[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-104]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 28, 2012
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana BILL OWENS, New York
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM RYAN, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHRIS GIBSON, New York HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JOE HECK, Nevada COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Doug Roach, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, February 28, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Air
Force.......................................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, February 28, 2012....................................... 53
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force.............. 3
Schwartz, Gen Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Donley, Hon. Michael B., joint with Gen Norton A. Schwartz... 60
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 57
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 59
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Smith.................................................... 95
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 111
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 120
Mr. Courtney................................................. 118
Mr. Critz.................................................... 122
Mr. Forbes................................................... 101
Mr. Griffin.................................................. 137
Dr. Heck..................................................... 127
Mr. Hunter................................................... 121
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 126
Mr. Langevin................................................. 102
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 119
Mr. McIntyre................................................. 100
Mr. McKeon................................................... 99
Mr. Miller................................................... 101
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 153
Mr. Runyan................................................... 133
Mr. Ruppersberger............................................ 125
Mr. Schilling................................................ 131
Mr. Scott.................................................... 135
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 120
Mr. Smith.................................................... 99
Mr. Turner................................................... 103
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 121
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 28, 2012.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining
us today as we consider the President's fiscal year 2013 Budget
Request for the Department of the Air Force.
Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, it is good to have you
back again before the committee today, at least for us. I hope
you enjoy your time here.
We are fortunate to have experienced leadership on our Air
Force in this challenging period. We appreciate all that you do
and we are truly grateful to have leaders like you in service
to our Nation. When you took your respective positions, you
probably didn't fully appreciate the leadership challenges that
you would confront.
The Air Force has been engaged in combat operations
supporting the Joint Forces for the past 20 years, beginning
with the Gulf war in 1991 and continuing thereafter through
enforcement of the Iraq no-fly zones; combat operations in the
Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the related logistics support
missions; and worldwide humanitarian support missions. And of
course the Air Force has continued the 24/7, 365-day-a-year
nuclear-deterrence mission.
Everyone should fully understand that our vital interests
have not changed since last year. The threats to those
interests have not decreased, and they are not likely to
diminish over the next 5 years. What has changed is that the
President directed at least $400 billion in cuts to our
military, which were reflected in the Budget Control Act.
Despite the suggestion by some that the strategy evolved
independent of the President's fiscal guidance, each of the
military services is making force-structure and equipment-
modernization recommendations to Congress based purely on the
budget and not based on the world security environment.
For example, there are 54 aircrafts in the Air Force budget
request. If procurement continues at this rate, and assuming an
aircraft lifespan of 25 years, the resulting force structure is
1,350 aircraft; one-quarter the size of the current force. I do
not believe 1,350 total Air Force aircraft--bombers, fighters,
airlifts, search-and-rescue, rotorcraft, and trainers--is in
the national security interest of this country. And this is
without the potential of sequestration.
Furthermore, the budget request does little to mitigate the
consequences of aging force structure resulting from the
procurement holiday of the 1990s. Operation and Maintenance
accounts are not increasing to sustain and extend these aging
platforms. Other budget-driven choices include the requested
increase in TRICARE fees for retirees. Congress addressed this
issue at length last year and enacted what I considered a
reasonable approach for managing cost.
The Department's proposal would increase the fees by 96
percent to 345 percent over a 5-year period which, in my
opinion, is unreasonable. With that said, I am pleased to see
the priorities for strategic airlift, a new bomber, and an
airborne tanker have been preserved. As well, the Air Force has
deliberately elected to ensure the percentage of the Air
Force's combat and mobility forces that are on Active Duty will
increase after the implementation of the force structure
changes.
This is appropriate from a risk perspective, but I believe
it is important for the Air Force leadership to continue this
public discussion to better ensure that Guard and Reserve
personnel fully accept that they have received and will receive
equitable and fair treatment in this transition process.
Thank you very much again for being here. Representative
Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 57.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
And I thank Secretary Donley and General Schwartz for
being, once again, before this committee, and for their great
leadership of the Air Force and their service to our country.
It is terrific to have such able people in charge of such an
important task. We appreciate you being here.
The Air Force has been critical to all of our missions in
the recent past--in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, as
the chairman mentioned--and also, you know, providing critical
lift capacity for humanitarian response in Haiti and Japan and
many other places. The strength of our Air Force is one of the
great strengths of our national security and the strengths of
our entire Nation, and we do appreciate that leadership.
This is a very challenging time, as the chairman mentioned.
The needs are still great. We are still fighting in
Afghanistan. We still face threats on a number of fronts and
needs globally. At the same time, the budget picture is not
good. We are running a significant deficit and we have
challenges to figure out how to make that work within the
budget. We have had that debate, and I am sure we will continue
to have the debate on the committee about whether or not
strategy or budget should drive what we do in the national-
security realm; and of course my position is both.
We are always, no matter what you are doing, constrained by
the budget to a certain extent. And we would not pretend that
nobody thought for a second about the budget when putting
together the strategy. But I do think that the gentlemen before
us and everyone over at the Pentagon and the White House did
put together a strategy looking at our national security needs
first to figure out what needs to be met, and then figuring out
how to match that strategy to the budget constraints that we
have. And I want to compliment both of these gentlemen for
doing a great job of that--for, I think, realistically looking
at our choices going forward.
I mean, the bottom line is, over the course of the last 10
years in the Air Force and elsewhere, we have started more
projects than we could ever possibly have the money to finish;
in part, because some of them have wound up costing far more
than we thought they would. But that forces difficult choices,
frankly, almost no matter the budget environment. I think those
choices have been made wisely in the Air Force budget that has
been put forth. And we have a good strategy and I think we have
a budget to match it, but there will be challenges.
And I think this hearing is a perfectly appropriate form to
have the gentlemen before us explain how they met some of those
challenges; how they see some of the tougher aspects of it
coming to pass over the course in the next several years. And I
look forward to their comments. And, again, I thank them for
their leadership in very, very difficult times. I look forward
to the testimony, and I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Secretary Donley. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Smith and Members of the committee.
It is a pleasure to be here representing more than 690,000
Active Duty Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen. I am also
honored to be here today with my teammate, who is now the dean
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one of our Nation's finest
public servants, General ``Norty'' Schwartz.
For fiscal year 2013, the United States Air Force requests
$110.1 billion in our baseline budget and $11.5 billion in the
Overseas Contingency Operation supplemental appropriation to
support our work.
This budget request represents the culmination of many hard
decisions taken to align our fiscal year 2013 budget submission
with the new strategic guidance, and with the cuts required by
the Budget Control Act over the next 10 years. Finding the
proper balance between force structure, readiness, and
modernization is our guiding principle. In short, we determine
that the Air Force's best course of action is to trade size for
quality. We will become smaller in order to protect a high-
quality and ready force; one that will continue to modernize
and grow more capable in the future.
The capabilities resident in the Air Force mission set are
fundamental to the priorities outlined in the new strategic
guidance. And in assessing how to adjust the Air Force programs
and budgets in the future, we have taken care to protect the
distinctive capabilities our Air Force brings to the table:
Control of airspace and cyberspace, global intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, rapid global mobility, and
global strike; all enabled by effective command and control.
The Air Force and our joint interagency and coalition
teammates and partners rely on these capabilities. And though
we will be smaller, we intend to be a superb force at any size,
maintaining the agility and the flexibility that is inherent in
our air-power capabilities, and ready to engage a full range of
contingencies and threats.
This budget protects the Air Force's top priorities. We
protect the size of the bomber force. We are ramping up our
remotely piloted aircraft force to a goal of 65 combat air
patrols, with the ability to surge to 85 CAPS [combat air
patrols].
We protect our Special Operations Forces' capabilities;
largely protect space programs and our cyber capabilities. But
as we get smaller, it is not possible to protect everything.
Our proposed force structure changes include the reduction of
286 aircraft over the Future Years Defense Plan, including 123
fighters, 133 mobility aircraft, and 30 ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms. Many of these
changes correspond to adjustments in the overall size of the
Armed Forces, especially the Army and the Marine Corps ground
forces, which is the case for the proposed reduction in A-10s
[Thunderbolt II close air support jets].
Our smaller force structure has also led us to favor
divesting smaller niche fleets such as the C-27J [Spartan
medium-sized airlifter], and emphasizing multirole capabilities
that will provide operational flexibility across the spectrum
of conflict, demonstrated by our C-130s [Hercules strategic
airlifters] and by our choices in fighter-force structure,
which include a smaller A-10 fleet and plans for F-16 [Fighting
Falcon multirole jet fighter] service-life extension. We also
emphasize common configurations which can be seen in the
adjustments to the C-5 [Galaxy heavy intercontinental-range
strategic airlifter] force structure and the C-17 [Globemaster
III strategic airlifter] mobility fleets; and in ongoing
efforts to seek common configuration within the F-22 [Raptor
fifth-generation stealth fighter jet] and F-15C [Eagle tactical
fighter jet] fleets.
Because force structure changes have a ripple effect on
manpower, our budget proposals call for a reduction of 9,900
Air Force military personnel. By component, this amounts to
reductions of 3,900 in Active Duty; 5,100 in Air National
Guard; and 900 Air Reserve personnel. And the Chief and I are
joined today by the Chief of the Air Force Reserve, Charlie
Stenner, and the Director of the Air National Guard, Lieutenant
General Bud Wyatt.
Fighter mobility and other force-structure changes have
been strategy-driven, based on changed requirements. And
consistent with that strategy, especially where Air National
Guard units are affected, we have proposed to remission units
where feasible.
We have carefully balanced our Active and Reserve Component
changes to make sure that we can meet the demanding operational
tempos, including both surge and rotational requirements that
are part of the current and projected strategic environment. As
our force gets smaller, all of our components gets smaller
together, and will become even more closely integrated.
We remain fully committed to our total force capability,
and have proposed several initiatives to strengthen integration
of effort, including increasing the number of Active Reserve
Component associations from 100 to 115.
Our intention is to protect readiness at any force level;
because if we are going to be smaller, we have to be prepared.
To that end, we put funds in critical areas such as flying
hours and weapon system sustainment.
We also support the Air National Guard readiness reset,
which balances manpower across the States from lower-demand
units to new high-demand intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions, and increases readiness in 39 units.
We are committed to ensuring that our military forces do not go
hollow. And readiness bears close watching as we move forward.
Modernization is our most significant concern, especially
as our fleets age and new technologies drive new investment
needs. In this year's budget proposal, we slow modernizations
as we protect programs that are critical to future
capabilities. We also restructure or terminate some major
programs to protect key priorities.
Protected modernization priorities include the long-range
strike bomber, the KC-46 refueling tanker; and key space
programs such as the space-based infrared and advanced
extremely high-frequency satellites; and follow-on global-
positioning-system work; and advanced ISR.
We remain fully committed to the F-35 [Lightning II fifth-
generation stealth fighter] Joint Strike Fighter, which is the
future of the fighter force. But we reduced the rate of
procurement for a few years because, in our judgment, Lockheed
Martin is not ready to ramp up to full-rate production. Due to
recent delays in the F-35 program, we have also proposed to
proceed with an F-16 service-life-extension program.
Among the programs slated for termination are the Global
Hawk RQ4 [surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle] Block 30
Aircraft because, among other reasons, we could not justify the
cost to improve the Block 30 sensors to achieve capability that
already exists in the U-2 [``Dragon Lady'' high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft]. We also terminated the Defense
Weather Satellite System, a termination initiated by Congress,
but one that we can accept for now because the program is early
to need.
As noted earlier, we decided to divest the C-27J, but we
have a good alternative to this aircraft with the multirole C-
130, which has demonstrated its ability to provide the direct
support mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. And we remain
committed to providing this support to the Army. In other
cases, we eliminated programs that were judged to be
nonessential in the current budget environment such as the
light mobility aircraft and the light attack and armed
reconnaissance aircraft.
Through a more disciplined use of resources, our Air Force
continues to ring savings out of overhead; to squeeze
discretionary spending; and find more efficient ways of doing
business. In fiscal year 2012, we committed to $33.3 billion in
efficiencies across the FYDP. In this year's budget, we have
identified about $3.4 billion in additional efficiencies and
another $3.2 billion in programmatic adjustments to add on top
of that $33.3 billion.
In keeping with our enduring obligation to take care of our
people, we will keep faith with airmen and their families.
Doing right by our service members is key to our ability to
recruit and retain a high-quality force.
Nevertheless, the impact of increasing personnel costs
continues to be a serious concern. Therefore, we support the
military-compensation program reforms in the President's Budget
which include a modest pay raise, proposals to control health-
care costs and calls for a commission to recommend reforms in
retired pay. We must continue to seek and develop reforms to
ensure the long-term sustainability of the benefits our men and
women in uniform have earned.
Identifying $487 billion in defense cuts to comply with the
current requirements of the Budget Control Act has been
difficult. Our Air Force will get smaller, but we are confident
that we can build and sustain a quality force that is ready for
the contingencies ahead, and that will improve in capability
over time. However, further cuts through sequestration or other
means will put at risk our ability to execute the new strategy.
To get this far, we have made tough decisions to align
structure and balance our forces in a way that can meet the new
strategic guidance. If substantially more reductions are
imposed on DOD [Department of Defense], we will have to revisit
the new strategy. We cannot afford the risk of a hollow force.
Mr. Chairman, General Schwartz and I feel deeply that our
leadership team has inherited the finest Air Force in the
world. It is our obligation to keep it that way so that our
joint and coalition partners know they can count on the United
States Air Force to deliver the capabilities that we need to
meet the security challenges ahead, and so that our future
airmen remained confident as we are today that they are serving
in the world's finest Air Force. That is our obligation going
forward, and we are going to meet it.
We remain grateful for the continued support and service of
this committee and we look forward to discussing our proposed
budget.
Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Donley and
General Schwartz can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR
FORCE
General Schwartz. Thank you Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman,
Congressman Smith, and Members of the committee.
I am privileged to be here today with Secretary Donley,
representing the men and women of the United States Air Force.
When we appeared before you last year to discuss our budget
request, America's airmen were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan
alongside their joint and coalition teammates. Little did
anyone know at that time that we were on the verge of surging
into two additional theaters of operation ranging more than
5,500 miles apart; engaging in operations spanning the entire
spectrum of activities.
But when multiple disasters struck in Japan on March 11th,
and when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
1973 6 days later, the men and women of the United States Air
Force and the Armed Forces were ready to respond; and respond
they did.
The ability to address the concurrent surge requirements
while we remained fully engaged on two fronts in the United
States Central Command area of responsibility was most
assuredly not trivial. Such a capability and the capacity to
address potential similar scenarios remains important to our
success in the future security environment.
But in light of our fiscal circumstances both presently and
for the foreseeable future, helping to ensure America's success
in these and other contingencies requires carefully tailored
preparedness of our Air Force and the Armed Forces.
The budget request we have forwarded to you, fully
appreciating the Department's role in helping to stabilize the
Nation's extraordinary fiscal condition, supports our airmen in
our continuing efforts to structure the Force for maximum
versatility with minimum risk across the range of operations.
So using our very own version of March Madness last year,
as an example, this spectrum includes humanitarian relief
operations in places like Japan, where more than 13,000
personnel were called to action to increase much needed
airfield capacity; to conduct search-and-rescue operations; to
provide airborne wide-angle views of the devastation for
overall situation awareness; and to provide rapid and tailored
airlift capability delivering some 5 million pounds of cargo.
The operational continuum also includes airpower-intensive
combat operations such as Libya, where airmen surged to
contribute more than 65 percent of all coalition sorties;
notably, 99 percent of the lift, 79 percent of the in-flight
refueling, 50 percent of the airborne reconnaissance, and 40
percent of the strike missions.
And our Nation's full spectrum requirements that rely on
Air Force capabilities include everything else from
counterinsurgency to counterterrorism; to our regular
operations; to safe and reliable operation and maintenance and
security of two of the Nation's three legs of the strategic
deterrent.
In all of these mission areas, our airmen are committed to
the task of leveraging air-and-space power with all of its
inherent versatility, tailor-ability and rapidity. Ultimately,
Air Force capabilities present to the President and the
national leadership a range of strategic options to meet
priorities of the new defense strategic guidance such as
projecting power in anti-access and area-denial environments;
preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction;
conducting space and cyber operations; and maintaining the
preponderance of the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
The wide array of Air Force capabilities which will remain
vital to our Nation's diplomatic, economic, and military
interests fall into four general categories--air and-space
control; global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
rapid global mobility; and global strike.
As part of the defense strategic guidance, we are
structuring our force to be more agile and responsive even as
we accept some risk with the smaller force.
While still maintaining quality, we will divest nearly 230
fighter, mobility, and ISR aircraft in fiscal 2013 toward a
total of 286 aircraft retirements over the program period. We
project that these targeted divestitures will save some $8.7
billion.
And when applied to our modernization strategy, as
Secretary Donley discussed, as well as to all important
operations and maintenance sustainment accounts, our guiding
principles in these careful and responsible reductions were to
favor multirole systems over those with more niche capabilities
so that we could maximize versatility; and to retire entire
aircraft types where possible, that we could potentially
eliminate the entire support infrastructure, thereby, achieving
greater efficiency.
But where retirement of entire fleets was not feasible, we
evaluated options for eliminating aircraft that were the least
capable or the most expensive to operate.
For the assets that we will retain--that is 54 combat-coded
fighter squadrons, 275 airlifters, 453 tankers, and a robust
mix of remotely piloted, U-2, E-3 [Sentry airborne warning and
control system (AWACS) aircraft], EA, and other ISR systems--we
are emphasizing common configurations for fewer support-and-
sustainment requirements. And therefore, we would be positioned
to achieve greater efficiency in delivering the core
capabilities I addressed earlier.
The defense strategic guidance articulates our plan to
execute a $487 billion defense-spending reduction over 10
years. And although we have no illusion--no illusion at all--
about the road ahead being easy, we have confidence in our
ability to manage this tight fiscal circumstance.
I must echo, however, Secretary Donley's concern that
across-the-board cuts driven by sequestration would
dramatically change the complexion of our thoroughly
deliberated defense strategy.
We would effectively be sent back to the drawing board
because indiscriminate salami-slicing of the budget would
nullify the carefully considered and responsible reductions
that preserve our readiness, our effectiveness; notwithstanding
the fiscal constraints in a smaller force.
The comprehensive nature of our fiscal year 2013 budget
request includes a holistic interstate approach to Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve force structure. From both an
operational-effectiveness and fiscal-responsibility
perspective, we prefer this strategy over a more piecemeal
State-by-State approach.
Our proposed efforts will correct several manpower
disconnects, rebalance forces, and improve sortie generation
and aircraft utilization rates, thereby improving the total
forces' readiness and responsiveness across the spectrum of
operation.
It allows us to better resource our high-priority
requirements such as ISR; distributed and mission training; and
domestic and homeland defense operations.
On our manpower side, our program total-force realignment
on the order of 10,000 Active Guard and Reserve airmen will
bring the total force end strength down to 501,000 by the end
of fiscal year 2013. And we hold no illusions that these
personnel reductions affecting all 54 States and U.S.
territories will be easy. Taken comprehensively, however, this
recalibration will robust nearly 40 units across the Air
National Guard and, thus, enhance overall total force
readiness.
Clearly, the Air Force's vitality and effectiveness is
dependent on the strength of the total force, and therefore the
leadership of both the Active and the Reserve Components work
closely together in all deliberations and decisions affecting
the total force.
Understandably, we did not always achieve to total
unanimity, but we most certainly were unified and we remain
unified in the common goal of ensuring total force vitality and
viability. And together we remain committed to fulfilling the
requirements of the defense strategic guidance as one Air
Force.
Mr. Chairman and committee Members, the Air Force remains
committed to the providing of global vigilance, reach, and
power for Americans' needs today, and for her aspirations and
challenges that we know the Nation will face tomorrow.
Every single day, our airmen, Active Guard, and Reserve
proudly serve on behalf of the American people as trusted
stewards of the Nation's resources and stalwart defenders of
her security.
Finally, please allow me to make one comment concerning
military compensation. I appeal to the committee to carefully
consider those initiatives in our budget proposal that begin to
tackle the escalating personnel costs of compensation, health
care, and retirement. Among all the other challenges facing us,
the reality of fewer members of the Armed Forces--costing
increasingly more to recruit, train, and retain for promising
careers--is the monumental defense issue of our time.
Our inability to address this issue properly will place
other areas of the budget, including force structure and
modernization, under yet more pressure, forcing out needed
military capability at the time when we are already right-sized
for the likely missions ahead.
Thank you again, sir, for your continued support of the
United States Air Force and for the committee's support of our
airmen and their families. We look forward to your questions,
Mr. Chairman.
[The joint prepared statement of General Schwartz and
Secretary Donley can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Schwartz, in this budget, the Air Force made the
choice to cut older platforms in favor of newer modernized
platforms. For example, you sustained the F-35 and the old and
retired older F-16s and A-10s. Similarly, you retire all the C-
5As and the C-130Hs.
While I would prefer we didn't retire so much force
structure, I understand that given the choice between old and
new, the Air Force went for the most modernized advanced
program. One of two notable exceptions is the decision to cut
the Global Hawk Block 30 and extend the use of U-2s.
Please explain why, in this case, the Air Force chose to
retain a plane that was flown by the grandparents of today's U-
2 pilots, especially given that 8 months ago, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
certified to Congress that the continuation of the Global Hawk
program was essential to national security; and that there are
no alternatives to provide acceptable capability at less cost.
At that time, we were told that the U-2 aircraft cost $220
million per year more than the Global Hawk Block 30 to operate.
Isn't this a short-sighted decision that favors near-term
savings over long-term capability and cost?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, the Block 30 decision was
made on two bases--one, that the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reduced the demand signal for high-altitude
surveillance. I can't go in the explicit detail here. I would
be happy to do so in another manner. That was one factor.
The second factor was a realization that the operating cost
of the two systems was, at best, to push; in the neighborhood
of $32,000 per flying hour--U-2 versus Global Hawk Block 30.
The third factor was the realization that the sensor
capability on the U-2--particularly for EO [electro-optical],
IR [infrared] and, to some degree, also on the signal side--was
better, and required improvements in the Global Hawk system
that were yet not funded.
And I acknowledge the Nunn-McCurdy certification which
occurred last year, but I would only remind that that occurred
prior to the Budget Control Act and its implications in terms
of resources for our Air Force.
So, our choice was--it is true the U-2 has been flying a
long time, the U-2 is not the senior plane that our
grandfathers flew. It has been improved and modified and
continues to be modified as we speak. And it was our judgment
that--given the demand signal, the sensor capability, and the
relative modest, if any, cost differential--that sustaining the
U-2 was a better bet.
I would conclude by saying, sir, that we are not giving up
on Global Hawk by any means. Block 20 will continue to perform
the communications mission. Block 40 will continue to perform
the ground moving-target-indicator mission. And that is, under
these circumstances, the best package we could offer our joint
teammates.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Also, General Schwartz, you talked a little bit at the
conclusion of the--for the compensation to the Force--I have
one other question on that.
The Department's proposal to increase the TRICARE prime
enrollment fee is a tiered approach based on an individual's
retired pay. The health-care benefit for retired Federal
employees is not based on an individual's retirement pay.
So in essence, the President would pay the same for Federal
retirement health care as the lowest level Federal employee.
Why, then, should the military retirement health care benefits
be means tested?
General Schwartz. It was a recognition, Mr. Chairman, that
there were those among our alumni who were less able to
accommodate the increases in the fees than others. And so, this
simply was, in my view--was a recognition of reality in that
enlisted retirees were certainly not as capable of absorbing
these costs as retired flag officers. And it was simply done on
that basis in an attempt to be as fair as possible.
The Chairman. So you probably did the right thing, and the
rest of the Federal employees should probably follow suit?
General Schwartz. Sir, I am not in the position to----
The Chairman. I understand.
General Schwartz [continuing]. To make policy here.
But I can tell you that I am comfortable with what we
decided to do.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ask about the F-35--it is still a little bit uncertain
exactly where that program is going exactly. Over the course of
the next 4 or 5 years, what are you counting on from the F-35?
How many planes? What is the cost point that is going to become
problematic? And how confident are you that those planes can be
delivered at this point on whatever the current schedule is?
And I say that, because, as you know, every year it seems like
we have to readjust that schedule based on delays; increases in
cost.
As of right now, what are you counting on in terms of the
number of planes? What are the cost points? And then how
confident are you that this schedule is actually going to hold
up?
Secretary Donley. Mr. Smith, we are currently working
through the concurrency in the program that I think the
committee is aware of, where the development program is not yet
complete. And we have started production and we are weighing
carefully, year to year, the progress of the program to make
sure that we do not ramp up production too quickly, and that we
worked out all the kinks in the program. And there is a list of
issues that the Joint Program Office and the Air Force and the
Navy are watching and managing together, going forward.
We have worked hard with Lockheed Martin to reach
conclusion on the low-rate initial production of LRIP-4
contracts last year. We are in negotiations with them now on
Lot 5, and we think that work needs to continue and to come to
closure soon.
Mr. Smith. And it is interesting. As you talked about, you
know, we don't want to produce them until they are actually
ready, but we kind of are, as we have gone through a series of
lots.
But within those productions lots, we are still not at the
point where we are like, ``Okay, it is good. We are building a
plane that we know is going to be ready to go.'' We are still
saying, ``Okay, we are working out concurrency. We are working
out these different things.'' And it is not at all clear at
this point when that is going to be worked out. We are hoping
at certain points that it will be worked out, but it is not
locked in by any stretched imagination. Is that correct?
Secretary Donley. It is becoming more locked in. The Joint
Program Office----
Mr. Smith. Right.
Secretary Donley [continuing]. Just completed a baseline
review really capturing the last 2 years----
Mr. Smith. Not to be overly philosophical, but you are
locked in or you are not. There is no such thing as more locked
in. So, we are still----
Secretary Donley. The Joint Program just finished preparing
a new program baseline based on the changes over the last 2
years; the cumulative adjustments to set the way forward for
the program.
So Admiral Venlet, I think, has a good handle on how to
push the program forward. The program of record for us has not
changed. It is 1,763 of the A-models for the United States Air
Force. That is obviously taking a little bit longer than we
would like, so production is being pushed out a bit. But we
remain fully committed to this aircraft going forward.
Mr. Smith. And what is the per-unit cost estimate at this
point?
Secretary Donley. This is still to be negotiated. The early
lots tend to cost more than the others. So let me give to you
some numbers for the record which reflect----
Mr. Smith. Okay.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 95.]
Secretary Donley [continuing]. Sort of where we are today.
But we have ongoing negotiations with Lockheed on this. And
I will say that the Joint Program Office and the Air Force and
the Navy are working together to get the best deal for the
taxpayer; to push this program forward, but at an affordable
cost that represents continuing progress down the price curve,
as we should expect in this program.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you.
And just one quick question on the Guard and Reserve--there
are concerns and been expressed by a number of adjutant
generals about--I guess it is 5,100 Guard airmen that are being
cut, and then a fair number of planes are being cut from the
Reserve and Guard components. They are concerned about the
impact of that. What is your response as to why you made the
decisions that you made?
Secretary Donley. Sir, a few points here.
First, the adjustments in the aircraft were driven by the
changes in strategy that we referred to in our opening
statements. So the Department's assessment was that the Air
Force could take additional risk in fighter force structure. We
just went through some significant changes in fighter force
structure a couple of years ago, where most of those reductions
took place in the F-16 fleet and in the F-15C fleet; so we just
went through some significant adjustments there.
As we look at the strategy changes and the sizing of the
fighter force going forward, it was determined that we could
take additional risk in the A-10 fleet. We will still have in
excess of 300 A-10s in our inventory. But going forward, it
looked like we could take additional risk in that area.
On the C-130 side--on the mobility, for example--the prior
Mobility Capability Requirement Study, MCRS--before we even got
in to the strategic review--had told us that we had excess
tactical-lift capabilities in excess to requirements. So we
felt like we could take additional risk in the size of the C-
130 fleet going forward.
So, again, these are the force structure adjustments and
strategic adjustments that started the force structure changes.
Then, the issue was how to mix the Active Duty and the
Guard capabilities most effectively to meet the requirements of
the strategy, but also provide for surge and provide for
rotational capabilities at the same time--make sure the Force
is robust.
So this is why, while we are getting smaller, we are
focused on making sure that the Active Guard and Reserve are
more integrated going forward. And I would defer to the chief
for some additional comments.
General Schwartz. I would only make one additional comment
in that it is important from a force-management point of view
to understand what the likely tempo is of the respective
forces.
For the Active, the goal was set at not less than one to
two--that is a deploy-to-dwell ratio of 6 months deployed, for
example, 1 year home; and a tempo of not less than 1 to 4,
ideally 1 to 5, for the National Guard and Reserve components.
And the reason for that is so that we do not overuse any of
the components, with the downside of forcing folks either to
leave the Active Duty; or because of the multiple demands on
the Guard and Reserve, including their employment in the
private sector, to leave the Guard and Reserve.
So this was fundamentally in a smaller Air Force,
recognizing the activity level that is anticipated to have the
right mix that allowed us to manage the tempo at levels which
were sustainable for the future.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you both very much for your service.
General Schwartz, in February of 2008, the Air Force
certified to Congress in a letter--and I want to quote from
that letter, sir--``Time-sensitive mission-critical resupply is
crucial to our success as war fighters. We also believe there
are mission steps that may support additional procurement of
the C-27, such as building international partnerships around
the common airframe; National Guard support of Federal
Emergency Management Agency regions; delivery of Special
Operations Forces teams, and others small unit maneuvers; more
efficient movement of small payloads in theater; taking convoys
off the road; precision air-drop of bundles and joint precision
air-drop systems operations; and recapitalization of
operational support aircraft inventories.''
This is the direct quote from that letter of February of
2008. Fifteen months later, you were in front of this
committee--and let me quote from your testimony there--``Our
programs reflect their commitment to pursuing joint
multimission solutions such as the procurement of eight C-27Js
in the fiscal year 2010.''
These appear to be in direct conflict to your written
testimony, where you say that the Air Force is divesting the C-
27 aircraft in favor of the multirole C-130 because you
consider the C-27J a niche capability.
Again, this seems to be in direct contrast to these two
previous quotes. Why, sir, do you believe 3 years later that
this C-27J is no longer a multimission capable aircraft? Has
there been any formal Air Force testing or analysis conducted
that proves the C-27 is no longer a multimission aircraft?
General Schwartz. It is a multimission aircraft. We don't
dispute that, Congressman Bartlett.
But what I would say--the significant thing that has
changed since both 2008 to 2010 testimony is $487 billion. I
mean that is a factor in our approach to how to address the
force structure.
When we looked at the C-27, sir, as attractive at was,
there was a personal commitment from me to George Casey in the
2010 timeframe to perform that mission for the Army.
We looked at a couple things--life-cycle costs, for
example. The C-27 life-cycle cost over 25 years is $308 million
an aircraft. For the C-130J, it is $213 million per aircraft.
For the C-130H, it is $185 million per aircraft. So there was a
cost differential; sometimes it is worth it. But in this fiscal
environment it certainly caught our attention.
Additionally, we had demonstrated our capacity, both in
Iraq and Afghanistan, to provide the time-critical support
mission for the maneuver units with the C-130 platform.
Mr. Bartlett. Excuse me, I am led to understand that
because we do not have enough C-27Js that we are--and I am
quoting your people--``flying the blades off the 47 [CH-47
Chinook heavy-lift helicopter],'' and using the 130, which is
more expensive and cannot be used on short air strips.
The C-27 procurement costs us less than the C-130. It has
only two engines as compared to four. It is one-half the size
of a 130. The hourly cost is $3,000 less than the 130 and
$5,000 less per hour than the helicopter.
The parts and avionics of the C-27 are 35 percent to 40
percent in common with the C-130. They should be. The engines
are identical, as I understand. Yet, the Air Force claims that
the C-27 is more expensive to own and operate than the C-130.
Given these facts, can you please explain to me how the Air
Force determined that operating a C-27 is more expensive than
the 130 and the 47?
General Schwartz. I didn't talk about the 47. I did talk
about the 130. And it has to do with the basing arrangement; it
has to do with the contract logistic support, rather than
organic sustainment. There are a number of factors that affect
life-cycle costs, sir, but I would just--allow me to make this
point--that there is not a single airfield in Afghanistan today
that the C-27 is using that the C-130 cannot. That is a reality
on the ground today.
Mr. Bartlett. My time has expired. I thank you very much.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks Mr. Chairman.
Several questions--I didn't note it in your testimony--in
the past couple of years we have had discussions here with you
all about electronic warfare; and, in particular, some of that
platforms we have for use for the Air Force's electronic
warfare capability, including the information operations like
Compass Call and so on.
But I didn't note anything in your testimony specific to EW
[electronic warfare], and I was wondering if you could
enlighten us to the investment the Air Force has been able to
make despite the budget constraints you are under.
General Schwartz. Certainly the Compass Call--we will
sustain the Compass Call mission and continue to expand its
repertoire with the onboard equipment and so on and so forth.
We are equipping some of the remotely piloted aircraft with
EW capabilities as well, and we are--in the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance area, this is mapping
adversary signals and so on and so forth; there is certainly a
concerted effort in that domain.
So the other area which is not as obvious is part of our--
for example, our service-life extension proposal on the F-16
introduces an electronically scanned array radar, an AESA
[active electronically scanned array]. That in itself is an EW
capability, both offensively and defensively. So there are
traditional investments in the traditional platforms, but there
are also efforts under way in less visible ways like the AESA
radars, which will magnify our EW confidence.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Secretary, is that good enough? Yes, okay.
With regards to anything you are doing on EW jointly with
either Navy or Army or Marine Corps--can you discuss that?
General Schwartz. Sure. And this is something, sir, that is
a part of the air-sea battle collaboration between the Navy and
the Air Force. There are electronic-warfare potential
capabilities out there that concern us greatly. And we are
collaborating with the Navy in order to introduce
countermeasures; to introduce resilience into our respective
systems to make sure, for example, that our data links are
robust enough so that we can assist one another--mutually
support one another--when, say, one aircraft is being jammed,
but we can link with another aircraft of the other service to
still engage a target.
These are the kinds of things that I think hold great
promise for us in making better use of the assets we possess.
Mr. Larsen. And as this is the budget-posture hearing, then
are these activities reflected in the budget?
General Schwartz. They certainly are, and they will be more
visible over time.
Mr. Larsen. Sure. And I gather from your answer there may
be room for a bigger discussion in a different setting as well?
General Schwartz. I would be happy to do that, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Okay, good.
In your testimony, with regards to the nuclear deterrent--
sorry, page 20 or so--yes, nuclear-deterrence operations--can
you talk a little bit about the Air Force's investment in the
two legs of the triad that you have is--obviously, I am on the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee--several of us are, certainly,
and we will probably look into this further. But if you could
give us an introduction of what we might be looking into on the
subcommittee?
Secretary Donley. Sure. Sure.
Just quickly, an overview--nuclear-deterrent operations
make up about 6 percent of our overall Air Force budget. We
made no major force structure adjustments in this area, pending
presidential decisions on how to structure the nuclear triad
going forward. Broadly speaking, there are funds in the budget
to support the beginning of START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty] implementation.
In the START regime and in the current force structure, we
have what are referred to as phantom capabilities that count
against us but, are purely not operational. I refer here to
Peacekeeper [LGM-118A missile] silos, which are still in
existence but have not been dismantled, but have no missiles in
them; and bombers that have been retired for several years and
are no longer capable but still count in the totals. So we are
making the investments to start dismantling the phantom
capabilities that are present in the force structure. And we
are working on other measures that would lead in to the START
implantation work ahead of us.
The existing decisions, as they stand are that we would
plan on no more than 420 ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic
missiles] and up to 420 ICBMs, up to 60 nuclear-capable
bombers. So these are decisions that the President has in front
of him about how to shape the nuclear posture going forward.
And we will wait for those decisions before taking next steps.
Just two additional points quickly----
Mr. Larsen. Sure.
Secretary Donley. Our immediate goal for the ICBM force is
to get the Minuteman [LGM-30 ICBM] to 2030, and so we have the
resources in there to support that. And I would remind the
committee that the long-range strike bomber, while it is
intended to be nuclear-capable, is a factor in considering the
nuclear-deterrent force structure. But we are building this
bomber for conventional operations over 20 or 30 years. Where
our bomber capabilities have been used is on the conventional
side.
Mr. Larsen. Yes good. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you both for being here.
Mr. Conaway and I both share a concern about a particular
issue and I will yield to him to ask you about that.
Mr. Conaway. Well thanks for your time, Mr. Thornberry. In
the force-restructure plan, you are moving C-130s from Dallas/
Fort Worth to Montana; you are moving F-15s from Montana to
California; and then you are moving something called the MC-12
[Liberty ISR turboprop aircraft] I guess a twin-engine ISR
platform to Fort Worth.
Moving aircraft is very simple. But these are Guard assets
and the Guard complement that they currently fly--the C-130s--
maintain them, evaluate them and train the pilots, all that
kind of stuff--they are not moving to Montana.
And I suspect that the F-16 protection team in Montana is
not going to move to California. You got MIL-CON [military
construction] considerations in all these places. Given the
overall cuts of the budget, can you walk us through the
business plan for why this makes sense?
Because, while it may seem parochial because Mike and I are
from Texas, it is not; I have going to answer questions back
home to folks who are looking at tough decisions. And moving
things for the sake of moving thing doesn't make a lot of sense
at this stage.
General Schwartz. Sir, it goes something like this--that F-
15s are a air-sovereignty mission in the Air National Guard.
And they are better utilized on the West Coast than they are in
the north central part of the United States. That is why the F-
15s are moving to Fresno, because that is an established air-
sovereignty location for North America----
Mr. Conaway. And how long have the F-15s been in Montana
that we are making the exchange for? I mean this is a new air-
sovereignty issue for the F-15s?
General Schwartz. Remember we are taking out 200 fighter
aircraft in the Fiscal 2013 program and so----
Mr. Conaway. Let us focus on the C-130s because----
General Schwartz. Okay.
Mr. Conaway [continuing]. As I understand it, they are the
only C-130s available to Governors on the Gulf Coast that are
Governor-to-Governor as opposed to going to the Pentagon to get
those. Can you walk us through why we are moving C-130s to
Montana?
General Schwartz. I think that the fundamental reason is
because there are other multitudes of other C-130s in the
region that you are well aware of, regardless of their
component affiliation. And there was a requirement--there has
been a need for lift in the central northwestern part of the
States--FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] Region 10,
specifically.
The logic here was to try to position lift capabilities--
again, total force lift capabilities--in a way that that could
posture for potential natural disasters and the like.
Mr. Conaway. And those considerations overweigh the
financial circumstances--the millions of dollars in training,
the pilots that current fly for commercial carriers in Dallas,
Fort Worth, who fly the C-130s, you got----
General Schwartz. And they will fly MC-12s which is an
enduring mission for our Air Force, as far as the eye can see,
sir.
Mr. Conaway. But I am more interested in what the C-130s do
for our National Guard and their ability to respond to fires in
Texas and hurricanes throughout the region. It is a 2.5-hour
flight from Montana to Texas and a 2.5-hour back flight.
General Schwartz. And Abilene has 28 C-130s.
Mr. Conaway. But those belong to you, and they are not
controlled by the National Guard. And I got to believe, unless
you can show differently, that a Governor-to-Governor response
time is quicker than a Governor-to-Pentagon-and-back-to-the-
Governor--whatever.
General Schwartz. And the Governor of Arkansas and the
Governor of Mississippi, I am sure, will happily support the
needs of the Governor of Texas, sir.
Mr. Conaway. You have got C-130s that belong to the Guard
in Arkansas, and where else did you say?
General Schwartz. Mississippi.
Mr. Conaway. Mississippi.
All right; well, I stand corrected, as I was told that
these are the only ones available in the Gulf Coast.
It is troubling. And again it looks like it is parochial,
but it is not, and----
General Schwartz. No, I take your point, sir.
Mr. Conaway. All right.
And I do yield back.
Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. General, let me ask you briefly one other
thing--you all delayed the follow-on to the T-38 [Talon twin-
engine supersonic jet trainer] trainer a year. There are some
questions to how serious you are about bringing that trainer
on. It is not just us. It is our European allies who jointly
train. How big a deal is that for you all?
General Schwartz. There is just no space, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. But next year?
General Schwartz. I can't promise you. I mean this is an
issue of resources. And, you know, we need a new trainer. As
you are well aware, the T-38 is older than I am, almost. And we
need a new trainer. But the bottom line is that we simply did
not have space to pursue that in the current budget
environment.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both witnesses.
General, just to go back to the C-27 issue, the--it is my
understanding that the decision to end this program is not
simply to truncate it, but to actually take these brand-new
planes and send them to ``the boneyard''--I think was the term
that was used in the description of the budget earlier.
These are planes that are bought and paid for. Can you
explain how that is a good business plan? Because, frankly, it
feels like a ``60 Minutes'' moment in terms of the taxpayer.
And again, first of all, is that correct? And number two, just
explain how that works.
General Schwartz. There are multiple options which haven't
played out. Yes, they certainly could go into what we call
flyable storage. It happened out in Arizona.
They could also become foreign military sales vehicles to
other air forces. And there are other air forces interested in
the platforms. So I mean there are a couple of options which,
again, haven't played out. And certainly that would happen in
the next number of months.
Mr. Courtney. Well, again, I think for some of us that is
an issue we kind of need to understand a little better. I mean
it is my understanding the producer is not too thrilled about
the idea of us turning around and sort of flipping the planes
for resale. And, frankly that is pretty understandable.
Secretary Donley. Maybe. But I mean we have a mandate from
you to----
Mr. Courtney. Understood.
Secretary Donley [continuing]. Get smaller; and we are.
Mr. Courtney. Again, but so when the F-22 production line
came to an end, I mean we truncated the program. And that,
frankly, for some of us it was a bitter pill; but nonetheless--
I mean those planes are still being used. And that is sort of a
thing that I think we are struggling to understand is why
perfectly brand-new planes are not being sort of at least used.
And again, I am sure that is something that the budget
folks can walk us through.
For Guard and Reserves who have been given sort of an
alternative for the--is it the 12-MC--or the MC-12 rather,
excuse me--Mr. Secretary, you indicated that the adjustments to
Guard and Reserves aircraft is being driven by strategy.
Again, those planes are, in my understanding--are used for
intelligence and reconnaissance given the fact that, you know,
the strategy horizon is that we are sort of going to be leaving
Afghanistan sometime in the future.
I am just trying to visualize, for Guard units who are
being told, ``This is your new assignment''--what is the
strategy that will make that a firm commitment? I mean this has
been an issue. I don't have to tell you that, you know, Guard
units are kind of feeling like, you know, their head is
spinning in terms of trying to keep up with what their mission
is.
Secretary Donley. This is a fair point. And we struggle as
well with rapid changes in force structure; the rapid changes
in the fiscal environment that have caused us to have to take
decisions, revisit decisions and continue to adjust.
This is a challenging part of the environment in which we
live. I would say when the MC-12 came into the inventory, we
gave serious consideration to putting it in the Guard and
Reserve from the beginning. It does have a counterdrug kind of
capability that is well beyond the existing capabilities of the
RC-26 [Metroliner twin turboprop aircraft], which has been used
in that capacity across the southern tier of the U.S. to
support Guard and counterdrug activities. So it does represent
an increase in those capabilities.
But when we brought the MC-12 into the Force, the Guard did
not have the manpower to support and to generate quickly the
required capability to operate that down range.
You should be aware--I think already are--the MC-12s are
not in the United States. They went straight from the factory
into the theater, and that is where they are operating today.
But as we look forward, we think this is a more sustainable
mission for the Guard as the op tempo adjusts a little bit. And
I believe that the Air National Guard looked at the locations
of the MC-12 along the southern tier mainly as a good fit.
Mr. Courtney. Well, again, certainly we want to work with
you in terms of trying to, you know, find missions. It is
critical, obviously, to keep that capability which you talked
about earlier. But obviously there is going to be questions and
look forward to working with you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary and General--thank you for your service
to our country. I only have 5 minutes so I have got to be kind
of concise and I just want to say at the outset that I am going
to ask you to forgive me for not swimming in the same sea of
accolades that some of my colleagues are comfortable in doing.
But when I first came into office, the way we would have
these hearings--we would spend a lot of time bragging about
you; you would spend a lot of time bragging about us. And we
never really asked the tough questions necessary to defend this
country. And I vowed never to do that again.
Mr. Secretary, you said that your decisions are strategy-
driven.
And, General, you have said that--it is in your written
statement--that the strategy was driven by security changes.
You don't mention in there that it was also driven by $427
billion of cuts. So I want to focus on those security changes.
When I first came into office, I had this report that the
RAND Corporation did that said if we were involved in a
conflict between China and Taiwan, the United States Air Force
would easily defeat the Chinese in that particular situation.
Since you have been in the position that you are in, you
have canceled the F-22. You have retired 235 F-15s and F-16
fighters. You are now proposing retiring another 123 combat
aircraft. You put all our eggs in the F-35 platform, which I
think everybody acknowledges is smaller, slower; less lethal
than the F-22.
And now I see a new study that has come out by the RAND
Corporation that takes a totally different tack. It says that
we would lose in that conflict between China and Taiwan.
Now, I don't have time in the 5 minutes I have to get into
the specifics of those studies. But my question for you is: Do
you have any other studies that you can present to this
committee that we can review, that would refute the conclusion
that the RAND Corporation had in this study?
General Schwartz. Congressman, I would have to take a look
at that study. I will certainly----
Mr. Forbes. You have not seen the study by RAND
Corporation?
General Schwartz. I am not sure. I can't see it from this
distance. I certainly will----
Mr. Forbes. Are you familiar with any study that RAND
Corporation did, as big as this one was, that said that we
would lose in that conflict?
General Schwartz. Congressman, I don't know what the
assumptions are in that study. I don't know what the premises
were. You need to allow me to exercise that professional
judgment.
Mr. Forbes. And I will, General. I just want you say for
the record today that you are not aware of this RAND study and
you haven't reviewed the study. Is that correct?
General Schwartz. What I am saying is I have not seen
that--what is the title of the study, Congressman?
Mr. Forbes. ``Question of Balance, Political Context and
Military Aspects of the China and Taiwan Dispute'' by the RAND
Corporation.
General Schwartz. I have not seen that study.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. It is a big one.
I would suggest the Air Force look at it. Second thing I
would say is if that conclusion in that study was correct,
would that be an acceptable risk for the Air Force to have?
I am not saying it is. I am saying if it would be?
General Schwartz. If the conclusion is correct, I would say
that would be, decidedly, a concern for all of the entire Armed
Forces.
Mr. Forbes. Let me come back to the F-22 decision that you
made.
When you did that, you and the Secretary wrote this at op-
ed piece saying that we should have 183 F-22s. Prior to that
decision, according to the Congressional Research Service, not
me, there were 30 air-campaign studies that said you were
wrong.
Did you review a single study that said that you were
correct, and that we should reduce the F-22s down to only 183?
And the reason I say it--because right when you did it, the
commander of the Air Combat Command said that there were no
such studies out there at all. Did you review any of those? And
can you just present them to the committee for us to review?
General Schwartz. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Forbes. Were there any----
General Schwartz. There was. And the Department and
Congress chose otherwise in the end.
Mr. Forbes. So General Corley was incorrect when he said
there were no studies out there that justified that?
General Schwartz. The study that I refer to talked about
more than 187 aircraft.
Mr. Forbes. If you would, present that to us.
Can you tell us now, General, what is the current strike-
fighter shortfall that the United States Air Force has?
General Schwartz. Given the new strategy, we have
sufficient aircraft to deal with the threats that are outlined
in the force-sizing construct at moderate risk.
Mr. Forbes. And, General, was that strategy, according to
your testimony today, driven completely by security changes or
was it driven by the 427----
General Schwartz. Of course it was driven by both, but----
Mr. Forbes. And----
General Schwartz. The recognition was that we were out of
Iraq, that we were going to diminish our presence in
Afghanistan----
Mr. Forbes. General, my time is running out.
Can you tell us if you can distinguish between the part of
the strategy that was driven by the cuts, and the part by the
security changes?
General Schwartz. Clearly, it is a combination of both. But
I would submit to you, sir, that the F-35, the long-range
strike bomber, and the new tanker--those programs are sustained
by the new strategy and not diminished by it.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank both of you for being here today as well.
Thank you for your service. And, of course, as I have discussed
with both of you, I remain, I guess, deeply concerned about the
proposal to retire the Iowa National Guard's 132nd Fighter
Wing's F-16s, as well as the broader budget decisions affecting
the Air National Guard. I know this issue is brought up by
Ranking Member Smith earlier as well.
Roughly 130 airmen from the 132nd are currently deployed to
Afghanistan or elsewhere across the globe. They have proven
time and again that they are one of the most-experienced, best-
performing fighter wings in the Air Force; maintaining a very
high degree of readiness for some of the lowest personnel,
maintenance, and flying costs of all F-16 units. As you know,
in other words, this is a very, very effective unit by any
measure.
And while I am still baffled by the proposal to retire the
132nd F-16s, I am deeply concerned about the budget proposals
affecting the entire Air National Guard as well, which would
bear--my understanding is--59 percent of the total aircraft
cuts, and see most of their personnel reductions occur in
fiscal year 2013, if I am not mistaken; which provides little
leeway to reserve course from a strategy that is stated to be
meant to be irreversible.
Given that the Air National Guard also plays a critical
homeland-security role for our States and our country at lower
basing personnel and life-cycle costs to the taxpayers, I have
a couple of questions related to these issues.
In your joint testimony, you state that the right mix of
Active Duty and Reserve Components must be maintained. And I
think we can all agree that that is the case. How did you
determine the appropriate mix, what the appropriate mix would
be, and what were the factors such as experience and personnel
and operational cost that were taken into account? Could you be
specific about the factors and the mix?
Secretary Donley. I go back to the rationale that we
provided in the opening statement. And I think we have been
clear about it. The issue here was where we could take risk in
the force structure. And the DOD and Air Force decision
collectively was that we could take additional risk in the
fighter force structure.
We have already taken significant reductions in the F-16
force, but the assessment was we could take an additional
squadron this time around.
The unit at Des Moines, while it continues to perform very,
very well--there is no question about the competency and the
capability of this unit--the aircraft are a little bit older
and less capable than some others. And they are not
participating in the Air Sovereignty Alert mission. This has
not been a mission that has been assigned or associated with
Des Moines for the North American Air Defense Command. So those
were the factors that went into this particular decision.
The issue on the Active Reserve Component balance, I think
the chief has been very clear on. This is not just about the
cost to operate the unit. This is how the unit fits into the
force structure, and how that force structure not only meets
the demands of the strategy, but our ability to surge and then
sustain combat operations going forward. And we have tried to
strike the right balance.
Our Air Force is now small enough; small enough that we
have to go forward as one Air Force together and become more
integrated going forward. As we get smaller, the requirements
for readiness and immediate capability go up here. So these
were the decisions that factored into the Active arc balance.
And, again, it is not--as you suggested, we understand the
perception the reductions are disproportionate on the Air
Guard. Certainly, that is the way the numbers fall in fiscal
year 2013.
But this is a multiyear look backwards and forwards in
terms of how we are going to structure our Air Force going
forward. And we need the right balance of Active Duty and
Reserve Components, so we don't break these components----
Mr. Loebsack. Yes.
Just one quick historical question--because we mentioned
certainly we have got to be able to deploy folks fairly
quickly. Accessibility is an issue. I think it is an issue that
the Guard--it has been raised as a concern. And I just have one
question about that. Over the last 10 years, have there been
any instances where the Air Guard has not been able to fulfill
request for deployment?
General Schwartz. There have been no occasions where we did
not--if we resorted to mobilization--where the guard was not
available. And there were very few cases when we ride on
volunteer status of the guardsmen.
I would just say, sir, that the Guard and the Reserve are
an essential part of our family. And we respect what they do.
And in the case of your unit, sir, they are going to go
transition into a remotely piloted aircraft mission that
clearly is for the ages.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you. Thanks to both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To both gentlemen--I would like to know--Secretary Panetta
recently talked about the call for maybe two more rounds of
BRAC [base closure and realignment]. I would like to go back to
our last round of BRAC, if I might--and just ask: Do each of
you think that BRAC of 2005--the recommendations in that
document--carry the force of law?
Secretary Donley. Yes.
Mr. Miller. And I think it was section 2703 of the 2012
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] requires that you
complete all the closures and realignments recommended by the
2005 BRAC Commission as expeditiously as possible. So you are
finished now with all of the BRAC recommendations and
requirements?
Secretary Donley. Sir, we believe we have complied with the
law at Eglin.
Mr. Miller. So a comment by General Hoffman last week at
the AFA [Air Force Association] Convention that, ``BRAC 2005
has expired, it is irrelevant,'' and that, ``people just need
to get over it,'' is a correct statement?
General Schwartz. Congressman, I was there. That is not
what he said.
Mr. Miller. What did he say, General?
General Schwartz. Congressman Miller, what he said was that
BRAC 2005 was complete, and that what we propose now with
respect specifically to the Air Armament Center and the mission
at Eglin is something to address today, in today's context, and
not relative to something which, in our view, is a completed
project.
Mr. Miller. So the Recommendation 185 to create an
integrated weapons-and-armament, research development and
acquisition, test-and-evaluation center at Eglin has been done?
General Schwartz. I would argue that it has, sir.
Mr. Miller. Not co-location--integration at Eglin?
General Schwartz. I would argue that it has.
Mr. Miller. How does disestablishing the Air Armament
Center support your compliance with the BRAC law?
General Schwartz. We are not disestablishing the Air
Armament Center, sir. Nothing is migrating from Eglin with
respect to the proposal for AFMC [Air Force Materiel Command]
reorganization--nothing. The one major change that is involved
is collapsing the two wings which exist at Eglin into one,
which is fundamentally an efficiency move.
So the 96th wing and the test wing will become one
organization. And the overhead that is associated with the two
will be thinned out. That is the major element of the changes
that we proposed here.
I acknowledge forthrightly that we are talking about
establishing a brigadier rather than a two-star in this
instance. We have had pressure, as you are aware, to reduce 39
flag officers in the Air Force--no doubt more in the future.
But, again, the bottom line is we are not migrating a thing
away from Eglin. We simply are collapsing overhead.
Mr. Miller. And it is not your intent in the future to move
forward with moving things away from Eglin?
General Schwartz. I would say it is not our intent to do
that, Congressman Miller. I can't presuppose the future; but
there is no secret effort, no clandestine effort here, to
change the chemistry.
What we had to do was we--the Air Force had a target of
16,000 civilian spaces to reduce. And so one of the ways that
we approached that problem was in the Air Force Materiel
Command reorganization--was to go from 12 direct reports to Don
Hoffman to 5, and to reduce the overhead throughout the
command. That overhead involved more than 1,000 civilian
spaces. This was a mandate we had to accomplish. And this is
one of the ways we achieved that end.
Mr. Miller. General, you were sent a letter from the
Ranking Member Bordallo and Chairman Forbes of the Readiness
Subcommittee expressing their opinion that changes materially
impacting BRAC decisions should be made only within the BRAC
process.
With that in mind--and I don't believe they received a
response--do you intend to continue the disestablishment of the
Air Armament Center?
General Schwartz. We do not intend to disestablish the Air
Armament Center. What we are doing is renaming it the Air
Armament Complex, and it will remain in its current state, sir.
Mr. Miller. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. I commend the diligence with which
you have prepared your fiscal year 2013 budget, shaped as it
was by the Defense Department's strategic guidance, and the
initial round of cuts required by the Budget Control Act; cuts
which I recognize as necessary.
However, it is important that we work together to make sure
that these cuts are made to programs and installations in a
manner that minimizes risk to our national security and future
readiness.
My district borders Hanscom Air Force Base, a facility
which can uniquely leverage local assets such as the numerous
defense firms and exceptional universities nearby, including
MIT's [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Labs,
which is located onsite to research and develop cutting-edge
capabilities. It is an ideal site for cybersecurity R&D
[Research and Development], an area in which the Department
seeks to increase spending while so many cuts are being made
elsewhere.
We have incredible capability and value-added technology
that we should be growing at Hanscom, because technology is
even more important in a smaller military, which is what the
strategic guidance in the budget envisions. However, a February
21 article in the Boston Globe revealed that internal Air Force
documents showed that Hanscom was sustained a double hit--a
loss of 380 Government positions and a 74-percent decrease in
funding for contract of services over the next 4 years.
My office, along with Representative Markey and
Representative Tierney's offices, have jointly requested a
briefing to learn more about these cuts, and we look forward to
it.
But as you are both here, could I ask: Given that greater
Boston has an extraordinarily skilled workforce--one of the
best in the world--and that we are in a world that needs less
boots and planes and more intelligence in cyber, why isn't
Hanscom growing?
Secretary Donley. As the chief articulated, Hanscom has
been--it remains an important center force--the Electronic
Security Complex there is extremely important. But I would say
that it has faced the results of the AFMC restructure and the
requirement for us to take down 16,000 civilian spaces across
the Air Force, which we have been working through over the last
year or so.
And we also recognize that Hanscom has been hit by
programmatic impacts in areas where programs have been
restructured or canceled. So we have been working through, with
General Davis--a broader assessment of the capabilities at
Hanscom and of the surrounding community; the impact of the
program reductions that are coming there; to understand how we
can best fit the workforce with the available work going
forward, and build a plan for how to take that forward.
So General Davis has had this mandate from the chief and I
since he arrived last year.
Ms. Tsongas. General Schwartz, would you like to add
anything?
General Schwartz. And we heard earlier a question regarding
electronic warfare, command and control, software, enterprise
resource, planning systems--all these very important kinds of
capabilities are the expertise that resides within C.R. Davis'
organization. And that is not going to change.
But I would just reiterate that we are getting smaller. And
so those reductions will be reflected at Hanscom, as they are
at the other locations that have been addressed here.
Ms. Tsongas. Well, as we wrestle with this, I know the
Hanscom community wants to work with you. Is there anything
that it should do in particular to expand its mission; to help
the Air Force be successful in these challenging times? Is
there anything you would suggest?
Secretary Donley. I think the same thing we would require,
ma'am, from any of our acquisition enterprises--and that is to
produce on cost, on time, and to have successful programs; not
ones that are subject to termination or restructure.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for your service. But I am very, very
concerned about the reductions in the personnel of our
military--other reductions--at the time of war. And I have just
gotten back from visiting in Pakistan, and how horrible it was.
There was an attack on a bus station; the next day, an attack
on a police station. Today I read where a convoy of buses were
stopped and persons associated with the Taliban took out
certain persons and assassinated them right there, 16 people.
This is incredible--an ally so important as ours--a nuclear
power--and we have just got to be prepared. And I am very, very
concerned.
General Schwartz, the Air Force has made headlines recently
with the involuntary separation of 157 majors, and selective
early retirement boards selecting 106 colonels for early
retirement. You have indicated--and I am concerned, too--about
leading to a hollow force.
To what extent does the Air Force intend to use the
Temporary Early Retirement Authority in the 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act?
General Schwartz. We will use it very, very selectively;
very surgically only. This will not be broadly applied at all.
In fact, we did not anticipate, sir, the use of involuntary
measures in 2013. We will wrap up the difficult work we have
done to try to reduce our over-strength through 2012.
Mr. Wilson. Well, that is reassuring because the
experienced people we have--it is just crucial of what we are
facing.
Mr. Secretary, according to the Washington Free Beacon
today, the Administration's proposal of defense budget cuts for
military families and retirees to pay more for the health care,
while leaving unionized civilian defense workers' benefits
untouched. Why is there a disparity in treatment between
civilian and uniformed personnel?
Secretary Donley. I think, as the chief indicated, when the
Department looked at the rising personnel costs facing us--and
in particular the rising cost of health care, we determined
that we needed to slow that growth, and that the best way to do
this was to propose increases in premiums for working-age
retirees.
And as we looked at options in front of us for how that
might be done, the sense was that we should scale those
premiums to match the resources available to our retirees----
Mr. Wilson. Well----
Secretary Donley. Our staff sergeants versus retired flag
officers, for example.
Mr. Wilson. But why would that only be applied to uniformed
personnel and not civilian employees?
Secretary Donley. Yes. We did not address the civilian
health-care systems that exist across the Federal Government.
We did not have a mandate to address that. That was not part of
our discussions or deliberations in the Department. Our focus
was on the military piece of this.
Mr. Wilson. That strikes me as tragic for retention and
recruiting.
And Mr. Secretary, this has already been brought up about
the Global Hawk system, but the Deputy Secretary had certified
earlier, just a couple of months ago, that it was essential to
national security; additionally, that the Global Hawk is $220
million cheaper per year to operate than U-2. And now it is
being terminated--the Block 30. How can we understand that an
asset critical to national security and costs less than an
alternative be terminated?
Secretary Donley. Sir, we got a lot of careful attention in
the Department, recognizing that we have been in the middle of
procurement and these are relatively new capabilities being
fielded.
When the Department came back to Congress on the Nunn-
McCurdy certification previously on Global Hawk Block 30, the
question was, ``What would it take to operate any other
capability at the Global Hawk level of capability?'' That is,
the U-2 was compared to the Global Hawk capability.
We understood and we still understand that the Global Hawk
offers persistence that the U-2 does not have, so--but that was
the measure in the Nunn-McCurdy--is measuring the U-2 against
the persistence of the Global Hawk, and the cost variable
between the two.
Mr. Wilson. And----
Secretary Donley. Subsequent to that, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council adjusted the requirements for
high-altitude ISR. And they took a broader look at ISR
capabilities across the Department, not just one or two
programs--determined that those requirements could be adjusted.
After they adjusted those requirements, we then went back
and looked at the existing fleets and capabilities, and we
said, ``Can we live with the U-2 capability that we have,
because the U-2 will be good through 2040, basically?''
Mr. Wilson. And finally, you referenced ``through 2040''--
could you provide us information on what the cost would be to
upgrade and support the U-2s through 2025? Thank you.
Secretary Donley. We can do that, sir. And the main message
here is----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is up.
Could you do that for the record please?
Secretary Donley. Sure, we can.
The Chairman. Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, thank you for your
service to the country.
My first question is more of a statement or a request. The
recent Air Force structure change has announced the closing of
an Air Reserve station in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania outside of
the BRAC process. This base serves 1,400 Active Reserve and
Guard units of both the Air Force and the Navy. The base just
completed an $8.1 million housing project and is set to break
ground on a $13.8 million joint Reserve center.
Now, to give you some perspective of the efficiencies at
this base, the Air Force leases 100 acres at this base. It
includes access to four runways, an FAA [Federal Aviation
Administration] control tower, medical and crash-fire response
and zero-cost airfield maintenance, including snow removal and
capital improvements for $20,000 a year.
It is also worth pointing out that the Pittsburgh region
has significant success with recruiting, and that the 911th
Airlift Wing is one of the highest manned units in the Air
Force Reserve command. This being said, I can't understand why
the Air Force would make the decision to close this Air Reserve
station.
If this is truly an issue with retiring C-130s, then let us
bring in new C-130s to this very efficient and very effective
wing so that this cost-effective base can continue to serve
both the Air Force and the Pittsburgh community.
Mr. Secretary General, I would like to see the cost
analysis of the 911th Airlift Wing compared to others
throughout the Air Force and the justification for closing this
base.
My first question concerns the reduction of 65 C-130
tactical airlifters, getting us to a total fleet projection of
318. And I am going to go through some notes here so that you
know where I am coming from.
Mobility Airlift Aircraft Program has previously discussed
the budget request for fiscal year of 2013--plans to divest
intertheater and intratheater force structure in support of the
new defense strategy. Air Force officials state that Case 3 of
the Mobility Capability and Requirement Study 2016, MCRS-16,
was the analytical underpinning for the new mobility force
structure associated with the 2012 defense strategy.
Air Force minimum C-130 force structure has concluded MCRS-
16 was to go no lower than 335 C-130s under the QDR 2010.
However, MCRS-16 also did not take into account United States
Code title 32 Air National Guard or Army Guard airlift missions
that would be required to support State Governor mobilization
missions.
MCRS-16 also did not analyze the Army's time-sensitive
mission-critical mission, and noted that additional C-130s
beyond the planned program of record of 335 aircraft and 38 C-
27J aircraft may be required. Note, time-sensitive mission-
critical missions noted that additional may be required to
supplement C-27s to support the mission.
Part of my concern is that the Army is going down to
490,000, approximately, members. Pre-9/11, we were at about
480,000 and we had 530 C-130s.
Now, General Dempsey, when he was in here, sort of
referenced that, ``Lessons learned mean we need less.'' But the
MCRS-16 says otherwise. So can you elaborate on how we are
going from 530 for 480,000 to 318 for 490,000; and how that
works--either for the General or for you, Secretary Donley?
General Schwartz. Congressman, the MCRS put the floor at
335. Our analysis indicates that 275 is sufficient to support
the intratheater requirements. And the excess has to do with
the time-sensitive, mission-critical mission that you referred
to, for a total of 318.
It is also important to appreciate the fact that we were
talking about C-130H models at one point in time, and now we
are talking about a force that is currently about a third Js
and, over time, will become more and more dominated by the J
version, which is a more capable platform.
There is a mix of analysis. MCRS is one piece of that,
certainly. Our own that we have--that 318 C-130s is the minimum
number in order to perform the strategy that we have been
given, and its inherent force-sizing construct, which no longer
supports a long-term--I am missing the word--stability--yes,
sir, a long-term stability operation, which the former QDR
strategy did include.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Your time expired.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, a little over a week ago, there was a
memo from NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command]
outlining a reduction of two ACA [Aerospace Control Alert]--
formerly ASA [Air Sovereignty Alert]--sites; one in Duluth,
Minnesota and the other in Langley, Virginia. The justification
was said to be based on a year-long comprehensive risk analysis
completed by NORAD in deliberation with the United States Air
Force.
There was a GAO [Government Accountability Office] report
in 2009 that gave specific recommendations for, among other
things, conducting routine risk assessments of ACA operations.
However, in a follow-up memo in 2009--a study released just
last month--the GAO stated, and I am quoting, ``Although NORAD
has not conducted routine risk assessments, it took steps
toward implementing our 2009 recommendation by developing a
computer model to evaluate current ASA basing locations.
However, we found that the model had certain limitations
that limit its ability to provide NORAD commanders, DOD
decision makers, and Congress risk-based information.''
And additionally, GAO report notes that, ``In 2009, NORAD
analyzed its ASA basing strategy to identify whether it could
chance the number and location of ASA sites without affecting
its ability to defend the homeland from an aviation-related
attack. However, the analysis did not identify potential cost
savings that could result from eliminating a given number of
sites.''
So General, can you explain what risk assessment and
potential cost-saving conclusions you are using to justify your
decision, since the GAO could not identify any? And it would be
appreciated if you could provide the committee with any copies.
General Schwartz. Be happy to give you what our part of
this was. But I think that is a question better directed at
General Jacoby, who performed that analysis as NORTHCOM
[Northern Command]-NORAD, and came to the conclusion that--and
justified this through the program process in the Pentagon--
that we could reduce the alert sites.
I acted, we acted, the Air Force acted on that basis; that
there was proposal made by the relevant combatant commander to
reduce the number of alert sites, and that there are benefits
associated with that. And we would be happy to provide that to
you, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. So if I am understanding this right,
you will attempt to determine if there are studies you can
provide to us that justify this and give us an analysis?
General Schwartz. I will certainly ask Chuck Jacoby to make
available his analysis, on which we acted in good faith.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Chairman, do we have a mechanism to, in
an appropriate amount of time, follow up to see if the General
can comply with our request of the committee?
Do we have a mechanism to do that? I am a little concerned
with just the timeline getting stretched out and months and
months go by, and then somehow we just don't hear anything
back.
The Chairman. May I ask when we can expect those answers?
General Schwartz. How about the end of March?
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for joining us here
today.
I have heard many cries about the cuts proposed to sacred
cows that are made in our backyards. I have heard others
claiming that this 1-percent reduction in the Pentagon's base
budget from 2012 to 2013 could mean the difference between the
world's greatest military and a hollowed out force. And I
frankly just don't see how that would happen with a 1 percent
cut.
But now, General, some of us on this panel have a poor
understanding of how military planning is carried out. For our
benefit, could you explain to us how and why strategic
considerations must merge with a pragmatic assessment of
available resources as the Department develops its budget
proposals in any given year?
General Schwartz. Congressman, it starts with what is
required: What do we want the Armed Forces of the United States
to do, and where? And what are the relative priorities in terms
of the likely missions that we are going to be assigned?
That was the genesis and the motivation for the strategic
review which the Department undertook over a period of many
months to provide the backdrop for the program review which
followed.
The bottom line, sir, is that--and the Secretary of
Defense, sir, was determined not to make this a bookkeeping
exercise. And I think we avoided that.
Mr. Johnson. But you have to look at what Congress has
mandated that you do within a certain amount of funding. You
must take that into consideration, isn't that correct?
General Schwartz. It certainly influenced the program
decision process. But it was independent of the strategic
formulation.
Mr. Johnson. I understand.
Mr. Secretary, can you remind this committee that it was
the Republican-controlled House that forced passage of the
Budget Control Act which mandated the caps on defense spending;
and those cuts are reflected in this proposal.
Secretary Donley. Well, Congressman, certainly the Budget
Control Act represented the work of the House and the Senate
together in crafting a compromised bill, which was acceptable
to the President, which was signed.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
Now, General, we have got a penetrating-bomber capability
from the B-2s [Spirit stealth strategic bombers] for several
more decades. And we have got cruise missiles. We have got
unmanned stealth strike aircraft. And we are developing a
prompt global strike capability. Why in the world do we need a
next-generation bomber?
General Schwartz. There are 20 B-2s. They are great
platforms, but they are 20 years old now. And the technology on
which they were designed, with respect to signature management
and so on--the stealth capabilities is 1980s vintage.
And the reality is that the B-2, over time, will become
less survivable in contested air space.
Mr. Johnson. Well, let me ask this question. You have said
that the next-generation bomber won't be an ``exquisite''
aircraft in order to keep costs under control.
Can you tell us how much is too much to pay for this next-
generation bomber?
General Schwartz. We have a rough target of about $550
million per aircraft flyaway.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
I have got time to yield back, Mr. Chairman. So I will do
so.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General--both of you in your statements
indicated the importance of our global ISR assets and the
increasing reliance upon those assets.
Remotely piloted aircraft remain, and are increasing their
role as part of that infrastructure. There is an effort by
Congress, of which I have been a part, to see ways in which
remotely piloted aircraft could be integrated into our domestic
air space for the issues of testing, training, and pursuing
additional capabilities.
In the FAA Reauthorization Bill, there is the establishment
of six test ranges. We also put language in the National
Defense Authorization Act last year that calls for a report on
the ways in which the FAA and DOD were working together on this
issue; and also how support language--encouraging the FAA and
the DOD to work together. Recognizing the FAA, of course, has
jurisdiction in this area, AFRL [Air Force Research Laboratory]
and NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] are
working with the FAA on trying to resolve the conflicts that
may be inherent in remotely pilot aircraft being in domestic
air space.
As we look to formulate this National Defense Authorization
Act this year, gentlemen, what do you believe might be helpful
in assisting the AFRL efforts in working with the FAA to
incorporate them into our domestic air space?
General Schwartz. Congressman, I think that the key thing
here is to increase confidence on the part of civil airspace
control authorities that remotely piloted aircraft are
predictable. That is the key thing--that if an anomaly occurs--
that we know how the machine will respond. And that is the key
technology, in my view, and certainly something that AFRL has a
place in fielding, ultimately; but being able to assure the
civil airspace authorities that the remotely piloted aircraft--
if we lose link, if there is an anomaly on the weapon system--
will react in a predictable manner is the coin of the realm
here.
Secretary Donley. Sir, I would simply add that this is a
very important issue to our Air Force going forward. We have
had several interactions with AFA--really, it has been on a
continuing basis the last several years. We have Air Force
personnel in the FAA headquarters helping work through these
issues relative to the development to the National Airspace
system; and how to make sure unmanned systems are part of that
and an accepted part of the normal way of doing business going
forward.
Mr. Turner. So I also have a question concerning the Air
Force Institute of Technology that I am going to submit and
request your statements for the record, hoping of course to
have your strong support for AFIT [Air Force Institute of
Technology].
Last year, in the National Defense Authorization Act, I
inserted a language that allowed for students to enroll on a
space-available basis. The Air Force has not taken advantage of
that. We hope that in your written answers that we will have
your commitment to that.
As you know, I am also chairman of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee. And as you are aware, the President established a
modernization plan in the 1251 Plan in the 2010 NPR [Nuclear
Posture Review]. The fiscal year 2013 budget, after the new
START Treaty was ratified--we see that the President is backing
off those plans. Let us review that list.
The B61 gravity bomber is 2 years delayed. The associated
tail kit is late, and we understand that certain high-accuracy
options are not being looked at. The W78 warhead is being
pushed back, and a certain modernization options have been
arbitrarily taken off the table. The new bomber won't be
certified at the outset. And the new cruise missile is late at
least 2 years. And the plan for modernization of the Minuteman
III appears to be lacking commitment.
So my question, gentlemen, is: Can you assure us that the
Air Force has an ironclad, no-caveat commitment to field a new
ICBM, to field a new nuclear-capable bomber and cruise missile;
and will this commitment change result in the Administration's
many EPR, which the Administration is not sharing with Congress
as it is formulating?
Secretary Donley. Sir, let me assure you that these issues
have the most senior attention in the Department. The Nuclear
Weapons Council has been meeting on these issues over the last
month, a month and a half--on an extended basis, again, for
many months now, but we are----
Mr. Turner. Does it surprise you that Congress has not had
any of this information shared with them, regardless of the
fact that we have repeatedly asked?
Secretary Donley. You are about to get a communication from
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy--joint
communication on the subject.
I won't address what is in that letter at this point, but
that communication is being prepared.
I will say that the B61 LEP [Lifetime Extension Program]
program is important to the United States Air Force and the
work on the W78 as well. These are priority issues for our Air
Force, among others.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Gentleman's time has expired.
It is my intention after the next question period to call a
5-minute recess for the committee.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Secretary, one of the most intriguing things that I
have learned--and as you know I am a freshman coming in--is the
fact that in the building of F-35, we actually have nine allies
who are participating with us in that construction and
technology. And, you know, I had never even envisioned that we
would be doing something like that.
Having said that--on page six of your report to us, you
talk about the budget--``seeking to leverage strong
relationships with allies and partners including the
development of new partners''--so this seems to tell me that
the Air Force of the future may not be as we envision it.
So can you first tell me what is meant by the ``leveraging
of the strong relationships?'' And in addition to that, how is
that going to, then, affect what we may look at the Air Force
into the future?
Secretary Donley. Ma'am, just a couple of thoughts to leave
with you on this model here--our thinking for this is the F-16
program, which has been a very successful multinational program
since the early to mid-1970s. Much of that program was put
together after the United States had made a decision to build
the F-16; and the international partners came in after.
So there are many, many nations that fly the F-16. This
provides for interoperability in operations. It provides for
more efficient logistics and worldwide access to logistics as
we collaborate with partners on availability in the supply
chain and such.
And I think from an operational--I will let the chief speak
to the operational point. But on the F-35 program, we are doing
that work upfront. So the partners are more involved earlier
and they are participating in the development as well. So we
are sharing the cost in that work.
General Schwartz. I would only to add, ma'am, that when we
do programs like this, it establishes a relationship that lasts
decades. In the case of the F-16, it will be 40 years with the
allies who have flown the F-16. Same thing is true with the F-
15, C-130J, or you know--the C-130 is the same thing.
Establishing these relationships, these professional
relationships, with counterpart air forces is important to us
for both professional reasons; for our ability to influence
others' thinking; for the potential of gaining access in areas
where the military and military relationship can be beneficial.
All of these things revolve around common equipment.
Mrs. Hanabusa. I understand what was unique about the F-35
is that we were doing it right upfront as we were developing
it. Because you hear people like, for example, Representatives
of Taiwan coming in saying, ``We want you to sell us the F-
16,'' or whatever it is that they are looking for, versus now
that you have it upfront with F-35, I assume that, in the
development of that relationship--military relationship--we
have already defined who will, then, buy or, who will have
access to the jet, with whatever kinds of components in it--
because I can't imagine we are sharing everything.
But I guess the long-term effect is this our way of holding
our allies close? And then, if we are going to ever
unfortunately enter another theater, we would be able to rely
on them because of this relationship? Is this the way we are
playing well together, so to speak?
General Schwartz. I think clearly there is a process within
the Government to make decisions about what to export, who to
partner with, and so on and so forth. And there is certainly
congressional involvement in that process.
But a key thing here is that, yes, it is certainly my
experience, over many years, that the relationships that we
have created--when I was a captain, I--there are still people
serving in other air forces--they all have a gray hair now, but
these kinds of things are profoundly important. And they do
influence the thinking we--when we can offer the best military
advice of our civilian masters.
Mrs. Hanabusa. And I am running out of time, but do you
foresee that what we are aiming towards is some sort of a
global military? When I say ``global''--is that we are not
going to have such defined lines between countries?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, I think sovereignty will always be
primary. I mean, national interest is national interest. But to
the extent that one can collaborate for positive outcomes, I
think it makes sense.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess for 5
minutes and when we return, Mr. Lamborn will have the next
round of questions.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Lamborn?
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, both, for your work and your service.
And on page 20 of the Posture Statement, under ``Nuclear
Deterrence Operations,'' the somewhat inconsistent information
is found that you are looking for $20.1 million to fund treaty
preparatory actions and other additional actions necessary to
accomplish treaty-required reductions by 2018. Specifically
what is it that you are wanting to do with that $20 million?
General Schwartz. Sir, it is a couple things.
The Secretary addressed this earlier. Some of that is
eliminating the missile silos and the bombers that are out at
Davis-Monthan that are still counters against treaty limits but
haven't been dismantled in a way that it takes them off the
books. That is what part of the cost is for.
Some of the additional cost is associated with the design
effort that is required to convert nuclear-capable B-52s
[Stratofortress strategic bombers] to conventional-only B-52s.
That design effort is necessary. As you know, the 1251 report
said up to 60 airplanes. We have 76. So there is at least 16
birds that need to be converted and----
Mr. Lamborn. Under New START?
General Schwartz. Under New START. That is correct.
Mr. Lamborn. And I have problems with New START. It was
passed by a lame duck Senate; the same lame duck session that
repealed ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.''
And so I just am concerned about the other things that are
going on that might be unilateral actions by this
Administration. Is there any activity that either of you are
aware of to de-MIRV [multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle]--to take from multiple warheads or ICBMs and convert
them to single-warhead status?
General Schwartz. I think I would prefer to talk with you
about this in a classified forum. But it should be no surprise
that our intent, expressed over many years, was to move away
from MIRV ICBMs towards single-warhead ICBMs. And that is
unrelated, frankly, to START limitations.
Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Donley, were you going to add
something on that?
Secretary Donley. I just was going to mention that that was
a result of the Nuclear Posture Review. And it was not a treaty
compliance issue. This was a U.S. Government choice to do that.
Mr. Lamborn. And we are talking about the new-generation
bomber, but isn't that decades away?
General Schwartz. We anticipate having platform at least
for test in the mid-2020s. So it is a decade away.
Mr. Lamborn. And it is not even on the drawing board yet.
General Schwartz. Well----
Mr. Lamborn. Sometimes you say something is just on the--
this isn't even on the drawing board.
General Schwartz. The program is now under way, sir. And,
again, the target is the mid-2020s; 80 to 100 total aircraft
inventory. And, very importantly, we intend to manage this very
carefully, and with discipline. We are not going to repeat the
B-2 experience with long-range strike bomber.
Mr. Lamborn. What do you mean? Could you clarify what you
meant by that?
