[Senate Hearing 112-419]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-419
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
112TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
MICHAEL G. VICKERS; DR. JO ANN ROONEY; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; HON.
LEON E. PANETTA; GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN,
USN; LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC; MADELYN R. CREEDON; ALAN F. ESTEVEZ;
ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; GEN.
WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; ADM JONATHAN
W. GREENERT, USN; LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA; HON. ASHTON B.
CARTER; MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN; MARK W. LIPPERT; BRAD R. CARSON; AND KEVIN
A. OHLSON
----------
FEBRUARY 15; MARCH 3; JUNE 9, 28; JULY 19, 21, 26, 28; SEPTEMBER 13;
NOVEMBER 17, 2011
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
112TH CONGRESS
S. Hrg. 112-419
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
112TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
MICHAEL G. VICKERS; DR. JO ANN ROONEY; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; HON.
LEON E. PANETTA; GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN,
USN; LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC; MADELYN R. CREEDON; ALAN F. ESTEVEZ;
ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; GEN.
WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; ADM JONATHAN
W. GREENERT, USN; LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA; HON. ASHTON B.
CARTER; MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN; MARK W. LIPPERT; BRAD R. CARSON; AND KEVIN
A. OHLSON
__________
FEBRUARY 15; MARCH 3; JUNE 9, 28; JULY 19, 21, 26, 28; SEPTEMBER 13;
NOVEMBER 17, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
74-537 WASHINGTON : 2012
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Page
february 15, 2011
Nominations of Hon. Michael G. Vickers to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence; and Dr. Jo Ann Rooney to be Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.. 1
Statements of:
Hon. Michael G. Vickers, Nominated to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence....................................... 4
Rooney, Ph.D., Jo Ann, Nominated to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness............... 6
march 3, 2011
Nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army....... 93
Statements of:
Reed, Hon. Jack, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island..... 98
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.................... 100
june 9, 2011
Nomination of Hon. Leon E. Panetta to be Secretary of Defense.... 181
Statements of:
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from the State of California 187
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California... 188
Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Nominated to be Secretary of Defense...... 190
june 28, 2011
Nominations of GEN James D. Thurman, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Commander, United Nations
Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces-Korea; VADM William
H. McRaven, USN, to be Admiral and Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command; and LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, to be
General and Commander, International Security Assistance Force/
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan............................. 353
Statement of:
Thurman, GEN James D., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined
Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea............................... 358
McRaven, VADM William H., USN, Nominated to be Admiral and
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command..................... 359
Allen, LtGen John R., USMC, Nominated to be General and
Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander,
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan........................................ 360
iii
july 19, 2011
Nominations of Madelyn R. Creedon to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and Alan F. Estevez to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel
Readiness...................................................... 505
Statement of:
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana... 508
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico... 513
Creedon, Madelyn R., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Strategic Affairs........................... 513
Estevez, Alan F., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness........................... 515
july 21, 2011
Nominations of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, for
Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army; and Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, for
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command......................................... 575
Statements of:
Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade
of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 581
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.................... 582
Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 584
Annex A.......................................................... 764
july 26, 2011
Nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 783
Statements of:
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff........ 788
july 28, 2011
Nominations of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, for Reappointment
to the Grade of Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations;
and LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, to be General and to be
Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command...................................... 909
Statements of:
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations.................... 913
Jacoby, LTG Charles H., Jr., USA, Nominated to be General and to
be Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command...................................... 915
september 13, 2011
Nomination of Hon. Ashton B. Carter to be Deputy Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 1007
Statements of:
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut.................................................... 1008
Carter, Hon. Ashton, Ph.D., Nominated to be Deputy Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 1013
november 17, 2011
Nominations of Michael A. Sheehan to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Mark
W. Lippert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs; Brad R. Carson to be General Counsel
of the Department of the Army; and Kevin A. Ohlson to be a
Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces........ 1173
Statements of:
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 1181
Leahy, Hon. Patrick, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont...... 1182
Sheehan, Michael A., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict...... 1184
Lippert, Mark W., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs......................... 1185
Carson, Brad R., Nominated to be General Counsel of the
Department of the Army......................................... 1186
Ohlson, Kevin A., Nominated to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces................................... 1186
APPENDIX......................................................... 1321
NOMINATIONS OF HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTELLIGENCE; AND DR. JO ANN ROONEY TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Webb,
Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Blumenthal, McCain, Brown, and Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional
staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael
J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member;
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member; and John H. Quirk V, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John
W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Daniel A.
Lerner, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Hannah I.
Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to
Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall;
Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to
Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator
Shaheen; Jordan Baugh and Elana Broitman, assistants to Senator
Gillibrand; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to
Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; and Brad
Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nominations of two senior officials
to serve in important positions within the Department of
Defense (DOD). Dr. Michael Vickers has been nominated to be the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He is currently
serving in that position on an acting basis while continuing
his duties as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent
Capabilities (SOLIC&IC). Dr. Vickers has served ably in that
position, guiding and overseeing major elements of our
operations against terrorists and insurgents across the globe.
Dr. Vickers has had a long and distinguished career in
Government service, much of which is relevant to the position
for which he has been nominated by the President.
In his present position as Assistant Secretary of Defense-
SOLIC, he has been deeply involved in intelligence matters
across the Government as a policymaker, as a consumer of
intelligence, and as a producer of intelligence. He served
previously as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations
officer in multiple divisions, spanning the Near East, South
Asia, and Latin America, and including involvement in covert
actions. He also served as an Army Special Forces soldier and
officer.
Congress created the position of Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence (USD(I)) in 2002 in recognition of the growing
importance of intelligence to our military forces, especially
in conducting operations after the events of September 11. The
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the principal
staff assistant and adviser to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence,
counterintelligence, security, and other sensitive matters. In
this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the Secretary's authority
over the intelligence components of DOD and is responsible for
intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, policy
formulation, and oversight.
The USD(I) is also responsible for ensuring that DOD
intelligence components are responsive to the direction and
requirements of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
Indeed, by formal agreement between the DNI and the Secretary
of Defense, the USD(I) is dual-hatted as the Director of
Defense Intelligence on the DNI's staff.
Dr. Jo Ann Rooney has been nominated to be the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
the Department's number two position for military and civilian
personnel issues, including recruitment, retention, pay and
benefits, health care, readiness, and the quality of life of
the members of our Armed Forces and their families. Dr. Rooney
comes to us from academia, where she most recently served as
the President of Mount Ida College and has served as an
instructor at various colleges since 1994.
Dr. Rooney also serves on the board of trustees for the
Jewish Hospital and St. Mary's Health Care, a nonprofit health
care system in Louisville, KY, experience that could serve her
well in her new position should she be confirmed.
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness position is vitally important as the
Department and Congress continue to wrestle with many
challenges, including vastly growing personnel and health care
budgets and the proper size of the force. The Department is
actively planning a reduction in its ground forces, depending
on conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2012 budget
request includes modest reductions in the Army and Navy, while
the Department plans greater reductions in future years.
In evaluating the size of the force, we must be mindful of
the stress on the force, including inadequate dwell time for
many soldiers and a deeply concerning suicide rate.
Finally, the Department is continuing its deliberate
progress in implementing the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell.
We welcome both our nominees. We thank them. We thank their
families for their distinguished public and private service and
willingness to serve our Nation in these important positions.
When we call upon them for their opening statements, we will
ask them to introduce the family members and their friends who
are with them as they give those statements.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in
welcoming our nominees and their families and friends who are
here today, especially our two youngest there [pointing to the
audience], who have been working on paperwork in preparation
for this hearing. We thank you for that. [Laughter.]
Secretary Vickers has had a distinguished and storied
record of service to this country. He served as an Army Special
Forces soldier, as a CIA case officer, and since August 2007 as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.
Dr. Vickers, you must be prepared to streamline the size
and cost of the organizations which you'll oversee. Secretary
Gates has announced his initiative to cut costs, eliminate
waste and redundancies, and focus defense dollars on the most
vital programs. With the rollout of the fiscal year 2012 budget
yesterday, we will want to know what parts of the defense
intelligence enterprise will be affected.
In the face of an unacceptably high and increasing deficit,
we must examine all aspects of defense spending. I hope we can
learn from you how you would apply these efficiencies for cost
savings for other vital defense priorities. For example, which
intelligence functions are redundant and can be eliminated;
which intelligence organizations that are bloated can be cut;
are there senior civilian positions that could be transferred
or eliminated; which contracts for services could be
terminated; and which major acquisition programs should be
restructured or eliminated to save money?
My questions, however, should not be interpreted as
reflecting a lack of concern or support for our ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obviously, failure is not
an option in achieving our goals in both Operation New Dawn and
Operation Enduring Freedom, and robust intelligence-gathering
and analysis are critical to our success.
The list of imperatives for the defense intelligence
enterprise is lengthy. We must be able to continue to locate
and track America's most relentless enemies on the battlefield,
to include former Guantanamo detainees who have made their way
back into the fight. We must safeguard our Nation's vital
secrets to prevent another Wikileaks episode and any further
neutralization of our lawful intelligence collection methods.
Through sound acquisition practices, we have to ensure our
troops and our Nation have the overhead surveillance required
for national security and mission accomplishments.
Dr. Rooney, you've had a distinguished career in law,
education, and health administration. I expect you'll be called
on very quickly to assist Secretary Gates and Under Secretary
of Defense Stanley in making progress in several key areas that
demand attention. Foremost among these is identifying ways to
improve the well-being and quality of life of servicemembers
and their families. After 9 years of combat operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, our forces, particularly the ground forces,
special operators, and the combat support personnel who
mobilize and sustain them through multiple deployments, are
stressed.
While recruiting is strong and retention levels for
experienced noncommissioned officers and officers remain
historically high, the Department must continue to ensure that
the resources, policies, and programs are in place to guarantee
that deploying troops are trained, ready, and focused. For our
wounded or injured, there must continue to be world-class care
on the battlefield, and when they return home that the
procedures for helping them and their families transition
seamlessly to the next stages of their military service or
civilian life work as rapidly and fairly as possible.
I look forward to hearing your testimony and I wish to
congratulate you on your nominations and I look forward to
confirming you as quickly as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Let me now call on you for your opening statement,
Secretary Vickers.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS, NOMINATED TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
Dr. Vickers. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of the committee: It is an honor to appear before you
here today. Thank you for your consideration of my nomination.
I am profoundly grateful for the confidence President Obama has
shown in me by nominating me for the position of Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and in designating me as
the Acting USD(I) on 28 January. In the brief period I have
been Acting USD(I), I have gained a further appreciation of the
immense responsibilities of this office.
I am also deeply grateful to Secretary Gates for his
support. I had the great privilege of serving with Secretary
Gates in the CIA during the 1980s and he has been the model for
me ever since of what a professional intelligence officer
should aspire to.
The USD(I) is dual-hatted as the DNI's Director of Defense
Intelligence. I have had the great honor of serving with
Director Clapper for the past 3\1/2\ years and I am grateful
for his support for my nomination.
I would also like to thank my family for their love and
support. It is a great honor, Mr. Chairman, to introduce them
to the committee today. With me here today are my wife, Melana,
and our daughters Alexandra, Sophia, Oksana, and Kalyna. I
would be a very poor dad if I did not also introduce in
absentia our fifth daughter, Natasha, who is busily studying
for her midterms at Ohio State and thus could not be with us
today.
Chairman Levin. Which is the youngest of your daughters who
are here today, by the way?
Dr. Vickers. Kalyna is our kindergartener, who is 6 years
old on February 8th.
Chairman Levin. I was trying to win her vote here by asking
which is the youngest. Thank you. [Laughter.]
Dr. Vickers. I'd like to also add that Oksana has the same
birthday as President Obama. [Laughter.]
Also with me here today are my mother-in-law, Oksana
Hepburn, my brother-in-law, Roman Gila, and his son and my
nephew Muletti Gila, and numerous friends and colleagues from
the Pentagon.
It has been a great privilege and honor for the past 3\1/2\
years to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC&IC
under both President Bush and President Obama. Our special
operators do much to keep us safe and I am immensely proud of
them.
We face many challenges as a Nation, from the war with al
Qaeda in Afghanistan to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by rogue
states, the development of asymmetric capabilities by rising
and resurgent powers, and the continued effects of the global
financial crisis. I am confident we'll be more than equal to
these challenges, as Americans before us were to the challenges
that confronted them.
Our intelligence capabilities constitute an increasingly
critical source of advantage for our Nation. Recent events in
the Middle East remind us of the importance of intelligence,
but also of the unpredictable and rapid turns developments can
take. Our warriors in the field and our policymakers here at
home are better served by U.S. intelligence today than at any
time since I began my service nearly 4 decades ago. We owe them
the best intelligence we can provide. If confirmed as USD(I), I
will do my best to ensure that this continues to be the case.
As a CIA officer in the 1980s, I learned first-hand about
the importance of congressional oversight of intelligence. Even
more important, I learned what an indispensable partner
Congress can be.
I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Vickers, we thank you very much
for that opening statement.
Dr. Rooney.
STATEMENT OF JO ANN ROONEY, Ph.D., NOMINATED TO BE PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
Dr. Rooney. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am grateful
for the confidence that President Obama has shown in me by
nominating me for the position of Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I also want
to thank Secretary Gates for his support of my nomination. If
confirmed, I will be honored to serve.
I want to thank my family and extended family for their
support and it's my pleasure to introduce them now. My mom,
Patricia Rooney, is with me today and I want to offer her my
heartfelt and special thanks. It is because of her support and
that of my late dad, John, that I'm here with you today. My
dad, an Army veteran, and my mom, a retired public school
elementary teacher, taught me that anything is possible, but
that I must embrace opportunities to use my experience and
talent to help others and leave an organization and people
better for my efforts.
I'm also fortunate to have several other people very
special in my life here today. My dearest friend of over 30
years and true sister of the heart, Linda Pizzorni, is here.
Her daughter Alessia, a high school senior, is also here with
us today. She and her sister Veronica, who is home because she
has to be in school and she's with her dad, are truly my nieces
in many ways.
Father Al Faretra, who is like my big brother, is
representing the rest of the extended family in the Boston
area. Prior to becoming a priest, Al served in the Navy and
spent time aboard the USS Forrestal.
Finally, Father Jim Rafferty, a very dear friend and
someone who I've had the pleasure of logging many nautical
miles sailing the waters throughout New England, is here
lending support.
I have not had the opportunity to serve our Nation in
uniform, as did my dad, my uncles, my godfather, and many
members of my extended family. They served in peacetime and in
wartime, including World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. But like
many Americans, I'm aware of the myriad of challenges members
of our military, the civilian force, and their families face in
supporting their service to our country. It is my desire to
serve our country and, if confirmed, I pledge to bring all of
my experience, knowledge, energy, and passion to the role.
The responsibilities and functions of the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness are vast
and challenging. They encompass advising and assisting the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and
advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in
matters relating to manpower, force management, planning,
program integration, readiness, Reserve component affairs,
health affairs, training, civilian and military personnel
requirements and management, commissary and exchange, morale,
welfare, and recreation, quality of life matters, spousal and
family support, and dependent education.
By nature, as the needs of our military and civilian
members of DOD and their families change the responsibilities
of the role must also evolve.
My background in law, finance, business, strategy,
organizational change, education, and health care provide me
with a broad range of experiences and perspectives to bring to
this role, if confirmed.
All of us face daunting challenges, not only within DOD,
but throughout the country, in areas of health care, cost
containment, efficient use of resources, assessments, and
accountability. Yet the goal is to balance these issues in a
way to ensure we have the necessary resources so that the men
and women in the Department are able to meet our Nation's
requirements for national security.
I understand the importance of working with this committee,
the entire Congress, other governmental departments and
agencies, and civilian and educational institutions in order to
accomplish this goal. I understand the longstanding and
daunting challenges associated with these and other aspects of
DOD personnel and readiness, enabling the effective
recruitment, retention, and training of the people we need. I
will take all these responsibilities seriously and, if
confirmed, I pledge my best efforts to work with this committee
and many others to meet these challenges.
In closing, I would like to again thank President Obama and
Secretary Gates for selecting me as the nominee for this
position. If the Senate confirms me, I will make every effort
to live up to the confidence they and all of you have placed in
me.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Rooney.
We give a warm welcome to your families and friends, who
are such an important part of who you are and your being here
today.
We have standard questions which we ask our nominees, which
we'll ask each of you now. You can answer together. Have you
adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts
of interest?
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Dr. Vickers. No.
Dr. Rooney. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established or requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Dr. Vickers. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Dr. Vickers. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Dr. Vickers. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Dr. Vickers. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Dr. Vickers. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I think we'll try a 7-minute round of questions.
