[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-108]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 1, 2012
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_____
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana BILL OWENS, New York
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM RYAN, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHRIS GIBSON, New York HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JOE HECK, Nevada COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Kimberly Shaw, Professional Staff Member
William (Spencer) Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, March 1, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request from U.S. Pacific Command......... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, March 1, 2012.......................................... 29
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
WITNESSES
Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command..... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 33
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 35
Willard, ADM Robert F........................................ 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 65
Mrs. Davis................................................... 65
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 71
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 73
Mr. Forbes................................................... 70
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 74
Mr. Langevin................................................. 70
Mr. McKeon................................................... 69
Mr. Reyes.................................................... 69
Mr. Schilling................................................ 75
Mr. Scott.................................................... 75
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 73
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 1, 2012.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. You know
with the busy schedule we have had the last couple of weeks I
inadvertently overlooked the fact that we have a new Member of
our committee, my colleague from California, Jackie Speier. We
want to officially welcome you to the committee and are happy
that you are here with us.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed
Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from
Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the United States PACOM
[Pacific Command], more than 38 years of service, almost 39.
You have distinguished yourself as one of our top military
leaders, one of our top pilots. I understand that your claim to
fame is wearing the black hat, flying the enemy plane in ``Top
Gun.'' Congratulations you survived that.
Admiral Willard, thank you for your long, distinguished
service to our Nation. And thank you to Donna, your spouse,
your partner. She has also been a great support of the Navy. I
know when we were down there she was the--I don't know the
title but it was kind of like you did everything for the USS
California and their crew.
Admiral Willard. Sponsor.
The Chairman. Our newest attack submarine and I was able to
participate a little bit in that and saw the love that the crew
had for you and those who built that boat. So it was good to
see Admiral Willard taking your picture and fitting in the role
reversal model.
Admiral, with your retirement next week I know you have
been very busy handing over command to Admiral Sam Locklear. So
I thank you for taking the time to appear before this committee
one last time. I apologize in advance, we will be having some
votes. I know Members will be leaving, but we do really
appreciate you taking the time to be with us.
Our economy and security has never been more dependent on
our military, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The
President's new strategy focuses on a so-called pivot to the
Asia-Pacific. While I don't quite question the critical
importance of this theater, I am concerned that our forces may
not be properly postured to support this ship. The Chief of
Naval Operations has said that ship and aircraft deployments in
the Pacific would remain at current levels. Over the next 5
years we cut 16 ships out of our new construction budget and
retire 9 more. Further, our tanking and airlift capacity will
be reduced, limiting our ability to project power and sustain
our forces.
This budget does not address reductions to our nuclear
deterrent, but the Administration is reportedly contemplating
unilateral reductions below New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty] levels. As you have discussed often with us, quantity
does have a quality all of its own, especially in a theater
that covers half of the Earth's surface.
We must be prepared to effectively respond with the needed
manpower and assets. As I stated at last year's hearing, it is
important our forces in the Pacific have the personnel,
training, equipment, and the authorities they need to instill
confidence in our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to
respond decisively to any contingency. It is not yet clear how
the new strategy will meet these goals. Events in Asia can
change rapidly as we saw in December with the death of North
Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Alongside our South Korean allies,
our forces must be ready to deter further North Korean
provocation.
China's growing influence creates concern for many of our
regional allies. The balance of power against the Taiwan
Straits continues to shift in the direction of Beijing. The
South China Sea is a vital shipping lane through which more
than $5 trillion in trade passes each year. Deterring,
delaying, or denying U.S. forces from operating along China's
periphery is still a key goal of the People's Liberation Army.
As China's military budget continues to grow annually by double
digits, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] is focused on
improving their capacities to counter U.S. military
capabilities and exploit any potential weaknesses that we may
have.
We also see the growing threat of terrorism in the region
as aims of certain groups like LeT [Lashkar-e-Tayyiba] expand
beyond their traditional border disputes.
In partnership with our allies and friends, our forces must
stand ready to respond to unprovoked, hostile behavior and
defend our regional allies and security interests.
We look forward to your testimony and shedding the
additional light on the matters and the range of security
challenges that we face in the Pacific.
Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to join
you in welcoming Ms. Speier to the committee. It is great to
have her on. We have already worked on some issues that she has
been interested in on the Armed Services Committee. It is great
to have her on the committee and welcome. It is great to have
you join us.
I also definitely want to thank Admiral Willard for being
here today, but also for his service. He is retiring soon, his
last opportunity to testify before us, and we certainly want to
thank Mrs. Willard as well. It is a total team effort, a career
like the one that you built. And we really appreciate all of
have both done for our country.
I also appreciate talking to Mrs. Willard before and she
said that her presence she always thought it would make the
Members be nicer to Admiral Willard, but she did point out that
it never actually worked, but it is still sentiment. We really
appreciate all that you both have done, great service to our
country. And your last command incredibly important in the
Asia-Pacific theater, we have a number of allies and partners
in the region and a number of challenges in the region. I agree
with the list the chairman rolled out, trying to figure out how
to deal with the rising China, the unpredictability of North
Korea, a number of different terrorist groups in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and elsewhere. It is a critically
important region.
The Navy is one of our best, best allies in terms of
delivering a positive U.S. message; it shows our presence in
the region. I think that is the most important thing about our
strategy going forward. The President has said we are a Pacific
power. We want to make it clear to everyone in the world,
particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, that we will continue
to be a Pacific power, and the Navy is one of the best ways
that we demonstrate that. Our presence there builds those
partnerships and builds those relationships.
I remember reading somewhere that last year alone there
were over 700 port calls in Asia by the Pacific Command, and
all of those are opportunities to build relationships and build
friendships and build partnerships. Of course our Pacific
Command has responded to many natural disasters in the area,
most recently that earthquake and tsunami in Japan but
certainly the earthquake and tsunami before that in Thailand
and Indonesia.
You put the best face on U.S. policy in the region and we
really appreciate that work. It is critical that we give you
the resources to enable that mission to go forward.
I look forward to your testimony, look forward to your
answers to our questions, and again thank you very much for
your service and your leadership.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Willard. Thank you very much, Chairman McKeon. Mr.
Chairman, in order to accommodate the committee's questions
sooner, I will keep my remarks brief and ask that my full
statement be included for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Admiral Willard. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss United
States Pacific Command in the Asia-Pacific region. I would like
to begin by thanking you for recognizing my wife Donna and her
sponsorship of the USS California. She is present today and has
been at my side for nearly 38 years. She is an outstanding
ambassador for our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men
and women of our military and their families. Together we have
thoroughly enjoyed this experience both with our counterpart
foreign friends and with all of you who advocate for our men
and women in uniform. Thank you.
I would like to acknowledge this committee's enduring
support for our joint forces and by your actions their
contribution to our Nation's security. Your visits to the
region have been and will continue to be an important reminder
of the United States' national interests there.
North Korea, the world's only remaining nation divided by
armistice, continues to threaten peace and security in
Northeast Asia now under the leadership of a 29-year-old son of
Kim Jong-il. There we are observing closely for signs of
instability or evidence that leadership transition is
faltering. As General Thurman will attest in his testimony to
you, we believe that Kim Jong-un is currently tightly
surrounded by KJI [Kim Jong-il] associates and for the time
being that the succession in North Korea appears to be on
course.
With that said, we also believe Kim Jong-un will continue
to pursue his father's course of strategy that embraces
nuclearization, missile development, WMD [Weapons of Mass
Destruction] proliferation, provocations, and totalitarian
control over North Korean society.
As you stated, management of the China relationship
continues to be a challenge to U.S. Pacific Command on many
levels. Our military-to-military relationship is still not
where it should be. Although a strategic level exchange of
views with DOD [Department of Defense] persisted throughout
2011, the PLA continues to advance its military capabilities at
an impressive rate, is growing bolder with regard to their
expanding regional and global presence, and China continues to
challenge the United States and our partners in the region in
the maritime, cyber and space domains.
President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta recently
reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific and our
Nation's future focus on its security challenges in the
document ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense.'' It appropriately addressed the
opportunities and challenges that PACOM faces in a region
covering half the world and containing the majority of great
powers, economies, populations, and militaries.
Importantly, our five treaty allies, Australia, Japan,
South Korea, Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand,
together with many regional partners, represent the greatest
opportunities for the United States and Pacific Command to
contribute to a broad security association in the region. Of
particular note we seek to advance our important relationship
with India in South Asia.
We are making progress in adjusting PACOM's force posture
toward Southeast Asia, following overtures from Australia,
Singapore, and the Philippines to help enable and increased
rotational military presence in this important subregion.
As was evidenced by United States support to Japan during
the epic triple disaster last March, close military
cooperation, frequent exercises, and interoperable systems
merged to create the type of partnerships that take us to
levels of cooperation such that we are ready and effective.
Throughout the Asia-Pacific numerous transnational threats,
such as bio and extremist organizations, proliferation,
trafficking, piracy and perpetual natural and manmade
disasters, challenge our Nation and our allies and partners in
the region. Across this wide spectrum of current and potential
future threats PACOM must provide persistent overwatch,
ensuring our Nation retains continued strategic access and
freedom of movement in the global commons.
Amidst this challenges everyday our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and civilians devote their efforts to
contributing to Asia-Pacific security. Their success has long
been enabled by this committee's enduring support, including
the resources and quality of life that you provide them to
accomplish their important missions. During the 2\1/2\ years
that I have been in command you have allowed me and my
commanders to share our perspectives with you, sought to
understand the dynamics of this complex region, and traveled
and met with our military families and foreign partners. Yours
has been a powerful message and demonstration of U.S.
commitment to the 36 nations in the Asia-Pacific. On behalf of
the more than 330,000 men and women of the United States
Pacific Command, thank you for your support and for this
opportunity to testify one final time. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Admiral, and again thank
you for your distinguished career, your tremendous service to
the Nation. I think this command that you are retiring from is
one of the most important to our Nation and to the world. And
with the President's new switch in strategy and moving, as he
said, moving, I don't know exactly how he put it, but moving
more emphasis on the Pacific region, I think as we have had
other chiefs coming in and testifying talking about the budget
cuts and how we are going to be asked to do more with less, it
seems that no region will be asked to do more with less than
your command. And what I would like is if you could lay out for
us are you gaining any additional capacity or ability to carry
out this new effort? And could you let us know what in your
best military judgment the requirements, capabilities, any
potential gaps that we should be looking at as we go through
the budget process and reaffirming this announcement by the
President. Please.
Admiral Willard. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. And I think one
of the relevant questions of the day, given both the budget
that has been presented and the strategy that has been
articulated by the President, by Secretary of Defense Panetta.
U.S. Pacific Command in the 2\1/2\ years that I have been in
command and in my previous assignment as U.S. Pacific Fleet,
has been well served I think by the Nation in terms of the
force structure that is there. And while we have been there we
have been endeavoring to adjust posture to optimize the forces
that we do have. We have been at war for 10 years and during a
decade of warfare we have given to the theater, as all the
combatant commanders have, such that particularly our Army and
our Marine Corps have been decremented by about 10 percent as
they have rotated in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan over the
last 10 years.
When you ask the question will we gain more, I think as we
draw down from two wars that are now a decade old, we will see
a recovery of particularly the ground forces that have been so
dedicated to those conflicts. As well the strategy that has
been laid out by the President and Secretary of Defense
prioritize the security environment globally, and I think that
is very important to both recognize and then track to ensure
that we actually take the actions that those words I think so
appropriately establish. And it provides focus on the Asia-
Pacific region as one of those important security environments
globally. And your summary of the rationale, the reasons why I
think was very accurate.
So I think what is important is to recognize that even in a
situation where the budget will cause for force reductions
postwar and given our current economic environment within the
country, that where we bias the forces that we do have will be
most relevant, and given the focus on the Asia-Pacific and the
focus on the Middle East, I think that in the future we should
anticipate that the force structure that we attempt to optimize
will be biased in those directions. So I expect U.S. Pacific
Command to continue to be well served.
So to the extent that the budget focuses on particular
capabilities, ballistic missile defense, cyber and others, I
think all the combatant commanders will enjoy increased
emphasis there, but in the Pacific Command I look forward to
the ground forces in particular, our special forces, returning
to the region on a permanent basis and for the focus to be
represented by a biasing of other forces such as our Naval
forces and Air forces there.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Admiral, give us a little bit of a
look at the repositioning of troops between Okinawa, Guam,
mainland Japan and Hawaii. And I was particularly concerned
with how it impacts Guam and when those plans are going to be
finalized, and how you see us resolving the continuing
difficulty on Okinawa in terms of how we place Marine Corps
base there, trying to shut down Futenma but we can't find a new
place. How do you see that coming out? The sooner we can figure
it out the better for all involved, but certainly for Guam and
particularly to understanding exactly what they are going to
have. Just give us a little bit of a preview on what is
happening with that.
Admiral Willard. As you know, we are still in discussions
with the Japanese on this. We have working groups on both sides
that are attempting to finalize plans for the 8,000 or so
marines that we committed in 2006 to redistribute from Okinawa.