General Schwartz. The B-2 requirement set moved around over
a period of time. And as a result, in some respects, we
overdesigned the airplane. And that is why it was $1.5 billion-
plus per copy. And, of course, we only acquired 21, as well--
another issue.
And so the mandate that we have from the Department is that
we are going to produce a machine where we are disciplined on
its requirements--that it will have an opportunity to grow over
time. But it is not going to be the end-all, be-all the first
time it flies. And we are going to do this in a way that allows
us to purchase the aircraft in sufficient numbers, again, to
succeed the B-52s; the B-1s [Lancer strategic bombers].
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Changing subject entirely in my last 45 seconds here--the
President's budget request has zeroed out the Operationally
Responsive Space Mission. And with the modular space vehicles,
in particular, I guess that that is included. But isn't that
meeting a need that we absolutely have to have--and so we are
zeroing it out?
General Schwartz. So the Department remains committed to
the Operationally Responsive Space concept, sir. But as we
looked at affordability and other ways to do this, we
determined this year that the best approach was really to build
in resiliency in the existing constellations of satellites
across each mission area, and not to rely on a single program
office to try to provide that capability from a single program.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you both.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hochul.
Ms. Hochul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary and General, I appreciate your service to
our country and, certainly, the challenge that you have before
us.
In your opening statement, Mr. Secretary, you talked about
the fact that in some cases you provided new missions to guard
units whenever possible. And I believe that 14 of 24 will
receive new missions.
Can you tell me what the analysis that went into the
decision as to which locations receive new missions, and help
me understand the thought process?
Secretary Donley. The considerations that the Air National
Guard went through in making these decisions involved making
sure that there was a flying operation in each State, to the
extent that we could do that; and also, judging across
individual locations whether or not there were other Guard or
Reserve units on station or very close by.
So we have a number of States that have multiple Guard and
Reserve and flying missions. New York is one of those. And at
Niagara, in particular, while the Guard unit there was proposed
to be taken down, the Reserve unit at that same location
remains intact.
So this was a reason why Niagara was not prioritized higher
for a re-missioned unit, if you will--coming in behind the
Guard unit.
Ms. Hochul. Do you also take into consideration geographic
location and the fact that the Niagara Falls Air Reserve
station is on the border with Canada, protecting hydroelectric
power plants as well, and four bridge crossings?
I mean I know that some geographic locations and all the
cities in the center of this country have received two new
missions. And I am just asking whether you look at our
strategic location on the border with a foreign country like
Canada, which has different--you know, we have relationship
with them. And I just wanted to know whether or not that, you
know, any priority in your mind should be given to a location
on the border with Canada.
Secretary Donley. As we look at adjustments across all the
50 States here, there remains significant C-130 capability in
New York. And we think the reductions here, while they are
painful at the unit level, and certainly the manpower
associated with it, the reductions in the number of aircraft
are relatively marginal.
Ms. Hochul. And certainly, that being said, I--if the
aircraft need to go to a different function elsewhere or
removed completely, that is understandable.
But what I am asking, again, as a consideration--since the
decision is not final--that a new mission be given to this,
given that, number one, the strategic location; but also, the
investment the Air Force has already made into this facility.
And that is why I want to make sure that our taxpayer dollars
are being spent wisely; that if you have already put money in
here since 2005, why not continue, instead of pulling out one
of the two operations and, you know, just ceasing that?
So as a watchdog of our taxpayer dollars, as you are as
well, that is something I am asking, as you undertake your
reconsideration of the Niagara Falls Air Station Guard
mission--we will take another mission. It doesn't have to be
the C-130s. We will take another mission. And again, location
and investments that have already made is something I would ask
you to consider.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Donley and thank you, General Schwartz
for being here. You know, I never want to miss an opportunity
to thank people such as yourself--General Schwartz--on behalf
of my 3-year-olds for your lifetime dedication to the cause of
freedom. You all are the most noble figures in our society.
Most of my questions have been asked. So I am going to ask
one that is going to be a little longer, if you will indulge
me. It is an energy-related question. And I find very little
discussion in the hearing materials about energy, apart from
some references in the ``HASC Memorandum on Energy Horizons
Papers,'' it is titled. It outlines the Air Force plans to
increase energy supply by reduced demand; and change the
culture to meet mission requirements. And then there is some
general discussion about green and renewable energy initiatives
in the Air Force that it intends to implement over the next few
years.
My question is more about an immediate energy challenge in
my mind. A lot of the studies, as you know--we have had several
major ones now--show our civilian power grid is critically
vulnerable to both natural and man-made electromagnetic pulse.
Furthermore, the reports show that domestic military
instillations received 99 percent of their electricity needs
from the civilian power grid.
And when I look in your summary for what the Air Force is
doing to eliminate or to mitigate or to really fully understand
those vulnerabilities to our electric-power supply coming from
the civilian government, I really--I am not finding anything,
now, that may be there. And it is not a rhetorical question.
So if I am missing something, you know, I--it is hard for
me to see that--in the green initiatives--the real effort in
that direction. And so I guess my question is along the lines--
has the Air Force considered the magnitude in the immediacy of
what is potentially a catastrophic danger to the nation if our
civilian power grid were to go down for an extended period of
time, you know, as a result of natural or man-made EMP
[electromagnetic pulse].
Bottom line, does the Air Force feel like they have a
strong handle on this? And have they considered the magnitude
of the challenges it would face in trying to carry out its
mission in such an environment if we did have a major
catastrophic power-grid failure? And what are the plans here to
deal with this issue?
And I will start with you, Secretary Donley; and then
General Schwartz.
Secretary Donley. Sir, we would be happy to fill in the
record on your specific question regarding EMP, which is a
significant one. But I would offer--and as we fill in this
discussion for you--that many of our initiatives on alternative
forms of--solar, wind, other renewable projects--are focused on
the local instillation capabilities. So they are generating
capabilities sometimes upwards of 20 percent, 23 percent, 25
percent of local power needs--generated on the base.
So in some cases we are trying to get to--we are at the Air
Force Academy, trying to get to 100 percent as a test effort,
if you will. So there is a connection between our application
of renewable-energy sources at local bases and a reduction in
our dependency on the local grid. But it is true that we still
get most of our power from local grids.
General Schwartz. I would only add, Congressman, that we do
have a process of evaluating such vulnerabilities. And there
are about 900 of these vulnerabilities currently in our
database, 62 of which are considered significant enough that it
would affect at a strategic level of military mission. And 22
of those 62 are considered national-level vulnerabilities.
So again, we have this process to assess--to identify these
vulnerabilities. And as the Secretary suggested, certainly we
have backup power for key functions on our installations;
primarily hydrocarbon-driven, obviously. But we are working
hard on the renewables, as the Secretary said. And Nellis Air
Force base is a case-in-point, where obviously solar is
abundant. And it powers just under 25 percent of the daily
requirement.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, given the magnitude of that
kind of a possibility, I still guess I am not hearing what
seemed--I mean I don't even know if EMP is one of those 22
national categories. But I am hoping that we can have further
discussion about this because if Iran or someone like that
should gain nuclear capability, then the equation is changed
dramatically.
Thank you.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to Mr. Secretary and General. I too would
like to add my thanks to you for the sacrifices you have made
through a lifetime career protecting us.
General, you had said earlier when we were discussing the
F-16s that the relationships that have developed with many of
our allies have lasted a generation and have been very
constructive to us. I noted that with the F-35, there have been
reports to suggest that Australia--that originally was going to
purchase 12--is now rethinking that. So are Turkey and Italy.
And I am wondering, with the F-16 experience as a backdrop,
what does that tell us about, one, relationship-building, but,
two, whether there is really confidence in the F-35 around the
world?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, I think this is less a question of
confidence than it is an issue of the economic circumstances
that many nations find themselves in right now. And it is
affecting us too, obviously, with the Budget Control Act. I
think that it should not be a surprise that Canada, Australia,
Italy, others, you know, are watching their checkbooks.
And so the fact that military programs in general are
getting additional scrutiny shouldn't--you know, is not that
much of a surprise.
It should not be read as a diminished commitment to
pursuing this capability over the longer term. I know
personally--you know, I interact with my counterparts
routinely--Canada, Australia, Italy, Turkey, each on the
military-to-military basis--are committed to moving to the
generation-five level of capability as soon as their economic
circumstances permit.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
Just this morning, the Government Accounting Office just
released a report. It is its ``Annual Report on Opportunities
to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, and Achieve
Savings.''
The very first two areas that they focus on deal with the
military and, in particular, electronic warfare; and they point
that the Navy and the Air Force have been in discussions
historically to try and reduce the duplication; try and find
ways to acquire much of this equipment jointly so the costs can
be reduced. And, yet, not much has happened. Can you give us an
update on that?
General Schwartz. I guess I would dispute that assessment.
We walked away from the EF-111 [Raven electronic warfare
aircraft] aircraft, which was our dedicated jammer platform, in
favor of what, at the time, was the EA-6 [Prowler electronic
warfare aircraft] capability in the United States Navy.
And we have been dependent on EA-6 capability for some
period of years. I think the key thing here is that certainly
there is a renewed effort on the part of the Navy and the Air
Force; not just in electronic warfare, but in other areas.
Global Hawk and BAMS [Broad Area Maritime Surveillance] is a
case in point, ma'am, where we are using a common system. There
is a different sensor because their mission is maritime and
ours is over land. But fundamentally it is the same platform
and we are pursuing it together.
Ms. Speier. They specifically reference the services M-A-L-
D-hyphen-J--MALD-J, Increment II, and Airborne Electronic
Attack Expendable Initiatives to determine if these activities
should be merged.
General Schwartz. Well, in fact, we terminated Increment II
in the 2013 program in our proposals. So it is no longer in
play.
Ms. Speier. All right.
And then, with my 40 seconds remaining--also reference the
unmanned-aircraft systems and pointed that since 2008, in an
effort to save money, there have been requests made to see if
there could be joint efforts there.
According to a DOD-sponsored study in 2010, the Department
could have saved almost $1.2 billion had the Air Force acquired
the same sensor as the Army. Would you like to comment on that?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, I would have to see the specific
reference and what sensor they were referring to. I would be
happy to do that for the record.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you gentlemen for being here today; and thank you
for your service. My first question is for General Schwartz.
General, week before last, Secretary of Defense Panetta
visited Barksdale Air Force Base, which is in my district.
And while I couldn't be there--we were here voting--my
understanding is that he laid out a very positive plan for
moving forward with our bomber platform. And, in fact, I met
with Global Strike Command and the 8th Air Force this past
Friday. And it looks like--that nearly $300 million requested
in fiscal year 2013 and $6.3 billion is programmed through
fiscal year 2017. So it looks like the commitment is real; that
the long-range strike bomber is really beginning to come
together; and so as it should.
Now, picking up on some of the questions you have already
answered, we understand it will probably be beyond the decade
before they will actually roll out and be operational. We also
know that there will probably be at an estimated cost of $550
million each and numbers as high as 100. That is all good to
know. And, I will give you a personal experience.
About 6 months ago, I actually flew inside of a B-52. And
it was a very interesting experience. Number one, it is a giant
airplane but it is very cramped on the inside. It is sort of
like being inside a cave or inside of a mine or perhaps a
submarine. So it is jammed with a lot of stuff. And what is
interesting--it has all of the old 1950s vintage dials and
gauges and tubes--actually tubes--still in operation.
Well, I am seriously concerned that the budget bans a
number of vital modernization programs that will fill in the
gap between now and when these new bombers roll out; and that
is legacy radar of the 1960s, which they can't even turn it off
because they are afraid they can't get it back on. And that can
seriously hamper our readiness, bringing us down to maybe a 37-
percent mission-success probability; and also, the EHF
[Extremely High Frequency] FAB-T [Family of Advanced Beyond-
Line-of-Sight Terminals] program which, as you know, is a
communication with satellites, receiving orders for nuclear
deployment and missions.
So my question--and as I understand it, both of these have
been completely zeroed out--if you could respond to that
please?
General Schwartz. Sure.
With respect to FAB-T--really, that was a priority
decision. And by the way, FAB-T is a terminal to allow
communications with the new advanced, extremely high-frequency
satellites' protected communications architecture.
The priority was to do ground terminals and command-and-
control requirements first. And it had been deferred for the B-
52 because the B-52 has a reliable proven LF [Low Frequency],
VLF [Very Low Frequency] command-and-control capability--low-
frequency, very-low-frequency capability--on the platform as it
stands.
So I think was an appropriate prioritization, sir, to go
with the command-and-control platforms first, both air and
ground, and then to rely on the existing capability for the
time being in the B-52.
With respect to the radar, we looked at that carefully. I
believe it is the APQ-166--is the designation for the radar in
the B-52. And the cost of the new radar relative to what we saw
as a renovation--in other words, maintaining the 166, but
perhaps going solid state in some of its subcomponents--was a
wiser path than putting a brand-new, probably, electronically
scanned radar on the B-52.
So bottom line is these are choices based on priority and
available resources. And they were carefully considered. And
that is kind of where we stand. They have not been eliminated
in the context you mentioned.
Dr. Fleming. Okay.
To follow up then, the radar, there is sort of a semi-
modernization or a--parts or components--and the FAB-T, you are
really looking at other capabilities that can get around that
reliably.
Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, I want to thank you
very much for appearing before the committee today, and for
your testimony; of course, most especially for your service to
our Nation.
As a ranking member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, I
have long maintained, as you probably know, a strong interest
in mitigating vulnerabilities in cyberspace. In particular, I
have long been concerned about the potential of what a
cyberattack in our electric grid--and its impact on our ability
to conduct military operations.
In the past hearings before the committee, of course, I
have been pleased with the Air Force's engagement on this
issue. I did have a question, Secretary Donley, on what
progress the Air Force has made in evaluating threats to our
bases that rely on civilian power sources and how the Air Force
has strengthened its plans for alternative energy sources.
I think you probably answered a lot of that question when
Mr. Franks asked his question. If there is anything else you
want to add, feel free.
But I will go to the next one, which is--I also continue to
be concerned about the overall strength and size of our
nation's cybersecurity workforce. So in that point, perhaps, if
you both could comment--what is the Air Force doing to recruit
and train airmen with cyberskills? And what is it doing to
encourage them to stay in uniform?
In particular, then, the next question--this one, perhaps,
is more directed at General Schwartz. General, I recently
visited 24th Air Force at Lackland Air Force Base, and was very
impressed with General Vautrinot and the work that her team is
doing there with its operations. We have clearly made great
strides in our ability to impact the cyber domain. But, as I am
sure you would agree, we really have to continue to innovate
and transform in order to maintain and expand that ability.
In your view, what must the Air Force do next in order to
ensure the ability of its networks to support the full spectrum
of operations?
Perhaps, Secretary Donley, if we could start with you; and
then we will go to General Schwartz?
Secretary Donley. Well, just a couple of general points
here.
This is a key capability for us and for the joint force
moving forward. No question about it. It is an emerging threat.
It is actually with us today.
The first order of business for the Air Force was to
establish our component 24th Air Force to do this work, and to
give control of what we referred to as Air Force--AFNetOps--Air
Force Network Operations--across all our bases so that we view
this as an entire enterprise together; and especially to work
through the cyberdefense issues that are immediately in front
of us; also to build the forensic capability that will allow us
to move from just defensive operations to more of a dynamic
defense environment; and also to develop the offensive tools
that our commanders will need going forward. So this is the
general evolution of our cyber capability.
The airmen that we recruit for this work are outstanding.
They perform not just Air Force work but also joint work. They
are in high demand in the Defense--at the Defense Department
level for the work that they do. And we also have Guard and
Reserve units that are contributing here based on regional
expertise from the Northwest and also from the San Francisco
Bay Area; Northern California area--so a very important
capability for us.
General Schwartz. Sir, I think the major thing we need to
do is to recognize that this is not an administrative activity,
if it ever was. It is to change mindset that this is about
operations. This is a recognition that these are operators, not
network controllers or managers, but operators.
And I know Sue Vautrinot, I am sure, explained that to you.
It is a culture issue that will take a bit longer to inculcate
throughout our Air Force. But this is a military capability,
and it needs to be employed and cultivated and so on, along
those lines.
Our recruiting and retention has generally been good in
part, no doubt, over the last couple of years, because of the
economy--has been suffering some. But, again, there are
exciting things that we do that I would argue that IT
[Information Technology]-competent people in the private sector
don't get to do.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you gentlemen. I appreciate the work
you are doing.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to the more specific discussion on the
Global Hawk, if I could, and some of the things that you have
already said in your testimony--just to clear up. I am an Army
guy, so I apologize for any confusion I may have. But I think,
General, you talked about the B-52 being 20 years old, you
know. We know the U-2 is at least that old.
And then I think that you said at the beginning of your
testimony that the decision was made to discontinue the Block
30 part of the Global Hawk because of--the U-2 cost versus the
Global Hawk was essentially a push. Correct me if I am wrong on
that.
I guess my question--what I want to start my question off
is--I have seen the Global Hawk up close. It was very
impressive. You know, it makes you feel proud to be an American
that this is the kind of stuff that we are putting out. Nothing
against the U-2, but when you talk about antiquated systems
versus what we have got to show the world in the future, it was
just impressive.
And so I guess if we are worried about the age of the B-52,
and the cost of the Global Hawk and the U-2 was essentially a
push, why don't we err--or why don't we decide for the future
that the capability that we are going to use is something
that--I assume that where we are going in this kind of
surveillance in the future would be unmanned aircraft like the
Global Hawk, someday in the future. So why wouldn't we err on
the side of starting to use that now, especially if we have
already built some of these things?
General Schwartz. If resources were not an issue or were
less an issue, we might well make a strategic decision to do
something on those lines; but we did not have that option.
Just to put it in context--so you have a sense--keeping the
U-2 vs. terminating Block 30 yielded $2.5 billion in savings in
the program period; not trivial. So, you know, if there were
$2.5 billion, you know, more in our top line, I am not sure how
we would use it.
Mr. Rooney. Right.
General Schwartz. I just want to give you that sense that
we recognize that. And remotely piloted aircraft are growing in
our inventory and will continue to grow. And we will have a
foothold with Global Hawk. And the Department of Defense will
have a broader one, including the Navy. This was a choice that
we had an asset that could do the mission as it is currently
specified, and could do it overall at much less cost.
Mr. Rooney. I just want to--for the sake of presenting this
letter that I have from my colleague from Florida, Mr. Young,
from Secretary Ashton Carter, which highlights--and this is
just 6 months ago. ``The continuation of the program is
essential to national security and there are no alternatives to
the program which will provide acceptable capability to meet
the joint military requirement at less cost.''
There is also language in here that talks about how,
because of the need for a U-2 not being able to fly
continuously and that a Global Hawk could, it--the cost for U-2
would actually be $220 million more per year.
I understand that those numbers, you know, aren't matching
up now. But 6 months ago--what I look at when you say ``We have
spent'' or ``We have appropriated $4 billion for you to make,''
or ``for us to be able to purchase,'' I think, ``21 of these
Global Hawks. We have got 14 built.''
When I have to talk to my constituents and the taxpayers,
and I say, ``Yes, we have got these really cool surveillance
Global Hawks that are going to take the place of this 50-year-
old plane. We have got 14 of them made, but now we have made
the decision to just park them in the garage somewhere''--you
see, it is hard for me to be able to explain that to--
especially in this kind of age.
So, I mean, I guess what I am asking you is: What do I tell
them, you know, when we talk about how we are going to park
this vehicle in a garage for God knows how long?
General Schwartz. We will put the platforms into
recoverable storage.
So we are not talking about breaking the birds up. We want
to be able to have access to them. And as circumstances change,
you know, perhaps there will be a time when they come back out
of storage. But right now--right now, we strongly recommend the
U-2 solution set given all the demands that we face.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And for Secretary Donley and General Schwartz--I am
impressed by your ability to stay with this. I want to thank
you for your answers; the forthcoming way in which you have
dealt with the multitude of questions here.
I was going to ask you about the Global Hawk, but that has
been covered at least by five of us. And I will let it go at
that. And I thank you for a private discussion that you gave me
earlier.
My question is going to go on the mobility side. Obviously,
it is extremely important element in the future of war planning
and the direction we are going. You are downsizing some
elements of it. Could you just give us a quick overview on the
downsizing and then see where it takes us?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
We are going from--on the intratheater lift side from
somewhere--well, down to 318 aircraft; C-130 class aircraft.
And we were at about 390 to start. So 65 birds come out, 39 of
which can retire in 2013--on the big-airplane life side, we
will reduce 27 C-5As. And that will keep 275 total big
airplanes--that is 223 C-17s and 52 C-5Ms. That is the re-
engined version of the C-5, a very efficient--a good lifter; so
that is the basic approach on the lift side.
I would just say that the analysis that was done based on
the new strategy suggested that we needed--one of the metrics
we use is called ``million-ton miles per day''--that the former
mobility-capability requirements studies specified a minimum of
32.7 million-ton miles per day. The analysis we have based on
the new strategy and the reduced force size, and the other
components of the Department of Defense is 29.4 million-ton
miles. And our actual capacity is somewhere around 30.5. So
there is a little bit of excess there. It is okay to have a
little management reserve here, in my view. And so we think
that, again, 275 and 318 is the right combination.
Mr. Garamendi. Are you going to continue to upgrade the C-
5As?
General Schwartz. The remaining C-5As will go out of the
inventory before there is an opportunity to modify them. So
there will be 52 total C-5s, all of which will be the re-
engined version of the C-5M.
Mr. Garamendi. And how many do you have to day on the C-5s?
General Schwartz. There are 89 total C-5s and----
Mr. Garamendi. Reducing 27.
General Schwartz. And reduce it by 27.
Mr. Garamendi. Have you decided where they are going to be
deployed, the remaining?
General Schwartz. I don't think we have decided that
specifically. I would indicate, however, that the units that
were donors on the C-5As, as reflected in the program, either
are going to get C-5Ms or, in one case, get Active Duty C-17s.
It is a Guard unit.
Mr. Garamendi. You know I would have the preference as to
where you would locate those.
On the tankers--you are retiring some tankers and looking
forward to the new tanker coming in. Is this a transition
process that is under way?
Secretary Donley. Well, the tanker program does not deliver
an initial operational per-squadron-level capability until
about 2017. So we will, this year, go through the process of
establishing the requirements for basing, and then make
decisions at the end of this calendar year on the first two
bases for initial bed-down of the tanker.
Mr. Garamendi. We do like the West Coast.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Griffin.
Mr. Griffin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I have got several questions here, so I want to
try to move quickly. First and foremost, I saw that--and this
is for Secretary Donley--I saw that there has been a reversal
with regard to the LAS [Light Air Support] contract involving
Hawker Beechcraft. I have got the statement you put out today,
Mr. Secretary. Is there anything you would want to add to that?
Secretary Donley. No, certainly, the situation is that as
we went to make a court filing on this issue, we found--the
service acquisition executive and support staff found that the
documentation for this source selection was not what it needed
to be.
And, certainly, we are disappointed that that has been the
case, and that we have fallen short here. But we need to go
back and take corrective action. We are in the process of doing
that.
Mr. Griffin. Okay--another quick question on that issue. It
was brought to my attention that there was a change or a
lowering in the pilot-safety standards with regard to ejection
in this contract. Are you familiar with that? Do you know if
there was lowering of safety standards so that the Super Tucano
would be compliant?
Secretary Donley. I am not familiar with those details.
Mr. Griffin. General, are you familiar with that at all?
General Schwartz. I am not.
Mr. Griffin. Okay.
We may submit that in writing for more detail.
With regard to the A-10s that are outside of my district, I
am going to ask a question here to try to assist my colleague
who had the A-10s in his district in Fort Smith.
My understanding is that the BRAC report cited the airspace
around the airfield in Fort Smith, a low-level route, as to why
Fort Smith was an ideal location for the A-10.
Now the A-10s are being moved. Was there something in the
current basing commission report that contradicted the BRAC
findings? Can you give me any insight as to why the A-10s might
be moved from there?
Secretary Donley. The A-10s are not moving. The A-10s are
being retired out of the fleet. So it really doesn't affect
BRAC-related issues that----
Mr. Griffin. So we will have no A-10s left at all?
Secretary Donley. No. The Air Force will still have about
248 A-10s in the inventory. But we have made a decision at a
corporate and strategic level that we could take additional
risk in the fighter force structure. And that inside the
fighter force structure, the best place to take that was
probably in the size of the A-10 fleet. So that was the basis
for the decision.
Mr. Griffin. Right, but----
Secretary Donley. And I think in this case, as has been
applied in other locations where it was feasible--we have a
mission to backfill at this location with an RPA [remotely
piloted aircraft]----
Mr. Griffin. Right--with the unmanned.
Secretary Donley. Right.
Mr. Griffin. But you said they are completely retired. But
then you said, ``But we are keeping A-10s.''
I think the question here is if you are going to keep them
anywhere--BRAC indicated that this was a type of place you
would want to keep them. But if you--I have only got like 50
seconds, but if you have anything else to add on that?
General Schwartz. Again, sir, one of the imperatives for us
was to try to retain a flying mission in each State; a Guard
mission. And in this case, of course, there is a substantial
presence in the Little Rock area, with the National Guard.
Mr. Griffin. Sure. Sure.
Let me move on to the next question. This is regarding AMP
[Avionics Modernization Program] vs. AMP light--some call it
AMP light. I met with the pilots out at the Little Rock Air
Force Base last week.
Can you talk about--when you were comparing AMP to what
some have called AMP light, were you considering the cost of
supporting that navigator position for the AMP light, which you
wouldn't have to do with the AMP? If you could--I don't if
the----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Griffin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If you will answer for the record?
And we are going to--we will have a briefing on--classified
briefing on that.
Mr. Griffin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to thank both the Secretary and the
General for your service, and for being here today. When we
have less than 20 percent to 22 percent of the people serving
as Members of Congress with any previous military experiences,
it is always great to hear from those who have served and are
serving, and representing hundreds of thousands of our men and
women in uniform--to be able to come share your experience,
your insight, and expertise with us.
It is definitely a tough time for our military, and it is
pretty tough for you all having to propose and make these tough
force-structure decisions. I definitely don't envy you. But at
the same time we have a lot of questions, you know, the C-130J
and the C-27J, we have talked about it. So, Mr. Secretary,
thank you for briefing the Mississippi delegation on those two
projects. And we are going to be talking about it probably for
a long time as we move ahead.
So my first question really involves the C-130J. And if you
don't mind, I will read my question. I do want to know how the
decisions were made to move the airplanes within the Air Force.
My staff and I have been looking at this for quite some
time now, and still fail to see any military benefit or cost
benefit to some of these moves. In fact, some of the numbers we
are looking at seem like it is going to cost into the millions
in new construction, training and other incidentals and
collateral costs just to move these aircraft a couple hundred
miles from their current location.
Can you tell me what kinds of calculations were used when
making these decisions? And were some of these--that would be
my first question--the calculations used in making these
decisions.
General Schwartz. It had to do with what demands were there
for both Federal and State missions. It had to do with what
backfill opportunities did we have, even as we were getting
smaller. And it had to do with the ability of the local
community to recruit and provide the expertise for a new
mission, if that was, in fact, going to materialize. And so
those are three of the thought processes involved in deciding,
again, how to allocate scarcity; how to allocate the reduction
of 286 aircraft in total, and so on.
Secretary Donley. I would just add that it is complex work
to do this across 50 States. And we have been working with and
supportive of the Air Guard as General Wyatt and his staff work
through these issues on how best to balance capabilities across
the 50 States in these different disciplines--C-130s, ISR
capabilities, et cetera.
Mr. Palazzo. Right.
I mean I have four pages of reasons why we think the C-130J
should stay where they are at, and why it is possibly a bad
decision to move them, again, just a couple of hundred miles--
infrastructure improvements; the amount of money that this
congress or prior congresses in the administrations have
invested in Keesler for the C-130Js, especially post-Katrina--
brand new hangars, the wreckers, the accomplishments, the
squadrons just received from completing missions in
Afghanistan, and so forth and so on.
The fact that we have great training areas--very, very
limited interference from civilian population. We have, you
know, Camp Shelby to the North, Stennis Space Center to the
West--just hundred--and then, of course, we have the entire
expense of the Gulf of Mexico as un-encroached training areas
for the Air Force. And so I mean, I do have some valid
concerns.
I guess if we continue to propose these, what is the next
step? I mean if we can--I mean, in concrete? It is done? It has
been penned in blood? This is a covenant going forward? Can we
have an opportunity to explain as we are here today that can
possibly change your mind that this is not in the best interest
of our national security or our force structure?
Secretary Donley. Well, the force structure proposals we
made are part of the President's fiscal year 2013 budget--many
moving parts. And, you know, we are happy to answer questions
and support, you know, further discussion. But it is really up
to Congress now to----
Mr. Palazzo. I am out of time. Thank you very much.
Secretary Donley [continuing]. Take the next steps.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I want to thank
you for being here. And more importantly, as a Member of
Congress, I want to thank you for standing up for the Air
Force.
When the Secretary of the Army and their respective
commanders were here, I didn't really get the sense that they
were standing up for their divisions.
And talking about--using the terms, if you will, that you
have used--you know, we have talked about--you have talked
about additional risk that comes from the force structure
changes.
And, General, you used the word ``indiscriminant salami-
slicing.'' I think that is an accurate word for what has been
done to the military. And, quite honestly, it leaves Americans
at risk.
And as a Member of Congress, what we need is the two of you
and your colleagues standing up and saying that, you know, it
is not just the magnitude of the cuts, it is the pace of the
cuts and it is the mandate of how the cuts are done that is
putting the security of Americans at risk.
So I hope you will continue that. We have to undo the
sequestration. I am interested in your suggestions with regard
to that.
In dealing with the force structure changes that you have
proposed to us--as you know, I represent Robins Air Force Base.
And obviously, the depots are extremely important to us. And I
would like, if you will, just speak to the potential loss of a
qualified workforce and how much greater that loss may be
because of the pace at which the cuts have to be made.
Secretary Donley. Well, certainly, sir, we value all three
depots. And our intent is to move forward with the three-depot
strategy. We think it would be very costly and a complex
operation to consider changing that. And I think there would be
a penalty paid in trying to move or recreate the workforces
that have built up around these three depots.
I would offer that the workload at these locations does ebb
and flow. And this is what our working capital fund is intended
to address. So employment does not always stay level; it goes
up and down with the aircraft that are being inducted and
worked on and then depart. So the workload issues will continue
with us going forward, but our intent is to stick with the
three-depot approach.
Mr. Scott. Thank you so much.
You have got a wonderful gentleman in Warner Robins right
now, and General McMahon, that is going to be retiring. And he
has done an excellent job of maximizing the performance of that
base; a lot of great men and women out there supporting the
warfighter.
But we also have the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System] unit there. Certainly, there is the
ability to expand their intelligence capabilities. I hope that
is something that you will continue to pursue.
And gentlemen, I want to help you solve this problem. I
want suggestions on how we are going to do the sequestration
and find a better national security for Americans.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining balance of my
time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz, certainly I want to
echo my colleagues in expressing our gratitude for both of your
great service to our nation and the important work that you are
doing, and the challenges with the budget restraints that you
are working under.
Before I ask or comment specifically on a force structure
issue, Mr. Secretary, could you kind of give me an update? I
have had a lot of inquiries in my district, as I know Members
across the country have, about the Dover mortuary issue and
with the most recent report. And I apologize. I am in a markup
in another hearing. If this was asked earlier, I apologize--but
with the Special Counsel's findings and the report being
issued, and the repercussions that were suffered by those who
sought to do the right thing, where we stand and both from a
disciplinary standpoint and going forward in the best way
possible?
Secretary Donley. Sir, I will just give you a quick
overview. General Abizaid completed his work this week; briefed
that out to the Secretary of Defense. The chief and I were
there yesterday. And we will have some more to say about that
today. But we do support the results of the Abizaid panel and
are embracing their recommendations. And we intend to move out
on those. I will speak to those later.
Mr. Platts. Okay.
Secretary Donley. We did receive, at the end of January, a
report from the Office of Special Counsel concerning reprisals
against the whistle blowers in the original--during the
original investigation of this. And the OSC [Office of Special
Counsel] report concluded that, indeed, reprisals had taken
place and this raised a new requirement for us to consider the
need for additional disciplinary action against those involved
in that work. And I assigned that to a two-star general who has
undertaken that work. And I expect him to report out in sort of
mid-March--around the 19th of March is what we are forecasting
at this point.
Mr. Platts. I appreciate those continued efforts in this
issue and the importance of--that we properly honor the fallen,
and properly hold accountable those who sought to punish those
who are doing the right thing.
I am the--have been, for 8 years, working on strengthening
our whistleblower-protection laws so that Federal employees who
see wrong can come forward and know they are not going to be
punished for doing the right thing as, unfortunately, happened
in this case. So staying focused on that is, I think, very
important.
A follow up on that issue--and I know there is, I guess,
not great certainty about the partial remains that were then
incinerated in landfills of some of our fallen heroes--is there
any consideration--and this is a specific question from one of
my constituents--a veteran himself who lost a brother in combat
years back--not related to this current situation, but where
the legs of the fallen were not recovered with the body and
buried appropriately.
His question was, ``If we know that a lot of these remains
were landfilled, is there any current review of how to properly
honor those remains with a memorial marker or something,
because we have the remains of fallen that apparently are in a
landfill, not properly acknowledged?
Secretary Donley. Sir, I am not sure it is possible for the
Department of Defense to go back and reconstruct the history
for every single case prior--where this practice was in place.
Certainly we are in a better place today. And certainly we
apologize for any additional grief or concern caused to the
families as a result of this prior practice. It changed in
2008.
And the Abizaid panel actually has additional ideas for us
to consider going forward that we might consider for how best
to honor the disassociated remains of the fallen that are
subsequently--come in after the remains are processed through
Dover.
So we will continue to work this issue going forward and
make sure that we honor our fallen and treat them with the
respect that they deserve.
Mr. Platts. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.
And any way that we are able to honor the fallen that we do
so especially going forward, but even if there is a way in
retrospect. And just a final comment----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
We are into the vote.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mrs. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as you can see,
there are several of us that have been running back and forth.
So I apologize for my absence.
But I do appreciate General Schwartz and Secretary Donley,
you being here today. And all of my concerns today, although
there are many concerns--but if I could focus in a little bit
on the Air National Guard and the decisionmaking process--I
know you touched on some--the C-130s. But I really would like
an opportunity, mainly for the benefit of those back in
Alabama, for you to expand upon the Air National Guard's
ability.
I know that the Air Force has said that they were a full
partner in these cuts, but could you just kind of paint a
picture for what that looked like? Did they have a vote? To
what extent was their input taken?
General Schwartz. I would describe it as--and again, you
know, the two gentlemen behind us certainly were there
throughout. And their voices were heard. They were not timid.
You know, discussions unfolded and we debated. And
ultimately, the Secretary decides. I mean that is the way it
unfolds. As I have suggested in another forum--I mean it is not
to say that everyone agrees with the outcome necessarily. But
it is also incorrect to contend that their interests were not
represented. That is not the case.
Mrs. Roby. That is the message that we want to make sure we
get back to home, Secretary.
Secretary Donley. Just an additional point--and I think the
chief and General Stenner and General Wyatt articulated that
view jointly together.
And as we went through the decision process--you are aware
of the mitigating efforts that we made to remission units, even
moving some capability from the Active to the Reserve
Components. And the Guard and Reserve helped work through all
those decisions about what units and where, and how to make the
adjustments.
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
So the Air Force justified the reduction for the Air
National Guard. Is that the Active Air Force has made cuts in
the past when the Air National Guard has grown. And if you
could, just talk about that. Is that true?
Secretary Donley. It is part of the context, but that
wasn't the motivation.
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
Secretary Donley. It wasn't the case of what is their turn;
not at all. What this really was, was a recognition that we had
a new strategy in force-sizing construct first and a
recognition that the Air Force as a whole was getting to a size
where we had to have access in utility out of every asset.
Mrs. Roby. Right.
Secretary Donley. And that suggested, again, having that
utility in a way, though, that wouldn't destroy the fabric of
the units either on the Active Duty side with expected tempo
for full time, or on the Guard and Reserve side where there is
a lesser expectation of personal availability because of
structure of those organizations.
And so the bottom line is that we worried about tempo and
making sure that the mix would accommodate both the surge and
the rotational requirements that we foresee in the future. And
again, exactly how we did that, others might differ, but you
have the proposal before you.
Secretary Donley. And as we go forward, the Air National
Guard, with our support, is going forward with a multiyear
effort to increase the readiness of the Guard.
We are all going to have to be focused on that going
forward together, as we get smaller. So readiness is more
important. The Guard is working on that. And we support them in
that effort. And we are increasing the number of associations
between the Active and the Reserve Components from 100 to 115,
with maybe more coming.
So this reflects a closer integration of effort to get the
most combat capability out of all of our units going forward.
Mrs. Roby. Well, thank very so much. I have other question
and I will submit them to the record because my time is about
to expire.
But thank you so much.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The lady yields back. Thank you very much.
Thank you General, Secretary, for being here today; for all
the work that you have done to get to this point in the
process. You can see with all the questions there is lots of
angst over these cuts. And I think only one or two mentions of
sequestration, which will be that much worse on top of it.
So that is something that I think we really need to address
and focus on. And we will be doing that.
We have started the vote.
Thank you all.
With that, we will conclude our hearing here today.
[Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
February 28, 2012
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 28, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force
February 28, 2012
The Air Force has been engaged in combat operations
supporting the joint forces for the past 20 years, beginning
with the Gulf War in 1991 and continuing thereafter, through
enforcement of the Iraq no-fly zones, combat operations in the
Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the related logistics support
missions, and worldwide humanitarian support missions. And of
course the Air Force has continued the 24/7, 365-day-a-year
nuclear-deterrence mission.
Everyone should fully understand that our vital interests
have not changed since last year. The threats to those
interests have not decreased and are not likely to diminish
over the next 5 years. What has changed is that the President
directed at least $400 billion in cuts to our military, which
were reflected in the Budget Control Act.
Despite the suggestion by some that the strategy evolved
independent of the President's fiscal guidance, each of the
military services is making force structure and equipment
modernization recommendations to Congress based purely on the
budget and not based on the world security environment.
For example, there are 54 aircraft in the budget request.
If procurement continues at this rate, and assuming an aircraft
lifespan of 25 years, the resulting force structure is 1350
aircraft, one quarter the size of the current force. I do not
believe 1350 total Air Force aircraft--bombers, fighters,
airlift, search and rescue, rotorcraft, and trainers--is in the
national security interests of this country. And this is
without the potential of sequestration. Furthermore, the budget
request does little to mitigate the consequences of aging force
structure, resulting from the ``procurement holiday'' of the
1990s. Operation and Maintenance accounts are not increasing to
sustain and extend these aging platforms.
Other budget-driven choices include the requested increase
in TRICARE fees for retirees. Congress addressed this issue at
length last year and enacted what I consider a reasonable
approach for managing costs. The Department's proposal would
increase the fees by 96 percent to 345 percent over a 5-year
period which, in my opinion, is unreasonable.
With that said, I am pleased to see that priorities for
strategic airlift, a new bomber and an airborne tanker have
been preserved. As well, the Air Force has deliberately elected
to ensure the percentage of the Air Force's combat and mobility
forces that are Active Duty will increase after the
implementation of the force structure changes. This is
appropriate from a risk perspective. But I believe it is
important for the Air Force leadership to continue its public
discussion to better ensure that Guard and Reserve personnel
fully accept that they have received and will receive equitable
and fair treatment in this transition process.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force
February 28, 2012
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I
want to also thank the witnesses, Secretary of the Air Force,
Michael Donley, and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton
Schwartz, for appearing here today and for their dedicated
service to our country.
Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a
strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat
environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those
threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately
places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific
region, which will likely result in an enhanced role for the
Air Force in our national defense.
Over the last 10 years, the Air Force has contributed
greatly to the recently concluded war in Iraq and the ongoing
war in Afghanistan. The contributions of Air Force personnel
who have provided air support, transport, reconnaissance, and
other key functions have been invaluable. Going forward, under
the new strategic guidance, the Air Force will continue to
carry out those missions, although the relative balance between
and the geographic area of focus may change. The budget put
forth 2 weeks ago will enable the Air Force to continue to be
the greatest air power in the world.