Dr. Vickers, we've been making efforts over the years, this
committee, to expand the budgets, the production rate, the
planned number of orbits, for major unmanned aerial vehicles
that have been so critical to our forces in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and elsewhere, including the Predator and the Reaper. Our
current objective is 65 orbits for these aircraft. The budget
for fiscal year 2012 that we just received funds these aircraft
at the maximum current production rate.
However, the fact is that our troops need more and are
asking for more of these assets right now. They're living with
significant unfulfilled requirements every day. Now, we were
recently told that the limiting factor for accelerating the
expansion of that force is operators and linguists rather than
the production capacity at factories. My question is, why can't
the Services accelerate the recruitment and the training of
operators and linguists?
Dr. Vickers. Mr. Chairman, our Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) task force, under Secretary Gates'
direction, has been working very hard since 2008 to provide the
intelligence capabilities our warriors in the field require.
Nevertheless, demand has continually outstripped supply, which
is one reason during the recent Quadrennial Defense Review we
raised the requirement for Predator and Reaper combat air
patrols or for orbits from 50 to 65, and it's not clear at this
point that 65, which we'll reach in 2013, will still meet our
demand.
To supplement that, we've been adding manned aircraft of
various kinds, variations of C-12 aircraft, Project Liberty by
the Air Force, and medium altitude reconnaissance and
surveillance systems by the ground forces, to address this
shortfall.
As you noted, buying the aircraft is not enough. We also
have to have operators, linguists, bandwidth, across the
intelligence cycle. The Air Force in particular has been
working very hard at converting operators to these functions.
In fact, there are now more pilots involved in unmanned
aircraft in the Air Force than there are flying manned
aircraft. But we still have work to do.
Chairman Levin. I recently wrote Secretary Gates about the
current requirements for ISR support in the Horn of Africa and
about the Department's current acquisition plans for additional
ISR assets to support the geographic combatant commands. Now,
I've not received a reply to this letter, but I would ask,
since less than 10 percent of the requirements are being filled
right now, that you pay some very urgent attention to that and
that you get a response to that as quickly as possible. Would
you do that?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Vickers, in your current position as
Assistant Secretary of Defense-SOLIC, I think you understand
very well how our Special Forces have discovered how to tightly
integrate the different sensors to achieve unprecedented
capabilities to identify high-value enemy personnel, to locate
them, to track them, to identify their broader networks, and
attack them.
Signals intelligence, sensors are used to cue airborne
video cameras where to look. Radars that can detect moving
vehicles or even people walking are used as tipoffs to begin
focused collection, and so on.
Now, it's proven a lot more difficult for the regular
conventional forces of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to
achieve the degree of ISR system integration necessary to
replicate U.S. Special Operations Command's success because the
ISR assets are not under unified control. It's my understanding
that the ISR task force and the Joint Staff are focused now on
this problem. Do you have any ideas as to how the
organizational obstacles can be removed in order to truly
integrate our ISR assets operationally?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do. As you noted, the technique
that our Special Operations Forces have pioneered, which we
call ``find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze''--to have a
recurring intelligence cycle to lead to successive operations
to take down an enemy network is something that has been
progressively transmitted from our national Special Operations
Forces to our theater forces and progressively to our general
purpose or conventional forces.
General Petraeus is working this problem with his J-2 very
hard in Afghanistan and we're seeing results in that area.
I would add as well that we're providing additional
capabilities in Afghanistan that we only had in very limited
numbers in Iraq, for example, very persistent aerostats over
all our conventional force positions to provide the kind of
persistent surveillance that our forces need, particularly
against improvised explosive devices.
There is still some work that needs to be done. If you
compare the different organizations, national, Special
Operations Forces, theater, and conventional forces, in their
ability to rapidly exploit this kind of information, but the
gap is narrowing.
When we used to describe a goal in the Department of trying
to make conventional forces more special operations-like, we
used to mean operating in small groups like special operators.
Now we mean the ability to exploit intelligence across the
cycle in the manner you described.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Dr. Vickers, General Petraeus in a recent interview
discussed what he called the growing friction between local
Taliban fighters living in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban
leadership who phone in orders that the local insurgents should
continue to fight against Afghan and coalition forces through
the winter, while the leadership remains safely in the
sanctuaries in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan.
According to General Petraeus, Taliban leadership is eager
to keep up the fight through the winter because they know
they've suffered losses over the last year. He also said that
we're seeing a degree of discord among the Afghan Taliban
leaders and between them and the lower level fighters, and a
level of discord that we have not seen in the past. Do you
agree with General Petraeus' assessment that there is friction
and discord between local Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and
the Taliban leadership in Pakistan as the leadership phones in
those orders while they keep safely somewhere else, and is this
level of friction something that we've not seen in the past?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do agree with General Petraeus'
assessment. I'd be happy to provide more detail in a classified
session, but let me say now that this discord as operational
commanders from Afghanistan go back to sanctuary in Pakistan
for the winter has increased over the past year, particularly
as the effects of the surge of forces the President ordered in
December 2009 really began to be felt at the end of this past
2010 fighting season, from September to November.
The situation that General Petraeus was describing, where
the Taliban senior leadership wants to continue the fight
during the winter months--a lot of local commanders have been
voting with their feet, essentially, and saying, ``I've had
enough of this,'' to the effects of our increasingly effective
operations, but also because of multiple competing interests
within the insurgency. The insurgency is not a monolithic
group. A lot of fighters fight for very different reasons,
including economic ones. So there's naturally a lot of
frictions induced there. But the leadership-warrior divide is a
big part of it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Before I call on Senator McCain, let me just quickly
mention that I hope we'll get a quorum here this morning, and
when we do we will offer the committee budget to be approved.
I'm going to turn the gavel now over to Senator Reed and
call upon Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses. Secretary Vickers, we've
recently heard some rather guardedly optimistic assessments of
the situation in Afghanistan. Do you agree with those
assessments?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator McCain. The main problems still being corruption
and Pakistan?
Dr. Vickers. The strategic problem, sir, as you identified,
are the continued presence of a sanctuary in Pakistan and then
the governance challenge.
Senator McCain. On the issue of Wikileaks, what's your
understanding of the status of investigations into the cause of
Wikileaks?
Dr. Vickers. Sir, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence has mainly been focused on assessing
the damage, which they've done a very good job on, and remedial
measures with our chief information officer in the lead. My
understanding of the investigation is that it is ongoing, but
that's about all I can say at this time.
Senator McCain. I've been interested to hear some in the
media and others say that Wikileaks was a good thing, and that
it didn't damage our national security or our ability to carry
out our missions.
Yet isn't it true that in Wikileaks some individuals who
were cooperating with us were identified?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, that is true.
Senator McCain. That puts their lives in danger?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, it does.
Senator McCain. I'm curious about your assessment of the
damage that Wikileaks did to your abilities, and particularly
in the area of getting people to cooperate with us in the vital
aspect of human intelligence.
Dr. Vickers. Sir, I think it's had implications from the
foreign policy level about governments wanting to ensure that
their confidential relationships with the United States are
protected, down to operational issues, as you mentioned, of
assets that would cooperate with us. Fortunately, we are able
to attract the intelligence assets that we require to serve our
policymakers and warriors, but the damage should not be
understated and the Department has learned many lessons about
how to prevent this from ever happening again.
Senator McCain. But the damage especially has been on the
operational level. If we disclose an ambassador's candid
assessment of a foreign leader, that's one thing. But to have
operations and individuals disclosed in my view--and more
importantly, what is your view--this can be very damaging, and
some local individual may think twice before agreeing to
cooperate with us if that person's name is going to be
publicized.
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, that is exactly correct. As a former
CIA operations officer, your first responsibility is to protect
the security of those who would cooperate with the United
States through tradecraft and proper information security, and
they depend on us to do that.
Senator McCain. Do you have a good sense of how former
detainees are making their way back into the battlefield? I saw
a news report this morning that another one was apparently
killed, just reported today. Do you have a sense on how they're
making their way back to the battlefield?
Dr. Vickers. Sir, approximately 20 to 25 percent have made
their way back in one form or another.
Senator McCain. That we know of.
Dr. Vickers. That we know of. Some of those have
subsequently been killed or recaptured. Others are out there
fighting against us as well. The routes that they take depend
on the circumstances of their release. But needless to say,
it's been in multiple countries and multiple routes, and I'd be
happy to discuss that in more detail at a classified session.
Senator McCain. You would agree it is a problem?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator McCain. Because now it seems to be a status symbol
for those that return to the battlefield with their
compatriots.
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. That's a very good point, that some
mid-level operatives have been elevated to leadership positions
by this conferral of status.
Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, we intend to confirm you, and
obviously I believe you're well-qualified, but you don't have a
depth of experience with the men and women in the military. If
I could suggest--and suggestions are a very cheap commodity
around here--that you spend some time traveling around, not
only to the bases here in the continental United States, but
also our overseas bases and areas, if you can, even forward
deployed, so to give you a better depth and understanding of
the challenges, particularly of the repeated deployments that
our men and women in the military have been making and the
strain and stress that puts on their families, I hope you will
do that as a very high priority.
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. If confirmed, that would be an
immediate priority.
Senator McCain. Last year, in a contentious markup, this
committee voted 15 to 12 to allow servicemembers, their
dependents, and retirees to obtain privately paid abortions at
military hospitals. Do you support the administration's
position that abortions should be provided in military
hospitals?
Dr. Rooney. My position, sir, is to support the law and
enforce the law. But I also understand that the abortions are
voluntary, they would be outpatient services, and it's not
mandatory that any physicians there actually perform the
abortions, but it's making the health care available. I would
comply to the law.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join both the chairman and Senator McCain in
thanking you, Secretary Vickers, for your service in the past,
very distinguished service, and thank you, Dr. Rooney, for
undertaking this very challenging, but critically important,
assignment.
Secretary Vickers, I'd like to ask about one of the answers
that you gave in the advance policy questions about a very
important area that I know has concerned the committee in the
past regarding the sharing of information, raw intelligence
data, where you observed in the past there have been cultural
barriers to the full access to this information.
I wonder if you could please describe for the committee
what steps you would take to increase the sharing and
availability of this data to special operations personnel and
others in the field who need it?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. As I indicated in my answers to the
committee's advance policy questions, the Intelligence
Community was raised throughout the Cold War on the principle
of need-to-know, and increasingly in the war with al Qaeda and
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the responsibility to share is
imperative for our forces on the battlefield. That means not
only sharing with our own forces, but in Afghanistan we have 49
nations fighting alongside us and sharing with them as well.
This requires technical solutions to the problem. Until
recently in Afghanistan we had 26 different networks, that
we're standardizing to facilitate the movement of information
into a common network. But it also requires changes in the way
we operate and what information can be provided at what level.
Particularly, as Chairman Levin noted, some of the sensitive
information we get in signals intelligence and others, that has
typically been very compartmented, is critical on a time-
sensitive basis to operators, both to kill or capture their
adversary, but also to protect from attack.
We have been working that very hard. There is an inherent
tension, however, between the responsibility to share and need-
to-know that we always have to weigh to protect sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, while making sure we get
timely information in the hands of our warfighters.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you feel that the barriers, as has
been observed before, are still primarily cultural, or do you
think there are procedural barriers that need to be overcome?
Dr. Vickers. I think there's a mix, sir. I think some of it
is cultural legacy, but others, as I said, are technical
challenges, or also, as Chairman Levin noted earlier, having
the intelligence structures to rapidly process and move the
information. Not all elements of the force are equally equipped
in that area and it's something we're working to address.
Senator Blumenthal. Going to another line of questioning, I
wonder if you could give us a more precise view about the
extent of the discord and perhaps the magnitude of the
phenomenon of these perhaps dissatisfied enemy combatants
voting with their feet, as you have put it?
Dr. Vickers. Sir, you mean those going back into combat?
Senator Blumenthal. Exactly.
Dr. Vickers. There are different perspectives on this, sir.
Some are inherently repeat offenders, in the way that some
portion of those from the criminal justice system do the same,
particularly if they're going back into an area where they're
surrounded by those engaged in terrorism, and there are certain
ungoverned areas that they've made their way back to in Yemen,
in Pakistan, that are very conducive to this. I wouldn't want
to ascribe a single motivation, but looking at a number of
these cases over the past several years and the recidivism,
some have chosen a life of terrorism and their associates have.
In some cases it's a family business that we've seen, that
a lot of relatives are all engaged in the same line of work. I
think that creates a greater propensity for them to go back.
It's hard to know a priori necessarily which ones will and
won't.
There are those that we have very clear indications that
would and therefore they're not released. But there are others
that are in that grey ground that we need to do more to fix.
Senator Blumenthal. Are there specific steps being
contemplated to do more in that area, as you suggested?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. We have a Department of Justice-led
initiative, with interagency participation, to review release
of detainees at the highest levels or to transfer them to
another country, and then we have task forces in the field
working with local governments to review cases in the zones of
armed conflict as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Rooney, you may have seen recent
reports about the very unfortunate and tragic perils of perhaps
overuse of combinations of pharmaceutical drugs in treating
young men and women coming back and suffering from post-
traumatic stress and other psychological phenomena. Are you
aware of these reports and do you have thoughts about what can
be done to address this problem?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I am aware of the reports and the
issue of particularly psychotropic drugs, whether it's on the
military side or the civilian side, absolutely shares some
common factors. I think the lesson that we're all learning is
that--and I'm not a medical doctor--the use of drugs and not
understanding the interactions of the drugs actually at times
exacerbates the problem. I think we're getting a lot more
intelligent about that. We're starting to get a lot more
research about where those drugs are effective and where
they're not, and also understanding that at times it's critical
to link--sometimes our service people are going outside to
civilian providers and then also having service inside the
military, and we're not necessarily connecting and
understanding the drugs that have been prescribed by both.
Because of that awareness, there is now much more emphasis
on trying to destigmatize the treatment, so that we can have a
coordinated basis of care. But it is an ongoing issue.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. I thank you both
for your answers and for your very distinguished service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, Dr. Rooney, I first of
all want to commend both of you for your career histories.
Secretary Vickers, thank you so much for your service to our
country. You're both eminently qualified. I also want to
commend your families and thank them for their support for both
of you.
Secretary Vickers, I wanted to ask you again; you had cited
a statistic in response to Senator McCain that 20 to 25 percent
of the Guantanamo detainees have been released and have
returned to the conflict. Is that the correct number?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, ma'am. In the case of Guantanamo it's
closer to 25 percent. Of the approximately 600 that have been
released, about 150, we either know that they've returned or we
strongly suspect that they've returned. In the case of other
detainees that have been released on the battlefield, the
number is between 20 and 25.
Senator Ayotte. How is that fact informing release
decisions going forward?
Dr. Vickers. It has a strong impact on it, in the sense
that remaining cases are scrutinized not just for recidivism,
but also the ability in the case of third countries to continue
to detain them if they're transferred. A lot of detainees can't
be transferred because there's no assurance that they'll be
properly detained and not released.
Part of the recidivism problem breaks down when they're
transferred to another country and then they're quickly
released. So part of it is, as I said, is looking at the
transfer problem in itself.
In zones of hostilities, it may be local politics in some
cases. Someone with connections is getting someone released and
then again there's a high probability that they'll be
recidivists, but the political system has intervened in the
past. We've learned from this experience and are trying to
address it, but it's not a foolproof system.
Senator Ayotte. Given the President's Executive order
advocating for the closure of Guantanamo, if tomorrow we
capture a high-value target in Pakistan or overseas, or perhaps
someone you would deem a repeat offender, what are we doing
with them?
Dr. Vickers. The administration is in the final stages of
establishing its detention policy. But there is a challenge
with those picked up outside zones of hostilities. In zones of
hostilities, in Afghanistan principally now, there are well-
established procedures and mechanisms to detain them for the
period as required. If a terrorist were picked up in Somalia,
for example--one example of a very ungoverned space--that has
been a vexing challenge for both administrations, I would add,
both the Bush administration and the Obama administration,
there's not an obvious solution that presents itself.
But the USD(I)'s responsibility in this is to work on the
intelligence aspects and not the detainee policy. I would defer
to my policy colleagues in the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy's Office of Detainee Affairs to address your question
more fully.
Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, I fully appreciate that
there are others that will have more direct impact on this. But
given the breadth of experience that you have in this area and
the vexing challenges that you've identified, what
recommendations would you have to your colleagues in the
administration on how we can best address this issue to make
sure that if we capture a high-value target in one of these
areas that we can make sure that we have the ability to
interrogate that individual and also, if they present a
continuing threat, that we can detain them?
Dr. Vickers. On the interrogation side, the first step to
extract intelligence, the administration has established a
high-value interrogation group led by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, with participation from Defense and the CIA as
well. That group has deployed several times and that mechanism
should work well for interrogation and debriefing of detainees.
Options range from transferring to another country,
provided human rights assurances and access to the detainee and
others can be met. But given the problem that many countries
are either incapable or unwilling of taking some of these
detainees, we require some mechanism to be able to detain them
ourselves. That again, others in the administration are working
that very hard.
