[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-112]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,
AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 7, 2012
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana BILL OWENS, New York
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM RYAN, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHRIS GIBSON, New York HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JOE HECK, Nevada COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 7, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Budget Requests from U.S. Central Command, U.S.
Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 7, 2012......................................... 43
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
WITNESSES
Fraser, Gen William M., III, USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 9
Mattis, Gen James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command...... 5
McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Fraser, Gen William M., III.................................. 101
Mattis, Gen James N.......................................... 51
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 47
McRaven, ADM William H....................................... 78
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 127
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 127
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 132
Mr. Brooks................................................... 146
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 140
Mr. Franks................................................... 139
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 140
Mr. Langevin................................................. 131
Mr. Runyan................................................... 147
Mr. Schilling................................................ 141
Mr. Scott.................................................... 145
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 140
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 7, 2012.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. The Committee will come to
order.
The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
testimony from the Commanders of U.S. Central Command, General
James Mattis; U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral William
McRaven; U.S. Transportation Command, General William Fraser.
Thank you all for being with us today.
Much has changed since we last received testimony from your
respective commands. We have withdrawn all forces from Iraq;
continued to disrupt Al Qaeda and target its senior leadership
around the world; the President has begun the withdrawal of the
surge forces in Afghanistan; tensions with Iran continue to
increase; and a new defense strategy has been released that
demands increased power projection and a more globally
balanced, agile, and persistent Special Operations Force.
Still, even more significant events are on the horizon.
Reports in the press continue to speculate that the
Administration may be prepared to announce an additional
withdrawal of forces and a change to an advisory strategy for
Afghanistan in advance of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] summit in Chicago in May.
I see little strategy in such a plan, if it exists; but
rather a political calculus that will ultimately protract the
war in Afghanistan, increase casualties, and further erode
confidence among our allies and credibility among our
adversaries.
Meanwhile, Iran is showing little willingness to curtail
its nuclear program, in spite of the tightening brace of
economic sanctions imposed at the insistence of Congress.
Although the Supreme Leader may not yet have made the
decision to build a nuclear weapon, time is running out for
Iran to responsibly join the international community.
I agree with the recent recommendations of the Bipartisan
Policy Center task force on Iran, led by former Senator Charles
Robb and retired General Charles Wald, including their warning
that the United States must immediately shift to a triple-track
strategy: diplomacy, sanctions, and visible, credible
preparations for a military option of last resort.
But let me be clear. This isn't casual talk of war. A
nuclear Iran is a serious problem that the Commander in Chief
should be discussing with the American people and our allies
every day. And it must be confronted with all elements of
national power, not simply an outstretched hand.
As for Special Operations Command, I alluded to the changes
envisioned by the new defense strategy. SOCOM [Special
Operations Command] is truly being asked to do more, with less.
The Command's budget was modestly reduced, but it is expected
to continue its 5 percent growth rate for the next 3 years.
Furthermore, all signs point to a heavy demand signal for
our Special Operations Forces in U.S. Central Command where
more than 80 percent of all deployed Special Operations Forces
are right now.
In Afghanistan alone, Special Operations Forces will
continue to be stretched dangerously thin as conventional and
enabling forces draw down.
Although only 8 percent of the total force in Afghanistan,
Special Operations Forces are increasingly leaned on at the
local level through the Village Stability Operations and Afghan
Local Police programs, and at the national level, with ongoing
counterterrorism and direct action missions in conjunction with
our Afghan partners.
And now, with the potential to have a new three-star SOF
[Special Operations Forces] General or Flag Officer at ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] command levels, I am
increasingly concerned that our Special Operations Forces may
be forced into an overburdened role if our conventional forces
withdraw too fast and without a sound transition to the Afghan
National Security Forces.
Finally, we speculated last year what might happen should
Pakistan close supply routes to Afghanistan, and now we know.
TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] has been doing incredible
work to make sure that our troops in Afghanistan continue to
get what they need in spite of the current downturn in U.S.-
Pakistan relations.
Looking forward, TRANSCOM will be challenged to provide
their--the lift and prepositioned stocks necessary to fulfill
the vision laid out in the new defense strategy.
It seems to me that an increasing emphasis on the Asia-
Pacific, and an increasingly maritime theater in the Middle
East, will demand more lift, refueling, and prepositioned
assets--not less.
Yet the President's budget request reduces our capacity in
each of these areas. This topic warrants further oversight by
this committee and I look forward to your testimony on these
matters and more.
Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all three of you gentlemen for being here
this morning and for your great service to our country.
Central Command, Operations Command, Transportation
Command--three critical components of our entire national
security strategy, I think this will be a very informative
hearing. I look forward to your testimony and your answers to
the questions of the members.
In CENTCOM [Central Command], we seem to have, you know,
not quite all of the world's problems gathered in one place but
I am sure, General Jim Mattis, it seems like that at times. It
is certainly a very challenging area.
For our committee, Afghanistan continues to be job one and
that is where our troops are actively engaged in a war.
We want to make sure the strategy is working there and that
we have a plan going forward, and then most importantly, we are
providing everything that you need to make sure that our troops
can do the job and the task that they have been given in that
critically important region.
But certainly, Afghanistan is not the only issue. We are
curious to hear how the relationship with Pakistan continues to
impact what is going on in Afghanistan and the larger problems
in the region.
That certainly has been a very problematic relationship.
You know, the classic ``can't live with them, can't live
without them'' situation, but I am mindful of the fact that we
need to try to maintain whatever relationship we can with
Pakistan.
It is a dangerous part of the world. But whatever help we
can get from them, we need; and where we can't get help, we
need to figure out what we have to do in order to meet the
national security challenges that we have in that region.
But all of that adds up to the fact that we cannot simply
walk away from Pakistan. We need to find a way to make that
relationship work and your insights on that would be very
helpful to this Committee.
As the Chairman mentioned, there are other problems in the
region, in Syria and in Iran. So overall, it is a very
challenging command that you have and we thank you for your
leadership.
Admiral McRaven, we thank you for everything SOCOM has
done.
It is been an amazing set of accomplishments over the
course of the last few years--most notably of course, taking
out Osama bin Laden with an incredible precision and talent
that was just--that was exactly the way I think the Special
Operations folks envisioned the development of SOCOM.
You know, way back in 1980 when we first started to rethink
what we need in the Special Operations Force, it was, you know,
just an incredible accomplishment. We thank you for that, but
certainly not the only one.
All across the globe, Al Qaeda is on the run and in trouble
because of the pressure that our military and our Intelligence
Services are putting on them, and SOCOM is, I like to say, is
at the tip of the spear on all of that.
It is been an incredible string of successes and without a
doubt, it is contributed to the fact that we have not had an
attack here in the U.S.
If you are a member of Al Qaeda whether you are in
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, wherever, you are forced to spend the
bulk of your time wondering when a missile might come down on
you from nowhere.
And I got to believe that makes it vastly more difficult to
do what you are trying to do and we thank you for that great
leadership, and we also want to thank Admiral Olson and some of
the other predecessors.
A plan was put in place, 5 or 6 years ago to grow the
Special Operations Forces to meet the very challenges that we
saw.
I guess I would disagree with the Chairman a little bit
here, you are not doing more, but less--you are doing more with
more. It is just that the more that you have to do, perhaps,
outstrip the more that you are getting in terms of supplies and
you are doing a great and we appreciate that.
And also, most importantly, you know, there was concern
when all of these started because the quality of the Special
Operations Forces is critical. We don't simply--you can't just
pick people up off the streets and make them into special
operators.
And you guys have done an amazing job of training them and
making sure that as the Force has grown, the quality has been
maintained. So, we thank you for that and we look forward to
hearing from you how we can continue to support your efforts.
And of course, none of this happens without Transportation
Command. That is how all the troops, the equipment gets to
where it needs to be and win.
The complexity of your job, General Fraser, is something I
don't think most people appreciate and you have done it
amazingly well. We have had incredible supply chains,
incredible ability to get, you know, our troops the support
they need when they need it.
You know, obviously, the two challenges are the ones that
the Chairman mentioned: one, how do we continue to provide the
supplies in Afghanistan that we need given the challenges in
Pakistan? You have done an amazing job of making that work and
I want to hear more about how that is going.
And then as we do lay out the new strategy with the new set
of equipment that is going to be provided for over the course
of the next decade, how does that fit into your long-term
plans? What do we need to do to make sure the strategy works?
I will again emphasize and thank all of you--all
participated in the strategy review. It was a comprehensive
approach to look at our national security needs and say, ``What
should the strategy be?''
We have had a debate on this committee and I suspect we
will continue to have debate about what role the shrinking
budget played in that strategy? Was it the strategy that drove
it or was it the budget that drove it? I would say, obviously,
it was a little bit of both.
Every strategy, every development in this situation had to
at least partially factor in the resources available to
implement it. I think taking the approach that you all did
which was, let us look at the strategy, figure out what we need
to do, and then take another look and say, ``How can we make
this work within this budget environment?'' was the exact,
right approach and the strategy that has been laid out makes
sense.
I wish we had more money, wish we had more money for a lot
of things. We are having a big debate right now about passing a
transportation bill here. And the big debate there is we don't
have enough money to do what people would like to do.
We are going to have many challenges in many areas but our
physical situation is what it is. It is incredibly important.
We cannot be a deterrent nation forever. Deficits can in fact
explode to the point where they jeopardize our national
security so that has to be at least part of the conversation.
And I think the national security apparatus in our country
did a really good job of looking at those confined resources
and still coming up with a strategy that meets the national
security priorities of this Nation.
I thank all of you for doing that. I look forward to you
testimony. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Thank you. General Mattis.
STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND
General Mattis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Smith, Members of the committee. And thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the U.S. Central Command region.
I have submitted a written statement and request it be
accepted for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
General Mattis. It is my privilege to appear today
alongside two admired leaders, Admiral Bill McRaven and General
Will Fraser. Special Operations Command and Transportation
Command had been key enablers to our operations in Central
Command and I am grateful for these officers' personal support.
Let me begin with what I see today in the Central region.
The Arab Awakening is manifesting differently in each country.
While we may hope for and certainly will firmly support
efforts for more democratic government, the awakening's origins
are not necessarily a rush for democracy. Rather, this
awakening stems from breakdown in the social contract between
governments and their people.
Unjust or unresponsive regimes have fallen or are in the
throes of falling, as is the case in Syria. However, the
transition to a democratic government is never easy as we see
in Egypt. Further, it is not clear what the resulting
governments across the region will look like.
Challenges remain beyond the promise of the Arab Awakening.
Iran and its surrogates continue to orchestrate violence
worldwide as evidenced by its plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador
here in Washington, D.C.
Iran represents the most significant regional threat to
stability and security. Its reckless behavior and bellicose
rhetoric have created a high potential for miscalculation.
While we have made security gains in the fight against
terrorists, the threat remains. Al Qaeda and associated groups
continue to kill innocents from the Levant to Yemen and are
adapting in the face of U.S. pressure.
While we maintain our pressure on the enemy, we are nesting
our military efforts inside four broad U.S. diplomatic
objectives for the region: first, we support each country's
political reform to adapt at their own pace; second, support
for economic modernization to provide the people ownership of
their future; third, a renewed pursuit of Middle East peace,
recognizing the status quo is simply not sustainable; finally,
we stand firmly with our friends and we support regional
security, territorial integrity of sovereign nations and the
free flow of commerce.
As the Military Commander for the Central region, my
overarching goal is to prevent another conflict. We seek to
deter those with hostile intent. And should deterrence prove
unsuccessful, we provide military options to the President.
As our President has said, our strong presence in the
Middle East endures and the United States will never waver in
defense of our allies, our partners or our interests.
The military challenge will be determined how we retain a
sustainable presence and operational flexibility in a
physically constrained environment.
Although we are withdrawing ground forces from the region,
we are not withdrawing our support for long-time allies and
partners, nor are we pulling back our commitment from a region
that too many times has taken a commitment of American blood
and treasure to restore stability.
Through a persistent military-to-military engagement, our
troops reassure our friends and temper adversary intentions.
Security cooperation activities such as foreign military
sales; international military education and training; security
force training; and multinational exercises are cost-effective
means for building our friends' defensive capabilities,
allowing us to operate in consort with allies and friends and
to rapidly respond in times of need.
A sustained joint presence with a pronounced naval
character supported by embarked troops, agile Special
Operations Forces, strong aviation elements and an
expeditionary Army and Marine Corps, demonstrates our joint
commitment to our allies, underwrites regional stability,
familiarizes our forces with the theater and builds partner
abilities to protect themselves, all while providing timely
response to crisis.
There are some other key-needed capabilities that we have.
We need improved counter-IED [Improvised Explosive Device]
efforts even now for all the effort we have put into this.
We need them to protect our troops from a pervasive threat
that extends well beyond Afghanistan; information operations
and voice programs to counter adversary information; and
recruiting on the Internet; improved ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] assets that enable us to
locate an elusive enemy; and intelligence expertise to support
deployed elements.
We also need specific resources that are vital to the
Afghanistan campaign. Coalition support funds, the Commander's
Emergency Response Program, Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund and
reintegration authority enable us to meet urgent humanitarian
and infrastructure needs of a population that is increasingly
today secured by its own forces we have been building and
training for the Afghan Security Forces Fund.
In conclusion, I appreciate the essential resources you
provide which enable us to carry up the strategy assigned.
We ask only for what we need and what we request is
critical as we carry out the transition in Afghanistan and
continue on course to achieve our desired strategic end state
there by December 2014 as laid out at the NATO conference in
Lisbon.
Thanks to Congressional support and thanks to the
sacrifices of our military families, our forces represent
America's awesome determination to stand by our friends,
maintain regional stability and defense of our values and our
interests.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Admiral McRaven.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral McRaven. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking
Member Smith and distinguished members of the Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today and
represent the extraordinary men and women of the United States
Special Operations Command.
It is an honor to command the world's finest special
operations force, a force serving side by side with our broader
military and interagency teammates. And I am proud to appear
today with my friends and teammates, General Jim Mattis and
General Will Fraser.
With your permission, sir, I will submit my written posture
statement for the record and open with some brief remarks.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Admiral McRaven. This morning I would like to provide you
an overview of SOF's role in addressing our Nation's ongoing
and emergency--emerging security challenges.
Secretary Panetta recently outlined how he viewed the
future joint force. He called for low-cost, lean,
technologically advanced, agile, responsive, innovative,
efficient and effective forces able to address a variety of
challenges and adversaries.
As I read those characteristics, I am struck at how
accurately they described your Special Operations Forces and
what we bring to the military arsenal.
Special Operations Forces have had a tremendous impact on
our Nation's security and never more so during the last 10
years of war. Since 9/11, our force has doubled in size, now at
66,000. Our budget has tripled and a number of SOF-deployed
forces have quadrupled to meet the emerging demands.
However, even with that growth, our $10.4 billion budget in
fiscal year 2013 still comprises only 1.7 percent of the total
DOD [Department of Defense] budget. Simply put, SOF remains
relevant, in high demand, and offers unparalleled return on the
Nation's investment.
As we evaluate today's rapidly evolving strategic
landscape, it is clear that the demand for Special Operations
capability will remain high.
Our near-term focus is on weighing the current fight
against violent extremism. First and foremost, we will sustain
our efforts in Afghanistan in support of ISAF by continuing the
application of SOF's direct and indirect approach.
The direct approach, lethal and precise, continues to
degrade extremist leadership and their facilitation networks.
The indirect approach, which I believe offers the greatest
opportunity for victory, builds security and governance through
efforts such as the Village Stability Operations and the
development of Afghan security forces.
Both the direct and indirect approaches continue to have
daily positive impacts on ISAF strategy. Our sacrifice and
effort in Afghanistan has been tremendous and we continue to
make this our highest priority.
In addition to our efforts in Afghanistan, we also strive
to maintain persistent presence globally. Today, U.S. Special
Operations Forces are in 78 countries around the world
supporting U.S. policy objectives.
In the Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe and other
regions, SOF's unique skills, cultural knowledge and ability to
work with partners creates effects far above our relatively
small numbers.
All of these international engagements are done with the
complete support and the approval of their respective
geographic combatant commanders and the chiefs of mission.
In addition to our focus on winning the current fight, I am
committed to strengthen in our support to the geographic
combatant commanders via reinforcing and enabling their theater
Special Operations Commands.
As you know, the Theater Special Operations Commands are
subunified commands of the GCCs [geographic combatant commands]
and provide the regional commanders his Special Operations
capability.
As a force provider for those SOF capabilities, USSOCOM
will ensure theater Special Operations Commands have the human
capital, the capability and the SOF expertise to meet the GCC's
requirements.
Another important aspect of SOF's utility to the GCC's is
our ability to partner with other national SOFs.
Since the establishment of service, Special Operations
Forces in the 1960s and then USSOCOM in 1987, our relationship
with our allied partner forces around the world has
strengthened each nation's SOF and each nation's ability to
deal with their own security problems. We must continue to
build these relationships wherever possible.
To win the current fight and strengthen our support to
geographic combatant commanders, it will be necessary to ensure
our force and their families remain strong.
My predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, established the task
force to examine the fraying around the edges in our SOF
community. We confirm that a decade of war coupled with a
consistently high demand signal for SOF has exerted a physical
and emotional stress on our force and families.
I am committed to taking care of our people with the best
support we can provide. I have put a general officer and my
command Sergeant Major in charge of preservation of the Force
and families.
They are empowered to implement innovative solutions across
the SOCOM enterprise to improve the well-being of our warriors
and their families.
In conclusion, the demands for SOF will not end in the
perceivable future. With your strong advocacy, we will continue
to sustain a world class Special Operations capability thereby
providing the Nation a decisive edge in addressing the
challenges that affects us today and will undoubtedly emerge
tomorrow.
It is an honor to appear before you today as a commander of
the United States Special Operations Command. You can take
pride in what the men and women of Special Operations are
accomplishing around the world each and every day.
Thank you for your continued support and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in
the Appendix on page 78.]
The Chairman. Thank you. General Fraser.
STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Fraser. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking
Member Smith, distinguished Members of this committee, it is my
distinct privilege to be here with you today representing the
United States Transportation Command.
We are a Total Force team of approximately 150,000 men,
women, military and civilians dedicated to deploying,
sustaining and then returning home our Nation's most precious
resource--our men and women in uniform.
United States Transportation Command is a lean, dynamic
organization which plays a critical role in supporting our
Joint Force around the world.
I am indeed honored and privileged to be joined here today
with my good friends, General Jim Mattis and Admiral Bill
McRaven.
During 2011, the United States Transportation Command added
a new Command--the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command led by
Rear Admiral Scott Stearney.
We added it to our component command leadership team which
is comprised of Air Mobility Command led by General Ray Johns;
Military Sealift Command led by Rear Admiral Mark Buzby; and
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command led by Major
General Kevin Leonard.
Over the last month, I have witnessed firsthand the spirit
and the ingenuity of our subordinate commands during my travels
throughout the United States, Central Asia, Afghanistan, the
Pacific, and Antarctica, just to name a few.
