[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-113]
ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT
CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL RISKS
UNDER THE REVISED 2012 DEFENSE
STRATEGY
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 7, 2012
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri, Chairman
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas RICK LARSEN, Washington
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Emily Waterlander, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 7, 2012, Assessing Mobility Airlift Capabilities
and Operational Risks Under the Revised 2012 Defense Strategy.. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 7, 2012......................................... 29
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2012
ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL RISKS UNDER THE
REVISED 2012 DEFENSE STRATEGY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 2
WITNESSES
Barclay, MG James O., USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff....... 6
Bogdan, Maj Gen Christopher, USAF, Director, KC-46 Tanker
Mobilization Directorate....................................... 8
Johns, Gen Raymond E., USAF, Commander, Air Mobility Command..... 3
Russell, Cary, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 6
Wyatt, Lt Gen Harry M., USAF, Director, Air National Guard....... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 33
Barclay, MG James O.......................................... 59
Johns, Gen Raymond E......................................... 36
McIntyre, Hon. Mike.......................................... 35
Russell, Cary................................................ 65
Wyatt, Lt Gen Harry M........................................ 48
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Griffin.................................................. 81
Mr. Langevin................................................. 81
Mr. Young.................................................... 81
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Akin..................................................... 85
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 95
Mr. Griffin.................................................. 95
ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL RISKS UNDER THE
REVISED 2012 DEFENSE STRATEGY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 7, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:37 p.m. in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. W. Todd Akin
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION
FORCES
Mr. Akin. I am going to bring the hearing to order here. We
are going to have some members showing up in a few minutes.
And before I read an opening statement, if it is all right
with you, I will start with a prayer.
Father, we thank you for each day you give us. We thank you
for the pretty day outside. We thank you for the many people
who serve our country. We ask you please to watch over our
words and our thoughts at this time in this hearing. Please
watch over the people who serve us overseas.
And I ask this in Jesus' name.
Amen.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I would like to welcome everyone here to the first hearing
of the second session of the 112th Congress for the Seapower
and Projection Forces Subcommittee. I look forward to
continuing our bipartisan efforts that have been a longstanding
tradition in this subcommittee in providing our service men and
women with the best equipment possible in this most challenging
budget environment. That is an understatement.
Testifying before us are representatives from the Air
Force, Army and Government Accountability Offices. We have
General Ray Johns, Commander of Air Mobility; Lieutenant
General Bud Wyatt, Director of Air National Guard; Major
General Jim Barclay, Deputy to the Office of the Army Deputy
Chief of Staff; and Major General Chris Bogdan, the KC-46
Tanker Program Manager; and Mr. Cary Russell, Acting Director
of GAO's [Government Accountability Office] Defense
Capabilities and Management Directorate.
Gentlemen, welcome and thank you for the many years of
service providing leadership that enables our military to be
the finest in the world. Today, we are here to assess the
increased risk incurred within the airlift and tanker mobility
portfolios of the Army and Air Force as a result of the
President's April, 2011 initiative calling for continued
reductions to the defense budget.
As a result, the fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD
[Department of Defense] is $45.3 billion or 8 percent below the
planned fiscal year 2013 budget submitted in last year's fiscal
year 2012 request. The end-state consequences resulted in
divestment of 150 aircraft from air mobility programs and will
even force the Air Force to fly brand-new C-27 joint cargo
aircraft directly from the production line to the ``boneyard''
in Arizona this year.
Furthermore, this new budget-driven defense strategy
negates the 2010 quadrennial defense review scenarios developed
just 2 years ago that were used to right-size airlift programs
in anticipation of the threats and contingencies that the U.S.
Government should be prepared for in the 2016-and-beyond time
period.
Nothing to date has occurred over the last 2 years
indicating that the world has gotten safer or that the
foreseeable operations tempo of our military will significantly
decrease to justify such a large reduction of force structure.
A smaller force structure operating under the same
operational tempo only leads to our military wearing out their
equipment quicker than planned. Just ask the Navy. They have
285 ships today, but currently operate them as if they had a
fleet of 350.
The next threat around the corner that is certainly
predictable is budget sequestration. The $487 billion in cuts
imposed upon the defense budget already concern me and I
certainly do not support the devastating effect that
sequestration will have on national security come this January.
It makes no sense to me why some believe that penalizing
defense, which is only 20 percent of our discretionary budget,
an additional $500 billion to $600 billion through
sequestration, is acceptable policy.
The only outcomes from such a mindset is a guarantee that
we will move toward becoming a regional power and open a global
void that another rising power will most certainly fill. I ask
our witnesses to please help the subcommittee understand what
impact sequestration will have on your respective areas of the
DOD budget.
Gentlemen, I thank you again for being with us today. We
look forward to your testimony.
And I now recognize the ranking subcommittee member, who
is--okay, Mrs. Davis are you going to stand in? Good. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to express
these remarks on behalf of Congressman Mike McIntyre, ranking
chair of the subcommittee.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for appearing here
today and for your service to our country.
Given the number of recently announced reductions, it is
important for us to have a clear understanding of what the
airlift requirements are to meet the new defense strategy. With
the retirement of all 27 C-5As, the elimination of the entire
C-27J fleet, and the retirement of 65 C-130s, I am concerned
about whether or not we have the mobility resources required to
meet current and future global demands.
While there will be a drawdown in the overall end-strength
of the ground forces in the coming years, there will also be a
shift of resources to the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility,
and that will require increased support. My understanding is
that many of these shifts will begin in the coming years, while
our commitments to the current conflict in Afghanistan remain.
I am interested in hearing how the strategic shift,
combined with our current commitments, will impact mobility
demands. I am anxious to hear from the witnesses about the
decision to terminate the C-27J program and retire all the
current aircraft we have already bought and paid for. A
clarification in the assumptions that were made in this process
and how the Air Force plans to fulfill this requirement would
be helpful to the subcommittee.
With regard to the KC-46 tanker-replacement program, I am
encouraged to see signs that the program is progressing in a
positive direction. Recent briefings to committee staff shows
both low risk in the areas of cost and technical performance
and moderate risk in scheduled performance. I know that the KC-
46 program office is working diligently to keep the program on
a stable track and avoid any design or contract changes that
could potentially delay delivery and allow for increased costs.
Once again, thank you very much to the witnesses for
appearing here today, and we all look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
Eloquent; good job.
Okay, we are going to have opening statements.
First, General Johns, go ahead. I think, what are we
talking about, maybe 5 minutes or so? Is that what we typically
do? About 5 minutes or so; and then going to be Lieutenant
General Wyatt, Major General Barclay, and then Mr. Russell.
Okay? Good.
Thank you, General.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND E. JOHNS, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
MOBILITY COMMAND
General Johns. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the full written
statement be placed in the record.
Chairman Akin, Acting Ranking Member Mrs. Davis, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you about our Nation's air mobility
capabilities.
I am honored to be joined by the distinguished members of
this panel, and particularly pleased that General Wyatt is
here. Air Mobility Command is the 135,000 airmen from Active,
Guard, and Reserve. We could not do our mission without the
full support and commitment of the Air National Guard and the
Air Force Reserve.
We in the mobility forces answer the call so others may
prevail across the spectrum, from humanitarian to combat
operations. In March of last year, we moved 13,000 military and
civilian personnel to Japan to support tsunami relief. We
evacuated thousands of DOD dependents back to the U.S. over
radiation concerns and provided 79 percent of the refueling
required for Libya operations and continued to support the
ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan with air, land, and air-
drop missions. It was truly our version of March Madness.
AMC [Air Mobility Command] is a force provider. We are the
air component of United States Transportation Command, so we do
not determine the requirements, but are responsible for making
sure the combatant commanders' requirements can be met.
Our Nation's air-mobility fleet is a national treasure that
truly sets us apart as a world power. We take the stewardship
of this fleet very seriously. We want to ensure our Nation's
leaders that follow generations from today will have the same
strategic options we now enjoy.
We can project combat power anywhere in the world when we
match an air-refueling tanker with a strike platform. We can
resupply a forward-operating base cut off from the ground using
our airlifters for air drop. We can return a wounded soldier to
critical care back in the United States within hours of being
injured.
We are also keenly aware of the fiscal realities we face.
This committee, like few others, understands the impact of a
$487 billion reduction of funding over the next 10 years. Air
mobility is not immune from this. Let me assure you today that
very thoughtful analysis and deliberation went into the fiscal
year 2013 President's budget request. No less than four
different studies performed by various stakeholders and OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the joint staff and
the air staff informed the air mobility portion of the
President's budget request.
We will be smaller, but at the same time, more modern and
more agile than we have ever been. I can assure the committee
that we can support the 2012 defense strategic guidance.
AMC supports the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
request. We truly appreciate the impact, though, of the force
structure changes that it will have on your communities, and
they are our communities also. We searched for total force
solutions, and with the help of General Wyatt and many others,
we believe we are best poised to go into the future.
Again, we thank you for letting us discuss air mobility
today. We look forward to your questions, and a special thank
you to this committee for your enduring support of what we hold
as a national treasure, our airmen and this mission.
[The prepared statement of General Johns can be found in
the Appendix on page 36.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, General.
And General Wyatt.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN HARRY M. WYATT, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIR
NATIONAL GUARD
General Wyatt. Chairman Akin and Ranking Member McIntyre
and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before
you today representing the over 106,000 dedicated men and women
of our Nation's Air National Guard.
As the director of the Air National Guard, my job is to
ensure Guard airmen have the resources and training necessary
to accomplish their assigned missions and task. But as a U.S.
Air Force officer and an American citizen, I want an Air Force
which has both the capability and capacity to meet future
national security challenges, and I want that Air Force at the
lowest possible cost.
There have been a number of airlift requirement studies in
the last two years, as I know you are aware. I doubt that any
of them have captured the full requirements to meeting overseas
contingency operations, direct support to the Army, and
domestic emergencies. It is not for a lack of trying. We simply
do not fully understand all of the airlift requirements.
The Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS
2016, is the most comprehensive study, but there is an
assumption that ``ground transportation provides the best rate
of closure.'' I question whether that stands up to historical
fact or exercise experiences.
Hurricanes, floods, blizzards, and earthquakes block access
roads and damage bridges, making ground transportation very
difficult. As demonstrated in many real-world experiences, it
is far easier and faster to clear a few miles of runway and
ramps than hundreds of miles of highways.
And in complex, catastrophic events, such as last summer's
National Level Exercise 11, sometimes referred to NLE 11, a
major earthquake along the New Madrid Fault or the Japanese
experiences of a year ago, outgoing refugee traffic will make
in-bound relief traffic practically impossible.
I recognize that a once-in-a-100-year event, such as the
Hurricane Katrina, may not be the best benchmark for
requirements planning, but it does provide a frame of reference
for complex, catastrophic events.
In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Air National Guard
used 83 Air National Guard airlift aircraft or about 35 percent
of the Air Guard inventory at that time to transport supplies,
equipment, and aid workers into the stricken area and to
evaluate victims.
Of the 29 Air Guard airlift units that supported the
Katrina recovery mission, 6 have undergone major mission
changes, primary due to BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment]
2005, and more could be affected by fiscal year 2013 budget.
It is also not just about numbers of aircraft that will be
needed to respond to simultaneous domestic and overseas events.
It is also about basing or disbursement. During a major event,
such as a hurricane, earthquake, or chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear event, the aircraft and personnel in
the affected area may not be available to respond.
We have all learned a lot since Hurricane Katrina, and even
since MCRS 2016 was done. NORTHCOM [Northern Command], FEMA
[Federal Emergency Management Agency], and the National Guard
are working to improve the Nation's response capabilities and
to better understand response requirements including airlift.
But now is not the time to assume away domestic airlift needs.
It is interesting to note that, because of the timing of
MCRS 2016, it was not informed by the new national strategy or
the lesson of National Level Exercise 11 or the restructuring
of the chemical, biological, and radiological enterprise, which
created 10 homeland response forces in the Air National Guard,
each comprised of 550 passengers or soldiers and airmen that
could in all likelihood require airlift transportation to the
next domestic emergency.
Thank you for inviting me here today. Thank you for your
service to the Nation and support to the United States Air
Force and its Reserve Components. And I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in
the Appendix on page 48.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, General.
And Major General Barclay.
STATEMENT OF MG JAMES O. BARCLAY, USA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF
General Barclay. Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear here today, and I also welcome this
opportunity to testify before you and appreciate the tremendous
ongoing support of Congress and your committee to our soldiers
stationed around the world.
These soldiers need our efforts to sustain and support them
as they continue to fight in one of our Nation's longest wars
and doing this with an all-volunteer force.
While our operational tempo is very high, our commitment to
ensuring our Army force remains a viable and essential enabling
capability to the joint force remains steadfast to the Army.
Your continued leadership and support in providing full,
timely and sustained funding is critical to our success.
Everything we do in the Army, every decision we make, has
one constant that we cannot subordinate, and that is the
mitigation of risk to our soldiers who are in harm's way.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you
again for your continued generous support and demonstrated
commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United
States Army and their families. I look forward to answering
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Barclay can be found in
the Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, General.
And then Mr. Russell.
STATEMENT OF CARY RUSSELL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND
MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Russell. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McIntyre, members
of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here
today and talk about our work on DOD's mobility capabilities.
As you know, in February 2010, DOD completed its Mobility
Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS 2016. It is
important to examine this study and its limitations in light of
DOD's new strategic guidance on defense priorities and the Air
Force's proposal for aircraft reductions.
I will briefly summarize the key findings from our report
on MCRS 2016 and then highlight some important air mobility
issues to consider with respect to the Department's new
strategic guidance.
DOD's MCRS 2016 study was intended to provide an
understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for
possible future military operations by identifying the
capabilities and requirements to support national strategy. In
essence, the MCRS 2016 was to help leaders make investment
decisions regarding mobility systems.
MCRS 2016 had several specific objectives, and my statement
will focus on our analysis of two of these. One, determining
the gaps or shortfalls and overlaps or excesses associated with
mobility capabilities; and two, providing a risk assessment.
We found that although the MCRS 2016 included some useful
information concerning air mobility systems, it did not provide
decisionmakers with specific information on shortfalls and
excesses or the associated risks.
For each of the three cases of potential conflicts or
disasters that DOD used in the MCRS 2016 study, DOD identified
the required capabilities for air mobility systems. But the
study stopped short of explicitly stating whether or a
shortfall or excess existed.
For example, in each case the study identified unused
strategic airlift capacity but did not state whether this
unused capacity represented an excess of strategic mobility
aircraft such as the C-5.
The MCRS 2016 also did not provide risk assessments related
to potential shortfalls and excesses in mobility capabilities.
Assessing risk related to shortfalls and excesses is important.
The risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might
not be accomplished, while the risk associated with excesses is
that resources may be expended unnecessarily.