I have consistently said that we can rationally evaluate
our national security strategy, our defense expenditures, and
the current set of missions we ask the military to undertake
and come up with a strategy that enhances national security by
spending taxpayer dollars more wisely and effectively. I
believe this budget supports that goal as well.
Overall, the defense budget is also fully consistent with
the funding levels set by the Budget Control Act passed by
Congress. Although I did not support this act, many members of
the House Armed Services Committee did, Congress passed it, and
the Department of Defense has submitted a budget that complies
with the congressionally mandated funding levels.
Over the last few years, with the strong support of the Air
Force, our military has put together a significant string of
foreign policy successes, including the death of bin Laden,
Anwar Al-Awlaki, the elimination of much of Al Qaeda's
leadership, the end of the war in Iraq, and supporting the
uprising in Libya. The budget lays out a strategy that will
enable the United States to build on those successes and
confront the threats of today as well as in the future.
I want to thank the witnesses again and I look forward to
hearing their testimony.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 28, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Secretary Donley. Based on the December 2011 F-35 Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress, the unit recurring flyaway cost
numbers for the aircraft we are procuring in FY13 are: $123.2 million
for the F-35A conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant; $155.0
million for the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL)
variant; and $131.7 million for the F-35C carrier (CV) variant. These
unit cost numbers account for the ``must fix'' concurrency changes
(captured in the engineering change order line) but do not account for
block upgrades. [See page 12.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 28, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. I am pleased to see the Department has continued
funding in FY 13 for the T-X Advanced Jet Trainer Replacement Program.
Replacing the aging T-38s with a new trainer suitable to train pilots
for 4th and 5th generation fighters such as F-22 and F-35 is critical
to readiness. The contract award for this program slipped a year in the
budget from FY 15 to FY 16. Is replacement of the current Air Force
trainer an important component of USAF readiness and training? Is the
Air Force committed to moving forward with the T-X program with
procurement funding in FY 16?
General Schwartz. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. What is the Air Force's plan in the FY13-17 FYDP to
address the aging 707 and C-135 fleet of C2ISR aircraft? Given the
historical precedent that acquisition programs take many years and that
the E-8 JSTARS may only continue operations until about 2025, is there
a plan to start to address this issue?
General Schwartz. The Air Force continues to sustain/modernize the
707 and C-135 fleet of C2ISR aircraft. All platforms are considered
viable through the 2035-2040 timeframe. Airborne Warning and Control
system (AWACS) Prime Mission Equipment Diminishing Manufacturing Source
(DMS) and Avionics DMS cockpit issues are being addressed through the
Block 40/45 and DRAGON programs. The upgrades will ensure AWACS remains
compliant with military, civil, and international flight certifications
and flight safety standards.
Air Combat Command's recently completed Airborne Synthetic Aperture
Radar/Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and Joint STARS Mission Area
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) evaluated materiel solutions to fulfill
future overall SAR/MTI requirements. JSTARS Prime Mission Equipment DMS
and Avionics DMS cockpit issues will be addressed based on the approved
way-ahead of the AoA. Based on the data from the E-8C Fleet Viability
Board the E-8C is viable until 2035.
Mr. Smith. How does the Air Force plan to provide continued support
to the Army in SAR/GMTI/DMTI mission area?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed to providing continued
support to the Army to fulfill the ever growing demand for SAR/GMTI/
DMTI data. The Air Force continues to sustain and modernize, as
required, the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS), fielding Global Hawk Block 40 with Multi-Platform Radar
Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) with Initial Operational
Capability 4th quarter FY14, and fielding Dismount Detection Radar
(DDR) on the MQ-9 in late FY14 to early FY15.
Mr. Smith. Assuming the retirement of the E-8 JSTARS in 2025, what
is the Air Force doing to ensure that future ground surveillance radar
capability will be available to the ground forces and intelligence
community after that date?
General Schwartz. Based on the data from the E-8C Fleet Viability
Board the E-8C is viable until 2035. The Air Force continues to sustain
the E-8C with necessary Prime Mission Equipment Diminishing
Manufacturing Source (DMS) and Avionics DMS cockpit upgrades work to
ensure the E-8C remains compliant with military, civil, and
international flight certifications and flight safety standards. Air
Combat Command's recently completed Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/
Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) evaluated
materiel solutions to fulfill future overall SAR/MTI requirements.
Mr. Smith. As part of the ongoing analysis of alternatives, has the
Air Force done a complete cost analysis of all of its alternatives?
When will Congress see the result of this analysis?
General Schwartz. Air Combat Command presented the final results of
the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to the Air Force Requirements
Oversight Council (AFROC) for validation on 30 November 2011. Vice
Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the AoA's release on 25 Jan 12
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE). OSD/CAPE is currently reviewing the final
report for sufficiency. A complete cost analysis was accomplished on
the 10 AFROC validated alternatives during the AoA.
Air Force senior leadership has not made a decision on when the
data will be released.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE
Mr. McIntyre. The fiscal year 2012 NDAA requires the Air Force to
maintain a combat-coded B-1 fleet of 36 aircraft during fiscal years
2012 and 2013. Does the budget request for FY 2013 include funding to
comply with this legislative directive?
General Schwartz. The fiscal year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the Air Force to maintain not less
than 36 B-1 aircraft as combat-coded in a common capability
configuration. The Air Force will comply with this requirement by
performing the necessary maintenance actions to keep a minimum of 36
combat-coded aircraft flyable and mission capable at their respective
Main Operating Bases. However, since the FY12 NDAA did not provide
additional funding for the continued operation of the three combat-
coded aircraft planned for retirement, the Air Force prioritized the
programmed reinvestment of the expected savings in both the B-1 program
and other department priorities over the restoral of Operation &
Maintenance funding for flying hours in the FY13 President's Budget
request. To this end, three combat-coded aircraft will be withheld from
daily operations until their planned retirement dates as permitted by
the FY12 NDAA, but these aircraft will remain available to support
Combatant Commander requirements during the phased retirement period.
Mr. McIntyre. With the decision to delay procurement of 179 F-35s
in the FYDP, what steps is the Air Force taking to prevent fighter
inventory shortfalls in the mid- to long-term?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is modernizing and extending F-16
Block 40-52 service life via the Combat Avionics Programmed Extension
Suite (CAPES) and Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP). The programs
are planned for 350 aircraft, yet still only programmed for 300 within
the Future Years Defense Plan. Both programs are scalable and able to
grow to 650 aircraft if needed. Additionally, the Air Force continues
to modernize F-15 C/D/Es with system upgrades to include Active
Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, Eagle Passive Active
Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS), Eagle Passive Attack Sensor
System (EPASS), Infrared Search and Track (IRST), Advanced Display Core
Processor (ADCP) -II, and Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) radios.
Additionally, F-22A modernization remains on track and includes
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) mapping, Small Diameter Bomb (SDB),
Electronic Protection, Combat ID, AIM-9X, AIM-120D, Link-16 upgrades,
and Geo-location capability. Finally, the Air Force remains committed
to the F-35 and procurement of 1,763 Conventional Takeoff and Landing
(CTOL) variants. The decision to delay procurement was an effort to
minimize concurrency costs and maximize combat capability when the
aircraft moves into full rate production in 2019.
Mr. McIntyre. The committee has been informed that the recent F-22
scientific advisory board did not determine a root cause of the recent
hypoxia incidents. What action is the Air Force taking to address the
risk of future hypoxia events with the F-22?
General Schwartz. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. McIntyre. The Navy has a plan to continue low-rate production
of the D5 ballistic missile to keep the industrial base healthy. The
Air Force does not appear to have a similar program for the Minuteman
III ICBMs. Why not? What are the risks to the ICBM industrial base?
General Schwartz. The Air Force recognizes the importance of
maintaining the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) industrial
base and has programs in place to ensure the Minuteman III remains
viable through 2030 and to support any follow-on ground based strategic
deterrent system. The research and development portion of the Solid
Rocket Motor (SRM) industrial base, exercised as part of ICBM
Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program
(PAP), matures SRM technologies for insertion into any future
propulsion modernization program. The Air Force PAP program exercises
design and systems engineering skills critical to maintaining a healthy
SRM industrial base.
Mr. McIntyre. Just last year the Global Hawk Block 30 program was
certified as ``essential'' to national security, yet the FY 2013 budget
request proposes mothballing all of the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft.
How can you explain such a dramatic change in the Air Force's position
on this program?
General Schwartz. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. I am pleased to see the Department has continued
funding in FY 13 for the T-X Advanced Jet Trainer Replacement Program.
Replacing the aging T-38s with a new trainer suitable to train pilots
for 4th and 5th generation fighters such as F-22 and F-35 is critical
to readiness. The contract award for this program slipped a year in the
budget from FY 13 to FY 14. Is replacement of the current Air Force
trainer an important component of USAF readiness and training? Is the
Air Force committed to moving forward with the T-X program with
procurement funding in FY 14?
Secretary Donley. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Submitted on behalf of Congresswoman Cathy McMorris
Rodgers: In the FY13 proposed budget, the Air Force is proposing to
purchase only 54 aircraft. How is the Air Force planning to
recapitalize its aging fleet?
Secretary Donley. While the Air Force continues to advocate for
strong investment in recapitalizing our aging fleet, modernizing the
Air Force during a period of budget decline is a significant challenge.
In order to address this challenge, we are slowing the pace and scope
of modernization while protecting programs critical to future
warfighter needs. Focused investment in high priority programs such as
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Long Range Strike Bomber, and KC-46A
refueling tanker is critical to the Department's overall strategy.
Simultaneously, investment in service life extensions for legacy
aircraft is necessary to sustain the capacity necessary to meet the new
Defense Strategic Guidance. The Air Force objective is to mitigate risk
by addressing recapitalization concerns as aggressively as possible
within fiscal constraints, while ensuring our existing force structure
remains ready, capable, and relevant in the near-term. As budget
pressures ease in future years, the Air Force will be postured to
resume a more expansive recapitalization effort.
Mr. Forbes. Submitted on behalf of Congresswoman Cathy McMorris
Rodgers: Funding for the KC-46A Refueling Tanker is largely preserved
in the FY2013 Budget. Should sequestration go into effect this year,
will the KC-46A tanker remain an Air Force priority? What would be the
effect of sequestration upon the KC-46A tanker program?
Secretary Donley. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER
Mr. Miller. What is the Air Force's definition of a ``Center,'' as
the term is used by Air Force Materiel Command to describe commands
such as the Electronic Systems Center, the Air Armament Center, and the
Flight Test Center? What functions must be present for a location to be
designated a ``Center''? Is strategic planning an essential part of a
Center?
Secretary Donley. Within the Air Force, a ``Center'' is a named
unit that performs a specialized mission. A primary characteristic of a
Center is that it performs most of its mission within a large complex
at one location and usually has only a few subordinate units. There are
a number of centers across the Air Force. Other commands outside of Air
Force Materiel Command use the term ``Center'' such as the Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center which is a Direct Reporting Unit
to Headquarters United States Air Force. Aside from the characteristics
mentioned above, there are no standard functions that must be present
for an organization to be designated a ``Center''. Additionally, since
a ``Center'' is a unit that may have functions at multiple locations,
it is the organization (and not the location) that is designated a
``Center.'' Strategic planning is not a mandated ``Center'' function,
but by the nature of their functions, most ``Centers'' do support
strategic planning, either at the Major Command or Headquarters Air
Force level.
Mr. Miller. What is the Air Force's definition of a ``Center,'' as
the term is used by Air Force Materiel Command to describe commands
such as the Electronic Systems Center, the Air Armament Center, and the
Flight Test Center? What functions must be present for a location to be
designated a ``Center''? Is strategic planning an essential part of a
Center?
General Schwartz. Within the Air Force, a ``Center'' is a named
unit that performs a specialized mission. A primary characteristic of a
Center is that it performs most of its mission within a large complex
at one location and usually has only a few subordinate units. There are
a number of centers across the Air Force. Other commands outside of Air
Force Materiel Command use the term ``Center'' such as the Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center which is a Direct Reporting Unit
to Headquarters United States Air Force. Aside from the characteristics
mentioned above, there are no standard functions that must be present
for an organization to be designated a ``Center''. Additionally, since
a ``Center'' is a unit that may have functions at multiple locations,
it is the organization (and not the location) that is designated a
``Center.'' Strategic planning is not a mandated ``Center'' function,
but by the nature of their functions, most ``Centers'' do support
strategic planning, either at the Major Command or Headquarters Air
Force level.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Secretary Donley, what progress has the Air Force
made in evaluating threats to our bases that rely on civilian power
sources, and how has the Air Force strengthened its plans for
alternative energy sources?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force's dependency on the commercial
power grid represents a critical asymmetric vulnerability that must be
mitigated through partnerships with industry, state and local
governments. The Air Force conducts Critical Asset Risk Assessments
(CARAs) to identify key critical assets and supporting infrastructure.
Identification of critical assets focuses within installation
boundaries, and extends to the first critical infrastructure nodes
outside perimeters. The Air Force has identified over 900 critical
assets, and 62 of those are Tier 1 assets, where loss or degradation of
energy would impact strategic-level missions. Of the 62 Tier 1 assets,
22 of them are Defense Critical Assets (DCA); the loss of a DCA would
result in mission failure for the entire Department of Defense (DOD)
capability.
To date, the Air Force has completed 30 CARAs (12 in FY11). In
FY12, there are nine CARAs scheduled. The Air Force expects to complete
CARAs for all Tier 1 assets by the end of FY13. Eight CARAs have been
conducted on DCAs and two more are scheduled for FY12. The Air Force is
also a member of the DOD's Energy Grid Security Executive Council,
which exists to discuss grid concerns across the Services.
The Air Force uses the CARA report as a starting point to work with
the owning organizations to develop risk response plan that identifies
discrete courses of action to address identified risks. CARA reports
are provided to Commanders, Major Commands (MAJCOM), Combatant
Commanders, the Joint Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and America's Secutity Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)),
Headquarters Air Force functional stakeholders, and the Air Force
Directorate for Air Operations, to inform Commanders' decisions on how
to apply limited resources, and provide visibility to asset owners and
mission owners of those issues affecting their roles and
responsibilities. Decisions on responses to identified risks can be
made at various levels of the organization. Such decisions may be to
remediate, mitigate, or following a comprehensive review by leadership
and evaluation within the corporate process, to accept risk.
The Air Force also prepares Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM)
Plans for a select subgroup of critical assets. Of the 17 course of
action (COA) recommendations developed thus far in the seven CARM Plans
submitted to ASD(HD&ASA), 3 have been funded at a total Operations and
Maintenance cost of $250,000, and the corresponding vulnerability to
the respective critical assets remediated. Remediation is currently in
progress for two additional COAs, at a total cost of $6.65 million.
COA examples include installing power generators to provide
electricity to a critical asset in the event of a power failure or
developing a continuity of operations plan. Projects addressing risks
identified in CARA reports can receive higher weighting factors during
Air Force budgeting process. Additionally, a further six CARM Plans are
currently in development.
The ability of the Air Force to ensure continuity of operations is
dependent upon not only the delivery of reliable and uninterrupted
energy supplies in the necessary quantities, but also on the
adaptability of mission platforms to operate on diversified energy
sources, such as biofuels or synthetic fuels. To assure its energy
supply, the Air Force has two very ambitious goals in place--to certify
aircraft to use alternative aviation fuels and to develop on-base
source of renewable energy. The Air Force is certifying its fleet on
several alternative aviation fuels to ensure our aircraft could fly on
commercially available fuels by 2016. Those alternative fuels will need
to be drop-in fuels that are cost competitive with traditional
petroleum-based jet fuels, and meet our environmental and technical
specifications. For the second goal, the Air Force is focused on
developing on-site sources of renewable energy, particularly those
sources that can insulate the Air Force from grid failure or other
supply disruptions, and plans to achieve 1,000 megawatts of on-site
capacity by 2016. This will largely be accomplished through third-party
investments and at those installations where renewable energy is
mission compatible.
Mr. Langevin. I continue to be concerned about the overall strength
and size of the nation's cybersecurity workforce. What is the Air Force
doing to recruit and train airmen with cyberskill and what is it doing
to encourage them to stay in uniform?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force, in order to improve the
identification of future enlisted and officer cyberspace operators
during the recruitment process, partnered with Navy and the Army in the
development of a cyber test that could be used as a supplement to the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. At this time, the test has
been used at selected military entrance processing stations as part of
a pilot program to test enlisted recruits' cyberspace aptitude.
However, the results have not yet been used in the selection of a
recruit's Air Force Specialty Code. Additional work needs to be
completed to ensure test results identify cyberspace aptitude versus
simply identifying current skill level and knowledge. The United States
Air Force Academy and Air Force Reserve Officer Program have also
created three cyberspace emphasis pre-accessions programs for officers.
These programs have an annual throughput of 330 future cyberspace
officers. Additionally, over the last two years, the Air Force has
implemented 10 separate training programs that have an annual
throughput of over 2,600 cyberspace operators. Finally, in regards to
the retention of our cyberspace enlisted career fields, as of October
2011, 5 Air Force Specialty Codes have varying levels of retention
bonuses, which are used to encourage re-enlistment. Currently, no
incentive programs are used to retain the officer and civilian
cyberspace populations.
Mr. Langevin. General Schwartz, I recently visited 24th Air Force
at Lackland Air Force Base and was very impressed with its operations.
We have clearly made great strides in our ability to impact the cyber
domain, but as I am sure you agree, we must continue to innovate and
transform in order to maintain and expand that ability. In your view,
what must the Air Force do next in order to ensure the ability of its
networks to support Full Spectrum Operations?
General Schwartz. The Air Force contributes to the Joint force by
developing, integrating, and operating cyberspace capabilities in three
mission areas: support, defense, and offense. Future capabilities will
enable effects across the full spectrum of operations.
The Air Force Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master
Plan specifies nine capabilities that require programmatic actions to
evolve the force from its current capability state: Passive Defense,
Defensive Counter Cyberspace, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance & Situational Awareness, Persistent Network Operations,
Data Confidentiality & Integrity Systems, Cyberspace Air Operations
Center, Offensive Counter Cyberspace for Global Reach and Access,
Contingency Extension, and Influence Operations.
A shift in mindsets from support to operations will
foster greater concentration of effort. Air Force members will
understand their contributions to the joint fight. The shift in mindset
will engender greater operational integration across all warfighting
domains.
Attaining the Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master
Plan's specified capabilities and shifting from a support to
operational mindset sets the conditions for attaining partnership
capabilities. Partnerships with other governmental agencies, industry,
allies, and partners, will enhance mission effectiveness. The ability
to integrate and leverage partnerships will underpin force projection
in all domains. The Air Force will invest as required to ensure its
ability to operate effectively and enhance the resiliency and
effectiveness of critical cyber capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. The President established a modernization plan in the
1251 plan and the 2010 NPR. The FY13 budget, after the New START treaty
was ratified, is backing off those plans. Let me review the list, the
B61 gravity bomb is 2 years delayed; the associated tail kit is late,
and we understand that certain high-accuracy options are not being
looked at; the W78 warhead is being pushed back, and certain
modernization options have been arbitrarily taken off the table; the
new bomber, won't be nuclear-certified at the outset, and new cruise
missile are late by at least 2 years; and the plan for the
modernization of the Minute Man III appears to be lacking commitment.
Further we hear all of these programs are dependent on the President's
review--the so-called mini-NPR--about which this Committee has been
completely shut out by the White House.
1) Can you assure us that the Air Force has an iron-clad, no-
caveat, commitment to field a new ICBM, to field a new nuclear-capable
bomber and cruise missile? Will this commitment change as a result of
the Administration's mini-NPR?
2) Why would the plan to implement the New START treaty, which was
ratified in 2010, depend on the President's mini-NPR which is being
conducted in complete secrecy from the Congress?
3) Secretary Panetta promised to assist this committee in oversight
of the nuclear war plan, in fact promising read-ins last December, but
nothing has happened since then. What accesses do you have to the so-
called 8010 plan? How many Air Force personnel have access to that
plan? Tens? Hundreds? More?
a. Does it surprise you that the Department is denying any access
to that plan to the Congress? Understand that we're told that the
Administration may be considering 80% reductions in the nuclear force,
and no one in Congress has been allowed to see the plan.
Secretary Donley. The President's fiscal year 2013 (FY13) Budget
reflects the Air Force's continued commitment to invest in the enduring
and compelling attributes the Nation needs for a safe, secure and
effective nuclear deterrent force. The Air Force fully funded and is
conducting the materiel solution analysis to identify the options for
both a follow-on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system and a cruise
missile to follow the Air Launch Cruise Missile. Reports are expected
to be completed in FY14. A nuclear-capable Long Range Strike Bomber is
also funded in the Presidents FY13 budget. The Administration's post-
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) analysis has not altered these
commitments.
Air Force plans to implement New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) are not dependent on current Post-NPR analysis efforts
underway. As stated in the 2010 NPR, the Administration is conducting
follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the
levels in New START. Although a final New START force structure
decision has not been made, the Air Force has fully funded NST
implementation actions to achieve the baseline force structure as
outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1251 Report:
240 deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles on 14 strategic
nuclear submarines, up to 420 deployed intercontinental ballistic
missiles and up to 60 deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
As a Service component to United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) responsible for providing assets and capabilities required
for execution, several echelons of the Air Force have access to
Operational Plan 8010. Since this is a USSTRATCOM plan, the Air Force
defers to USSTRATCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
regarding your concerns in this question.
Mr. Turner. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to
strengthen our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and
use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that
infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where
these systems can be freely tested. With the military operations
overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate
remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system
(NAS). Working with the FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) is leading the charge within the Air Force in developing the
future technology for the safe operation of RPAs in the national
airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps are
needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research
capabilities of AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the
challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the
future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to
leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and NASA as a goal to shorten
the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force is working both airborne (long
term) and ground based (near term) sense and avoid programs to
integrate remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace
system (NAS). We have been working technology development in this area
for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to acquisition
over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to complete
our ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and
complete certification of the system approximately 18 months later.
Once certification is complete, this system will enable more routine
access to portions of the NAS and enhance our readiness. Equally
important, we are developing the required Department of Defense
certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional
authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA's) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems airspace integration and test site mandate in both the
2011 National Defense Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and
Modernization Act is a significant step forward to both expand
technology and establish performance standards needed for full RPA
integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further
serve to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally.
The Air Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching
research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and Air Force Research Laboratory is vital to
effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA integration into
the National Airspace System.
Mr. Turner. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the
primary post-secondary education institution for the Air Force and it
has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in
specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern
aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget environment, I
am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in the
future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of
short-term needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains
committed to offering future leaders the kind of advanced technical
degrees that AFIT provides?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer
advanced technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT). Air Force senior leaders have become
intimately involved in determining the proper educational development
for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees
are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer
developmental equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased
emphasis on providing officers with the right education, particularly
in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an
invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that
meet the critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs.
Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge
of technology, which allows the students to work on projects that will
advance the technical exploitations of the DOD. Given our fiscally
challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible to leverage
this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to
obtain maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient
use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of
AFIT.
Mr. Turner. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act
included an amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) to enroll up to 125 civilians on a
space-available basis. This is similar to authority granted other
defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this
new policy will be implemented and have been told ``soon.'' We are now
working on the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate
implementing the provision and what is causing the delay?
Secretary Donley. The Title 10 language clearly requires permission
by Secretary of the Air Force to admit defense industry employees as
students. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed
the strategy and policy needed to manage this new student base and has
coordinated the draft language with senior Air Force leadership,
including our legal staff. A staff package implementing this program is
currently in coordination for Secretary of the Air Force signature. The
implementation guidance gives AFIT permission to proceed and delegates
authority for annual reviews to the AFIT Commandant. We do not
anticipate any further delays and expect to enroll defense industry
employees in our September 2012 class.
Mr. Turner. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to
strengthen our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and
use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that
infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where
these systems can be freely tested. With the military operations
overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate
remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system
(NAS). Working with the FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) is leading the charge within the Air Force in developing the
future technology for the safe operation of RPAs in the national
airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps are
needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research
capabilities of AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the
challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the
future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to
leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and NASA as a goal to shorten
the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force is working both airborne (long
term) and ground based (near term) sense and avoid programs to
integrate remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace
system (NAS). We have been working technology development in this area
for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to acquisition
over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to complete
our ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and
complete certification of the system approximately 18 months later.
Once certification is complete, this system will enable more routine
access to portions of the NAS and enhance our readiness. Equally
important, we are developing the required Department of Defense
certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional
authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA's) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems airspace integration and test site mandate in both the
2011 National Defense Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and
Modernization Act is a significant step forward to both expand
technology and establish performance standards needed for full RPA
integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further
serve to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally.
The Air Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching
research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and Air Force Research Laboratory is vital to
effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA integration into
the National Airspace System.
Mr. Turner. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the
primary post-secondary education institution for the Air Force and it
has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in
specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern
aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget environment, I
am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in the
future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of
short-term needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains
committed to offering future leaders the kind of advanced technical
degrees that AFIT provides?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer
advanced technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT). Air Force senior leaders have become
intimately involved in determining the proper educational development
for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees
are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer
developmental equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased
emphasis on providing officers with the right education, particularly
in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an
invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that
meet the critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs.
Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge
of technology, which allows the students to work on projects that will
advance the technical exploitations of the DOD. Given our fiscally
challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible to leverage
this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to
obtain maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient
use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of
AFIT.
Mr. Turner. The President established a modernization plan in the
1251 plan and the 2010 NPR. The FY13 budget, after the New START treaty
was ratified, is backing off those plans. Let me review the list, the
B61 gravity bomb is 2 years delayed; the associated tail kit is late,
and we understand that certain high-accuracy options are not being
looked at; the W78 warhead is being pushed back, and certain
modernization options have been arbitrarily taken off the table; the
new bomber, won't be nuclear-certified at the outset, and new cruise
missile are late by at least 2 years; and the plan for the
modernization of the Minute Man III appears to be lacking commitment.
Further we hear all of these programs are dependent on the President's
review--the so-called mini-NPR--about which this Committee has been
completely shut out by the White House.
1) Can you assure us that the Air Force has an iron-clad, no-
caveat, commitment to field a new ICBM, to field a new nuclear-capable
bomber and cruise missile? Will this commitment change as a result of
the Administration's mini-NPR?
2) Why would the plan to implement the New START treaty, which was
ratified in 2010, depend on the President's mini-NPR which is being
conducted in complete secrecy from the Congress?
3) Secretary Panetta promised to assist this committee in oversight
of the nuclear war plan, in fact promising read-ins last December, but
nothing has happened since then. What accesses do you have to the so-
called 8010 plan? How many Air Force personnel have access to that
plan? Tens? Hundreds? More?
a. Does it surprise you that the Department is denying any access
to that plan to the Congress? Understand that we're told that the
Administration may be considering 80% reductions in the nuclear force,
and no one in Congress has been allowed to see the plan.
General Schwartz. The President's fiscal year 2013 (FY13) Budget
reflects the Air Force's continued commitment to invest in the enduring
and compelling attributes the Nation needs for a safe, secure and
effective nuclear deterrent force. The Air Force fully funded and is
conducting the materiel solution analysis to identify the options for
both a follow-on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system and a cruise
missile to follow the Air Launch Cruise Missile. Reports are expected
to be completed in FY14. A nuclear-capable Long Range Strike Bomber is
also funded in the Presidents FY13 budget. The Administration's post-
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) analysis has not altered these
commitments.
Air Force plans to implement New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) are not dependent on current Post-NPR analysis efforts
underway. As stated in the 2010 NPR, the Administration is conducting
follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the
levels in New START. Although a final New START force structure
decision has not been made, the Air Force has fully funded NST
implementation actions to achieve the baseline force structure as
outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1251 Report:
240 deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles on 14 strategic
nuclear submarines, up to 420 deployed intercontinental ballistic
missiles and up to 60 deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
As a Service component to United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) responsible for providing assets and capabilities required
for execution, several echelons of the Air Force have access to
Operational Plan 8010. Since this is a USSTRATCOM plan, the Air Force
defers to USSTRATCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
regarding your concerns in this question.
Mr. Turner. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to
strengthen our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and
use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that
infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where
these systems can be freely tested. With the military operations
overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate
remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system
(NAS). Working with the FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) is leading the charge within the Air Force in developing the
future technology for the safe operation of RPAs in the national
airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps are
needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research
capabilities of AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the
challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the
future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to
leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and NASA as a goal to shorten
the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is working both airborne (long
term) and ground based (near term) sense and avoid programs to
integrate remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace
system (NAS). We have been working technology development in this area
for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to acquisition
over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to complete
our ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and
complete certification of the system approximately 18 months later.
Once certification is complete, this system will enable more routine
access to portions of the NAS and enhance our readiness. Equally
important, we are developing the required Department of Defense
certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional
authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA's) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems airspace integration and test site mandate in both the
2011 National Defense Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and
Modernization Act is a significant step forward to both expand
technology and establish performance standards needed for full RPA
integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further
serve to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally.
The Air Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching
research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and Air Force Research Laboratory is vital to
effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA integration into
the National Airspace System.
Mr. Turner. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the
primary post-secondary education institution for the Air Force and it
has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in
specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern
aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget environment, I
am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in the
future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of
short-term needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains
committed to offering future leaders the kind of advanced technical
degrees that AFIT provides?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer
advanced technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT). Air Force senior leaders have become
intimately involved in determining the proper educational development
for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees
are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer
developmental equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased
emphasis on providing officers with the right education, particularly
in specialized scientific and technical disciplines; AFIT becomes an
invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that
meet the critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs.
Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge
of technology, which allows the students to work on projects that will
advance the technical exploitations of the DOD. Given our fiscally
challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible to leverage
this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to
obtain maximum benefits. Policies are in places that require efficient
use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of
AFIT.
Mr. Turner. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act
included an amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) to enroll up to 125 civilians on a
space-available basis. This is similar to authority granted other
defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this
new policy will be implemented and have been told ``soon.'' We are now
working on the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate
implementing the provision and what is causing the delay?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer
advanced technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT). Air Force senior leaders have become
intimately involved in determining the proper educational development
for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees
are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer
developmental equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased
emphasis on providing officers with the right education, particularly
in specialized scientific and technical disciplines; AFIT becomes an
invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that
meet the critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs.
Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge
of technology, which allows the students to work on projects that will
advance the technical exploitations of the DOD. Given our fiscally
challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible to leverage
this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to
obtain maximum benefits. Policies are in places that require efficient
use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of
AFIT.
Mr. Turner. As an estimate, how much of the development and
procurement costs associated with the long range strike bomber can be
associated with making it nuclear-capable and nuclear-certified? What
percentage of the total development and procurement costs is this? Does
the Air Force plan to buy additional aircraft for the nuclear mission,
or would the same number of aircraft be procured if the bomber were
only for conventional missions?
General Schwartz. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Long
Range Strike Bomber program was started in Fiscal Year 2012. The Air
Force recently began the process of building detailed cost estimates
for the development, procurement, and sustainment of the Long Range
Strike Bomber. We are working closely with the nuclear centers of
excellence to understand the stringent nuclear design and certification
requirements to inform these cost estimates. Upon completion, we will
fully disclose the requested information within appropriate channels.
The Air Force plans to field 80-100 nuclear-capable Long Range
Strike Bombers beginning in the mid-2020s by leveraging mature
technologies and making capability tradeoffs to hold down procurement
costs. The $550 million average procurement unit cost (Base Year 2010)
includes sufficient funding to make the bombers survivable in a nuclear
environment and capable of nuclear weapons employment. The Long Range
Strike Bomber will be certified for nuclear operations in time to meet
USSTRATCOM's nuclear force structure requirements.
Mr. Turner. The Navy has a continuous low-rate production program
for D5 ballistic missiles to keep the industrial base healthy and
responsive. The Air Force does not have a similar program for Minuteman
III ICBMs--why not? What are the risks of this approach?
General Schwartz. The Air Force recognizes the importance of
maintaining the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) industrial
base and has programs in place to ensure the Minuteman III remains
viable through 2030 and to support any follow-on ground based strategic
deterrent system. The research and development portion of the Solid
Rocket Motor (SRM) industrial base, exercised as part of ICBM
Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program
(PAP), matures SRM technologies for insertion into any future
propulsion modernization program. The Air Force PAP program exercises
design and systems engineering skills critical to maintaining a healthy
SRM industrial base.
Mr. Turner. Does the FY12 request include funds to make the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter dual-capable (to carry nuclear payloads)? When is
the F-35 expected to be fully nuclear-capable and nuclear-certified?
Have the estimated costs for this nuclear-capable retrofit increased,
and if so, is that a lesson for the new bomber (i.e., to make it
nuclear-capable from the outset)?
General Schwartz. The JSF Operational Requirement Document (ORD)
directed the F-35 program to incorporate Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA)
capability in the first post-System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
block upgrade, Block 4, currently projected to field in the 2021
timeframe. The Air Force fully supports our commitment to our NATO
partners to provide forward deployed DCA capable fighters in European
Command (EUCOM), and is reviewing available options to maintain DCA
requirements in the European theatre by other means until nuclear
capable F-35As are ready to assume the mission.
In the President's Budget 2013, the Air Force chose to defer
further dual capable aircraft (DCA) funding. The Air Force made this
decision based on several factors:
1) Uncertainty in the F-35 Block 4 delivery timeline and associated
candidate list due to congressional marks on F-35 Follow-on Development
funding and F-35 SDD re-plan activities
2) Uncertainty in the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) approach and
timeline; the B61 LEP is a joint DOD/DoE effort that will provide a
digital nuclear weapon capability that can be integrated on the F-35A
3) The ability to mitigate delays in F-35A DCA capability through
Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) for legacy aircraft
The Air Force fully supports the commitment to provide forward
deployed DCA capable fighters and is reassessing DCA need dates and
development timelines. To mitigate potential future hardware changes
and retrofit costs, DCA basic provisions, to include power, wiring,
cooling, and weapons bay volume, were accounted for in the current F-
35A design. Should the Department of Defense decide to fund for F-35A
DCA integration in PB 14, funding will total $309M across the Future
Years Defense Plan. Including fiscal year 2012 funding and additional
funding in fiscal year 2019+, the total DCA cost is still anticipated
to be $339M.
Mr. Turner. Please describe the Air Force's plans for a follow-on
to the nuclear-capable Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). When is such
a capability needed and what is the anticipated total quantity and cost
needed? Why has the program been delayed?
General Schwartz. Long Range Standoff (LRSO) is the Air Force's
plan for the follow-on to the nuclear-capable Air Launched Cruise
Missile (ALCM). The need date is based on survivability of the ALCM, to
mitigate risk to this validated capability requirement. The Air Force
is currently executing an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to determine
the best materiel solution to meet the future need in a quantity
required by the combatant commanders. Affordability is one factor to be
assessed during the AoA. Potential options under analysis range from
modification of existing inventory to new weapon system development.
Once the AoA is complete, the Air Force will be able to determine
options that best provide our Nation a safe, secure and effective
nuclear deterrent in the 21st Century.
The Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) AoA, which began in August 2011,
continues and is scheduled to be completed in early fiscal year 2013
(FY13). The LRSO program was delayed until FY15. This delay was driven
by necessary adjustments within the current fiscally-constrained
environment.
Mr. Turner. The Air Force plans to spend $80 million in FY13 on
development of the tail kit for the B61-12, the life-extended nuclear
gravity bomb. The National Nuclear Security Administration has delayed
production of the first B61-12 by 2 years, to FY2019. How does this
affect the Air Force's plans for the tail kit? Is the Air Force
comfortable with National Nuclear Security Administration's decision to
delay the B61-12 by 2 years? What risks are there in this delay? Is
there any more room for schedule slippage, or have we taken all of the
flexibility out of the schedule? Please provide a classified response
detailing the technical requirements for the new tail kit as compared
to the technical requirements of the current B61; how will the CEPs of
the B61 mods differ?
General Schwartz. The new schedule for the first production unit
was incorporated into the B61-12 Tailkit Assembly (TKA) Service Cost
Position/Independent Cost Estimate and is reflected in the FY13
President's Budget. The tail kit development schedule was extended so
it remains in synch with the National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) schedule.
The Air Force is comfortable with NNSA's decision to delay the B61-
12 by two years. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of
Energy (DoE) conducted an integrated schedule review to ensure both
efforts remain synchronized.
This delay adds schedule risk to the program, as legacy B61s
continue to age and must be replaced. As a result, flexibility has been
removed. Mitigation efforts have already been implemented to extend the
life of legacy B61s so that the B61-12 can be fielded before they
retire. Further life extensions of the legacy stockpile may be
possible, but they would likely be very expensive and difficult to
execute.
A classified response will be forwarded separately detailing the
technical requirements for the new tail kit as compared to the
technical requirements of the current B61.
Mr. Turner. Will the next-generation bomber be built to meet
nuclear-hardening requirements? Will nuclear certification of the next-
generation bombers be delayed after initial operational capability is
achieved--if so, when would nuclear certification be expected? What are
the costs and risks for delaying certification of a nuclear-capable
bomber?
General Schwartz. Yes, the Long Range Strike Bomber will meet
nuclear-hardening requirements in accordance with current military
standards.
Currently, nuclear certification is planned after the Long Range
Strike Bomber has met initial operational capability. The Long Range
Strike Bomber will achieve nuclear certification in time to meet United
States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) nuclear force structure
requirements. USSTRATCOM is integrally involved with the Air Force in
this process to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent force will remain
credible and effective.
Delaying nuclear certification until after conventional
certification reduces the costs and risks to the Long Range Strike
Bomber program because it minimizes concurrency during baseline program
integration and test activities. It also ensures sufficient, production
representative test assets are available for a dedicated nuclear
certification effort.
Mr. Turner. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to
strengthen our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and
use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that
infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where
these systems can be freely tested. With the military operations
overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate
remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system
(NAS). Working with the FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) is leading the charge within the Air Force in developing the
future technology for the safe operation of RPAs in the national
airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps are
needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research
capabilities of AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the
challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the
future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to
leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and NASA as a goal to shorten
the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is working both airborne (long
term) and ground based (near term) sense and avoid programs to
integrate remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace
system (NAS). We have been working technology development in this area
for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to acquisition
over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to complete
our ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and
complete certification of the system approximately 18 months later.
Once certification is complete, this system will enable more routine
access to portions of the NAS and enhance our readiness. Equally
important, we are developing the required Department of Defense
certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional
authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA's) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems airspace integration and test site mandate in both the
2011 National Defense Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and
Modernization Act is a significant step forward to both expand
technology and establish performance standards needed for full RPA
integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further
serve to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally.
The Air Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching
research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and Air Force Research Laboratory is vital to
effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA integration into
the National Airspace System.
Mr. Turner. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the
primary post-secondary education institution for the Air Force and it
has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in
specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern
aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget environment, I
am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in the
future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of
short-term needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains
committed to offering future leaders the kind of advanced technical
degrees that AFIT provides?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer
advanced technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT). Air Force senior leaders have become
intimately involved in determining the proper educational development
for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees
are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer
developmental equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased
emphasis on providing officers with the right education, particularly
in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an
invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that
meet the critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs.
Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge
of technology, which allows the students to work on projects that will
advance the technical exploitations of the DOD. Given our fiscally
challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible to leverage
this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to
obtain maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient
use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of
AFIT.
Mr. Turner. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act
included an amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) to enroll up to 125 civilians on a
space-available basis. This is similar to authority granted other
defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this
new policy will be implemented and have been told ``soon.'' We are now
working on the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate
implementing the provision and what is causing the delay?