And you refer to a Futenma replacement facility, the air field
that actually contains the rotary wing lift for the marines
that are currently on Okinawa and, as a separate issue within
the Defense Policy Review Initiative, the shift of the location
of that airfield from the urban area in Okinawa to Camp Schwab,
an area further north on the island.
In the past within the Defense Policy Review Initiative,
DPRI, the two were linked together, FRF, the Futenma
Replacement Facility, and the movement of the 8,000 marines.
One of the agreements between Japan and the United States
recently was to delink the two so that the challenges, the
policy challenges that have been posed that have caused delays
and the Futenma replacement facility could be dealt with
separate from the issues of Guam and other sites for our Marine
Corps. And at the same time, the Marine Corps, Secretary
Panetta and U.S. Pacific Command, in the course of
deliberations of optimum sites for our marines, given both the
economic environment that we are in and the specific strategic
needs of U.S. Pacific Command in the region to have those
marines sited properly, have been working on the distribution
of both the headquarters elements from Okinawa and the marine
troops from Okinawa and where they should be located. And
presently the view is for about 4,700 marines to be located on
the island of Guam and others to be distributed to sites such
as Hawaii and, as you know, a rotational presence out of
Darwin, Australia. Those combinations are part of the ongoing
working group deliberations with Japan and the United States.
There is a way to go with it and the Futenma replacement
facility issue has resulted in strong advocacy by Tokyo, by the
governance there, and continued challenges locally in Okinawa.
And we think that Camp Schwab remains the best option. The
Government of Japan appears to sanction that. We will continue
the deliberations with them and attempt to see progress made
over the coming year.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Admiral. Thank you.
The Chairman. We are well into the first vote. Looks like
there is going to be five votes. What I am going to do is call
on Mr. Bartlett and then we will resume questioning as we
return back from the vote.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Admiral, thank you very
much for your long years of service to our country. For several
years now I have been watching a global phenomenon that could
enormously affect your area of responsibility and I wanted to
get your insights into it. The United States has only 2 percent
of the known reserves of oil in the world. We use 25 percent of
the world's oil. China has even on its mainland less oil than
we have. They do not yet use as much as we. But last year they
bought more automobiles than we bought in this country so their
use of oil is increasing.
China is very aggressively buying oil all over the world.
While we are an enormously larger user of oil than China, we
are buying oil reserves nowhere in the world. And I am
wondering why you think China is buying oil reserves all over
the world. Sir, it doesn't make any difference today who owns
the oil, the person who comes with the dollars, and let's hope
it stays dollars, who comes with the dollars to the global oil
auction gets the oil they need. Why would we not be buying oil
when China is very aggressively buying reserves of oil all over
the world?
Admiral Willard. Congressman Bartlett, I can't speak to
U.S. rationale for its oil energy policies in their entirety. I
would certainly direct you to the Department of Energy to
answer that question, but I would offer to your point China is
very much interested in energy sources globally, as is India.
We have more than one nation, as you know, in the Asia-Pacific
region that are both industrial, growing, expanding economies
and very much interested in energy resources worldwide. Energy
security is a concern of the United States Pacific Command;
both the security of the energy as it moves around the world
and the potential disputes that challenges and competition over
energy could generate. And so we pay a great deal of attention
to the issues in regions such as the South China Sea and
emerging regions in the Indian Ocean where energy is being
tapped. And again to your point, there is great competition for
this; China, India, Japan and others very much concerned about
their access to energy and their ability to secure it globally.
Mr. Bartlett. At the same time that China is buying oil
reserves all over the world, they are very aggressively, as you
know, sir, building a blue water navy. They don't really need a
blue water navy if they are only interested in protecting their
shores, do they? Won't a brown water navy do just fine there?
Admiral Willard. The Chinese have been fairly clear in
their desire to not only have a navy that can project itself
within the region immediately surrounding China, but also be
influential enough to both protect its interests and contribute
to global security concerns elsewhere beyond the first island
chain region and out into the Pacific as well as in the Indian
Ocean. As you know, they have committed now for several years
to counter piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden. I think that
their focus is on sea lines of communication that they consider
to be vital to their commerce and to their economy.
Mr. Bartlett. They have 1,300,000 people, 900 million of
them in rural areas that through the miracle of communications
know the advantages of industrialized economy, and they are
saying, Hey, guys, what about us?
Do you think that there is a possibility that with their
need to satisfy the needs of this huge population that the time
would come and they would say, Hey, guys, I am sorry but we own
the oil and we can't share it? Wouldn't that require a big blue
water navy to make sure they control the sea lanes so that they
could absolutely certify that the oil was theirs and they would
not need to share it with the rest of the world?
Admiral Willard. Again, I think China's view of the need
for a blue water navy as they see their economy expand and
their great power status establish itself, they would reflect
on other great economies and great powers and the use of navies
and other arms of their military to secure and protect what is
theirs.
I wouldn't speculate that China has designs on challenging
the rest of the world with regard to what is on the waterways.
In fact our military-to-military engagement with China is aimed
at both learning to coexist with their military and also
ensuring that at the end they are a constructive contributor to
global security and not an impediment to it. So I would have a
more optimistic view of the trends with regard to the PLA-Navy
and what their goals are. We don't believe that their goals are
to challenge other nations' access to energy or other commerce
but rather to secure their own.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, sir. I hope you are right.
The Chairman. Thank you. We will recess now for votes. We
will return back as soon as the votes are done.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Thank you for your patience. The committee
will come to order.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Admiral Willard,
thank you so much for all of your service, all of these years.
You have so many great experiences and reflections I am sure.
If I get through my questions I want to ask you to give
Congress a word of advice, if you might, from what you have
seen in the give and take, and it doesn't all have to be
positive. I want you to go out on a limb a little bit since you
are retiring. Okay?
The first question I wanted to ask you was about the
retiring seven cruisers. And I understand that we sometimes get
about 35 years of service, most of these have 20, I know that
some are in a state of disrepair that they don't want to move
forward with, but on the other hand there is a concern about
that. Do you share that? And what does it take to bring them
back to service if in fact we do retire them?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, a great question. In my
previous assignment I was a Pacific fleet commander and I spent
a considerable amount of time worrying over life cycle
maintenance and challenges associated with our surface ship
Navy. And I have had the discussions fairly recently with our
Chief of Naval Operations with regard to his plans and the 30-
year shipbuilding plan in order to produce enough ships to be
able to accommodate our security needs throughout the world.
And as was mentioned earlier, as a combatant commander and
especially one in a maritime area such as the Asia-Pacific, a
quantity of surface ships has a quality all its own. And there
is time distance factors in this area of responsibility that
are unique in the world.
The overall ship count in my view matters, but matters less
than what we do with those ships when we have them. And the
Chief of Naval Operations I think would attest that his plan
calls for a gradual increase in our ship count, but that it
won't occur in the next several years, it occurs beyond that as
a consequence of some of the decommissionings and retirements
that are ongoing.
So the short answer is, am I concerned? We are always
concerned about the number of ships and type model series of
ships to meet our needs throughout the world. I have been well
served both as a Pacific fleet commander and now as a Pacific
Command commander that the forward-deployed Naval force and the
other Naval forces concentrated in San Diego and Pearl Harbor
and forward in Guam have been adequate to serve our presence
needs in the region. I am confident that given the priorities
that President Obama has established and that Secretary Panetta
has very much supported, the Asia-Pacific will continue to get
the number of and type of surface ships that it needs.
We will still have, I think, a little over 80 Aegis ships
that will continue to serve our Navy. And I know a lot about
the life cycle challenges that the Chief of Naval Operations
faces and his need to retire some of these ships earlier than
the ideal life cycle would have called for. But I think he does
that eyes wide open. He does that knowing that eventually we
will recover from this.
Mrs. Davis. Are they sometimes brought back?
Admiral Willard. They are sometimes brought back. I guess
the most notable example would be our battleships that were
retired after World War II and some of those were recovered,
recommissioned four times in the course of my career. Actually
as they were brought back into service for varying conflicts
and at varying times when we were in buildup periods within our
Navy. So it is possible to reconstitute the ships that we
retire and we can actually put ships into lay-up status in a
decommissioned status at varying levels so that we can bring
them back quicker. Sometimes they take longer.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Admiral. I just wanted to say at the
onset that San Diego is very proud to play the critical role
they are playing now in the Pacific, and I think we anticipate
being able to do that. We are not moving and neither is the
Navy. So we appreciate that very much.
My time is up. I just want to, on personnel issues with
families do you see particular challenges that families and
personnel have in the Pacific that you would like to address?
And you can do that with me at another time if you would like.
Admiral Willard. Yes.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired if you
could respond to her for the record, please.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 65.]
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral, we do
thank you for your service. We are going to miss you a great
deal as you retire, but we thank you for all that you have
done. This is probably one of the most delicate parts of your
job in coming in here and testifying and knowing what you can
say and what you can't say. But I know that when we established
our network of bases in the region we did so partly to ensure
that we would never have to fight our way in again. And the
question I would ask you is what would be the impact on your
ability to perform the duties that you need to perform if we
were to bring especially the marines back on to the continental
United States? Because you know we have a lot of voices that
say we ought to no longer have them forward deployed.
And the second thing is how much is it going to impact you
if we do away with the prepositioned stocks that we have been
having in the Pacific?
The third thing, I hate to give you three, but the third
one is, I am concerned, like you said, sometimes numbers start
becoming a serious thing in and of themselves. How do you see
the comparison between the number of subs we are going to have
and the number of subs the Chinese will have over the next 8-
year period in the Pacific?
Admiral Willard. Thank you. Should the marines be withdrawn
from their period presence in the Pacific to Garrison in the
United States, it would be very impacting to the United States
Pacific Command. The marines that are located in Okinawa now on
paper, about 18,000 strong--they have been decremented over the
course of the wars to 13,000 or so--are generally our first
responders in the region, disaster response. We respond to
natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region on the average of
once every 8 weeks. Most recently we were in Thailand and the
marines were in Thailand to handle some of the deflooding, some
of the flooding challenges that they had when Thailand
experienced the worst flooding in 50 years. And a year ago
nearly today when Japan had its epic series of disasters, the
3rd Marine Expeditionary Force commander himself and the
marines deployed immediately to northern Honshu to assist the
Japanese ground forces in the recovery efforts following the
tsunami and earthquake, continued earthquake series that
occurred there.
Our marines are part of every contingency plan that we
have. And when you consider the time-distance factors in the
Pacific, the largest ocean in the world, it is very important
that we maintain the posture and presence forward that we do.
In fact I was asked, have been asked many times what is most
important to you, and it is the forward presence within the
Asia-Pacific simply because of the time-distance challenges
that we face there and being able to be responsive as flexible
as we need to be.
And I guess the last point I would make is our marines, our
ground forces, the nations in the Asia-Pacific, even those that
are some of the largest archipelagos in the world, like
Indonesia, and Philippines, and even Japan, have militaries
that are generally ground force centric, they are army centric,
surprisingly. And the ground forces are a major tool for
engagement and capacity building within these nations and our
marines play a special role in that. So their forward presence
to me is very, very vital.
Mr. Forbes. How about prepositioned stocks?
Admiral Willard. Prepositioned stocks, not just servicing
our marines but servicing virtually any contingency in the
area? Again very, very vital. I know that there have been
discussions with regard to putting some of our prepositioned
stocks into a lesser readiness status. Fortunately there is no
plan to do that with our prepositioned stocks in Guam or Diego
Garcia, and they are vital to me as well. So the prepositioned
stocks are necessary in our contingency planning but they are
also a source that we exercise with our marines on a frequent
basis to ensure that we know how to use them correctly.
Mr. Forbes. I only have 20 seconds left. Can you hit me
with your forecast of where we are going to match up over the
next 8, 10 years with our subs versus what you see happening
with China in the Pacific?
Admiral Willard. Submarine activity in China, the growth in
both capability and capacity has been impressive to watch in
the submarine force. And our submarines fortunately are biased
60 percent in the Pacific and that is very helpful. So it is
necessary, I think, that the United States maintain a
substantial submarine force in the Pacific and the forward
presence of our submarines as well in order to contend with all
the challenges that we face there and the submarine community
contributes to a lot of what we do.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard,
thank you for appearing before this subcommittee today and for
your many years of service to our Nation. As the chairman has
mentioned and you mentioned yourself this morning, this will be
your last appearance in a policy hearing before this committee
as you will be retiring later this year. With that in mind, I
just want to thank you again for your nearly 40 years of
service to this country and to the sacrifices that you have
made to ensure that we continue to have those freedoms that we
all enjoy and that so many take for granted. You have our most
sincere gratitude.
I would like to start, really to continue on with the
discussion that my colleague Mr. Forbes just raised with the
future of Naval assets. With the coming focus, added focus and
the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and China's continued
investments in power projection and A2/AD [anti access area
denial] capabilities, can you speak to the future utilization
of our submarine force? Specifically, can you discuss the need
for the capabilities offered by the Virginia class submarines
and the future challenges presented by a declining submarine
fleet size?
