[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-109]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 6, 2012
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana BILL OWENS, New York
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM RYAN, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHRIS GIBSON, New York HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JOE HECK, Nevada COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Timothy McClees, Professional Staff Member
Catherine Sendak, Research Assistant
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 6, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Budget Requests from U.S. Southern Command and
U.S. Northern Command.......................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 6, 2012........................................... 27
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Fraser, Gen Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command... 3
Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command........... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Fraser, Gen Douglas M........................................ 34
Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr................................... 69
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 31
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 100
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 103
Mr. Franks................................................... 103
Mr. Hunter................................................... 104
Mr. Schilling................................................ 104
Mr. Scott.................................................... 106
Mr. Turner................................................... 99
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 6, 2012.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning. The committee meets today to receive
testimony on the status and posture of both our Southern
Command and Northern Command. I am pleased to welcome General
Douglas Fraser, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, and
General Charles Jacoby, Commander of U.S. Northern Command and
North American Aerospace Defense Command.
General Fraser, I understand this will be your last
appearance before the committee in this capacity. I see your
wife is smiling very, very cheerful there; great support that
she has provided for you all these many years. After 37 years
in the Air Force, we thank you for your service to your country
and wish you all the best in your retirement.
Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished
service in your uniforms, for the service to your Nation, and
for joining us here today.
Looking at SOUTHCOM [Southern Command], General Fraser, in
my mind, the illicit trafficking threat is one of the greatest
challenges we face in your geographic area of responsibility.
In your statement, you highlight the threat of transnational
criminal organizations and their role in SOUTHCOM's area of
responsibility.
Growing crime and violence in Central America, as well as
the continuing growth of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian
influence in the region bring with them opportunities and
challenges. China, Russia and Iran have been very active in
Latin America through arms sales, personnel exchanges,
investments, and trade deals.
In addition, the activities of Hezbollah in the region are
very troubling. It is also, I should add, one that requires
close collaboration and coordination with your colleague at the
table from NORTHCOM [Northern Command], as well as your
interagency partners. The committee would benefit from your
assessment of trends in the activities and influence of these
actors in the Western Hemisphere.
Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is a threat
directly impacting the U.S. homeland on a daily basis, and we
need to treat it as a national security imperative. I laud the
heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and public
officials who, make no mistake, are risking their lives and the
lives of their families in a war against these brutal criminal
enterprises. We need to support these heroes in their fight,
while fully respecting the sovereignty of Mexico.
I look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress
being made by Mexican authorities in the NORTHCOM; and what
NORTHCOM is doing to support them and build their capacity and
capabilities.
Additionally, the committee is concerned about the
sufficiency of the fiscal year 2013 budget for the ground-based
midcourse defense system which NORTHCOM relies on to protect
the U.S. from long-range ballistic missiles.
Homeland defense is supposed to be the first priority for
missile defense, but this budget request does not reflect that
prioritization. We must be careful not to compromise homeland
missile defense for the sake of theater missile defense or
budget shortfalls.
In this continually changing budget environment and with
the new defense strategy laid out by the President earlier this
year, evaluation of each combatant command and their
interpretation of missions and goals within the Department
becomes vital. With the looming threat of sequestration, we
must also understand the consequences of such severe cuts on
the effectiveness of your commands.
Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before us here
today.
Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join your
remarks in thanking both General Fraser and General Jacoby for
their leadership and service to our country.
And General Fraser, since this will be your last time
before our committee in all likelihood, thank you in particular
for your service and I hope you and your wife enjoy your
retirement. You served your country very well.
And General Jacoby, it is good to see you again. Your
leadership out at 1st Corps in Fort Lewis was very much
appreciated; an outstanding job out there in the 9th District
of the State of Washington. So it is good to see you in this
new position as well. Thank you for all of your service to our
country.
Securing our hemisphere is absolutely critical to our
national security. Obviously, there have been many challenges
and threats in other parts of the world, but we all must, you
know, stay focused on the fact that securing what is closest to
home will continue to be a very, very important part of that
job. And in NORTHCOM in particular, protecting the homeland is
job one, but there are many challenges and threats to that.
I agree with the chairman on Mexico being, you know, the
top one. The challenges they face down there from the drug
cartels are significant, and clearly bleed over to the other
side of the border and cause challenges.
I want to thank General Jacoby and the entire NORTHCOM
command for their work in building a relationship with Mexico
to try to find ways to help them in any way we can to, you
know, get back control of their country, quite simply. It is a
very devastating situation right now. We need to work with them
to try to bring greater security to that region.
I am also very focused on the cyber-security challenge.
Everyone throughout DOD [Department of Defense] has to deal
with that, but NORTHCOM has the, you know, particular concern
again in protecting the homeland. It is a murky and difficult
area. Cyber touches absolutely everything and we are all aware
of the size of the threat. And so any thoughts that either of
you gentlemen have on how best to confront that threat, how
best to organize the Department of Defense to be in a position
to do that, and what authorities you might need that you don't
currently have, we would be interested in hearing.
And then SOUTHCOM, again as the chairman mentioned, the
major threat obviously is narco-trafficking. I appreciate your
leadership, General Fraser, in trying to confront that. And it
becomes all the more critical that we find as many partners and
allies as we can in the region.
I think that is an important part of SOUTHCOM's work--is to
build those relationships so that we can help confront whatever
threats that emerge from there. And again, I agree with the
chairman in his assessment both of what those threats are and
how important they are to our national security.
I thank both you gentlemen for being here before us today.
I look forward to your testimony and your answers to our
questions.
And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Fraser.
STATEMENT OF GEN DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND
General Fraser. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to represent the
outstanding men and women of the United States Southern
Command.
As you mentioned, I am joined today by my wife Rena. She is
a strong advocate for our military families and their service
to our great Nation, and she has helped build enduring
relationships with our partners across Latin America.
I am also extremely pleased this morning to join my good
friend and counterpart, General Chuck Jacoby. He and I served
with one another in a previous assignment and we work closely
every day to coordinate our respective activities across the
Western Hemisphere. Through routine cooperation and
collaboration, relations between our staffs grow closer every
day.
With the continued support of Congress and the Members of
this committee, United States Southern Command will continue
defending the southern approaches to the United States,
enhancing regional security, and building enduring
partnerships. Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a full statement
and respectfully request that it be entered into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
General Fraser. I want to briefly discuss two topics with
you this morning. One of them you mentioned, countering
transnational organized crime. The other is building enduring
partnerships.
As I discussed with you in previous testimony, United
States Southern Command is increasingly focused on a concern
that permeates this region; and that is transnational organized
crime. Like Secretary Panetta and Secretary Clinton, I am
concerned about the impact of transnational organized crime on
citizen safety in Central America, especially in countries like
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which are facing
unprecedented levels of violence.
Transnational criminal networks threaten to overwhelm the
law enforcement capacities of some of these Central American
countries. And in an effort to reduce violence and halt the
spread of criminal groups, some countries have deployed their
militaries in support of law-enforcement organizations.
To address this growing threat, last year the President
implemented a strategy to combat transnational organized crime.
In support of this strategy, United States Southern Command
developed and implemented Operation Martillo; a focused plan to
disrupt illicit maritime traffic through the departure zones of
South America and the arrival zones into Central America.
In Central America, we have helped train our partner
militaries to effectively support their law enforcement
partners.
Southern Command also supports U.S. interagency and
international efforts to provide network analysis of
transnational criminal organizations and their operations.
In the Caribbean, under the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative, we are developing a regional partner interdiction
plan to enhance the capabilities of our Caribbean partners. And
in South America, we will sustain our support to Colombia and
Peru as they fight narco-terrorist groups in their countries.
Success in combating transnational organized crime is
enhanced by fostering enduring partnerships with international
and interagency organizations. That is my second topic this
morning.
United States Southern Command is working to build such
partnerships by enhancing cooperation and promoting
information-sharing with regional and interagency
organizations. In addition, we are strengthening our
partnerships through traditional military engagement programs
and activities with our counterparts across Latin America.
We work with them to strengthen humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief capacities, and we remain ready to respond
should our assistance be requested.
Last year, we conducted hundreds of training and
educational events, 12 major multinational exercises with
partner nations in the hemisphere, and 56 medical-readiness
training exercises in 13 different countries.
The sustained engagement has yielded some important
benefits. Last year, for the first time, Colombia assumed the
land component commander role during PANAMAX [Panama Canal
Exercise], our annual multinational exercise focused on
supporting the defense of the Panama Canal; next year, Brazil
will assume the maritime component role as well, an important
step in strengthening and expanding partnerships in the
hemisphere.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Congress
for your years of support to Colombia, and I ask for your
continued support to help achieve a lasting peace.
And finally I want to thank you, and for your unwavering
support to the men and women of United States Southern Command
who diligently work every day to ensure our security. I look
forward to our discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in
the Appendix on page 34.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Jacoby.
STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General Jacoby. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith,
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you this morning. It is an honor to be here.
It is a pleasure to be here with my fellow combatant
commander and friend, General Doug Fraser and his wife Rena.
Doug, it is a pleasure to be with you.
On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Northern Command and
North American Aerospace Defense Command, I appreciate this
committee's continuing support of our missions of homeland
defense, including ballistic missile defense; defense support
of civil authorities, for which the highlight last year was the
team response to Hurricane Irene; and security cooperation,
including our expanding cooperation with the Mexican military
as they tackle brutal transnational criminal organizations.
In the case of NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense
Command], our assigned missions for the United States and
Canada include aerospace warning and control through our safe
and successful Operation Noble Eagle; and maritime warning,
where we continue to grow capability through improved
interagency and international information-sharing.
In addition to cooperative defense with our ally Canada, we
are steadily improving our security cooperation with our good
friends in Mexico and the Bahamas at a pace determined by
mutual agreement and with constant respect for national
sovereignty.
Our vision is that with our trusted partners we will defend
North America by outpacing all threats, maintaining faith with
our citizens, and supporting them in their times of greatest
need.
We view our missions as a sacred trust by our governments
and our citizens. We appreciate that the American people and
their elected representatives in Congress and the White House
rightly have high expectations of our ability to defend them
here at home.
And consistent with the necessity for collaboration with
many other organizations in a wide variety of challenging
situations that can threaten the citizens of our great Nation,
my priorities are to expand and strengthen our trusted
partnerships; to advance and sustain the binational command
NORAD; to gain and maintain all domain situational awareness,
including air, space, cyberspace, land, maritime, and the
unique and fast-changing domain known as the Arctic; to
advocate and develop capabilities in our core mission areas to
outpace all threat; and to take care of our people. They are
our foundation.
And I am tremendously proud of the committed, selfless men
and women--military and civilian, Americans and Canadians--that
serve our command.
And when appropriate, in accordance with the Stafford Act,
the national response framework, and other laws and guidance,
such as on the request of a governor and upon direction of the
President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. NORTHCOM pulls together
unique capabilities and capacities of the Department of Defense
to multiply the impact of a primary federal agency, such as
FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], in protecting our
citizens.
Thanks to Congress and the President, the 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act put into law initiatives supported by
the Council of Governors and the Secretary of Defense
concerning dual-status commanders and the activation of
reserves in domestic-disaster response.
I appreciate this committee's support for these two
important measures, which will surely help save American lives.
It was my privilege to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq with
many superb members of the National Guard and Reserves. I
believe that in the crucible of over 10 years of continuous
conflict, with the support of Congress, we have developed the
finest total force that I have ever seen, and NORAD and
NORTHCOM depend on that total force every day.
This past year has been busy. We have synchronized our
activities with many partners and we have done our part to
realize efficiencies that we have worked through the budget
process; for fiscal year 2012 trimming our workforce by 141
full-time equivalents, and for fiscal year 2013 reducing our
O&M [Operations and Maintenance] by about 6 percent.
