vehicle fleet through the recapitalization
(RECAP) program. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles will
rely on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds to upgrade until
the program transitions to the Army. Additionally, the FY13 budget
submission supports modernization of the service life extension program
(SLEP) for the Logistics Support Vessels. The Army is aware that the
industrial base will be affected through the loss of HMMWV RECAP and
FMTV completion. We will continue to buy or RECAP vehicles into the
future but at fewer quantities. Procurement will include multiple
purchase cycles to reduce cost and allow technology to be integrated
into the vehicle during production.
Mr. Bartlett. What are the plans for the M113 replacement program,
the AMPV? Is there an approved timeline and are wheeled vehicles being
considered? Does the Analysis of Alternatives include using some of the
MRAP fleet?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The AMPV program seeks to
replace the aging Armored Personnel Carrier (M113) fleet within the
Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT). Planned vehicle capability is
categorized within the framework of five mission roles: General
Purpose, Mortar Carrier, Mission Command, Medical Evacuation, and
Medical Treatment. On February 9, 2012, the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) approved the AMPV Materiel Development Decision (MDD)
and authorized the program's entry into the Materiel Solution Analysis
(MSA) Phase. The approval of the MDD and the MSA initiates the Analysis
of Alternatives (AoA). These approvals were documented in the AMPV
Acquisition Decision Memorandum, dated March 16, 2012.
An AoA is currently being conducted in accordance with the Weapon
System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. The Caiman Multi-Terrain Vehicle
and the Stryker Double-V Hull vehicle are the two wheeled options being
considered as part of the AMPV AoA. The Army anticipates the AoA will
be complete in the Fourth Quarter of Fiscal Year 2012. The Army expects
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to approve an AMPV
requirements document in early Fiscal Year 2013. With a completed AoA
and an approved requirement, the Army will be postured to request DAE's
approval to release the AMPV Request for Proposal to industry.
Mr. Bartlett. We appreciate the fact that the decision to cancel
the MECV was due to budget constraints. Nonetheless, we recognize the
limitations of the HMMWV. What do each of the services plan to do to
improve the fuel efficiency and capabilities of their enduring HMMWV
fleet?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The U.S. Army's priority
efforts to improve the capability of our Light Tactical Vehicle fleet
will be accomplished through investments in the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle. The overall health of the HMMWV fleet is excellent with
roughly 100,000 vehicles of the U.S. Army's 160,000 HMMWV fleet having
an average age of just under four and a half years due to the new
procurement of the Up Armored HMMWVs (UAH) and our Depot
Recapitalization programs.
The Army is continuously seeking new opportunities to improve fuel
efficiency. Some of these efforts include a lightweight door developed
for UAH variants to reduce vehicle weight and fuel consumption. We are
considering many options to improve the existing HMMWV fleet with the
$70 million added by the U.S. Congress in the Fiscal Year 2012
appropriation. We will continue to explore opportunities to identify
better components and modernization through spares whenever feasible.
Mr. Bartlett. Regarding the industrial base, the current hope seems
to be that foreign military sales can compensate at least in part for
decreased U.S. demand. As often is the case there remains significant
risk with the foreign military sales market. Is there a risk that loss
of design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial
base could undermine the idea of ``reversibility'' emphasized by
Secretary Panetta? If so, which areas of the industrial base are the
greatest areas of concern? For example, at the vendor base level both
the Army and the Marine Corps are dependent upon one Transmission
Company for many of their platforms. If based on current funding
profiles this company were to close down or leave the defense industry
what would be the impact to current and future Army and Marine Corps
vehicle programs?
General Phillips. The risks that loss of design and manufacturing
capability and capacity in the industrial base could undermine the idea
of ``reversibility'' are minimal. The Army is ensuring that industrial
base reversibility is carefully assessed and managed by: (1) continuing
on-going efforts to determine the health of Industrial Base sectors
critical to support Army and Joint Services programs; (2) identifying
and assessing current status of organic and commercial critical
manufacturing and maintenance capabilities required to meet future Army
contingency Reversibility & Expansibility requirements; and (3)
identifying supply chain issues in design, manufacturing and
sustainment that can present risk to critical Army capabilities.
The impact of a sole-source, commercial sector supplier leaving the
Defense industry could be significant; however, as indicated above, the
Army is taking measures to help ensure that the risk associated with
such an occurrence would be minimal.
In the case of a single point failure in the transmission sector,
the Army is currently working with the commercial sector of the
industrial base to develop and implement mitigation plans to resolve
this issue.
Mr. Bartlett. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 required that the GAO conduct a report on the health of the
tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base, and upon further review of
the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) budget accounts in the FY 2013
budget request, this report could not be more relevant. All new
production will cease beginning in FY 2013 and FY 2014. The only major
acquisition effort by DOD in the tactical wheeled vehicle sector for
the foreseeable few years will be JLTV, which is designed to replace
roughly \1/3\ of the current HMMWV fleet. How then do you gauge the
future health of this sector of the defense industrial base in light of
these significant reductions?
General Phillips. Shrinking budgets combined with the healthy state
of readiness within the tactical vehicle fleet necessitate a reduction
in the number and size of new orders for tactical wheeled vehicles over
the next few years. Although demand for military vehicles will decline,
commercial market heavy-duty truck sales are expected to continue their
recovery from the past recession. The supply chains for on-road
commercial trucks and off-road equipment are important because they
provide vehicles and components to the military as well. Nevertheless,
the Department of Defense will monitor the situation and take actions
as necessary to preserve military-unique, single- or sole-source
capabilities.