General Schwartz. The Title 10 language clearly requires permission
by Secretary of the Air Force to admit defense industry employees as
students. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed
the strategy and policy needed to manage this new student base and has
coordinated the draft language with senior Air Force leadership,
including our legal staff. A staff package implementing this program is
currently in coordination for Secretary of the Air Force signature. The
implementation guidance gives AFIT permission to proceed and delegates
authority for annual reviews to the AFIT Commandant. We do not
anticipate any further delays and expect to enroll defense industry
employees in our September 2012 class.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. Will the divesture of the C-27J have a logistical
impact on the supply chain in theater and if so, what will the impact
be?
Secretary Donley. No, divestiture of the C-27J will not impact the
supply chain in-theater as the C-130 has sufficient airlift capability
and capacity. The Air Force remains committed to providing this support
to the Army.
Ms. Bordallo. Could either of you explain in more detail why you
proposed a larger cut in Air Guard & Reserve forces, than you did in
Active Duty forces?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force FY13 Budget Request achieves $8.7
billion in savings across the Active and Reserve Components by retiring
over 200 aircraft in FY13 and nearly 300 aircraft over the FYDP,
consistent with the new strategic guidance. Our programmed force
reductions are wide ranging and affect over 60 installations. Without
the Total Force re-missioning actions our plan would have significantly
affected 24 units and left eight installations without an Air Force
presence. After specific efforts to reallocate Air Force missions to
locations affected by force structure reductions, we were able to
preserve 14 squadron level units and leave only one installation
without an operational mission. With the re-missioning, the plan would
have direct impact in 33 states, but in order to support Total Force
re-missioning, the manpower realignment plan built by the Reserve
Components ultimately will affect additional units in all 54 states and
territories.
Our analysis of requirements driven by the new strategy shaped all
of our decisions. Air Force force sizing analysis answered two
complementary questions: what is the maximum, or surge, requirement
posed by the force sizing model of the new strategy; and what is the
steady state, or post-surge, requirement for deployed rotational
forces? Because the new guidance requires the Joint Force to be capable
of fighting one large scale, combined arms campaign with sufficient
combat power to also deny a second adversary, and deemphasized large-
scale, prolonged stability operations, our FY13 budget request accepts
risk by retiring fighter, mobility, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft excess to the surge requirements of the
new force sizing construct. Although the U.S. has removed all combat
forces from Iraq and the new strategic guidance reduces the steady
state requirement for ground forces, we expect Air Force steady state
rotational requirements to remain nearly constant, or perhaps increase,
under the new strategy. This continuing rotational post-surge
requirement is a key factor in determining the required mix between
Active and Reserve Component forces due to differences in sustainable
deployment rates and operations tempo. Where possible, we attempted to
retire all aircraft of a specific type, allowing us to also divest the
unique training and logistic support structure for that aircraft. Where
that was not possible, we worked to retire the oldest aircraft first,
and redistributed aircraft into effective and economical units,
eliminating other units when that was most efficient. Where we retained
older aircraft, we are taking steps to ensure they will remain viable
into the future.
Ms. Bordallo. One of the cut programs is the CONECT program. It
provides much-needed digital communication and mission retasking
capability for our warfighters, which is essential for B-52 missions,
especially with the added emphasis on the Pacific theater. With this
program successfully finishing flight test, why would the Air Force cut
the production funding, and leave our crews with a temporary laptop
solution that doesn't satisfy the CONECT operational requirements?
Secretary Donley. Based on competing budget priorities, the Air
Force restructured Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) to
address the sustainability issues within the program and the
replacement of legacy displays. The restructured program also funds
conversion of the temporary Evolutionary Datalink (EDL) system into a
permanent modification, which provides a viable (although less robust)
communication capability for the B-52. This decision was made as part
of a balanced investment strategy for the Air Force Nuclear Deterrence
portfolio. At the time the decision was made, CONECT had not completed
the flight test program, and the program faced significant cost,
schedule, and performance issues. The completion of MS C certification
later this year provides the Air Force an option to re-examine the
CONECT program in future budget cycles.
Ms. Bordallo. Another program proposed to be completely terminated
is the replacement of the B-52 radar. The reliability of the current
radar, which will continue to degrade, results in ever-increasing cost
and unacceptable impact to the probability of success of long missions.
With the nuclear and conventional importance of the B-52, how do we
maintain a much-needed capability without a radar replacement program?
Secretary Donley. To meet higher priorities, the Air Force has
elected to maintain the current B-52 APQ-166 radar versus investing in
a replacement radar with higher near-term costs. Analysis indicates
that the current B-52 radar system is sustainable through the B-52's
service life (2040). Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) will
pursue reverse engineering/sustainment initiatives to address radar
reliability and availability to meet B-52 mission requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. You prepared a statement that read ``The Air Force
will meet its OSD-directed civilian end strength target for FY12.'' How
do you reconcile that statement and direction with the requirements of
sections 129 and 129a of title 10 that prohibit management to a
civilian personnel constraint such as end-strength?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force does not manage its civilian
workforce by any constraint or limitation in terms of man-years, end-
strength, fulltime equivalent positions, or maximum number of
employees. Based on fiscal constraints, OSD-directed civilian workforce
targets for FY12; and these targets were achieved through strategic
reviews to improve business operations, streamline administrative
functions, and eliminate low-priority/overhead functions and expenses.
As such, the Air Force has followed section 129 of title 10 with regard
to execution of civilian personnel management.
Ms. Bordallo. In your prepared statement, you addressed
``congressionally mandated military end strength'' and ``OSD-directed
civilian end strength''--what kind of limitations or levels have been
placed, or have you imposed, on your contract support workforce?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force's ``sourcing'' of functions and
work between military, civilian, and contracted services must be
consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness
and management needs, as well as applicable laws and statute. The Air
Force remains committed to meeting its statutory obligations to
annually review missions, functions, and workforce composition,
including reliance on contracted services, and to ensure the workforce
is appropriately balanced and aligned to our most critical priorities.
Ms. Bordallo. In your prepared statement, the Air Force wrote that
``We continue to put downward pressure on service support contract
spending and are committing to an additional $200 million reduction in
FY13 and $1 billion across the FYDP.'' Considering that in the fiscal
year 2010 inventory of contracts for service the Air Force reported
more than $24 billion in obligations--for a single year--on contracted
services, this downward pressure is laughable. Why are the reductions
so small?
Secretary Donley. The inventory of contract services (ICS) is a
much broader set of service contracts than what was referred to in
testimony as ``service support contractors''. While the Air Force
submitted $24.8 billion in our Fiscal Year 2010 ICS, that amount
captured all Air Force-funded service contracts that perform critical
missions across every functional domain across the Air Force. These
include service and maintenance of our aircraft, base operations, and
supply chain management.
The ``service support contractors'' definition is stated in the
Secretary of Defense's memo, ``Reducing Reliance on DOD Service Support
Contracts,'' dated September 24, 2010, which directed a 30 percent
reduction from the FY10 levels by FY13 (10 percent per year). The
definition of support contracts/contractor is ``any contracted
personnel who provide support as staff augmentation for Government
employees; i.e., personnel who are subject to the direction of a
Government official and function as a staff/action officer.''
The additional $200 million savings in FY13 and a total of $1
billion across the FYDP is over and above our past service support
contractor reductions. Our intent in additional reductions was to
target headquarters staff augmentation contract support to a more
manageable level as this is an area that has grown tremendously since
2001.
Ms. Bordallo. How do these reductions of less than 1% over the FYDP
compare to the fiscal and manpower reductions associated with the
mandated civilian workforce levels?
Secretary Donley. The true service support contractor reduction
(staff augmentation dollars) is approximately 62 percent ($390M from a
$634M baseline) which is drastically higher than our programmed
civilian reduction of approximately 8 percent (16K positions from a
199K baseline).
Ms. Bordallo. You also stated that ``These efforts are consistent
with . . . OMB guidance to reduce contract spending by 15 percent by
the end of FY12 from an FY10 baseline.'' That would mean that you
should reduce by $3.6B annually from the $24B in FY10, as opposed to
the $200M you stated. This is an exponentially large discrepancy and I
am requesting further explanation and justification of your statement,
and the small reductions planned in the Air Force in contracted
services.
Secretary Donley. Again, there is a definitional issue that must be
clarified in answering this question. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) guidance has its prime focus to reduce contract spending
on management support services which is quantified by 12 separate
product service codes in such areas as automated information systems
development and services; system engineering; intelligence services;
personal services; and acquisition/contract support. The Federal
Procurement Data System--Next Generation (FPDS-NG) captures
approximately $5.6B management support services funded by the Air Force
in FY10. The OMB mandated 15 percent reduction equates to approximately
$843M. Currently, the Air Force is ahead of schedule based on a FPDS-NG
current FY12 obligations of approximately $1.7B through the end of
month February.
Ms. Bordallo. You stated that you had a target of 16,000 civilian
spaces to reduce. Can you please provide a list of those 16,000 based
on the Air Force's FAIR Act inventory, including the location,
functions performed, and manpower mix criteria associated with each?
Can you estimate the cost savings associated with each? Can you assure
the Committee that the workload associated with any one of these 16,000
reductions was not absorbed by contract as you executed the AFMC
reorganization and reduced overhead? Where did this target of 16,000
civilian space reductions come from, and was that target based on a
workforce analysis considering mission risk and cost, or did the Air
Force essentially have to reverse engineer it and associated workload/
organizational structures to achieve that number?
Secretary Donley. 1) The Air Force does not have a specific list of
the civilian positions based on the Air Force's Federal Activities
Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act inventory because a large portion of the
reductions were tied to planned growth; thus, these ``positions'' were
not captured by any previous or existing FAIR Act inventory.
2) These changes in programmed growth resulted in an approximate
total savings of $1.6 billion through Fiscal Year 2012.
3) The workload associated with the reductions was not absorbed by
contract because in addition to the civilian funding reductions, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense also strove to achieve savings by
reducing the number of service support contractors. The AFMC
reorganization and other Air Force consolidation efforts were a means
to achieve savings in both civilian and contractor funds; the AFMC
reorganization resulted in a workforce reduction.
4) The target reductions were based on workforce analysis
considering mission risk, readiness and cost. The Secretary of Defense
issued Department of Defense-wide efficiency measures to reduce
overhead and eliminate redundancies while reducing the associated
funding. To meet the guidance issued by Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Air Force conducted a comprehensive strategic review to
streamline operations and consolidate overhead while preserving or
growing the most critical mission areas. The Air Force maintained some
growth in areas like acquisition, nuclear enterprise, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, while streamlining headquarters and
support functions.
Ms. Bordallo. Given the civilian personnel constraints first
reflected in last year's budget and continued in the FY13 submission,
can you certify in full accordance with 10 USC sections 129 and section
129a? Your certification was due on 1 February. When can the committee
expect it?
Secretary Donley. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Bordallo. How does the Department of Air Force's budget request
for FY13 reconcile with legislative language set forth in Division A,
Section 8012 of Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-74)
which states that `` . . . during fiscal year 2012, the civilian
personnel of the Department of Defense may not be managed on the basis
of any end-strength, and the management of such personnel during that
fiscal year shall not be subject to any constraint or limitation (known
as an end-strength)'', and more specifically, that the fiscal year 2013
budget request be prepared and submitted to the Congress as if this
provision were effective with regard to fiscal year 2013?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force does not manage its civilian
workforce by any constraint or limitation in terms of man-years, end-
strength, fulltime equivalent positions, or maximum number of
employees. Based on fiscal constraints, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense-directed civilian workforce budgetary targets for fiscal year
2012 achieved through strategic reviews to improve business operations,
streamline administrative functions, and eliminate low-priority/
overhead functions and expenses. For the fiscal year 2013 (FY13) budget
request, the Air Force determined the best workforce mix based on the
most-efficient and cost-effective means to perform the Air Force
mission. The FY13 budget request also accounted for budget constraints
while at the same time returning a flexible, agile, and ready
workforce.
Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, does the Air Force FY13 budget request reflect an
appropriately balanced workforce across all major capabilities,
functional areas, and requirements?
Secretary Donley. The fiscal year 2013 (FY13) budget request
reflects an appropriately balanced workforce that meets required budget
reductions that preserves readiness while avoiding a hollow force. The
Air Force's ``sourcing'' of functions and work between military,
civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with workload
requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as
well as applicable laws and statute. The FY13 budget request reflects
our best judgment today and represents a carefully coordinated approach
based on the Department of Defense's strategy and policy that balances
operational needs and fiscal reality. The Air Force remains committed
to meeting its statutory obligations to annually review missions,
functions, and workforce composition, including reliance on contracted
services, and to ensure the workforce is appropriately balanced and
aligned to our most critical priorities.
Ms. Bordallo. The Department's budget request overview included
discussion of improved buying power and how acquisitions are managed.
To what extent is the Department of Air Force using its Inventory of
Contracts for Services to make such improvements and influence how it
manages the Air Force Total Force?
Secretary Donley. This is currently one of many tools available
internal to the Air Force to help manage our total force. Although we
have fully complied with Department of Defense Guidance each year,
there is room to improve the Air Force's use of this inventory of
contract services. To this end, we are working with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the other Services in order to determine the
best way to document and use our annual Inventory of Contracts for
Services as required by Title 10, Section 2330a, Procurement of
Services.
Ms. Bordallo. Did the Department of Air Force seek relief from DOD-
mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work
more cost-effectively performed by civilians?
Secretary Donley. As part of our fiscal year 2013 (FY13)
President's Budget submission, the Air Force did not seek relief from
Department of Defense (DOD) mandated civilian personnel levels. Our
overall strategic review of all civilian resource allowed the Air Force
to retain civilian end strength to satisfy our most critical insourcing
initiatives. While the Air Force uses civilian end strength as a target
for management, there are mechanisms in place to permit exceptions to
the target, if justified, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) approval. In order to pursue any further/new insourcing
initiatives, the Air Force would plan on requesting OSD approve the
corresponding civilian end strength increase as allowable growth given
it drives efficiencies or is a result of converting inherently
governmental workload to in-house DOD civilians. The Air Force is
committed to ensuring no inherently governmental functions are
outsourced or otherwise contracted.
Ms. Bordallo. If relief was not sought, does that mean that the
Department of Air Force is comfortable that all contracted services
currently procured by the Department are the most cost-effective source
of labor and minimize risk?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force's ``sourcing'' of functions and
work between military, civilian, and contracted services must be
consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness
and management needs, as well as applicable laws and statute. The
fiscal year 2013 budget request reflects our best judgment today and
represents a carefully coordinated approach based on the Department of
Defense's strategy and policy that balances operational needs and
fiscal reality. The Air Force remains committed to meeting its
statutory obligations to annually review missions, functions, and
workforce composition, including reliance on contracted services, and
to ensure the workforce is appropriately balanced and aligned to our
most critical priorities.
Ms. Bordallo. What assurances can you give me that as civilian
reductions or hiring freezes are occurring across Air Force
installations work is not shifting illegally to contract performance?
Secretary Donley. We are tracking, on a monthly basis, our use of
support contractors performing knowledge based services, service
support contractors, management support services, and advisory studies
to ensure that we achieve already planned/programmed reductions. These
actions, coupled with the current monthly tracking of the financial
obligations of contract usage, facilitate prevention of inappropriate
migration of workload from organic to contract support. In addition, we
worked closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) who developed a memo dated 1 Dec
2011 Prohibition on Converting Certain Functions to Contract
Performance. The basic intent of this memo was to inform leadership at
all levels and to reiterate the need to be cognizant of not converting
work performed by organic personnel to contract performance.
Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within the Air Force to
ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the
civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by
other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
Secretary Donley. The main process is the Air Force's planning,
programming, and budget execution process. The Air Force conducted a
comprehensive strategic review to increase efficiency, reduce overhead,
and eliminate redundancy while preserving or growing the most critical
mission areas in our civilian workforce. This force mix determination
will be reviewed annually as we submit our president's budget
submission to ensure that we maintain the most-efficient and cost-
effective means to perform the Air Force mission, taking into account
current budget realities.
Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates' mandated.
Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions the Department of Air
Force has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as
well as any exceptions across that were requested but not approved, and
the justification for such.
Secretary Donley. The Office of the Secretary of Defense allowed
limited Service growth for certain requirements. The exceptions
include: portions of Combat Commander requirements, joint basing
requirements and acquisition workforce requirements. The warfighter
requirements were linked to Joint Staff-approved changes at Combatant
Commands where the Air Force is the executive agent. Allowances were
provided for Joint basing growth to ensure equivalency across all
Services as a result of the transfer of responsibilities, and the
associated manpower, from other Services. Acquisition workforce growth
was allowed due to the Department's focus on strengthening and growing
our in-house acquisition workforce.
Ms. Bordallo. To what extent have the existing data sets available
to Air Force planners, specifically the annual inventory of inherently
governmental and commercial activities, contributed to the functional
streamlining, organizational realignments, workforce shaping decisions,
and civilian personnel reductions reflected in last year's efficiencies
initiative and continued in this year's budget?
Secretary Donley. The efficiencies initiatives began under
Secretary Gates, and continued in this year's budget, were implemented
based on guidance to conduct organizational assessments and mission/
function prioritization. This guidance required the Air Force to:
baseline our organizations; assess and prioritize missions; eliminate
duplication; ensure workload distribution; and submit recommendations
for organization restructuring and reallocation of manpower, including
workforce reductions.
While the guidance did not specifically require the Department of
Defense components to use their annual inventory of inherently
governmental and commercial activities, it is one of many data sets and
workload quantification sources that the Air Force utilizes during the
planning, programming, and budget execution process.
Ms. Bordallo. In achieving the right mix for the Total Force, how
does the Department of Air Force use the annual inventory of inherently
governmental and commercial activities, and associated manpower mix
determinations, to identify the civilian workforce reductions reflected
in the past two budgets?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force conducted a comprehensive strategic
manpower review to size civilian workload contained in our past two
budgets with the goal to increase efficiency, reduce overhead, and
eliminate redundancy while preserving or growing the most critical
mission areas--not necessarily the Inherently Governmental and
Commercial Activities (IGCA) review. However, the Air Force continually
refines our Total Force skill mix to include civil servants and
contractors, to determine the most appropriate, efficient, and cost-
effective means of performing Air Force missions. As outlined in
Department of Defense Instruction, 1100.22, ``Policy and Procedures for
Determining Workforce Mix'', as well as Federal Acquisition Regulations
7.5, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 207.5, and Air Force
Instruction, 38-204, Programming United States Air Force USAF Manpower,
the Air Force adheres to the overarching guidance regarding workforce
mix determination. Also, the Air Force annually performs a
comprehensive annual IGCA review to ensure it has the proper work force
mix. This review categorizes all organically performed work as either
an inherently governmental function (which must be performed by organic
personnel) or a commercial activity (could be performed by organic or
contractor support).
Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across the
Department of Air Force, is the workload and functions associated with
those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual
inventory of functions?
Secretary Donley. The annual Inherently Governmental and Commercial
Activity review is not currently utilized to track eliminated or
divested functions, but rather, identifies current positions that are
either inherently governmental or a commercial activity in nature. As
efficiencies are realized, government positions identified with
performing those functions are removed from unit manning documents.
Contractor reductions associated with efficiencies are tracked via a
combination of financial commitments and organization surveys.
Ms. Bordallo. I'd like to ask you questions I posed to the service
vice chiefs during an October hearing. Why would Congress consider any
potential changes to recruiting and retention incentives such as
military retirement and health care or reductions to essential training
accounts when the military departments can't identify the cost of what
they pay for contracted services? So what is your military department
doing to reduce contracted services and work requirements instead of
just reducing dollars? If you are only reducing dollars then you are
likely setting up conditions to default to contractors in light of the
current civilian personnel constraints.
Secretary Donley. The Air Force knows the dollars obligated/
programmed for contracted services and continues toward implementing a
contractor manpower data collection system, similar to the system the
Army has developed, to manage the contractor full time equivalents
providing these services. The Air Force is using the planning,
programming, and budget execution process to ensure workload reductions
remain consistent with the contract dollar reduction. This force mix
determination is reviewed annually during the president's budget
submission process to ensure the Air Force maintains the most efficient
and cost-effective means to perform the Air Force mission taking into
account the current budget realities.
Ms. Bordallo. When the Air Force says they are going to divest the
block 30 inventory, does that mean that they are going to cut their
losses with just the block 30's that haven't hit the production or will
you be mothballing all block 30's in the inventory? How will this
affect Guam's strike/ISR capabilities?
General Schwartz. Fourteen Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft have been
delivered to the Air Force and an additional four are in production.
Pending congressional direction and consistent with appropriate
statutes and regulations, the Air Force will gauge interest for the
transfer of these eighteen aircraft to qualified entities, both
internal and external to the Department of Defense (DOD), who express
an interest. The Air Force does not plan to spend fiscal year 2012
funding for the remaining three Block 30 aircraft at this time.
In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council
reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that
high-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance force
structure could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U-2,
which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these
reduced requirements. There will be no impact to warfighting
capability, and peacetime support will be managed by the current Global
Force Management Process.
Ms. Bordallo. Have you worked with the Army to come up with a plan
to compensate or fill the gap for the loss of the C-27J platform and if
so, what is it?
General Schwartz. The Air Force and Army signed a Direct Support
Memorandum of Understanding on 27 January 2012. Divesting the C-27J
fleet does not create a capability gap as the Air Force continues to
maintain the more capable and cost effective C-130. The Air Force
remains fully committed to support time-sensitive, mission-critical
direct support airlift to the Army and will continue to provide direct
airlift support to the U.S. Army with the fleet of 318 C-130s.
Currently, C-130s are providing daily direct support airlift in the
Central Command area of responsibility.
Ms. Bordallo. Could either of you explain in more detail why you
proposed a larger cut in Air Guard & Reserve forces, than you did in
Active Duty forces? Will this impact the Air Forces deployment ops
tempo and if so, how?
General Schwartz. The new Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic
Guidance ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st
Century Defense'' directs the services to build a force that will be
smaller and leaner, flexible, ready and technologically advanced. To
deliver the capabilities required by this strategy, and remain within
funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all
service core functions. While remaining consistent with the new
strategy, the Air Force FY13 Budget submission achieves $8.7 billion in
savings across the Active and Reserve Components by retiring over 200
aircraft in FY13 and 286 aircraft over the Future Years Defense Plan.
Our programmed force reductions are wide-ranging and affect over 60
installations.
This was an integrated, Total Force effort--Active Duty, Reserve
and National Guard--working together to achieve our end state of a
ready and sustainable force that can meet our surge and rotational
requirements. My directive to the Air Force was to realign our forces
to better meet this new strategic guidance using the following four
principles: ensure the Total Force can fulfill surge requirements;
maintain a balance between components that allows us to fulfill
continuing rotational requirements at sustainable rates; retain the
recruiting, training and operational seasoning base required to sustain
the Total Force's needs into the future; and ensure the Reserve
Component remains relevant and engaged in both enduring and evolving
missions.
To meet this end, the Air National Guard (ANG) developed five
Capstone Principles to help guide this transition: allocate at least
one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize
concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG
resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia
construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support
Functions) relevant to the states. Similarly, our Reserve Component
used the following four principles: ensure aircraft reductions do not
negatively impact operational support to Combatant Commands; ensure
force structure movements do not create any new Air Force bills; ensure
risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected
increases in mission capability rates; and, consider locations that
continue to have an Air Force mission due to the presence of another
Air Force Component. This Total Force approach allowed us to maintain
the right Active/Air Guard/Reserve mix, which will allow us to meet our
operational demands with a leaner force while taking care of our
Airmen.
Ms. Bordallo. In reviewing the President's proposed FY13 budget it
appears many critical B-52 programs were cut. As the backbone of the
Air Force's nuclear and conventional bomber fleet, what is the Air
Force's plan to maintain a reliable and viable B-52 with such drastic
cuts?
General Schwartz. The Air Force continues to ensure the B-52 stays
relevant throughout its service life (2040) by focusing on bomber
sustainment and addressing diminishing manufacturing source (DMS)
issues in the fiscal year 2013 President's Budget. Efforts such as the
development of replacement visual displays in the restructured Combat
Network Communications Technology (CONECT) program and modernization of
the anti-skid braking system address existing supportability issues.
Multiple smaller efforts continue to add B-52 capability including
Military Standard 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade (1760 IWBU) and
Mode S/5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). Funding totals include
$202M for research, development, test and evaluation and $250M for
procurement across the Future Years Defense Plan. The B-52 remains the
backbone of the USAF manned strategic bomber force; we are actively
supporting the continued bomber presence in Guam and maintaining a high
state of nuclear mission readiness.
Ms. Bordallo. One of the cut programs is the CONECT program. It
provides much-needed digital communication and mission retasking
capability for our warfighters, which is essential for B-52 missions,
especially with the added emphasis on the Pacific theater. With this
program successfully finishing flight test, why would the Air Force cut
the production funding, and leave our crews with a temporary laptop
solution that doesn't satisfy the CONECT operational requirements?
General Schwartz. Based on competing budget priorities, the Air
Force restructured Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) to
address the sustainability issues within the program and the
replacement of legacy displays. The restructured program also funds
conversion of the temporary Evolutionary Datalink (EDL) system into a
permanent modification, which provides a viable (although less robust)
communication capability for the B-52. This decision was made as part
of a balanced investment strategy for the Air Force Nuclear Deterrence
portfolio. At the time the decision was made, CONECT had not completed
the flight test program, and the program faced significant cost,
schedule, and performance issues. The completion of MS C certification
later this year provides the Air Force an option to re-examine the
CONECT program in future budget cycles.
Ms. Bordallo. Another program proposed to be completely terminated
is the replacement of the B-52 radar. The reliability of the current
radar, which will continue to degrade, results in ever-increasing cost
and unacceptable impact to the probability of success of long missions.
With the nuclear and conventional importance of the B-52, how do we
maintain a much-needed capability without a radar replacement program?
General Schwartz. To meet higher priorities, the Air Force has
elected to maintain the current B-52 APQ-166 radar versus investing in
a replacement radar with higher near-term costs. Analysis indicates
that the current B-52 radar system is sustainable through the B-52's
service life (2040). Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) will
pursue reverse engineering/sustainment initiatives to address radar
reliability and availability to meet B-52 mission requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. In October when General Breedlove testified to this
committee, I asked him about the statutorily required inventory of
contracts for services. His response was that there the Air Force as in
an ongoing review that was ``looking at everything we do
contractually'' and particularly ``What is inherently governmental and
what should we be retaining as a blue suit requirement versus those
things that we contract for . . . '' and ``how does that relate to
those jobs that typically our civilians also do, civilians who are a
part of our Air Force.'' Can you please share the results of that
review and what the end-result has been in terms of realignment of
work? Please provide a list identifying services that have since been
cut or reduced, and instances where contracted work has been reassigned
to Airmen or Air Force civilians.
General Schwartz. The review to which General Breedlove was
referring was the inventory of contract services review requirements,
defined in Title 10, Section 2330a, Procurement of Services. The end
result is that we preliminarily identified approximately 400 contractor
full-time equivalents who may be performing inherently governmental
functions out of our full inventory of 143,184 contractor full-time
equivalents. This work spans the 91 instances reflected in government
Accountability Office (GAO) Report Number GAO-12-357, Defense
Acquisitions--Further Actions Needed to Improve Accountability for the
Department of Defense's Inventory of Contracted Services. This includes
a variety of acquisition and professional services, primarily technical
functions, such as accounting, quality control, management support
services, engineering and technical, financial, program management, and
other professional services. We are still working on our final
assessment and disposition. For those functions determined to be
inherently governmental, remedial actions may range from divestiture of
the service, restructuring the contract, or insourcing the function.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
Mr. Courtney. Please describe the anticipated mission and use of
the MC-12 once transferred to the Air National Guard. Do you see this
mission as a long-term, enduring mission for those units receiving this
platform? Is the USAF committed to the MC-12 program through the FYDP,
to include all necessary manpower and platform funding requirements?
Secretary Donley. Once transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG),
the MC-12W could provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, homeland
defense, and border patrol missions, as well as continue to support
deployed ISR operations. Once they reach Full Operational Capability
(FOC), the ANG will sustain two ``steady state'' Combat Air Patrols
(CAP), with the ability to surge to six total CAPs. In addition, the
Air Force will create an active duty associate unit to augment MC-12W
operations which will maintain long-term active duty Air Force
expertise/presence in MC-12W operations/capabilities. The active unit
will augment the ANG's steady state CAPs and have the capability to
surge to four CAPs if required for a total of ten Total Force MC-12W
CAPs. The MC-12W is an enduring Air Force capability that will stay
with us beyond the conclusion of the current engagements. The Air Force
has programmed all necessary funds and manpower through the FYDP.
Mr. Courtney. Please describe the anticipated mission and use of
the MC-12 once transferred to the Air National Guard. Do you see this
mission as a long-term, enduring mission for those units receiving this
platform? Is the USAF committed to the MC-12 program through the FYDP,
to include all necessary manpower and platform funding requirements?
General Schwartz. Once transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG),
the MC-12W could provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, homeland
defense, and border patrol missions, as well as continue to support
deployed ISR operations. Once they reach Full Operational Capability
(FOC), the ANG will sustain two ``steady state'' Combat Air Patrols
(CAP), with the ability to surge to six total CAPs. In addition, the
Air Force will create an active duty associate unit to augment MC-12W
operations which will maintain long-term active duty Air Force
expertise/presence in MC-12W operations/capabilities. The active unit
will augment the ANG's steady state CAPs and have the capability to
surge to four CAPs if required for a total of ten Total Force MC-12W
CAPs. The MC-12W is an enduring Air Force capability that will stay
with us beyond the conclusion of the current engagements. The Air Force
has programmed all necessary funds and manpower through the FYDP.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is an important
initiative intended to build capabilities and partnerships between the
U.S. military and our allies where our shared interest in defeating
insurgency and other threats are advanced through the operation of
aircraft familiar to the U.S. military and well suited to the relevant
missions. Is it the Air Force's intention that the LAS aircraft comply
with U.S. weapons, communications, and design standards in order for
U.S. military personnel and partners to work seamlessly?
Secretary Donley. The Afghan LAS aircraft will comply with U.S.
weapon, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military
personnel and partners to work seamlessly. That said, the LAS aircraft
program will also adhere to U.S. export policy governing military
equipment transfers to Afghanistan. Accordingly, the LAS aircraft
communications and weapons capabilities will be configured to the
envisioned future Afghan Air Force (AAF), but not necessarily state-of-
the-art U.S. Air Force capability. U.S. Air Force and NATO military
personnel will train and advise the AAF on maintaining and employing
the LAS aircraft. The aircraft will employ U.S. and NATO-standard
weaponry, interface with friendly forces via common communications
equipment and follow U.S. design standards to ensure safety and
maintainability.
Mr. Loebsack. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is an important
initiative intended to build capabilities and partnerships between the
U.S. military and our allies where our shared interest in defeating
insurgency and other threats are advanced through the operation of
aircraft familiar to the U.S. military and well suited to the relevant
missions. Is it the Air Force's intention that the LAS aircraft comply
with U.S. weapons, communications, and design standards in order for
U.S. military personnel and partners to work seamlessly?
General Schwartz. The Afghan LAS aircraft will comply with U.S.
weapon, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military
personnel and partners to work seamlessly. That said, the LAS aircraft
program will also adhere to U.S. export policy governing military
equipment transfers to Afghanistan. Accordingly, the LAS aircraft
communications and weapons capabilities will be configured to the
envisioned future Afghan Air Force (AAF), but not necessarily state-of-
the-art U.S. Air Force capability. U.S. Air Force and NATO military
personnel will train and advise the AAF on maintaining and employing
the LAS aircraft. The aircraft will employ U.S. and NATO-standard
weaponry, interface with friendly forces via common communications
equipment and follow U.S. design standards to ensure safety and
maintainability.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. The current FMS LAS requirement is 20 aircraft for
Afghanistan. Over the course of the next 10 to 15 years, do you
anticipate the LAS program expanding to other countries beyond
Afghanistan and if so, will the contract made with Afghanistan serve as
any type of ``program of record'' for future foreign military sales? Is
there a requirement within the FMS LAS program to Afghanistan that U.S.
forces will partner with Afghanistan to train and mentor them on the
system? If so, should the LAS platform be familiar to U.S. forces to
facilitate this training?
Secretary Donley. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is funded by
Afghan Security Forces Funds and provides a light attack capability
specifically for Afghanistan. This program is specifically for
Afghanistan and no plan currently exists to extend the platform beyond
Afghanistan. However, it could be used as a model for future light
attack foreign military sales. There is a requirement within the Afghan
LAS program for U.S. forces to partner with the Afghan Air Force to
train and advise them on the system. Although there are advantages to
U.S. forces being familiar with the LAS platform, this is not an
absolute requirement. The USAF will leverage experienced USAF
instructor pilots, maintainers and logisticians capable of quickly
learning the LAS system and then training and advising their Afghan
counterparts.
Mr. Shuster. What is the Air Force justification for not acquiring
the technical data rights to the F117 engine? Does the Air Force have a
plan to acquire such data rights?
Secretary Donley. Under the procurement and sustainment contracts,
the Air Force has never purchased data rights for the F117 engine
because: (1) under the C-17 contract, Boeing acquired the engines from
Pratt & Whitney (P&W) as a commercial item; and (2) under the Air Force
contract to acquire engines, the Air Force used a commercial contract.
P&W paid for the development of these engines. Also, the C-17
sustainment program included Contractor Logistics Support for life;
therefore, there was no need to acquire data rights. Since then, the
Air Force has decided to break out the engine technical overhaul,
supply chain management and systems engineering from the C-17 support.
As a result, the Air Force is currently working two separate contract
actions to acquire licensed use of P&W's technical manual, and to
acquire the data rights for the System Engineering and Supply Chain
Management processes for the F117 engine. In December 2011, P&W agreed
to a General Terms Agreement release of their technical manual for
basic F117 repairs, and the Air Force will further pursue Government
Purpose Rights on historical supply chain management and systems
engineering to enhance future competition.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. During our review of the FY11 Omnibus reprogramming,
it came to light that funds to support the operations in Libya would be
funded internally. The total realignment from within Operation &
Maintenance, Air Force was estimated at over $400 million. What was the
final realignment in FY11, and with realignments of this magnitude,
what mission requirements were not supported due to this internal
support of the Libyan operation?
Secretary Donley. The final FY11 Operation & Maintenance (O&M), Air
Force costs in support of operations in Libya were $408 million (both
flying hours and non-flying hours). In addition, O&M, Air Force had to
reimburse the Air National Guard O&M $99 million for flying hours flown
in support of Title 10 missions.
The flying hours were sourced from the Air Force's baseline flying
hour program. Instead of the hours being flown at home station, they
were flown in support of Libya. The pilots still received some level of
training therefore there was no loss to the flying hour training
program. The remainder of the support funding supported transportation,
travel, base support, communication and global lift and sustainment. To
fully support Libyan operations, funding was sourced from the Airlift
Readiness Account and lower priority base operating requirements.
Mr. Conaway. The MCRS-16 study recommends using C-17s for
intratheater airlift but several senior mobility leaders in the past
have been concerned that we are overusing the 30-year/30,000-hour life
expectancy of that airframe too quickly. Can you tell me what the
average age and number of hours our C-17 fleet currently has on it?
General Schwartz. As of 29 February 2012, the average age of the C-
17 fleet was 8.9 years and the average number of hours per aircraft was
10,104.
Mr. Conaway. During our review of the FY11 Omnibus reprogramming,
it came to light that funds to support the operations in Libya would be
funded internally. The total realignment from within Operation &
Maintenance, Air Force was estimated at over $400 million. What was the
final realignment in FY11, and with realignments of this magnitude,
what mission requirements were not supported due to this internal
support of the Libyan operation?
General Schwartz. The final FY11 Operation & Maintenance (O&M), Air
Force costs in support of operations in Libya were $408 million (both
flying hours and non-flying hours). In addition, O&M, Air Force had to
reimburse the Air National Guard O&M $99 million for flying hours flown
in support of Title 10 missions.
The flying hours were sourced from the Air Force's baseline flying
hour program. Instead of the hours being flown at home station, they
were flown in support of Libya. The pilots still received some level of
training therefore there was no loss to the flying hour training
program. The remainder of the support funding supported transportation,
travel, base support, communication and global lift and sustainment. To
fully support Libyan operations, funding was sourced from the Airlift
Readiness Account and lower priority base operating requirements.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. General Schwartz: With the reduction in strategic lift
assets for the Air Force and the previous reduction in the
prepositioned stocks of the Army and the Marine Corps, what missions
will be eliminated to meet the equipment availability? How will the
Administration be able to accomplish all combatant commander theater
plans with reduced strategic lift capabilities?
General Schwartz. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. I understand that only about 15% of Air Force's engine
sustainment contracts are competed. What is your estimate of the
savings that could be achieved from more effective use of competition
in this area?
Secretary Donley. The United States Air Force is committed to
competition in the propulsion enterprise to achieve the best value for
our warfighter while preserving system safety. Typically, life-cycle
sustainment decisions regarding data rights made in the early phases of
a propulsion system's acquisition significantly impact the pace and
degree of competition for an engine during the sustainment phase.
Today, the Air Force leverages competition at three different
levels of an engine during sustainment:
1. At the weapon system/whole engine level, the Air Force attempts
to gain sufficient access (e.g., via licensing) to sustainment data in
order to facilitate competition of engine overhaul and supply chain
management. As an example, the Air Force secured the necessary
sustainment data to compete the sustainment, to include overhaul and
supply chain management, of the F103 engine (KC-10 aircraft).
2. At the component repair/replace decision point, the Air Force
leverages the use of component repairs to the maximum extent
practicable. Components can often be repaired more economically than
replaced with new components, and a repair capability provides the Air
Force with an additional source of supply. For example, the Air Force
introduced a repair for an air seal in the F100 engine (F-15/F-16
aircraft) reducing the need for new air seal replacement by 90 percent.
3. At the individual part level, the Air Force is engaged in
several initiatives to create alternative sources. These initiatives
include expanding the base of new manufacturers beyond the Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and evaluating potential sources for
repaired and used parts. To expand to new manufacturers, the Air Force
encourages industry to submit Source Approval Requests (SARs) to obtain
certification to compete as alternative sources. The SAR process is
designed to balance safety with competition and cost improvement
objectives. Evaluating sources for repaired and used parts, the Air
Force recently competed new, OEM parts against used parts with
exceptional results. The Air Force achieved a $36M savings (projected
cost of $43M, versus contract cost of $7M) by leveraging a source of
used fan blades for the F108 (KC-135 engine). The Air Force continues
to expand this type of individual part competition and the pool of
alternative sources.
Mr. Hunter. The Air Force awarded an $11.75 billion sole source
maintenance contract for continuing the C-17 Contractor Logistics
Support (CLS) using the justification and approval rationale from 2009
without change.
What actions do you intend to take with regard to this issue to
ensure competition in sustainment of weapon systems?
What are you doing to increase opportunities for competition,
particularly at the subsystem and component level where broad
commercial capabilities often exist?
Secretary Donley. On November 29, 2009, the Air Force Service
Acquisition Executive approved a justification and approval document
that permitted the award of a sole source contract to the Boeing
Company to provide Performance Based Logistics (PBL) for the C-17
weapon system. The Air Force entered into this contract with the Boeing
Company on October 1, 2011.
The structure of the contract allows the program office to evaluate
Boeing support on a monthly basis as well as develop alternative
sustainment strategies should the contractor not produce desired
outcomes at committed-to costs. While not a traditional form of
competition, the option to move work from Boeing to the Government has
proven to be a successful incentive and form of competition for the C-
17 program.
The C-17 Program Office is pursuing further competition for
sustainment of the F117 engine. The Program Office is planning a
competitive award for Performance Based Service Arrangement (PBSA) for
overhaul of F117-PW-100 (C-17) engines, to include F117 depot Supply
Chain Management (SCM). This competitive acquisition strategy should
yield F117 engine sustainment at reduced costs, while sustaining F117
performance outcomes.