The MCRS 2016 showed, for example, that airborne tanker
demand exceeded tanker capacity by 20 percent in one of its
cases, but it did not identify the risk associated with this
potential shortfall.
At the time we issued our report on the MCRS 2016 in
December 2010, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify
shortfalls and excesses in mobility systems, identify the
associated risks, and provide this additional analysis to DOD
and congressional decisionmakers.
Although DOD disagreed with the recommendations,
decisionmakers rely on studies such MCRS 2016 so that they can
make informed choices to address shortfalls and excesses.
If the MCRS 2016 had identified an excess, decisionmakers
may have chosen either to retire aircraft or keep an
operational reserve to mitigate against unforeseen events. Or
if the study had identified a shortfall, decisionmakers may
have chosen to accept the operational risk or sought to
increase capabilities.
Furthermore, quantifying the risk associated with specific
mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate
resources so that the most risk can be addressed at the least
cost. Therefore we continue to believe that DOD needs to report
on shortfalls, excesses, and associated risks.
I would like to now turn to a brief discussion of DOD's new
strategic guidance, issued just this past January, which could
affect air-mobility requirements.
DOD has stated that the guidance will ensure that our
military is ready for the full range of contingencies. However,
it includes changes from previous strategy, such as U.S. forces
will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged
stability operation.
Based on the new guidance, the Air Force has proposed
changes to the mobility air fleet, including reductions of 130
mobility aircraft. But the Air Force's February 2012 document
that outlines its proposed reductions does not provide details
of any analyses.
Given the new guidance, it is unclear to what extent the
requirements developed from the MCRS are relevant today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. That
concludes my remarks. I would happy to take any questions you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell can be found in the
Appendix on page 65.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Russell.
And, General Bogdan, I understand you did have a couple of
thoughts before we get started in the questions and all.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN CHRISTOPHER BOGDAN, USAF, DIRECTOR, KC-46
TANKER MOBILIZATION DIRECTORATE
General Bogdan. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and the
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity for me to address this committee with an update of
the status of the KC-46 program, 1 year after contract award.
I have been the KC-46 Program Executive Officer and Program
Director since May of 2009, as we began the second KC-X source
selection. I appreciate the subcommittee's continued support of
our Air Force tanker programs and of our Air Force and look
forward to answering your questions today and continuing to
brief you and your professional staff on a regular basis on the
execution of the KC-46 program. Thank you.
Mr. Akin. Thank you very much.
One thing that may be for the benefit of the committee I
think that might be helpful is just to go to kind of a before-
and-after here in terms of just number of aircraft, because
that would give us a little bit of a sense of what we are
doing.
So let us identify--let us just start from the top. We have
got tankers. And how many do we currently have before we make
these cuts?
General Bogdan, you don't know for sure? Okay.
General Bogdan. Yes, sir, I do.
Currently the tanker fleet consists of KC-135s and KC-10s,
and there are 453 in the inventory today; 59 of them are KC-10s
and 794 of them are KC-135s.
Mr. Akin. Let us do those numbers again. I wasn't quite
fast enough.
The total in inventory is how much?
General Bogdan. Four hundred and fifty-three.
Mr. Akin. Four hundred and fifty-three--and we are going to
drop that to what?
General Johns. Mr. Chairman, we are going to take down 20
KC-135s.
Mr. Akin. 43.
General Johns. 20 will come off the KC-135, sir.
Mr. Akin. 20?
General Johns. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. So we are going to go minus 20 out of the KC-135.
Okay. So we----
General Johns. And the KC-10s stay the same, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Okay.
And then let us see what we have beyond that. We have got
your big C-17s. What do you call the----
General Johns. C-17, sir, that is the----
Mr. Akin. Right. What do you call them, though----
General Johns. Loadmaster.
Mr. Akin. Yes, I know, but what--they are the large cargo-
hauling planes. Is there a category for those?
General Johns. Strategic airlift aircraft.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
General Johns. So we put that, the C-5 and the C-17, in the
same category, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. And we are reducing--how many do we have total
aircraft?
General Johns. 223.
Mr. Akin. 223.
General Johns. And we have sustained that number, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Akin. So you keep the same number----
General Johns. Correct.
Mr. Akin [continuing]. Of those. You are retiring, what is
it, the C-5s that are the A models?
General Johns. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So we have 79 C-5s, which
are A's, B's and M models----
Mr. Akin. Yes.
General Johns [continuing]. And we are going to ask them to
retire 27 C-5As, not convert them, and retire them.
Mr. Akin. So you are going from 223 down by 27, right?
General Johns. Two hundred twenty-three, plus we would have
to add the 79, if you want to put C-5s and C-17s together. So
C-17s stay the same at 223; the C-5 goes from 79 down to 52.
Mr. Akin. Okay. So you got strategic and then you have--the
C-130s. You don't call those strategic, right?
General Johns. Tactical airlift.
Mr. Akin. Tactical, yes.
General Johns. Mr. Chairman, we are going from 390 to 318
C-130s.
Mr. Akin. 390 to 318.
General Johns. And then the C-27 is the--I call it the
little brother.
Mr. Akin. Yes.
General Johns. And it is going to be going down. Again, we
are going to go to zero with that. And we haven't fully taken
the----
Mr. Akin. What do you have, 38 now?
General Johns. No, sir. We have nine delivered, and we are
supposed to get more, and then we are going to go down zero.
Mr. Akin. Okay. So that kind of covers the whole--does that
cover the whole waterfront of all the aircraft?
General Johns. The ones that we are talking about for the
airlift support, yes, Mr. Chairman, we have the specialty fleet
at Andrews, but that is not really part of----
Mr. Akin. Part of what we are discussing here.
Now then the Guard--are these numbers to include what you
have in the Guard as well?
General Johns. That is true.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
General Johns. The general has decided----
Mr. Akin. Okay, so this is across the whole spectrum of
what we are trying to do.
I am one of these people I have to get the big picture
before I can get into the details a little bit, so bear with
me.
So now, because the fact that we are whacking the budget
for reasons that have nothing to do with the military
whatsoever or the condition of the world whatsoever--I mean,
other than the world outside of Washington D.C., that is--there
was a decision that we are going have to do things with less
money. So we come up with a new strategy in order to justify,
you know, spending less money.
So we take a look at potential contingencies around the
world, and then from that we back out what we think might
happen. And from those numbers you come up with a strategic
airlift requirement, is that correct?
In other words, if somebody does this to somebody else,
military planners take a look at that operation. And then they
are going to say, ``Well, that means we are going to need so
much airlift.'' Is that the way it works?
General Johns. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Again, looked at what does the Nation need of its military
on that strategic defense part, and then how does that apply to
what airlift requirements are there to support that. From
humanitarian across to full military spectrum wartime----
Mr. Akin. I think that is what I was trying to say anyway.
So in other words, the other part of the military generates
what they think they are going to need for airlift, is that
correct? Or do you say this is what I think you are going to
need?
General Johns. Mr. Chairman I think the COCOMs [Combatant
Commands] come together under--the joint staff OSD--ultimately
TRANSCOM [Transportation Command]--will say, ``Here is all the
requirements,'' and then we look at, ``How do I match the
aircraft to that requirement?''
So we have an input but there is also the views of others
who say, ``Here is how we think you can utilize the aircraft.''
So it is a big effort that comes together. But clearly air
mobility command--the Air Force, TRANSCOM--answer that
basically capability of what is required.
And we answer that to the other leadership in the OSD who
talk to us and say, ``Okay. Have you thought about this? Have
you thought about that?'' So it is a very large discussion, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Well, I believe it is a large discussion. What I
am trying to identify is where are the assumptions loaded at
the front end?
Are you given that, ``We need to move this much material in
this period of time from here to here,'' that type of thing? Is
that what you are given to work with?
General Johns. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. And then from those you can say, ``With these
aircraft we could do it''?
General Johns. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay, now the assumptions that went into that--
are you involved in those assumptions or is that something that
is happening sort of--are those numbers that are passed on to
you that you don't really challenge particularly?
General Johns. No, we are involved in and we do have
discussion about--and I won't say challenge, but we do discuss
them and debate them.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Okay, that is helpful.
So what we are saying is that somehow or other we are
planning that we are not going to be able to do as much stuff
and therefore we can get by with a lower level of number of
aircraft?
General Johns. Yes, Mr. Chairman that is true, but we also
had an excess from before. So we are also trying to be good
stewards. I shouldn't have any additional capability that I
don't need to ensure the success that we can always say yes to
whatever call we get from the Nation.
Mr. Akin. Right.
Now, Mr. Russell, you were pretty erudite. You know, it is
afternoon after lunch. This is tough on some of us, okay?
What I think I am hearing you say is: Here is the trade-
off. You have a certain probability that you can meet all these
requirements. If you don't, the wheels fall off of the whole
mission, so what is it cost you to keep a little bit of Reserve
versus what your risk if you don't--if you can't make that
capability? Are those the things you were looking at?
Mr. Russell. Yes, I think generally.
And when we talked about the shortcomings of the MCRS 2016;
it really didn't lay that out. It laid out a capacity required,
and then it laid out existing capacity and it showed a delta.
Either it was too much, you know, more capacity required or
less, but it didn't go forth and declare a certain number of
aircrafts like a C-5 is in excess or lay out a risk associated
with maintaining that fleet in terms of, you know being able to
accomplish the mission or being in a position of having more
aircraft than needed.
Mr. Akin. Okay, and General Wyatt, I think what I was
hearing you say in very tactful language was you weren't really
included in the planning process is that--or am I saying that
too strongly?
General Wyatt. Well I think, you know, when you look at the
way the MCRS was put together, the primary focus of the MCRS
was the national warfighting strategy and the warfight
overseas.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
General Wyatt. My concern with MCRS is that it was kind of
a cursory look at the requirements of the homeland, I think
the----
Mr. Akin. Is your requirement pretty much strictly
homeland? Or do you supplement sometimes way that other Guards
do sometimes you get units moved overseas to do stuff?
General Wyatt. Mr. Chairman we do both.
Our Air Guardsmen swear an oath to the Constitution of the
United States which requires them to answer the President's
call for the Title 10 mission overseas warfight. And we also
take an oath to the constitution of our respective states,
which requires us to answer the call of the governors for
domestic activities within the state boundaries.
Mr. Akin. But still, General Johns, you know the aircrafts
that are in the Guard right? So, when you are looking at
capability of moving stuff, that is something that everybody
understands. Or is there a lot of other logistical stuff that
has to go with those aircraft that needs to be part of that
equation as well?
General Johns. I worry about the enterprise. I worry about
the airmen, Active Guard and Reserve. As I said, two-thirds of
the capability of the Nation in mobility is in the Guard and
Reserve.
Mr. Akin. Two-thirds?
General Johns. Two-thirds; two-thirds of the tankers, two-
thirds of the C-5s, and about two-thirds of the C-130s. We did
that back in the mid-1990s when we said, ``Okay; we are coming
out of the old scenario,'' and we said, ``We only need the
Guard and the Reserve for that strategic mobilization for the
big wars.''
Well that held true until about 2001, and then we went to
the Guard and Reserve for so many of our contingencies and
deployments. So I literally count on the Guard and Reserve to
answer the call tonight.
We went to Libya to support the air refueling mission as we
were supporting the efforts there. I went to the Guard units
and the Reserve units because a lot of my Active Duty were
already deployed and said, ``Can you take this mission?'' And
sir, every guardsman, every reservist said, ``Sir, when do you
want us to leave?'' and the answer was, ``Tomorrow.''
And on that phone call, because we didn't have mobilization
authority--it was volunteerism--I had 564 airmen, primarily
Guard and Reserve, deploy from their home units and head to
Moron, Spain. And they stayed there on and off from March to
October. That is the kind of commitment we have from our Guard
and Reserve. But, I also have to worry about balancing, because
this Guard and Reserve--the traditional--they have full-time
jobs; they have families. And they can come in and say, ``Sir,
we can't do this''----
Mr. Akin. I understand that kind of balance, I am just
wondering--I got the impression that the plan that we are
looking at here has been pulled together fairly quickly because
of the budgetary requirements.
And General Wyatt, you can--given the parameters that
were--if you buy the assumptions in the model, are you
comfortable enough that you can provide what is needed just
assuming we don't blow through that model?
General Wyatt. As far as the Federal warfight, the Title 10
mission, I am comfortable that we can do that. I have some
concern on the domestic operations requirements----
Mr. Akin. Because you could get slammed with something that
you are not sure about and now you are strength is lower. And
if we get hit with a big national contingency or something,
then that is a problem, or could be a problem?
General Wyatt. Yes sir. As the Air Guard, aircraft that are
in--and airmen that are in Title 32 status working for the
governors, in the event of a national Title 10 effort, we would
come to the aid of the Active Component as we did in Odyssey
Dawn.
And likewise, if there were something that happened that
overwhelmed the Guard in the domestic arena, we would look to
the Active Component and the Reserve Component, and the Army
National Guard brothers and sisters for lift capability too.
The question becomes the timing that it takes to get there.
And the commitments that General John's Title 10 forces have
around the world. And, you know, there are some scenarios that
would stress both the Title 10 warfight and the domestic
operations depending on the scenarios and the events.
Mr. Akin. Thank you General. I know I have been talking a
little bit too long for my colleagues here.
Mr. McIntyre, you want to?
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you
gentlemen for your service to our country.
General Johns, assuming our current commitments remain the
same in the near term, how do you plan to meet the airlift
requirement that will go along with the strategic shift of
forces to the Asia-Pacific AOR [Area of Responsibility] in the
plan for rotational presence throughout that region?
General Johns. Sir, the commitments that we have on the
higher end of the spectrum remain unchanged. So that is
something we planned for and that will remain. If we have
increased rotational during peacetime--more exercises and
things like that--in that environment, we are not stressed.
So in wartime, we mobilize the entire Guard and Reserve and
everybody--we go to the fight, we come home when we are done.
In peacetime I won't mobilize, so I go to the volunteerism,
I go to the Active Duty. And there my real issue is, ``Do I
have enough airmen to do a dwell-to-deploy?'' We talk about a
one-to-two, where you are gone one period and home twice as
long for the Active Duty. I want to sustain that.
For the Guard and Reserve, it is about a one-to-five,
because again of their full-time commitments to employers and
families. So how do we balance that?
So we look at that, and say do we have the right rotational
presence. So in the 2013, I actually found that I was short on
the Active Duty C-130 aircrew and maintainers. We built three
squadrons of C-130 aircrew and maintainers, but we put them
with the Guard and the Reserve because they have a predominance
of the iron.
So this way I am actually able to balance the force, get
access to the hardware, by putting Active Duty members with the
Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve to share the
aircraft. So that is how we balance in the peacetime
contingency when we are not mobilized sir.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.