Mr. Bartlett. Could you clarify the request for $271.0 million for
HMMWV recapitalization in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
account? Will this work be intended for Army depots or do you plan to
compete this effort with private vendors?
General Phillips. The $271M OCO request is intended to recapitalize
approximately 2,128 Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) returning from theater. The
work is a continuation of an ongoing U.S. Army depot effort funded with
Fiscal Year 2010 through 2012 dollars and serves to ramp down the
workload. This recapitalization is consistent with the U.S. Army's
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy and will serve to renew the service
life for the remaining UAHs from theater that will remain in the
inventory. The U.S. Army will not compete this effort which is
currently ongoing.
Mr. Bartlett. Last year the Marine Corps was aggressively pursuing
an Up-Armor HMMWV survivability initiative program; a major component
of this program was the structural blast channel design program. I
understand the Marine Corps is no longer resourcing an Up-Armor HMMWV
survivability program. Please walk us through your recapitalization and
modernization strategy for the Up-Armor HMMWV fleet. What is the status
of the structural blast channel design program?
General Mills and General Kelley. The USMC and our Army partners
are aligned regarding JLTV as the preferred light fleet investment
alternative. Based on the lessons learned and extensive analysis
conducted as part of JLTVs 27 month Technology Demonstration phase and
experimentation with novel HMMWV survivability designs, we know JLTV
will provide superior force protection, mobility, transportability, and
reliability compared to alternatives. Accordingly, by FY22, the Marine
Corps will replace approximately \1/3\ of our legacy HMMWV fleet with
JLTVs. We intend to sustain our remaining legacy HMMWVs through a
Sustainment Modification line that will provide safety and mobility
related component level upgrades, estimated to cost approximately
$60,000 per vehicle. In combination with our existing depot level
maintenance program, the HMMWV Sustainment Modification line will keep
our legacy HMMWV fleet viable through FY30 timeframe.
The Marine Corps does not have a structural blast channel (SBC)
program and is not committing funding to explore its capabilities. As
discussed above, our experimentation testing conducted during Spring/
Summer of 2011 informed the Marine Corps regarding SBC capabilities. We
understand the physics and impacts the SBC, or ``chimney,'' has on
vehicle design, performance, survivability, and cost.
According to Limited User Testing using Marines, the 12'' x 12''
chimney located in the mid section of the modified HMMWV had negative
impacts on crew visibility, communication, and immediate action drill
response. Due to the increased vehicle weight to improve survivability,
off road mobility and performance were severely degraded. Survivability
improvements were due to fully integrated design, energy dissipating
floors and seats, and structural rigidity as opposed to the chimney.
Finally, in addition to a $70k-$100k for a SBC cab, a properly
integrated vehicle would include a modified HMMWV frame, upgraded
suspension, power train and brake modifications to account for a GVW
over 16,000 lbs. $240k, or the base price for a JLTV, is the estimated
cost for these modifications. Accordingly, the USMC and our Army
partners agree that JLTV is the preferred Light Vehicle investment
alternative.
Mr. Bartlett. Regarding the industrial base, the current hope seems
to be that foreign military sales can compensate at least in part for
decreased U.S. demand. As often is the case there remains significant
risk with the foreign military sales market. Is there a risk that loss
of design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial
base could undermine the idea of ``reversibility'' emphasized by
Secretary Panetta? If so, which areas of the industrial base are the
greatest areas of concern? For example, at the vendor base level both
the Army and the Marine Corps are dependent upon one Transmission
Company for many of their platforms. If based on current funding
profiles this company were to close down or leave the defense industry
what would be the impact to current and future Army and Marine Corps
vehicle programs?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. Marine Corps
Programs do not impact the defense industrial base as much as the
larger joint programs in which we are a small participant. Marine Corps
programs do have an impact on many small business that perform work
tailored toward more specific Marine Corps requirements. As with any
level of budget reduction in our investment accounts, the new defense
strategy and our associated reduced funding and force structure mean a
smaller demand, proportionately, for the small business. We have tried
very hard to work with our industry partners, demonstrated by our
planned MV-22 MYP and our depots, during these challenging times.
In the case of the transmission manufacturer, the Marine Corps does
its best to plan for possible major sub component obsolescence or a
vendor that goes out of business in order to ensure parts support for
our equipment during the sustainment phase. By procuring our vehicles
using performance-based specifications vice rigid government military
specifications, industry has greater flexibility for cost-effective
technology insertion in the design and production of sub components.
There will always be a big impact on an end item such as a truck if a
major component like a transmission is no longer available. A
replacement component which meets the performance standards has to be
found, tested and eventually procured to replace the component that is
no longer available.
Mr. Bartlett. The need to supply U.S. ground forces with immense
volumes of fuel, in particular, imposes significant costs upon U.S.
ground forces. Ground vehicles are responsible for approximately one-
third of the fuel demand of ground forces engaged in combat. What do
the Army and Marine Corps plan to do to reduce this demand as they
modernize their vehicle portfolios?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The limited new
vehicle platform program starts under way in the Marine Corps each
specifically address the need for improved fuel efficiency, calling out
in development documentation unprecedented demands for improvement, the
exploration of hybrid and emerging technologies, and the consideration
of lighter component materials.