Admiral Willard. First, I don't think there is a question
that the United States possesses the finest submarine force the
world has ever seen. And I have every confidence in our
submarines in the Pacific and anywhere else in the world that
they can perform the job that they perform and the very quiet
way that they go about achieving that. So we rely on our
submarines greatly for a great many things. They are
multimission capable assets and we employ them globally, and
again they serve to secure the Pacific in every way.
The Virginia class submarine is our newest, most
formidable, and provides increased capacities in some cases
that we very much need. I am not prejudiced because my wife has
sponsored one. I would offer that the Virginia class subs are
the best submarine the world has probably ever seen. And that
is not to take away from the great service our Los Angeles
class have performed. They have done remarkably well and they
continue to perform remarkably well across our oceans.
Submarines happen to be an area where there is a
proliferation in this part of the naval forces throughout the
Asia-Pacific. Vietnam is acquiring additional submarines, the
Japanese are acquiring submarines, Malaysia recently acquired
submarines, Indonesia has designs on increasing its submarine
fleet. India just took possession of a Russian submarine that
is very capable. So we see the submarine forces in the region
themselves proliferating, not to mention China's advancing
submarine capability.
It is important that the submarine forces among our allies
and partners are coordinated with our own efforts, and again I
think we establish a pretty good benchmark for everyone to
consider in terms of how to professionally employ that
particular asset. Great boats.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. With regard to cyber security,
which I focus a great deal on, I believe that we can no longer
expect to have a single domain conflict. I am pleased that you
mentioned that several times this morning, obviously it is on
your radar, and you realize what a challenge we face in that
area. And quite frankly, the low barriers to entry into the
cyber arena means that any future conflict will have a cyber
dimension. To that end I am very concerned about the
capabilities of our basis to withstand a cyber attack directed
against outside supporting infrastructure. So much is owned and
operated by the private sector which we don't control, such as
the electric grid. And I have had conversations with Secretary
Panetta, General Dempsey, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert,
and many others before this committee about the resilience in
the face of such a threat. Have you examined the ability of our
bases in PACOM's AOR [Area of Responsibility] to operate and
recover in the event of such an attack? Do you feel that our
bases and networks are adequately resourced in the cyber domain
and have the resilience to support full spectrum operations in
the face of coordinated A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial] cyber
threats?
Admiral Willard. I have examined it. I think
vulnerabilities exist and I am as concerned as you are with
regard to the cyber threat. I think it threatens not only
infrastructure broadly across the United States and elsewhere
in the region among our allies and partners as well, but it
also challenges every day my command and control capabilities
in the region, whether that is to the bases or to the forces
that are afloat or flying themselves. Cyberspace of all the
domains is probably the most broadly challenged right now and
most in need of very strong governance and the necessary
authorities to defend it both passively and actively.
I think Cyber Command was a great initiative on the part of
the United States. I work very closely with Keith Alexander. We
are conducting a year long pilot in the Pacific right now
trying to advance our cyber defense capabilities and we will
continue to do that. We have done that for several years, and I
think we are making progress. But across domains, I am
concerned about the maritime certainly in the region, I am
concerned about space, I think I am concerned about cyberspace
most of all.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you again.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral,
very much for being here. My father served with the 14th Air
Force, the Flying Tigers, in India and China. And so, as you
know, military service impacts your whole family. And so I grew
up with a real understanding and appreciation of how
hardworking and capable the people of India and China are. It
has been really good to see the developing relationship with
India. Because of my dad's service I became the chairman of the
India Caucus. So I have seen a relationship develop between our
countries. What is the status of the partnership with India?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, great question, and thank you
for bringing India up and South Asia as a very important
subregion within the Asia-Pacific.
The relationship with India is strong and growing stronger.
It is not without its challenges. We don't have a great, a long
history between the countries, as you know. We went through a
cold war without much of a relationship at all and following
the nuclear tests in the late 1990s, we suspended relations
government-to-government. So we have really only been
acquainted with India in the past decade. And mil-to-mil we
began at a pretty nascent stage and have progressed to the
point that today we exercise with India across all the
Services. It is one of the most significant security assistance
programs that we have in the Asia-Pacific theater right now. I
think government-to-government the United States and India have
made great progress. And I have had the opportunity to be
introduced into India's senior leadership and they are very
interested in an ongoing relationship with the United States.
At the same time they pride themselves in what they term
strategic autonomy, kind of a nonalliance philosophy. And as a
consequence of that, we are challenged in the relationship by
virtue of India seeking to balance its associations with many
other nations as well. We are challenged in our relationship
with Pakistan as a consequence of the animosity that has
existed historically between India and Pakistan. And India is
in a very challenged part of the world, as we all know, with
Afghanistan close by, Pakistan is a neighbor, the Kashmir issue
which has persisted for a long time, and disputed border
between India and China. So there are a lot of issues on the
plate and we are seeking to continue to dialogue with India,
terror being one of them, and try to improve the relations
where we can.
Mr. Wilson. I was grateful to be in Islamabad last week
during the same time that the Speaker of the Indian Parliament
of all things was visiting. And so to see the relationship and
trade has resumed between India and Pakistan and to me a stable
Pakistan, the greatest beneficiary would be India. So I hope
that is the case. In fact too they have a joint enemy, that is
LeT. And of course LeT led the murderous assault on Mumbai.
What efforts are being made to counteract that level of
terrorism?
Admiral Willard. Yeah, thank you. We have currently special
forces assist teams, Pacific assist teams is the term, laid
down in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives as well as
India, and we are working very closely with India with regard
to their counterterrorism capabilities. And in particular on
the maritime domain, but also government-to-government, not
necessarily DOD but other agencies assisting them in terms of
their internal counter terror and counter insurgency. Lashkar-
e-Taiba is very dangerous, Pakistani based, very good
operational security, and a lot of international design in
terms of their aspirations. So it is a very important threat
and we are working very closely with the nations in the region
to help contain it.
Mr. Wilson. That is really very positive. Another positive
spot is Palau and the strategic significance of Palau with the
territory of Guam that we appreciate so much. For America what
are we doing working with Palau?
Admiral Willard. We just changed over the small team of
engineers that we maintain in Palau on a continual basis. I
think our Army engineers just turned over with Navy Seabees in
a ceremony in the region. Palau is one of our compact
association states. There are three, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. Strategically the
three provide a southern flank to Guam which is obviously a
very strategic territory of the United States. I am obligated
to defend the compact states, and we work closely with the
compact states on many of their challenges. Small teams of
engineers is one method of doing that, but we also frequently
visit with Pacific partnership and Pacific angel, the hospital
ship, and provide engineering, veterinary and medical services
where we can.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
Willard, thank you for your dedicated service and your
testimony today, and I know this will be one of your last times
before Congress. I want to take this opportunity to thank you
and your wife Donna for the services to our country. I think
you are the Navy's number one team.
Admiral Willard. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. As you know, the realignment of marines from
Guam to Okinawa has recently undergone significant changes. And
I appreciate DOD's recent efforts to address local concerns
about the rotational forces. However, I do remain concerned
that this decision was driven primarily by concerns raised in
the Senate, not this committee, as well as budgetary
considerations.
Can you elaborate on the strategic rationale for these
proposed changes? Aren't we just potentially shifting costs
from MILCON [Military Construction] over to O&M [Operations and
Maintenance] accounts over the long term?
Admiral Willard. I have been part of the Global Posture
Review by the Department of Defense over the course of the last
couple of years. Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, as you
recall, called for that review following the last Quadrennial
Defense Review. And the posture review has been a hard look at
where United States Pacific Command forces are.
Notwithstanding defense policy review initiative with
Japan, but where they are broadly. And there was a strong
desire to balance the forces more effectively in Southeast Asia
and South Asia. Right now as you know, all of the permanent
forces, with the exception of those in Guam and those in
Singapore, are by and large in Northeast Asia. Whether or not
they are permanently based or rotational forces is
inconsequential, frankly, to me. I can work with either one.
There are benefits to both.
In general, when we think of our foreign partners and their
appetite for permanent bases, there isn't one. So rotational
force presence, for example in Darwin, Australia, I think will
be very effective.
What is most important to me is that the forces that we
have present in Guam and elsewhere are maintained at a
readiness level where they can be the first responders in the
region so they have to dwell there long enough to be trained
and exercised and equipped, resourced and engaging on a fairly
continuous basis.
So the duration with which they are present in Guam matters
to me. And the work, the ability to lift those marines or other
forces where they can do the most good matters to me as well.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Admiral. The next question I have
is last year General Dunford testified before the Readiness
Subcommittee that it would take seven consecutive miracles to
move marines from CONUS [Continental United States] to respond
to contingencies or operational plans in PACOM AOR if portions
of the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Forces] were based in
CONUS. Now, do you share this view and could you elaborate on
some of the strategic considerations why III MEF, Marine
Expeditionary Forces, need to remain in the PACOM AOR?
Admiral Willard. Well, the Pacific Command AOR, just as a
review, extends from the West Coast of the United States to a
dividing line between India and Pakistan. But the fact that it
covers half the world and that the Asia-Pacific theater extends
entirely across the Pacific Ocean, the strategic imperative
that the marines be forward and present exists. In fact that is
true for all the Service forces.
So the fact that we have Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Special Operations Forces readily accessible,
forward and present in the Asia-Pacific, very crucial because
of the lift requirements at great expense and time to cover the
distances involved in bringing them from garrison in the United
States. So very, very important strategically to Pacific
Command that the forces are forward and accessible.
And we talk about forces beyond the international dateline.
Frankly, I think the forces that are located in Hawaii are
strategic in terms of their ability to respond into the region.
But forces on the West Coast become more problematic simply
because they have to be mobilized and moved such a great
distance.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral, and again
thank you for your service to our country.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you for
your service and certainly your distinguished career.
I chair the Strategic Forces subcommittee so as you go from
that subcommittee we have nuclear weapons, missiles, missile
defense, space--several areas that overlap within your area of
expertise. I have three questions. Two I am going to lump
together, even though they are not similar. The two I lump
together I know you can provide an answer as your perspective
on these occurrences.
Secretary Gates referenced when he was at the Shangri-la
conference in June of 2011 a potential new North Korea mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile. He said: With the continued
developments of long-range missiles and potentially a road-
mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued
development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the process
of becoming a direct threat to the United States.
Admiral, I would like your thoughts on the development by
North Korea of this ballistic missile technology, a road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile, and your thoughts on what
must be done to counter such a threat.
And then secondly, our subcommittee held a hearing last
year on Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons modernization
programs. And one hearing that I had I think was the first
actually in Congress to discuss a report authored by Dr. Phil
Karber, and the report detailed an unclassified report of the
existence of a large Chinese tunneling program, perhaps 5,000
kilometers of tunnels. In fact, the tunneling seems to have
doubled from 25 kilometers to 5,000 kilometers in the past 20
years.
Would you please discuss why you believe China is racing to
construct these elaborate underground facilities and what are
they trying to protect, hold at risk? How many of these tunnels
are we able to hold at risk with our U.S. nuclear weapons
technology? What do you propose or suppose the tunnel's purpose
is, Admiral?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Congressman. First on the issue
of road-mobile, as you know we are challenged by mobile missile
systems. That is why they are created. I mean, holding mobile
missile systems at risk is always problematic for any armed
force and we are no exception.
There is development within North Korea of a road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile system that we have
observed. We have not observed it being tested yet, to my
knowledge, and we are watching the development very closely.
The missile system is advertised to be significant in terms
of its range capability, and I think it is something that we
will continue to monitor very, very closely as it develops. And
you know, what will it mean to us when it proves itself? There
will be a decision made with regard to how we posture to deal
with what could be something less predictable than Taepo Dong
II or some of the other ballistic missile capabilities that are
a little more easy to observe.
Mr. Turner. Before we go on to China, as you just said, the
ability to hold the missile at risk because it is mobile means
I am presuming that there should be that much more of increased
focus on defense, if this is a system that we should face in
its use; is that correct?
Admiral Willard. I think that is one of the posture options
that will have to be considered, yes.
Mr. Turner. And the Chinese tunnels?
Admiral Willard. Many nations in the Asia-Pacific region
utilize hardening of facilities in order to provide for their
security, their defense. I would offer that North Korea is a
prime example of this, where tunneling is very much a part of
the defensive infrastructure in the--among the armed forces in
North Korea with regard to their being hardened and defensible.
We see it, frankly, in many locations. China, no exception. The
tunneling activities associated with China's submarine force is
very obvious and have been widely publicized.
When we anticipate the purpose of that, the purpose of that
is generally to provide both a hardened environment for the
force structure that they utilize there, whatever that happens
to be.
Mr. Turner. Which you presume to be?
Admiral Willard. I think we would take that into closed
session and discuss it. But, again, there is the point of
hardening. There is also the point of being able to move forces
in tunnels, unobserved. So there are a variety of benefits that
come from developing underground facilities to occupy the needs
of the Armed Forces. And again, China is one example; there are
many in the world.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Admiral, for your incredible service to our country and to your
spouse for standing with you.