With the resources and authorities at hand, and maintaining
our vigilance, we will be able to continue to defend and
support the American people.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear today, and I look
forward to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of General Jacoby can be found in
the Appendix on page 69.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Fraser, in your statement you point out the
importance and emergence of the transnational criminal
organizations. Can you expound on that a little bit about what
their influence is in the region and what we are doing to
combat them?
General Fraser. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman.
We see that it is a network that extends from the
production areas of the northern part of South America, through
the transit zone in Central America and Mexico, and into the
demand region in the United States and other parts of the
region.
We are seeing that now some of that supply of cocaine--and
I will talk specifically cocaine--is moving through South
America, as well as Central America. But the violence continues
to increase in Central America, and that is where and why we
are focusing there.
Last year, the U.N. [United Nations] estimated or said that
Honduras has the highest violence of any country in the world.
And we see that as a direct influence of transnational
organized crime, but there are gangs and there are other
factors that also enter into that.
We are focused on our maritime mission, which is to support
the detection and monitoring of the traffic through the
maritime environments of the Caribbean and the Pacific. We
started Operation Martillo on the 15th of January as an
effort--and a focused effort--to try and disrupt that traffic
and see if we can influence how it is impacting in Central
America.
We are also working with our interagency partners, as well
as our partner militaries, in Central America to build their
capacity to support law enforcement as the militaries in
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have been asked by their
governments to come in and support law enforcement.
We are working both maritime and land. We haven't taken our
eye off the Caribbean, and we are still focused with our
partners in South America as well, as well as working with
Northern Command as that traffic transits through Central
America into Mexico.
The Chairman. Big job.
General Jacoby, with the release of the 2013 budget your
command announced that it will be eliminating the 24-hour alert
requirement at 2 of the 18 existing aerospace control alert
sites across the Nation. At these sites, North American
Aerospace Defense Command has armed aircraft on 24-hour alert
to conduct air operations to deter, detect, and if necessary
defeat hostile air attacks aimed at the homeland.
How did the command arrive at this decision to eliminate
these requirements at Duluth, Minnesota, and Langley, Virginia?
And how can you assure the committee that the U.S. is not
assuming any additional risk to our national security with
these reductions?
General Jacoby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
That is correct, and the reduction of 24/7 standing
capability at those sites was a very difficult decision.
The Secretary of Defense and the President asked all the
COCOMs [combatant commands] to turn over every rock and look at
their mission sets and see where we could gain some
efficiencies and make some progress in matching ends, ways,
means and risk, in that dynamic relationship which is called
strategy.
And so in good faith every COCOM did turn over every rocks.
And the NORTHCOM and the NORAD mission sets' ACA [Aerospace
Control Alert] basings were looked at very vigorously. Really
as a result of the GAO [Government Accountability Office]
reports of 2009 and 2011, there was a lot of work done about
each of the bases.
And so we dove into it as a team, OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense], NORAD, NORAD/NORTHCOM--and looked for
ways to trim and gain efficiencies.
In my view, reducing by two bases after all the analysis
and discussion that took place, I believe we can mitigate any
additional risk that we assume by reducing the 24/7 presence.
I want to be clear that this does not mean closing down
bases. It did not mean removing fighter squadrons. It just
meant simply we would not sit alert at those two bases 24/7.
I believe that I have the resources and authorities to
respond to any threats or any additional risk that can be
accrued by closing down those 24/7 sites.
The Chairman. It does mean, though, that we are taking on
additional risk.
General Jacoby. Chairman, that is correct.
After careful analysis and working with the United States
Air Force, the Guard, and working with OSD, I believe I have
the authorities and capabilities to mitigate that risk.
For instance, I have the authority to move to another level
of alert and go from 14 bases with 28 fighters to 23 bases with
46 fighters in just a matter of 48 hours.
I also have the authority to restore a CAP to restore a
presence over each one of those bases in less than an hour.
So I think we have the ability to do it. These were
difficult decisions. I agree with the ranking member, the
homeland is job one. But I think in this case we did due
diligence and made good choices.
The Chairman. I think you did the best with what you have.
I just think it is important that the country understand that
with these cuts we are assuming additional risk around the
world. This is just the one in your command.
But we don't know, and you don't know, until you look back,
if you are able to withstand--if some of these additional risks
develop into a tragedy, we don't know. Just like if you go back
the last 5 or 10 years where we haven't been attacked, we could
have cut down all 18 bases because we, you know, we didn't have
that problem.
But you don't know what risks are until after you have--I
mean, if the risk is real until somebody exploits it.
But thank you for what you have done and how you have made
the best of this situation.
Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, you certainly have a difficult task under the best of
circumstances. And I think the thing about risk is there is no
way to eliminate it. We could spend another trillion dollars in
the defense budget and I am sure a whole lot of people would
pour over it and say, ``Well, there is risk here. How come you
didn't eliminate that?'' It is a question of balancing risk.
And as I argued before the committee, resources are always
part of the equation in figuring out what your strategy is. We
don't have infinite resources. We have to live within finite
means and try to figure out how to make it work best.
Along those lines, the question I want to ask both of you
is with the strategic review and the change in approach, tell
us a little bit how that change in strategy has changed your
particular commands; what you are doing differently.
And you can balance it out. Part of it is, as the chairman
has alluded to, you know, what risks are you taking on, but
then also perhaps, how did you refigure how you spend things in
a way that was more efficient and more effective in terms of
meeting your strategic goals? And did those goals themselves
change somewhat during the course of this process?
And I will yield to--I guess General Fraser, you go first,
and then General Jacoby.
General Fraser. Thank you, Congressman Smith.
From my perspective, we took some very deliberate
reductions, our command reduced by about 10 percent. And we
took those in areas that I think we could use to mitigate the
risk. A lot of it was--some of it is in travel. Some of it was
in the number of people we sent to conferences.
We have adjusted the way we approach exercises. And some of
that was a fact of life in working with our partners. They were
not able to sustain the rate at which we were exercising with
their vessels and their aircraft, and we needed to make some
adjustments there, as well.
We are working much more--and continuing to work much more
deliberately--with our interagency and international partners.
And I see growing partnership throughout, especially Central
America, but as well as the Caribbean, in our ability to work
with one another to share a common understanding of that
strategy and build capacity.
Mr. Smith. And can you on that be specific and say what--I
mean, what mission is it that you are better able to serve with
those greater partnerships and that interagency----
General Fraser. It is the area that we are focused on the
most; a nontraditional area which is that countering
transnational organized crime. We are playing our role in that
effort. We adjusted our strategy to put a more permanent
presence along those departure and arrival zones within Central
America, the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific.
We are working deliberately with each of our interagency
partners with the United States as well as our partners within
Central America to build a common approach to this effort.
It is a long way to go but we are adjusting our strategy to
the reality that none of us have enough resources to compete
with the level of these transnational organized crime.
Last year, the estimate is, worldwide, that their profit
was $88 billion. Within Central America it is $18 billion.
These countries don't have that capacity, and so it really is
interagency international support to address that problem from
our perspective.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
General Jacoby.
General Jacoby. Thank you.
I believe that as we looked across the cuts to NORAD and
U.S. Northern Command, the mission of NORAD and Northern
Command and the job of defending the homeland was treated
appropriately for the gravity of that responsibility.
And so essentially we took a 6 percent cut in our O&M
funding as almost all the COCOMs did. We could absorb that. It
is operating overhead. It is belt-tightening.
We lost a small amount in our chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear-response capability. That was two CSTs
[Civil Support Teams], the State teams that were not mandated
in Congress. We kept teams in every State. We just reduced two
that were additional ones that States had fielded. And that was
on top of the already talked about reduction in 24/7 operations
at two sites for our alert fighters.
Those were really the majority of the pressure, budget
pressure that we felt. Across the board, I think that the
homeland received the attention that it deserved; and in order
to meet the high expectations of this committee and the people
of the United States for defending the homeland.
I will say that we are entering into a period here--and we
are well in that period--where there is such an intimate
relationship between the home game and the away game that I
spend much of my time worrying about the same threats--the same
set of threats that Jim Mattis does; the same set of threats
that Bob Willard has done. And so those are reflected back in
the homeland.
And so their capacities and capabilities are just as
important to me as the ones that are extant in the homeland.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you both very much for your service. We
are in your debt.
General Jacoby, North Korea has nuclear weapons. We believe
that Iran may be developing them. We keep watching both of
those countries to see when they will have a ballistic missile
which could reach us.
Sir, I do not believe that this is the nature of the
threat. These countries may be evil; they are not idiots. They
know that we have space assets that if they launch, we would
detect that launch. And if the weapon landed on our soil and
detonated, they know that they would be quite immediately
vaporized.
I do not believe that they are collectively suicidal, so I
do not believe that we have a threat of an intercontinental
ballistic missile launched from either North Korea or Iran.
I think the real threat, sir, is for a medium-range missile
launched from a ship off our shore. This needn't even be a
state actor. A nonstate actor with a tramp steamer, a Scud
launcher--which they can buy, I believe, on the open market for
about $100,000--and any crude nuclear weapon detonated above
the atmosphere over the Mid-Atlantic.
And, sir, they could miss by 100 miles and it really
wouldn't make any difference, would it? And this would create
Katrina at least 10 times over with the EMP [electromagnetic
pulse] effect. This would be close to a mortal wound. And if
they then sank the ship, there may be little consequence of
retaliation because there could be no fingerprints.
What assets do we have, sir, to protect against this kind
of attack and to what extent are they in place along our shore?
General Jacoby. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the question,
and I agree with you on the importance of considering that type
of threat to the country. And you have helped us think our way
through many of the steps that we have taken in the recent
past.
First of all, it really divides itself into two questions,
the EMP question itself and then specifically the scenario you
painted as a maritime threat. And we have a responsibility from
NORAD for our maritime assessment and warning. So we have got,
really, two aspects of that.
First of all, in a maritime issue, we have made big strides
over the last 5 years in bringing together all of the
stakeholders in maritime domain awareness. We are increasing
our capability to understand, to see and advise against
maritime threats in a much greater capacity and capability than
we have in the past.
Still have work to do; we continue to push the envelope. We
have many tests ongoing that we conduct both with Canada and
with all of our partner agencies in the United States. But we
are getting closer to the kind of maritime domain awareness
that the scenario you painted requires us to have.
On EMP itself, it is a challenge. And it could result in
very tough effects for any advanced country that relies on its
electronic grid and that type of energy support system.
So for that command itself, as you know, my alternate
command center in Cheyenne Mountain has EMP protective
capability as well as our headquarters at Peterson Air Force
Base. So in terms of the command-and-control nodes required to
defend this country in times of crisis--we are postured to deal
with, at least partially, the EMP threat.
Now, we need to understand more about that. And one of the
things we have done--and you have participated in this--is
conduct a series of table-top exercises called Secure Grid. We
did Secure Grid 11 last year, and it dealt primarily with the
cyber threat and the consequences and interdependencies that
create vulnerabilities of a cyber-attack.
And next year, NORTHCOM will host the next TTX [table-top
exercise] on Secure Grid and it will deal specifically with the
challenges and the requirements that are needed as a result of
an EMP attack.
So we are paying attention to this. In the final analysis,
our best defense is intelligence, interdiction and deterrence
so that we prevent such a strike from occurring.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to both of you generals for joining us today.
General, congratulations on your years of service and the
prospects as you look forward to your new life. And your wife,
I am sure--you know, your partner who has supported you--is
also looking forward to a new life, as well. And I am hopeful
that everything will work out real well for both of you.
Thank you for your service.
General Jacoby, for what purpose do we currently operate
drones in U.S. airspace?
General Jacoby. Thank you for the question.
There are tremendous opportunities and utility in using
droned or unmanned aerial systems not just in theater but also
in the homeland. In the past it has been pretty difficult. We
have a challenging airspace. It is the best regulated, best
controlled airspace in the world, and it has been a work in
progress in integrating UAS, or unmanned aerial systems, into
that airspace.