This year has been particularly challenging as our team of
Active Duty Guard; Reserve civilian servants, merchant mariners
and commercial partners; maintained an unusually high
operations tempo supporting combat operations, sustainment
efforts, humanitarian relief and crisis action responses, both
at home and abroad.
These efforts from the evacuation of Japan following the
devastating earthquake and tsunami; to supporting the
warfighter in Afghanistan; to our withdrawal from Iraq at the
end of 2011; were all made possible by the amazing United
States Transportation Command professionals who are committed
to ensuring our Joint Force maintains global logistics
dominance.
As we enter a very challenging physical environment,
focusing on capabilities which are needed for the 21st century
as defined in the President's defense strategy, our challenge
is to continue to find fiscally responsible efficiencies to
deliver the required capability for the combatant commanders.
The United States Transportation Command strongly supports
this transition and will remain focused on supporting our
forces around the world. This will not be an easy task. The new
strategic guidance requires a military that is smaller and
leaner, while at the same time, being more agile, flexible, and
ready.
Having an integrated distribution system will be important
to our Nation. And the Unites States Transportation Command
will meet the challenges of this new environment. We will
continue to build our relationships with the interagency and
with other nongovernmental organizations, commercial and
international partners.
Together, we will ensure our Nation's ability to project
national military power and be able to confront other national
challenges anywhere and anytime.
Since taking command last fall, I have been amazed to see
the unique capabilities that are inherent in the Command and I
could not be prouder of the United States Transportation
Command team and our partners.
No one in the world can match our Nation's deployment and
distribution capability, and the foundation of this enterprise
is the enthusiasm, the dedication and efficiency of the United
States Transportation Command team.
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith and all the Members
of this committee, I want to thank you for your continued
superb support of the United States Transportation Command and
all our men and women in uniform.
I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the
committee today. I do ask that my written statement be
submitted for the record. I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in
the Appendix on page 101.]
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Thank you for your statements.
General Mattis, I mentioned the report of the Bipartisan
Policy Center in my opening statement. I would like to get your
thoughts on their recommendations in the context of asking
about your satisfaction with our ability to respond to an
Iranian scenario.
The BPC [Bipartisan Policy Center] emphasized the United
States must be clear that we are willing to prevent a nuclear
Iran which includes making visible and incredible preparations
for U.S. military options including maintaining two carrier-
sized groups and deploying an additional mine countermeasures
squadron to the area; conducting broad exercises for the
regional allies; prepositioning U.S. military supplies; and
augmenting the credibility of the Israeli prep by bolstering
its ability--its capability to strike around Iran's program.
They suggest that if such pressure fails, the U.S. should
consider quarantining refined petroleum imports into Iran and
ultimately to be capable of an effective surgical strike on
Iranian nuclear and military facilities.
What is your assessment of these recommendations?
General Mattis. Chairman, I read the report and I believe
that I have the forces to include some of the specific forces
that they outlined in the report. I also have significantly
more forces than they highlight.
We are conducting with our allies, partners, friends in the
region, numerous exercises, quiet in many cases, but they are
very obvious to our friends across the water.
As far as prepositioning of equipment, I have prepositioned
equipment in place for Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines and I
think we are in a very credible position in terms of offering
the President's options should they need to exercise them.
The Chairman. Are you satisfied with your current
authorities to respond to an Iranian crisis?
General Mattis. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven, your request for fiscal year 2013 is $10.4
billion, which is approximately $100 million less than the
fiscal year 2012 authorized levels. As I said in my own opening
statement, you are truly being asked to do more with less since
the size of your force will continue to grow to 71,000 by
fiscal year 2015.
Where are you assuming the most risk in your budget
request?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, fortunately, the fiscal year 2013
budget took care of Special Operations pretty well, as you
know.
When you take a look at where we took our cuts, where we
recommended our cuts to the Secretary and to the President, was
in our light submersible program, which we have kind of
postponed. But we have additional submersible programs that
frankly will cover down on that capability. And, we have
delayed some of our nonstandard aviation.
So, I am very comfortable with the fiscal year 2013 budget
as it stands now. Sir, I think, again, it has done a good job
of protecting the critical capability that SOF brings to the
military arsenal particularly our people.
As you mentioned, sir, we will grow to 66,000 this year and
if the budget slope stays as per ramp-up to 71,000 by fiscal
year 2015.
The Chairman. Since your Force relies heavily on all of the
other Services, how are the cuts to the Services--the other
Services impacting on your overall growth and operational
readiness?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I would say it is a little too early
to tell. Those cuts have come in place this year but we will
see that service degradation over time. What I will tell you,
though, is that the service chiefs and I talked pretty
routinely.
They understand that Special Operations is not Special
Operations without the support of the Services and I get
fantastic support from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine
Corps.
So, both the personal relationships I have with the Service
Chiefs and the professional relationships between SOCOM and the
Services, I am very confident that we will do fine as the
Services draw down a little bit.
The Chairman. Thank you. We haven't--as we get into the
Subcommittee hearings and markups, we will find out better what
these cuts, what these impacts will be across all the different
programs.
I doubt that we just take the President's budget and
rubberstamp it but we will be going through all of these things
at those levels and that will give us better information as we
move forward.
General Fraser, in response to the budget cuts and the new
defense strategy, the Air Force plans to retire 27 C-5As,
bringing the total strategic lift to 274. The Air Force will
also retire 65 C-130H1s and divest all of the program 38C, 27J
aircraft reducing our tactical lift force structure to 318.
What is the required strategic lift to meet our current
wartime requirements?
General Fraser. Chairman, thank you very much. The planned
reductions are reductions that I support based on analysis that
we have done.
As you know, we completed Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study 2016 but that was based on a different
strategy and a different requirement in different scenarios. We
now have a new strategy.
We have evaluated that strategy and taken a look at the
fore structure that has been proposed with the strategic lift
and are comfortable that it is manageable and we will be able
to support it as far as the combatant commander requirements
go.
I would also note though that this is a more modernized
force. When I look at the strategic airlift, the piece of this,
this is principally about our outsized and oversized cargo. And
the requirement there and what they are reducing to will
actually enable us to have greater capability and capacity.
And, what I am saying is with a modernized C-17 ERF,
Extended Range Force, coupled with 52 C-5Ms which are
modernized C-5Ms, actually give us more capability and capacity
in the sense that we are able to support the scenarios in which
we are given against.
The A models are less mission-capable. They can't carry as
much. They are also only meeting a mission capability rate of
about 55 percent. The Ms are going to be about 75 percent. And
that is what we are looking forward to in the future with
greater capacity and capability.
I give you a real world example. The A models are not able
to do the polar overflight. The M models can, and they can
carry a load of over 100,000 pounds. You cannot do that with
the As.
So there is an efficiency. There is a capability. There is
a capacity there that will enable us to still meet the
requirements.
The 130s you mentioned are also in the same boat, in the
sense that it is going to be a modernized force. It is going to
be an optimized legacy force of Hs, also a greater number of Js
that they have laid the C-130Js that they have laid in.
And so, that will enable us to be able to accomplish the
mission of the inner theater lift. Also, we will still be able
to accomplish the role of dedicated support to the Army.
The requirement there is approximately 48 to 50 aircraft
and can be accomplished with the C-130 aircrafts. So I am very
comfortable with what they have laid in back by the initial
analysis we have done.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis, in Afghanistan, there are, you know, a
couple of troubling reports coming out in terms of dealing with
President Karzai on the issues.
Number one, their insistence on us returning, you know, all
prisoners to them that we have captured, on that issue, and
then, the issue of night raids which I will be curious about
Admiral McRaven's comments on that, as well, and it is always
been a real challenge in Afghanistan, you know, having a
reliable partner in the Afghan Government.
They certainly have their challenges. President Karzai has
said many things that make it more difficult, but you are very
familiar with.
So I am just curious on those two issues, in particular,
but then on the broader issue of how you see our partnership
with Afghanistan, which obviously is so critical to the success
of our effort.
How is that going and what impact you think that should
have on our strategy depending on how those two issues and some
of the other conflicts are resolved? And I will be curious on
both General Mattis and Admiral McRaven's comments on that.
General Mattis. Congressman, the desire of President Karzai
to have sovereignty over his country is one we fully support.
The reason we are there is to stand up his military-to-
military reason and to enable--support them in standing up a
government that can meet the needs of their people and ensure
Afghanistan never becomes again a haven for the kind of attacks
on our country that we sustained back in 9/11.
Certainly, there are very difficult issues that we have got
to sort out between us. His desire for sovereignty mirrors our
desire for Afghan sovereignty--timelines, how you do it, the
devil is in the details, so to speak, that is where we come
into some of the discussions that when they get portrayed
publicly, showed that there are different equities involved
here.
With that said, with Ambassador Crocker and General Allen
there representing us, knowing that we have got some very
practiced and long-term allied leaders there in Minister
Wardak, Minister of Defense; and Minister Bismillah Khan,
Minister of Interior.
At the working level, we are working through these issues.
They are difficult issues. These are two that cut to the very
heart of their self-image. We understand that and we are seeing
an increased Afghanization of the night operations, for
example. And this is exactly consistent with where we want to
go and where President Karzai wants to go.
They are also, I must add, they--the military activities
that are generally least apt to have any civilian casualties,
which is why we are very adamant that we must continue these to
throw the enemy leadership off-balance while doing the least
possible harm to any of the Afghan people.
But overall, after 10 years of war and the stresses that
come from that, I think we are in relatively good shape.
Mr. Smith. Yes, thank you.
Admiral McRaven, your own comment on that issue.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. I will echo General Mattis'
comments on night raids. It is an essential tool for our
Special Operations Forces to be able to have the ability to
conduct night raids.
The enemy invariably will bed down at night which makes
them that much more targetable. As General Mattis mentioned,
also what happens is the rest of the village bed down--beds
down at night, so consequently, the potential for collateral
damage and civilian casualties is much less.
What we have done is we have really Afghanized our night
raid approach, really for over probably about the last 9 to 10
months. We have made a very consorted effort. The Afghans are
in the lead on all our night raids.
They are the ones that do the call outs, asking the people
to come out of the compounds. They are the first ones through
the door. They are the ones that do all of the sensitive side
exploitation.
So this is really the common Afghan heavy lead on the night
raids. But we continue to recommend, from a SOF perspective, to
General Mattis, General Allen and Ambassador Crocker, that we
continue the night raids.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. I have more questions. But,
I had the opportunity to meet with all of you so I want to give
my colleagues a chance. I will yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you for being here.
Admiral McRaven, the new strategy from the Administration
talks about a greater emphasis on Special Operations Forces.
And in the past, you have talked about a global SOF network,
rebalancing our SOF forces around the world.
There are some press reports that there are plans under
consideration to give you some greater flexibility in moving
Special Operations Forces around the world. I think there maybe
some misunderstanding about that.
Can you describe what the plan is under consideration?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. Thank you, Congressman. I am
happy to set the record straight on this.
Every 2 years, the Pentagon goes to the staffing process of
looking at the unified command plan which lays out the
missions, responsibilities of the combatant commanders.
Additionally every year, we look at the forces four which takes
a look at the assigned forces to the combatant commanders.
So USSOCOM is involved in those processes, and right now,
that is kind of internal Pentagon deliberations. We have not
even briefed this to the Chairman or the Secretary yet so I
think it would be a little bit inappropriate to get too far out
ahead of them.
Having said that, one of the things I would like to make
clear is that all of our recommendations ensure that we
coordinate with the geographic combatant commanders that we get
their approval before any forces are moved--SOF forces are
moved from the continental United States or from one geographic
combatant command to the other.
We also make sure that anytime we go into a foreign nation,
the chief of mission, the Ambassador, has to approve the
movement of Special Operations Forces into that nation.
So as we go through these deliberations internal to the
Pentagon, those two pieces--the geographic combatant
commander's equities and the chief of mission's equities--are
always being considered, and we would never recommend, and I
would certainly never recommend that we circumvent either of
those.
Mr. Thornberry. General Mattis, based on your
understanding, does this seem like a good idea to you?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. My recommendation would be to
support Admiral McRaven's initiative. I have no reservations
about it, but again, it is very premature. I have not formally
even submitted that recommendation, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, let me--speaking of press reports,
let me try another one out on you.
There have been press reports that there is consideration,
at least somewhere in the Administration, of taking all the
Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and switching them to
a Title 50 hat. And so, that way, we can pretend that they are
not there in some way.
And, General Mattis, I suspect you have seen the story to
which I refer. Is there any consideration of a plan like that?
General Mattis. None whatsoever, Congressman.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, take it back from a little less
sensational. There are also concerns that, as the numbers of
conventional forces go down in Afghanistan, that our Special
Operations troops will be asked to do more--take up those
missions or maybe even increase.
And so, I have some concern that, as we draw down numbers
perhaps for political reasons, that we are going to stretch our
Special Operations Forces more and more expecting more of them.
What can you tell us about this ratio of SOF forces to
conventional forces and how that interplay is expected to go in
Afghanistan?
General Mattis. I would make a couple of points,
Congressman.
First, Special Operations Forces forte has to do with
working with indigenous forces advising and assisting them. So,
as we stand up using our conventional and Special Forces, the
Afghan security forces, they are the ones who will carry more
of the load. The Afghan forces will.
But we do not want to simply pull the training wheels off.
We don't want to pull off the people who have been called in,
close air support for them, and say, ``You are on your own.''
Special Forces will pick up more of that, certainly. But it
is in percentage because as the number of our general purpose
forces draws down towards 20 under 2014, when we pull them out,
we will still need the advisers there.
And I think that is where the interpretation is coming that
more is going to be demanded of the Special Forces. I don't see
it that way. I see them continuing their traditional role and
the Afghan Forces, more will be demanded from them, and they
are doing more each year now.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral McRaven, can you just briefly
comment--you are all going to do whatever you are asked to do,
but do you not require some level of conventional forces to
help--as a means of support for your folks to do their job?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir, we absolutely do. And, I think
when you look at the current strategy for Afghanistan and
General Mattis and General Allen and I talked frequently about
this, there is an understanding that there will have to be some
conventional force capability, remains to be seen how much
capability, but there will need to be some capability as the
forces remain--as our forces remain in Afghanistan.
We have--I think, SOF brings to the fight, our strengths is
our core capabilities for counterterrorism, for COIN--
counterinsurgency--and for security force assistance.
Having said that, things like route clearance packages,
some of the big ISR requirements, some of the CASEVAC [Casualty
Evacuation] and MEDEVAC [Medical Evacuation], these are
provided by the conventional forces.
So, we will still need to have that capability regardless
of what is left in terms of the SOF Force in Afghanistan.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for your service.
General Mattis, there has been a recent report that
Ambassador Crocker in the classified cable expressed concern
about the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan and their impact on
our ability to continue to be effective in Afghanistan, my
question is, would failure to eliminate the Taliban safe zones
in Pakistan, is that a showstopper for us in our operations and
our efforts in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. No, Congressman. It is not. And if I were
sitting here 2\1/2\ years ago, I would probably be asked with
the enemy, the Taliban, move it against Islamabad only 60 miles
away in Swat Valley.
This is--these havens have just become a penalty, both
countries--that is recognized in both countries. And today, as
you know, the Pakistan Army has thrown the Taliban buck back up
into the mountains.
They continue to fight. They fight--fought this week. They
continue to take casualties in this fight and I--the havens
that are there in some of those areas exist because the
Pakistan Army is stretched.
Now we do have a problematic-at-times relationship with
Pakistan. But that does not prevent us from working it and
there is a lot of common ground that we use--that we operate
off of together against this enemy.
We don't have 100 percent common ground about it, but it is
not a showstopper.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven, in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, it
indicates a shift to the Asia-Pacific or an emphasis to the
Asia-Pacific region. How does this impact our Special Ops
Forces, given the fact that we have been mostly focused for the
last 10 years in the Iraq-Afghanistan theaters?
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, sir.
SOF Forces have had a longstanding partnership with many of
our allies in the Asia-Pacific region starting from Korea, and
the Philippines, in Thailand, in Singapore. And, we expected
those relationships will continue, if not get stronger, as time
goes on.
I would tell you what I think, SOF's benefit to this new
strategy is that we can uncover down with security force
assistance in areas where the conventional forces may not be
fully engaged such as South America, Africa, other regions
where we have applied less capability over the years.
So, SOF can be an enabling force in other regions as the
larger conventional force shifts its emphasis on the Asia-
Pacific region.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
General Fraser, the great majority of equipment that is
moved by TRANSCOM goes by sea using ships that are operated by
the Military Sealift Command, which is a component of TRANSCOM.
For ships operating in maritime security programs, what do
the potential cut backs mean, would that put the companies out
of business? Will that force them to mothball and what kind of
impact would be felt in that area?
General Fraser. Congressman, thank you.
The entire command is certainly dependent upon our
commercial partners. This is both for air, as well as for
sealift.
You specifically addressed sealift. We are doing a lot with
our commercial partners with respect to sea as we have shipped
more goods sustainment via ship. And then also, before the
Pakistan border was closed down, we would take it to Karachi,
and then we would truck it in.
The flexibility that we have with our commercial partners,
though, is that when the border shut down, we were able to
redirect these ships and then use their network to go to other
ports, offload the sustainment supplies, offload unit cargo,
store it and then fly it in.
We call this multimodal--by taking it by sea, taking it to
a port and then, further onward movement, taking it in by air.
As we look to the future and we see the drawdown in Iraq
already, it is having some impact because we are not doing as
much by sea.
And we have recently gone and booked the last ships that
are necessary to bring out the cargo that was brought out of
Iraq. And, we look forward to getting that back. But we will be
doing less in the future as we move to change the size of the
force, also in Afghanistan.
Our commercial partners are aware of that. It is going to
be going down and they need to plan accordingly.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I want to thank
all of you for your service to our country and for being with
us today. I know each of us which we could spend more time
talking with you and picking your brains with the experience
and knowledge that you have.
General Fraser, thank you for taking time. I know how busy
your schedule is but to meet with us and talk about readiness
needs even in addition to this hearing today.
General, we know that you are the Commander of the U.S.
Transportation Command and just looking at the nature of that
command, it is a single manager for global air, land, and sea
transportation for the Department of Defense, and a fancy way
of basically saying, ``You have got to get the assets to our
combatant commanders when they need them.''
Mr. Reyes mentioned the fact that, with the new strategy we
have, at least a renewed focus or additional focus in the Asia-
Pacific area and one of the big concerns there is our new air-
sea battle concept and how that may play out.
One of the things that we have also heard is the Navy has
proposed, as you know, a reduction in their prepositioned
operating stocks, and the same time, the fiscal year 2013
budget is talking about a reduction in strategic lift.
So my first question is, has TRANSCOM done an analysis or
an assessment that you could provide to the committee that
would show that you could meet the needs of the combatant
commanders if you have a simultaneous reduction in those
prepositioned stocks, and in a reduction in the strategic lift?
General Fraser. Thank you, Congressman.
And, specifically of course, have we done that analysis on
the maritime preposition and the answer to that is no.
I know there is a requirement out there. I know that the
Navy and the Marines together are taking a look at this based
on the direction that they have in the fiscal year 2012, in the
AA [Authorization Act] language.
I look forward to that report and the certification from
DOD, and then, we will take a look at it.
