[Senate Hearing 112-459]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-459
SECURITY ISSUES RELATING TO IRAQ
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
74-867 WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Security Issues Relating to Iraq
november 15, 2011
Page
Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary of Defense...................... 7
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 11
McGurk, Brett H., Visiting Scholar, Columbia University School of
Law............................................................ 48
Ollivant, Dr. Douglas A., Senior National Security Fellow,
National Security Studies Program, The New America Foundation.. 57
Pollack, Dr. Kenneth M., Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, The Brookings Institution.............................. 65
(iii)
SECURITY ISSUES RELATING TO IRAQ
----------
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Ayotte,
Collins, Graham, and Cornyn.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
research assistant; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J.
Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian E. Brose, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton
IV, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Diana
G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd, Brian F. Sebold,
and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey Howard, assistant to
Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Joanne
McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Patrick Day and Chad
Kreikemeier, assistants to Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman,
assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch,
assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; and Sergio
Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today the committee receives testimony from two panels of
witnesses on security issues relating to Iraq, including the
withdrawal of U.S. troops and the long-term U.S.-Iraq
relationship.
Our first panel consists of Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Martin Dempsey. This panel will be followed by a panel of
outside witnesses.
First, a very warm welcome to you, Mr. Secretary, and to
you, General Dempsey.
Last month, the President announced that all U.S. military
forces would be coming home from Iraq by the end of this
December as required under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement which had been agreed to by President George W. Bush
and Prime Minister Maliki. The fulfillment of our obligations
under that 2008 agreement represents a bipartisan U.S. policy,
set by a Republican President and carried through to completion
by his Democratic successor. U.S. Forces Iraq under General
Lloyd Austin is on track to meet the December legal deadline
for the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. military forces and
equipment. As of today, there are around 30,000 U.S. military
personnel in Iraq, down from a peak of 160,000 during the surge
in 2007. At the beginning of Operation New Dawn in September of
last year, the United States had 92 bases in Iraq; after the
closure of Balad, we are down to 11. Department of Defense
(DOD) property in Iraq has declined from 2 million pieces of
equipment September a year ago to around 600,000 pieces of
equipment now.
We arrive at this point after 8\1/2\ years of conflict and
great sacrifice by our service men and women, their families,
and the American people. Many of our men and women in uniform
have served multiple tours in Iraq. They have been separated
from their families for months and years at a time, and many
will bear the scars of this conflict for the rest of their
lives. Over 4,400 U.S. personnel have been killed and nearly
32,000 wounded in Iraq, and the direct costs of Operation Iraqi
Freedom total over $800 billion. We owe an immense debt of
gratitude to our military men and women and their families.
The administration had sought to reach an agreement with
the Iraqi Government for military trainers to remain in Iraq
after December 31. However, those negotiations reached an
impasse on the issue of legal immunity for our troops, that is,
protections from prosecution in Iraqi courts. Once it became
clear that the Government of Iraq was not prepared to grant our
service men and women the same legal protections that they had
had under the 2008 Security Agreement and the same legal
protections that the U.S. military has under agreements with
other countries in the region, President Obama decided that all
U.S. military forces would be withdrawn as provided for under
the 2008 agreement. I believe that that was the right decision.
I would have supported a small U.S. residual presence in
Iraq of a few thousand troops with a limited mission of
training Iraqi security forces and providing additional
protection for our diplomatic personnel if, and only if, Iraq
had agreed to legal protections for those U.S. troops. I
believe our military commanders supported leaving a residual
military force if, and only if, legal protections were provided
and that they did not support keeping U.S. troops in Iraq
without immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts.
Our military withdrawal, as agreed to in the 2008 Security
Agreement, sends a clear message to the Iraqi people and the
Arab world that the United States keeps its commitments. It
puts the lie to propaganda that the United States is an
occupation force in Iraq.
It is time to complete the transition of responsibility for
Iraq's security now to the Iraq Government. The Iraqis are in a
position to handle their own internal security. Violence in
Iraq has dropped 90 percent from its peak during the surge. At
the same time, the Iraqi security forces have made significant
progress. According to U.S. Forces-Iraq, Iraqi security forces
exceed 650,000 people. In addition, Iraq can assume the costs
of its own security, with oil production in Iraq reaching
record highs. Government of Iraq oil revenues during the first
9 months of 2011 were more than 50 percent greater than during
the same period the year before and exceeded Iraqi budget
projections for 2011 by more than 20 percent.
With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, one chapter
in U.S.-Iraqi relations closes and another chapter opens. This
new chapter in U.S.-Iraqi relations after December is not an
abandonment of Iraq. The United States remains committed to the
bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) which was entered
into at the same time as the 2008 Security Agreement. The SFA
sets out numerous areas for continued U.S.-Iraqi cooperation,
including on defense and security issues. The United States has
stood up a robust Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) at the
U.S. embassy and sites across Iraq to manage security
cooperation efforts in support of the Government of Iraq. By
January of next year, this office will be administering nearly
370 military sales to Iraq, totaling nearly $10 billion.
Certainly Iraq faces a number of significant security
challenges, which the United States can assist Iraq in
confronting. Al Qaeda in Iraq and affiliated terrorist
organizations seek to exploit ethnic divisions among Iraq's
sectarian groups and minorities. In this regard, recent arrests
of Sunni political and intellectual leaders by the Maliki
Government have exacerbated Sunni-Shia tensions, potentially
creating an opening for al Qaeda to exploit. We would be
interested in hearing from our witnesses this morning what
steps the administration has taken to try to defuse that
situation.
In northern Iraq, the internal boundary remains under
dispute between the Kurds and the Government of Iraq. The
initiative put in place by U.S. Forces Iraq to reduce or avoid
conflict, which is called the Combined Security Mechanism, is
transitioning from a three-way mechanism involving U.S., Kurd,
and Iraqi security forces to one operating bilaterally between
Kurd and Iraqi security forces. I hope our witnesses will
address how the United States intends to play an overwatch role
along the disputed internal boundary, particularly through the
U.S. consulate in Erbil and the OSC site in Kirkuk. We would
also be interested in hearing whether there could be a role for
a multilateral peacekeeping force to maintain stability along
this boundary while the parties address the outstanding
political and security issues.
Our concern about the security of the Christian minorities
is very strong. We need to work with the Government of Iraq to
ensure it has the will and the capability to protect Iraq's
religious minority communities from targeted violence and
persecution.
The status of the residents at Camp Ashraf from the Iranian
dissident group MEK remains unresolved. As the December 2011
deadline approaches, the administration needs to remain
vigilant that the Government of Iraq lives up to its
commitments to provide for the safety of Camp Ashraf residents
until a resolution of their status can be reached. We need to
make it clear to the Government of Iraq that there cannot be a
repeat of the deadly confrontation begun last April by Iraqi
security forces against Camp Ashraf residents.
Another challenge is Iran's efforts to influence the
political and security environment in Iraq. Iran continues to
fund, train, and equip extremist groups, groups that have
targeted U.S. forces in Iraq for deadly attacks. I hope our
witnesses this morning will address the capability of the Iraqi
security forces and the willingness of the Maliki Government to
respond forcefully to attacks by these Iranian-backed groups
after the withdrawal of U.S. military forces.
The departure of U.S. military forces from Iraq in the
coming weeks, consistent with our legal obligations, can
contribute to advancing the normalization of relations between
the United States and Iraq based on mutual respect and shared
interests as sovereign nations. That can strengthen stability
not only in Iraq but also throughout the region.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
convening this important hearing.
Let me thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us
today, for their continued service to our Nation, and for their
tireless support of our men and women in uniform.
The purpose of this hearing, as the chairman said, is to
examine the implications of the President's decision of October
21 to end negotiations with the Government of Iraq over whether
to retain a small U.S. military presence there beyond this
year. As a result, all U.S. military forces will withdraw from
the country by next month.
I continue to believe that this decision represents a
failure of leadership, both Iraqi and American, that it was a
sad case of political expediency, supplanting military
necessity, both in Baghdad and in Washington, and that it will
have serious negative consequences for the stability of Iraq
and the national security interests of the United States. I
sincerely hope that I am wrong, but I fear that General Jack
Keane, who was one of the main architects of the surge, is
correct once again when he said recently ``We won the war in
Iraq, and we are now losing the peace.''
Let me be clear: Like all Americans, I am eager to bring
our troops home. I do not want them to remain in Iraq or
anywhere else for a day longer than necessary. But I also agree
with our military commanders in Iraq, who were nearly unanimous
in their belief that a small presence of U.S. forces should
remain a while longer to help the Iraqis secure the hard-won
gains that we had made together. General Petraeus, General
Odierno, General Austin, and other military leaders under their
command, all of them believed that we needed to keep some
troops in Iraq. This is what they consistently told me and
others during our repeated visits to Iraq.
Our commanders held this view for a very specific reason,
which they made clear to this committee on numerous occasions.
For all the progress the Iraqi security forces have made in
recent years, and it has been substantial, they still have some
critical gaps in their capabilities that will endure beyond
this year. Those capability gaps include enabling functions for
their counterterrorism operations, the control of Iraq's
airspace and other external security missions, intelligence
collections and fusion, and training and sustainment of the
force. Indeed, in the latest report of the U.S. Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the chief of staff
of the Iraqi military is quoted as saying that Iraq will not be
able to fully provide for its own external defense until
sometime between 2020 and 2024. Specifically he says, ``Iraq
will not be able to defend its own air space until 2020, at the
earliest.'' Unfortunately, the President chose to disregard the
nearly unanimous advice of our military commanders, not for the
first time, as well as the clear long-term needs of Iraq's
military.
Advocates of withdrawal are quick to point out that the
current security agreement, which requires all U.S. troops to
be out of Iraq by the end of this year, was concluded by the
Bush administration. That is true. It is also beside the point.
The authors of that agreement always intended for it to be
renegotiated at a later date to allow some U.S. forces to
remain in Iraq. As former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
whose State Department negotiated the security agreement, put
it recently, ``There was an expectation that we would negotiate
something that looked like a residual force for our training
with the Iraqis.'' She said ``Everybody believed it would be
better if there was some kind of residual force.'' So you can
believe testimony and statements we have heard or you can
believe what the then-Secretary of State believed would be the
case as it regards to a residual force in Iraq.
Clearly Iraq is a sovereign country, and we cannot force
the Iraqis to do things they do not want to do. But this also
misses the main point. All of the leaders of Iraq's major
political blocs wanted some U.S. troops to remain in the
country. I met, along with Senator Graham and Senator
Lieberman, with all of these leaders this year and that is what
they told us. The problem had more to do with the
administration's unwillingness or inability, or both, on more
than one occasion to provide the Iraqis with a clear position
on what our government wanted. The administration seemed more
concerned with conforming to Iraq's political realities than
shaping those realities, focused more on deferring to Iraq's
interests than securing the critical interest we had at stake
at this process.
So what will be the implications of the full withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Iraq? My concern is that all of those
disturbing and destabilizing trends in Iraq are now at much
greater risk of becoming even more threatening, and the events
of the past month alone offer many reasons to think that this
may already be happening.
One such threat to Iraq's stability is rising sectarianism.
At the end of last month, Prime Minister Maliki's government
arrested more than 600 Iraqis, mostly Sunnis, who were
characterized as Baathist coup-plotters but who may have also
included ordinary political opponents of the government. This
action has only exacerbated tensions with Iraq's Sunnis who
already see the political process as unresponsive and unfairly
exclusive. At the same time, longstanding tensions between
Iraqi Arabs and Kurds are arising over the control of the
country's hydrocarbons. Last week, the president of the
Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, warned that the
withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to ``an open-ended civil
war.''
In short, while Iraq's nascent democracy seems to be at
growing risk from a new centralization of authority, the
sectarian rivalries who had almost pulled the country apart
before the surge are now showing troubling signs of reemerging.
A related threat comes from a resilient al Qaeda in Iraq
and, on the other side, Shia militias that take orders from
Iran. A November 5th article in the New York Times reports
growing concern among senior American and Iraqi leaders that al
Qaeda in Iraq is ``poised for a deadly resurgence.'' Similarly,
one of the most dangerous Iraqi Shia militant groups recently
participated in a gathering of regional terrorist groups in
Beirut, which included Hezbollah and Hamas, suggesting that
Iranian-backed forces in Iraq may seek to establish a state
within a state that can serve as a base for engaging in
destabilizing activities beyond Iraq. At the same time, not one
day after the President's withdrawal announcement, Muqtada al-
Sadr stated that Iraqis should view U.S. embassy officials in
Iraq as ``occupiers,'' and that they should be targets of his
``resistance'' movement.
This points to a final threat, the rise of Iranian
influence in Iraq. While there are certainly limits to this
influence, the fact remains that Iran's number one priority
this year was to get all U.S. troops out of Iraq. They will now
accomplish that goal, and in his public comments, Iran's
Supreme Leader has barely been able to contain his enthusiasm.
He has referred to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq as
constituting the ``golden pages'' of Iraq's history. Other
Iranian leaders have described our impending withdrawal as a
great victory for Iran. Iraqis, on the other hand, appear to be
making the necessary accommodations to an emboldened Iran. The
week after the President's announcement, Kurdistan President
Barzani went to Iran. Next week, the chief commander of the
Iraqi army plans to visit Iran. It is hard to see the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq as anything but a win for
Iran.
When Ambassador Ryan Crocker departed Baghdad in 2009, he
warned, ``the events for which the Iraq War will be remembered
by us and by the world have not yet happened.'' Unfortunately,
the events of the past 2 years, culminating in the
administration's failure to secure a presence of U.S. forces in
Iraq, have greatly and unnecessarily increased the odds that
the war in Iraq may be remembered not as the emerging success
that it appeared when the administration took office, but as
something tragically short of that. Considering all that our
troops have sacrificed in Iraq and considering our enduring
national security interests in Iraq's stability, we have a
solemn responsibility to stay committed to Iraq's success. But
as we do, we cannot avoid the fact that Iraq's progress is now
at greater risk than at any time since the dark days before the
surge, and that it did not have to be this way.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Secretary Panetta?
STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you, as always,
for your continuing support for our men and women in uniform
and for their families. We deeply appreciate the support that
we get from all of you that helps those that put their lives on
the line.
I appreciate the opportunity to describe our strategy in
Iraq and to do so alongside General Dempsey who has overseen so
many critical efforts of the Iraq campaign from its outset in
2003. I think General Dempsey has been deployed multiple times
to that area, served in key positions both here in Washington
and at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa and has a pretty
good feel for the situation in Iraq.
It is helpful, as always, to recall the objective here with
regards to Iraq. In February 2009, President Obama--and before
President Obama, President Bush--I heard him say this directly
to the Iraq Study Group--laid out a very clear and achievable
goal that was shared by the American and Iraqi people, and that
was simply an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant;
in the words of President Bush, an Iraq that could govern,
sustain, and secure itself.
Today, thanks to innumerable sacrifices from all involved,
Iraq is governing itself. It is a sovereign nation. It is an
emerging source of stability in a vital part of the world, and
as an emerging democracy, it is capable of being able to
address its own security needs.
For our part, the United States is ready to mark the
beginning of a new phase in our relationship with Iraq, one
that is normal, similar to others in the region, and based on
mutual interests and mutual respect.
As the President announced last month, we are fully
implementing the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, and under
the outstanding leadership of General Lloyd Austin--and I
cannot compliment him enough--there are no limits to what I can
say about his leadership. It has been absolutely outstanding at
a very difficult period. We are completing the drawdown of our
forces by the end of this year. This fulfills the pledge made
by President Bush, as well as President Obama, which called for
an end to combat mission last August and a removal of all U.S.
combat forces by December 31, 2011.
We are continuing to pursue a long-term training
relationship with the Iraqis through the OSC which will include
a limited number of U.S. military personnel operating under our
embassy and receiving normal diplomatic protections. Through
the U.S.-Iraq SFA, we also have a platform for future
cooperation in counterterrorism, in naval and air defense, and
in joint exercises. We will work with the Iraqis to pursue
those efforts.
Let me briefly walk through some of the major challenges
that have already been pointed out that will confront Iraq and
mention why I believe that Iraq is at a stage when it is able
to deal with them. Certainly with our continuing long-term
relationship, I think they can deal with these issues.
First is the challenge of extremism. I expect that we will
see extremists, including al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed
militant groups that will continue to plan and continue to
carry out periodic high-profile attacks. While these groups
remain capable of conducting these types of attacks, they do
not enjoy widespread support among the Iraqi population, and
more importantly, the Iraqis have developed some of the most
capable counterterrorism forces in the region. They have been
active against Iranian-backed militants in recent months, and
we will be in a position to continue to assist them in building
these capabilities through our OSC. The fact is that despite
our reduction in forces from well over 150,000 to now
approximately 24,000, levels of violence in Iraq remain low.
A second challenge for Iraq is the conflict between
political blocs, Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, and others, as in any
democracy. Iraq deals with a range of competing agendas. But
the solutions to these challenges lie in the political not the
military realm. Our diplomats, including Ambassador Jeffrey and
his team, continue to work with and assist the Iraqis in
bridging these remaining divides, in particular, the formation
of the government and the appointment of defense and interior
ministers, which still has not happened and should, and the
cooperation along the Arab-Kurd divide in the north. Resolving
all of these issues will take time, but Iraq's political
leadership remains committed to doing so within the political
process that has been established.
A third key challenge is closing the gaps in Iraq's
external defense. The Iraqis will need assistance in this area,
including logistics and air defense, and that will be an
important focus of the OSC. The recent decision by the Iraqis
to purchase U.S. F-16s, part of a $7.5 billion Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program, demonstrates Iraq's commitment to build up
its external defense capabilities and maintain a lasting
military-to-military training relationship with the United
States.
Finally, one last challenge is the Iranian regime's attempt
to influence the future of Iraq and advance its own regional
ambitions. Tehran has sought to weaken Iraq by trying to
undermine its political processes and, as I have mentioned, by
facilitating violence against innocent Iraqi civilians and
against American troops. These destabilizing actions, along
with Tehran's growing ballistic missile capability and efforts
to advance its nuclear program, constitute a significant threat
to Iraq, the broader region, and U.S. interests. Yet, the
strong, sovereign, and self-reliant Iraq we see emerging today
has absolutely no desire to be dominated by Iran or by anyone
else.
With our partners in the region, the United States is
committed to countering Iran's efforts to extend its
destabilizing influence. We have made very clear that we are
committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,
and while we have strengthened our regional security
relationship in recent years, Iran's destabilizing activities
have only further isolated that regime. So as we mark this new
phase in our enduring partnership with Iraq, the Iranian regime
is more likely than ever to be marginalized in the region and
in its ability to influence the Iraqi political process.
Our long-term security partnership with Iraq is part of a
broader commitment by the United States to peace and security
throughout the region. Our message to our allies, our friends,
and our potential adversaries is very clear. We have more than
40,000 American troops that remain in the Gulf region. We are
not going anywhere, and we will continue to reassure our
partners, deter aggressors, and counter those seeking to create
instability.
Iraq has come through this difficult period in its history
and emerged stronger with a government that is largely
representative of and increasingly responsive to the needs of
its people. This outcome was never certain, especially during
the war's darkest days. It is a testament to the strength and
resilience of our troops that we helped the Iraqi people
reverse a desperate situation and provided them the time and
space to foster the institutions of a representative
government.
As was pointed out, more than a million Americans have
served in Iraq. More than 32,000 have been wounded, and as we
know, nearly 4,500 servicemembers have made the ultimate
sacrifice for this mission. Americans will never forget the
service and sacrifice of this next greatest generation and will
always owe them a heavy debt. In the coming weeks, as our
forces leave Iraq, they can be proud of what they have
accomplished, and they and all veterans of the Iraq campaign
have earned the Nation's most profound gratitude.
Are there concerns about the future? Of course there are.
Concerns about what Sadr will do, concerns about Iran, concerns
about al Qaeda, concerns about Shia extremism, concerns about
the Arab-Kurd tensions, along with disputes in other sectarian
areas. There are many of us, many of us that could have
designed perhaps a different result. There is no question that
a lot of pressure was brought on the Iraqis, pressures by the
Senators who visited there, pressures by the President of the
United States, by the Vice President of the United States, by
Secretary Clinton, by Secretary Gates, and by myself. But the
bottom line is that this is not about us. This is not about us.
It is about what the Iraqis want to do and the decisions that
they want to make. So we have now an independent and sovereign
country that can govern and secure itself and, hopefully, make
the decisions that are in the interests of its people.
The United States will maintain a long-term relationship
with Iraq. We are committed to that. We will establish a normal
relationship as we have with other nations in the region. In
talking with our commanders--I asked this question yesterday to
General Odierno who has been there for a good period of time--
they basically said the time has come. The time has come for
Iraq to take control of its destiny. With our help, they
hopefully can be a stable and secure nation in that region of
the world.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Leon E. Panetta
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of
the committee. Thank you for your support for our men and women in
uniform and their families.
I appreciate the opportunity to describe our strategy in Iraq and
to do so alongside Chairman Dempsey, who has--across multiple
deployments and positions here in Washington and at U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa--overseen so many critical efforts of the
Iraq campaign from its outset in 2003.
As we all know, this hearing comes at an important turning point in
the history of Iraq and in the evolving nature of the U.S.-Iraq
relationship.
It is helpful to recall our objective in Iraq. In February 2009,
President Obama laid out a clear and achievable goal shared by the
American and Iraqi people: an Iraq that is ``sovereign, stable, and
self-reliant.''
Today, thanks to innumerable sacrifices from all involved, Iraq is
governing itself--as a sovereign nation, as an emerging source of
stability in a vital part of the world, and as an emerging democracy
capable of addressing its own security needs. For our part, the United
States is ready to mark the beginning of a new phase in our
relationship with Iraq--one that is normal, similar to others in the
region, and based on mutual interests and mutual respect.
We have built a strong and enduring relationship with Iraq, which
President Obama and President Maliki will affirm next month when they
meet in Washington. This broad strategic partnership forms the basis
for cooperation across a wide range of areas, including economic,
cultural, educational, and security ties.
On the security front, as President Obama announced last month, we
are fully implementing the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Under the
outstanding leadership of General Austin, we are completing the
drawdown of our forces by the end of this year. This fulfills the
pledge made by President Bush and now by President Obama in his
February 2009 strategy for Iraq, which called for an end to our combat
mission last August, and a removal of all U.S. forces by December 31,
2011.
Going forward, we will pursue a long-term training relationship
through the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), which will
include a limited number of U.S. military personnel operating under our
Embassy and receiving normal diplomatic protections. Through the U.S.-
Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, we will also have a platform for
future cooperation in counterterrorism, naval and air defense, and
joint exercises.
I believe Iraq is ready to handle security without a significant
U.S. military footprint. Since this administration came into office, we
have removed more than 100,000 U.S. forces from Iraq and the Iraqis
long ago assumed primary responsibility for internal security. At the
same time, violence levels have remained steady at their lowest levels
since 2003. In January 2009, there were over 140,000 U.S. forces in
Iraq conducting a combat mission. In the summer of 2009, we removed our
troops from Iraq's cities. By the summer of 2010, we ended combat
operations and drew down to fewer than 50,000 forces; those remaining
forces will leave Iraq as planned by the end of the year. Again, as the
Iraqis have assumed security control, the level of violence has
decreased significantly and stayed at historic lows. The number of
weekly security incidents across Iraq has decreased from 1,500 in 2007
to fewer than 100 in recent weeks.
To be sure, Iraq faces a host of remaining challenges, but I
believe Iraq is equipped to deal with them.
First, the challenge of extremism. We will likely continue to see
attacks in Iraq during and after we complete our drawdown. I expect
that we'll see extremists, including al Qaeda in Iraq and Iran-backed
militant groups, continue to plan and carry out periodic high-profile
attacks. But while these groups remain capable of conducting attacks,
they do not enjoy widespread support among the Iraqi population. The
Iraqis have some of the most capable counterterrorism forces in the
region, and we will be in a position to continue to assist them in
building these capabilities through the OSC-I. Meanwhile, in recent
months, Iraqi forces have also been active in going after Iranian-
backed militants, recognizing them as a threat not just to U.S. forces
but also to the Iraqi people and government. Iraqi leaders have also
pressed Tehran to stop supporting these groups.
A second challenge for Iraq is conflict between political blocs. As
in any democracy, Iraq deals with a range of competing agendas, and has
the added burden of overcoming years of ethnic and sectarian mistrust.
But the solutions to these challenges lie in the political, not
military realm. Our diplomats, including Ambassador Jeffrey and his
team, continue to assist the Iraqis in bridging the remaining divides,
in particular the formation of the government, appointment of Defense
and Interior ministers, and cooperation along the Arab-Kurd divide in
the North. The leadership in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional
Government remain committed to the political process. Resolving all
these issues will take time, compromise, and strong political
leadership.
A third key challenge lies in the area of Iraq's external defense.
The Iraqis will need assistance to address gaps in this area, including
logistics and air defense, and that will be an important focus of the
OSC-I. The size and functions of the OSC-I will be similar to security
cooperation offices we have in other partner countries in the region,
such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. CENTCOM is also developing a
plan for joint exercises to address challenges in the naval, air, and
combined arms areas--much like our robust security cooperation with
other partners in the region. The recent decision by the Iraqis to
purchase U.S. F-16s, part of a $7.5 billion Foreign Military Sales
program, demonstrates Iraq's commitment to build up their external
defense capabilities and maintain a lasting military-to-military
training relationship with the United States.
One last challenge is the continuing effort of Iran to attempt to
influence the future of Iraq. To advance its own regional ambitions,
the Iranian regime has sought to weaken Iraq by trying to undermine
Iraq's political processes and, as I have mentioned, by facilitating
violence against innocent Iraqi civilians, as well as our presence.
These destabilizing actions, along with Iran's growing ballistic
missile capability and efforts to advance its nuclear program,
constitute a significant threat to Iraq, the broader region, and U.S.
interests. Yet the strong, sovereign, self-reliant Iraq we see emerging
today has no desire to be dominated by Iran or by anyone else. Iraqi
nationalism is real and powerful, and the Iraqis have consistently
shown their willingness to resist the Iranians and their surrogates
when Tehran has over-reached.
With our partners in the region, the United States is committed to
countering Iran's efforts to extend its destabilizing influence in Iraq
and across the region. We've made very clear that we are committed to
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. While we have only
strengthened our regional security relationships in recent years,
Iran's destabilizing activities have only further isolated the regime.
So as we mark a new phase in our enduring partnership with Iraq, Iran
is more likely than ever to be marginalized in the region and in its
ability to influence the Iraqi political process.
Our long-term security partnership with Iraq is part of a broader
commitment by the United States to peace and security throughout the
region. Our allies, friends, and potential adversaries should know that
we will remain fully engaged in the Middle East, maintaining a robust
military footprint and advancing cooperative security efforts with our
partners. With more than 40,000 troops remaining in the Gulf region,
the U.S. military will continue to reassure partners, deter aggressors
and counter those seeking to create instability.
Iraq has come through this difficult period in its history and
emerged stronger, with a government that is largely representative of--
and increasingly responsive to--the needs of its people. This outcome
was never certain, especially during the war's darkest days. It is a
testament to the strength and resilience of our troops that we helped
the Iraqi people reverse a desperate situation and provided them the
time and space to foster the institutions of representative government.
Our troops and their families have borne a very heavy burden during
more than 8 years of war and have paid a great price. More than 1
million Americans have served in Iraq, more than 32,000 have been
wounded, and as we know, nearly 4,500 servicemembers have made the
ultimate sacrifice for this mission. Americans will never forget the
service and sacrifice of this next greatest generation and will always
owe them a heavy debt. In the coming weeks, as our forces leave Iraq,
they can be proud of what they have accomplished, and they and all
veterans of the Iraq campaign have earned the Nation's most profound
gratitude.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Panetta.
General Dempsey.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
and other members of the committee.
In June 2003, I arrived in Baghdad to take command of our
Army's 1st Armor Division, and I was given the responsibility
for the city of Baghdad. Nine months later in April 2004, our
effort to establish security, to develop Iraqi security forces,
enable restoration of fundamental services for the Iraqi
people, and encourage Iraqis to take control of their own
destiny was at risk. Although about a third of my division was
already redeployed to Germany, our tour of duty was extended in
order to suppress an uprising of Shia militia in the southern
provinces of Iraq. Over the course of the next few days, I
visited nearly every unit in the division to explain to them
why it was important that we remain in Iraq for another 4
months. To their great and everlasting credit to a man and
woman, they recognized the importance of our mission, they
embraced the challenge, and they did what their nation asked
them to do.
As I look back, I think I will remember most the toughness,
the resolve, and the resilience of America's sons and daughters
and their families in those early days. Sometimes, often,
actually always their character shines through in the toughest
of times.
I remember in particular one female staff sergeant
listening intently as I explained why we were being extended.
She actually interrupted me to say, hey, listen, General, do
not worry. We trust you. But, she said, when we get to the
point where Iraqis can and should do what they need to do for
themselves, I also trust that you will bring us home.
Today we are gathered to talk about the future of Iraq. In
preparing for this session, I have thought a lot about the
context of that discussion, that discussion with that young
staff sergeant. I thought about what we set out to accomplish,
what we have accomplished, and what we should seek to
accomplish.
Today we are going to talk about establishing a normal
security relationship with Iraq. Now, let me put that in
context.
In 1991, I left my family to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. In
2003, I left my family to drive Saddam Hussein out of Baghdad.
In 2011, we are talking about establishing a normal security
relationship with Iraq. If you are a colonel or a master
sergeant in the armed forces of the United States or more
senior than that, this has been a 20-year journey. We have shed
blood and invested America's treasure in Iraq. Our futures are
inextricably linked. It is not a question of whether we will
continue to invest in Iraq. It is a question of how. There is
no question we must continue to support the development of the
Iraqi security forces, and there is no question we must
continue to support our diplomatic effort so that we can
continue to demonstrate our commitment to Iraq's nascent
democracy.
In anticipation of the question about whether I am
concerned about the future of Iraq, the answer is yes.
Nevertheless, America's armed forces are proud to have been
part of this effort to provide Iraq the opportunities it now
has and we are eager to be part of the effort to determine how
we can continue to partner with them on issues of common
interests for the future.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, thank
you for this opportunity to discuss the beginning of a new chapter in
the United States' relationship with Iraq.
In just a few weeks, the U.S. military will complete its withdrawal
from Iraq after nearly 9 years of war. This departure does not mark the
end of our military-to-military relationship with Iraq, but rather the
transition toward a normal one. It will make our diplomats the face of
the United States in Iraq. It will clearly signal the full assumption
of security responsibilities by the forces, the leaders, and the people
of Iraq. It creates an opportunity that is theirs to seize.
The United States and Iraq agreed on this transition 3 years ago
when it was clear that the surge of American and Iraqi forces had
driven violence to all-time lows. In so doing, we helped create the
security conditions that have allowed Iraqi institutions to continue to
mature. At that time, we agreed that the transfer of security
responsibilities would begin with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement
taking effect on January 1, 2009 and the withdrawal of U.S. combat
forces from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and that the full withdrawal
of our forces from the country would be completed by December 31, 2011.
When the Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement were
signed, President Bush noted that the dates were ``based on an
assessment of positive conditions on the ground and a realistic
projection of when U.S. forces [could] reduce their presence and return
home without sacrificing the security gains made since the surge.''
Today, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are responsible for the
security needs of their country. There are now more than 600,000 Iraqis
serving in the army, police, and other security components. Their
growth and professionalization have been considerable. They have the
capacity to independently secure the population, protect critical
infrastructure, and conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorist
operations. In addition, they are continuing to develop the
foundational capabilities to defend the country against external
aggression.
Iraq's security forces must stand up to several very real threats.
Foremost are those that seek to undermine national unity. Ethno-
sectarian divisions--though not manifested in murderous death squads
run out of corrupt ministries as in the past--are still a reality in
Iraq's politics and security dynamics. Arab-Kurd tensions inhibit full
cooperation between the ISF and Kurdish security elements. Isolated,
residual elements of al Qaeda in Iraq conduct intermittent attacks and
seek to incite sectarian violence. But, the more serious threat comes
from malign Iranian influence that undermines political progress. We
believe and expect Iraqi leaders and forces will confront these threats
with steady resolve.
More work must be done for the Iraqis to better confront internal
and external aggression. In particular, they need to develop air
defense, intelligence, and logistics capabilities. Within the context
of a normalized military-to-military relationship, we will continue to
work on strengthening Iraq's defenses and security institutions. We
have established the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, a
relatively small training and advisory contingent operating under the
authority of the U.S. Ambassador. It will resemble the robust capacity
building efforts we have with other partners such as Egypt and Saudi
Arabia. Our security assistance officers will advise the ISF in closing
their capability gaps, assist in the expansion of their training
programs, and facilitate their procurement of new equipment. In the
future, we hope this office will help integrate the Iraqi forces into
broader regional security cooperation activities.