We have had success in the past with the FAA [Federal
Aviation Administration], but there is a long turn to get
certificates of waiver in order to operate outside of military-
restricted airspace to use unmanned aerial systems.
In that regard, we very much appreciate the legislative
initiative that directs figuring out a way to integrate that
airspace--UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] into the airspace--by
2015.
I think there is a tremendous opportunity to use UASs,
particularly in my mission, for incident awareness as a result
of a natural or manmade disaster. I mean, the ability to see,
to understand, to build a common operating picture of a
disaster could be greatly enhanced by the use of UASs, and so
that would be the first place where I would see great utility
in improving our ability to integrate our airspace.
Mr. Johnson. Are there any other purposes for which you
would use the drones in U.S. airspace?
General Jacoby. What we would do, sir, is provide defense
support to another civil authority or a lead federal agency,
you know, upon proper request. And so there could be incidents
where we were requested and authorized, perhaps, to support a
law-enforcement activity, but none of that would obviate the
need for us to operate within Posse Comitatus.
Mr. Johnson. How can you guarantee that spying on the
activities of Americans would not come into play? And how can
you ensure that such action does not violate the Posse
Comitatus Act?
General Jacoby. It is very important to us, and it is
clearly defined for us in law; and we don't do anything that we
are not directed by the Secretary of Defense to do.
In my headquarters specifically, I have eight law
enforcement organizations that are represented. And so we have
careful intelligence oversight of everything that we do within
the homeland. And in fact, as I mentioned earlier, our
priorities--keeping faith with the American people--is a
priority of this command, and it will be done.
Mr. Johnson. Is there any congressional meaningful
oversight into the use of drones in American airspace?
General Jacoby. Just from a regulatory standpoint, it is
very restricted airspace and it is a challenge to use UAVs in
that restricted airspace.
As we move through the implementation of this legislation,
I am sure there will be careful watch of ensuring safeguards
that are in place.
Mr. Johnson. So in other words, in restricted airspace only
is--are these drones used currently--restricted airspace?
General Jacoby. In either restricted airspace that is under
military control of the airspace over a post, camp, or station,
for instance, or under the specific direction of the Secretary
of Defense in support of another lead federal agency, for
instance FEMA, in terms of incident awareness in a natural
disaster.
Mr. Johnson. So FEMA would be able to request your
capabilities?
General Jacoby. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. Johnson. What about the FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation] or a local police department?
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank both of you for your service.
And General, best wishes on your retirement. That happened
to me a couple of years ago in the National Guard. There is
life after service for you and your family; so best wishes.
I am mighty proud of the success of Plan Colombia. Sadly,
when things are really positive, you don't hear about them. But
I am really pleased that under the new government of President
Juan Manuel Santos, they have recently rolled out a new
strategy in the fight against FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia].
What is the new strategy? How does it differ from the prior
strategy in Colombia?
General Fraser. Thank you, Congressman.
And from my view, Plan Colombia has been very successful.
It is a whole-of-government approach by the Government of
Colombia to address the concern with the FARC. They have
reduced the FARC from 18,000 down to 9,000, but the FARC are
still an element that needs to be addressed.
As a result of continued pressure over 10 years, the FARC
have adjusted their strategy. And in conjunction with that,
President Santos directed that their strategy change as well.
They are working across the government. They have put a
deliberate effort into adjusting that strategy. We provided
support to them in a meaningful way as we helped them work
through that design, and we are continuing to support them as
they implement this.
They are going to establish additional joint task forces
that include not only military, but law enforcement. And they
will have as well task forces in a maritime environment, as
well as the air environment, and put a very deliberate focus on
reducing the capability of the FARC to continue their efforts.
Mr. Wilson. And I have seen it first-hand. Our family is
very active in the Partners of the Americas Program. We have
had exchange students from Colombia live with us, and
unfortunately they couldn't go home because of the violence,
but now they obviously can.
And we have had two sons as exchange students in Cali,
Colombia--Colegio Bennett. So it really is a story that the
American people need to know because we hear all the time that
we just can't make a difference, but we can in a huge country;
40 million people.
On the other hand, there is Venezuela. It has been reported
concerning the counter-narco-trafficking activities in the
region--what is Venezuela's role? And what has been the conduct
of Chavez?
General Fraser. Congressman, Venezuela has reduced its
support to a lot of the counter-drug activity over the last 4
or 5 years. They are starting to increase some of that, but we
see most of the air traffic that departs South America towards
Central America coming from Venezuela.
They continue to conduct some operations in counter--some
of those organizations. They just captured one of the leading
members that Colombia was interested in getting hold of
recently, but their efforts have not been enough; and so they
continue to provide a basis on which narco-organizations can
continue to operate.
Mr. Wilson. And that is such a threat to the sovereignty of
their country. That is really sad.
General Jacoby, I am very proud. I have four sons currently
serving under your command, and I am very grateful. I am also a
strong supporter of your efforts for the missile defense
system. I am concerned with a $256.8 million reduction for the
ground-based midcourse defense program that this program will
be at risk.
Can you assure us that it won't?
General Jacoby. Thank you for your question. Thanks for
your children's service.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
General Jacoby. Ground-based missile defense is perhaps one
of our most important missions in defending the Nation. I am
very proud that NORTHCOM has that responsibility.
To that end, as the combatant commander, my interest is
that when we are threatened, that we understand the threat, we
detect the threat. And when we pull the trigger, missile leaves
the silo, intercepts, and defeats the threat. And so it is the
reliability of that system of systems which I discuss with the
whole array of stakeholders in the missile defense world. And
we have a lot of tough conversations about this because we have
a high standard of expectation.
Despite the cuts, my conversations with General O'Reilly
have gratified me in that we are embarked on a realistic
testing schedule that takes us through 2017, one test a year. I
am very happy about that.
And then, of course, all the work that goes before a test
and all the work that goes after a test; all contributing to
that reliability. It gives me the assurance as a commander when
we pull the trigger, it is going to work.
Mr. Wilson. I think my time is up.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Fraser and General Jacoby, thank you very much for
being here and for your extensive service to our Nation.
And congratulations on your retirement, General.
I wonder if you could tell us more about Exercise UNITAS
Pacific. And speak to the emphasis on improving maritime
interdiction capabilities with regard to the submersibles that
are being used by transnational criminal and possibly terrorist
organizations.
We are hearing a little bit more about this, originating in
the Southern Command's area of responsibility. And I am
wondering how mature is this capability and is it used more for
the traffic of drugs or people? And what do we have to
counteract it?
General Fraser. Congresswoman Davis, thank you very much.
UNITAS is a maritime exercise. It is the oldest maritime
exercise in the region, over 52 years now. We run it in two
versions, one on the Atlantic, one in the Pacific. It really is
a deep-water, a blue-water exercise that involves very
traditional military exercises and capabilities. It has been a
long-running exercise, very valuable to us on both coasts of
South America and we continue to work that and build
partnerships with our partner navies.
You brought up the issue of submersibles, essentially
submarines, as well as semisubmersibles. We had seen a decline
in the number of semisubmersibles. And these are vessels, as
you know--100 feet long, a crew of six, very low waterline,
very difficult to detect, and can carry up to 10 metric tons of
cocaine.
We are also seeing fully submersibles; dimensions very
similar, but they can submerse to 60 to 100 feet to avoid
detection as they--built in the jungles, primarily of Colombia.
They transit from Colombia or the northern part of South
America nonstop to Central America. And they are difficult to
detect as well.
General Fraser. It is very, very difficult and time-
consuming and expensive to try and find them in the open
oceans. And so we are working with our interagency partners, as
well as our international partners, to see if we can do a
better job of finding where they are built, how they are built,
who is building them so that we can interdict them on land.
This year was the first year that we had seen
semisubmersibles in the Caribbean. So we see an increasing use
of those vessels.
Mrs. Davis. I know that the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] is
not being deployed in those areas. Where does that fit into
this?
General Fraser. Well, ma'am----
Mrs. Davis. At all?
General Fraser [continuing]. When the LCS comes on line--
and it is still in production right now, so they are beginning
production; so it will come on line later in this decade. And
that is one of the primary ships that will be of benefit to
supporting our counter-trafficking efforts within both the
Caribbean and the Pacific.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you.
I just wanted to say as well that I certainly appreciate
your focus on the interagency capacity building, but I am also
whether you feel that enough people, enough countries and
partners have really bought into that. And is there anything
that you see coming along that we should really be aware of in
terms of whether it is funding; whether it is budget cuts?
Because I think that sometimes it is hard for people to see
that this provides a multiplier for us in the field.
General Fraser. What I would argue is I see growing
relationships within the U.S. interagency to address this
effort. And I find us in a supporting role, not a leading role,
and that is where we should be.
With our partners around the region we see the same thing
across all areas. I see growth in that area as well.
What I would ask for is continued support to the foreign
assistance budgets because dealing with law enforcement,
judicial systems, underlying causes of this problem are really
the solution to the problem.
Mrs. Davis. As you depart, any other words of wisdom? You
know, what made you crazy throughout your service?
General Fraser. I don't think----
Mrs. Davis. As it relates to Congress.
General Fraser. I would say I genuinely appreciate
Congress, this committee's as well as the entire Congress'
support to our men and women in uniform and our civilians who
also support us.
They know you care about them. They know you care about
their capabilities and their requirements. And I just ask for
you to continue to maintain that faith with our men and women
serving and our veterans and their families.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you again for your service, and your family.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Fraser, General Jacoby, thank you for being here
and for your service.
General Jacoby, I know that Chairman McKeon earlier
addressed my concerns about assuming additional risk with the
proposed ACA wing closures. And having the 177th Fighter Wing
in my district, this is a major area of concern for me. And I
am looking forward to reviewing the analysis you and your team
have done to justify these decisions.
With that said, I have two questions. Could you please
confirm whether or not there is funding for the ACA mission
across the F-Y-D-P, the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], in
NORTHCOM proposals, to not continue funding? Is it the 2-year
increments you did in the past? Is that what we are doing?
General Jacoby. Congressman, thanks for the question.
I believe we are adequately funded, 16 sites up to April
13th. And then beyond that we drop to the 14 sites. And I
believe that there is adequate funding. And that funding is
across the 5-year defense plan.
Mr. LoBiondo. 5-year.
And also are you comfortable that with the delay in the F-
35 procurement, that the budget submission has sufficient funds
to maintain the necessary Strike Fighter inventory to meet
national military strategy requirements, especially those that
apply to the ACA mission?
General Jacoby. My concerns are specifically the ACA
mission, and whether it is F-35s, F-22s, F-15s, F-16s--we have
had any number of platforms pull the mission, to include CF-18s
from Canada, and pull that mission successfully. And we have a
robust inspection program that ensures whatever platform has
been provided by the United States Air Force; that it is
capable and meets the mission standard.
So, you know, specifically on ACA, at this point in time, I
believe that we are, in terms of platforms, adequately
supported by the United States Air Force for that mission, and
the Canadian Government.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being here.
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM share a critical common boundary
through which the majority of drug trafficking flows. And not
too many years ago Secretary Rumsfeld, he at one point tried to
dismantle DOD's counter-narcotics programs; so a couple of
questions on that.
First, can you tell the committee how you are cooperating
in this critical area? Secondly, I guess the best way to put it
is: What percentage would be impacted by the potential
sequestration cuts in this vital and important area?
General Fraser. Congressman, let me start, and then I will
turn the floor to General Jacoby.
We have a very close relationship between our two commands.
Our staffs talk weekly. Our military deputies talk on a monthly
basis. And we meet periodically as well to coordinate our
strategies, coordinate our efforts as we cross that land
boundary, is where I would say primarily.