General Barclay, you said in your testimony that the direct
support role does not fulfill 100 percent of the Army's
requirement for time-sensitive, mission-critical cargo and
personnel. The Army fills this gap with contract airlift in CH-
47 aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom.
Having said that, if you could clarify for us--if the Air
Force has the responsibility for executing the Army's direct
support mission critical airlift mission, why then is the Army
having to supplement the Air Force with contractor provided
airlift and CH-47 helio aircraft to meet your requirements?
General Barclay. So it is a combination of several reasons
as we are trying to meet those needs of the deployed forces in
theater.
The Air Force does provide--we have an ongoing now direct-
support study where the C-27s and the C-130, which were
providing direct-support airlift to free up some of the 47
hours and allow them to get to more combat-focused operational
missions; but there is still a gap there required to meet the
full movement of supplies and sustainment to those forces; some
of those because the disparate locations require more rotary
wing.
And so that is why, if you look at the combination of what
we have in theater now, those contract platforms, 55 of them
are rotary-wing type, and there are about 10 to 12 fixed-wing
moving those type of supplies. But the majority of them are
rotary-wing to assist the Army to continue to move supplies out
to those FOBs [Forward Operating Base] and COBs [Contingency
Operating Base] for the soldiers.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. I thank all our panelists for your service;
thank you for being here today.
Mr. Russell, I will direct my first question to you, but I
guess I will tee this up by saying that, you know, I have been
a bit frustrated through this whole process. As we are
refocusing our military strategy, we have heard from a number
of uniformed persons, think-tankers, and others who appeared
before the full committee and our subcommittees indicating that
any cuts to our military budget have to be strategy-based as
opposed to merely a budget exercise.
That is budgeting down or up to a particular figure doesn't
make a whole lot of sense as we develop a new strategy here and
adapt to that strategy.
Former Defense Secretary Gates said that, you know, Look,
if we are going to embark upon more military cuts, we need to
articulate specifically where we are no longer going to go and
what missions we are no longer going to perform, or which
missions are of lesser importance.
And we have done that in a very vague way, I think, through
the new strategic guidance. It has been followed up by the
budget request, but translating the new strategic guidance,
which is an essentially an edit to the existing Quadrennial
Defense Review--translating that into specific line items and
programmatic changes--I have very little idea how this, sort
of, black magic has occurred.
And so that takes me to Mr. Russell and the report that I
just had an opportunity to read that I thought was very helpful
and encouraging. I think your reading of the situation, at
least with respect to the air mobility command, is similar to
mine.
You know, I highlighted a number of different things you
wrote here, but in essence, you are saying that the Air Force's
February 2012 document--I am quoting here--``that outlines its
proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any
analyses. Given the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the
extent to which the requirements developed from the MCRS 2016
are still relevant.''
That is written in a very academic and unexciting sort of
fashion--but that seems pretty damning when you are coming up
with new budget requests.
They don't provide any details of analysis. How are we, in
our oversight role, to, you know, make a decision as to whether
or not these proposed cuts and different spending priorities--
if they are done wisely?
That is part A of my question, and then part B would be, do
you believe that analysis exists somewhere? Is it on paper, and
if so, where do you think we might find it, and from whom?
Mr. Russell. Okay. Well, first, with regards to the second
part of the question, we focused our work, and my statement was
on the MCRS 2016 study, so haven't seen the studies that have
been done subsequent to that, so it is difficult to know what
is in it and what is not, but you are right; we have not seen
any details that have explained the methodologies behind it.
But going back to the first part, you are right; the MCRS
2016 study really was built based upon detailed defense
planning guidance in effect at the time with detailed
scenarios. And all that rolled up into a set of requirements,
which was then provided.
The criticisms we had was that it didn't draw the line
directly to excesses or shortages, but it was a very elaborate
methodology. So the question is: Now that we have a new defense
strategy, what do those scenarios look like today?
And that is what is not certain. So, in order to take the
MCRS 2016 study and all the elaborate methodology that was done
there, and then walk it to today's decision is difficult
because it is not sure how that new strategy translates into
those specific scenarios.
Mr. Young. Based on your past work in this area, Mr.
Russell, do you have any idea, and perhaps after you consider
this question, others might weigh in, where those studies might
reside, who we might contact to receive them?
Mr. Russell. Well, there is a number of folks--you go back
to the MCRS 2016, the OSD CAPE, the Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, played a large role in developing that--in those
studies. And I presume they might have played a role here in
some of these studies as well.
And then TRANSCOM, U.S. Transportation Command, also in the
MCRS-16, also played a heavy role in designing that and then
developing that study as well.
Mr. Young. Okay. You know, I think my general sentiment
here seems to be shared by a number of adjutants general of the
National Guard, because I have seen a letter that several
signed on to, addressed to our Secretary of Defense, indicating
they weren't included in this sort of planning here.
So I have got about 15 seconds, and I will turn it over to
the panel, if you have any closing thoughts about this topic.
General Johns. If I may, sir, the MCRS was done, as we
said, in 2010, so it was--as the new strategy was built, OSD
took different scenarios, as we talked about, and said, ``Okay,
what is the feasibility and how many scenarios will occur,'' so
Chairman Dempsey had talked about that with the committee.
The joint staff did an operational assessment 12, and then
the dep-sec [Deputy Secretary] also did some other things with
CAPE and said, ``Okay, let us kind of take MCRS now that we
know what it was; we changed the scenarios. Let us do a one-
off.'' And that was what informed us as we were building this
President's budget submission.
Mr. Young. I would like to see some papers. I would like to
maybe see these studies. You indicated there are four separate
studies that went into the President's air-mobility request. Is
that something I could obtain, General?
General Johns. Sir, let me take it for action because that
was done by the Department of Defense, and I am part of that. I
will take that back to the Department.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 81.]
Mr. Young. All right.
General Johns. And I will take that back to the Department.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
When General Schwartz came over, last week, I guess, we,
again, had a number of members who asked questions about the C-
27 and the decision to, again, not just truncate the program
but eliminate it and take brand-new planes and send them to the
boneyards, I guess it is called.
And intuitively, I think people are just going to have a
hard time, sort of, understanding that. But, you know, we
figured, well, okay, we will have an analysis that is going to
show why even flying these planes is a net loser.
Our committee staff has actually done, I think, a pretty
interesting job of looking at other cost estimates of what it
costs to operate the C-27; which, as you know, there is a
couple planes over in Afghanistan now.
In terms of the flying-hour costs, in terms of the
lifecycle costs, I mean, it actually seems like it is the
opposite, that the C-27 is more efficient and cheaper to
operate than the C-130s.
So explain to me again why we--you know, again, we have cut
programs. I mean, I come from Connecticut. We are very familiar
with the F-22 and what happened with that program, but we
didn't stop flying the planes.
I just have a hard time getting my head around why we are
not just using what is already built and apparently using with
costs that actually work, in terms of efficiency?
General Johns. If I can, Mr. Courtney, as we look at coming
down, I have two measures: How many do we need for a capacity
and how good do we have to be for a capability?
And so with the reduction of $487 billion, we had to go
back and look and say, ``What do we really need to meet all the
commitments of our Nation, from contingency to, as I said,
military operations?''
And we have a commitment to direct support, you know, to
the Army, and that is very important to us. But as we came down
and looked at it, yes, the C-27 was a very good aircraft; it is
a very good aircraft. The unit at Mansfield has done wonderful
work in deploying with it.
We have been with them; we talked to them; the wing
commander sits behind me, and a phenomenal airman.
But the issue came, as we went down to the minimum capacity
we needed, what should we keep in the Air Force?
And, yes, the C-27 is cost-effective, but it is a niche
capability compared to what we can do with the C-130. So as we
went down, I would rather have a fleet of C-130s than give up
more C-130s to keep the C-27, because the C-130 can serve a
larger purpose.
In the initial stages of a war, I can use a C-130 from day
one; I don't get to use the C-27 until day whatever, when I am
now doing direct support for the Army because it is not in the
initial phases.
When I look at the number of pallets I can carry, I can
carry more with the C-130. So I have to reduce to the fleet
capacity-wise, I would rather have it be with C-130s.
And so that was the cornerstone of the conversation, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Well, and again, I would find that a
perfectly acceptable answer if we were talking about going from
38 down to whatever the produced number is, which is 18 or 19
or whatever is.
But to absolutely just mothball them--I think people really
are going to struggle with that. You know, the chairman, sort
of, walked through with you the net reductions in--category by
category, which, again, was very helpful in terms of framing
the top line.
But it is my understanding that all of those reductions are
going to be in the Air National Guard and not a single plane in
the Active Duty Component.
And given, you know, what General Wyatt said about the
domestic needs, that, you know, he is somewhat concerned about,
I mean, have we got the right balance here?
I mean, I have just, sort of, wondered whether that sort
of--well, why don't you respond to that question?
General Johns. Sir, the second part first.
When we look at the balance of the Active and the Guard and
Reserve, two-thirds of the C-130s are in the Guard and Reserve.
Right now, the Active Duty members, with the limited assets
that we have in the Active Duty, I have them on a dwell-to-
deploy that is one-to-one. They are gone as much as they are
home. And I see that commitment staying there.
My guardsmen--and I will say ``my guardsmen'' because I am
very worried and I--you know, they are on a one-to-five dwell-
to-deploy and going down to a one-to-four.
So we are asking a lot of them. We have plenty of aircraft.
It is about the crew. So this last cycle, we--actually, we
built Active Duty crews to put them with the Guard units so I
can actually reduce the burden on the Active Duty aircrews. So
that is why we worried about that.
And then to your question about, ``Why not just go to a
lower number of C-27s?''--it goes to the ownership costs;
because, if I have one or two, I still have the depot concerns;
I have all of the overhaul capability. And then people will
debate about what the numbers are, but I still have a cost of
ownership even if I have a small amount.
So the more efficient operation is to basically have a
fleet that doesn't include both the C-27 with all the lifecycle
costs there. Though we can talk about efficiencies, it is still
an additional cost, when I can go to a C-130 fleet.
Mr. Courtney. And again, I mean, that sounds logical.
And, General Wyatt, you know this. I mean, in Connecticut
we actually built up infrastructure to prepare for the mission
of C-27 and so it does seem like we have already made that
investment in terms of some of these, you know, depot class, et
cetera.
The question obviously at the end of the day in terms of
the Air Guard is just, you know, ``Where are we going to be
with our domestic priorities?''
Governor Malloy from Connecticut has joined a number of
governors expressing deep concerns. Again, the MC-12 sounds
like a really interesting plane and mission. Still, again, I
think people are trying to understand, you know, or visualize,
you know, where New England, you know, reconnaissance missions
are going to be flying.
I mean, I assume they will be deployed overseas, but in
terms of the domestic role of, you know, the New England units,
it is hard to see how that fits into, you know, the priorities
of the governors that are there. I don't know if you want to
comment on that, General.
General Wyatt. We know the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance] in the Air Force is a growing demand, and
so there are, I think, some enduring missions in the ISR world
where the MC-12 resides.
There are missions that we have performed in the Air
National Guard with the RC-26 supporting counter-drug
operations. And the MC-12, while it has an ISR role in the
Title 10 fight, it also could assist in our counter-drug
operations and will be a good backfill, I think, for the RC-12,
which is being eliminated out of the Air National Guard
inventory as part of the PB13 [President's Budget Fiscal Year
2013], too.
When we looked at kind of two different issues--mobility to
governors is extremely important for all the reasons that I
talked about. ISR is important, too. So you have an enduring
mission that we think will be coming into Connecticut. You are
right. There was a MILCON [Military Construction] project there
to build a hangar for C-27s. The MC-12 is a considerably
smaller aircraft.
But the thing that we have to put into perspective here, as
General Johns tries to reach that balance--he has some issues
that he has to address. You know, I am not a combatant
commander, so my primary concern is the domestic role. And I
guess what concerns me is not a whole lot of focus in my
opinion to the domestic requirements--hopefully, we will get
that in the future as we learn more from the exercises that we
do do.
But it is a combination of things that goes back to the
2005 BRAC and the loss of a considerable amount of mobility out
of the Air National Guard at that point in time. The Army is
divesting 43 C-23s out of the Army National Guard. I kind of
look at it from a perspective of the National Guard, Army and
Air; and when you combine the divestiture of the C-23, the
divestiture of the C-27, the reduction of C-130s out of BRAC,
the reduction of C-130s as a result of PB13, I can't help but
get a little bit concerned.
It is difficult and tough questions that we have to answer
because we have the balance that is needed for the Title 10
warfighter overseas, but we also have to be concerned about the
domestic operations here in the homeland and we are working
through the Department to try to get that balanced focus on
both of those requirements for the Air Force.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
And Mr. Griffin.
Mr. Griffin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Johns and General Wyatt--whoever has the best
knowledge on this, feel free to answer.
As you know, I have Little Rock Air Force Base in my
district, and I am real interested in AMP [Avionics
Modernization Program] versus what some are calling AMP-lite.
And I understand that the President has talked about--or the
president's budget claims that there will be a savings of $2.6
billion by transitioning away from AMP to AMP-lite.
And I have been having a hard time getting an analysis. I
hear the top-line number, but clearly there are assumptions
underlying the analysis. And I would like to just formally ask
if you could go back to DOD and, just like you are for my
colleague over here, and find out if I can get copies of any
supporting documentation that would enlighten me on what the
assumptions are underlying the alleged cost savings.
And I am interested, for example, when you are looking at
AMP versus AMP-lite, did you consider the cost of the Navigator
slot that is going to stay there; the retirement for that
Navigator and all that?
So anything that you could get me that lays that out would
be very helpful because, you know, I just like to trust, but
verify, and crunch some of those numbers myself. And so if you
could help facilitate that, that would be great.
It looks like you are answering that you did consider the
Navigator personnel costs. Is that what you are saying,
General?
General Johns. Yes, sir, we did.
And we also looked at--as a test pilot, I first flew an AMP
C-130 in 1991. And now, we are delivering it. And what an AMP
does basically is takes an analog aircraft and tries to make it
a digital aircraft. And so we were on the lead of doing that.
And so we went through that and we learned a lot by doing
it with the C-130--one of the first aircraft to do that. And we
have come a long way with it, but the costs to actually do AMP
are very high, and we will provide those numbers.
What we looked at are called the ``son of AMP'' or the
follow-on. Basically, many other air forces of C-130s, they
have actually gone out to other people and they have said,
``Hey, we can do this much cheaper now because technology has
advanced.''
So by doing this, we are giving the same basic safety
capabilities that I need for my aircrew, and so the aircraft
and the crews can perform because, again, they are very
dedicated airmen that do this, at a much lower cost,
significantly lower cost. But it does mean we are keeping the
Navigator with us, and that was part of the discussions we had
as we looked at doing that, sir.
