[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-106]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 29, 2012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-432 WASHINGTON : 2012
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana BILL OWENS, New York
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM RYAN, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHRIS GIBSON, New York HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JOE HECK, Nevada COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Kimberly Shaw, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, February 29, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Budget Requests from U.S. European Command and
U.S. Africa Command............................................ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, February 29, 2012..................................... 39
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.......... 5
Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command,
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe........................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Ham, GEN Carter F............................................ 141
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 43
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 45
Stavridis, ADM James G....................................... 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Chart Prepared by Frank Boland, NATO Director of Planning for
Defence Policy and Planning Division, Showing Volume
Indices of GDP and Defense Expenditures for U.S. and NATO
Allies, Submitted by Hon. Michael Turner................... 171
U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Letter
to Admiral James G. Stavridis Regarding the Participation
of the Republic of Georgia in NATO Special Operations
Forces Activities, Submitted by Hon. Michael Turner........ 172
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 177
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 178
Mr. Turner................................................... 177
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 187
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 192
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 195
Mr. Langevin................................................. 183
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 200
Mr. Schilling................................................ 195
Mr. Scott.................................................... 196
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 183
Mr. Turner................................................... 186
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 193
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 29, 2012.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
testimony from the commanders of the United States European
Command and the United States Africa Command. I am pleased to
welcome Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of the U.S. European
Command and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and General Carter Ham,
Commander, U.S. Africa Command.
Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished
careers and your service to our Nation.
The last year has been very busy for both of your commands,
from operations in Libya to the current tensions with Israel
and Iran and the recent announcements of force posture changes
to our U.S. forces deployed in Europe.
Admiral Stavridis, for the last 2 years before this
committee you have strongly advocated for the presence of four
Army brigade combat teams. But 2 weeks ago the Defense
Department announced its decision to withdraw the two heavy
BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] from Europe. You have talked about
the ready, proven, mature basing infrastructure in Europe that
allows the U.S. military to rapidly respond to crises in the
world's most likely hot spots. I am worried about the decisions
being made for the sake of efficiencies and budget that change
our force posture in Europe and neglect our commitment to
regional allies and stability.
I also want to highlight my continuing concerns about
President Obama's missile defense strategy. It appears the
United States is spending $4 on regional missile defense, like
the European phased adaptive approach, for every $1 it is
spending on homeland defense. What is more, European missile
defense will be a national contribution to NATO, meaning the
costs will be borne entirely by the U.S. at a time when most of
NATO is failing to meet even the 2 percent of GDP [Gross
Domestic Product] threshold for NATO membership.
I am also concerned that the new strategy continues to
provide sufficient resources to EUCOM [European Command] for
the defense of Israel, given the growing threats to Israel and
its security. It is important the United States upholds our
pledge to defend one of the most reliable and loyal allies from
threats to their security and existence.
General Ham, although operations in Libya concluded last
October, there remain significant challenges to stability and
security on the African continent. While I am glad that the
brutal Libyan dictator Qadhafi is gone, the country is still
transitioning. A stable peace may not come for some time.
Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations continue to be a
significant concern in Africa. The attacks by Boko Haram in
Nigeria, especially against Christians, are extremely
worrisome. Somalia remains a continuing source of instability,
still hosting Al Qaeda and its affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist
organization. The increasing coordination between Al Qaeda and
al-Shabaab is a dangerous development and a reminder of the
threat posed by radicalism, terrorism, and ungoverned spaces.
Piracy remains a serious threat in the Gulf of Aden,
threatening commercial shipping in a major sea lane. The recent
Navy SEAL [Sea Air and Land] operation rescuing two hostages,
including the American Jessica Buchanan was good news, but we
must find a way to prevent these violent criminal acts of
piracy and terrorism from happening in the first pace.
Nevertheless, the new defense strategy appears to emphasize
presence and engagement in Asia at the expense of other
regions, including Africa. We look forward to your testimony
shedding additional light on these matters.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Ranking Member Smith.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both Admiral Stavridis and General Ham for
being before us today and for their outstanding leadership and
service to our country. We have two great leaders in two very
important commands. I appreciate your service. Both in Europe
and in Africa, there are many challenges going forward.
Certainly our relationship with NATO is critical as we
continue to fight in Afghanistan, and it will be critical going
forward as we look for ways to partner on the various
challenges that we have faced. It has been successful in the
past as we have dealt with situations in the Balkans, in Libya;
and, Admiral Stavridis, I appreciate your leadership in
maintaining those relationships. It is critical to us meeting
our national security needs.
And certainly in Africa there are growing challenges. It is
a region that I have always been concerned about. Clearly, in
the last 10 years, our focus has been on Iraq and the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and rightly so, to some extent.
That is where we were fighting the fight. But, at the same
time, there are growing problems in the African region, in
Somalia, but then also in Nigeria and Mali as Al Qaeda on the
Arabian Peninsula and also Al Qaeda in the land of the Islamic
Maghreb are both rising and extremely problematic.
Stability in Africa is going to be critical because it is
clearly a potential breeding ground for Al Qaeda and like-
minded ideologies. We are going to need to continue to pay
close attention to that area and be mindful of the need to
spend some resources there.
Now the overall challenge that you will hear throughout
this hearing is you don't have enough resources to do all of
what I just described, much less the considerable more than
what I just described that you have to do. We are aware of that
challenge. The budget is a challenge right now. It is a
challenge for the countries in Europe and our NATO allies as
they try to figure out how to deal with deficits while at the
same time meeting national security needs.
But I do hope the committee will keep in mind that, as
Admiral Mullen said, the greatest threat to our national
security, he felt, was our weak economy and our budget deficit.
So trying to meet that is also a national security need and
also something that this committee should be concerned about.
And certainly we have finite resources in meeting the
concerns that we have. And I have issued this challenge many
times before this committee, that if Members are upset about
the amount of money being spent somewhere, then tell us where
we can find it. That is a challenge that has not yet been met.
Some have mentioned that the stimulus bill was a mistake, and
it may or may not have been. I am not going to debate that
issue. But that money has been spent. So from an accounting
perspective, that doesn't help.
We need to realistically look at our budget. And if this
committee realistically looks at the budget and says we don't
have enough money, then let's propose where we are going to cut
spending and let's propose where we are going to raise taxes in
order to make that up.
Because I do believe the Armed Services Committee has
responsibilities that go just beyond this committee and just
the Department of Defense. We have a responsibility for the
national security of this Nation in all its aspects, and we
need to figure out how to meet that challenge.
And I have enormous sympathy for the two gentlemen seated
before us and all others who have come in previous weeks and
will come in the weeks ahead because you are dealing with
scarce resources and very difficult challenges. So we
understand that, and that has to be part of the equation when
you are figuring out how to meet those challenges, to live
within the budget that we all have to live within.
With that, I look forward to the testimony from our two
witnesses explaining to us how they are going to meet those
very difficult challenges in this very difficult budget
environment and to their answers to the committee's questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND, NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
Admiral Stavridis. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you very much for
having us down to talk about the important issues that both the
chairman and the ranking member have articulated.
I want to acknowledge it is a pleasure for me to be here
with Carter Ham, a good friend. We would say in the Navy, a
great shipmate. Carter, thanks for being a part of this
hearing.
Sir, I have a full and prepared statement. I ask that it be
entered for the record, as you always allow me.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Admiral Stavridis. So for 3 years now I have been appearing
here and doing my best to lead U.S. European Command and also
work in NATO.
And just to highlight a couple of things since the last
time I appeared in front of the committee about a year ago: We
have concluded a campaign in Libya. We have continued our hard
work in Afghanistan. I speak from a NATO perspective here. We
are working hard, both U.S. and NATO, in the Balkans to
maintain stability there. I think we have, in fact, been able
to strengthen our partnerships in Europe, which are important
to us around the world; and we have found time to work on some
of the new and emerging areas of security--special operations,
cyber, interagency, private/public, countertrafficking. I think
we are making progress in all those areas.
And at U.S. European Command, we continue to focus on
defending America forward. And if I were to articulate sort of
three things that we work very hard to do, the first is to be
ready, because the unexpected will occur. A year ago at this
time, we saw a very sudden change of events with the Arab
Spring. In U.S. European Command, we try to be ready to execute
our contingency plans and be ready for the unexpected.
Secondly, we try and conduct operations effectively. We do
that both within the confines of U.S. European Command but,
also, many U.S. European Command based units forward deploy
into Afghanistan and into Iraq. We support that, and we
consider that part of our operational responsibility.
And then, thirdly, we work, as I mentioned, very hard on
partnerships. Because I do firmly believe, although we see
great strategic challenge in the Pacific and in the Middle
East, I think we will continue to need these strategic
partnerships that we have developed over decades in Europe.
We are also working, as the chairman mentioned, on missile
defense, weapons of mass destruction, focusing on the new
strategic guidance that we, all of us, combatant commanders,
work together with the service chiefs and with the civilian
partners in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And that
has created a change in our European posture. We are going to
reduce our current presence there, part of a larger reduction
that has really been going on for 20 years. We have reduced
from almost 400,000 troops in Europe at the height of the Cold
War, troops and civilians, down today to somewhere under
100,000, about a 75 percent reduction.
That will continue, as the chairman mentioned, with the
reduction of two heavy brigade combat teams coming out. We are
going to add a rotational presentation which I think will
ameliorate that a bit, and I am glad to answer questions about
that as we go along.
I am very much focused on the question of why do we need to
continue to engage in Europe. I think people ask that question,
and I would answer it with several different things.
First of all, the economic base, although under stress, as
are many economies around the world, the European economy is
still about 25 percent of the world's GDP, about the same size
as that of the United States.
Secondly, the geography of Europe itself is important. It
really is the nexus point between the United States and our
operations in Africa and our operations in Central Command
region. And of course you will hear from General Mattis next
week.
Thirdly, the NATO alliance I think continues to be of great
importance to us. As we look at, for example, Afghanistan, we
see 40,000 allied troops standing alongside 90,000 U.S. troops.
It is a significant contribution.
Fourthly, this is the part of the world that really shares
our values: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of
assembly. We stand with Europe in many, many ways
philosophically.
And then, fifth and finally, the technology, the trained
militaries that are available to us to come and partner around
the world, as I have described.
So I think for all those reasons Europe will continue to
matter. I hope to make the case that we are approaching it in a
balanced way, and I believe that as we look at the challenges
ahead we will endeavor to meet them.
I want to close by simply saying thank you to the members
of the committee. You support our military magnificently, and
we appreciate it every day. From the men and women of U.S.
European Command, it is an honor to be with you.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement Admiral Stavridis can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND
General Ham. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members
of the committee, thanks very much for this opportunity to
discuss with you the accomplishments of the men and women of
the United States Africa Command.
I really am honored to be here with Admiral Stavridis. He
is a respected colleague, an old friend, and, truth be told, an
old boss.
Operations in Libya truly have brought U.S. European
Command and Africa Command to a higher level of collaboration,
and this year we will continue to work closely together as we
seek to more effectively address the security challenges in our
respective areas of responsibility.
During the last year, significant changes swept across the
African continent. The broad wave of democratic movements that
began in Tunisia spread faster and more broadly than many
forecasted. The Republic of South Sudan became the world's
newest nation. In Nigeria, as the chairman mentioned, Boko
Haram conducted violent attacks and demonstrated an increased
threat to Western interests. And in the Horn of Africa, al-
Shabaab and Al Qaeda publicly formalized their longstanding
merger.
Security in Africa, indeed, continues to be influenced by
external actors, by rapid economic developments, population
growth, and the overall size and diversity of the continent
itself.
In line with the new defense strategic guidance, we have
prioritized our efforts, focusing on the greatest threats to
America, Americans, and American interests. Countering the
threats posed by Al Qaeda affiliates in east and northwest
Africa remains my number one priority. Strengthening the
defense capabilities of our partners to responsibly address
security challenges remains an integral part of all we do.
Strengthening regional capabilities and peacekeeping and
maritime security also remain important areas of focus. Our
engagements are designed to be innovative, low cost, and have a
small footprint. In Africa, truly a small investment can go a
long way.
As I travel across Africa I have been encouraged by the
optimism of African leaders in confronting the challenges and
embracing the opportunities ahead. I believe that, in the long
run, it is Africans who are best able to address Africa's
security challenges. Because of this and because a safe,
secure, and stable Africa is in the U.S. national interest, we
at U.S. Africa Command will continue to strive to be the
security partner of choice in Africa.
Everything U.S. Africa Command has accomplished has been
the result of the professionalism and dedication of the
uniformed and civilian women and men of the Command, our strong
partnerships in Africa, and our teammates across the U.S.
Government. I appreciate the tools that you have given us to
execute our missions, including new authorities under sections
1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act.
Meeting our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
requirements continues to be a great challenge; and I am
working with the Department of Defense to gain additional
capabilities to monitor the activities of Al Qaeda and its
affiliates in east, north, and West Africa.
ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] is
also essential to U.S. Africa Command's ongoing efforts to
assist the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Central
African Republic, and the Republic of South Sudan to defeat the
Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa.
Again, I join Admiral Stavridis in thanking the committee
for its enduring support, without which the United States
Africa Command would be unable to accomplish its missions.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement General Ham can be found in the
Appendix on page 141.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis, the new strategy talks about reorienting
our forces away from Europe to other regions. In light of the
recent announcement that two brigade combat teams will come out
of Europe and your public support for continued U.S. military
presence in Europe, what are the risks and gaps to EUCOM's
abilities to respond to emerging regional threats and deter
aggressors, including defending Israel from potential attacks
from its enemies? With fewer forces, what will EUCOM
realistically no longer be able to do?
Admiral Stavridis. Chairman, thank you.
First of all, just to sort of set the stage, again, we are
in the middle of coming down from a Cold War-high of 400,000
troops in Europe. So I believe that the reduction in the two
BCTs that we are talking about, the 170th and the 172nd, these
are both heavy brigades, they will come out of Europe in 2013
and 2014.
We are also going to take out one A-10 squadron and one air
control squadron as well. So this is going to represent, sir,
in the aggregate about a 15-percent reduction in our forces in
Europe.
I am content that we have examined this strategically; and
while there is, obviously, some additional risk in the
reduction of forces, that it is a manageable level of risk and
it is appropriate in the larger global context. All of the
combatant commanders, all of the service chiefs came together
to discuss this. We all had the opportunity to present. Again,
I support the strategy, and I support this reduction.
In terms of how it will affect us, we are looking at how we
can mitigate for that increased risk. One of the things that we
have settled on is to have a dedicated brigade combat team in
the United States that will come on a rotational basis to
Europe. So we will have the benefit of bringing that in. It
won't be static in Germany, as the previous brigades were, but
will be available to deploy to Eastern Europe, to the Baltics,
to the Balkans. So I think that will help us mitigate this
level of risk.
In terms of the aircraft reductions, even though we are
taking out some aircraft, we are going to bring some new
aircraft in, including the V-22, which is optimized for special
operations. We are going to add a few ships that are going to
be part of the missile defense system. So I think, Chairman, in
the aggregate, I believe, although we are accepting a level of
additional risk, I think it is a manageable level of risk when
I look at the mitigation that we put together.
In terms of Israel specifically, which you mentioned, I
focus on our military-to-military relationships with Israel
very closely. Israel is a proud and strong nation. We are very
proud of our relationships. They run the spectrum of education,
weapons systems, financing, funding, and so forth as well as
the missile defense piece. I am also content that these
reductions in Europe will not affect our ability to partner
effectively with Israel.
The Chairman. I feel good about the fact that you and the
combatant commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the
chiefs have had months to work on this. And I appreciate that
you support the final decisions. I understand when you were all
in a room, I am sure everybody had differences, but it is
important that you do come together in support of it.
If you had not been facing these budget cuts, however, the
$487 billion, the sequestration that is set to hit us in
January, would you have recommended making these cuts?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it is fair to say that all of
these cuts were in the context of a $500 billion reduction in
defense over a 10-year period and that they must be understood
in that context.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Ham, I have got a multipart question here.
What do you consider the top three threats to regional
stability? How does the changing force posture in Europe and
evolving plans for building partnership capacity affect your
ability to respond to these threats in a timely and effective
manner? And how does the Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab merger impact
AFRICOM [Africa Command] planning and its building partner
capacity programs for counterterrorism?
General Ham. Mr. Chairman, I would categorize broadly the
number one threat for us is countering violent extremist
organizations that present threats to America, Americans, and
American interests that might emanate--those threats which
might emanate from the continent of Africa. So, in that
context, I would say that very clearly in my mind the top three
concerns for me are al-Shabaab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the
lands of the Islamic Maghreb, which operates in north and
western Africa, and the emerging threat of Boko Haram, as you
mentioned, based in Nigeria.
And while each of those three is dangerous, what concerns
me more is at least the aspirational intent expressed by the
leaders of those organizations to more closely collaborate and
synchronize their efforts. So while each three is independently
dangerous, if they are able to coordinate their efforts, share
funding, training, weapons exchange, and what have you, I think
that presents a real challenge for us.
Specifically to the al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda public
announcement of the 9th of February, this of course has been
long suspected, that there was a strong relationship between Al
Qaeda and al-Shabaab in Somalia and as well as Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula across the Gulf of Aden operating in the
country of Yemen.
Some have postulated that the timing of this public
announcement may actually be indicative that al-Shabaab is
under duress. I believe that they are very much under duress by
the African countries, the African Union mission in Somalia,
Ethiopia, and Kenya who have joined in the effort to defeat al-
Shabaab and to clear areas of Somalia from al-Shabaab control.
And I believe the public announcement may be--certainly not
quite a last gasp but I would say an effort by al-Shabaab to
gain some international support.
To counter the threat posed by these three organizations,
we do work by, with, and through the indigenous forces, the
host nation forces, to increase their capability. There are
some times where it may be appropriate for U.S. forces to act.
Libya is an example of that, although not directly related to
terrorism. But, more generally, we are better off when it is
Africans leading with a little bit of training and support and
equipping from us.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up a little bit, General Ham, on Africa, can you
talk a little bit about the instability that is going on in the
eastern Congo and, in particular, our recent efforts to try to
track down the last remnants of the Lord's Resistance Army? We
deployed some special operations forces in cooperation with the
Ugandan Government there. How is that operation going? How do
you see that as sort of a template along the lines of what you
talked about on the by, to, and with approach to trying to
bring greater stability to the region and keep extremist
groups, like the one you described, from rising up and causing
problems?
General Ham. Congressman Smith, thanks for that question.
The Lord's Resistance Army is an organization which
creates, through violence, a tremendous amount of instability
in a four-country region of east and central Africa. Initially
beginning in Uganda but now extending their efforts into South
Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, they have displaced many thousands of
African citizens. They brought terror and fear to families
across the region.
It is very encouraging, actually, to see the four nations,
the four African nations come together in an increasingly
collaborative approach. The U.S. support to that approach is
one of training, advising, a little bit of equipping, and
intelligence-sharing but more in a facilitating role than in a
leading role.
To date, what we have found is that the presence of the
U.S., mostly Special Forces advisers that are working with the
nations, with the armed forces of those four nations, are
having a very positive effect. We are assisting in intelligence
fusion, in facilitating long-range communications, logistics
operations to sustain forces in the field for long periods of
time, and increased intelligence collection.
So I am optimistic, but I am not yet to the point where we
see the end in sight.
Mr. Smith. And if I may, I think that is an important model
going forward for the threats we face and how to confront them.
I think we all agree the most likely threats are coming from
these mostly non-state actors, terrorist groups affiliated with
Al Qaeda. And for a relatively small amount of money and a
light footprint we can work with local partners to strengthen
those local partners to contain that threat.
And going forward that is the most likely threat we are
going to face. I think we have all learned the limitations of
major full-scale occupations and full-scale ground wars in
place like this. If we can fund those smaller, cheaper forces,
they can be much more effective as well. So I certainly
appreciate that leadership.
I want to follow up on the size of the force in Europe and
how it fits in with the strategy. I do think it is important to
point out that yet the strategy has budget components to it. We
don't have infinite resources. In any given endeavor in life,
you are going to have to look at what your budget is and then
match that up against the strategy.
But we did start with a broader strategy. You mentioned at
the height of the Cold War there were 400,000 troops in Europe,
and the point was they had to be there to stop the Soviet Union
from coming from eastern Europe into western Europe. That was a
very clear purpose. That is not something--I don't want to
assume, but I am pretty sure that is no longer part of our
strategy. We don't feel like we have to have a strong enough
force to stop that.