In the maritime boundary, JIATF-South's [Joint Interagency
Task Force South] area of operation already encompasses not
only NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, but portions of AFRICOM [Africa
Command], European Command, as well as Pacific Command.
So I see great unity of effort across our combatant command
boundaries in both areas, be it land and/or maritime
environment; Sequestration, from my standpoint, as you know--we
will go at each of our accounts and decrement each of our
accounts in some manner.
On a basis I receive that counter-narcotics funding from a
central transfer account in the Department of Defense. So it
will really be--how the Department of Defense decides to
apportion that money, will depend on how much we are affected
directly within our operations. But it will impact the maritime
environment primarily because that is where a lot of the
capability goes; but it will impact also our ability to support
and train with our partner militaries throughout the region as
well and equip them.
General Jacoby. Thank you, Congressman. I think we have an
unprecedented level of cooperation between our two commands,
and if we didn't, Grace and Rena would get on us; so we are
doing a lot of things to take advantage of some of the lessons
we have learned over the last 10 years of warfare. And that is
that bad things happen at boundaries; and they are a weakness
unless you make them a strength. And Doug and I have decided to
make it a strength; where a boundary now is a place where
cooperation takes place.
And as I said, in an unprecedented way along the Mexico,
Guatemala, Belizean border, where we have real concerns, the
cooperation has reached an all-new high, to include the Mexican
participation, which is critical. So I am very confident that
we are working that boundary very, very carefully and
diligently. And I think we are going to have success there.
In terms of counter-narcotics funding, as General Fraser
indicated, it is very difficult to know how the additional cuts
would play out. I would of course argue that counter-narcotics
funds used by the Department of Defense to support lead
agencies in the homeland are your greatest bang for the buck.
It is our homeland. And so that is where you would want to
start. And so we will make that argument if that comes to pass.
But there are many, many competitors--worthy competitors--
for each and every one of those dollars.
I would say in the homeland that when we use counter-
narcotics funding to support lead agencies you get a twofer,
because our standard is we support our great partners,
primarily at DHS [Department of Homeland Security] and
primarily within that CBP [Customs and Border Protection]; we
get tremendous training value.
And I talk to commanders all the time that have the
opportunity to train with our partners on the southwest border,
and they absolutely feel it is the best possible training they
could get for integrating all their systems, to working in a
complex interagency environment against a noncooperative enemy
which is a real threat to our country.
So we will watch that very closely. I think it would be a
real problem for us if we lost more money due to sequestration.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your terrific
service. Congratulations on retirement. I hope you have got a
place on a lake or something; at least a golf course.
It seems to me that over the last decade or so, during a
time when the Nation has felt, and correctly so, greatly
threatened, and we are in a time of pretty significant
buildup--military buildup--in end strength and activities, that
we have actually increased the number of COCOMs.
And I am wondering if it isn't perhaps time to take another
look at that; sort of a cost-saving rationalization of the
geographic combatant commands. And I am looking at your--I am
not picking on your two specifically here, but in general, if
you look at SOUTHCOM--got a budget of something over $200
million; about $50 million for headquarters support. NORTHCOM,
similarly, over a couple hundred million dollars, and then some
other costs that are taken up in each service as part of that.
NORTHCOM, according to my notes here, has something over
1,500 people; 17 general officers or members of the Senior
Executive Service. SOUTHCOM has got 22 generals or SES [Senior
Executive Service] and over 3,000 people. No forces committed
to either command full-time, but of course you actually have
access to them, and we have just heard some testimony here from
both of you on that.
Are you aware of any discussions about perhaps looking
again at the number and composition of COCOMs? Either one of
you? Both of you?
General Fraser. Congressman, this conversation comes up on
a recurring basis I think as the Department looks at the
Unified Command Plan. And I think that discussion is ongoing.
Mr. Kline. Thank you.
General Jacoby.
General Jacoby. Congressman, there have been a number of
studies in the past that have looked at this. None of them have
ever ended up recommending consolidation of those two commands.
But I know that the Unified Command Plan will undergo the same
scrutiny that all the other functions in the Department of
Defense undergo as the Secretary has to turn over every rock.
Mr. Kline. Right. Well, I appreciate that. Those are, I am
sure, exactly accurate answers.
But we are in an extraordinary position right now, as we
are reducing end strength. And rapidly in the Army and the
Marine Corps particularly, we are looking at budget cuts that
are keeping all of us here on this committee awake all the
time, and perhaps you as well, and the men and women in your
commands.
And so it just seems to me that this would be a good
opportunity for us, the people on this committee and folks in
the Pentagon, to look again at the composition of the COCOMs
and the number and size and missions and see if we can't
perhaps achieve some savings there.
General Fraser, I just couldn't help--I was listening to
the conversation. Mrs. Davis asked some questions about drug
trafficking and you were talking about submarines and
semisubmersibles. And I happened to be in Colombia not long
ago, a few months ago, and had a chance to look at those
things.
And I don't know whether those are the bravest people in
the world that would drive those things, or the dumbest. I am
not sure. But incredible--if Americans could see the lengths to
which the drug traffickers will go with submarines that I
wouldn't want to float on the surface in them, much less go
underwater with them.
It is extraordinary the lengths to which they are going,
and I just wanted to say I very much appreciate the work that
you are doing and the Americans are doing, our partners are
doing, the Colombians are doing; a heck of a problem.
So again, thank you very much for your service, and Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. West.
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Fraser, and also General Jacoby, for
being here.
And congratulations on your retirement; hopefully, you will
stay down in south Florida where we have plenty of golf courses
for you to enjoy.
Kind of dovetailing off of a theme that we have heard up
here in Washington, D.C., for quite some time--you talked about
the transnational criminal organizations. But we also have an
issue with Iran being down in this SOUTHCOM AOR. And you and I
talked about this last week. You know, the fact that we just
recently had Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Ecuador, Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Cuba; the fact we have a Hezbollah footprint.
You know, we know that Iran was dealing with Mexican drug
cartels for the assassination plots against a couple of
ambassadors.
So my question is: When you look at this type of activity,
how do you assess Iran's involvement in the SOUTHCOM AOR? And
also I would like us to continue the conversation, to talk
about the battle hand-off TTPs [tactics, techniques, and
procedures] that you share, because this is flowing from South
America up through Central America and across our borders,
especially when you look at that category on the Border Patrol
website called OTMs--the other than Mexicans.
So, if you could, address your assessments on Iran's
involvement in your respective AORs, and also those TTPs for
battle hand-off.
General Fraser. Thank you, Congressman West. And we did
have a good conversation on this topic.
As I see, Iran is interested in engaging in building
relations with counterparts in Latin America. They have
increased their number of embassies in the last 5 years;
doubled those. They now have 10 embassies. They have also
helped support different cultural centers, in building of
cultural centers, throughout the region.
Primarily, I see a diplomatic as well as commercial
interests; economic interests. And that is how their
relationship has been growing. There is connections, and that
is our concern as we watch this--the connections with Hezbollah
and Hamas, who have been in the region for a number of years,
primarily still focused on conducting illicit activity to
provide funding support and logistics support back to parent
organizations within the Middle East.
That is still the relationship that I see today. I don't
think that President Ahmadinejad had the impact that he was
looking for, except with the ability to continue to strengthen
his anti-U.S. connections in the region.
General Jacoby. Thank you.
As I mentioned earlier, there is not a threat overseas in
the other combatant commander areas of operations that I don't
keep an eye on. And I have got both eyes on the Iranian issue.
It is our working assumption that if we had problems with
Iran, that it could get reflected back into the homeland. And
so we are working closely with all the agencies on a daily
basis in our threat working group to make sure that we
understand bleed-over of the Middle East threats into the
homeland.
To that end, I would also say that our partners in Canada
and Mexico are great allies in protecting this continent from
the terrorist threat.
Mr. West. With that being said, do you feel that you have
the requisite allocation of forces to be able to contend with
any escalation you may see, or any collusion that intensifies
between, you know, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and these
transnational criminal organizations?
General Fraser. Congressman, we continue, as General Jacoby
mentioned, to keep a very close eye. And I agree with him; I
keep both eyes on this as well. And I am confident as we work
and if we get indications of anything from which I am concerned
about, that we can make those requests to the chairman and the
Secretary of Defense and we will get direct support.
General Jacoby. In our case in the homeland, and
considering potential threats from Iran, I believe it is less
an issue of forces and more an issue of intelligence and
warning.
We have an extraordinary relationship with law enforcement
activities throughout the United States, and with our partners
both in SOUTHCOM and in Central Command. And so I feel that we
are well postured now to see it coming and I am confident that
we will be given resources required to deal with it if that
comes to pass.
Mr. West. Well, thank you both. And being savvy military
commanders, I am sure you know that the enemy always looks for
a gap by which he can exploit you. And I hope that we are not
showing weakness along our southern border area because we
don't need to have a soft underbelly.
So with that being said, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Gentlemen, thanks for being here and your long and
distinguished service, et cetera, et cetera. We are proud of
you.
And good luck in whatever you decide to do, General Fraser,
moving forward.
Real quickly, a little bit of a line of questioning that my
colleague, Mr. West, talked about. Hamas and Hezbollah have
focused principally on illicit activities. Do we have the kind
of insights or tools to understand when they might change that
focus, General Fraser, from those activities towards some
threats to the homeland?
General Fraser. We are very focused--well, we support the
intelligence community that is very focused on this issue, not
only within the Central Command region of responsibility, but
across the globe. So I am confident we have that insight.
Mr. Conaway. General Jacoby, part of what we are doing here
is we have the, you know, the Secretary of the Air Force, the
chairman of the Air Force come in and talk about reduction in
the number of airplanes and those kind of things. We are trying
to translate that into what they are doing at Big Blue, versus
what you have access to.
Given the reductions in fighters and in other aircraft, how
does that affect what you are--when you look at your mission
and say, ``I need to do these things,'' and then you ask for
those assets, what has been the impact of these--or will be the
impact of these reduced airplanes to defending the homeland?
General Jacoby. Congressman, I am reliant on the United
States Air Force and the total Air Force for the accomplishment
of our NORAD and NORTHCOM missions.
On the NORAD side of the house, almost all of the alert
sites, except for the ones in Alaska, are served by the Air
National Guard. So I am very reliant on the Air Guard for the
fighter support required for the air-control mission.
In disaster response, defense support to civil authorities,
of course, the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve have been
critical players in responding effectively and in a timely
manner to disaster. In fact, their responsiveness is the key to
much of our success.
So I would say that as the combatant commander, for me it
is a matter of the United States Air Force meeting
requirements, both to defend the homeland and to respond in
support of civil authorities.
Mr. Conaway. So at this stage, you are not seeing those
reductions affect their ability to service what you need done?
General Jacoby. No, I have not. And General Schwartz has
had to make some real tough calls here and it will mean
priorities will have to be adjusted so we get what we need in
time to take care of our responsibilities in the homeland.
And so we trust the Air Force to do that. I know there have
been some tough calls. I am a huge admirer and respecter of the
Air Guard, and I look to the Air Force to supply the
requirements for both those missions.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you.
General Fraser, do you want to talk to us about China and
Russia's activities in the SOUTHCOM area? Just because they
have got activities, they are not necessarily things that we
should be worried about. It may just be commercial competition
and/or other things. Could you visit with us about what your
perspective is on what they have been doing in South America?
General Fraser. Thank you, Congressman.
I find that China's engagement is very much focused on
diplomatic and economic; very engaged in commodities purchases
and agreements. But we see them also increasing their
engagement militarily. They have offered weapons for sale,
primarily some light attack aircraft, as well as air-defense
radars and some other equipment. And they do provide military
training opportunities for officers from various countries in
the region to be educated within region.
I do not see a military threat in the region. I see them
very much in the region very much engaged economically and
diplomatically with China, like they would with any other key
partner.