Senator Ayotte. When we transfer to another country,
Secretary Vickers, aren't we in a position in which we don't
have full control over the situation, even if we get assurances
from the country? The level of control we have is much less
than if we had them, for example, in a Guantanamo-type
facility?
Dr. Vickers. Before we transfer anyone, we want assurances
that, in a number of areas, as I said, if they need to be
detained the country in question is capable of detaining them;
if there is intelligence value to the detainee, that we would
have access to that detainee. But countries are sovereign and
we do our best to ensure that these conditions are met; they're
not always met 100 percent in some of these areas. Again,
that's part of the challenge.
Senator Ayotte. How can Congress help with this issue,
because it's obviously of deep concern if we are in a position
where we capture a high-value target or a repeat offender and
that person still remains a danger, or we need to have them in
a position where we can gather important information from them?
Dr. Vickers. It is critical to have the option of capturing
for laws of war, but also for intelligence value as well.
Again, this is something that my colleagues in the inter-agency
and within DOD are working, and I'm sure they will come to
Congress for help on this.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I appreciate your
answers today. Thank you, Dr. Rooney.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Secretary Vickers for your past service to
our country; and, to Secretary Vickers and Dr. Rooney, thank
you for your agreeing to be nominated to these positions and
your willingness to serve. Also, kudos to the families and
extended families. Thank you for being here and supporting
these very well-qualified individuals.
I did want to ask, Secretary Vickers, when confirmed you
will be responsible for implementing Secretary Gates'
efficiency initiative as it relates to defense intelligence. In
particular, you will need to downsize and consolidate the
intelligence workforce and ensure that we avoid duplication of
work among the respective intelligence agencies. What is your
plan to address and implement this plan while still ensuring
the timely development of actionable intelligence for our
warfighters?
Dr. Vickers. During the efficiencies process, the principal
focus of eliminating redundancies was to look at Service,
meaning Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps intelligence
organizations and those of the combatant commands. So we have
developed an organization called Joint Intelligence Operations
Centers (JIOC), that every combatant command has, and they've
all grown rather large, in the thousands of staff.
We have developed a standardized model, after some
experience now, that resulted in the major warfighting command,
or Central Command, to have a large JIOC, as we describe it,
and Pacific Command, which has a lot of challenges in its
region, to also have a very large JIOC. But the other combatant
commands have been reduced in some cases or had contractors
eliminated to a more standardized model appropriate to their
theaters, that is Africa Command, Southern Command, Northern
Command, and European Command. There have been some savings in
that area.
We've also consolidated missions. The counter-threat
finance mission has been, on the intelligence side, assigned to
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), so this will develop
more focused intelligence to support Treasury and other
policymakers who have the lead in this area, but also eliminate
some redundancies. We had a lot of counter-threat finance
intelligence across the Department.
We've also done the same in counterterrorism intelligence
in the Department in empowering our Joint Intelligence Task
Force for Counterterrorism in DIA to be the lead.
I would add that we've reduced senior executive service
ranks, contractors, and others. I would add that Secretary
Gates has been very clear that these rounds of efficiencies are
really the first step in looking at eliminating redundancy.
Intelligence is increasingly important to our policymakers and
to our operators, but it's also an area in which the American
people and Congress invest a lot of treasure and we have to
make sure it's as efficient as possible. If confirmed as
USD(I), it's something that will be on the top list of my
priorities.
Senator Hagan. You've said that a lot of these efficiencies
have taken place, but you'll also work to ensure that more
efficiencies will go forward in these same areas?
Dr. Vickers. Let me clarify, Senator Hagan. The decisions
have been made to standardize these intelligence organizations.
There is an implementation plan that will occur. But yes,
additional efficiencies might well be sought. Senator Levin
mentioned in his opening comments about intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and Senator McCain as
well, that we probably still have some homework to do down the
road.
Right now we're trying to give all the support we can to
our warfighters in Afghanistan, but over time we will
rationalize those as we move forward.
Senator Hagan. Obviously, we do want to support them in
every fashion possible.
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn has addressed the
Department's cybersecurity strategy, which I understand
involves five pillars: the first, recognition that cyberspace
is a new domain of warfare; two, proactive defenses, avoiding a
fortress mentality; three, ensure the safety of critical
infrastructure; four, undertake collective defense; and five,
sustained technological advantage.
Dr. Vickers, within these pillars, which do you see as the
most challenging to facilitate, and why? Just the whole pillars
of cybersecurity.
Dr. Vickers. Let me say, cyber is an increasingly important
domain of warfare or competition, used both for intelligence
purposes as well as potentially destructive purposes or
warfighting purposes. The U.S. Cyber Command is overseen by our
Policy Under Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
while the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence really oversees the intelligence aspects of this.
But let me try to address your question in saying that the
reason Cyber Command was established was because of the need to
have a command for this emerging domain that is so important to
our national economy and infrastructure, as well as our
warfighting, but also someone to have an organization and a
commander that had responsibility for both offense and defense,
protecting our networks as well as potentially using this tool.
That integration of offense and defense I think will be
very critical to our future, supported by appropriate
intelligence in this new area.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Rooney, let me ask you. When confirmed, you will play
an integral role in implementing Secretary Gates' efficiencies
initiatives also related to personnel, namely the Army and
Marine Corps end strength reductions, freeze in civilian hire,
reduction in contractors in the administration of TRICARE. What
do you believe will be the impact of these initiatives?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, the efficiencies initiatives, as you've
suggested, cut across many of the areas under personnel and
readiness. The first one, from the human resource side, gives
an opportunity to really take a look at that mixture of Active
Duty, Reserve, civilian, and contractors, and looks at the
roles, contractors and civilians, are playing in support
services. Are some of those same programs still viable? Do they
need to be administered differently? I think I've seen the term
used, ``good business practices,'' and that's really just
another way of saying, ``should we be doing the same thing, and
if so should it be done maybe a little bit differently?''
That would be the personnel side and are there ways to cut
some of those costs and combine, really assess, programs. If
they're not working, then at that point they need to be
eliminated and resources shifted to more critical, mission
critical-type initiatives.
The health care side again is a myriad of possible
initiatives, everything from a slight increase in the premiums,
because that hasn't been changed since the mid-1990s, but also
changing behaviors--prescription drugs, using mail order
instead of the current system ends up saving a tremendous
amount over the years. What we call supply chain, which is as
you're purchasing, doing similar purchasing and look at how
you're purchasing supplies for a hospital setting. You get
great efficiencies in that. Contracting, another way that you
can also look at your contracts, make sure you're getting not
only the best prices, but coordination in those areas.
Then there's some other, longer-term initiatives that end
up eventually impacting efficiency, and that would be looking
at practice plans. Are there ways to use urgent care facilities
so that we're not forcing people to go to emergency rooms?
That's also an issue on the civilian side. So there are some
opportunities there, and using primary care physicians
differently in terms of practice focus, and then also those
types of things I've seen also working in mental health areas.
It would be those types of things, taking the current proposals
and expanding on them.
Senator Hagan. You certainly do have a full plate in front
of you. I will say, please look at TRICARE. So many of the
individuals are having trouble having TRICARE accepted in
places that are outside the actual bases.
My time is up. Once again, I thank both of you for your
commitment to our country. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Vickers, you're eminently qualified by virtue of
your military background, your operational experience, your
educational enhancement, and your policy experience. I think
this is a great fit and I will be a very strong supporter and
hope to be working with you on some of these issues in the near
future.
Dr. Rooney, I congratulate you on a very strong career to
date, particularly in the academic area, and your willingness
to serve. At the same time, I would like to learn more from you
about how you have prepared yourself to take the experiences
that you have had and apply them to this position. It's my
understanding from reading your bio that you have not worked
with DOD before; is that correct?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Webb. This is an extremely important under
secretaryship. I would like to point out that I recommended the
creation of this position in 1985 in a memorandum to Caspar
Weinberger. I'm not the only person who's ever recommended this
position, but at the time when I was serving as Assistant
Secretary of Defense, we had 11 different stovepipes moving up
to the Secretary, which was not a healthy management model. Cap
Weinberger's hesitation at the time was that it was going to
consolidate so much of the responsibilities, the day-to-day
responsibilities of DOD, under one office, and if you're going
to do that, you need to make sure that the people at the top
comprehend the special nature of military service and of DOD.
I'd like to point out, if I may--you may have come across
this--that solutions in the military don't always compute on a
traditional civilian model. There are a lot of different
factors in military service and across the board. We have these
situations in the acquisition side, too, as well, but
particularly in the area of personnel.
Your nomination has come forward very fast. It was sent on
February 4, which was a Friday, and we've had 11 days, most of
which last week we weren't here. I have not had the opportunity
to meet with you. I'm the chairman of the Personnel
Subcommittee, which is the subcommittee that would have policy
jurisdiction over the issues that you're working on.
Can you give me a better idea of how you have prepared
yourself to understand the unique cultures that are involved in
the United States military?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I'd be happy to do that. I will step
back a bit and say that when I went from being a business
executive with a background in finance and tax law into higher
education, my first presidency at a doctoral-level institution,
I had never been a higher education administrator. I had taught
for a number of years, but never ran a college or university.
The way I assimilated into that culture was to be a perpetual
student, which is what I would also propose here: learned
really what happened in the institution and walk around, talk
to people, listen, understand. It turned out to be very
effective, to the point where I, prior to this, have been at my
second presidency.
The same with hospitals. When I first started on a hospital
board, quite frankly, the first meeting I sat in I didn't
understand most of the acronyms that were put in front of me.
Again, what I really did was took the time to study it, talk to
the people, spend time in the traditional form, as they say,
walk-around management.
As Senator McCain pointed out earlier, one of the first
things I would do would be to continue what have been
tremendous briefings, but they have certainly been briefings,
sir, and material I've been able to read and get a handle on,
to understand more clearly the military culture, but also that
connection between the military members that this role would
have responsibility for overseeing, personnel and readiness,
but also the civilian counterparts in many ways and how that
system worked together, and the contractors.
I think it would be the breadth of understanding all of
that, and I think my experience in the past shows that I can
definitely make that transformation and dive in with that
passion and that lifelong education focus, would enable me to
prepare and be very effective for this role.
Senator Webb. There are military cultures and there are
cultures within the military cultures, and there are
expectations that have evolved based on service in different
eras, and they all affect the area that you are sitting here
waiting to be confirmed on.
When I was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, we had all 4 Active Services, all 7 Guard and Reserve
components, plus political civilians and career civilians, and
at any staff meeting we had at least 11 different cultural
traditions among the uniformed people sitting at that table,
with different relationships, quite frankly, with the
overarching policies of DOD.
On issues of health care, you just mentioned the notion of
increasing the premiums on TRICARE. Would you elaborate on
that?
Dr. Rooney. I mentioned that one of the efficiencies
initiatives set out for us by the Secretary was a modest
increase, and I believe that number was about $5 per month, in
the premiums, understanding that we have the duty and
obligation to support our Service people--it's what we said
from the beginning, that we would take care of our Service
people--but on the other hand trying to find a balance of
supporting that, but also doing it in a fiscally sound and
sustainable manner. I would support the Secretary's position in
looking at those modest increases.
Senator Webb. Here's something you want to remember. As
someone who grew up in the military, served in the military,
have family members in the military, health care--lifetime
health care for career military people--was part of a moral
contract. I grew up inside that moral contract. On the one
hand, if you're applying a civilian model to a DOD medical
program, you can say, ``well, if you compare a civilian health
care plan, this is an incredibly good deal.'' On the other
hand, these are people who have been told since the day they
came into the military that they're going to have health care
for the rest of their lives if they give a career to the U.S.
military.
It's a moral contract. I'm the chairman of the subcommittee
that's going to have to evaluate this proposal, and I hope you
will pay strong attention to--again, this is the abstract
nature of military service that doesn't come out when you try
to compare a model directly with civilian programs.
There are a number of other areas like that. I'm going to
ask you to do something. I'm going to ask you to come by and
see me. I did not have the opportunity to talk to you, and we
can discuss some of these things a bit more.
Dr. Rooney. I would welcome the opportunity, sir.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Webb.
I'm next in order, but let me recognize Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me too add to all of my colleagues, our thanks for your
service, to both of you, and your willingness to serve. I think
it's admirable.
Dr. Vickers, first with you. I've read your bio and I've
learned a little bit about you and I like everything I see.
Also, I'm new. With some of my colleagues, we're new to this
committee, but we're also new to this process of evaluating
where we are in the world, where we're going and how we get
there in the most efficient manner. You seem to have been part
of an Afghanistan movement back with the Soviet Union and what
you were able to witness, what you were able to be a part of,
to see an outcome, and to see how we dropped the ball. I think
that was very well-documented.
We're in a situation now where, if you could for me
identify who our enemy is in the Middle East, what the strength
of our enemy is, what is the cost to our enemy, what they're
financing their war with, and compared to what we as the United
States Government and the people that are supporting our
troops, which we will always do, and the comparison between
what you saw in the outcome of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan to where we are today, and the predicted outcome--
it's the longest war we've ever been in and we're not seeing
much change. If you could help me with that, sir, first, your
evaluation, because I don't know of a better person that's had
a bird's-eye view and can evaluate this than you.
Dr. Vickers. Thank you, sir. As you alluded to, one of the
tragedies at the end of the Cold War, one of the great
tragedies, is that we, after winning the war in Afghanistan,
driving the Red Army out, failed to win the peace and left a
sanctuary in which al Qaeda could grow, in partnership with the
Taliban, that then led to the events of September 11. Secretary
Gates has said repeatedly that we will never make that mistake
again.
As part of your second question----
Senator Manchin. I'm sorry to interrupt you on that, but if
I could just ask for a further clarification. With that comment
that Secretary Gates made and with the failure of before, of
the Soviets, then what we're saying is that we need to have a
presence, maybe a different type of a presence, but we will
have to have a presence over there. The American people should
understand, the citizens of this country should understand, we
have to have a presence there.
Dr. Vickers. What form that engagement takes, of course,
will be determined based on conditions down the road. But
unlike at the end of the Cold War, where we essentially
disengaged from that region and allowed an ungoverned area to
become very hostile to us and to provide a sanctuary for al
Qaeda, it's something that we don't want to repeat. A core
element of our counterterrorism policy is to deny any sanctuary
to terrorists, so that they can't plan operations against the
Homeland or our interests abroad.
You asked about the enemy. Unlike the Cold War, which was a
very daunting time for Americans of a previous generation, but
it had one virtue, that we had a principal adversary that we
could focus on for a long period of time, and we got very good
at that by the last decade of the Cold War. Today we face a
more complex environment with a number of challenges around the
world.
Foremost among those right now is the continued threat that
violent extremism poses to us, and specifically al Qaeda. It's
why the President and his topmost advisors have said we are at
war with al Qaeda, and that war spans a number of areas. Al
Qaeda and its affiliates do not depend on great sums of
financial strength to be able to plot against us in the manner
they do. The September 11 attacks, for example, were carried
out with approximately $500,000 of investment.
Our Treasury Department, working with our interagency
partners and partners around the world, does everything they
can to constrict the flow of funds to al Qaeda and other
terrorist and insurgent groups, and has had a significant
success. But there are still funds flowing to various groups
and, as I said, funding is not the critical resource that they
depend on. It's willing people to do these attacks.
Senator Manchin. What's the strength of al Qaeda in
Afghanistan?
Dr. Vickers. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is largely confined
now to mid-level operatives, no senior operatives.
Senator Manchin. 10,000, 100,000?
Dr. Vickers. No, sir. The Taliban insurgency is in the tens
of thousands. Al Qaeda would be under 50,000 or so, 50,000 to
75,000, and that is on a part-time basis. Al Qaeda is
principally concentrated elsewhere, in Pakistan and then its
affiliates in Yemen and elsewhere.
Senator Manchin. We have how many troops in Afghanistan
now?
Dr. Vickers. We have just about 98,000 troops, just shy of
100,000, and 40,000-some of our coalition partners, and
building up a substantial Afghan National Security Force
(ANSF).
The principal challenge in Afghanistan is the Taliban which
is still aligned with al Qaeda. They provided sanctuary to them
in the past. It is adjacent to Pakistan, where al Qaeda's
senior leadership resides currently. The President's stated
goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and prevent
their return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. So Pakistan and
Afghanistan are an integrated strategy for the United States.
Even though Afghanistan is not principally where al Qaeda is,
it could become a future safe haven if we were to repeat the
errors we made after the Cold War.
Senator Manchin. I think the hardest thing that I have to
understand, I know the people in West Virginia have to
understand, is the greatest army that history has ever known,
the United States, and the greatest trained and equipped
soldiers, we're at 100,000 and let's say that our enemy may be
at 30,000 maximum, probably more 10,000 or 15,000, by every
report that I'm receiving.