So how many troops do we have there now, and what will we
have once we implement the strategy that the President has put
in place as a starting point?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we have about 80,000 uniform
personnel. We are going to withdraw about 12,500. So we will be
down in the 68,000 range. I can break those down by service
very quickly. There are about 35,000 Army, 25,000 Air Force,
10,000 Navy and Marine Corps, roughly. And 10,000 dedicated to
NATO.
Mr. Smith. As succinctly stated as possible, what is their
purpose? How does that fit into our national security strategy?
Admiral Stavridis. First and foremost, they are there as
part of the NATO alliance that bespeaks all of the commitments
that NATO undertakes, therefore, Afghanistan, the recent
operations in Libya, the operations in the Balkans, the
counterpiracy operations at sea, et cetera, et cetera, et
cetera. So there is the alliance piece.
Secondly, there is a large component of building partner
capacity, working with these European nations to encourage them
to come and stand with us in these battlefields under non-
alliance circumstances, similar to what you are describing in
Africa. That is the model that allows us to get allies to come
and do that.
And then, third, all of these troops are very engaged in
training and exercises within Europe itself. So I would say
those three things are the three fundamental purposes, which I
would argue remain valid today.
Mr. Smith. Yes. And I think they are very valid.
Are they there for the purpose of being a forward-deployed
force to go fight a war somewhere in the region so that they
can get there more quickly?
Admiral Stavridis. That is part of their purpose, yes.
Mr. Smith. Okay. How much more quickly can you get some--
what would be a scenario for a place that the European forces
could get to? How much more quickly could they get there than
coming from the continental United States?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, I would start by simply pointing
to my colleague here on the left and say Africa, an immediate
shot down, particularly into northern Africa, certainly into
the near Middle East, to Levant, into Israel, Syria, in that
region, off and into that whole broad area, the Central Command
region. Europe is a very geostrategic platform that sits,
again, between the United States and any number of places where
we might hypothetically be engaged.
Mr. Smith. And given the size of the Force that this new
strategy will have in Europe and given some of those scenarios
you just laid out, are you comfortable that you have the size
of the Force to be the quick response for those small
contingencies that is needed?
Admiral Stavridis. I am.
Mr. Smith. And I mean, that is the thing. The strategy was
not pulled out of whole cloth. And I think the impression that
is given sometimes by the questions is, you know, that you are
all just sort of scrambling around, it is a big fire sale,
there is no budget, no money, so we just do the best we can.
We have a very large, very capable force. We have spent
nearly as much as the rest of the world combined on our defense
budget every year for 15 years. We have doubled the defense
budget in the last 7 years and built a highly, highly capable
force to respond to precisely these types of strategic needs.
So I think, while it is fair to say that every strategy is
constrained by whatever the budget constraints might be, even
with the doubling of the defense budget in the last 5 or 6
years, we were somewhat constrained by resources. We certainly
saw that in Iraq and Afghanistan. That will always be the case.
We, nonetheless, have a strategy and a budget that matches that
strategy that gives us a large enough force to respond to the
contingencies that you have discussed.
And I think you have explained that quite well, and I have
no further questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you both very much for your service to our country.
General, the Arab Spring is still playing out. We have had
government changes in a number of countries and some still in
ferment. In many of these countries, they simply exchanged a
tyrannical government for a dysfunctional government. I would
like to ask you two questions relative to this.
In your view, is the average citizen in these countries now
better off under the dysfunctional government than they were
under the tyrannical government? And has your concern and
responsibility been lessened or heightened by the Arab Spring
and the changes that we have seen there?
General Ham. Congressman, I would say that the average
citizen in the two countries in the AFRICOM AOR [area of
responsibility], which are most affected, which would be
Tunisia and Libya, are indeed better off, because they at least
now have the opportunity--in Tunisia, where they already have
selected a government of their choice, and in Libya, where they
will soon have the opportunity to select a government of
choice, choices that were denied them previously. That is not
to say that there aren't significant challenges in every
domain. Whether it is economic governance or security,
significant challenges certainly lie ahead.
The challenges for us in partnering with the security
forces of those two countries specifically I think actually are
heightened now in this post-Arab Spring or Arab awakening
timeframe where--in Libya, for example, where we did not have a
previous military-to-military engagement, we do now. And we
have met several times, to include my visit to Tripoli and
hosting the military chiefs of the Libyan armed forces at our
headquarters in Germany. We are building a relationship and are
helping them craft the way ahead.
Similarly, in Tunisia, where we have had a longstanding
good military relationship, the needs perhaps are greater now.
In terms of professionalizing, the Tunisians have asked for
some assistance in border security and in a number of areas as
well.
So the opportunities are great, but the challenges are also
great.
Mr. Bartlett. When we first became involved in Libya, I
asked Mr. Gates if the people we were aiding and abetting in
Libya were the same people that we were fighting in Iraq and
Afghanistan; and his honest answer was we didn't have the
foggiest notion whether that was true or not. Do we now know
whether that was true or not?
General Ham. By and large, I would say, sir, that is not
true. But there are some small pockets remaining in Libya and
in other places in north Africa that were centers of foreign
fighters who had left north Africa, transited along various
routes, and ended up fighting against us and other coalition
forces inside Iraq. There are remnants of that, and there are
indications that Al Qaeda's senior leadership is seeking to
reestablish those networks, and that is one of the challenges
that lays ahead for us.
Mr. Bartlett. Admiral, Europe has an economy I think a bit
bigger than the United States. The amount of money that they
spend on defense is a fraction of what we spend on defense.
After the cuts that we have made in our spending, our
military budget will grow from $525 billion this year to $767
billion 5 years from now. Obviously, we are contributing
nothing to reducing the deficit when we spend more next year
than we spent this year. And with a deficit that grows $1
billion every 6 hours, clearly we have to do something, which
will mean that Europe ought to step up and spend more on
defense so that we can spend less on defense or we are going to
go bankrupt, sir. I know some of their countries are going
bankrupt now. In your view, do they have either the will or the
ability to step up and provide an equitable commitment to their
defense?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think that the Europeans--as you
correctly say, the economies are roughly about the same, $15
trillion economies, the United States and Europe. The
Europeans, by and large, the NATO members have set a goal of
spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense.
Mr. Bartlett. We are spending double that; is that correct?
Admiral Stavridis. They are not meeting that goal, and they
are failing to meet a goal that they have set for themselves.
So I believe that Europe should spend more on defense; and I
have spoken publicly on this many, many, many times.
Now the good news is, even at that low level, Europeans
spend about $300 billion a year on defense, which is a
significant contribution in the sense of being part of security
globally. It is not enough. They should spend more. And if they
spent more, it would permit the United States to spend somewhat
less.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome and thank you for your service in these
very critical areas internationally.
Admiral Stavridis, I think you are uniquely qualified and
experienced in this position in several areas. I have always
appreciated your perspective both from a military and from a
diplomatic perspective, and I would recommend to the Members
that any time they get an opportunity and are in Europe to stop
by and get your unique perspective. I know that I have
appreciated the insight that you bring to that position.
Having said that, in the area of counternarcotics, can you
explain to us exactly what is going on with the bridge,
particularly from Latin America through Africa and into Europe?
And I would be interested to know, since Azerbaijan is a key
ally in terms of resupply for Afghanistan, do they have a role
in this effort of stopping narcotics going into Europe?
And then for you, General Ham, thank you for your service
as well. If you could explain to us the strategic value of
Djibouti and the role that it both plays and you think will
play as we look at ways to reduce our presence particularly in
Europe but as it would affect Djibouti.
Admiral Stavridis. Congressman, thank you very much. It is
great to see you, as always.
I think Europe has two streams of narcotics that come into
it, both of which are dangerous in slightly different ways.
The first, as you allude to, is cocaine which, as you and I
both know from our conversations when I was with SOUTHCOM
[Southern Command], is a series of flow that comes out of the
Andean ridge. It comes up to the United States, but we are
increasingly seeing it break and come over to western Africa.
And I would invite General Ham to comment here. But then it
flows from western Africa north into the Iberian Peninsula.
There are many countries in Europe that have a significant
problem with cocaine. The money from that trade tends to go
back into Latin America, where it undermines fragile
democracies, notably in Central America and the Andean ridge.
The second flow, which you also alluded to in the context
of Azerbaijan, is heroin, which comes, of course, from poppy
which is grown in Afghanistan, converted into opium, through
which it is typically transported, and it then becomes heroin.
That is a business that not only creates corruption, has a huge
human cost, particularly in Eastern Europe and Russia, which
have many, many addicts, but it also flows money and resources
back to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
So these two streams coming into Europe are of concern to
us from a security perspective. Therefore, at U.S. European
Command, one of the things we are doing is using some of our
current and existing resources to focus on countertrafficking,
how we can help the interagency break apart this supply
process.
Azerbaijan, to answer your question, is very important in
this. Turkey is very important in this in that the stream of
countries between Afghanistan and into eastern Europe is where
we are focusing a lot of those efforts.
General Ham might want to comment on the African piece of
that as he answers your other question.
General Ham. I would, Congressman Reyes.
As Admiral Stavridis pointed out, counternarcotics is very
much a destabilizing influence, particularly in West Africa.
The Africans are not the overall consumers of these drugs that
are coming from Central and South America, but they are the
transit point for the narcotics that go into Europe.
A couple of efforts that we are undertaking, we are
supporting a multinational intelligence operations center in
Cape Verde; and last year they facilitated the largest seizure,
well over $100 million worth of cocaine, in a good effort. But
more importantly than specific seizures, it is the undermining
of good governance, the influence of corruption that permeates
areas where illegal narcotics are flowing, and that works
contrary to our national interests.
In Djibouti, sir, I would mention that, at present, there
is a good contingent of Texas Army National Guard folks that
are there. I had the opportunity to see them a few weeks ago.
It is a very stable platform afforded to us by a most
reliable partner in that part of the world. It allows us at
Africa Command as well as those from Central Command,
Transportation Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command a
place from which we can operate and project into multiple
different regions: Africa, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean. It
provides a great platform for countering piracy. It is a vital
installation for us and one that has served most capably. And,
most recently, in the hostage rescue situation it would have
been extraordinarily difficult to have executed that mission
without the basing in Djibouti.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ham, I won't repeat the concerns that have been
expressed about Africa and the potential dangers there. I would
just add that the circumstances are not going to be static.
They are going to evolve in some direction or another. And I
think we are all going to trust that if it evolves in a more
dangerous direction and you don't have the resources you need,
of whatever variety, to deal with an increasing danger, that
you will raise your hand and say, I have got to have more,
regardless of, you know, some overall strategy that emphasizes
other parts of the world.
Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to ask you about a couple of
news headlines that got my attention, related to NATO. One was
an op-ed in today's Wall Street Journal about whether the
Afghans hate America.
And, you know, a lot of us are getting the question after
this most unfortunate Koran-burning incident about whether we
are being successful--NATO is being successful in helping to
train the Afghans to defend themselves, which, even if it is in
our best interest, if they don't want to be trained, if they
don't want us there, it causes lots of people to say, can we be
successful? So, given what we have seen on the news the past
week, what is your perspective about chances of success there?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
First of all, it has been a very challenging week in
Afghanistan, obviously the result of a variety of circumstances
that have dominated the news cycle.
If you step back and you look at the larger progression in
Afghanistan, I remain cautiously optimistic that we can succeed
there. I think the key--and you mentioned it--is can we
effectively train the Afghan security forces to take on this
important mission of defending their own country, which is how
it should be. Why I feel confident that we are moving forward
in that is the build-up of the Afghan security forces. We now
have over 300,000. They are in everything from marksmanship
training to literacy training. But, most importantly, we are
seeing them very effectively move into the battlefield.
Two years ago when I testified in front of this committee,
we were getting ready to mount an operation into a place called
Marja, which is in south Afghanistan. At that time, we had 10
coalition forces for every Afghan who was in the fight. Today,
we have two Afghans for every coalition soldier in the fight.
That is real progress over a 2-year period.
I think additionally, when I look at the operations we are
conducting to date, 90 percent of them are conducted with
Afghans; 40 percent of them are conducted with Afghans in the
lead.
My own trips to Afghanistan--I have been there many, many,
many times. To the question, do Afghans hate Americans? I don't
think so. I have seen with my own eyes frequently the standing
together of Afghan and coalition troops very, very effectively.
We are always going to see an incident or two. But if you stop
and think about 300,000 Afghan troops, 140,000 coalition troops
effectively operating together every single day, they are
standing and taking the field.
I think you will hear from General Allen, who will be back
here in a couple of weeks, in detail about all of this. But as
the strategic NATO Commander for the operation, again, I remain
cautiously optimistic despite a very challenging week that we
have been through in Afghanistan.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
And just very briefly let me ask about one other complex
topic. There was a news report yesterday about a study that
says that NATO is still playing catch-up in the cyber arena.
Could you just briefly outline how NATO, as an alliance, is
catching up from a military standpoint on cyber?
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with the statement that we are
in the process of catching up. We have hard work to do on
cyber.
Two very quick things that I will mention. One is the Cyber
Center of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia. It is a nascent
organization that is bringing together policy actors across the
military side of the spectrum. Secondly is a computer incident
response center that we are building in the operation center of
the alliance which will, I believe, begin to create some
effectiveness in this area.
We have a lot of work to do, and it is a focus area of
mine, as you and I have discussed.
Mr. Thornberry. I appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you,
gentlemen, for being before us today.
Admiral, in particular, we know the life extension plan for
the B-61 nuclear warhead which we forward-deployed in Europe
will cost upwards of $5 billion. What is the cost to EUCOM and
the continued value of forward-deploying nuclear weapons in
Europe? What is the military utility of these weapons? And if
our NATO allies do not invest in continuing to maintain our
nuclear delivery vehicles, how does EUCOM expect to fill this
gap?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you very much. Excellent question.
First of all, NATO's position on this is in the process of
being revisited in anticipation of the Chicago summit in May
where the defense and deterrence policy review will present the
alliance's path forward in total on nuclear weapons, not just
B-61 but strategic as well. So the first answer would be this
is very actively under discussion in the alliance. We will see
how the nations come out at the summit in May.
In terms of the military utility of the weapons, they have
a deterrent value since other actors hold similar levels of
weapons.
And in terms of NATO continuing to finance the
infrastructure and what are their costs, the costs are
relatively significant in protecting these weapons and, thus,
we have to, as an alliance, make decisions about whether we
want to maintain them or not. Again, I think that will be
something that will be decided in the May timeframe. I assure
you it is being focused on, and I anticipate a fairly clear
NATO policy statement in May.
Ms. Sanchez. As our NATO head, where do you see
opportunities for further partnership with NATO?
Admiral Stavridis. I would look, first and foremost, at
building on the coalition in Afghanistan. Twenty-eight NATO
nations, but we have 22 other nations who are partnering with
NATO in Afghanistan. These are many Pacific nations: Korea,
Australia, New Zealand, and Tonga. So I think that coalition
base gives us one set of potential partners looking forward.
Secondly, we have two organizations that reach beyond NATO
today, the Mediterranean dialogue. We are in the process of
talking, for example, with Libya. Already many of the other
nations in General Ham's region are part of this. The nations
around the Mediterranean are natural NATO partners.
Thirdly, we have an organization called the Istanbul
Cooperative Initiative which are the Gulf states. We partner
with all of them in piracy operations at the moment.
And then, fourth, just to push a little further out there,
two nations that I think are worth exploring possibilities with
are India and Brazil. They both have great capability. They
could operate with us, for example, on a piracy mission, should
they choose to do so.
So I think that is a spectrum of partners. But, again, this
idea of partnership is very important to the alliance.
Ms. Sanchez. Great.
And to both of you gentlemen, what are your thoughts on our
relationship with Russia? Is there strategic stability there?
What are our mil-to-mil relationships with them? Have they been
helpful in Afghanistan? Is it worth continuing to pursue
missile defense cooperation with them?
We had talked to them a while back about the phased
approach and coming in with it and helping us, and we haven't
really heard much back. So can you sort of give us an idea of
how you see our relationship with Russia out there?
Admiral Stavridis. I can. Russia is part of the EUCOM
region, so I will hit that one, I think.
First of all, we have many areas of cooperation with
Russia: counterterrorism, counterpiracy. They are being helpful
in Afghanistan, both with logistics, with sales of helicopters,
Mi-17 helicopters, donations of ammunition, weapons,
cooperation on information- and intelligence-sharing. They are
a very effective partner in piracy off the Horn of Africa,
which General Ham knows quite well. So there are many zones of
cooperation. Our mil-to-mil includes a robust program of
exercises and engagement. That is the good news.
We do have areas of disagreement with Russia. We disagree
with them about the policy with regard to Georgia. We disagree
with them at the moment about missile defense. So, as always in
a relationship, there is going to be balance, but I would argue
that we need to continue to pursue trying to find cooperation
where and when we can with Russia.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral and General, I truly want to thank you for your
service to our country.
As you know, this is probably one of the most bipartisan
committees in Congress, and I always appreciate when the
distinguished ranking member points out that sometimes there
are things outside of this room that impact us so much. That is
why I can't help but continue to be mindful, as we were when we
passed that $825 billion stimulus package, that if you added
that with the $345 billion of interest we are paying, that
almost equals the amount of cuts that we will take both now and
with the sequestration.
We talk about the strategic guidance and the new strategic
guidance. But, Admiral, can you tell us how much time were you
given to analyze this new strategic guidance and offer your
input from the time you were first asked to do that until the
time you submitted your input?
Admiral Stavridis. General Ham will remember with me,
because it was done with all the combatant commanders together.
My recollection is it was over about a 6-month period, I
believe.
Mr. Forbes. Were you all together in doing that?
Admiral Stavridis. We were. We did it not only using
technology, video teleconferences, but then we would
periodically physically come together, because it is important
to do that I think in a room together.
Mr. Forbes. Were you given a dollar figure that you had to
work to before you----
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir.
Mr. Forbes. So you did this totally out of context of the
$487 billion of cuts?
Admiral Stavridis. We did it in a context of a need to
reduce in general, but we were not given a specific dollar
figure--for example, in the case of EUCOM, of being told you
have to cut your activities by this dollar figure. We certainly
did it in the context of the reductions.
Mr. Forbes. So your strategic guidance would have been the
same whether the cuts were $7 billion or $487 billion?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, I think we were informed by the
size of the cuts. There was, as I say, a contextual sense of
the cuts but not a parsing dollar for dollar.
Mr. Forbes. So how were you informed by the size of the
cuts? It just looks like to me--maybe I am wrong, but it looks
like to me it would make a big difference on your guidance as
to whether you thought you were working with $487 billion of
cuts or $8 billion of cuts.
Admiral Stavridis. We were all certainly aware of the
magnitude of the cuts; and so I think that, again, contextually
informed us as reasonable actors. But, again, I want to
emphasize that this was not a specific dollar for dollar kind
of a drill. It was very much, let's get out a clean sheet of
paper, we are in the context of reducing the budget because of
a national deficit, and how are we going to do that? How are we
going to contribute to this?
Mr. Forbes. And I don't want to push this too much. I am
just trying to understand. It looks like to me it is just light
years of difference.
Because one thing we hear is people saying we had security
changes, and that drove this new strategy. The other thing is
we hear people always coming in there and say, well, we had to
do this because we had $487 billion of cuts. And I am just
scratching my head when the two of you got together with the
other combatant commanders, if you had no idea whether this was
going to be $400 billion or something of that magnitude, then
what you would be saying is this was all done based on a
security change, as opposed to the budget. How did you know
this magnitude? I mean, were you guessing at it or--I mean, you
had to have some kind of guidance.
Admiral Stavridis. No, no, we were--obviously, any senior
officer in the Department is quite well aware of the macro
sense of where the budget is going. So that is sort of a common
baseline. And, again, we were brought forward into the process
specifically in response to the reductions in the deficit.
Mr. Forbes. You guys just kind of came into the meeting
kind of all quietly knowing that there were these cuts that had
to be made, but there was never a discussion about the dollar
figure that was----
Admiral Stavridis. Again, the macro dollar figure was well
understood.
Mr. Forbes. Which was what? What macro dollar figure?
Admiral Stavridis. We had--I think it was around $500
billion was the number we were looking at.