With Russia, I see their focus primarily on diplomatic
engagement as well; a lot from the economic standpoint in a
military focus. But we have also seen recent engagement in the
counter-drug effort. Their counter-drug czar was just recently
in the region making agreements for training and helping equip
governments to address that concern also; again, primarily
diplomatic, with commercial sales for military weapon.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, gentlemen. Who has responsibility
for Gitmo? Either one of you? I should know that.
General Fraser. Sir, I have that.
Mr. Conaway. All right. You don't need to comment, but this
recent article about the soccer field and the monies expended
there are frustrating, at about $4,300 per detainee. I am not
sure 171 of them can still play soccer. It is troubling; indeed
head-scratching. I know it was made back in 2010, but that one
is troubling.
Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Did you wish to comment on that, General?
General Fraser. Chairman, if I might. Thank you for the
opportunity to address that concern.
As I look at Guantanamo, I had four issues that we need to
deal with, and that is work the efficiencies and understand as
we uncover every rock, how can we operate that encampment more
efficiently; comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention; as well as comply with the recommendations from the
Walsh Report; and maintain a secure environment for force
protection across the camps.
In the consolidation that we worked, and we have been
working at consolidation to move detainees from camps one
through four, into camps five and six, primarily--in that
effort we had a field that was in camp four that was like the
one that we just built within Guantanamo, and it provides a
very secure environment for our guards, because it reduces
their interaction, but provides an outlet, if you will, for the
detainees.
And so that really is my focus on the reason for building
that field. And as a result of the consolidation, we reduced
the guard force by 150 guards and overall by 200 guards. That
equates to, conservatively, $3 million to $4 million a year in
savings.
And so we think that the investment in that field--I think
that investment in that field was worth the money.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, General Fraser. There is always
another side to the story, and typically it is helpful to get
the other side.
The fact that your wife grinned remarkably when I asked the
question means that you and she have had this conversation--or
you have had this conversation with other folks. So I
appreciate that clarification and thank you for that. Again,
thanks for your service.
General Fraser. And thank you, Mr. Conaway.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And I had the opportunity to have very extended office
calls with both these commanders in the previous week and
opportunity to ask them numerous questions.
So actually they have responded to those questions already,
so let me just use my time to then publicly state that I can
personally attest that both of these commanders are
extraordinary leaders.
We are fortunate to have them in uniform. Our thoughts and
prayers are with your troopers and your families at this time.
And I look forward to continuing to work closely with you going
forward as we work through the very difficult issues this year
and the years to come.
And particularly for General Jacoby, as you work through
the detailed planning process, fleshing out those details for
the joint concepts attendant to the review--I look forward to
working with you on that.
And again thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. That concludes requests I have for questions.
I do have one final question I would like to ask both of
you, and that is: How would sequestration affect your ability
to fulfill the missions of your commands?
General Fraser. Chairman, it would impact us across the
board, because as you well know better than I, it has a
targeted reduction in every program element of our commands.
And so it would impact our ability to support communications
with our military groups and embassies around the region.
It would impact our ability to conduct as well as support
our military partners in the effort against transnational
organized crime. It will impact our ability to continue to
train and build the relationships with our partners. In each
case, it will have a deliberate impact.
As well, as you look in Colombia, as our support to the
Government of Colombia as they counter the FARC, as well as we
are working with Peru to help them counter Sendero Luminoso.
Each one of those areas would be decremented.
And the unknown for me is we receive a lot of support from
external to the command, so each of the services and the impact
on their capabilities is an unknown that I don't have right
now; and so I can't give you the full extent of how
sequestration would impact the command overall.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Jacoby. Chairman, I echo many of General Fraser's
concerns. I think the greatest concern we have is unknown, the
unknown of it.
I believe in my heart of hearts that it would create a
cascading effect of risk, which would jeopardize the defense of
the homeland. It would fail to meet the expectations of you,
this committee, Congress, and the American people for how we
should defend our people.
The Chairman. Thank you for those responses.
I have great concern. I think the cuts that we are going
through on the current budget are excessive; the $487 billion
over the next 10 years; and then sequestration of $500 billion,
$600 billion on top of that in the same budget year, probably
when we will be dealing with wrapping up a continuing
resolution, because we probably won't finish up a budget this
year, given the environment around here.
And then the budget cuts that we are looking at right now,
the chiefs have had a lot of time to digest that. The COCOMs
have had a lot of time to digest that and to have input and to
see results of planning; where sequestration is just an
automatic, across-the-board cut on every line item in the
budget.
I see total chaos around here in January if we don't fix
that before that time. So I am hopeful that it won't--I am
hopeful that we are able to fix it so that it doesn't come to
pass. When we originally voted for the Deficit Reduction Act we
were promised that that was so severe that it never could
happen. And I think we all understand that.
It is just how we get from here to there and actually get
it fixed. And I know we each have different ideas as to how
that happens. But it is something that we really need to
address, sooner better than later, I feel.
Does the ranking member have any closing comments?
Thank you very much again for your service.
Rena, thank you for all the support you have given this guy
for these many years.
And we really appreciate your service. Pass that on, if you
would please, to those who serve under you. We appreciate all
their service.
Thank you very much. This hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 6, 2012
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 6, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests from U.S. Southern Command
and U.S. Northern Command
March 6, 2012
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
status and posture of both our Southern Command and Northern
Command. I am pleased to welcome General Douglas Fraser,
commander of U.S. Southern Command; and General Charles Jacoby,
commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace
Defense Command. General Fraser, I understand this will be your
last appearance before the Committee in this capacity. After 37
years in the Air Force, we thank you for your service to our
country and wish you all the best. Gentlemen, thank you for
your long and distinguished service to our Nation and thank you
for joining us today.
Looking at SOUTHCOM, General Fraser, in my mind, the
illicit trafficking threat is the greatest challenge we face in
your geographic area of responsibility. In your statement, you
highlight the threat of transnational criminal organizations
and their role in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. Growing
crime and violence in Central America as well as the continuing
growth of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the region
bring with them opportunities and challenges. China, Russia,
and Iran have been very active in Latin America, through arms
sales, personnel exchanges, investments, and trade deals. In
addition, the activities of Hezbollah in the region are very
troubling. It is also--I should add--one that requires close
collaboration and coordination with your colleague at the table
from NORTHCOM, as well as your interagency partners. The
committee would benefit from your assessment of trends in the
activities and influence of these actors in the western
hemisphere.
Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is a threat
directly impacting the U.S. homeland on a daily basis, and we
need to treat it as a national security imperative. I laud the
heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and public
officials, who--make no mistake--are risking their lives and
the lives of their families in a war against these brutal
criminal enterprises. We need to support these heroes in their
fight--while fully respecting the sovereignty of Mexico. I look
forward to hearing your assessment of the progress being made
by Mexican authorities, and what NORTHCOM is doing to support
them and build their capacity and capabilities. Additionally,
the committee is concerned about the sufficiency of the FY 2013
budget for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which
NORTHCOM relies on to protect the U.S. from long-range
ballistic missiles. Homeland defense is supposed to be the
first priority for missile defense, but this budget request
does not reflect that prioritization. We must be careful not to
compromise homeland missile defense for the sake of theater
missile defense or budget shortfalls.
In this continually changing budget environment and with
the new Defense Strategy laid out by the President earlier this
year, evaluation of each combatant command and their
interpretation of missions and goals within the Department
becomes vital. With the looming threat of sequestration, we
must also understand the consequences of such severe cuts on
the effectiveness of your commands. Gentlemen, thank you again
for appearing before us today.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests from U.S. Southern Command
and U.S. Northern Command
March 6, 2012
I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General
Fraser, and General Jacoby. We appreciate your time and look
forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget requests for
your respective commands.
Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a
strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat
environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those
threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately
places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific
region, but our regional commands will continue to play a vital
role as we work to confront national security threats wherever
they arise.
I look forward to hearing from General Fraser regarding
your important issues at SOUTHCOM. I want to hear more about
your thoughts on the nontraditional threats in the region, the
rising violence and instability in Central America, our
military-to-military cooperation in the area, and your
counternarcotics duties. While SOUTHCOM lacks traditional
military threats to the United States, these issues are
important to the United States and often require an interagency
approach to address them. I hope you can take some time to
address how you are working with your interagency partners and
were we can make progress in that area.
In regard to NORTHCOM, I look forward to hearing about how
we are working with Mexico to address issues on our Southern
border. We focus a lot of our attention on the Southern border
but I'd also like to hear your views on some of challenges on
our Northern land borders. I'd also like to hear your thoughts
about what global warming and increased access to the Arctic
mean for national security, how NORTHCOM, in partnership with
EUCOM [European Command], is addressing this challenge and
whether you have the resources you need.
Again, thank you all for your time and I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 6, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Last week, a ship dropped anchor off of Mombasa, Kenya,
and cut the Indian Ocean East Africa Marine Systems (TEAMS) cable which
connects to East Africa. This TEAMS cable was carrying redirected
traffic from the earlier cutting of three other cables in the Red Sea.
Kenya's Ministry of Information and Communications says that the cost
of the Internet outage could reach $500 million by the time repairs are
finished. In 2008 there were a number of submarine cable disruptions.
The first incident caused damage to up to five high-speed Internet
submarine communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle
East causing major Internet disruptions and slowdown for users in the
Middle East and India. This incident called into doubt the safety of
the undersea portion of the Internet cable system. In late February,
there was another outage affecting a fiber optic connection between
Singapore and Jakarta. On December 19, 2008, FLAG FEA, GO-1, SEA-ME-WE
3 and SEA-ME-WE 4 were all cut. While there was considerable discussion
from a number of COCOM posture hearings on the aspect of cybersecurity,
it would appear as though most have approached the issue from the
perspective of cybersecurity from a software perspective. In
consideration of these Internet disruptions due to damage to submarine
and fiber optic cables, what alternative architecture has NORTHCOM
designed to account for these possible disruptions? On the design of
these alternative architectures, what is the current status? Is
NORTHCOM able to fulfill its mission should cables running to/from the
U.S. be cut?
General Jacoby. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Turner. Please describe, in detail, what metrics you will use
to agree to reduce the shot doctrine for protection of CONUS against
long-range missile threats. Are you now ready to endorse the MDA plan
to reduce shot doctrine by 2018-2020?
When was the last drill or exercise conducted by NORTHCOM against a
theoretical or hypothetical unauthorized or accidental launch by a
Russian or Chinese ICBM directed at CONUS?
Is NORTHCOM comfortable that there will not be an intercept test of
the GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system involving an ICBM
target until 2015, yet a mobile ICBM threat against CONUS may develop
sooner than that?
What were the findings of the NORTHCOM GBI study conducted before
the 2010 BMDR?
Please describe whether and why COBRA DANE is an important
capability for CONUS defense.
How does the decision to remove the SBX radar from day-to-day
operational readiness affect the capability of the GMD system? How much
warning time is necessary to make SBX operational, in the event of a
threat to the United States?
How much lead time would NORTHCOM need to ensure all available GBI
silos would be outfitted with available GBIs? What is the maximum
number of GBIs the U.S. could deploy each year through 2024 (and please
detail availability of GBI silos and GBIs).
If there were 10 ICBMs deployed by North Korea by the end of 2012,
would we have enough GBIs to defend CONUS under current shot doctrine?
How about by 10 DPRK ICBMs by 2020? How about 20 North Korean ICBMs by
2020, under current and the proposed MDA shot doctrine in 2020?
What are the plans to deploy SM-3 IIB by 2020 to defend CONUS from
North Korean ICBMs? How many IIB missiles will be available for the
protection of CONUS from North Korea? Are there any plans for land-
based IIB missiles for the protection of CONUS from North Korea? Would
NORTHCOM be concerned if the IIB was not able to be deployed on Aegis
BMD ships at IOC in 2020?