I've also read in your bio that you have a different type
of a procedure that you think would have worked there, or maybe
you still think that or not, by an unconventional type of war
with your special operations. I think that it sounds very
intriguing and it seems like we're not going in that direction.
Dr. Vickers. Sir, every counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency challenge has to be taken on its own merits
and time. Ultimately, these are internal conflicts or
transnational conflicts. We can't prevail in these wars
without--in the counterterrorism case, it's a global
challenge--a host of international partners. We simply couldn't
do it by ourselves. In any intra-state conflict, in an
insurgency, ultimately it's the locals that have to be able to
secure their territory. Sometimes we have to create the time
and space for them to be able to do that as we build them up.
After our great success in 2001 of overthrowing the Taliban
and kicking al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, we unfortunately did
not build up ANSFs to a sufficient level where they could gain
control or stabilize their country and secure it. We are
rapidly addressing that in the past few years.
Again, I would just caution that some of this is in the
range of tactics specific to a portion in time, that may apply
to one situation or one country and not another, or for this
period of time and not a later period of time. But ultimately
we have to empower locals to succeed.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, if I may very quickly just
follow up.
If I may request that maybe I can meet with you personally
and go into that in more detail, I would appreciate it very
much, sir.
Dr. Rooney, just very quickly. I have heard and I know that
Senator Webb had mentioned and talked about some concerns he
may have. That would be a valid concern when you see the
resume, but the bottom line is I also see your private sector
experience, too. Would you consider yourself a cost-cutter or
efficiency expert?
Dr. Rooney. I think if you ask those that have worked with
me, they'd probably say yes.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Let me take my time and then recognize Senator Ayotte for a
second round and, Senator Blumenthal, if you also want a second
round.
Secretary Vickers, Dr. Rooney, welcome. Thank you for your
service. I've had the privilege to work with Secretary Vickers
before. Thank you very much.
First of all, because of your extensive experience in your
field of endeavor, if there's anything that you feel would be
best held to comment on in a private, nonpublic session, let me
know. Don't feel obliged to answer. But one question I think is
obvious in the wake of the last several days. We have
cooperated and collaborated with intelligence services
throughout the Maghreb--Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, et cetera.
What's your estimate of the status today of that cooperation
going forward? Would that impose any complications on efforts
under your jurisdiction?
Dr. Vickers. Sir, the U.S. Government has intelligence
relationships with scores of partners around the world, many
scores of partners, including in North Africa and the Middle
East. Each of those relationships is important in some right,
but they vary in terms of the depth of intelligence sharing and
the particular threat that emanates from that country. I would
hesitate in this open session to give a general answer, other
than it's very important.
A number of al Qaeda plots are broken up every year and
they are done by our local partners with intelligence
assistance in some cases from us, in some cases intelligence
provided by them. Our relationships with some of these
countries that have had instability in recent weeks, we've had
longstanding ties with them that will transcend this
instability, both on the military side and on the civilian
intelligence side. Sir, I'd be happy to talk to you about it in
greater detail.
Senator Reed. Let me open up another topic, which Senator
Hagan alluded to. That's cyber security. History often suggests
that we fight the last war and prepare for the last war. I
think we all recognize now that, even in the context of low-
intensity conflict, that cyber activities are becoming
increasingly more important. Let me pose some issues.
How well do you think we're prepared for it, its coming, to
what are the gaps, technological, institutional, and even legal
gaps, in terms of your ability to actually deal with this new
technology?
Dr. Vickers. Sir, it is critically important and it's a
domain that, as you indicated, is employed by both state and
non-state actors in both forms of conflict, both for
intelligence purposes as well as disruption and others. Cyber
poses a number of challenges because it is inherently a global
enterprise, so a lot of cyber traffic, of course, comes through
the United States, which previous Congresses have addressed,
which has been a tremendous help to U.S. intelligence.
I would be guilty of practicing law without a license if I
go too far----
Senator Reed. You wouldn't be the first here. [Laughter.]
Dr. Vickers. But in some cases it raises questions when the
web site or server, for example, raises neutrality questions in
law, of where that site is located. So it poses a number of
unique challenges for us.
Then of course, there's always intelligence gain-loss when
we look at operations in these areas. Is it better to monitor
someone or take down? There's always very difficult decisions
for policymakers to weigh in that area as well.
Senator Reed. I think this is again a topic that will
consume us, indeed consume us going forward.
Dr. Rooney, you've had an extraordinarily accomplished
career. My colleagues with more experience have commented on
the unique culture of the military, and it is unique. But my
sense is that you have associated yourself and worked with
people who share some of the same attributes as our military.
They have vocations, not just jobs; and they're dedicated to
selfless service, not just to personal ambition. I think in
your service and your association you have those, so I think
those might be touchstones going forward as you begin this job
and I think they will be valuable touchstones.
But let me ask two basic questions. You have a myriad of
responsibilities, from the immediate you've spoken about, but
there's one that's continuing, and that is to try to integrate
not just the operations within DOD, but DOD and the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA). I know VA Secretary Shinseki has been
working very diligently on this.
We have problems where soldiers, sailors, marines, and
airmen are injured and then they had disability determinations
and then they're transferred to the VA system and there's no
continuity of care. Just whatever impressions you have today of
how you're going to deal with more fully integrating what the
VA does for our veterans with what DOD does for Active Duty and
Reserve personnel?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. While I have not been able to have an
entire deep dive, what I can say is what I've learned is you're
absolutely correct that the timing--even with the new
integrated system--there is the first phase of that's been put
in; there's two more phases throughout this year. My
understanding is that will proceed on the timeline outlined.
But those timeframes are still approaching just under a year,
340 days, I think was the last I saw.
I think any of us sitting here, while we might not know
what the exact answer is, if you're looking for those services
a day is too long, a week is too long. There are clearly some
opportunities where better coordination and being able to
understand where that process is bogging down. My understanding
is it's in three different areas. What can be done to ensure
much better communication and cooperation, building on--yes, a
technology infrastructure is one way, so you don't duplicate
services, but it's not the only answer at this point.
I concur that what I've seen really points out some
improvement, but a dramatic need for some further coordination
between all areas.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
One other area. Under the new financial reform legislation,
we have created a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and
within that Bureau, there is an Office of Servicemember
Affairs. In fact, Holly Petraeus is leading that up. I'm sure
you will, but I urge you to ensure you link up, because some of
the problems that military personnel face in terms of paying
bills, in terms of getting appropriate resolution of their
rights under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act is a function
not only of DOD, but this new bureau. A lot of what you can do
and will do through the Services is educating young military
personnel about their rights and their responsibilities. That's
just some advice as you, I assume, prepare to take these
responsibilities.
Dr. Rooney. Thank you, sir. If confirmed, I will.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, doctor.
Dr. Rooney. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rooney, you were talking with Senator Webb about the
health care system within the military and he mentioned to you
the moral obligation that we have to the military. Appreciating
that we're in a fiscal climate where we do need to look to do
things differently, there are still some unmet needs. In my
State of New Hampshire, we have approximately the fifth or
seventh highest per capita rate of veterans in the country.
Yet, effectively we're the only State in the Nation that does
not have a full-service veterans hospital. Alaska is similarly
situated, but there is an Active Duty military base in Alaska
where there is full service available.
I would ask you for a commitment to work with me to look at
that need and to come up with a solution so that the needs of
veterans in New Hampshire are met, and particularly since we
have more and more deploying as well in the Guard and becoming
veterans and serving our country.
I would ask you to look at that very carefully, because it
is a moral obligation that we have to fulfill and,
unfortunately, my State is one where I don't believe that moral
obligation is being fully met.
Dr. Rooney. Absolutely. If confirmed, I would look forward
to that.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
The other question I have for you, we had talked briefly
yesterday about this, but given the multiple deployments of our
Guard and Reserve, what is it that you think that we can do to
ensure that when our Guard and Reserve deploy and also when
they return home that the services are in place to make sure
that as they return to civilian life, both they and their
families are getting the services that they need? Because with
the multiple deployments in the Active Duty, there is usually a
base where there is a much more robust set of programs
available than in the Guard and Reserve. Yet we've asked so
much of our Guard and Reserve with these deployments.
I would ask you what thoughts you have on that to make sure
that we are serving our Guard and Reserve and so when they come
home that they can acclimate back into civilian life and we
give them that support that they deserve?
Dr. Rooney. You're right. I'm glad we had a brief
opportunity to have that conversation. But really, the issue
does come that this is the first time where we have relied on
the Guard and Reserve and their families to the extent that we
have with multiple deployments. One of the factors I think
everyone is recognizing now is when these people go home it
isn't to a base. They're scattering throughout their States,
they're scattering throughout the country.
The Department has not always been acutely aware of how to
connect those people to services. At times--and we talked about
it--there are some good examples where private sector
nonprofits are brought in to be able to cover that. But that's
not uniform across the country. So it would be a combination of
looking at some of those States and those areas where those
services are being connected better and seeing ways to do that
across the country.
The other thing would be to close some gaps, where there
are benefits being given to Active Duty, but yet there's some
that slip through for education, potentially, to make sure that
those again extend to employers; to see how again that reentry
process can be either streamlined and also involve the
employers in that. Again, it's uniformity across the country,
but there are some good examples out there to build on.
Senator Ayotte. Very good. I appreciate that, and also
would point you to a New Hampshire program called the
deployment cycle support program that is a partnership between
State agencies and also the private sector, as a pilot or one
that you could look to, that I think is very effective and one
that other States could employ as well.
Dr. Rooney. Absolutely.
Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, we had testimony in
February from General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey about Iraq
and our withdrawal from Iraq in December. I wanted to get your
assessment, the other day I saw a report of another terrorist
incident in Iraq. My question to you is, do you have any
concerns about our ability to transfer security as of December
to the Iraqis? Also, we're going to leave a significant
responsibility to protect our own people with the State
Department, without the military support. What thoughts do you
have on that?
Dr. Vickers. I am confident that we're on the path toward
this transition. There will be a robust civilian mission--as
Iraq becomes a normal country, there will still be a large
diplomatic mission, with military assistance, intelligence, a
range of things to ensure that any threats to the stability of
Iraq or threats external there are properly dealt with through
our Iraqi partners.
That transition has already been well underway since August
2010 on a path to the end of 2011, and I have no reason to
expect that it won't succeed. There is still violence in Iraq,
but it is at very low levels compared to what it has been. Some
of these attacks of course make news and they will continue to
be a challenge for Iraq going forward, but it's something I
have high confidence that the Iraqis can handle.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Reed. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a couple of quick questions. First, to pursue the very
significant questions asked by Senator Reed, and more comment
on them than question. If there are any legal impediments to
your efforts in this cyber area, I would very much like to know
about them and I hope that you will suggest them, because I
think, as Senator Reed very importantly observed, this is the
next war or it may be even the present war, and if there's
anything that you need in that area, meaning you collectively,
DOD, our defense efforts, I would appreciate your letting us
know.
Then to pursue an answer that you gave to Senator McCain.
He asked about the corruption in Pakistan, which you very
adroitly referred to as a governance challenge. Do we face the
same kind of governance challenge in Afghanistan and, if so, to
what extent, and what are we doing about it?
Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. In any counterinsurgency, governance
and development are essential lines of operation as much as
security. Ultimately, of course, it's up to the people of a
nation to determine how they'll be governed. Afghanistan's
history has been one essentially of decentralized government, a
central state that does some functions, but then the provinces
and local areas have a lot of autonomy. When Afghanistan has
been stable throughout its history, it's been with that model.
The challenge is to make sure that there is governance that
first and foremost meets the needs of the Afghan people, but,
second, also does not undermine the international coalition's
effort through corruption or other areas in providing
assistance to the Government of Afghanistan. So governance is a
central challenge in stability and it is in Afghanistan as it
is in many countries around the world. But in Afghanistan, of
course, we have 100,000 troops and so we care very dearly about
it.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Dr. Rooney, just very briefly. You may be aware that in the
past there have been difficulties in some of the treatment of
our National Guard and our reservists in terms of recognizing
that they have become in effect part of our Active-Duty Force
and the failure to recognize that service in educational
benefits and sometimes health care has been a problem. I've
observed it in Connecticut, and I would appreciate your
commitment that you will do everything possible to make sure
that they are given the recognition they deserve in terms of
those benefits and fair treatment and keeping faith with them.
Dr. Rooney. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
I want to thank Secretary Vickers and Dr. Rooney for your
testimony today and, on behalf of Chairman Levin and the
Ranking Member, Senator McCain, for your service and your
prospective service.
If there are no further questions, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Michael G. Vickers by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD)
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Special Operations reforms have endured for a generation. I do not
see a need for any modifications at this time. If confirmed as the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), I will be alert
to the need for any modifications.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the USD(I)?
Answer. The USD(I)'s primary responsibility is to support the
Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related
responsibilities and authorities under title 10 and title 50 U.S.C.
This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the
Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on
behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations
within the Department of Defense (DOD); ensuring that intelligence
organizations in DOD are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to
support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DOD
components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, are
responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the
execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant forces,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the
Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring
that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and
managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive
activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and
managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense Department
personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military
Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DOD components funded by
the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and in
compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring
that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-
related information sufficient to execute its oversight
responsibilities.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe I have the background and
experience to perform the duties of the USD(I). My qualifications
include: my training, operational experience, duties, and
accomplishments as a Special Forces soldier and officer, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Officer, and Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)); my experience as a
producer and consumer of intelligence at both the tactical/operational
and national levels; my experience executing and overseeing clandestine
operations and covert action programs; and my regular interaction and
close relationships with the Office of the USD(I), the leadership of
the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the leadership of several key
foreign intelligence services.
For the past 3\1/2\ years as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have had
responsibility for overseeing the global operations of DOD, including
the war with al Qaeda, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sensitive
counterproliferation and counternarcotics operations. I have had
responsibility for overseeing a wide-range of intelligence operations,
spanning the full range of intelligence priorities and capabilities,
and have had responsibility for overseeing and supporting the full-
range of special activities conducted by other agencies of the U.S.
Government. As a member of the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, I have
participated in the major resource allocation decisions of the
Department, including many involving national and military
intelligence. I have had access to all of the Department's special
access programs.
As a senior policy official, I have participated extensively in
Deputies' Committee Meetings, and occasionally, Principals' Committee
Meetings and meetings of the National Security Council chaired by the
President, and through this experience, I have developed a keen
appreciation for how intelligence supports policy. As a result of my
oversight of global operations and the operational capabilities of the
Department, I have developed a deep understanding of intelligence-
driven operations and the Department's intelligence capabilities,
including those in the cyber domain.
I am a graduate of the CIA's Career Training Program and a CIA-
certified Operations Officer. I have served operationally in three CIA
Divisions: Latin America, Special Activities, and Near East and South
Asia. I have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship
with the Director and Deputy Directors of the CIA, as well as the
Chiefs of CIA Centers, Divisions, Offices, and Stations and Bases. I
have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship with the
DNI and the staff and components of Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI). I have had extensive interaction with and have a
deep understanding of the intelligence organizations of DOD. I have had
frequent interaction and have close relationships with the heads of
several foreign intelligence services.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe there are actions I would need to
take to strengthen OUSD(I)'s oversight of the military intelligence
program and clandestine activities and support for the national
intelligence program. I also believe there are actions I could take
that could achieve further efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe the Secretary would expect me to
discharge the duties and functions--both explicit and implicit--as
outlined above. I believe the Secretary would expect me to ensure full
intelligence support for ongoing operations; to ensure that
intelligence operations conducted by DOD are effective and in
compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and
policies; to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
postured to prevent strategic surprise; to ensure, without abrogating
the Secretary's statutory responsibilities, that the DNI has visibility
and oversight over the full range of intelligence activities in the
Department; and to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
as efficient as possible. The Secretary may also assign me other duties
as his priorities and my background and experience warrant.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will provide my full support to
the Secretary of Defense in carrying out my duties as his principal
advisor on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. I will keep
him informed, seek his guidance and direction, exercise his oversight
authority on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security-related
matters throughout the Department, and attempt to relieve him of as
many burdens in the intelligence domain as possible.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will keep the Deputy Secretary
fully informed of my activities and will afford him the same support
provided the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Each of the Under Secretaries has vital functions to carry
out. If confirmed as USD(I), I will work closely with each of them. A
close relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
and the USD(I) is particularly important. In my current position as
ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked to forge a close relationship between
Defense Policy and Defense Intelligence and between Policy and the
broader Intelligence Community. I have also worked closely with
components of the IC on major collection systems. If confirmed as
USD(I), I would to continue to build on these relationships.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and
Information Integration (ASD(NII))/Successor Organization.
Answer. ASD(NII) has had oversight of enabling capabilities which
are central to the conduct of intelligence and security-related
activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the successor
organization to ASD(NII) to ensure that this support remains robust.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for
Detainee Policy on the intelligence aspects of detainee policy and
operations.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities
(ASD(SO/LIC&IC)).