Mr. Forbes. So you all were told when you started this
planning process that you had to have cuts of about $500
billion.
Admiral Stavridis. We were aware that reduction was going
to be appropriate for the Department.
Mr. Forbes. How were you made aware of that?
Admiral Stavridis. Through our own processes as well as
briefings.
Mr. Forbes. So when you got a briefing, did somebody ever
communicate and say, this is $500 billion of cuts; basically,
we have got to find a way to make them work?
Admiral Stavridis. The general context was presented to us
of the level. When I say we weren't focused on the numbers, I
am speaking as the Commander of U.S. European Command.
Mr. Forbes. I understand. I am just trying to get a handle
on when all of you came together did you just kind of assume it
is going to be $500 billion? Or at some point in time----
Admiral Stavridis. No.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Does somebody say, here is $500
billion, roughly; we have to make a strategic guidance that
fits that?
Admiral Stavridis. I think all of those things came
together.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral and General, for your service to our
country and for your devotion to our country. I mean my
questions not to be rhetorical but clinical.
Admiral, you do an eloquent job, I think, of laying out the
historic importance of our relationship with our friends and
allies in Europe and you talk about shared values and the
critical importance of the European economy and the global
economy and the proximity of Europe to hot spots around the
world. It is a very compelling presentation. I want to ask you
this question: Who are our adversaries or enemies in the
European area command today?
Admiral Stavridis. I would argue that we don't have a
specific set of enemies within the confines of the U.S.
European Command. I think, as the chairman and the ranking
member both alluded to, the threats we face today are
transnational in character, generally speaking. So it is
difficult to sort of pin an area and say here is an enemy.
Mr. Andrews. Understood. And in an era of asymmetric
warfare you can't really define the opposition the way you used
to be able to.
If you had to characterize the asymmetric threat in your
AOC [area of commitment], how kinetic has it been in the last
12 months or 24 months? Kinetic ranging from Afghanistan is
incredibly kinetic on an hourly basis to, thank God, a country
like the UK [United Kingdom] or France is rather quiet. How
kinetic are things in your AOC?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, in terms of terrorism in Europe
last year, there were 300 kinetic terrorist incidents, ranging
from bombings to assassinations, including two U.S. airmen, for
example, who were shot dead at the Frankfurt airport. So there
is a terrorism piece to it.
In terms of cyber, there have been, as there are here in
the United States, thousands of cyber incidents that are of
concern.
In terms of the Balkans, as an area within the EUCOM
region, we had major rioting there about 3 months ago,
including several of our NATO peacekeepers being shot, dozens
of them being put in the hospital. This is in northern Kosovo.
So I think there is a certain amount of kinetic activity.
But, again, I think it is, by and large, the concerns we have
from a security dimension are the transnational things that are
difficult to categorize geographically.
Mr. Andrews. Sure. And I am well aware of the fact that the
mission of an organization like yours goes far beyond what is
happening today. It is designed to mitigate what might happen
in the future and improve what might happen in the future. I am
well aware of that.
The question we are all going to have to wrestle with is
how to match up our resources and our basing structure with the
level of those threats; and, again, I think you have done a
very eloquent job describing your views on this.
Here is what a lay person in my district might say about
this discussion; and, General, this will go to you as well.
At least on the surface, the level of kinetic activity by
Al Qaeda and its allies has been quite acute in the African
theater. You have mentioned al-Shabaab, AQIM [Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb], Boko Haram as very, very active, not to
discount in any way the kineticism we see in Europe. But if I
understand this correctly, we have committed 96,000 personnel
to Europe, if you count uniform and defense civilian and
contractors, and 2,100 people to Africa, which if I understand
correctly, 550 of them are under your command but not actually
based in Africa. How would we explain that apparent mismatch of
resources to a citizen? Either of you?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, I would say that we are in the
process of reducing our forces in Europe for exactly these
reasons; and this is why we are, within a balanced,
strategically calculated way, drawing down in Europe. And I
think we will continue to do that.
Again, if you look at the line which goes from the Cold
War, when we had almost 400,000 total, down to where we are
today, about 96,000, that is a 75 percent reduction in 20
years. I would anticipate over time that will continue to go
down.
In terms of Africa, I will let [General] Carter describe
it, but I will pick up from a previous life when I was U.S.
Southern Commander. Part of the answer is because the nations
at least in the Southern Command region don't leap to the
opportunity to have U.S. troops stationed there, by and large.
Mr. Andrews. I am certainly well aware of that.
Admiral Stavridis. That is part of the answer to----
Mr. Andrews. General, I have about 16 seconds.
General Ham. Sir, in Africa, I would say a light footprint
is consistent with what we need and consistent with the defense
guidance. Lots of the forces who operate in Africa are based in
Europe; air, maritime and special operating forces; and it is
that proximity to the theater that enables the agility we
require.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you. I appreciate the discussions about
right sizing. I think you have been very helpful. Thanks both
of you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you for being here, and thank you
for your testimony.
Admiral, I appreciate your substantive knowledge, your
leadership, and your capability. I want to walk you back a bit,
though, on your answers that you were giving my ranking member
on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Loretta Sanchez, on the
issue of the deterrent and the defense review that is
undergoing with NATO.
First off, I want to acknowledge, before I toss this to
you, in the National Defense Authorization Act just last year
Congress, with the President's signature, stated that the
presence of the nuclear weapons of the United States in Europe,
combined with NATO's unique nuclear sharing arrangements under
which nonnuclear members participate in nuclear planning and
possess specifically configured aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear weapons, provides reassurance to NATO allies who feel
exposed to regional threats.
That was an affirmation both from the Administration and
Congress of the importance of nuclear weapons in Europe. The
strategic concept for NATO reaffirmed the nuclear alliance and
the issues of basing.
The Senate, in the ratification of the START [Strategic
Arms Reduction] treaty, placed upon the Administration the task
of looking to Russia's advantage in tactical nuclear weapons,
which public sources quantify those as we are in the hundreds
and they are in the thousands. It is a 10-to-1 ratio of
advantage that Russia has.
No one suggests that we should withdraw our nuclear weapons
without concessions, significant concessions from the Russians.
You did make a statement that there were similar presence to
ours. I believe you mean similar ----
Admiral Stavridis. I was speaking of quality, not quantity.
Mr. Turner. That is exactly what my note was just going to
be. I wanted you to confirm that that is of type, not quantity.
So that as we go up to the issue of the value, that
disparity--and I appreciate you acknowledging it--has to be a
focus of a 10 to 1. And that is obviously the issue in the
deterrence, the defense and deterrence review, and also in the
acknowledgements from the Senate and I think from our NATO
allies of no one is suggesting, certainly on behalf of the
Administration, that we should be withdrawing without
acknowledging the Senate's focus of reduction in the tactical
nuclear weapons on the part of Russia. I appreciate your
clarifying that.
With respect to Mr. Bartlett's discussion, you were saying
that, you know, of the 28 nations only 4 of them are meeting
the 2 percent GDP requirement threshold. This is their own
goal. They continue to fall short of it.
As you know, I am active with the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly. Mr. Frank Boland, the director of planning for the
defense policy and planning division on the NATO international
staff, gave us a chart, which I believe you have in front of
you, that shows basically the United States foots
overwhelmingly, perhaps as much as 75 percent, of the overall
expenses with respect to NATO operations. This was his
presentation. He was showing the comparable GDPs, which you
mentioned in your discussion, that the GDP of Europe and the
United States are the same, Europe being down here, defense
spending for the United States being up here.
Now, the comment you made that I thought was most
interesting is you said perhaps if they would spend more we
also could spend less. I know that you know that among our NATO
allies there is a view that some of this disparity is a result
not just of our contributions to NATO but just a global
presence. Could you speak a little bit more about what our
European allies need to do to bolster their participation in
NATO? People talk about smart defense, how they need to also
come together in ways in which they spend. I would appreciate
your input on that.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you.
Again, just to do the numbers, if our budget is kind of
$600 billion-ish, $650, theirs is about $250 to $300 billion.
It is about a two-to-one ratio. They do not meet the 2 percent.
You could argue it is somewhere between 4 and 8 of them are
perhaps meeting it out of 28. So that is far too low.
Again, I think you hit the nail on the head, sir; and it is
smart defense, which is this idea of how they can operate
collectively together to get more bang for the buck, which are
things like Baltic air policing, alliance ground surveillance,
helicopters, NPA [non-precision approaches], ISR. I can provide
for the record, since we are running out of time, some detail
on that. But I think that is the powerful point the Europeans
should focus on as they go toward this NATO summit.
Mr. Turner. I would appreciate if you would do that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 171.]
Mr. Turner. One more item, Admiral. I know that you are
aware that the NATO PA [Parliamentary Assembly] committee from
the House has sent you a letter asking for the consideration of
Georgia to participate in the NATO Special Operations facility
headquarters with the Special Operations training and
coordination activities. I think as a great ally and partner
they would be excellent for that, and we would appreciate your
thoughts on that.
Admiral Stavridis. I agree, and we are investigating that,
with an eye toward making it happen.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and
certainly to Admiral Stavridis and General Ham, thank you so
much for your service and for being here.
I wanted to ask you to focus for a minute on something that
we have been calling over the last number of years the whole-
of-government approach. And as you know, General Ham, in many
ways I think AFRICOM was supposed to be the kind of poster
child for this. What can you tell us about any services,
purposes, programs, processes that are occurring that you are
working with the Department of State and that in any way have
reduced the need for defense, the Department of Defense, to be
doing something there in the area as well? Is it making any
difference in that way? Is it something that is helpful? What
are we actually doing that we have seen a true difference in
the way that we do our job?
General Ham. Ma'am, I would start by looking at Somalia,
which is an area, again, in the region of Africa which is the
highest priority for me. And in our security assistance
approach, most of those authorities and most of those resources
reside with the Department of State. So we look for a
collaborative approach with the Department of State and in
partnership with the chiefs of mission in the countries that
are neighboring Somalia.
And under the auspices of the African Union mission in
Somalia, under State authorities, augmented by Department of
Defense trainers and advisors, we have helped particularly
Uganda and Burundi, and increasingly Djibouti and now Kenya, to
build capable forces to operate inside Somalia in an effort to
provide additional security there.
If that is successful, and I believe the trend line is
pretty good right now, that means that that is an area where
the United States would not have to commit sizable forces to
address a security situation. And that is really what we are
trying to do. That is the essence of building partner capacity
in this collaborative approach with State and Defense.
Mrs. Davis. When we think of the number of troops, and I
think my colleague was contrasting in the European Command with
AFRICOM, you mentioned working with the State Department, are
we talking mostly contractors there? Are those State Department
personnel that are working there?
General Ham. By and large, ma'am, the training is generally
accomplished by contractors and often augmented by U.S.
uniformed military personnel.
Mrs. Davis. So if you add those numbers, I guess trying to
get--maybe that would provide a more complete picture.
But, again, when we look at resources and we look at where
we should be, where we want to put our dollars, and with the
economic constraints that we will be having, I think trying to
get--that would be helpful in getting a better picture of what
needs to occur there. Because, in many ways, I think that would
probably be an area where people would target and would think
that that is an area that we could certainly cut back on.
General Ham. For us in Africa, in most missions, the use of
contractors is a good solution; and it is consistent with the
Defense guidance of, again, a light U.S. military footprint. So
what we seek to do is provide the unique U.S. military
capabilities when and where required to augment the basic
capabilities that are provided by the contractors.
Mrs. Davis. I think we are also aware of the humanitarian
assistance we provide, and are you worried that in a number of
instances that we would be looking to cut back on those? And
what argument would you make that that would not be a good
idea?
General Ham. The linkage between security and humanitarian
efforts in Africa is very clear to me, and I think we have to
look at each situation independently. But I do worry overall
that if there is a significant decline in the State
Department's security assistance or in USAID's [U.S. Agency for
International Development] ability to provide developmental or
humanitarian assistance those will have security consequences.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my time
is just about up. So I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Admiral, always a great pleasure to see you. I am looking
for the opportunity to come visit again sometime. A great time.
General, good to see you.
I am just going to kind of go through some numbers here and
see if I got this right.
Admiral, EUCOM has roughly 80,000 troops, going down to
about 68,000 troops, about 10,000 in Afghanistan on the EUCOM
side, not total NATO, of course. You have got 1,000 or so
people in the headquarters, something like that, and about $35
million.
And, General Ham, you have got it looks like about a couple
of thousand people, something like that, according to the
document here, and about $67 million for headquarters support
and then a couple hundred million dollars for other activities.
Admiral, you testified that you, in response to somebody
here, that you conduct training and exercises with these
troops. General, you don't have troops assigned. Do you conduct
training and exercises? And, if so, where and how do you get
the troops?
General Ham. Sir, we most certainly do conduct training and
exercises, a very robust program. We request those forces
through an established process----
Mr. Kline. Which is? What is that process?
General Ham. It is called the global force management
process, where there are priorities established. I submit a
requirement, typically on an annual basis unless there is an
emergent requirement such as the operations in Libya, so that
there is some predictability. And we place our requirements,
and that goes through a process managed by the Joint Staff. It
ultimately leads to a Secretary of Defense decision for force
allocation.
We are very heavily reliant on Reserve Components. That is
a good thing for us. We have very strong State partnership
programs that contribute very significantly to our training and
exercise programs as well.
Mr. Kline. Okay. I am sort of going somewhere with this. I
am a little bit concerned that we have built up the number and
size of combatant commands over the last few years. AFRICOM
being clearly an example didn't really exist as a command until
almost about--I guess you had one predecessor----
General Ham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kline. Kip probably was the first, as I recall, and now
you are there. And yet we are shrinking. Not only are we going
down from 80,000 to 68,000 in Europe, presumably the source of
some of the troops that you borrow through this process to
train with, but the end strength of the United States Army is
going to be plunging. The Marine Corps are going down
significantly, from over 200,000 to 182,000 or something. So we
have fewer and fewer forces, and yet we have the combatant
commands that have to train and draw on these forces. And even
when you draw from the Reserve Component, they have been pretty
heavily used, too.
So I am looking at potentially a pretty high OPS TEMPO
[operations tempo] as we--as SOUTHCOM and EUCOM and AFRICOM and
CENTCOM [Central Command] and PACOM [Pacific Command] and so
forth are conducting exercises with fewer and fewer troops, and
I am a little bit concerned about the size of these forces and
of these combatant commands.
And looking at AFRICOM, I am reading here from--this is a
document prepared by us. It wasn't part of your testimony, but
I think it is accurate. But it says AFRICOM has no assigned
standing forces. It does, however, have service component
headquarters. It has got U.S. Army Africa [USARAF]. USARAF is
headquartered in Vicenza, Italy. U.S. Naval Forces is
headquartered in Naples, Italy. U.S. Air Forces Africa is
headquartered in Ramstein Air Base, Germany. U.S. Marine Forces
Africa and Special Operations Command Africa are both located
in Stuttgart, Germany; and AF-Africa [U.S. Air Forces Africa]
and NAVAF [U.S. Naval Forces Africa] are dual-hatted commands,
with responsibility to EUCOM and NATO.
You know, I spent my life in uniform, and I know how these
things shuffle around a bit, but, boy, that does seem to be
stretching just a little bit as we have tried to pull this
AFRICOM together. So I am going to run out of time here, and I
am not expecting you to actually respond to this, but I think
it is important that we as a committee and OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] and the chiefs really take a look at
these combatant commands in the light of much reduced resources
and money and reduced forces, if that is really the way we
ought to be organized.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis and General Ham, I want to thank you for
appearing before the committee today and, of course, thank you
for your service to our Nation. I know we have already talked a
little bit about cybersecurity here today, and I would like to
touch on that a little more.
Admiral Stavridis, in past years several nations in the
EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility] have been subject to
sophisticated cyber attacks in conjunction with political and
military conflicts. To what extent do you communicate with
these countries on cyber threats and how has your communication
with other countries changed as a result of the inclusion of
cyber in the 2010 NATO strategic concept? And are there
limitations on your ability to communicate with these and other
EUCOM AOR countries on cybersecurity-related matters that need
to be addressed?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, thank you for the question. Thank
you very much, sir.
You are absolutely correct. For example, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Georgia have all been subject to fairly severe
cyber attacks within the last 5 to 8 years. We continue to see
daily cyber attacks.
We are--within the alliance, as I mentioned to
Representative Thornberry, we have created a center--and I
would encourage any of the Members to come and visit it--in
Tallinn, Estonia--appropriate because Estonia was one of the
countries that had suffered an attack--where we bring together
our policy planners to look very specifically at the cyber
challenges we are facing.
We also have an operational component, as I mentioned, that
is centered in my operational headquarters in Belgium.
And then, thirdly--I didn't have a chance to mention
earlier, and I think it is an important part of this debate--is
the private-public connection here, which we of course wrestle
with in the United States. The Europeans wrestle with it as
well. Cyber crosses this border between purely military and
purely civilian-type functionality.
So all of those elements have to be a part of the mix in
this conversation. I think we are pursuing all of those in
NATO. As you said, the strategic concept drives us in this
direction. We will have another statement along these lines at
the May summit. It is an area where we continue to put
additional resources. As I mentioned to Rep. Thornberry
earlier, we have a long way to go.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, do you feel that EUCOM's lines of
communication and responsibility are well defined with regards
to operational cyber?
Admiral Stavridis. I do. I think we have more thinking and
talking to do within the U.S. military structure as to the
precise authorities and responsibilities of our--what is
currently a sub-unified command, CYBERCOM [Cyber Command], and
what its relationship is to each of the combatant commands. It
is a new area of endeavor. We are talking constantly with
General Alexander, who is I think the superb head of U.S. Cyber
Command. So this is kind of a work in progress, but it is again
an area of security that we are all addressing.
Mr. Langevin. Let me ask you about base energy security as
it relates to cyber in particular. I have been very concerned
over time about the capabilities of our bases here in the
United States to withstand a cyber attack directed against
outside supporting infrastructure such as the electric grid.
Obviously, much of our critical infrastructure is owned and
operated by the private sector, which we don't have
responsibility per se to protect, and yet our bases are
dependent on that critical infrastructure for its power and
other needs. Have you examined the ability of overseas bases in
your areas of responsibility to operate in the event of such an
attack?
And, General Ham, you can answer this question as well.
Admiral Stavridis. We have; and I would be glad to provide
some more information on that for the record, since we are
quite short on time. The short answer is yes.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 171.]
General Ham. And the same for us. Principally at our base
at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, we do frequent cyber
vulnerability assessments.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Let me--since my time is running out, I will ask this
question to the degree you can answer it but something to think
about as well. Do you have a good understanding of the
capabilities that people within your command have with respect
to their knowledge and ability to use computers and operate in
cyberspace?
And I ask the question because it is not necessarily going
to be the admirals, the commanders, captains or colonels that
have maybe the most robust capabilities. It is probably going
to be your newest enlisted people and officers who have grown
up with computer skills and could be very effective in
assisting you in your work, especially when the stuff hits the
fan, if you know what I mean.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you so much for your long and continued
service to our country.
First, Admiral, I believe do we have 28 NATO allies? Is
that the number?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, there are 28. Technically, the
United States has 27 allies. There are a total of 28 nations in
NATO, yes, sir.
Admiral Stavridis. So out of the 27 allies to the United
States within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, how many
are spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on
defense?
Admiral Stavridis. It depends how you measure it. As few as
four and as many as eight.
Mr. Coffman. Could it be argued that, now, they have a lot
of the same pressures that we have, where, you know, are they
going to maintain a welfare state or are they going to cut
their defense budget. And it seems to me--and I would like you
to reflect on this--that they see perhaps the United States as
the guarantor for their security. Maybe there is an
overreliance on the United States as a NATO member where they
feel like they can make those cuts in defense. Where we are
spending about 4.7 percent of GDP on defense in the United
States, they are spending less than 2 percent on most NATO
countries. Is that an accurate statement?
Admiral Stavridis. That is an accurate statement.
And, again, as I mentioned to one of your colleagues
earlier, it is a subject I frequently press on with the
Europeans and I encourage our senior diplomatic and military
officers to press with their interlocutors. We should continue
to pressure the Europeans to spend more on defense.