Mr. Forbes. And, General, my follow-up question is, you may
not be even able to answer this but, don't we--aren't we
starting to get the cart before the horse from some many of
these things?
Because it looks like to me that before the Navy would
propose this reduction in our prepositioned stocks or before we
would include in the budget that we are going to have a
reduction in the strategic lift that we would have done an
analysis by the major command that is going to have to get
those assets there.
And I don't know if you can even explain, maybe it is
something that is not explainable but wouldn't it that make
sense to do the analysis first and say, ``We can still get the
assets to our combatant commanders before we make these
recommendations and include them in the budget''?
General Fraser. Congressman, we continue to take a holistic
look on how we would provide support to whatever geographic
combatant commanders requirements might be as we look forward
to the future whether it is propositioned stocks, whether it is
actually providing a sealift in order to get supplies there
once we have indications and warning, whether it would be by
sea or it be by air. We have done some initial analysis in
looking at the strategic lift based on very sound analytical
work that was done in MCRS 16 [Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study 2016] and comfortable with the strategic
lift reduction.
Mr. Forbes. And, general, again, please understand I am not
putting this on you, you have to play the cards you are dealt.
I am just asking this question even in that holistic look we
have had, there hasn't really been an analysis in that holistic
look that we can still meet the requirements of our combatant
commanders if we have a simultaneous reduction in our strategic
lift and a reduction in those preposition stocks. Is that
accurate?
General Fraser. Sir, we are going to continue to evaluate
this and take a holistic look. We have a lot of capacity within
our commercial sealift partners too, as well as our craft
partners, the civil reserve air fleet and that capacity that we
have, we continue to adapt to the needs of the combatant
commanders in order to meet that. I will give an example, where
our craft partners stood up and gave us more capacity----
Mr. Forbes. And, General, I don't want to cut you but we
only----
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Have 20 seconds left but wouldn't
it be fair to my question that we haven't done the analysis
though to make sure we can meet those combatant commanders'
needs if we do both the reduction and preposition stock and
strategic airlift?
General Fraser. I have not specifically done that scenario.
I have done the scenarios which I have been asked to look at,
Congressman.
Mr. Forbes. And thank you, General, for your work. And, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
gentlemen. I thank you all for being here this morning and I
commend you for your leadership over your respective commands
in what we all know are very challenging times.
I wanted to turn again to the issue of Afghanistan. I
oppose President Obama's initial request for supplemental
funding for the surge for an additional 30,000 troops because I
had questions about our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan
that I felt went unanswered.
And I still believe we could do everything right in
Afghanistan a challenge in itself but if Pakistan, a very
uncertain ally, did do not do his part, our efforts in
Afghanistan would be seriously undermined.
And while the Defense Department should be congratulated
for establishing a time line and benchmarks for success, I
believe this time line is overwhelmingly dependent on the
capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces.
So, General Mattis while I am pleased that the Afghan
National Security Forces have taken the lead in seven areas
representing more than 25 percent of the population, I remain
concerned, as I am sure we all do by the repeated incidents of
Afghan soldiers turning their guns on coalition forces.
According to a January 17 article in USA Today, since 2005
more than 50 ISAF troops have been killed and 48 wounded by
Afghan troops. This attack on NATO advisers in the Afghans' own
Interior Ministry 2 weeks ago was particularly alarming, since
presumably anyone allowed inside would have the highest
clearance levels.
I would echo the comments of one senior Afghan general who
said these attacks are ``A nightmare that refuses to go away.''
These horrific incidents create mistrust and frustration
between NATO personnel and their Afghan counterparts.
And in a visit last year to Afghanistan I met with one of
our young soldiers and such an incident had just taken place
and he talked about the very chilling effect it had. It
certainly undermines a partnership that is key to furthering
our strategy to eventually transfer responsibility over to the
Afghan security forces.
So, can you tell me what kind of vetting procedures we have
in place today for Afghan security personnel; how do we, for
example, address challenges such as the fact that is common for
Afghans to go only by one name, making the vetting process as
challenging?
And in the aftermath of this recent attack, are any of
these procedures being modified?
General Mattis. Yes, Congresswoman, they are being
modified. The vetting procedures are not precluded by the
single name, for example, we get statements from village elders
who know the young men and ask if they are men of good
character, they don't have psychological problems, the kind of
things that would be known by local leaders, not by a screening
test that would be imperfect in a country where literacy is so
low.
We have unprecedented cooperation from the Afghan
authorities on this issue; you are quite right, they see it too
as a nightmare that they have got to stop. On the point I would
make is the Afghan security forces, ma'am, are not defined by
these occasional tragedies.
We have tens of thousands of Afghan boys fighting alongside
us. We have our Special Forces sleeping alongside them at
night, and our partner conventional forces going on patrol
alongside them. And while these tragedies show that treachery
in war is something that has always existed, it does not define
the organization at all.
More Afghan boys have died as the result of this sort of
thing in a society that has been turned upside down by the
Soviets some decades ago and a Kalashnikov culture found its
way inside that society.
Violence has become too often the norm. That is one of the
things we are trying to turn back. But in Afghanistan right
now, it has not stopped us in our tracks that over our
strategy, of course we are taking prudent measures and of
course we are adopting those measures.
Ms. Tsongas. I have a follow-up question, the same USA
Today article reports that since the later part of 2011,
military commanders in Afghanistan no longer make public the
number of allied troops killed by Afghan soldiers and police.
Obviously, when there is a very visible incident, we are aware
of it.
Can you talk about the rationale for this change in policy
and if we have run out of time, I will take it for the record.
General Mattis. There is no change, ma'am. We notify
Congress, we notify the Department of Defense, we notify the
families on every case where there is a casualty whether it is
an accident or what we call a green on blue what you are asking
about enemy KIA [killed in action].
You know, this killed in action, that article is not
correct. We notify all of our chain of command and the families
when we take casualties.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
your service. And as I begin, General Mattis, I want to thank
you for explaining the relationship that our troops have with
the Afghan security forces.
My former National Guard Unit, the 218th brigade of South
Carolina led by General Bob Livingston, worked very closely in
helping train the army-trained police units. And they really
developed at appreciation of their Afghan brothers, so it is an
aberration as you explained of what has occurred.
I am really grateful, just 2 weeks ago I was on the House
Democracy Partnership delegation with Congressman David Dreier
and we visited Pakistan. And I was very pleased, we had a very
warm meeting with the Prime Minister, the Chief of the--the
Chairman of the Senate, also the Interior Minister.
It was very positive. And then, that is such an important
country for mutual agreements to be working together. So, what
is the status of our resuming relationship with the Pakistani
Army and Military?
General Mattis. Congressman, you know, in a couple of weeks
I will be flying back out there but the bottom line is
following the tragedy that occurred on the cross-border fires
in late November, the parliament troop under consideration a--
an investigation into what had happened and a determination of
what sort of relationship they want with us in the future.
Now, Congressman as you know, this has been a challenging,
it is a crucial relationship but it has been a challenging
relationship and it has been prone to recriminations on both
sides but the bottom line is that this is a critical
relationship, as complicated as it is, and they have just come
out of support of reconciliation in Afghanistan, that is a
first, by the way, the Prime Minister made the public statement
here a little over a week ago.
And I think that we are on track to start recovering some
of the ground lost under some of this incidents that have
occurred.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I appreciate it is for the mutual benefit
of the people of Pakistan, Afghanistan and America, also
security for India having a stable Pakistan is my view.
Another country that has truly impressed me is Bahrain, and
I have visited there and was very happy to find out that our
countries have had a relationship over a hundred years, with
the country of Bahrain establishing hospitals and of course the
Fifth Fleet, Admiral, we are very proud over 50 years.
And so many Americans just do not know that we have had
such a long-term association and partnership and I would like
for either one of you to explain why Bahrain is important for
U.S. security interests.
General Mattis. First Congressman, it is my only main
operating base in the region. That is the only one that I have
for central command in the entire Middle East region. And I
think when we look at the necessity for the international
community to carry its responsibility for security in the Gulf
area, that base becomes absolutely fundamental to our foreign
policy, to the world's economy and to the stability we are
trying to maintain.
And Bahrain has shown, we know they have had some problems
over the last year. They have shown they can learn from their
mistakes and I think they have earned our support.
Mr. Wilson. And I am really grateful, I represent Hilton
Head Island and my first visit to the Persian Gulf States,
including Bahrain, I felt like I was seeing Hilton Head on
steroids. And it has really been frustrating to me, so many
people in America feel like people in Middle East want to
evolve back to the 14th Century and that is not true. So, thank
you for your efforts there and Admiral, the SOF capabilities
are so important to our country.
What is the status of our working with our allies? Are they
keeping up, particularly NATO?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, they are. Back in 2006 with the
support of NATO, we established the NATO SOF coordination
center which several years later became the NATO SOF
headquarters which it is now.
The U.S. is the framework nation for the NATO SOF
headquarters. We have a three-star U.S. General that is the
NATO officer in charge of that SOF element. They do an
absolutely magnificent job.
About 250 some on folks on the staff there, they provide a
lot of the training and the education for somewhere in the
neighborhood of the 22 NATO SOF and NATO alliance countries
that are part of that SOF alliance.
Just to give you an indication when the--in 2006, when we
stood up a NATO SOF coordination center, they were about 300
NATO SOF members in Afghanistan, now there are over 2200 NATO
SOF in Afghanistan.
And while I can't make the direct linkage, I can tell you
that by coming together as a NATO SOF element at the NATO SOF
headquarters, there was a sense of commitment, there was a
sense of understanding at the SOF level and what needed to be
done.
We have a number of courses that we train and that we teach
there at the NATO SOF headquarters that teach to the NATO
standards. So, when these folks do deploy forward, we are very,
very confident at that capability.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you Mr. Chairman and gentlemen thank
you for all that you do for this Nation.
A couple of questions, General Mattis, in your testimony
there was no information about the contingency fund for
Afghanistan, perhaps that is for a later hearing but could you
tell us what is the potential expense for 2013, 2014 and
beyond.
General Mattis. Congressman, I will have to take it for the
record, it is a critical fund for what we are doing there in
terms of our counterinsurgency campaign but I need to get
specifics for you, I don't want to give you general ballpark
figures, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I certainly would appreciate that and
I suspect the numbers are pretty large.
General Mattis. They are, sir, and they are in my testament
for the appropriations committee but I didn't think to put them
in your--I will correct that.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you and I would appreciate that.
Admiral McRaven, you have sufficient ISR assets to carry out
the tasks that you have discussed here and in your written
testimony.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we do. We are very well served by our
ISR assets that we get both from the SOF ISR capability and
from the conventional support. So, for example, in
Afghanistan--but I don't want to talk specific numbers of
orbits here--suffice to say, we are very well resourced with
ISR.
Mr. Garamendi. Some of those ISR assets are being retired.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, none of the ISR assets that I use
currently are being retired.
Mr. Garamendi. I think we have information that some are
going to be retired, some of the platforms that are operating
out of Beale Air Force Base, for example.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, the--I used primarily the MQ9s, the
MQ1s and then we have a large fleet of manned aircraft, small
manned aircraft. Those to the best of my knowledge, the orbits
are not going away.
I will continue to get the orbits that I need whether or
not the individual platforms are being modified such as the
MQ1; that I will have to get back to you on, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Please do. And I would like some specific
information on how those assets are used in the Horn of Africa.
Admiral McRaven. Sure.
Mr. Garamendi. And Congo.
Okay, back to you General Mattis, a recent New York Times
article indicated that there may be some discrepancy in the
reporting of the success or failures in Afghanistan.
Are you familiar with that article?
General Mattis. Not in particular, sir. I have read
articles alleging that sort of thing but I don't--sir, we are
very confident that we given a rigorous analysis when we make
our assessments of how we are doing there. And just the fact we
have been so reluctant over many years to say that we were on
the right track.
And now, we can ensure right down to the district level how
it is going. It shows the detailed rigger that we have put into
this and we don't assess it simply from an episodic role.
We talked to the sergeants and the captains on the ground.
We talked to the Afghans on the ground. We are very confident
that we have got as good as an objective and subjective melded
together assessment can give us.
Mr. Garamendi. So, therefore, we should have confidence in
the information that we receive from the Department of Defense.
General Mattis. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay and my questions end there. Thank you
very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for your service and your commitment.
General Mattis, over the past several years, I have tried
to focus my attention on the Afghan narcotics trade as a major
source of funding for the insurgents.
In 2006, General James Jones, then the Supreme Allied
Commander of Europe, stated, ``The Achilles heel of Afghanistan
is the narcotics problem.'' He went on to state, ``I think the
uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that
it brings in, the money that it generates, is being used to
fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, anything to bring
chaos and disorder.''
In 2012, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
published a study showing that the opium production rapidly
increased in Afghanistan from the period of 2006 to 2010.
And gentlemen I have shown you this chart before, this is a
chart from CRS [Congressional Research Service] that basically
expresses that period. It shows the peak; I am fond of folding
this chart in half because it shows that what we are dealing
with is a spike that exceeds the--what is the historical level
of production of previous periods.
So, we saw from that period a nearly doubling of
production. In a recent correspondence with General Allen, he
told me that, ``The narcotics trade and its linkage to the
insurgency contribute to regional insecurity, corruption,
volatility in the rule of law and the stagnation of economic
development.''
General Petraeus agreed that it was a serious problem,
noting that the trade financed roughly one-third of the
Taliban's funding. In an attempt to confront this issue. I have
discussed this issue with you, General Mattis, President
Karzai, General Petraeus, General Allen and the DEA [Drug
Enforcement Agency], just to name a few.
And in response to my question on this issue last year, you
stated, ``The U.S. Government and other international partners
including the Afghans are reducing poppy cultivation and opium
production in Afghanistan. Our intra-agency counternarcotics
strategy supports a comprehensive set of actions to reduce
opium productions.''
This strategy includes a public information campaign, good
performance initiative, complimentary efforts in law
enforcement and justice capacity within the narcotics police,
Afghanistan's specialized unit such as DEA sponsored national
in addiction and special investigative units and collaborate
work with USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development].
I compliment you on your leadership on these efforts as
they appear to have had success. The United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime, April 2011, winter poppy assessment
demonstrated a decrease in 2011 poppy production.
Further in correspondence with General Petraeus last year,
he told me that his forces, ``Have seen a 48-percent increase
in, excuse me, a 48-percent decrease in opium production in the
first quarter of 2011 and that they saw a 341-percent increase
in drug seizures compared to the same period a year ago.''
So, I can hold up this new chart and which I also fold in
half which shows that the spike downward. And if you fold it in
half and look at that period that we were concerned with, you
can see that we have once again return to a lower level that is
more historic.
And the chart that General Petraeus says has shown the
spike of the seizures of the drugs have had a huge impact.
Okay, now, while I find these trends reassuring, I am concerned
that the premature drawdown of U.S. and ISF forces in
Afghanistan may reverse this trend and allow the insurgence to
regain this lucrative source of funding.
Now, General Mattis are we still pushing these programs to
the degree that you indicated in your response that we received
in August or are we still seeing the same positive results?
Do you anticipate that these positive results will continue
as we draw down our forces? Does the Afghan army have the
capacity to address these counternarcotic efforts?
And if this administration ignores the advice of its combat
commanders, what do you anticipate happening to the
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in the future, can we
continue to see this lower level of poppy production? General.
General Mattis. Congressman, this is an intimate part of
going after this insurgency and I would agree with the one-
third of their funds were coming, we are sure, from the poppy
trade. So, we have got to get our handle on it.
Also, this criminal patronage network that is funded by the
various drug producing, whether it would be the facilities,
where they refine it, the network that gets it out of the
country and the return, the money coming back in that then
poisons all the local people who see the lucrative nature of
this and so they are drawn away from legitimate crops and this
sort of thing.
This is all having a rot effect on Afghanistan. The result
is that we stay unrelenting in our pursuit of this criminal
patronage network whether it is specific to the Taliban or it
is simply a feeder into the Taliban. It is still part of our
targeted enemy.
We have also got a much stronger international effort going
on right now and that grows each year, this is a regional
problem, as well as an Afghanistan problem. So, the answer is
that we will create an Afghan National Army, Afghan national
police that has this capacity if we continue on the track we
are on right now. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Admiral McRaven, as you know this much
speculation about timing and nature of drawdown, in
Afghanistan, including the possibility that we will shift to a
model with substantial special operation forces remaining in
the country would be subordinated to the CIA [Central
Intelligence Agency] and operate under title 50 authority, as
they did for the bin Laden raid is and this has been reported
in the Associated Press on March 3rd, as coming from high-level
Pentagon officials which I assumed to be one or all of you all.
Is my assumption correct and are these reports true?
Admiral McRaven. No, sir. The reports are false. We have no
plans right now to put Special Operations Forces under title 50
in Afghanistan.
Mr. Johnson. So, no plans at the present but assuming that
did become operational at some point in the future, it would
raise complex oversight questions and if such a plan was put
into effect, at what level of specificity would the Department
of Defense be required to report such use of Special Operations
Forces under CIA command to this committee?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, all I can tell you is right now, we
have no plans to do that. Now, the Special Operations Forces
work routinely with the Intelligence Community and we do
occasionally partner or we do partner with the CIA.
And occasionally, we will put SOF operators with the CIA in
very small numbers as required; that oversight goes through the
normal CIA oversight channels. So, whatever SOF personnel are
assigned to the CIA, then the committees will have full
visibility over those personnel and those measurements.
But right now, again, there are no plans, absolutely no
plans right now to put Special Operations Forces under title 50
in Afghanistan either now or for the future that I am aware
off.
Mr. Johnson. Well, there is nothing that would ban such a
plan from being implemented at this time. But let me ask the
question this way Admiral: Is the military required to report
to this committee specific operations conducted by Special
Operations Forces under CIA command?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I can certainly talk about specific
incidences but I would prefer to do that in a more closed
session, if we could.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I am not looking at specific instances.
I am just looking at generally policywise. Is there any
requirement that you know of that would require you to report
specific operations to this committee, to the House Armed
Services Committee, as opposed to the Intelligence Committee?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. Sir, what I can tell you----
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Actually the Defense Department
would not be required to report to the Intelligence Committee
but would it be required to report to the House Armed Services
Committee?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, if it is an intelligence operation
then it is reported to the Intelligence Committee. So, if it is
under CIA as an intelligence operation, then it is reported to
the Intelligence Committee.
If it is under title 10 and it is a special operation
mission, then it is reported to the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Johnson. This and of course, the House Armed Services
Committee does have budgetary authority over the Special
Operations Command but apparently, there is no restriction on
special ops being able to pass off if you will, the operational
authority for special operations and its forces to the
Intelligence Community which is more than just the CIA.
No restrictions on that and thus if that happens then there
is no report that is required----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Committee and thank you and we do
we get----
The Chairman. Mr. Smith and I get briefings at a higher
level of what they do.
Mr. Johnson. There is no way that we can or no requirement
that the committee as a whole in a secret session if that is
what it require--requirement that we----
The Chairman. Mr. Johnson, we can talk to you about that
after.
Mr. Johnson. Okay, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Mattis,
Admiral McRaven and General Fraser, thank you so much for
joining us today. Thank you for your leadership and leading the
best military the world has ever known. We deeply appreciate
that.