Mr. Griffin. And my understanding--and correct me if I am
wrong--but I met with a lot of the pilots on the National Guard
side at Little Rock Air Force Base a couple of weeks ago, I
guess. And I had them sort of go down the list and enumerate
for me what they anticipated would be left out of AMP-lite as
compared to an AMP in terms of capabilities.
And so, any information you have got on that would also be
helpful. Sort of, ``These are the things we have got to drop if
we go to an AMP-lite.''
And has there been any kind of independent analysis of AMP
versus AMP-lite? Just anything that you could get me on that
would be great.
General Johns. I would be happy to find it, Mr. Griffin,
whatever we have.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 81.]
Mr. Griffin. Okay.
While I have got you here, General Wyatt, this is a little
off-subject, but I am going to ask it anyway.
With regard to the 188th in Fort Smith--we have talked
about the A-10s and the fact that the A-10 mission is
potentially going away. My understanding is that Secretary
Panetta met with the Council of Governors in late February,
maybe on the 28th or so, and that he had agreed to allow the
Council of Governors to submit some recommendations for an
alternate plan.
Is that correct? Are you familiar with that?
General Wyatt. I am, sir, and that is correct.
Mr. Griffin. Okay.
Could you give me an update on where that is in the
process? Have they submitted the alternate plan? It looks like
they have. I have got some of the contrasting reductions--the
manpower adjustments here. Is that being considered? How long
will that take? Could you elaborate on that?
General Wyatt. The Council of Governors' plan, though, was
submitted and is currently under review inside the United
States Air Force. Air National Guard staff is working with
headquarters Air Force staff to validate the cost estimates in
the Council of Governors' plans. And at this point, it is being
worked internally to the Air Force corporate process.
As far as expectations, we are on a pretty tight timeline,
so I would expect some sort of decision out of the Air Force
here in the next week to 10 days, but don't hold me to that
because I am not the one driving the time schedule, but it is
being considered. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffin. Okay. And now I have only got 17 seconds, but
I would just mention that with regard to the 188th in Fort
Smith, I feel like the comments that Mr. Russell made in his
report about there not being a basis for understanding how
decisions were made. I feel that way about the 188th as well.
And as we talked about over on the Senate side when we met,
if any analyses come to light that you could share with me,
that would be very helpful because, from the outside, it looks
like decisions were made at 30,000 feet, if you will, and then
they were just sort of forced--they were just pushed down on
the force structure.
It doesn't seem that there was a lot of individual analysis
of Fort Smith and the different locations. Basically, I am
asking for information.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Johns, General Wyatt, General Bogdan, and General
Barclay and Mr. Wilson, thank you very much for your service to
the Nation and for appearing before the committee today.
General Johns, if I could start with you, I would like to
begin with a question about your force structure moving
forward. One of the primary missions of the Armed Forces
outlined in the new strategy is to defend the homeland and
support civil authorities.
My question is, are you confident that the C-130 can
provide the best support to that mission? And how large is the
set of CONUS [Continental United States] airports that would
have been able to be served by the C-27, but cannot be served
by the C-130?
General Johns. Sir, thank you for the question.
And General Wyatt talked about the guardsmen responding to
the governor. I will offer that every military member will
respond immediately to when our Nation calls, domestically and
internationally. We will take an aircraft that is flying and
say there is a crisis somewhere. We will divert that aircraft
while it is airborne to go in support anybody--any nation,
national need.
So it is really not about the guardsmen doing this. It is
about our military. And so those assets that are available,
they are the Nation's assets, from a C-17, a large aircraft,
even a C-5 or a 130, if we need to move it somewhere and we
have done this--I don't want to say we do it daily, but we do
it routinely across the Nation, across the globe--just say,
``There is somebody in need. Let us divert the aircraft
airborne and go pick up.''
The one that comes to mind is the tsunami. We diverted a C-
17 to March Air Reserve Base, picked up the L.A. search-and-
rescue team, air refueled, then nonstop to Tokyo, where we were
the first ones there to help save lives.
So that is what we do, we answer that call. And I
understand the concern about the guardsmen, but really I look
at it as totality of the mobility capability to support our
Nation, which includes that domestic mission.
So I believe we have the capability to respond to the
domestic missions. The question will be: How many do you want
to plan on having while we are engaged in a global war?
So that is where some of the math comes in, to say, ``Well,
did we plan on three, did we plan on six?'' And so we go
through that calculus and say, ``The most likely is let us plan
on this many occurring here in the States. Let us look at what
the overseas commitments will be,'' then, ``Do we have enough
force structure?''
So I believe we have looked at that to assess that we can
respond to the national mission here locally, and then across
to the global commitments.
Mr. Langevin. But it still doesn't answer my question,
though. How large is the set of CONUS airports that would have
been able to be served by the C-27 that can't be served by the
C-130?
General Johns. Sir, we have a worldwide database, and so I
can't answer the CONUS ones. I know globally it is 97 percent
of all the bases are common to the C-27 and the C-130. But let
me get an answer for the record, if I may, on specifically how
many are unique to the C-27.
But also, importantly, how close would that small, little
strip be, if there is a difference, to a base that can service
C-130 in terms of mileage, and, you know, if it is a five, 10
mile difference? So I would like to answer that for the record,
if I may.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 81.]
Mr. Langevin. Fair enough. And maybe you answered my next
question. How do you plan to address the shortcomings
associated with state airports that cannot accommodate a C-130
given the state's needs during domestic operations, such as a
complex contingency operation?
General Johns. Yes, sir.
And then, again, I also count on my Army brethren, because
every Air National Guard has an Army National Guard component,
and I think also every state has helicopters, those marvelous
CH-47s that can also respond and go right to somebody's
backyard if we have to.
So I think it is a combination of the Air and Army Guard to
respond, and the Army and the Air Force at large to respond to
the national need.
Mr. Langevin. With the proposed pivot to the Asia-Pacific
region, how will your airlift requirements change?
General Johns. Sir, in terms of the higher end, that has
been factored in. I see no change there.
Where I see a change potentially is the increased exercise
opportunities potentially down in Australia. So do I have more
forces that I rotate? And a majority of the forces that
actually move are commercial partners. Those commercial folks
move 90 percent of all of my passengers right now.
So I actually contract that out for exercises and also for
redeployments to and from Afghanistan, they go on commercial
air. So I see that capability residing as we do the exercises
globally.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Those are basically the questions
that I had. I appreciate the first part of the answer you gave
when you talked about how nimble you can be and will be in
terms of meeting the needs wherever they are, whether it is at
a--situations arise at the state level or internationally; how
nimble and flexible you are and your folks are in terms of
responding to those emergencies and those contingencies.
And I really do appreciate the job you are doing and thank
you all of your service.
With that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Hunter, please.
Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you on the panel today for your service and
time.
I guess the first thing I would say is I think we are in
big trouble. And, two, I think that you are having to explain
away cuts that you wouldn't do unless you were forced to do
them and then explain the rationale behind them. I think that
is where we are at right now.
My question, I will just focus kind of largely on Guard and
Active ratios. What were they? I mean, up until now what were
the ratios for mobility? Did you have them down?
General Wyatt. If I recall, initially, in early February,
when the Air Force released its iron flow, I think the initial
percentages were 51 percent Active, 49 percent Guard and
Reserve. That would be the Reserve Component. And then PB13
shifts the percentage I think to 55-45 or 54-46.
Mr. Hunter. 54-46?
General Wyatt. Yes, sir.
General Johns. On mobility, though, it is much more 34
Active Duty to 66 Guard and Reserve, and what the shift does
now is make me about 36 Active Duty versus.
So it is much different on the mobility side, again,
because two-thirds of our capability really has been in the
Guard and Reserve, with the exception of the C-17.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. So explain that to me; I am not
understanding--54-46, but not really.
General Johns. That is for the total Air Force.
Mr. Hunter. Okay.
General Johns. Now, I am looking at just the mobility as a
subset. Predominance of it really has been in the Guard and
Reserve since the late 1990s. So it is different than----
Mr. Hunter. 54-46 counts what, if it is not mobility? Like
fighter planes or what?
General Johns. Yes, sir. Fighter planes, the ISR, the
bombers, the entire capability in the United States Air Force,
I would offer.
Mr. Hunter. What was the percentage of just mobility prior
to the PB?
General Johns. When I look at the tankers, the KC-135s, and
I look at the C-130s and the C-5s, and I am probably in the 34-
66 percent. And so now that takes me--that is what it was. And
by the shift I am up a couple percent in the Active Duty and
down a couple percent in the Guard and Reserve.
And, sir, if I could, I will provide the specific numbers
for the record for you.
Mr. Hunter. I don't care about specific numbers; I am just
trying to get the gist of this.
Then you got the 54-46 from the 49-51. Does that save you
money? And that is total Air Force. Does that save the Active
Duty Air Force money, General Johns?
General Johns. Sir, I am pausing because when a person to
work for full-time, a guardsman or Active Duty is all the same;
and when they are mobilized at the same cost.
When I am not using them--and in my world I am using all
the same, so it doesn't specifically save me money. It may in
the other parts of the Air Force if I am having them just in a
strategic reserve and not requiring to use them. There is a
savings, I think, to have members in the Guard and Reserve, you
know, being on that traditional role and only being called when
the Nation needs them.
Mr. Hunter. Well, the reason I am asking--this is kind of
obvious--even if it just goes up 1 percent Active and down 1
percent Reserve/Guard, that still doesn't make sense to me
then.
General Johns. It is about the dwell-to-deploy.
Right now, for example, I try to sustain our Active Duty to
one-to-two dwell-to-deploy in the Guard and Reserve at one-to-
five. Why I have had to increase it in the mobility side is
because my Active Duty, I have so few of them----
Mr. Hunter. But you are cutting them at the same time.
General Johns. No, sir, in the 130 I am actually growing
those--Active Duty in the mobility side, sir, is all staying
the same, in the Active Duty side we are potentially growing in
the C-130 by three squadrons.
Mr. Hunter. So you are saying that the Air Force personnel
numbers are going to be going up?
General Johns. In the mobility side, sir, yes, the mobility
numbers actually grow a little bit in the Active Duty side and
they come down in the Guard and Reserve side.
Mr. Hunter. So the numbers come down in the Guard and
Reserve side; by how much?
General Johns. That is correct. I can give you the numbers
total that would involve----
Mr. Hunter. Don't do that. Let us me ask this. Does that
save money?
General Johns. It doesn't save money, but it balances the
force. It balances the force for me so that I can keep the
Active Duty healthy and I can keep the Guard and Reserve as I
look at the demands of the force.
So it is actually trying to do the right thing to preserve
the health and welfare of our airmen who we are asking so much
to do.
So I am actually increasing the cost by having more Active
Duty come on to balance this because too much was in the Guard
and Reserve, based on the rotational needs we have.
Mr. Hunter. Do you concur with that, General Wyatt?
General Wyatt. Let me just say that, in the Air Force
corporate process, the Air Guard is allowed a voice and we are
allowed to make input into the process, in fact encouraged to
do that.
We don't always agree, as we engage in these debates, but
the decision has been made, and so, as a Title 10 officer, I am
supporting the way ahead.
Mr. Hunter. Okay, well, that is pretty plainspoken. Well,
once again, I think we are in big trouble, and Congress will
try to fix this for you.
I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
And I think Mr. Coffman is next.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your service to our country.
Mr. Russell, I will start with you. When we had a strategy,
or still have a strategy, and I guess it is going to change,
where the United States has the ability to do two concurrent
conflicts at the same time.
And I understand that we will, with these changes, be able
to engage in one conflict and then, I guess, a spoiling or a
holding action in the other one.
I wonder if you or somebody else on the panel could confirm
that the scenario before us today will strip us from the
ability to engage in two concurrent conflicts. Is that correct?
Would anybody like to--is anybody capable of answering that?
General Johns.
General Johns. Yes, sir. What we have done by going to the
new scenario is the two near-simultaneous, as you said very
well, spot-on, have been adjusted. And so that then adjusts how
much airlift we have to have to meet that requirement.
So as the strategy has been adjusted, then the capacity we
need to meet that strategy has come down. So that is the
foundation of what we are doing here.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. So that allows you to make the cuts that
are before us today. It is the mere fact that we have changed
our strategy, that we have downsized our strategy; so therefore
you have downsized the force accordingly.
Is that correct, then?
General Johns. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Then go back. Are there any other
areas--okay, we talked about, I think, is it the C-130--I am
sorry--what was the area again that we were reducing the Guard
and Reserve Component?
General Johns. We are actually reducing C-130s, C-5s, KC-
135s and C-27s. All four are coming down in the Guard and
Reserve Component.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. And then tell me, is there--on that
reduction, is there a commensurate reduction, then, in the
Active Duty side on that?
I think you mentioned in which one--where was the growth in
the budget?
General Johns. There is a very small reduction on the
Active Duty side of the tanker. That is very small. It is three
aircraft, I believe. So the rest of the Active Duty stays where
it is, except in the C-130, where we are growing that by three
units, three squadrons.
And the reason the Active Duty stays where it is, their
dwell-to-deploy, how much I am asking them to be deployed right
now is so high that, if I took down the Active Duty any
further, I would basically--their dwell-to-deploy would be
worse than a one-to-one. I am trying to get them to one-to-two.
So there is so much demand. It is just about trying to
balance the Active and the Guard at this time.
Mr. Coffman. Well, here is the thing. And I think that
that--where I might differ with you on that, because I think
there is a fairly significant savings by being able to rely on
the Guard and Reserve more.
And so we have phased out of Iraq. We are phasing down out
of Afghanistan. And what we have seen is a tremendous
willingness upon the Guard and Reserve to do some very short-
term deployments.
I think the Guard in my home state goes--the Air Guard has
been going on 4-month deployments.
And I think there is a willingness, even though the pace
will slow, to do some of that, and not to go back to the status
quo ante, when we are a strategic versus and operational
reserve in the Guard and Reserve.
So I think, really--I really question the direction that we
are going, that it is not--not only is it not cost-effective
but I think, by virtue of having higher personnel costs, we are
eating into acquisition costs unnecessarily.
So can any of you--General Wyatt and General Jones--can
both of you comment on that?
General Wyatt. Well, you know, the numbers that are in the
PB13, I think this will, maybe, help put some numbers to what
you are saying, Congressman.
In the mobility Air Force, I think there was 124 total
airplanes that were divested in PB13, 60 of those out of the
Air National Guard, 61 out of the Air Force Reserve, and the
three that General Johns mentioned out of the refueling fleet.
It gets to a, I guess, an analysis of what the Federal
warfight demand will be in the future. And if it is going to be
high, then you might balance the force. If it is going to be
high for a long time, you might balance the force more heavily
in favor of the Active Component, as General Johns has
described.
If it is not going to be high for a long time, it would
make sense, because the Air Guard is more cost-effective,
especially when in garrison, to shift the balance that other
direction.