Mr. Coffman. So outside of those facilities we have in
Europe to support the NATO operations in Afghanistan, outside
of those bases to maintain our expeditionary forces such as I
think we have a naval presence in Naples and Rota, Spain--if we
still do--so the permanent bases, our support of NATO does not
necessarily--I mean, we could articulate our support for NATO
by joint military exercises. We don't necessarily--there is no
requirement to have permanent military bases in Europe, is
there not?
Admiral Stavridis. There is no treaty requirement to have
bases in Europe. That is a fair statement.
Mr. Coffman. Very good. Let me just say, as a former
soldier in the United States Army and later transferred to the
Marine Corps, I served in the First Army Division during the
height of the Cold War--and it was very cold there--as an
infantry guy, mechanized infantry in the 1st Armored Division,
where I felt that there was a need for part of that 400,000
troops that you mentioned in Europe at that time, where there
was truly a need for permanent military bases there, because we
rotated back and forth to the Fulda Gap to have a presence
there, where we were facing the Warsaw Pact forces just on the
other side of the Czechoslovakian border where my unit used to
rotate to the West German--then west German-Czechoslovakian
border. So I think we ought to look at taking all of the BCTs
out of there.
General Ham, you mentioned the use of contractors for
trainers in Africa. Is that the standard practice for AFRICOM?
General Ham. It is. To be clear, sir, most of that training
is under State Department authorities and resources, and it is
largely under State contract that those contractors operate.
Mr. Coffman. Is a central part of your mission then to
train up African military forces that share our strategic
interests?
General Ham. It is. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Then why is it necessary for us to go beyond
that mission in terms of the Lord's Resistance Army? So instead
of--where we are actually going out with them on active
operations?
General Ham. Sir, we do not go out with them on active
operations. The law and policy place us there in a training and
advisory role only.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Now, you are based in Europe. Is it you
are not based in Africa for security reasons?
General Ham. Sir, when Africa Command was formed in 2007-
2008, it split apart from European Command, which previously
had responsibility for Africa; and they are and remain located
in Stuttgart. So it made sense that there were facilities and
people to remain in Stuttgart.
Mr. Coffman. Let me just say I don't think it makes sense
today. And I think Central Command is located in Florida. And I
believe that your command, since it is not located in Africa,
ought to be located in the United States as well.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you for joining us today; and I
deeply admire the professionalism and competence with which you
all exhibited jointly in the Libyan operation.
The new defense strategy and budget request, including
force reductions in Europe, reflect the hard work and forward
thinking of President Obama, our DOD civilian leaders, and our
military commanders. But I must say that the last few hearings
of this committee have caused me some amusement to watch the
righteous indignation that is on display by some of the
armchair quarterbacks on this committee.
Some of us have never served before, and we are indignant
about the 1-percent defense cut that has been offered up by the
Obama administration pursuant to the Budget Control Act that
was passed last year by this Republican-led House. So to show
indignation about a 1-percent cut in growth and then claim that
it is going to result--not claim but infer that it is going to
result in a hollowed-out force is truly amusing to me.
But I will ask you, Admiral, how have EUCOM and AFRICOM
been able to partner to support each other's missions and find
efficiencies?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
We are, I think, very strong partners. As Carter just
mentioned, our headquarters are co-located. AFRICOM and EUCOM
have a tradition of working together.
Some of the specifics include the sharing of forces which
are based in Europe but then come and do training and exercises
in Africa with General Ham.
We have shared nautical component commanders; and, thus,
when we operate, for example, in a NATO and a U.S. way in the
piracy operation we are constantly partnering there.
We are also exploring ways that we can create efficiencies
in intelligence and information sharing, and I believe we
essentially share intelligence facilities now, and there may be
some ways to do even more of that. This is a good idea because
of the close connection between the European partners and the
African continent itself.
So there is a very natural partnership I think between the
two of us, and I will let General Ham add anything he would
like.
General Ham. I would echo that, Congressman.
The Europeans, both through NATO and the European Union,
are heavily invested in security matters in Africa; and it is
our strong relationship and partnership with U.S. European
Command that allows us to have access and meaningful dialogue
in the planning and coordination of those activities.
Admiral Stavridis mentioned earlier today the Mediterranean
dialogue in which the North African countries participate
because they see themselves--they are partly African, they are
partly Arab, they are partly Mediterranean; and these hard
lines that we draw as boundaries between combatant commands,
the nations, of course, don't abide by those.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, General.
Admiral, how will the Administration's newly released
defense strategy change the way that you do business at EUCOM?
Admiral Stavridis. In a sense, it will not dramatically
change what we do. As I have categorized the new strategy, sir,
to our European partners, who often ask about it, I think the
strategy reflects a sense of challenge for the United States in
the Pacific and in the Middle East. It reflects strategic
opportunities in places like Latin America, the Caribbean, and
AFRICOM; and I think it reflects enduring strategic
partnerships with Europe. So, in that sense, for European
Command, I don't think there will be dramatic changes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, and I will yield back.
Mr. Coffman. [Presiding.] Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, General Ham, thank you so much for
joining us today. We appreciate your service to our Nation.
General Ham, I want to follow up a little bit. You talked
about those innovative partnerships that are being developed.
Obviously, in Africa, you are looking to build those
partnerships with those nations in Africa. I know that is an
ongoing effort there.
I know also there are other competing interests in the
region looking to develop those partnerships. I wanted to get
your perspective on how you believe those partnerships are
perceived by those African nations with that partnership-
building. How are our partnership efforts being perceived by
other countries, such as China? Where do you believe that they
will be for us strategically in the next 5 to 10 years? And do
you see the role and mission of AFRICOM moving more towards
those partnership-building efforts, those efforts versus a more
strategic or more kinetic relationship there?
I know we have some Special Operations Forces in the
region. But do you see AFRICOM's role there more on the side of
partnership building in the region in the next, let's say, next
5 to 10 years?
General Ham. Sir, I do. While we obviously always want to
preserve the capability to conduct whatever military operations
might be necessary, it is far better if we can focus our
efforts on preventive measures by, with, and through our
African partners. I think that is what they expect from us, it
is what they desire from us, and we try to head in that
direction.
One of the challenges that I have encountered--I have been
there just about a year now--is how do we cooperate more
closely with other nations whose security interests align with
our own so that as we deal with a particular African country or
with a regional organization of the African Union that we do so
in a much more collaborative and synchronized manner? I think
that is an area in which we can improve.
Similarly, I think we should look for opportunities with
nontraditional partners, such as China, to find those areas
where our interests do align and look for ways in which we
might increase our cooperation.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Ham.
Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to ask you, you talked a little
bit about this shifting of strategy there across the globe. And
one of those shifts is the movement of four Arleigh Burke class
destroyers to Rota, Spain, and I wanted to get your perspective
strategically what that means. What do you see, as a combatant
commander, as the primary use for those, and how do you see
that as being indicative of the strategic shift that this
Nation is placing in the way it defends this country's
interests?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
Primarily, the destroyers are going forward in order to be
the backbone of missile defense. That is the primary
functionality.
However, these are marvelous ships. I was lucky enough to
command one several years ago. I was a commodore of a squadron
of six of them. I know the ships well. They are the ultimate
multimission-capable ship, with anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-
surface [capabilities], wonderful to partner with other
nations. So they will be a very robust addition to our European
capability set.
They will also very much be part of General Ham's world.
Because, as I mentioned before, the naval commander, the four-
star Admiral who will have charge of these ships reports both
to me and to General Ham.
So these are ships that you will see off the Gulf of
Guinea. They will be operating in counterpiracy off the East
Coast of Africa. They will be in the Mediterranean. They will
be up north. So I think that their home porting overseas
reflects the ongoing engagement not only in Europe but also in
the African theater as well, and I think it is a very powerful
statement of that.
Mr. Wittman. Another question. I know that EUCOM is very
involved in joint operations--joint training operations with
Israel. And, as we know, with the instability in that
particular region of the world, there has been a lot of
increased interest, obviously, in Israel and their interests
and what they have to deal with in the region. Can you tell me
where you see EUCOM's relationship and cooperation with Israel
going in the months and years to come?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it will continue to be extremely
strong. It is based on exercises, information-sharing,
intelligence-sharing, very much on the sale of U.S. defense
systems, on technology-sharing. Missile defense is certainly an
important component of it.
And, finally, I would say, as always, personal contact
trumps everything in the sense that the key leader engagements,
the personal relationships up and down will continue to be
extremely robust going forward.
Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mrs. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I could expand on the question that was just asked
as it relates to Israel. This is obviously a concern of many
right now, not just in this country but all across the world.
And I guess I would ask if there are any gaps or areas of
concern as we discuss your role in the relationship with
Israel.
Admiral Stavridis. I think, ma'am, that we have a very high
level of commitment and a very high level of engagement with
Israel. We have ongoing discussions with them constantly about
their needs, and I think they would say they are satisfied. I
feel like we are providing them what is appropriate as we stand
with them in this time. And, as you say, it is a very nervous
time for Israel because of the Arab Spring and the strategic
circumstances surrounding all of that.
Mrs. Roby. Do you want to comment, to the extent you can in
this setting, about the concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear
development and----
Admiral Stavridis. I think those are probably questions
that would best be done in a closed session.
I can comment in a context of for the record in terms of
support to Israel in that context.
Mrs. Roby. Sure. And I thank you for that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 172.]
Mrs. Roby. And then, sir, I just would ask you if you would
just talk about the AFRICOM's current location, how that really
plays into the cost of what you are responsible for and what
you have to do and what potential negative impacts there are
related to that as we move through our concerned fiscal times.
General Ham. I don't really see, ma'am, any negative
consequences to our current stationing. We have good
facilities. We are well supported. We are relatively proximate,
as proximate as anything can be to the African continent
without incurring the costs of building a headquarters on the
continent, which I think would not be wise for a host of
reasons. At the top of that list would be fiscal issues.
The Congress has required the Department of Defense to
conduct a review and report back in April, a study to look at
the basing of the Africa Command headquarters. The Department
of Defense is conducting that review through the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation Office of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. The review is not complete, but that is
ongoing.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. Well, let me just--I should have said this
on the front end as well--thank you for both your tremendous
service to our country, and we certainly appreciate you being
before this committee today to answer all of our concerns.
Thank you very much.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mrs. Roby.
Mr. Gibson of New York.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the panelists for being here today and also for
your service, your long and dedicated, distinguished service.
And our thoughts and prayers are with all the troopers and
their families from your commands.
And I apologize for being late. I was at a hearing on the
Committee on Agriculture. So if this question has been asked
before, I do apologize for that.
But I would like to have described for me the timeline,
some of the specifics with regard to the movement of two BCTs
from Europe back to the United States. And then, Admiral, to
hear your perspective, I understand we are going to now have
deployments, exercises to help strengthen our relationship with
our allies, and hear your vision on that. And, then, finally
what the reaction is from our allies with all this.
Thanks.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir, and thanks for your
service as well.
And I would tell you that we are going to take two heavy
BCTs out of Germany. It will be the 170th and the 172nd. They
are coming out of Baumholder and Schweinfurt, and they are
scheduled to go out in 2013 and 2014 respectively.
We are also going to take out one A-10 squadron, the 81st,
out of Spangdahlem, and then the 603rd Air Control Squadron,
small unit out of Aviano.
So when you put all that in the aggregate, it will all be
done kind of between now and 2014; and it will be about 12,500
people coming out of Europe. That represents about a 15-percent
decrement in the number of uniform personnel in Europe.
Thank you for asking about the European reaction, because
that is a very pertinent question. I have been pleasantly
surprised to find that the Europeans understand this. They find
it is sensible. They recognize that we are facing budget cuts
here, just like they are; and so they are accepting of this in
a very straightforward way.
In terms of mitigating the reduction of the two BCTs, what
we are going to do is the Army has committed to identify a BCT
here in the United States that would rotationally come through
Europe. So, in other words, instead of being a static BCT
essentially parked in Germany, this would be a BCT that could
rotate its battalions one time into eastern Europe, one time
into the Balkans, one time into the Baltics, as well as other
places that U.S. European Command might be tasked to operate.
So that is sort of the outline and the timeline as I see it
now, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Very good.
And in the process of planning was a course of action
looked at that took all four BCTs, rotated them back to the
States and then looked to use the same model in terms of
sustaining relationships and providing capabilities?
Admiral Stavridis. Over the time I have been at EUCOM as
the European commander we have looked at all the options you
can imagine, with BCTs, squadrons. And of course a lot of this
is deeply involved with the Services. I am not the sole voice
in this at all. As you appreciate fully, sir, the Army has
views about all this, the Air Force has views. So it is part of
an ongoing conversation. But it is fair to say we have looked
at all the options.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you. Very informative. I look forward to
at some point sitting down and learning more about how all that
analysis went, and I just want to conclude by once again
thanking you for your service and for being here today.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Franks of Arizona.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I always want to take the same opportunity to express
my own personal gratitude for your service to the country. I
have 3-year-old twins, and I know that their futures are going
to be greatly enhanced by the commitment of your lives. And I
really continue to believe that people like you are the noblest
figures in our society.
With that said, you know, it is our responsibility on this
committee, more than anything else, to make sure that we try to
have insight and see to the future of this country in terms of
our national security. And you are the guys that get to try to
flesh all that out and make it work, and we try to create the
kind of resource equation that will empower you in the best
way. So every once in a while I ask questions just a little
differently and kind of turn around and ask you to tell me what
you think the most important thing this Congress could do to
enhance your capability to defend this country and the cause of
freedom in the world.
I mean, that is a really broad question. But, in other
words, your greatest need, or perhaps that you would consider
is an unmet or an unaddressed issue that we need to consider
more carefully or something you see coming down the road. What
is the thing that you think that we should be focusing on to
empower you to do those noble things that you have dedicated
your life to doing?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, I would, frankly, start by saying
that Congress is already doing it, and that is to fully
resource--in fact here on this placard in front of me it says,
``The Congress shall have power to raise and support armies,
provide and maintain a navy.'' You know these words better than
anybody.
Mr. Franks. I happen to have the privilege of being the
chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee in this Congress, so
it means a lot to me, actually.
Admiral Stavridis. Well, I have felt, in my 6 years as a
combatant commander, well supported by Congress.
I will pick up one thread, and maybe Carter has a different
site picture on how to answer the question. I will say one less
traditional thing perhaps.
But I would say when Congress comes to the field to visit
our troops, when you come on a congressional trip to meet with
high-level leaders, when you engage with your counterparts in
other parliaments, that is tremendously beneficial to me in
U.S. European Command, when you come to EUCOM. So I know it is
always hard for all of you to get out of Washington. But when
you can find time to do that, both the ``visit the troops''
piece but also the high-level engagement with counterparts,
that is tremendously helpful. So I would offer that as one
thought.
Carter?
General Ham. Sir, I would say, first of all, I think
managing 3-year-old twins is probably harder than my job. I
don't envy you that.
The foundation upon which everything we do is built is the
All-Volunteer Force, and those men and women and their families
who make a conscious decision to serve our Nation is what
enables us to do the things that we need to do. Now, the Force
might be a little bit smaller as we head into the future, but I
think it is vitally important that all of us in leadership
positions--and certainly I would ask this of Congress--to make
sure that we have programs in place that continue to attract
and retain the very bright, innovative, imaginative, committed
servicemembers that we need to address the Nation's security
needs well into the future.
Mr. Franks. Tell me, would either of you have any reactions
to the challenge that some of us see that the sequester
represents to the military? That is probably not the fairest
question to ask of you in the world, because I know how you
guys are. You are willing to salute and charge off with the
proverbial squirt gun. But that is not where some of us are. We
want to make sure you are more capable--or more armed, more
fully equipped, and trained than that.
But let me ask you, what does the sequester represent, in
your mind, to your operation?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, first, I would say that the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have
spoken very directly on this and used a wide variety of
expressions, to include devastating; and I would simply say
that I would agree with their assessment in terms of the macro
for the Department.
In terms of U.S. European Command if sequestration were to
kick in, obviously, we would have less ability to conduct our
operations, less ability to do the military construction that
we need to do, less ability to do the building of partnership
capacity to support our allies to come to Afghanistan and help
us win in that very challenging world. Across the spectrum, it
would be an extremely challenging scenario for U.S. European
Command.
Mr. Franks. Well, my time has gone here, so thank you,
gentlemen; and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Forbes from Virginia.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you again; and I do echo what
everyone has said about appreciation for your service to the
country.
Admiral, you mentioned the fact that we have resourced to
the strategy. But if the strategy is not correct then we are
not doing what we need to, to defend the country. And many of
us have a number of questions, and I would like to just pursue
some of the questions I asked you earlier.
Specifically, you indicated to me that the combatant
commanders had about 6 months to come together and work on the
new strategic guidance. Is that pretty accurate?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And you worked in a combination of ways,
through technology and meetings together, I would assume?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. A number of different ways.
On that 6-month period of time do you just happen to recall
when that began? It is a pretty big-deal item, so I imagine
that would--just the month.
Admiral Stavridis. Carter, do you remember when we had our
first get-together on all that?
General Ham. Sir, my recollection was March; and that is
because I became the Commander of U.S. Africa Command in March.
And shortly after that we had the first meeting that I am aware
of with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. So it would be fair to say sometime around
March or April of 2011?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that is right.
Mr. Forbes. In that ballpark?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And it lasted for about 6 months?
Admiral Stavridis. Probably a little longer, actually, if
you think about it, since we ran from March until--basically, I
think our last meeting was December where we really put it all
to bed. So probably closer to 7 or 8 months.
Mr. Forbes. And at what time again--again, not to narrow it
down, but towards the beginning of the process, the middle of
the process, the end of the process, were you ever told
formally this is the number that we have got to work with? In
other words, I know you said you were looking at basically $500
billion in cuts. But I just want to make sure we are not all
walking in as combatant commanders and saying, well, I am
relying on what I read in the Washington Post or----
Admiral Stavridis. No, not at all.
Mr. Forbes. But at some point in time I would take it
someone came in to you and formally said we have got to have a
strategic guidance that is locked into about $500 billion or
$487 billion--whatever the figure was--of cuts. Is that fair?
Did that happen?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, it did.
And, again, when I responded earlier that we didn't have a
number, I thought what you were pressing on was, did U.S.
European Command have a specific slice of that or a piece of
that? And we did not.
Mr. Forbes. No, no, but, overall, for your meetings and
putting together your input for the strategic guidance, were
you ever formally given a number in some capacity at all?
Admiral Stavridis. I would say we were not kind of given a
formal number, but I think in each of the meetings there was a
general presentation that would give us a sense, broadly, of
where the current debate was in terms of the budget cut.
Mr. Forbes. And, again, this is important to us in knowing
how much of this is security driven and how much is budget
driven. I just can't comprehend how--and the reason I say this
is the Secretary of Defense said he wouldn't have picked $487
billion. He would have picked another number. He thought that
was too high. He said that in testimony. He said it privately.
So at some point in time somebody had to walk in and say we
have got to reach this goal of $500 billion of cuts or $487
[billion]. You don't recall anybody ever coming in with that
figure and saying we have got to shoot for this?
Admiral Stavridis. I think in each of our meetings we would
have a presentation that kind of talked about the budget and
where the budget situation was. But you know, Congressman, when
you do strategy, you are trying to combine ways, means, and
ends. You are trying to have goals----
Mr. Forbes. The reason I say that, General Amos, I think,
the other day said, if sequestration came down--what I think
Mr. Franks was saying--we would have to do a whole different
strategy. So if we had $500 billion more cuts, it would be a
hugely different strategy than if we had $487 billion in cuts.
Admiral Stavridis. I would say that any strategy that
anybody has, including in our personal lives when we try to put
a financial strategy together, that if the resources change,
then the strategic picture will change.
Mr. Forbes. So wouldn't it be important for us, in
developing the strategy, to know what the resources were before
we started making it?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that is fair. I think it is also
important that we understand the geopolitical situation.
Mr. Forbes. I fully agree with that.
Admiral Stavridis. I think it is all those things put
together.
Mr. Forbes. I absolutely agree. The only point I am saying
is I am having a hard time understanding whether you guys ever
knew what those resources were to begin with or not. Because
you are saying you just had kind of an understanding. They were
talking about it. But nobody ever came down and said, this is
the world we are living in, this $487 billion cut?
Admiral Stavridis. Congressman, again, at each of our
meetings, we would get a very short sort of sense of the
budget, but the vast majority of our time was devoted to the
geopolitical structure.