Admiral McRaven, I want to begin with you and looking at
where we are in Afghanistan with the pending drawdown on
conventional forces and looking at the redirection or
refocusing strategy where SOCOM's manning, their budget, their
operations roles are going to increase.
It appears highly likely that SOCOM's presence--Special
Operating Forces presence in Afghanistan is going to continue
past 2014. With that being said, we know that enablers have to
be there to support our Special Operations Forces.
We know today with conventional forces there, there is a
pretty robust number of enablers there and a depth of enablers
there. My question is this, going forward as conventional
forces are drawn down, who will be the enablers for our special
operators there in the theater?
Are there going to be enough special operators? Are they
going to have the depth necessary to make sure special
operators have all that they need in those particular
circumstances?
And I am going to lead that into another question and turn
it over to you. General Mattis had stated previously that the
insurgency remains both resilient and capable, so we must
remain vigilant and resolved as our gains are reversible.
The fear is that as conventional forces draw down and our
special operators have more tasks there in theater that they
get spread too thin, and that they don't have that support
group, those enablers there.
The question is are we getting to a point where we are
asking our special operators to do so much in a time where we
know, the Taliban is going to be pretty active in seeking out
where weakness is, not just with the Afghan forces but seek out
where weaknesses may be in our forces as the support forces for
the Afghans.
Can you tell me, are we putting ourselves in peril with the
situation we are putting our special operators in and specially
based on General Mattis' comments?
Admiral McRaven. Sure, Congressman and first, I will
address the enablers issue. Special Operations Forces deploy
with a certain set of enablers, primarily our ISR requirements
and a lot of our helicopter lift and some of our internal
CASEVAC capabilities.
So, we are fairly robust when we deploy. Having said that
as you pointed out, we do rely quite a bit on the Services
there for things like route clearance packages, if we are
moving from point A to point B.
The Services do provide some additional helicopter assault
forces and some additional ISR. So, as the forces begin to draw
down, we will be in constant dialogue with the General Allen,
General Mattis, and our ISAF partners to ensure that the right
level of enablers are there.
And we have been having these discussions for quite some
time, recognizing that the President has already made the
decision to move down to 68,000 on the U.S. side. So, I am
pretty comfortable that we are having good discussions on this
and that all the right folks understand what our requirements
will be as we stay in Afghanistan to 2014.
On the issue of the fact that the insurgency will remain
resilient and capable, it is worth recognizing that as we ramp
up to about 352,000 in terms of the Afghan National Security
Forces, that force will take on the bulk of the fight against
the insurgency.
On the SOF side, as you know, we are training the Afghan
commandos, the Afghan Special Forces. We have Afghan partner
units and then, of course, our local police, the NATO SOF folks
are training a lot of folks as well.
So, as we look at the drawdown occurring, the expectation
and I think a very real expectation, is that our Afghan
partners will step up as we provide them increased capability
and they will be able to take a lead and do the job himself.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. That is going to lead me into the
next question. You talked about the challenges and the role of
our special operators play. I know that there are two critical
missions there, the village stability operations and also
training the Afghan Local Police.
With special operators, they will be making up about 8
percent of the force as there, as this transition occurs and we
are putting more and more emphasis on the Afghans to be able to
take up some of these responsibilities, hoping that they are
able to assume then our conventional forces leaving.
It seems like to me there is more focus and there is much
more pressure on our special operators that if things don't go
as planned with the Afghans, both local police and the ANSF
[Afghan National Security Forces].
Where does that leave your special operators? In other
words, if they are placed in a situation where things starts to
decay a little bit, is the capability there with them only
being 8 percent of the total force structure that are there now
and then they are going to carry a much greater share of the
load, under what probably is going to end up being some pretty
challenging scenarios.
Can you tell me where you feel they will be? Are they going
to be properly supported? Are we going to make sure that we are
not asking too much of them in that situation?
The Chairman. Gentlemen, the time has expired, if you could
submit that to the record please.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to all of you and your very challenging positions that you
hold.
I want to just follow up very quickly on the sustainment
issue because I know that, you know, the American public
certainly understands that the Afghanistan Government is not
able to support their military monetarily now and probably not
into the distant future.
Where do you see those resources coming from, the
international community as a whole has been providing those
with us in the lead, do you see that being sustained and if
not, how are we going to sustain the rest of the military?
And I think just to that, the NATO enablers and the issues
around logistics from on the score of one to five, I guess,
where do you see the logistics capability now and their ability
to maintain their own logistics, but going down the line even
some of the infrastructure that has been put in?
General Mattis. Congresswoman, as the President stated, we
are not going to abandon Afghanistan in 2014, so it begs the
question how we are going to sustain this in the long term, so
Afghanistan does not again become a haven for the kind of
attack we took on 9/11.
I think the international community will have to sustain a
fairly robust aid network going into Afghanistan but at the
same time, Afghanistan is starting to get some economic
vitality showing up from extraction industries and other, an
education system that is going to turn out people directly
employable to do things that are more than just subsistence
farming.
Certainly, agriculture has a great potential to create more
wealth; at one time, as you know, Afghanistan exported food
outside exporters. I think too that logistically, we have put
in place logistics schools for the military, so they can
maintain the military infrastructure and equipment we are
giving them.
All of this is in its nascent stages of course because we
have to start from such a low starting point in the country
where literacy and any kind of governmental organization was
totally lacking.
So, it is going to be difficult. I think the international
community will have to continue but it will taper off too as
inside Afghanistan, some degree of an economic basis actually
gets started, gets rolling there.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. If I could I am just going to switch
to Syria because I want to give you a time to respond to that
as well. Could you comment on the security of the Syrian
chemical weapons, what do we know about that? What can you
share with us?
General Mattis. In open session, ma'am, we think the
chemical weapons are secured right now. We have seen no
indications of use against their own people at this point but
it is something that we are keeping a very, very close eye on.
Mrs. Davis. Could you comment as well on the security
situation in Syria and how it affects Iran; how that landscape
might change if in fact Assad stepped down or was removed from
office.
General Mattis. Well, when Assad goes, ma'am, and he will
go, I don't know if it will be next month or it will be some or
a longer period of time when he goes it will be the most
significant strategic setback for Iran in 20 years.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. That is as much as you would like to
share this time?
General Mattis. Well, the thing is, ma'am, I think the
situation, the tragedy that is unfolding there and Assad's
willingness to use force and a lot of force against this people
would certainly--it is convincing me the situation probably is
going to get worse there before it gets better.
And it is going to take some kind of an international,
regional solution.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you. And finally, just if you could
comment on leveraging the expertise and the capabilities of
others, of all of our men and women who were serving obviously,
there have been tremendous changes in the role of women as they
have been engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And there is a report that suggests that women can serve in
many more positions. I know that the Services are looking at
some physical standards that would affect them.
How--what would you like us to know about that role and how
you see it changing? We are continuing to train women in their
role in Afghanistan and yet we are also looking to exit. But
how do you see that continuing to engage women in a very
different role when they played in the past?
General Mattis. Ma'am, as the combatant commander, I can
just say that the Armed Services, Army, Navy Air Force, Marines
have given to me men and women who are superbly trained.
I think we have got it about right in terms of the
employment of the women. I don't have any demands signal to go
one way or another. I think the Services are giving me what I
need at this time.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. Dr. Heck.
Dr. Heck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your service, as well as for the service of
those that you command.
General Mattis, as you yet stated a little bit early that
you expect that it is going to be the Afghan National Security
Forces that will kind of seal the operational void as we draw
down.
But yet recent data reveals that of the Afghan National
Army units assessed, only 36 percent are effective
independently or with purely advisory support, that only 44
percent of the Afghan National Police battalions assessed were
similarly effective.
So, how confident are you that the Afghan National Security
Forces will be capable to assume that responsibility?
General Mattis. Congressman, I am relatively confident. It
is hard standing up an army in the middle of a fight against an
enemy that even goes after women and children.
Creating an ethical force under those conditions is a
challenge, but what we have found, for example, we wanted to be
at 352,000 by October, to have them at full strength finally.
We are going to be there within 60 days. Afghan boys are
willing to fight. We want them to fight right. We want them to
fight well. And certainly, there are challenges standing up
these units in putting them right into combat.
We learned that in World War II and Korea in our own army.
But at the same time, I am relatively confident that this is on
the right tract.
Dr. Heck. Thank you and then, Admiral McRaven, the fiscal
year 2013 budget request decreases funding for the undersea
mobility programs 62 percent from $68 million to $26 million.
Given the current and aging fleet of SEAL [Sea, Air, and
Land] delivery vehicles and the fact that we have significant
capability gaps in that area, what are some of your concerns
with this funding decrease and how is it going to impact our
ability to contribute to the anti-access, area denial mission
areas?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you. I have taken a hard look
at our undersea mobility program and actually as we went
through the budget drills for fiscal year 2013, I felt we could
assume a little bit of risk in our light submersible program
recognizing that we have recommended a medium submersible
program that we think we will cover down on that gap as you
talked about for the area of denial piece.
So, I think with the current SEAL delivery vehicles we have
and we have some modifications that we are making to those,
along with the recommended budget that will include the medium
submersible program but that gives us the capability we need
within naval special warfare.
Dr. Heck. Thank you, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. [Presiding.] Thank you. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony.
General Mattis, there is starting to be some growing voices
about airstrikes--U.S.-led airstrikes in Syria and you in your
testimony talked about how challenging that country's situation
is for our military.
I mean, looking last year in terms of Odyssey Dawn, I mean,
our military did a magnificent job, sort of coordinating with
NATO. You know, an operation that at least superficially would
seem to be similar.
I just wonder if you could maybe talk a little bit more
about what you see as the challenges because certainly it is on
the talk shows every Sunday lately.
General Mattis. Congressman, each operation is unique, of
course, and we have to be careful about templating an
operational approach to a unique situation.
Our challenge in Syria is that with Assad's willingness to
murder his own people, we are in a situation where we sense we
have to do something to stop this.
I provide options to the President. I can just tell you
that options such as working with the Syrian opposition, we
would have to perhaps get a little more fidelity, so we know
who exactly we are working with and then look at the end state
we are trying to achieve and come up with regional partners,
the best in international partners, the best possible way to go
forward.
I think right now, the effort to bring increasing
diplomatic and economic pressure on the Assad regime are
exactly the right way to go.
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. I am glad that you at least
stated clearly that, you know, the situation is intolerable and
we can't just sort of watch. I mean, we got to do more than
that but--and certainly, you know, hopefully this other tools
are going to effect some change there.
In your testimony regarding Pakistan, again, you sort of
articulated support for some of the assistance that we are
still providing there.
And, you know, I have to share with you that I have been at
VFWs [Veterans of Foreign Wars posts] lately where, you know,
staunch, pro-military veterans come up to me and rather angry
about the, you know, the events that we saw unfold in
Abbottabad and what, I think, most people think was clearly a
situation that the Government there was aware of.
Admiral Mullen's testimony regarding the Haqqani Network's
connections to Pakistani intelligence and the question is posed
to me at these meetings, like why are we providing any support
for this government?
I thought maybe, you know, I got a couple of minutes left
on my time here, you could articulate for people who again, are
not hostile to your mission but really question, you know, what
is the value here.
General Mattis. Congressman, the questions are valid.
The point I would make is in this, it is a very challenging
but a crucial relationship that we maintain with Pakistan. I
have looked at the evidence, and I do not believe anyone in
authority was aware that Osama bin Laden was in Abbottabad.
And I am not reluctant to say what I think. I am rather
well-known for saying what I think.
I don't think that they knew about it. We are going to have
to sustain a workable relationship and, for example, along the
border, there is collaboration going on. Now, it is not
complete and it is not at the level we want.
There are disagreements on some aspects of who is the enemy
and who is not. And over years, some of this has shifted below
both of our feet, but the threat that the enemy projects is a
threat to Pakistan, as much as it is to Afghanistan.
The Pakistan military has taken a lot of casualties. They
probably have lost more people in this war than NATO combined
has lost. So, my point would be that we continue to search for
the common ground.
We fight in many cases in a collaborative way. I could not
have gone in, in 2001 to southern Afghanistan, absent
Pakistan's support. I would not have--I needed their support.
So, it has not been perfect by a long sight and certainly,
we have got to overcome some of the recriminations from both
sides that have characterized the relationship.
I think in the long term, the shared requirements we both
have to address this situation will find us more common ground
that we can work from.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. West.
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, gentlemen,
for being here.
I want to try to get a question to each and every one of
you.
First of all, General Mattis, when you look at your SOCOM
AOR [area of responsibility], what is your assessment of the
resulting unintended consequence of going to no credible, no
viable, no military presence--U.S. military presence in Iraq?
General Mattis. Congressman, in Iraq we now have a State
Department-led effort. I have a Lieutenant General there with
an Office of Security Cooperation, with several hundred U.S.
military but even a larger number of contractors who help on
bringing in the equipment that they have purchased, training
them on that equipment.
We are also working around the region, for the regional
militaries to invite the leadership from the Iraqi military to
countries exercises around the region, so we get them out of
their pariah status.
We have pretty good relations. We have very good relations
because of the years we spent fighting together and we are
going to try to sustain those. So, we don't take those kinds of
costs that could come from the lighter footprint.
Mr. West. Thank you very much.
Admiral McRaven, one of the privileges I had was to command
a battalion in Iraq in 2003; as a matter of fact my XO
[executive officer] is sitting right there but now Colonel Rich
Root, you know, one of the key tasks that we had was to provide
an outer cordon for special operations direct missions that
were going on.
And that is one of my concerns and I think you heard that
here and talk about their relationship between conventional
forces and special operations forces. So, is that going to be a
consideration as we draw down? I understand we are working very
well at the VSO [Village Stability Operations] programs,
working well with the Afghans special operations commando
units.
But I think there is still as a comfort of the Special
Forces, elements having an American conventional force that can
provide some type of security or outer cordon.
So, will we make sure we consider that as we go through the
drawdown leading up to 2014?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we will absolutely consider it and
again, General Allen and General Mattis and I have these
discussions quite frequently about what is the right balance
between the SOF element out there and the conventional forces.
And you are probably happy to know, we actually have two
conventional battalions that are assigned through the SOF
elements out there, helping with the VSO program and they have
been very successful at that.
So, as we move forward in recognizing what that balance is,
as the numbers draw down will be crucial, but I am happy to say
that the dialogue is very strong. And I am very comfortable
that as we move forward in that direction, we are going to get
that right balance.
Mr. West. Good and General Fraser, as we look at this 21st-
century battlefield and the enemy is always going to be in
tough spots and it was very difficult for us to get to.
Are we looking at logistical and transportation networks
that enable us to be a little bit more expeditionary, so that
we don't have to come and depend upon questionable countries
such as Pakistan?
Because I think that, you know, we talked about last time
when you were here General, the littorals and how we can, you
know, deploy and get into these areas without having a big
logistical footprint.
So, is there some move we can look to see in that in
TRANSCOM?
General Fraser. Absolutely, Congressman.
We take a look at that from an en route infrastructure
perspective and where we have access. And I am very pleased
with a recent report that we have completed called the ``En
Route Infrastructure Master Plan'' that we put in; it is a
global look where we are going to have access, where we need to
make investments, and where we need to partner.
And I think as we go forward and continue to exercise and
work with the ground component commanders in their exercise
program, this will both trust and build confidence, also build
partnership capacity. And potentially, maybe the opportunities
to get engaged in other airfields, other seaports, other things
of this nature, but I am confident that we have got a solid
plan, it is a balanced plan too.
Mr. West. Very well, and gentlemen please give all your
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines my best. Thank you very
much and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome all of you
today and especially to Admiral McRaven, I would like to
recognize your previous headquarters of being at Ft. Bragg, the
justified center of the universe as we would refer to it.
General Fraser--some while back, we got word from our Air
National Guards that somebody wanted the C130s and that was
diverted and I just wonder with our airlift change in
capacities, do our Air National Guard folks need to worry about
their C130s again?
Admiral McRaven. Congressman, I don't have any of the
specifics that you are referencing there. I know that the Air
Force is taking a look and has a proposed bed-down plan with
respect to all of their assets.
And I can't pass up this opportunity to thank and
appreciate all the contributions that all the guardsmen and the
reservists provide to us. So, we are a Total Force and we in
TRANSCOM are the recipients of that on a day-to-day basis and
very much value their contributions.
Mr. Kissell. If something happens, where they should be
worried, give us a heads-up on that one, please.
General Mattis, we had a--recently some situations in
Afghanistan resulting from how certain materials at a prison
was handled. And I had some conversations with somebody who
talked about that one of the good things coming out of that, is
the Afghan army took the lead in kind settling that situation
and that there is a commission including some of the people
from the religious part of Afghanistan to investigate and see
what happened. And also towards the long-term effect if any--
kind of where does this situation stand now?
General Mattis. Congressman, it was a very unfortunate,
inadvertent mishandling of the religious materials, but the
performance of the Afghan security forces--disciplined,
restrained--was pretty magnificent under these kind of stresses
when you are actually having to stand against your own people.
It is a tough situation, they were in a word magnificent in
carrying out their duties and standing with us and restoring
calm.
Right now, there are three investigations under way; one is
by the U.S., since there are certain orders that we give in
SOF's that we insist on. We have to look at our own culpability
and were any of our procedures, our commanders' orders
violated.
One is by a joint Afghan NATO senior officer, general
officer commission, and one was by the religious folks there.
In all three of these, two of them have reported out--the joint
one, and the religious one--and the U.S. investigation is still
under way at this time.
Mr. Kissell. And Admiral McRaven, also someone that you
guys were talking about the night raids--it was pointed out to
me recently that one--that President Karzai has problems with
this, the rank-and-file population in Afghanistan welcomes them
because it gets rid of bad guys.
And you were talking about how we are training special
forces for the Afghans, so they can take the lead but I also
have heard that we are--have recently asked for Afghan ladies
to become trained special forces, so they can be involved in
this.
I just wonder if you can expand a little bit on what the
general view from the Afghan population is toward night raids
and toward this specialty of asking ladies to become involved.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you. On the night raids, when I
was there over the past 3 years as one of the commanders of one
of the SOF units there, we routinely brought in governors,
Afghan governors, and we brought in some of the senators and we
brought in some of the parliamentarians to talk to them about
how special operations conducted their missions within
Afghanistan.
And I will tell you across the board, after we had those
discussions with the Afghan senior leaders and they had an
appreciation of how we did things, how small the civilian
casualty rate was, they came away with a much greater
appreciation.
And I would say at that point in time, I myself felt
comfortable that they understood the value of night raids. And
sometimes for political reasons, they will tend to use the
night raids, kind of against us in order to gain some political
leverage within their province, their district, et cetera.
But having said that, my sense in talking to most of
leadership and up and down the chain of command, the Afghan
chain of command, is that there are reasonably supportive of
night raids, particularly when it takes out a high-value
individual that is creating problems in their region with
minimal civilian casualties which is what we try to do every
time.
In terms of the females, sir we have a U.S. female cultural
support teams much along the line of the Army and Marine Corps
female engagement teams. They have been very, very successful.