To increase competition at the weapon system subsystem and
component level, Air Force Instruction 63-101 (October 2011) mandates
that all source of repair analysis (SORA) determinations be conducted
at the System/Subsystem level. In the C-17 PBL program, all depot
maintenance is placed on contract to Boeing, the product support
integrator (PSI) responsible for performance outcomes. The PSI
contracts with either Government depots or other product support
providers, for repairs in support of the weapon system. Boeing and the
technical repair centers negotiate repair quantities quarterly, based
on the repair center capacity and best value to the Government. For
example, two viable sources of C-17 airframe depot repair are
maintained, fostering competition, supporting required C-17 maintenance
and modification throughput, reducing program costs and depot schedule
risk.
Mr. Hunter. As the Air Force moves to transition engines such as
the F119, F117, F135 into Tinker Air Logistics Center, what is being
done to ensure competition and to reduce organizational conflict of
interest in the supply chain relating to the servicing of systems,
subsystems, and components?
General Schwartz. The F119 has transitioned to organic depot
maintenance under a partnership arrangement with Pratt & Whitney.
However, the supply chain management (SCM) responsibilities for the
F119 engine remains with the contractor. The Air Force made the
decision to keep SCM responsibilities for the F-22 airframe and engine
with their respective contractors for another five years based on the
Jan 10 F-22 Product Support Strategy Business Case Analysis to reduce
risk to the government by allowing the F-22 weapon system to fully
mature. The F-22 Program Manager will revisit the BCA decision in five
years to determine if SCM responsibilities should be transitioned to
organic execution.
The United States Air Force (USAF) approach to increasing
competition for the F117 engine is to secure access to the overhaul and
component repair manuals as well as other technical data. Access to
these manuals and data will allow the Air Force to compete touch labor
and supply chain management. In addition, because the F117 is a
commercial derivative engine, the USAF is working to approve Non-
Original Equipment Manufacturer parts and repairs by using the Source
Approval Process (SAR) detailed in AFMCI 23-113. The USAF will
implement this strategy over a two year transition period to ensure all
potential offerors are provided an opportunity to compete. This process
injects competition at the engine and component levels for parts and
repairs. The strategy is designed to balance operational risk and cost
savings while providing support at the best competitive cost.
The F135 engine is still in acquisition and details of the
sustainment strategy are still being finalized.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ
Mr. Critz. The recent Air Force structure changes announced the
closing of an Air Reserve station in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, outside
of the BRAC process. This base serves 1,400 Active, Reserve and Guard
units of both the Air Force and the Navy. The base just completed an
$8.1 million housing project and is set to break ground on a $13.8
million joint Reserve center. The Air Force leases a hundred acres at
this base. It includes access to four runways, an FAA control tower,
medical and crash fire response and zero-cost airfield maintenance,
including snow removal and capital improvements for $20,000 a year. The
Pittsburgh region has significant success with recruiting and that the
911th Airlift Wing is one of the highest manned units in the Air Force
Reserve Command. This being said, I can't understand why the Air Force
would make the decision to close this Air Reserve station. If this is
truly an issue with retiring C-130s, then let's bring in new C-130s to
this very efficient and very effective wing so that this cost-effective
base can continue to serve both the Air Force and the Pittsburgh
community. Can you provide, for congressional review, the cost analysis
of the 911th Airlift Wing compared to others throughout the Air Force
that was used as the justification for closing this base?
Secretary Donley. While cost savings are part of the decision-
making process, the most important factor is the Air Force's ability to
provide the capabilities required by the new Defense Strategic
Guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense.'' This new strategy directs the services to build a
leaner, more flexible, and technologically advanced force. We made
these decisions after careful analysis. As we assessed intra-theater
airlift using scenarios consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force studies determined
excess capacity exists in the Air Force fleet. The reduced intra-
theater airlift requirement permitted retirement of 65 C-130H aircraft.
The C-130s proposed for retirement are among the oldest in the USAF
fleet and would require costly modifications and modernization efforts
to keep the aircraft viable. Twenty-seven bases worldwide have C-130s
assigned; of the 27 bases, either force structure reductions or
aircraft transfers affected 18 of them. Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station
has seven C-130H2 aircraft assigned to the 911th Airlift Wing. The FY13
President Budget submission retires all seven C-130H2s in FY13,
resulting in a savings of $41 million across the Future Years Defense
Plan and avoidance of approximately $77 million in modernization costs.
With the reduction of the C-130H2s, Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station
becomes excess to Air Force needs. Since the number of full time
civilians assigned to the installations below the BRAC threshold
defined by 10 USC Sec. 2687(a)(1), I have recommended the base for
closure. It is currently the only Air Force Reserve installation that
meets these criteria, and as such, presents an opportunity to preserve
national resources. After installation shutdown actions are complete,
we expect an annual installation savings of approximately $25 million
for the Air Force. In addition, manpower savings associated with the C-
130 divestment will result in approximately $16 million savings the
first year, and $32 million annual savings after that. Other factors we
considered in the decision are that Air Force Reserve bases at
Youngstown and Niagara are both within reasonable commuting distance
from Pittsburgh. As a result, those bases may be able to support
continued military service for those members of the 911th Airlift Wing
who wish to remain serving but are unable to relocate to more distant
Air Force Reserve
Mr. Critz. Regarding the reduction of 65 C-130 tactical airlifters
getting us to a total fleet projection of 318: The Air Force planned in
the fiscal year 2012 budget to eventually modernize and upgrade 383 C-
130's and procure 38 C-27J's to support intratheater, homeland defense,
stead-state rotational, building partnership capacity, and Army time-
sensitive/mission-critical airlift requirements. The Air Force's
minimum C-130 force structure, as concluded in the Mobility Capability
and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), was to go no lower than 335 C-
130s under the QDR 2010 defense strategy. The budget request for fiscal
year 2013 plans to divest intertheater (strategic) and intratheater
(tactical) force structure in support of the new defense strategy. Air
Force officials have stated that ``Case 3'' of the MCRS-16 was the
analytical underpinning for new mobility force structure associated
with the new 2012 defense strategy. As stated above, Air Force minimum
C-130 force structure as concluded in MCRS-16 was to go no lower than
335 C-130s. However, MCRS-16 did not take into account United States
Code Title 32 Air National Guard or Army Guard airlift missions that
would be required to support State Governor mobilization missions nor
did it account for the Army's time-sensitive/mission-critical mission
and noted that additional C-130s beyond the planned program of record
of 335 aircraft and 38 C-27J aircraft may be required. Additionally,
pre-9/11 the Army was around 480,000 strong with 530 C-130s, and now we
are drawing down to similar force levels, 490,000, with only 318 C-130s
planned. How will 318 C-130s support a force of 490,000 when pre-9/11
historical lift capacity indicates otherwise, and MCRS-16 Case 3 states
that 335 C-130s PLUS 38 C-27Js is also not enough to execute Title 32
and Army time-sensitive missions? Is the Air Force's plan to reduce or
restrict Title 32 and other Army requirements?
Secretary Donley. The 2013 Presidential Budget Request reduced the
C-130 fleet size to 318 aircraft to meet the requirement that was
outlined in the new strategy presented by the President and the
Secretary of Defense. The fleet is sized to fulfill intra-theater (270
aircraft) and Direct Support Mission (48 aircraft). The new strategy
reduces the requirements as forces are no longer sized to meet two
near-simultaneous large scale campaigns. The MCRS-16 had previously
influenced sizing with Case 1 (335 C-130s) and Case 3 (270 C-130s).
However, Case 1 was based on two near-simultaneous large-scale
campaigns and, per the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is no longer
a valid force-sizing scenario under the new strategy. Case 3, on the
other hand, is consistent with the new strategy. Although the MCRS
scenarios did not examine the Direct Support Mission, Case 3 did
include airlift to support two domestic missions, a major regional
disaster, and a Homeland Defense event to inform its 270 intra-theater
aircraft requirements.
Mr. Critz. Part of my concern is that we are actually adding duties
to the Air Force's C-130s, because they are going to be doing the C-27J
lift as well. Just as a sort of general idea, I look at the C-27J, it
was going to be sort of the pick-up truck and the C-130 might be more
like a tractor trailer truck. I'm just curious if the C-130 is going to
be able to get into the same airports as the C-27, and is it really a
cost savings or are we going to start saying well we can't get into
these places so we're going to up the tempo for the Chinooks to do what
the C-130s can't do. My question is, long-term--this is a short-term
savings--is it also a long-term savings? Have we looked at the 20-30
year life cycle of these aircraft?
Secretary Donley. According to the RAND USAF Intra-Theater Airlift
Fleet Mix Analysis, Oct 2010; during sea-level/standard day conditions,
the C-27J and C-130J require 2000 ft/2200 ft runway respectively.
However, under high pressure altitude/high temperature conditions which
are representative of the majority of current operations in
Afghanistan, the C-130J only requires 2600 feet while the C-27J
requires 2700 feet with approximately 43% less payload. Further
analysis of take off capability for the C-27J, C-130J, and C-130H
reveals very similar short-field take off characteristics, with
relatively miniscule differences in take off capability. The C-27J is a
niche capability providing access to airfields that are 1700 feet or
less in length. While this capability is not without value, current
operations in deployed locations show that there are no airfields being
used by the C-27J that cannot be accessed by the C-130J.
In regard to long-term savings, there are substantial long-term
savings associated with the divestiture of the C-27J. The 25-year life-
cycle cost of the aircraft is $308M based on the May, 2011 Service Cost
Position. Overall long-term cost avoidance for divesting the previously
programmed fleet of 38 aircraft is $11.7B.
Mr. Critz. What are the Air Force's plans for the 21 C-27s already
procured?
Secretary Donley. The final disposition determination of the C-27J
fleet will not be made until the 2013 National Defense Authorization
Act is signed into law. The full range of disposition options is being
considered.
Mr. Critz. The Air Force's decision to delay orders for 179 F-35s
over the next five years will likely have an impact on overall program
cost, and the cost-per-aircraft. This will affect our international
partners as well as our own bottom line. In your budget analysis, what
cost increases were assumed for the purchase delays?
Secretary Donley. The Department of Defense made a decision
reflected in the President's Budget 2013 (PB13) budget request to delay
the order of 179 F-35s (all three variants). The Air Force share of
this delay includes a reduced procurement of 98 conventional take-off
and landing (CTOL) aircraft from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017.
When a decision is made to delay procurement of aircraft, there are two
primary effects on unit recurring flyaway cost. First, the contractor
will not be as far down the learning curve in procurement and so
average costs of the smaller quantity procured will be higher. Second,
fixed contractor costs will be spread over fewer quantities. The
increase in CTOL (F-35A) Unit Recurring Flyaway cost between PB12 and
PB13 are shown below.
CTOL URF
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buy Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY12 (SAR 10) $112.1 $96.7 $91.2 $80.6 $84.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY13 (SAR 11) $123.2 $122.0 $107.7 $93.4 $91.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
URF Increase $11.1 $25.3 $16.5 $12.8 $6.6
($)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
URF Increase 9.9% 26.2% 18.1% 15.9% 7.8%
(%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite this projected increase in unit cost, the Air Force felt it
a prudent choice to delay these quantities so as to reduce the risk of
concurrent development and procurement. Since flight testing is not
scheduled to be complete until fiscal year 2017, there is risk that
planes procured now may require expensive retrofits later. The Air
Force felt reducing this risk of concurrency outweighs any short-term
increases in unit cost driven by the delay in procurement quantities
within the Future Years Defense Plan. In addition, these delays allow
the aircraft prime contractor time to stabilize production, decrease
scrap and rework, and work through final finishes/flight line issues.
Mr. Critz. In an interview with Defense News 27 February, DOD
Comptroller Robert Hale, in response to a question regarding the
cancelling of the C-27J program, stated that ``In the case of the C-27,
we have enough C-130s to do most of that mission.'' What percentage of
the mission will C-130s not be able to cover, and what asset(s) will
cover the remainder of that mission?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force is postured to fully meet the
Direct Support airlift mission requirements. C-27J was developed and
procured to provide direct support airlift to Army urgent needs in
difficult environments such as Afghanistan where we thought the C-130
might not be able to operate effectively. However, in practice, we did
not experience the anticipated airfield constraints for C-130
operations in Afghanistan; furthermore, we expect these constraints to
be marginal in future scenarios. The Air Force has analyzed scenarios
consistent with the new strategy and determined a range of 22-50
aircraft would meet direct support airlift requirements. The 2013
Presidential Budget Request reduced the C-130 fleet size to 318
aircraft to meet the requirements of the new strategy. The fleet is
sized to fulfill intra-theater airlift (270 aircraft) and the Direct
Support airlift mission (48 aircraft).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER
Mr. Ruppersberger. What contracting structure will the Air Force
pursue regarding its EELV procurement? Has Air Force determined a
quantity or duration for the next EELV acquisition, starting in FY13?
If so, what types of ``off-ramps'' are you considering to the block
buy, if/when a New Entrant is qualified?
Secretary Donley. The contracting structure is two-fold: release a
Request for Proposal (RFP) that will properly inform a government
decision on the quantity and length of the first block buy; and then
award a contract based on analysis of the most advantageous approach to
the government. The Air Force has not determined a final quantity or
duration for the contract starting in fiscal year 2013. The Air Force
believes it is essential to have more fidelity in the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) pricing strategy before making a long
term contractual agreement. In order to validate the most advantageous
production rate and commitment period, and to use maximum leverage in
negotiations, the Government will require the contractor to propose a
range of fixed prices for various rate and commitment options. The
Government decision on the specific contractual commitment will be
balanced among price, operational requirements, budget realities
(including all fiscal law constraints), and potential for competition.
Requirements above the commitment will be met through a full-and-open
competition among all certified providers. While United Launch Alliance
(ULA) is currently the only responsible source certified to launch EELV
class payloads, research indicates there are potential New Entrants;
however, the earliest timeframe to meet all EELV-class launch
requirements appears to be fiscal year 2016-2017.
To facilitate the certification of potential New Entrants, the Air
Force has identified two opportunities that providers may bid on--the
Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) mission, targeted for launch in
late fiscal year 2014, and the Space Test Program (STP) mission,
targeted for launch in late fiscal year 2015. These EELV-class missions
have a higher risk tolerance and will provide an opportunity for
potential New Entrants to prove their capability for certification.
When the Phase I Block Buy expires, assuming New Entrants are
certified, we will have a full and open competition for launch services
for the second Block Buy.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Currently the Air Force has 39 rocket booster
cores purchased from ULA for 35 missions that have not yet launched,
some purchased back in 1998. Given this substantial backlog of orders,
why haven't prices come down already? Indeed, why have they continued
to increase by more than 50 percent?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force currently has 16 rocket booster
cores on order to support 16 mission launches. For all National
Security Space partners (National Reconnaissance Office, Navy, Air
Force, and Australia) combined there are 32 rocket booster cores for 28
mission launches on order; 17 of these are currently in the production
flow to be launched in fiscal year 2012 and 2013. Another 9 cores are
projected to be launched in fiscal year 2014, while the remaining five
are projected to fly out by fiscal year 2016, exhausting the backlog.
The backlog does not affect the current vehicle pricing as the
program's initial inventory of components and smaller follow-on lot
quantity buys are being depleted. Additionally, production breaks,
production rework, subsequent recertification, annual inflation and a
reduced supplier business base have driven higher unit costs,
particularly from propulsion system suppliers. As a result of these
factors, United Launch Alliance's costs to build the launch vehicle
have increased.
Mr. Ruppersberger. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total
Ownership Cost data for U-2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the
cost per operational hour (that is, the cost per hour executing
missions) for Global Hawk is lower than U-2. This seems to be a much
more relevant number than cost per flying hour. How does this square
with your claim that Global Hawk operating costs are higher?
Secretary Donley. The Global Hawk Block 30 has not matured to the
point where a true apples-to-apples cost comparison of operational
costs is possible. Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis
during the FY13 budget review using the Air Force Total Ownership Cost
(AFTOC) database where Global Hawk and U-2 operating and support costs
were compared using the operational cost per flying hour (CPFH) metric.
This metric reflects costs associated with the sum total of a
platform's flying hours including training hours and the flying hours
associated with mission execution. The AFTOC figures for FY11 show the
U-2 had $32K per hour and the RQ-4 also had $32K per hour. The Air
Force did not begin flying the RQ-4 Block 30 until March 2011, so there
is only six months of representative flying hour information in the
database. Also, the Air Force did not fly the RQ-4 Block 30 with the
SIGINT sensor in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying this payload in
April 2012 and once operational, we expect the Global Hawk CPFH to
increase relative to those of the U-2. Given these flying hour cost
considerations, and the large investment required for the RQ-4, the Air
Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and save a net of $2.5B.
Mr. Ruppersberger. The Department based its Global Hawk Block 30
divestment decision on it being more expensive to operate than the U-2.
Can you explain how the Department determined these costs?
Secretary Donley. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Mr. Johnson. Secretary Donley: How long will the A-10 aircraft
remaining in service under your budget proposal stay in the fleet?
Secretary Donley. Under our current plans, the A-10 will remain in
the Air Force inventory through 2035. At that time, the average age of
remaining A-10s in the fleet will be approximately 53 years old.
Mr. Johnson. General Schwartz: Even after the B-2 is not adequately
survivable in the least permissive air defense environments, the U.S.
Armed Forces will have the F-35, the F-22, cruise missiles, prompt
global strike capability, and long-range stealthy unmanned strike
aircraft. To complement this set of impressive strike systems, what
unique capabilities will a manned ``next-generation'' bomber provide?
Please specify those unique capabilities the bomber would provide such
that its role is not redundant given the other systems at the disposal
of the Armed Forces.
General Schwartz. The Long Range Strike Bomber's unique
capabilities include long range, significant payload capacity,
operational flexibility, and survivability in anti-access environments.
The Long Range Strike Bomber will provide the President with the
option to hold any target at risk at any point on the globe. Its long
range, large payload, and survivability will provide operational
flexibility and necessary capacity to satisfy Joint commander needs
across the range of military operations. Fighters provide great value
in shorter range engagements, but offer limited capability and capacity
to service targets deep within enemy territory, especially if theater
basing is constrained or unavailable.
The Long Range Strike Bomber will employ a broad mix of standoff
and direct attack munitions to provide effects within hours across the
spectrum of conflict, from deterrence to raids to campaigns. While
standoff weapons provide an essential capability to prosecute targets
in dense anti-access environments, their significant expense and
limited quantity constrain their capacity to address an extensive
target set. Further, standoff weapons are less effective against mobile
targets due to the fleeting nature of the targets coupled with the
finite speed of the weapons. A survivable bomber fleet is necessary to
penetrate enemy air defenses and deliver the volume of munitions
required to address the potential target set.
In addition, bombers remain a key element of our nuclear deterrence
capability and are the only systems that can be surged, relocated, and
recalled. The Long Range Strike Bomber will be designed from the outset
to be capable of nuclear weapons employment and certified for nuclear
operations in time to meet United States Strategic Command's nuclear
force structure requirements.
Despite upgrades, our aging bomber inventories are increasingly at
risk to modern air defenses and are becoming increasingly difficult and
expensive to maintain and modernize. The Air Force plans to field 80-
100 Long Range Strike Bombers beginning in the mid-2020s to ensure they
are available before the current aging bomber fleet begins to go out of
service.
Mr. Johnson. General: We're retiring A-10s, unmanned systems
provide useful air-to-ground capabilities but are controlled from
thousands of miles away, and the F-35 can't fully replicate the close
air support capabilities of the A-10. In future land warfare scenarios,
how are we going to provide close air support to troops in combat?
General Schwartz. The remaining A-10, F-16, MQ-9, MQ-1, F-15E, B-1,
& B-52 aircraft force structure will meet the requirements for air-to-
ground and Close Air Support capability. This aircraft force structure
is based on conducting one large-scale combined-arms campaign in a
single region while simultaneously denying the objectives of, or
imposing unacceptable costs on, an opportunistic aggressor in a second
region. Multi-role platforms were preferred over the A-10 due to
providing greater utility across the range of potential missions for
which the Air Force is directed to prepare.
Mr. Johnson. General: Does the F-35 fully replicate the close air
support capabilities of the A-10?
General Schwartz. When test and development is complete and the
USAF has sufficient capability and capacity of Joint Strike Fighters to
begin replacing our legacy fleet, the F-35 will have the appropriate
capabilities to safely and effectively conduct the close air support
(CAS) mission, similar to our F-16 and F-15E fleets. While not
optimized for CAS like the A-10, the F-35 will be able to conduct this
mission and survive in the higher threat scenarios we expect to face in
the future. Although the F-35 will eventually replace the A-10, the
USAF is planning to keep A-10s in our fleet to provide CAS for ground
forces until at least the 2030s. Replacement of the single-mission
focused A-10 with the multi-role F-35 provides the USAF and the
Department of Defense a more affordable solution to retire and replace
our aging legacy fleet while ensuring our ability to meet National
Military Strategy requirements.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. HECK
Dr. Heck. The F-35 provides a significant challenge to the Nevada
Test and Training Range (NTTR). The F-35 has new unique capabilites in
the way that it detects and engages ground threats (Surface to Air
Missile Systems, Aquisition Radars, etc.) F-35 targets are not only
detected via radio signals and infared signatures, but also proper
visual signatures. At this time, the NTTR does not have ground target
systems that can provide all three parameters to the F-35s being
trained at the NTTR.
1) Does the Air Force see this as a challenge in supporting current
and future F-35 training within the existing NTTR infrastructure?
2) How does the Air Force intend on employing the existing NTTR
capability in support of that training?
3) If there are identified shortfalls in support of F-35 training,
what are they, what are the capabilities required to alleviate them,
and what are the associated costs and priorities for each needed
capability?
4) If capabilites are needed, when do they need to be in place to
support propper F-35 training?
5) What are the current personnel authorization changes at Nellis
AFB or the NTTR resulting from the current F-35 program in FY13 budget
and are they quantified at this time?
Secretary Donley. The unique capabilities of the F-35 do create
challenges for the Air Force in providing support for future training
at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). However, these challenges
are being addressed and will be met through various avenues of
approach. The Air Force is in the process of investigating and
acquiring threat emitters that will be used to meet the requirements of
the F-35. Additionally, many of the challenges posed by the F-35 will
be met by creating a training environment that is not only composed of
traditional threats and threat emitters, but will synthesize virtual
threats creating a combined Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) training
environment. This composition will allow the NTTR and other ranges
supporting the F-35 to provide necessary training.
The NTTR will employ its existing capabilities, along with those in
the acquisition process, to provide the ``live'' portion of the LVC
concept. To meet the unique sensor requirements of the F-35, the NTTR
is developing a CONOPs for a dry ``sensor fusion'' range that will
consist of realistic targets/decoys. Additionally, the NTTR is
investigating the use of assets currently located at other ranges to
increase its capabilities. The NTTR is working with Pacific Air Forces
to examine the option of entering into a phased ``threat'' sharing
agreement that will provide additional threat density and realistic
threat emitters to meet the F-35 training requirements. The first phase
will only include one threat emitter. While the NTTR currently provides
the best training for F-22 and 5th gen aircraft and has the best target
sets available, these target sets alone are not sufficient to provide
realistic training when multiple sensors (EO, visual, Radar) are fused
into a single picture. (These limitations also exist within current 4th
generation training.) Current emitters are also insufficient to provide
adequate density to fully replicate threat environments. To meet these
shortfalls Air Combat Command (ACC) is procuring more threat emitters
for NTTR; however it is impractical to procure enough emitters to fully
represent threats anticipated in current operational plans. ACC intends
to use LVC training to overcome these shortfalls by providing
sufficient threat density and realistic training to `stress' pilots.
New targets need to be in-place by 1 August 2014 when the first F-35s
are scheduled to arrive at the Air Force Weapons School. There are no
personnel authorization changes at the NTTR resulting from the current
F-35 program in the FY13 budget.
Dr. Heck. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop:
1) Secretary Donnelly, in FY2013, the Air Force has requested
$135.4 million in RDT&E funds in the Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile--Engineering and Manufacturing Development funding line (PE
0604851F). Air Force budget justification documents cite a sub-element
request of $8.0 million for a new start Solid Rocket Motor
Modernization program. Specifically, related justification documents
state that the Air Force plans to use these funds to:
``Accomplish studies to investigate the application of new
technologies in the Minuteman III booster stack. Evaluate current
Minuteman III solid rocket motor requirements and update as required
based on legacy system issues and availability of mature technology
that will reduce total ownership costs. Prepare for release of requests
for proposals.''
What ``new technologies'' do you foresee being investigated during
these studies? Budget documents show no funds requested in the out-
years for this effort. With no follow-on funding requested, how will
any of these technologies be fully developed?
Secretary Donley. New technology candidates for insertion into a
possible solid rocket motor program include components the Air Force
has developed within the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program
(PAP). Included in these are advanced propellants, igniters, composite
case materials, case insulation, thrust vector actuators, and nozzles.
In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force will analyze the maturity level of
available technologies and identify the most promising candidates.
ICBM Dem/Val matures technology to a Technology Readiness Level
(TRL) 6 and then makes it available for use within a program where it
can be fully developed and integrated into a production effort. The
candidates identified in fiscal year 2013 will be assessed for use in a
future Minuteman III Solid Rocket Motor Modernization program as well
as in any ICBM follow-on program considered in the Ground Based
Strategic Deterrence (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives, which is funded
in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014.
Dr. Heck. The F-35 provides a significant challenge to the Nevada
Test and Training Range (NTTR). The F-35 has new unique capabilites in
the way that it detects and engages ground threats (Surface to Air
Missile Systems, Aquisition Radars, etc.) F-35 targets are not only
detected via radio signals and infared signatures, but also proper
visual signatures. At this time, the NTTR does not have ground target
systems that can provide all three parameters to the F-35s being
trained at the NTTR.
1) Does the Air Force see this as a challenge in supporting current
and future F-35 training within the existing NTTR infrastructure?
2) How does the Air Force intend on employing the existing NTTR
capability in support of that training?
3) If there are identified shortfalls in support of F-35 training,
what are they, what are the capabilities required to alleviate them,
and what are the associated costs and priorities for each needed
capability?
4) If capabilites are needed, when do they need to be in place to
support propper F-35 training?
5) What are the current personnel authorization changes at Nellis
AFB or the NTTR resulting from the current F-35 program in FY13 budget
and are they quantified at this time?
General Schwartz. The unique capabilities of the F-35 do create
challenges for the Air Force in providing support for future training
at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). However, these challenges
are being addressed and will be met through various avenues of
approach. The Air Force is in the process of investigating and
acquiring threat emitters that will be used to meet the requirements of
the F-35. Additionally, many of the challenges posed by the F-35 will
be met by creating a training environment that is not only composed of
traditional threats and threat emitters, but will synthesize virtual
threats creating a combined Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) training
environment. This composition will allow the NTTR and other ranges
supporting the F-35 to provide necessary training.
The NTTR will employ its existing capabilities, along with those in
the acquisition process, to provide the ``live'' portion of the LVC
concept. To meet the unique sensor requirements of the F-35, the NTTR
is developing a CONOPs for a dry ``sensor fusion'' range that will
consist of realistic targets/decoys. Additionally, the NTTR is
investigating the use of assets currently located at other ranges to
increase its capabilities. The NTTR is working with Pacific Air Forces
to examine the option of entering into a phased ``threat'' sharing
agreement that will provide additional threat density and realistic
threat emitters to meet the F-35 training requirements. The first phase
will only include one threat emitter. While the NTTR currently provides
the best training for F-22 and 5th gen aircraft and has the best target
sets available, these target sets alone are not sufficient to provide
realistic training when multiple sensors (EO, visual, Radar) are fused
into a single picture. (These limitations also exist within current 4th
generation training.) Current emitters are also insufficient to provide
adequate density to fully replicate threat environments. To meet these
shortfalls Air Combat Command (ACC) is procuring more threat emitters
for NTTR; however it is impractical to procure enough emitters to fully
represent threats anticipated in current operational plans. ACC intends
to use LVC training to overcome these shortfalls by providing
sufficient threat density and realistic training to `stress' pilots.
New targets need to be in-place by 1 August 2014 when the first F-35s
are scheduled to arrive at the Air Force Weapons School. There are no
personnel authorization changes at the NTTR resulting from the current
F-35 program in the FY13 budget.
Dr. Heck. The Air Force recently announced that it is setting aside
the award for the Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft program. In
subsequent press statements, Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz called the
issue ``embarrassing'' and cited poor documentation processes as the
reason for delaying this important capability to help transition U.S.
force out of Afghanistan. Was the issue in fact a matter of
documentation or rather of specific decision process substance? What is
the Air Force's specific plan moving forward? Will the service continue
to use the same solicitation or delay this time-sensitive program with
another RFP? What is the new timeline for contract award?
General Schwartz. After the Air Force announced that it is setting
aside the award for the Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft program, on
February 27, 2012, the Air Force Materiel Command Commander initiated a
commander directed investigation (CDI). The CDI into the LAS
procurement confirmed that inconsistencies in level of documentation,
failure to fully adhere to Source Selection processes outline in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and supplements and source
selection team inexperience contributed to the need to restart the LAS
source selection. As a result, a new source selection team was
established and an amended RFP was released to both offerors on May 4,
2012. The amended RFP did not include any changes to requirements but
more clearly defined the evaluation criteria and decision-making
process. Air Force officials met individually with both original
offerors, SNC and HBDC, to review the amended RFP changes line-by-line
on April 17, 2012. Both offerors submitted comments on the draft
amended RFP, which were individually addressed prior to release of the
amended RFP. While the decision process will be event-driven, the Air
Force targets a source selection decision in early calendar year 2013.
This would allow first aircraft delivery to Afghanistan in third
quarter 2014.
Dr. Heck. With respect to a recompetition of the LAS program, since
the RFP was for a nondevelopmental solution, will new or readmitted
competitors be allowed to introduce new information, such as product
developments or improvements that were accomplished after the deadlines
for original RFP submissions? Will the Air Force maintain the mission-
based performance requirements from the original competition, or lower
the requirements to allow additional competitors? Will offerings that
have not previously been produced in the United States be barred from
the future competition? If so, please explain why. Additionally, please
explain fully why Hawker Beechcraft was found technicially insufficient
and therefore excluded from the competitive range during the original
LAS competition.
General Schwartz. Consistent with the corrective action accepted by
the Court of Federal Claims, the Air Force decided to issue an
amendment to the LAS request for proposal (RFP) to current offerors.
The amended RFP did not include any changes to requirements but more
clearly defined the evaluation criteria and decision-making process.
Because offerors may submit entirely new proposals in response to this
amended RFP, either offeror could conceivably submit new information.
Offerings that have not previously been produced in the United
States are not barred from the LAS competition. LAS offerors with
proposals that meet the requirements and other terms and conditions of
the request for proposal will be considered for award. Specifically,
the RFP incorporates provisions required by the Buy American Act and
the Balance of Payments Program. Each offeror will be required to
certify whether it will provide domestic end products, qualifying
country end products, or other foreign end products. The Buy American
Act and Balance of Payments Program clause (DFARS 252.225-7001)
incorporated in the solicitation defines a domestic end product, in
part, as an end product manufactured in the United States ``if the cost
of its qualifying country components and its components that are mined,
produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of
the cost of all its components.'' The evaluated price would be
adjusted, if and as required by DFARS 225, for an offeror who proposes
a foreign end product. The Source Selection Authority will consider the
adjusted evaluated price in the best-value award decision.
The results of the evaluation of HBDC's proposal are considered to
be source selection and proprietary information and only releasable by
HBDC.
Dr. Heck. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop:
The Senate version of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act
included report language stating:
``. . . the Air Force may use up to $12.0 million of the funds
available for the solid rocket motor warm line for consolidation
purposes. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to
inform the committee no later than December 1, 2011, of its decision
and the funding needed to carry out such decision.''
What decision has been made concerning this ``consolidation''?
General Schwartz. The Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line program will
close out in fiscal year 2012 and will document, disassemble, clean and
store the government furnished equipment used during the Warm Line
program. Before the Air Force puts its equipment in long term storage,
we will use up to $10M of fiscal year 2012 Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line
closeout funds to perform a Solid Rocket Motor Smart Transition. The
Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line Smart Transition activity will transfer
and install Stage 1 equipment at the ATK Bacchus facility. After
washing out and recasting a Stage 1 motor, we will static fire the
motor, document the result, then disassemble, clean, and store all
equipment. Through this testing and documentation, the Air Force will
establish the procedures necessary to quickly install the equipment at
a consolidated production facility in the future. This ensures the Air
Force retains the capability to re-pour the current motors while
helping to sustain the industrial base through consolidation of excess
infrastructure. This consolidation also allows the contractor to
manufacture a variety of solid rocket motors more efficiently, thereby
reducing contractor overhead and providing an overall cost savings to
the government. The Air Force's decision to implement this smart
transition is consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Solid Rocket Motor Interagency Task Force recommendation to right-size
solid rocket motor contractor production facilities.
Dr. Heck. Submitted on behalf on Representative Rob Bishop:
In FY2013, the Air Force has requested $71.2 million in RDT&E funds
in the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile--Demonstration/Validation
funding line (PE 0603851F). Air Force budget justification documents
cite a sub-element request of $45.0 million for the ICBM Propulsion
Applications Program, a program otherwise known as ``PAP.'' Related
justification documents state that the Air Force plans to use some PAP
funds to ``continue LCS [Large Class Stage] motor development.'' In
fact, I understand that as much as 25% of FY2012 funds are being used
to integrate Minuteman LCS stages into a demonstration launch vehicle,
a task in the past left for industry, even as there are no funds for
LCS flight tests.'' Please tell me why these funds are not better spent
on the continued development of MCS [Medium Class Stage] motors, where
there appear to be sufficient funds for flight tests?
General Schwartz. The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program
(PAP) is transitioning technology development efforts from Large Class
Stage (LCS) to Medium Class Stage (MCS) in fiscal year 2013.
Technologies demonstrated under LCS, (e.g.) domestic fiber case
qualifications and thrust vector control development, as well as early
integration work will help reduce MCS motor development risk. There is
no plan to flight test the integrated LCS booster in the PAP program,
but exercising the systems engineering expertise required to do the
integration work has value for continued MCS development.
Dr. Heck. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop:
This Administration has repeatedly stated that they wish to reduce
negative environmental impacts made by Department of Defense programs
and activities. At the same time, the Air Force continues to
demilitarize its excess rocket motors, specifically Minuteman stages 1
and 2, through open burning. I understand industry has developed an
alternative method, where propellant is washed out, and then key
ingredients--such as ammonium perchlorate--are recovered. While this
process may be slightly more expensive, since it eliminates
introduction of pollutants to the atmosphere, is the Air Force
considering moving in this direction?
General Schwartz. The Air Force's Rocket System Launch Program
(RSLP) is responsible for storage, aging surveillance, and
demilitarization of many excess and decommissioned motor assets,
primarily Minuteman and Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) motors. The decision to dispose of excess solid rocket motors
via burning or chemical wash-out is subject to many considerations, to
include motor type, environmental regulations, existing Depot 50/50
law, weather, facility capacity, contract availability, and costs.
While the Air Force Comprehensive Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment
(AFCANS) 2 Report resulted in the addition of $11 million over fiscal
year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 for motor destruction (which is being
used to dispose of approximately 150 motors, including at least 15
Minuteman 1st Stage motors by the washout method) most years have no
funding available for motor destruction. Without AFCANS funds, the
near-total of RSLP funds are utilized to store excess motor assets and
complete safety-of-storage aging surveillance. The Air Force will
continue to apply its current decision-making processes for motor
destruction, to include adherence to existing laws and environmental
regulations, when demilitarization funding is available.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
Mr. Schilling. What is the Air Force doing to increase competition
opportunities and therefore cut down on costs for DOD on all levels of
the industrial base--from subsystem and component levels to major
platforms?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force continually looks to find places,
both large and small, where we can leverage competition and reduce
costs. The Air Force is working to understand the interrelated supply
chains that support our programs at all levels of the industrial base.
As we increase supply chain visibility we will be able to identify
risk. It will also allow the Air Force to identify opportunities to
evaluate for cost effective breakouts, as well as the potential to move
competition to lower, more competitive tiers in the supply chain.
The Air Force is also taking a comprehensive approach that looks at
both our legacy platforms and our new platforms in terms of data rights
and ownership. Where our legacy platforms did not include full
ownership of data rights, thus limiting competition, the Air Force has
initiated a business case analysis to determine which data rights are
required to organically sustain our legacy major weapons systems. We
then look at ways to pursue attaining the rights for that data and the
trade off of attaining the rights versus the cost to do so. Where new
platforms are established, the Air Force is taking a proactive planning
approach by determining what type of data rights are required for both
acquisition and sustainment. This approach will lend itself to greater
competition and cost savings at various milestones through the
acquisition and sustainment life cycles.
Mr. Schilling. How does the Air Force intend to ensure that small
and medium sized business are able to compete for contracts?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force recently released the ``Small
Business Improvement Plan'' which has several recommendations. The
first four are adopted from the plan:
a) More standardization of North American Industrial Classification
System (NAICS) Code (dollar and size standards). Contracting officers
too often assign two or more NAICS codes to the same or very similar
types of acquisitions resulting in lost opportunities for small
businesses that have grown out of the small business category when a
larger more appropriate NAIC S size standard could have been applied.
Where flexibility in application of NAICS codes exists, Air Force
leadership will provide guidance for the uniform selection of NAICS
codes that maximizes practicable opportunity for small business prime
contract participation.
b) Use of a Bundling and Consolidation ``early warning report'' to
alert key stakeholders as early as possible and to ensure that the Air
Force provides maximum practicable opportunity for small business
participation
c) Encourage teaming by small businesses with firms other than
small (there is no such term as ``medium'' size in federal contracting)
in order to compete for larger dollar contracts Solicitations should
contain language that encourages teaming arrangements and/or joint
ventures to counter the tendency to issue larger, sometimes bundled or
consolidated contracts
d) Improve the quality and availability of acquisition procurement
forecasting information available to small businesses. This would allow
small businesses more time to plan for responding to upcoming
acquisitions, to more fully consider teaming arrangements and to
produce a higher quality Request for Proposal
e) Identify and standardize market research processes to maximize
small business opportunities in Air Force services contracts. After
processes are developed, provide training to our small business
specialists who, in turn, can train the acquisition community
f) Require that the small business specialist fully participate in
all early acquisition planning meetings and review all documentation.
These include review of ``requirement approval documents'' (RADs). This
provides more planning time to fashion successful small business set-
aside strategies
Mr. Schilling. How do the Air Force's views on best practices
compare to the commercial sector's best practices?
The above QFR was rephrased by the committee POC and/or Military
Legislative Fellow Derek R. Noel, as of 04/09/2012: QFR: The commercial
aircraft industry has embraced FAA-approved components and repairs for
the PW2000 engine, but the Air Force has still not found these
practices acceptable for F117 repair contracts. If the commercial
industry is finding considerable success in using FAA-approved
components and repairs, why is the Air Force not considering the same
practice for the F117 engine?
Secretary Donley. In December, Pratt and Whitney (P&W) agreed to
share their repair and overhaul manuals, which was a major step to
enable proper overhaul and supply chain competition. With access to the
repair manuals, the Air Force proposes a F117 competitive contract
which aligns F117 supply chain with industry best practice.
The P&W manuals allowed the Air Force to enhance the competitive
playing field by building on PW2000 commercial approaches, and allow
the Air Force to more rapidly reduce the F117's reliance on the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in parts repair and new parts
source approval process. Because the Air Force flies its engines in six
profiles for which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will not
certify the F117 engine, we cannot rely on FAA certified parts
manufacturer approval (PMA) parts. Instead, we have elected to mimic
the Delta Airline engine repair approach we learned of during further
market research. More specifically, like Delta, we will rely on P&W as
the OEM for as much as 95 percent of the new engine parts in the near
term and rather than continually buying new parts, the commercial data
P&W made available allows us to repair the parts rather than replace
them. We expect this strategy to deliver significant savings over
exclusive parts replacement, which we believe has been P&W's technique.
Additionally, to seek new part cost savings through our Source
Approval Request (SAR) process, similar to those we believe are
achieved by United/Chromalloy (through the FAA's PMA process), the P&W
data will allow the Air Force to procure and use non-OEM parts. This
will separate us from an exclusive relationship with P&W for OEM parts.