Mr. Forbes. In that short sense, did somebody give you a
number at all?
Admiral Stavridis. We saw many numbers in the course of
that and many numbers of aircraft and ships and dollars and the
geopolitics, and all those things need to kind of come together
if you are going to create a coherent strategy.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you for allowing me to get an extra
question in, Mr. Chairman.
I will ask this of General Ham. Last week, Secretary
Clinton attended the London conference on Somalia. What do you
think was the result of the conference and what are the
implications for Somalia's future?
General Ham. Congressman, I think the London conference was
a very significant and worthwhile step forward. Because it
brought together I think about 40 different nations, to include
the leadership of the Somalian Transitional Federal Government,
to address the near, mid, and longer term needs of Somalia.
There has been I think very much a focus on the security
aspects in Somalia and not so much focus on the governance and
developmental aspects that would follow the establishment of a
sufficiently secure environment; and I think this London
conference really started to address, in a very meaningful way,
how the international community will seek to pull together to
assist the Somali people in forming a government of their
choice. So it is too soon to really tell, but I think all the
indications are quite positive coming out of the London
conference.
Admiral Stavridis. If I could just add on that, because
many of the participants were European, and I think the United
Kingdom in particular had a real driving role in this.
I, too, am cautiously optimistic that this is the right
approach for the international community to begin to focus on
this because this area of the world could have potentially
negative impacts in terms of transnational threat. And I
believe that we are on the right course, but we have got a lot
of work to do in that region.
Mr. Johnson. The leadership of the African Union, what is
their involvement in that process?
General Ham. The African Union has a very significant role
in Somalia, especially at present with the African Union
mission in Somalia which is primarily focused on the security
line of operation, as we would----
But the African Union, with all of its members pulling
together, again, to address not only security but governance
and developmental needs in Somalia in the whole of East Africa
I think is a very significant component of the international
community's effort to help Somalia stand up once again as an
independent and cohesive nation.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
And, General, one last question. As you are probably aware,
undercover journalists with Al Jazeera English recently
documented high-level corruption in the office of Sierra
Leone's vice president; and it appears on tape that his aides
accepted bribes on his behalf in exchange for illegal logging
permits. The evidence was so damning that 19 Members of
Congress have urged that the U.S. Government push Sierra Leone
to hold the perpetrators responsible.
General, Sierra Leone is an important security partner.
Would you please relay to your counterparts in Sierra Leone
that Members of Congress are still deeply concerned about this
matter? And will you please explain to the committee how high-
level corruption in partner countries make security
partnerships, counternarcotics cooperation, and security
assistance more difficult?
General Ham. I will, sir. And your comment is timely, as
Sierra Leone has offered to the African Union mission in
Somalia a troop contingent, which would be the first out-of-
region force to join the African Union mission in Somalia. And
certainly the reports and indications of corruption undermine
that overall effort.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
And I would like to thank the witness for your testimony
today. I really appreciate it.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 29, 2012
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 29, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests from U.S. European Command
and U.S. Africa Command
February 29, 2012
The last year has been very busy for both of your commands,
from operations in Libya to the current tensions with Israel
and Iran, and the recent announcements of force posture changes
to our U.S. forces deployed in Europe.
Admiral Stavridis, for the last 2 years before this
committee, you've strongly advocated for the presence of four
Army brigade combat teams. But 2 weeks ago, the Defense
Department announced its decision to withdraw the two heavy
BCTs from Europe. You've talked about the ``ready, proven,
mature basing infrastructure'' in Europe that allows the U.S.
military to rapidly respond to crises in the world's most
likely hotspots. I'm worried about the decisions being made for
the ``sake of efficiencies and budget'' that change our force
posture in Europe but neglect our commitment to regional allies
and stability.
I also want to highlight my continuing concerns about
President Obama's missile defense strategy. It appears the
United States is spending $4 on regional missile defense, like
the European Phased Adaptive Approach, for every $1 it is
spending on homeland defense. What's more, European missile
defense will be a ``national contribution'' to NATO, meaning
the cost will be borne entirely by the U.S. at a time when most
of NATO is failing to meet even the 2% of GDP threshold for
NATO membership.
I'm also concerned that the new strategy continues to
provide sufficient resources to EUCOM for the defense of
Israel, given the growing threats to Israel and its security.
It's important the United States upholds our pledge to defend
one of our most reliable and loyal allies from threats to their
security and existence.
General Ham, although operations in Libya concluded last
October, there remain significant challenges to stability and
security on the African continent. While I am glad that brutal
Libyan dictator Qadhafi is gone, the country is still
transitioning. A stable peace may not come for some time.
Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations continue to be a
significant concern in Africa. The attacks by Boko Haram in
Nigeria, especially against Christians, are extremely
worrisome. Somalia remains a continuing source of instability,
still hosting Al Qaeda and its affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist
organization. The increasing coordination between Al Qaeda and
al-Shabaab is a dangerous development and a reminder of the
threat posed by radicalism, terrorism, and ungoverned spaces.
Piracy remains a serious threat in the Gulf of Aden,
threatening commercial shipping in a major sea lane. The recent
Navy SEAL operation rescuing two hostages, including American
Jessica Buchanan, was good news. But we must find a way to
prevent these violent, criminal acts of piracy and terrorism
from happening in the first place. Nevertheless, the new
defense strategy appears to emphasize presence and engagement
in Asia at the expense of other regions, including Africa. We
look forward to your testimony shedding additional light on
these matters.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests from U.S. European Command
and U.S. Africa Command
February 29, 2012
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I
would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming Admiral
Stavridis and General Ham. We appreciate your time and look
forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget requests for
your respective commands.
Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a
strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat
environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those
threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately
places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific
region, but our regional commands will continue to play a vital
role as we work to confront national security threats wherever
they arise.
Today, we will take a close look at the posture of two
important regional commands: U.S. European Command and U.S.
Africa Command.
First, let me address U.S. European Command. The U.S.
European Command remains an essential part of U.S. and
international security. Looking beyond the military operations
in Afghanistan, the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran
and the risk of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons to terrorists remain grave threats to U.S. and
international security. We are particularly concerned about the
recent escalating tensions with regard to Iran and the impact
for EUCOM.
Now, let me address AFRICOM. Recently, AFRICOM played a key
role in our efforts to oust a brutal dictator and support the
aspirations of the Libyan people. Moving forward, it is clear
that stability in Africa is in the United States' national
interest. Supporting justice, human rights, and the secure
access of goods and services to the world markets is imperative
to encouraging stability, but even more pressing is the variety
of violent extremist organizations aligning with Al Qaeda: al-
Shabaab in Somalia being the most dangerous, but also Al Qaeda
in the Magreb and Boko Haran in Nigeria. Their desire to do
serious damage to our Nation, our friends, and our partners is
real. Additionally, our efforts assisting our partners in going
after the Lord's Resistance Army will bring stability to a
resource rich part of the country that has known enormous
bloodshed and strife for too many years. AFRICOM will play a
central role as we continue to emphasize the importance of
building the capacity of our African partners, who are also
endangered, to deal with these mutual threats.
In closing, I would like to remind our Committee that
overall, the defense budget is fully consistent with the
funding levels set by the Budget Control Act passed by
Congress. Although I did not support this act, many members of
the House Armed Services Committee did, Congress passed it, and
the Department of Defense has submitted a budget that complies
with the congressionally mandated funding levels.
I want to thank the witnesses again and I look forward to
hearing their testimony.
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?
=======================================================================
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 29, 2012
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 29, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Admiral Stavridis. The details for this question come down to
Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP). The key phrase in the
question is ``to operate'' which means we have examined how we will
ensure that critical Warfighting missions will continue to function if
the Host Nation grid or other critical infrastructure is successfully
attacked. This is a Command/Operations task--the Warfighting Commander
will ultimately decide how resources (e.g. fuel, power generation,
communications assets) will be allocated to support those Base missions
determined to be most important. Providing more detailed information on
each installation would require a USEUCOM tasking to each Component
asking the Component to articulate how they would COOP critical
capabilities.
Every installation/command has a COOP/disaster plan to deal with
these situations. Additionally, all service components have reach back
capabilities for technical expertise and limited equipment. [See page
26.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Admiral Stavridis.
Smart Defense
The Smart Defense initiative aims to assure continued capability
development commensurate with global security challenges and NATO's
Strategic Concept in a resources constrained situation. Smart Defense
is based on the principles of affordability, availability, national and
NATO priority alignment and complementarity.
A key element of Smart Defense is that all projects are ``owned''
and implemented by member nations, with NATO acting in a supporting and
coordinating role.
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR),
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and Air Policing have been selected as
flagship initiatives for the NATO Summit Meeting of Heads of State and
Government (Chicago Summit) in May 2012. The Chicago Summit is meant to
highlight a starting point for Smart Defense, to demonstrate the
principle and to build confidence for additional projects.
Compatibility of Air Policing, Helicopter Maintenance, Maritime
Patrol Aircraft, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
with Smart Defense
Air Policing today uses already existing air forces in support of
Iceland and the Baltic States, and Albania; states who lack air forces
with that capability, thus enabling them to concentrate scarce
resources on other security capabilities that are more in demand for
the Alliance as a whole rather than the purchase of costly fighter
aircraft.
The Helicopter Maintenance initiative will develop economies of
scale by centralizing logistics support for commonly fielded
helicopters. With multinational participation, this can reduce
footprint and redundancy, increase the cost-efficiency and optimize the
use of resources. For example, there is much potential in this area for
NH90 operating nations (a similar conceptual approach is found within
the Joint Strike Fighter project).
As existing Maritime Patrol Aircraft fleets age-out across many
NATO member nations, rather than duplicate existing numbers with costly
modern replacements, an agreement for multinational use of these
specialized assets will to some extend achieve greater flexibility and
efficiency by creating a multi-national framework to pool and share
capabilities.
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, including the
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project, is Smart Defense in that a
number of nations have agreed to procure critical assets that would
otherwise be prohibitively expensive on an individual basis. Within the
Alliance Ground Surveillance project, NATO will provide an organization
and structure, Air Base facilities, training, etc, which will serve as
an Alliance hub into which participating nations can collaboratively
generate information for the benefit of NATO. [See page 22.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Admiral Stavridis.
Iran's Nuclear Program
Since September 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
has been working to clarify the nature of Iran's nuclear program. In
one of his most detailed reports to the Board of Governors on Iran's
activities, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei indicated in November
2004 that Iran had failed to report, declare, and provide information
on a number of critical issues.
Since November 2004, IAEA Directors General have issued numerous
reports on Iran's implementation of its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of UN Security
Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929. The IAEA Board found
Iran in noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement in September 2005
and, after Iran restarted uranium enrichment activities at Natanz in
January 2006, the Board reported Iran to the UN Security Council (UNSC)
for its noncompliance.
In response to the IAEA Board of Governor's finding of
noncompliance, the UNSC has adopted a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/
2006, March 2006) and six resolutions (UNSCRs) on Iran: UNSCR 1696
(July 2006), UNSCR 1737 (December 2006), UNSCR 1747 (March 2007), UNSCR
1803 (March 2008), UNSCR 1835 (September 2008), and UNSCR 1929 (2010).
Four of the six resolutions (UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929) impose
Chapter VII (legally binding) sanctions on Iran.
In June 2006, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States,
and United Kingdom--the P5+1, also known as the E3+3--offered Iran a
substantial incentives package of economic cooperation and assistance
in return for Tehran's full cooperation with the IAEA and suspension of
its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The P5+1
presented Iran with a refreshed package of incentives in June 2008, but
Iran has yet to respond clearly and positively to this offer, or comply
with its UNSC and IAEA obligations. On April 8, 2009, the P5+1 invited
Iran to meet with the group to resolve international concerns and
rebuild the confidence of the international community. On October 1,
2009, the United States and the other P5+1 members met with
representatives from Iran in Geneva, Switzerland.
In late 2009, Iran appealed to the IAEA for fuel assemblies for the
Tehran research reactor (TRR), which has operated for decades and
produces medical isotopes. The IAEA, with support from the United
States, France, and Russia, offered a TRR re-fueling proposal that
would utilize Iran's own available low-enriched uranium (LEU) at the
Natanz fuel enrichment plant by sending 1,200 kilograms of the LEU to
Russia for further enrichment, fabricating it into fuel, and returning
it to Iran for use in this safeguarded reactor. The plan would have
provided the TRR with much-needed fuel to continue to produce medical
isotopes while also beginning to build international confidence in
Iran's peaceful intent by removing the majority of its LEU stockpile
from Iran's territory; however, parties did not reach an agreement on
the swap deal.
On June 9, 2010, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1929, the fourth
legally binding resolution calling on Iran to halt its proliferation-
sensitive nuclear activities and comply with its NPT, UNSC, and IAEA
safeguards obligations. The resolution calls for several actions to
restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program.
International concerns regarding the nature of Iran's nuclear
program were deepened and reaffirmed by a November 2011 IAEA Director
General's report that concluded that Iran has carried out activities
``relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device,'' and
``that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a
structured program, and that some activities may still be ongoing.'' On
November 18, 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution
expressing its deep concern about the unresolved issues regarding
Iran's nuclear program and calling on Iran ``to engage seriously and
without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
program.'' President Obama said on 7 March 2012, ``To resolve this
issue will require Iran to come to the table and discuss in a clear and
forthright way how to prove to the international community that the
intentions of their nuclear program are peaceful.'' And as he also
noted, we don't expect a breakthrough in a first meeting. As President
Obama noted, there are steps that Iran can take that are verifiable,
that would allow them to be in compliance with international norms and
international mandates and would provide the world an assurance that
they're not pursuing a nuclear weapon. This is not a mystery; they know
how to do it, and the question is going to be whether in these
discussions they show themselves moving clearly in that direction. They
understand that the world community means
business.
``We have demonstrated consistently through the P5+1 that the
international community is united in our concerns and condemnation of
Iran's actions that violate their international obligations. We are
united in continuing to press the Iranian regime to come to the P5+1
diplomatic forum.'' (Secretary Clinton)
``We continue to believe we have space for diplomacy. It is coupled
with very strong pressure in the form of the toughest sanctions that
the international community's ever imposed.'' (Secretary Clinton)
``Iran insists that their nuclear program is purely peaceful and if
that's the case, then openness and transparency, not only with the P5+1
but also with the IAEA and the Security Council and the international
community, is essential.'' (Secretary Clinton)
``We are hoping that the Iranians will come to the table prepared
to have the kind of serious and sincere discussion we have been seeking
for several years.'' (Secretary Clinton) [See page 31.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 29, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. If you were to relocate the headquarters of US
AFRICOM, what weighted factors would you deem important in determining
the location for the command? What confluence of features and
parameters create an ideal location for the headquarters of US AFRICOM?
What kind of community would properly support the mission of the
command?
General Ham. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently
leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated, Basing Alternatives
Study which will assess the cost-benefit with moving the headquarters
from its current location to the United States. We provided the
requisite operational data to support their analysis of the comparative
costs, benefits, and risks.
Strategically and operationally, our current location provides for
effective command, control and coordination of operations. We
demonstrated this during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) in Libya. A key
factor in OOD's successful execution was that the Headquarters lies in
the same time zone (+/- 3 hours) of the entire African continent,
including Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, the command's
service components, U.S. European Command and our European allies and
partners active in Africa.
Cost is also a consideration. Alternative options must account for
the significant expense associated with a move from Stuttgart including
the infrastructure costs related to any new headquarters facility. The
cost associated with travel to the continent to meet face to face with
our African partners, where strong personal relationships are valued
and critical for working effectively together to address threats, is
essential and will be a recurring obligation.
Until a final decision is made, we will continue to accomplish our
mission from Stuttgart, where our proximity to Africa, both
geographically and in terms of time zones, facilitates our ability to
build relationships with our African partners, and where our service
members, civilians and their families can serve from a safe and well-
supported location. Once the study is complete, we will comply with the
guidance and decision of the Secretary of Defense.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Admiral Stavridis, in past years, several nations in
the EUCOM AOR have been subject to sophisticated cyberattacks in
conjunction with political and military conflicts. To what extent do we
communicate with these countries on cyber threats?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM is the executive agent for five
Information Assurance/Cyber Defense Information Exchange Memorandums of
Understanding (MOUs), which are negotiated by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Chief Information Office. These agreements
facilitate sharing classified information with key regional partners,
building robust relationships, and strengthening collective cyber
security. Absent such MOUs, we can exchange only unclassified
information.
CYBER ENDEAVOR is EUCOM's premier cyber security program for
advancing collaboration, familiarization, and engagement with partner
nations. It is designed to strengthen cyber defense capabilities
through seminars, events, and exercises with NATO, partner nations,
academia, and industry. Owing to the critical role that the cyber
domain plays in military operations, CYBER ENDEAVOR is essential to
maintaining and improving force readiness for deployment in support of
multinational crisis response activities, combined exercises, and
future missions.
Mr. Langevin. How has your communication with other countries
changed as a result of the inclusion of cyber in the 2010 NATO
strategic concept, and are there limitations on your ability to
communicate with these and other EUCOM AOR countries on cybersecurity-
related matters that need to be addressed?
Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Langevin. To what extent is EUCOM involved with cyber threats
that are associated with terrorism and organized crime?
Admiral Stavridis. Both terrorist organizations and organized crime
syndicates are certainly well-versed in employing the cyber domain to
assist them in their nefarious activities. Primarily, however, the
cyber domain is employed by these two groups as a means of
facilitation: recruiting, fundraising, propaganda messaging, or cyber
crime schemes to defraud unwitting victims. While certainly
problematic, these uses of the internet do not rise to the level of
``cyber threats,'' as the relative lack of ``cyber sophistication''
generally demonstrated by these groups does not threaten EUCOM networks
in the way that more tech-savvy adversaries might be able to.
Mr. Langevin. How has EUCOM's cyber threat environment changed over
the past year, and where do you see it going in the near term? Are we
adequately
prepared?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM's threat environment over the past year
has seen an increase in hacker-activist (colloquially termed
``hacktivist'') threat activity from non-state actors. The expectation
is that the hacktivist threat will continue to increase in the near
term. Preparing for an evolving and changing threat such as hacktivism
is a challenge, but the agile and flexible work force at EUCOM is the
best defense for such a dynamic adversary.
Mr. Langevin. Are EUCOM's lines of communication and responsibility
well defined with regards to operational cyber?
Admiral Stavridis. The recently adopted construct for command and
control (C2) of cyberspace operations specifies command relationships,
roles, and responsibilities of Combatant Commands, Services, and
Agencies for operations in the cyber domain, consistent with existing
authorities, requirements, and capabilities. This standardized
framework will help EUCOM configure, operate, and maintain its Theater
networks, allowing it to effectively operate in and through cyberspace
in support of command requirements. The cyber C2 construct will
continue to be refined as it is implemented over the coming year.
Mr. Langevin. I have been very concerned over time about the
capabilities of our bases here in the United States to withstand a
cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as
the electrical grid. Have you examined the ability of overseas bases in
your areas of responsibility to operate in the event of such an attack?
Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Langevin. Do you see significant challenges or capability
shortfalls where our research and development investments and
capabilities could help you in achieving operational goals?
Admiral Stavridis. Research and development investments and
capabilities play a key role in satisfying our capability shortfalls.
We have a robust process of identifying and validating our capability
shortfalls, in coordination with OSD and Joint Staff, which leverages
ongoing research and development efforts. We proactively engage the
research and development community to identify capabilities that would
enhance our ongoing operations. Several areas in which we have seen
benefits include ballistic missile defense, countering illicit
activities, cyber security, and knowledge management.
The most significant challenge to addressing operational
requirements with research and development (R&D) investment exists in
the potential for Combatant Command (COCOM)- oriented R&D programs to
be curtailed. Programs such as the Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD) provide the COCOM with the ability to target R&D
efforts to rapidly identify new solutions to meet joint urgent and
emergent operational needs. Continued support of the JCTD program,
combined with the efforts of the Service Laboratories, enables new
technologies to be developed supporting a broad range of capabilities.
Recent challenges to R&D funding have had a measurable effect on the
pursuit of technological solutions to meet operational requirements.