This military-to-military cooperation is just one component of our
strategic partnership with Iraq as outlined in the 2008 Strategic
Framework Agreement. Our embassies and consulates will continue to
build ties in many areas, including education, economic development,
agriculture, health care, and energy. This will help Iraq continue to
develop its potential and ensure we take advantage of our shared
achievements and sacrifices. It is an essential, but still dangerous
mission. We cannot lose sight of the risks our civilian and military
personnel will continue to face. We cannot fail to fund it at
sustainable levels.
This transition will also advance our broader regional security
goals. As we withdraw our forces from Iraq, we will reposture to
preserve military options in the region. We will retain a credible and
capable forward presence to safeguard our interests, promote regional
security, and signal our resolve. Our forces, together with those of
our many partners, will be fully capable of deterring aggression,
countering terrorism and proliferation, and responding to any crisis
that should arise.
This transition in Iraq would not have been possible had the brave
men and women of our military not done all the many things we asked of
them over the past decade. We asked our military to depose a brutal
dictator who had started wars with his neighbors and murdered countless
numbers of his own people. We asked them to restore control to a nation
whose governing institutions and facilities had suffered decades of
oppression and neglect. We asked them to build, train, mentor, and
fight beside a new army and a new police force. We asked them to
provide the space for a new, open, democratic, and accountable
government to emerge. We asked them to be diplomats and city managers.
We asked them to combat rejectionists, and then insurgents, and then
international terrorists, and then sectarian death squads. When the
situation appeared desperate, we asked them to double down, to surge in
the face of seemingly insurmountable odds, and to maintain hope at a
time when most Americans--most of the world--had abandoned all hope. We
asked them to leave their families, sometimes for up to 15 months at a
time, and we asked them to do it again and again and again.
Our successes in Iraq and the conditions that allow us to withdraw
our forces with a sense of pride and accomplishment are the result of
the sweat, blood, determination, and unrelenting hope of the over one
million of our men and women in uniform who have served in Iraq. They
have done everything we have asked of them and more. They have done
what many believed was not possible. For that, our Nation owes them a
tremendous debt, and I thank Congress for your continued support of
them.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Dempsey.
Let us try an 8-minute round for the first round.
Let me ask you both this question about the 2008 U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement which was agreed to between President Bush
and Prime Minister Maliki which requires the withdrawal of U.S.
forces by the end of December of this year.
There has been an effort made to negotiate continuation of
a limited number of U.S. forces beyond December of this year,
particularly trainers. Let me ask you first, General. Did we
make a strong effort to negotiate a continuing presence of
trainers providing there was an immunity agreement with Iraq so
that our people would not be subject to Iraqi courts?
General Dempsey. Senator, I was the Chief of Staff of the
Army during that period of time, and I can tell you that in
conversations among the Joint Chiefs, we were all asked to
engage our counterparts, encourage them to accept some small
permanent footprint. Our recommendation actually was a small
permanent footprint and a rotational training agreement for
field training exercise and such, built fundamentally around
what we call the ``program of record,'' which is the FMS case.
So I can speak for the Joint Chiefs having been encouraged by,
first, Secretary Gates and then Secretary Panetta to engage our
counterparts.
Chairman Levin. Did you make the effort to support a
continuing limited presence of U.S. forces?
General Dempsey. I did.
Chairman Levin. Are you willing to have those forces remain
without an agreement relative to immunity for those troops?
General Dempsey. No, sir, I am not, and it was the
recommendation and advice and strong belief of the Joint Chiefs
that we would not leave service men and women there without
protections.
Chairman Levin. Why is that?
General Dempsey. Because of the many institutions in Iraq
that are still evolving and immature. The Iraqi judicial system
is certainly among those. We did not believe it was appropriate
or prudent to leave service men and women without judicial
protections in a country that still had the challenges we know
it has and a very immature judicial system.
Chairman Levin. Is it your understanding that that was the
sticking point, that Iraq was not willing to provide that
assurance?
General Dempsey. Sir, it is hard for me to understand
exactly what Prime Minister Maliki's fundamental bottom line
was, though I have spoken to him within the past 6 months. What
I will say is it was part of it. I think the other part of it
was that he believed it to be in his political interest to
cause us to live up to the agreement we made to withdraw from
Iraq in the 2008 agreement. That was called the Security
Agreement. Now, it is important to remember that underneath
that was the Security Framework Agreement which establishes six
lines of operation, and it was his strong preference in my
conversations with him to base our enduring relationship on
that and not simply on the matter of military presence.
Chairman Levin. So from what you know, there was an
unwillingness on the part of the Iraqi leadership to negotiate
the continuing presence of our troops for two reasons: one,
they would not give us the assurance of legal protection or
immunity; and two, that politically it was not in their
interest to make such an agreement.
General Dempsey. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Given that, is it your understanding that
our military commanders are also unwilling to have our troops
there without that legal protection?
General Dempsey. It was the topic of many secure video
teleconferences and engagements person to person. I can state
that they also believed we needed the protections, both General
Austin and General Mattis, in order to leave our troops there.
Chairman Levin. So the decision of the President to
basically comply with a 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement that
was agreed to between Presidents Bush and Maliki, that that
decision to comply with that agreement unless we could
negotiate a satisfactory continuation of a residual force with
protection, with immunity--do you agree with the President's
decision to proceed in that way?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Panetta, some have expressed the
concern that U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq is going to give
Iran a propaganda victory, with Iran claiming to have driven
U.S. forces out of Iraq. Do you believe that Iraqi leaders and
other Arab nations in the region will buy into Iran's
propaganda that they drove us out of Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. I really do not. I think that the one
thing I have seen time and time again is that Prime Minister
Maliki in Iraq and other countries in that region basically
reject what Iran is trying to do, view Iran as having a
destabilizing influence in that part of the world, do not
support Iran and what they do. My view is that the region
largely rejects Iran and its intentions. I think Iraq is at the
top of that list.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask you about protection of
religious minorities. Since our invasion of Iraq in 2003, I
have worked and many Members of Congress have worked with our
military and civilian leadership both here and in Iraq to
ensure that the small religious minority communities in Iraq
are protected from targeted violence and persecution. Give us
your assessments--first, Secretary, and then perhaps, General--
of the Iraqi Government's willingness and capability to protect
the religious minority communities in Iraq, particularly the
Christians.
Secretary Panetta. I believe that Ambassador Jeffrey and
the State Department continue to work very closely with the
Iraqis to ensure that religious minorities are protected there.
It is a problem. It is a concern. I think it is going to demand
continuing vigilance by all of us, continuing pressure by all
of us on the Iraqi Government that they do everything possible
to recognize both human and religious rights. There is a lot of
history here, and there are a lot of challenges here. But I am
absolutely convinced, when you talk to the political leadership
in Iraq, that they do not want to have these kinds of
divisions, they do not want to have this kind of discrimination
take place within their country. But it is going to require
constant vigilance to make sure it does not happen.
Chairman Levin. General, do you have a comment on that?
General Dempsey. No. Just a comment, Senator, on the fact
that in the pre-surge period, which many of us remember, it was
very common for state-sponsored militias out of the security
ministries to be conducting these kinds of attacks against
those religious groups that did not agree with their particular
faith. We have not seen anything like that since the surge,
meaning the security ministries have become responsible agents
of government. So not discounting the continued pressure on
small religious communities, at least there is no evidence that
it will be state-sponsored, and that is a significant change.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You brought up, regrettably, General Dempsey, 2003 and
2004, the fact is that you did not support the surge and said
that it would fail. Secretary Panetta was a part of the Iraq
Study Group that recommended withdrawals from Iraq and opposed
the surge. So we are all responsible for the judgments that we
make, and obviously, that affects the credibility of the
judgments that we make now on Iraq. I regret that you had to
bring that up, General Dempsey. The fact is that there are some
of us who were over there in those years you talked about, in
fact, some maybe even had other members of their family over
there, and saw that it was failing and that we needed to have
the surge and the surge succeeded.
The fact is that we could have been given sovereign
immunity, as we have in other countries, to keep our troops
there and give them the immunity that they needed. We have
other agreements with other countries that guarantee sovereign
immunity. The fact is that every military leader recommended
that we have residual forces at minimum of 10,000 and usually
around 20,000. That was the recommendations made before this
committee by General Odierno, recommendations made by General
Petraeus, recommendations made by even lower ranking military
who had spent, as you mentioned, a great deal of time there and
did not want to see that service and sacrifice all wasted away
because of our inability and lack of desire to reach an
agreement with the Iraqis.
As I said in my opening statement, the Iraqis are largely
responsible as well, but the fact is when Senator Lieberman,
Senator Graham, and I were there, the Iraqis were ready to
deal. What was the administration's response? They did not have
a number and missions last May as to our residual force in
Iraq. So as things happen in that country, things fell apart.
Now, can you tell the committee, General Dempsey, if there
was any military commander who recommended that we completely
withdraw from Iraq?
General Dempsey. No, Senator. None of us recommended that
we completely withdraw from Iraq.
Senator McCain. When did we come up with the numbers of
troops that we wanted to remain in Iraq? Do you know when that
final decision was made as to the exact numbers that we wanted?
General Dempsey. To my understanding, the process started
in about August 2010, and there was a series of cascading
possibilities or options that started at about 16,000 and ended
up with about 10,000 and then migrated to 3,000 and we ended up
with the program of record.
Senator McCain. Do you know when that final decision on
numbers was reached?
General Dempsey. The final decision on focusing on the OSC
was based on a conversation between our President and President
Maliki. Prior to that, I do not know.
Senator McCain. The reason why I think you do not know is
because there never was an exact number and missions
articulated by our Government which would have been a concrete
proposal for the Iraqi Government. So to say that the Iraqi
Government did not want us when they did not know the numbers
and missions that we wanted to have there, of course, makes it
more understandable why we did not reach an agreement with them
as it, as you mentioned, cascaded down from 20,000 down to the
ridiculously small number of 3,000.
So, Secretary Panetta, we are now going to have a residual
presence in Iraq of some 16,000 American embassy personnel. Is
that not correct?
Secretary Panetta. I believe with contractors, that is
correct.
Senator McCain. How are we planning on ensuring the
security of those 16,000 Americans?
Secretary Panetta. A lot of that 16,000 are security
people.
Senator McCain. So we will now be using civilian
contractors to protect and maintain the security of the State
Department personnel, the largest embassy personnel in the
world. Is that correct?
Secretary Panetta. That is correct.
Senator McCain. The comparative costs of a contract
personnel versus a military individual is dramatically
different. The costs of a contract personnel is dramatically
higher than that of the costs of an ordinary servicemember.
Correct?
Secretary Panetta. I believe you are correct. I will give
you an accurate answer later.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Panetta did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator McCain. So in these times of fiscal austerity, we
withdraw all our military troops and hire a whole bunch of
contractors, who either rightly or wrongly do not have a very
good reputation as opposed to the uniformed military, in order
to secure the safety of some X thousands. You have certain
thousands who are there for security and some thousands who are
there--the 16,000 number is divided up that way.
Secretary Panetta. Senator McCain, if I could just add for
the record.
Senator McCain. Sure.
Secretary Panetta. Actually as Director of the CIA, I had
talked with Prime Minister Maliki regarding this issue, and
then when I became Secretary of Defense, I had a number of
conversations with him as well in which I made very clear,
along with General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey, that it was
extremely important that we needed to have a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA), that we needed to have immunities for our
troops, that we needed to have that protection. He believed
that there was possibly a way to do this that did not involve
having to go to the parliament, to their council for approval.
It was very clear, among all the attorneys here, that we
absolutely had to have their approval through their parliament
if we were going to have a SOFA that provided the kind of
immunities we needed. I cannot tell you how many times we made
that clear. I believe the Prime Minister understood that, and
it was at the point where he basically said I cannot deliver
it, I cannot get it through the parliament that we were then
left with the decisions that were made.
Senator McCain. Again, then we should be having to withdraw
our troops from those countries where we have a presence that
we do not have it go through the parliament, that it is done
through sovereign immunity. The fact is that the President was
presented with options, either a declaration of sovereign
immunity made by the government as the case with other
countries, which the Iraqis may have been willing to do, and
the other option of demanding it go through the parliament. So
I guess now we should withdraw those troops from countries that
we do not have a parliamentary approval from.
So, look, the fact is if we had given the Iraqis the number
and the mission that we wanted long ago, if we had done what
Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, has said, ``everybody
believed it would be better if there was some kind of residual
force. There was an expectation we would negotiate something
that looked like a residual force.'' We met with Barzani and
Maliki and Allawi, and they were ready to move forward. The
fact is that they were not given the number and mission that
the residual U.S. troops would be there for.
As General Dempsey just mentioned, it cascaded down. It
cascaded down over months, Mr. Secretary, from 20,000 to 15,000
to 13,000 to 10,000 to 5,000, and each time there was a
different number given for Iraqi consideration. That was what
they told us.
Now, maybe they were not telling us the truth, Mr.
Secretary. But we have a relationship with them that goes back
many, many years, and they have always told us the truth. The
truth is that this administration was committed to the complete
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and they made it happen.
Secretary Panetta. Senator McCain, that is just simply not
true. I guess you can believe that, and I respect your beliefs.
Senator McCain. I respect your opinion.
Secretary Panetta. But that is not true.
Senator McCain. The outcome has been exactly as predicted.
Secretary Panetta. But that is not how it happened.
Senator McCain. It is how it happened.
Secretary Panetta. This is about negotiating with a
sovereign country, an independent country. This was about their
needs. This is not about us telling them what we are going to
do for them or what they are going to have to do for us.
Senator McCain. This is about our needs as well, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Panetta. This is about their country making a
decision as to what is necessary here. In addition to that,
once they made the decision that they were not going to provide
any immunities for any level of force that we would have
there--and this is a lot different than other countries,
frankly, Senator. This is a country where you could very well
be engaging in combat operations. If you are going to engage in
those kind of operations, you are going to engage in
counterterrorism operations, you absolutely have to have
immunities, and those immunities have to be granted by a SOFA.
I was not about to have our troops go there in place without
those immunities.
Senator McCain. They were ready to make that agreement.
They were ready to be able to get it through the parliament,
and for months we did not give them the numbers and mission
that were necessary in order for us to remain there. Again,
your version of history and mine are very different, but the
way it has turned out is the way, unfortunately, many of us
predicted that it would. In the view of every military expert
that I know, we are now at greater risk than we were if we had
had a residual force there.
By the way, I understand the American people's approval of
withdrawing from Iraq. I would imagine they probably would
approve if we would withdraw from Korea and that is because we
have not made the case as to what is at stake here and what the
consequences of our failure are.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, Mr.
Secretary and General, for being here.
So I add my voice as one who also felt during the time that
the SOFA existed between the United States and Iraq, based on
conversations that I had with leaders in both countries, that
the expectation was that a residual force would remain at the
expiration of the SOFA at the end of this year, 2011. The
reason was clear. It was clear it would have to be negotiated
as two sovereign nations. The reason was that from our point of
view certainly, that we had invested so much blood and treasure
in the success, extraordinary, unexpected success, we have
achieved in Iraq, that it would not make sense to just pick up
and leave unless we felt that the country, that the Iraqis were
totally prepared to protect their own security and the progress
that they have made, which incidentally, in my opinion, has not
only been great for them and transformational within their
history but also throughout the Middle East.
Personally, I think that the sight of the Iraqis pulling
that statue of Saddam Hussein down, showing people throughout
the Arab world that those tyrants were not forever, is one of
the preconditions, one of the factors that enabled the Arab
Spring or Arab Awakening that is going on now to occur.
I also believe that President Obama and Prime Minister
Maliki must have wanted to have a residual force remain in Iraq
after January 1st of next year or else they would not have had
people on both sides negotiating to achieve that end. So to me,
the failure to reach agreement or the inability to reach
agreement, causing the total withdrawal of our troops at the
end of this year, was not a success but a failure. I worry
about the consequences.
General Dempsey, as Senator McCain said, we have talked to
our military commanders over there over the years, and
everybody said that we should keep some troops. The numbers
went from probably a low of 5,000 to a high of 25,000 at
different times.
I was really interested in your answer to Senator McCain,
and I appreciate it because I know it is the truth, that no
military commander, including yourself, recommended zero
troops, American troops, there after January 1. I presume that
is because you thought there was an unnecessarily high risk for
us and Iraq if we had no troops remaining after January 1 of
next year. Is that a fair assumption?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. The cascading that I
mentioned to Senator McCain was a result of negotiating the
missions. The force structure is completely dependent upon the
missions you ask us to do. Tell me what you want me to do. I
can build you a force structure to do it.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Dempsey. The negotiations that occurred were on
which missions the Iraqi Government wanted us to continue to
execute, and that is why the numbers went from--the highest
number I touched was 16,000--but it could very well have been
25,000--down to about 5,000. But at the end of the day, the
Iraqi Prime Minister deemed that he wanted to rely on the
security agreement and base a future relationship on the SFA.
Senator Lieberman. Understood.
In your own thinking, since you obviously did not recommend
zero American troops there after January 1st, what do you think
now are the greater risks that we face as a result of the fact
that we will have no continuing military presence in Iraq?
General Dempsey. Some of the things that the larger
military footprint addressed will now have to be addressed
diplomatically, and that is some of the things that have come
up today about the protection of the small religious
communities and so forth, the Arab-Kurd tensions, if you will.
But I also want to mention this OSC will help us ensure
that the FMS program, the program of record, as we call it,
that continues to build the institution of the Iraqi security
forces will continue to be addressed. So this is not a divorce.
It may feel that way because of the way the Iraqi Government
came to the decision. But the fact is we will be embedded with
them as trainers not only tactically but also at the
institutional level. I think that is an important way to
mitigate the risk you are talking about.
Senator Lieberman. Let me, Secretary Panetta, pick up from
that point. I have heard from friends in Iraq, Iraqis, that
Prime Minister Maliki said at one point he needed to stop the
negotiations. Leave aside for the moment the reasons. But he
was prepared to begin negotiations again between two sovereign
nations, United States and Iraq, about some American troops
being in Iraq after January 1st. So that is what I have heard
from there.
But I wanted to ask you from the administration point of
view--and I know that Prime Minister Maliki is coming here in a
few weeks to Washington--is the administration planning to
pursue further discussions with the Iraqi Government about
deploying at least some U.S. forces in Iraq after the end of
this year?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, as I pointed out in my
testimony, what we seek with Iraq is a normal relationship now,
and that does involve continuing negotiations with them as to
what their needs are. I believe there will be continuing
negotiations. We are in negotiations now with regards to the
size of the security office that will be there. So there are
not zero troops that are going to be there. We will have
hundreds that will be present by virtue of that office,
assuming we can work out an agreement there.
But I think that once we have completed the implementation
of the security agreement, there will begin a series of
negotiations about what exactly are additional areas where we
can be of assistance, what level of trainers do they need, what
can we do with regard to counterterrorism operations, what will
we do on exercises, joint exercises, that work together. We
have these kinds of relationships with other countries in the
region, and that is what we are going to continue to pursue
with Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. In fact, just using a term that both of
you have used, that would be a ``normal'' relationship. A
normal relationship would not exclude the presence of some
American military in Iraq. Correct?
Secretary Panetta. That is correct.
Senator Lieberman. Do you, Mr. Secretary, personally
believe that it is in the interest of the United States to have
some military presence in Iraq as part of an agreement with the
Iraqis?
Secretary Panetta. I believe there are areas where we can
provide important assistance to the Iraqis, but again, I would
stress to you, Senator Lieberman--and I know you have been
there--that in order for this to happen, we have to be able to
have them basically say these are our needs, this is what we
want, these are the missions that we want to accomplish, and
then we can assist them in saying we can provide this in order
to accomplish those missions. It has to be a two-way street.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you one final, quick
question. We have been concerned--and I have talked to you and
General Dempsey about this--about the fact that Iran over the
course of the war has been training and equipping extremist
groups that have come back into Iraq and killed a lot of
Americans and even more Iraqis. What is your belief now about
whether the Iranians, the IRGC particularly, are continuing to
train Iraqi Shia extremist militias to come back into Iraq and
cause havoc?
Secretary Panetta. We went through a difficult period where
we knew that the Iranians were providing military weapons to
Shia extremist groups, and those weapons were being used to
kill Americans. We indicated our concerns about that. That was
part of the discussion that I had with the Prime Minister when
I was there, was my concern about that.
As a result of that, they took actions. Operations were
conducted against the Shia militant groups. In addition to
that, Maliki made very clear to the Iranians that this had to
stop. We did go through a period where it did stop, but we
continue to have concerns that the Iranians will try to provide
that kind of assistance as well. We have made very clear to
Iraq that they have to take whatever steps are necessary to
ensure that does not happen.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I appreciate the answer. Thank
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to follow up with a question
that Senator Lieberman asked. He asked do you think it is
important to have a military presence in Iraq, and you did not
answer. You said we need to provide important assistance to the
Iraqis. But do you or do you not think that we should have a
military presence in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. I think that providing a military
presence that assists them with training, that assists them
with counterterrorism operations continuing to work against
terrorist groups there is important, but I have to stress to
you, Senator, that it can only happen if the Iraqis agree that
it should happen.
Senator Brown. No. I understand that.
Secretary Panetta. I know, but I get the impression here
that somehow everybody is deciding what we want for Iraq and
that that is what should happen. But it does not work that way.
This is an independent country.
Senator Brown. I understand that. I want to get a chance to
ask my questions. I am not sure what your perception is about
what the others have said, but I have some very specific
questions.
To follow up with Senator McCain a little bit and his
concerns about contractor cost versus soldier cost, it is a
tremendously large dollar amount. It is the same in
Afghanistan. It is the same in Iraq. We are going to have
potentially 16,000 contractors over there. How does the SOFA or
their ability to perform their duties over there affect the
contractors? I know that they are going to be performing
security and have some very serious legal challenges as well.
How is it any different?
General Dempsey. Yes, I can take that one, Senator, because
when I was running the Security Transition Command, training
and equipping the Iraqi security forces, I had a rather small
military staff of about 1,000, and I had probably three or four
times that in contractors. The contractors are often third-
country nationals. These are not all DOD contractors. Security
contractors could be from a third country, and as part of the
contract, there will be a negotiated position on protections
and immunities. But oftentimes they are not protected and if,
therefore, something happens, they can be imprisoned and tried
in the host nation. That is a common practice around the world.
We ought to take, for the record, I think though, the issue
of cost because there is a distinction on the kind of
contractors that are used. A truck driver driving a cargo truck
of foodstuffs from Kuwait to Baghdad will get paid at a certain
rate, a security contractor at a different rate. These are not
all contractors making $250,000 a year. So I think we ought to
peel that back a bit for you to see the real costs.
Senator Brown. I think it is important to let the American
public know because I know when I was in Afghanistan talking to
the soldiers who were deeply concerned about those drivers just
throughout the post and from post to post getting upwards of
$100,000 and you have a soldier that can do it at $20,000-
$30,000. When we are trying to squeeze out every last dollar, I
think it is important. I would rather be, quite frankly,
providing the tools and resources to our military personnel
versus contractors. So I would hope that you would look at
that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The assertion that not all Department of Defense contractors in
Iraq are making $250,000 per year is correct. The costs for contractor
support depends greatly on the type of labor categories used to perform
the work; types of contractors range from local national (LN) laborers,
to third country nationals (TCN) providing installation support, to
highly specialized U.S. citizens with security clearances. In general,
TCN and LN labor costs are substantially lower than U.S. citizens. The
anticipated contractor split supporting Department of State after 2011
in Iraq is projected at: U.S. - 47 percent, TCN - 43 percent, LN - 10
percent. The following sampling of labor categories from various State
Department support contracts provides further validation that not all
contractors in Iraq are highly paid:
Static Guard: $10,000/year.
Security Escort: $30,000/year.
Protective Detail: $110,000/year.
Welder: $131,000/year.
Air Defense Mechanic: $159,000/year.
Senior Mechanic: $185,000/year.
Senator Brown. Mr. Secretary, you have committed to not
allowing Iran to get nuclear weapons. Do you think we are
accomplishing that?
Secretary Panetta. I think that the United States, working
with our allies and implementing the sanctions that have gone
against Iran have, combined with other efforts, impeded their
effort to move forward in that area. That is correct.
Senator Brown. We have so many sanctions. Yet, I think the
biggest problem we have is actually enforcing them. I cannot
remember the last time we actually fined a company for
performing work and doing business in Iran.
How involved is Russia in actually helping them gain
nuclear capabilities?
Secretary Panetta. I really think you probably ought to ask
our intelligence officials about the specifics of Russian
engagement there. But there is no question that they have
provided some help.
Senator Brown. I just bring it up because you brought up
that we are not allowing them to gain nuclear capability. Yet,
we seem to really not be putting any teeth behind the sanctions
and really I think we can do it better I guess is my point.
Maybe we can talk offline about that.
But I also have heard in speaking to, obviously, members of
the committee and others that the Prime Minister has kicked out
officials in the intelligence services and the army and
replaced them with his own loyalists. Police sources report
that roughly 200 people have been arrested since October 24 on
charges of affiliation with the Baath party under Saddam and
planning to conduct terrorism within Iraq. Are you concerned
with these types of arrests and whether it will either require
us to have a larger footprint or how it is going to be affected
by a footprint being reduced?
Secretary Panetta. I am concerned by the actions that the
Prime Minister took with regard to arresting the Baathists.
They are being held at this point without charges and that
raises concerns about due process.
At the same time, I have to say that the Sunnis--and it is
a reflection of what has happened in Iraq--that the Sunni
population there recognizes that even in light of that, that
their actions ought to take place through the institutions of
government, and they are bringing their pressure through the
parliament and through the government to try to change that
behavior. I think that is what democracies should do.
Senator Brown. What level, do you think--in terms of a
percentage basis, would you give Iraq's counterterrorism forces
today? Either one?
General Dempsey. I will take that, Senator.
They number about 4,500.
Senator Brown. How does that rank in terms of percentage
capability of being fully ready to perform the mission?
General Dempsey. Yes. I would describe their readiness rate
to be about 80 percent, and the gap is in their ability--they
are extraordinarily good--extraordinarily good--at closing onto
a particular target when the target is identified for them
generally, in their case, through human intelligence (HUMINT).
What they lack is the ability to fuse intelligence, signals
intelligence, HUMINT, and identify a network. You visited--by
the way, nobody else in the world does it like us. So I am
comparing us to them. But the point is when you visit our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in operations centers in
Iraq, they will have a wiring diagram of the network in their
particular area. That has come after years of adaptation and
learning that we have not yet managed to pass over to our Iraqi
counterparts. But in this OSC, we have a cadre of trainers to
continue to build that capability and close that gap.
Senator Brown. How functional is their air force? Is it
capable of defending its airspace? Does that matter at this
point? Or where do you think we are with that?
General Dempsey. I will tell you where they are and then I
will take a stab at whether it matters or not. But they have F-
16s on order as part of the $7 billion FMS program. The first
18 or so of what will eventually be 24 will be delivered in the
2015 timeframe. So there is a gap between now and 2015 on their
ability to protect their air sovereignty.
Does it matter? It is not apparent to us that it matters--
that there is no air threat to Iraqi sovereign airspace right
now. But after the first of the year, as Prime Minister Maliki
sees what the security agreement--how that has evolved, what it
looks like as we begin our withdrawal, I suspect there will be
some negotiation back with us on issues related to air
sovereignty. They also have long-range radars on order that
come in this next calendar year to help paint themselves an air
picture. So there is a gap at least out through 2015, probably
beyond because you have to train the pilots. When General
Babaker, the Chief of Defense, speaks about not being ready
until 2020, it is that kind of capability that he is talking
about, not the day-to-day capability on the ground.
Senator Brown. Thank you. Thank you, both.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, was it the uniform recommendation of all
the joint chiefs and yourself to the President that without
appropriate immunities for American forces, that you could not
maintain American forces in Iraq?
General Dempsey. It was, Senator.
Senator Reed. From your perspective, the Government of Iraq
was not prepared to give appropriate immunities to American
forces?
General Dempsey. Yes. That was the feedback we received
back, that based on the legal advice of not only DOD lawyers
but lawyers across the interagency, that the protections we
required could only be achieved through an agreement that
passed through the council of representatives inside of Iraq.
When that was not forthcoming, then our advice was we could
not leave--and by the way, just to Senator McCain's point. We
do have soldiers all over the world deployed in joint combined
exercise teams, but these are small groups of soldiers doing
training missions, not what we believe would be a large
footprint of men and women potentially at checkpoints
conducting combat operations that could be very prominent, very
visible, and, therefore, very vulnerable to a very immature
judicial system.
Senator Reed. Meaning that they could be policed up, thrown
into a system without any adequate due process, and be subject
to essentially the whims of whatever Iraqi justice is at the
moment?
General Dempsey. That was the concern, but the larger
concern was that there would be some kind of incident that
would put us at odds with the Iraqi security forces trying to
arrest one of our soldiers.
Senator Reed. We actually could have force-on-force
conflict.
General Dempsey. In the worst case.
Senator Reed. The necessity for the core, their assembly,
their general assembly--this was a result of the SOFA, I
presume, that any amendments to the treaty had to be approved
by their parliamentary procedures, including the parliament?
General Dempsey. That was both their interpretation and our
own.
Senator Reed. So this notion of who can bestow immunity
rests on the SOFA which the Bush administration negotiated and
signed.
General Dempsey. I do not know how far back it goes. This
is longstanding legal interpretation that I am sure goes back
well beyond the Bush administration.
Senator Reed. You are both more familiar with the SOFA than
I, but my understanding is that there was very explicit
language calling for the withdrawal of all American military
personnel but that there was no language or no explicit
language calling for further negotiations as to the
continuation of forces. Is that correct?
General Dempsey. Are you referring to the 2008 Security
Agreement?
Senator Reed. I am.
General Dempsey. That is my understanding.
Senator Reed. But then there are suggestions today that
everyone understood that this was just a placeholder, that this
major policy decision calling for all forces to withdraw from
Iraq, which was approved by their parliament, was simply a
placeholder because everyone knew that going down the road, we
would renegotiate both sides in good faith and come up with
another combination. Do you think that is realistic?
General Dempsey. I will not comment on its realism, but I
will say that I expected that there would be some negotiation
prior to the end of 2011, and by the way, there was. That
negotiation terminated when the Iraqi Prime Minister determined
that he did not need the missions we were willing and capable
to perform and would not provide the protections.
Senator Reed. It goes back essentially to the point that
the Secretary has made, that that was a determination of a
sovereign leader about what he felt was in the best interest of
Iraq and that without his cooperation and, indeed, without the
approval of his parliament, we have no standing essentially
other than to follow what was agreed to in 2008 by the Bush
administration. Is that correct?
General Dempsey. To my understanding, yes, Senator.
Senator Reed. But as you suggested, going forward we still
have a relationship in terms of FMS, in terms of not only our
diplomatic presence, but there is always the possibility,
because that is not precluded by the 2008 SOFA, of amendments
which in the future could allow for some participation of
American military personnel with Iraqi personnel. That is true
also.
General Dempsey. It is, Senator. There is the opportunity
for them as part of routine theater security cooperation.
General Jim Mattis will travel there in January. There is a
committee called the High Coordination Committee for each of
the six lines of operation in the SFA, some of which are
economic, educational, commerce, but there is a security line
of effort. There is a High Coordinating Council that meets.
General Mattis will go and convene one of those meetings in
January to discuss future security cooperation.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I presume for the record that
we are prepared to entertain any of these serious discussions
at any time with Prime Minister Maliki and his cabinet.
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. It seems to me the key point at this juncture
is the point at which Prime Minister Maliki and his government
begins to reevaluate their position and their perception of the
need for additional American military support, and without
that, then the 2008 agreement which they negotiated, they
agreed to, and they seem to accept stands as the law.
General Dempsey. That is correct.
Senator Reed. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey for being here today on
this very important topic.
I think all of us want to make sure that everything we have
fought for and those who have sacrificed in Iraq, that what we
have done there does not become undermined. My husband is an
Iraq War veteran. This is very, very important, and I think all
of us share that. We would like to bring our troops home, but
there are serious questions remaining on whether the Iraqis
will be able to maintain their own security. I think that is
what we are trying to get at.
I wanted to ask you, Secretary Panetta, in an October 21
conference call, when the withdrawal was initially announced by
the administration, that my staff participated in, Dennis
McDonough, the Deputy National Security Advisor, and Tony
Blinken, the National Security Advisor to the Vice President,
were both asked whether if now the Iraqis changed their
position and we receive the immunity that our troops need,
whether we would change our position on maintaining troops in
Iraq. The answer we got on that call was no.
So my question to you is, is that accurate? If today the
Iraqis changed their position and gave us the immunity that we
were asking for, would we keep troops there?
Secretary Panetta. Obviously both Prime Minister Maliki and
the President are moving forward with the implementation of the
security agreement. But as I have said here, we are prepared to
continue to negotiate with the Iraqis. We are prepared to try
to meet whatever needs they have, and if those needs require a
SOFA in order to ensure that our troops are protected, then
obviously we would be prepared to work with that as well.