Toward legacy fleets, multiple efforts are under way to improve
platform performance. In conjunction with the Office of Naval Research,
the Marine Corps is conducting an examination of the MTVR 7 ton truck
(medium fleet), with the goal of improving fuel efficiency a minimum of
15%, constrained by a fiscal limitation per platform. It is hoped this
improvement can be realized through the insertion of existing
technologies within the transmission, drive train, and engine idle.
Further the incorporation of an Auxiliary Power Unit is being tested,
which would be used to energize several electronic components and
systems on the truck while it is stationary, without requiring the
engine to be idling and burning fuel. Based on the success of this
effort, the finding would be applied to the LVSR (heavy fleet)
vehicles. Toward the HMMWV (light fleet), while undergoing
modifications to return performance (payload/mobility) technology
inserts will be examined to likewise improve HMMWV fuel efficiency.
To further impact a reduction in fuel demand, modernization of
tactical trailers is under way, which will sustain the throughput
requirement of cargo and supplies, while reducing the number of vehicle
platforms required to provide the needed capacity. The MTVR cargo
trailer will nearly double the amount of cargo a single MTVR can
transport, and the PLS trailer will do the same for the LVSR, reducing
the number of fuel burning platforms while moving the same volume of
cargo.
The Onboard Vehicle Power System is being tested on the MTVR and
HMMWV. This system provides a vehicle platform with essentially an
integrated power generation capability, where the vehicle itself will
provide exportable power, and in doing so eliminate a standalone
generator and utility trailer, freeing the vehicle and its towing
capacity to transport more cargo, while eliminating an additional fuel-
burning piece of equipment.
Additionally, the extensive rebalancing of legacy fossil-fuel-
burning generators and the introduction of an improved fuel-efficient
generator family across the Marine Corps, coupled with the expanding
introduction of renewable power generation systems in multiple roles,
will tangibly reduce the overall number of these systems and amount of
fossil fuel required to provide the required energy in the field.
Though this action will not directly impact the fuel efficiency of
transportation platforms, it will measureably decrease the amount of
equipment requiring not only transportation, but refueled as well, and
in doing so, reduce ground resupply requirements and overall force
fossil-fuel demands.
The Marine Corps recognizes that the service enterprise solution to
improved fuel efficiency rests not in a singular vehicle, but a
culmination of legacy and future platform performance improvements,
changes in tactics and procedures, and capitalization upon emerging
technologies, as well as the education of current and future Marines.
Mr. Bartlett. How comfortable are you with the current state of
modernization for ground combat and tactical wheeled vehicles? What
concerns do you have regarding the industrial base?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps is
beginning a series of long-term modernization efforts focused on
replacement of the aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) and a portion
of the High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). The Marine Corps'
single tactical wheeled vehicle modernization program is the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The JLTV's requirements are mature and
stable. The program will begin the Engineering Manufacturing and
Development phase this spring. The JLTV represents an effective
collaboration between the Marine Corps and the Army to modernize a
portion of the light tactical vehicle fleet. Our priority is to replace
critical weapons, Command and Control, and utility variants of the
HMMWV in order to restore payload and mobility to the fleet which has
been degraded by ever-increasing armor loads and power consumption
demands. The technology development phase of this program which is now
complete demonstrated a strong and competitive U.S. industrial base
well capable of developing and manufacturing a vehicle to meet our
expeditionary requirements. We have sequenced procurement of the JLTV
ahead of our AAV replacements because of the maturity of the program
and our ability to complete the majority of procurement before we begin
procuring the AAV's replacement.
Marine Corps modernization of combat vehicles will focus on
infantry armored mobility to support both amphibious and landward
combat missions. The modernization of our amphibious combat vehicle
capability, currently the AAV, is critical to our ability to meet
future operational demands. Our current plan calls for the replacement
of the AAV with two complementary platforms to meet our expeditionary
armored mobility requirements for Marine infantry forces. The
initiatives are called Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine
Personnel Carrier (MPC). The ACV is intended to meet, at a minimum,
basic amphibious operational capabilities and capacities through a
self-deploying amphibious tracked vehicle and provide effective follow-
on land mobility for a portion of infantry forces. The MPC, a multi-
wheeled armored personnel carrier, is a complementary capability. It
will be capable of entry into theater via Navy-provided connectors such
as the LCAC as well as via strategic airlift and secured ports. Its
foundational requirements will drive design (largely available on the
current market) that is more suited to extended landward mobility in
high-speed maneuver operations as well as in much more constrained
maneuver but IED-threat-prone environments such as we faced in the
later stages of operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan. We are
continuing to assess the required capabilities, capacities of each
platform and the affordability of any portfolio options. Through a
disciplined MPC technology development effort we have a solid
understanding of the industrial capacity to meet our requirements and
do not have any concerns. Similarly, our cost-informed systems
engineering work on ACV requirements, together with industry
interaction gives us confidence that the U.S. industrial base can
support the unique requirements associated with the ACV.