That is the debate that has taken place inside of the Air
Force, as we go forward.
Mr. Coffman. Let me just say quick, and I will go to you,
General Johns, and that is that, you know, as--I am an Iraq War
veteran, United States Marine Corps, and I have got to tell
you, I don't think we are going to go down this heavy
conventional footprint, nation-building path again.
I think those days are over with. And if I have anything to
do with it in the House Armed Services Committee, I will make
sure that we don't go down that road again.
And so I just don't see--if we are in a conventional
conflict, absolutely, but I don't see us going down this road
where we are going to have to mobilize so much of our Guard and
Reserve, you know, for this kind of counterinsurgency nation-
building stuff.
General Johns. Sir, if I may, one of the things I worry
about is the dwell-to-deploy for the Guard and Reserve. We say
we want to keep them on a one-to-five because they are
traditional guardsmen and reservists, and they have full-time
employers.
Mr. Coffman. Sure.
General Johns. So I don't have mobilization authority for
much of what we do. So they go to their employer and say, ``The
Air Force needs us; I am going again. The Air Force needs us; I
am going again.'' And it is to Haiti and it is a Katrina and it
is a Rita and it is a Tomodachi.
The employers then put some pressure on those folks,
because I visited 121 units--I have 16 units left to go to see
all the Guard and Reserve units that do our business--and talk
to them and listen to them, and I am concerned about their
ability to continue to support, for long terms--not this year
or next year--but when the economy turns and they all have all
have good jobs and they keep going back to their employer.
Well, they have pressure on them that they can't support
beyond the one-to-five dwell-to-deploy. The tankers right now,
sir, in the Guard and Reserve are at a one-to-3.8 dwell-to-
deploy. They are surging, and every day we call on them and
they do marvelous things.
But can we sustain this for the health of their continued
support to the Air Force and our Nation? That is what we are
trying to balance here.
Mr. Coffman. And just one last thing, Mr. Chairman.
And I know we have got to find where that balance is. Let
me just say that the--and I need to have that discussion with
my Guard back home. I mean, the morale is high. Retention is
high. You know, they seem to love what they do. And so I would
like to talk to them.
But you know, the Israeli military is on a constant war-
footing and they rely--if they had the ratio of Active Duty to
Guard--to their Reserve equivalent that we have, they would
bankrupt the country overnight. And yet they seem to maintain a
war-footing and rely on their equivalent of the Guard and
Reserve.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
All good questions; I thank you all for helping us out
here.
I had just a couple of follow-ups. First of all, this is a
little bit more parochial, General Wyatt. We just talked about
losing a couple of hundred people out of the state of Missouri.
First of all, are there any kinds of provisions--you have
got some people that have been serving honorably and well for
some period of time, and all of a sudden they hit the bricks.
Anything we can do to help them out?
General Wyatt. Currently working through OSD, I think, or
maybe some legislative proposals--that would help us.
Our big challenge in the Air National Guard in fiscal year
2013 is the fact that we lose 5,100 of those Air National
Guardsmen. Our end-strength is reduced that much. We also have
some re-missioning to the tune of about another 3,200.
So it is essential that in order to hang onto these highly
experienced, highly skilled people that the taxpayer has
invested a lot of money in, there are some things that the Air
National Guard and the Air Force supports that would help us as
we go forward; things like as an individual maybe is
terminated, extending their TRICARE benefits for a little bit
longer to allow them to make that transition.
Perhaps allowing the Air National Guard to pay for PCS
[Permanent Change of Station] moves so that if an individual
loses a job in a particular state, but there is one that is
open, it is a lot cheaper to move that individual with PCS
funds, as opposed to recruit and go out and retrain a new
individual.
There are things like allowing a guardsman a little extra
time to exercise the GI Bill benefits that they have earned,
not changing the eligibility or qualification requirements for
the GI bill, but allowing them a little bit more extra time to
exercise those benefits.
Mr. Akin. So we can give people some options anyway and the
possibility is they might be able to find this. Of course, if
we are dropping--what did you say, 5,000 people----
General Wyatt. It is 5,100 in fiscal year 2013. It is a
pretty steep drop and that is why----
Mr. Akin. Yes, so they are all going to be looking for
probably a limited number of openings if somebody might retire
or something like that. It is going to be hard to--you are not
going to get all 5,000 of them back, just some.
General Wyatt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Yes, okay.
General Wyatt. These benefits that I am talking about would
obviously not apply across the board.
We do have some individuals who will retire when given an
option to transition into another aircraft, if they have
several years in, they may have said, ``Hey, I have done my
fair share; it is time for me to retire.'' So some of those
will fall out of our ranks through natural attrition, but we
would need some tools to help us----
Mr. Akin. I think we are just getting the first taste of
what some of the medicine that we are putting together here in
Congress. And obviously, people on this committee I think even
from both parties are not very happy with where we are going,
and that is not even talking sequestration.
So there is a great deal of angst here, but some limited
degree that we know of what we can do to try and fix it. We are
going to try, but that is where we are.
Thank you for that. And let me see if there is anything
else.
The other thing is, you know, this idea of pivoting, you
know, to move further away from America, so therefore don't
need as much airlift. Somehow, the logic of that seems a little
strained. You know, I appreciate trying to sell some new change
and put a good spin on it, but I remain a little bit skeptical.
The further we have to go, it seems like to me it is going to
be more airlift.
I think that is pretty much got things covered, unless you
had a follow-up or something? No.
Well, gentlemen, thank you for being here today and the
professionalism. And you got the answers for us. It is very
helpful, but we are grumbling a little bit.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 7, 2012
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 7, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. W. Todd Akin
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces
Hearing on
Assessing Mobility Airlift Capabilities and Operational Risks Under the
Revised 2012 Defense Strategy
March 7, 2012
I'd like to welcome everyone to the first hearing of the
second session of the 112th Congress for the Seapower and
Projection Forces subcommittee. I look forward to continuing
our bipartisan efforts that have been a longstanding tradition
of this subcommittee in providing our service men and women
with the best equipment possible in this most challenging
budget environment.
Testifying before us today are representatives from the Air
Force, Army, and Government Accountability Office. We have:
LGeneral Ray Johns, Commander of Air Mobility
Command;
LLieutenant General ``Bud'' Wyatt, Director of the
Air National Guard;
LMajor General Jim Barclay, Deputy from the Office
of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff of the G-3-5-7;
LMajor General Chris Bogdan, KC-46 Tanker Program
Manager; and
LMr. Cary Russell, Acting Director for GAO's
Defense Capabilities and Management Directorate.
Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for your many years of
service providing leadership to those that enable our military
to be the finest in the world.
Today, we're here to assess the increased risk incurred
within the airlift and tanker mobility portfolios of the Army
and the Air Force as a result of the President's April 2011
initiative calling for continued reductions to the defense
budget. As a result, the fiscal year 2013 budget request for
DOD is $45.3 billion, or 8 percent below, the planned fiscal
year 2013 budget submitted in last year's fiscal year 2012
request.
The end-state consequences resulted in divestment of 150
aircraft from air mobility programs and will even force the Air
Force to fly brand-new C-27 Joint Cargo Aircraft directly from
the production line to the ``boneyard'' in Arizona this year.
Furthermore, this new budget-driven defense strategy
negates 2010 QDR scenarios developed just 2 years ago that were
used to right-size airlift programs in anticipation of the
threats and contingencies that the U.S. should be prepared for
in the 2016-and-beyond time period. Nothing to date has
occurred over the last 2 years indicating that the world has
gotten safer or that the foreseeable operations tempo of our
military will significantly decrease to justify such a large
reduction of force structure. A smaller force structure
operating under the same operational tempo only leads to our
military wearing out their equipment quicker than planned. Just
ask the Navy . . . they have 285 ships today, but currently
operate them as if they had a fleet of 350.
The next threat around the corner that is certainly
predictable is budget sequestration. The $487 billion in cuts
imposed upon the defense budget already concern me, and I
certainly do not support the devastating effect that
sequestration will have on our national security come this
January. It makes no sense to me why some believe that
penalizing defense, which is only 20 percent of our
discretionary budget, an additional $500 to $600 billion
dollars through sequestration is acceptable policy. The only
outcomes from such a mindset is a guarantee that we'll move
towards becoming a regional power and open a global void that
another rising power will most certainly fill. I ask our
witnesses to please help the subcommittee understand what
impact sequestration will have to your respective areas of the
DOD budget.
Gentlemen, thank you again for being with us today and we
look forward to your testimony.
Statement of Hon. Mike McIntyre
Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces
Hearing on
Assessing Mobility Airlift Capabilities and Operational Risks Under the
Revised 2012 Defense Strategy
March 7, 2012
I would like to thank all of the witnesses for appearing
here today and for their service to the country.
Given the number of recently announced reductions, it is
important for us to have a clear understanding of what the
airlift requirements are to meet the new Defense Strategy. With
the retirement of all 27 C-5As, the elimination of the entire
C-27J fleet and the retirement of 65 C-130s, I am concerned
about whether or not we have the mobility resources required to
meet current and future global demands.
While there will be a drawdown in the overall end strength
of the ground forces in the coming years, there will also be a
shift of resources to the Asian-Pacific Area of Responsibility
that will require increased support. My understanding is that
many of these shifts will begin in the coming years while our
commitments to the current conflict in Afghanistan remain. I am
interested in hearing how this strategic shift combined with
our current commitments will impact mobility demands.
I am anxious to hear from the witnesses about the decision
to terminate the C-27J program and retire all the current
aircraft we have already bought and paid for. A clarification
of the assumptions that were made in this process and how the
Air Force plans to fulfill this requirement would be helpful.
With regard to the KC-46 Tanker replacement program, I am
encouraged to see signs that the program is progressing in a
positive direction. Recent briefings to committee staff show
both low risk in the areas of cost and technical performance
and moderate risk in schedule performance. I know that the KC-
46 program office is working diligently to keep the program on
a stable track and avoid any design or contract changes that
could potentially delay delivery and allow for increased cost.
Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing here
today and I look forward to hearing your testimony.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 7, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN
General Johns. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), FY13-FY17, cost
savings from terminating C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and
initiating the ``Optimize Legacy C-130 Communication, Navigation,
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)'' program is $2.3B.
Additionally, when adding the ``To Complete'' cost of AMP in the FY12
PB to what the Air Force has funded in the FY13PB for CNS/ATM, the Air
Force identified a total cost savings of $3.5B in investment dollars.
By going with the new Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM, which retains
the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we
would lose the mission personnel ``cost savings'' of $482M in base year
dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 C-130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR) to Congress) vice AMP.
Furthermore, the 2010 SAR identified that there were no other life
cycle costs savings by continuing with AMP. The SAR identified an
expected cost increase in both Unit Level Consumption ($513.4M Base
Year dollars) and Sustaining Support ($157.7M Base Year dollars) for
AMP modified aircraft.
Lastly, the termination liability for C-130 AMP is $5.1M. [See page
20.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
General Johns. There are 1,115 CONUS airfields in the AMC GDSS
Airfield Database (ASRR), and of those, only 30 are suitable for C-27s
and NOT suitable for C-130s (2.6% of the database). [See page 22.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. YOUNG
General Johns. The MCRS 2016 was accomplished in 2010 using three
cases; each consisting of OSD approved warfighting scenarios. Revised
strategic guidance to the scenarios superseded one of these cases, and
the Air Force used the two cases consistent with the new strategic
guidance to shape mobility force structure decisions.
The RAND ``U.S. Air Force Intra-theater Airlift Requirements for
Direct Support Missions for the U.S. Army'' study was also accomplished
in 2010 and analyzed the direct support to the US Army requirements.
This was a ``platform-agnostic'' analysis that noted C-130s could
perform the mission at least as well as the C-27J. It used a
warfighting scenario that was a subset of those used in the MCRS to
determine a range of aircraft required to meet this mission set.
The Joint Staff also conducted a force structure study called
Operational Availability 12, or OA-12. While this Joint study focused
on the combat air forces, Headquarters Air Force A9, Studies and
Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned Directorate, used the force
planning construct from OA-12 to further analyze the mobility force
structure subsequently informing the Service's force structure
decisions.
Finally, the Office of Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation Office conducted an independent airlift study that
took a warfighting scenario consistent with the new strategic guidance
and analyzed the strategic airlift fleet force structure, ultimately
validating the strategic airlift force structure the Air Force had
developed.
The Air Force has provided copies of the MCRS 2016 and RAND Direct
Support Mission studies for review and briefed the classified analysis
summarizing the impact of OA-12 on the mobility fleet to multiple
groups of House and Senate PSMs and MLAs. We stand ready to provide
additional briefings as necessary. The AF does not have the final CAPE
briefing or report to provide. [See page 16.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 7, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN
Mr. Akin. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease
significantly over the next 3 years as a result of the new defense
strategy requirements. The Air Force will decrease its strategic
airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20
KC-135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C-23 tactical
airlift aircraft. However, the current operational tempo, ongoing
operation and forecasted threats, may not be conducive and align to
coincide with the new strategy and the different planning assumptions
used to size the force structure within that strategy. In your opinion,
what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements with a
reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions
within the new defense strategy do not materialize?
General Johns. The Air Force plans to reduce the strategic and
theater airlift fleets by about 10% and the tanker fleet by about 5%.
The FY13 PB request air mobility fleet will be a more modern and
reliable fleet that retains significant capacity and capabilities. If
the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not
materialize, there is a risk that airlift and air refueling support
will not be available to the degree desired. Airlift flows could be
delayed and air refueling support could be diminished in one or more
theaters of operations. The impact can be mitigated by committing air
mobility resources to a large scale operation in one region while
retaining a lesser capability to deny the objectives of an
opportunistic aggressor in a second region. At the end of the day, the
Nation is retaining a capable array of air mobility assets, and our
forces will not be defeated on any battlefield for lack of air mobility
support.
Mr. Akin. In the February 2012 Air Force White Paper provided to
Congress outlining the Air Force's fiscal year 2013 force structure
reorganization, the Air Force states that ``although the U.S. has
removed all combat forces from Iraq and the new strategic guidance
reduces the steady state requirement for ground forces, we expect Air
Force steady state rotational requirements to remain nearly constant,
or perhaps increase, under the new strategy.'' Given the anticipated
increase in Air Force rotational requirements, does it make sense to
reduce our airlift inventory until we're able to determine what the new
rotational ``baseline'' will be?
General Johns. Based on the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
analysis indicates that an intra-theater fleet of 318 C-130s and an
inter-theater fleet of 223 C-17s and 52 C-5Ms will meet the demand of
the fully mobilized wartime surge scenarios. The forecast that steady-
state rotational requirements within the wartime scenarios will remain
constant, or perhaps slightly increase, does not indicate the need for
larger overall fleets, but does point to the need to ensure the active
duty/air reserve component mixes within the airlift fleets are
sufficient to meet rotational deployment demand without a higher
reliance on mobilization of reserve component forces. This is why the
Mobility Air Force fleet reductions outlined in the FY13 PB request
attempt to balance active duty and air reserve component force
structure.