We are working with the Afghans now to see if we can get
Afghan females to take on that role of being able to talk to
Afghan female to Afghan female. And we hope that that program
will take root and be as successful as some of our other female
engagement programs.
Mr. Kissell. Of course, again, thank you gentlemen and I
yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank
you for being here today.
General Mattis, kind of playing back off what the Chairman
started off in terms of his conversation, with you--that you
have got some reprogramming requests and to the committee
relative to Iran area of operation.
Can you visit with us about what you are trying to
strengthen and that what are the changes there that are driving
these reprogram requests?
General Mattis. As you all understand Congressman, I keep a
very weather eye on this situation with reference to Iran. As
we look at anything that is revealed in terms of their
capabilities, we are looking to see if there is something new
coming out.
And in the couple of cases, they brought up capabilities
either faster than we anticipated and these are relatively
minor, refocusing our effort; in other words, there is no
significant area where I have got to come in and say we have
got a big problem here, there are just areas I want to make
certain we maintain our edge.
And each of those cases are justified in detail and I can
discuss those with you; I would prefer to discuss those in your
office with you, sir.
Mr. Conaway. All right. When was the last time we did a
missile defense test in that area with our Gulf partners. Have
we done one?
General Mattis. Routinely and within the last 30 days, sir.
Mr. Conaway. Alright. I was in Abu Dhabi recently and the
Patriot battalion commander there that was training the Abu
Dhabi's was jealous of their I guess, block three or whatever
you call the system--he said, that is better than what he has
in his normal duty station.
Admiral McRaven, Allen West may have touched on this a
little bit, last October I was in Kunduz at a village stability
operations area and we were working with local Afghan National
Police--local Afghan Local Police, driven or led by a SOF--or
an army A-team and the limitations you see and they had--they
were augmented by non-SOF forces.
Limitations seemed to be that the A-team had to lead each
of these areas. Have you looked at expanding the--in other
words, can we get to all of the villages that need to have this
done, by the time the clock runs out, and are you looking at
ways of moving some of that mission, maybe out of the direct A-
team folks to a broader military--to make sure we get it all
done in time?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, when we started the village stability
program almost 2 years ago now and then, the Afghan Local
Police program which is one of the security components of the
village stability program, we mapped out each individual site
that we were looking to grow to. General Petraeus came in and
actually asked us to expand that, which we did.
So they have done some very, very detailed analyzes looking
at where every ALP [Afghan Local Police]/VSO site ought to be.
And we are moving along a very good azimuth to get to all those
sites in time.
What we do, it takes really about 18 to 24 months from the
time that an ODA [Operational Detachment Alpha], Special Forces
ODA comes in to an area, gets together with the tribal
leadership, gets the shura, gets the approval of the villagers,
get the linkage to the MOI [Ministry of Interior], gets the
Afghan Local Police funded and we are in a position where we
are confident that then we can provide oversight.
So part of the plan is establishing the Afghan Local Police
units and then when they are fully capable of standing on their
own two feet, the Special Forces folks kind of move on to the
next site but provide oversight and overwatch to that
particular ALP site.
So as we grow from our current 11,000 up to approximately
30,000 folks, ALPs, that will be part of the scheme maneuver.
So we will always have a Special Forces officer NCO [non-
commissioned officer] or a special operations operator, a Navy
SEAL or Marine Special Operations officer NCO, providing either
direct support or overwatch with our Afghan commandos and
Afghan special forces folks as well.
Mr. Conaway. Is the--and maybe speak a little bit to the
post period when we are mostly gone. Are there plans in place
to train the Afghans to do that overwatch and also expand that
policy, as well as I guess, ``police the police'' on a going-
forward basis once we are no longer there looking over their
shoulder?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, the Afghan commandos and the Afghan
special forces have been integral to everything we are doing on
the ALP program. So the expectation is if we were to depart in
2014, then the Afghan commandos and the special forces will be
able to take up that role and provide the oversight necessary
for the ALP program.
Mr. Conaway. And you are confident that we have got enough
capacity and time between now and 2014 to get to that 30,000?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, to get to that 30,000, yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. Gentlemen, thank you all for your
service. Appreciate it. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry. And good
afternoon, gentlemen. I want to thank you for your important
and dedicated service to our country. General Fraser, I have a
couple of quick questions for you and it is good to see you
again today.
As you are well aware of the President's initiative to
increase our force presence in the Asia-Pacific region, can you
share with the committee the strategic significance of Guam in
your global en route infrastructure and how critical will it be
for the future stability and the growth of this region?
General Fraser. Thank you very much and good to see you
again too. The global look that we have taken is certainly
something that is going to be important to us as we look
forward to the future because we don't know where the next call
will come, whether it is a humanitarian response or it is
responding to a crisis of some other nature.
As we take a look at the Pacific and what we have out
there, there is a number of things that I feel confident that
we will be able to capitalize on and one is our commercial
partners and the access that they have, be it through seaports
or airfields and things of this nature which will enable us to
support the large region in the Pacific.
Also, as we have discussed the other day, when I take a
look at the importance of Hawaii, but also of Guam, it is going
to be a vital link as we look forward in the Pacific and the
ability to get access and to forward-deploy our forces there.
So Guam is vital to us as a link in the Pacific.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General. How does the budget
support USTRANSCOM for their strategic imperatives such as
increased focus on the Asia-Pacific region and investments in
new technologies or infrastructure?
General Fraser. We are very well supported as we work
through our transportation working capital fund, but also if I
would refer back to our en route infrastructure plan that we
have, we have a process by which we are able to evaluate the en
route infrastructure and then balance that against both CONUS
[Continental United States] and OCONUS [Outside the Continental
United States] requirements.
We feed that into a process, not only through a global
look, but also with our combatant commanders and with the
Services to garner that support and we are very well serviced.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General. And I know I
have time left but I am going to yield back. I did visit with
the general yesterday. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say that I
think organizing this hearing with the Central Command, the
Special Operations Command, and Transportation Command has been
productive. I think the written testimony, unfortunately I
missed the opening remarks, but I read the written testimony
and the dialog here, I think, today has been very informative.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service,
for leadership. Admiral McRaven, let me just start by saying, I
strongly support what you are doing. I think the initiatives
that you are taking are making our country safer, talking
particularly now about (?) and other matters that you have
ongoing. And also want to commend the coordination that you are
doing with the regional combatant commanders to bring this
about and tell you that the field trips that I have taken
recently have really highlighted a burgeoning capability that I
really am optimistic about going forward.
I did note that the interagency capacity and teamwork there
is--it appeared to me largely through personalities and through
informal arrangements. All the more commendable where we are
today but concerning just from a systemic standpoint looking, I
would hope at some point, towards codification or
solidification someway of some of the things that you are doing
that I saw on field trips.
And so, as you know, Admiral, we asked for a study or the
committee asked for a study. I am just curious to know, I want
to get out in front of this. I know it may be part of other
studies that you are doing but curious to know the timeline for
completion of that study to share with the committee and if you
had any remarks you wanted to make on this.
And, Mr. Chairman, of course, I know you are tracking. This
is a study with asking the admiral for his thoughts on
organization within the command. Thanks.
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, Congressman. First, I will
address the interagency issue. As you point out, we have
tremendous relationships with the interagency across the board.
And I think this really began to develop as a result of 9/11
and while we have always had special operations, always had an
enduring relationship with the intelligence community and with
law enforcement community, 9/11 really kind of solidified that
and today we are probably at the peak of that.
I look around just for USSOCOM alone. I have got somewhere
in the neighborhood of 300 interagency folks that are assigned
to U.S. Special Operations Command from all of the agencies.
And that partnership is crucial to us.
So regarding the study, as you point out, we are in the
process of completing that and we will forward that when the
time comes. I am--you know, again, I am very satisfied with
USSOCOM and the current organizational structure writ large.
However, as every new commander comes in, there are small
tweaks on making inside the headquarters.
And as you point out, my long term intent is to be able to
provide as a force provider, the finest forces I can to the
geographic commanders and to the chiefs of mission as required.
And with the support we have gotten in this year's budget, I
think we are well poised to do that.
Mr. Gibson. Very well. Thank you for that and I look
forward to receiving the study.
General Fraser, as you pointed out earlier in some of your
responses that the mobility study that we have is based on
2009. It certainly predates the current change in direction in
our strategy. And having experienced firsthand the
underresourcing of strategic lift for a mission and I am
referring here for the earthquake response for Haiti in January
of 2010, certainly a lot going on then, surging Afghanistan and
get all that. But we are all products of our experience. And so
I come with some trepidation when I see how we are preparing to
move forward with regard to strategic lift.
And so I come at this with a question that says, have we
modeled this and what are the plans in terms of simulations and
exercises to validate the assumptions that were made for
reduction in strategic lift. And in the planning that you have
done, what assumptions were made in terms of leadtime. I mean,
we have had over the last decade and even going back to when I
was a young lad, I mean, 1990, we had leadtime and we were able
to move, equipment and people and there is no guarantee that we
would have that if we really needed it.
And of course we have provisions to civilian aircraft but
that would depend on the situation on how permissive it would
be to use that. So I am certainly interested to hear your
response to these.
General Fraser. Thank you, Congressman. The analytical
rigor that went in to the mobility capabilities study is still
valid and it is something that we have taken and then done some
analysis from in order to support the further reduction of
strategic airlift. And that is how we come to the conclusion
that we do that we can support the Air Force and their position
with the oversized outsized cargo lift capabilities of the C17
and also the C5.
With respect to Haiti, of course there were a lot of
different things that created the challenges that we had with
Haiti. You had a single runway there, and you didn't have a
taxiway so you would max out the ability on the ground right
away. You had a lot of international support. There was a lot
of coordination necessary.
We couldn't get the port open right away, so there were a
lot of other variables associated with it. So it was not just
the strategic lift piece, because we did have capacity and we
also had the ability to fly shorter-legged aircrafts such as
C130s or other things to get capability in there to support
that operation. The analytical rigor needs to be done again to
take a look at what the requirements are as a result of a
change in the strategy.
Mr. Gibson. And are there plans for that in the coming year
to model, simulate, exercise in some way so that we get a finer
level of confidence?
General Fraser. Sir, we are always evaluating and we have
an organization that does that.
Mr. Gibson. Okay, thank you very much and thank you,
gentlemen. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral McRaven, the study to which Mr.
Gibson referred was due March 1st. Do you have any idea when we
might get that?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we will get it to you absolutely as
soon as possible, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank
you for your testimony and your service to our country.
All my questions are actually for General Fraser. Dealing a
lot with the--with craft and our service there with obviously
we had testimony in front of this committee from the Air Force,
other members of the Air Force that stated that were really
flying the blades, quote--``flying the blades off'' the 47
referring to Chinooks.
And even our strategic airlift fleet has dramatically
exceeded its plan program records. Since 2002, C17s exceeded
their program by over 103,000 hours and C5s have exceeded
theirs by 151,000 according to this committee's research.
Can you explain to the committee how Air Mobility Command
can overfly these levels nominally for training purpose when
craft carriers could have been cheaper, reduce the tremendous
recapitalization costs that we will soon face and have enabled
the American carriers to reinvest in more in fuel-efficient
aircraft to support the Department.
General Fraser. Congressman, thank you very much. And first
I would comment that I have not seen those hours that you
specifically referenced there. I know that as a result of the
surge and as a result of other no-notice requirements with
respect to our strategic airlift, they did overfly the plan--
the flying hour program.
I thought it was by about 6 percent and maybe by about 30
percent total overflying that--but that was due to other
requirements. Other requirements such as the surge, such as the
other things that they were asked to do.
Oversized, outsized cargo is not available in the craft. It
is not a requirement. And so therefore, it is not available and
it was necessary from an organic perspective in order to
satisfy their requirements to overfly those programs, so it is
not available in the craft.
We depend on the craft for cargo, as well as packs and we
continue to do that and are very much appreciative of what they
do. Example is how fast they are able to turn to give us expert
capacity. When we were asked to bring the troops home from Iraq
before the holiday period, they provided additional capacity to
us and we were able to accomplish that mission ahead of
schedule.
So I very much appreciate what our craft partners do for
us. As we do look to the future, there are concerns as they see
a downturn in the Government business, if you please, they are
having to take a look at their business models, as they move to
the future and shift more of the business to the commercial
side by relying on the military to provide that income that
they have been dependent upon here in the past. They have
already started to see that with the downturn in Iraq.
Army is moving to 9-month deployments. So there will be
lesser rotations as far as R&R [rest and recuperation] programs
and things of this nature so there would be less business in
that area which is just another example. But we are continuing
to talk with the CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] and they are
planning for the future.
I am encouraged and I do very much appreciate what the
industry has done to modernize their fleet. About 80 percent is
now modern aircraft; more fuel-efficient, can carry more, can
go further and we are deeply appreciative of that because it is
a savings to all of us.
Mr. Runyan. And I just wanted to point that out because I
mean, obviously one of the biggest craft carriers, Global
Aviation, has declared bankruptcy as we speak. And I want to
point out to you also that the Air Force over the last 5 years
has spent $2.2 billion on strategic airlift on foreign noncraft
carriers also.
So it is something where you take care of your own a lot of
times. And I just wanted to make sure that you are aware of
that and any actions you can do to help, you know, maximize the
craft of our United States flagged aircraft would be greatly
appreciated. So thank you.
General Fraser. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Runyan. I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Appreciate it. Admiral McRaven, I have got
one last question for you. I noticed in the bios of the
witnesses today that General Mattis had included the college
from which he graduated. And even General Fraser is willing to
admit that he is a graduate of Texas A&M. But I didn't see that
on your bio. You are not embarrassed by your alma mater, are
you, sir?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I am absolutely not. I am a proud
graduate of University of Texas.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. I just recommend a little staff
follow-up on some of that perhaps.
Admiral McRaven. We will do.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you all seriously for being here, for
your service to the country and for all of those who serve in
your commands for their service. We appreciate it. And with
that, the hearing stand is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 7, 2012
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 7, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget
Requests from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special
Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command
March 7, 2012
The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
testimony from the Commanders of U.S. Central Command, General
James Mattis; U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral William
McRaven; and U.S. Transportation Command, General William
Fraser. Thank you all for being with us today.
Much has changed since we last received testimony from your
respective commands. We have withdrawn all forces from Iraq;
continued to disrupt Al Qaeda and target its senior leadership
around the world; the President has begun the withdrawal of the
surge forces in Afghanistan; tensions with Iran continue to
increase; and a new defense strategy has been released that
demands increased power projection and a more globally
balanced, agile, and persistent Special Operations Force.
Still, even more significant events are on the horizon.
Reports in the press continue to speculate that the
Administration may be prepared to announce an additional
withdrawal of forces and a change to an advisory strategy for
Afghanistan in advance of the NATO summit in Chicago in May. I
see little ``strategy'' in such a plan, if it exists; but
rather a political calculus that will ultimately protract the
war in Afghanistan, increase casualties, and further erode
confidence among our allies and credibility among our
adversaries.
Meanwhile, Iran is showing little willingness to curtail
its nuclear program, in spite of the tightening brace of
economic sanctions imposed at the insistence of Congress.
Although the Supreme Leader may not yet have made the decision
to build a nuclear weapon, time is running out for Iran to
responsibly join the international community. I agree with the
recent recommendations of the Bipartisan Policy Center task
force on Iran, led by former Senator Charles Robb and retired
General Charles Wald, including their warning that the United
States must immediately shift to a ``triple-track strategy:
diplomacy, sanctions, and visible, credible preparations for a
military option of last resort.'' But let me be clear--this
isn't ``casual'' talk of war. A nuclear Iran is a serious
problem that the Commander in Chief should be discussing with
the American people and our allies every day. And it must be
confronted with all elements of national power, not simply an
outstretched hand.
As for Special Operations Command, I alluded to the changes
envisioned by the new defense strategy. SOCOM is truly being
asked to do more, with less. The Command's budget was modestly
reduced, but it is expected to continue its 5% growth rate for
the next 3 years. Furthermore, all signs point to a heavy
demand signal for our Special Operations Forces in U.S. Central
Command where more than 80% of all deployed Special Operations
Forces are right now.
In Afghanistan alone, Special Operations Forces will
continue to be stretched dangerously thin as conventional and
enabling forces draw down. Although only 8% of the total force
in Afghanistan, Special Operations Forces are increasingly
leaned on--at the local level through the Village Stability
Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs (VSO/ALP), and at
the national level with ongoing counterterrorism and direct
action missions in conjunction with our Afghan partners. And
now, with the potential to have a new three-star SOF General or
Flag Officer at ISAF command levels, I am increasingly
concerned that our Special Operations Forces may be forced into
an overburdened role if our conventional forces withdraw too
fast and without a sound transition to the Afghan National
Security Forces.
Finally, we speculated last year what might happen should
Pakistan close supply routes to Afghanistan, and now we know.
TRANSCOM has been doing incredible work to make sure that our
troops in Afghanistan continue to get what they need in spite
of the current downturn in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Looking
forward, TRANSCOM will be challenged to provide the lift and
prepositioned stocks necessary to fulfill the vision laid out
in the new defense strategy. It seems to me that an increasing
emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and an increasingly maritime
theater in the Middle East, will demand more lift, refueling,
and prepositioned assets--not less. Yet the President's budget
request reduces our capacity in each of these areas. This topic
warrants further oversight by this committee and I look forward
to your testimony on these matters and more.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget
Requests from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special
Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command
March 7, 2012
I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General
Mattis, Admiral McRaven, and General Fraser. We appreciate your
time and look forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget
requests for your respective commands.
Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a
strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat
environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those
threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately
places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific
region, while maintaining our focus on the Middle East and
other emerging threats.
With the drawdown in Iraq and the ongoing transition to
Afghan lead for security in Afghanistan, our presence in
Central Command will be changing. While we being the process of
ending involvement in ground combat in Afghanistan over the
next several years, new challenges will emerge and old
challenges continue to intensify. Iran's nuclear program, the
Arab Spring in Egypt, the recent conflict and strife in
Bahrain, the civil war in Syria, ongoing terrorism in Iraq and
other places, and the problems of Yemen, to name a few, all
present significant challenges to the United States and our
allies. I look forward to hearing from General Mattis how his
command is postured to respond to those challenges and how he
sees that posture evolving over the next several years.
It is appropriate that United States Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) has fared well in the President's proposed
budget. We have relied heavily upon them in the years since
September 11th, 2001, and we will continue to do so in the
future. It is critical, therefore, that our special operations
forces are fully resourced. Part of that task is to provide
some respite to a force--and their families--that has operated
at an incredible pace for so long. To that end, their ranks are
scheduled to grow slightly over the next few years and that
will help. Nevertheless, we can expect them to play an even
larger role in Afghanistan as we withdraw our conventional
troops, and we will reorient many of them to complement the
President's new strategy as we shift attention to the Asia-
Pacific region. Moreover, in the effort to face a growing
global counterterrorism challenge, we must not overlook the
critical role they play in countering weapons of mass
destruction.
With the closure of the five major ground routes through
Pakistan for moving equipment into and out of Afghanistan,
United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) will continue
to face major challenges toward ensuring the safe, efficient,
and affordable transport of critical warfighting materiel and
supplies. I will be interested to hear how TRANSCOM is managing
these challenges and what efforts are being made to further
develop the Northern Distribution Network through central Asia.