General Jacoby. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. General Fraser, in your prepared statement, you
indicated that SOUTHCOM had conducted a manpower analysis to align
resources and functions. Can you please share the results of that
analysis? To what extent did the Department's policies on workforce mix
and cost factor into that analysis. Please support your response with
workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.
General Fraser. Between October and December 2011, U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted a comprehensive manpower review to examine
how our resources are aligned against Command priorities. Certain facts
and assumptions guided our study: 1. The potential for further
Efficiencies-driven cuts exists. 2. Diminishing funding for Reserve
augmentation. 3. Given the current zero-growth environment, no new
authorizations will become available.
As a result, SOUTHCOM looked to posture its permanent and
nonpermanent resources in the most efficient manner possible. For our
manpower analysis, Military, Civilian and Contractor Full Time
Equivalents (FTEs) were arrayed against two measurements: the current
list of prioritized Intermediate Military Objectives (IMOs) from our
Theater Campaign Plan, and our Joint Mission Essential Task List, which
are derived from Presidential and Secretary level guidance. More than
1,300 requirements were individually examined, and the results compiled
to provide a picture of headquarters and individual directorate
manpower. Our analysis showed that more than 50 percent of our manpower
is aligned against our top five IMOs, 20 percent against the remaining
eight IMOs, and slightly more than 20 percent against HQ mission
support, which is typical of a large headquarters. Our analysis
indicated that our manpower is properly aligned with our requirements.
The scope of the study strictly focused on the workforce mix of
existing manpower resources as arrayed against command missions and
functions, per DOD Instructions. A detailed cost analysis was outside
the scope of this study.
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the current SOUTHCOM workforce construct reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and
contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
as required by statutes and policies.
General Fraser. In light of the Secretary of Defense-imposed fiscal
year 2010 cap on authorized manpower, and as part of Department of
Defense efficiencies efforts, we examined our mission areas and
prioritized them according to our Theater Campaign Plan-based
Intermediate Military Objectives (IMOs). Our manpower mix (48 percent
Military, 41 percent Civilian, and 11 percent Contractor, is
appropriate for our mission set. SOUTHCOM has sought no corresponding
increase in contracted manpower.
Ms. Bordallo. Did SOUTHCOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian
personnel levels in order to in-source contracted work more cost-
effectively performed by civilians?
General Fraser. HQ SOUTHCOM has not sought any increases in DOD-
mandated civilian personnel levels and has no further insourcing
initiatives. Contractors are only used to source highly technical
positions and capabilities not found in U.S. Government personnel.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has SOUTHCOM used insourcing to reduce
reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
efficiencies?
General Fraser. In keeping with 2009 Secretary of Defense and
Presidential guidance to reduce reliance on contractors and to maximize
value to the U.S. taxpayer, HQ SOUTHCOM has an established insourcing
record, which began in 2007 with our Contractor-to-Civilian-Conversion
(CTCC) project. Under this initiative, HQ SOUTHCOM converted 55
contractor requirements to civil service positions with a 33 percent
savings. SOUTHCOM contractors are directed primarily against highly
technical requirements, or those not found in U.S. Government
personnel.
Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
currently supporting SOUTHCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-
averse source of labor?
General Fraser. We have a responsible and efficient policy on the
use of contractors. Contractors are only used to source highly
technical positions and capabilities not found in military or federal
civilian personnel.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within SOUTHCOM to ensure
the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM expects no reductions in our current
civilian workforce and has sought no increase in contracted manpower.
Ms. Bordallo. In the SOUTHCOM plan for the inventory of contracted
services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's
appropriations act, signed by your Chief of Staff on September 30,
2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of
the consolidated DOD plan, SOUTHCOM planned to begin modifying
statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions
have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?
General Fraser. Since October 2011, all new requirements, including
options, processed by a contracting office for award have included the
Contractor Manpower Reporting (CMR) requirements. New actions consist
of 57 requirements and 3 options exercised.
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions SOUTHCOM has had
approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any
exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification
for such.
General Fraser. In July 2011, SOUTHCOM sought, and ultimately had
approved, a technical correction to our FY10 baseline as reflected by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (OSD CAPE). Our previous baseline did not include 55
Contractor-to-Civilian-Conversion (CTCC) positions approved in 2008.
The correction was supported by both the Department of the Army and The
Joint Staff.
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across SOUTHCOM,
are the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
General Fraser. All Combatant Commands were directed to divest our
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) functions and therefore
eliminated our SJFHQ billets. For SOUTHCOM, that meant the loss of 50
military and 4 civilian billets. The functions performed by the SJFHQ
were also eliminated. These were the only billets eliminated as part of
the recent efficiencies activities. We have gained additional
efficiencies by streamlining operations and consolidating functions.
Ms. Bordallo. You stated you reduced your workforce by 141 full-
time equivalents. Where those reductions based on mandated civilian
levels or directly correlated to workload and mission requirements?
What have you done to ensure the workload associated with those is not
being inappropriately performed by contractors in lieu of civilian
staffing?
General Jacoby. The net loss of 141 full-time equivalents impacted
all three categories of personnel (military, civilian and contractor)
who support the NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission set. The majority of the
net loss is due to the mandate to reduce by 10 percent per year for the
period of FY2011-2013 funding for service support contracts. The
workload associated with this reduction shifted from our contract
workforce to our Government (military and civilian) workforce.
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the current NORTHCOM workforce construct reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military, and
contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
as required by statutes and policies.
General Jacoby. In light of the Secretary of Defense-imposed fiscal
year 2010 cap on authorized manpower, and as part of Department of
Defense efficiencies efforts, we examined our mission areas and
prioritized them according to our Theater Campaign Plan-based
Intermediate Military Objectives (IMOs). Our manpower mix (48 percent
Military, 41 percent Civilian, and 11 percent Contractor, is
appropriate for our mission set. SOUTHCOM has sought no corresponding
increase in contracted manpower.
Ms. Bordallo. Did NORTHCOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian
personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-
effectively performed by civilians?
General Jacoby. Yes, USNORTHCOM sought relief from DOD for mandated
civilian personnel levels in order to in-source contracted work that
was more cost effective if performed by civilians. Prior to the
announcement to freeze the number of civilian personnel at the FY10
level, USNORTHCOM intended to in-source 90 contract full-time
equivalent (FTE) positions in FY11. As DOD assessed the impact of this
mandate, USNORTHCOM requested relief in order to continue our FY11 in-
sourcing plan. DOD granted this request for FY12 and approved a level
of civilians which included the original 90 FTE positions that were
planned for in-sourcing in FY11.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has NORTHCOM used insourcing to reduce
reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
efficiencies?
General Jacoby. In FY10, NORAD and USNORTHCOM in-sourced 198
positions. In FY12, USNORTHCOM in-sourced 90 positions. These actions
reduced NORAD and USNORTHCOM's reliance on contractors, rebalanced our
workforce, and generated efficiencies.
Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
currently supporting NORTHCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-
averse source of labor?
General Jacoby. Yes. We have a rigorous corporate process that
includes a variety of mechanisms to ensure the right labor mix is used
to perform our missions. Once a determination has been made that
contracted services are appropriate, contracted services will be
acquired via a competitive acquisition in accordance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within NORTHCOM to ensure
the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
General Jacoby. The NORTHCOM organizational construct made a
substantive shift from overhead support to mission-focused support.
This organizational adjustment, in conjunction with the consolidation
of like functions and the impact of reductions across all labor
sources, has mitigated the need to establish processes that oversee
potential workload transfers.
Ms. Bordallo. In the NORTHCOM plan for the inventory of contracts
for services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's
appropriations act, signed by on October 3, 2011, and submitted to the
congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan,
NORTHCOM planned to begin modifying statements of work beginning
October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the
new requirements since October 1, 2011?
General Jacoby. We have modified one solicitation to include the
reporting requirement. In addition, on 14 Mar 12, we completed a
comprehensive inventory of the 36 service contracts that were in place
last year in order to determine which ones must be modified. Our
initial analysis shows that nine of the 36 contracts will not be
modified to include the reporting requirement as they expired at the
end of 2011 and six will expire in 2012. The remaining 21 contracts
will be addressed and the reporting requirements added to any new
contracts awarded in FY12.
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions NORTHCOM has had
approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any
exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification
for such.
General Jacoby. NORTHCOM has had the following ``exceptions'' to
FY10 civilian levels approved. There were no disapproved NORTHCOM
exception requests.
Four civilian positions for NORAD Maritime Warning
These positions fulfill the United States'
responsibilities outlined in the bi-national treaty with Canada
Six positions for NORTHCOM Maritime Homeland Defense
These positions execute NORTHCOM's Maritime Homeland
Defense mission by developing operational concepts, identifying
required capabilities, managing the maritime experimentation
program and sustaining the maritime exercise program
Six civilian positions for NORAD and USNORTHCOM Global
Force Management
Three positions were established in each command to
implement their portion of the NORAD and NORTHCOM's Global
Force Management Process as outlined in the Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance signed by the Secretary of
Defense on 7 Jan 2010
10 civilian positions for Joint Task Force Civil Support
(JTF-CS)
These positions perform a variety of functions within
JTF-CS to anticipate, plan, and integrate NORTHCOM chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear response operations
Nine civilian positions for Operation Clear Voice
These positions execute OSD-funded operations for all
geographic combatant commands to conduct foreign focused
strategic communication activities to counter violent extremist
organizations, drug trafficking and trans-national criminal
network activities
90 civilian positions for in-sourced contract work that
was closely related to inherently governmental workload and more cost
effective when performed by Government civilians
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across NORTHCOM,
are the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
General Jacoby. The NORTHCOM organizational and management
construct enables a complete understanding of priorities of functions
and missions across our enterprise. Based on this understanding, our
leadership can prioritize workload to accomplish the highest priority
missions and functions on a daily basis. In addition, when the
workforce is again adjusted, the Command has an understanding of the
lowest priority work for reduction.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. In recent years Iran has been rapidly perfecting its
uranium enrichment and launch vehicle technologies. In February, Iran
used an improved Safir-class launch vehicle to place a 50 kilogram
satellite into an orbit about 200 miles above the earth. Its orbital
path brings it over the continental U.S. on a recurring basis. Although
that is a modest size and weight for an orbital payload, we know Iran
is preparing to use a more powerful Simorgh-class launch vehicle to
place a much heavier satellite into orbit. The Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper, told this committee that the Simorgh
``could be used for an ICBM-class vehicle.'' One could see Iran
perfecting these technologies and merging them to place a nuclear
warhead or device into low earth orbit and detonating it over the
United States to create an electromagnetic pulse that would take out or
significantly degrade the civilian power grid, possibly for weeks,
months, or possibly even years. There are some who discount the
possibility because they believe it would be an irrational act by Iran.
However, the decisionmaking processes behind the last two major attacks
against the United States, Pearl Harbor and 9/11, were hardly rational
either. Moreover, the sun is now entering a period of solar maximum
when severe space weather could cripple the civilian power grid for an
extended period of time. If either event were to happen--EMP whether
manmade or natural--what would be its impact on the ability of NORTHCOM
to carry out its mission? Is NORTHCOM prepared today to respond to the
loss or significant degradation of the civilian power grid for weeks,
months, or years? If it is not, how long would it take to become
prepared and what resources would it need?
General Jacoby. A large megaton EMP burst from a high altitude
nuclear device would impact USNORTHCOM operations by disrupting our
communications and electrical power supplies. Today, we are prepared to
continue our warfighting missions in the wake of an EMP event. We are
constantly working with our mission partners to refine plans to carry
out systematic recovery of key infrastructures, improve protection and
monitoring of the conditions of critical components, conduct research
regarding EMP effects, and develop cost-effective solutions to manage
such effects. To this end, USNORTHCOM continues a very aggressive
funding line to ensure our systems have the appropriate EMP protection.