Senator Ayotte. So just to be clear, when Dennis McDonough
and Tony Blinken said even if we had immunity now, we would
withdraw altogether anyway, were they right or were they wrong
in terms of that being the administration's position?
Secretary Panetta. I think they were reflecting the
decision at that point that was clear from the Iraqis and from
the Prime Minister that they wanted to proceed with the
implementation of the security agreement. I think that the
decision was, even with the Iraqis, let us proceed, implement
that, and then perhaps beyond that, we will negotiate a further
presence.
Senator Ayotte. But it would certainly be a lot easier to,
rather than take all the troops out and bring them back, that
if we could work this out. You would agree with me there?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. No, look, we have been working this
for a long time. I think it came down to the fact that it was
very clear from the Prime Minister and even the other
leadership--as Senator McCain said, other members of the
leadership there were interested in trying to pursue this, but
when it was clear that they could not get immunity passed by
the parliament, that that brought that issue to an end.
Senator Ayotte. The reason that I raise it is I was
concerned, when it was reported back to me, that the answer
from the administration was that even if immunity was granted
tomorrow, that we would still withdraw altogether. That made me
concerned, and that is why I raised it.
I wanted to ask you about the recent findings of--the
Wartime Commission on Contracting found that from waste, fraud,
corruption, and money going into the hands of our enemies, we
have lost between $31 billion and $60 billion of taxpayers'
dollars that were obviously wasted, and the worst part is some
of it went to our enemies.
Before the Senate Armed Services Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee recently, we had a hearing on the Wartime
Contracting Commission report, and Deputy Secretary Frank
Kendall testified before that subcommittee. I actually asked
him about what was happening in Iraq with respect to--you have
stated today--roughly 16,000 contractors that will be left
there, many of them performing security functions with our
troops withdrawing by the end of the year. When I asked him
about that, how will the State Department handle that, he told
me that there is a lot of risk in this transition and that the
State Department has never done anything this big. Would you
agree with me on that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. That is right.
Senator Ayotte. Also that day before the subcommittee, we
had the actual commissioners that did the analysis in Iraq and
Afghanistan of the fraud, waste, and abuse and money that went
to our enemies. Mr. Zakheim who testified before our
subcommittee that day--I also asked him about what is happening
in Iraq and what the implications would be for the State
Department putting 16,000 contractors there, many of them asked
to handle security. What he said to me really made me very
concerned. He said: ``I do have tremendous concerns. I have
more concerns, unfortunately, than I have answers. Clearly if
the State Department, until now, has had trouble managing its
contracts--and it is no question that they have had some--I do
not know how they are going to manage all this.''
He went on to say, now, clearly if you have a whole bunch
of contractors there with guns who will be doing all sorts of
things, to me, to my simple mind, this is something that
involves security that is inherently governmental. It is a
high-risk project so that you are going to have a bunch of
contractors either being shot at or shooting Iraqis, and this
is a disaster waiting to happen is how he described it to me.
Can you assure this committee that--I guess I would ask you
first. Essentially my concern is that we are putting a civilian
army there of contractors at an unprecedented level when we
have already had some significant issues with contracting. We
are going to ask these contractors to protect our diplomatic
personnel that are there, our civilian personnel who will still
be serving in Iraq. Will they be secure? Will these contractors
be able to perform the function that they are needed to
perform? Can you assure this committee that the State
Department will be able to perform this unprecedented task?
Secretary Panetta. There is no question that there are
risks involved here. What we are facing is an issue of
continuing an important State Department role that relates to
economic issues, that relates to development issues, that
relates to education issues, that relates to the other pieces
that we have been assisting the Iraqis with. The State
Department is taking the lead in trying to build those
relationships. So they have a presence. They have bases
throughout Iraq or locations where State Department officials
will be.
In the absence of not having the military presence, then
obviously in order for them to do their job, they have to have
security. They have to have support. They have to have food.
They have to have transportation. That is, obviously, brought
about through a contracting approach.
Are there going to be risks associated with the
contractors? Yes, I think that is the case. Do we have any
other alternatives? No.
General Dempsey. Senator, could I comment on that question?
Do we have time?
Senator Ayotte. If it is okay with the chairman.
Chairman Levin. In response to the question, sure.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
General Dempsey. This is not entirely new. Even from the
very beginning when it was the Coalition Provisional Authority
and then it became the U.S. Mission in Iraq, the State
Department has always contracted for personal security. So it
is not as though they have no experience in doing it. But this
is orders of magnitude, and I think that is what people are
reacting to.
But in order to help mitigate that, we have had a joint
committee, the Department of State-DOD Joint Staff, in place
since August 2010 to talk about transitioning activities in
Iraq, 437 activities. We have transitioned 437 of them. We
would be happy to brief you on that. We are going to retain the
contract management. DOD will maintain, through directing
contracting management authority, oversight or control of the
contracts because we have the expertise. The contracting office
representatives will be Department of State personnel on the
ground. So we have recognized it, and we are working to
mitigate it.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General Dempsey. Thank you,
Secretary Panetta.
I would just add this, though, back in August 2010, we were
all talking about having some military support there, and when
I hear from the Wartime Commission on Contracting commissioner
that this is a disaster, I have real concerns about this in
terms of protecting our personnel and also a waste of
taxpayers' dollars.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, for your
service and for being here today.
I am going to try to bring things a little closer to home
for the moment. The 935th aviation detachment from the Nebraska
Army National Guard is scheduled to deploy in Iraq in May, but
given our pending departure from Iraq in December this year, I
understand that this deployment might be able to be moved,
shifted to a new location, or canceled altogether. I am sure
maybe the decision has not been made, but if it has, it would
be interesting to know what it is.
Concerning the end of the military missions in Iraq, how is
DOD handling scheduled Guard deployments? I understand from the
Guard that soldiers already sourced for deployment will have
already started to make arrangements with their families,
employers, and communities to deploy, everything from hiring
temporary employees to cover the deployment of the soldier to
moving families. So how will this work now to use units that
are sourced for mobilization even when the requirements in Iraq
seem to be changing right before our eyes?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, I will answer that and with
my experience as the Chief of Staff of the Army because this
was something we watch very carefully to make sure that before
we hit a mobilization date, we understand where these
organizations can be used so that we reduce the risk of having
to demobilize them.
So the specific unit you are talking about, if it is inside
of a year, it has already been mobilized. Therefore, it is
training. Therefore, we will find a place to use it. What we
have done in the past is we find a place to use that portion of
it that wants to stay. Now, the first step is to see if there
are volunteers to go back home, and we find that often a
percentage of the unit will be happy to do that. The rest of
the unit will typically be remissioned someplace. First choice
would be in the area of responsibility, but there are other
opportunities to do that as well. That is the procedure. You
try to make a decision before you mobilize them, but if you
have mobilized them and now the mission changes, we either
remission them or allow those that choose to to go home.
Senator Nelson. So it is probably unlikely that they would
be mobilized to go to Iraq.
General Dempsey. What kind of unit are they, sir? Aviation?
Senator Nelson. Aviation.
General Dempsey. Aviation is in high demand. It is among
our most high-demand organizations. So it is likely that they
would be used, unlikely that it would be in Iraq.
Senator Nelson. I would like to talk to you both today
about providing certainty for military members and their
families. I know that there have been a lot of discussion in
connection with cost-cutting and cutting spending in
Washington, DC, particularly as it relates to DOD dealing with
military pay and compensation and benefits. I think that,
obviously, earned military retirement benefits need to be
maintained and, as promised, delivered. What are your thoughts
and recommendations to change military retirement for members
who are currently serving?
Secretary Panetta. We have, obviously, discussed this as we
have gone through the budget exercise, and I think our view is
that this ought to be given to a commission. The President made
that recommendation. We would support that to have a commission
review the retirement area. But we also made clear that with
regards to those that have served, that they ought to be
grandfathered. We have made a commitment to those that have
deployed. They put their lives on the line. We think we ought
to stand by the benefits that were promised to them.
Senator Nelson. Keeping our promises is important. General
Dempsey, you might have a view on that as well. I would be
surprised if it was not the same.
General Dempsey. It is exactly the same.
Senator Nelson. I understand.
General Dempsey, you might recall that some time ago, a few
years ago, I visited Iraq and met with you, I think, when you
were in charge of the training and acquisition mission. You
outlined at that time how the Iraqi Government engaged with our
military by contract for acquisition of military equipment
because we were able to do it more efficiently and cost-
effectively than they were because they did not have the
acquisition structure in place in order to be able to do it.
Do you remember why we engaged them at that time in that
bilateral agreement to acquire, through the use of their money,
the equipment that they needed?
General Dempsey. Even then, Senator, it was clear to me
that at some point we would have something that we would
describe as a normal relationship with Iraq. One of the ways we
solidify that relationship not just in Iraq, but around the
world, is through our FMS program. So in those early days, we
were able to convince the Ministry of Defense to invest. At
that time, I think it was about $600,000, and today they have
invested about $7.5 billion. It is a point of managing the
relationship but also helping them grow their own capability to
be responsible stewards of their own resources.
Senator Nelson. We have had a lot of discussion about the
pros and cons of hiring outside contractors, and discussion
will be ongoing. The proof will be how it works out as to
whether or not it is as advisable as it seems to be upfront.
Now, in connection with that, in the cost differentials
that may be there, is it possible to enter into an agreement
with the Iraqi Government for cost-sharing on continuing to
provide security, training of their troops, and every other
mission that we might accept to help them secure, stabilize,
and self-govern?
General Dempsey. Yes, sure it is, Senator. When we do
multilateral and bilateral exercises around the world, there is
always a negotiation on the cost, and who will bear it.
But I also have to mention, in terms of the contractor-
supplied security, in any nation in which we are present
diplomatically, the first responsibility for security is the
host nation and then it is the close-in security that we are
talking about that tends to reside with the contracted support.
Senator Nelson. I think it is debatable perhaps about the
costs given the fact that the contractors will be paid by
contract. The military requires more than just the soldier
providing the security, all the backup, the back room, the
supply, the support that the military gets. That is a factor
that is not necessarily included in the contractor's agreement.
Is that accurate, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. That is correct.
Senator Nelson. So it may not be as out of whack. I am not
an advocate for contracting, but it may not be as
disproportionate as it sounds up front with high numbers for
contractors when you add in the cost of the back support for
the military providing the security.
Secretary Panetta. I believe that is correct.
Senator Nelson. General Dempsey, do you have any thoughts
on that differential and what it may consist of?
General Dempsey. I do, and the answer is we can actually
peel that back and provide it to this committee or others.
Senator Nelson. I think that would be advisable.
General Dempsey. Yes. We call it ``fully encumbered
costs,'' and when you fully encumber it, it is not as dramatic
as it might seem otherwise.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
The fully encumbered cost of a soldier is $138,519/year. This
number does not include contingency costs to deploy/sustain/redeploy
forces to Iraq. Including all incremental costs that are not in the
base budget (Reserve Component pay, transportation, sustainment, force
protection, equipment reset), leads to an additional cost which has
historically been between $500,000 and $800,000 per deployed soldier.
By comparison, the costs for contractor support depends greatly on
the type of labor categories used to perform the work; types of
contractors range from local national (LN) laborers, to third country
nationals (TCN) providing installation support, to highly specialized
U.S. citizens with security clearances. In general, TCN and LN labor
costs are substantially lower than U.S. citizens. The anticipated
contractor split supporting Department of State after 2011in Iraq is
projected at: United States - 47 percent, TCN - 43 percent, LN - 10
percent. The following sampling of labor categories from various State
Department support contracts provides further validation that not all
contractors in Iraq are highly paid:
Static Guard: $10,000/year.
Security Escort: $30,000/year.
Protective Detail: $110,000/year.
Welder: $131,000/year.
Air Defense Mechanic: $159,000/year.
Senior Mechanic: $185,000/year.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, before I turn to my
question on Iraq, I want to share with you an experience that I
had yesterday. I visited a wounded marine from Maine at
Bethesda. He was severely wounded by an improvised explosive
device (IED) in Afghanistan. He lost part of one leg. The other
leg has a lot of shrapnel in it. Both of his arms were wounded,
and he has a traumatic brain injury as well. He has recently
been moved into a little apartment that has newly been built.
They are wonderful accommodations for our troops and their
family members, and his spirits are amazingly good and upbeat.
But I asked him if he had any concerns, and I want to share
with you his concern. He said that while he praised the care
that he was getting, that there was a severe shortage of
physical therapists and other trained clinical personnel to
help him in what is going to be a very long recovery. He is
expected to be there for another 9 months. So he is looking at
a long haul.
This really troubled me because here we had this young man
who is probably 19 or 20 years old. He was wounded just 6 weeks
after arriving in Afghanistan. He faces a very long recovery
period. His spirits are high. His morale is good, but he is
worried that he is not going to get the care that he needs
because there has been a freeze, he said, put on the number of
physical therapists that can be hired. He described a session
to me where the physical therapist helps him for a while, then
has to turn to other patients to help them, and he feels that
is impeding his recovery.
So I mention this to you. I promised him that I would bring
it to the highest levels. I am delighted that you are here
today so that I could keep that promise. I ask you to look into
that because none of us wants to be scrimping in any way on the
care that we owe these wounded warriors who have given so much
to our country.
Secretary Panetta. Senator Collins, I appreciate your
bringing that to my attention. I have been out to Bethesda a
number of times, but I have not heard that there was a problem
with physical therapists because, frankly, most of the
soldiers, most of the troops that I visited with, all need
tremendous physical therapy. It is the only way they are going
to make it. They have great spirits, as you saw. They have
great spirits, great hope for the future. But we have to have
the physical therapists there to try to assist. So you can give
him my assurance that I will look into this and make sure that
that is not the case.
Senator Collins. Thank you so much. I am sure he will be
delighted that we had this exchange, and I will get back to
him.
Turning now to Iraq, we have been training the Iraq
security forces for nearly 8 years now, and yet concern still
exists about gaps in the numbers, the training, the
capabilities, particularly as far as their ability to
successfully defend the borders against the infiltration of
weapons and militants from Iran.
Now, some people contend that until we withdraw most of our
forces, the Iraqis are never going to step up to the plate
fully to defend their country. I personally think that is a
legitimate argument. But others say that if we withdraw our
troops, that we will lose the security gains that have been so
hard-fought.
So, General, given the outstanding concerns about Iraq's
ability to defend itself against direct threats and against the
infiltration of weapons from Iran, are you concerned that we
are jeopardizing the security gains and that we will see a
deterioration of security and a step-up in violence as we
withdraw our troops?
General Dempsey. That was always a concern of mine. But I
will say that over the last 3 years in my contacts with those
who are--and I am dated. I have not lived in Iraq for about 4
years, but in my trips back and forth there and in
conversations with those who are partnered with them, that is
to say, our forces, they all have considerable confidence that
the Iraqi security forces that we have built at great cost and
effort over the last, as you said, 8 years will be able to
maintain security inside of that country. What they lack is the
institutions and that is where our effort ought to be at this
point.
Senator Collins. What about the Kurdish region in Iraq?
There are concerns that Kirkuk stands out as an unresolved area
where there is still a lot of tension with the central
government in Baghdad. I understand that only a small DOD
contingent will remain there, and it is my understanding that
the State Department is going back and forth on whether or not
it should have a full consulate presence in Kirkuk or maintain
a less formal diplomatic presence post. If there is no U.S.
military presence to act as a buffer between the Kurdish forces
and the Iraqi security forces, are you worried that this region
of Iraq will become a destabilizing flashpoint?
General Dempsey. I worry about a lot of things, Senator,
and I will include this among the list of things I worry about.
We put in place several years ago joint checkpoints where there
was a member of the Kurdish Peshmerga. There was a member of
the Iraqi security forces and a U.S. service man or woman and a
coordinating center. Part of our OSC footprint will include our
participation in the coordination center. We will not be on the
checkpoints anymore. That is true. So we will have to rely upon
the continuing negotiations between the Kurdish political
leaders and the Government of Iraq. But this is not, again, a
place where we are completely removing ourselves, but your
point is accurate. We will not be on the checkpoints. We have
been there as a buffer. The risk goes up, but our presence in
the coordination center provides a stabilizing influence to get
them to find negotiated answers not violent answers.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Finally, Secretary Panetta, we have military relationships
with countries all over the world, and we have SOFAs with those
countries. Are there other countries where we have a military
presence that goes beyond protecting our embassies where we do
not have the legal protections that a SOFA provides, or will
Iraq be the only one?
Secretary Panetta. There are obviously different--in
different areas, there are going to be different approaches
here. There are some areas where we have SOFAs. There are some
areas where we basically put them under diplomatic protection
of one kind or another if they work out of the embassy. So it
does vary depending on the area that we are talking about in
terms of protections.
I guess what I want to assure you is that in each area we
do try to seek protections for the troops that are there
because of the concern that they be treated correctly if any
kind of incident takes place.
Senator Collins. That is absolutely critical.
What I am concerned about is while diplomatic immunity is
pretty easily extended to troops that are guarding an embassy,
for example, it sounds like our mission of our remaining troops
in Iraq would be broader than that. So I am worried about
whether the legal protections will be there for them.
Secretary Panetta. That is a concern that we all have. If
there is to be in the future a larger presence there, we have
to ensure that they are given the proper legal protections.
Depending on the size, that would determine whether or not a
SOFA would be required.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, thank you for your
service. We all certainly do appreciate what you all are doing.
In light of Senator Collins' question concerning the
wounded warrior that she met yesterday, about 2 weeks ago, my
office hosted a wounded warriors' luncheon for a number of
soldiers from North Carolina, and they brought with them their
family member that was helping them recuperate. We have done
this before, and it was certainly a welcomed luncheon for me to
get to attend and also I think all of these soldiers that were
here at the Capitol appreciated the outreach from the office
and they also got a Capitol tour.
But what was really intriguing too was one young man had
lost his leg to an IED about 2 months before. He had been
recuperating for about 2 months. He said he was most anxious to
get back to the battle and that his job was to detect IEDs. I,
too, just really highlight the morale, what these young men and
women go through each and every day. So we do need to have as
many physical therapists as possible to be sure that they do
get the treatment that they have certainly paid for and
deserve.
I want to talk about our Special Operations Forces (SOF).
Our SOFs have engaged with their Iraqi counterparts in
counterterrorism and training and advising activities. What
will things look like in Iraq from a SOF standpoint going
forward, and what type of engagement would our SOF have in
Iraq?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. The size of the Iraqi
special operating forces is about 4,500. They are organized
into a counterterrorism section commanded by an Iraqi
lieutenant general by the name of Kanani. We are partnered with
him at the headquarters level and will remain so. We are in
discussions with Iraq about training trainers that would stay
inside the wire of the places where this counterterror force is
located, not go with them on missions, but rather continue to
train them to go on missions.
As I mentioned earlier, the gap is actually in their
ability to identify the network and target it. We call it the
``find, fix, finish, exploit, and assess cycle.'' They are very
capable of fixing and finishing, not so capable as yet in
finding, exploiting, and assessing, so that you continue to
keep pressure on a network.
But I will tell you they are extraordinarily competent
individual soldiers. What we have to do is keep raising the bar
with them on their ability to do the things at echelons above
tactics.
Senator Hagan. With the drawdown taking place in less than
2 months, what is your outlook for the ability to continue this
training process to enable them to be able to do this on their
own?
General Dempsey. They will be limited. They do not have the
airlift to deliver them to the target that we might have been
able to provide. They do not have the ISR platform to keep
persistent surveillance over top of the target. So they will be
limited to ground movement and they will be limited to HUMINT,
but part of the OSC provides the trainers to keep developing
those other capabilities. But we are some time off in reaching
that point.
Senator Hagan. As we continue this drawdown of our U.S.
military personnel from Iraq, I really remain concerned about
their force protection, the individuals that are remaining in
Iraq. So what are these remaining challenges for our military
personnel in Iraq in terms of managing their vulnerabilities,
managing their exposures during the drawdown?
General Dempsey. Senator, you are talking about getting
from 24,000 down--the existing force now and having it
retrograde back through Kuwait?
Senator Hagan. The ones that are going to remain over
there.
General Dempsey. The ones that will remain will be----
Senator Hagan. Their protection.
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. First and foremost, we have
10 OSC in Iraq bases, and their activities will largely be
conducted on these bases because their activities are
fundamentally oriented on delivering the FMS program. So F-16s
get delivered. There is a team there to help new equipment
training and helping Iraq understand how to use them to
establish air sovereignty. Or there are 141 M-1 tanks right now
generally located at a tank gunnery range in Besmaya, east of
Baghdad. The teams supporting that training stays on Besmaya.
So this is not about us moving around the country very much at
all. This is about our exposure being limited to those 10
enduring, if you will, OSC base camps and doing the business of
training and educating and equipping on those 10 bases.
The host nation is always responsible for the outer
perimeter. We will have contracted security on the inner
perimeter, and these young men and women will, of course,
always have responsibility for their own self-defense.
Senator Hagan. So we will have contracted security on the
inner perimeter.
General Dempsey. That is right.
Senator Hagan. Iraqi counterterrorism forces in partnership
with the U.S. special operations personnel have significantly
degraded al Qaeda in Iraq's ability to conduct these
spectacular attacks by repeatedly removing the group's mid- and
senior-level leadership, which I compliment you on. These
operations were enabled by U.S. capabilities including our
unmanned intelligence platforms.
What do you assess are the capabilities of Iraqi
counterterrorism forces to continue these similar operations,
some of what you were just describing, General Dempsey, against
al Qaeda in Iraq, once again, in the absence of our forces, and
how will our counterterrorism activities change following the
drawdown of the U.S. military? You have just identified some,
but it seems with the lack of all the other personnel, that
this is going to be a very hard task.
Secretary Panetta. If I could, Senator, in my past
capacity, we were helping to provide a lot of intelligence and
assistance, and I think some of those efforts will continue to
provide intelligence, try to provide assistance in these areas.
Having said that, the one thing that I have been impressed
by is the fact that their counterterrorism operations have been
very effective, and despite the fact that we have drawn down
150,000 to 24,000 now, they have been very good at going after
al Qaeda and being able to go after the threats that they have
been able to perceive.
There is a need--and I think General Dempsey has pointed
this out--with regards to some of the capabilities,
helicoptering in, being able to have the ISR above. Those are
the areas where we are going to have to provide assistance to
them so that they can develop that capability. But they are
still very good at going after those targets.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for testifying. This is a very important
issue for the country, and I think we have had a good
discussion.
Number one, I completely concur with the idea that American
troops should not be left behind in Iraq without legal
protections. It is not fair to them. To say that the Iraqi
legal system is mature is being gracious. If an American
soldier were accused of rape anywhere in Iraq, I do not think
they would get a fair trial. So at the end of the day, Iraq has
a long way to go on the legal side and I think a long way to go
on other sides.
My concern is that I have never bought into the idea that
the impasse was getting the parliament to approve an immunity
agreement. I will just give you one vignette. I went over with
Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman in May to talk to the
Prime Minister about a follow-on force, and I was discussing
with him that no American politician, Republican or Democrat,
would accept a follow-on force without legal protections. As we
were talking about it, he says, ``well, how many people are you
talking about? What is your number?'' I turned to Ambassador
Jeffrey and General Austin and said you have not given them
numbers. He says, ``no, we are still working on that.'' That
was in May.
So let us get into this, General Dempsey. 16,000, 10,000,
5,000, cascading. Is it your testimony that we were proposing
16,000 to the Iraqis and they said no? Then we came back with
10,000 and they said no. Then we came back 5,000 and they said
no. Then it got to be 0.
General Dempsey. No, that is not what I testified to.
Senator Graham. What caused the cascading effect? General
Austin told me--and I will just tell you now because it is so
important--he thought we needed 19,000, and I said, ``Lloyd,
that is probably going to be more than the market can bear.'' I
said that because I am concerned about American politics too.
Then the numbers were around 15,000 to 16,000. Then we
started about 10,000. It came to 10,000, and nobody got below
10,000. So I know what General Austin had on his mind.
At the end of the day, General Dempsey, you are right. It
is about the missions you want that determines the numbers. We
have gone through it pretty well. Iraq does not have the
intelligence capacity we do. We need to make sure they have
better intelligence. They do not have an air force. We need
embedders. We need trainers. We need counterterrorism. We need
to referee the Kurd-Arab dispute. I think 10,000 or 12,000 is
what you need. At the end of the day, we are down to 0.
I guess my question is, is Iran comfortable with a
democracy on their border in Iraq, Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. I think they are very nervous about
having a democracy on their border.
Senator Graham. Let me tell you what the speaker of the
Iraqi parliament, a Sunni, Mr. Najaf, said. Iraq now suffers
from points of weakness. If neighboring countries see that Iraq
is weak and incapable of protecting its border and internal
security, then definitely there will be interference. This
interference does not exist now. He was talking about how Iran
would step up their efforts to destabilize Iraq if we all left.
Do you agree that is a more likely scenario? They are doing
it now. They are only going to do it more if we do not have
anybody there.
Secretary Panetta. I think there will be a continuing
threat. I think that the reality is that the Iraqis do not want
to have Iran exert that kind of influence in their country.
Senator Graham. Now, if the Sunni speaker of the parliament
is worried about that, is there any doubt the Kurds want us
there? If it were up to the Kurds, there would be 50,000
American troops in Kurdistan. Do you agree with that?
Secretary Panetta. Yes.
Senator Graham. So we know the Sunnis are worried about
this, and we know the Kurds would have 50,000 if we would agree
to put them there. I would not agree to that, but they are very
welcoming of U.S. troops. So I am getting a little bit
concerned that all the blame on the Iraqi political system is
maybe not quite fair.
Secretary Panetta, you were a politician in another life.
Would it be a political problem for President Obama to announce
this year that we are going to keep 15,000 people in Iraq past
2012? Did that ever get considered in this administration? Did
anybody ever talk about the numbers changing because the
Democratic base would be upset if the President broke his
campaign promise?
Secretary Panetta. Not in any discussions that I
participated in.
Senator Graham. Do you think it ever happened anywhere? Do
you think anybody in the White House ever wondered about the
political effect of having troops in Iraq on the 2012 election?
You talk openly about the Iraqis having political problems. You
do not think there are any politics going on on our side?
Let me ask you about Afghanistan, General Dempsey. Did any
commander recommend that all of the surge forces be pulled out
by September 2012?
General Dempsey. I honestly do not know, Senator.
Senator Graham. Let me tell you. The testimony is clear. No
option was presented to the President in July to recover all
surge forces by September 2012, and you put General Allen in a
terrible spot--the administration has. I think it is no
accident that the troops are coming home 2 months before this
election in Afghanistan, and if you believe that to be true, as
I do, I do not think it is an accident that we got to 0.
Now, at the end of the day, we are at 0. Do you think the
people in Camp Ashraf are going to get killed? What is going to
happen to them?
General Dempsey. Senator, the State Department is leading
an effort to ensure that we work with the Iraqi----
Senator Graham. Can you tell the people back here that the
likelihood of their friends and family being killed is going up
greatly if there are no American forces up there policing that
problem?
General Dempsey. I will not say anything to those people
because I am not involved in the outcome.
Senator Graham. Fair enough.
I asked Admiral Mullen, your predecessor, what is the risk
of an Arab-Kurdish conflict over the oil reserves around Kirkuk
in terms of a conflict if we are not present. He said it was
high. Do you agree with that?
General Dempsey. I might have said moderate because of my
own personal contacts with both the Kurds and the Iraqis.
Senator Graham. So you believe that there is a moderate
risk, not a high risk, if there are no U.S. forces policing the
Kurd-Arab borderline disputes and the Kirkuk issue.
General Dempsey. I do. I would like to take some time to
articulate why I believe that, but if you would like me to take
that for the record, I would be happy to do so.
Senator Graham. I would.
[The information referred to follows:]
The lack of a continued presence by U.S. forces in the vicinity of
Arab-Kurd disputed areas presents a moderate risk to Iraqi security.
In the past, U.S. forces fostered cooperation and coordination
between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Kurdish regional forces
(the peshmerga) through the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM), an
agreement that allows these forces to operate jointly in selected
areas. Our forces participated in the joint patrols and manned combined
checkpoints. They served as honest-brokers and helped mitigate the risk
of local-level violence between the ISF the peshmerga. Unless another
neutral and credible third party fills this role, there will be some
risk of an outbreak of violence between these groups.
That said, what our presence and our participation in the CSM did
not and could not do is help resolve the underlying Arab-Kurd political
tensions. This is the real issue, and a national-level solution is
ultimately required. Such a solution would involve, at a minimum,
agreements on the disputed internal boundaries, the governing status of
Kirkuk, the sharing of hydrocarbon revenues, and the structure of
national, regional, and local security forces. Resolving these issues
will be challenging and will take great effort and compromise from both
sides. However, given my experiences dealing with both Arab and Kurdish
leadership, I believe that the risk of a full political failure and the
outbreak of an Arab-Kurd civil war to be moderate, not high.
Senator Graham. Now, do you believe it is smart for the
United States not to have counterterrorism forces? Is it in our
national security interest not to have any counterterrorism
forces in Iraq?
General Dempsey. It is in our national security interest to
continue pressure on al Qaeda wherever we find them either by
ourselves or through partners.
Senator Graham. But do you think the counterterrorism
problem in Iraq is over?
General Dempsey. I do not.
Senator Graham. Secretary Panetta, you have been great
about this. You said there are a thousand al Qaeda in Iraq, and
I know in your old job that you are very worried that they are
going to reconstitute. So will you do the best you can to
convince the Iraqis--and I tell you what. I am willing to get
on a plane and go back myself--that they would benefit from
counterterrorism partnership with the United States?
Secretary Panetta. I have made that clear time and time
again.
Senator Graham. They just tell you they are not concerned
about that.
Secretary Panetta. What they tell me is that they are
concerned about that. They obviously have their forces that are
dealing with that.
Senator Graham. Is it your testimony the Iraqis would not
have 3,000 U.S. forces? They do not want any U.S. forces at
all. They are not willing to expend the political capital to
get this agreement done because they just do not see a need for
U.S. forces. Is that the Iraqi position that they have come to
the point in their political military life that they just do
not need us at all?
Secretary Panetta. I think the problem was that it was very
difficult to try to find out exactly--when you say the Iraqi
position, what exactly the Iraqi position was at that point.
Senator Graham. What is the Kurdish position in Iraq about
U.S. forces?
Secretary Panetta. I do not think there is any question
they would like to----
Senator Graham. So what is the Sunni speaker of the
parliament's position about U.S. forces?
Secretary Panetta. I think the same.
Senator Graham. When I was with Prime Minister Maliki in
May, the next day he announced that he would accept a follow-on
force if other parties would agree. So how did this fall apart?
Secretary Panetta. I heard the same statements and read the
same statements. But the problem is in the negotiations that
involved the Ambassador, that involved General Austin, in those
discussions they never came to the point where they said we
want this many troops here.
Senator Graham. I can tell you--and I have taken my time. I
can tell you in May they had no number given to them by us.
They were in the dark as late as May about what we were willing
to commit to Iraq. So this is a curious outcome when you have
Sunnis and Kurds on the record and the Prime Minister of Iraq
saying he would accept a follow-on force if the others agreed.
I do not know who does the negotiation for the United States,
but if I had three people saying those things, I thought I
could get it over the finish line. But we are where we are.
Thank you for your service.
Chairman Levin. I am just going to have a second round for
those of us who are here, just maybe a couple questions each so
we can get to our second panel.
Mr. Secretary, did Iraq ever request U.S. trainers or other
troops remain in Iraq after December 31, and if so, what number
did they request and were they willing to grant legal
protection, immunity to our troops?
Secretary Panetta. There was no such request.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.
I do not see how you could have expected the Iraqis to
agree when we could not give them a number, and that was not
just the case in May. We came back. We kept asking the
President's National Security Advisor and others what is our
proposal, and we never had one until it got down to, I guess,
5,000 or 3,000. History will show, Secretary Panetta, that they
were ready to negotiate in May and we would not give them a
hard number both as far as numbers are concerned and missions
are concerned. So it is hard to understand how anyone would
believe that they were reluctant to negotiate when we would not
give them a number to negotiate from. But history will provide
that, and I am sure we will have further spirited exchanges on
this issue in the future.
But I also wanted to thank you for the letter that you
wrote to me and Senator Graham. I think it crystallizes the
challenges that our Nation would face if we had sequestration.
I do not think there is any two greater deficit hawks than
Senator Graham and me. But your letter, I hope, is read by
every Member of Congress and every citizen of this country
because we cannot put our Nation's national security at risk.
You gave us a very definitive answer, and I want to thank you
for that.
Secretary Panetta. I appreciate it.
Senator McCain. I want to thank you and General Dempsey for
your continued leadership and putting up with these occasional
insults that you have to endure here in the Senate. [Laughter.]
Could I just say finally on the Camp Ashraf issue? I know
that the Secretary of State is addressing this issue, but it is
American troops that are protecting them now. I hope that you
can give us some idea as to what the disposition is going to be
because I think it is very clear that the lives of these people
are at risk.