However, to immediately and unconditionally accept FAA certified PMA
parts for the F117 engine puts our crews and aircraft at operational
safety risk. Without validation that the parts can perform to our
military mission, the Air Force cannot accept the risk. Once PMA parts
are validated and found to be safe, suitable and cost effective they
will be used for the military application.
The competitive approach the Air Force has proposed puts us on an
ownership track that keeps our crews safe, will deliver near-term and
long-term savings in repaired part costs, and promises more savings to
come via the source approval process for new non-OEM parts.
Mr. Schilling. You have stated that cutting squadrons was painful,
but necessary. What assessments were made when deciding that the Air
Force should cut these squadrons? Would other efficiencies have been
able to cover the costs of keeping some of these important squadrons?
General Schwartz. The Air Force formed a General Officer-led team
of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined force
structure changes at various locations. Each course of action was
assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition,
location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state,
and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location
(e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The team's
recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately
approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24
squadron-level units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight
installations would have been left without an operational Air Force
mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level
units were preserved and only one installation was left without an
operational mission.
The new Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic Guidance ``Sustaining
U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense'' directs
the services to build a force that will be smaller and leaner,
flexible, ready and technologically advanced. As such, the Air Force
was able to make force structure reductions, with acceptable risk, to
provide the capabilities required by the new DOD Strategic Guidance.
The Air Force identified $33 billion in efficiencies in the FY12
President's Budget (PB), which the Air Force was able to realign from
tail to tooth, and an additional $6 billion in efficiencies in the FY13
PB. Additional efficiencies would come at the expense of other programs
and possibly prevent the Air Force from meeting the capability required
in the new DOD Strategic Guidance.
Mr. Schilling. You have stated the importance of the Air Force's
work on cyberspace security issues for some time and have now
reiterated that point and noted that it is vital for our networked
force. You also mentioned that our adversaries are realizing the
benefits of doing so as well. How do you see the Air Force's role in
addressing this force structure change in current and future
adversaries?
General Schwartz. The Air Force Cyberspace Superiority Core
Function Master Plan, submitted by the Air Force Core Function Lead
Integrator for Cyberspace Superiority (AFSPC/CC), specifies nine
capabilities that require programmatic actions to evolve the force from
its current capability state: Passive Defense, Defensive Counter
Cyberspace, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Situational
Awareness, Persistent Network Operations, Data Confidentiality &
Integrity Systems, Cyberspace Air Operations Center, Offensive Counter
Cyberspace for Global Reach and Access, Contingency Extension, and
Influence Operations. The ability to integrate and leverage these
capabilities will underpin force projection in all domains while
serving to deny adversaries operational and informational advantages.
The Air Force will meet this challenge by dedicating funding to ensure
its ability to operate effectively and enhance the resiliency and
effectiveness of critical cyber capabilities. Cyberspace capabilities
will assure freedom of action to conduct operations at times of our
choosing by safeguarding cyberspace systems and negating adversary
cyberspace capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN
Mr. Runyan. How much do you anticipate saving if you retire the C-
5s, C-130s, and the six fighter squadrons?
General Schwartz. Based on the retirements of 27 C-5As, 65 C-130s,
and 123 A-10s and F-16s, the Air Force projects to save approximately
$458 million in FY13 and $4.1 billion over the Future Years Defense
Program.
Mr. Runyan. What would be the economic effect on the Air Force if
you put all those aircraft (C-5s, C-130s, and the six fighter
squadrons) you plan to retire into the Reserve and Guard instead of
retiring them?
General Schwartz. Retaining C-5A and C-130H aircraft retired in the
FY13 President's Budget (PB) would provide excess strategic and theater
airlift capacity at the expense of other programs vital to national
defense. Replacing the aircraft in the Guard and Reserve would result
in the requirement to restore over $2.97 billion in operations,
maintenance, and personnel funds. This amount does not include
additional costs associated with modification programs or the cost to
address obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing source issues unique
to the C-5A and C-130H fleets. Placing those aircraft back in the
Reserve and Guard would require the Air Force to divert funds from
other critical programs. The FY13 PB divested five Air Reserve
Component (ARC) fighter squadrons and one Active component fighter
squadron. The economic effect of restoring five ARC squadrons to the
FY12 PB level is an unfunded cost of $207 million in FY14 and $1,414
billion over the next five years in both manpower and operations &
maintenance costs. Notionally moving the sixth combat coded squadron
from the Active Component to the ARC generates an unfunded cost of $38M
in FY14 and $265M over the next five years in both manpower and
operations & maintenance costs.
Mr. Runyan. Can you retire less aircraft if you put more of them in
the National Guard and Reserve? Could you not have more aircraft
available if you made the ratio of Active to Reserve Component flying
squadrons 1:3?
General Schwartz. The Air Force does not intend to change the
planned active and reserve component mix. Force structure adjustments
have been and will continue to be supported by Force Composition
Analyses of weapon system and career field communities, which use
models developed by SAF/FM's Center of Expertise (COE) to present cost
and benefit information for several Active and Reserve Component mixes
produced by combinations of stand-alone units and Total Force
Integration Associations. The Air Force will continue to leverage the
Total Force's Regular Air Force (RegAF), Air National Guard (ANG), and
Air Force Reserve components to maintain the same high capabilities and
standards across the components while meeting our many and varied
commitments. Maintaining the appropriate mix of forces between the
Active and Reserve Components is critical to sustaining Air Force
capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate
rotational demands with a smaller overall force. In 1990, the Reserve
Component represented 25 percent of Total Force end strength; today
that percentage is 35 percent. The proper ratio between Components must
be achieved to maintain acceptable operations tempo levels within each
Component, and to preserve the ability of a smaller Air Force to meet
continued overseas presence demands and the rapid deployment and
rotational force requirements of the strategic guidance. After the
proposed force reductions and mitigations of FY13, Reserve Component
end strength will make up 33 percent of Total Force military personnel,
a reduction of two percent from the FY12 numbers. Within the Combat Air
Forces (CAF), the Reserve Component will have 38 percent of total
aircraft which is only four percent lower than FY12. For the Mobility
Air Forces (MAF), the Reserve Component shares shift from 51 percent to
46 percent. In order to maintain and enhance combat capability, the Air
Force intends to grow the number of Total Force Integration
Associations from 100 to 115. This will enable the seasoning of our
RegAF personnel while improving the combat capacity of our Reserve
Component. The FY13 Active and Reserve Component mix is the appropriate
mix to maintain the Air Force's combat capability.
Mr. Runyan. Do you think that keeping a smaller Active force and
greatly increasing the Reserve Component forces will decrease your
combat capability? Why or why not?
General Schwartz. The Air Force does not intend to change the
planned active and reserve component mix. Force structure adjustments
have been and will continue to be supported by Force Composition
Analyses of weapon system and career field communities, which use
models developed by SAF/FM's Center of Expertise (COE) to present cost
and benefit information for several Active and Reserve Component mixes
produced by combinations of stand-alone units and Total Force
Integration Associations. The Air Force will continue to leverage the
Total Force's Regular Air Force (RegAF), Air National Guard (ANG), and
Air Force Reserve components to maintain the same high capabilities and
standards across the components while meeting our many and varied
commitments. Maintaining the appropriate mix of forces between the
Active and Reserve Components is critical to sustaining Air Force
capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate
rotational demands with a smaller overall force. In 1990, the Reserve
Component represented 25 percent of Total Force end strength; today
that percentage is 35 percent. The proper ratio between Components must
be achieved to maintain acceptable operations tempo levels within each
Component, and to preserve the ability of a smaller Air Force to meet
continued overseas presence demands and the rapid deployment and
rotational force requirements of the strategic guidance. After the
proposed force reductions and mitigations of FY13, Reserve Component
end strength will make up 33 percent of Total Force military personnel,
a reduction of two percent from the FY12 numbers. Within the Combat Air
Forces (CAF), the Reserve Component will have 38 percent of total
aircraft which is only four percent lower than FY12. For the Mobility
Air Forces (MAF), the Reserve Component shares shift from 51 percent to
46 percent. In order to maintain and enhance combat capability, the Air
Force intends to grow the number of Total Force Integration
Associations from 100 to 115. This will enable the seasoning of our
RegAF personnel while improving the combat capacity of our Reserve
Component. The FY13 Active and Reserve Component mix is the appropriate
mix to maintain the Air Force's combat capability.
Mr. Runyan. What missions can you put into the Reserve Component
forces where you can perform them at lower cost? ICBM? Pilot training?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is rebalancing the Total Force to
match capability and capacity requirements of the new Defense Strategy.
The Air Force, in full collaboration with Reserve Component (RC)
leadership, will make decisions placing mission capabilities in the
Guard/Reserve to achieve an appropriate mix in order to sustain the Air
Force's ability to provide forward presence, rapid crisis response, and
high rotational demands. Examples of these missions include remotely
piloted aircraft operations, MC-12W, and intelligence.
Decisions on the placement of capabilities into RC forces were
based upon mission requirements and included analysis of the costs
involved. RC value is enhanced by a part-time model and the continuum-
of-service construct whereby their participation in all mission sets is
valuable, but more cost effective in missions that do not require full-
time participation to meet daily requirements, such as pilot training.
The RC is already a full partner in the Air Force Nuclear
Enterprise and is fully integrated in six of the thirteen core nuclear
career fields. The Air Force is currently evaluating several additional
mission areas where greater RC participation would benefit the Air
Force through increased continuity and retention of critical nuclear
expertise. RC Security Forces currently support of the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missille (ICBM) mission at Minot AFB and the Air Force
continues to assess other areas of the ICBM mission that may be
compatible with RC participation.
The Air Force will continue to analyze the best mix of forces and
capabilities between the Active and RC forces balancing costs and
mission requirements.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. How would you describe the relationship between the U.S.
Air Force and the Republic of China Air Force? What impact does the ban
on U.S. general officers visiting Taiwan have on enhancing and building
upon this relationship?
General Schwartz. The United States Air Force (USAF) and Taiwan Air
Force relationship is strong. Our current Air Force leadership has
developed enduring relationships with their Taiwan Air Force
counterparts through annual meetings here in Washington. The USAF works
closely with our Taiwan counterparts to provide the services they need
to transform their force into one that will continue to deter
aggression from the People's Republic of China. Last September the
Administration announced a $5.85B sale to Taiwan that included
retrofitting their F-16 A/Bs. This retrofit will significantly increase
the war-fighting capability of Taiwan's Air Force.
What impact does the ban on U.S. general officers visiting Taiwan
have on enhancing and building upon this relationship?
The ban has had minimal impact to the USAF-Taiwan Air Force
relationship, due to the strong relationships built through engagement
here in Washington. In addition, consistent with our longstanding
policy, we will continue the practice of sending USAF Senior Executive
Service (SES) leaders and retired flag officers to Taiwan to assist in
improving their defense capabilities. Most recently, Ms. Grant (SAF/IA)
and Mr. Wert (ESC) visited Taiwan and provided security cooperation on
F-16 A/B retrofit program and the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP).
Retired flag officer visitors have included Admiral (ret) Blair,
Admiral (ret) Natter, Lieutenant General (ret) Gregson, and Lieutenant
General (ret) Leaf. They have all spent weeks in Taiwan sharing their
decades of experience and mentoring senior Taiwan flag officers on how
to improve Taiwan's defenses, culminating in the annual Han Kuang
exercise. We will continue to send these highly-qualified Air Force
leaders to preserve our strong ties and help ensure Taiwan maintains a
robust self-defense capability.
Mr. Scott. When do you expect to complete the JSTARS Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) study?
General Schwartz. Air Combat Command (ACC) presented the results of
the Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI)
and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Mission Area Analysis
of Alternatives (AoA) to the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council
(AFROC) for validation on 30 November 2011. Vice Chief of Staff of the
Air Force approved the AoA's release on 25 Jan 12 to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
(CAPE). OSD/CAPE is currently reviewing the final report for
sufficiency.
Mr. Scott. DOD's new strategic guidance calls for cooperative
partnerships to bolster common interests around the world. What are
some examples of the kinds of innovative partnerships that the U.S. Air
Force can assist in developing?
General Schwartz. Developing mutually beneficial partnerships with
militaries around the world enables interoperability, integration and
interdependence between Coalition forces while providing our partner
nations the capability and capacity to resolve their own national
security challenges. Through these relationships, we are able to
develop innovative partnerships such as the Wideband Global SATCOM, C-
17 Heavy Airlift Wing at Papa Air Base Hungary, the deployment of UAE
F-16s in support of operation ODYSSEY DAWN, the U.S. and U.K. RC-135V/W
RIVET JOINT (RJ) weapon system, and the C-130J multi-national
cooperative upgrade program.
The Wideband Global SATCOM satellite system, with the first
satellite launched in 2007, will reach full operational capability with
5 operational satellites in FY13. WGS increased our communications
capacity more than ten times over the existing legacy system. As a
result of a partnership with Australia, a 6th satellite is in
production, which will increase U.S. overall capabilities at zero
additional U.S. cost, yet enable Australia to realize 100% of their
global SATCOM requirements. In January of this year, the U.S. signed
another cooperative agreement with 5 new partners for a 9th satellite,
increasing capacity for the U.S. and our international partners.
A Heavy Airlift Wing activated on 27 July 2009 at Papa Air Base
Hungary, the result of a cooperative-agreement among 12 NATO and
Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations. The wing's, mission is to provide
strategic airlift to the consortium's members in support of national,
NATO, European Union and United Nations humanitarian assistance/
disaster relief operations. Through a consortium, economies of scale
provide a capability for numerous nations that did not have the
resources to realize an airlift capability on their own. Additionally,
missions this wing executes are sorties the USAF does not have to fly,
potentially saving the USAF upwards of $200M/yr. In August, 2009, the
wing began delivering supplies to the Swedish ISAF contingent in
Afghanistan. A C-17 from the wing delivered construction material to
Haiti, seven days after the devastating earthquake. Last fall, a
multinational crew supported the U.S. Army's hundred and seventy-third
airborne Brigade Combat Team jump-week with multiple airdrop training
sorties.
The United Arab Emirates demonstrated their capability to carry out
integrated coalition combat air operations in support of a NATO-led
humanitarian mission when they flew their Block 60 F-16s in Operations
ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Their participation was made
possible due to the strong relationship the USAF cultivated through
multiple personnel exchanges, direct commercial sale of F-16s, foreign
military sales cases for maintenance, equipment, parts, training and
logistical support, pilot training from the Air National Guard's 162nd
Fighter Wing, participation in RED FLAG and GREEN FLAG exercises, and
training at the Gulf Air Warfare Center.
The RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT (RJ) weapon system merges the respective
U.S. and U.K. RIVET JOINT fleets into a single, cooperative program for
upgrade and sustainment (RIVET JOINT Sustainment and Follow-on
Development MOU) of RJ aircraft and mission systems, and provides
cooperative training for the initial cadre of operations and support
personnel. This initiative allows for the U.S./U.K. to jointly train,
operate and base a combined RJ fleet, increasing ISR capability 20
percent, saving the USAF $841M in follow-on and sustainment costs, and
enabling economies of scale in training, maintenance, and personnel.
The C-130J Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was established
between the U.S. and 6 member nations as a vehicle for cooperative C-
130J projects enabling common requirement studies, block upgrades, and
capability updates for continued flight. Project Arrangements (PAs)
pursuant to the MOU concluded under the MOU have totaled over $667M,
and leveraged $376M in participant investment.
Mr. Scott. How does JSTARS operations provide a test bed for the
networked future of air warfare?
General Schwartz. Through the use of a dedicated test aircraft, the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) program has
delivered capability to inform the networked future of air warfare.
JSTARS' robust onboard Line of Sight (LOS)/Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)
data links and Battle Management Command & Control (BMC2) mission
aircrew employed on JSTARS provide ample network capability to develop
improved network capabilities. JSTARS are able to digitally commit
fighters to targets in air to ground engagements within an
electronically contested environment without ever speaking on the
radio. Moreover the majority of all Command/Control taskings now occur
in chat room environments vice traditional radio voice methods. In 2010
JSTARS demonstrated the ability of an Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance platform to provide terminal guidance of net enabled
weapons (NEWs) such as the Joint Surface Warfare (JSuW) to an intended
target from increased stand-off ranges. In 2011 JSTARS tested and
fielded a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) to improve the Beyond Line of
Sight (BLOS) reach back. Near-real-time aircraft collection data was
provided via Satellite to any Secret Internet protocol Router network
(SIPRnet) subscriber to an expanded audience including the Air and
Space Operations Center. The capability reduced Air Operations Center
leadership decision making timelines tremendously informing Rules of
Engagement (ROE).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN
Mr. Griffin. C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP): According
to the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, the
Administration plans to cancel the AMP and replace the AMP with a less
ambitious, less costly program, commonly referred to as ``AMP Lite,''
for modernization of the C-130 fleet, including 184 C-130 aircraft.
According to General Schwartz, these upgrades would likely be similar
to those used on the KC-10 refueling aircraft and would keep the
navigators in our C-130s.
When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force consider
the cost of retaining the navigator position over the life cycle of the
legacy C-130 fleet? If so, what is the cost? What were other criteria
for considering the cost of AMP Lite?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force did consider the cost of retaining
the navigator. As reported in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR), eliminating the navigator position results in a mission
personnel cost savings of $482 million (Base-Year 2010 dollars) over 15
years for the 221 C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) aircraft
fleet. This equates to a cost savings of $694 million in Then-Year
dollars (i.e., dollars that are reflected in the budget).
Other criteria weighed when considering the cost of the C-130
Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/
ATM) program vice C-130 AMP, were that the C-130 CNS/ATM program has 40
percent fewer requirements, to include retaining the navigator (which
drove less avionics integration), and not driving commonality across
the legacy C-130H fleet.
Although the fiscal year 2013 President's Budget reflects funding
for 176 aircraft, the Air Force plans to modernize all 184 aircraft
legacy C-130H combat delivery fleet in the most economically efficient
way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM solutions on other Air Force
mobility aircraft (KC-10, KC-135), and an awareness of CNS/ATM
modifications to foreign nations' C-130 aircraft, indicate that less
expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available.
Mr. Griffin. The President's FY13 budget proposed to terminate the
C-130 AMP and claims this will save $2.2 billion. However, it is my
understanding that the $2.2 billion in savings does not include the
cost of a new program start, current contract termination costs or the
life-cycle savings that AMP will provide.
How much will the new start effort truly save after considering the
termination liability, and other life-cycle cost savings are removed
from the solution?
Secretary Donley. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), fiscal year
2013-2017, investment cost savings from terminating C-130 Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) and initiating the ``Optimize Legacy C-130
Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/
ATM)'' program is $2.3 billion. Additionally, when adding the ``To
Complete'' cost of AMP in the fiscal year 2012 President's Budget (PB)
and comparing to what the Air Force has funded in the fiscal year 2013
PB for CNS/ATM including its ``To Complete'' cost, the Air Force
identified a total investment cost savings of $3.5 billion.
By going with the new Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM, which retains
the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we
would lose the mission personnel ``cost savings'' of $482 million in
base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 C-130 AMP Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP. This additional cost of
retaining the navigator reduces the program savings referenced in the
above paragraph.
Furthermore, the 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) identified
that there were no other life-cycle costs savings by continuing with
AMP. AMP was a program intended as a force enhancement, not an
efficiency.
The termination liability for C-130 AMP is $5.1 million, and has
been factored into the cost savings referenced above.
Mr. Griffin. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's
final report to the President cited airspace, low level routes, and
auxiliary airfields and nearby Fort Chaffee as reasons why ``Fort Smith
is an ideal location for the A-10.'' Since the report was released, the
unit has significantly modernized its facilities, greatly expanded its
existing world-class airspace, become a leader in data link operations,
and solidified training relationships with attack controllers special
forces.
What did the current Basing Commission find to contradict the BRAC
commission's findings and suggest the transition from the A-10 to a
remotely piloted aircraft mission at Fort Smith? Is the Air Force
moving the A-10s at Fort Smith to other guard units to replace aging A-
10s?
Secretary Donley. The reduction of A-10 aircraft is driven by the
need to reduce excess force structure as identified in the new Defense
Strategy and was not driven by a basing study. In conjunction with
National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air
National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by (the
Adjutant Generals (TAGs)) of maintaining at least one Air Force flying
unit in each state. As such, the Air Force chose the 188th Fighter
Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three (ANG) A-10 unit closures because
the base, along with those in Michigan, have other manned ANG flying
units in addition to the A-10 units selected for divestment. Final
disposition of the individual tail numbers is determined during fleet
management reviews and some aircraft may be realigned to other units to
replace older A-10 aircraft. Our intent is to keep the remaining A-10
fleet in the best possible health.
Additionally, the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies
Remotely Piloted Aircraft as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The
proximity of Arkansas' Razorback Range (less than 10 miles from Fort
Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint
training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive location for
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint training. The divestiture of the
A-10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to assign Fort Smith a
RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate
joint training.
Mr. Griffin. I am concerned that the Air Force's acquisition
strategy for the LAS was flawed, for example, for LAS, the Air Force
lowered modern pilot safety standards for accommodating women pilots in
ejection seat aircraft. The choice for the LAS contract, the Brazilian
Super Tucano doesn't even meet these lowered safety standards.
Why did the Air Force roll back the clock on LAS aircraft safety
requirements that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft, instead
of using the modern, and congressionally mandated pilot size
accommodation requirements used for your T-6, F-35, and T-38
modernization programs?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety
standards for the light air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a
security assistance effort for Afghanistan, NATO Air Training Command--
Afghanistan (NATC-A) defined the ejection seat and pilot accommodation
requirements based on expected seating height range for potential
Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected for
the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation
standards.
Mr. Griffin. In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-12,
the Senate Armed Services Committee commends the Air Force for ``its
commitment to developing and maintaining a transparent, repeatable, and
effective strategic basing process.'' They went on to say the Air Force
has developed a process that consists, in part, of establishing basing
criteria, developing a preliminary list of candidate bases based upon
those criteria, and selecting final bases following a detailed
evaluation of a smaller group of installations (Senate Bill 1253).
Removal of aircraft is a basing decision and will affect future basing
actions. Is there an A-10 basing study? If not, what criteria did you
use to determine basing? Can I see the scores? If there was not a
study, then explain how you compared options?
Secretary Donley. The reduction of A-10 aircraft is driven by the
need to reduce excess force structure as identified in the new Defense
Strategy and was not driven by a basing study. The new Defense
Strategic Guidance states that U.S. Forces will no longer be sized to
conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Analysis based on
scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced
requirement for tactical combat aircraft and a preference for multi-
role fighters to provide the most flexible capability within each
scenario. As a result, A-10 retirements were selected in lieu of other
combat aircraft and the Air Force made the difficult choice to retire
five A-10 squadrons comprised of 102 A-10 aircraft. Previous reductions
in fighter force structure shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve
component forces, and Air Force decisions in the FY13 President's
Budget request rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable force
structure over the long term. In conjunction with National Guard Bureau
leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guard (ANG)
Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs) of maintaining at
least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force
chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A-10
unit closures because the State, along with those in Michigan, has
other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A-10 units selected
for divestment. Additionally, the proximity of Arkansas' Razorback
Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation
Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith
a very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint
training. The divestiture of the A-10s afford an opportunity for the
Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of
range capabilities to facilitate joint training.
Mr. Griffin. Background: In the fall of 2008, Secretary of the Air
Force Michael Donley and the Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz
sought to redefine how the Air Force expects to make basing decisions.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations
Kathleen Ferguson said ``We created a process that was deliberate,
repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities.''
(Official Air Force Web site) Did the Air Force follow their
established procedures for A-10 basing decisions, and was the process
deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and
responsibilities?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force basing process is a great tool to
determine the optimal location for assigning assets; however, the Air
Force's goal was to reduce force structure based on the new Defense
Strategy. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active
Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined force structure
changes at various locations. Each course of action was assessed using
specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of the
installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a
replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed
and range and airspace availability). The team's recommendations were
reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved
by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Before backfill missions were identified, 24 squadron-level units were
in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations would have been
left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions
were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one
installation was left without an operational mission.
Mr. Griffin. Background: In the National Defense Authorization Act
for FY-12, the Senate Armed Services Committee stated: ``Given the high
cost of operating aircraft and the fact that these flying operation
costs are recurring, the committee believes these costs warrant
examination in the strategic basing process. These flying operation
costs include, at a minimum, the costs associated with the additional
flying time resulting from a candidate base's relative distance to (1)
operational training areas for fighters and training aircraft, (2)
operational refueling tracks for tankers, and (3) critical logistic
centers for strategic and tactical airlift aircraft. The 188th Fighter
Wing's distance to their operational training areas is the closest in
the Air National Guard which significantly minimizes its operations
costs. The committee directed, ``no later than 180 days after the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force to review and
report on the role that the efficiency of flying operation costs should
play in the strategic basing process and any steps that it plans to
take to capture these costs in evaluating candidate bases in that
process.'' Was the Armed Services Committee's guidance to consider
distance to the operational training areas followed in the A-10 basing
process? If so, what weight was given to the significant taxpayer
savings due to reduced transit time to the 188th's training areas?
Secretary Donley. When determining A-10 divestitures, Air Force
assessed various criteria to include manpower composition, location of
the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well
a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON
needed and range and airspace availability). The team's recommendations
were reviewed by Air Force leadership, and ultimately approved or
disapproved by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Arkansas' Razorback Range and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA) make
Fort Smith a very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft
joint training, providing an enduring mission capability to Fort Smith
while facilitating training with our joint warfighters.
Mr. Griffin. Background: The Commander of United States Special
Operations Command Admiral Eric Olson testified to Congress in March
2011: ``The shortage of readily available, local ranges currently
hampers special operations forces' ability to meet deployment training
timelines and causes our operators to `travel to train,' further
increasing their already excessive time away from home.'' Additionally
Vice Admiral William McRaven (current Special Operations Commander)
testified in his confirmation hearing June 28, 2011, that ``high
operational tempo has impacted readiness.'' He went on to say among the
areas effecting the high operations tempo was the ``lack of fixed wing
aircraft for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint Tactical Air
Controllers.'' (SOF Background and Issues for Congress) The 188th
Fighter Wing is a leader in Special Forces integration with an
extensive history of SOF integration (All Services), the unique ability
to conduct face-to-face briefs/debriefs, and an on-site Special Forces
unit (SEALs). Without tactical fighters at Fort Smith, SOF training
quality would significantly decrease. In addition, SOF operations tempo
would increase since forces would have more ``travel to train''
requirements. Were the Special Operations Forces training needs and
their operations tempo considered in the A-10 basing plan? If so, what
weight was given to the significant joint force multiplier capabilities
of the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary Donley. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we
used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while
maintaining the ability to execute strategic guidance. Analysis based
on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a
reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and a preference for
multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability to
successfully prosecute each scenario. The Air Force provides full
spectrum support to all joint warfighters. Special operations forces
training involves a variety of weapon systems, and the Air Force will
continue to provide required support while accounting for the
divestiture of A-10s from Fort Smith. The Air Force will continue to
provide the necessary training capability required by special
operations forces. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
is aware of the divestiture of A-10s at Fort Smith and has not
expressed any concerns with operational training impacts.
Mr. Griffin. Background: In the 2010 QDR and the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY-12, the Senate Armed Services Committee
recommended the services produce formal Memoranda of Agreements (MOA)
between general purpose forces and special operations forces. A recent
report required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010
stated the requirement to ``codify support through formal agreements,
and eventually get SOF units and their general purpose forces
counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle.'' The
188FW has numerous formal MOA's in coordination with SOF and
effectively trains with special operations throughout their deployment
cycle. Does closing the 188FW and losing their unique SOF training
relationship, support the special operations forces in accordance with
the Senate Armed Services direction?
Secretary Donley. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we
used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while
maintaining the ability to execute strategic guidance. The Air Force
provides full spectrum support to all joint warfighters. Special
operations forces training involves a variety of weapon systems, and
the Air Force will continue to provide required support while
accounting for the divestiture of A-10s from Fort Smith.
Mr. Griffin. Background: On October 5, 2009, the President signed
Executive Order (EO) 13514, which set sustainability goals for federal
agencies to make improvements in their environmental, energy, and
economic performance. He went on to say ``The Defense Department must
take a hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and
operated--indeed, every aspect of how it does business.'' The 188th
Fighter Wing is a leader in renewable energy, energy conversation, and
has among the lowest energy costs in the Air National Guard. When
making basing decisions did the Air Force consider energy costs and
sustainability? If so, what weight was given to the significant energy
cost savings of the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary Donley. The impact of energy on basing decisions can be
important. However, the changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a
basing decision but a force structure realignment decision. This force
structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with National
Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National
Guard's (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ``allocate at least one flying
unit with ANG equipment to each state,'' when deciding which A-10 bases
would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A-10 units, two have no
other flying unit and so reductions came from the three states,
including Arkansas, that have other flying units.
Mr. Griffin. Background: On May 8, 2010, the Secretary of Defense
gave a speech at the Eisenhower Library, in which he announced his
intention of reforming the business operations of the Pentagon in an
effort to root out duplication, waste, and excess spending. The
Secretary stated: ``The Defense Department must take a hard look at
every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operated--indeed,
every aspect of how it does business. In each instance we must ask:
First, is this respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of
economic and fiscal duress? And second, is this activity or arrangement
the best use of limited dollars, given the pressing needs to take care
of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in the capabilities
necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?''
Additionally, in January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released the
Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing
the budget, the DOD first turned to where DOD could reduce among other
things operations expenses across the defense enterprise. Flight hour
costs represent a significant proportion of fighter training expenses.
Flight time spent transiting to/from the training areas is waste of
taxpayer resources. The 188th Fighter Wing has the closest airspace
therefore, it also has the lowest flight hour cost per training event.
Were operational costs considered in the A-10 basing plan? If so, what
weight was given to the significant cost savings provided by the 188th
Fighter Wing?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team
of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety
of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the
installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a
replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed
and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure
reductions and not part of the strategic basing process, the specific
criteria was not weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by
Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the
Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Mr. Griffin. Background: In January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta
released the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that
in developing the budget the DOD first turned to where DOD could reduce
among other things personnel costs across the defense enterprise. Fort
Smith, (compared to all current A-10 bases and all air-to-ground Air
National Guard fighter units) has the lowest combined health, housing
and utility costs. Were personnel costs included when A-10 basing
decisions were made? If so, what weight was given to the significant
personnel cost savings at the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team
of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety
of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the
installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a
replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed
and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure
reductions and not part of the Air Force's formal strategic basing
process, the specific personnel cost criteria was not weighted. The
advantages of the relatively low cost of living found near Fort Smith,
AR will continue to benefit the members of the unit who will perform
the new MQ-1/9 Remote Split Operations mission. The team's
recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately
approved.
Mr. Griffin. Background: On Oct. 25, 2010, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen responding to a letter on JTAC
training said ``I share his concern regarding the increased demand
signal for JTAC's and the stress it exerts on the current production
capacities.'' On November 16, 2010, General Raymond Odierno, the
Commander of United States Joint Forces Command, wrote Admiral Mullen
to express concerns he had over JTAC tasking and training. He said
``The increased demand has resulted in a more than 100 percent increase
in schoolhouse throughput with a corresponding increase in the number
of required support sorties.'' Since the 188th's primary mission is
Close Air Support almost every training sortie is in support of ground
forces. With unmatched airspace proximity, volume, and availability,
the 188th produces the most JTAC training per flight hour in the entire
Air Force. When making fighter basing decisions, did the Air Force
consider JTAC training requirements? If so, what weight was given to
the significant JTAC training production of the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary Donley. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance,
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century
Defense,'' directs the Services to build a force that will be smaller,
leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the
Air Force is reducing its size to support one large-scale combined arms
campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second adversary. With
the divestiture of Fort Smith's A-10s, the Air Force will maintain
sufficient capacity to produce and train Joint terminal Attack
Controller to support the new Defense Strategy.
The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and
Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to
include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is
suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace
availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not
weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. Griffin. Background: Quality attack controller training has
long been a problem for the DOD. A Due to airspace and asset
limitations at other locations throughout the country the quality of
attack controller sometimes suffers. The 188th Fighter Wing with it's
unique capability to face-to-face brief/debrief, diverse training
environment, regional training partners, and incorporation of leading
edge technology provides the best training for the services JTAC's,
When making fighter basing decisions did the Air Force consider the
quality of JTAC training? If so, what weight was given to the second-
to-none JTAC training VALUE at the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary Donley. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance,
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century
Defense,'' directs the Services to build a force that will be smaller,
leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the
Air Force is reducing its size to support one large-scale combined arms
campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second adversary. With
the divestiture of Fort Smith's A-10s, the Air Force will maintain
sufficient capacity to produce and train JTACs to support the new
Defense Strategy.
The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and
Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to
include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is
suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace
availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not
weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of
the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Mr. Griffin. Did the Air Force consider innovation and joint
network capabilities when developing the A-10 basing plan? If so, what
weight was given to the leading edge initiatives of the 188th Fighter
Wing?
Secretary Donley. The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing
are not a basing decision but a force structure realignment decision.
This force structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with
National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air
National Guard's (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ``allocate at least
one flying unit with ANG equipment to each state,'' when deciding which
A-10 bases would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A-10 units,
two have no other flying unit and so reductions came from the three
states, including Arkansas, that have other flying units. Additionally,
our General Officer led review considered a variety of criteria to
include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is
suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace
availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria were not
weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved.
The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing
decision but a force structure realignment decision. This force
structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with National
Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National
Guard's (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ``allocate at least one flying
unit with ANG equipment to each state,'' when deciding which A-10 bases
would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A-10 units, two have no
other flying unit and so reductions came from the three states,
including Arkansas, that have other flying units. Additionally, our
General Officer led review considered a variety of criteria to include
manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component
presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for
a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace
availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not
weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. Griffin. Was F-35 basing considered in the A-10 basing study?
If so, how did bases that scored lower in the study keep their manned
fighter aircraft?
Secretary Donley. F-35 basing was not considered when making force
structure reduction or backfill mission decisions that take effect in
FY13 and FY14. Given current F-35 production estimates, the next set of
F-35 basing decisions will include domestic and overseas bases and will
not be required prior to FY17. The Air Force formed a General Officer
led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined
force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action was
assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition,
location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state,
and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location
(e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The team's
recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately
approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24
squadron-level units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight
installations would have been left without an operational Air Force
mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level
units were preserved and only one installation was left without an
operational mission.
Mr. Griffin. Was the capability to support Total Force Initiatives
considered in the A-10 basing decisions? If so what weight was given to
Fort Smith's efficiencies and unique strengths?
Secretary Donley. The new Defense Strategic Guidance drove a
holistic inter-state approach to Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserve force structure. The Air Force's proposed efforts will correct
several manpower disconnects, rebalance forces, and improve sortie
generation and aircraft utilization rates across the Total Force. This
combination is intended to improve the Total Force's readiness and
responsiveness across the spectrum of operations. From both an
operational effectiveness and fiscal responsibility perspective, this
strategy was preferred over a more piecemeal state-by-state approach.
In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force
considered the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously
approved by TAGs) of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in
each state. As such, the Air Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort
Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A-10 unit closures because the base,
along with those in Michigan, have other manned ANG flying units in
addition to the A-10 units selected for divestment. Additionally, the
Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted Aircraft
(RPA) as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas'
Razorback Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military
Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make
Fort Smith a very attractive location for RPA joint training. The
divestiture of the A-10s affords an opportunity for the Air Force to
assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range
capabilities to facilitate joint training.
Mr. Griffin. Questions regarding AMP
Why are you now choosing to end a program that is over 98% complete
with development activities and with very little risk going forward?
With a reasonable learning curve, what is a cost of the current AMP
system fully installed? What would the cost be for the alternative
system?
Could you explain the numbers that have been floating around in the
press on the cost of the current program? My understanding is we've
invested about $2.1B and should have around $2.5B to go. However, it
appears the USAF is using a $6.2B total program cost, leaving over
$4.1B yet to be spent. With less than 200 aircraft to be modified and
using $8M a copy, we should be able to finish the program for around
$2B.
Has there been any analysis of the long-term cost savings the
current AMP solution provides versus the new start for just a CNS/ATM
capability that is proposed for FY 13?
So that the taxpayer's money invested in the program and research
is not lost, have you considered restructuring the current program to
work within your new funding profile and avoid the cost and inherent
risks of a new start effort?
Can the current program be scaled down and still retain its
certification? If so, have you thought about doing that instead of
starting all over again?
Secretary Donley. Due to budget constraints, the fiscal year 2013
President's Budget (PB) terminated the C-130 Avionics Modernization
Program (AMP).
As reflected in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR), the C-130 AMP per aircraft estimate is $19 million. The fiscal
year 2012 PB per aircraft cost of ``Optimize Legacy C-130
Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/
ATM)'' program is $3.7 million.
A total of $1.8 billion has been spent to date on C-130 AMP. A
breakdown by phase follows: RDT&E: $1.7 billion Procurement: $0.1
billion
Total cost of the 221 C-130 AMP aircraft fleet is $6.3 billion: The
latest cost estimate is from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's (CAPE) Independent Cost
Estimate (ICE) dated 23 March 2010; it reflects total cost of $6.3
billion (Then-Year dollars): RDT&E: $1.8 billion Procurement: $4.5
billion
A specific comparative analysis of the long-term cost savings the
current C-130 AMP solution provides versus the new C-130 CNS/ATM
program was not accomplished. Compliance with looming CNS/ATM mandates
was the primary reason behind the C-130 AMP program, and remains the
primary reason for the planned C-130 CNS/ATM program. The Air Force
plans to modernize the 184 aircraft legacy C-130 combat delivery fleet
in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar
CNS/ATM solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC-10, KC-135),
and an awareness of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations' C-130
aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently
available.
The C-130 CNS/ATM program will provide the capabilities related to
global access and global engagement that the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) determined are essential to national security.
The primary differences between the C-130 AMP and the C-130 CNS/ATM
program are: The new program retains the navigator position, thereby
requiring much less avionics integration than C-130 AMP, the new
program does not standardize the aircraft cockpit across the C-130H
fleet, and there is more than a 40 percent reduction in requirements
when compared to C-130 AMP. These changes were too large to restructure
the C-130 AMP program or to simply scale it down. The goal is for an
open and transparent defense industry competition, with C-130 CNS/ATM
program contract award in fiscal year 2014. This is required to ensure
the legacy C-130H combat delivery fleet meets the Federal Aviation
Administration's air traffic management 1 January 2020 mandate.
Mr. Griffin. Today, the Air Force advised the Department of Justice
that it will take corrective action on the Afghanistan Light Air
Support Contract and will set aside the contract award to Sierra Nevada
effective March 2, 2012.
What does this announcement mean for the LAS contract award and is
the AF planning on reopening the competition for the LAS contract?
Secretary Donley. On February 28, 2012, the Air Force initiated
review of appropriate corrective action in response to litigation and
dissatisfaction with source selection documentation. At a minimum, the
Air Force corrective action would:
1) Set aside (terminate) the award to Sierra Nevada Corporation
(``SNC''), 2) Reinstate Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company, LLC
(``HBDC'') to the competitive range under the procurement, 3) Accept
new proposals from the parties, based upon the existing solicitation in
its original form, or as amended, 4) Conduct meaningful discussions
with the parties, and 5) Reevaluate proposals in accordance with the
terms of the solicitation; or 6) Reserve the right to conduct a whole
new competition
Concurrently, the Air Force Materiel Command initiated a Commander
Directed Investigation (CDI) into the Light Air Support (LAS)
procurement. After studying the circumstances prompting the corrective
action and facts from the subsequent CDI, the Air Force decided to
issue an amendment to the LAS Request for Proposal (RFP) to both
offerors. Air Force officials met with both original offerors, SNC and
HBDC, individually to review the amended RFP changes line-by-line on
April 17, 2012. Both will have time to submit comments on the draft RFP
amendment, after which the Air Force expects to release the final
amended RFP on approximately April 30, 2012. While the decision process
will be event-driven, the Air Force targets a source selection decision
in early calendar year 2013. This would allow first aircraft delivery
to Afghanistan in third quarter 2014.