Of course, all this is occurring at the same time the Air Force
is reducing its airlift fleet, both for strategic and tactical
airlift, so it is important that we understand the implications
of these reductions, both on the ability to respond to
worldwide events and to meet homeland Title 32 mission
requirements. On the strategic side, we know that capacity
exists in the private sector through the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet, or CRAF, and I would be interested to hear how
effectively TRANSCOM is using those assets.
Again, thank you all for your time and I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 7, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Admiral McRaven. I am confident that those objectives, which GEN
Allen has outlined in his campaign strategy for SOF, can be
accomplished even in the face of GPF reductions. There will be inherent
challenges of course, but our collective ability to build capacity in
our Afghan partners, assist them in mitigating regional threats, and
establish the underpinnings of lasting stability at the village level
through Village Stability Operations (VSO), will continue undiminished.
Ultimately, enduring security and stability will rest on the shoulders
of the Afghans and our commanders and operators in the field will do
everything possible to provide them the opportunity and conditions for
this to occur. But we cannot and will not do it alone. Our NATO and
coalition SOF allies, as well as our critical interagency partners will
have an equal hand in it. GEN Allen's and GEN Mattis's staffs are
working hard to ensure SOF and the aggregate effort are sufficiently
supported and enabled. [See page 29.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
General Mattis. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates it needs
$88.5 billion in FY13 OCO funding of which $85.6B is to conduct
military operations for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.
$2.9B is for our activities in Iraq, primarily for the repair and
replacement of damaged equipment and for the operation of the Office of
Security Cooperation-Iraq. Since the DOD budget is a bottom-up budget
prepared each year to support current military operations and strategy,
the Department does not have the information necessary to predict its
FY14 or beyond OCO requirements. The President's budget request does
however propose a binding cap on OCO spending of $450B from 2013
through 2021. Based on the need for flexibility in budgeting for
overseas contingencies, this is a multiyear total cap rather than a
series of year-by-year caps. [See page 23.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 7, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. General Mattis, I've asked this question of other
Combatant Commanders and would appreciate your thoughts as well--I have
been very concerned over time about the capabilities of our bases here
in the United States to withstand a cyberattack directed against
outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. Have
you examined the ability of bases in CENTCOM to operate in the event of
such an attack?
General Mattis. Yes, continuity of operations is a primary concern
for all of our CENTCOM bases and I am confident that our bases will
continue to operate in the event of conventional attack, a natural
disaster or a cyber-attack even against outside supporting
infrastructure. We have assessed the more modern and enduring bases in
the western areas of CENTCOM's area of responsibility may have
interruptions in the commercially leased infrastructure for utilities
that include power and communications. To mitigate this concern, we
resourced sufficient on-site backup generators and military satellite
capability to continue our critical missions. The tactical bases in
Afghanistan are much more self-sufficient with respect to all their
utilities based on the design of the combat-portable systems that
provide the daily operating utilities to those locations. Bagram Air
Base, for example, generates all of its power on-site, has multiple
satellite communications systems in addition to the commercially leased
fiber optic connectivity to that post. We practice our ability to
continue operations even if a cyber-attack interrupts our connectivity.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral McRaven, in the aftermath of 9/11, much of
SOCOM's attention and abilities have been focused on the
counterterrorism mission. With the unsettled politics of many countries
in possession of nuclear materials, are you confident that SOCOM can
still undertake its counterproliferation contingencies?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM maintains an unsurpassed capability to
counter global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Despite a counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency operations (COIN)
focus since mid-2003, Special Operations Forces have continued to
increase their capacity to conduct counter proliferation (CP)
activities. We are working towards balancing our counter terrorism
operational requirements while increasing our capacity to counter the
global proliferation of WMD, all of which contribute towards posturing
SOF to respond to the Nation's most challenging contingencies and
mitigate the risks associated with counter WMD operations.
Moving forward SOCOM must continue to work across DOD and the USG
to ensure SOF develops global access and placement from which to
counter WMD threats, gains visibility of and has access to WMD
intelligence and has the authorities to enable or conduct CP
activities. Finally, USSOCOM must continue to exercise CP capabilities
across the entire WMD pathway. Additional national-level exercises and
war games are required to ensure all parts of the Government and levels
of command are prepared for CP contingencies.
Mr. Langevin. Are there capability shortfalls with regard to your
counterproliferation mission that require investments in R&D?
Admiral McRaven. Executing the SOF counter proliferation (CP)
mission requires USSOCOM to have a strong and active relationship with
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense Advanced Research and
Projects Agency, and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical
and Biological Defense as our Research and Development (R&D) resource
sponsors. This interagency partnership is the primary enabler which
provides SOF the required agility, flexibility, and readiness to
respond to counter proliferation contingencies. With the current
constrained fiscal environment this approach is leveraged to mutually
support the closely related SOF counter terrorism mission.
For all counter proliferation R&D efforts that support the SOF
mission, USSOCOM is dependent on our resource sponsors to support SOF
in advancing CP and to rapidly develop material solutions to address
our Nation's most demanding security challenges. While gaps exist in
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) detection capabilities and in timely,
usable intelligence on upstream development activities, there are
several funded programs that are attempting to close these gaps.
USSOCOM continuously assesses SOF capabilities in the CP mission
area to identify and prioritize requirements. We are continuing to
review global manpower and equipment levels throughout the SOF
enterprise in order to fully leverage emerging technologies to counter
current and future CWMD threats.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. You stated you have a large number of contractors
conducting training in Iraq associated with the Office of Security
Cooperation. Is that the most cost-effective means of providing that
training or could, or perhaps should, civilians be providing that
training?
General Mattis. While uniformed personnel are preferred as the most
cost-effective option, we are limited by authorities, host nation
acceptance of uniformed boots on the ground and the number of available
specialized (high demand/low density) uniform personnel. This leaves
contractors as a suitable alternative. In addition, the Security
Assistance Team contractors in Iraq conduct a range of duties
associated with the ongoing Foreign Military Sales cases in Iraq,
including provision of the equipment, training, maintenance, and
sustainment. Their breadth of engagement in Iraq encompasses air, sea,
and land functions. Additionally, the variety of systems the United
States is providing to Iraq requires a multitude of special trainer
skills not maintained by the military or Department of Defense
civilians, which results in a significant need for contractors who have
these skills. In summary, I think civilians provide the viable option
in light of the competing factors.
Ms. Bordallo. The GAO released a report last week regarding the
excessive reliance on contract support, and associated risks, in using
contractor personnel to train Afghan police. The GAO stated that
``After assuming program responsibility from State in 2009, DOD did not
assess the advantages or disadvantages of using USG or contractor
personnel for the ANP training program and has not assessed the
potential impact of transferring responsibilities to USG personnel for
the ANP training program since awarding the contract to DynCorp in
2010.'' Is there any plan in CENTCOM to conduct such an assessment,
consistent with the requirements of DOD workforce mix guidance and
other Federal policies and statutory requirements?
General Mattis. A drawdown plan is currently under development that
will reduce the number of Afghan National Police (ANP) training sites
and associated personnel, from approximately 32 current sites to
approximately 11 permanent sites. As part of this review, we are also
analyzing how to optimize the workforce mix of personnel to meet all
the various objectives while still delivering training. Taken together
I think we are gaining the advantages of an assessment.
Ms. Bordallo. How does the decision to rely on DynCorp to provide
these services reconcile with Secretary Gates' January 2011 memorandum
which directs the Department to ``assess opportunities for insourcing
contracted capabilities that represent high risk . . . consistent with
budget and force-mix policy''?
General Mattis. Our plan to reduce Afghan National Police training
sites will provide an assessment inclusive of an evaluation of
insourcing high-risk contracted capabilities. As our force posture
draws down, we will continue to apply due diligence in ensuring our
remaining force mix is optimally balanced to address mission
requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. The GAO also stated that ``DOD officials considered
the use of government personnel to perform the mission and found that
the ANP training program did not include any inherently governmental
functions.'' Did CENTCOM consider other factors other than simply
consideration of inherently governmental consistent with its own
policies on workforce mix--such as risk mitigation, critical or
discretionary nature of the work, or cost--as required by 10 USC 2463?
General Mattis. As noted by the GAO, the Department of Defense
assumed the police training mission from Department of State in 2009
and assessed the function should not be considered ``an inherent
governmental function.'' While uniformed personnel are preferred as the
most cost-effective option and DOD units retain the organic capability
to perform some tasks required to adequately develop ANP officers (such
as weapons handling, conduct of patrols, and basic survival skills), we
are limited by the number of uniformed boots on the ground we can have
in Afghanistan and the number of available specialized military
personnel. As a result, and in accordance with 10 USC 2463,
specifically per paragraph b.2, DOD decided to augment police training
teams with contracted police trainers to fill these critical skills.
Ms. Bordallo. DOD officials also told the GAO that there the
Government did ``not have sufficient personnel with the needed skills
in civilian policing available . . . contractor personnel were used to
fill skill and resource gaps.'' What is CENTCOM doing to remedy such
shortfalls and skill gaps within your area of responsibility?
General Mattis. Due to the scope and limited duration of the police
training mission in Afghanistan, DOD chose to utilize specialized
contractors to remedy the shortfalls for qualified trainers.
Contractors serve as a valuable resource in the absence of sufficient
U.S. Government personnel with the needed skills in civilian policing
available to provide all the trainers and mentors needed by the Afghan
National Police (ANP) training program. CENTCOM also draws on DOD
capabilities, when possible, to support training, such as the Personal
Security Vulnerability Assessment Train the Trainer Course taught by
Soldiers from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command, in support
of the Afghan Senior Leader Protection Program. This type of
specialized training provides a great opportunity to leverage the
skills of our military personnel over a short period of time and does
not count against our mandated force limit requirements in theater.
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the current CENTCOM workforce construct reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and
contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
as required by statutes and policies.
General Mattis. The current workforce construct reflects an
appropriately balanced work force for this Headquarters and enables
this command to perform its shaping and missions to achieve theater
security objectives. To enable an improved balance of constrained
military resources, CENTCOM converted 57 military positions to civilian
billets between 2009 and 2011 and also converted 247 contractor full-
time equivalents to civilian positions between 2010 and 2011.
Currently, our civilian requirements consist of 468 civilian billets,
including 388 in the management headquarters and another 80 throughout
our area of operations working hand-in-hand with their military
counterparts. While it is difficult to capture workforce and cost data,
we estimate a savings of approximately forty thousand dollars for each
conversion.
Ms. Bordallo. Did CENTCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian
personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-
effectively performed by civilians?
General Mattis. Yes, following the decision by DOD to freeze
civilian manpower levels at the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 levels, CENTCOM
asked for an exception to convert 98 billets in FY 2011 and 31 billets
in FY 2013. The exception for the 98 billets in FY 2011 was approved.
The request to convert 31 billets in FY 2013 was denied citing the
necessity to remain at the FY 2010 manpower levels and emphasizing that
any insourcing actions must be implemented within the civilian cap.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has CENTCOM used insourcing to reduce
reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
efficiencies?
General Mattis. Since 2008, we have converted 247 contracting
equivalents to civilian billets resulting in a $145.7 million reduction
in contract funds over the future years' defense plan (2010-2014).
Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
currently supporting CENTCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-
averse source of labor?
General Mattis. We endeavor to use the existing military force
structure and capabilities to meet operational requirements within the
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. However, since we are at times limited
by authorities, host nation acceptance of uniformed boots on the ground
and the number of available specialized uniform personnel, contractors
are often the only option. I am never completely comfortable with our
use of contractors and persistently assess our operational requirements
to leverage only the contract servicing we need. I insist on a process
that is as flexible and responsible as possible for CENTCOM operating
forces with the critical skills they need, while balancing this
emphasis against cost and limited resources.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within CENTCOM to ensure
the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
General Mattis. We have not experienced reductions in the civilian
workforce because of the approved military to civilian and contract-to-
civilian conversions. Currently, the workload is balanced across the
major labor sources, but CENTCOM will continue to assess any future
reductions that emerge.
Ms. Bordallo. In the CENTCOM plan for the inventory of contracts
for services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's
appropriations act, signed by your Chief of Staff on October 4, 2011,
and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the
consolidated DOD plan, CENTCOM planned to begin modifying statements of
work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been
executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?
General Mattis. CENTCOM has executed no contract actions with the
new requirement because the Army's Contract Manpower Reporting
Application (CMRA) website application is still under development and
expected to be fielded in the next several months. CMRA will gather the
contractor information in accordance with section 8108(c) guidance.
CENTCOM will insert the appropriate language in existing and new
contracts once the CMRA website becomes functional.
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions CENTCOM has had
approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any
exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification
for such.
General Mattis. The Department approved five (5) exceptions and
disapproved two (2). A detailed list follows:
1. Approved 10 military-to-civilian conversions. In 2007, USCENTCOM
programmed the conversion of 57 military billets to civilian over the
2009-2012 programs as part of the Defense Manpower Review Process.
During implementation, 10 of these 57 positions were delayed due to
budget consideration. The subsequent approval allowed the 10 positions
to convert in 2011 and 2012. This conversion was directed by the
Defense Department in order to return military billets to the Services
for reallocation to units.
2. Approved growth of one civilian and 3 military for Special
Operations Command, Central's Cultural Engagement Group. The 2010
National Defense Authorization Act directed development of a
sustainment plan for the Cultural Engagement Group. This is an enduring
mission that meets compartmentalized SECDEF objectives throughout the
USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The unit requires specialized
operational and tactical level logistic support in order to accomplish
highly classified, SECDEF directed operations.
3. Approved 9 full-time Counter Narcotics equivalents as civilian
billets. The Department approved funding in 2010 for an increase of
eight Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) positions in 2010 and one additional
in 2011. They will also provide continuity of expertise and oversight
for the contractors supporting the newly assigned mission area. The
positions establish a rotational presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan
and provide savings in contractor expenses.
4. Approved Afghanistan/Pakistan Center of Excellence 221 civilian
billets. The SECDEF approved 221 new civilian billets in the
President's 2011 budget for our Afghanistan/Pakistan Center of
Excellence. The Defense Intelligence Agency authorized our Intelligence
Director to begin advance hiring personnel against provisional billets
in June 2010 and withdrew $64.6 million in 2011 in Overseas Contingency
Operations funding.
5. Approved insourcing 98 positions planned for 2011. This
contractor to civilian conversion initiative saved the Department $80M
over the Future Years Defense Plan. Allowing USCENTCOM to continue on
this cost savings track not only provided better continuity and
expertise in critical mission areas across USCENTCOM's mission set but
facilitated the civilian hiring actions then in progress.
6. Disapproved insourcing 31 positions planned for 2013. The
directed SECDEF freeze of civilian manpower at 2010 levels halted our
remaining Future Years Defense Plan programmed contract conversions.
The command identified 31 as critical to achieving manning objectives
within funding constraints. The SECDEF's policy now requires such
requests be validated through the Chairman's Joint Manpower Validation
Process.
7. Disapproved 144 (28 Defense civilians, 30 foreign national
civilians, and 86 military) permanent Office of Security Cooperation,
Iraq (OSC-I) billets. USCENTCOM requested permanent manning to
establish OSC-I to reach full operational capability as validated by
the Joint Manpower Validation Process. The Department denied the
request to fund OSC-I in the base budget and instead funded it through
the Overseas Contingency Operations budget and is using temporary Joint
Individual Augmentation for staffing.
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across CENTCOM, is
the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
General Mattis. Yes, we are tracking efficiency initiative
implementation using the Defense Enterprise Performance Management
System (DEPMS). In addition, Departmental guidance for annual inventory
of inherently governmental and commercial functions, issued 24 October
2011, required us to identify and provide rationale for all major
changes to both civilian and military workload. This includes
identification of any difference resulting from the implementation of
organizational efficiencies and budgetary reductions as a result of
USCENTCOM's efforts to streamline business operations, reduce
redundancies and/or overhead functions, and maximize shared services.
We submitted our data sets to Joint Staff and OSD in February 2012.
Ms. Bordallo. You stated that you while contractors are expensive
there are places and times where having a contract force works well for
us as opposed to putting uniformed military? In this era of constrained
budgets, why would we pay more for contractors and not use military or
even civilians, to do the necessary work of the Department?
Admiral McRaven. While military and civilian personnel can be
utilized to perform a myriad of functions and roles there are,
inherently in any organization, specific skill sets and workload
requirements that are best fulfilled through the use of contract
personnel. Skill sets not available in military/civilian workforce must
be procured. Contractors, when utilized in a specific and targeted
manner, facilitate the holistic mission completion and serve to
maintain a balanced work force. We have discovered that Contract
personnel are a preferred approach to meet periodic and surge
requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the current SOCOM workforce construct reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and
contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
as required by statutes and policies.
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM's workforce is approximately the right
amount, but the mix between military, civilian, and contract support
will continue to flex based on current demand and mission requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. Did SOCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian
personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-
effectively performed by civilians?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM did not seek relief from DOD-mandated
civilian personnel levels. SOCOM has met the mandated contract service
levels and civilian cap. Both of these levels are being closely
monitored during each fiscal year to ensure that SOCOM and its
Components do not exceed these levels. The Command is analyzing the
impact these caps have placed on work load and cost in an effort to
determine and degradation in efficiencies. Currently the impact of
these restrictions is manageable.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has SOCOM used insourcing to reduce
reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
efficiencies?
Admiral McRaven. Insourcing is a statutory requirement/mandate,
rather than solely a policy-driven action. We try to refrain from using
the term ``contractor-to-civilian conversions,'' because we are
insourcing work/services, not necessarily converting contractors. Also,
we do not have contractor requirements, we have requirements determined
to be commercial in nature and choose to meet them with contract
support. In an effort to meet Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)
guidance, USSOCOM has continued to analyze the benefits of contractor-
to-civilian conversions as a continuing process each fiscal year. The
long-term requirements, we expect to be enduring, are placed on a list
of potential contractor-to-civilian conversions. This list is reviewed
and approved by USSOCOM senior leadership to ensure all criteria are
within the established guidelines provided by OSD. This process is
utilized every year as a best practice for future solutions to long-
term or enduring contractor requirements. In some cases the benefits
are not in line with the best use of contract requirements, such as
periodic or surge requirements which can be better met by the use of
continuing contract services. This provides a much more flexible
approach to rapidly changing requirements, which is much more difficult
to satisfy with civilians.
Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
currently supporting SOCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse
source of labor?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, USSOCOM has established a two-phase process
to ensure that all service contract requirements are cost-effective.
First, the Command established a senior level review board to validate
all new and annual service requirements. This senior level review board
determines whether any proposed effort can first be met by internal or
other Government resources. The board also ensures that service
requirements reflect the minimum needs of the Government. Second, the
Command established a Service Acquisition Management Office (SAMO) to
assist in the development of those service requirements that have been
validated. For these requirements, the SAMO determines the most risk
averse acquisition strategy and ensures to the maximum extent practical
that all service requirements are performance-based and contracted on a
firm fixed price basis.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within SOCOM to ensure
the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM has instituted the ``SOCOM Efficiencies
Compliance Effort.'' This initiative tracks the reduction in the
civilian workforce, as dictated by DOD guidance. The work load
associated with the reduction has been eliminated in most cases, but in
some instances, specific tasks have been transferred to other labor
sources until those tasks can be eliminated.