I have a question. As we move into an era of shrinkage in
terms of our fleets, and we look at new ways to be innovative
and efficient, I am told that there are ways in which we can
transfer our troops from our large ships by keeping them in
the--in place, rather than spending 6 months getting to where
they are supposed to be serving their time there, and then
spending 6 months returning to the United States for
maintenance and repair. And in particular, there is a
suggestion that has been made by a number of people who are
fairly noteworthy, that we could basically fly in new troops to
these destroyers and cruisers rather than have them moving
across the waterways long distances that take as much as 6
months. Do you have any thoughts on that?
Admiral Willard. Being a sailor and having deployed 6 or
more months many, many times, I certainly have an opinion on
it. I think that--a couple of important things to note. First
of all, the suggestion that we can fly in, fly out crews and
locate a ship in a distant port has been experimented with in
fairly recent times within the last decade. We have attempted
to at least demonstrate the capability to do this. It comes at
some expense. There are disadvantages to it. And one of the
disadvantages is the ability of that ship to be brought back to
a location where it can be maintained properly.
So it is generally, if we talk about ships forward in
Australia or ships forward in Singapore, there has to be a
place to service those ships when they require it, in order to
achieve the life cycle duration that we desire out of those
ships. And there is the continuity associated with a crew
manning a ship for a long period of time. So flying in, flying
out crews is also a challenge that has to be overcome in that
scenario.
That said, one of the discussions that we are having
regarding the overture that Singapore made to perhaps utilize
Changi Naval Base for our littoral combat ships, one of the
concepts for doing that would be a rotational presence of the
ship's crew. So it is possible, it comes with advantages and
disadvantages. It is not without cost. And I think there are
times when it is appropriate.
I think the rotational cycle that we have developed with
the ships coming out of the major force concentration area,
fleet concentration areas in the United States has been
effective. And it is not as if we are not conducting business
as soon as we leave port, I mean, whether it is training and
exercise or whether it is the opportunity to touch many areas
across the Pacific. The transit of ships is not without utility
to me I guess is the way I would put it.
Ms. Speier. So you are suggesting there is a cost
associated to it. What I have been told is that you can do with
3\1/2\ ships what normally takes 5 ships and you can actually
see an efficiency of 40 percent. So I am a little confused as
to whether there are cost savings here or costs associated with
doing that.
Admiral Willard. Well, there will be costs either way. Once
again, the idea of rotating crews forward to man up a ship,
leaving that ship in place, comes with its own dynamics in
terms of how we manage that ship's maintenance cycles and so
forth. So it is not without its challenges.
What you are referring to is what it takes to maintain a
single ship forward in terms of the cyclical nature of
deployment, when we are conducting forward deployment. And
typically it is about four to make one, to your point.
I would again contend that there are advantages to that.
One of the advantages is the ability to return the ship and
return the crews to a home base and a level of continuity and
maintenance continuity that advantages the ship. And it is not
as if there is a point A, point B in this calculus. When ships
transit the Pacific, we have them working the entire time they
are in transit, whether it is in the southern Pacific, island
nations, territorial areas, or whether it is forward in the
western Pacific or whether it is in the Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf region. So----
Ms. Speier. My time has expired.
Admiral Willard. Ships that deploy are continually in work.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard,
thank you so much for joining us today. I deeply appreciated
you hosting our congressional delegation that visited the
Pacific Command during the summertime. That was one of the most
eye-opening and rewarding experiences of my service here in
Congress. So I thank you. And thank you for your 39 years of
service to our Nation and to our Navy. From being a squadron
commander to carrier commander, to fleet command, to being part
of what I think is one of the greatest movies ever made, that
is an absolutely stellar career. We deeply, deeply appreciate
it. It is an honor to have men such as yourself leading our All
Volunteer Force.
And Donna, thank you for your unlimited passion for our
sailors and for our Navy and your commitment. You have been a
stellar example of service and sacrifice to our Nation and to
our military. So thank you so much. It is great to have such a
great Navy family out there serving this Nation. So we deeply
appreciate that.
Admiral Willard. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. I wanted to ask this question. You had spoken
about the new strategy in the Asia-Pacific. As we look at that,
and we are looking at $487 billion in reductions to defense
budgets, my question is this: Are you going to be able to
achieve that new strategy with these reductions? And I think
you are being asked to do an awful lot with a lot less.
And if we look at what is happening, you look at the SCN
[Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] Navy account being reduced,
you look at the number of ships being reduced. You also see
some decommissioning of ships before the end of their service
lives. You see a number of programs being moved to the right,
outside of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], the SSNs,
we are going down 1 year to a single ship being built that
year. The F-35, the SSBN(X). It seems like we are asking an
awful lot.
And my question is: In the Pacific Command, will there be
the assets, the ships, the planes necessary for you to be able
to carry out that mission? It seems like we are asking an awful
lot with this big shift, but we are doing it in a time of some
pretty severe reductions in resources. I want to get your
perspective on how you see that unfolding.
Admiral Willard. Thank you. First, Congressman, I think you
characterize it very well. It should be a concern for all of us
that the actions that we take with the fleet and with the other
Service forces that we have are the right ones in accordance
with a strategic design. I think that one of the real strengths
of what President Obama and Secretary Panetta unfolded as a set
of strategic priorities was to try and establish the places in
the world that we felt from a security standpoint were of the
greatest importance for our Nation, and I was pleased but not
surprised that the Asia-Pacific was prominent in that
discussion.
What that means is that the commitment we are making is
that we will put the forces into those highest priority regions
that are required. And I think that is the answer to your
question. I would anticipate that my successor will vocalize
his requirements very clearly to the Pentagon and elsewhere,
and that by and large these requirements will be met.
I think in the Aegis we are challenged across the Services
with regard to these budgets. And should, heaven forbid,
sequestration or other very severe cuts take place, then I
think the Department of Defense is going to be challenged to
execute to these set of priorities. But I think the strength in
the work that has been done is to try to establish a strategy
whereby we can make the right decisions with regard to where
the forces go.
Mr. Wittman. I want to get a little bit of your perspective
about things that are happening currently with China. As your
great career as a naval aviator, you spent a lot of time in the
Asia-Pacific. You also were there at a time when we watched the
buildup in Russia through the seventies and eighties. We
watched that Cold War scenario. We have seen that wane. You
have also been a part of watching a buildup in China, an
exertion of China's influence in that particular region.
What do you see as the biggest challenge for us in the
Asia-Pacific in years to come? And having that metric of the
Russian buildup in the Cold War, where do you see the United
States being 5 years, 10 years, 15 years down the road in the
Asia-Pacific with what is currently happening in China and
elsewhere, even in places like North Korea?
Admiral Willard. Chairman McKeon talked about the more than
$5 trillion of commerce, of which a sizable portion is U.S.
commerce that is on the water in the South China Sea. As we
look forward to our greatest challenges it is going to be the
ability to coexist among all of the nations in the Asia-Pacific
region, China being one of them. And right now, one of my
daunting strategic challenges is to engage effectively with
China and with the People's Liberation Army in order to be able
to coexist and both contribute to the security of this region
for its future prosperity.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hi, Admiral.
Admiral Willard. Aloha.
Ms. Hanabusa. Aloha. I was going to tell you the same
thing. I won't repeat my colleagues, especially Congressman
Wittman, but my mahalo to both you and Donna for everything
that you have done. And I would like to add to that my mahalo
on behalf of the people of the State of Hawaii. You have been
absolutely great. You have embraced them and I think they have
embraced the both of you right back.
Having said that, Admiral, you know one of the things that
we take for granted is munitions. Do you have any concerns
regarding the DOD's current inventory of munitions?
Admiral Willard. I do. The short answer is yes, I have
concerns. When we look across our munitions inventories,
notwithstanding what has been expended over the past 10 years,
there exists gaps and shortfalls and insufficiencies in a
variety of different areas. In the new strategic design in
terms of priorities, there is emphasis on improving our missile
defense capabilities, as one example, and our crew missile
capability. So we think that there will be advances in some
munitions inventories. But the short answer to do I have
concerns? The answer is yes.
When we talk about major operations, nation state level
operations, there are munitions, acquisition production rates,
and in some cases insufficiencies that we have got to overcome.
Ms. Hanabusa. So how does that look in terms of the fiscal
year 2013 budget request? Are we procuring a sufficient number
of weapons to basically ensure you and other combatant
commanders the sufficient numbers that you will need?
Admiral Willard. We have spent the last couple of years
articulating the munitions status very clearly into the
Department of Defense. And I have had a good association with
Deputy Under Secretary Carter and others with regard to
determining what to do about some of the munitions challenges
that we face.
Again, the 2013 budget will improve some areas that we have
regarded as critical in the past, specifically related to
ballistic missile defense where the production rates of SM3s
and other capabilities have been limited--and cruise missile
inventories. There remain other areas in which we are
challenged. And our responsibility has been and will continue
to be to articulate those as clearly as we can so that the
Services make the appropriate investments to try and overcome
some of these shortfalls.
Ms. Hanabusa. I guess in another conversation before you
retire, we can see where those other areas are.
Now, Admiral, we have had this discussion before, but I
would like you to be able to walk us through. We talked about
basically rotational bases and afloat. Now, we know kind of
what that means, but can you use the remainder of this time to
tell us what do you envision when we talk about rotational
bases and we have basically service men afloat, especially
since we are going to be forwarding them to areas where we
don't have bases, traditional bases?
Admiral, Willard. Thank you. When we talk about posture, we
are generally talking about where we are either permanently
based or where we are able to rotate from. So Hawaii is a
permanent base for us. We have a fleet concentration area
there. We have some very significant strategic assets, such as
the shipyard there that we are able to operate from and we
deploy and we employ the forces that are stationed in Hawaii.
Elsewhere, such as the offering made by Singapore,
Australia, in terms of the Darwin marines, and the discussions
that we are currently having with the Philippines, may afford
us opportunities to rotate forces--not fly, in fly out, but it
is a term they use--but essentially bring forces forward, allow
them to train and operate from those bases for a temporary
period of time, and then replace them with other forces that
will in turn rotate.
So we have the responsibility to posture correctly. And
then there is the presence requirement, which is entirely
different. This is where day to day, the forces should be
operating to engage with other countries to exercise or to be
present to help secure the Asia-Pacific region.
Ms. Hanabusa. So when we are talking about a rotational
type of force and they are deploying from a particular area,
like the Philippines or Darwin, are they envisioned to have--to
live there for a period of time? To have actual quarters there?
Admiral Willard. They have quarters there, yes. We do not
anticipate that they will be taking their families there, so
there is not a permanence to their presence there. They will
dwell there to exercise with their Australian counterparts and
eventually deploy into the region where we need them.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral Willard,
thank you for being here and thank you for your service to your
country. I was on Chairman Wittman's CODEL [Congressional
Delegation] to PACOM and I would have to say it was--I echo
everything that he said. Eye opening. It was very professional.
Your staff was wonderful. It was definitely a learning
experience and also ratified a lot of the concerns I guess we
pick up in our day-to-day job. But it elevated it to put it on
our radar, and that is what Secretary Panetta and the President
and their new defense strategy kind of echoes as well; that we
are looking at emerging threats, we are looking at the security
and safety and safe passage of our shipping lanes because of
the commerce and the economies and the fragile alliances that
are out there. And there is no way to separate America's
national security from our economic security and vice versa.
One of the things that I did pick up throughout--and many
of my questions have already been answered--was talking to our
friends in the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of Korea, was
that they want to know what we were doing. They were looking to
us for leadership. Not only just, you know, just the leadership
that America has provided for hundreds of years, but of course
they are wanting to know what our fiscal affairs are like and
are we getting our house in order. Because my takeaway was that
we have some very good friends over there, but at the end of
the day they are worried about their personal security and
stability of their nation and their sovereignty, and that if we
had a reduction of force or we started doing some shifting back
and forth, that these alliances could be put into jeopardy.
Would you care to comment on that?
Admiral Willard. I think you make great points. And our
alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region are the
great opportunities that exist there. And our current alliances
with nations such as Japan and South Korea, the Philippines,
Australia and Thailand, to name our allies, are very, very
important to the overall security of the region. And to your
point, there is a refrain there that expresses concern about
the staying power of the United States, the commitment to the
region which has been allayed, frankly, in the last couple of
years because of the very strong commitment that this
Administration and our various secretaries have made to the
Asia-Pacific.
But there is a concern, especially witnessing the economic
situation that the United States finds itself in regarding our
ability to sustain ourselves and be influential and continue to
be a partner in the region, and I assure them that we will, and
assure them that a presence--forward presence remains paramount
to the United States.
So I am frankly, you know, very pleased to see the emphasis
that the Asia-Pacific has received in this strategic design by
this administration and our Secretary. And I think it is vital
to the region to take that message and then to see us back it
up with the actions that we take.
Mr. Palazzo. Well, if the opportunity comes up again to go
back on a PACOM CODEL, Mr. Chairman, please put my name and Ms.
Bordallo's on there too, I think she would like to go. Because
we just touched the surface and we would like to learn a lot
more about our assets over there.