Answer. USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) interact on several important
matters, and this interaction has grown substantially during my tenure
ASD(SO/LIC&IC). As the previous ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I will be well-placed,
if confirmed, to ensure that this close interaction continues. If
confirmed, I would seek to further expand the already close
relationships that exist between Defense Intelligence and Special
Operations Forces (SOF) and between the broader Intelligence Community
and SOF.
Question. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence
Directors.
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), as the Program Executive for the
Military Intelligence Program, I will work with the Secretaries of the
Military Departments and the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure
their intelligence requirements are met, that the Military Departments
and Services develop intelligence capabilities appropriate for the
current and future security environment, and that the intelligence
organizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their
respective Military Department/Service, the Joint Force, the
Department, and the Nation.
Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked very closely with the
General Counsel and his staff. If confirmed as USD(I), I will continue
to work closely with the General Counsel, and seek his advice on the
myriad legal issues that impact USD(I)'s duties and functions.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a wide range of
issues. If confirmed as USD(I), I would continue this close
relationship to ensure that Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence
Community meet the requirements of the Joint Staff and combatant
commands.
Question. The commanders of the combatant commands, including U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have had policy oversight of SOCOM,
U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S.
Transportation Command. I was involved in the initial planning for the
establishment of U.S. Cyber Command. I have had close relationships
with all of the geographic combatant commanders. If confirmed as
USD(I), I will build on these relationships to ensure that the
intelligence needs of the commanders of the combatant commands are met.
Question. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Directors
of the Defense intelligence agencies. If confirmed as USD(I), I will
exercise the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control
over the National Security Agency (NSA), NGA, NRO, and DIA. In this
capacity, I will provide planning, policy, and strategic oversight over
the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security policy, plans, and
programs they execute. I will work with the Office of the DNI to ensure
clear and unambiguous guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence
agencies.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Office of
the DNI and its components, and have worked closely with the Director.
If confirmed as USD(I), I intend to fully support the DNI in his goal
of greater Intelligence Community integration. Dual-hatted as the DNI's
Director of Defense Intelligence, if confirmed, I will advise the DNI
on Defense intelligence capabilities. I will exercise the Secretary of
Defense's authority, direction, and control over the Directors of NSA,
NGA, NRO and DIA, and I will consult with the DNI regarding national
intelligence and related matters as appropriate.
Question. The Director of Central Intelligence.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked to forge a particularly
close relationship between the CIA and the Department. If confirmed as
USD(I), I will strive to forge an even closer relationship with the
Director of CIA, and will fully support him in his role as National
Manager for Human Intelligence.
Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked very closely with the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. If confirmed as
USD(I), I will build on this already close relationship, and provide
policy, oversight, and guidance for all Defense intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security support provided to the National
Counterterrorism Center.
Question. The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National
Intelligence.
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will fully support the Deputy and
Assistant Directors of National Intelligence to ensure unity of effort
in the direction and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with
intelligence responsibilities.
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Secretary of
Defense's focal point for intelligence, counterintelligence, and
security matters for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I will
work with DHS to expand our intelligence and law enforcement
information-sharing initiatives with state and local authorities.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the USD(I)?
Answer. The major challenges that, in my view, will confront the
next USD(I) are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of global
operations and unmet demand for intelligence in an era of intelligence-
driven operations; the need to adapt to a rapidly changing intelligence
environment; the need to address longer-term challenges to prevent
strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations; and the
need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment.
Additionally, we must do a better job of protecting intelligence
sources and methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of
information.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If I am confirmed, given the importance of intelligence to
ongoing operations, I would do my best to ensure that sufficient
resources are devoted to the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and that
intelligence is shared as widely as possible while also ensuring that
it is properly protected. I would also ensure that the clear priorities
are established, that actions are taken to mitigate strategic risk, and
that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient and adaptive
as possible.
Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems
in the performance of the functions of the USD(I)?
Answer. One of the most serious problems currently confronting the
USD(I) is the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The
spate of unauthorized disclosures of very sensitive information places
our forces, our military operations, and our foreign relations at risk.
It threatens to undermine senior leaders' confidence in the
confidentiality of their deliberations, and the confidence our foreign
partners have that classified information they share with us will be
protected.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. The Office of the USD(I) (OUSD(I)) recently led a
comprehensive review of information security policy. If confirmed, I
will work with the DOD Chief Information Officer to facilitate
immediate implementation of the review's recommendations, as
appropriate, and will take additional actions as required.
PRIORITIES
Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you were quoted as saying: ``I spend
about 95 percent of my time on operations'' leaving the rest of your
time for ``Service Secretary-like'' activities including policy,
personnel, organizational, and development and acquisition decisions
impacting Special Operations Forces.
Do you believe that division of time was appropriate in your
position as ASD(SO/LIC&IC)?
Answer. I have been assigned a very broad set of responsibilities
during my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). Per the statutory obligations of
ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have oversight of Special Operations Forces. I also
serve as the Secretary's principal advisor on Irregular Warfare matters
across the Department. I help provide oversight of the Department's
global operations, including the war with al Qaeda and its affiliates
and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have shared oversight of the
Department's clandestine operations and sensitive activities, including
several which have involved the collection of intelligence. I have
regularly participated in the national security policy decisionmaking
process at Deputies' Committee meetings, and serve as the Secretary's
principal advisor on special activities conducted by other agencies of
the U.S. Government. In my Interdependent Capabilities role, I have had
oversight of the Department's strategic and conventional forces, in
addition to the Department's Special Operations Forces. I also help
oversee the Department's special access programs. I have oversight of
the Department counternarcotics and counterthreat finance activities,
stability operations, partnership strategy, and humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, and was recently assigned responsibility for
overseeing additional aspects of the Department's information
operations (IO).
The time I have personally devoted to each of these areas has
varied, consistent with their importance to the Department's mission
and the degree to which I could delegate oversight to my Principal
Deputy. During the first 18 months of my tenure, I spent substantial
amounts of time on capability and resource allocation decisions across
strategic, conventional, and Special Operations Forces. During the
2009-2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, I focused intensely on the
Special Operations and Irregular Warfare capabilities of the
Department. The unprecedented scale and scope of operations in which
U.S. forces are involved, and the strategic importance of and oversight
required for sensitive activities conducted by the United States have
required increasing amounts of my time since mid-2008. With the war
with al Qaeda and its affiliates, the war in Afghanistan, and other
sensitive operations for which I have oversight responsibilities, the
preponderance of my time in 2010 has been devoted to oversight of
operations. This has been in line with the President's and Secretary's
priorities. Throughout my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), blessed with my
exceptionally capable and willing partner in Admiral Eric Olson, I
believe that I have provided the strong oversight of and advocacy for
Special Operations Forces that Congress intended when it established
the position of ASD(SO/LIC). I likewise believe I have been effective
in fulfilling my duties across my entire portfolio. Accordingly, I
believe that the allocation of my time has been appropriate.
Question. How would you anticipate dividing your time as the
USD(I)?
Answer. Although there is some overlap, the duties and functions
assigned to USD(I) are very different from those I currently have as
ASD(SO/LIC&IC). That said, if confirmed, I would use a similar approach
to allocating my time: focusing on the President's and Secretary's top
priorities and on the most difficult challenges, and delegating other
responsibilities where I can to my Principal Deputy or other senior
staff. I would anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of
intelligence operations, the development of intelligence capabilities,
and other duties as the Secretary and the DNI may assign.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the USD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I would establish the following
broad priorities: (1) ensuring that the full weight of Defense
intelligence capabilities are brought to bear to achieve the
President's objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al
Qaeda, creating and sustaining stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Iraq, and supporting other ongoing operations in which the Department
is engaged or may be engaged; (2) ensuring that intelligence operations
conducted by DOD are effective and in compliance with all relevant
statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; (3) ensuring that the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic
surprise and fully exploit emerging opportunities; and (4) ensuring
that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. I
would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that we have the
right collection and analytical priorities, that we have a robust ISR
architecture (both space and airborne), today and in the future, that
the Department's clandestine operations are fully integrated with those
of the CIA and National Clandestine Service, that the President's
highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced, that
analysis addresses policymakers and operational commanders' needs, that
intelligence is timely, accessible, and protected, and, where
appropriate, that we aggressively exploit advances in technology to
improve our intelligence capabilities.
COMBATING TERRORISM
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism (CT), both
at home and abroad?
Answer. The Department's counterterrorism strategy directly
supports the President's stated goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al Qaeda and its affiliates, first operationally and regionally, and
then strategically and globally. Operationally defeating al Qaeda and
its affiliates requires actions that render the organization incapable
of planning and conducting attacks. Doing this requires, among other
things, that the relationship between al Qaeda and groups that support
al Qaeda and provide it sanctuary be severed. Strategically defeating
al Qaeda requires preventing al Qaeda's resurgence. Achieving these
aims requires a sustained global CT campaign involving several mutually
reinforcing direct and indirect lines of operation. These include
preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by
terrorist groups, conducting operations to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat terrorist organizations and deny them sanctuary, building the
capacity of our partners, and countering radicalization. Within zones
of hostilities, the Department has a lead role, along with our
international partners. Outside such zones and those areas where named
operations authorized by the President are being conducted, the
Department plays a supporting role. While al Qaeda and its affiliates
remain the most dangerous threat to the United States, my assessment is
that we--the Department, the U.S. Government, and our international
partners--have the correct strategy, and it is increasingly working,
particularly since mid-2008.
Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities
related to combating terrorism?
Answer. If confirmed, I will build on the work of my predecessors
to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is fully engaged and
supportive of all efforts to defeat al Qaeda and combat terrorism. I
will work closely with the Military Departments and Services, the
Defense intelligence agencies, the combatant commanders, the
Intelligence Community, and our international partners to ensure that
we have the intelligence capabilities we need to achieve our CT
objectives.
Question. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure
that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?
Answer. During my tenure as the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), it has become
increasingly clear to me that close collaboration among U.S.
departments and agencies and with our international partners is
essential to CT success. Within DOD, we have restructured our
organization to ensure full interagency contributions to the fight,
through the establishment, for example, of Joint Interagency Task
Forces (JIATF). We have forged an extremely close operational
partnership with CIA and the Intelligence Community, and we have
substantially strengthened our international capacity building efforts.
We have also given top priority to the rapid development of CT and
counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities. I believe these actions posture
the Department to effectively combat terrorism.
Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
agencies?
Answer. During my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), we have worked hard to
achieve unity of effort in CT operations across the U.S. national and
homeland security establishment. This has included significant efforts
to improve coordination of operations and interagency concurrence. If
confirmed as USD(I), I would seek to build on this by moving, for
example, from coordination of intelligence operations to integration.
SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS
Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you had oversight of all section 1208
activities by Special Operations Forces to provide support (including
training, funding, and equipment) to foreign regular forces, irregular
forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations
to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. Since its enactment in 2005, Section 1208 has been a
critical authority for the war with al Qaeda and for counterterrorism
and related COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the specific
details of Section 1208 use are classified, it has enabled important
human intelligence operations, operational preparation of the
environment, advance force operations, unconventional warfare
operations, and partnered CT operations.
Question. Do you believe changes to the authority and/or funding
restrictions are needed?
Answer. I support the current request for additional funding
authority, raising the annual funding level restriction from $40
million to $50 million, and I support extending the authority for the
duration of named counterterrorist operations and for other
contingencies.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS
Question. During your time as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), Special Operations
Forces expanded their role in a number of areas important to countering
violent extremist organizations, including those related to information
and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
What changes, if any, would you recommend to SOCOM's title 10
missions?
Answer. The list of special operations activities in section 167 of
title 10, U.S.C. could be updated to reflect SOCOM's current list of
core tasks and the missions assigned to it in the Unified Command Plan.
The language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C. also includes ``such
other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary
of Defense,'' which provides the President and the Secretary the
flexibility they need to meet changing circumstances.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role of Special
Operations Forces in the Department's IO?
Answer. IOs are a core SOF task. They are a vital instrument in
countering violent extremism and other transnational threats. They can
greatly enable unconventional warfare operations. IO support special
operations from the combatant command level to the tactical
battlefield.
Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
by special operations personnel different from those carried out by
others in the Intelligence Community?
Answer. Some intelligence operations conducted by special
operations personnel have unique attributes which are a function of the
background, training, and experience of special operators, the missions
assigned to their organizations, the intelligence targets they pursue,
and the collection methods they employ. Special operations intelligence
activities primarily support SOF intelligence requirements. However,
when directed, SOF intelligence operations also support Intelligence
Community and combatant commander requirements. For certain national
collection missions, SOF personnel receive the same training as
officers in national intelligence organizations.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence
activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are adequately
coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the
Intelligence Community?
Answer. Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence
activities with the Intelligence Community as required by applicable
law, policy, and agreements, including Intelligence Community Directive
Number 304 and the Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and CIA
Concerning Operational Activities, July 20, 2005. If confirmed, I would
further the operational integration between SOF and the Intelligence
Community that has progressively been put in place during my tenure as
ASD(SO/LIC&IC).
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have with
respect to military information support operations (MISO)?
Answer. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise plays a crucial role in
support of MISOs. Collecting and analyzing the information required to
understand complex foreign human environments is the foundation for
effective IOs. Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure that military
IOs are properly coordinated and operationally integrated with the IOs
of other organizations within the Intelligence Community.
Question. DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of
the term ``psychological operations'' in favor of the term ``military
information support operations.''
Why do you believe such a terminology change was necessary?
Answer. Psychological operations as a term had become increasingly
anachronistic, and had taken on avoidable, negative connotations. MISO
is a more accurate description of the purpose of these operations.
Question. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe
such a change will have?
Answer. I believe it will have positive operational and doctrinal
impacts.
Question. In your experience as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), do you believe the
Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the
range of military information support missions being asked of them?
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and as a senior advisor to the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review before that, I strongly supported
significant growth in our psychological operations/MISOs force
structure. MISO forces remain in high demand across our combatant
commands. MISOs require specially trained personnel and unique
capabilities, and such personnel are important assets not only for the
Department, but for other departments and agencies of the U.S.
Government as well. Given the rapid rate of change in the information
environment and the diverse character of this environment, sustained
modernization and a diverse portfolio of capabilities is required. Our
long-term goal is measured growth and significant quality improvements
for this force.
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded a growing number
of psychological operations and influence programs under the rubric of
strategic communications programs. While the Department does not have
any separate documentation outlining these activities, the Government
Accountability Office reports that DOD ``spent hundreds of millions of
dollars each year'' to support these operations, including initiatives
funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and
the geographic combatant commands. Many of these programs support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support
Teams from SOCOM are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of
particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the
Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
In your capacity as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you had limited oversight of a
number of these programs. In the position for which you have been
nominated, you will continue to play a role in these programs.
What are your views on DOD's strategic communications,
psychological operations and influence programs, and their integration
into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?
Answer. The effectiveness of Department IOs in the rapidly evolving
global information environment is an increasingly important determinant
of our ability to achieve U.S. military objectives. DOD has an
important role in IOs, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in
zones of armed conflict. DOD IOs must be integrated with other U.S.
Government efforts--those by the Department of State and other
government agencies--to shape information environments to our
advantage. They must also reduce our adversaries' abilities to do the
same.
Question. In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second-in-command,
declared that ``We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking
place in the battlefield of the media.'' Earlier this year, a non-
partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter
radical ideologies that foment violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-
Jihadism).
As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), what did you do to further DOD's strategic
appreciation of the ideological basis of al Qaeda and its affiliates?
Answer. DOD fully recognizes the importance of al Qaeda's ideology
and the extent to which it underpins the al Qaeda movement. As ASD(SO/
LIC&IC), I worked to advance this strategic appreciation within DOD and
across the interagency. I have strongly advocated for programs and
activities, many of which are conducted by other departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government, to deal with the ideological challenge
posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates. In the unclassified realm, my
office was recently involved in the establishment of the Department of
State-led Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, which
will serve as the interagency focal point for U.S. Government counter-
radicalization efforts.
Question. In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that
foment violence?
Answer. The most effective counter will be within the affected
population and the radical groups themselves.
Question. What do you understand to be the role of the Intelligence
Community, as opposed to DOD and the State Department?
Answer. The Intelligence Community has special authorities and
capabilities that can be brought to bear. Intelligence collection and
analysis informs all IOs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to utilize the results
of research being conducted by DOD's Minerva and Human Social Cultural
Behavioral Modeling programs?