Mr. Bartlett. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 required that the GAO conduct a report on the health of the
tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base, and upon further review of
the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) budget accounts in the FY 2013
budget request, this report could not be more relevant. All new
production will cease beginning in FY 2013 and FY 2014. The only major
acquisition effort by DOD in the tactical wheeled vehicle sector for
the foreseeable few years will be JLTV, which is designed to replace
roughly \1/3\ of the current HMMWV fleet. How then do you gauge the
future health of this sector of the defense industrial base in light of
these significant reductions?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The future health of
the tactical wheeled vehicle industry will face some challenges in the
coming years due to the significant reductions in new vehicle
procurement by the Department of Defense. As identified, the JLTV
program is the only new truck procurement on the horizon for DOD which
promises intense competition amongst the vendors during both the EMD
and production phases, and should translate into good production prices
for the Army and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps' HMMWV Sustainment
Modification effort will provide some rebuild work as well as the
procurement of automotive kits in order to modernize and prolong the
life of the fleet.
The prospects for subcontractors who provide the major subsystems
for tactical wheeled vehicles should remain robust in the future as DOD
will rely on these vendors to supply spares, and improved subsystems
for modifications, SLEP and IROAN efforts. Additionally, the majority
of these components are also used on commercial vehicles, therefore
their business is not tied solely to the Defense Department. Those
vendors and suppliers with the flexibility to serve both military and
commercial customer bases are perhaps the best suited to thrive in the
current acquisition climate. In contrast, those vendors and suppliers
who focus solely on the military are the most at risk.
Mr. Bartlett. In today's austere budget environment, how can the
Marine Corps afford to procure the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle, and Marine Personnel Carrier programs?
General Mills and Mr. Taylor. Combat and tactical vehicle
modernization is critical to maintaining responsive and relevant
expeditionary and amphibious combat forces in the future. We have
sequenced the mature Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program ahead
of our amphibious vehicle modernization programs in order to reduce
future procurement bow waves. Similarly, we have accelerated some
ground programs so that procurement will be completed before we begin
procurement of the ACV and MPC. We continue to conduct detailed cost-
to-capability assessments and estimates in order to understand and to
control program costs at the requirements level. We believe that
investment in these important capabilities can be managed as an
increased percentage of our future procurement account for a limited
period of time without incurring significant risk in other warfighting
areas.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT AND MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Shuster. As the Army and the Marine Corps have
ended combat operations in Iraq and will be looking to do so in
Afghanistan in 2014, we will inevitably be left with the decision of
what equipment will be donated or sold to the Afghan Government and
what we bring home. Part of the most significant investment the
Congress has made over the past years of combat operations is in the
development of the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle
fleet. What are your Services' plans to sustain this fleet? Will they
simply be passed into a new DOD ``boneyard,'' and has the DOD conducted
any internal analysis for sustaining or consolidating the separate
supply chains that support each MRAP variant?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The initial task was to build
and field MRAPs as fast as possible to address the Improvised Explosive
Devices threat. Logistic sustainment, while important, was a secondary
consideration. As a result, the DOD fielded vehicles from six
manufacturers producing over 26 variants, which makes sustainment a
challenge. However:
(1) The DOD plans upgrades to the MRAP capability in an effort to
bring the earlier variants up to the latest/common configurations. This
variant consolidation strategy, coupled with the Army's plan to divest
about 1,200 MRAP vehicles with very low density and/or considered
uneconomical to repair, will reduce the number of variants from 26-plus
to 8 and the number of manufacturers will decline from 6 to 4,
resulting in simplified and improved sustainment and training. Divested
MRAPs not utilized by other United States Government entities could be
made available to coalition partners via donation, loan, and/or Foreign
Military Sales.
(2) The Army has conducted an extensive analysis regarding vehicle
quantities, mission roles and sustainment for enduring force MRAPs. As
Army MRAPs are no longer required in theater, the remaining quantity
will be reset to a Full Mission Standard. The majority (about 60
percent) will be placed in augmentation sets (long-term storage) for
use in future contingency operations, thereby significantly reducing
the sustainment costs associated with parts and fuel. Sustainment cost
efficiencies will also result from retrograding current MRAP repair
parts in theater, when prudent to do so, to sustain enduring force
MRAPs in peacetime.
(3) The remaining (about 40 percent) of the Army's MRAPs will be
allocated on the Tables Of Equipment of specific units (Sustainment,
Engineer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and the various Institutional
Schools) to support unique training efforts.
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps has
received 4045 MRAP vehicles. We plan to retain approximately 2600 MRAPs
for their post-OEF role, specifically toward route clearance, combat
engineer, EOD, and protected mobility based on the threat faced. Their
value is unprecedented and no other asset presently available can match
their performance toward protecting Marines in an environment similar
to the one currently encountered in OEF.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO AND MR. ROONEY
Mr. LoBiondo and Mr. Rooney. Of the Army's $79.4 million request
for Abrams Engineering Change Proposals, does that amount include
specific funding for Abrams Engine Technology Insertion to address fuel
efficiency and improved reliability?