Mr. Griffin. Why did the USAF roll back the clock on LAS aircraft
safety requirements that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft
instead of using the modern, and congressionally mandated pilot size
accommodation requirements used for your T-6, F-35, and T-38
modernization programs?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety
standards for the light air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a
security assistance effort for Afghanistan, NATO Air Training Command--
Afghanistan (NATC-A) defined the ejection seat and pilot accommodation
requirements based on expected seating height range for potential
Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected for
the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation
standards.
Mr. Griffin. Why did the USAF ignore inputs from industry that
pointed out that the LAS solicitation was using outdated pilot size
accommodation requirements and instead should be using the state of the
art safety standards established for the JPATS, JSF, and T-38
modernization programs?
Secretary Donley. Since light air support (LAS) is a security
assistance effort for Afghanistan, NATO Air Training Command--
Afghanistan (NATC-A) defined the ejection seat and pilot accommodation
requirements based on expected seating height range for potential
Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected for
the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation
standards.
Mr. Griffin. C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP): According
to the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, the
Administration plans to cancel the AMP and replace the AMP with a less
ambitious, less costly program, commonly referred to as ``AMP Lite,''
for modernization of the C-130 fleet, including 184 C-130 aircraft.
According to General Schwartz, these upgrades would likely be similar
to those used on the KC-10 refueling aircraft and would keep the
navigators in our C-130s.
When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force consider
the cost of retaining the navigator position over the life cycle of the
legacy C-130 fleet? If so, what is the cost? What were other criteria
for considering the cost of AMP Lite?
General Schwartz. The Air Force did consider the cost of retaining
the navigator. As reported in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR), eliminating the navigator position results in a mission
personnel cost savings of $482 million (Base-Year 2010 dollars) over 15
years for the 221 C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) aircraft
fleet. This equates to a cost savings of $694 million in Then-Year
dollars (i.e., dollars that are reflected in the budget).
Other criteria weighed when considering the cost of the C-130
Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/
ATM) program vice C-130 AMP, were that the C-130 CNS/ATM program has 40
percent fewer requirements, to include retaining the navigator (which
drove less avionics integration), and not driving commonality across
the legacy C-130H fleet.
Although the fiscal year 2013 President's Budget reflects funding
for 176 aircraft, the Air Force plans to modernize all 184 aircraft
legacy C-130H combat delivery fleet in the most economically efficient
way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM solutions on other Air Force
mobility aircraft (KC-10, KC-135), and an awareness of CNS/ATM
modifications to foreign nations' C-130 aircraft, indicate that less
expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available.
Mr. Griffin. The President's FY13 budget proposed to terminate the
C-130 AMP and claims this will save $2.2 billion. However, it is my
understanding that the $2.2 billion in savings does not include the
cost of a new program start, current contract termination costs or the
life-cycle savings that AMP will provide.
How much will the new start effort truly save after considering the
termination liability, and other life-cycle cost savings are removed
from the solution?
General Schwartz. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), fiscal year
2013-2017, investment cost savings from terminating C-130 Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) and initiating the ``Optimize Legacy C-130
Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/
ATM)'' program is $2.3 billion. Additionally, when adding the ``To
Complete'' cost of AMP in the fiscal year 2012 President's Budget (PB)
and comparing to what the Air Force has funded in the fiscal year 2013
PB for CNS/ATM including its ``To Complete'' cost, the Air Force
identified a total investment cost savings of $3.5 billion.
By going with the new Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM, which retains
the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we
would lose the mission personnel ``cost savings'' of $482 million in
base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 C-130 AMP Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP. This additional cost of
retaining the navigator reduces the program savings referenced in the
above paragraph.
Furthermore, the 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) identified
that there were no other life-cycle costs savings by continuing with
AMP. AMP was a program intended as a force enhancement, not an
efficiency.
The termination liability for C-130 AMP is $5.1 million, and has
been factored into the cost savings referenced above.
Mr. Griffin. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's
final report to the President cited airspace, low level routes, and
auxiliary airfields and nearby Fort Chaffee as reasons why ``Fort Smith
is an ideal location for the A-10.'' Since the report was released, the
unit has significantly modernized its facilities, greatly expanded its
existing world-class airspace, become a leader in data link operations,
and solidified training relationships with attack controllers special
forces.
What did the current Basing Commission find to contradict the BRAC
commission's findings and suggest the transition from the A-10 to a
remotely piloted aircraft mission at Fort Smith? Is the Air Force
moving the A-10s at Fort Smith to other guard units to replace aging A-
10s?
General Schwartz. The reduction of A-10 aircraft is driven by the
need to reduce excess force structure as identified in the new Defense
Strategy and was not driven by a basing study. In conjunction with
National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air
National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by (the
Adjutant Generals (TAGs)) of maintaining at least one Air Force flying
unit in each state. As such, the Air Force chose the 188th Fighter
Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three (ANG) A-10 unit closures because
the base, along with those in Michigan, have other manned ANG flying
units in addition to the A-10 units selected for divestment. Final
disposition of the individual tail numbers is determined during fleet
management reviews and some aircraft may be realigned to other units to
replace older A-10 aircraft. Our intent is to keep the remaining A-10
fleet in the best possible health.
Additionally, the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies
Remotely Piloted Aircraft as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The
proximity of Arkansas' Razorback Range (less than 10 miles from Fort
Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint
training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive location for
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint training. The divestiture of the
A-10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to assign Fort Smith a
RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate
joint training.
Mr. Griffin. I am concerned that the Air Force's acquisition
strategy for the LAS was flawed, for example, for LAS, the Air Force
lowered modern pilot safety standards for accommodating women pilots in
ejection seat aircraft. The choice for the LAS contract, the Brazilian
Super Tucano doesn't even meet these lowered safety standards.
Why did the Air Force roll back the clock on LAS aircraft safety
requirements that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft, instead
of using the modern, and congressionally mandated pilot size
accommodation requirements used for your T-6, F-35, and T-38
modernization programs?
General Schwartz. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety
standards for the light air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a
security assistance effort for Afghanistan, NATO Air Training Command--
Afghanistan (NATC-A) defined the ejection seat and pilot accommodation
requirements based on expected seating height range for potential
Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected for
the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation
standards.
Mr. Griffin. In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-12,
the Senate Armed Services Committee commends the Air Force for ``its
commitment to developing and maintaining a transparent, repeatable, and
effective strategic basing process''. They went on to say the Air Force
has developed a process that consists, in part, of establishing basing
criteria, developing a preliminary list of candidate bases based upon
those criteria, and selecting final bases following a detailed
evaluation of a smaller group of installations'' (Senate Bill 1253)
Removal of aircraft is a basing decision and will affect future basing
actions. Is there an A-10 basing study? If not, what criteria did you
use to determine basing? Can I see the scores? If there was not a
study, then explain how you compared options?
General Schwartz. The reduction of A-10 aircraft is driven by the
need to reduce excess force structure as identified in the new Defense
Strategy and was not driven by a basing study. The new Defense
Strategic Guidance states that U.S. Forces will no longer be sized to
conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Analysis based on
scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced
requirement for tactical combat aircraft and a preference for multi-
role fighters to provide the most flexible capability within each
scenario. As a result, A-10 retirements were selected in lieu of other
combat aircraft and the Air Force made the difficult choice to retire
five A-10 squadrons comprised of 102 A-10 aircraft. Previous reductions
in fighter force structure shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve
component forces, and Air Force decisions in the FY13 President's
Budget request rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable force
structure over the long term. In conjunction with National Guard Bureau
leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guard (ANG)
Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs) of maintaining at
least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force
chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A-10
unit closures because the State, along with those in Michigan, has
other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A-10 units selected
for divestment. Additionally, the proximity of Arkansas' Razorback
Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation
Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith
a very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint
training. The divestiture of the A-10s afford an opportunity for the
Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of
range capabilities to facilitate joint training.
Mr. Griffin. Background: In the fall of 2008, Secretary of the Air
Force Michael Donley and the Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz
sought to redefine how the Air Force expects to make basing decisions.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations
Kathleen Ferguson said ``We created a process that was deliberate,
repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities.''
(Official Air Force Web site) Did the Air Force follow their
established procedures for A-10 basing decisions, and was the process
deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and
responsibilities?
General Schwartz. The Air Force basing process is a great tool to
determine the optimal location for assigning assets; however, the Air
Force's goal was to reduce force structure based on the new Defense
Strategy. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active
Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined force structure
changes at various locations. Each course of action was assessed using
specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of the
installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a
replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed
and range and airspace availability). The team's recommendations were
reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved
by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Before backfill missions were identified, 24 squadron-level units were
in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations would have been
left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions
were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one
installation was left without an operational mission.
Mr. Griffin. Background: In the National Defense Authorization Act
for FY-12, the Senate Armed Services Committee stated: ``Given the high
cost of operating aircraft and the fact that these flying operation
costs are recurring, the committee believes these costs warrant
examination in the strategic basing process. These flying operation
costs include, at a minimum, the costs associated with the additional
flying time resulting from a candidate base's relative distance to (1)
operational training areas for fighters and training aircraft, (2)
operational refueling tracks for tankers, and (3) critical logistic
centers for strategic and tactical airlift aircraft. The 188th Fighter
Wing's distance to their operational training areas is the closest in
the Air National Guard which significantly minimizes its operations
costs. The committee directed, ``no later than 180 days after the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force to review and
report on the role that the efficiency of flying operation costs should
play in the strategic basing process and any steps that it plans to
take to capture these costs in evaluating candidate bases in that
process.'' Was the Armed Services Committee's guidance to consider
distance to the operational training areas followed in the A-10 basing
process? If so, what weight was given to the significant taxpayer
savings due to reduced transit time to the 188th's training areas?
General Schwartz. When determining A-10 divestitures, Air Force
assessed various criteria to include manpower composition, location of
the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well
a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON
needed and range and airspace availability). The team's recommendations
were reviewed by Air Force leadership, and ultimately approved or
disapproved by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Arkansas' Razorback Range and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA) make
Fort Smith a very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft
joint training, providing an enduring mission capability to Fort Smith
while facilitating training with our joint warfighters.
Mr. Griffin. Background: The Commander of United States Special
Operations Command Admiral Eric Olson testified to Congress in March
2011: ``The shortage of readily available, local ranges currently
hampers special operations forces' ability to meet deployment training
timelines and causes our operators to `travel to train,' further
increasing their already excessive time away from home.'' Additionally
Vice Admiral William McRaven (current Special Operations Commander)
testified in his confirmation hearing June 28, 2011 that ``high
operational tempo has impacted readiness.'' He went on to say among the
areas effecting the high operations tempo was the ``lack of fixed wing
aircraft for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint Tactical Air
Controllers.'' (SOF Background and Issues for Congress) The 188th
Fighter Wing is a leader in Special Forces integration with an
extensive history of SOF integration (All Services), the unique ability
to conduct face-to-face briefs/debriefs, and an on-site Special Forces
unit (SEALs). Without tactical fighters at Fort Smith, SOF training
quality would significantly decrease. In addition, SOF operations tempo
would increase since forces would have more ``travel to train''
requirements. Were the Special Operations Forces training needs and
their operations tempo considered in the A-10 basing plan? If so, what
weight was given to the significant joint force multiplier capabilities
of the 188th Fighter Wing?
General Schwartz. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we
used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while
maintaining the ability to execute strategic guidance. Analysis based
on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a
reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and a preference for
multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability to
successfully prosecute each scenario. The Air Force provides full
spectrum support to all joint warfighters. Special operations forces
training involves a variety of weapon systems, and the Air Force will
continue to provide required support while accounting for the
divestiture of A-10s from Fort Smith. The Air Force will continue to
provide the necessary training capability required by special
operations forces. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
is aware of the divestiture of A-10s at Fort Smith and has not
expressed any concerns with operational training impacts.
Mr. Griffin. Background: In the 2010 QDR and the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY-12, the Senate Armed Services Committee
recommended the services produce formal Memoranda of Agreements (MOA)
between general purpose forces and special operations forces. A recent
report required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010
stated the requirement to ``codify support through formal agreements,
and eventually get SOF units and their general purpose forces
counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle.'' The
188FW has numerous formal MOA's in coordination with SOF and
effectively trains with special operations throughout their deployment
cycle. Does closing the 188FW and losing their unique SOF training
relationship, support the special operations forces in accordance with
the Senate Armed Services direction?
General Schwartz. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we
used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while
maintaining the ability to execute strategic guidance. The Air Force
provides full spectrum support to all joint warfighters. Special
operations forces training involves a variety of weapon systems, and
the Air Force will continue to provide required support while
accounting for the divestiture of A-10s from Fort Smith.
Mr. Griffin. Background: On October 5, 2009, the President signed
Executive Order (EO) 13514, which set sustainability goals for federal
agencies to make improvements in their environmental, energy, and
economic performance. He went on to say ``The Defense Department must
take a hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and
operated--indeed, every aspect of how it does business.'' The 188th
Fighter Wing is a leader in renewable energy, energy conversation, and
has among the lowest energy costs in the Air National Guard. When
making basing decisions did the Air Force consider energy costs and
sustainability? If so, what weight was given to the significant energy
cost savings of the 188th Fighter Wing?
General Schwartz. The impact of energy on basing decisions can be
important. However, the changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a
basing decision but a force structure realignment decision. This force
structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with National
Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National
Guard's (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ``allocate at least one flying
unit with ANG equipment to each state,'' when deciding which A-10 bases
would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A-10 units, two have no
other flying unit and so reductions came from the three states,
including Arkansas, that have other flying units.
Mr. Griffin. Background: On May 8, 2010, the Secretary of Defense
gave a speech at the Eisenhower Library, in which he announced his
intention of reforming the business operations of the Pentagon in an
effort to root out duplication, waste, and excess spending. The
Secretary stated: ``The Defense Department must take a hard look at
every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operated--indeed,
every aspect of how it does business. In each instance we must ask:
First, is this respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of
economic and fiscal duress? And second, is this activity or arrangement
the best use of limited dollars, given the pressing needs to take care
of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in the capabilities
necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?''
Additionally, in January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released the
Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing
the budget, the DOD first turned to where DOD could reduce among other
things operations expenses across the defense enterprise. Flight hour
costs represent a significant proportion of fighter training expenses.
Flight time spent transiting to/from the training areas is waste of
taxpayer resources. The 188th Fighter Wing has the closest airspace
therefore, it also has the lowest flight hour cost per training event.
Were operational costs considered in the A-10 basing plan? If so, what
weight was given to the significant cost savings provided by the 188th
Fighter Wing?
General Schwartz. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team
of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety
of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the
installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a
replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed
and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure
reductions and not part of the strategic basing process, the specific
criteria was not weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by
Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the
Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Mr. Griffin. Background: In January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta
released the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that
in developing the budget the DOD first turned to where DOD could reduce
among other things personnel costs across the defense enterprise. Fort
Smith, (compared to all current A-10 bases and all air-to-ground Air
National Guard fighter units) has the lowest combined health, housing
and utility costs. Were personnel costs included when A-10 basing
decisions were made? If so, what weight was given to the significant
personnel cost savings at the 188th Fighter Wing?
General Schwartz. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team
of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety
of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the
installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a
replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed
and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure
reductions and not part of the Air Force's formal strategic basing
process, the specific personnel cost criteria was not weighted. The
advantages of the relatively low cost of living found near Fort Smith,
AR will continue to benefit the members of the unit who will perform
the new MQ-1/9 Remote Split Operations mission. The team's
recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately
approved.
Mr. Griffin. Background: On Oct. 25, 2010, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen responding to a letter on JTAC
training said ``I share his concern regarding the increased demand
signal for JTAC's and the stress it exerts on the current production
capacities'' On November 16, 2010, General Raymond Odierno the
Commander of United States Joint Forces Command wrote Admiral Mullen to
express concerns he had over JTAC tasking and training. He said ``The
increased demand has resulted in a more than 100 percent increase in
schoolhouse throughput with a corresponding increase in the number of
required support sorties.'' Since the 188th's primary mission is Close
Air Support almost every training sortie is in support of ground
forces. With unmatched airspace proximity, volume, and availability,
the 188th produces the most JTAC training per flight hour in the entire
Air Force. When making fighter basing decisions, did the Air Force
consider JTAC training requirements? If so, what weight was given to
the significant JTAC training production of the 188th Fighter Wing?
General Schwartz. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance,
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century
Defense,'' directs the Services to build a force that will be smaller,
leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the
Air Force is reducing its size to support one large-scale combined arms
campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second adversary. With
the divestiture of Fort Smith's A-10s, the Air Force will maintain
sufficient capacity to produce and train Joint terminal Attack
Controller to support the new Defense Strategy.
The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and
Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to
include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is
suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace
availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not
weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. Griffin. Background: Quality attack controller training has
long been a problem for the DOD. A Due to airspace and asset
limitations at other locations throughout the country the quality of
attack controller sometimes suffers. The 188th Fighter Wing with it's
unique capability to face-to-face brief/debrief, diverse training
environment, regional training partners, and incorporation of leading
edge technology provides the best training for the services JTAC's,
When making fighter basing decisions did the Air Force consider the
quality of JTAC training? If so, what weight was given to the second-
to-none JTAC training VALUE at the 188th Fighter Wing?
General Schwartz. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance,
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century
Defense,'' directs the Services to build a force that will be smaller,
leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the
Air Force is reducing its size to support one large-scale combined arms
campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second adversary. With
the divestiture of Fort Smith's A-10s, the Air Force will maintain
sufficient capacity to produce and train JTACs to support the new
Defense Strategy.
The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and
Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to
include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is
suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace
availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not
weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of
the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Mr. Griffin. Did the Air Force consider innovation and joint
network capabilities when developing the A-10 basing plan? If so, what
weight was given to the leading edge initiatives of the 188th Fighter
Wing?
General Schwartz. The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing
are not a basing decision but a force structure realignment decision.
This force structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with
National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air
National Guard's (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ``allocate at least
one flying unit with ANG equipment to each state,'' when deciding which
A-10 bases would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A-10 units,
two have no other flying unit and so reductions came from the three
states, including Arkansas, that have other flying units. Additionally,
our General Officer led review considered a variety of criteria to
include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is
suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace
availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria were not
weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved.
The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing
decision but a force structure realignment decision. This force
structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with National
Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National
Guard's (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ``allocate at least one flying
unit with ANG equipment to each state,'' when deciding which A-10 bases
would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A-10 units, two have no
other flying unit and so reductions came from the three states,
including Arkansas, that have other flying units. Additionally, our
General Officer led review considered a variety of criteria to include
manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component
presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for
a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace
availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not
weighted. The team's recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. Griffin. Was F-35 basing considered in the A-10 basing study?
If so, how did bases that scored lower in the study keep their manned
fighter aircraft?
General Schwartz. F-35 basing was not considered when making force
structure reduction or backfill mission decisions that take effect in
FY13 and FY14. Given current F-35 production estimates, the next set of
F-35 basing decisions will include domestic and overseas bases and will
not be required prior to FY17. The Air Force formed a General Officer
led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined
force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action was
assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition,
location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state,
and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location
(e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The team's
recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately
approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24
squadron-level units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight
installations would have been left without an operational Air Force
mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level
units were preserved and only one installation was left without an
operational mission.
Mr. Griffin. Was the capability to support Total Force Initiatives
considered in the A-10 basing decisions? If so what weight was given to
Fort Smith's efficiencies and unique strengths?
General Schwartz. The new Defense Strategic Guidance drove a
holistic inter-state approach to Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserve force structure. The Air Force's proposed efforts will correct
several manpower disconnects, rebalance forces, and improve sortie
generation and aircraft utilization rates across the Total Force. This
combination is intended to improve the Total Force's readiness and
responsiveness across the spectrum of operations. From both an
operational effectiveness and fiscal responsibility perspective, this
strategy was preferred over a more piecemeal state-by-state approach.
In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force
considered the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously
approved by TAGs) of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in
each state. As such, the Air Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort
Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A-10 unit closures because the base,
along with those in Michigan, have other manned ANG flying units in
addition to the A-10 units selected for divestment. Additionally, the
Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted Aircraft
(RPA) as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas'
Razorback Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military
Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make
Fort Smith a very attractive location for RPA joint training. The
divestiture of the A-10s affords an opportunity for the Air Force to
assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range
capabilities to facilitate joint training.
Mr. Griffin. Why are you now choosing to end a program that is over
98% complete with development activities and with very little risk
going forward?
With a reasonable learning curve, what is a cost of the current AMP
system fully installed? What would the cost be for the alternative
system?
Could you explain the numbers that have been floating around in the
press on the cost of the current program? My understanding is we've
invested about $2.1B and should have around $2.5B to go. However, it
appears the USAF is using a $6.2B total program cost, leaving over
$4.1B yet to be spent. With less than 200 aircraft to be modified and
using $8M a copy, we should be able to finish the program for around
$2B.
Has there been any analysis of the long-term cost savings the
current AMP solution provides versus the new start for just a CNS/ATM
capability that is proposed for FY 13?
So that the taxpayer's money invested in the program and research
is not lost, have you considered restructuring the current program to
work within your new funding profile and avoid the cost and inherent
risks of a new start effort?
Can the current program be scaled down and still retain its
certification? If so, have you thought about doing that instead of
starting all over again?
General Schwartz. Due to budget constraints, the fiscal year 2013
President's Budget (PB) terminated the C-130 Avionics Modernization
Program (AMP).
As reflected in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR), the C-130 AMP per aircraft estimate is $19 million. The fiscal
year 2012 PB per aircraft cost of ``Optimize Legacy C-130
Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/
ATM)'' program is $3.7 million.
A total of $1.8 billion has been spent to date on C-130 AMP. A
breakdown by phase follows: RDT&E: $1.7 billion Procurement: $0.1
billion
Total cost of the 221 C-130 AMP aircraft fleet is $6.3 billion: The
latest cost estimate is from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's (CAPE) Independent Cost
Estimate (ICE) dated 23 March 2010; it reflects total cost of $6.3
billion (Then-Year dollars): RDT&E: $1.8 billion Procurement: $4.5
billion
A specific comparative analysis of the long-term cost savings the
current C-130 AMP solution provides versus the new C-130 CNS/ATM
program was not accomplished. Compliance with looming CNS/ATM mandates
was the primary reason behind the C-130 AMP program, and remains the
primary reason for the planned C-130 CNS/ATM program. The Air Force
plans to modernize the 184 aircraft legacy C-130 combat delivery fleet
in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar
CNS/ATM solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC-10, KC-135),
and an awareness of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations' C-130
aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently
available.
The C-130 CNS/ATM program will provide the capabilities related to
global access and global engagement that the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) determined are essential to national security.
The primary differences between the C-130 AMP and the C-130 CNS/ATM
program are: The new program retains the navigator position, thereby
requiring much less avionics integration than C-130 AMP, the new
program does not standardize the aircraft cockpit across the C-130H
fleet, and there is more than a 40 percent reduction in requirements
when compared to C-130 AMP. These changes were too large to restructure
the C-130 AMP program or to simply scale it down. The goal is for an
open and transparent defense industry competition, with C-130 CNS/ATM
program contract award in fiscal year 2014. This is required to ensure
the legacy C-130H combat delivery fleet meets the Federal Aviation
Administration's air traffic management 1 January 2020 mandate.
Mr. Griffin. The Air Force has stated that you were a full partner
in the decisions to cut force structure and manpower from the Air
National Guard in the budget process. Does this mean that you had a
vote in the decisions? How did you vote on the decision to cut three
(3) A-10 squadrons from the Air National Guard? 65 x C-130s? F-16s? Did
you offer alternate solutions?
General Schwartz. The Air National Guard (ANG) was a participant in
the budget discussions during the decision-making process. Neither ANG,
Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) or Active Duty Major Command (MAJCOM)
leadership took part in a ``vote'' on the final force structure
decisions. The Secretary of the Air Force, with the Chief of Staff's
best military input, made the call on determining which planes would be
cut from the Guard component. ANG leadership did provide inputs on
which squadrons to stand down based on the five ANG Captsone
Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to
each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular
Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that
fit the militia construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (Emergency
Support Functions) relevant to the states.
Following release of the President's fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget
proposal, the Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an
opportunity to suggest changes to those proposals affecting the Air
National Guard. The CoG empowered two state Adjutants General to
develop an alternative which was recently provided to the Air Force and
the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results of
the DOD's assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13
budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.
Mr. Griffin. Do you think we can leverage the cost savings in the
ANG to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally sensible way for FY13
compared to what was released earlier this week in the President's
Budget Request? Can your staff prepare some alternate options for the
Congress to consider that the Air Force may not have been willing to
look at?
General Schwartz. Following release of the President's FY13 budget
proposal, the Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an
opportunity to suggest changes to those proposals affecting the Air
National Guard. The CoG empowered two state Adjutants General to
develop an alternative which was recently provided to the Air Force and
the Department of Defense through the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results of
the Department of Defense's assessment and any recommended changes to
the proposed FY13 budget will be provided to Congress within the next
few weeks.
Mr. Griffin. The Air Force's justification for reducing the Air
National Guard is that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past
when the Air National Guard has grown? Is this true? Do you believe
that it was the right decision to reduce the Active Air Force rather
than gutting the ANG in the past? Has anything changed that would
change our way of doing business since those reductions were made?
General Schwartz. It's not correct to say the Air Force is reducing
the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty
force. To meet the requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy
and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult
choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest
portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle was
balance. To retain critical core capabilities and maintain our ability
to rapidly respond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission
demands, the Air Force balanced risk to force structure and
modernization.
Mr. Griffin. Did the AF consider Homeland Security capacity in
their reductions? Do you think the AF places the same interest or
emphasis on homeland missions as it does overseas missions? What
happened with the C-27J? Was it a good aircraft for the Homeland
Security mission? How is it doing in Afghanistan?
General Schwartz. The Air Force conducted detailed analysis of
wartime and disaster response (Homeland Defense) scenarios consistent
with the new the Department of Defense strategic guidance and validated
a reduced airlift requirement, leaving the Air Force with excess
airlift capacity. As a result the Air Force was able to reduce the C-
130 fleet by 65 aircraft and divest the C-27J fleet. The Air Force is
exploring options on the disposition of the C-27J fleet. While the C-
27J can perform the Homeland Security mission, the C-130 is a more cost
effective and capable aircraft. In support the Homeland Security
mission, the Air Force meets mission requirements/taskings through the
Global Force Management process that prioritizes all combatant
commanders' (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements. Feedback from
CENTCOM indicates the C-130 has generally outperformed the C-27J
providing intra-theater airlift support in Afghanistan.
Mr. Griffin. It appears the AF is changing the force mix out of its
concern for readiness and to avoid asking too much of the air reserve
components (ARC). How is your retention? Are you maxed out in the ANG
and need the AF to reduce your operational load? Or do you have the
capacity to do more in some of your missions? Where are you near
capacity?
General Schwartz. Retention in the Air Force is at a 17 year record
high. Although we've had to implement Force Management programs to
ensure we remain within authorized end strength, we also continue to
invest in retention programs for certain critical career fields to
guarantee we maintain the right balance of skills and experience.
The FY13 Presidents Budget proposal outlined a total force mix to
meet the requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy. The Air
Force retains critical core capabilities and maintains its ability to
meet the operational load. Balancing the right mix of Active Duty,
Guard and Reserve components allows us to rapidly respond with a
sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, while balancing risk
to force structure and modernization.
Mr. Griffin. The experience levels in the ANG are well known, and
are a major factor in how you can fly older aircraft less often and
thus extend their service life and save money. Will the same hold true
for RPA and MC-12? What can we expect regarding these missions? Are
they good ANG missions, and can we count on having them longer than the
plan to retire the A-10s? Did the MC-12s and RPA missions come to you
at your request? Were these missions part of a long term strategy to
equip the ANG?
General Schwartz. Yes, the ability of the Air National Guard (ANG)
to establish and maintain superior experience levels, regardless of the
particular platform, is well known. History tells us that there is no
reason to believe that would be any different in the Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (RPA) and MC-12 and in fact, the ANG currently has the highest
experience levels in RPAs.
As part of the plan to meet the increased RPA taskings to the Air
Force from the SecDef, Air Combat Command (ACC) has asked the ANG to
operate 11 steady state Combat Air Patrols (CAP) indefinitely. The
fiscal year (FY13) budget proposal takes this into account and converts
an additional four units from former missions to RPAs in order for the
ANG to meet this requirement. As an end state, there will be a total of
11 ANG RPA units operating 11 steady state CAPs with the ability to
mobilize more.
The RPA mission is excellent for the ANG for several reasons.
First, ANG Airmen are able to augment active duty forces in a wartime
tasking while ``deployed in place.'' This means these Guard Airmen are
able to maintain relevancy in the fight, but are able to be with their
families at the end of the duty day; traditional guardsmen are able to
maintain their important roles in business and community life. Second,
ANG RPA units are part of that traditional rheostat of reserve forces
that continue to be called upon when demand increases and then can go
back to civilian life when not needed. Case in point, the ANG has been
asked and is continuing to fly five surge CAPs while ACC reconstitutes
its active duty RPA force. Finally, RPAs could be an invaluable asset
to State Governors and Department of Homeland Security in both the
DomOps and Defense Support to Civil Authorities role for events such as
natural disasters or Incident Awareness and Assessment.
The transition of RPAs and the MC-12s to the ANG may extend the
service life of the aircraft based on predicted reduced operational use
after the Afghanistan drawdown. The MC-12 provides a replacement for
the retiring RC-26, preserving ANG aviation capabilities and
experience. The addition of the MC-12 mission also mitigates some
mission losses sustained by the ANG in the FY13 President's budget. The
reliance on the Guard for these important missions is, indeed, an
important part of our long term strategy to equip the ANG to continue
its important national role into the foreseeable future.
Mr. Griffin. If approved, this new plan will once again require
many units to convert to new missions and require retraining of
hundreds of airmen. How much do these conversions cost? Were there
options to save this expense on our people and to avoid losing all the
experience the ANG possesses?
General Schwartz. The conversion costs will vary between units and
missions. Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion
costs. When exploring options we were guided by the Air National Guard
(ANG)-developed five Capstone Principles: allocate at least one flying
Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in
balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG
people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-
use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states.
Following release of the President's fiscal year (FY13) budget
proposal, the Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an
opportunity to suggest changes to those proposals affecting the Air
National Guard. The CoG empowered two state Adjutants General to
develop an alternative which was recently provided to the Air Force and
the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results of
the DOD's assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13
budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. I understand that the Air Force decision to cut the C-
130s was based on removing the older aircraft from the fleet that
require costly modification and modernization efforts to remain viable.
However, some of these older aircrafts have not put on as many flight
hours than others and are only portionally through their life cycle.
Was this at all considered than just arbitrarily retiring the older
aircrafts?
Secretary Donley. Yes, this was one of multiple factors considered
when deciding which aircraft to retire. While the relative age of each
model was the primary factor for consideration, existing and required
modifications and creating fleet commonality were also considered.
Mrs. Roby. In regard to the C-130s being retired, how was the
decision made in which squadrons to retire rather than any
consideration made to the actual performance and role of the squadrons
than just that the older C-130s were at those locations?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force found very little variance in
squadron performance and roles when it looked at C-130 force structure
reductions. The Air Force used two primary means to determine the
optimum way to reduce intra-theater force structure while retaining
needed capacity and capability. Using scenarios consistent with Defense
Strategic Guidance, the Air Force determined that excess capacity
exists in the Air Force intra-theater airlift fleet. A reduced intra-
theater airlift requirement enabled the retirement of 65 C-130H
aircraft. To not only meet surge requirements, but also to meet a 62-
aircraft post-surge and steady-state requirement with a reduced total
fleet size, adjustments to the Active Duty (AD)/Air Reserve Component
(ARC) mix were necessary. The previous AD/ARC mix of 33%/67% was
problematic during post-surge and steady-state operations with
excessive AD deploy-to-dwell rates. Therefore, 65 aircraft were removed
from the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve changing the AD/ARC
mix to 41%/59% which more closely aligns with other Air Force force
structure.
Mrs. Roby. Was there a consideration given to moving the C-130s to
any of these squadrons due to their mission and location rather than
retiring those units with the oldest aircraft?
Secretary Donley. Yes, besides retiring 65 older C-130H aircraft,
the Air Force realigned a substantial portion of its C-130 fleet to
ensure fleet commonality at individual units, effectively streamlining
operations and maintenance. In some cases, units gained newer C-130H
models or C-130J aircraft. Besides realignment, the Air Force in
coordination with the National Guard Bureau, considered State-by-State
capability and in multiple cases employed mission mitigating options to
avoid divesting entire units.
Mrs. Roby. Do you believe that we can leverage the cost savings in
the Air National Guard to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally
sensible way for Fiscal Year 2013 compared to what was released earlier
this week in the President's Budget Request?
Secretary Donley. The proposed FY13 President's Budget provides the
most cost effective force structure to meet the new U.S. defense
strategy. Out of this assessment, the Department of Defense developed a
strategy that transitions our defense enterprise from an emphasis on
today's wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad
range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department's
efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security
imperative of deficit reduction by reducing defense spending. The
resulting strategic guidance provided a set of precepts to guide
decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent
budget cycles.
Mrs. Roby. The Air Force's justification for reducing the Air
National Guard is that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past
when the Air National Guard has grown. Is this true and has anything
changed that would change our way of doing business since those
reductions were made?
Secretary Donley. It's not correct to say the Air Force is reducing
the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty
force. To meet the requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy
and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult
choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest
portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle was
balance. The Air Force retains critical core capabilities and maintains
its ability to rapidly respond with a sustainable agile force to meet
mission demands, while balancing risk to force structure and
modernization.
Mrs. Roby. Does the Air Force places the same interest or emphasis
on homeland missions as it does overseas missions when it comes to the
Air National Guard and was homeland security capacity consider with
reductions?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force recognizes that the first
responsibility of U.S. forces is to defend U.S. territory from direct
attack by state and non-state actors. When directed by the President or
approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force conducts defense
support of civil authorities and assists at all levels in preventing,
protecting against, mitigating the effects of, and responding to man-
made or natural disasters. To fully analyze the effects of impending
reductions, the Air Force conducted detailed analysis of wartime and
disaster response scenarios consistent with the new Department of
Defense strategic guidance. In support of the Homeland Security
mission, the Air Force continues to meet mission requirements/taskings
through the Global Force Management process that prioritizes all
combatant commanders (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements.
Mrs. Roby. If approved, this new plan will once again require many
units to convert to new missions. Were there options to save this
expense on our people and to avoid losing all the experience the Air
National Guard possesses?
Secretary Donley. The conversion costs will vary between units and
missions. Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion
costs. When exploring options we were guided by the Air National Guard
(ANG)-developed five Capstone Principles: allocate at least one flying
Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in
balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG
people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-
use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states.
Following release of the President's fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget
proposal, the Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an
opportunity to suggest changes to those proposals affecting the Air
National Guard. The CoG empowered two state Adjutants General to
develop an alternative which was recently provided to the Air Force and
the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results of
the DOD's assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13
budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.
Mrs. Roby. I understand that the Air Force decision to cut the C-
130s was based on removing the older aircraft from the fleet that
require costly modification and modernization efforts to remain viable.
However, some of these older aircrafts have not put on as many flight
hours than others and are only portionally through their life cycle.
Was this at all considered than just arbitrarily retiring the older
aircrafts?
General Schwartz. Yes, this was one of multiple factors considered
when deciding which aircraft to retire. While the relative age of each
model was the primary factor for consideration, existing and required
modifications and creating fleet commonality were also considered.
Mrs. Roby. In regard to the C-130s being retired, how was the
decision made in which squadrons to retire rather than any
consideration made to the actual performance and role of the squadrons
than just that the older C-130s were at those locations?
General Schwartz. The Air Force found very little variance in
squadron performance and roles when it looked at C-130 force structure
reductions. The Air Force used two primary means to determine the
optimum way to reduce intra-theater force structure while retaining
needed capacity and capability. Using scenarios consistent with Defense
Strategic Guidance, the Air Force determined that excess capacity
exists in the Air Force intra-theater airlift fleet. A reduced intra-
theater airlift requirement enabled the retirement of 65 C-130H
aircraft. To not only meet surge requirements, but also to meet a 62-
aircraft post-surge and steady-state requirement with a reduced total
fleet size, adjustments to the Active Duty (AD)/Air Reserve Component
(ARC) mix were necessary. The previous AD/ARC mix of 33%/67% was
problematic during post-surge and steady-state operations with
excessive AD deploy-to-dwell rates. Therefore, 65 aircraft were removed
from the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve changing the AD/ARC
mix to 41%/59% which more closely aligns with other Air Force force
structure.
Mrs. Roby. Was there a consideration given to moving the C-130s to
any of these squadrons due to their mission and location rather than
retiring those units with the oldest aircraft?
General Schwartz. Yes, besides retiring 65 older C-130H aircraft,
the Air Force realigned a substantial portion of its C-130 fleet to
ensure fleet commonality at individual units, effectively streamlining
operations and maintenance. In some cases, units gained newer C-130H
models or C-130J aircraft. Besides realignment, the Air Force in
coordination with the National Guard Bureau, considered State-by-State
capability and in multiple cases employed mission mitigating options to
avoid divesting entire units.
Mrs. Roby. Do you believe that we can leverage the cost savings in
the Air National Guard to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally
sensible way for Fiscal Year 2013 compared to what was released earlier
this week in the President's Budget Request?
General Schwartz. The proposed FY13 President's Budget provides the
most cost effective force structure to meet the new U.S. defense
strategy. Out of this assessment, the Department of Defense developed a
strategy that transitions our defense enterprise from an emphasis on
today's wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad
range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department's
efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security
imperative of deficit reduction by reducing defense spending. The
resulting strategic guidance provided a set of precepts to guide
decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent
budget cycles.
Mrs. Roby. The Air Force's justification for reducing the Air
National Guard is that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past
when the Air National Guard has grown. Is this true and has anything
changed that would change our way of doing business since those
reductions were made?
General Schwartz. It's not correct to say the Air Force is reducing
the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty
force. To meet the requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy
and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult
choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest
portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle was
balance. The Air Force retains critical core capabilities and maintains
its ability to rapidly respond with a sustainable agile force to meet
mission demands, while balancing risk to force structure and
modernization.
Mrs. Roby. Does the Air Force places the same interest or emphasis
on homeland missions as it does overseas missions when it comes to the
Air National Guard and was homeland security capacity consider with
reductions?
General Schwartz. The Air Force recognizes that the first
responsibility of U.S. forces is to defend U.S. territory from direct
attack by state and non-state actors. When directed by the President or
approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force conducts defense
support of civil authorities and assists at all levels in preventing,
protecting against, mitigating the effects of, and responding to man-
made or natural disasters. To fully analyze the effects of impending
reductions, the Air Force conducted detailed analysis of wartime and
disaster response scenarios consistent with the new Department of
Defense strategic guidance. In support of the Homeland Security
mission, the Air Force continues to meet mission requirements/taskings
through the Global Force Management process that prioritizes all
combatant commanders (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements.
Mrs. Roby. If approved, this new plan will once again require many
units to convert to new missions. Were there options to save this
expense on our people and to avoid losing all the experience the Air
National Guard possesses?
General Schwartz. The conversion costs will vary between units and
missions. Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion
costs. When exploring options we were guided by the Air National Guard
(ANG)-developed five Capstone Principles: allocate at least one flying
Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in
balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG
people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-
use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states.
Following release of the President's fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget
proposal, the Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an
opportunity to suggest changes to those proposals affecting the Air
National Guard. The CoG empowered two state Adjutants General to
develop an alternative which was recently provided to the Air Force and
the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results of
the DOD's assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13
budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.
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