Mr. Akin. General Schwartz briefed the committee during a briefing
on January 25, 2012 that his greatest concern with the new defense
strategy is that the Air Force may not have the capacity in the
mobility aircraft and combat aircraft fleets to execute the new
strategy. Can you please quantify for the committee the risks incurred
with the significant reduction to the mobility airlift fleet and what
it may mean in meeting warfighting requirements of the combatant
commanders?
General Johns. The Air Force plans to reduce the strategic and
theater airlift fleets by about 10% and the tanker fleet by about 5%.
The FY13 PB request air mobility fleet will be a more modern and
reliable fleet that retains significant capacity and capabilities. If
the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not
materialize, there is a risk that airlift and air refueling support
will not be available to the degree desired. Airlift flows could be
delayed and air refueling support could be diminished in one or more
theaters of operations. The impact can be mitigated by prioritizing air
mobility resources to theaters of our choosing and delaying full
support to others. At the end of the day, the country is retaining a
capable array of air mobility assets, and our forces will not be
defeated on any battlefield for lack of air mobility support.
Mr. Akin. The Air Force proposes making a significant adjustment of
mobility force structure not only for aircraft inventory numbers, but
also closing units and standing up new units around the country. The
total cost of this reorganization of mobility locations, we've been
told, is approximately $603 million dollars. Why is the Air Force
incurring such cost to realign units with different mobility missions
and locations around the country?
General Johns. While cost savings are part of the decision-making
process, the most important factor is the Air Force's ability to
provide the capabilities required by the new Defense Strategic
Guidance, ``Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense.'' This new strategy directs the services to build a
leaner, more flexible, and technologically advanced force. As a result,
the Air Force is rebalancing our Total Force to match the capability
and capacity requirements of the new guidance. The proposed Reserve
Component force structure reductions were determined using a deliberate
and collaborative process which leveraged careful analytical review of
warfighting scenarios consistent with the new strategic guidance. Two
decades of military end strength and force structure reductions in our
active duty component have changed the active and reserve component
mix, and achieving the appropriate active and reserve component mix is
critical to sustaining Air Force capabilities for forward presence and
rapid response, as well as meeting high rate rotational demands with a
smaller force.
To meet this end, the Air National Guard (ANG) developed five
Capstone Principles to help guide this transition: allocate at least
one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize
concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG
resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia
construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support
Functions) relevant to the states. Similarly, our Reserve Component
used the following four principles: ensure aircraft reductions do not
negatively impact operational support to Combatant Commands; ensure
force structure movements do not create any new Air Force bills; ensure
risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected
increases in mission capability rates; and, consider locations that
continue to have an Air Force mission due to the presence of another
Air Force Component. This Total Force approach allowed us to maintain
the right Active/Air Guard/Reserve mix which will allow us to meet our
operational demands with a leaner force while taking care of our
Airmen.
Mr. Akin. In your written testimony, it states that ``with the
requirements for two near simultaneous large-scale land campaigns
removed from the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and in turn the most
demanding 2016 Mobility Capability and Requirements Study scenario no
longer considered, the demand on the air mobility fleet is greatly
reduced.'' In your opinion, why has the Department determined that the
scenarios modeled just two years ago for the year 2016 time period are
no longer relevant in maintaining mobility airlift capabilities for?
General Johns. The process of developing a national military
strategy includes selecting potential adversaries, defining the level
of threat they represent and the time span in which they will have to
be engaged with. In each of these elements there is a range of values
that can be rationally set. The threat scenario posed in the national
military strategy is entirely rational and I fully support the budget
devised to field the capabilities necessary to support that strategy.
Mr. Akin. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the
effective use of the Guard and Reserves ``will lower overall personnel
and operating costs, better ensure the right mix and availability of
equipment, provide more efficient and effectivce use of defense assets,
and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active and Reserve
components.'' However, the force structure adjustments that the Air
Force made to the mobility portfolio actually increased the portion of
force structure located within the active component under the new
strategy. Given that this contradicts the 2010 QDR assessment of Guard
and Reserve benefits, why is it that the Air Force chose to reorganize
the mobility force structure in this manner?
General Johns. The key to the QDR is the ``effective'' use of the
Guard and Reserves. We are at a point now in our force structure where
roughly 65% of our C-130 and KC-135 capability resides in the reserve
component. We do not believe we can continue to meet the day to day
combatant commander requirements with this force structure without
continued mobilization authority and we cannot plan to have that
authority forever. It is important to note that the force structure
adjustments to the mobility portfolio do not increase the number of
assigned aircraft to the active duty. The active duty will stand up
active duty units co-located with existing ARC units leveraging total
force capabilities.
Mr. Akin. In your opinion, is the Air National Guard's equipping
strategy effective for an operational reserve? Does the current Air
Force procurement plan for mobility aircraft adequately address aging
aircraft issues in the Air National Guard? Please explain.
General Johns. Yes. The equipping strategy for the Mobility Air
Forces effectively covers the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve
Command, and the Active Duty. The C-17, our most modern inter-theater
airlifter, is based across ANG, AFRC, and AD locations. The most
modernized C-5s, the C-5M, will be based at AFRC and AMC locations. The
KC-135R, currently being equipped with the Block 45 modification, is
based across ANG, AFRC, and the AD, with the majority in the ANG and
AFRC. The C-130J is based across ANG, AFRC, and AD locations. The
majority of the newest variants of the legacy C-130 fleet reside in the
ANG and AFRC. We plan to base the KC-46A, our newest tanker, across the
Total Force IAW the SecAF's Strategic Basing Process.
Mr. Akin. How do you plan to help the Air National Guard mitigate
projected mobility aircraft shortfalls to ensure their units retain
capability for both Title 10 federal and Title 32 state executed
missions?
General Johns. The entire mobility air forces, notwithstanding
their unit or component stand ready to assist any state in times of
emergency. The 2010 NDAA created streamlined processes for the federal
government to provide DOD resources to the states. No state, even those
without an airlift unit should think they won't get the assistance they
require.
Mr. Akin. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type as do
the overall costs to operate any given aircraft between the Active Air
Force and the Reserve Component. If an aircraft costs more to fly but
is flown less by more experienced pilots in the Air National Guard
component, wouldn't it make fiscal sense to put those aircraft in the
Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, wouldn't we
get a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way?
General Johns. At the heart of this discussion about force
structure should be the question of capability. When a reserve
component unit is fully mobilized it brings similar capabilities at a
similar cost compared to its active duty counterpart. However, we
typically don't have mobilization authority for our day to day
combatant commander requirements. The active duty unit provides the
Nation that day to day capability. Also, in most instances the
experienced aircrews that make up the reserve component started as
inexperienced active duty aircrews. By design, the active duty is a
feeder of experience into the reserve component. We need these aircrews
to fly regularly to build experience when they are young; the active
duty provides that opportunity. The Nation receives a tremendous value
from the reserve component, but only because of the active duty
investment up front. If we were to shift to a model where the majority
of inexperienced aircrews entered directly into the reserve component,
we believe over time the capability those units provide to the Nation
would be greatly diminished.
Mr. Akin. In your testimony, you state that ``the [Army's Direct
Support/Mission Critical] mission is being accomplished with two C-27s
and one C-130'', yet General Barclay's testimony contradicts this by
stating ``the [Air Force's] direct support role does not fulfill 100%
of the Army's requirement for time sensitive, mission critical cargo
and personnel. The Army fills this gap with contract airlift and CH-47
aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom.'' When does the Air Force plan
to assume 100% of the Army's Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift
missions? Or, does the Air Force plan to never assume 100% of the
missions? If not, why not?
General Johns. The Air Force is committed to supporting the Army
Direct Support/Mission Critical requirement. CENTCOM, the combatant
command responsible for requesting forces has not requested the Air
Force assume 100% of the Direct Support/Mission Critical mission for a
variety of reasons.
Mr. Akin. Given the reduced airlift inventory in both the Air Force
and the Army, how would you assess the operational risk incurred with
the Air Force meeting the Army's Direct Support/Missional Critical
airlift mission in future contingencies and training operations?
General Johns. The FY13 PB request allows for 48 C-130H/J aircraft
to be available for the Direct Support/Mission Critical mission. We
believe this is sufficient to meet previously established requirements.
Mr. Akin. Currently, there are two C-27J aircraft deployed to
support the Army's direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in
Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans to deploy two more in the April to
May timeframe. Can you provide the committee an update as to how the
aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not
you've gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter's they are
supporting?
General Johns. Clarification: the Air Force will replace the two C-
27s in theater with two other C-27Js in April. There will still only be
two C-27Js in theater.
The C-27J has performed to expectations of responsiveness,
reliability and performance since its deployment to support the US
Army's Time Sensitive/Mission Critical cargo mission. The feedback on
the C-130 aircraft performing this mission has been equally positive.
Mr. Akin. What is the current reimbursable flying hour cost/per
hour for DOD users stated in AFI 65-503, table A15-1 for the C-27J, C-
130H and C-130J aircraft for fiscal year 2012?
General Johns. Per AFI 65-503, table A15-1, the current FY12
reimbursement rate for DOD users of the C-27J is $1,299/flying hour,
for the C-130H is $7,626/flying hour, and for the C-130J is $5,945/
flying hour.
Mr. Akin. According to recent Operation Enduring Freedom data that
the committee has received from the Department regarding C-27J current
operations, 65 percent of the time C-27s have been tasked to move only
1 pallet of cargo, and the remaining 35 percent of time, have been
tasked to only move 2 to 3 pallets of cargo. In your professional
opinion, would it be more efficient to move 1 to 3 pallets of cargo
with either a C-130H or C-130J aircraft? If not, why not?
General Johns. Given that a C-27 and C-130J are sitting on the ramp
and a 1 to 3 pallet load of cargo needs to be moved, it is more
efficient to use the C-27 to move that load. However, it is less
efficient to establish an entire system to support the C-27 in order to
move that 1 to 3 pallet load rather than using C-130s that are already
in the fleet and can perform a wider array of missions with greater
capacity. The issue with the C-27J is not the cost efficiencies of
payload capacity, but with the forecast cost of continued procurement
in conjunction with the overall infrastructure and sustainment costs of
a separate fleet spread across multiple locations. The C-27J is an
entire major weapon system (MWS) introduced into a fleet that has
already been identified as surplus to need. An additional MWS entails
another depot, another schoolhouse, another fleet of simulators, and
new BOS tail associated with every beddown location. In today's
fiscally constrained environment, the AF could no longer justify the
overall cost for the C-27J's niche capability.
Mr. Akin. The Air Force C-27 Analysis of Alternatives, revalidated
in 2008, states that a fleet of 38 C-27J aircraft are needed to
support, with high risk, 1 major contingency operation. Given that the
new defense strategy focuses on only executing 1 major contingency
operation, why would it not be prudent to keep at least 38 C-27Js, or
more to reduce the assessed risk, in the inventory to meet warfighting
requirements that were validated in the C-27 Analyis of Alternatives?
General Johns. The more recent RAND study, ``Intratheater Lift-
Direct Support'' provided a range of tactical aircraft required for the
TS/MC mission. It also concluded that the C-130 and C-27J were equally
suited for executing the TS/MC mission. The FY13 PB request includes up
to 48 C-130s for the TS/MC mission.
Mr. Akin. The committee notes that the Air Force used the current
Air National Guard basing strategy of 9 locations for 38 C-27J
aircraft, with 4 aircraft at each to base, in the business case
analysis that decided the fate of the program. In your professional
opinions, is basing 38 aircraft at 9 locations an efficient plan, and
if not, did you look at any other basing strategies that would enable a
more efficient and cost-effective program?
General Johns. The Service Cost Position, $308M per aircraft, is
based upon a rule set by DOD to account for all cost elements
associated with the program. Specifically for C-27J, it includes a 4
aircraft based at 9 bases, plus 2 aircraft for formal training and the
all associated Air National Guard manpower. This Service Cost Position
was signed by the AF Service Acquisition Executive and the Air Force
Financial Management and Comptroller back on 24 May 2011 for the full-
rate production decision milestone. The AF is currently completing a
business case analysis of the C-27J to the C-130, directed by the
Senate Armed Services Committee. The cost benefit analysis accomplished
for the SASC report is a comparative analysis between the C-27J and the
C-130 and applied a completely different set of assumptions from the
Service Cost Position; the two efforts are not directly comparable. The
Air Force performed cost excursions to compare the C-27J life-cycle
costs to those of the C-130 by examining analytic excursions of
different basing, manning, and unit size options. We will provide that
to the committees once completed.
The analysis demonstrated that for a similar or even reduced cost,
the C-130 offers greater capability to support the warfighter,
therefore the AF made the difficult decision to cancel the C-27J
program. The remaining 318 C-130s retained in the fleet have sufficient
capacity and capability to meet both the Direct Support and General
Support missions in the new strategic guidance. Buying or retaining
excess capacity in the intra-theater airlift fleet will disadvantage
our ability to balance risks across the Air Force core functions.
Mr. Akin. How many parts and avionics does the C-27J have in common
with the C-130 aircraft? Was this considered during the cost evaluation
of depot maintenance stand-up for the C-27J aircraft?
General Johns. The C-27J and the C-130J share a common heritage
based on Lockheed-Martin's membership on the original C-27J design
team. Based on this heritage, there are avionics and engine components
that are common to both platforms. However, Lockheed split away from
the C-27J team several years ago and the number of avionics and engine
components that are common to both platforms has slowly decreased as
the C-130J configuration has evolved. At this time, there are
approximately 30 avionics and engine components that are common to both
platforms (and no common airframe parts). The cost estimate for the C-
27J did not include costs for the depot activation for the common
avionics components. For the common engine components however, the Air
Force assumed a strategy that shares depot activation costs between the
C-130J and the C-27J, as well as with the CV-22 and the RQ-4 (since
these last two platforms also have common engine components with the C-
27J). Therefore, the cost estimate allocates one sixth of the depot
activation cost for these common engine components to the C-27J
program.
Mr. Akin. The Air Force plans to send 21 brand new C-27J aircraft
to the boneyard. What is the Air Force's plan for the aircraft once
they reach the boneyard?
General Johns. The Air Force is currently reviewing potential
options for divesting the C-27J fleet. In accordance with DOD guidance,
the Air Force will offer these aircraft to Military Services, DOD
activities, DOD Law Enforcement Support Office, Security Assistance
agencies, and other Federal agencies before they would be put into
storage at the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group
(AMARG), Davis-Monthan AFB, NM. If the aircraft are not acquired by any
authorized agency, the C-27Js will be placed in long-term, inviolate
storage.