General Lennox and General Phillips. No, not at this time. However,
the U.S. Army is considering an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)
effort beyond the current Abrams ECP I program. This power-train
improvement ECP effort would potentially include improvements to both
the engine and transmission focusing on fuel efficiency, reliability,
durability, and maintainability. Initial analysis indicates that these
improvements could result in a 14 percent fuel savings over a combat
day. Specific engineering efforts would focus on designing a new dual
centrifugal compressor that will be integrated within the existing
Total InteGrated Engine Revitalization Allison Gas Turbine-1500, or
TIGER AGT 1500, engine and changes to the transmission involving a two-
stage main oil pump, evacuated torque converter, and modulated cooling
fans. The engine/transmission effort will take approximately 5 years
from project initiation to delivery of the prototype engines/
transmissions available for test. Requirements and funding approval for
this potential effort is subject to Army priorities and funding
availability.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. I would like to spend some time exploring this idea of
``reversibility'' and the strange notion that we can just turn
fundamental national security programs off and then turn them back on
without assuming an unacceptable level of risk and incurring tremendous
cost. The President's Strategic Guidance states, ``the concept of
`reversibility'--including the vectors on which we place our industrial
base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture,
and our partnership emphasis--is a key part of our decision calculus.''
Secretary Panetta explained that this ``means reexamining the mix of
elements in the active and reserve components; it means maintaining a
strong National Guard and Reserve; it means retaining a healthy cadre
of experienced NCOs [non-commissioned officers] and mid-grade officers,
and preserving the health and viability of the nation's defense
industrial base.'' So, please explain to me this concept. If a
particular parts manufacturer goes out of business and they were the
only producer of that part--how does ``reversibility'' take this into
account? In some cases, depending on the complexity of the part, it can
take over a year for a prime contractor to get another vendor
qualified? What is the risk of increasing our vulnerability from an
industrial base perspective where we will be forcing our prime
contractors to depend on foreign sources to supply critical parts? How
does shutting down this production line preserve ``the health and
viability of the nation's defense industrial base''?
General Lennox. To keep the concept of reversibility a viable one,
the Army continually works with the suppliers in the commercial
industrial base to reduce the chances of single points of failure.
Reductions in the nation's forces will be structured and paced in a way
to allow the Army to surge, regenerate, and mobilize the capabilities
and materiel needed for any future contingency. To build in the ability
to quickly mobilize requires that the Army continue to re-examine the
mix of elements in its forces and work to preserve the health and
viability of the nation's Defense Industrial Base.
Related strategies to support reversibility include a Department of
Defense-wide effort to assess the health of and risk to the industrial
base on a Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) basis. The S2T2
analysis seeks to identify critical areas that could constitute single
points of failure and develop strategies to mitigate the risks
identified. The Army is also incorporating mitigation strategies
involving the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to address
identified risks. The FMS program allows our vendors to diversify and
balance military with commercial business so they can weather the lean
years and be in position to compete when we start investing in the next
generation of products or recapitalize current platforms. FMS sales
also help sustain highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial base by
maintaining and extending production lines, thereby strengthening
reversibility. The Army would not recommend shutting down a production
line if shutdown would jeopardize the Army's ability to meet surge
requirements.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. Have Remote Weapons Systems been given a thorough
capabilities review as a possible subcomponent for future combat
vehicles such as the JLTV? What is the Army and Marines opinion on the
possibility of utilizing remote weapons systems on future ground
vehicle programs and could you talk about the benefits of utilizing
weapons platforms like the RWS or CROW?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The RWS gives the Soldier the
benefit of protection under armor while surveying, acquiring and
engaging the enemy, both from stationary positions and while on the
move RWS capability enhance combat operations in several ways. The day
and thermal optics on the RWS provide a significant improvement over
current weapon optics. The laser range finder, along with the ballistic
fire control, provide the ability to put first burst on target with a
high probability of hit resulting in faster, more effective
engagements, and a reduction in the expenditure of ammunition, all
while the Soldier remains protected under armor.
The JLTV program has a requirement for a RWS capability within the
Heavy Gun Carrier Variant. The program expects to demonstrate the
initial integration of their capability during the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development phase during Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) and FY14
in conjunction with Developmental Testing and Limited User Testing. The
JLTV program will continue the evaluation of the RWS/CROWS integration
within the Production Deployment phase as part of Production
Qualification Testing and Multiservice Operational Testing and
Evaluation during FY16 and FY17.
RWS has been successfully integrated on existing vehicles. The RWS/
CROWS have been mounted on several thousand Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicles, half of the Stryker vehicles (5 of 10 variants),
M1A1 Abrams tanks, and numerous other vehicles in support of operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This combat proven capability has been useful
to units exposed to improvised explosive devices, snipers and
firefights with the enemy.
The Army has an approved Basis of Issue Plan committed to
permanently mounting RWS on thousands of vehicles for the future force.
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. CROWS is in use by
the U.S. Army and a limited number (five) were fielded to Marines in
Afghanistan as part of proof of concept and field user evaluation.
CROWS represents the current generation of remotely operated weapon
stations in what is likely to be a growth industry. As such, it is one
system that the Marine Corps is considering for future applications on
any of several combat and tactical vehicles in our inventory. For JLTV
specifically, we do not have current plans to procure CROWS or any
other remote weapon station due to the lack of warfighter demand and
competing investment priorities. However, during JLTV requirements and
technical development, we planned for and have designed in the weight,
space and power requirements to enable a retrofit of remote weapon
stations if necessary.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. Army leadership has acknowledged publicly that they
are unsure if the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle (MECV) program
would be able to achieve the required levels of survivability and
mobility necessary against today's threats. The Army leadership has
also acknowledged that the requirement to improve the HMMWV's
survivability and mobility still exists and that the reason for killing
the program was a matter of affordability. Congress provided the Army
$20M of FY12 RDT&E funding for you to conduct a competitive assessment
of potential solutions for your MECV program. As a part of the Army's
risk mitigation plan for the Light Wheeled Vehicle Fleet, can you
explain to me why wouldn't it make sense to complete the MECV
competitive assessment so that the Army can make informed decisions as
necessary in the future?