EUCOM has identified a number of challenges and capability
shortfalls where increased R&D will indeed help find solutions to
operational goals, managed formally through the Comprehensive Joint
Assessment (CJA) process (which identifies longer-term theater
requirements appropriate for R&D). More immediate-term shortfalls are
identified in the EUCOM Integrated Priority List. Despite the timing
differences, there are a number of common topics identified in these
two documents. Three areas where we believe there needs to be
additional effort are in ballistic missile defense, energy security,
and cyber defense.
Energy Security. There are dramatic changes occurring in the energy
domain that portend real risks to forces in terms of sourcing and
vulnerability. These changes require earnest effort into developing
energy-independent platforms and facilities as well as visibility and
accountability of how we use energy and entirely different and
significantly less vulnerable ways to power the force.
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). BMD is taking on an increasingly
important role due to current events, which requires more attention in
the R&D community. We are accepting real risk in system capabilities
such as data fusion and defense planning tools, as well as in
operational and communications capabilities and
enhancements.
Cyber Defense. Threats to our cyber domain are continually
increasing. Despite significant Department-wide efforts, we are
concerned that we are not allocating significant resources to mitigate
these potentially crippling threats. We are a leading partner in
development of cyber domain command and control, enumeration of
adversary, insider, friendly, and environmental activities, and
experimentation in cyber authority delegation, but more R&D work and
investment is urgently needed in these areas.
Mr. Langevin. I have been very concerned over time about the
capabilities of our bases here in the United States to withstand a
cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as
the electrical grid. Have you examined the ability of overseas bases in
your areas of responsibility to operate in the event of such an attack?
General Ham. We have examined whether our systems would be able to
withstand a cyber attack directed against outside supporting
infrastructure at Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti, our only enduring
location in our area of responsibility, and at locations where we
maintain a temporary military presence. We also regularly conduct
assessments to determine the likely effects of an attack and measure
redundancy to ensure we are able to continue operations. As needed, we
refine our plans to ensure continuity of operations. While the loss of
outside supporting infrastructure would have a detrimental effect, we
would be able to sustain critical functions.
Mr. Langevin. General Ham, to what extent has the transnational
terrorism threat in Africa changed over the past year, and have you
seen communication and coordination between different terrorist
elements or criminal organizations?
General Ham. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Langevin. Do any developments demand a change in U.S. posture
with regard to training, support, or counter-terrorism programs, both
military and civilian?
General Ham. Events in Africa over the past year provide both
opportunities and challenges. The Arab Spring gives us the opportunity
to assist in the development of new governments and militaries while
instability in East Africa and the Sahel region of North Africa
requires greater vigilance to address threats posed by violent
extremist organizations. Despite the dynamic nature of Africa, however,
no major changes in U.S. posture, other than my previously stated
requirement for additional collection assets, are required at this
time.
Mr. Langevin. Do you see significant challenges or capability
shortfalls where our research and development investments and
capabilities could help you in achieving operational goals?
General Ham. There are several areas where the Research and
Development (R&D) community can assist us in meeting our operational
goals. Our top priority is for improved Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) systems that include near-real time processing,
exploitation, dissemination, and communications capabilities to improve
on-station time, persistence and timely delivery of information. Also,
we would benefit from ISR systems with foliage penetration or counter-
concealment capability. Additionally, investment in Identity Resolution
capabilities such as biometrics, document exploitation, and forensics
capabilities could provide critical indications and warnings. R&D
investments in a Friendly Force Tracking capability integrated with a
command and control system for Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) locator
beacons would improve JPR operations. In the medical arena, timely and
cost effective rapid diagnostic testing, surveillance, monitoring and
reporting capabilities would help us keep our personnel healthy while
they are conducting operations, engagements, and exercises on the
continent in remote areas of known infectious diseases. Lastly, given
the diverse environment and lack of a reliable infrastructure, further
investment in portable, lightweight, long enduring, regenerating power
technologies would enable continuous operations while reducing the
amount of weight and demand for replenishment of power (e.g. batteries,
fuel).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. As you know, the European Phased Adaptive Approach is
being offered by the United States as a contribution to NATO. This
means we're offering it free-of-charge. What discussions are taking
place to make sure that our allies chip in a fair share of this system
which, as you know, solely defends Europe until at least 2020? As a
corollary, does EUCOM know how much this system will cost it through
the four phases of the EPAA?
Admiral Stavridis. Many of our Allies already possess low-tier
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities, either in the form of
U.S. Patriot systems or French SAM-T systems. Germany and Italy remain
committed to development of the Medium Extended Air Defense System
(MEADS) program which would provide increased lower tier capability.
For upper-tier capability development, The Netherlands recently
committed to upgrading their maritime forces to be able to support BMD
operations (sensor only for now); Germany, Denmark, and Norway are
examining the feasibility of similar upgrades for their maritime
forces. Finally, it is important to note that the basing access which
Spain, Turkey, Romania, and Poland are providing for our planned EPAA
forces is yet another form of Allied contribution. As to the long term
costs of EPAA, this question is best answered by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) who can consolidate Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) and Service-related costs.
Mr. Turner. Second, this document (See the chart on page 171) is
from a recent NATO PA Joint Committee meeting, specifically a
presentation to the NATO PA from Mr. Frank Boland, Director of Planning
for the Defence Policy and Planning Division on the NATO International
Staff. What it shows is that even accounting for inflation, the United
States foots the overwhelming majority, perhaps as much as 75%, of the
defense spending in NATO. This was a clear lesson from the operation in
Libya, when even some of our strongest allies ran out of basic
munitions. Given your dual role as EUCOM Command and Supreme Allied
Commander of Europe, please explain what this chart means to you?
Admiral Stavridis. What this slide shows is that since 9/11 the
United States has invested heavily in its armed forces, ensuring that
they have the right resources for the mission and its operations across
the globe. This slide, unfortunately, does not capture what part of the
U.S. defense budget is committed to the Alliance, and what part is
committed to other global defense and security priorities. With the
exception of a very few (France, UK, to an extent Canada) Allied
defense spending is 100% dedicated to NATO defense. Hence, comparing
the U.S. defense spending to Allies' defense spending is difficult to
do since many Allies focus on defense purely in support of NATO. We
know that the financial crisis has hit many of our Allies hard, and it
is indeed affecting U.S. defense spending in a similar manner, but we
are all seeking ways to best address the challenges we face. What is
important to remember is that the Alliance is working hard to ensure
that it has the appropriate capabilities to meet the ambitions set out
in the 2010 Strategic Concept. Much of the focus for the NATO Summit in
Chicago this May will be on defense capabilities and ensuring the
Allies, and hence the Alliance, remain capable to meet their Washington
treaty obligations.
Mr. Turner. We also spoke briefly about the fine work of our
Georgian Allies in Afghanistan. As you know, three of their soldiers
were killed last week in an IED attack and one of their officers is at
the Walter Reed Army hospital right now, having suffered multiple
amputations. a. Can you speak to the contributions of the Georgians in
Afghanistan? b. As you know, there are at least seven Non-NATO states
present at that facility undertaking NATO coordination activities for
Special Operations. Yesterday, four members of the U.S. NATO PA
delegation and I wrote to you (See the letter on page 172) asking you
to review what needs to be done for Georgia to join the NATO SOF HQ. Do
you support such a step?
Admiral Stavridis. To date, the Georgian contribution to ISAF has
been indispensable to the overall effort and has contributed
considerably to United States capabilities and success in Regional
Command Southwest. They have already sent four battalions on six-month
deployments since 2010, and recently offered to double their
commitment, and beginning in October will provide two battalions every
six months. They have served valiantly to date suffering significant
casualties while volunteering to conduct all the same missions as the
U.S. Marines. The Georgians also secure a significant amount of
territory (own battle space) in Helmand Province, an exception among
other non-NATO partners.
To begin dialog on participation in the NATO Special Operations HQ
(NSHQ), Georgia would need to gain a special security arrangement with
NATO in accordance with the NSHQ governing legal framework, which first
requires meeting certain NATO operational security benchmarks. Georgia
would then need to establish a formal sponsorship arrangement with one
of the NSHQ participating NATO member nations. Such a sponsorship
arrangement would likely require as a prerequisite a full assessment of
Georgian SOF capabilities and follow-on training support.
Pending resolution of these issues, I support Georgian
participation in the NATO Special Operations HQ.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Sanchez and I are the heads of the Congressional
Romania Caucus, which has 32 members. When we spoke last week we
discussed the interest of Romania in purchasing F-16 fighters from the
United States. Can you speak to where that proposal stands? Do you
believe a part of ``smart defense'' should be making sure our allies
are properly equipped?
Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the current EUCOM workforce construct reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and
contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
as required by statutes and policies.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, EUCOM Headquarters reorganized to embrace
an interagency and ``whole of society/government'' approach to
maintaining security and stability in Europe and Eurasia, while shaping
existing structures to accommodate the security environment through
2020. Our assessment allowed us to reshape EUCOM Headquarters to ensure
an organization that ``effectively conducts the mission efficiently.''
Directorates prioritized all permanent billets in order to identify
those with the lowest priority. Directorates also developed a
prioritized list of manpower requirements, drawn from the ``gaps'' that
we identified in our assessment. Both the assessment and the
prioritization of on hand resources looked at the enterprise across the
board, and took into account all categories of available manpower
(civilian, military, contractor, and Reserve Component). Permanent
manpower requirements were accommodated from within the HQ USEUCOM
staff, using lowest priority billets as offsets and other available
human resources for mitigating or bridging any capability gaps.
The results allowed EUCOM Headquarters to execute an internal staff
rebalance without incurring any growth. In accordance with our new
mission-set the staff developed a re-prioritization of all permanent
billets. This new prioritization presented leadership a picture of our
bottom 10% zone in anticipation of additional reductions in manpower
and fiscal resources that we took as directed by the SECDEF.
To achieve these ends, EUCOM Headquarters relies on the guidance
and policy published in DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for
Determining Workforce Mix and CJCSI 1001.01A, Joint Manpower And
Personnel Program. EUCOM Headquarters supplements and provides further
procedural guidance within the Command through its command
instructions, ECI 1601.02, Manpower (currently under revision) and
command guidance ECG 5101.01, EUCOM Organization and Functions
(currently under revision). Additionally, the Command conducts regular
directorate manpower reviews and detailed Strength Reports that
highlight trends across all categories of manpower.
Ms. Bordallo. In your prepared statement, you stated that EUCOM has
implemented Contract Management Boards to review all manpower contracts
for possible in-sourcing or reduction. How do you define manpower
contracts and how does that reconcile with requirements of 10 USC
2330a?
Admiral Stavridis. Manpower Contracts are services contracts
provided by industry to government to place subject matter experts and
specialists or consultants in place to perform specific requirements in
place of non-available military or civilian manpower. EUCOM's Contract
Management Board considers the information set forth in 10 U.S.C
2330a(c)(2), relating to the reporting requirements for manpower
contract issues.
Ms. Bordallo. Your prepared statement indicated that EUCOM uses
Manpower Governance Boards to validate authorized billets, and have
willingly accepted greater risk in our Program Objective Memorandum in
order to fund our most important missions and functions. To what extent
do these Boards ensure compliance with statutory requirements and
Personnel & Readiness issued policies related to workforce mix, cost,
and risk?
Admiral Stavridis. The Manpower Governance Board (MGB) is the
strategic governing body within USEUCOM to review and recommend changes
to EUCOM's total force manpower. The purpose of the MGB is to ensure
EUCOM's manpower resources, as well as its manpower polices and
processes, are aligned to achieve the most important strategic and
functional objectives of the Command within available funding.
According to its charter, the MGB will:
a. Provide oversight and policy guidance to the manpower governance
processes to include the Compensation Review Board (CRB), Joint Reserve
Requirements Board (JRRB), and the Contract Management Board (CMB)
actions that will result in contracted manpower. The MGB represents the
decision-making authority
for these governance processes and will serve to synchronize manpower
decision-
making.
b. Ensure that requests for increased manpower, permanent and
temporary over-hires, are prioritized and consistent with EUCOM
strategic objectives.
c. Ensure that internally-generated initiatives to realign manpower
(e.g., across directorates; convert temporary positions to permanent)
are consistent with EUCOM missions, avoid redundancy, and minimize risk
to accomplishment of work. This includes contractor to civilian
conversions (Concept Plan submissions), and military to civilian
conversions (Defense Manpower Review Process and Reserve Component).
d. Ensure that EUCOM has sufficient manpower deployed to its most
critical missions and functions.
e. Provide transparency in manpower resource decision-making and
resource allocation within and across directorates.
The membership of the MGB includes: EUCOM Assistant Chief of Staff
(ACOS) and Deputy ECJ1, who serve as co-chairs. The ACOS serves as the
voting member for the Special Staff. The MGB also includes primary and
alternate O-6 or GS-15 deputy-level representatives from each EUCOM
numbered J-code directorate. The MGB submits recommendations to the
EUCOM Chief of Staff for final approval.
The Manpower, Personnel, and Administration Directorate (ECJ1)
staff will provide facilitation and analytic support to the MGB, and
serves as the office of primary responsibility for the MGB. ECJ1 serves
as manpower requirement and personnel policy subject matter expert to
the J codes/Special Staff and the MGB, owns the operation of the
manpower governance processes, analyzes business case analysis-based
manpower increase requests (to assess the validity and priority of the
request, as well as the best sourcing options for the requirement), and
conducts analysis of current manpower alignment to ensure that
internally-generated manpower realignment initiatives (e.g., across
directorates; convert temporary positions to permanent) are consistent
with EUCOM missions and minimize risk to the accomplishment of work.
Ms. Bordallo. Did EUCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian
personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-
effectively performed by
civilians?
Admiral Stavridis. No, not during the last fiscal year. But, yes,
over the last 5 years in order to accomplish insourcing. And EUCOM
coordinated with the Joint Staff to ensure our manpower requirements
were adequately reflected within the existing civilian personnel level.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has EUCOM used insourcing to reduce
reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
efficiencies?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM Headquarters has been reducing reliance on
contractors since 2006 and rebalancing our workforce. Several contracts
have been cancelled due to mission accomplishment or when no longer
needed. More than 60 contractor billets have been transitioned to
civilian positions, creating efficiencies and cost avoidance of more
than $3 million.
Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
currently supporting EUCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse
source of labor?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. EUCOM continues to integrate updated DOD
guidance to support a more efficient manpower solution. Through our
contract management board process, we review alternatives to contracted
services as well as conduct a ``cost benefit analysis'' to ensure that
we are meeting the intent of 8108(c) and the Campaign to Cut Waste
Guidance. We feel confident that we have taken the necessary measures
to develop a process that achieves a cost effective source of labor,
and our contract management board decisions continue to yield cost
savings.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within EUCOM to ensure
the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
Admiral Stavridis. After the SECDEF Efficiency Initiatives
reduction to the EUCOM Headquarters, EUCOM initiated EUCOM 2020 Phase
III to review and assess manpower against functions and rebalance the
staff, if necessary, in order to correctly align appropriate manpower
against the highest priority missions and functions, while taking
additional risk in lower priority missions and functions.
The EUCOM staff prepared organizational functional risk assessments
and identified areas of risk or functions that could either be deleted
or transferred. The risk assessments and staff rebalance was approved
by the EUCOM Deputy Commander on 8 June 2011, and the list of deleted
functions was approved on 11 November 2011.
Subsequently, the EUCOM Organization and Functions Manual is being
completely revised. Combined with the risk assessment tool developed
during EUCOM 2020 Phase III and the Annual Manpower Process, through
which organizations identify additional manpower requirements within
EUCOM, the Command will conduct an analysis on an annual basis to
ensure that manpower is correctly allocated, and that any reduction in
either the military or civilian workforce reflects the elimination or
reduction in the associated mission or function.
Ms. Bordallo. In the EUCOM plan for the inventory of contracts for
services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's
appropriations act, signed by your Director of Manpower, Personnel, and
Administration on October 1, 2011, and submitted to the congressional
defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, EUCOM planned
to begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How
many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements
since October 1, 2011?
Admiral Stavridis. Contract actions initiated by EUCOM Headquarters
are processed by several contracting organizations in Europe and the
United States. Contracting Officer's Representatives have been
coordinating with these contracting agencies and have commenced
contract modifications as existing contracts come up for renewal. At
least 12 out of 24 services contracts supporting EUCOM Headquarters
have been executed with the new requirements. We expect to have all
contracts modified by the beginning of fiscal year 2013
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates' mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions EUCOM has had approved
to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions
that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.
Admiral Stavridis. Subsequent to the Secretary's August 2010
announcement of a civilian ``freeze,'' EUCOM did request exceptions to
the limit. None of those requests were granted.
Specifically, in September 2010, EUCOM requested exceptions for the
following 28 positions:
Ballistic Missile Defense--13 positions Interagency engagement--1
positions Strategy for Active Security--2 positions Academic
coordination--1 position Critical Infrastructure (counter-terrorism,
information technology, cyber)--3 positions Defense Intelligence Agency
conversion of 20 Air Force military positions--8 positions
There were no specific justifications for denial of these requests
for exceptions.
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across EUCOM, is
the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
Admiral Stavridis. Beginning in August 2010, EUCOM participated in
the Secretary of Defense Efficiency Initiatives that resulted in a loss
of both manpower and funding to the headquarters. From December 2010 to
June 2011, the management headquarters staff conducted EUCOM 2020 Phase
III, a project that involved conducting a headquarters-wide functional
risk assessment and resulted in reorganizing and rebalancing the staff.
The functional risk assessments also resulted in recommendations for
functional deletions, which was approved by the Deputy Commander on 9
November 2011.
The U.S. European Command Organization and Functions Manual (ECM
5100.01) has been completely revised from previous versions. The last
version to be approved by the EUCOM Chief of Staff was dated 1 October
2009. On 22 June 2011, the Director, ECJ1 signed an interim guidance
ECG 5100.01, which captured organizational changes to the Command but
did not review or update the associated
functions.
The starting point for this version of ECM 5100.01 is the functions
developed during the EUCOM 2020 Phase III organizational risk
assessments and approved by the EUCOM Deputy Commander on 8 June 2011.
Reductions in manpower also forced directorates and special staff
sections to reorganize in order to operate more efficiently. The
current version reflects functions eliminated during EUCOM 2020 Phase
III. Future versions will track further reductions.
It is expected that the EUCOM Organization and Functions Manual
will provide a common foundation as the Command continues to
periodically update the organization functional risk assessments and
potentially absorb additional reductions in manpower or changes to
missions and priorities.
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the current AFRICOM workforce construct reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and
contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
as required by statutes and policies.
General Ham. Our headquarters has an adequate, balanced and skilled
workforce. We are currently authorized 804 military and 827 civilians.
As the command formed, we bridged some personnel gaps with contractors
until permanent manpower was assigned, but have since divested many of
those contracts.
From Fiscal Year (FY)10 to the end of FY12 we will have reduced a
total of 67 contractors for a savings of over $17 million.
Specifically, in FY10 we replaced 50 contractors with permanent
military and civilian personnel for a savings of $13.5 million; in FY11
when contractor to civilian conversions were no longer authorized, we
reduced one contractor for a savings of $275K; in FY12 we will divest
another 16 contractors with an expected savings of over $4 million.
In our Intelligence Directorate, the majority of positions are
authorized and managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. In FY12, the
Secretary of Defense directed geographic combatant commands to resize
their Joint Intelligence Operations Centers. This will result in a FY12
reduction of $2.8 million in funding for contracts equating to 10
Contract Manpower Equivalents and an additional $5.2 million in FY13
equating to 19 Contract Manpower Equivalents. Additionally, in
complying with the President's guidance, we have consistently vetted
contract requirements through a corporate board for validation and
funding. The board meets as often as biweekly in a continuous effort to
reduce contract support.
Ms. Bordallo. You indicated in your prepared statement, you
indicated that throughout Africa, small teams of soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and DOD civilians and contractors,
along with teammates from many other U.S. Government agencies, conduct
a wide range of engagements in support of U.S. security interests. How
many contractors does AFRICOM currently have operating throughout
Africa and what work are they performing? Given the mission and
operating environment, is this the most appropriate and cost-effective
form of labor to meet support U.S. security interests?