The Secure Grid Table Top Exercise Series is an example of our
commitment to work with various DOD organizations, the Department of
Homeland Security and its subordinates, the Department of Energy, and
private industry to better understand the effects of an EMP attack and
solar weather, as well as prepare for such events.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. As you know, the USAF has decided to eliminate 133
mobility aircraft and 123 fighter aircraft from its inventory, along
with 11 RC-26s. How will this reduction in available aircraft affect
NORTHCOM's missions in JTF-North and JTF-Civil Support? As the
supported command, what input did you give to the Air Force regarding
their decision to cut such a large number of aircraft?
General Jacoby. While the Air National Guard provides reliable,
capable, and responsive air support across all of our mission sets,
USNORTHCOM leverages the entire inventory of air assets available to
USTRANSCOM through our supported/supporting relationship. Given this
robust pool of assets, combined with the extensive surface
transportation infrastructure available within our Area of
Responsibility, we do not foresee these force structure changes
significantly impacting the USNORTHCOM mission, to include JTF-N or
JTF-CS. We were fully aware of and tracked Air Force aircraft reduction
decisions throughout the duration of the budget process. If there had
been any impact to our missions, we would have provided input to the
Air Force.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. Despite recent efforts, drug trafficking and other
illicit trade has continued and violence has increased--as indicated by
the alarmingly high homicide rates in Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador. While additional joint task forces to improve the military
and police forces in these countries will help with targeting
transnational criminal organizations, the current approach fails to
address the root of the problem: military and police corruption. Given
the situation, what measures are you taking to combat police and
military corruption in the Central American countries experiencing
increased violence?
General Fraser. The significant levels of violence in Central
America are related not only to corrupt officials, but to a myriad of
challenges that include rampant poverty, unequal distribution of
wealth, high unemployment rates, gang proliferation and undergoverned
spaces. SOUTHCOM works primarily with the militaries of Honduras and El
Salvador. Human rights concerns and U.S. legislation precludes direct
training with some Guatemalan military units, although Special
Operations Forces (GIER) can be trained. Most of the militaries in
Central America enjoy much higher public confidence and lack the
endemic corruption of the police forces. More and more, militaries are
being directed by their governments to perform an internal security
role. While this is not the preferred method of establishing internal
public security, in the near term, it remains the only viable method
for some countries to address the growing violence. All U.S. military
training provided to Central American countries contains specific
instruction focused on human rights and civilian control of the
military, and only vetted units can be trained. SOUTHCOM will continue
to focus on professionalizing Central American militaries in order to
contribute to internal security.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
Mr. Schilling. You have stated the way in which SOUTHCOM works with
agencies and departments both in the U.S. and with other governments
has been successful in monitoring transnational criminal organization
usage of smuggling routes. Have you been able to improve these
relationships to better address these smuggling routes? What can
Congress do to make sure that you get the support you need to make sure
these routes are not used by terrorist organizations? Have you been
successful in impeding the money laundering system that these
transnational criminal organizations have been using?
General Fraser. USSOUTHCOM has been working with the interagency
and their liaison officers (LNO's) working at HQ USSOUTHCOM to develop
and refine our Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) of smuggling routes
and other illicit activities. We leverage our partners in the
intelligence community for resources and analysis, and we have
increased information sharing throughout the intelligence community. We
support the Department of Treasury through intelligence analysis to
identify interconnected criminal and terrorist finance networks.
We ask that Congress look at this problem set as the complex
challenge it is. It requires the cooperation and capabilities of a
broad range of Government agencies, not just the Department of Defense.
Agencies like the Department of State, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the
Intelligence Community play major roles, and we ask that Congress
continue to support them, especially the security cooperation
activities funded by the State Department.
Mr. Schilling. You have stated that partnering with countries in
the area and early investing best serve the regional stability. Can you
expand on the long-term dividends, including the money and manpower
these programs provide to the U.S.?
General Fraser. United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) security
assistance activities encompass a wide array of programs that support
the achievement of our theater strategic end states which include
combating illicit trafficking, countering violent extremism, assisting
partner nations in controlling their sovereign territories, building
the capacity of partner nations to support humanitarian assistance/
disaster relief and peace keeping operations, and ensuring the
unimpeded flow of legal commerce. Quantitative assessments to determine
the long-term dividends, including the money and manpower these
programs provide the U.S., is not a data set that the SOUTHCOM staff
maintains, nor is the staff resourced to undertake such a study;
however, conclusions can be drawn from anecdotal evidence that provides
indications of the benefits and the effectiveness of the SOUTHCOM
investments in the Caribbean Basin and Central and South America.
SOUTHCOM security cooperation programs are executed to prepare our
partner nations to shoulder more of the burden of regional security.
The following are tangible successes of SOUTHCOM security cooperation
activities over recent years:
Counter Illicit Trafficking--Colombian military Joint Task Forces
supported with DOD funded communications network, intelligence data
management systems, rotary wing aircraft, and training continue to
eliminate drug trafficking organizations as part of their ongoing
efforts to defeat the FARC, a terrorist organization operating in our
hemisphere. Maritime interdiction capabilities fielded in Central
America (boats, communications, and training) since 2009 have
substantially complemented U.S. illicit trafficking detection and
monitoring operation. Panama has seized more drugs in the past three
years than the ten prior years combined. Nicaragua's Navy has become a
major deterrence to illicit maritime trafficking due to their fierce
reputation of pursuing 24/7. In June 2012, a week after receiving new
boats, the Costa Rican Coast Guard interdicted a go-fast carrying 1.1
tons of cocaine.
Deter and Disrupt Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and Defeat
VEO--After many years of U.S. assistance, Colombia has developed robust
train the trainer programs and provides counter-terrorist training to
countries across the globe.
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response--SOUTHCOM has witnessed a
decrease in requests for USSOUTHCOM support of disaster response
operations in Central America as the capabilities of our Partner
Nations increases. From 2007-2009, our Central American Partner
Nations' capacity to respond to flooding events within their borders
was frequently overwhelmed, resulting in several requests for DOD
support in the form of logistics (rotary airlift support), medical, and
engineering. From 2007 to 2009, USSOUTHCOM expended $4.6M conducting
disaster response operations in Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica. In
2010 and 2011, USSOUTHCOM expended $2.1M in disaster response
operations in El Salvador and Guatemala.
Global Peace Operations--SOUTHCOM's Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI) Program builds peacekeeping capacity in 11 select
Partner Nations allowing them to initiate participation in United
Nations Peace Support Operations (PSOs), increase troop contributions
to existing missions, or enhance the capability provided to a specific
PSO mission. Development of national PK capability results in
tangential benefits such as: (1) access to militaries that are more
challenging to deal with through traditional Security Assistance and
mil-to-mil initiatives, (2) significant skill set overlap between PK
and other military mission sets such as HA/DR, and (3)
professionalization of the Armed Forces to include respect for human
rights, protection of civilians (noncombatants), and civilian control
of the military.
Mr. Schilling. You mention the fact that Iran is becoming
increasingly involved in South and Central America. Have Iran sanctions
helped slow their progress in these areas?
General Fraser. Sanctions on Iran may have helped slow Tehran's
progress in developing relations in the region. In large measure, South
and Central American governments hesitate to further develop ties with
Iran due to concern over punishment for breaking the sanctions.
Sanctions restrain Iran from complying with its side of most economic
deals, souring many governments from pursuing growing economic ties.
For example, in early February 2012, Venezuelan President Chavez said
sanctions impede joint ventures with Iran.
Mr. Schilling. Can you speak to the positive outcomes of
maintaining our presence and capabilities at U.S. Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?
General Fraser. Absent a detention facility and even following the
eventual demise of the Castro regime, the strategic capability provided
by U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (NAVSTA GTMO) remains essential
for executing national priorities throughout the Caribbean, Latin
America and South America which also fall under the U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).
NAVSTA GTMO is a strategic U.S. base for the Caribbean
and the entire SOUTHCOM AOR. It provides a forward location that
enhances regional stability and essential logistics and potential
forward operating base for SOUTHCOM, Joint Interagency Task Force
South, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, and Drug
Enforcement Agency operations.
NAVSTA GTMO's organic logistics capabilities enable U.S.
forces to maintain better operational security and tactical advantage
when operating in this region. The Panama Canal expansion will increase
the amount of shipping transiting the Caribbean enroute to ports in the
U.S. and Europe. NAVSTA GTMO will help the U.S. maintain the security
of these maritime routes. NAVSTA GTMO is essential for possible migrant
interdiction operations. Because of its location, the provisions of the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act do not apply to persons
detained at this base. This provides the U.S. Government with a
neutral, humane, and safe location for processing migrants and other
detainees awaiting their final disposition. The Migrant Operations
Center (MOC) and Non-Domestic Migrant Processing Center at NAVSTA GTMO
are indispensible resources for any future mass migration events.
Mr. Schilling. You talk about the civil support and homeland
defense cooperation work that you do throughout the country, but I did
not see specific information about the Civil Air Patrol. How do you see
the inclusion of the Civil Air Patrol in your missions at NORTHCOM
especially with the great capabilities they have during natural
disasters?
General Jacoby. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP), in its status as the
Air Force Auxiliary, directly supports my missions in the NORTHCOM Area
of Responsibility, and I consciously integrate them early and often in
all phases of planning and response to contingencies. My air component,
Air Forces Northern, has specific approval authorities, as delegated
from Secretary of the Air Force, to employ CAP in the CONUS, which has
been completely responsive to my needs. A portion of the situational
awareness that I receive comes from the CAP in the form of disaster
imagery. This helps me plan what next steps to take with any arriving
Title 10 DOD forces, or to help scale the response appropriately. In
addition, the CAP continues to provide support to search and rescue
organizations throughout our country and I would certainly leverage
this expertise in any large scale disaster.
Mr. Schilling. Because of your homeland security missions you point
out your partnership with the National Guard. How is this continued
partnership for the Aerospace Control Alert possible with the
reductions of aircrafts that the Air Force has proposed?
General Jacoby. Our partnership with the National Guard is
paramount to homeland defense. The Air Force has provided me, through
the Air National Guard, sufficient assets to conduct our Aerospace
Control Alert mission. Despite the proposed cuts, I have the authority
to quickly increase NORAD's force posture to counter any threat that
may emerge. This is only possible in light of the complete confidence
we have in our National Guard partners.
Mr. Schilling. In your testimony you touch on aerospace threats and
specifically point to the fact that a terrorist threat still looms and
proliferation of advanced asymmetric capabilities is growing. Are there
specific ways or programs that Congress needs to examine to make sure
our airspace is not used to harm us again like we experienced on 9/11?
General Jacoby. NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to work many programs
and capabilities to deter, detect, and if necessary, defeat current and
emerging aerospace threats to the homeland. One of our biggest concerns
is our ability to detect and track potential threats at low altitude
with very small radar cross-sections, and much of our focus is centered
on these types of threats. To address these considerations, we continue
to collaborate with industry, Service and national laboratories, and
academia to evaluate a wide spectrum of surveillance and both lethal
and nonlethal engagement options. We will look to the Department and
Congress at the appropriate time in our analysis to seek suitable
levels of support through the President's Budget.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. How would you assess the performance of the E-8C JSTARS
to date in SOUTHCOM's AOR? Do your requirements for these platforms
outpace the number of planes available?
General Fraser. The performance of the E-8C JSTARS is outstanding
and provides an unmatched and available capability that supports Joint
Interagency Task Force South's (JIATF South) detection and monitoring
(D&M) wide area surveillance requirements to counter the illicit
trafficking in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). No other
asset currently can provide similar extended duration and as expansive
radar coverage. The E-8C JSTARS is uniquely equipped to provide wide
area surveillance (changing search time from hours to minutes) against
the flow of illicit maritime trafficking which comprises 89% of the
total flow of drugs into Mexico and the U.S. The E-8C JSTARS is a key
enabler that ensures effective and efficient utilization of JIATF
South's other limited allocation of air and maritime assets.