Answer. Research from the Minerva program and the applications
developed as part of Human Social Cultural Behavioral (HSCB) Modeling
program are components of the overall Defense Intelligence effort to
improve socio-cultural information. As currently envisioned by OUSD(I),
the socio-cultural analytic effort will integrate social science
research, all-source analysis, and regional expertise into fused
intelligence products. The modeling capabilities in HSCB will help
analysts manage and visualize large volumes of data on economics,
infrastructure, demographics, et cetera. Insights developed as a result
of enhanced capabilities could also improve the Intelligence
Community's ability to provide warning on emerging crises.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Question. IOs, as currently defined by DOD, include electronic
warfare, operational security, computer network operations,
psychological operations, and military deception--each of these lines
of operations is unique and complex, and, in some cases, interwoven.
What do you understand to be the roles of the OUSD(I) in overseeing
DOD IOs?
Answer. The roles and missions for IOs are being addressed by a
Front End Assessment. I would expect that the OUSD(I) will continue to
play an appropriate role in the oversight of several of these areas.
Question. What are your views on the roles assigned to USD(I) and
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with respect to IOs, and
particularly offensive computer network operations? If confirmed, what
changes, if any, would you consider recommending to the Secretary of
Defense?
Answer. The Front End Assessment is addressing this question. Some
aspects of IO, as currently defined, will likely migrate to Policy,
while others will likely remain in USD(I). I would expect that the
USD(I) will continue to play an important role in overseeing computer
network operations.
Question. Given the formation of a separate U.S. Cyber Command,
what are your views on retaining computer network operations as a core
competency with IOs?
Answer. IOs, as currently defined, refer to the integration of
various information activities to achieve effects across the
information environment, which includes the cyber domain. The formation
of U.S. Cyber Command will not change the relationship of computer
network operations to the other capabilities necessary for DOD to
conduct information and cyber-related operations. It will, however,
enhance our ability to conduct IOs in the cyber domain. As noted above,
oversight of IO and its components, as currently defined, is being
addressed in a Front End Assessment.
COUNTER THREAT FINANCE
Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
Community have called for applying significantly more resources and
attention to identifying, tracking, and halting the flow of money
associated with the terrorist networks and the illegal narcotics trade.
Comparable efforts have been undertaken by the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization against the flow of money and
components supporting the construction and employment of improvised
explosive devices.
What are your views on efforts to invest additional resources into
identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorism
and narcotics, especially in Afghanistan?
Answer. Engaging all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the
flow of money associated with terrorist networks, the illegal narcotics
trade, and other threats to the U.S. Government is critical. The narco-
insurgent nexus is a key enabler, for example, of the insurgency in
Afghanistan. While DOD is not the U.S. Government lead in counter
threat finance (CTF), it does have a role to play. We are in the
process of building an appropriate CTF capability within DOD, and will
be alert to the need for additional resources.
Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you were responsible for a portion of
the CTF duties in the Department. What is your assessment of DOD's
current CTF organizational structure?
Answer. DOD's threat finance structure is still developing, but it
is headed in the right direction. In August 2009, Deputy Secretary Lynn
approved the DOD Directive on CTF Policy, which formalizes CTF as a DOD
mission. CTF Interagency Task Forces are making important contributions
to our counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. A critical element of
success in the CTF area will be DOD's ability to support the Department
of Treasury, which has the CTF lead for the U.S. Government. The ODNI
is also working to strengthen the Treasury Department's capabilities
with respect to CTF intelligence.
INFORMATION SHARING
Question. There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing
access to, the mass of raw intelligence data that has not been included
in finished reports or analyses and approved for dissemination within
the Intelligence Community. As long as these barriers exist, DNI
Clapper's vision of an integrated repository with analytic tools able
to connect-the-dots cannot be achieved. The implication is that the
Nation will remain more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than it could
be. The reasons cited to justify these information access barriers are
the need to protect sources and methods and the privacy of U.S.
persons.
What are your views about whether it is possible to provide greater
access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while
adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing
exposure of U.S. persons' information?
Answer. I believe it is possible to provide greater access to
counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while adequately
protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing exposure of
U.S. persons' information. While cognizant of the problem we face with
respect to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, if
confirmed, I will seek, in concert with the DNI, to enable better,
faster, and deeper sharing of counterterrorism data. We have already
made significant progress in this area. Until very recently, multiple
U.S. military, civil, and coalition networks in Afghanistan were unable
to communicate with one another. We have moved to a common, integrated
network--the Afghan Mission Network--and one common database--Combined
Information Data Network Exchange--that supports intelligence, military
operations, command and control, and logistics across all U.S. entities
and 46 partner nations. This approach of establishing a common network
and common database has allowed us to ensure that all releasable
national, tactical, and commercially available data from across the DOD
and IC is available and discoverable.
Question. Do you agree with DNI Clapper that these barriers are
mainly cultural in nature?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the DNI. Reflecting upon my own
operational experiences and the intelligence support I have received
over the years, it is clear that the IC has produced multiple
generations of intelligence analysts and leaders inculcated with the
philosophy that need-to-know had to be proven before information could
be shared. Under that approach, the first and foremost rule was to
protect sources and methods, or the result would be loss of sensitive
capabilities and lives. While protecting sources and methods must
remain a critical concern and need-to-share cannot trump need-to-know,
there can be an even greater risk to mission or potential loss of life
if information is not shared between government agencies and with our
allies. As USD(I), Mr. Clapper initiated and, if confirmed, I will
continue to foster policy changes and make investments in training and
capability development that will make Responsibility-to-Provide the
mindset for the entire DOD enterprise. This is already underway in our
schoolhouses where Write-for-Release is part of the curriculum, and in
our acquisition programs where federated information sharing via common
protocols is an integral part of all fielding efforts at the enterprise
intelligence architecture level, the combatant commands and the
military departments.
Question. What role do you expect to play in addressing this issue,
if confirmed, to be USD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI to ensure
that as we build out our information-sharing capability, we do it in
full synchronization with the IC. I will also ensure that we have
appropriate controls in place to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
information.
HOMELAND DEFENSE
Question. With the establishment of the positions of USD(I), the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs, and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, DOD has
been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical homeland
defense mission.
In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the
intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of
Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local
agencies?
Answer. Two of the longstanding challenges to integrating the
intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of
Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local
agencies have been IT compatibility and guidance on sharing classified
information. With the issuance of Executive Order 13549, Classified
National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and
Private Sector (SLTPS) Entities, we have made significant progress in
the latter. The Executive Order establishes the right balance between
sharing classified information with SLTPS entities in support of
homeland defense, while ensuring proper safeguards are in place for
protecting information from unauthorized disclosure. OUSD(I) is
currently assisting DHS and other agencies in the development of
implementation policy, and will have an ongoing role in supporting an
integrated approach.
Question. Does DOD's existing requirements-setting process
adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for
the homeland defense mission?
Answer. The technical solutions needed to inject homeland defense
intelligence requirements into the overall DOD requirements-setting
process now exist or are in development. Dividing finite resources
among existing DOD intelligence requirements, while ensuring adequate
support for requirements unique to the homeland defense mission, will
present a significant challenge. Adequate intelligence support must be
provided, however. Al Qaeda continues to pose a grave threat to the
American Homeland, and for at least a decade, intelligence
professionals have recognized that the foreign-domestic divide has been
shattered by transnational terrorist groups.
EFFECTIVENESS OF USD(I)
Question. The Secretary of Defense took the extraordinary step of
establishing an independent ISR Task Force in early 2008 to rectify
major shortfalls in support to ongoing military and counterterrorism
operations. The Secretary determined that the Military Services had not
sufficiently deployed innovative solutions to meet the requirements of
combatant commanders. Responsibility for this problem lay not only with
the Military Services but also the functional manager for
intelligence--the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
Do you believe that the Secretary's initiative suggests that the
OUSD(I) lacks expertise, initiative, or clout, or some combination
thereof, or do you think that other factors prevented appropriate
action?
Answer. The ISR Task Force was established by Secretary Gates to
assess and propose options for maximizing and optimizing deployed ISR
capabilities in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has
been led by an OUSD(I) Deputy Under Secretary, and is primarily staffed
by OUSD(I) personnel, though it is also comprised of personnel from
OSD(AT&L), the Services, Joint Staff, and Combat Support Agencies. The
establishment of the ISR Task Force does not reflect a unique shortfall
within OUSD(I). Rather, gaps exist in the ability of the Department to
quickly meet the urgent near-term needs of our warfighters,
particularly when facing a rapidly evolving threat. This gap is not
just confined to ISR or intelligence. The same extraordinary process
was required, for example, to rapidly procure mine-resistant ambush
protected vehicles and develop additional counter-IED capabilities for
Afghanistan. The establishment of the ISR Task Force provided the focus
and resources necessary to pursue rapid acquisition of ISR assets. Its
efforts are part of a larger departmental effort to expand and
institutionalize a rapid acquisition capability led by the USD(AT&L).
As a result of the ISR Task Force's success, it was determined that
there is an enduring need for the focus and effectiveness the Task
Force has brought to integrating ISR systems into Joint Operations.
Accordingly, the Secretary notified Congress on September 16, 2010,
that he was institutionalizing the responsibilities of the ISR Task
Force within the OUSD(I).
DUAL HAT AS DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
Question. In May 2007, Secretary Gates and DNI McConnell signed a
Memorandum of Agreement designating the USD(I) as the Director of
Defense Intelligence under the DNI.
What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities
of this office under the DNI?
Answer. The position of the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI)
was established within the ODNI to assist the DNI in the execution of
DNI responsibilities for the oversight of Defense intelligence matters.
As the principal advisor to the DNI and ODNI for defense intelligence,
the DDI is responsible for requirements, intelligence activities, and
advice and assistance. This includes:
Overseeing the development of DOD's national
intelligence requirements on behalf of the DNI;
Facilitating alignment, coordination, and
deconfliction between National and Defense Intelligence
activities; and
Advising and assisting the DNI by synchronizing and
integrating Defense intelligence functions with other IC
elements.
By creating this dual-hat arrangement, the DDI can exercise
authority on behalf of the DNI, while the USD(I) exercises authorities
delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense.
Question. What is your assessment of the relevance or importance of
this dual designation, and whether it should be continued?
Answer. I believe strongly in the DDI/USD(I) dual-hat arrangement,
and strongly support its continuation. I believe it is the most
effective way to serve the Defense intelligence needs of both the
Secretary of Defense and the DNI, and it is a key instrument for
achieving greater integration of U.S. intelligence. The DDI/USD(I)
attends all National Intelligence Boards, all DNI Executive Committee
meetings, and all senior ODNI staff meetings. The DDI/USD(I) meets
weekly with the DNI in a one-on-one session. A full-time senior liaison
officer resides in each staff in an effort to enhance communication and
coordination. If confirmed, I would plan to build on and expand the
collaboration between the OUSD(I) and ODNI staffs through this
arrangement.
usd(i) role in intelligence personnel, acquisition, and policy
Question. DOD senior leaders include Under Secretaries responsible
for personnel, policy, and acquisition matters, yet the OUSD(I)
includes staff with responsibilities for each of these areas as they
apply to the intelligence mission.
In your view, should the OUSD(I) staff continue to duplicate the
functions and resources of these other Under Secretaries? If so, why?
Answer. I do not view the OUSD(I) staff functions as duplicative,
but rather complementary. The Intelligence components of the Department
operate under the authority of the Secretary of Defense in title 10 of
the U.S.C. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the DNI, the OUSD(I) staff provides
oversight on behalf of the USD(I) to ensure these programs are aligned
both within the Department and the broader Intelligence Community. The
USD(I) is uniquely positioned to provide oversight of sensitive DOD
programs that are integral to the Intelligence Community, including
those exercised clandestinely, and to ensure that those programs
complement the activities of the entire Department and the DNI. These
efforts ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency of the consolidated
National Intelligence and Defense Intelligence programs.
The USD(I) is the Principal Staff Assistant responsible for
promulgation of intelligence policies within DOD (DODD 5143.01). In
this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the authorities to ensure efficient
use of resources for the intelligence mission set. DOD routinely
interacts with the Intelligence Community, and those interactions
require special consideration in order to preserve the necessary
division between national and military intelligence activities. The
USD(I) provides oversight of training, education, and career
development for all Defense intelligence personnel. This oversight
enables the Department to develop a cadre of well rounded and
experienced intelligence experts and to horizontally integrate existing
and new capabilities for warfighters. Without this focused oversight,
the efficiency and effectiveness of the DOD Intelligence Enterprise
would be put at risk. The Department also has responsibility to provide
specialized oversight of all Military Intelligence Program funding.
Congress has recognized the importance of this oversight in the areas
of acquisition, security, personnel, and resources.
OUSD(I) provides advice and assistance to OUSD(AT&L) concerning
acquisition programs and processes that significantly affect Defense
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components.
Additionally, OUSD(I) works closely with OUSD(AT&L) and ODNI on
programs that are funded by the National Intelligence Program and
executed in the Department. This advice and assistance is integral to
OUSD(I)'s Military Intelligence Program oversight and Battlespace
Awareness Capability Portfolio Management responsibilities.
Question. What is your understanding and view of the military
departments' initiatives with respect to their tactical, operational,
and strategic intelligence collection and analysis force structure and
technologies?
Answer. The military departments understand that we are operating
in a resource-constrained environment, and they are developing
initiatives and strategies to field comprehensive capabilities
providing optimized intelligence to full-spectrum operations. If I am
confirmed as USD(I), they will have my full support. These strategies
provide a range of investment options to realign and reinvest in
existing capabilities, while still providing timely, fused, and
actionable intelligence to the Joint Force. I support the Secretary of
Defense's effort to maximize production of ISR capabilities in support
of U.S. forces in combat, as evidenced by the ISR Task Force
Initiative. If confirmed, I will work with the Intelligence Community,
the military departments, and the combat support agencies to ensure an
integrated effort. I will meet with the Service Intelligence Chiefs,
the Joint Staff J2, the Combat Support Agency Directors, and the
combatant commands to ensure I have a clear understanding of their
highest priority initiatives.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities among these
initiatives and how would you propose to provide policy and program
oversight and support them with appropriate resources?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be nested with the
Secretary of Defense's Planning Guidance and the DNI's National
Intelligence Strategy. I would ensure that the initiatives and
strategies of the military departments were also nested with Secretary
of Defense priorities, and through my office of Joint and Coalition
Warfighter Support, would provide the necessary oversight of their
plans and programs. My top priority is to support our forces engaged in
combat operations with the best intelligence available. To do that, we
need to balance our capabilities at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels of war. We would improve innovation and pursue
technological advances in support of information sharing--from policy
to hardware to analysts; improving collection and exploitation,
countering current and emerging threats, strengthening
counterintelligence, and improving our security processes.
EFFICIENCIES ISSUES
Question. The Secretary of Defense has announced his intention to
eliminate the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks
and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) and the J-6 from the Joint Staff
on the grounds that other organizations in the Department perform
similar functions, particularly the Defense Information Systems Agency
and U.S. Cyber Command. Similarly, the Department has a number of
combat support defense agencies that are totally engaged in
intelligence--such as NSA, DIA, NGA, and NRO. There is also the DNI who
manages intelligence, including all the national intelligence agencies
within the Department. Each Military Service has an intelligence chief
as well. U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and each of the
other combatant commands have major intelligence components and
missions.
In your view, does the logic that led to the decision to eliminate
NII and the J-6 imply that USD(I) and the J-2 should also be eliminated
in view of the role played by DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, U.S. Cyber Command,
and U.S. Strategic Command? Why or why not?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is examining the Department's
intelligence organization, responsibilities, and authorities as part of
his efficiency effort. That endeavor is ongoing, and at this point the
Secretary has not made any final decisions. Key members of the OUSD(I)
staff are participating in the efficiency effort to inform the larger
efficiency team about the intricacies of the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise. In my view, there is a radical difference between
streamlining oversight and management of command, control, and
communications functions and those of a diverse intelligence
enterprise. The USD(I), on behalf of the Secretary of Defense,
coordinates, oversees and orchestrates the multidiscipline components
of the global Defense Intelligence Enterprise and its interaction with
the Intelligence Community. I believe the creation of the position of
USD(I) was a major step forward in the oversight of defense
intelligence, and that the dual-hatting of USD(I) as the DNI Director
of Defense Intelligence ensures that Defense Intelligence is fully
integrated into the U.S. Intelligence Community. I would not support
its elimination. I likewise believe that the J-2 provides critical
intelligence support to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Combatant
Commands.
Question. Do you see an opportunity for the elimination of
redundant layers of bureaucracy and greater efficiency in the operation
and management of the Defense Intelligence Community, including the
combatant commands and the Service component commands?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense initiated an efficiency effort
that includes the review of the organizations and functions of Defense
Intelligence Enterprise components to identify overlaps and
inefficiencies. This effort includes a review of the entire enterprise
to include the Defense intelligence agencies, Service intelligence
components, and all of the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence
Operations Centers. I anticipate that the efficiency effort will
identify some redundancies, and if confirmed, I will work to carry out
any decisions made by the Secretary.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CONSOLIDATION
Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 is the most recent legislative attempt to calibrate the need to
centralize management of intelligence across the Federal Government
with the need to sustain the benefits of departmental intelligence
answerable to cabinet secretaries. General Clapper, while serving as
USD(I), initiated a proposal to separate out the National Intelligence
Program (NIP) portion of the Defense budget, establish a new
appropriations account within the 050 Defense Function, and expand the
ODNI comptroller function to enable ODNI to execute these funds
independent of the DOD Comptroller organization.