General Ham. As of 1 Feb 12, 370 contractors were accompanying U.S.
forces in Africa. These contractors provide communication support,
transportation, training, base support, general logistics and
construction. Some of the considerations in deciding to hire
contractors to perform a particular mission on the African continent
are a review of factors such as the mission duration, the immediacy of
the presence, and the availability of service members or civilians with
the required skill set within the Department of Defense (DOD) or other
federal agencies. Given limited DOD resources, contractors are often
required to fill gaps in capability. A majority of the contracts on the
continent are awarded based on full and open competition with a desire
to maintain a small footprint. Any sole source requirement is
accompanied with required justification. The labor mix (contractor/DOD
civilian/military) has been evaluated and determined to be appropriate.
The contract costs associated with labor are determined based on best
contracting practices. These numbers do not reflect contractors that
our components may use to provide basic support services to our
deployed personnel at various locations on the African continent.
Ms. Bordallo. Did AFRICOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian
personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-
effectively performed by
civilians?
General Ham. Yes; we requested relief to continue in-sourcing
positions. There was a short window of opportunity to identify these
positions. Our Operations Directorate had a standing plan to convert 33
positions over two years. We were successful in having these approved
for Fiscal Year 12. Further guidance from the Department of Defense
absolved the possibility of in-sourcing. Even without in-sourcing, we
continue to reduce reliance on the use of contractors.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has AFRICOM used insourcing to reduce
reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
efficiencies?
General Ham. During the initial establishment of the Command, we
relied heavily on contractors to fill gaps until permanent personnel
arrived. In Fiscal Year (FY)10 we began an in-sourcing plan in our
Operations Directorate which targeted contractors in key mission areas,
such as our current operations, future operations, information
operations, and anti-terrorism divisions. Based on the guidance at the
time for in-sourcing, we identified approximately 50 contractor
positions to in-source over a two year period. In FY10 we identified 22
positions, with the remainder to follow in FY11 and FY12. We continue
to scrutinize contracts vetting each contract requirement through a
corporate board for validation and funding. The board meets as
frequently as biweekly in a continuous effort to reduce contract
support. We have also generated efficiencies by internal realignments
while managing acceptable risk to mission accomplishment.
Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
currently supporting AFRICOM are the most cost-effective and risk-
averse source of labor?
General Ham. Yes; however we continue to evaluate ways to implement
cost savings whenever possible. Part of any decision to hire
contractors to perform a particular mission in Africa is a review of
such factors as the duration of the mission; the immediacy of our
participation; and the availability of service members or civilians
with the required skills within the Department of Defense or other
agencies. A large portion of our contract support lies in skills that
are not readily available in the government workforce with the required
skill currency.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within AFRICOM to ensure
the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
General Ham. We have a number of internal processes to review labor
activities. These processes include a Civilian Hiring Review Board, a
Joint Manpower Working Group and a Business Management Working Group
which conducts a holistic review of all contracts, contract renewals
and workforce related activities.
Ms. Bordallo. In the AFRICOM plan for the inventory of contracted
services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's
appropriations act, signed by your Acting Director of Resources
September 29, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense
committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, AFRICOM planned to
begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many
contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since
October 1, 2011?
General Ham. AFRICOM does not have contracting authority, therefore
we are supported by various contracting offices. Of the 17 contracts
anticipated to be reported in the inventory of contracted services, 11
contracts have been modified to include the support for the Contract
Management Reporting Application. We anticipate the contracting offices
will have the remaining six contracts modified prior to 1 October 2012.
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions AFRICOM has had
approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any
exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification
for such.
General Ham. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Global
Offices of Security Cooperation (OSC) Review identified a 5 year
expansion plan for U.S. Africa Command to meet expanding DSCA and
command programs. We requested 17 civilian exemptions for Fiscal Year
(FY) 11 and in FY12 we requested an exception for 24 civilian positions
in support of this expansion of programs in our OSCs on the continent.
Also, for FY12 we requested an exception for 33 positions
identified in our Operations Directorate in-sourcing plan from FY10 to
divest the headquarters of contractors in critical mission areas.
Additionally for FY12, we were awarded an exception for 13 civilian
positions for the Management Headquarters which are critical to the
command's engagement missions. We were not provided justification for
additions or deletions.
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across AFRICOM, is
the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
General Ham. As we execute efficiencies, the workload is either
eliminated, decreased or modified. Specifically, contracted manpower is
decreasing due to the temporary nature of assigned tasks.
Reorganization resulted in further reductions in administration and
overhead and enhanced the efficiency of the command in terms of
planning and operations. Our Operations and Functions Manual is
currently being rewritten to reflect functional changes and workload.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. There is a significant decrease in the number of
troops in the EUCOM AOR with two Army BCTs being relocated to CONUS. Is
this going to create excess intra-theater airlift capacity in the EUCOM
AOR?
Admiral Stavridis. No, the inactivation of the two Army Heavy
Brigades will not create excess intra-theater airlift capacity in the
EUCOM AOR. The United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) provides
intra-theater airlift capabilities to both the United States European
Command (EUCOM) and the United States African Command (AFRICOM). These
capabilities support a broad spectrum of EUCOM missions that include
routine airlift channel missions, airlift in support of regional
contingencies, exercises and training, airlift for EUCOM and AFRICOM
components, and activities supporting building partnerships/building
partnership capacity
(BP/BPC).
The 173rd Airborne Brigade's Joint Airborne/Air Transport Training
requirements was considered as one of the many factors in determining
the intra-theater airlift capacity requirements for EUCOM; the two
heavy Brigades were not included in the study as both were scheduled to
return to CONUS during the study period. The 173rd ABCT is one of the
two remaining BCTs in Europe.
Mr. Conaway. What OPLAN does the C-130J unit at Ramstein support
and how many non-training missions does the C-130J unit fly per day?
Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Conaway. With the reduction in A-10s and F-16s and the Army
troop reductions in Europe, in your professional opinion, do we have
excess basing capacity in Europe that could be warm-based or closed yet
still retain access if the need were to arise?
Admiral Stavridis. The recent posture decisions did not include any
F-16 reductions. The Army reductions will allow the U.S. to return the
communities of Bamberg and Schweinfurt, Germany, in addition to the
ongoing actions to return the communities of Mannheim and Heidelberg.
EUCOM is assisting the Office of the Secretary of Defense in its 2012
National Defense Authorization Act-directed study of basing capacity.
In addition, all of the Services continue to evaluate their stationing
capacity seeking efficiencies where possible. Any Departmental
decisions to warm-base or close bases that assume the U.S. will enjoy
the same degree of access must be informed by a thorough assessment of
the relationship with the affected country.
Mr. Conaway. Does the Department plan to make a final decision on
the permanent location for AFRICOM's headquarters this year and if so,
what are the criteria that are going to be used to select the location?
General Ham. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently
leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated, Basing Alternatives
Study, which will assess the cost-benefit of moving the headquarters
from its current location to the United States. We provided the
requisite operational data to support their analysis of the comparative
costs, benefits, and risks. Once the Basing Alternatives Study is
complete, we will comply with the guidance and decision of the
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Conaway. Would you please give me an update on the final
decision for permanent location of AFRICOM's headquarters?
General Ham. At this time, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
is leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated, Basing
Alternatives Study which will assess the cost-benefit with moving the
headquarters from its current location to the United States. We
provided the requisite operational data to support their analysis of
the comparative costs, benefits, and risks. Until a final decision is
made, we will continue to accomplish our mission from Stuttgart, where
our proximity to Africa, both geographically and in terms of time
zones, facilitates our ability to build relationships with our African
partners, and allows our service members, civilians and their families
to serve from a safe and well-supported location. Once the study is
complete, we will comply with the guidance and decision of the
Secretary of Defense.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. Admiral, with the recent announcement that the United
States Navy will be home port shifting four Arleigh Burke Class DDGs to
Naval Station Rota, Spain, in the coming years, how do you see these
ships impacting your theater operations? Do you envision these ships
strictly supporting missions in EUCOM and AFRICOM. As you are well
aware, these are very versatile and capable platforms outside of their
BMD mission set. What operational and strategic advantage do these
ships provide you as a Combatant Commander?
Admiral Stavridis. The four destroyers planned to be forward
deployed to Rota, Spain, will provide EUCOM with the ability to
maintain a continuous BMD presence in the region, while minimizing the
impact of our missions on the overall readiness of the fleet. While
these ships will primarily be assigned BMD duties, the multi-mission
capabilities of these ships provides EUCOM with the tactical assets
capable of responding to any number of emergent threats in the region.
I envision these assets will primarily be employed in two ways: first,
in steady-state operations providing EUCOM with the ability to carry
out its BMD mission as assigned by the Secretary of Defense; second,
these ships may be employed in contingency operations supporting
national objectives and military operations, such as last year's
Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral, EUCOM conducts many exercises with the Israel
Defense Forces. The instability in the region coupled with the numerous
threats to Israel has increased in the last year. What is EUCOM doing
to ensure the defense of Israel and ensure the stability of the region?
Admiral Stavridis. First, while Israel is certainly in a volatile
region of the world, I would argue that the threats to Israel have not
increased in the last year. If you take the broad view of the history
of the modern state of Israel, it is certainly more secure now that it
was in 1948, 1967, 1973, or even during the First or Second Intifadas.
Israel currently has signed peace treaties with two of its four
neighbors. A third neighbor, Syria, is currently undergoing a period of
serious internal unrest and is in no position to threaten Israel
militarily. The terrorist threat posed by Lebanese Hezbollah from
within the fourth neighbor has been deterred from overt attacks since
the war in 2006. Moreover, the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has
renounced violence. Unrest in the West Bank has subsided significantly
over the last few years. Similarly, since Operation Cast Lead in 2008,
rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip have never been more than sporadic.
The most recent attack, from March 9-12, saw nearly 250 rockets
launched without causing a single Israeli
casualty.
Second, since the Arab Spring, Israel faces a more uncertain
neighborhood. This effect, particularly in Egypt, combined with the
continued Iranian nuclear program gives the Israeli government reason
for concern about the future.
EUCOM's robust bilateral and multilateral military exercise program
offers the Israel Defense Forces strong reassurances of the United
States' strong commitment to the security of Israel. The following list
details the many EUCOM exercises and exercise planning conferences
scheduled for 2012 in support of this commitment:
March Organization JCET Execution SOCEUR NOBLE DINA 12 Execution
NAVEUR NOBLE MELINDA 12 Initial Planning Conference NAVEUR RELIANT
MERMAID 12 Initial Planning Conference NAVEUR
April NOBLE SHIRLEY 12-1 Initial Planning Conference MARFOREUR
Senior Leader Meeting EUCOM
May CBRNE Enhanced Response Force--Package National Guard NOBLE
SHIRLEY 12-1 Main/Final Planning Conference MARFOREUR NOBLE MELINDA 12
Main/Final Planning Conference NAVEUR
June RELIANT MERMAID 12 Main/Final Planning Conference NAVEUR
July NOBLE SHIRLEY 12-1 Execution MARFOREUR
August NOBLE MELINDA 12 Execution NAVEUR RELIANT MERMAID 12
Execution NAVEUR NOBLE SHIRLEY 13-1 Initial Planning Conference
MARFOREUR
September None
October NOBLE SHIRLEY 13-1 Main Planning Conference MARFOREUR
AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase III FTX EUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase III
CPX EUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase III WFX EUCOM
November AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase IV CAX EUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE
12 Phase V Tech Demo EUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase V LFX EUCOM
Exercise Description:
NOBLE SHIRLEY: A biannual Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) combined
arms exercise, designed to enhance selective small arms shooting and
small unit movement tactics, training, and procedures (TTP) for
employment in a counter-terrorism environment.
NOBLE DINA: An annual Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) trilateral
combined exercise scheduled with the maritime forces of the United
States, Israel, and Greece and focused on Maritime Interdiction
Operations (MIO) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations.
NOBLE MELINDA: An annual NAVEUR bilateral exercise scheduled with
the maritime forces of the United States and Israel, focused on
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), mine warfare, and salvage skills.
The exercise often includes both land-based EOD teams and divers.
RELIANT MERMAID: An annual NAVEUR trilateral combined exercise
scheduled with the maritime forces of the United States, Israel, and
Turkey and focused on maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) and Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations.
JCET: An annual SOCEUR Joint Combined Exchange Training
encompassing Air, Ground and Maritime Special Operations Forces (SOF)
engagement with IDF
counterparts.
CERF-P: A bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,
Explosive (CBRNE) exercise coordinated by the National Guard Bureau
involving units from the Indiana National Guard.
AUSTERE CHALLENGE: A bilateral joint Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) and Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) exercise that
encompasses exercises JUNIPER COBRA 12 and JUNIPER FALCON 13.
Mr. Wittman. General, East Africa remains a key operating and
training area for Al Qaeda associates, and specifically, the Somalia-
based terrorist group al-Shabaab. How concerned is the Department about
al-Shabaab's ability to attract and train foreign fighters--including
recruits from the United States--who may project violence outward from
East Africa and what exactly is the Department doing to counter this
threat? Do you have a sufficient amount of Department resources--
including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and SOF
assets--working to mitigate the spread of Al Qaeda's influence in the
AFRICOM AOR?
General Ham. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Wittman. General Ham, the new strategy calls for us to build
innovative partnerships in order to maintain our global force posture.
In attempting to build these partnerships, how are AFRICOM and U.S.
military efforts in Africa perceived by Africans and by other foreign
countries, including China? Do you feel that we are winning or losing
when compared to China in attempting to build relationships, trust and
influence throughout Africa?
General Ham. We do not view China as a military adversary in
Africa. I believe our African partners value a diverse set of
relationships when it comes to meeting their security needs. Both the
United States and China have the ability provide this support. I
believe we should look for opportunities to partner with China in areas
where our interests are similar.
The operations, exercises and security cooperation engagements of
the U.S. military are, in large measure, warmly received across the
continent. We have developed and continue to maintain strong
relationships with many key African partners as we address shared
threats. We also look to establish partnerships with the new
governments and militaries in such countries as Libya, Tunisia, and
South Sudan. I have discussed with the National Guard Bureau the
expansion of the State Partnership Program by two additional state
partners this year. The long term relationships developed through this
program would be beneficial to the development of the militaries in
these nations.
We also look to maintain strong relationship with non-African
nations, non-governmental organizations and international
organizations. We have strong relationships with the United Kingdom,
France, the Netherlands, Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and the European Union in order to partner to accomplish
common goals in Africa. We are developing a relationship with the
International Red Cross. In the future, I expect such combined efforts
to increase.
Mr. Wittman. General Ham, according to the International Maritime
Bureau, 56% of global piracy attacks conducted from January to October
2011 were orchestrated from the coasts of Somalia, and as of January
31, 2012, Somali pirates held 10 vessels and 159 hostages. Do you feel
that this global piracy problem, resonating out of Somalia, which is
continuing to cost the United States, its allies, and international
commerce millions of dollars and numerous resources to combat; is
improving, deteriorating, or remaining unchanged? Additionally, since
this problem will not be eliminated or even significantly reduced until
the conditions in Somalia improve, is there any potential for positive
changes inside Somalia in the near future?
General Ham. The international response to the Somali piracy
problem is achieving some success. Over the last year, pirate success
rates originating from Somalia dropped by nearly 50 percent. This drop
was, in large part, achieved by the increased use of industry accepted
best practices such as embarked armed security teams which have proven
100% effective in defending vessels against pirate attacks.
Additionally, coalition and international forces may be contributing to
the lower number of successful pirate attacks due to increased
interdictions. Nevertheless, the total number of attempted attacks has
remained essentially unchanged, suggesting that the pirates are
continuing at the same operational tempo. Furthermore, due to the
continuing trend of higher ransom payments, piracy generated revenue
has remained steady. As long as the benefits outweigh the risks, Somali
pirates will continue to conduct operations in this lucrative business.
Ultimately, counter-piracy operations at sea must be complemented by
the strengthening of law enforcement and judicial systems ashore.
I believe there is potential for positive change inside Somalia.
The tactical and operational successes of the African Union Mission in
Somalia, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Somali forces against al-Shabaab over
the last 12 months have greatly reduced the organization's control over
south-central Somalia. Improvement of governance in Somalia, to include
security sector reform, is key to establishing conditions that are not
conducive to piracy. The recent London Conference on Somalia
highlighted the international community's support for change in
Somalia. During the conference Secretary Clinton announced the United
States will work with Somali authorities and communities to create
jobs, provide health and education services, build capacity, and
support peace building and conflict resolution. The combination of a
weakened al-Shabaab and international support for development within
Somalia makes this the best opportunity we have seen for positive
change in Somalia.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Mr. Johnson. As you know, undercover journalists with Al Jazeera
English recently documented high-level corruption in the office of
Sierra Leone's Vice President, Samuel Sam-Sumana.
Footage presented in the Al Jazeera English documentary (``Africa
Investigates--Sierra Leone: Timber!) appears to show that Vice
President Sumana's aides solicited and accepted bribes on his behalf in
exchange for illegal logging permits. The evidence was so damning that
19 Members of Congress have requested that the U.S. government push the
Government of Sierra Leone to hold the perpetrators
responsible.
General, you have agreed to convey to your partners in the
Government of Sierra Leone and The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed
Forces (RSLAF) how deeply concerned Members of the U.S. Congress remain
concerning this matter. Will you please update us on your conversations
to this effect?
General Ham. I have not yet had the opportunity to visit Sierra
Leone to discuss the importance of good governance and fighting
corruption, which is a conversation I believe, is best achieved in
person. I will certainly provide an update after my visit. I believe it
is worth noting that Sierra Leone has agreed to contribute troops to
the African Union Mission in Somalia, the first nation to do so outside
the East Africa region. I feel this is a positive step in the continued
development of good
governance.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
Mr. Schilling. Admiral, you've emphasized that the U.S.
relationship with Poland is crucial to long term stability in the
region. Can you please explain further what you mean by that? Why do
you think Poland is important?
How has our relationship changed with them and how will our future
relationship be altered by the changes to the missile defenses plans in
the region?
Admiral Stavridis. Poland and the United States are natural
partners in promoting democracy and good governance. Poland takes
seriously its commitment to NATO, spending more on defense (in relation
to GDP) than any other country in its region, including Germany. And
Poland has one of healthiest economies in the EU. Poland has
consistently been a staunch supporter of US policy, contributing troops
to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and currently ranking 5th out of 49 partner
nations in total force contributions to the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Poland has significantly invested in
its Air Force through the purchase of 48 F-16 aircraft and continues to
improve its military police and special operations capabilities.
Lastly, Poland's unique geopolitical position makes it, in both time
and space, a key ally that can and does safeguard US and NATO Alliance
interests in Europe.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement with Poland was initially
changed in 2010 when a US policy shift made the intended ground based
interceptors untenable. Poland did not receive this change well but
remains a steadfast, willing partner in our national and NATO Alliance
pursuit of ballistic missile defense. Therefore, it is in our interest
to follow through on the commitment we have made to deploying ballistic
missile defense assets in Poland.
Mr. Schilling. Admiral, we focus a great deal on anti-terrorism
efforts in the Middle East and in regards to the protection of the
homeland. However, what challenges do you face with terrorist
activities in the European theater and how are you dealing with them?
Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Schilling. Admiral, it is my understanding that when our
soldiers are hurt in the conflicts in the Middle East they are first
sent to EUCOM to be treated.
How will the change in force structure in the European theater
affect how we can take care of our wounded from overseas conflicts?
Admiral Stavridis. The current projected change in force structure
in the European theater is not expected to alter the staffing at the
Medical Treatment Facilities in EUCOM and, therefore, will not affect
EUCOM's ability to care for wounded service members during contingency
operations.
Mr. Schilling. You have had to address the threats that are posed
by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa, but also new emerging
terrorist groups. Will you be able to keep the same amount of vigilance
under the new budget and force structure?
General Ham. I do not anticipate any reduced vigilance under the
proposed budget and force structure. We will continue to work with the
Department of Defense to obtain additional ISR assets.
Mr. Schilling. You have stated that a lack of ISR capabilities have
been challenging for AFRICOM. Will the changes to the Air Force's U2
and Global Hawk programs make this issue more pronounced?
General Ham. The U-2 multiple collection capability as well as
anticipated future upgrades could expand our collection effectiveness
on the continent. Though the RG-4 Block 30's single collection
capability make it a less valuable mission platform when requirements
necessitate the need for multiple sensors during a single
mission.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. The E-8C JSTARS is a high-demand, low-density platform.