Now, knowing that this has become part of the emerging,
possible emerging threats somewhere that we have to have on our
radar, I am concerned that the Secretary and others, not just
the Navy and the Army and other branches of Services, that
their rhetoric is really not matching the reality or the level
of concern that we may have in this region, because we are
looking forward to the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Are we going
to be at 313 ships, or is it going to be less than that? So we
are all anxious to look at that.
Are we going to have the resources and assets in the
theater to address this? But it looks like we are going to be
decommissioning ships decades before their useful lives are up.
We are pushing new shipbuilding to the right. A lot of these
things just do not make a lot of sense. We are saying there are
future threats, but at the same time we are not going to
address them currently. What do you see as your most important
needs for the next 5 years?
Admiral Willard. The sustainment of the force structure and
forward presence of that force structure that we have enjoyed
in the past, and the additions that will come out of the
conclusion of the last two wars that have occurred. So there is
a reconstitution that is ongoing, and certainly the capacities
that the United States Armed Forces have are important to us.
That they be biased appropriately into the Asia-Pacific region
is very important to the Asia-Pacific Command.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to see
you, and thank you for hosting us a few months back, the small
business panel, as part of this committee. We had a great set
of visits out there, and appreciate the time out there.
I have four questions. They are kind of all over the place.
I will be quick with each one of them and if you could answer
them one at a time. Can you characterize the relationship with
Indonesia?
Admiral Willard. Very strong, 140 or so activities annually
with Indonesia. Very impressed, frankly, with President
Yudhoyono and his democratic government and the progress that
they have made, particularly in military reform. And we are
reengaged with KOPASSUS [Indonesian Army Special Forces
Command] at a pace, but nonetheless reengaged. They are
effective in counterterrorism and they are reaching out to many
countries but particularly to the United States.
Mr. Larsen. Great. Second, we are shifting from P3s to P8s
now, and Whidbey Island is part of that and Jacksonville is
part of that. Can you just talk briefly about the role--what
the P8s will be giving you versus moving from the P3s and what
the P8s might give you in the Pacific Command?
Admiral Willard. I think in general we get dwell from those
assets that we haven't--that we just can't enjoy from an asset
like the P3. So we are very much looking forward to the fact
that this is a jet that can move quickly, and it is going to
come with a great deal of capability.
So the P8 will be a great addition in what is an inherently
maritime area of responsibility. I have great use for them and
we are very much looking forward to a P8 community out there.
Mr. Larsen. Great. I think when you first sat down in my
office when you first started as PACOM, we had this discussion
about--PACOM had just started, or was in the middle of further
discussions with the Government of Japan about ballistic
missile defense and the operations of BMD [Ballistic Missile
Defense], not necessarily the cooperation, but how it is going
to be operating. Can you give an update on that?
Admiral Willard. I think the Japanese have advanced
greatly. We continue to team in this, as you would expect, very
much, 7th Fleet with the Japanese self-defense force. Able to
work ballistic missile defense scenarios into many of the
exercises that we perform. I right now regard the Japanese as a
very credible BMD force and continuing to grow in its
capacities.
Mr. Larsen. So any issues left over from the operational
questions that existed because of the--it was embedded--the
problem was embedded in the Japanese Constitution about self-
defense and whether or not we could fully operate BMD if we
needed to if there was a fly-over--to fly over the islands.
Admiral Willard. Thank you. I think these are manageable
issues. What I have learned over the past 2\1/2\ years is that
in working closely with the Japanese--and, frankly, their
defense force appropriately brings their civilian oversight
into the room frequently as we have these discussions--they
have been very good about educating the Diet and others in the
Ministry of Defense with regard to what it really takes to
defend Japan. And as you know, I have that responsibility.
So in the deliberations that we have with the Japanese
joint staff and others in developing the concepts to cooperate
in ballistic missile defense, I think there has grown a good
understanding of the requirements to accomplish this. There
continue to be constitutional limitations in what those
Japanese defense forces can do, as you you know. But again I
think in the way in which we have structured our tactics,
techniques, and procedures we are able to work our way through
those.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. And finally, the last page of your
testimony you discuss JPAC [Joint Personnel Accounting
Command], specifically China, Burma, and DPRK [Democratic
People's Republic of Korea]. Could you maybe briefly touch on
maybe Burma, what next steps we are going to be taking to
continue recovery operations there?
Admiral Willard. We are going to move back into Burma--we
have been there before, as you know--but looking very much
forward to that opportunity. And with the level of cooperation
that we have seen from the Burmese Government recently, the
overtures that they have made and some of the reforms that they
are committing themselves to, I think we will have less concern
about the security of those forces when, in fact, they go in
there. So the Personnel Accounting Command is very busy out in
the Asia-Pacific and, frankly, globally right now, and ready to
move back into the DPRK, to your point.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, Ma'am, thank
you for your service to our country. Admiral, I was glad to
hear you say that China's goal, you thought, was to be a
constructive contributor, if you will, to commerce and peace in
the region. Did I understand that correctly?
Admiral Willard. I think they would certainly assert that,
and despite the challenges that we face and continue to
endeavor to overcome, it is my hope as well.
Mr. Scott. Could you speak to the cross-strait
relationships between China and Taiwan? And I guess what you
said is the first I have heard that, and certainly respect your
opinion. But they keep approximately 1,500 missiles and rockets
pointed at Taiwan which certainly would lead you to believe
that maybe they weren't going to be such a constructive
contributor, if you will, to peace in that region. Could you
speak to that briefly?
Admiral Willard. There is very impressive combat power
across the strait on mainland China. Whether that is integrated
air defense system, ballistic--offensive ballistic missile
capabilities or force structure in their ports and airfields.
It is very impressive. It has been there a long time now,
several years, and has not diminished. They continue to improve
the capability. So in terms of a balance of power, I mean, it
is generally one-sided.
The cross-strait relations have improved since President Ma
was elected in 2008 and reelected just last year, we have
witnessed improved relationships between mainland--the People's
Republic of China and Taiwan. And we anticipate that will
continue with President Ma's reelection. And we are encouraged
by that, frankly.
That said, the combat power, as you allude, is somewhat
incongruous to those improved relations cross-strait. But as
they improve their relationship economically and
diplomatically, we think that it should lower the likelihood of
coercion or conflict taking place.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. And when I woke up this morning and
saw the news, the comments about North Korea and our food aid
in exchange for them stopping their nuclear programs, how
optimistic should we be that there will be a long-term change,
if you will, in the approach of North Korea's leadership
towards nuclear weapons, if you will?
Admiral Willard. First to clarify, in the ongoing
negotiations that have been going on, there are discussions of
food aid. There have been now for, by and large, the past year.
And the United States has been engaged in discussions very
recently with regard to quantities of food that we anticipate
providing to North Korea on the humanitarian side. In the same
discussion but a separate topic, has been the discussion of
nuclearization and the efforts to verifiably denuclearize North
Korea.
We have a new--a new successor in North Korea, as you know,
since Kim Jong-il passed. He passed on leadership to his 29-
year-old son, Kim Jong-un. We know something of him, not
everything. We are observing closely the actions of the new
administration in Pyongyang with regard to how they will deal
with a variety of security and coercive strategy issues,
nuclearization being one of them.
And we are encouraged by the outcome of the talks that
talked about the possibility of IAEA [International Atomic
Energy Agency] being let back into Yongbyon [Nuclear Scientific
Research Center] and the cessation of some of the activities,
including ballistic missile development. But I think this is
something that we need to watch very carefully, wait and see.
In the past we have not seen much change out of what is now a
third generation of leadership in Pyongyang.
Mr. Scott. Hopeful, but not optimistic; Is that it?
Admiral Willard. I think that is well said.
Mr. Scott. Well, Admiral, with 10 seconds left to go, I
represent Robins Air Force Base, home of the JSTARS [Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System]. I know that they
have flown many missions for you and I certainly would
appreciate your support of that platform as we go forward.
Admiral Willard. It is a brilliant platform and you
certainly have my support.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard thank
you so much for your service to our country and your role as
the commanding officer for U.S. Pacific Command. And I wish you
the best in retirement, which will be coming up pretty soon.
First, if I understand it right, we no longer have ground
forces in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea;
is that correct?
Admiral Willard. That is correct. We continue to--our
United Nations commander, J.D. Thurman, General Thurman,
continues to be responsible for the overall security across the
DMZ [demilitarized zone] and maintenance of the armistice. But
the forces that were previously forward on the DMZ have been
relocated.
Mr. Coffman. And is there a plan to give operational
control to the South Korean military?
Admiral Willard. In December 2015 is the currently
scheduled date. As you will recall, the 2012 date passed and
there was a delay. But right now, what we term operational
control transition is scheduled to occur in December 2015.
Mr. Coffman. And am I right to understand--I think we have
28,000 U.S. military personnel, about that number----
Admiral Willard. Roughly.
Mr. Coffman [continuing]. In South Korea today?
Admiral Willard. We do.
Mr. Coffman. Now, is there still in place a plan for a
multimillion-dollar military construction program to bring the
families up, sort of as a program for tour normalization in
South Korea? Where is that right now?
Admiral Willard. Somewhat in suspension, I guess is the
best way to term it. And J.D., I am sure when he testifies,
will provide you the details on that. But looking at the number
of families that currently reside in South Korea with their
service member, I think J.D. recognizes that in this fiscal
environment, completing tour normalization as it was originally
scoped is probably not viable, and he is continuing now to look
at it and dialogue with the Pentagon with regard to what he
perceives to be the right mix of families and service members,
both accompanied and unaccompanied, on the peninsula.
Mr. Coffman. Do you know if they are having--one thing that
the United States Army does versus the Marine Corps, and I
served in both, is the Army tends to on some of its forward-
deployed units rotate individuals in and out of those units,
whereas the United States Marine Corps rotates units at the
battalion level in and out of the area of operation. So is the
Army having a discussion to move to more of a rotational basis
for forces as opposed to assigning individuals? Are you aware
of any discussion like that?
Admiral Willard. No, I am not, though there is an ongoing
discussion with regard to the Army in the Asia-Pacific region
writ large, and how, with a reconstituted ground force
following the two wars, the Army intends to support my needs in
the region.
I would offer that the Army forces on the Korean peninsula,
especially given the decisions that have been made recently
with regard to tour normalization and us, you know, slowing or
stopping this now, are the dominant ground force on the
peninsula, where the marines are down in Okinawa, Japan.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. After we reach--after we hand over
operation and control to the South Koreans, if we are able to
achieve that in 2015, are there any projections as to drawing
down our forces at that point in time?
Admiral Willard. There are not. Operational control is at
the leadership level. And this is now to say that rather than
the United States commanding the defense of the Republic of
Korea in wartime, that the Republic of Korea themselves will
command and the United States will be in support. So that
28,000 or so ground forces that we have maintained on the
peninsula throughout the period since the war and during
armistice are intended to continue to support the defense of
the Republic of Korea.
Mr. Coffman. The South Koreans, as I understand it, are
spending 2.7 percent of their gross domestic product, their
GDP, on defense. The U.S. right now is about 4.7 percent. What
kind of burden sharing--maybe you could get back to me because
we are running out of time. I wonder if you all could get back
to me, Admiral, as to what exactly the South Koreans are paying
in terms to support our presence in the peninsula.
Admiral Willard. We will provide those numbers to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 65.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Admiral, Donna, once again on behalf of the
entire committee, we thank you very much for your 39 years of
service. Wish you all the best in the new venture that you will
be embarking on shortly. And this committee stands adjourned.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
your continued support for our Armed Forces.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 1, 2012
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 1, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from
U.S. Pacific Command
March 1, 2012
Our economy and security has never been more dependent on
our military, especially in the Asia-Pacific Region. The
President's new strategy focuses on a so-called ``pivot to
Asia-Pacific.'' While I don't question the critical importance
of this theater, I am concerned that our forces may not be
properly postured to support this shift.
The Chief of Naval Operations has said that ship and
aircraft deployments in the Pacific would remain at current
levels. Over the next 5 years, we will cut 16 ships out of our
new construction budget and retire 9 more. Further, our tanking
and airlift capacity will be reduced, limiting our ability to
project power and sustain our forces. This budget does not
address reductions to our nuclear deterrent. But the
Administration is reportedly contemplating unilateral
reductions below New START levels. As you have discussed often
with us, quantity does have a quality all its own--especially
in a theater that covers half of the Earth's surface.
We must be prepared to effectively respond with the needed
manpower and assets. As I stated at last year's hearing, it is
important our forces in the Pacific have the personnel,
training, equipment, and the authorities they need to instill
confidence in our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to
respond decisively to any contingency. It is not yet clear how
the new strategy will meet these goals.
Events in Asia can change rapidly, as we saw in December
with the death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Alongside
our South Korean allies, our forces must be ready to deter
further North Korean provocations.
China's growing influence creates concern for many of our
regional allies. The balance of power across the Taiwan Straits
continues to shift in the direction of Beijing. The South China
Sea is a vital shipping lane through which more than 5 trillion
dollars in trade pass each year. Deterring, delaying, or
denying U.S. forces from operating along China's periphery is
still a key goal of the People's Liberation Army. As China's
military budget continues to grow annually by double digits,
the PLA is focused on improving their capacities to counter
U.S. military capabilities and exploit our weaknesses.