Ms. Bordallo. In the SOCOM plan for the inventory of contracted
services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's
appropriations act, signed by your Senior Acquisition Executive on
September 29, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense
committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, SOCOM planned to begin
modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many
contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since
October 1, 2011?
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM was prepared to include language requiring
the collection of direct labor hour/related cost data from contractors
in both new and existing service contracts when it was determined that
public comment was necessary on this DOD reporting requirement. Once
this process is completed, USSOCOM will immediately begin implementing
this requirement. In the meantime, the Acquisition Executive has
developed a portal based Services Acquisition Management site in order
to ensure increased transparency and accountability of all service
acquisitions. In accordance with USSOCOM's original response to
Congress, the Services Acquisition Management site is currently under
development to include the capability for direct labor hour/related
cost data required under 8108(c) to be collected and reported in the
Inventory of Contracts for Services (ICS) on a yearly basis. Initial
Operating Capability is expected by the end of fiscal year 2012.
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions SOCOM has had approved
to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions
that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.
Admiral McRaven. Exceptions were granted for 133 USSOCOM positions
(no requested exemptions were disapproved):
a. Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center
(SORDAC), 91 positions. One of USSOCOM's Title 10 authorities is to
ensure the interoperability of SOF equipment throughout Department of
Defense (DOD), including the development and acquisition of special
operations-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services. This
activity requires a substantial acquisition workforce to properly
execute. These efforts are in line with the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Growth Strategy to rebalance the acquisition workforce
outlined in Resource Management Decision (RMD) 802. Additionally, they
afford SORDAC the opportunity to transition its internal acquisition
capabilities from contractor based support, establish a more stable mix
of acquisition resources, and provide better management of acquisition
programs. The exemption includes acquisition, contracting, finance,
administration, logistics, and engineering positions.
b. Communications Systems Directorate (J6), 17 positions. J6
provides continuous support for the operations and maintenance of
USSOCOM's Information Technology environment, supporting 74,000+
personnel around the world, through the Special Operations Forces
Information Technology Contract (SITEC). This is managed by the 17-
person Information Technology Management Office. The freeze on Office
of Secretary of Defense (OSD) full-time hiring was determined to
adversely affect the implementation of this office and the $572M SITEC
contract. The SITEC contract consolidated multiple task orders into a
single contract as part of USSOCOM's Program Objective Memorandum 12
efficiencies effort with an approximate savings of $60M a year.
c. Financial Management Directorate, 3 positions. USSOCOM is the
only Combatant Command (COCOM) with Service-like responsibilities which
require management of a Major Force Program and the submission of
financial statements. This exception converts 4 contractors into 3
civilian positions to meet the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF)
direction to achieve efficiencies and have civilians accomplish
inherently governmental work. Conversion to Federal civilians is
required for the continual manning, long-term stability and expertise
in providing accounting support for over $2B executed by USSOCOM.
d. Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC), 22
positions. These positions provide support to, and operate with and
through USSOCOM and the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs).
Additionally, they work closely with the interagency to support efforts
to combat violent extremism. As the only DOD Command organized to
provide transregional and strategic military information support to the
United States Government's efforts in countering violent extremist
organizations, these 22 positions, were determined to be critical.
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across SOCOM, is
the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
Admiral McRaven. In response to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), programs were either eliminated or reduced to meet
financial targets mandated and funds were transferred to higher
priority or operationally oriented activities. Workload and functions
associated with these reductions were not directed to be tracked in the
annual inventory of functions; however, USSOCOM internal processes are
in place to maintain continued compliance with the direction of OSD.
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the current TRANSCOM workforce construct reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and
contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
as required by statutes and policies.
General Fraser. Given the constraints placed on the size of the
military and civilian positions, the TRANSCOM workforce is
appropriately balanced across all major capabilities, functional areas,
and requirements. TRANSCOM is currently reviewing its Inventory of
Contracted Services (ICS) to identify economies of scale or scope,
potential areas of risk, overreliance on contracted services, and
opportunities for efficiencies. The ICS will be used to make decisions
regarding workforce rebalancing to include the potential realignment of
contracted workload to civilian performance.
Ms. Bordallo. Did TRANSCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian
personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-
effectively performed by civilians?
General Fraser. Yes, in Sep 2010 memo to DEPSECDEF, TRANSCOM sought
exceptions to the manpower cap in order to continue with insourcing
initiatives. All TRANSCOM insourcing initiatives included workload that
would be more cost-effectively performed by civilians.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has TRANSCOM used insourcing to reduce
reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
efficiencies?
General Fraser. Although TRANSCOM was not specifically targeted for
insourcing, the Command made the decision to examine its reliance on
contractors and explore the possibility of converting selected contract
workload to civilian performance. Potential candidates were nominated
for insourcing, and we conducted a feasibility assessment, market
research, and cost benefit analysis for each nomination. Based on this
analysis, TRANSCOM insourced 80 FTEs in FY11 and FY12. The insourcing
initiatives involved nine different contracts and included functions
such as training, administration, public affairs, planning, analysis,
and program management support. As a result of its insourcing efforts,
TRANSCOM reduced its reliance on contractors, realigned resources, and
generated efficiencies within the Transportation Working Capital Fund
(TWCF). TRANSCOM saved approximately $3.5M by converting contract FTEs
to in-house performance. Cost savings were determined IAW Directive-
Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-007, ``Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs
of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support.'' This
represents an average savings of 20% over contract labor costs.
TRANSCOM is now reviewing its Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) to
identify potential insourcing opportunities for the future.
Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
currently supporting TRANSCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-
averse source of labor?
General Fraser. I am confident that the contracted services
supporting TRANSCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source
of labor. TRANSCOM, like so many other DOD organizations, often relies
on contracted services in order to be responsive to our customers. In
some cases, it is also less cost-effective and more risky to use a
civilian workforce due to the length of time required to justify,
source, and hire additional civilian positions. TRANSCOM is currently
reviewing its Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) to identify
economies of scale or scope, potential areas of risk, overreliance on
contracted services, and opportunities for efficiencies. The ICS will
be used to make workforce shaping decisions such as the potential
realignment of workload to civilian performance.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within TRANSCOM to ensure
the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
General Fraser. The Manpower and Personnel Directorate documents
all manpower increases/reductions on the TRANSCOM Joint Table of
Distribution (JTD). In addition, a narrative description is kept to
explain the historical manpower changes throughout the Command since
1987. These documents allow us to track the reductions made in the
civilian workforce and to ensure that eliminated workload is not
absorbed by other labor sources. However, in the case of arbitrary
reductions, COCOMs are forced to downsize their workforce without the
elimination of workload. As a result, we are then forced to absorb the
remaining workload within our existing resources.
Ms. Bordallo. In the TRANSCOM plan for the inventory of contracted
services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's
appropriations act, signed by your Director of Acquisition on September
26, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part
of the consolidated DOD plan, TRANSCOM planned to begin compliance in
October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the
new requirements since October 1, 2011?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM is compiling the FY2011 Inventory of
contracted services in accordance with the aforementioned plan. Our
FY11 inventory will be provided in time to meet the June 30, 2012
submission date. Beginning October 1, 2011, our plan called for our
contractor full-time equivalents for airlift services (the new
requirements) to be based on actual cost data submitted by our airlift
carriers. As described in our plan, TRANSCOM will use the methodology
of calculating contractor full-time equivalents for the FY12 inventory
of contracted services based on actual cost data submitted by airlift
carriers. Preliminary analysis depicts from 1 October 2011 through 16
March 2012, TRANSCOM has executed 2,089 centralized airlift contract
actions totaling $2.6B. In addition 1,552,120 decentralized actions
were executed totaling $316.5M.
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions TRANSCOM has had
approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any
exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification
for such.
General Fraser. The TRANSCOM Chief of Staff sent a memo to
DEPSECDEF on 17 Sep 2010 entitled, ``Exception to the FY10 Cap on
Authorized and Funded Manpower Billets.'' In this memo, TRANSCOM
requested exceptions for 190 billets for programmed increases and
identified insourcing goals. Of the 190 exceptions, 155 were approved
and documented in RMD 703. However, TRANSCOM did not receive detailed
information outlining the specific exceptions that were approved/
disapproved. The following is a summary of all exceptions that were
requested by TRANSCOM. Of these exceptions, all were for Air Force
civilian Full Time Employees (FTEs). A total of 155 were approved; 80
for insourcing initiatives and 75 for programmed growth in new mission
areas. Position Type of Resource Series Quantity Security Specialist
Air Force Civilian 0080 1 IO (General Military Analysis) Air Force
Civilian 0132 4 HR Specialist Air Force Civilian 0201 4 Misc Staff
Positions Air Force Civilian 0301 17 Misc Tech/Support Positions Air
Force Civilian 0303 6 Administrative Air Force Civilian 0318 7
Management/Program Analyst Air Force Civilian 0343 8 Logistic
Specialist Air Force Civilian 0346 11 Financial Mgt/Cost Analyst Air
Force Civilian 0501 7 Accountant Air Force Civilian 0510 6 Budget
Analyst Air Force Civilian 0560 13 Civil Engineer Air Force Civilian
0801 1 Computer Engineer Air Force Civilian 0854 11 Attorney Air Force
Civilian 0905 2 Paralegal Air Force Civilian 0950 1 Public Affairs
Specialist Air Force Civilian 1035 1 Visual Info Specialist Air Force
Civilian 1084 2 Acquisition Program Specialist Air Force Civilian 1101
9 Procurement Analyst Air Force Civilian 1102 6 Contract Specialist Air
Force Civilian 1102 15 Operations Research Analyst Air Force Civilian
1515 9 Transportation Specialist Air Force Civilian 2101 15
Transportation Asst Air Force Civilian 2102 1 Computer Tech Air Force
Civilian 2204 2 IT Specialist Air Force Civilian 2210 31 TOTAL
EXCEPTIONS 190
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across TRANSCOM,
is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
General Fraser. Although TRANSCOM has not been targeted in DOD's
recent round of reductions, the Command is proactively examining its
capabilities and functions to identify efficiencies. We have just begun
the process of rewriting the TRANSCOM Strategic Plan in light of the
dynamic global environment and shifting National/Departmental
strategies. During this process, we will be looking at TRANSCOM's
capabilities and functions to determine how the Command will evolve
over the next five years and how to effectively realign and refocus our
resources. As decisions are made to realign workload, the data will be
tracked through the annual inventory of functions. In addition, as
TRANSCOM reviews its Inventory of Contracted Services, we will identify
potential areas of risk and opportunities for efficiencies. The results
of this review will be used to make strategic decisions regarding the
composition and potential rebalancing of the TRANSCOM workforce.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. Over the past 3 years Iran has steadily and
significantly developed and perfected its nuclear programs and weapons
delivery platforms. We know that Iran is now capable of producing its
own domestic fuel rods and that it has been enriching its low-enriched
uranium to a fissile concentration of about 20 percent. Weapons grade
material would merely require further enrichment. We also know that
Iran has been perfecting its launch vehicle technology and may be about
to use a Simorgh-class launch vehicle to place a satellite into orbit.
The Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told this Committee
that the Simorgh design ``could be used for an ICBM-class vehicle.''
Iran's leadership has repeatedly threatened to destroy the nation of
Israel and drive the U.S. from the region. If we had the political will
to do so, are we prepared and able to assist Israel militarily if
Israel finds it necessary to carry out a strike against Iranian
facilities and how will our announced strategy to pivot to the Pacific
as we continue to draw down in the Middle East impact our ability to
defend our allies and interests in the Middle East as Iran continues to
develop its nuclear programs and perfect its launch vehicle capability?
General Mattis. We are ready to provide the President with military
options to protect our allies and United States interests should he
chose to do so. We continuously assess the strategic environment and
adjust our forces and posture, in close coordination with our partners,
to ensure we are prepared to defend our interests and deter potential
aggressors. We will retain the ability to defend our allies and
interests throughout the Middle East as we shift emphasis according to
our broader defense strategy.
Mr. Franks. As you know, hard-line Islamists and Salafists have
come to power in Egypt in the past year, and it is the Administration's
intention to continue to provide foreign aid to Egypt despite the
Islamist and Salafist government's anti-U.S. and anti-Israel sentiments
and interests. What are we doing to ensure that this assistance will
not be used to undermine U.S. interests in the region, how do you see
the U.S. and Egypt relationship evolving over the next few years, and
what challenges do we need to be prepared for as we continue to
withdraw our forces from the Middle East?
General Mattis. The cornerstone of our relationship with Egypt has
been the military-to-military ties developed over many years through
our security assistance and various exercises and engagements with the
Egyptians. The recent Secretary of State action to release security
assistance funds to the Egyptian Armed Forces will help to secure
United States interests in Egypt by sustaining the high level of
military to military interaction we value. At this time, we have no
reason to believe this assistance will be used to undermine our
interests in the region. We are seeing the emergence of a new Egypt. No
one can be certain of the course that Egypt will take, but the
character of the Egyptian people is unlikely to embrace policies as
radical as past Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist statements indicate. In
particular, I believe we can sustain our military ties though continued
engagement, training and exercises like BRIGHT STAR, and foreign
military financing program. The reduction of United States troops in
forward presence in the Middle East will challenge our reaction time to
potential regional events requiring military intervention. Rapid
deployment and sustainment through the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace
is vital to force projection. Our continued security assistance
programs with the Egyptians will help to secure these privileges while
sustaining our military linkage as Egypt transitions through this
uncertain time.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. What are the utilization rates and average cargo loads
(# of pallet positions and load weight) of C-27Js in Afghanistan and
what are the utilization rates of C-130s in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Conaway. What are the utilization rates and average cargo loads
(# of pallet positions and load weight) of C-27Js in Afghanistan and
what are the utilization rates of C-130s in Afghanistan?
General Fraser. The C-27s have flown 108.5 hours/month while
deployed to Afghanistan (Aug 11-Feb 12) while the fleet averages were
32.8 hours/month in FY11 and 46.5 hours/month in FY12. The number of
deployed aircraft has been two aircraft for the entire period.
The C-130 utilization rate in Afghanistan has averaged over 100
hours/month the last 3 fiscal years (FY10-124.3, FY11-105.3, FY12-
108.1) while the whole fleet has stayed below 50 hours (FY10-47.0,
FY11-46.3, FY12-45.1).
The average cargo load information is not available to USTRANSCOM
or AMC. The information for Afghanistan cargo loads should be requested
from CENTCOM.
Mr. Conaway. The MCRS-16 study recommends using C-17s for
intratheater airlift but several senior mobility leaders in the past
have been concerned that we were overusing the 30 year/30,000 hour life
expectancy of that airframe too quickly. Can you tell me what the
average age and number of hours our C-17 fleet currently has on them?
General Fraser. The average age of the fleet is 8.9 years (as of
Mar 2012); per tail average flying hours is 10,105 hours. As operations
change and either increase or decrease the average hours over time will
follow accordingly.
Mr. Conaway. What percentage of TRANSCOM's airlift requirements for
intertheater and intratheater airlift is flown by foreign contract
airlift contractors? How much money do we spend annually on foreign
airlift contracts for both intertheater and intratheater airlift?
General Fraser. In 2011, approximately 7% of the intertheater cargo
airlifted on 618 Air Operations Center, Tanker Airlift Control Center
missions was airlifted on foreign aircraft. USTRANSCOM does not have
data on intratheater airlift under the operational control of other
COCOMs. The amount USTRANSCOM spent for charter contracts with foreign
airlift contractors is as follows:
FY11 Intertheater and Intratheater CRAF Contracts: $372.2M
FY11 Intratheater rotary wing contracts: $213M
FY11 Intratheater Korean Airlines contract: $1.9M
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. General Mattis, if possible to answer at an
unclassified level, how many deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq can be
linked to Iranian-supplied explosives?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. General Mattis, with regard to AQAP and Yemen, you
said ``the new Yemeni government will need assistance in order to
reorganize its military under civilian control and build capacity to
deal with critical national security threats. We are supporting
military professionalization and look to continue our relationship in
the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in
accordance with our national policy. We expect increased Iranian
malfeasance in an attempt to undercut Yemen's efforts to create a
peaceful path to the future.'' In light of recent events in Yemen, how
do you manage the situation there and mitigate the spread of the AQAP
influence across the Peninsula and in to Eastern Africa?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Wittman. ADM McRaven, with the pending drawdown and decrease of
conventional forces in Afghanistan and the strategy to increase SOCOM's
manning, budget, and operations, it is certain that Special Operations
Forces (SOF) will remain in Afghanistan well past 2014. Who will enable
these forces that are left behind in training, advisory, and key direct
action roles? What types of enablers has SOF had to rely on from
conventional capabilities that are currently deployed in Afghanistan?
Have these enablers been as available as needed, and, if not, what must
SOCOM do to ensure it has the capability needed to execute its missions
effectively in the future? General Mattis stated that ``the insurgency
remains both resilient and capable, so we must remain vigilant and
resolved as our gains are reversible.'' The fear here is that if we
spread SOF too thin in Afghanistan, due to the desire to withdraw
conventional forces. How do you see SOF executing their missions
throughout Afghanistan against a resilient and capable insurgency if we
have a decreased conventional footprint? What level of risk are your
commanders on the ground assuming with this plan?
Admiral McRaven. The road ahead in Afghanistan is undoubtedly
complex and daunting with recent events highlighting this fact.
However, SOF, General Purpose Forces (GPF), NATO and Coalition SOF and
our Afghan partnered forces are uniquely postured and capable of
addressing these challenges. International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) has laid out a balanced and comprehensive strategy that
identifies and addresses the resulting impacts of this scheduled force
reduction. In that strategy Counter Terrorism and Village Stability
Operations (VSO) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions remain
dominant SOF lines of effort now and into the future. SOF command teams
and planners across Afghanistan and here at home are working diligently
to mitigate risk at every level. They are working closely with ISAF,
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the interagency community to ensure
sufficient logistical, aviation, Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance, medical and Explosive Ordinance Disposal support
remains consistently available. We are managing this very closely to
preclude our forces from being arrayed too thinly and to ensure we
maximize their results. We must also remember that Afghan security
forces will remain in many of these areas where our GPF are drawing-
down. Additionally, there are approximately 20K Afghans partnered with
U.S. and Coalition SOF. These capable and evolving forces will offset
the impact of scheduled Phase II U.S. force reduction. By 2014 this
partnered force will substantially grow as well as their collective
capability, allowing for further U.S. force off-ramps and risk
mitigation.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
Mr. Schilling. You have mentioned the need for USCENTCOM to be
flexible and able to balance interests and needs. What type of
flexibility is most needed in our forces--manpower, platforms, or
training in different capabilities in our troops?