I thank you.
Secretary Panetta. I appreciate that.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
The State Department has the lead on this issue for the U.S.
Government. I understand they are working actively with the Government
of Iraq, the international community, and the residents of Camp Ashraf
on an acceptable solution that avoids further bloodshed. I would refer
you to the State Department for additional information.
Chairman Levin. Just on that point, if we turn it into a
question, it may be, General, this needs to be addressed to you
to. There is obviously a greater risk to folks there unless the
Iraqis keep a commitment and what is going to be done to make
sure, to the best of our ability, that they keep that
commitment, and what about the question of removing them from
the list--not them but the organization from the terrorist
list? We are all concerned about that.
General Dempsey. We share your concern. Lloyd Austin shares
the concern, and I know Ambassador Jeffrey shares the concern.
There is no--we are not sparing any diplomatic effort to
encourage the Iraqis to do what we think is right in this
regard to ensure the protections of those folks in Camp Ashraf.
But right now, actually the Iraqi security forces guard
Camp Ashraf with our advisory and assistance group with them.
So the concern about that capacity, when we do leave, that
capacity is a real one. But I actually think we have to put the
pressure on the Iraqi Government diplomatically to have the
outcome we think is correct.
Chairman Levin. Just assure them, if you would, that there
is a really strong feeling around here that if they violate a
commitment to protect those people, assuming that they are
still there and that they have not been removed from the
terrorist list so they can find other locations, that if they
violate that commitment to us, that is going to have a severely
negative impact on the relationship. I think I can speak here
for Congress, although I am reluctant to ever say that. I think
there is a lot of concern in Congress about it, and this will,
I believe in my opinion, severely negatively impact their
relationship with the U.S. Congress. Let me leave it at that.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, I want to assure you that
Ambassador Jeffrey has made that point loud and clear to the
Iraqis.
Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I would add my voice, and I think you can speak for
Congress, Members of both parties in both Houses, in expressing
our concern about the safety of the people in Camp Ashraf.
This is one of a series of what I would call ``what ifs''
which have different answers now that we are dealing with a
sovereign Iraq. I suppose this is true whether we have troops
in Iraq or not or outside or in the neighborhood. We are going
to be relying on diplomacy, cajoling them. What if there is a
victimization, attacks on the people at Camp Ashraf. What if
al-Sadr, who says he wants the U.S. embassy out of Baghdad,
begins to strike at the embassy beyond the capacity of the
security forces? What if a conflict breaks out between the
Kurds and the Sunni Arabs at the fault line there in the north?
I think I would just leave that question because it is an
answer that is going to be spelled out in our negotiations with
them.
I do not know if I am quoting somebody whose testimony on
the second panel I read, but I thought it was a great quote.
Maybe I got it from somebody else about diplomacy. Frederick
the Great apparently said that ``diplomacy without military
force behind it is like music without instruments.'' There is
something to be said about that.
My question is to ask you, Mr. Secretary, if you would just
spend a moment to develop in a little more detail the statement
that you made earlier that we will have 40,000 American troops
in the region. Does that include the 24,000 now in Iraq? Have
we made a decision to increase the number? Based on the failure
to have more troops in Iraq after January of next year, have we
made a decision to increase the number of troops in the region
outside of Iraq for some of those ``what ifs'' that I just
talked about?
Secretary Panetta. No, Senator, that did not include Iraq.
What we have now is in Kuwait we have almost 29,000; Saudi
Arabia, we have 258; Bahrain, over 6,000, close to 7,000; UAE,
about 3,000; Qatar, 7,000. If you go through the region and add
up all those numbers, that is the 40,000.
Senator Lieberman. So has there been a decision made to
increase that number at all because we were unable to reach an
agreement about a continuing presence of American troops in
Iraq, in other words, keeping them in the region?
General Dempsey. Yes. I would not describe it as a cause-
and-effect relationship based on what happened in Iraq, but
rather our continuing concern with a more assertive Iran.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Dempsey. We are looking at our CENTCOM footprint.
Senator, that prior to 2001, we routinely rotated brigades in
and out of Kuwait for training, but also as part of deterrence.
I think we have not negotiated this with Kuwait yet, but it
would be my view that we should have some kind of rotational
presence, ground, air, and naval.
Senator Lieberman. Some of those would be combat troops?
General Dempsey. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Now, Senator Shaheen has not had a first
round, but if you would limit it to a couple of questions this
second round.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, it is very nice to have
you both here.
You mentioned, General Dempsey, the more assertive Iran and
clearly Iran's attempting to assert influence throughout Iraq.
Can you discuss how we are working with some of our partners in
the region to try and thwart that influence? Specifically, if
you could start with Turkey, because we have cooperated in the
past with Turkey on the Kurds in northern Iraq, and we are
seeing that violence between Turkey and the Kurd rebels has
escalated since the summer. We saw a major Turkish operation
into Iraq, and yesterday there were reports that U.S. drones
have deployed into Turkey from Iraq for surveillance flights.
So can you just give us an update on that situation?
General Dempsey. I can. Thank you, Senator.
Each combatant commander has a theater security cooperation
plan that supports both building the capability of our
partners, allows us to make ourselves better, and deters
potential adversaries. So in Turkey, for example, we have
recently, as you have described, taken the ISR platform that
was currently flying out of Balad in Iraq and it is now flying
out of Incirlik in Turkey to support the Turks in their fight
against terrorism. The Turks recently agreed to put a Tippy 2
radar as part of the European phase adaptive approach,
integrated air defense, against the possibility of a rogue
missile strike from Iran if they develop that capability.
Then if you walk down the Gulf, the Gulf Cooperative
Council, we have bilateral agreements with each of them, some
of which are multilateral, for example, air defense, some of
which are exclusively bilateral.
Then the other thing we do is exercises as well as this FMS
program, which becomes a significant cornerstone of our
relationship with these countries.
Senator Shaheen. Relative to the U.S.-Turkey cooperation on
the Kurds, how is Iraq responding to that?
General Dempsey. Iraq has consistently denounced the
presence of the PKK on Iraq soil, and so too, by the way, has
the Kurdistan regional government. So there has not been any
friction as long as there has been transparency about intent.
Senator Shaheen. So we are cooperating with them as we are
doing these kinds of actions.
General Dempsey. We are, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. You talked about some of the other
neighbors in the region. Obviously, again, back to Iran and
their effort to influence Iraq and the region, does Iraq view
its potential to be a proxy for Iranian influence and for some
of the other influences in the region to play out in Iraq? Do
they see that as a possibility and are they concerned about it?
Secretary Panetta. I think they are aware that that is a
possibility, and I think more importantly they clearly resist
that effort. They have made very clear that Iran should have no
influence as to the government in Iraq.
Senator Shaheen. Again, to stay on Iran, I know that the
hearing is about Iraq, but given the recent reports this week
from the IAEA about Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons
capability, obviously that threatens not only us, the region,
but Iraq, I would assume, is very concerned about that
prospect. So are we working with Iraq to try and isolate Iran
in response to this report, or have we been doing other actions
around Iran's potential to get nuclear weapons?
Secretary Panetta. We have worked very closely with Iraq in
trying to make it very clear to Iran that they ought not to
provide any kind of military weaponry particularly to the
extremists in Iraq, and they have cooperated fully in that
effort. In addition, I think they share the concern about any
kind of nuclear development in Iran.
Senator Shaheen. Are they also working with other nations
in the Middle East to share that concern? So do you see, in
terms of their relationship with other Middle Eastern
countries, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, some of the other countries you
mentioned--do you see that as a cooperative effort that
everybody is concerned about?
Secretary Panetta. I do not know the extent of the
cooperative effort there, but I think they have made their
position clear. From my own experience, the other countries in
the region basically share that same viewpoint.
Senator Shaheen. You talked, I believe, in your opening
statements about our continuing strategic relationship with
Iraq. As we look into the future, the next 10, 15, 20 years,
what is the shared interest that we expect to continue to have
with Iraq? Obviously, in the short-term we have spent a lot of
resources and certainly human lives to help defend Iraq and
support their ability to have a free democratic country. But
long-term, I think, we are in a different situation than post-
World War II, for example, where Europe and Japan had the
threat of communism to help us have a mutual strategic
interest. But what do we see that interest being in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, I think the President has made
this clear and the Prime Minister has made it clear that we are
going to continue a long-term relationship with Iraq.
Obviously, it is going to be multi-tiered. My hope is that we
can develop that normal relationship that we have with other
countries in the region so that we can assist on training, can
assist on counterterrorism operations, can assist with regards
to intelligence in other areas. I think if we can develop that
kind of relationship with Iraq, that we can actually strengthen
their ability to deal with the threats that we are concerned
about.
General Dempsey. If I could add, Senator, because I lived
there for 3 years and studied it quite extensively. I think
when you talk about the future of our relationship with Iraq,
Iraq sits on three prominent fault lines, Arab-Kurd, Arab-
Persian, Sunni-Shia. So I think Iraq has the potential to be a
stabilizing influence. It also has the potential to be a
destabilizing influence. It has been for 20 years. We would
expect and aspire to help them to be a stabilizing influence
and have enormous economic potential. So I do think we should
take a long view of this thing.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Sessions? He has not had a first round either.
Senator Sessions. I have not had a first round, but Senator
Graham had a time constraint. Could I yield to him and do my
first round later?
Chairman Levin. Of course. The second round was a couple
questions.
Senator Graham. Yes, I will try to make it very quick.
One, we have people in military custody in Iraq. Is that
correct, Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. That is correct.
Senator Graham. There is a suspect called Daqduq, a
Hezbollah suspect, who has been accused of plotting the murder
of five or six American soldiers. Do we know what is going to
happen with him at the end of this year?
Secretary Panetta. We have made our concerns known to the
Iraqis about the importance of detaining that individual, but
others as well that we are concerned about.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me if he is tried in an
Iraqi court, justice is not going to be delivered. He should
come to the United States and be tried by military commissions.
Secretary Panetta. I think he would certainly find better
justice here.
Senator Graham. I promised to be very quick.
General Dempsey, did any Iraqi commander ever suggest to
you that they did not need a follow-on force or did they ever
object to a follow-on force?
General Dempsey. The Iraqi military leaders were
universally supportive of us continuing to partner with them.
Senator Graham. One last question. Do you agree with me
that if we had 10,000 to 12,000 U.S. forces performing
refereeing duty between the Kurds and the Arabs, embedding
counterterrorism, intelligence gathering, and training, that
the likelihood of Iraq becoming a successful, stable state is
dramatically improved?
General Dempsey. I am not equivocating. I do not know,
Senator. I think that probably there is a higher likelihood
that it would be stabilizing. But there is, nevertheless, the
possibility that it would be destabilizing.
Senator Graham. Would you recommend to the President if the
Iraqis would accept--give us immunity to keep troops there?
General Dempsey. If the Iraqis approach us with the promise
of protections and we can negotiate the missions, then my
recommendation would be to find a way to assist them.
Senator Graham. Is that true with you, Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. Yes.
Senator Graham. Thank you both.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
That was a very significant question because we have a big
decision to make, and we are heading toward a path that, from
my perspective, creates great concern that as a result of an
artificial deadline, we are placing at risk a goal that we have
spent many years now working toward, expended great amounts of
money and lives and blood to achieve. So to accelerate too fast
in the last days for some artificial reason, not a core
military reason, is very worrisome to me. Now, that is just my
perspective, and I am really worried about it.
Second, Mr. Secretary, you have been in the White House.
You know how the world works. There has been a belief somehow
that the State Department can fill the role of the military. We
are going to have a big embassy there. We are going to have
16,000 State Department--does that include the security
personnel also--there that is going to replace the military.
Forgive me, but I just am not confident that they are capable
of fulfilling that role. State Department people cannot be
asked to go down a dangerous road. General Dempsey says we are
going down the road. They salute and they go. They put on their
helmets. They put on their bullet-proof vests. They get in
their military vehicles and they go do the job. They go meet
some tribal leader, some regional official, some mayor. They do
that. So now we are going to have a series of State Department
compounds apparently with some private security.
But would you not agree, Secretary Panetta, that a
determined adversary could place the State Department personnel
at risk if they move away from those compounds and actually get
out and travel the countryside and attempt to build a stronger,
healthier nation?
Secretary Panetta. Obviously that is the purpose of having
that security detail with them. But I would also say, Senator,
that our hope would be that this is not just a State Department
presence, but that ultimately we will be negotiating a further
presence for the military as well.
Senator Sessions. Thank you for saying that. I just would
say sometimes in the White House elbows fly. You have been
there, they do. So would you bring to bear your experience and
best judgment? Would you be sure that it is well-discussed, the
dangers of a total removal of the military and totally turning
this over to the State Department?
Secretary Panetta. I think everyone understands the risks
involved here, and that is the reason we are in negotiations
with them about trying to maintain a military presence that can
assist them to help provide the right security.
Senator Sessions. I remember Secretary Condoleezza Rice
saying to me that--maybe in testimony--that she was prepared to
call any member of the State Department that they needed in the
theater and ask them personally to go. The Secretary of State
personally would ask them to go. So that indicates--that just
reveals the fact that State Department personnel are not
required and don't have the same duty that the military does to
go into dangerous areas. First of all, thank you, General
Dempsey, for your service in Iraq and the war on terror. All
the men and women who have gone into harm's way, gone wherever
they have been asked to go even though it was dangerous. State
Department personnel are not assigned to do that in the same
way and I just believe we will lose something if you are not
successful in maintaining a military presence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know the vote has started. So
you guys can relax from my perspective.
Chairman Levin. We thank you very much for your testimony.
We just appreciate all you do for our troops and their
families.
We will move to our second panel even though a vote has
begun. [Pause.]
We are going to begin with this panel, and I am going to
try to catch the end of the first vote and vote the second
vote. Here is what we are going to do. We are going to begin
with the testimony of the second panel. Some of my colleagues
are going to be voting the first vote, I hope come back, and
then go and vote at the end of the second vote. That is what
Senator McCain is going to try to do. What I am going to do is
open up the second panel, listen, I hope, to all of the
testimony and then run and vote, stay for the beginning of the
second vote. The bottom line is this is going to be a little
bit scattered, but I think the witnesses are probably all
familiar with the way that works around here.
So let us continue today's hearing on security issues
relating to Iraq with the second panel comprised of three
outside witnesses.
First, Brett McGurk. He served as a senior policy advisor
on Iraq issues for both President Bush and President Obama. On
President Bush's National Security Council, Mr. McGurk served
first as the director for Iraq and then as special assistant to
the President and senior director for Iraq and Afghanistan. He
remained on the National Security Council into the Obama
administration serving as a special advisor. Mr. McGurk also
served from 2007 to 2008 as the lead U.S. negotiator on the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and the bilateral SFA. He is
currently a visiting scholar at Columbia School of Law.
Second is Dr. Douglas Ollivant. Dr. Ollivant is a senior
national security fellow with the New American Foundation and a
retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army. Earlier this year,
Dr. Ollivant returned from a 1-year tour as a counterinsurgency
advisor to the commander of Regional Command East in
Afghanistan. He served also at the National Security Council as
director for Iraq in both the Bush and Obama administrations.
From 2006 to 2007, he served in Iraq as the chief of plans for
Multinational Division Baghdad.
Finally, we have Dr. Kenneth Pollack, senior fellow and
director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution. He has twice served on the National
Security Council from 1995 to 1996 as the director for Near
East and South Asian Affairs and from 1999 to 2001 as the
director for Persian Gulf Affairs. Dr. Pollack has also served
as a military analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. He
has written extensively on Iraq and Middle Eastern affairs,
including several books.
We welcome our witnesses. We thank our witnesses, and we
look forward to your testimony.
Senator McCain will be back to give his opening statement
as soon as he has had the opportunity to vote.
I want to make sure I am calling in the order indicated.
So, Mr. McGurk, I will call on you first.
STATEMENT OF BRETT H. McGURK, VISITING SCHOLAR, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and
distinguished members of the committee.
It is an honor to appear before you at such a critical
juncture in Iraq. I have been involved in Iraq policy for
nearly 8 years, spending more than 3 years in Baghdad and 4
years in the White House. My testimony this morning is my own
personal opinion and not the views of the U.S. Government.
I will review where we have been and then look forward over
the next 12 to 18 months. This will be a transitional period of
risk and opportunity for the United States. Given the stakes in
Iraq and the greater Middle East region, it is critical that we
get this right and I believe we can.
I divide the past 8 years into three phases: descent,
turnaround, and transition. The period of descent from 2003 to
2007 was characterized by a policy that failed to reflect
circumstances on the ground, with an over-reliance on political
progress to deliver security gains and failure to grapple with
Iraq as we found it, a nation and population wrecked by decades
of war and dictatorship that left nearly 1 million people dead.
The turnaround began in 2007, enabled by a new policy that
focused on security first and began to stem what was becoming a
self-sustaining civil war. That policy is now known as ``the
surge.'' But in the White House, during the planning stages, we
called it a bridge: a boost in resources to bridge gaps in
Iraqi capacity and set conditions for U.S. forces to move into
the background. As President Bush said at the time, if we
increase our support at this critical moment and hope the
Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the
day our troops begin coming home.
Contemporaneous with this new policy, we began negotiating
a long-term security and diplomatic relationship with Iraq.
Talks began in the summer of 2007 and resulted in a preliminary
text called the ``Declaration of Principles'' that envisioned a
relationship across many fields, including education,
economics, diplomacy, and security.
Security came last for two reasons. First, it was essential
for our own interests that security was but one part of a
broader relationship. Second, a security agreement alone, even
at that time with nearly 160,000 U.S. troops deployed, was
unlikely to survive the crucible of Iraq's political process.
Iraq's historical memory focuses on a few singular events,
one of which is a security agreement negotiated with the United
Kingdom in 1948. That agreement was meant to affirm Iraqi
sovereignty by mandating the withdrawal of British forces but
permitted ongoing British access to Iraqi airbases and sparked
massive riots that left hundreds dead, a toppled government,
and an abolished agreement.
Mindful of this experience, our negotiations over the
course of 2008 focused on a broader set of issues, but they
nonetheless became fraught, particularly as Iraqis, beginning
with the battle of Basra in the spring, pressed demands for
sovereignty and control over their own affairs. In addition,
our own positions at the time, one of the most sensitive
issues, including immunity for U.S. personnel and contractors,
were at first unrealistic. Thus, when a proposed U.S. text
leaked over the summer, our talks reached a dead end.
The process of restarting those talks began at the third
phase of the war, transition. This is not what we originally
intended, but it was fortunate because it provided a clear road
map that has lasted to this day with broad U.S. and Iraqi
support.
On November 26, 2008, Iraq's parliament ratified two
agreements, the first called the Security Agreement, set the
terms for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities
by June 30, 2009, and from Iraq by the end of 2011. The second,
called the SFA, set a foundation for permanent relations in the
areas of diplomacy, culture, commerce, and defense. These
agreements passed only in the last possible hour before a year-
end recess in the Iraqi parliament, and on the morning of the
final vote, I sat with Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad
believing the vote might not succeed.
Under the Security Agreement, the first transition
milestone was the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities
in June 2009. I was in Baghdad at that time. There was great
unease at the embassy and within MNF-I that withdrawing from
Baghdad would abandon hard-fought gains. I shared that unease.
But the tactical risk of withdrawing was outweighed by the
strategic gain of allowing Iraqi forces to control their
streets for the first time. Security incidents, already
approaching record lows, continued to fall after our
withdrawal.
The next transition milestone was August 31, 2010. Shortly
after his inauguration, President Obama set that date for
withdrawing U.S. forces to 50,000 from nearly 130,000 when he
took office and shifting our mission from combat to advising
Iraqi forces. I had left Baghdad in late 2009 and the following
spring wrote two articles for the Council of Foreign Relations
urging reconsideration of that milestone. Iraq had just held
national elections. Less than 1 percent separated the two major
lists. Government formation had yet to begin. So withdraw to
50,000?
When I returned to Baghdad that summer, however, I saw
firsthand that Iraq had already crossed the bridge. Outside the
specialized area of high-end counterterrorism, which by 2010
did not require a large number of troops, our security role was
increasingly indirect. The drawdown to 50,000 passed without
incident and security trends remained stable, even during a
period of great political uncertainty, which lasted into
December of last year.
The next stage of transition was the drawdown of all U.S.
forces by the end of this year.
Chairman Levin. Mr. McGurk, I am going to interrupt you--
forgive me--because I am going to have to run and vote now.
We are going to recess for about 10 or 15 minutes. Can you
all stay here for that period of time? I am sorry for the
chaos. If anyone else comes back during this period, they can
restart it. So it will be about 10 minutes. [Recess.]
Senator McCain [presiding]. I would like to apologize to
the witnesses for the machinations of the U.S. Senate which
require us to be on the floor which, obviously, has affected
the lunches that are coming in. We would like to go ahead with
your testimony, but I would like to recommend to the chairman
that we bring you back on another day. I think your opening
statements we should proceed with and maybe ask you to return
on another day because I think your testimony is important. I
think your involvement in this issue is important.
Unfortunately, the majority of my colleagues are not here to
listen to what you have to say. I hope you understand and I
apologize for it. I think maybe we could go ahead with the
opening statements, and then I will ask Senator Levin if
perhaps we could go ahead and ask you to come back again
another time before the committee.
Mr. McGurk, were you testifying?
Mr. McGurk. I was, Senator. I can pick up where I left off.
Senator McCain. Please continue.
Mr. McGurk. Thank you.
Senator McCain. Again, my apologies.
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Senator.
In the beginning I just laid out where we had been from the
surge until now, the surge being so critical to getting to the
point we are now.
The next stage of the transition was the drawdown of all
U.S. forces by the end of this year. This past July, I returned
to Iraq to assist Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin who
were in discussions with Iraqi leaders on whether and how to
extend that deadline. Ultimately the decision was made not to
do so. In my view, there is one primary reason for that
decision. Iraqi and U.S. legal experts had determined that
legal immunities for U.S. troops could only be granted by the
Iraqi parliament. The parliament simply would not do so, a view
confirmed by the Iraqi leaders on October 4 in a unanimous
decision.
This outcome reflected a volatile mix of pride, history,
nationalism, and as in any open political system, public
opinion. A recent poll by an independent research institution
is consistent with what I heard across Baghdad over the summer
and fall. Nearly 90 percent of Iraqis in Baghdad and more than
80 percent nationwide supported the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Iraq. Had the issue been framed in terms of granting legal
immunity to U.S. personnel, the numbers would surely be higher.
Then there was the question of Iran. The Iranians have
tremendous influence in Baghdad. Its embassy rarely rotates its
personnel, resulting in longstanding relations with Iraqi
leaders. Its trading relationship with Iraq is approaching $10
billion, including $5 billion with the Kurdish region alone.
But this influence is rarely decisive on bilateral U.S.
matters, and it was not decisive on the issue of a residual
U.S. force. In the end, even the most anti-Iranian leaders in
Baghdad refused to publicly support us. When a Sunni
nationalist and vehemently anti-Iranian bloc in parliament
began a petition to ban all U.S. military trainers in Iraq, it
rapidly collected 120 signatures.
This nationalist sentiment is our best weapon against
Iranian designs on Iraq. The poll cited above found only 14
percent of Iraqis hold a favorable view of Iran. Even Sadr
supporters hold an unfavorable view of Iran by a margin of 3 to
1. To be sure, the issue of Iran's role in Iraq is exceedingly
complex, multifaceted, and deeply troubling. But it is also
self-limiting by history, ethnicity, and religious orthodoxy.
Iran will continue to push, but the Iraqis will push back. In
the end, the question of whether U.S. troops would remain in
Iraq had little to do with Iran and everything to do with Iraq.
This is now the hard reality of Iraq's constitutional
system, a system assertive of its sovereignty, responsive to
public opinion, and impervious to direct U.S. pressure. A
similar dynamic may arise in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and other
states where political systems are opening for the first time
with new leaders accountable to their people.
It would be a mistake, however, to see this new reality as
militating against long-term U.S. interests and partnerships.
Iraq may be an example. Over the course of the summer, even as
Iraqi leaders warned against taking a security agreement to
parliament, they took actions in concert with us and sought to
deepen a diplomatic and defense partnership.
After a series of rocket attacks on U.S. bases by Iranian-
backed militants in Maysan Province, the Iraqi army moved
quietly but in force and arrested hundreds of militia fighters.
The Iraqi Government replaced ineffective police commanders and
directed special operations against leadership targets. Iraqi
officials sent messages to Tehran declaring that attacks on
U.S. facilities or troops would be considered an attack against
the Iraqi state. By the end of the summer, security incidents
in Maysan and then nationwide dropped to their lowest levels of
the entire war.
In addition, in September, Iraq completed the purchase of
18 F-16s, transferring more than $3 billion into its FMS
account, which is now the fourth largest in the region and
ninth largest in the world. Iraq, in its next budget cycle,
plans to purchase 18 more F-16s, topping $10 billion in its FMS
program, which already includes 140 M1A1 main battle tanks,
naval patrol boats, reconnaissance aircraft, and over 1,000 up-
armored Humvees. A number of countries have sought to sell
weapons systems to Iraq. It is, thus, significant that they
chose the United States as their primary supplier with long-
term training and maintenance contracts.
Against this backdrop, the best available policy for the
United States was to fulfill the commitment under the Security
Agreement and elevate the SFA as the pillar of our long-term
relationship. Having just returned from Baghdad, I am confident
that this policy, if handled right, can open a new window of
opportunity for relations with Iraq, including close security
and defense relations.
The next 12 to 18 months should mark the final stage of
transition to normalized relations. In practice, that means
moving swiftly to anchor U.S. engagement under the SFA. Article
X of the SFA envisions an organized partnership through high-
level and mid-level joint committees including in the areas of
defense, education, economics, and diplomacy. Standing up and
empowering these committees will institutionalize regular
patterns of interaction, which in turn can lend coherence to a
complex relationship, help identify and address emerging
problems, and reinforce opportunities as they arise.
Importantly, the Iraqis do not see the SFA as a framework
for U.S. aid or assistance, and nor should we. It is instead a
structure for building a broad strategic partnership. It
carries wide popular support in Iraq and has the status under
Iraqi law of a treaty. Its implementation over the next year
can institutionalize arrangements to mitigate risks associated
with our military withdrawal and manage the friction that will
naturally arise between Iraqi and U.S. officials during a
period of transition.
With respect to our civilian presence, we must begin a
serious conversation with the Iraqis on what we mutually expect
out of a strategic partnership. By necessity, for much of the
past 2 years, we focused on government formation and whether
and how to extend our military presence. Now we can begin a
broader and ongoing strategic dialogue that focuses on
identifying and then pursuing mutual interests.
That dialogue should accelerate next month when Prime
Minister Maliki visits Washington. This visit is an
opportunity, first, to honor the sacrifice of thousands of
Americans and Iraqis over the past 9 years. The withdrawal of
U.S. forces with Iraqis in charge of their own security and
violence at record lows was unimaginable 4 years ago. It was
made possible only because tens of thousands of Americans
fought in Iraqi streets at the height of a sectarian war with a
mission to protect the Iraqi people. As we approach the formal
end of the war, their valor must be honored and memorialized.
Then we must look forward. President Obama and Prime
Minister Maliki have an opportunity to set a common vision
beyond the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The aim should be setting
in place, over the next year, a strong and enduring foundation
for normalized ties under the SFA. This will be an iterative
and nonlinear process. Results will not be instant. There will
be areas of disagreement with the Iraqis and within our own
government. But the goal is to ensure that the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Iraq marks not an end but a new beginning
under the SFA. That goal is achievable.
In the security area alone, the SFA provides the basis for
enduring defense ties. Through CENTCOM, U.S. forces can assist
in maritime and air defense and conduct combined arms
exercises. The OSC at the embassy offers an additional platform
for training Iraqi forces through its FMS program. The OSC will
begin small, but it can expand as Iraq's FMS program grows.
Intelligence sharing, including with Iraqi special forces,
should continue and intensify. Counterterror cooperation,
especially against al Qaeda, can be strengthened and
institutionalized.
In the economic area, Iraq is rapidly becoming, in the
words of the U.N. Development Program, ``the world's oil
superpower with the ability to influence markets on a global
scale.'' Its oil output will surpass Iran's in 2 years and
double in 5 years. Iraqi officials are now focused on public
services and how best to invest their country's resources, a
sea change from 4 years ago. We can help. The SFA envisions
permanent structures for linking Iraqi officials and business
leaders with American companies and expertise. It further
envisions bilateral cooperation to complete Iraq's accession to
the WTO and other international financial institutions. Iraq's
global integration is in our mutual interests and can be a
mainstay of U.S. policy.
In the education area, Iraq has the largest Fulbright
program in the Middle East, the largest international Visitor
Leadership Program in the world, and is developing linkages
with colleges and universities across the United States. The
SFA offers a platform for knitting these and other programs
into a more permanent fabric.
In the diplomatic area, Iraq sits in a turbulent
neighborhood and its leaders see potential problems at every
border. They also view themselves as the vanguard of the Arab
Spring, yet they act with increasing hesitation as events
unfold. One senior Iraqi leader proposed a permanent structure
for strategic dialogue under the SFA to discuss fast-moving
events and avoid misunderstandings with Washington. Such a
structure would replace the dormant U.N.-sponsored neighbors
process that met three times with varying results between 2006
and 2008. It will not align Iraq's foreignbv policy with ours,
but it could help bolster Iraq's confidence and help its
leaders better pursue regional policies that both expand
democratic rights and promote Iraq's stability.
Serious risks remain. The largest is renewed sectarian or
ethnic conflict. Levels of violence remain low, however, and
the costs of any group leaving the political process have
increased together with Iraq's increasing resources. But we
must remain vigilant.
Establishing regular and formalized patterns of engagement
under the SFA can mitigate risk and spot early indicators of
conflict. According to historical models, there are five
primary indicators of conflict recurrence: serious government
repression; wholesale withdrawal of forces supporting the
government; serious declarations of secession; new and
significant foreign support to militants; and new signs of
coordination between militant groups. This framework can help
U.S. diplomats and analysts make sense of what will remain a
fast-moving kaleidoscope of events.
Ultimately, however, experience in Iraq helps diplomats
develop a feel for what is a problem and what is truly a
crisis, and today there are far more of the former than the
latter. There is no question that al Qaeda will seek to spark
ethnic and sectarian conflict. The governing coalition will
remain fractious and dysfunctional. Sadr will be a wild card,
unpredictable to us, to Iran, and to his own followers. Maliki
will seek to enhance his own powers. Speaker Nujayfi and
President Barzani may do the same. The test is whether Iraq's
constitutional arrangements allow inevitable conflicts to be
managed peacefully through the parliament and accepted legal
means.
There have been some encouraging signs over the past year.
Parliament is becoming an assertive and independent
institution. Iraqis on their own managed potential flashpoints,
such as the massacre this summer of Shia pilgrims in Anbar
Province. Tensions among Arabs and Kurds eased with improved
relations between prominent leaders, some of whom used to never
speak to each other. The withdrawal of U.S. forces may change
the calculus of some actors. But successful management of
political disputes has turned more on established relationships
between U.S. and Iraqi officials and between the Iraqis
themselves than the number of U.S. troops in Iraq at any given
time.
At bottom, Iraq faces serious challenges over the next
year. The U.S. military withdrawal may increase some risks in
the short-term. But similar to our withdrawal from Iraqi
cities, it also provides a strategic window to reset relations
with Iraq and establish permanent diplomatic structures that
mitigate risks over the long-term. That is now the central
challenge and opportunity before the United States.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McGurk follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brett H. McGurk \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Visiting Scholar at Columbia University School of Law. Former
Special Assistant to President Bush and Senior Director for Iraq and
Afghanistan; Special Advisor to the National Security Council; and
Senior Advisor to three U.S. ambassadors in Baghdad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of
the committee. It is an honor to appear before you at such a critical
juncture in Iraq. I have been involved in Iraq policy for nearly 8
years, spending more than 3 years in Baghdad and four in the White
House. My testimony this morning will review where we have been and
then look forward over the next 12-18 months. This will be a
transitional period of risk and opportunity for the United States.
Given the stakes in Iraq and the greater Middle East region, it is
critical that we get it right. I believe we can.
I divide the past 8 years into three phases: descent, turnaround,
and transition. The period of descent, from 2003 to 2007, was
characterized by a policy that failed to reflect circumstances on the
ground, with over-reliance on political progress to deliver security
gains and failure to grapple with Iraq as we found it: a nation and
population wrecked by decades of war and dictatorship that left nearly
1 million people dead.
The turnaround began in 2007, enabled by a new policy that focused
on security first and began to stem what was becoming a self-sustaining
civil war. That policy is now known as the surge. But in the White
House, during its planning stages, we called it a bridge: a boost in
resources to bridge gaps in Iraqi capacity and set conditions for U.S.
forces to move into the background. As President Bush said at the time:
``If we increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the
Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our
troops begin coming home.''