Does this proposal weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense
over the intelligence components of the DOD?
Answer. This proposal should not weaken the authority of the
Secretary of Defense over the intelligence components of DOD.
Separation of the NIP portion of the Defense budget, as conceptually
proposed, is an administrative action. Thus, it will not affect the
Secretary of Defense's ``authority, direction, and control over the
Department of Defense.'' 10 U.S.C. sec. 113(b). It will not affect how
the Secretary ``prescribe[s] regulations for the government of his
department, the conduct of its employees, [and] the distribution and
performance of its business.'' 5 U.S.C. sec. 301.
Question. Is this proposal consistent with the Secretary's
efficiencies initiative, which seeks to avoid duplication and to reduce
the overhead burden, by creating a second large financial control
system operating within the Department?
Answer. The proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense
budget was not intended to be an efficiency initiative, but to provide
greater visibility and oversight of NIP resources, as well as improve
NIP financial management practices. ODNI is leading a collaborative
study effort to determine the feasibility of the conceptual proposal,
with DOD stakeholders participating. The study team is still assessing
possible approaches and implications. No final decisions have been made
on removing the NIP from the DOD budget. If approved, I believe the
proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense budget would not be
incompatible with the Secretary's efficiencies initiative.
SUPPORT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
Question. In late 2009, Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, who
was serving as Chief, CJ2, International Security Assistance Force and
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, published an article that criticized the
Intelligence Community broadly for focusing excessively on support for
kinetic operations against adversary forces in Afghanistan and failing
to devote sufficient attention to the counterinsurgency strategy and
its emphasis on population protection, tribal dynamics, cultural
insight, the rule of law, and the like.
Do you think that General Flynn's criticism was accurate, and if
so, has this imbalance been corrected?
Answer. Major General Flynn was correct in his assessment that in a
counterinsurgency environment, focusing our intelligence assets solely
on the insurgent forces is not effective. A comprehensive understanding
of the socio-cultural environment is absolutely critical to developing
and implementing effective strategies to separate the insurgency from
any viable base of support in the general population. Developing this
comprehensive understanding is clearly an intelligence responsibility
as laid out in Service and Joint doctrine within the Department.
Mobilizing the local population in rural areas for village stability
operations has become a critical element of our strategy in
Afghanistan, one that is already showing major gains on the
battlefield. Tribal engagement is increasingly central to U.S. strategy
in other countries as well. Thus, a detailed understanding of tribal
dynamics is a critical intelligence task, and will likely remain so for
the foreseeable future.
The Intelligence Community has worked hard to implement Major
General Flynn's recommendations. The Stability Operations Information
Centers he called for have been created and manned by the Defense
Intelligence Agency and Service intelligence analysts who are doing the
integration and analysis work necessary to generate the comprehensive
District Assessment reports that were the cornerstone of Major General
Flynn's approach. Significant challenges remain in developing the
integrated information-sharing environment envisioned by Major General
Flynn, but the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Task Force and the U.S. Central Command have been doing tremendous work
in this area as well. Additionally, the former USD(I) commissioned the
Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board in March 2010 to
evaluate how intelligence can most effectively support
counterinsurgency operations. The Board is currently compiling its
findings and recommendations and is scheduled to brief the results in
the first quarter of calendar year 2011.
I believe the Intelligence Community has responded well to the
challenges laid out by Major General Flynn. One of my first actions, if
confirmed, will be to confer with Brigadier General Fogarty, who has
replaced Major General Flynn, to get his assessment of the support
currently being provided by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the
Intelligence Community to determine if additional enhancements are
required.
Question. In your opinion, has the Intelligence Community devoted
enough resources to provide policymakers and combatant commanders with
the information on the cultural, social, political, and economic
dynamics needed to formulate sound strategies for other critical
regions, like Yemen and Somalia?
Answer. As noted above, tribal engagement is an increasingly
critical tool in U.S. irregular warfare strategy. It was central to our
success in overthrowing the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in
2001, it has been a major factor in our success in Iraq (Anbar
Awakening), it is again becoming a critical element of our
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and it offers U.S.
policymakers important options in other countries of concern.
Information on cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics is
likewise needed for effective IOs, as well as enhanced options to deal
with power brokers in urban areas. I believe we have made good progress
regarding intelligence support in this area, but additional
improvements are required. A key part of the required investment is the
development of operators--within both the intelligence and the special
operations communities--with the requisite language skills.
Effectiveness in this area also requires intelligence analysts with
very different backgrounds. If confirmed, I would engage the DNI, the
Director of CIA, the relevant components of the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise, and the Commander of SOCOM to ensure that we continue to
develop the required capabilities.
Question. Is collection and analysis on these subjects in these
geographical areas a tier one priority for the Intelligence Community
or is it classified as lower-priority general background intelligence
information? Do you agree with this prioritization?
Answer. As the committee is aware, our National Intelligence
Priorities are classified. As noted above, however, intelligence
support in this area is increasingly central to effective strategy and
operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that it is accorded
appropriate priority within both the Intelligence Community and the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Question. Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of
political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a
conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts
within DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not
part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such
pressure?
Answer. In my experience, I have found the intelligence analysis
that holds up best under scrutiny are those assessments that were
reached impartially and independently, using all sources of information
available, and which highlight the intelligence gaps that limit the
judgments that can be reached by current analysis. Intelligence
analysts are inculcated with the importance of ``speaking truth to
power.'' As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have interacted regularly with
intelligence analysts across the Intelligence Community, and have found
them to be professionals who apply rigorous tradecraft standards to
their products. The quality of analysis provided to policymakers today,
in my judgment, is substantially better than it was in the Cold War. I
have spoken to analysts as they attend their career training programs
about the importance of what they do, and the need for objectivity and
independence. If confirmed, I would reaffirm the importance of
objective and independent analysis from the frontline analyst, to the
Directors of analytical organizations, to senior policymakers. There
will be zero tolerance for political pressure on analysts to reach
certain conclusions.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think
intelligence officers and analysts should be able to testify to
Congress on their professional conclusions regarding a substantive
intelligence issue even if those views conflict with administration
positions?
Answer. If Congress requires testimony on a substantive
intelligence issue, it should be provided, whether or not it conflicts
with an administration position.
CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN DOD
Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA) of 2004 granted the DNI control over the preparation and
execution of the National Intelligence Program budget and tasking of
national intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also contained
language asserting that nothing in the act should be construed so as to
impair the authorities of secretaries of cabinet departments, and the
Secretary of Defense has delegated ``direction, control, and
authority''--the highest form of authority in the executive branch--
over the national intelligence organizations within the DOD to the
USD(I).
What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA
to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of
Defense?
Answer. IRTPA struck a proper balance of authorities, in my view,
in that it gave the DNI strong authority over core intelligence
functions for the National Intelligence Program, such as setting
requirements and budgets, as well as determining priorities for and
managing the analysis and dissemination of national intelligence, while
leaving the responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence activities
to the Secretary of Defense, and assigning primary responsibility for
leadership and management functions such as inspector general
activities, personnel, information technology, financial management
systems, and acquisition within the IC elements outside of ODNI and CIA
to the heads of the departments in which those elements are located.
The recently-enacted Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 significantly increased the authorities of ODNI over leadership
and management functions in the IC elements, and I expect that DOD and
the DNI will together devote considerable time and attention to
implementing these new ODNI authorities in a manner that gives full
effect to the act while avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort and
preserving the Secretary of Defense's ability to execute his statutory
responsibilities over DOD's intelligence components.
Question. What are your views on the extent of the grant of
``direction, control, and authority'' to the USD(I) over DOD national
intelligence organizations?
Answer. Statutory provisions in both title 10 and title 50 of the
U.S.C. assign authority, direction, and control to the Secretary of
Defense over DIA, NSA, NGA, and NRO as components of the Department,
consistent with the statutory authorities of the DNI. In my view, this
balance of authorities is appropriate.
Question. What type of relationship would you strive to establish,
if you are confirmed, with the DNI to ensure that DOD interests in
national intelligence are satisfied, that DOD adequately assists the
DNI in discharging his responsibilities, and that the defense
intelligence agencies are properly managed?
Answer. With the former USD(I) now in place as the DNI, with his
extensive experience in both DOD and the Intelligence Community, with
the close personal partnership we have forged during my tenure as
ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and with the close relationships we both have with the
Secretary of Defense and with the leaders of the Intelligence
Community, I believe there is an unprecedented opportunity to further
strengthen the relationship between DOD and the DNI. If confirmed, I
expect that together we will look for additional ways to build on the
arrangement established by the Secretary of Defense and the DNI under
which the USD(I) serves as the Director of Defense Intelligence within
ODNI.
Question. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities,
processes, and structures in place between the DOD and the DNI provide
sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence
capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare for and conduct
military operations will be developed and acquired through the National
Intelligence Program?
Answer. Yes, I believe that current relationships, authorities,
processes, and structures in place between DOD and the DNI have
produced highly effective support by NIP resources for military
operations.
ROLE IN ACQUIRING SPACE SYSTEMS
Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you would have
in the requirements process for, and in oversight of the acquisition
of, space systems, including space systems for which milestone decision
authority rests with either the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the DOD Executive Agent for
Space?
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), as the principal staff assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for all intelligence matters, my role in space
system acquisition will be to ensure the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise meets national and Department requirements. I will ensure
that we've balanced our investments towards delivering the right mix of
intelligence capabilities to support the combatant commanders to
accomplish their missions. DOD space systems are one component of a
broader architecture of sensors, systems, and capabilities.
As the DOD Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program
(MIP), the USD(I) role is to ensure all parts of the ISR architecture,
to include space, air, and ground, are integrated into an overall
architecture optimized to meet the warfighters' needs. If confirmed, I
will work closely with the DNI to ensure that the DOD intelligence
architecture, including space intelligence capabilities, is integrated
with the national architecture, and that we have a mission-focused
space enterprise that is affordable, responsive, efficient, flexible,
and fully supportive of military operations and national security
needs.
As the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Manager, if
confirmed, I will participate in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) requirements and acquisition oversight process by providing
intelligence input into the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) requirements process, the Functional
Capabilities Board (FCB), the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB), and the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), as well as provide input
into the DOD acquisition process on the Defense Acquisition Board.
DOD INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATIONS POLICY
Question. DOD Directive Number 3115.09 assigns the USD(I)
responsibility for providing oversight of intelligence operations,
detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning, and ensuring overall
development, coordination, approval, and promulgation of DOD policies
and implementation of plans related to intelligence interrogations,
detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning.
Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum
issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant
DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must
fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes, I fully support this policy.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes, I fully support these standards.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies
and plans comply with applicable U.S. law and international
obligations, including Common Article 3.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes, I strongly hold the view that the manner in which the
United States treats detainees may well impact how captured U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated in future conflicts.
I believe it has broader national security and foreign policy
ramifications as well.
Question. Under DOD Directive Number 3115.09, the USD(I) is
responsible for developing policies and procedures, in coordination
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, the DOD General Counsel, and the appropriate DOD components,
to ensure that all contracts in support of intelligence interrogation
operations include the obligation to comply with the standards of DOD
Directive Number 3115.09 and exclude performance of inherently
governmental functions in accordance with DOD Directive 1100.4 and that
all contractor employees are properly trained.
What do you believe is the proper role of contractors in
intelligence interrogation operations?
Answer. Consistent with Section 1038 of Public Law 111-84, ``The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,'' October 28,
2009, I believe that in areas where adequate security is available and
is expected to continue, contractor personnel with proper training and
security clearances may be used as linguists, interpreters, report
writers, information technology technicians, and other employees
filling ancillary positions (including as trainers of, and advisors to,
interrogators) in the interrogation of individuals who are in the
custody or under the effective control of DOD or otherwise under
detention in a DOD facilities.
Contractors may be used as interrogators only if the Secretary of
Defense determines that it is in the interests of the national security
to do so and grants a waiver for a 60-day period, and for an additional
30 days if a renewal is approved. If a waiver is granted, contract
interrogators must be properly trained and certified to DOD standards,
and they must be supervised and closely monitored by properly trained
and certified DOD military and/or DOD civilian interrogators to ensure
that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the government-
approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any inherently
governmental function.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
intelligence interrogation operations are performed in a manner
consistent with the requirements of the manpower mix and that
contractors involved in such operations do not perform inherently
governmental functions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies
and plans comply with Section 1038 of Public Law 111-84, ``The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,'' October 28, 2009,
which delineates the functions that contractors may perform in support
of intelligence interrogations. If the Secretary of Defense grants a
waiver permitting the use of contractors as interrogators, I will
ensure that they are properly trained and certified to DOD standards,
and that they are supervised and closely monitored by properly trained
and certified DOD military and/or DOD civilian interrogators to make
certain that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the
government-approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any
inherently governmental function.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT
Question. Over the last 5 years or so, the approved requirement for
24-hour orbits of ISR aircraft has grown from approximately 10 to 65.
U.S. Central Command, and specifically the Iraq and Afghanistan areas
of operation, has received the overwhelming share of these assets. The
other combatant commands, as well as such critically important regions
as Yemen and the Horn of Africa, have received little or no additional
assets. Even within U.S. Central Command, demand exceeds supply.
Secretary Gates established the independent ISR Task Force partly
because the normal requirements and acquisition processes in the
Department favored long-term investments in capabilities for waging
conventional military operations rather than the needs of deployed
forces engaged in irregular warfare.
In your view, is DOD allocating sufficient resources to airborne
ISR to protect long-term force modernization preferences?
Answer. I believe the Department is now allocating sufficient
resources to airborne ISR. Working closely with Congress, the
Department has greatly expanded airborne ISR capabilities during
Secretary Gates' tenure. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have consistently and
strongly advocated for additional Predator/Reaper CAPs (orbits). These
assets are absolutely critical to U.S. strategy in several areas, and
demand continues to exceed supply. This is why in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review, the Secretary made the decision to expand the
authorized U.S. Air Force force structure goal further by another 15
CAPs/orbits (from 50 to 65). We continue to upgrade the capabilities of
our airborne ISR systems as well. The introduction of high definition
video capabilities, for example, provides resolution that was not
possible just 5 years ago. Combining this capability with recently
developed SIGINT capabilities has dramatically improved the
effectiveness of our ISR orbits. Other airborne ISR systems are having
an equally dramatic impact on the battlefield.
The Secretary has provided very clear guidance. His first defense
strategy objective is to ``Prevail in Today's Wars,'' and that is where
the preponderance of our attention and effort is focused. His strategy
also makes it clear that we must continue to ``Prevent Future
Conflict'' and ``Prepare to Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies.''
Maintaining an appropriate balance between winning today and preparing
for the future requires tough choices, but they are being made. The
President's budget for 2011 has the balance right, in my view.
Question. Is the current focus an appropriate one?
Answer. Yes.
REPORTING OF CYBER OPERATIONS IN THE CLANDESTINE QUARTERLY REPORT
Question. The USD(I) coordinates preparation of the quarterly
report on clandestine military operations (Clandestine Quarterly
Report) to Congress. In discussions with the Department about actions
to establish the U.S. Cyber Command, it became apparent that the
Department may have failed to report certain cyber activities in the
Quarterly Report that should have been included, since they would
legitimately fit the accepted definition of clandestine military
activities.
What is your understanding of whether the Department failed to
report these activities in the regular Clandestine Quarterly Reports,
and why?
Answer. It is my understanding that the congressional language
directing provision of the Clandestine Quarterly Report specifically
calls for reporting on clandestine HUMINT activity. Former USD(I)
Clapper, in an effort to keep Congress better apprised of activities
within his purview, expanded the report to routinely include a wide
range of activities that exceeded the congressional reporting
requirements. I fully support this expanded approach, and, if
confirmed, will review the status and process for reporting DOD cyber
activities. I am committed to appropriate reporting of all intelligence
and intelligence-related activities to Congress.
Question. Setting aside the issue of advance notice of certain
significant cyber activities, what is your view on the appropriateness
of reporting cyber activities that fit the definition of a clandestine
military operation in the Clandestine Quarterly Report?
Answer. The USD(I) is charged with keeping the appropriate
committees of Congress fully and currently informed on all DOD
intelligence and intelligence related activities. It would be my
intent, if confirmed, to fully comply with that responsibility, to
include cyber activities.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Question. What technical challenges does the Intelligence Community
face that in your opinion are currently not being addressed adequately
by DOD science and technology efforts?