We also see the growing threat of terrorism in region, as
aims of certain groups like LeT [Lashkar-e-Tayyiba] expand
beyond their traditional border disputes.
In partnership with our allies and friends, our forces must
stand ready to respond to unprovoked, hostile behavior and
defend our regional allies and security interests. We look
forward to your testimony shedding additional light on these
matters and the range of security challenges we face in the
Pacific.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from
U.S. Pacific Command
March 1, 2012
I would like to welcome Admiral Willard and thank him for
making a long journey to be here with us today. I look forward
to his expert testimony on a variety of important matters.
Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a
strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat
environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those
threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately
places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific
region, a shift that will surely call for additional resources
and an enhanced role for U.S. Pacific Command.
The Asia-Pacific region is a vital region of the world that
includes a number of important U.S. allies and partners.
Without question, U.S. service men and women play a crucial
role in maintaining these relationships and in promoting peace
in the Pacific.
Many of our partners in the regions are concerned about the
recent rise of China. While I do not believe that a conflict
with China is inevitable, we should continue to work to promote
mutual interests, mitigate concerns, and perpetuate
multilateral cooperation in the region. We should also continue
to develop our security relationship with India and continue to
strengthen existing relationships with partners such as Japan,
South Korea, Australia, and Singapore.
Transnational threats, such as violent extremism, cyber-
threats, and illicit trafficking in persons, narcotics, and
weapons continue to menace the region. Disease, malnourishment,
environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and natural
disaster do as well. The more we can do to defuse tensions
through cooperative efforts with our many allies and strategic
partners in the region, the more we can help to realize the
immense potential for growth in the region.
The United States will continue to lead in the Pacific and
to offer assurances through our forward military presence in
the region, and the U.S. Pacific Command's flexible force
posture will continue to be essential to surmounting security
challenges now and in the future.
While I believe that the defense budget provides PACOM with
the resources necessary for securing our strategic objectives,
I would like to remind the Committee that the defense budget is
consistent with the Budget Control Act that was passed by
Congress. Although I did not support passage of that law, many
members of the House Armed Services Committee did. The
Department of Defense submitted a budget that complies with
congressionally mandated funding levels and that supports our
strategic objectives.
I look forward to receiving your testimony and to
continuing our dialogue on these and other important issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 1, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Admiral Willard. [The information was not available at the
time of printing.] [See page 10.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Admiral Willard. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 28.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 1, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. A recent report issued by the Congressional Research
Service points out that China has repeatedly suspended its mil-to-mil
contacts with the United States as a retaliatory measure for various
U.S. actions. It also describes the limitations of those relationships.
The report does not suggest suspending mil-to-mil contacts, but what is
your opinion on ways to improve them? Does the U.S. get as much benefit
from mil-to-mil contacts with the PLA as they do? Are there different
approaches that we could take to improve the value of those contacts?
Admiral Willard. The Department of Defense conducts mil-to-mil
contacts with the PLA because we believe such contacts help build a
cooperative capacity to address common security challenges, foster
institutional understanding of each others' military doctrines and
intentions, and build a common view of the international security
environment. The PLA continues to suspend mil-mil contacts as a means
to express displeasure for various U.S. actions that run contrary to
PRC interests, a practice which indicates the PLA places less value on
a sustained, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship
with the United States.
One method of raising the value of mil-to-mil contacts is to
increasingly conduct such contacts in a multi-lateral setting or to
link bilateral mil-to-mil contacts with multi-lateral engagements where
the PLA has an interest of increasing its level of participation. One
of the greatest strengths of USPACOM's forward presence in the Asia-
Pacific region is that we are there at the invitation of our partners
and allies, who hold a like-minded view of the security environment. By
inviting the PLA to mil-to-mil engagements where our partners and
allies already either co-host or actively participate makes it
increasingly difficult for the PLA to regret without adversely
impacting their relationships with those nations. The intent is to
bring the PLA more frequently to the table, to demonstrate that it is
better for the PLA to be a part of the conversation, rather than apart
from the conversation.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES
Mr. Reyes. I understand that China is becoming more economically
involved in both Central and South American countries. What visibility
does PACOM have on these activities and what are your greatest concerns
involving these actions?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Reyes. Since 2002, it appears that the activities and the
numbers of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf have decreased in the
Philippines. What actions is PACOM taking in order to ensure that this
group and others in the country are eradicated? Has there been an issue
with drug trafficking out of the country in order to fund the terrorist
groups? How are you engaging international partners on the terrorist
groups in the area?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Reyes. What is the status of mil-to-mil engagements with China?
How would you propose improving the value of such contacts?
Admiral Willard. Although the Defense Consultative Talks took place
in December (an institutionalized dialogue) there have been no other
bilateral mil-to-mil engagements since last September. However, some
engagement still takes place sporadically along the periphery through a
multitude of multilateral, rather than bilateral, venues across the
Pacific theater.
When China's President, Xi Jinping, visited Washington in February
and met with Secretary Panetta, the two sides agreed to move forward in
developing the specifics of this year's program of military-to-military
exchanges and also expressed support for an exchange of visits between
Secretary Panetta and China's Minister of National Defense at an
appropriate time.
During the week of 26 March 2012, representatives from the
Department of Defense and the Chinese military will hold discussions
detailing the bilateral military-to-military engagement plan for 2012
which will include Secretary Panetta's trip to China.
One method of raising the value of mil-to-mil contacts is to
increasingly conduct such contacts in a multi-lateral setting or to
link bilateral mil-to-mil contacts with multi-lateral engagements where
the PLA has an interest of increasing its level of participation. One
of the greatest strengths of USPACOM's forward presence in the Asia-
Pacific region is that we are there at the invitation of our partners
and allies, who hold a like-minded view of the security environment. By
inviting the PLA to mil-to-mil engagements where our partners and
allies already either co-host or actively participate, makes it
increasingly difficult for the PLA to regret without adversely
impacting their relationships with those nations. The intent is to
bring the PLA more frequently to the table to demonstrate that it is
better for the PLA to be a part of the conversation, rather than apart
from the conversation.
Military engagement can be valuable, but can only truly work if
China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges that serve to
enhance and deepen the mil-to-mil relationship. We should use military
engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S.
commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage
China to play a constructive role in the region and to press China to
partner with the United States and our Asian Allies and Partners in
addressing common security challenges.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Given the limitations of the Harpoon, how would you
assess the requirement for a new ASCM with greater range against other
competing priorities?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. Despite describing the great potential of the UCLASS
program in testimony for negating emergent A2/AD technologies, this
program appears to be downgraded in the Navy's FY13 budget request and
the FYDP. The UCLASS program was cut by $240 million this year and the
limited operational capability (LOC) date is being delayed by two years
from 2018 to 2020. Also, UCLASS was not mentioned as a key program for
projecting power in contested areas in the Defense Budget Priorities
and Choices document nor was it identified in the written testimony of
Secretary Mabus as a capability the Navy is investing in to counter
advanced A2/AD challenges. How important does PACOM consider the
capabilities found in the UCLASS program for meeting its mission
requirements?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. What are the challenges presented to U.S. Navy undersea
dominance by the numerical growth and modernization of the PLA(N)
submarine fleet over the next 8-10 years. What risk assessment has been
conducted relative to contingency plans given PLA(N) submarine force
structure projections versus the projected U.S. SSN shortfall in the
2020-2030 timeframe? What mitigation strategies have been emplaced by
the Commander to address the potential inequity in undersea warfare
between the U.S. submarine force and the PLA(N) submarine force in the
out years?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Yesterday the State Department announced that North
Korea agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches,
nuclear tests, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including enrichment
in exchange for food aid. While I'm sure all of us here will continue
to carefully examine all aspects of the security situation on the
Korean peninsula, how do you expect this announcement to affect PACOM's
security posture, if at all, as well as that of our regional allies?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Langevin. During your testimony you mentioned a yearlong cyber
pilot with CYBERCOM to advance cyber capabilities in the Pacific. Could
you elaborate more on the progress and goals of this pilot? How do you
plan on integrating lessons learned into future operations and
capabilities?
Admiral Willard. 1. USPACOM established the Cyberspace Operations
Command-Provisional (CYBERPAC-P) in February 2011 in order to bring
together key PACOM stakeholders into a single entity for the
synchronizing of cyberspace operations. With the pending approval of
the Transitional Cyberspace CONOPS, CYBERPAC-P was renamed the
Cyberspace Operations Center Pacific (CYBERPAC) to serve as the
theater's Joint Cyber Center (JCC).
2. CYBERPAC's mission is to plan and conduct theater cyberspace
operations by synchronizing regional, national and allied cyberspace
capabilities in support of USPACOM objectives in order to maintain
freedom of action in cyberspace for U.S. Forces, our Partners, and
Allies while denying the same to our adversaries.
3. CYBERPAC's essential tasks include: a. Coordinate Theater DOD
Global Information Grid Operations. b. Direct and coordinate Theater
Defensive/Offensive Cyber Operations. c. Plan against designated
cyberspace threats. d. Coordinate with Direct Reporting Units, Sub-
Unified Commands, and appropriate U.S. government agencies for
cyberspace effects. e. Synchronize Cyber Operations with Allies and
regional partners.
4. As the Regional JCC, CYBERPAC continues to direct, coordinate
and synchronize the planning and execution of regional cyberspace
operations with USCYBERCOM, as the agent for global cyberspace
operations. Over the past 13 months, the CYBERPAC has greatly enhanced
PACOM's ability to integrate cyberspace operations into the full
spectrum of operations and has emerged as the standard model for a
regional JCC. Lessons learned and best practices continue to be
integrated into the CYBERPAC construct through Tier 1 exercises and
current contingency operations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. In the discussion on the realignment the overall
strategic imperatives of this move have not been adequately addressed.
The key to these realignments is about strengthening our alliance with
Japan. To that extent, what message are we sending the Japanese by
utilizing U.S. Forces Japan as primarily a logistics and administrative
function versus being an operational command like U.S. Forces Korea?
U.S. Forces Japan did a tremendous job during Operation Tomodachi but
how could the operation have been enhanced by an operational command
based in Japan? If U.S. Forces Japan was being utilized as an
operational command in every sense of the word, could they be assigned
a mission of enhancing U.S.-Japan bi-lateral training?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Bordallo. Can you comment on your view of future Navy ship
maintenance and repair requirements and capabilities required in the
Western Pacific? In particular, do you foresee maintenance and repair
requirements for submarines or the LCS on Guam?
Admiral Willard. The current Submarine repair model for Guam will
remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. As the number of Littoral
Combat Ships home ported in the Pacific increases, more voyage repairs
in support of Western Pacific deployments are likely. However, the
support provided would be similar to that currently given to other Navy
ships that transit in the vicinity of Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. With the increased military presence ramping up in
the Asia-Pacific region, I find it concerning that the Department of
Defense is cutting critical resources in that particular AOR. A recent
example is the Air Force announcing the divestiture of the Global Hawk
block 30, of which there are currently 3 aircraft at Andersen Air Force
Base. Do you feel that you will still have adequate ISR capabilities in
the PACOM AOR if these 3 aircraft and potentially other assets are
divested from the inventory? What risk are we currently facing with ISR
capabilities in the PACOM AOR and what steps are being taken to
mitigate that risk?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the current PACOM workforce construct reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and
contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
as required by statutes and policies.
Admiral Willard. USPACOM's sourcing of functions and work between
military, civilian and contracted services must be consistent with
workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management
needs, as well as applicable laws and statutes. USPACOM's FY 2013
budget requests, and associated civilian workforce reductions, reflect
USPACOM's best judgment today. It represents a carefully coordinated
approach based on the overall command strategy and policy, balancing
operational needs and fiscal reality. USPACOM remains committed to
meeting its statutory obligations to annually review missions,
functions and workforce composition, including reliance on contracted
services, and to ensure the USPACOM workforce is appropriately balanced
and aligned to our most critical priorities.
Ms. Bordallo. Did PACOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian
personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-
effectively performed by civilians?
Admiral Willard. USPACOM requested a SECDEF exception to the FY10
civilian personnel cap for 38 contractor-to-civilian conversions in the
FY12 program. The 38 conversions were determined to be exempt from
private sector performance for readiness/management needs. These in-
sourcing actions were expected to result in net savings for USPACOM, as
civilian performance has been estimated to be more cost-effective than
contract performance.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has PACOM used insourcing to reduce
reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
efficiencies?
Admiral Willard. HQ USPACOM's current workforce percentages are 50%
military, 34% civilian and 8% contractor with the remaining 8% as over-
hires and activated reservists. As a result of in-sourcing, USPACOM's
rebalanced workforce has generated significant cost saving which is
reflected in the USPACOM budget.
Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
currently supporting PACOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse
source of labor?