Contemporaneous with this new policy, we began negotiating a long-
term security and diplomatic relationship with Iraq. Talks began in the
summer of 2007 and resulted in a preliminary text--called the
Declaration of Principles--that envisioned a relationship across many
fields, including education, economics, diplomacy, and security.
Security came last for two reasons. First, it was essential for our
own interests that security was but one part of a broader relationship.
Second, a security agreement alone--even at that time with nearly
160,000 U.S. troops deployed was unlikely to survive the crucible of
Iraq's political process.
Iraq's historical memory focuses on a few singular events, one of
which is a security agreement negotiated with the United Kingdom in
1948. That agreement was meant to affirm Iraqi sovereignty by mandating
the withdrawal of British ground forces. But it permitted ongoing
British access to Iraqi airbases and sparked massive riots that left
hundreds dead, a toppled government, and an abolished agreement.
Mindful of this experience, our negotiations over the course of
2008 focused on a broader set of issues, but they became fraught--
particularly as Iraqis, beginning with the battle of Basra in the
spring, pressed demands for sovereignty and control over their own
affairs. In addition, our own positions on the most sensitive issues--
including immunity for U.S. military personnel and contractors--were,
at first, unrealistic. Thus, when a proposed U.S. text leaked over the
summer, the talks reached a dead end.
The process of restarting those talks began the third phase of the
war--transition. This was not what we originally intended, but it was
fortunate because it provided a clear roadmap that has lasted to this
day with broad U.S. and Iraqi support.
On November 26, 2008, Iraq's parliament ratified two agreements.
The first, called the Security Agreement, set the terms for a phased
withdrawal of U.S. troops--from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009; and from
Iraq by the end of 2011. The second, called the Strategic Framework
Agreement, set a foundation for permanent relations in the areas of
diplomacy, culture, commerce, and defense. These agreements passed only
in the last possible hour before a year-end recess, and on the morning
of the final vote, I sat with Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad
believing the vote might not succeed.
Under the Security Agreement, the first transition milestone was
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in June 2009. There was
great unease at the Embassy and within MNF-I that withdrawing from
Baghdad would abandon hard fought gains. I shared that unease. But the
tactical risk of withdrawing was outweighed by the strategic gain of
allowing Iraqi forces to control their streets for the first time.
Security incidents, already approaching record lows, continued to fall
after our withdrawal.
The next transition milestone was August 31, 2010. Shortly after
his inauguration, President Obama set that date for withdrawing U.S.
forces to 50,000 (from nearly 130,000 when he took office) and shifting
our mission from combat to advising and training Iraqi forces. I had
left Baghdad in late 2009 and the following spring wrote two articles
for the Council ofForeign Relations urging reconsideration of the
August 31 milestone. Iraq had just held national elections. Less than
one percent separated the two major lists. Government formation had yet
to begin. So why withdraw?
When I returned to Baghdad that summer, however, I saw first-hand
that Iraq had already crossed the bridge. Outside the specialized area
of high-end counter-terrorism, which by 2010 did not require large
numbers of troops, our security role was increasingly indirect. The
drawdown to 50,000 passed without incident and security trends remained
stable, even during a period of great political uncertainty, which
lasted into December.
The next stage of transition was the drawdown of all U.S. forces by
the end of this year. This past July, I returned to Iraq to assist
Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin who were in discussions with
Iraqi leaders on whether and how to extend that deadline. Ultimately,
the decision was made not to do so. There was one primary reason for
that decision. Iraqi and U.S. legal experts had determined that legal
immunities for U.S. troops could only be granted by the Iraqi
parliament. The parliament would not do so--a view confirmed by Iraqi
leaders on October 4 in a unanimous decision.
This outcome reflected a volatile mix of pride, history,
nationalism, and (as in any open political system) public opinion. A
recent poll by an Embassy funded research institution is consistent
with what I saw and heard across Baghdad over the summer and fall.
Nearly 90 percent of Iraqis in Baghdad and more than 80 percent
nationwide supported the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Had the
issue been framed in terms of granting legal immunity for U.S.
personnel--the numbers would surely be higher.
Then there was the question of Iran. The Iranians have tremendous
influence in Baghdad. Its embassy rarely rotates personnel--resulting
in longstanding relations with Iraqi leaders. Its trading relationship
with Iraq is approaching $10 billion, including $5 billion with the
Kurdish region alone. But this influence is rarely decisive on
bilateral U.S. matters, and it was not decisive on the issue of a
residual U.S. force. In the end, even the most anti-Iranian leaders in
Baghdad refused to publicly support us. When a Sunni nationalist--and
vehemently anti-Iranian--bloc in parliament began a petition to ban
U.S. military trainers, it rapidly collected 120 signatures.
This nationalist sentiment is our best weapon against Iranian
designs on Iraq. The poll cited above found only 14 percent of Iraqis
hold a favorable view of Iran. Even Sadr supporters hold an unfavorable
view of Iran by a margin of 3 to 1. To be sure, the issue of Iran's
role in Iraq exceedingly complex, multifaceted, and troubling. But it
is also self-limiting--by history, ethnicity, and religious orthodoxy.
Iran will continue to push, but the Iraqis will pushback. In the end,
the question of whether U.S. troops would remain in Iraq had little to
do with Iran, and everything to do with Iraq.
This is now the hard reality of Iraq's constitutional system: a
system assertive of its sovereignty, responsive to public opinion, and
impervious to direct U.S. pressure. A similar dynamic may arise in
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and other states where political systems are
opening for the first time with new leaders accountable to their
people.
It would be a mistake, however, to see this new reality as
militating against long-term U.S. interests and partnerships. Iraq is
an example. Over the course of the summer, even as Iraqi leaders warned
against taking a security agreement to parliament, they took actions in
concert with us--and sought to deepen a diplomatic and defense
partnership.
After a series of rocket attacks on U.S. bases by Iranian-backed
militants in Maysan province, the Iraqi Army moved quietly but in force
and arrested hundreds of militia fighters. The Iraqi Government
replaced ineffective police commanders and directed special operations
against leadership targets. Iraqi officials sent messages to Tehran,
declaring that attacks on U.S. facilities or troops would be considered
an attack against the Iraqi state. By the end of the summer, security
incidents in Maysan and then nationwide dropped to their lowest levels
of the entire war.
In addition, Iraq in September completed the purchase of 18 F-16s,
transferring more than $3 billion into its FMS account--which is now
the fourth largest in the region and ninth largest in the world. Iraq
in its next budget cycle plans to purchase 18 more F-16s, topping $10
billion in its FMS program--which already includes 140 M1A1 Main Battle
Tanks, 6 C-130 transport aircraft, 24 Bell 407C helicopters, in
addition to naval patrol boats, reconnaissance aircraft, and over 1,000
up-armored Humvees. A number of countries sought to sell weapons
systems to Iraq. It is thus significant that they chose the United
States as their primary supplier with long-term training and
maintenance contracts.
Against this backdrop, the best available policy for the United
States was to fulfill the commitment under the Security Agreement and
elevate the SFA as the pillar of our long-term relationship. Having
just returned from Baghdad, I am confident that this policy--if handled
right--can open a new window of opportunity for relations with Iraq,
including close security and defense relations.
The next 12-18 months should mark the final stage of transition: to
normalized relations. In practice, that means moving swiftly to anchor
U.S. engagement under the SFA. Article X of the SFA envisions an
organized partnership through high-level and mid-level joint
committees, including in the areas of defense, education, economics,
and diplomacy. Standing up and empowering these committees will
institutionalize regular patterns of interaction, which in turn can
lend coherence to a complex relationship; help identify and address
emerging problems; and reinforce opportunities as they arise.
Importantly, the Iraqis do not see the SFA as a framework for U.S.
aid or assistance--and nor should we. It is instead a structure for
building a broad strategic partnership. It carries wide popular support
in Iraq and has the status of a treaty under Iraqi law. Its
implementation over the next year can institutionalize arrangements to
mitigate risks associated with our military withdrawal and manage the
friction that will naturally arise between Iraqi and U.S. officials
during a period of transition.
With respect to our civilian presence, we must begin a serious
conversation with the Iraqis on what we mutually expect out of a
strategic partnership. By necessity, for much of the past 2 years, we
focused on government formation and whether and how to extend our
military presence. Now, we can begin a broader--and ongoing--strategic
dialogue that focuses on identifying and then pursuing mutual
interests.
That dialogue should accelerate next month when Prime Minister
Maliki visits Washington. This visit is an opportunity, first, to honor
the sacrifice of thousands of Americans and Iraqis over the past 9
years. The withdrawal of U.S. forces with Iraqis in charge of their own
security and violence at record lows was unimaginable 4 years ago. It
was made possible only because tens of thousands of Americans fought in
Iraqi streets at the height of a sectarian war with a mission to
protect the Iraqi people. As we approach the formal end of the war,
their valor must be honored and memorialized.
Then we must look forward. President Obama and Prime Minister
Maliki have an opportunity to set a common vision beyond the withdrawal
of U.S. troops. The aim should be setting in place--over the next
year--a strong and enduring foundation for normalized ties under the
SFA. This will be an iterative and non-linear process. Results will not
be instant. There will be areas of disagreement with the Iraqis, and
within our own government. But the goal is to ensure that the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq marks not an end, but a new
beginning under the SFA. That goal is achievable.
In the security area alone, the SFA provides the basis for enduring
defense ties. Through U.S. Central Command, U.S. forces can assist in
maritime and air defense and conduct combined arms exercises. The
Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) at the Embassy offers an
additional training platform through Iraq's FMS program. The OSC will
begin small but it can expand as Iraq's FMS program grows. Intelligence
sharing--including with Iraqi Special Forces--should continue and
intensify. Counterterror cooperation, especially against al Qaeda, can
be strengthened and institutionalized.
In the economic area, Iraq is rapidly becoming--in the words of the
U.N. Development Program--``the world's oil superpower with the ability
to influence markets on a global scale.'' Its oil output will surpass
Iran's in 2 years and double in 5 years. Iraqi officials are now
focused on public services and how best to invest their country's
resources a sea change from 4 years ago. We can help them. The SFA
envisions permanent structures for linking Iraqi officials and business
leaders with American companies and expertise. It further envisions
bilateral cooperation to complete Iraq's accession to the WTO and other
international financial institutions. Iraq's global integration is in
our mutual interests and can be a mainstay of U.S. policy.
In the education area, Iraq has the largest Fulbright program in
the Middle East, the largest International Visitor Leadership Program
in the world, and is developing linkages with colleges and universities
across the United States. Half the Iraqi population is younger than 19
years of age and 25 percent were born after the U.S. invasion. It is in
our interest to encourage this new generation to study outside Iraq--
and in the United States. Iraq does not want handouts. It is allocating
$1 billion for its own Iraq Education Initiative to send thousands of
students per year to study at English speaking universities. The SFA
offers a platform for knitting these programs into a more permanent
fabric.
In the diplomatic area, Iraq sits in a turbulent neighborhood and
its leaders see potential problems at every border. They also view
themselves as the vanguard of the Arab spring, yet they act with
increasing hesitation as events unfold. One senior Iraqi official
proposed a permanent structure for ``strategic dialogue'' under the
SFA--to discuss fast-moving events and avoid misunderstandings with
Washington. Such a structure would replace the dormant U.N. sponsored
``neighbors process'' that met three times with varying results between
2006 and 2008. It will not align Iraq's foreign policy with ours, but
it could help bolster Iraq's confidence and help its leaders better
pursue regional policies that both expand democratic rights and promote
Iraq's stability.
Serious risks remain. The largest is renewed sectarian or ethnic
conflict. Levels of violence remain low, however, and the costs of any
group leaving the political process have increased together with Iraq's
increasing resources. But we must remain vigilant.
Establishing regular and formalized patterns of engagement under
the SFA can mitigate risk and spot early indicators of conflict.
According to historical models, there are five primary indicators of
conflict recurrence: (1) serious government repression; (2) wholesale
withdrawal of forces supporting the government; (3) serious
declarations of succession; (4) new and significant foreign support to
militants; and (5) new signs of coordination between militant groups.
This framework can help U.S. diplomats and analysts make sense of what
will remain a fast-moving kaleidoscope of events.
Ultimately, however, experience in Iraq helps diplomats develop a
feel for what is a problem and what is truly a crisis, and today there
are far more of the former than the latter. There is no question that
al Qaeda will seek to spark ethnic and sectarian conflict. The
governing coalition will remain fractious and dysfunctional. Sadr will
be a wildcard, unpredictable to us, to Iran, and to his own followers.
Maliki will seek to enhance his own powers. Speaker Nujayfi and
President Barzani may do the same. The test is whether Iraq's
constitutional arrangements allow inevitable conflicts to be managed
peacefully, through the parliament and accepted legal means.
There have been encouraging signs over the past year. Parliament is
becoming an assertive and independent institution. Iraqis on their own
managed potential flashpoints, such as the massacre this summer of Shia
pilgrims in Anbar province. Tensions among Arabs and Kurds eased with
improved relations between prominent leaders (some of whom used to
never speak to each other). The withdrawal of U.S. forces may change
the calculus of some actors. But successful management of political
disputes has turned more on established relationships--between U.S. and
Iraqi officials and between the Iraqis themselves--than on the number
of U.S. troops in Iraq at any given time.
At bottom, Iraq faces serious challenges over the next year. The
U.S. military withdrawal may increase some risks in the short term.
But--similar to our withdrawal from Iraqi cities--it also provides a
strategic window to reset relations with Iraq and establish permanent
diplomatic structures that mitigate risks over the long-term. That is
now the central challenge and opportunity before us.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Dr. Ollivant?
STATEMENT OF DR. DOUGLAS A. OLLIVANT, SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY
FELLOW, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, THE NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION
Dr. Ollivant. Chairman Levin and members of the committee,
it is my pleasure to testify today on the future of Iraq
following the withdrawal of the U.S. troops by December 31 of
this year. This is an important foreign policy issue for the
United States, and I am pleased to see it receive at least some
of the attention that it deserves.
I began working on Iraq policy over 7 years ago. I first
went to Iraq in June 2004 as a uniformed Army officer. During
this tour, I fought in the battles of Najaf Cemetery and Second
Fallujah, conducted nascent counterinsurgency operations in the
Kadhamiya district of Baghdad, and was in southern Baghdad for
the January 2005 elections, and witnessed the first outburst of
Iraqi nationalism through a democratic process. I also lost
several friends.
I returned to Baghdad in late 2006 as the chief of plans
and chief strategist for Multinational Division Baghdad. In
this capacity, I led the team that wrote the coalition portion
of the Baghdad security plan, the core implementing document
for the 2007 surge.
After 14 months in Iraq on this second tour, I came to
Washington to serve on the National Security staff as the
director for Iraq, where I worked on, among other issues, the
dissolving of the Iraq coalition in late 2008, the first
transition moment, the securing of the SOFA for our few
remaining coalition partner nations after the signing of our
SOFA, and initiated the planning for the transition of police
training from DOD to the State Department.
I was last in Iraq in the summer of 2009 in a private
capacity but have retained my contacts on the issue, despite
spending a year in Afghanistan as a civilian counterinsurgency
advisor in the interim.
My bottom line on our position with Iraq is this: the
complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq is the right
policy at this time. Our forces are no longer welcome, as the
mood in the Iraqi parliament demonstrates, and serve as a major
distraction in Iraqi politics. Further, while Iraq does face
numerous challenges, the presence of U.S. forces would do
little to ameliorate them.
I do have two concerns. First, Iranian influence in Iraq,
though not to the extent that I find common in Washington, is a
very real concern that we need to watch closely. Second, and
more importantly, I am concerned that once U.S. military forces
are withdrawn, Iraq may suffer from neglect by the Washington
policy community. Iraq has been a deeply divisive issue in our
domestic politics for some time, and it may be tempting to just
put the entire subject behind us. This would be a mistake, and
the United States should actively engage Iraq as an emerging
partner, engage in educational and cultural exchanges, and most
importantly, do everything in its power to assist the
engagement of the U.S. business community in this emerging
market.
Our forces should withdraw from Iraq, and the President has
made the right call in abiding by the agreement signed by his
predecessor despite the open courting over the past year by
some agencies of the U.S. Government to remain indefinitely.
First, and most importantly, we should leave because we
said we would. There are significant portions of the Arab
street that are convinced that the United States invaded Iraq
to gain access to its oil resources. While we can never hope to
disarm all conspiracy theorists, the departure of all military
forces from Iraq will signal to any open minds that this is
simply not the case. Our departure, after removing the previous
regime and eventually, if belatedly, bringing some semblance of
stability to the country, signals that the United States may
hope for friendship but is not looking for neo-colonial
territories. If and when the United States has to intervene in
yet another country, it will be immensely helpful to be able to
point to the utter absence of U.S. military forces in Iraq to
demonstrate that we do leave when asked.
Second, U.S. troops should leave because the Iraqis want us
to leave. Yes, the Sadrists and their Iranian-influenced
leadership are the most vocal advocates, but Iraqi nationalists
of all stripes find the continuing presence of U.S. forces to
be deeply humiliating, even when their presence appeals to
their rational interests. If we stay, our presence will
continue to be a galvanizing, even defining, political issue in
Iraq. Conversely, our departure may allow the Iraqis to spend
precious political bandwidth elsewhere.
Third, U.S. troops should leave because they are the wrong
instrument for the political problems that the Iraqis now face.
I am the first to admit that Iraqi politics are immature and
that numerous political issues, Kurd versus Arab, Sunni versus
Shia, relationships with the neighbors, executive versus
legislative power, distribution of hydrocarbon revenue and
authorities, all remain unresolved. Military forces are at best
irrelevant to these issues and at their worst, complicate them
by ham-handed attempts to intervene in them. Soldiers tend to
make poor diplomats, and the bulk of Iraq's remaining
challenges are diplomatic in nature. Let us get the soldiers
out of the way and let the diplomats solve them.
Finally, while my position on withdrawal of U.S. military
forces is not driven by domestic politics, it is nonetheless
good domestic politics. President Obama is now abiding by and
overseeing the agreement signed by his Republican predecessor
to put an orderly end to our military presence in Iraq. We
should all welcome this lamentably rare bipartisan moment.
This does not mean there are not continuing challenges in
Iraq and it is still possible that Iraq could go badly wrong.
It is simply that a U.S. military presence no longer reduces
that possibility.
Let me briefly review some of the challenges facing Iraq.
The most urgent from our perspective is the continuing Iranian
influence in that country. This is a real threat, and the
intentions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force
units are most assuredly not benign. But the threat is
overstated. Iran shares a border and a religion with Iraq, but
here the commonalities end. Iran is a majority Persian country,
while Iraq is majority Arab. The Iraqis have no desire to be a
client state of their Persian neighbor, and they have not
forgotten that they fought a long and bloody war with them not
so long ago.
With respect to politics, yes, they are gridlocked with
Prime Minister Maliki taking advantage of this gridlock to
expand executive power at the expense of the legislature. Many
have accused Maliki of becoming the next Saddam, settling
himself in as a Shia dictator with his Dawa Party as the new
Ba'ath. Recent purges of Sunni officers in the security forces
do add fuel to this fire.
However, these accusations are also overstated. Maliki is
consolidating executive power, as those in executive office
tend to do, but the appropriate comparison is probably less
Saddam and more Erdogan in Turkey. It is something to be
concerned about perhaps but hardly a cause for panic.
Finally, relations between the various factions in Iraq,
Shia, Arab Sunni, and Kurds continue to experience friction
points. This should not be surprising to us as these groups
have differences that caused civil war to break out in 2005 to
2008. But while a return to civil war is always possible, I
consider it strongly unlikely. All of the factions know that a
return to civil war will be counterproductive to their
interests. The Sunni have learned the hard way that to attempt
violence against the government will spur reprisals from Shia
militias. The Kurds have carefully watched the re-
professionalization of the Iraqi army and have no desire to
trade their new-found quasi-autonomous status and exponential
economic development for the pain and dubious payoffs of armed
conflict.
In fact, what we see today is exactly what we would have
hoped for, but would not have dared hoped for in 2006. These
three groups have very real differences. Yet, despite a
relatively gridlocked politics, these groups have not returned
to widespread violence, but instead continue to work through a
political system, however frustrating it must be. That said, we
should continue to encourage Iraq to integrate all sectarian
groups into positions of power in order to promote societal
harmony.
Iraq does continue to have a terrorism problem. The most
prominent of these groups, al Qaeda in Iraq, is a mere shadow
of its former self, but this does not mean it is toothless. We
should expect AQI to continue its nihilist campaign of violence
against Shia Iraqis, and it is quite possible that they may try
to attack Western targets outside Iraq. However, we have a
committed partner in the Iraqi security forces and we can
expect them to continue to aggressively target AQI forces
throughout Iraq.
The various Shia extremist militias backed by Iran will be
interesting to watch. I believe that nationalist forces in Iraq
have largely turned a blind eye to these forces as they
targeted the unpopular American bases. However, now that the
American forces are departing, it will be interesting to see if
the Iraqi masses remain as tolerant of these Iranian quislings
in their midst. I am sure that Iran will attempt to use these
militias to influence Iraqi politics. Again, it will be
interesting to see how the Iraqi Government reacts to such a
move. I suspect that once American forces depart, these Iranian
proxies will discover that any reservoir of goodwill they might
have had disappeared when the Americans crossed the border. We
have seen Maliki settle scores with Shia groups who threatened
the central government before in early 2008. I would not be
surprised to see a reprise.
As was pointed out at several points during the debate over
residual troop presence, Iraq will need Western military
trainers, most notably for their navy and their fledgling air
force but also for U.S. ground equipment such as the M1 tanks
and the M198 artillery pieces. Not only will they require
technical advice on the care and use of these individual
pieces, which will come through the OSC, but they will need to
know how to employ them in concert.
However, this does not require U.S. troops. There are
numerous firms that will be happy to respond to any request for
proposal from the Iraqi Government for properly skilled
trainers. The market will respond quickly to Iraqi petrodollars
and the absence of U.S. troops need not be a showstopper. This
would just mean the Iraqis pay the bills instead of U.S.
taxpayers.
As an aside, it would also be helpful were the Iraqi
defense establishment to request that firms provide not only
trainers, but also technical solutions that could help with the
very real vulnerabilities of explosive detection (as opposed to
the modified divining rods they now use) and to the security of
their borders.
Finally, speaking of firms, the departure of military force
from Iraq should mark the transition not so much to just the
State Department, but also to America's real strength, the
private sector. I would suggest that the best way to ensure
that America's war in Iraq was not in vain is to promote
investment by American firms throughout Iraq alongside the
already burgeoning Chinese, Turkish, and French presence. This
is not to minimize some real challenges to doing business in
Iraq, but this is where America should focus its diplomatic
effort. It is when Americans and Iraqis interact with each
other not as adversaries, but as business partners that we can
let the peaceful bonds of commerce work to the advantage of
both sides.
Iraq should not be afraid of this engagement. Iraq is
blessed with abundant oil reserves, perhaps more than we can
now identify, but it is a truly diversified economy that is in
the interests of the Iraqi people. We can help the Iraqis
generate wealth and participate in that wealth generation. As
the Iraqis begin to participate in the great transformation
that a market economy can bring, we can become more confident
of the long-term health of the democratic institutions that we
planted, however tenuously, there.
In summary, I am not trying to pain an overly rosy picture
of Iraq. There are real challenges and for many of its people,
it remains an unpleasant place to live. But the problems that
remain do not lend themselves to military solutions. I believe
the most likely outcome of the removal of the U.S. troop
presence will be a slow normalization of Iraqi politics as they
realize that we are no longer present to either assist or take
the blame. Iranian influence will be a reality. They share a
border and thousands of years of history. But Iraq will move
decisively to limit this influence. Iraq will work hard in the
coming months and years to ramp up their oil production.
I want to see a continuing American influence in Iraq. But
I want this influence to come via our training of hundreds of
Iraqi military and police officers in the United States,
letting them see how a democratic army behaves within its own
borders and what a real rule of law system looks like. I want
this influence to come through American educational
institutions, which should open their doors to Iraqi students,
aided by liberal, if carefully screened, student visas. I want
this influence to come via American business both large and
small, which helps the Iraqi economy diversify first into
agriculture, small manufacturing, and then into a future which
I cannot predict. All these efforts would fit neatly within the
boundaries of our existing SFA with Iraq referenced to in depth
by Mr. McGurk.
In short, now that the Saddam regime is gone and the civil
war put to rest, the environment is ripe for America's cultural
and economic institutions to welcome Iraq into the family of
nations. Again, the SFA signed in 2008 between the United
States and Iraq makes it clear that these exchanges are welcome
and in the interest of both sides.
We have sacrificed much blood and treasure in the past
years in Iraq, and while we should leave the final accounting
to history, I am sure we can all agree that at the very least
we have overpaid for this outcome in Iraq. But we find
ourselves at a surprisingly good outcome that we could hardly
have predicted in the dark days 5 years ago. Again, it is
entirely possible that Iraq could still end up very badly. The
future is contingent. But as our military-to-military
relationship with Iraq normalizes with the withdrawal of
troops, I feel much better about the prospect of a democratic
Iraq that is an ally in the fight against terrorism and that
respects the rights of its citizens.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ollivant follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Douglas A. Ollivant
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee: It is my pleasure to testify today on the future of Iraq
following the withdrawal of U.S. troops by December 31 of this year.
This is an important foreign policy issue for the United States, and I
am pleased to see it receive at least some of the attention it
deserves.
I began working on Iraq policy over 7 years ago. I first went to
Iraq in June 2004 as a uniformed Army officer. During this tour I
fought in the battles of Najaf Cemetery and Second Fallujah, conducted
nascent counterinsurgency operations in the Kadhamiya district of
Baghdad, and was in southern Baghdad for the January 2005 elections. I
also lost several friends. I returned to Baghdad in late 2006 as the
Chief of Plans and chief strategist for MultiNational Division-Baghdad.
In this capacity, I led the team that wrote the coalition portion of
the Baghdad Security Plan, the core implementing document for the 2007
``Surge.'' After 14 months in Iraq on this second tour, I came to
Washington to serve on the National Security Council staff as Director
for Iraq, where I worked on--among other issues--the dissolving of the
Iraq coalition in late 2008, the securing of Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFA) for our few remaining partner nations after the
signing of our 2008 SOFA, and initiated the planning for the transition
of police training from the Department of Defense to the State
Department. I was last in Iraq in the summer of 2009, but have retained
my contacts on the issue, despite spending a year in Afghanistan as a
civilian counterinsurgency advisor in the interim.
My bottom line on our position with Iraq is this--the complete
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq is the right policy at this time.
Our forces are no longer welcome, as the mood in the Iraqi parliament
demonstrates, and serve as a major distraction in Iraqi politics.
Further, while Iraq faces numerous challenges, the presence of U.S.
forces would do little to ameliorate them. However, I do have two
worries. First, I am concerned about Iranian influence in Iraq, though
not to the extent that I find common in Washington. Second--and more
importantly--I am concerned that once U.S. military forces are
withdrawn, that Iraq may suffer from neglect by the Washington policy
community. Iraq has been a deeply divisive issue in our domestic
politics for some time, and it may be tempting to just put the entire
subject behind us. This would be a mistake, and the United States
should actively engage Iraq as an emerging partner, engage in
educational and cultural exchanges, and--most importantly--do
everything in its power to assist the engagement of the U.S. business
community in this emerging market.
Our forces should withdraw from Iraq, and the President has made
the right call in abiding by the agreement signed by his predecessor,
despite the open courting, over the past year, by some agencies of the
U.S. Government to remain indefinitely. First, and most importantly, we
should leave because we said we would. There are significant portions
of the ``Arab street'' that are convinced that the United States
invaded Iraq to gain access to its oil resources. While we can never
hope to disarm all conspiracy theories, the departure of all military
forces from Iraq will signal to any open minds that this is simply not
the case. Our departure, after removing the previous regime and
eventually--if belatedly--bringing some semblance of stability to the
country, signals that the United States may hope for friendship, but is
not looking for neo-colonial territories. If and when the United States
has to intervene in yet another country, it will be immensely helpful
to be able to point to the utter absence of U.S. military forces in
Iraq to demonstrate that we do leave, when asked.
Second, U.S. troops should leave because the Iraqis want us to
leave. Yes, the Sadrists and their Iranian-influenced leadership are
the most vocal advocates, but Iraqi nationalists of all stripes find
the continuing presence of U.S. forces to be deeply humiliating, even
when their presence appeals to their rational interests. If we stay,
our presence will continue to be a galvanizing, even defining,
political issue in Iraq. Conversely, our departure may allow the Iraqis
to spend precious political bandwidth elsewhere.
Third, U.S. troops should leave because they are the wrong
instrument for the political problems that the Iraqis now face. I am
the first to admit that Iraq's politics are immature and that numerous
political issues--Kurd vs. Arab, Sunni vs. Shia, relationships with
neighbors, executive vs. legislative power, distribution of hydrocarbon
revenue and authorities--remain unresolved. Military forces are at best
irrelevant to these issues and at their worst, complicate these issues
by ham-handed attempts to intervene in them. Soldiers tend to make poor
diplomats, and the bulk of Iraq's remaining challenges are diplomatic
in nature. Let's get the soldiers out of the way and let the diplomats
solve them.
Finally, while my position on the withdrawal of U.S. military
forces is not driven by domestic politics, it is nonetheless good
domestic politics. President Obama is now abiding by and overseeing the
agreement signed by his predecessor to put an orderly end to our
military presence in Iraq. We should all welcome this lamentably rare
bipartisan moment.
This does not mean there are not continuing challenges in Iraq and
it is still possible that Iraq could go badly wrong. It is simply that
a U.S. military presence no longer reduces the possibility of things
going wrong.
Let me briefly review some of the challenges facing Iraq. The most
urgent, from our perspective, is continuing Iranian influence in that
country. This is a real threat, and the intentions of the Iranian
Revolution Guard Corps ``Qods Force'' units are most assuredly not
benign. But the threat is overstated. Iran shares a border and a
religion with Iraq, but here the commonalities end. Iran is a majority
Persian country, while Iraq is majority Arab. The Iraqis have no desire
to be a client state of their Persian neighbor. They have not forgotten
that they fought a long and bloody war against them not so long ago.
Yes, the politics in Iraq are gridlocked, with Prime Minister
Maliki taking advantage of this gridlock to expand executive power at
the expense of the legislature. Many have accused Maliki of becoming
the ``next Saddam,'' settling himself in as a Shiite dictator, with his
Dawa party becoming the new Baath. Recent purges of Sunni officers in
the security forces do add fuel to this fire.
However, these accusations are also overstated. Maliki is
consolidating executive power--as those in executive officers tend to
do--but the appropriate comparison is probably less Saddam and more
Erdogan. This is something to be concerned about, perhaps, but hardly a
cause for panic.
Finally, relations between the various factions in Iraq--Shiite,
Arab Sunni, and Kurds--continue to experience friction points. This
should not be surprising to us, as these groups have differences that
caused civil war to break out in 2005-2008. But while a return to civil
war is always possible, I consider it strongly unlikely. All of the
factions know that a return to civil war will be counterproductive for
their interests. The Sunni have learned, the hard way, that to attempt
violence against the government will spur reprisals from Shiite
militias. The Kurds have carefully watched the re-professionalization
of the Iraqi Army, and have no desire to trade their newfound quasi-
autonomous status and exponential economic development for the pain and
dubious payoffs of armed conflict.
In fact, what we see today is exactly what we would hope for--but
would have not dared hoped for in 2006. These three groups have very
real differences. Yet despite a relatively gridlocked politics, these
groups have not returned to widespread violence, but instead continue
to work through a political system, however frustrating it must be.
That said, we should continue to encourage Iraq to integrate all
sectarian groups into positions of power in order to promote societal
harmony.
Iraq does continue to have a terrorism problem. The most prominent
of these groups--Al Qaeda is Iraq (AQI)--is a mere shadow of its former
self, but this does not mean it is toothless. We should expect AQI to
continue its nihilist campaign of violence against Shiite Iraqis, and
it is possible that they may try to attack Western targets outside
Iraq. However, we have a committed partner in the Iraqi Security
Forces, and we can expect them to continue to aggressively target AQI
forces throughout Iraq.
The various Shiite extremist militias, backed by Iran, will be
interesting to watch. I believe that nationalist forces in Iraq have
largely turned a blind eye to these forces as they targeted unpopular
American bases. However, now that the American forces are departing, it
will be interesting to see if the Iraqi masses remain as tolerant of
these Iranian quislings in their midst. I am sure that Iran will
attempt to use these militias to influence Iraqi politics. It will be
interesting to see how the Iraqi Government reacts to such a threat. I
suspect that once American forces depart, these Iranian proxies will
discover that any reservoir of good will they might have had
disappeared when the Americans crossed the border. We have seen Maliki
settle scores with Shiite groups who threatened the central government
before in early 2008. I would not be surprised to see a reprise.