General Lennox and General Phillips. Based on the Army and Marine
Corps' commitment to Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and defense
department fiscal constraints, the Army could not afford to initiate
the MECV program. Additionally, the Army felt that it would not be in
the best interest of industry to participate in a minimally funded
research and development effort with no profitable procurement period.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS
Mr. Owens. General Lennox, for FY 2013, the Army is requesting $116
million in RDT&E funding for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) to essentially complete HMS
radio development and test and evaluation. This is significantly more
than the $12.5 the Army projected would be necessary to close out the
program this year. Can you explain the discrepancy between these
figures, and give me your assessment of whether similar funding will be
requested in future fiscal years?
General Lennox. The FY13 HMS RDT&E ($116M) includes a FY13
increases to fund HMS development and testing caused by delays in MUOS
waveform delivery and satellite on orbit capability ($45.0M); and
funding to update the HMS Manpack to the Department of Defense Public
Key Infrastructure standard ($10.0M); baseline program funding ($61M).
The program is not expecting to request similar funding in future
fiscal years unless requirements change.
Mr. Owens. General Lennox, can you give us your assessment of
whether the HMS product is meeting expectations in the Network
Integration Evaluation, and is the program currently experiencing cost
overruns or is it on track with the fiscal targets originally set
forward?
General Lennox. The HMS program is meeting expectations as defined
in the Capability Production Documents for HMS Manpack and Rifleman
Radios. These documents define the Joint Service requirements for the
radios in the HMS program. The Rifleman Radio has successfully
completed its Initial Operational Test & Evaluation and the HMS Manpack
Radio is on track to conduct a Multi-Service Operational Test &
Evaluation in May 2012. The program is executing to the Acquisition
Program Baseline established at the Milestone C in May 2011. However, a
funding reduction of $60M to the Fiscal Year 2012 Research,
Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and delays in
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) waveform have affected HMS cost
baselines. The overall impact of these actions to the funding baseline
is still being assessed. The Product Manager is exploring caps on the
cost of the current RDT&E contract and/or reducing the number of
Waveforms ported (based on Service requirements) in order to execute
within current funding levels.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROONEY
Mr. Rooney. Can you please describe the Army/Marine Corps plan for
runflat tire systems procurement for the JLTV and GCV programs?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The current JLTV Capability
Development Document kit allocation table calls for two percent of the
U.S. Army's planned vehicles to receive run-flat kits, while the U.S.
Marine Corps currently does not plan to purchase these kits. The GCV
technology development effort is on fully-tracked vehicle solutions for
which runflat standards do not apply.
Mr. Rooney. Can you please provide the Committee with Army/Marine
Corps policy on minimum standards for runflat tire systems for the JLTV
and GCV programs?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The JLTV specifications
require all JLTV's to be capable of accepting run-flat tire kits. The
kit must be able to be applied with two man-hours of effort or less and
the vehicle must be capable of traveling 18 miles at 20 miles per hour
with complete loss of pressure in any two tires. These requirements can
be found in the JLTV Purchase Description document v.3.0.2 under
paragraph 3.4.5.8.10 Run-Flat Kit. The current Capability Development
Document kit allocation table calls for two percent of the U.S. Army
JLTVs to receive run-flat kits, while the U.S. Marine Corps currently
does not plan to purchase these kits. The GCV technology development
effort is based on fully-tracked vehicle solutions for which runflat
standards do not apply.
Mr. Rooney. Can you please describe the Army/Marine Corps plan for
runflat tire systems procurement for the JLTV and GCV programs?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps
procurement strategy for runflat capability on the JLTV platform is to
contract for runflat kits as an option on the production contract
depending upon the results from EMD phase testing. If selected for use
on the JLTV, the kits will be fully provisioned and available for
procurement by individual units based on the unit commander's
discretion and operational environment. This mirrors the strategy of
other recently procured Marine Corps tactical wheeled vehicles such as
the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) and Logistics Vehicle
System Replacement (LVSR).
Mr. Rooney. Can you please provide the Committee with Army/Marine
Corps policy on minimum standards for runflat tire systems for the JLTV
and GCV programs?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps has
no policy for minimum standards for run flat tire systems. Each vehicle
is evaluated based on its mission profile with specifications to meet
the unique requirements of that vehicle.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ
Mr. Critz. As a survivability enabler, has the Marine Corps been
successful in fielding the Improved Weapons' Loader Station (ILWS) for
the Marine Corps' armor community?
General Mills and General Kelley. The Improved Loader's Weapon
Station has not been fielded. It is currently on schedule for fielding
to begin in the first quarter of FY13.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. Within the U.S. Army, have you assigned a program office
to lead the effort to develop a universal controller? It appears that
the equities/responsibilities are spread across several PEOs since
we're dealing with small UAVs, UGVs and UGSs.