Mr. Akin. Has the Air Force done any preliminary analysis of what
the airlift requirement will be for the new Asia-Pacific force laydown
structure that is being proposed? If not, how will it be determined?
General Johns. The Air Force has no preliminary analysis of what
the airlift requirement will be for the new Asia-Pacific force laydown
structure that is being proposed. AMC plans to participate alongside
USTRANSCOM, OSD and the combatant commanders to conduct a mobility
study that will determine this requirement.
Mr. Akin. The Major Capabilities Requirements Study-16 study
assumed that DOD would maintain 3 prepositioned locations of military
stock equipment. Now that DOD plans to downsize the number of locations
of prepositioned stock equipment to 2 locations. What does this do in
terms of adding additional requirements for strategic aircraft during
the Phase 0 and Phase 1 of a major contingency operation?
General Johns. The Mobility Capabilities & Requirements Study 2016
(MCRS 16) began with the National Military Strategy (NMS) and
determined the capabilities and requirements needed to deploy, employ,
sustain and redeploy joint forces in order to accomplish that strategy.
While it does take into account locations of prepositioned stock, it is
not safe to assume there is a linear relationship between numbers of
prepositioned stock locations and the size of the strategic airlift
fleet. The multi-modal modeling assesses airlift, aerial refueling,
sealift, surface transportation, ashore and afloat prepositioning,
forward stationing, and infrastructure. It puts these multimodal tools
against the time phased force deployment plan. Ultimately, for planning
purposes we run excursion upon excursion against scenarios anticipated
by the NMS and determine the optimum force structure to accomplish that
strategy with a given level of risk.
While MCRS-16 analyzed requirements of an older strategy which
called for a peak capacity of 32.7MTM/D, one of the study's scenarios
is sufficiently consistent with the new strategy to inform our force
structure and indicates a 29.1 MTM/D capacity is sufficient. Our
proposed mobility air fleet has a capacity of 30.4 MTM/D, which meets
this potential demand with a small amount of margin in reserve. This
fleet size and mix allows us to execute the National Military Strategy
at an appropriate level of risk.
Mr. Akin. In your testimony, you state that ``the KC-135 continues
its Block 45 avionics upgrade and 95 aircraft will be upgrading their
engines for great fuel efficiency.'' Is the Air Force re-engining the
KC-135 fleet? If so, what is the total cost of this upgrade and why are
the current engines not sufficient?
General Johns. No, the Air Force is not re-engining the KC-135
fleet. However, starting in FY13 we will be upgrading engines with up-
to-date technology during normal overhaul operations to gain fuel and
sustainment efficiencies. The KC-135 engines have been extremely
reliable; in fact, 56% of engines (988 of 1741 engines) have never
required a depot shop visit and have been on wing an average of 9500
flying hours. However, because they have stayed on wing so long, they
have fallen technologically behind their commercial counterparts, and
are starting to reach an age where maintenance issues are becoming more
common. Utilizing spares manufactured with the latest technology
improves fuel efficiency and provides long-term sustainment cost
avoidance by reducing the number of required future overhauls. We plan
to upgrade approximately 93 engines in FY13 at a cost of $29M. The AF
business case analysis assumed the entire fleet would be upgraded over
approximately 16 years (dependent on future force structure decisions),
at a total cost of $278M (constant FY11 $). Expected benefits are a
total of $1.3B in avoided engine overhaul costs (beginning FY25) and
56M gallons of fuel saved through 2046--a return on investment of
greater than 5 to 1, with a break-even point of 2027.
Mr. Akin. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease
significantly over the next 3 years as a result of the new defense
strategy requirements. The Air Force will decrease its strategic
airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20
KC-135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C-23 tactical
airlift aircraft. However, the current operational tempo, ongoing
operation and forecasted threats, may not be conducive and align to
coincide with the new strategy and the different planning assumptions
used to size the force structure within that strategy. In your opinion,
what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements with a
reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions
within the new defense strategy do not materialize?
General Wyatt. The value the Mobility Air Forces (MAF) bring to the
nation cannot be overstated. If one looks around the world, what
separates us from the other nations is we can project power and sustain
it, anywhere and at any time. The Air National Guard (ANG) provides
crucial capabilities vital to defending our nation and supporting our
citizens. We need to ensure America properly resources and
recapitalizes our ANG MAF to be prepared to respond to events in an
uncertain future. The MAF mission is a good fit for our Citizen Airmen;
it is a good fit for America because our inherent cost savings can be
leveraged to preserve greater capacity and capability to help preserve
America's mobility forces. Reversibility is key should the planning
assumptions within the new defense strategy not materialize. If the
assumptions for the new strategy prove to be wrong and we need to
regrow the mobility community, we will, initially, have reduced our
ability to regenerate that mobility force structure. Once force
structure is cut, it will take a significant amount of time and money
to regenerate them. This is a calculated risk in that mobility force
capacity allows our nation to hedge against future uncertainty and
changing assumptions. I haven't seen analysis detailing what mobility
requirements would be if the Army and Marine Corps in fact need to grow
in response to a changing security environment. But, in my opinion, the
ANG needs to recapitalize our mobility fleet concurrently and
proportionately with the Regular AF, to ensure we preserve the greatest
capability for our nation at the greatest value to the American tax
payer. If we leverage the cost-effectiveness of the Reserve Component
mobility forces to the maximum extent possible, we can retain greater
flexibility to regenerate force structure if needed to support a larger
ground force.
Mr. Akin. Under the new defense strategy, the Air Force has shifted
its mobility ratio of aircraft inventory between the active and reserve
components from 49% active and 51% reserve, to 54% active and 46%
reserve. Historically, in your opinion, has it been more cost-effective
to retain a majority of aircraft inventory in the active or the reserve
components?
General Wyatt. Recent RAND analysis shows that the Reserve
Component (RC) has lower fixed and variable flying hour costs*. Hence,
it is our belief that it is more economical to size the force structure
to use the RC until their maximum capacity is reached before employing
the Active Component (AC). Furthermore, because RC personnel are
generally more experienced than their AC counterparts, we believe the
RC is able to maintain a trained, ready, and available workforce at
less cost.
*Costs of Operating AC and RC, RAND, Project Air Force, March 2012
a. F-16 squadron fixed costs (average): $120M Active Duty/$39M ARC
b. F-16 squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $24,400 Active
Duty/$22,000 ARC c. C-130 squadron fixed costs (average): $168M Active
Duty/$12M ARC d. 11 Primary Aircraft Assigned (PAA) C-130 squadron
variable cost/flight hour (average): $31,797 Active Duty/$18,020 ARC
Mr. Akin. In your written testimony, you state that ``the nation
can maintain defense capabilities at less total cost through a careful
and thoughtful balancing of Active and Reserve component forces.'' In
your opinion, is the Air Force's current force structure plan for
mobility aircraft appropriately balanced between the active and reserve
components? If not, why not? What adjustments would you make if given
the opportunity to do so?
General Wyatt. The balance between the Active Component (AC) and
the Reserve Component (RC) are dependent on several assumptions in
light of the national strategy. Reversibility and affordability are key
elements of the assumptions. The Fiscal Year 2013 President's Budget
changed the Mobility Air Forces AC/RC mix from 51%/49% to 54%/46%.
We need to ensure that Air National Guard (ANG) mobility aircraft
are recapitalized concurrently and in proportion to active duty, to
include the KC-46 and C-130Js. The ANG strikes a harmonious balance
between affordability as an operational force, and reversibility as a
surge-to-war force for large contingencies. Looking into the future, if
analysis showed the federal war fight demand was going to be higher for
an extended period of time, a force balanced more heavily in favor of
the active component might be more desirable. If the demand was not
anticipated to be higher for an extended period of time, it might make
more sense to shift the balance in the other direction because the ANG
is more cost effective.
Mr. Akin. Understanding that the Air National Guard meets many
active component deployment requirements through volunteerism of its
forces, and not actual mobilization, if more force structure were moved
into the reserve component, do you believe the Air National Guard could
still meet active component deployment requirements through continued
volunteerism in the long-term? Basically, is volunteerism sustainable
in the long-run?
General Wyatt. Yes, we expect volunteerism to be the norm; however,
mobilization does provide our Guard members with some measure of
protection with their employers. The Air National Guard (ANG) has shown
a sustained ability to meet deployment requirements via volunteerism.
Over the past three years, the ANG sourced approximately 75% of all
Combatant Command requirements through volunteerism. Our view, and the
belief of the Adjutants General, is that we can sustain the current
levels of volunteerism indefinitely.
Mr. Akin. What additional funds, if any, are needed in fiscal year
2013 and beyond to improve the equipment readiness of Air National
Guard mobility aircraft units that do not currently meet standards?
General Wyatt. While the FY13 request meets our needs, should
additional funds become available, the Air National Guard (ANG) has
identified $13.3 million worth of additional requirements to meet the
mission needs of the ANG mobility fleet.
The additional requirements we have identified include:
$2.7 million for aircraft fixtures, test sets, maintenance
stands, and ground handling trailers for C-5 aircraft.
$9.9 million for analyzers, cranes, fixtures, test sets,
trailers, and wrenches for C-130 aircraft.
$735,683 for cable assemblies, fixtures, heaters, jacks,
power supplies, ground handling trailers, and test sets for KC-135
aircraft.
These items would modernize cockpits for the Air Reserve Component
C-130H fleet to comply with Communication/Navigation System/Air Traffic
Management Requirements by FY 2025, and replace instruments which are
obsolete and not available due to diminished manufacturing sources.
Mr. Akin. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type as do
the overall costs to operate any given aircraft between the Active Air
Force and the Reserve Component. If an aircraft costs more to fly but
is flown less by more experienced pilots in the Air National Guard
component, wouldn't it make fiscal sense to put those aircraft in the
Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, wouldn't we
get a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way?
General Wyatt. Recent RAND analysis shows that the Reserve
Component (RC) has lower fixed and variable flying hour costs*. Hence,
it is our belief that it is more economical to size the force structure
to use the RC until their maximum capacity is reached before employing
the Active Component (AC). Furthermore, because the RC has higher
experience, we believe it is able to maintain a trained, ready,
available workforce at less cost.
Recently acquired high-cost platforms, the F-22 and the F-35, are
both designed with an 8,000 flight hour service life requirement. On
average, an Air National Guard (ANG) fighter pilot flies 30% fewer
hours/year than an active duty pilot. This results in a longer airframe
service life of approximately seven years, based on an annual average
of 250 hours/fighter in the ANG and 325 hours/fighter in the AC. A
longer service life directly reduces the required cost of future
fighter recapitalization or expensive service life extension
modifications.
* Costs of Operating AC and RC, RAND, Project Air Force, March 2012
a. F-16 squadron fixed costs (average): $120M Active Duty/$39M ARC
b. F-16 squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $24,400 Active
Duty/$22,000 ARC c. C-130 squadron fixed costs (average): $168M Active
Duty/$12M ARC d. 11 Primary Aircraft Assigned (PAA) C-130 squadron
variable cost/flight hour (average): $31,797 Active Duty/$18,020 ARC
Mr. Akin. Currently, there are two C-27J aircraft deployed to
support the Army's direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in
Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans to deploy two more in the April to
May timeframe. Can you provide the committee an update as to how the
aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not
you've gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter's they are
supporting?
General Wyatt. You are correct; we presently have two aircraft
providing direct support in Operation Enduring Freedom. In April-May,
we will complete our first unit rotation. Ohio's 179AW has led the way
since July 2011 with our initial deployment. After serving 270 days,
they will be replaced by Maryland's 135AG. We are not adding more
aircraft during this rotational swap; instead, we are simply bringing
the next unit into the fight. Our original plan, coordinated with Air
Mobility Command, is to provide two additional aircraft to support the
mission in late 2013.
From the theater, we are receiving very positive feedback from the
Army. The Army's 25th Combat Aviation Brigade issued a press release
this past week that showed the positive effect the C-27J provides in
closing the last tactical mile. The presence of the C-27J has allowed
the Army to shift its general support airlift off its CH-47 fleet and
allows them to focus their support on forward operating bases that are
only accessible by rotary wing aircraft. The Army estimates that ``it
has saved $30 million by conducting missions with the C-27J instead of
the CH-47 Chinook.'' The aircraft is fulfilling the full range of
intratheater airlift for the Combatant Command.
Mr. Akin. According to recent Operation Enduring Freedom data that
the committee has received from the Department regarding C-27J current
operations, 65 percent of the time C-27s have been tasked to move only
1 pallet of cargo, and the remaining 35 percent of time, have been
tasked to only move 2 to 3 pallets of cargo. In your professional
opinion, would it be more efficient to move 1 to 3 pallets of cargo
with either a C-130H or C-130J aircraft? If not, why not?
General Wyatt. The C-27J was originally planned to fulfill the Army
intratheater airlift needs as the Service retired its C-23 Sherpa. In
that same timeframe, the Air Force recognized that the same platform
could be used to fulfill its Light Cargo Aircraft needs. The
culmination has been to develop, field, and deploy an aircraft that
leverages its smaller capacity to move smaller payloads in a more
efficient and effective manner. Air Mobility Command's Air Mobility
Master Plan 2012, November 2011, identified that the C-27J would add
``a more efficient means to move small payloads, shorter distances,
into austere locations.'' Since arriving in theater August 2011, our
practical experience is that the aircraft has met this expectation. We
are achieving Air Force efficiency in moving the smaller payloads with
no loss of effectiveness to the Army.
Mr. Akin. The committee notes that the Air Force used the current
Air National Guard basing strategy of 9 locations for 38 C-27J
aircraft, with 4 aircraft at each to base, in the business case
analysis that decided the fate of the program. In your professional
opinions, is basing 38 aircraft at 9 locations an efficient plan, and
if not, did you look at any other basing strategies that would enable a
more efficient and cost-effective program?
General Wyatt. The current basing model construct was based on the
model initially crafted by the Joint Program Office for the C-27J. At
that time, the ANG had the ability to field and support the program
under that basing concept. However, it is recognized that a 4 Primary
Aircraft Assigned basing construct is not an efficient allocation of
personnel or to support deployed operations. During the C-27J Full Rate
Production discussions in 2011, we have concurred with Air Mobility
Command and Headquarters Air Force that basing the 38 aircraft at seven
bases vice nine would still allow the ANG to field the aircraft and
fulfill its mission set. Other excursions at differing basing numbers
have and can continue to be explored as this program evolves. Our goal
would be to support a more efficient and cost-effective program.
Mr. Akin. Within the Air Force's cost-benefit analysis when
comparing the C-27 to the C-130H, were personnel, maintenance and
operations costs estimated for the C-27 adequately captured based upon
the differences between how the Air National Guard and active component
Air Force activate and apply personnel and fiscal resources? Was the
Air Force's C-27J Service Cost Position assumptions for unit personnel
reflective of current and approved unit manning documents of the unit's
that currently have C-27J fielded?