Admiral Willard. We have diligently scrutinized our contracted
services and are convinced we have the right balance of support.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within PACOM to ensure
the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
Admiral Willard. The civilian workforce and associated fiscal
funding reductions are being managed through a functional assessment of
workload priorities. USPACOM tracks manpower authorizations, personnel
and associated funding to manage workload requirements for military,
civilians, activated reserves, USPACOM-funded contractors and civilian
overhires for the current and future fiscal years. When civilian
employees resign or retire, the vacant position is reviewed based on
organizational assessments, prioritization of missions and functions,
and the associated risk and degradation to USPACOM readiness.
Ms. Bordallo. In the PACOM plan for direct labor reporting, signed
by your Chief of Staff on November 21, 2011, and submitted to the
congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan,
PACOM planned to incorporate manpower reporting language beginning
October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with this
requirement since October 1, 2011?
Admiral Willard. No contracts, with this requirement, have been
executed with this requirement since 1 October 2011.
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions PACOM has had approved
to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions
that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.
Admiral Willard. The SECDEF approved the conversion of 38
contractors to civilian in the FY12 program which were previously
approved and programmed in the FYDP. The 38 contractors consisted of 12
at USPACOM Headquarters, 21 for Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command and
five for Defense Intelligence Agency/USPACOM Joint Intelligence
Operations Command. None of USPACOM's requests were disapproved.
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across PACOM, is
the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
Admiral Willard. USPACOM submits an annual inventory of inherently
governmental and commercial activity (IG/CA) inventory of all
appropriated funded military and DOD funded civilian manpower
authorizations, categorized as either inherently governmental or
commercial activities. Workload and functions tied to military or
civilian authorizations that have been eliminated or divested are
tracked and reported in the IG/CA inventory using the manpower mix
criteria and functional codes.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. Are DOD's ISR platforms appropriate for use in the
contested airspace environment that we see in the PACOM AOR and if not,
what should we be doing to prepare our ISR assets for the contested
environment?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Conaway. The PACOM AOR has some of the most technologically
advanced nations in the field of cybersecurity. What can we do as a
nation and in the PACOM AOR to defend and defeat any attacks on our
network?
Admiral Willard. 1. Defending our networks and defeating attacks
requires the following:
a. Exercise a Whole-of-Government or Whole-of-Nation Strategy. The
DOD must partner closely with U.S. government departments, agencies and
the private sector to enable a whole of government strategy to address
diverse cyber threats to military targets, civilian infrastructure,
personal identifiers and intellectual property. Many of the DOD's
critical functions and operations rely on commercial assets, including
internet service providers and global supply chains, over which the DOD
has no authority to mitigate risk. The DOD is developing partnerships
with the private sector and government agencies, including law
enforcement, to best defend U.S. interests in cyberspace. For example,
a memorandum of agreement has been signed between DOD and DHS to
enhance inter-departmental strategic planning, synchronization of
operations and mutual support for capability development.
b. Recruit, Train, Retain, Organize, and Equip a Cyber Workforce.
Meeting the dynamic needs of cyber operations and managing cyber risks
requires a talented, trained force to develop innovative capabilities
and provide information assurance, real-time situational awareness and
network environments that are secure and resilient to evolving threats.
DOD will need to continually develop the integration and resourcing of
cyber workforce requirements and make itself competitive to entice and
retain skilled personnel.
c. Invest in the Development of Industrial Cyberspace Capabilities.
Technological innovation is at the forefront of national security. The
DOD will need to enhance its research, development, testing, evaluation
and acquisition processes to employ rapid cycles of technological
innovation. The DOD should focus significant investments on developing
game changing approaches to strengthen its defense capabilities and
make its systems unrecognizable to malicious activity. For example, we
should focus research on mission assurance and maintaining effective
cyberspace operations, including cyberspace maneuvering, active cyber
defense and full spectrum cyberspace operations. We should also pursue
new architectures to defend its critical networks, harden systems and
create assured environments to protect current and future systems from
attack.
d. Build Relationships with U.S. Allies and International Partners.
The development of international shared situational awareness and
warning capabilities will enable collective cyber self-defense and
deterrence. By sharing timely indicators and threats, allies and
international partners can increase collective cyber defense. Thus, DOD
will need to build and improve relationships with key allies and
international partners, including efforts to develop standard operating
procedures for strategic communications, establish cyber centers of
excellence and advance international cyberspace norms and principles
that protect the free flow of information, goods and ideas.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Willard, with the new strategy to shift our
focus to the Asia-Pacific how do the $487 billion in defense cuts over
the next 10 years affect your ability as the Combatant Commander
responsible for the Asia-Pacific to execute this strategy? In my
opinion you are being asked to do more with a lot less. The Navy's SCN
account is decreasing, our ship count is decreasing, we are
decommissioning ships before the end of their service life, and we are
moving advanced weapons platforms like SSNs, F-35, and SSBN(X) further
to the right and well outside the FYDP. Do you feel the Navy and Air
Force will be able to provide PACOM the numbers and types of ships and
aircraft sufficient to support PACOM's responsibilities under the
Department's new strategic guidance?
Admiral Willard. USPACOM has not assessed an ``inability'' to focus
on Asia-Pacific issues in the near term. As DOD provides further
details on future expectations, USPACOM will assess current readiness
accordingly.
We believe USPACAF and USPACFLT will be able to provide USPACOM the
numbers of forces sufficient to support our responsibilities. This
assumes a commitment by the Air Force, Navy and Department of Defense
to focus investments in the Pacific and availability of partner nation
capability. The fiscal realities will challenge all of us; however,
USPACOM and this nation have a long tradition of meeting its
responsibilities during tough times and will continue to do so in the
future. The Navy and Air Force will find ways to work together in
unprecedented ways to meet this challenge through efforts like the Air
Sea Battle strategy. These efforts will identify requirements,
establish ownership, find efficiencies and eliminate duplicative
efforts. Ultimately, this will drive us towards better theater
integration and coordination of efforts.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral, in the '70s and '80s you dealt with the
Soviet Union and operations that supported the Cold War. With China's
rapid military modernization, do you see the United States entering
into a Cold War-type scenario with China in the coming years? We have
the number 1 Navy in the world, how do we mitigate Chinese Navy from
securing a foothold in the Asia-Pacific that projects power and asserts
their maritime dominance of the region? Particularly in areas like the
South China Sea and the East China Sea.
Admiral Willard. The United States' relationship with China is more
complex than the relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. The U.S. and USSR bilateral relationship
existed largely in the diplomatic and security realms. By comparison,
in addition to our diplomatic and security relationship with China, we
have robust economic, cultural, environmental, and other linkages that
make the U.S. and China far more interdependent than the U.S. and USSR
ever were. I don't think a return to the days of the Cold War is
plausible and it is certainly not desirable. With regard to maritime
dominance, the U.S. Navy asserts its right to free and unfettered
access to the waters beyond the territorial seas of any nation in
accordance with UNCLOS. We don't question the right of China or any
nation to enjoy the same free and unfettered access to those waters in
accordance with international norms and we consistently support the
peaceful resolution of disputes. The East China Sea and South China Sea
are congested waterways with multiple overlapping claims of
sovereignty, including territorial and maritime claims. USPACOM
conducts routine, coordinated presence operations in the Western
Pacific in order to ensure a consistent presence, fulfill multiple
operational requirements, and retain the necessary operational
flexibility to address contingencies. Throughout the conduct of these
operations, USPACOM is careful to strike the appropriate balance
between operations that reassure allies and partners, operations which
challenge excessive maritime claims, and actions that serve to deter
behavior which is not consistent with international norms.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral, the South China Sea continues to become a
more contentious region with the convergence of sovereignty claims,
vital international trade routes, expansive natural resources, and
increasing military strength of multiple countries in the region. With
the escalating tensions concerning oil and natural gas drilling plans,
with potentially some American companies involved as well as American
allies, it seems the question is when the region will spark, not if. My
question is: What do you see ahead for the South China Sea in the next
2-5 years? What would you anticipate PACOM's reaction to be if a small
kinetic conflict broke out between two countries' maritime assets in
the region? Lastly, do you see the homebasing of 4 LCSs and marines in
Darwin as a significant gamechanger in future South China Sea issues?
Do you feel those shifts will escalate or decrease tension in the
region?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
Mr. Heinrich. ADM Willard, please detail for the Committee the
operational benefits that the capabilities being developed under the
Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project
(CHAMP) JCTD offer in your area of operation. In addition, what would
be the benefits of having additional resources to enhance those
capabilities?
Admiral Willard. The Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave
Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) JCTD provides us with new approach to
engage soft electronic systems with significantly reduced collateral
damage on non-targets. This in turn allows us to engage critical
targets that are difficult to engage due to location in sensitive areas
currently on the restricted strike list. An attack by a CHAMP-like
system also potentially reduces the post-conflict reconstruction over
kinetic effects. The CHAMP JCTD was designed to demonstrate the
benefits of engaging targets with High Power Microwaves. Additional
resources would provide for a program of record for the capability and
incorporate the solutions to the identified deficiencies of the
demonstrator system.
Mr. Heinrich. CENTCOM's Urgent Need for ISR Data led to the
development and launch of ORS-1, which went operational in January 2012
and is getting very high marks. Given the new strategic emphasis on
Asia and the Pacific, with large areas of denied-access terrain, does
PACOM have an Urgent Need for a similar capability?
Admiral Willard. The short answer to your question is ``yes''.
USPACOM has been working closely with the Operationally Responsive
Space program on a satellite of our own. ORS-2 is in development and
scheduled to be launched in 2015. While it has a different payload than
ORS-1, the capability will have a positive impact on USPACOM ISR
collection gaps, most notably, those areas that are out of the reach of
our airborne systems.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
Mr. Schilling. There are proposed changes to the basing arrangement
in the Pacific Theater. How will they affect PACOM's ability to address
North Korea's nuclear ambitions? How will this affect our ability to
respond to China's military buildup?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Schilling. What are PACOM's plans to optimize our alliances and
regional partnerships and do you have benchmarks you are trying to
achieve?
Admiral Willard. In general, while cooperation with regional allies
and partners is generally strong and on a positive trajectory, we
recognize the need to continue to strengthen our alliances and regional
partnerships while building new ones. Our bilateral alliances remain
the cornerstone of regional security and U.S. policy. Our relations
with our treaty allies have never been better. We aim to encourage
Korea's increasing emergence as not just a regional power, but a
responsible global leader. We're working closely with the government in
Australia on a host of critical security issues and it is our
indivisible bond with Japan that has driven the United States,
especially our armed forces, to lead the world's effort to help our
ally in its time of greatest need. In addition to our close cooperation
and exercise with our Philippine and Thai allies, the United States is
also transforming its mil-to-mil relations with a number of emerging
partners, including Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and India. Our
strategic partnership with India, in particular, holds immense
potential for shaping a geo-political balance within and beyond the
region that favors political and economic freedom. In short, the United
States is well positioned in the Asia-Pacific region, both in terms of
our expanding partnerships as well as our enduring capabilities, to
promote our National interests in the dynamic 21st century.
The United States Pacific Command's Theater Campaign Plan is the
mechanism used to manage security relations with allies and other
countries and collaborative relationships with other organizations. The
plan establishes both long and short term objectives all aimed toward
achieving the strategic end states outlined in our national level
strategic guidance. To mitigate risk this plan, and its execution,
remain adaptive. Twice a year, USPACOM will formally assess the
campaign. From this assessment, the Command will decide whether to
adjust the resourcing, execution or priorities of the theater campaign.
Mr. Schilling. How do you see PACOM moving forward in our
relationship with Taiwan?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. What were the contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard to
PACOM in 2011?
Admiral Willard. a. The Coast Guard Pacific Area Commander, at the
request of Pacific Command's Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies,
visited India and participated in a workshop held in Mumbai entitled
``Exploring India-U.S. Cooperation, Safeguarding Prosperity in the
Indian Ocean.''
b. As the Executive Agent for USPACOM to the Quadrilateral Defense
Working Group, Coast Guard District 14 worked closely with
representatives from Australia, New Zealand and France to plan and
conduct maritime operations across Oceania. These operations were
primarily related to preventing illegal commercial fishing, but they
also entailed the sharing of information at several levels.
c. The Coast Guard Pacific Area Command established a Coast Guard
Reserve Unit at USPACOM. This Reserve Unit will ultimately have a
complement of 17 Coast Guard Reservists assigned to various Pacific
Command directorates.
d. Coast Guard District 14 served as an adjunct component to
USPACOM in a number of contingency situations. Of particular note, in
conjunction with New Zealand, District 14 provided critically needed
fresh water to the New Zealand Territory of Tokelau. Tokelau was just a
few days away from having no fresh water, whatsoever, when Coast Guard
Cutter WALNUT arrived with 36,000 gallons of drinking water and a New
Zealand needs assessment team. Similarly, a District 14 C-130 aircraft
transported a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit and
Center for Disease Control personnel to the Republic of Marshall
Islands (Marjuro) to combat an outbreak of Dengue Fever (608 confirmed
cases). This rapid deployment of control specialists was instrumental
in preventing the spread and increase in severity of the outbreak;
consequently there was no loss of life.
e. Coast Guard District 14 participated with USPACOM in Operation
Pacific Partnership, the theater's premier humanitarian civic
assistance program. The program builds and strengthens alliances and
partnerships with participating host nations and integrated partners.
f. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel
participated in the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training exercise.