General Lennox and General Phillips. The universal controller,
known as the Army ``common controller,'' was originally established as
part of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Early-Infantry Brigade Combat
Team (E-IBCT) effort under Program Executive Office, Integration (PEO-
I). Following the cancellation of FCS in 2009, the programs under the
E-IBCT were transferred from PEO-I to other Army PEO's. In Fiscal Year
2011, reprioritization of Army funds resulted in the disestablishment
of the common controller program. Funding ceased for this program in
FY11 and the program office was disestablished. Currently, the Army is
re-evaluating the requirement for a common controller, which will guide
the future plan for this type of system.
Mrs. Roby. How long do you think it will take the USMC and the Army
to develop a joint program for a soldier wearable, universal
controller?
General Lennox and General Phillips. Currently, the Army is re-
evaluating the requirement for a common controller, which will guide
the future plan for this kind of system.
Mrs. Roby. Recently, the Army published its list of critical
research and development priorities--and one of the top priorities
remains reducing soldier load. How do you plan to address and reduce
the combat load?
General Lennox and General Phillips. Army Science and Technology
(S&T) has commenced a new collaborative effort to significantly reduce
the weight and volume of all items that individual Soldiers in a Small
Unit must physically carry to accomplish their missions, while
maintaining or increasing the ability of the Unit to perform tasks.
This Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration (TECD) effort was
initiated in FY12 with planned transitions of mature technologies to
equipment developed for Soldiers.
The TECD will demonstrate capabilities that reduce weight carried
and improve operational mission effectiveness through a combination of
materiel weight reduction, load management tools, off-loading, tactical
resupply, and availability of load management aid tools. The
technologies will be evaluated against the current baseline based on
Afghanistan-like engagement conditions. The overall objective goal for
SU is that no Solider carries more than 30 percent of their body
weight. Specific program objectives include: reducing weight of weapons
and ammunition, power and energy, clothing and equipment; developing
Load Planning Tool & Decision Aids for SU commanders; evaluating and
integrating off-loading and resupply-delivery technologies suitable for
SU/squads in dismounted operations; and increasing scientific
understanding of load on mission effectiveness (physical and cognitive
effects) and long-term health effects.
Mrs. Roby. To this end, today, both Services are operating dozens
of squad level unmanned systems from Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV) to Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and Unattended Ground Sensors
(UGS), each with a proprietary controller. These systems have
demonstrated over and over again their benefit by increasing
situational awareness and saving lives. This being said, there are huge
weight costs due to redundancies along with logistical and operational
costs associated with maintaining many different control systems for
these lifesavers.
The Army made great strides developing a Universal Common Ground
Station for larger UAVs (Tier 2 and Tier 3). And, today this Universal
Ground Control Station controls multiple unmanned aircraft systems for
both the Army and USMC. It seems the next, logical step is to deploy a
lightweight, wearable universal control system to operate the smaller
UAVs, UGVs and UGSs, as well, as to receive remote video as a common
architecture from other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets in the area. In addition to reducing the operational/logistical
burden on the force as a whole, providing control of this capability to
the warfighters who are on the ground and engaged in the missions
undoubtedly would reduce their load and increase their force protection
through enhanced situational awareness while increasing the
effectiveness of the unit.
I understand that the Army and the Marine Corps (through the Rapid
Equipping Force (REF) and the USMC Warfighting Lab in conjunction with
Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren (MSWCDL)) are evaluating such
lightweight systems ( 10 lbs) with favorable results in Afghanistan
that enable the squad by providing this capability to them for mission
use.
Where do we stand in developing a joint acquisition program to
broadly provide our warfighters with this capability?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The Army and the Marine Corps
are jointly developing the Tactical Robotic Controller (TRC) Capability
Development Document, which could provide a Warfighter wearable,
universal controller for Battalion and below Unmanned Air/Ground
Systems. Current systems in this category include: the Rucksack
Portable UAS (Raven, Wasp, and Puma), Small UGV, Man Transportable
Robotic System, Engineer Squad Robot (ESR), Micro UGV, and Squad Multi-
Equipment Transport. The Army/Marine Corps Tactical Robotics Controller
Capabilities Development Document draft will enter staffing in August
2012. A Materiel Development Decision to establish the TRC Joint
Program of Record is expected in 4QFY12. A decision to assign a program
office has not yet been made by the Army.
Mrs. Roby. Within the U.S. Army, have you assigned a program office
to lead the effort to develop a universal controller? It appears that
the equities/responsibilities are spread across several PEOs since
we're dealing with small UAVs, UGVs and UGSs.
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The universal
controller, known as the Army ``common controller,'' was originally
established as part of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Early-Infantry
Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) effort under Program Executive Office,
Integration (PEO-I). Following the cancellation of FCS in 2009, the
programs under the E-IBCT were transferred from PEO-I to other Army
PEO's. In Fiscal Year 2011, reprioritization of Army funds resulted in
the disestablishment of the common controller program. Funding ceased
for this program in FY11 and the program office was disestablished.
Currently, the Army is re-evaluating the requirement for a common
controller, which will guide the future plan for this type of system.