What are some of the missions they could perform if they were assigned
to EUCOM on a regular basis?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM would utilize E-8C JSTARS for monitoring
and tracking vehicular traffic in several different operational areas
across the EUCOM area of responsibility. First, we would establish a
Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) baseline with which to compare
future collection trends in support of indications and warning during
Phase 0 and Phase 1 operations and continued collection upon Concept
Plan (CONPLAN) execution. Specifically, GMTI can be employed to locate
and track movements of military or non-state actors, either singly or
in groups. In peacetime, this capability can be used to established
patterns-of-life, as well as assist efforts to counter smuggling and
illicit arms shipments to rouge states and terrorist organizations.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within your
respective AORs in building partnerships?
Admiral Stavridis. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) plays a very limited
role within the USEUCOM area of responsibility as there were no
operational Coast Guard ships or aircraft stationed in, or deployed to,
Europe in 2011-2012. The tall ship USCGC EAGLE (WIX 327) visited her
port of construction (Hamburg, Germany) and several other European
ports in the summer of 2011 as part of her normal training and goodwill
missions. The USCG has not deployed a cutter to participate in European
naval exercises in four years due to other operational commitments.
Due to the capable and professional nature of many European navies
and coast guards who work closely with their lesser developed
neighbors, the USCG experiences limited demand signals for development
and partnership building in Europe. What demand signal there is can
only be met by the USCG under limited circumstances due to the agency's
wide mission set and severely taxed resources. The USCG holds six
priority countries within Europe: Greece, Malta, France, The
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation. The first
two countries are priorities for their preeminence in maritime
shipping; the next three countries are priorities due to their
Caribbean territories and counter-narcotics cooperation; and Russia is
a priority based upon the need to manage a shared maritime boundary in
the Bering Sea. The USCG's partnerships with these countries are
focused upon unique missions and do not necessarily meet the
traditional definition of building partner capacity.
The one USCG unit permanently stationed in EUCOM's theater is
Activities Europe, a 28-man marine safety and inspection organization
located in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. This unit does not report to, or
directly interact with EUCOM. This unit conducts inspections of U.S.-
flagged vessels and some foreign-flagged ships headed to the United
States. Since September 11, 2001, the majority of the mission involves
administration of the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code. Under this reciprocal inspection regime, Activities Europe
personnel provide guidance to foreign port and vessel owners to assist
in the improvement of facility security, employee training, and
incident response.
As part of its limited international engagement authority, the USCG
hosts students from dozens of countries in its U.S. schoolhouses every
year. These students are nominated, vetted, selected, and managed by
U.S. Embassy Offices of Defense Cooperation. The students' attendance
is funded either via International Military Education and Training
(IMET) monies allocated to their nations by the U.S. Department of
State, or in large number by the Export Control and Related Border
Security (EXBS) program. Nations may also self-fund their students.
Between 30 and 70 European students attend USCG resident training each
year.
USCG Mobile Training Teams (MTT) travel the world to provide
initial, refresher, and advanced training in a wide variety of
subjects. They are common sights in Central/South America and Africa.
They are rare in Europe, but have visited Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece,
and Malta in recent years. These teams are funded by IMET, EXBS, or
national funds.
At a higher organizational level, the USCG participates in many
international forums, including the Arctic Council, the North Atlantic
Coast Guard Forum, the U.N.'s International Maritime Organization, and
the E.U.'s border control agency FRONTEX. This cooperation extends
mostly into the policy and strategy domains with very little
operational action, with the exception of the transfer of unclassified
information regarding illicit trafficking. The USCG was the lead
negotiator for the landmark international search and rescue agreement
signed by the Arctic Council nations in May 2011.
The USCG provides a maritime advisor in Georgia under the
Department of State's EXBS program. This effort includes a very robust
program of MTTs, U.S. resident training, two to three month subject
matter expert deployments, and numerous infrastructure projects.
Infrastructure projects include dry-dock overhaul of patrol boats,
construction and outfitting of a maintenance facility, installation of
an English language lab, and creation of a large maritime domain
awareness coastal surveillance system. This multimillion dollar project
includes integrating data from six radar stations via microwave/
Ethernet data network; installation of NATO-standard, encryption
capable, multi-bandwidth communications; and integration of HF/VHF
radio automatic direction finders.
A USCG officer teaches at the World Maritime University in Malmo,
Sweden. A USCG exchange helicopter pilot flies search and rescue with
the United Kingdom's Royal Navy. The only USCG Attache outside of the
western hemisphere resides on the country team of the U.S. Embassy in
Malta. Two USCG liaison officers are assigned to U.S. Naval Forces
Europe where they manage maritime strategy and military-to-military
engagements with many partner nations.
Finally, the USCG has two personnel permanently stationed on the
EUCOM staff. One is the Deputy Director of the Joint Interagency
Counter Trafficking Center where he guides the organization's
interactions with the law enforcement agencies of partner nations. The
other is the USCG liaison and maritime strategist within the Policy,
Strategy, Partnering, and Capabilities (ECJ5/8) Directorate who plays a
role in shaping EUCOM's Arctic strategy. Both personnel facilitate
interaction with USCG organizations while simultaneously executing
EUCOM missions and tasking.
Mr. Scott. What were the contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard to
EUCOM in 2011?
Admiral Stavridis. The tall ship USCGC EAGLE (WIX 327) visited her
port of construction (Hamburg, Germany) and several other European
ports in the summer of 2011 as part of her normal training and goodwill
missions. The USCG has not deployed a cutter to participate in European
naval exercises in four years due to other operational commitments.
The USCG holds six priority countries within Europe: Greece, Malta,
France, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Russian
Federation. The USCG cooperates closely with the maritime shipping
regulators of Greece and Malta due to their pre-eminence in maritime
commerce as vessel flag states and cargo transshipment points. The USCG
maintains very close operational relationships with France, The
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom due to their Caribbean territories
and counter-narcotics cooperation in that region. The USCG holds a
unique position within the U.S. government as a trusted partner with
Russia based upon the need to manage a shared maritime boundary in the
Bering Sea. The USCG's partnerships with these countries are focused
upon unique missions/initiatives and are not managed by EUCOM.
The one USCG unit permanently stationed in EUCOM's theater is
Activities Europe, a 28-man marine safety and inspection organization
located in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. This unit does not report to, or
directly interact with, EUCOM. The vessel and port facility inspection
mission of this unit has indirect effects upon USEUCOM partner nations
through reciprocal inspection regimes, goodwill, and
professionalization.
As part of its limited international engagement authority, the USCG
hosts students from dozens of countries in its U.S. schoolhouses every
year. These students are nominated, vetted, selected, and managed by
U.S. Embassy Offices of Defense Cooperation. The students' attendance
is funded via International Military Education and Training (IMET)
monies allocated to their nations by the U.S. Department of State or in
large number by the Export Control and Related Border Security program.
Nations may also self-fund their students. In 2011, the USCG hosted 52
resident students from 16 European countries. Courses included law
enforcement boarding officer, search and rescue, pollution response,
International Maritime Officer Course, and apprentice level
engineering.
At a higher organizational level, the USCG participates in many
international forums, including the Arctic Council, the North Atlantic
Coast Guard Forum, the U.N.'s International Maritime Organization, and
the E.U.'s border control agency FRONTEX. This cooperation extends
mostly into the policy and strategy domains with very little
operational action with the exception of the transfer of unclassified
information regarding illicit trafficking. The USCG was the lead
negotiator for the landmark international search and rescue agreement
signed by the Arctic Council nations in May 2011.
The USCG provides a maritime advisor in Georgia under the
Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security
program. This advisor assists in the identification, acquisition,
installation, training, and employment of maritime border surveillance
and associated law enforcement tactics, procedures, and policies.
A USCG officer teaches at the World Maritime University in Malmo,
Sweden. A USCG exchange helicopter pilot flies search and rescue with
the United Kingdom's Royal Navy. The only USCG Attache outside of the
western hemisphere resides on the country team of the U.S. Embassy in
Malta. Two USCG liaison officers are assigned to U.S. Naval Forces
Europe where they manage maritime strategy and military-to-military
engagements with many partner nations.
Finally, the USCG has two personnel permanently stationed on the
EUCOM staff. One is the Deputy Director of the Joint Interagency
Counter Trafficking Center where he guides the organization's
interactions with the law enforcement agencies of partner nations. The
other is the USCG liaison and maritime strategist within the Policy,
Strategy, Partnering, and Capabilities (ECJ5/8) Directorate who plays a
role in shaping USEUCOM's Arctic strategy. Both personnel facilitate
interaction with USCG organizations while simultaneously executing
EUCOM missions and tasking.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of military bands within EUCOM and are
they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering
greater understanding?
Admiral Stavridis. Three Service component command headquarters
maintain bands within the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Theater: U.S.
Army Europe (USAREUR); U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CNE); and U.S. Air
Forces in Europe (USAFE). These bands are key elements in the command's
outreach program, and their work is directly tied to two of EUCOM's
expressed strategic priorities: 1) Building partnerships to enhance
security, regional stability and support global initiatives; and 2)
Countering transnational threats, which these bands do by endearing
foreign publics to the United States.
Many of the bands' events are at no additional cost to the
government. The CNE Band was invited to participate in the most
prestigious military band event (called a ``tattoo'') in the world in
August 2012--the Edinburgh Military Tattoo. The travel and TDY expenses
for this month-long engagement are covered by the event sponsor, and
broadcast coverage is expected to reach 300 million people throughout
the world, including China for the first time this year.
The engagements that do have costs attached to them typically have
significant returns on investment. For example, the USAFE Band spent
approximately $140,000 to send a 42-person concert band to Russia last
year. Through seven performances in six days in Ural and Western
Siberia, the band played for a live audience of 5,800, and reached over
130 million people through positive media coverage. Based on post-event
discussions and audience feedback, these Russians began to see
Americans as ``very sociable, warm people who engage easily with
others--not at all like the Americans portrayed in movies.''
From an interagency perspective, the bands also help U.S. embassies
reach out to people who would otherwise be inaccessible. In September
2011, the CNE Band played in an Azerbaijan internally displaced persons
community where people do not have access to open information and lack
understanding of the U.S. and its partnership with Azerbaijan.
According to Chris Jones, cultural affairs officer for the U.S. Embassy
Baku, ``The Navy Band was one of the most effective tools I have seen
for building relationships with both government elites and the
population as a whole. They `made' every event in Azerbaijan--providing
that extra something that got us more media coverage, more public
support, and more buy-in from high ranking officials.''
Military bands hold a rich tradition, but, more importantly, this
``soft power'' tool of the Department of Defense continually
contributes to global and regional security and stability, enhances
diplomacy and partnership, and builds vital goodwill.
Mr. Scott. The hospital ships Comfort and Mercy are high-demand,
low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of
hospital ships, what roles and missions could they perform within
EUCOM's AOR?
Admiral Stavridis. The current design and configuration of the
COMFORT and MERCY makes it difficult to employ these vessels in the
EUCOM Theater due to displacement and port access. Potential missions
would include training and collaboration with partner nations in NATO
and European Union that desire increased medical cooperation. The
Hospital Ships would also support EUCOM Concept Plans (CONPLANS) within
the Levant Region, as well as support to ongoing NATO humanitarian
missions in Northern Africa.
Mr. Scott. What is the status of NATO's ongoing engagement with
Mongolia? What do they need to do in order to become formal NATO
partner in ``Partners Across the Globe.''
Admiral Stavridis. The first Mongolia-NATO Individual Partnership
and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) received the approval of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) on 19 March 2012. I expect the announcement
shortly acknowledging Mongolia as a formal partner to NATO in the
Partners Across the Globe framework.
Mr. Scott. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting
any countries within your respective AORs? If so, which countries?
Admiral Stavridis. In accordance with the September 2011 U.S.
Department of State Cable signed by Secretary Clinton, no engagements
between U.S. flag and general officers are to be conducted with
Belarus. Therefore, senior official travel is essentially banned there.
Mr. Scott. How would you rate the performance of E-8C JSTARS
aircraft within AFRICOM?
General Ham. During OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN (MAR 2011), we employed
JSTARS with good effect, but AFRICOM has not used JSTARS since that
time.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within your
respective AORs in building partnerships?
General Ham. The Coast Guard plays a critical role in building
maritime security capacity by providing ships in support of the African
Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership Program. By partnering with
African nations' maritime forces during real-world operations, the
Coast Guard assists our African partners enforce their maritime laws
and also provides training in search and rescue, small boat operations
and maintenance, and maritime law enforcement. The Coast Guard is also
valuable in developing maritime bilateral agreements to enhance both
U.S. and partner nation security by establishing the framework for
operational maritime law enforcement cooperation.
The Coast Guard's congressionally mandated International Port
Security (IPS) Program complements our mission and expands the number
of countries that conduct engagement with the command by maintaining
bilateral relationships with 31 African nations to assess their
implementation of effective maritime anti-terrorism measures.
Mr. Scott. What were the contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard to
AFRICOM in 2011?
General Ham. In 2011, the Coast Guard deployed the Coast Guard
Cutter FORWARD in support of the African Maritime Law Enforcement
Partnership Program and conducted real-world operations and training
with six African partner nations. Coast Guard training teams also
completed 29 training missions with partner nations and hosted 20
African students in resident training at U.S. Coast Guard training
centers. International Port Security Liaison Officers of the Coast
Guard's International Port Security program conducted maritime security
anti-terrorism visits to ports in 31 coastal African states.
In May 2011, the Coast Guard decommissioned and transferred a
Cutter to Nigeria as an Excess Defense Article. The newly renamed NNS
THUNDER is now being used in the Gulf of Guinea to counter threats such
as piracy, illegal oil bunkering, and to ensure the security of
offshore oil infrastructure.
Additionally, Coast Guard expertise in maritime law was key to the
success of our initiative to foster regional cooperation among the
nations and regional economic communities in West and Central Africa,
an important aspect of effectively combating piracy and maritime crime
in the Gulf of Guinea.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of military bands within AFRICOM and
are they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering
greater understanding?
General Ham. There are no bands assigned to U.S. Africa Command.
However, in the past year the U.S. Air Forces Europe band and the U.S.
Naval Forces Europe band performed in eight African countries. Military
bands provide a cost-effective and unique public diplomacy opportunity
for our country teams in Africa. They bridge cultural gaps and reach
elements of the general population vital to U.S. relationships abroad
by providing the best image of our men and women in uniform and
Americans at large. The good will demonstrated by military bands
highlights the professional nature of our armed forces and builds
civilian trust in the U.S. and partner nation forces.
Mr. Scott. The hospital ships Comfort and Mercy are high-demand,
low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of
hospital ships, what roles and missions could they perform within
AFRICOM's AOR?
General Ham. Hospital ships have tremendous trauma care capability
for combat operations and can contribute to humanitarian assistance
missions. However, hospital ships are not designed for capacity
building due to their configuration for acute care and surgery.
Additionally, the draft of large hospital ships limits access to many
African ports. Many African nations have medical delivery systems that
struggle to meet the most basic needs of the populace. The use of a
hospital ship under these circumstances has to be coordinated carefully
so as not to overwhelm developing medical systems. For these reasons we
find the use of multi-mission ships that have the capability to operate
in these constrained ports to be of greater overall benefit.
Mr. Scott. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting
any countries within your respective AORs? If so, which countries?
General Ham. There are no countries within our area of
responsibility that U.S. flag and general officers are banned from
visiting for official business. However, there are policy and force
protection restrictions that limit Department of Defense personnel from
traveling in certain areas on the African continent. For example,
Somalia has current policy restrictions that limit all Department of
Defense visits and require special approval for travel. Sudan,
Zimbabwe, and Eritrea are under sanctions and require close
coordination with Department of State before flag officer travel. But,
none of these restrictions specifically ban U.S. flag and general
officers from visiting these countries.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. Admiral, how will the Administration's newly released
defense strategy change the way you do business at EUCOM?
Admiral Stavridis. The Administration's recently released defense
strategy, entitled ``Sustaining Global Leadership--Priorities for 21st
Century Defense'' reads: ``In keeping with [the] evolving strategic
landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve.'' As this occurs,
the United States will maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied
security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for
coalition operations. You will see changes as we work with NATO allies
to develop a ``Smart Defense'' approach that pools, shares, and
specializes capabilities as needed. There is continuity in how we
approach the challenges we face: we practice active security and
forward defense focused on preserving our strategic partnerships in
Europe; building interoperability with the NATO Alliance; deterring
would-be adversaries; sustaining progress and transition in
Afghanistan; and, when directed, conducting decisive military and
counterterrorism operations to fight and win. The change will come in
an even greater emphasis on sustaining our partners' abilities to work
with us to accomplish these missions. Additionally, we will be making
changes to respond to new challenges emerging in missile defense and
cyberspace.
Mrs. Roby. Admiral, you've often discussed that the most effective
approach to the national security challenges of the 21st century is
through ``Whole of Government'' solutions. Can you describe for us what
you've learned from this approach, and if you still believe this is the
best path forward?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, I remain convinced that a ``Whole of
Government'' approach is still the best path forward. Indeed my
personal experience at EUCOM over the past three years continues to
reinforce my belief that this approach is both effective and expands
the solution sets that we use to address issues across our theater. In
my testimony, I cited the numerous interagency partners that we are
privileged to host within our Command's J9-Interagency Partnering
Directorate. We host representatives from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of
State, Department of the Treasury, Agency for International
Development, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Drug
Enforcement Administration and Customs and Border Protection. These
representatives help us tremendously, both in educating my staff and in
influencing our planning and exercises at the regional/operational
level. Their presence in Stuttgart complements the effective
interagency ``whole of government'' effort down to the ``tactical/
country'' level at U.S. Embassy Country Teams across the 51 countries
included in the EUCOM Theater.
What is even more encouraging is that these interagency
representatives are not at EUCOM simply to represent the interests of
their parent agencies or departments; rather, they are valuable members
of the EUCOM team, all working to achieve common objectives in the
pursuit of our Command's mission and our nation's interests. The
character and competency of our interagency partners earns them the
credibility needed to function well in a predominantly military
culture. Every day this team and their many contributions personify the
motto at our Command: we are truly ``Stronger Together!''
Beyond work with other federal partners, EUCOM is also reaching out
to collaborate with academia and the private sector in order to tap
non-traditional military solutions to the challenges we face. This is
more than a ``whole of government'' approach; it is actually a ``whole
of society'' collaborative effort. A good example of this approach was
EUCOM's outreach to the Business Executives for National Security
(BENS) in May 2011. With the concurrence of the U.S. Country Team in
Riga and the government of Latvia, I asked BENS to assess cyber
vulnerabilities in Latvia's government networks, financial systems, and
technology networks. BENS organized a ``cyber dream team,'' whose
experts generated a list of proactive steps that could be taken to
strengthen Latvia's cyber security. This trip to Latvia was among the
very best examples of useful and practical, public-private
collaboration that I have ever seen. It is another testimony to the
value of a ``whole of government/society'' approach in addressing the
security challenges of the 21st century.
Mrs. Roby. From you position as EUCOM Commander with responsibility
for the defense of Israel, what is your assessment of Israel concerns
about Iranian nuclear weapons development and what are the capability
gaps or areas of concern in defending Israel from missile or rocket
attacks?
Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mrs. Roby. What are the costs associated with AFRICOM and how are
these costs affected by AFRICOM's chosen headquarters location?
General Ham. Our Fiscal Year (FY)13 headquarters operating budget
request is $285M. There has not been a decision on the permanent
location of the command's headquarters. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense is currently leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated,
Basing Alternatives Study which will assess the cost-benefit with
moving the headquarters from its current location to the United States.
We have provided the requisite operational data to support their
analysis of the comparative costs, benefits, and risks. Until a final
decision is made, we will continue to accomplish our mission from
Stuttgart, where our proximity to Africa, both geographically and in
terms of time zones, facilitates our ability to build relationships
with our African partners, and provided a location where our service
members, civilians and their families are safe and well-supported. Once
the study is complete, we will comply with the guidance and decision of
the Secretary of
Defense.
Mrs. Roby. If U.S. Africa Command was to move back to the United
States, how would it be placed--one location or over a geographical
region?
General Ham. The decision on where to place the command
headquarters will be made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
which is currently leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated,
Basing Alternatives Study to assess the cost-benefit of moving the
headquarters from its current location to the United States. We have
provided the requisite operational data to support their analysis of
the comparative costs, benefits, and risks.
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