Understanding the global requirements on this low density airframe,
JIATF South and Air Combat Command support employing the E-8C JSTARS
using CONUS-based E-8C JSTARS aircraft that are designated for flying
training sorties two times a month on a not to interfere basis, and
provide 4-5 hours of station time on each flight. This mutually
beneficial relationship provides wide area maritime surveillance MTI
(Moving Target Indicator) capability for the AOR and needed training
opportunity for the JSTARS crewmembers to hone their skill sets. During
a recent two week deployment based out of Curacao, the E-8C JSTARS
provided millions of square miles of maritime D&M support and led to
the disruption of $3.6 million dollars of cocaine. Deploying the E-8C
JSTARS in the SOUTHCOM AOR supports DOD's ability to fulfill its
statutory D&M mission and to achieve the Office of National Drug
Control Policy stated cocaine removal goal for the transit zone.
It is our understanding that there are 17 JSTARS aircraft in the
inventory, and a number of those are in depot-level maintenance or
deployed to other combatant commands, which is why we make use of
training sorties in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The E-8C Joint STARS is the only
wide area maritime surveillance with MTI capability integrated in the
SOUTHCOM AOR and is considered a game-changing capability.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within SOUTHCOM
in building partnerships?
General Fraser. The U.S. Coast Guard provides forces to USSOUTHCOM
through its Districts Seven and Eleven to support to counter
transnational organized crime (air and surface) operations. The Coast
Guard also maintains bi-lateral agreements with most of the 33
countries in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility in support of the
counternarcotics mission and the mission to counter transnational
organized crime. They also work with Partner Nations as they conduct
bi-annual port safety security visits and host Partner Nations for
specialized training in the U.S. Coast Guard personnel are embedded in
the SOUTHCOM Headquarters staff, as well as in the Security Cooperation
Organizations in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, and Costa Rica,
actively participating in SOUTHCOM activities, operations, and
exercises.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of military bands within SOUTHCOM and
are they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering
greater understanding?
General Fraser. The military services oversee U.S. military bands
and establish the criteria for their support of official military
functions and community relations programs. They support official
ceremonies and functions sponsored and conducted by federal, state,
county and municipal governments. Within USSOUTHCOM's area of
responsibility, U.S. military bands help enhance the image of the U.S.
and the U.S. military during humanitarian missions like to SOUTHCOM-
sponsored Continuing Promise. Along with providing significant medical
care to disadvantaged people living in austere parts of the region, the
bands bring people together and foster greater understanding of the
U.S. and our intent. The military bands complement other activities
that support those objectives.
Mr. Scott. The hospital ships Comfort and Mercy are high-demand,
low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of
hospital ships, what roles and missions could they perform within
SOUTHCOM's AOR?
General Fraser. USNS COMFORT deployments provide medical, dental
and veterinary care, and conduct Humanitarian Civic Action engineering
projects in austere locations in support of CONTINUING PROMISE mission
objectives:
Train U.S. personnel and build local capacity in
cooperation with Partner Nation, Inter-Agency, Non-Governmental
and Private Volunteer Organizations, to conduct Civil-Military
Operations, including Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief.
Send a strong message of U.S. commitment and
partnership with the people of the Caribbean and Latin America.
Improve their preparedness to provide initial Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) support in
response to a crisis in the SOUTHCOM AOR. Over the past five
years, CONTINUING PROMISE has conducted more than 50 visits to
15 countries in the region, providing treatment to over 500,000
patients and training more than 100,000 FHA/DR responders.
Mr. Scott. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting
any countries within SOUTHCOM's AOR? If so, which countries?
General Fraser. U.S. flag and general officers are not banned by
law from visiting any countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR. However, there are
policy guidelines that establish the requirement for U.S. flag and
general officers to obtain higher level approval prior to travelling to
some countries within SOUTHCOM's AOR. For Example, as a matter of
policy, the State Department generally opposes travel to Cuba (not
Guantanamo Bay) by U.S. Government officials who are at/above the rank
of office director, GS-15, or O-6.
Mr. Scott. What is Hezbollah's center of gravity in Latin America?
General Fraser. Lebanese Hezbollah's center of gravity in Latin
America and the Caribbean is the clan-based, financial networks
generating tens of millions of dollars, primarily using the Free Trade
Zones (FTZs) in the region.
Lebanese Hezbollah support networks involved in licit and illicit
activities take advantage of relaxed oversight and the lack of
transparency in FTZs to launder the proceeds of crime both for personal
and Hezbollah organizational profit. Familial ties strengthen networks
integrating businessmen, shop attendants, couriers, local financial
specialists, and leaders worldwide.
Mr. Scott. What were the accomplishments of the U.S. Coast Guard in
2011?
General Fraser. The U.S. Coast Guard provided NORAD and USNORTHCOM
with excellent support in 2011. The ``Blackjack'' H-65 support in the
National Capital Region (NCR) and selected residential visits outside
the NCR was absolutely top notch as part of our integrated homeland
defense efforts. Furthermore, the U.S. Coast Guard provided security
and force protection for vessels engaged in the Military Outload
mission, ensuring critical logistics support for our troops overseas.
The U.S. Coast Guard also supported our top-tier exercises, VIGILANT
SHIELD and ARDENT SENTRY, incorporating their unique authorities, key
insights and experience as we exercised our homeland defense and civil
support plans. In addition, we collaborated with the U.S. Coast Guard
to develop a joint assessment of needed Arctic capabilities through the
DOD/Department of Homeland Security Capabilities Assessment Working
Group. Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard lent its extensive expertise to
our Theater Security Cooperation efforts through a series of Mobile
Training Team events with our international partners in Canada, Mexico
and The Bahamas.
Mr. Scott. Has SOUTHCOM ever considered creating a Coast Guard
subordinate command? If not, why not?
General Fraser. Service Component Commands are established by the
assignment of forces to a Combatant Commander in the ``Forces for
Unified Commands'' memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense
(SecDef). The force assignment process is governed by 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 162 which is a directive for the military departments. Although
the Coast Guard is an Armed Service under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 101, the
Department of Homeland Security is not a military department, and the
SecDef cannot assign Coast Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 162 while
the Coast Guard is operating as an Armed Service under DHS.
The Coast Guard allocates forces to SOUTHCOM and other combatant
commanders for specific mission requirements through the Global Force
Management (GFM) force allocation process. The GFM allocation process
provides appropriate mechanisms for mission validation and
prioritization to ensure that the Coast Guard is able to balance their
Title 14 and Title 10 mission responsibilities. Assignment of Coast
Guard forces under a Service Component Command could preclude their
availability for Title 14 missions.
Mr. Scott. According to a February 24, 2011, webmemo by Dr. James
Carafano and James Dean of The Heritage Foundation, ``America's
capacity to exercise its sovereignty, protect its interests, and
participate in global scientific research and commerce, however, is
collapsing.'' Do you agree or disagree with this assessment?
General Jacoby. I disagree. USNORTHCOM supports policy direction of
the President in the peaceful development of resources and scientific
research in the Arctic. To this end, on 13 March 2012, U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant ADM Papp and I signed the Arctic Capabilities Assessment
Group White Paper, which identifies near-, mid- and far-term shared
capability gaps and provides near-term investment recommendations for
the Arctic. Key enabling capabilities in the Arctic will center on
improved communications, domain awareness, smart infrastructure
investments, and leveraging training/exercising opportunities.
Mr. Scott. The U.S. had eight polar ice-breakers in 1970. Today,
the U.S. Coast Guard has three. Does the United States have the most
advanced and robust ice-breaker fleet in the world today? What is the
minimum number of ice-breakers required to maintain a U.S. presence in
the Arctic?
General Jacoby. According to the U.S. Coast Guard, two polar ice-
breakers are needed to meet minimum near-term requirements. In
addition, the U.S. Coast Guard's High Latitude Study identified a long-
term requirement of three heavy and three medium ice-breakers to
fulfill all statutory missions.
Mr. Scott. What were the accomplishments of the U.S. Coast Guard in
2011?
General Jacoby. The U.S. Coast Guard provided NORAD and USNORTHCOM
with excellent support in 2011. The ``Blackjack'' H-65 support in the
National Capital Region (NCR) and selected residential visits outside
the NCR was absolutely top notch as part of our integrated homeland
defense efforts. Furthermore, the U.S. Coast Guard provided security
and force protection for vessels engaged in the Military Outload
mission, ensuring critical logistics support for our troops overseas.
The U.S. Coast Guard also supported our top-tier exercises, VIGILANT
SHIELD and ARDENT SENTRY, incorporating their unique authorities, key
insights and experience as we exercised our homeland defense and civil
support plans. In addition, we collaborated with the U.S. Coast Guard
to develop a joint assessment of needed Arctic capabilities through the
DOD/Department of Homeland Security Capabilities Assessment Working
Group. Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard lent its extensive expertise to
our Theater Security Cooperation efforts through a series of Mobile
Training Team events with our international partners in Canada, Mexico
and The Bahamas.
Mr. Scott. What impact did the Coast Guard's antiquated fleet of
cutters and aircraft have on its ability to operate within your
respective AORs?
General Jacoby. There are several impacts in my AOR. The Coast
Guard's aging surface fleet, in particular major cutters, continues to
be challenged by unplanned maintenance resulting in a loss of
operational days at sea. The average age of the Medium Endurance Cutter
fleet is approaching 40 years and they are scheduled to be replaced by
Offshore Patrol Cutters. For example, within the Coast Guard's Atlantic
Area, the major cutter fleet (medium endurance cutters and high
endurance cutters) was underway for only 3,135 of the 3,669 days
originally planned for all missions in FY2011. Furthermore, USCG
Atlantic Area major cutters met 1,175 of the 1,446 days originally
planned in support of JIATF-South, a loss of 271 planned major cutter
days for the Drug Interdiction mission carried out collaboratively by
USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM via JIATF-South's law enforcement efforts. In
addition, the availability of C-130H aircraft continues to decline and
depot-level maintenance time and costs continue to grow, which reduces
operational hours for aircraft in my AOR.
Mr. Scott. Has NORTHCOM ever considered creating a Coast Guard
subordinate command? If not, why not?
General Jacoby. Yes, in 2007, USNORTHCOM conducted an
organizational mission analysis that considered a U.S. Coast Guard
subordinate command in regard to command and control in Alaska.
Ultimately, the current Memoranda of Agreement between DOD and DHS were
deemed sufficient to allow mutual support for homeland defense and
homeland security events, as they facilitate the rapid transfer of
forces between the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally, the
relationship between operational levels of the U.S. Coast Guard and
USNORTHCOM has grown much closer. For example, the Coast Guard Area
Commander now briefs me during biweekly Component Commander's Cross
Talk, and I have recently selected a Coastguardsman to serve as my
Staff Judge Advocate.
Mr. Scott. What homeland security missions could be performed by E-
8C JSTARS aircraft?
General Jacoby. JSTARS can enhance law enforcement agencies'
ability to counter transnational criminal organization (TCO) activities
through the use of JSTARS Moving Target Indicator and Synthetic
Aperture Radar detection and monitoring systems. JSTARS can communicate
with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) interdiction platforms to
support ground agents in the detection of illicit TCO activity. JSTARS
can also provide analysis of terrain and traffic patterns; geo-locate
TCO staging areas close to the border; confirm/deny TCO maritime
movement routes; link to other DOD operational and intelligence assets;
complement DHS Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
capabilities; conduct search and rescue; and nest with other agencies'
sensors in securing and defending of the homeland. Currently, JSTARS
provides support through Joint Task Force North to DHS counterdrug
missions primarily along the southern border and associated maritime
domain approaches.
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