General Mattis. The end of Operation NEW DAWN and the ongoing
evolution and transition of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan
provide a strategic opportunity to re-evaluate our requirements for
conventional forces and ``boots on the ground.'' We see the USCENTCOM
Area of Operations requiring a sustained joint presence with a
pronounced naval character--supported by embarked troops, agile special
operations forces, strong aviation elements and an expeditionary Army
and Marine Corps with an increasing interdependence, working by, with,
and through our regional partners. These forces and capabilities are
developed and provided by the Services.
Mr. Schilling. You point to Iran being a major factor of
destabilization and violence in the region. How do you view the success
of the recent sanctions on Iran and how do you see them changing their
strategies if at all because of these sanctions?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Schilling. We are in a situation where fiscal constraints must
be brought to every decision. Will our partners and allies be able to
pick up where we can no longer act due to fiscal constraints?
General Mattis. I believe the United States and its Coalition
Partners, as the state of affairs currently exists, will be capable of
overcoming the challenges presented by fiscal constraints. Our allies
have been very supportive of our efforts in the region and have
provided a considerable number of troops, resources, and/or money over
the last decade. However, many of our Coalition Partners are
experiencing the same fiscal constraints the United States is
experiencing, and in some cases, even worse. In the face of
debilitating deficit spending, monetary support from our allies for our
efforts in the region--especially beyond 2014--will likely decrease.
Therefore, I expect some support will be scaled back in the near
future. Nevertheless, our broad alliance is composed of nations with
varying advantages that can be leveraged to overcome fiscal challenges.
For example, the United Arab Emirates have the fiscal resources and
will to provide similar or expanded levels of support for our efforts.
Other allies, like Jordan, have demonstrated a strong political will
despite their monetary constraints by providing highly trained special
operations forces and capabilities funded by wealthier nations like the
United Arab Emirates.
It is critical that our partners and allies contribute to the
responsibility for ensuring the long-term peace and security of
Afghanistan and the region; they can do so in five key areas. First,
our partners and allies can and have provided adequate financial
support to the Afghanistan National Security Forces. Second, they can
continue funding their troop levels necessary to achieve a complete,
conditions-based withdrawal from Afghanistan. Third, they can resource
robust security assistance and cooperation efforts with the Afghanistan
National Security Forces in areas of common interest, to include
training and exercises, equipment, counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, air defense, and border security. Fourth, they
can provide adequate funding for Afghan infrastructure beyond those
projects currently funded by the United States Commander's Emergency
Response Program and the Afghan Infrastructure Fund. Lastly, our
partners and allies can take increased financial responsibility for
facilitating regional economic development and integration, to include
properly resourcing such critical efforts as the New Silk Road
Initiative.
Finally, although we are facing a reduction in available resources,
our efforts will also cost less. General Allen's Campaign Plan not only
recognizes the fiscal realities the Coalition confronts, but also the
anticipated reduction in costs thanks to the transition to Afghan lead
and a smaller coalition footprint. This is already manifested by our
Fiscal Year 2013 Afghan Security Forces Fund submission.
Mr. Schilling. In this new technical age we are seeing that cyber
conflict is a new realm of conflict and you specifically mentioned
Regional Web Interaction Program activities that the U.S. is doing to
address extremist organization recruiting and fund raising. We also
have examples of what cyber attacks can do as we saw with Stuxnet, the
computer worm that greatly damaged Iran's nuclear enrichment
infrastructure. Are there other cyber efforts that we are pursuing and
how will these capabilities affect U.S. posture in the Middle East?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Schilling. You state that currently Special Operations
currently constitutes 8% of the forces in Afghanistan and is the lead
for two major elements of operations. What is your opinion on the
continued success of these operations as we draw down in Afghanistan?
What are the difficulties you face when ensuring this continued
success?
Admiral McRaven. Success is achievable if our strategic aims in
Afghanistan remain centered on precluding the reemergence of
transnational terrorism and fostering governance stability. In pursuit
of these objectives SOF's center of gravity encompasses Afghan
empowerment, consistent pressure on insurgent networks and
organizational adaptability and innovation. We must remain focused on
governance development in key rural areas through Village Stability
Operations (VSO) and nest this effort with a comprehensive
Counterterrorism effect, necessary to create the time and space for
governance and security capacities to evolve at the district level.
Today, we have achieved relative stability in a majority of the 74 VSO
locations where we are employing this strategy. Recently, during both
the Koran burning incident and the tragedy in Southern Afghanistan,
there have been no protests near village stability platforms or those
that have occurred have been resolved by village and district leaders
without incident. This strategy of empowering traditional governance
structures, connecting it to formal governance at the district level,
and supporting it by limiting the effects of insurgent networks, is
positively influencing four million Afghans (13% of the population),
which has definitely improved their perception of the Government of
Afghanistan. Challenges affecting success will be defined in terms of
interagency support toward governance development, national policy
direction and any evolving security priorities.
Mr. Schilling. You said that you have been addressing issues of
fiscal constraint by working with our allies and partners. With our
drawdown and with the cuts to our budget, can our allies and partners
take on enough of the work to still make our missions viable, capable,
and successful?
Admiral McRaven. Our coalition partners have been instrumental to
our efforts in Afghanistan. Our coalition partners are contributing
nearly 8,000 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, making up over
half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan at ISAF. Coalition
forces have made significant contributions in the war against terrorism
across the spectrum of operations. Specific contributions include, but
are not limited to: providing vital intelligence, personnel, equipment
and assets for use on the ground, air and sea. Coalition members also
have provided liaison teams, participated in planning, provided bases
and granted over-flight permissions, as well as sizable contributions
of humanitarian assistance. Yes, our allies and partners have been and
will continue to be key factors in making our missions viable, capable
and successful.
Mr. Schilling. You specifically mentioned that the transportation
infrastructure in the U.S. is a concern for TRANSCOM. Can you speak to
the savings the DOD would see if the U.S. took a long-term approach to
a transportation bill that allows for improvements to our
infrastructure?
General Fraser. As the DOD does not invest in civilian highway
infrastructure, we would not see any costs or savings in this area. The
DOD works in partnership with the United States Department of
Transportation to identify DOD's requirements for the civil sector
transportation infrastructure and integrates these requirements into
the civil sector planning cycle. DOD relies on the civil sector's
highways, railroads, and ports to efficiently deploy our military
forces for our National Defense Programs. This partnership ensures our
transportation infrastructure is capable of deploying our military
forces. Operationally, the DOD does not associate any increased costs
based upon condition or operation of the highway infrastructure.
Mr. Schilling. How will your networks and distribution chains be
altered to address the new force structure? Will you be requiring
further MILCON expenditures to make this shift? How will the Pacific/
Asia focus affect your usage of Guam and other overseas transportation
routes?
General Fraser. We continuously analyze our network to maintain a
measure of agility and align with the current force structure used to
sustain distribution operations anywhere on the globe. We will continue
our partnership with Pacific/Asian nations to ensure our network
remains effective and efficient to support global mobility needs. In
terms of MILCON expenditures, USTRANSCOM continuously collaborates with
global stakeholders to ensure that vital en route locations are
developed and maintained to support global mobility operations. This
collaboration has been ongoing in advance of the shift in focus;
therefore we do not see a major increase in MILCON beyond what already
exists in our En Route Infrastructure Master Plan. USTRANSCOM has
always viewed Guam infrastructure as vital to the successful execution
of distribution operations in South East Asia, North East Asia, and
Oceania, and will continue to advocate for infrastructure improvements.
For example, USTRANSCOM continues to partner with USPACOM and Defense
Logistics Agency--Energy (DLA-E) to advocate for numerous
infrastructure improvements. Anderson AFB and Apra Harbor combine to
provide Guam with a highly capable multimodal option that can be used
to efficiently and effectively satisfy warfighter needs and
requirements. Guam will continue to be a much needed and important
Pacific/Asia en route location; vital to USTRANSCOMs and USPACOMs
global mission.
Mr. Schilling. You state that routing mobility airlift over the
polar ice caps will mitigate a number of issues for routes to CENTCOM.
Have the other Arctic nations, including Russia, been helpful in this
or have there been roadblocks to this work?
General Fraser. Our Arctic overflights to and from Manas and Bagram
Air Bases are routed through Russian and Kazakhstani airspace. Both
countries have been very helpful in providing overflight permissions,
especially when we are moving passengers and changing out KC-135
aircraft for routine maintenance. We have had no unnecessary
roadblocks, and do not anticipate any at this time.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN
Mr. Runyan. As had been noted in the FY13 Posture Hearing before
the Committee, U.S. Air Force officials have elsewhere stated that we
are literally ``flying the blades off the 47,'' referring to Chinooks.
Even our strategic airlift fleet has dramatically exceeded its planned
program of record. Since 2002, C-17s have exceeded their program by
103,581 hours, and C-5s have exceeded theirs by 151,570 hours,
according to Committee research. a. Can you then explain to the
Committee how Air Mobility Command can overfly these levels, nominally
for training purposes, when CRAF carriers would have been cheaper,
reduced the tremendous recapitalization costs we will soon face, and
would have enabled these American carriers to re-invest in more fuel-
efficient aircraft to support the Department?
General Fraser. Since 2002, the C-5 overfly was 30% over the
programmed hours and the C-17 overfly was 6% over programmed hours.
Both overfly conditions were the result of wartime and contingency
operations. In 2002-2005, C-5 and C-17 units were activated to support
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and constitute the overfly for that
period. In 2010-2011 the overfly was driven by the surge requirements
in Afghanistan, coupled with Haiti operations, OPERATION TOMODACHI
tsunami response, movement of large mine resistant vehicles, and Libya
operations. The use of CRAF carriers would not have reduced the C-5 and
C-17 overfly. The need to operate in potentially hostile areas often
precluded the use of commercial aircraft in many missions.
Additionally, the inability of CRAF aircraft to carry the larger pieces
of oversize and outsize equipment frequently dictated the use of
military aircraft.
Mr. Runyan. As had been noted in several news sources last month,
one of our Nation's largest CRAF carriers, Global Aviation Holdings,
has unfortunately declared bankruptcy. Among the reasons cited by the
company includes a decrease in sales due to our withdrawal from Iraq.
Though the Department is not expected to bail-out one defense
contractor, this announcement seems to contradict Committee research
which indicates that the Air Force spent $2.2 billion on strategic
airlift on foreign, non-CRAF carriers in just the last five years. Can
you reassure the Committee that the Air Force has maintained its
commitments to America's CRAF carriers when billions of taxpayer
dollars are being diverted to foreign air carriers?
General Fraser. In the last 5 years, more than 98% of the $2.2B was
contracted through CRAF carriers who then subcontracted to foreign
companies. Normal practice and policy require that contracts for the
use of foreign carriers be made through CRAF carriers. Policy limits
the use of foreign carriers to situations in which CRAF carriers are
either unavailable or unable to perform the missions. For example, U.S.
carriers may be restricted from operating at locations due to political
constraints or FAA flight prohibitions.
Mr. Runyan. As part of the Air Force's Mobility Capability &
Requirements Study 2016, the DOD will now use the least intensive
contingency scenario as the baseline for our strategic airlifter fleet.
However, this will not change the requirements of our Services to
accomplish their mission, and so this report actually compensates for
the reduced size of the U.S. military strategic airlift fleet by
increasing Department use of commercial carriers by 5 million-ton-miles
per day. What steps need to be taken to ensure that American commercial
CRAF carriers are ready for this significant increase in strategic lift
requirements? The Department has approved a significant number of non-
CRAF freight forwarders as DOD air carriers for operations in support
of Department cargo movements. Some of these non-CRAF air carriers are
also foreign companies so how can we expect American commercial
carriers to have the capital to sustain and modernize their fleets when
DOD air cargo is being moved outside CRAF carriers?
General Fraser. Mobility Capability and Requirements Study 2016
(MCRS-16) increased the required bulk cargo capability for the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to 25.5 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) from
the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05) requirement of 20.5 MTM/
D. The current CRAF bulk cargo capability is 29.34 MTM/D, which exceeds
the requirements of all MCRS-16 cases. It is DOD policy to preserve
commercial business for CRAF carriers, whenever possible. In the last 5
years, more than 98% of $2.2B of contracted lift was through CRAF
carriers who then subcontracted to foreign companies. Normal practice
and policy require that contracts for the use of foreign carriers be
made through CRAF carriers. Policy limits the use of foreign carriers
to situations in which CRAF carriers are either unavailable or unable
to perform the missions. For example, U.S. carriers may be restricted
from operating at locations due to political constraints or FAA flight
prohibitions.
Mr. Runyan. Defense contractors who provide logistics support to
U.S. forces are required by Congress to use the DOD's Defense
Transportation System for ocean transportation through VISA carriers.
DOD policies also mandate air transportation with CRAF carriers but
many major DOD and DLA contracts do not require CRAF air movements. Two
of the main contract vehicles which require large air movements are
DLA's Prime Vendor contracts and the Army's LOGCAP. With that said, and
as the Distribution Process owner, can you confirm your actions to
maximize CRAF use rather than allow Government contractors to decide if
they use CRAF or foreign flag carriers? To what extent are foreign
carriers being used in these contracts even when US-based CRAF carriers
are available?
General Fraser. CRAF participation is a mandatory prerequisite for
award of all USTRANSCOM airlift contracts utilizing CRAF-eligible
aircraft. Additionally, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
states that: ``For contracts that will include a significant
requirement for transportation of items outside CONUS, include an
evaluation factor or subfactor that favors suppliers, third-party
logistics providers, and integrated logistics managers that commit to
using carriers that participate in one of the readiness programs (e.g.,
Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement).''
To emphasize the importance of this regulatory requirement, on 28 Jul
11, OSD AT&L issued a memorandum to DOD emphasizing the importance of
promoting the use of CRAF and VISA carriers within DOD supply contracts
where the vendor arranges significant transportation outside the United
States. Regarding the DLA Prime Vendor contracts and the Army's LOGCAP
program, USTRANSCOM does not have visibility into DLA and Army
contracts/programs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. How would you assess the performance of the E-8C JSTARS
within CENTCOM in 2011?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. What were the accomplishments of the U.S. Coast Guard in
CENTCOM in 2011?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting
any countries within CENTCOM? If so, which countries?
General Mattis. Military travel for all ranks to Iran and Syria is
currently banned due to perceived threats and the lack of diplomatic or
consular relations with the United States. Military travel to the other
countries within our area of responsibility is also restricted to
mission-essential visits only, including flag and general officers.
CENTCOM closely follows the Department of Defense (DOD) Foreign
Clearance Guide (FCG) which directs policy and restrictions for
military personnel traveling outside the United States in addition to
observing Department of State travel warnings.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of military bands within CENTCOM and
are they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering
greater understanding?
General Mattis. This question is better answered by the Services
because there are no bands organic to CENTCOM.
Mr. Scott. What is the relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard
and U.S. Special Operations Command?
Admiral McRaven. The Coast Guard and U.S. SOCOM enjoy a close and
special relationship. Through its post-9/11 authorities, SOCOM has a
Special Operations Support Team Chief positioned at Coast Guard
Headquarters. Similarly, there is a Coast Guard Captain stationed at
SOCOM HQ in Tampa. Both headquarters enjoy the benefits of global
synchronization, interaction of their specialized maritime forces, and
exchange mutually beneficial tactics, techniques, and procedures, such
as tactical flotation and boarding contacts of interest. The Coast
Guard is the only service to send active duty candidates to the Navy's
SEAL training program, graduating four officers who serve with Naval
Special Warfare Commands.
Mr. Scott. How much a year is spent berthing Military Sealift
Command Ships at private docks instead of U.S. Navy piers?
General Fraser. In FY11, Military Sealift Command spent $5,358,630
on berthing costs for 11 ships at 5 different commercial layberth
locations. The $5.3M is for the fixed price of the berth itself and
does not include reimbursable expenses for things such as shore power,
security, water, additional soundings etc.
Mr. Scott. What is the relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard
and U.S. Transportation Command?
General Fraser. We collaborate with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) on
a number of significant issues, including piracy, the Arctic, port
opening and inspections for our reserve fleet. From an operational
standpoint, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) works closely with
the USCG on antipiracy/counterpiracy capabilities and best practices.
Additionally, we worked together to craft the Department of Defense/
Department of Homeland Security Arctic White Paper, which was recently
approved by both General Jacoby, Commander, United States Northern
Command and Admiral Papp, Commandant, USCG. USTRANSCOM and the USCG
have both advocated for additional icebreaker capability to ensure
security and peaceful exploitation of economic opportunities in the
Arctic domain. The USCG also partners with USTRANSCOM and the
Geographic Combatant Commands in providing Port Security Units for port
opening in theater and in providing domestic port security during out-
load operations at our U.S. strategic ports. Finally, the USCG inspects
vessels during the activation of our reserve fleet. During contingency
operations, USCG manning at USTRANSCOM can be augmented with additional
USCG Reserve personnel assigned to our Joint Transportation Reserve
Unit. In addition, USTRANSCOM and our transportation component
commands, Military Sealift Command and Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command, have agreements with the USCG to provide mutual
support in areas of common interest.
Mr. Scott. How much was spent in FY 11 on leasing foreign transport
aircraft?
General Fraser. We do not lease foreign transport aircraft. We
contract for charters of foreign transport aircraft through our
contracts with our U.S. Flag CRAF carriers when the material to be
shipped will not fit on a US-flag carrier's aircraft or transportation
is required into an airport where US-flag carriers are restricted from
flying. For FY 11 we spent $372.2M for charter of foreign transport
aircraft through the CRAF program. An additional $1.9M was spent
directly with Korean Air Lines due to transit agreement requirements
from the Uzbekistani Government.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. I am glad to read that the Administration is fully
funding the Maritime Security Program. As your staff will report, MSP
is a highly respected, cost-efficient way for the American Government
to obtain assured sealift assets during these troubled times. My
concern is the level of foreign involvement in the Maritime Security
Program. I am concerned that over time the program has come to be
dominated by foreign companies. I am informed that 49 of the 60 MSP
contracts are controlled by foreign companies, that is about 80% of the
program. When the program started the percentage was reversed--only 20%
were foreign companies. My question is simple and a simple request--
What is TRANSCOM doing to ensure that firms owned and operated U.S.
citizens have greater access to this program? The fact is that one day
the military may have a mission and a cargo for a certain port or
region and the foreign firms may refuse and we will have not grown and
sustained a sufficient U.S. maritime capacity to accomplish that
assignment. Having said that, I was told that the MARAD Administrator
David Matsuda, in his hearing with the House's Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, stated that he considers MSP one of his most
important programs. This leads me to my request--General Fraser can you
please send me a report on initiatives TRANSCOM will consider to
improve U.S. citizen participation in MSP.
General Fraser. Currently, all 60 MSP vessels are owned or operated
by U.S. citizens. Any vessels whose ownership is affiliated with a
foreign parent company have provided statutorily required assurances in
writing the parent company will not interfere with the operation of the
vessel and there are no legal impediments by law or treaty which would
have a negative impact on the interests of the United States in such
vessel. U.S citizenship participation is an important aspect of the MSP
due to the impact on the U.S. mariner community. While MARAD maintains
authority to manage the MSP, I support their efforts in maintaining
U.S. citizenship participation in MSP either through ownership or
operation of participating vessels. I will be happy to coordinate with
MARAD in developing initiatives which facilitate participation in MSP.
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