Mrs. Roby. How long do you think it will take the USMC and the Army
to develop a joint program for a soldier-wearable, universal
controller?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. We plan to field
this capability in the FY-19 timeframe. The ability to field this
system in a timely manner will largely depend on the funding available
for completion of the development and procurement of systems in
sufficient quantities. We, in collaboration with the Army and Navy, are
developing requirements for a Tactical Robotic Controller (TRC)
capability. The TRC will provide ground forces at the Battalion level
and below with a single device that will effectively control all Group
I Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS), and
Unattended Ground Sensors. This capability will be in the 8-10 lb range
and will be wearable or have the ability to be attached to existing
equipment worn on the Marine or Soldier. The TRC is envisioned to
replace all of the individual proprietary Operator Control Units that
are currently required to operate these systems. The Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab developed a prototype Tactical Robotic Controller (TRC)
architecture and hardware that has been tested in USMC Limited
Objective Experiments (LOE) for the last three years. This prototype
hardware has also been delivered as the controller for several systems
that are undergoing Operational Assessments in theater. The prototype
TRC hardware has also undergone limited testing as a wearable Remote
Video Terminal and is assessed to be at a Technology Readiness Level of
7.
Mrs. Roby. Recently, the Army published its list of critical
research and development priorities--and one of the top priorities
remains reducing soldier load. How do you plan to address and reduce
the combat load?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps is
actively engaged with our Army counterparts at various levels to reduce
the combat load on our Marines. We also seek and have partnered with
our international and coalition partners in order to share the
information we have learned and to harvest and implement the good ideas
they may have. We are committed to using every resource available in
order to integrate the squad as a system and manage the weight,
ergonomic, thermal and volumetric burdens of the Marine.
The Marine Corps has established a Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad
(MERS) integration facility called Gruntworks to characterize how
components of a Marine's equipment influence combat performance in
terms of weight, bulk and flexibility. Gruntworks' activities seek to
better integrate fielded equipment and soon-to-be fielded equipment on
the individual Marine in a more ergonomic way. This effort also
provides a metric for mobility in various equipment configurations for
the evaluation of future systems.
MERS does not procure equipment but works instead with all of the
Program Managers within Marine Corps Systems Command to ensure
individual items are integrated into an effective combat fighting
capability with a balanced redundancy within the squad. MERS is unique
in that its performance metrics are not cost, schedule and performance,
but rather the effectiveness of the Marine squad, user acceptance of
the equipment provided and the increase in mobility of Marines in
combat.
We plan to pursue a fully integrated infantry system of equipment
that will be driven by an overarching requirement. This requirement
will drive integration of capabilities more effectively at the
requirements level instead of trying to engineer it during materiel
development. The first increment of this capability will seek to better
integrate the capabilities being fielded now or in the near future; the
second increment will leverage emerging technologies to define
attributes for the baseline load bearing, protection, and power systems
and will require that all additional capabilities be fully integrated
with those baseline systems. This will reduce or eliminate the need for
additional capabilities to have their own power, cabling, and carrying
pouches, thereby reducing the bulk and weight of the requisite combat
load. The Army is taking a similar approach and the requirements and
acquisition communities in both Services are sharing their ideas to
collaborate where their interests coincide.
Mrs. Roby. To this end, today, both Services are operating dozens
of squad level unmanned systems from Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV) to Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and Unattended Ground Sensors
(UGS), each with a proprietary controller. These systems have
demonstrated over and over again their benefit by increasing
situational awareness and saving lives. This being said, there are huge
weight costs due to redundancies along with logistical and operational
costs associated with maintaining many different control systems for
these lifesavers.
The Army made great strides developing a Universal Common Ground
Station for larger UAVs (Tier 2 and Tier 3). And, today this Universal
Ground Control Station controls multiple unmanned aircraft systems for
both the Army and USMC. It seems the next, logical step is to deploy a
lightweight, wearable universal control system to operate the smaller
UAVs, UGVs and UGSs, as well, as to receive remote video as a common
architecture from other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets in the area. In addition to reducing the operational/logistical
burden on the force as a whole, providing control of this capability to
the warfighters who are on the ground and engaged in the missions
undoubtedly would reduce their load and increase their force protection
through enhanced situational awareness while increasing the
effectiveness of the unit.
I understand that the Army and the Marine Corps (through the Rapid
Equipping Force (REF) and the USMC Warfighting Lab in conjunction with
Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren (MSWCDL)) are evaluating such
lightweight systems ( 10 lbs) with favorable results in Afghanistan
that enable the squad by providing this capability to them for mission
use.
Where do we stand in developing a joint acquisition program to
broadly provide our warfighters with this capability?
General Mills, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps, in
collaboration with the Army and Navy, are developing requirements for a
Tactical Robotic Controller (TRC) capability. The Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab developed a prototype TRC architecture and hardware
that has been tested in USMC Limited Objective Experiments (LOE) for
the last 3 years. This prototype hardware has also been delivered as
the controller for several systems that are undergoing Operational
Assessments in theater. The prototype TRC hardware has also undergone
limited testing as a wearable Remote Video Terminal. The TRC will
provide ground forces at the Battalion level and below with a single
device that will effectively control all Group I Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS), Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS), and Unattended Ground
Sensors. This capability will be in the 8-10 lb range and will be
wearable or have the ability to be attached to existing equipment worn
on the Marine or Soldier. The TRC is envisioned to replace all of the
individual proprietary Operator Control Units that are currently
required to operate these systems. We plan to field this capability in
the FY-19 timeframe.
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