General Wyatt. The Air Force's Service Cost Position is an estimate
of what the total program cost could entail and is used to plan for all
possible costs. The service cost portfolio was based on the program's
original manpower estimate. As we began to convert units to their new
mission, we paired and tailored our manning documents to achieve the
current day needs. Subsequently, our unit manning is different than the
original manpower estimate.
Mr. Akin. How many parts and avionics does the C-27J have in common
with the C-130 aircraft? Was this considered during the cost evaluation
of depot maintenance stand-up for the C-27J aircraft?
General Wyatt. The C-27J shares 456 common parts with the C-130J.
This includes avionics and propulsion system parts. The C-27J shares 46
common parts with other weapon systems.
The C-27J Service Cost Position does take into account the parts
and avionics commonality between the C-27J and the C-130J. The Cost
Position assumes the depot process will leverage the three existing Air
Logistics Centers processes. The C-27J's System Program Office has a
Depot Working Group, and their charter is to continuously evaluate and
identify how to leverage the existing depot systems, and to ultimately
lower the aircraft's lifecycle sustainment costs.
Mr. Akin. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease
significantly over the next 3 years as a result of the new defense
strategy requirements. The Air Force will decrease its strategic
airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20
KC-135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C-23 tactical
airlift aircraft. However, the current operational tempo, ongoing
operation and forecasted threats, may not be conducive and align to
coincide with the new strategy and the different planning assumptions
used to size the force structure within that strategy. In your opinion,
what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements with a
reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions
within the new defense strategy do not materialize?
General Barclay. The United States Air Force is best suited to
respond to this question.
Mr. Akin. You state in your testimony that ``the direct support
role does not fulfill 100% of the Army's requirement for time
sensitive, mission critical cargo and personnel. The Army fills this
gap with contract airlift and CH-47 aircraft in Operation Enduring
Freedom.'' If the Air Force has the responsibility for executing the
Army's Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift mission, why is the Army
having to supplement the Air Force with contractor provided airlift and
CH-47 helo aircraft to meet your requirements?
General Barclay. The terrain over which OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
is being conducted is challenging and austere. The time sensitive/
mission critical mission the ground commander has to execute is not
always near an available airfield capable of landing fixed wing
aircraft. These missions require rotary wing aircraft such as the CH-47
and contract airlift both fixed and rotary wing. Although the agreement
between the Air Force and Army on time sensitive mission critical cargo
will not satisfy 100% the Army's requirement it will significantly
reduce the reliance on contract air and free up CH-47s for tactical
missions.
Mr. Akin. How many dedicated aircraft does it take to support one
heavy brigade combat team for the Direct Support/Mission Critical
airlift mission in a major contingency operation, and how do you assess
the Air Force's reduced tactical airlift inventory in meeting your
future requirements?
General Barclay. There is not a planning figure for resourcing
brigade combat teams with Direct Support aircraft. The intent is to
resource a division task force, based on mission analysis, with a
tailored package of two to four Direct Support aircraft. Based
partially on a RAND study stating it will require 42-92 aircraft to
fulfill the Army's time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) task, the
Air Force further assessed the requirement and determined it will take
48 aircraft to meet the TS/MC requirement. At this time, the Army is
willing to accept that assessment partially because it coincides with
our own 2007 assessment of acquiring 54 Joint Cargo Aircraft; 48 for
missions and six for training.
Mr. Akin. For each of the fiscal years 2009, 2010, 2011 and to date
in 2012, what percentage of the total time-sensitive/mission critical
airlift missions in both combat and training operations have been met
by Air Force fixed-wing intra-theater airlift aircraft? How many
missions over those same years has the Army designated ``time-
sensitive/mission critical'' and how many of those total missions have
been flown by Air Force fixed-wing aircraft?
General Barclay. a. Even though time sensitive/mission critical
(TS/MC) is not a new concept, it is an emerging doctrinal term that has
no formal definition and as a consequence, there is not an established
metric to track TS/MC requirements. The combatant commander makes his
own determination on what is TS/MC and based on his assessment of
current operations, he might decide to reprioritize certain logistics
commodities. The Army and Air Force are in the process of developing
how to define/track TS/MC.
b. Because TS/MC data is not available, we are unable to discern
how many TS/MC missions the Air Force has supported. Today, when a TS/
MC mission is required, it is being supported by a USAF aircraft, a
commercially contracted aircraft, or an Army rotary wing aircraft;
whichever is most readily available at the time.
Mr. Akin. Given the reduced airlift inventory in both the Air Force
and the Army, how would you assess the operational risk incurred with
the Air Force meeting the Army's Direct Support/Missional Critical
airlift mission in future contingencies and training operations?
General Barclay. The Air Force believes the risk to the Army is
minimal because the Air Force is completely committed to supporting the
time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) Direct Support theater airlift
requirements. Based partially on a RAND study stating it will require
42-92 aircraft to fulfill the Army's TS/MC task, the Air Force further
assessed the requirement and determined it will take 48 aircraft to
meet the TS/MC requirement. At this time, the Army is willing to accept
that assessment partially because it coincides with our own 2007
assessment of acquiring 54 Joint Cargo Aircraft; 48 for missions and
six for training.
Mr. Akin. In the future, how many Direct Support/Mission Critical
airlift missions does the Army expect the Air Force to provide?
General Barclay. Presently, there is not an established planning
figure on how many missions the Army expects the Air Force to provide.
It is difficult to apply a number because time sensitive/mission
critical (TS/MC) is an emerging doctrinal term that has no formal
definition and as a consequence, there is not an established metric to
track TS/MC requirements. The combatant commander makes his own
determination on what is TS/MC and based on his assessment of current
operations, he might decide to reprioritize certain logistics
commodities. The Army and Air Force are in the process of developing
how to define/track TS/MC.
Mr. Akin. The Army's plans to divest itself of the C-23 Sherpa
airlift fleet was predicated on the Air Force's procurement of the C-27
aircraft to support the Army's Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift
mission. Now that the Air Force plans to divest itself of the C-27, is
the Army reassessing whether or not you will keep the C-23 Sherpa, and/
or, possibly try to assume the C-27 from the Air Force?
General Barclay. The Army is continuing with its plan to divest the
C-23 Sherpa fleet. The C-23 primarily mitigated the requirement for
time sensitive/mission critical cargo for the Army. The current
agreement between the Army and Air Force will meet this time sensitive/
mission critical requirement. The C-23 fulfilled an Army cargo
requirement; the C-27 was conceived to fulfill this requirement
replacing the C-23. The current agreement with the Air Force is not
platform or aircraft specific but is based on the same Army cargo
requirement.
Mr. Akin. Does the Army have any plans to assume responsibility of
the C-27 aircraft from the Air Force and field it? If not, why not?
General Barclay. The Army does not plan to assume the
responsibility of the C-27J aircraft from the Air Force. Under the
current agreement between the Army and Air Force, the Air Force will
provide Direct Support air lift for time sensitive, mission critical
missions thereby removing the Army's initial requirement for the C-27
aircraft.
Mr. Akin. Currently, there are two C-27J aircraft deployed to
support the Army's direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in
Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans to deploy two more in the April to
May timeframe. Can you provide the committee an update as to how the
aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not
you've gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter's they are
supporting?
General Barclay. There has been no negative feedback from theater
on the current support provided by the Air Force. However, new concepts
take time to mature and develop. We anticipate this Direct Support
relationship to continue to improve and become more effective as both
the Army and Air Force collect lessons learned and continue to review
the agreement, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).
Mr. Akin. In February, Boeing announced that it would close its
production and maintenance facility in Wichita, Kansas as a cost-
savings measure. What impact does this have on the KC-46 program and
how do you plan to mitigate any program disruptions? Will any cost
increases to the KC-46 program occur as a result of this facility
closure?
General Bogdan. Boeing is closing the Wichita facility by the end
of 2013 and moving all KC-46 work to the Puget Sound area. Specific
functions and capabilities to be moved include the finishing center,
boom assembly, and KC-46 FAA supplemental type certification (STC).
Boeing has plans in place to mitigate the loss of key aerial refueling
engineering, manufacturing, and production expertise resulting from the
move. Additionally, the movement of STC requires new FAA delegation
authority to conduct STC. Boeing and the Air Force are working with the
FAA to obtain this updated STC authority.
If the transition occurs as Boeing plans, this move should result
in an overall risk reduction for the KC-46 program. For example, all
development testing will be consolidated in one location, all
manufacturing will be in the same area with expertise being co-located,
and the need for long ferry flights to Wichita to complete aircraft
assembly is eliminated. Contractually, the movement of KC-46 work from
Wichita does not impact the competitively negotiated KC-46 business
deal.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN
Mr. Griffin. According to the President's budget proposal for
fiscal year 2013, the Administration plans to cancel the AMP and
replace the AMP with a less ambitious, less costly program, commonly
referred to as ``AMP Lite,'' for modernization of the C-130 fleet,
including 184 C-130 aircraft. According to General Schwartz, these
upgrades would likely be similar to those used on the KC-10 refueling
aircraft and would keep the navigators in our C-130s. The President's
FY13 budget claims this will save $2.6 billion. However, it is my
understanding that the $2.6 billion in savings does not include the
cost of a new program start, current contract termination costs, cost
of keeping the navigator position, or the life-cycle savings that AMP
will provide.
Question: When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force
consider the cost of retaining the navigator position over the life
cycle of the legacy C-130 fleet? If so, what is the cost? How much will
the new start effort truly save after considering the termination
liability, and other life cycle cost savings are removed from the
solution? What were other criteria for considering the cost of AMP
Lite?
General Johns. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), FY13-FY17, cost
savings from terminating C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and
initiating the ``Optimize Legacy C-130 Communication, Navigation,
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)'' program is $2.3B.
Additionally, when adding the ``To Complete'' cost of AMP in the FY12
PB to what the Air Force has funded in the FY13PB for CNS/ATM, the Air
Force identified a total cost savings of $3.5B in investment dollars.
By going with the new Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM, which retains
the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we
would lose the mission personnel ``cost savings'' of $482M in base year
dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 C-130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR) to Congress) vice AMP.
Furthermore, the 2010 SAR identified that there were no other life
cycle costs savings by continuing with AMP. The SAR identified an
expected cost increase in both Unit Level Consumption ($513.4M Base
Year dollars) and Sustaining Support ($157.7M Base Year dollars) for
AMP modified aircraft.
Lastly, the termination liability for C-130 AMP is $5.1M.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. In General Schwartz's written testimony before the
full Committee, he stated that the Air Force is divesting the C-27
aircraft in favor of the ``multi-role'' C-130 because the AF considers
the C-27 a ``niche'' capability. However, on May 19, 2009, the AF
verbally testified to this committee that ``our programs reflect their
commitment to pursuing joint, multi-mission solutions such as the
procurement of 8 C-27Js in fiscal year 2010.'' Why, does the AF believe
three years later that the C-27 is no longer a multi-mission capable
aircraft? Has there been any formal Air Force testing conducted that
proves the C-27 is no longer a multi-mission aircraft?
General Johns. Background of Question: In February 2008, the Air
Force certified to Congress in a letter that the ``Time-sensitive/
mission-critical resupply is crucial to our success as warfighters . .
. we also believe there are mission sets that may support additional
procurement of the C-27 . . . [such as] building international
partnerships around a common airframe; National Guard support of
Federal Emergency Management agency regions; delivery of Special
Operations Forces teams and other small unit maneuvers; more efficient
movement of small payloads in theater, taking convoys off the road;
precision air drop of bundles and Joint precision Airdrop System
operations; and, recapitalization of Operational Support Aircraft
inventories.''
The C-27J is a capable aircraft that can conduct similar operations
as the C-130, but on a smaller scale (less range, speed, payload).
However, our analysis demonstrates that it does so at greater cost.
Therefore the AF has made the difficult decision to cancel the C-27J
program and fulfill the Direct Support mission it was designated to
conduct with the more capable and cost-effective C-130.
Mr. Bartlett. What are the cost and schedule impacts to the Navy's
BAMS program from ending and mothballing the USAF Global Hawk Block 30
program? What are the cost impacts to operating and sustaining the
remaining variants (Blocks 20 and 40)?
General Johns. The Air Force must defer to the Navy regarding cost
and schedule impacts to BAMS due to the divestiture of the Global Hawk
Block 30. This information is not available within the Air Force.
The FY13 PB contains the cost required to develop, retrofit and
sustain the remaining Block 20/40 fleet (does not include BACN-specific
payload updates and costs, which are funded under OCO). There will be
no additional infrastructure or spares costs associated with flying
Block 20/40 aircraft without Block 30 in the program. In order to
reduce operations and maintenance cost, the Air Force will reduce the
number of operational sites to coincide with the removal of Block 30
aircraft operations. Though cost per flying hour will increase due to
reduced aircraft quantities, reliability and maintenance improvements
are funded within the Global Hawk budget to further control costs.
Mr. Bartlett. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the
efficiency for every program. At a macro level it is clear that an
unmanned system can fly longer and further than a manned system. A
recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail how unmanned systems
feature \1/3\ the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it is
in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our
nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing
exceptionally well in theater for a five decade old manned system.
General Johns. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than
the U-2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit
1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13
Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to be
from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the
cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at $32K
per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership
Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in
the FY13 Budget Review.
After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The
Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements
for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced requirement.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between the
RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their normal operating locations and
the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although
money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.
Mr. Bartlett. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the
efficiency for every program. At a macro level it is clear that an
unmanned system can fly longer and further than a manned system. A
recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail how unmanned systems
feature \1/3\ the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it is
in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our
nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing
exceptionally well in theater for a five decade old manned system.
General Barclay. The United States Air Force is best suited to
respond to this question.
Mr. Bartlett. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the
efficiency for every program. At a macro level it is clear that an
unmanned system can fly longer and further than a manned system. A
recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail how unmanned systems
feature \1/3\ the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it is
in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our
nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing
exceptionally well in theater for a five decade old manned system.
General Bogdan. It is accurate that the RQ-4 can fly longer and
further than the U-2, and in last year's Nunn-McCurdy certification,
the RQ-4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than
the U-2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit
1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13
Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ-4 and U-2 was assumed to be
from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the
cost per flying hour of the RQ-4 and U-2 is roughly equivalent at $32K
per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership
Costs Database, the RQ-4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U-2 in
the FY13 Budget Review.
After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined
that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The
Air Force further determined the U-2, which remains viable until at
least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements
for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced requirement.
Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ-4 Block 30 was not
prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between the
RQ-4 and U-2 when operating from their normal operating locations and
the U-2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest
the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although
money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B
was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U-2 through the FYDP.
This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.
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