As was pointed out at several points during the debate over a
residual troop presence, Iraq will need Western military trainers--most
notably for their Navy and fledgling Air Force, but also for U.S.
ground equipment, such as the M1 tanks and M198 artillery pieces. Not
only will they require technical advice on the care and use of
individual pieces, but how to employ them in concert. However, this
does not require U.S. troops. There are numerous firms that will be
happy to respond to any request for proposal from the Iraqi Government
for properly skilled trainers. The market will respond quickly to Iraqi
petrodollars and the absence of U.S. troops need not be a show
stopper--it just means the Iraqis pay the bill instead of the U.S.
taxpayer. As an aside, it would be helpful if the Iraqi defense
establishment were to request that firms provide not only trainers, but
also technical solutions that could help with the very real
vulnerabilities of explosive detection (as opposed to the modified
divining rods they now use) and the security of their borders.
Finally, speaking of firms, the departure of military force from
Iraq should mark the transition not so much to just the State
Department, but also to America's real strength--the private sector. I
would suggest that the best way to ensure that America's war in Iraq
was not in vain is to promote investment by American firms throughout
Iraq--alongside the already burgeoning Chinese, Turkish, and French
presence. This is not to minimize some real challenges to doing
business in Iraq, but this is where America should focus its diplomatic
effort. It is when Americans and Iraqis interact with each other not as
adversaries, but as business partners, that we can let the peaceful
bonds of commerce work to the advantage of both sides. Iraq should not
be afraid of this engagement. Iraq is blessed with abundant oil
reserves, perhaps more than we can now identify, but it is a truly
diversified economy that is in the interests of the Iraqi people. We
can help the Iraqis generate wealth--and participate in that wealth
generation. As the Iraqis begin to participate in the Great
Transformation that a market economy can bring, we can become more
confident of the long-term health of the democratic institutions that
are planted, however tenuously, there.
In summary, I am not trying to paint an overly rosy picture of
Iraq. There are real challenges, and for many of its people, it remains
an unpleasant place to live. But the problems that remain do not lend
themselves to military solutions. I believe the most likely outcome of
the removal of the U.S. troop presence will be a slow normalization of
Iraqi politics, as they realize we are no longer present to either
assist or to take blame. Iranian influence will be a reality--they
share a border and thousands of years of history--but Iraq will move
decisively to limit this influence. Iraq will work hard in the coming
months and years to ramp up oil production.
I want to see a continuing American influence in Iraq. But I want
this influence to come via our training of hundreds of Iraqi military
and police officers in the United States, letting them see how a
democratic Army behaves within its own borders, and what a real rule of
law system looks like. I want this influence to come through American
educational institutions, which should open their doors to Iraqi
students, aided by liberal (if carefully screened) student visas. I
want this influence to come via American business, both large and
small, which helps the Iraqi economy diversity into agriculture, small
manufacturing, and then into a future which I can't project. All these
efforts would fit neatly within the boundaries of our existing
Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq.
In short, now that the Saddam regime is gone, and the civil war put
to rest, the environment is ripe for America's cultural and economic
institutions to welcome Iraq into the family of nations. Again, the
Strategic Framework Agreement signed in 2008 between the United States
and Iraq makes it clear that these exchanges are welcome and in the
interest of both sides.
We have sacrificed much blood and treasure in the past 8 years in
Iraq. While we should leave the final accounting to history, I am sure
we can all agree that at the very least we have overpaid for the
outcome in Iraq. But we find ourselves at a surprisingly good outcome
that we could hardly have predicted in the dark days 5 years ago.
Again, it is entirely possible that Iraq could still end up very badly.
The future is deeply contingent. But as our military to military
relationship with Iraq normalizes with the withdrawal of troops, I feel
much better about the prospect of a democratic Iraq, that is an ally in
the fight against terrorism, and that respects the rights of its
citizens.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Ollivant.
Dr. Pollack?
STATEMENT OF DR. KENNETH M. POLLACK, DIRECTOR, SABAN CENTER FOR
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Chairman Levin. It is an honor to
be before this distinguished body. I have prepared written
testimony, Mr. Chairman, that I would ask to be entered into
the record in full.
Chairman Levin. It will be made a part of the record.
Dr. Pollack. I would prefer to give only a summary of my
remarks for now. Thank you.
Although I am glad to discuss the totality of U.S. policy
toward Iraq since the 2003 invasion and even before, I would
like to focus my remarks on U.S. policy to Iraq looking forward
beyond the departure of all American troops at the end of this
year. While I certainly have opinions about American policy in
the past and even at the present time, I fear that to try to
begin cataloguing all of the mistakes that the United States
made both under the Bush and Obama administrations would take
much longer than the time allocated for the hearings.
I will say that I believe that the departure of all
American troops scheduled for the end of this year is premature
and a mistake, but it is also a reality. I think the most
constructive thing that we can do is focus on the U.S.
relationship with Iraq moving forward and how best to secure
our interests during that timeframe.
I would really like to make three principle points.
First, the state of Iraq today is one that is not headed in
the right direction and therefore could benefit from
considerably greater American assistance in the future. Iraq
today is wracked by economic and political problems, and these
are, unfortunately, beginning to unravel the security gains of
2007 to 2010. Iraq's political system is deadlocked. What is,
in effect, a national unity government worked out in late 2010
has simply brought all of Iraq's political differences into the
government and, in effect, paralyzed it. There are growing
signs of potential political fragmentation in Iraq.
Graft, which had been contracting, has now begun to expand
again and is even exploding by some accounts. Were it not for
the graft, I would argue, in fact, that the Iraqi Government
might not be doing anything at all.
Iraq's military and civilian bureaucracy has been
increasingly politicized by the Prime Minister and his staff
who is replacing anyone not deemed 100 percent loyal to him
with others who are and often with members of his own family,
his own party, his own sect.
Shia death squads have reemerged. They are killing both
Sunnis and Shia and are enjoying considerable immunity from the
rule of law. For their part, alienated Sunnis are talking again
of banding together to resist the government, as they did
before the Sunni Awakening, and support for Sunni terrorist
groups is slowly increasing and many Sunnis are even asking if
they will need to re-arm to protect themselves since the
government simply will not.
The second point I would like to make is that it is hard to
postulate a very optimistic scenario for Iraq's development
over the course of the next 5 to 10 years, but some of these
scenarios on offer are dramatically worse than others. The most
dangerous scenario and the place that it is worth starting with
is, of course, the possibility of a return to civil war.
Unfortunately, this may actually be the most likely of Iraq's
potential scenarios. There is extensive academic work on civil
wars, and these have found that between one-third and one-half
of all states that experience a major intercommunal civil war
experience a resumption of that civil war within 5 years of a
ceasefire. Iraq was a quintessential example of such a civil
war between 2005 and 2007, the ceasefire occurring in late
2008.
There is also ample evidence that Iraq may be sliding back
into civil war in textbook fashion. The group in control of the
government is using it to advance a narrow agenda at the
expense of its rivals. It is not reaching out to them, making
hard compromises and demonstrating a desire to put the common
good above its own self-interests. The group controlling the
government is purging personnel not members of their own group.
The group controlling the government is using the powers of the
government to hurt other groups, to crush their military power
and is ignoring the violence perpetrated by groups allied to it
against its rivals. All of this is breeding mistrust, fear,
anger, and resentment against the group in power, and the
rivals of the group in power are supporting their own violent
extremists, discussing secession and whether to re-arm their
own militias.
These are all classic indicators of the resumption of civil
war. They do not mean that Iraq is bound to return to civil
war. They simply illustrate that Iraq is prone to the same
problems that have caused other states to return to civil war
and that we should be very nervous that Iraq will do so in the
future. In fact, it is easy to imagine dozens of scenarios
whereby Iraq slides back into civil war. I am struck by the
fact that when I was last in Iraq over the summer, numerous
Iraqis were remarking and numerous Americans as well were
remarking that it felt like 2005 all over again to them.
It is also worth pointing out, Mr. Chairman, that typically
civil wars start and resume after a period of time when the
problems reemerge but seem relatively minor, easily
controllable, easily addressed. But then in these cases,
typically something happens that is unexpected but that
suddenly crystallizes all of the fears, all of the desires for
revenge and a gradual descent suddenly turns into an
uncontrollable plummet. Of course, this is exactly what
happened to Iraq in 2006. Again, what we are seeing now is
consistent with the same pattern repeating in the future.
Now, there are a variety of other circumstances, not all of
which I am going to touch on in detail. Certainly Iraq could
move back toward a dictatorship. As Dr. Ollivant pointed out,
this is something that many Iraqis are concerned about. I think
we can set that one aside for the moment. It is not to dismiss
it. It is simply to say that I think that it is better for us
to focus on other issues.
In addition, I think that there is real potential for Iraq
to become a failed state in the future. If the government does
not get its act together, if these calls for greater autonomy
and even secession gain steam, if the government's centripetal
efforts are countered more effectively by other centrifugal
forces, we could see Iraq turn into a failed state, again
something that is worth thinking about, something that ought to
guide our own policy toward Iraq moving forward.
The only set of positive scenarios out there for Iraq is
one where it muddles through its current impasse and eventually
begins to muddle upward. After a protracted period of
stalemate, one could imagine one of three things happening:
Iraq's leaders realize that they have to make a compromise or
else face a renewed civil war; a charismatic or altruistic
leader emerges--or actually both a charismatic and altruistic
leader would have to emerge, who sweeps the lesser leaders
aside, brings the Iraqi political system along with them, in
effect, an Iraqi Mandela; or that the Iraqi people are somehow
able to impose their will on their political leadership in a
way that they have not so far, forcing the leadership to act
responsibly, and forcing them to put Iraq's long-term interests
in place of their own short-term political calculations. This
could lead to a situation where Iraq's leaders begin to make
compromises, small at first but building trust over time,
allowing more meaningful compromises in the future, which would
then allow outside powers and businesses to see progress in
Iraq and begin to invest again and have violence more widely
discredited.
I consider this family of scenarios possible, but
unfortunately the least likely at the present time. There is
simply no evidence that this is happening or that it will
happen. It may. We cannot rule it out, but that is not what is
happening on the ground right now. Iraq's leaders are not
compromising. They are, unfortunately, adhering to the terrible
Middle Eastern dictum, ``when I am weak, how can I negotiate,
and when I am strong, why should I?'' They are all waiting for
the situation to turn in their favor and digging in their
heels. There is no sign of an Iraqi Mandela out there.
What is more, the Iraqi people have been unable to impose
their will on the government despite their efforts to do so
both in the 2010 national elections and then again in February
2011 in the Day of Rage demonstrations, both of which seemed
momentarily to perhaps have this galvanizing effect but neither
of which ultimately resulted in such compromises.
The third point I would like to make and where I would like
to end my comments is that although American influence has
declined dramatically in Iraq, both because of the withdrawal
of American troops and the conduct of that withdrawal, the
United States still has a certain ability to affect events
there, and what is more, we could build additional influence in
the future if we were willing to do so. What is most important
is to understand that the best way that the United States can
help this situation in the future is by strengthening Iraq's
own domestic politics. Nevertheless, that is going to be very
challenging. The withdrawal of American troops has removed a
tremendous source of American influence in Iraq, and of course,
ideally the United States would be willing to make up for that
diminution with a massive increase in aid of other forms,
military, diplomatic, economic, et cetera. Unfortunately, I
live in Washington and my experience of the current budgetary
and political climate suggests that that massive infusion of
aid is not likely to be forthcoming.
What is more, the White House has signaled by its behavior,
its withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, its willingness to
take a supporting role in Libya, its inactivity on the Middle
East peace process, its restraint toward Iran, that it plans to
scale back its involvement in the Middle East at least over the
coming year, and certainly that is the perception in Iraq, and
ultimately the perception is what could further limit our
influence in Iraq. Nevertheless, there are things that the
United States can and, I would argue, should do.
In particular, I would argue that modest amounts of aid
could be very helpful to Iraq in the near-term and would not
significantly affect our own fiscal problems. There is a remark
ascribed to any number of former Senators. I have heard it
ascribed to a whole variety of different people, including
Senator Russell, but Senator Symington as well, that a billion
here, a billion there, and pretty soon you are talking about
real money. When we are looking at a national debt of $12
trillion, a billion or 2 for Iraq is an utterly meaningless
figure from the perspective of our financial situation and
could be extremely important for Iraq.
In addition, obviously, as Mr. McGurk, as Dr. Ollivant have
already suggested, we need to find ways to use our diplomatic
strength to help Iraq with its diplomatic problems by using our
know-how to find creative solutions to Iraqi problems where we
are unable to provide cash or other resources. As Mr. McGurk
described at great depth--I think he is absolutely right--the
proper vehicle for renewed American aid or a blossoming of new
American aid toward Iraq is the SFAs. But there are great
problems there. We have yet to fill it out. We have yet to make
Iraqis even aware that it exists. In polls of the Iraqi people,
we have consistently found that the vast majority of Iraqis are
unaware of the SFA, let alone the prospect of considerably
increased American assistance to Iraq in the future or the
notion of a long-term American program to provide assistance to
Iraqis in the future. We need to develop that. We cannot simply
rest on our laurels. We cannot simply wait for the Iraqis to
come to us and ask us what we are willing to provide. We need
to aggressively seek out the Iraqis, make clear what is on
offer to them, and make public so that all Iraqis understand
what it is that their government is failing to take advantage
of, what is on offer for them, what they could have if their
government were willing to do so. We need to make it incumbent
upon the Iraqi politicians themselves to seek out our
assistance to make the SFA a reality, to turn it from a
document on paper to a full-fledged long-term aid program to
Iraq because the Iraqi people desire it. Once we have done so,
if we are able to do so, that will provide us considerable new
leverage and influence with Iraq.
The last point I would like to make on this--and I believe
it is particularly relevant because of the particular writ of
this committee--is the importance of American military aid to
Iraq moving forward. I will simply say that in light of our
experience with Egypt over the past year, we should all
recognize the importance of an ongoing American military
relationship with Iraq. U.S. military assistance to Iraq and to
other Middle Eastern countries has proven incredibly important
not just in terms of developing military-to-military ties, but
in improving the civil-military relations and even in heading
off some of the worst foreign policy adventures of these
different regimes.
Over the past 30 years, we have found that American
military assistance has helped move countries in the direction
of better civil-military relations, something that Iraq
desperately needs, and has headed off some of the worst
military ideas of various Middle Eastern regimes. At different
points in time, the United States has, through its provision of
military assistance to various Middle Eastern countries, headed
off wars in the region. There are people who lived who might
otherwise have died. There are wars and crises that would have
begun that did not because the United States was able to say to
our partners in the militaries in the region we do not want you
to do this and we will not support you if you do so. In a
number of critical cases, those militaries were forced to
simply forego their planned operations because they literally
could not take action without American military support.
In short, while I see Iraq as being in a very difficult
place and most of its roads being dark ones, I still believe
that there is the prospect that Iraq could slowly muddle
upward, and I believe that American assistance to Iraq is going
to be absolutely critical if Iraq is to find the right path and
not descend back into one of the many problematic paths, one of
many of the disastrous paths that are still open to it.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pollack follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Kenneth M. Pollack
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, I am honored to be able to
appear before you to discuss the situation in Iraq and the shape of
American policy toward Iraq beyond the end of the U.S. military mission
there in December 2011. It is a great credit to this august committee
that at a time when the Nation appears to want to forget about our
mission and our interests in Iraq, you refuse to forget. It is
absolutely vital. Since 2003, the United States has invested a great
deal in Iraq, and there is still a reasonable chance that we might see
real benefit to the blood and treasure we have sunk into that country.
Of far greater importance, Iraq remains deeply troubled, and retains
the potential to cause great harm to the rest of the Persian Gulf
region, with all of the awful consequences that would entail for our
oil-addicted global economy. Unfortunately, it is a task that will be
much harder in the future even than it was in the past, when it was
very, very hard.
It seems pointless to ask who ``lost'' Iraq. Iraq may not yet be
lost; although the most likely scenarios for the country seem dark,
historical events sometimes unfold in ways that defy human prediction.
If our concern on the other hand, is `what were the worst mistakes that
the United States made in Iraq and who was responsible for making
them?' then we have a very daunting challenge ahead of us. Those
mistakes are almost numberless. They stretch back in time to the months
before the invasion itself and continue on up to the present day. The
George W. Bush administration committed any number of catastrophic,
senseless errors in Iraq. Even at the very end, when they had reversed
some of the worst of their early mistakes, they were still making new
ones and compounding other old ones. For its part, the Obama
administration inherited a very weak hand on Iraq from the Bush
administration, but then played it very badly as well. The recent
negotiations over extending an American troop presence--in which the
administration negotiated with itself more than it negotiated with the
Iraqis--was only one such example, and it was not the only one.
Ultimately, the United States never formulated an exit strategy for
Iraq, we simply exited.
So much water has passed beneath that bridge that it seems far more
constructive--and time-efficient--to instead focus on what U.S. policy
toward Iraq ought to be moving forward. We cannot reverse time and undo
our many mistakes. We cannot change the past or conjure a new present.
We can only ask what is possible for America and Iraq in the future.
Of necessity, any discussion of the future must begin with a stock-
taking of the present. By any objective standard, Iraq remains weak and
fractious. It is not ready to be without an external peacekeeping
presence. Its political leadership has not demonstrated anything like
the maturity that will be required to prevent the country from sliding
back into civil strife, as has so often been the case historically with
countries that have experienced the same kinds of tragedies that Iraq
has over the past decade (or 3). Perhaps they will surprise us all and
become the selfless, far-sighted and wise leaders that Iraq desperately
needs. So far, their behavior during the past 2 years as the American
drawdown from Iraq became ever more tangible, has shown little to be
sanguine about. Indeed, Iraq's leaders generally continue to hew to the
worst patterns, those which typically lead to civil war, tyranny or
state collapse rather than stability, prosperity and democracy.
Yet be that as it may, that is where we and the Iraqis are headed.
To a very great extent, Iraq is passing beyond America's influence. The
administration's recent decisions have made this situation an
irreversible, if unfortunate, reality. There is no turning back the
clock, even if Washington suddenly had a change of heart. The decisions
that have been made are now virtually set in stone. There will not be a
significant American military presence in Iraq in the future. That
train has left the station and it cannot be recalled or reboarded at
some later stop.
So, the critical question that lies before us unanswered is how can
the United States protect its interests in Iraq without troops in
country, without the ability to act as peacekeeper, and without any
expectation that the administration or Congress will commit significant
resources to Iraq? That question is critical because Iraq remains
critical to America's vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, and
particularly the flow of oil from the region upon which the global
economy depends. It is especially true in the midst of the great Arab
Awakening that began this year and has rolled across the Middle East
bringing hope and fear, progress and violence in equal measures to a
region that previously seemed utterly moribund--and now seems entirely
up for grabs. The United States cannot afford to have Iraq turn bad,
both because of its own intrinsic importance and its ability to poison
other key Persian Gulf states. However, our ability to steer Iraq away
from rapids and cataracts has suddenly diminished. In the end, we may
simply be along for the ride as Iraq's leaders squabble over course and
speed, but it would be all to the good if we can pick up an oar or grab
the tiller and help guide Iraq toward safer waters.
iraq's persistent problems
Iraq is still far from sustainable stability, let alone prosperity
or true pluralism. The state institutions that have evolved since 2003
remain weak and characterized by political factionalism. Appointments
to ministries and other state institutions, especially in the economic
and social services spheres, are driven primarily by the notion of
``sharing the pie'' of power and patronage, rather than by
qualification or competence. Ministries themselves remain largely
political fiefdoms and massive graft machines, with jobs and services
frequently provided on the basis of ethnic, sectarian, or party
affiliation. Not surprisingly, politicization of the ranks of the civil
service has accelerated, in turn diminishing technocratic competence,
especially as experienced personnel have been culled, either as a
result of age or perceived links to the former regime. Thus, the
institutional vacuum created by the U.S.-led invasion and collapse of
the Iraqi state has still not been properly filled, and Baghdad
continues to struggle to extend its power and administration throughout
the provinces.
Complicating these problems have been two core issues that remain
unresolved and that threaten stability and the functioning of the Iraqi
Government: the dispute over federalism and the absence of progress
toward genuine national reconciliation. While Iraq is defined as a
Federal state in the 2005 Constitution, serious disagreements remain
over the extent to which decentralization is mandated, and ultimately
over where sovereignty lies. This issue does not just divide Arabs from
Kurds (and Irbil from Baghdad). There is also a lack of common vision
among Iraq's various Arab constituencies. Some Islamist Shi'i parties,
such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), have promoted a
sectarian-based system of regions modeled on the power of the Kurdistan
Regional Government. ISCI has since backed away significantly from
these ideas, but some officials in individual provinces, notably al-
Basra and Salah ad-Din (and to a lesser extent Maysan and al-Anbar),
continue to seek extensive decentralization of power for themselves,
with some of the same security and economic authority--including over
hydrocarbon resources and revenue--that Irbil has amassed. Indeed,
there is still considerable discussion of the three majority-Sunni
provinces of Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Nineveh forming their own region
on the Kurdish model, and that Basra might declare itself autonomous.
On the other side of the equation, a dwindling majority of Iraqi
Arabs--Sunni and Shi'i--appear to favor preserving Baghdad's
centralized authority; they see Kurdish efforts, and tentative similar
moves by various Sunni and Shi'i Arab groups as a serious threat to the
territorial integrity of Iraq.
This festering dispute has undermined both governance and
stability. Until now, the failure to reconcile the rival visions of
federalism has been papered over through ambiguity--as in the case of
the Constitution, of subsequent legislation on devolution of power, and
of the budget. This has blocked the passage of key laws altogether.
Worse still, Irbil and Baghdad have pursued policies based on their own
interpretation of their constitutional mandates, widening the gap
between them and complicating the steps that will need to be taken to
accommodate their rival visions of the state, not least because of the
growing mutual mistrust between the two sides. For the Kurds, creating
what amounts to a confederacy of Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi'i regions
throughout all of Iraq is viewed as an existential priority to ensure
that no future government in Baghdad will ever have the power to repeat
historical abuses and past ethnic cleansing against Kurds. But each
initiative Irbil takes to facilitate this objective--and to block the
central government's efforts to restore its former power--raises the
hackles of Arab politicians in Baghdad who suspect that the Kurds'
ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Iraq. The Kurds in turn interpret
what they see as foot-dragging on fully implementing decentralization
provisions called for in the Constitution as evidence that the mindset
in Baghdad has not really changed. These mutual concerns and fears have
driven political leaders there to ever-more hardline reactions, raising
the risk of local confrontations escalating out of control while
holding up key national events such as elections and the census.
The absence of progress toward genuine national reconciliation is
similarly destabilizing. While Iraqis have embraced representative
politics wholeheartedly, Iraq's political leadership has refused to
clarify unambiguously who can participate in government and under what
terms. In fact, it has often allowed the most radical groups and
individuals to manage this process and establish the framework for
determining who is in and who is out. Thus, de-Ba'thification
procedures have been abused for political gain, especially among
Islamist Shi'i politicians seeking to protect their gains since 2003.
Both the process and the institutions that administer it lack full
legislative underpinnings, and the refusal to draw a line under the
procedures--or to institute a truth and reconciliation process
comparable to post-apartheid South Africa's--create political
disruptions (as was evident in the run up to and after the March 2010
election). In the longer term, this will be a ticking time bomb if
Sunni and nationalist constituencies feel that de-Ba'thification is
being implemented as a way of denying them a legitimate share of power.
Left unaddressed, the disputes over federalism and national
reconciliation could unravel the progress toward stability. At the very
least, they will retard Iraq's ability to become an effective, well-
managed state, dooming it instead to continued muddling-through and
ineffective governance. As such, resolving the disputes should be a
priority for Washington. Tensions between Baghdad and Irbil, and
between the KRG and neighboring Iraqi provinces, have been high for
some time, with occasional threats of violence. Indeed, U.S. military
commanders still talk of it as the most vulnerable fault line in Iraq.
But Baghdad could also face unmanaged challenges from elsewhere in the
country, as recent regionalism initiatives in Salah ad-Din and al-Basra
attest. Meanwhile, ambiguity over political participation rights could
spark violent antipathy among constituencies formerly associated with
the insurgency in the west and north-west of Iraq. Many of these groups
remain deeply suspicious of the new regime in Baghdad, and the Islamist
Shiite that dominate it, suspecting that they will never create the
space for other constituencies to share political power. For them, the
specter of periodic purges and exclusion from power under the guise of
de-Ba'thification will limit the extent to which genuine national
reconciliation is possible.
Meanwhile, the inability/unwillingness of Iraq's leadership to
address Iraq's basic political divisions is beginning to re-ignite
Iraq's smoldering security problems. Prime Minister Maliki's dependence
on the Sadrists and Iran (who were the keys to his retaining office)
has meant that violent Shiite groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, Khitaib
Hizballah and the Promise Day Brigades of Muqtada as-Sadr's own Jaysh
al-Mahdi, have been able to operate with relative impunity. Their
attacks on U.S. forces are creating a real force protection problem for
the United States that will persist past the withdrawal of American
combat troops at the end of this year because Muqtada has already
announced that the U.S. Embassy still constitutes an occupying force
that must be resisted just as the troops themselves were.
Of greater importance still, rising Shiite violence, mistreatment
of the remaining Sons of Iraq, and the growing sense that the Shiite
``stole'' the election and are now using their control of the
government to deprive the Sunni community of its fair share of power
and economic benefits, appear to be pushing many Sunnis back in the
direction of fear and violent opposition. The recent arrest of nearly
600 Sunnis by the government on outlandish claims that they are all
Ba'thists seeking to overthrow Iraq's current government and return it
to a Ba'thist dictatorship, coupled with numerous smaller, but similar
actions, has many Sunnis convinced that Shi'i Islamists intend to use
their control of the government's security forces to kill and oppress
Sunnis exactly as they had been doing in 2005-2006 before the U.S.
surge put an end to ethnic cleansing. Slowly growing support for
nationalistic Sunni terrorist groups like Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-
Naqshbandia (JRTN, or The Men of the Army of the Naqshbandia Order) is
a particularly important canary in the coal mine because they represent
a more nationalist opposition compared to al Qaeda in Iraq, which
remains largely discredited by its foreign influence and extreme
religious beliefs. Worse still, many Sunni tribal leaders and mid-level
officials talk openly about having to take up arms to defend their
communities from the Shiite terrorists, since the government won't and
the Americans are leaving.
scenarios for the future of iraq
It is not hard to discern that Iraq today is not headed in a
positive direction. The government remains utterly paralyzed by the
country's divisions, and by leaders absolutely unwilling to make
compromises of any kind to break the logjam. Efforts to fight
corruption, nepotism, and politicization of the military and
bureaucracy have been discarded and all of these problems are running
rampant. Indeed, corruption currently appears to be the only engine of
government activity. Were there no corruption, the government might not
be doing anything at all. Violence has re-emerged as a tool of various
groups--including the governing coalition--seeking to advance their
political agendas. This in turn is pushing other groups in the
direction of taking up arms again if only to defend themselves against
other groups using violence since the government is unwilling to
apolitically enforce the rule of law.
Looking forward from this state of affairs, it is possible to
imagine four broad, plausible directions in which Iraq might move. None
would be worth celebrating, although some would be much worse than
others. Evaluating these scenarios is important both as a sobering
reminder of what is truly plausible as opposed to some rosy fantasies
we might like to believe, and that might have been possible several
years ago, but in today's context can only be seen as long-term
aspirations at best. They also provide a sense of what the United
States ought to be striving to achieve in Iraq, and what is most
important to try to prevent.
A New Dictatorship
Many Iraqis and many observers of Iraq, believe that the most
likely future for Iraq is a new dictatorship, this time by the Shiite.
Although Prime Minister Maliki almost certainly is not consciously
seeking such a position, his approach to Iraq's problems is nonetheless
taking him that way all the same. Maliki evinces considerable paranoia,
something entirely understandable from someone who was a member of a
small, revolutionary party relentlessly chased by Saddam's security
services for almost 30 years. This makes him prone to see conspiracies,
especially among Sunnis. He is often impatient with Iraq's democratic
politics, and he just as frequently acts arbitrarily, extra-
constitutionally, even unconstitutionally to root out a suspected
conspiracy or overcome political opposition. He is consolidating power
within Iraq, and even within the Iraqi Government, in a tight circle of
people around himself. He is purging large numbers of people from other
parties, groups, sects and ethnicities and rapidly politicizing Iraq's
relatively professional armed forces.
From an American perspective, a stable new dictatorship might be
perfectly acceptable, at least from the perspective of short-term
American material interests in Iraq. The problem is that any new
dictatorship is unlikely to be stable and is far more likely to lead to
civil war. It is worth keeping in mind that Saddam was the only
dictator Iraq new who could rival a Mubarak or a Hafez al-Asad in terms
of relative stability (and that is a very relative statement). It
required near-genocidal levels of violence to do so. Even Saddam had to
fight frequent revolts by the Kurds and, in 1991, by elements of the
Shi'i community. In Iraq's present circumstances, however, any bid for
a new dictatorship, whether consciously or absent-mindedly, would be
more likely to produce civil war than a return to centralized
autocracy. Whether it is Maliki or another would-be strong man, any
effort by someone (probably a Shi'ah) to make himself dictator of Iraq
would doubtless provoke various political and ethno-sectarian rivals to
take up arms to prevent his consolidation of power. The government and
military would most likely fragment (a la Lebanon) and the result would
be far more likely to be a civil war, not a stable tyranny.
In addition, if Maliki, or another Shiite were to emerge as a new
dictator, he would inevitably be pushed into Iran's arms. A Shiite
dictator of Iraq would axiomatically be rejected and ostracized by the
majority Sunni states of the Arab world. The only ally he would have
would be Iran--and perhaps Syria, if the Asads can hold power (and
indeed, Maliki's Government has come out publicly in support of the
Asad regime in Syria's own civil war). Moreover, a Shi'i dictator would
face tremendous opposition from Iraq's Sunni community, particularly
the tribes of Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Ninevah, all of whom would be
supported by the Sunni regimes. Again, an Iraqi Shiite dictator's only
source of succor would be Iran.
Renewed Civil War
Historically, this may actually be Iraq's most likely future.
Although academic studies of intercommunal civil war show some
variance, a considerable body of work--including the best and most
recent studies--indicate that states that have undergone one such round
of conflict (as Iraq did in 2005-2007) have anywhere from a 1-in-3 to a
1-in-2 likelihood of sliding back into civil war within about 5 years
of a ceasefire (which in Iraq came in 2008).\1\ Since the U.S. invasion
in 2003, Iraq has followed the quintessential pattern for how states
descend into civil war, how they emerge from it, and now how they fall
back into it. Everything that is going on in Iraq today as American
peacekeepers prepare to leave--the resumption of violence, the rapid
deterioration of trust, the expectation that things are going to get
more violent and corrupt, the unwillingness of leaders to compromise,
the determination of actors across the spectrum to take short-sighted
actions to protect themselves at the expense of others' trust and
security--shows that Iraq continues to hew closely to these awful
patterns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On the proclivity of civil wars to recur, see Paul Collier,
Lani Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and
Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and
Development Policy, The World Bank and Oxford University Press,
Washington, DC, 2003, available at http://homepage.mac.com/stazon/
apartheid/files/BreakingConflict.pdf, p. 83; James D. Fearon, ``Why Do
Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?'' Journal of Peace
Research, vol. 41, no. 3 (May 2004); Donald L. Horowitz, The Deadly
Ethnic Riot (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001); Stathis N.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); T. David Mason, ``Sustaining the Peace After
Civil War,'' The Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle, PA, December 2007; Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds.,
Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1999); Barbara Walter, ``Does Conflict Beget Conflict?
Explaining Recurring Civil War,'' Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3
(May 2004): 371-388.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil war in Iraq would be disastrous for the United States for a
variety of reasons. It could affect Iraq's own oil production, and
spillover from an Iraqi civil war could produce civil war in any of
Iraq's neighbors--including, most importantly, Saudi Arabia--or a
regional war over the carcass of Iraq that might also affect oil prices
or even oil production itself. Moreover in the short term, Iran would
likely find itself able to dominate significant areas of Iraq by
backing Shiite militias in the fighting--militias that would have no
one to turn to except Iran, as was the case in 2005-2007.
A Failing State
Another plausible outcome of Iraq's current state of affairs would
be a weak, fragmented, or even a failed state. The central government
has a certain amount of power, but it is not efficient and Iraq's
provinces have a certain ability to resist. Moreover, as Maliki
attempts to centralize power, so other groups are pushing in the
opposite direction. Thus, while one set of scenarios would have to
envision Maliki (or some other Shiite leader) prevailing in this
contest and establishing a new dictatorship, so another set of
scenarios would have to imagine him failing because the provinces/
regions/ethno-sectarian communities were successfully able to resist
and to pull away from the central government. Indeed, Salah ad-Din
province recently declared its autonomy, and there is widespread talk
of Anbar and Nineveh joining it in a Sunni region akin to the Kurdistan
Regional Government. Likewise, numerous groups and influential figures
in oil-rich Basra are talking about doing the same. If they were to
succeed, they would cripple the Iraqi central government. Because Iraq
actually requires a fair degree of integration for economic reasons,
such a centrifugal trend would likely result in an across the board
breakdown in public services, economic affairs and security. Local
groups (militias, but likely operating in the name of provincial
governments) would fill the vacuums as best they could, but their
efforts would be uneven at best, and at worst--and probably far more
likely--would be corrupt, incompetent and prone to violence. Iraq might
not quite look like Somalia, but it could end up bearing more than a
passing resemblance to it, with all of the terrible implications for
terrorism and instability in the wider region that implies.