This is a USPACOM-sponsored exercise consisting of a series of multi-
national bi-lateral maritime training events between forces from the
United States and participating Asian countries.
g. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel
participated in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, a biennial field
training exercise that includes ships, cutters, units and personnel
from the United States (Navy and Coast Guard), Australia, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. The
exercise is designed to enhance interoperability of combined forces and
improve war fighting capabilities.
h. Coast Guard District 14 conducted operations with USPACOM as
part of the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. Coast Guard Liaison
Officers rode onboard Navy ships that transited Oceania for the purpose
of Maritime Domain Awareness involving commercial fishing vessels in
United States Exclusive Economic Zones and in waters of partner nations
in Oceania.
i. Coast Guard District 14 exercised United States Shiprider
Agreements (there are currently 8 such agreements) with various Pacific
Island nations by conducting commercial fisheries law enforcement
patrols that included foreign shipriders onboard Coast Guard Cutters.
These patrols deterred illegal fishing and protected vital marine
resources in United States Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as those
of the Pacific Island nations; thus dove-tailing with Pacific Command's
broader regional security goals. District 14 has expressed interest in
establishing two more Shiprider Agreements with additional Pacific
Island nations, resources permitting.
j. At the request of USPACOM, Coast Guard Pacific Area Command
provided support for and participated in various annual training
exercises with the Republic of Korea.
k. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command's Maritime Intelligence Fusion
Center Pacific provided various intelligence products for the Pacific
Commander:
1) Maritime Domain Awareness to Navy/Military Sealift Command
vessels and submarines;
2) awareness regarding transnational crime, alien migration and
living marine resources;
3) daily targeting products regarding foreign flagged ships with
Chinese, Russian and Ukrainian crews; and
4) targeting products in support of Operation TOMADACHI, e.g., the
tracking of vessels that may have been exposed to low level radiation
when their transit was near Fukushima, Japan.
l. The Coast Guard acted as a ``door opener'' for USPACOM to
various foreign nations--notably including (but not limited to) Vietnam
and India--vis a vis capacity building by conducting 14 Maritime
Training Team visits and hosting 34 students in resident courses.
Topics for the Maritime Training Teams included Law Enforcement, Search
and Rescue, Port Security, Pollution Response and Leadership.
m. The Coast Guard maintained a Maritime Advisor in Indonesia to
assist its maritime service with training, capabilities and
professionalization.
n. In an effort to enhance the naval capabilities of a USPACOM
strategic partner, the Coast Guard provided the Republic of the
Philippines with a former High Endurance Cutter, along with requisite
training, via the Excess Defense Article process. This Cutter will be
used by the Philippines to project a greater maritime presence in its
territorial waters.
o. The Coast Guard Liaison Officer to USPACOM supported Pacific
Command initiatives in a variety of instances, e.g., serving as the
United States Co-Chairman of the Maritime Security Committee for the
Republic of the Philippines-United States of America Military Defense
Board/Security Engagement Board.
p. The Coast Guard funds seven active duty billets at Joint
Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W), at a cost of $1,074,184.00.
JIATF-W is the USPACOM Commander's executive agent for counter
narcotics. Other JIATF-W support includes:
--The USCG District Fourteen Intelligence Branch Chief attended the
JIATFW daily intelligence brief once a week and worked closely with
JIATFW staff on illicit trafficking events, and provided liaison to
other Coast Guard and law enforcement entities in the region.
--During multiple smuggling events, the USCGC SEQUOIA and the
Maritime Law Enforcement Team from Maritime Safety and Security Team
Honolulu (91107) were on stand-by to conduct intercept and boarding
operations against vessels suspected of smuggling.
--The Coast Guard Cryptologic Unit Hawaii provided direct
intelligence support for JIATFW's Illicit Tracking Cell and Collections
Management Branch.
--The USCG Maritime Intelligence Center Pacific (MIFCPAC) provided
living marine resources expertise which enabled JIATFW to determine the
legitimacy of maritime targets, and a myriad of documentation-related
requests for information concerning suspect vessels.
--Coast Guard Air Station Barber's Point C-130 maritime patrol
aircraft provided airborne maritime domain awareness during scheduled
patrols for District Fourteen, which enabled JIATFW analysts to
determine an accurate picture of what vessels were actually on the
water at any given time.
--The Coast Guard Investigative Service worked closely with
JIATFW's Special Programs Application program manager, and this
collaboration resulted in the seizure of 900 kilograms of marijuana;
the confiscation of one fishing vessel suspected of drug trafficking;
nine illegal migrants taken into custody, including one with an
outstanding warrant in another state, and identified maritime smuggling
routes from Mexico to the United States.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of military bands within PACOM and are
they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering
greater understanding?
Admiral Willard. The military bands within USPACOM are one of the
most effective means of fostering relationships between allies,
partners and even our adversaries. They use music to bridge language,
cultural, societal and socio-economic differences. These bands provide
a soft power projection tool for theater security cooperation efforts
and helps build strong relationships with countries throughout the
USPACOM AOR. Each band has objectives which include building
partnerships, sustaining war fighter morale, encouraging and enabling
coalition partners, providing precise ceremonial engagements,
recruitment of talented service members and fostering military pride,
patriotism and service.
In portions of the Pacific, there are times when a military band is
the exact right instrument of national power to employ, especially when
other combat capabilities are in short supply and better employed
elsewhere. The USPACOM military bands have bridged gaps in
relationships that are decades old, such as the Marine Forces Pacific
Band being the first U.S. band to visit Cambodia since the Vietnam War
or the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) Band being the first
U.S. band to travel to mainland communist China. During that trip, the
band performed at the Shanghai International Music Festival where they
were able to interact with the People's Liberation Army Band, as well
as bands from Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea. The
band was able to positively influence relations with the people of
these nations through their participation in the festival as well as
engaging with the local schools by providing one-on-one instruction and
training students how to repair and maintain the longevity of their
instruments.
USPACOM military bands also perform multiple community relations
roles through participating in humanitarian assistance and civic
initiatives. The U.S. Pacific Fleet and Marine Forces Pacific Band both
contribute to the annual Pacific Partnership deployment where they and
other Services members work closely with host nations, partner nations,
non-governmental organizations and other U.S. government agencies to
leave a lasting impact through cooperative engagements in the region.
In 2010 the Acting Consul General of Russia, Patricia Miller,
stated, of the 25th Infantry Division Band's visit to Sakhalin Island
region, ``their concerts in three days did more to showcase America
than what the Consulate could have done in several months. The Russians
were able to see a very human side of the U.S. Army.''
Due to the unique capabilities of USPACOM bands and the ability to
reach hundreds of thousands of people through the universal language
and appeal of music, there is no other PACOM asset that can reach so
many people in such a meaningful, peaceful and lasting way.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in building
partnerships within PACOM's AOR?
Admiral Willard. a. The U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) 27,000 personnel
in the Pacific Area frequently support USPACOM, engaging in a wide
range of activities that support USPACOM's Theater Campaign Plan. In
addition to USCG International engagements such as the North Pacific
Coast Guard Forum and International Ship & Port Facility Security Code
assessments, the USCG supports USPACOM's exercises such as Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC), a biennial Field training exercise that includes
ships, cutters, units and personnel from the U.S., Australia, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom. The
USCG also supports Pacific Fleet's CARAT exercise in Thailand, the
multi-lateral Southeast Asia exercise Cooperation Against Terrorism
(SEACAT) and the proliferation security initiative exercise DEEP SABRE.
b. As the Executive Agent for USPACOM to the Quadrilateral Defense
Working Group, Coast Guard District 14 (based in Honolulu HI) worked
closely with representatives from Australia, New Zealand and France to
plan and conduct maritime operations across Oceania. These operations
were primarily related to preventing illegal commercial fishing, but
they also entailed the sharing of information at several levels.
c. Coast Guard District 14 served as an adjunct component to
USPACOM in a number of contingency situations. Of particular note, in
conjunction with New Zealand, District 14 provided critically needed
fresh water to the New Zealand Territory of Tokelau. Tokelau was just a
few days away from having no fresh water whatsoever when Coast Guard
Cutter WALNUT arrived with 36,000 gallons of drinking water and a New
Zealand needs assessment team. Similarly, a District 14 C-130 aircraft
transported a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit and
Center for Disease Control personnel to the Republic of Marshall
Islands (Marjuro) to combat an outbreak of Dengue Fever (608 confirmed
cases). This rapid deployment of control specialists was instrumental
in preventing the spread and increase in severity of the outbreak;
consequently there was no loss of life.
d. In 2011, the USCG supported U.S. Pacific Fleet's premier
Humanitarian Exercise, Pacific Partnership, for the first time with two
cutters, supporting engagements in Tonga and Micronesia. Pacific
Partnership consisted of 600 military, interagency and non-governmental
organizational medical professionals and engineers engaging the
countries of Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua-New Guinea, Timor-Leste and the
Federated States of Micronesia. The USCG is currently programmed to
support Pacific Partnership 13, next year, which is scheduled to visit
the Oceania region of the USPACOM AOR.
e. The USCG provided significant support to USPACOM by acting as a
``door opener'' to various foreign nations--notably (but not limited
to) Vietnam and India--vis a vis capacity building by conducting 14
Maritime Training Team visits and hosting 34 students in resident
courses. Topics for Maritime Training Teams included Law Enforcement,
Search and Rescue, Port Security, Pollution Response and Leadership. f.
Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel participated in
the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training exercise. This is a
USPACOM-sponsored exercise consisting of a series of multi-national bi-
lateral maritime training events between forces from the United States
and participating Asian countries.
g. In an effort to enhance the naval capabilities of a USPACOM
strategic partner, the Coast Guard provided the Republic of the
Philippines with a former High Endurance Cutter, along with requisite
training, via the Excess Defense Article process. This Cutter will be
used by the Philippines to project a greater maritime presence in its
territorial waters.
h. Coast Guard District 14 exercised United States Shiprider
Agreements (there are currently 8 such agreements) with various Pacific
Island nations by conducting commercial fisheries law enforcement
patrols that include foreign shipriders onboard Coast Guard Cutters.
These patrols deterred illegal fishing and protected vital marine
resources in United States Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as those
of the Pacific Island nations, thus dovetailing with Pacific Command's
broader regional security goals. District 14 has expressed interest in
establishing two more Shiprider Agreements with additional Pacific
Island nations, resources permitting.
i. The USCG International Training Detachment provides Mobile
Training Teams (MTTs) on various maritime safety and security topics to
countries throughout the Pacific. Last year countries included
Bangladesh, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Marshall Islands
and Western Samoa.
Mr. Scott. How would you rate the performance of E-8C JSTARS
aircraft within PACOM?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. The hospital ships Comfort and Mercy are high-demand,
low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of
hospital ships, would there be enough work for them to perform within
PACOM's AOR?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. How would you assess the current state of Taiwan's
submarine fleet?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. Which aircraft is better suited in combat against
China's J-20: an upgraded F-16 A/B or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. Besides the Republic of China, are U.S. Flag and General
Officers banned from visiting any other country within PACOM's AOR?
Admiral Willard. State Department and OSD have strict policies that
restrict U.S. Flag and General Officers from visiting Burma. Officers
of the rank of O-6 and above require permission from the highest levels
of OSD and STATE. The U.S. DOD policy on military engagement with Burma
has not changed. The below excerpt is from OSD-P:
--DOD policy is not to engage with Burma's military. This policy
includes, but is not limited to, a prohibition on any form of security
assistance or cooperation, such as Foreign Military Financing or
International Military Education and Training, arms transfers, foreign
counterpart visits and bilateral meetings--State has the lead on
diplomatic engagement with Burma and the Department of Defense is
prepared to provide any necessary support.
Mr. Scott. Does the present ban on U.S. flag and general officers
from visiting the Republic of Taiwan violate the Taiwan Relations Act?
Admiral Willard. No, the present restrictions on visits by U.S.
flag and general officers to Taiwan do not violate the Taiwan Relations
Act. The Act does not expressly mandate such restrictions, nor does it
expressly prohibit such restrictions.
Mr. Scott. What would be the deterrence value if Taiwan were to
acquire 10 diesel-powered submarines?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. If Taiwan had 20,000 sensor fuzed munitions, would it
greatly increase Taiwan's ability to deter a Chinese invasion force?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. Would MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime)
compatible (300km range) missiles offer Taiwan any numerous asymmetric
advantages?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. Will Taiwan require 5th generation fighters in the 2020s
given the current security situation?
Admiral Willard. I believe Taiwan will require an inject of
additional fighter aircraft in the future to address the decline of its
overall fighter inventory and to ensure it can carry out its basic
defense functions. Any such capability would still need to be part of a
truly integrated air and missile defense system that is mobile and
redundant to include an air force protection plan that promotes airbase
hardening.
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