Muddling Through, Perhaps Ultimately Upward
The only plausible, positive (in a purely relative sense) scenarios
that one can imagine for Iraq given its current state of affairs are
ones that envision long, painful processes during which Iraq does not
fall apart or fall into dictatorship, but not much positive happens
either for some period of time. Then, at some point in the future,
either because Iraqi voters are somehow able to bend Iraq's politicians
to their will in a way that they could not in 2010, or because a
charismatic and altruistic leader emerges who galvanizes the Iraqi
polity, things begin to move in the right direction. Leaders begin to
make compromises, small at first, but growing as they build trust in
one another and reap the benefits of cooperation. Outside powers and
businesses see progress in Iraq and begin to invest again, creating an
economic stake for everyone in continued cooperation and progress.
Violence is discredited. Eventually, this could produce a strong, self-
confident, truly democratic Iraq that would have the strength and
confidence to limit Iranian influence to what is customary among
neighboring states.
Such scenarios are not impossible, but at present they also seem
quite unlikely. There simply is no evidence in contemporary Iraq that
would suggest that this is happening or could happen soon. The macro
trends in politics, security and the economy are all negative, and
while there are certainly some positive trends at a more micro level,
these are all almost certain to be swamped if those macro trends
continue to move in the wrong direction. When one looks at what is
happening in Iraq today, it is very hard to find evidence to make a
compelling case that Iraq is likely to muddle through its current
problems, find a way to unlock its paralyzed political process, and
begin to replace its vicious cycle with a benevolent one.
american priorities and iraqi domestic politics
The most likely scenarios for Iraq are dark ones, but some are much
blacker than others, and the United States must make every effort to
help Iraq avoid the worst and achieve the best, even if that best is a
far cry from what might once have been imaginable.
As those scenarios also make clear, Iraqi domestic politics has
become the center of gravity of the American effort toward Iraq. The
future of Iraq, and American interests there, will be principally
determined by the course of its domestic politics, and that in turn
will determine whether America's vital interests there are safeguarded.
Security in Iraq has improved significantly, but it will only hold over
the long term if Iraqi politics sorts itself out and is able to provide
for the people, govern the country, and resolve its internal
antagonisms. If Iraq's domestic political framework collapses, so too
will the country's security. Iraq's economy continues to sputter along
and it will only improve when there is a government in Baghdad able to
govern effectively, harness Iraq's oil wealth, and use the proceeds to
redevelop the entire country. Moreover, if there is going to be an
economic collapse in Iraq, it will almost certainly come from some
failure of Iraq's domestic politics (like mismanaging the oil sector).
In other words, while a civil war might technically be the result of a
deterioration in the security situation or an economic meltdown, in
actuality the many things that could give rise to such situations now
lie largely, if not entirely, in the realm of politics.
Because Iraq's domestic politics is the key to the future stability
or instability of the country, and because it remains so fraught, it
must be the principal American focus moving forward. Consequently, the
absolute highest priority for the United States for the next several
years must be to see Iraq's domestic politics work out right. That
means ensuring some degree of respect for democracy, transparency, and
the rule of law; some development of bureaucratic capacity; no coups
d'etat; no dictators; some movement toward reconciliation among the
various ethno-sectarian groupings, as well as within them; a reasonable
delineation of center-periphery relations including a workable
agreement over the nature of federalism; and an equitable management
and distribution of Iraq's oil wealth.
The problem is that domestic politics may well prove to be the area
where Iraq's political leadership are least desirous of an American
role. Iraq's political leaders have a less than stellar record of
playing by the rules of democracy and enforcing the rule of law.
Especially when they are in positions of authority, there has been a
dangerous tendency to skirt, avoid, or flat-out ignore the Constitution
in both letter and spirit. Iraq's political leadership tends to be
dominated by former warlords, clerics, tribal shaykhs, and expatriates,
few of whom have experience with democratic processes and even fewer of
whom seem to understand that respect for the Constitution establishes
precedents and norms that will constrain their rivals just as it
constrains their own behavior--and that that may someday be very
important to them. Most struggle to find ways to play Iraqi politics
the old-fashioned way and only grudgingly obey the rules when they
must.
Since 2003, the United States has provided the ultimate insurance
that no group will be able to completely overturn the system and
dominate others. This is a U.S. role that many Iraqis continue to
regard as at least a necessary evil if not a positive good. Most Iraqis
want greater democratization, even if they don't always use the word.
They want to see their new political system succeed and their leaders
forced to deliver goods and services for them, rather than vice versa,
which has too often been the case in Iraq. They want more transparency
and more accountability and blame corruption for the dismal state of
service delivery in the country. They want governmental institutions
they can rely on and political parties that represent their interests
rather than someone else's. They want all of the things that the United
States wants.
Iraq's leaders recognize this as well and they fear the residual
influence of the United States will force them to deliver. It is why
those out of power regularly call on the United States to ``play a more
active role'' in Iraqi politics, and why those in power often chafe at
American interference in Iraqi politics. It is why Iraqi leaders in
power call on the United States to stand aside and allow the Iraqis to
solve their own problems, especially when those leaders are acting in
an extra-constitutional or even entirely unconstitutional fashion.
Thus, it is important for both the future of Iraq and for America's
vital interests that the United States focus its energy and resources
on Iraq's domestic politics. Yet, domestic politics is also the arena
in which Iraq's political leaders, particularly those in power, will be
most determined to exclude the United States. For that reason, the
United States must be prepared to subordinate virtually every other
aspect of its Iraq policy by making major sacrifices in areas
previously held sacrosanct, to maximize its ability to influence Iraq's
domestic politics. It is why virtually every other element of the U.S.-
Iraq relationship needs to be seen as leverage to get the Iraqis to do
the necessary in the one area of greatest importance to us (and to
their own long-term best interests as well). For this reason, the
political arena should be the one where America applies conditionality
most clinically.
As important as Iraq's domestic politics are to American interests,
it is critical that the United States recognize its own limitations.
The United States can shape Iraqi politics, but shape is all it can do.
The United States cannot dictate to the Iraqis anymore. Especially
between 2003 and 2006, Americans often drew up virtual blueprints for
the Iraqis and then demanded that they adopt the U.S. project in toto.
Those days are gone. In fact, much of the success that the United
States enjoyed in 2007-2010 has been a result of new American political
and military leaders who recognized this reality and were far more
solicitous of Iraqi views. It is that practice that must continue and
even expand in the face of the diminishing American role in Iraq and
the re-emergence of Iraqi sovereignty and nationalism.
devising new instruments
Frederick the Great once said that diplomacy without arms is like
music without instruments. Perhaps nowhere is that more true today than
for American policy in Iraq. The end of the American military presence,
the dramatic reduction in American aid to Iraq, and the increasing
influence of Iran in Iraq all mean that the United States has
dramatically fewer assets to call upon to advance its Iraq policy than
it had even a year ago. Consequently, one of the most important tasks
for the United States as it attempts to maintain some influence in Iraq
is to forge new instruments that will provide us with new leverage to
replace what we have lost.
The most important source of American influence moving forward is
conditionality. Virtually all American assistance to Iraq should be
conditioned on Iraqis doing the things that the United States needs
them to do, which in every case is likely to be something that is in
the long-term interests of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi nation,
albeit not necessarily in the short-term interests of various Iraqi
politicians. Conditioning assistance means linking specific aspects of
American activities to specific, related aspects of Iraqi behavior. It
also means tying wider aspects of American cooperation with Iraq to the
general course of the Iraqi political system. Ultimately, the United
States must condition the continuation of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship
on the willingness of the Iraqi political leadership to guide their
country in the direction of greater stability, inclusivity and
effective governance.
The future of Iraq will be determined principally by the course of
its domestic politics, and that in turn will determine whether
America's vital interests there are safeguarded. Security in Iraq has
improved significantly, but it is already fraying and it will only hold
over the long term if Iraqi politics sorts itself out. If Iraq's
domestic political framework collapses, so too will its security.
Iraq's economy continues to sputter along and it will only improve when
there is a government in Baghdad able to govern effectively. If the
Iraqi economy collapses, it will almost certainly stem from a failure
of Iraq's domestic politics.
the strategic framework agreement
There are still literally hundreds of things that the United States
is doing for Iraq. The United States still provides some critical
economic and political assistance from capacity building in Iraq's
Federal and local government institutions, to micro-loans, to military
equipment, to technical expertise. It is why so many Iraqi governors
and mayors are despondent that they are losing the American Provincial
Reconstruction Teams.
Ultimately, the greatest source of American influence in Iraq
moving forward is likely to be the provision of additional assistance
in a vast range of different areas--from military operations and
weapons sales, to capacity building, education, almost every aspect of
economic reform, and a slew of major diplomatic matters. The foundation
for this future cooperation is a little-known but critically important
document known as the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which the
United States and Iraq signed in late 2008 at the same time that they
also signed the Security Agreement (SA) governing the continued
presence of American troops in Iraq until December 31, 2011.\2\ It is
important not to make too much of the SFA. It is nothing but a
framework; an empty shell for the United States and Iraq to flesh out
as they see fit over the years. There is little more than general
exhortations regarding the broad types of aid that could be provided,
without any specification of time, dates, quantities, or other details.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Security Agreement (SA) is often erroneously referred to as
a ``status of forces agreement (SOFA).'' The SA serves a similar
purpose, but the Iraqis specifically objected to naming it a ``SOFA''
because of the negative connotations associations with that term in
Middle Eastern, particularly Iranian, history.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, whereas the SA tended to be controversial in Iraqi
politics because it governed the presence of American troops, the SFA
is much less so because Iraqis desire continued American aid,
investment and assistance in many areas of public life. In fact, it was
the Iraqi Government that proposed the SFA as a way of demonstrating
that the bilateral relationship was no longer to be defined principally
by security issues. The SFA also seeks U.S. diplomatic assistance in
helping Iraq regain the international standing it had prior to Saddam
Husayn's disastrous invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Even Iraqis who would like to see every American soldier gone from
the country often favor the aid and assistance encompassed by the SFA.
Thus, the SFA and the potential for continuing American aid to Iraq
across the board and well into the future is a powerful source of
leverage for the United States. At bottom, anything that the Iraqis
want is a source leverage for the United States, especially if it is
not something that the United States needs for its own, independent
interests.
The central challenge will be reconciling U.S. and Iraqi
expectations for the SFA and finding creative ways to use it to pursue
these critical aims in an era of sharply declining resources. The
United States will need to be upfront with the Iraqi Government that
the SFA does not represent a new Marshall Plan for Iraq and that it
will only be making relatively limited additional financial
contributions to Iraq's reconstruction. This will doubtless be a major
disappointment for many Iraqis who imagine still more largesse flowing
their way from the U.S. Treasury. To mitigate this disappointment and
to make the American contribution to the SFA desirable to Iraqis, the
United States will have to think creatively about how to provide
valuable assistance without the need for large-scale American
financing. Moreover, as Iraq's oil revenues increase over time, Iraq
should be able to pay for more of its reconstruction needs. Therefore,
the real value added from the American side will be insight and advice
on how best to employ those resources rather than adding in more
resources--something that neither the administration nor Congress has
any interest in providing.
Consequently, the United States should focus the assistance it
provides to Iraq under the rubric of the SFA primarily on capacity
building by providing technical advice, consulting services, and
technology and knowledge transfers to key areas of the Iraqi economy.
The United States must now consider both how it can be most effective
in this role and how it can maintain the leverage to encourage Iraqis
to build a transparent and accountable government when America is no
longer putting up large amounts of its own money for projects.
There are, fortunately, a number of areas of the Iraqi economy both
inside and outside the SFA where the United States can deliver tangible
added value at a relatively low financial cost. These include:
International engagement and mediation on issues such
as Iraq's Chapter VII UN obligations, including annual
reparations to Kuwait and disputes over the Iraq-Kuwait
maritime boundary (which have the potential to hamper Iraq's
primary oil export route through the Persian Gulf), dialogue
with Iraq's northern neighbors, especially Turkey, on regional
water-sharing agreements, and the protection of Iraq's oil
revenues from legal claims relating to actions of the former
regime, something that if left unaddressed could hamper long-
term investment in the oil and gas sector;
Formation of a joint economic commission under the
SFA, which, when requested by Iraqis, could serve as a central
oversight body to coordinate, monitor, and provide technical
expertise for reconstruction and capital investment projects
initiated with Iraqi funds;
Technical advice, knowledge sharing, and technology
transfer to vital areas of the Iraqi economy and society such
as improved domestic water efficiency and management and
agricultural development and productivity;
Finding ways to continue to assist Iraq's provincial
governments, even after the shutting down of U.S.-led
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), in obtaining the
release of their annual investment budget allocations from
national authorities; and
Legislative actions to create a business environment
that encourages Western business investments.
The United States should make it clear that assistance of this type
is contingent upon Iraqi authorities at both the national and
provincial level taking specific steps to put in place transparency,
oversight, and accountability mechanisms aimed at mitigating the
corrupting and insulating effects of Iraq's oil economy. Fortunately,
and not by coincidence, these actions are all fully consistent with the
goals of the Iraqi National Development Plan to halve unemployment,
promote rural development, increase environmental protection, reform
administrative systems, and support decentralization. They would also
be of substantial financial and even political benefit to Iraq's new
government and generally should not be provided until it demonstrates
the willingness to take the hard steps to enable a greater portion of
Iraq's oil wealth is turned into investments that fuel service
delivery, economic growth, and broader political legitimacy. This must
ultimately be the overriding objective of all U.S. economic and
governance assistance to Iraq.
security assistance
The withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq by the end of this
year should not be the end of U.S. security assistance to Iraq. The
Iraqis still need help in this area, making it another critical area of
potential American leverage. Moreover, American security assistance to
Iraq can also play an outsized role in helping to safeguard a number of
key American interests in Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region.
Protecting Iraq from Regional Threats
On January 1, 2012, when all American troops have departed, Iraq's
military forces will be unable to defend the country's land or maritime
borders or control and protect Iraq's airspace. That fact poses two
dangers to America's interests in preventing the emergence of an
aggressive Iraq and desiring Iraq to retain a pro-American alignment.
First, it may encourage Iraq's neighbors to take advantage of Iraq's
weakness and second, it may encourage Iraqi leaders to try to build
their own military forces to a level that is itself destabilizing. Both
Iraq and its neighbors have historical reason to be concerned.
Iraq has been at war with its neighbors, the international
community, and itself for over 50 years. Even before Saddam Husayn's
congenitally aggressive approach to foreign policy, Iraq had been an
enthusiastic participant in several of the Arab-Israeli wars,
threatened Kuwait with invasion, nearly come to blows with Turkey and
Syria over water and the Kurds, and generally been a net liability for
regional security.
Of course, Iraq's neighbors have not been passive either and their
actions continue to anger and frighten Iraqis. Turkey has regularly
sent military forces into Iraq to hunt Turkish Kurds or punish Iraqi
Kurds. Syria, Turkey, and Iran manipulate the flow of water to Iraq in
ways that imperil Iraqi agriculture, energy production, and even oil
exports. Saudi Arabia and Syria have looked the other way when Salafi
terrorists have crossed their territory to get to Iraq. In addition to
the decades of past strife (including the horrific Iran-Iraq war), even
while American military forces have been present in great force in
Iraq, the Iranian military has violated Iraqi sovereignty on a number
of occasions, shelling Iraqi Kurdistan, seizing an oil well on Iraqi
territory, and overflying Iraqi airspace.
In all of these post-Saddam cases, the Iraqi response so far has
been moderate and muted. The presence of American troops and aircraft
in Iraq undoubtedly contributed greatly to this moderation--Iraqi
leaders preoccupied with internal problems were confident that U.S.
forces would not permit any large-scale or protracted foreign
adventurism in their territory and so didn't feel a need to respond
aggressively. In the absence of such a de facto American guarantee of
Iraqi state sovereignty, these trespasses could well have triggered
exaggerated responses either in the form of conflict on the ground or
of attempts to develop conventional military forces capable of
repelling the attacks and punishing the perpetrators.
In concrete terms, in the absence of American forces, a fragile
Iraqi Government might well feel the need to respond forcefully to
similar incursions. This has been the tradition in the Middle East,
even though it has led to several of the region's most disastrous wars.
Many Iraqi military leaders already harbor a disturbing attachment to
the Iraqi military of the late 1980s--the Iraqi military that smashed
Iran's ground forces and won the Iran-Iraq war. That is the same Iraqi
military that threatened Syria and Israel and eventually overran
Kuwait. Without an American military presence to reassure them, Iraq's
political leaders might feel pressure to demonstrate to the Iraqi
people that they can defend themselves. Any attempt to develop armored
forces, missile forces, or attack aviation that looked like an effort
to rebuild Saddam's army would set off alarm bells throughout the
region, possibly stoking a regional arms race.
Consequently, maintaining American military forces nearby Iraq and
developing a program of regular military exercises that brought
American combat formations to Iraq frequently, would both be of
considerable utility. Indeed, the United States should eagerly accept
any Iraqi overture that signaled an interest in something like the
``Intrinsic Action'' exercise program that the United States devised
with Kuwait in the 1990s. Under that program, a U.S. battalion task
force was continuously present in Kuwait, although no unit was
permanently based there.
Conducting Counterterrorism Operations
Assistance with Iraqi counterterrorism operations falls into a
similar category. The Iraqis may want American assistance, and if so,
that creates leverage. Likewise, it may be useful for the United States
to continue to assist Iraq's own CT efforts both as a means of keeping
AQI and other Salafist terrorist groups in check and as a way of
maintaining some oversight of how the Iraqi Government employs its
elite counterterror formations. Iraq's highly-trained CT units would be
perfect for the Iraqi leadership to employ either as part of a coup, or
merely to round up rivals (and brand them terrorists, of course).
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) no longer poses an existential threat to
Iraq's political stability, but it could serve as a dangerous catalyst
that could help push Iraq in the direction of some of the worst
scenarios, including renewed civil war. It does not currently pose a
significant threat to American interests outside Iraq, but it is still
integrated into the regional al Qaeda network whose affiliates have
attacked or have declared their intention to attack the United States
(including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and in Yemen, and al-
Shabaab in Somalia). AQI is severely weakened, and it is attempting to
regain its footing, but whether it is able to do so will be determined
as much if not more so by the course of Iraqi politics than by the
successes or failures of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
American Arms Sales to Iraq
It is critical that the United States be willing to provide Iraq
with major arms purchases. Ideally, the United States should furnish
every aspect of Iraqi military equipment, from mess kits to main battle
tanks and everything in between. As long as Iraq desires them (which it
currently does) and can afford them (which it eventually will), such
arms sales, when provided by the United States, could be inherently
stabilizing if managed effectively and in tandem with political reform
in Baghdad; it could also help stabilize the region by preventing the
emergence of an aggressive Iraq that would pose a threat to its
neighbors. In addition, arms sales represent yet another source of
influence with the Iraqi leadership since they are items Baghdad
greatly desires. Consequently, these sales should be considered from a
strategic perspective, not a commercial one and from that perspective,
they are not just desirable but critical. Indeed, one of the most
important lessons of the Arab Spring and Mubarak's fall has been the
tremendous utility American arms sales can have in the Middle East.
As with all American interactions toward Iraq in future, however,
Washington's critical consideration when weighing arms sales to Iraq
must be their impact on Iraq's domestic politics. Again, such sales can
be extremely helpful in this area, as I discuss below. However, they
can also be destabilizing if mishandled. Moreover, they too represent a
critical element of American leverage with Iraq. In particular,
American arms sales to Iraq should be conditioned on continuing
improvement (or at least no significant deterioration) in Iraq's civil-
military relations. The Iraqi military should understand that
Washington's willingness to provide the arms they so desperately want
will be possible only to the extent that the ISF stays in its lane and
stays out of politics. So too should the government understand that
American arms sales--among other things--will be jeopardized by efforts
to politicize the ISF. Finally, because the KRG is terrified that the
central government will imagine it has a military ``solution'' to their
dispute once the ISF is armed with American tanks and fighter-bombers,
Washington must lay down clear red lines to both sides regarding what
is permissible. Furthermore, the United States should extract
guarantees from the government that it will not invade the Kurdistan
region, except perhaps in the highly unlikely event that the Kurds use
their own forces to attack other parts of Iraq.
The more that the United States remains Iraq's paramount military
partner, the less likely (or even able) the Iraqi armed forces will be
to threaten neighboring states. The modern military history of the Arab
states makes clear that Arab allies of the United States become
completely dependent on the United States and lose the capacity to
project power without American support (and therefore approval).\3\
Today, Jordan, Egypt, and all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states coordinate all of their major, external military activities with
the United States. They rarely try to project power beyond their
borders because they are effectively unable to do so without American
support; a situation deepened by their tendency to buy weapons
platforms at the expense of logistics and other support functions.
Moreover, on a number of occasions, Washington has been able to prevent
its Middle Eastern allies from launching military operations because of
these countries' dependence on the United States. Such was not the
experience of Arab states who relied on the Soviet Union, China, or
other countries for their military support, and today there is little
to suggest that Russia, China, or any other country would even try to
use their arms sales to head off a war.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See, Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness,
1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this reason, Washington should welcome Iraq's desire to develop
a long-term military-to-military relationship and buy American
weaponry. Iraq's generals would like to return to the glory days of
1988-90, but one thing that they do not want to recreate, if they can
avoid it, is their reliance on Soviet military hardware. Iraqis have
long recognized that Western (particularly American) weaponry is
superior, and as such, they have coveted it. Since the fall of Saddam
and the Iraqi military's subsequent exposure to the U.S. military, that
desire has only grown. It should also be noted that there is not any
perception on the part of Iraqi generals and their political
counterparts that the United States is forcing them to buy American
materiel as payback for America's efforts in rebuilding the country.
Rather, the Iraqis want American equipment. By the same token, they are
quick to point out that if the United States won't sell them what they
want, they will go elsewhere and with their oil money, they will find
Russian, Chinese, European, or other sellers.
For their part, GCC rulers also want to see a close military-to-
military relationship continue between the United States and Iraq,
coupled with large-scale arms sales. More than anyone else, the GCC
states recognize that reliance on American arms and American training
and assistance makes their militaries dependent on the United States
for logistical support, intelligence, command and control, and a
variety of other requirements. GCC officials say quite openly, albeit
only in private, that an extensive Iraqi-American arms and security
relationship is the best insurance they can get that Iraq will never
threaten their countries with its conventional might again.
Moreover, refusing Iraq one of the most important benefits that
many other American partners and allies receive will seriously
undermine America's ability to influence Iraq in the future. Excluding
Iraq from the key security benefits that so many other U.S. allies
receive is as clear a statement as America could possibly make that it
does not regard Iraq as a partner, let alone an ally, and that Iraq is
outside America's sphere of interest. The White House will have no
basis to complain when Iraq's leaders make strategic calculations to
America's disadvantage if the United States has thus explicitly
communicated its lack of interest in Iraq's security and, in fact, its
belief in Iraq's fundamental unimportance to American security
interests.
The one important caveat to this overarching point is cost. Iraq
may someday be a very rich country thanks to its oil reserves, which
only seem to grow by the day. Today, however, Iraq is a very poor
country, with a gross domestic product per capita of only $3,800
(ranking it 159th in the world) and massive budgetary needs compared to
the revenues available. Even politically, Iraq's people seem far more
interested in investing in their economy than in fancy new weapons.
Consequently, the U.S. interest in preventing domestic political
problems means keeping Iraqi military spending from bankrupting the
country.
It is worth pointing out that this is yet another reason for the
United States to aggressively seek to be Iraq's primary arms supplier.
Simply put, no other country is likely to care about Iraq's finances
the way that the United States does. Iraq's leadership is determined to
buy these big-ticket weapons systems, and they have repeatedly stated
that they would buy them from Europe, Russia or China if they cannot
get them from the United States. Certainly Russia and China would not
care whether Iraq is spending too much on their arms, and European
nations may only to the extent that the United States pressures them.
Only Washington will urge Iraq to spend less, work with Iraq to spread
out its arms purchases over longer stretches of time, and otherwise
ensure that defense spending does not come at the cost of financial
stability.
uncharted waters
If, as seems likely, Iraq gets worse before it gets better, there
will be an inevitable American tendency to want to forget it
altogether. Already, the American people are turning away from it as
quickly as they can, as if to put a bad memory behind them. But Iraq is
not the modern equivalent of Vietnam, where we could decide that we had
made a mistake to ever be involved and simply end our engagement with
no real harm to our interests. Until the global economy kicks its
dangerous addiction to oil, Iraq will matter a great deal to us and to
our trading partners.
It is for this reason that the future seems so fretful to Americans
who dare to buck the tide and remember our vital national interests in
Iraq. Iraq is about to undergo a major transition and there is little
to suggest it is ready for it--or at least, ready to handle it well.
But that transition will take place now whether we want it to or not.
If we are willing to make some investment of time, of energy and even
some resources, there is still reason to believe that we can continue
to provide some much needed support for Iraq in finding the right path.
For that reason, it is worth ending on the topic of resources.
Facing record debt, painful unemployment, and the need to address
structural problems in our economy, there is no question that the
United States must make a major effort to get its own house in order.
At a time when the American public--and the long-term welfare of the
Nation--cry out for massive cuts in government spending it is hard to
justify spending on aid to foreign lands, especially lands like Iraq,
that have come to be associated with painful memory. However, this
would be the worst thing that we could do. No one could suggest
spending tens of billions, let alone hundreds of billions, of dollars
on Iraq any more. But a few billions of dollars could have a dramatic
impact on a country like Iraq (or Egypt, for that matter) and would
have no impact at all on America's financial circumstances. Saving a
few billion dollars on Iraq is meaningless when the national debt has
reached $12 trillion. It is a way that we are often penny wise and
pound foolish.
Dealing with our fiscal problems is going to mean tackling the core
financial problems facing the United States: entitlements, revenues,
taxes and welfare. Foreign aid is a few pebbles at the foot of a
mountain. Eliminating it will do nothing to significantly address the
problems, except to create new problems for America overseas. Then,
inevitably, those problems will fester and expand and at some later
date they will come to plague. Then, it will require vast expenditures
to beat back the problem and we will wish that we had not nickel and
dimed the problem back when it was manageable.
Such is the case with Iraq. There is still reason to believe that
the country can be salvaged, and real reason to believe that American
assistance could be crucial to its course. Now is not the time to shave
slivers off the deficit heedless of the problems we could be creating
for ourselves in the years ahead.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Pollack.
This is where we are at because of these two votes that
intervened here. We never know when those votes happen, as I
think our witnesses know. What we are going to do to try to
make available more information to colleagues--number one, we
obviously all have your statements and they will be made part
of the record. But more importantly perhaps, since that is
already accomplished, we will keep the record open for a
reasonable period of time so that the questions which would
have been asked of you will be asked of you. Then, if you can
accommodate us with the written answers, that would be helpful.
With that, we will keep the record open, let us say, for 3 days
for questions, and then as promptly as you can after that, if
you could provide us answers, we would appreciate it. The
testimony was extremely thoughtful and very, very helpful.
We will with that--and again, with our thanks--some of you
traveled some distance and rearranged your schedules. We are
appreciative.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
troop withdrawal from iraq
1. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, the President announced on October 21
that all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Iraq as of the end of
December 2011, as required under the 2008 Bush-Maliki Security
Agreement. You were involved in the negotiation of that 2008 security
agreement. You said you helped manage the negotiations on whether and
how to extend the December 2011 deadline for the withdrawal of U.S.
troops. In negotiating the 2008 Bush-Maliki Agreement, did the United
States seek to retain U.S. military forces in Iraq after December 2011?
Mr. McGurk. During the 2008 negotiation, I was involved from the
beginning of the planning process in early 2007 through the final
ratification of the Security and Strategic Framework Agreements (SFA)
in November 2008, ultimately serving as a lead negotiator of both
accords. The United States initially sought to negotiate a long-term
agreement that would retain flexibility for future presidential
administrations but would not specify the number of U.S. troops in Iraq
at any given time. It was later determined at the most senior levels of
the U.S. Government that a multi-year security agreement would not
garner adequate Iraqi political support or survive a vote in the Iraqi
parliament without a discussion of withdrawal timelines.
2. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, at the time of the negotiations,
didn't the Government of Iraq refuse to agree to permit U.S. military
forces in Iraq past the December 2011 deadline?
Mr. McGurk. The Security Agreement that was ratified by the Iraqi
Council of Representatives on November 27, 2008, stated that all U.S.
forces had to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011. There was some
debate at the time whether an implementing arrangement under the SFA--a
permanent accord ratified in parallel with the Security Agreement--
might allow for a limited number of U.S. military forces to remain in
Iraq beyond the 2011 withdrawal date, primarily for the purposes of
training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces. Iraqi and U.S. legal
experts later determined, however, that under Iraqi law, U.S. troops
carrying out a robust training mission could retain adequate legal
protections only via a new accord ratified by the Iraqi parliament.
3. Senator Levin. Dr. Ollivant, you argued in a recent article
against negotiating a residual U.S. force presence in Iraq, saying that
abiding by the terms of the 2008 security agreement is critical to the
United States because ``leaving Iraq on the terms dictated by its
sovereign government will put to bed the very real perception that the
United States invaded the country to transform it into its `51st
state.' '' Would you agree that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Iraq, as promised by the 2008 agreement signed by President Bush,
enhances U.S. credibility and influence among Arab nations that America
keeps its promises and is not an occupying force?
Dr. Ollivant. Yes. I absolutely believe that our abiding by the
terms of the 2008 sovereign agreement absolutely enhances U.S.
credibility and influence in the region.
4. Senator Levin. Dr. Pollack, you wrote that even prior to the
President's announcement on the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from
Iraq, that the Government of Iraq was already ``deeply ambivalent, if
not downright hostile'' to the idea of a U.S. force presence in Iraq
past the December deadline. Would you agree that the consent of the
Government of Iraq in a formal agreement is a prerequisite for any U.S.
military forces to remain in Iraq after December?
Dr. Pollack. Absolutely. Indeed, as I also stated in my testimony,
the Bush administration left the Obama administration a weak hand in
Iraq. Part of that weakness lay in the fact that the Bush
administration handed back sovereignty prematurely, at a point when
Iraq's political institutions remained weak, and may prove inadequate
to preserve a democratic system of government without significant
external assistance. However, having foolishly handed back sovereignty
prematurely, the United States was required to respect it.
5. Senator Levin. Dr. Pollack, should we leave troops in Iraq
without immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts?
Dr. Pollack. The specific question is a legal issue as much as a
political one. American military personnel certainly travel to and
spend considerable amounts of time in countries where they are not
immune from prosecution by local courts. However, the political
realities of Iraq made it seem highly risky to leave American troops in
Iraq without such immunities. All that said, I believe that the United
States could have handled the entire question of retaining a military
presence in Iraq past 2011 better than it did. Although it was still
likely that the Iraqis would not have agreed to a new Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA)--thereby making it possible to keep American troop in
Iraq--it was not impossible, and it would have been better for all
concerned if we had been able to do so.
6. Senator Levin. Dr. Pollack, should President Bush have refused
in 2008 to remove troops by December 2011?
Dr. Pollack. No. Once again, having made so many wrong-headed
decisions including the creation of a weak government dominated by
problematic elements of Iraqi society and the return of sovereignty to
that government, the Bush administration could not refuse to remove
troops in December 2011. But that does not cover the full spectrum of
possibilities. The Bush administration could have insisted on returning
to the U.S. Security Council for another extension of the U.S.
occupation mandate. It also could have handled the negotiations over
the Security Agreement better so that the United States did not make so
many concessions which limited our ability to ensure that Iraq's
political leaders would abide by the rules of their own political
system.
iranian influence in iraq
7. Senator Levin. Dr. Ollivant, you have written that,
``Ironically, it is by leaving Iraq that the United States can best let
Iraq stand up to its Iranian neighbor.'' You added that it is largely
because of the U.S. presence that Iran has made inroads in Iraq and
that once the perceived U.S. occupation of Iraq ends, Iraqi
nationalists like al Sadr are likely to recognize that they do not want
Iraq to be an Iranian client state. Is it your view that the U.S.
military departure from Iraq will actually reduce the dependence of
Arab nationalist groups, including al Sadr, on Iran because these
groups would no longer need Iran's assistance to resist a perceived
U.S. occupation of Iraq?
Dr. Ollivant. A clarification. I do not believe that the U.S.
presence has helped Iran make inroads into Iraq. Iran did that all on
their own. However, I do believe that the U.S. presence is the most
visible offense to Iraqi nationalists, pushing the Iranian presence
down their priority list.
I would distinguish between the senior levels of groups and their
constituents. I believe the senior Sadrist leaders have no desire to
give up Iranian funding, through which they gain power and influence.
However, in the absence of a U.S. ``occupier,'' it will be very
difficult for them to justify to their anti-Persian constituents why
they are still taking Iranian money.
8. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, in your view, what impact has the
presence of U.S. forces in Iraq had on the ability of Iranian-backed
extremist groups to recruit new members?
Mr. McGurk. The U.S. military presence in Iraq was a source of
recruitment for Iranian-backed extremist groups in Iraq. These groups,
often at Iranian behest, raised the false mantle of occupation to
recruit young Iraqis to their cause and carry out attacks against U.S.
and Iraqi forces. The Iraqi Government believes it can further
demilitarize Iranian-backed militias after U.S. forces withdraw. Iraqi
Security Forces--with U.S. technical assistance--must remain vigilant
to ensure that these groups can no longer pose a direct threat to the
Iraqi state or to the U.S. diplomatic and security presence that will
remain in Iraq beyond 2011.
9. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, you point out in your Washington Post
editorial that while Iran will have influence in Iraq, we will also
retain great influence through military sales and business deals. Do
you believe that Iraqi interest in U.S. military sales and business
deals with U.S. companies has the potential to offset Iranian influence
after the withdrawal of our troops?
Mr. McGurk. Iraq's relationship with Iran is exceedingly complex
and multifaceted, intertwined historically, economically, culturally,
religiously, and geographically. The United States, however, retains
levers of influence and it is important wherever possible to accelerate
them. In terms of U.S. business deals, Iraq has chosen Boeing as the
backbone of its civilian airline; General Dynamics and other U.S.
suppliers as the backbone of its military; and General Electric as a
primary supplier for future electricity generating infrastructure.
Iraq's FMS program is now valued over $10 billion and exceeds 400
cases, each with training, maintenance, and sustainment contracts, in
addition to end use monitoring. U.S. manufactured automobiles are now
among the most popular among Iraqi consumers, with General Motors
cornering nearly a third of the Iraqi consumer marketplace. U.S.
exports to Iraq increased by nearly 50 percent (to $2.4 billion)
between 2010 and 2011. There is potential--as Iraq becomes further
integrated into the global marketplace and Iran becomes further
isolated--to harness America's private industry to help balance Iranian
influence. This will, however, remain a long-term challenge and require
close coordination between the United States and Iraq, particularly in
the areas of macro-economic reform and improving the Iraqi business
climate, which remains weighed down by decades of war, sanctions,
corruption, and statist policies.
10. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, there are assertions being made that
when U.S. military units depart Iraq, faction militias, some aligned
with Iran, will restart or increase their attacks on the Iraqi Security
Forces. What is your assessment of the likelihood of militia attacks on
the Iraqi Security Forces after complete withdrawal of U.S. troops?
Mr. McGurk. Iranian-backed extremist groups are likely to try a
number of tactics to remain relevant after the U.S. withdrawal. They
have not, however, taken on the Iraqi Security Forces in an organized
way since the Battle of Basra in the spring of 2008; nor are they
likely to do so after the U.S. withdrawal. The Iraqi Security Forces
now overmatches Shia extremist groups. This was not the situation in
2008, when Jaysh al-Mahdi and other illegal militias controlled swaths
of territory across Baghdad and southern Iraq.
11. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, in you view, is the Iraqi Security
Forces capable and reliable enough to deal with militias regardless of
their political, ethnic, or religious allegiance?
Mr. McGurk. The effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces varies
greatly unit-by-unit. But we have seen over the course of 2011 an
ability to counter militias--particularly in Maysan province--with
limited U.S. support. Iraqi Special Forces have become among the most
effective in the region, although their effectiveness could be degraded
without continued U.S. intelligence and logistical support. This is
why, as explained in my testimony, it will be essential to do
everything we can--through the SFA--to ensure close cooperation in the
areas of counterterrorism and intelligence sharing.
strategic framework agreement
12. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, the United States and Iraq have a
2008 SFA that provides for a long-term relationship between our nations
regardless of any potential residual U.S. troop presence in the
country. The departure of U.S. forces has been characterized as the end
of only the first chapter of what will be an enduring relationship with
Iraq for many years to come. In your view, does the 2008 SFA provide a
basis for a long-term U.S.-Iraq relationship?
Mr. McGurk. Yes. The SFA was specifically designed to set a
foundation for a long-term and enduring bilateral relationship across a
number of fields, including energy, culture, education, commerce,
diplomacy, and defense. In the security area, the SFA establishes a
Defense and Security Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC). Through this
JCC, the United States and Iraq can begin to formalize high-level
discussions on a future defense partnership, which might include joint
military exercises, training and liaison programs, and enhancing the
role of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I). It is
anticipated that the first Defense and Security JCC will be held in
Washington over the first quarter of 2012. Additional JCCs will be held
throughout the coming calendar year, including in the critical areas of
energy, economics, diplomacy, and the rule of law.
13. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, in your view, is this agreement
sufficient to provide for developing the shared security, political,
and economic interests of the United States and Iraq?
Mr. McGurk. As its title implies, the SFA is a ``framework'' for
future relations between Iraq and the United States. Like any agreement
it now must be executed in a manner that begins to institutionalize its
structures and arrangements. As stated in my testimony, this means
institutionalizing the joint committees the SFA calls for, especially
in the areas of diplomacy, energy, and defense. Establishing regular
and coordinated contacts--between U.S. and Iraq officials, businesses,
educational institutions--will also be important for developing a
multi-faceted partnership. With a strong and determined commitment from
both the U.S. and the Iraqi side, the SFA has potential to set the
foundation for a future long-term partnership.
state department involvement
14. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk and Dr. Ollivant, after the
withdrawal of U.S. troops in December, there will reside within the
U.S. embassy a very robust OSC-I. Also, the State Department plans to
have 350 police advisors working with 52 Iraqi police sites around the
country. All of which will be in Iraq well beyond December providing
continuing support for the development of Iraq's security forces and
assistance with ongoing sales of U.S. equipment for their military
modernization. In your view, how will this sizable OSC-I be perceived
in terms of the U.S. commitment to Iraq's security and stability?
Mr. McGurk. The OSC-I is focused on facilitating the delivery of,
service, and training on purchased U.S. equipment, in addition to other
areas of security assistance and cooperation. As stated in my
testimony, the OSC-I will be the focal point for security assistance
and cooperation with the government of Iraq, managing what is now the
fourth largest FMS program in the region and ninth largest in the
world. The SFA envisions an even broader security relationship that
might include training exercises or other similar programs as we have
with partners in the region and around the world. This is one area that
might be developed over the coming year through the SFA.
Dr. Ollivant. I believe the OSC is a visible symbol of American
commitment to Iraq and will be largely welcome. Their role should keep
them almost exclusively on Iraqi military bases and they should have
little to no interaction with the larger Iraqi populace.
15. Senator Levin. Dr. Ollivant, you have written about the
importance of two instruments of U.S. soft power, specifically the
State Department and the American business community, in shaping future
U.S.-Iraq relations. What would you see as the role of the U.S.
military within a normalized relationship between the United States and
Iraq?
Dr. Ollivant. In addition to the very important role of the OSC, I
think that, after a decent interval, joint exercises with U.S. and
Iraqi forces--perhaps with Egypt's Bright Star as an explicit model--
could be very useful for both sides and continue to develop Iraqi
capability. In addition, Iraqi military officers and noncommissioned
officers should be trained in the U.S. military school system in the
largest possible numbers. Combined naval training should continue in
international waters. Training the air force remains the most complex
problem, but once a basic level of proficiency is attained, combined
air training could also occur in neutral territory.
political system in iraq
16. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk and Dr. Ollivant, what is your
assessment of the stability of the Maliki Government today and going
forward, including through the rest of this year and after the
withdrawal of U.S. military forces?
Mr. McGurk. Fundamental political disputes--including the division
of authority between central, regional, and provincial governments;
rivalries between and within competing political blocs; and
disagreement over the management and control of natural resources--will
continue well beyond the departure of U.S. troops. Under the Iraqi
constitution, an absolute parliamentary majority can remove confidence
from a prime minister or call for new elections. Thus far, Iraq has not
seen a movement coalesce with the strength of an absolute majority (163
seats) to force such a change. Absent such a majority coalition, the
next opportunity to constitutionally change the government may be
national elections in 2014. It will be vitally important that the
United States work with the Iraqi political leadership and the United
Nations to ensure: (1) that those elections happen on time; and (2)
that they are free, fair, and meet international standards.
Dr. Ollivant. The Maliki Government is clearly not as stable as we
would like. The most recent national election produced a gridlock that
is not conducive to normal politics. However, despite the recent
conflict between the various parties in the coalition government, I
fully expect politics to muddle through to the next electoral cycle.
This is not to say that the interim result will be optimal.
17. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk and Dr. Ollivant, in your assessment,
how resilient has the democratic process been in Iraq?
Mr. McGurk. Since January 2005, Iraq has held three national
elections, two sets of provincial elections, and a national referendum.
The democratic process has thus shown great resiliency even in the
midst of a sectarian war between 2006 and 2008. A healthy democratic
process also requires strong and independent institutions--including an
independent parliament and judiciary--and broadly accepted rules for
the division and separation of power. It is in the latter category that
Iraq continues to face challenges and will require active and
continuing U.S. engagement.
Dr. Ollivant. I believe that, for the region, Iraqi politics have
been reasonably resilient. It is easy now to forget the 2009 provincial
elections, which may be the only election in the region in which
religious parties were disempowered by democratic means in favor of
more secular nationalist parties. While the 2010 national elections
were not as clearly successful, they have had the virtue of keeping
tension and issues in the political process (some assassinations
perhaps excepted). We have yet to see any party in Iraq revert to
violence or militias. I see no reason to believe that will change in
the near future. But we must remember that states with multiple ethno-
sectarian groups are hard to govern.
18. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk and Dr. Ollivant, do you believe that
the major factions in Iraq remain committed to resolving their
differences within the political process rather than through violence?
Mr. McGurk. The parties that are now inside the political process--
including the three largest blocs: Iraqiyya, the National Alliance, and
the Kurdish Alliance--seem willing to resolve even the most contentious
disputes through a constitutional and democratic process. The primary
driver of violence in Iraq remains al Qaeda, which sits far outside the
political process. Working with the Iraqis to enforce the accepted
divisions of authority and power-sharing formulas as defined in the
Iraqi Constitution and the Irbil Agreements of 2010 can help ensure
that this consensus towards political solutions remains intact.
Dr. Ollivant. Yes.
u.s. troop immunity
19. Senator Levin. Mr. McGurk, U.S. and Iraqi negotiations on a
possible residual U.S. force presence in Iraq after December of this
year stalled over Iraq's unwillingness to grant U.S. troops immunity
from Iraqi courts. When the United States and Iraq negotiated the 2008
Security Agreement, was it the U.S. position that U.S. troops receiving
legal immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts was an absolute
requirement without which there could be no agreement?
Mr. McGurk. Article 12 of the Security Agreement (Jurisdiction) was
painstakingly negotiated over the course of a year. U.S. troops would
not have remained in Iraq without a provision on jurisdiction approved
by the Department of Defense (DOD). Article 12 was approved by DOD, but
it expires on December 31, 2011, together with the expiry of the
Security Agreement.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
legal protections for u.s. troops in iraq
20. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, on
November 17, 2008, the administration of President George W. Bush
signed an agreement with the Government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki that provided for the continued presence of U.S. combat
forces in Iraq. Under the agreement, the United States is to withdraw
its forces from Iraq no later than December 31, 2011. In October,
President Obama announced that, in keeping with the agreement, U.S.
forces in Iraq would be home by the end of the year.
Some have suggested that U.S. military forces should remain in Iraq
after the current December 31, 2011, deadline in order to prevent Iraq
from sliding back into violence. It seems likely that, given such a
mission, our troops would find themselves involved in combat.
The November 2008 agreement granted legal protections from the
Iraqi legal system to members of the U.S. Armed Forces. However, those
protections expire at the end of this year. If our troops were to stay
in Iraq past the December 31 deadline, they would likely be involved in
combat without protections from Iraqi laws.
What risks would U.S. servicemembers serving in Iraq face if they
continued to engage in combat or counterterrorism operations in Iraq
beyond the December 31, 2011, deadline without an extension of the
types of legal protections they are granted under the current SOFA?
Secretary Panetta. Throughout its discussions with the Iraqis, DOD
remained committed to its obligations to draw down remaining forces
under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. DOD consistently stated that it
was open to leaving additional training forces, but only at the request
of the Iraqis and with adequate legal protections. As a result, the
question of the legal status of any remaining forces was an essential
part of this discussion, because DOD requires appropriate legal
protections for U.S. troops, wherever they are deployed. It would be
inappropriate to deploy them without such protections.
Iraq's President Talabani convened a meeting of political bloc
leaders on October 4, 2011. After the meeting, bloc leaders declared
that any U.S. forces remaining after December 31, 2011, should not be
granted immunity from Iraqi law. As a result, the U.S. diplomatic
presence in Iraq will include a robust OSC-I, which will serve as the
primary mechanism for continued security support to Iraq. OSC-I
personnel in Iraq after 2011 will be accredited under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and attached to the U.S. diplomatic
mission.
General Dempsey. The Agreement between the United States and the
Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of Untied States Forces from Iraq
and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary
Presence in Iraq (The Security Agreement) contained privileges and
immunities afforded to both uniformed members of the U.S. Armed Forces
and the civilian component of DOD.
The risk to U.S. personnel remaining in Iraq after December 31,
following expiration of the Security Agreement, would be the exercise
of Iraqi criminal and civil jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in Iraq.
The Security Agreement limited the Government of Iraq's legal
jurisdiction to only the most ``grave premeditated felonies'' occurring
outside of agreed facilities and outside the member's duty status. The
United States maintained primary jurisdiction for those matters inside
agreed facilities, and during duty status outside agreed facilities and
areas. Further, the Security Agreement required Iraq to immediately
notify U.S. authorities of the arrest or detention of a member of U.S.
forces or its civilian component, and to hand them over within 24 hours
of arrest or detention. The absence of status protections would
potentially expose U.S. personnel to the uncertainties of the Iraqi
legal system, which does not contain the same due process protections
as provided under the U.S. legal system. Further, the Government of
Iraq would not be obligated to turn over any U.S. personnel upon
detention or arrest, or even to notify U.S. authorities of the arrest
or detention of U.S. personnel.
The Security Agreement also provided other necessary presence
authorities such as exemption from payment of taxes, duties, fees, or
other similar charges; exemption from Iraqi laws concerning licenses
such as driver's licenses; permission to carry weapons and wear
uniforms in furtherance of the member's duties; entry and exist
permissions; and freedom of movement of vehicles and aircraft within
Iraq. The ability of U.S. forces to conduct operations in Iraq would be
significantly hampered without these authorities.
21. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, do
you believe the Iraqi Parliament would have passed a new SOFA with the
United States that provided the types of legal protections to U.S.
servicemembers granted under the current SOFA?
Secretary Panetta. Iraq's President Talabani convened a meeting of
political bloc leaders on October 4, 2011. After the meeting, bloc
leaders declared that any U.S. forces remaining after December 31,
2011, should not be granted immunity from Iraqi law. Without political
bloc leader support, it is unlikely that members of Iraq's Council of
Representatives (CoR) would have voted to approve a new security
agreement with the United States providing legal protections to U.S.
servicemembers similar to those found in the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement, which did receive CoR approval. This approval is required
for such an agreement to be binding under international law.
General Dempsey. Iraq's President Talabani convened a meeting of
political bloc leaders on October 4, 2011. After the meeting, bloc
leaders declared that any troops remaining after December 31, 2011,
should not be granted immunity from Iraqi law. Without political bloc
leader support, it is unlikely that members of Iraq's CoR would have
voted to approve a new security agreement with the United States
providing similar legal protections to U.S. servicemembers as the 2008
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. CoR approval is required for a new
security agreement to be binding under international law.
22. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, can you discuss what
efforts the administration took to secure legal immunity for U.S.
forces, if a decision to extend some forces in Iraq had been achieved?
Secretary Panetta. The appropriate number of forces after 2011
always depended both on the mutually-agreed mission set and adequate
legal protections. This was never something that could decide
unilaterally--it was always going to be the product of ongoing
discussions with the Iraqi Government.
Throughout these discussions, DOD remained committed to its
obligation to draw down remaining forces under the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement. DOD consistently stated that it was open to leaving
additional training forces, but only at the request of the Iraqis and
with adequate protections. Iraq's President Talabani convened a meeting
of political bloc leaders on October 4, 2011. After the meeting, bloc
leaders declared that any U.S. forces remaining after December 31,
2011, should not be granted immunity from Iraqi law.
In the end, our governments agreed to a robust military-to-military
relationship in keeping with those the United States enjoys with other
countries, where interactions depend less on footprint and more on
frequent engagement. The OSC-I will be the cornerstone of America's
military-to-military relationship with Iraq. Because the OSC-I is part
of the embassy staff, just as security cooperation offices are
elsewhere around the globe, DOD personnel will have legal protections
under normal diplomatic status (the Vienna Convention).
23. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, what obstacles did the
administration face in attempting to secure such immunity?
Secretary Panetta. Iraq's President Talabani convened a meeting of
political bloc leaders on October 4, 2011. After the meeting, bloc
leaders declared that any U.S. forces remaining after December 31,
2011, should not be granted immunity from Iraqi law. Without political
bloc leader support, it is unlikely that members of Iraq's CoR would
have voted to approve a new security agreement with the United States
providing legal protections to U.S. servicemembers similar to those
found in the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which did receive CoR
approval. This approval is required for such an agreement to be binding
under international law.
24. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, do you believe that
anything could have been done differently that would have resulted in a
different outcome?
Secretary Panetta. Discussions with the Iraqis were about trying to
figure out what the military-to-military relationship with Iraq was
going to look like moving forward, and a big part of that was always
going to be Iraq's decision not only about what sort of help it
believed it needed, but also what it would accept. The question of the
legal status of remaining forces was part of this discussion, because
DOD requires appropriate legal protections for its personnel wherever
they are deployed.
The ultimate outcome of the discussions ensures a continuing
security relationship with Iraq and adequate protections for DOD
personnel. Iraqi leaders have made clear that they desire a continuing
training relationship with the United States, and DOD will deliver that
training through the OSC-I. Because the OSC-I is part of the U.S.
embassy staff, just as security cooperation offices are elsewhere
around the globe, defense personnel will be accredited under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
iranian influence in iraq
25. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, many are concerned that
Iraq will be vulnerable to Iranian influence once U.S. forces depart
Iraq. What is being done to sustain a check on the dangerous Iranian
regime?
Secretary Panetta. The Iraqi Government made clear that it desires
a strong relationship with the United States under the SFA, including
robust security cooperation. That represents a victory for the U.S.-
Iraq partnership, not Iran's government. In general, my sense is that
Iraqi nationalism remains a powerful influence among Iraq's various
political factions, including the Shia.
The United States' commitment to the future of the region is
enduring. That involves a military footprint in the Persian Gulf that
can help protect our interests, while also ensuring the stability of
our partners and the region.
26. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, where will U.S. forces be
in the region once they are no longer in Iraq and how will their
presence serve to check Iranian activities?
Secretary Panetta. The United States' commitment to the future of
the region is enduring. That involves a military footprint in the
Persian Gulf that can help protect our interests, while also ensuring
the stability of our partners and the region.
America's long-term security partnership with Iraq is part of a
broader commitment by the United States to peace and security
throughout the region. Our message to our allies, friends, and
potential adversaries is very clear: there are more than 40,000 U.S.
forces that remain in the Gulf region. DOD will continue to reassure
partners, deter aggressors, and counter those seeking to create
instability.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
iranian influence in iraq
27. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, this summer, the top U.S.
military spokesman in Baghdad (Major General Jeffery Buchanan) stated
that ``We're seeing a sharp increase in the amount of munitions coming
across the border, some manufactured as recently as 2010,'' and ``These
are highly lethal weapons, and their sheer volume is a major concern.''
What is your current assessment of the volume of munitions flowing from
Iran into Iraq?
General Dempsey. From May-July 2011, there was an increase in
attacks against U.S. bases in Iraq. These attacks were largely
attributed to Iranian-backed Shia militant and extremist groups.
Intelligence indicated that some of the munitions used by the Shia
groups flowed from Iran. Since July, Iraqi Security Forces increased
their operational focus on interdicting the flow of munitions within
Iraq and preventing attacks by Shia groups. Combined with the
Government of Iraq's political efforts, the frequency and lethality of
these attacks has diminished significantly. Consequently, the security
situation in Iraq continues to be much better than historical trends.
The Iraqi Security Forces have the capacity to counter potential
increases in security incidents and interdict the flow of munitions.
28. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in June, 14 U.S.
servicemembers were killed in Iraq, making it the deadliest month in
Iraq for U.S. troops since 2008. According to senior U.S. commanders,
Iranian-backed militias (Kataib Hezbollah, the Promise Day Brigade and
Asaib al Haq) were behind 12 of those deaths. U.S. officials also
believe that the explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), rockets, and
improvised rocket-assisted mortars (IRAMs) used in those attacks all
originated in Iran. It is my understanding that although the number of
daily attacks is a fraction of what it was in years past, the amount of
weaponry used in each attack is on the rise. One report indicated that
in one attack, as many as 14 EFPs were used against U.S. forces. Can
you comment on the assessment that the amount of munitions used in each
attack is on the rise?
General Dempsey. June 2011 represented a surge in the peak period
of attacks by Iranian-backed militants and terrorists against U.S.
forces in Iraq. Intelligence indicated that the munitions used in these
attacks may have originated in Iran. The perceived increase in volume
of munitions used in each attack is largely attributable to the
concurrent drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. As U.S. bases closed,
Iranian-backed Shia groups were able to concentrate their attempted
attacks to a few locations. This resulted in a corresponding increase
in the amount of munitions used in each attack which temporarily helped
the groups mitigate their technical inexperience and the relative
inaccuracy of the munitions employed. In tandem with the Government of
Iraq's political efforts, the Iraqi Security Forces reacted quickly and
effectively stemmed the flow of weapons and concentrations of attacks
against U.S. bases. Since July, the level of attacks returned to
significantly lower levels than historic trends and the security
situation remains stable as the United States completes the withdrawal.
29. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, do you believe that Iranian
backed militias will begin targeting U.S. diplomats once the U.S.
military has left Iraq, and if so, why?
Secretary Panetta. There may be some level of continuing violence
after DOD completes the drawdown, and extremists in Iraq will likely
continue periodic high-profile attacks, but Iraq's security forces made
tremendous progress in recent years and I assess that they are capable
of maintaining internal security.
Over recent months DOD, along with its Iraqi partners, made
aggressive actions against militant groups that target U.S. military
and diplomatic personnel. The Iraqis also exerted diplomatic pressure
on the Iranians. Together, these efforts resulted in a sharp decrease
in attacks.
Going forward, Iraqi leaders understand that a key condition of our
partnership and the support DOD provides is that the Iraqi Government
takes measures necessary to support defense personnel. This is
particularly the case in the context of the diplomatic presence the
United States will have post-2011.
30. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in testimony before this
committee earlier this year, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency noted that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force
is covertly providing money, weapons, safe haven, and training to Iraqi
Shia militants and terrorists, stating that ``Tehran approves the rules
of engagement that guide the targeting of U.S. forces in Iraq.'' In
Iraq, how great is the risk that the Iranian regime will obtain a
greater destabilizing influence following the planned withdrawal of the
last U.S. troops by December?
Secretary Panetta. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in your view, what is the
best strategy that the United States can employ to deter Iran's
destabilizing activities in the region?
Secretary Panetta. The United States and its partners in the region
are committed to countering Iran's destabilizing influence. While the
United States is strengthening its regional security relationships in
recent years, Iran's destabilizing activities only resulted in further
isolation. So as the United States marks a new phase in its enduring
partnership with Iraq, the Iranian regime is more likely than ever to
be marginalized in the region as a whole and in its ability to
influence the Iraqi political process.
America's long-term security partnership with Iraq is part of a
broader commitment by the United States to peace and security
throughout the region. Our message to allies, friends, and potential
adversaries is very clear: there are more than 40,000 U.S. forces that
remain in the Gulf region, and we will continue to reassure partners,
deter aggressors, and counter those seeking to create instability.
32. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, on November 12, Iraq was the
only country to abstain when the Arab League voted to suspend Syria
because of its violent, 8-month crackdown on protestors calling for
government reform. Although Iraq's foreign minister has stated his
country was not pressured to abstain, but had to take into account
``international and regional calculations.'' Others speculate that this
action is further evidence of Iran's influence in Iraq, as Iran remains
a strong supporter of the Assad regime in Syria. In your opinion, what
does this action by Iraq demonstrate?
Secretary Panetta. I do not believe that Iraq's decisions
concerning Syria reflect Iranian influence. Rather, it is my sense that
Iraqi nationalism and resistance to Iranian influence remain powerful
forces among all Iraqi political factions.
sofa negotiations
33. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, it is my understanding that
in many other countries, including in nations throughout the Arab
world, U.S. personnel operate under Memoranda of Understanding that
give them legal immunity and do not require parliamentary ratification.
It is also my understanding that the 2008 U.S.-Iraq SOFA, which granted
U.S. troops legal immunity, did not require ratification by the Iraqi
Parliament. Why did the administration insist that a new SOFA be
ratified by the Iraqi Parliament?
Secretary Panetta. Under Iraqi law, approval by Iraq's
parliamentary body, the CoR, is necessary for any security agreement to
be binding under international law. The 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement was approved by the CoR on November 27, 2008. Other countries
have different requirements for agreements to be legally binding.
Therefore, the arrangements with various countries in the world to
provide protections for U.S. military personnel will reflect that
difference.
34. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, the President opened talks
for extending the SOFA this summer, approximately 6 months before the
December 31 deadline. There are reports that prior to the President's
October conversation with Prime Minister Maliki, the two leaders had
not spoken in months. Additionally, it is my understanding that the
President and his senior aides did not meet with Iraqi officials at the
United Nations General Assembly in September. In contrast, President
Bush began negotiations for a SOFA roughly a year in advance of the
2008 SOFA and spoke with Prime Minister Maliki via video teleconference
weekly. If the report that the President was largely absent from
discussions with Iraqi officials over the past 9 months is true, should
it be a surprise that the administration was unable to reach an
agreement with the Government of Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. The field requested to have the lead, with full
Washington support. This was similar to the 2008 SOFA negotiations that
Ambassador Crocker led. The field had active discussions with the
Iraqis along two tracks: a political track led by Ambassador Jeffrey
and a military-to-military technical track led by General Austin.
The President and Vice President are engaged on the issue both
internally and with Iraqi leaders. Washington supported negotiations in
weekly deputies-level teleconferences with the field and regular calls
from the Vice President and other senior officials to Iraqi leaders. A
monthly principals-level meeting chaired by the Vice President was also
held to provide additional support.
I traveled to Iraq to move discussions forward, as did Secretary
Gates, Chairman Mullen, and senior State Department officials.
35. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, can you comment on the
frequency of discussions you had with your Iraqi counterpart regarding
a U.S. presence in Iraq past the end of 2011?
Secretary Panetta. I traveled to Iraq to move discussions forward,
as did Secretary Gates, Chairman Mullen, and senior State Department
officials.
The field requested to have the lead, with full Washington support.
This was similar to the 2008 SOFA negotiations that Ambassador Crocker
led. In this case, Ambassador Jeffery led a political track and General
Austin led a military-to-military technical track.
The President and Vice President have been engaged on the issue
internally and with Iraqi leaders. Washington supported negotiations
with weekly deputies-level teleconferences with the field and regular
calls from the Vice President and other senior officials to Iraqi
leaders. A monthly principals-level meeting chaired by the Vice
President was also held to provide whatever support was needed.
insurgents
36. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, several
military and civilian leaders have expressed serious concern regarding
the Iraqis' limited military capabilities in the key areas of
logistics, intelligence, and aviation, and what that will mean once
U.S. forces withdraw as planned, by December 31, 2011. How concerned
are you about al Qaeda returning to Iraq following the departure of
U.S. Armed Forces?
Secretary Panetta. There is a chance that al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
will use the withdrawal of U.S. forces as an opportunity to reassert
influence within Iraq. Iraqi Security Forces currently demonstrate the
capability to conduct counterinsurgency operations and maintain
internal security and stability in Iraq. This capability strengthens
daily. Therefore, while there may be a slight increase in security
incidents after December 31, 2011, I believe it is within the capacity
of the Iraqi Security Forces to handle.
General Dempsey. There is a chance that AQI will use the withdrawal
of U.S. forces as an opportunity to reassert influence within Iraq.
Iraqi Security Forces currently demonstrate the capability to conduct
counterinsurgency operations and maintain internal security and
stability in Iraq. This capability strengthens daily. Therefore, while
there may be a slight increase in security incidents after December 31,
2011, we believe it is within the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces
to handle.
37. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, will the
Iraqis adequately prevent terrorist organizations from taking root and
growing in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. I expect that the underlying security situation
in Iraq will remain stable. I believe that the Iraqis are capable of
preventing terrorist organizations from taking root in Iraq. The Iraqi
Security Forces are functioning well as a counterinsurgency force, and
demonstrated the capability to provide for the internal security of
their country. Although AQI remains a threat, as evidenced by
occasional high-profile attacks, terrorist organizations do not have
the support of the Iraqi people.
General Dempsey. The underlying security situation in Iraq will
remain stable. We believe that the Iraqis are capable of preventing
terrorist organizations from taking root in Iraq. The Iraqi Security
Forces are functioning well as a counterinsurgency force and have
demonstrated the capability to provide for the internal security of
their nation. Although AQI remains a threat, as evidenced by occasional
high-profile attacks, terrorist organizations do not have the support
of the Iraqi people.
sale of f-16 fighters to iraq
38. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in September, DOD announced
that Iraq had made the first payment for an initial purchase of 18 F-16
fighters. Reports indicate deliveries would be made in the 2014-2015
time period. In the interim period before delivery of these F-16s, how
does Iraq intend to maintain control of its airspace and what is your
assessment of its ability to do so?
Secretary Panetta. DOD continues to conduct various Air Force-
centric activities, training, and exercises in order to strengthen
Iraqi military capability as U.S. forces withdraw-to include Iraqi
control and oversight of their airspace. The OSC-I is responsible to
execute the current program of record. From an air perspective, OSC-I
is charged to develop and train the Iraq Air Force so it can defend
Iraq's borders and airspace against external threats. The Government of
Iraq will capitalize on Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military
Financing, International Military Education and Training programs, and
security cooperation activities, to include: exercises, combined arms
training, and mentoring activities.
In the near-term, some Iraqi capability gaps will remain as they
continue to professionalize the force. U.S. presence in the region will
provide a deterrent to foreign aggression in Iraq post-Operation New
Dawn (2012 and beyond) in support of the SFA.
39. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, what is DOD doing to
facilitate the sale of F-16s and ensure timely delivery of these
aircraft to Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. The Government of Iraq signed a Letter of Offer
and Acceptance (LOA) for 18 F-16s on 13 September 2011. One week later,
they funded the LOA with approximately $1.5 billion (half of the total
expected case value), and DOD initiated a full-scale effort to provide
Iraq with a complete F-16 capability, including aircraft, weapons,
infrastructure, sustainment, and training. Under the current plan, DOD
expects to deliver the first two F-16 aircraft to Iraq in February 2015
and anticipate the ability to accelerate delivery by 5 months with the
initial delivery of two F-16 aircraft in September 2014.
The following actions have occurred since Iraq funded their F-16
program on 21 September 2011:
Assembled program management team at the Air Force
Materiel Command's Aeronautical Systems Center (Oct.)
Hosted initial F-16 program management conference with
U.S. Government and industry (Nov.)
Provided basing recommendations to Iraqi Air Force
(Nov.)
Initiated first security requirements survey at
potential F-16 basing locations (Nov.)
Awarded $835 million contract to Lockheed Martin for
F-16 aircraft (Dec.)
Recommended training approach to Iraqi Air Force for
F-16 maintenance
Initiated F-16 training for first Iraqi Air Force F-16
pilot (Dec.)
Solicited proposals for facilities site surveys (Nov.)
Conducted communication and security site surveys at
two potential bed down bases (Dec.)
DOD expects the following activities to occur during the coming
months:
Host formal kickoff conference with U.S. and Iraqi
program management teams
Solicit proposals and award contracts for facilities
and security infrastructure design/construction
Conduct multiple definitization conferences to
solidify requirements for spare parts packages, support
equipment, training, and facilities
Present amendment to the first LOA for 18 aircraft
which will provide the next $1 billion required to continue
program development
Develop and offer LOA for 18 additional F-16 aircraft
(bringing the total to 36 x F-16s for Iraq)
[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