Answer. I believe an ``Intelligence Revolution'' has been underway
for some time, and that technological change is the principal driver of
this revolution. This revolution has already posed, and will continue
to pose, significant challenges as well as opportunities for the U.S.
Intelligence Community. I believe that DOD science and technology
programs are enabling the IC to keep ahead of the rapidly-changing
intelligence environment.
One challenge that we continue to face is making the best use of
existing and planned sensors and then exploiting data coming from those
sensors. Although we are continuing to push the envelope on new and
better sensing technologies, the real challenge has shifted towards
integrating data from platforms and sensors into a common framework.
Related technical challenges include layering the data, developing
advanced analytical tools that make sense of the data, and developing
tools that automatically alert analysts or cross-cue other sensors to
focus on unique and potentially dangerous activity. Other challenges
include the protection of critical space systems and data networks.
Question. Recently, DOD has been exploring a wide range of airship-
related technologies for ISR purposes, including those for long-
duration, high-altitude flight.
What are your views on the specific missions, concepts of
operation, technical viability, and affordability of airships as long-
duration, high altitude ISR sensor platforms?
Answer. I believe these technologies will have an immediate,
positive impact on our operations in Afghanistan, and could play an
even greater role in future operations as the capability continues to
evolve. An ``unblinking eye and ear'' is central to our ISR strategy
for the modern battlefield. Over the last decade, the Department has
significantly expanded our ability to dwell over the battlefield with
ISR platforms. We have done this predominantly through procurement of
aircraft systems and sensors. With the advent of long-endurance
platforms, the Department is expanding the paradigm of battlefield
dwell by developing ``game-changing'' persistent capabilities that
enable satellite-like endurance at a much lower cost and have the
flexibility to reposition anywhere in the world. These developments
will greatly increase the amount of valuable information available to
the warfighter. The development of long-endurance airborne
capabilities, I would add, is much broader than just airships. DOD is
also pursuing other long-endurance fixed-wing medium- and high-altitude
capabilities that can linger for weeks and even months at a time.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(I)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
WIKILEAKS REMEDIES
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, the imperative after September
11 was a paradigm shift from ``need-to-know'' to ``need-to-share''
intelligence and law enforcement information. The Wikileaks fiasco
illustrates some of the dangers that can accompany information-sharing
practices that are not wisely structured. It seems to me that we have
to be smart about this. We can't go back to the old practice of
hoarding information, but we also cannot be wantonly posting sensitive
material to hundreds of thousands of people who have no reason to see
it. The committee is examining technologies and processes to achieve
this balance, and I know that Secretary Gates and his staff have
already taken actions and are engaged in longer-term planning. What are
your views on how we can finally achieve our information-sharing goals
while better protecting information from insider threats?
Secretary Vickers. The Department of Defense (DOD) works to manage
the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information through
good security practices. For example, we vet our personnel for
suitability and trustworthiness in the security clearance process. We
establish and uphold rules for physical access to secure facilities and
to classified information. We also have rules about the use of
networked systems and conduct annual training to educate and remind
employees about the rules. Security policy and processes are generally
effective deterrents when everyone understands and implements them.
The unauthorized transfer of classified information to WikiLeaks
was made possible in part because standard security procedures were
relaxed in a war zone in order to facilitate the rapid exchange of
information critical to operations. In the aftermath of WikiLeaks, the
Department is taking a number of mitigation steps, including possible
disciplinary action. We are examining technologies that would improve
our ability to identify and thwart a threat from inside the Department
as well as strengthen information-sharing governance. Some actions were
already under way before the WikiLeaks disclosures. For example, the
Department has planned and resourced the development of a public key
infrastructure that would authenticate users of the Secret Internet
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) so we would know exactly who is on
the SIPRNet at any given time. Technical subject matter experts in the
office of the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) are also reviewing
options for developing role-based or attribute-based access control
capabilities that would more effectively control who has access to what
data--a very large and complex task given the Department's size and the
scope of its responsibilities.
To summarize, we can and must responsibly balance information
security and information sharing by managing risk using a number of
security and security-related protocols that act together to thwart
both intentional and unintentional violations.
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in your answers to the
committee's advance policy questions, you stated that the office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) had recently
completed a comprehensive review. What are the main recommendations of
that review, and will you make it available to the committee?
Secretary Vickers. Immediately following the WikiLeaks disclosures,
the Secretary of Defense directed the USD(I), in concert with the Joint
Staff and the DOD CIO, to review DOD information security policy and
procedures for handling classified information in forward-deployed
areas. The Secretary was particularly concerned over the appropriate
balance between the need to share and the responsibility to safeguard
classified information. The report was completed and provided to the
Secretary in December 2010. The report itself is an internal DOD
deliberative document, but some of the principal findings include the
following:
Adequate security policy and procedures exist, but
compliance must be better enforced. Forward-deployed units
maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage
media.
Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing
with an insider threat must be better defined.
Processes for reporting security incidents need
improvement.
Limited capability currently exists to detect and
monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.
USD(I) Security staff will continue to work closely with the DOD
CIO, elements of the Joint Staff and U.S. Cyber Command to address
these issues in the months ahead. We stand ready to provide the
committee with further details on the report's main recommendations, if
requested.
INFORMATION SHARING
3. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, on a closely related topic,
since September 11 the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland
security communities have struggled to develop effective means to
connect and correlate fragmentary information held by multiple
departments and agencies to thwart terrorist threats. As we learned in
the aftermath of the Christmas bombing attempt, achieving this so-
called connect-the-dots capability is not so much a technical
challenge; the hardest part is overcoming the resistance of agencies to
sharing their sensitive information and resolving the important policy
and legal concerns regarding protection of privacy and sources and
methods.
This challenge of finding and correlating the proverbial needles in
haystacks is not confined to the national-level threat from terrorism.
It turns out that our troops face identical types of challenges in
discovering the people and networks of the terrorist and insurgent
groups they are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere
around the world.
The committee's examination of this situation reveals that almost
every agency and department is developing large-scale search,
discovery, and correlation systems, but they are able to apply these
tools only to their own data--in their own stovepipes. In other words,
there is a lot of duplication going on but no interagency solution.
Indeed, there is no enterprise-wide search capability even within DOD.
Do you have an appreciation of this situation, and how do you think it
can be fixed, both within DOD and throughout the Government?
Secretary Vickers. Many DOD and Intelligence Community
organizations have leaned forward to provide improved and impressive
services rapidly for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This challenge
has been increased significantly by the breadth of our modern
coalitions, by the need to update intelligence disclosure and release
policies, and by the need for technology solutions to assist in marking
data for release and moving it down to non-traditional networks to
support coalition operations. We expect this trend to continue in
future contingency operations. I share your view that there is a need
to better coordinate and integrate these various contingency efforts,
and we are addressing this challenge aggressively in numerous ways.
The Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) Team of the
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force has,
over the past year, fielded a number of improvements to intelligence
architectures in theater and to data dissemination, discovery, access,
and retrieval capabilities. This group has also been focused on
identifying gaps, overlaps, and integration opportunities among the
Quick Response Capabilities delivered to theater, and on ensuring that
sustainment and upgrade decisions are made within the context of
integrating duplicative efforts, and migrating capabilities to common
enterprise standards. The ISC Team is working to ensure these quick-
turn-around efforts are designed and upgraded in ways that increase
their interoperability across the intelligence enterprise, and that
these investments will work toward enduring long-term solutions that
can be applied to global operations and will be reusable in future
contingency operations. Specific examples of these efforts include:
ensuring any upgrades or expansion of the CENTCOM's Combined
Information Data Network Exchange database and search capabilities are
migrated to global enterprise standards; and a just-initiated review of
all DOD and Intelligence Community ``cloud'' efforts to highlight gaps,
overlaps, and an enterprise integration way ahead.
Yet another important organization is the Intelligence Community's
Information Sharing Steering Committee (ISSC). DOD participates in the
ISSC along with representatives from all Intelligence Community
elements to align common information-sharing needs, priorities,
solutions, and architectures.
Our approach to accomplishing improvements in information sharing
requires that we implement a multi-faceted, layered approach. We
recognize explicitly that technology alone will not resolve
information-sharing shortfalls. The need to implement improvements in
an enterprise approach has led us to develop oversight processes
designed to effectively manage and synchronize the many information-
sharing initiatives we have underway into one well-orchestrated effort.
This focus has led to the establishment of a new Information Sharing
and Partner Engagement Directorate within USD(I). This newly created
directorate is engaging in a broad range of efforts specifically
designed to improve information sharing by addressing policy, foreign
relationship management, enterprise architectures, international
intelligence sharing architectures and mechanisms, and training and
education, and is ensuring we place the appropriate high-level of
attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on this
subject. Among its duties, this new Directorate will support a
governance structure to guide Intelligence Community-wide enterprise
solutions. It will reconstitute and support the Defense Intelligence
Information Enterprise (DI\2\E) Council, and will guide and oversee
development of the associated DI\2\E Framework. A Charter for the new
DI\2\E Council and Terms of Reference for the DI\2\E Framework have
both been drafted and are in review.
U.S. CYBER COMMAND AND CYBERSPACE
4. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, U.S. Cyber Command's mission
is to defend networks and, when directed, conduct offensive operations
in cyberspace. Both of these missions are heavily dependent upon
intelligence support. From a policy perspective, USD(I) is not
responsible for the mission of defending cyberspace, nor for offensive
military operations. Those oversight roles are the province of the CIO
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).
However, as we have come to learn, gaining access in cyberspace to
adversaries' networks to collect intelligence is tantamount to
establishing a foundation for offensive actions. Thus, the intelligence
activities that you oversee inherently have a relationship to potential
offensive military operations. These intelligence operations in
cyberspace can take on an extraordinarily sensitive cast, since
adversaries could or likely would interpret a penetration of important
targets as a potentially hostile act if or when they are discovered.
How are you planning to monitor cyber intelligence collection
operations under title 50 authorities and to coordinate with the USD(P)
and the CIO?
Secretary Vickers. Because the cyber mission transcends the various
OSD offices which execute a principal staff advisor role, it is
imperative that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence) (OUSD(I)) coordinates and consults with these offices in
order to ensure the integration and synchronization of cyber efforts
amongst the military and the Intelligence Community to satisfy the
requirements of the warfighter. USD(I) oversight of any cyber
intelligence collection operations under title 50 authorities is
conducted in accordance with applicable laws on reporting requirements
for intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
Oversight is executed in order to promote better cooperation and
collaboration amongst the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to ensure
efficient and effective use of our limited resources to achieve the
Nation's highest priorities in accordance with the National Security
Strategy, the Defense Intelligence Strategy, and the CIO's priorities.
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, are the USD(P) and the CIO
going to be consulted about sensitive intelligence operations in
cyberspace?
Secretary Vickers. As stated in a previous response, USD(I)
consults and coordinates with USD(P) and CIO on significant
intelligence and intelligence-related activities in accordance with
current DOD policy. Because of the sensitivities that such operations
could have across the Department, it is critical that OUSD(I)
coordinates and consults with the various OSD offices which execute a
principal staff advisory role pertaining to the cyber mission such as
USD(P) and CIO. This close cooperation within the Department and within
the Intelligence Community has empowered the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise to support U.S. national objectives while maximizing our
effectiveness.
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, the National Security Strategy
states that the United States will enhance deterrence in cyberspace by
``improving our ability to attribute and defeat attacks on our systems
or supporting infrastructure.'' If confirmed as USD(I), what role will
you play in identifying an effective deterrence strategy and
declaratory policy for cyberspace?
Secretary Vickers. USD(I) is a primary stakeholder in Department-
wide efforts to define an effective deterrence strategy and declaratory
policy for cyberspace. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(P)
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will participate in
National Security Council (NSC)-led fora related to this matter.
7. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in your view, what are the
elements of an effective deterrence posture for cyberspace that could
attribute and defeat attacks?
Secretary Vickers. An effective deterrence posture is one that
would deny aggressors any benefit of an attack through a blend of
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools to influence
behavior.
8. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, are those two elements alone
really enough to deter attacks, or is it also necessary to have a
counter-attack component?
Secretary Vickers. As we define our deterrence strategy, the
challenge is to make our defense effective enough to deny an aggressor
the benefit of an attack. In cyberspace, as with other areas, the
United States reserves the right to respond using the full range of
diplomatic, economic, and military tools at its disposal. Response to a
cyber attack, if necessary, does not require a response in like kind.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES
9. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in response to the committee's
advance policy questions, you advocate for a robust DOD presence in
conducting information operations and strategic communications programs
more broadly in both theaters of war and globally. According to the
Government Accountability Office, DOD spends ``hundreds of millions of
dollars each year'' conducting these operations. This committee and
Congress have repeatedly questioned DOD's ability to measure the
effectiveness of the dollars spent supporting these operations. In your
view, has DOD done enough to explain the measures of effectiveness for
these programs?
Secretary Vickers. The rapidly expanding pace of change in the
information environment made global and instantaneous communications
possible in ways that were unimaginable just a decade ago. Across the
globe, our friends and our adversaries are constantly producing and
consuming information that influences their decisions and their
actions. Drawing a causal link between a discrete action in today's
information environment and an individual or group decision is very
challenging. We continue to place great emphasis on obtaining good
measures of effectiveness and conducting thorough assessments of all of
our information operations. Leveraging lessons learned from commercial
enterprises, academia, and our interagency partners, we have made some
progress to improve our ability to measure effects in our information
programs. That said, we must continue to do much more in this area. As
the information environment continues to evolve and its complexity
grows, DOD must continue to press for new and innovative ways both to
communicate with intended audiences and to measure the effects of
communications and engagements.
10. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, do you believe the programs
you authorized while you were Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict have had a measurable
impact?
Secretary Vickers. Yes, although drawing a causal link between
discrete acts in today's information environment and an individual or
group response is very challenging, we continue to refine and improve
our abilities to measure the impact of our operations. We must continue
to invest both resources and intellectual energies to meet this
challenge. Our measurement efforts routinely demonstrate our impact.
Our COCOM-sponsored websites have ever increasing readership, providing
frequent and robust feedback. Our small teams supporting embassies
abroad are lauded both by the U.S. embassies they support and the
partner nations with whom they interact. Advertising for our rewards
programs has significantly increased the number and frequency of
reports of high value targets and terrorist supporting materials.
As the information environment continues to evolve, and its
complexity grows, DOD will continue to press for new and innovative
ways both to communicate with its intended audiences and to measure the
effects of our communications and engagements.
11. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in response to the
committee's advance policy questions, you suggest that DOD's
information operations and strategic communications programs should
support more robustly other government departments and agencies in
countering the message of violent extremists. Given the clear lines of
authority that each government department and agency are given by
Congress, how do you foresee DOD increasing its support of the
Department of State (DOS) and/or the Central Intelligence Agency?
Secretary Vickers. The purpose of DOD Information Operations is to
support our military objectives. The global nature of modern
communications has blurred, however, traditional lines between agency-
specific communications programs, increasing the need for mutual
reinforcement among them. Messages promulgated by one department or
agency which might previously have had effects limited to a single
geographic region or audience now find immediate global resonance. This
new communications paradigm makes cooperation and collaboration within
and among the various departments critical to ensure consistency and
efficacy of the U.S. global message. DOD maintains unique capabilities
to reach audiences in denied areas or to promulgate information in ways
that can support our military objectives. Those capabilities can also
contribute, where appropriate, to the larger U.S. Government
communications and public diplomacy strategies, in furtherance of U.S.
national security objectives. We will continue to strive to provide
transparency of our operations within the interagency environment, but
more importantly, we will make our capabilities available to support
other departments and agencies in areas where those capabilities
provide additional options for effective communications and engagement.
12. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, do you believe DOD has the
authority for expanded support operations?
Secretary Vickers. We have the authorities to support where and
when required. We will continue to leverage long-established processes
and mechanisms for planning, deconfliction, and partnered efforts to
enhance mutually supporting objectives with our interagency partners.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
1208 FUNDING
13. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, the committee has expressed
concern that U.S. Special Operations Command may be using section 1208
funding, which is intended to support counterterrorism operations, for
long-term engagement with partner nations. Is this still the case or
has it been corrected?
Secretary Vickers. Section 1208 funds must be used for specific
counterterrorism operations, not long-term engagement. Improved
reporting procedures and increased coordination with and notifications
to Congress have helped address past concerns regarding DOD section
1208 programs. Reviews conducted as part of our annual process by
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, U.S. Special Operations
Command, and the Geographic Combatant Commands, have resulted in the
termination of several operations over the last 3 fiscal years.
Beginning in 2010, SOLIC&IC began notifying the congressional
committees with a list of approved continuing operations for the next
fiscal year, along with any cost estimate changes. This information is
also provided in the annual report to Congress in accordance with
section 1208.
ZONES OF HOSTILITIES
14. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, in your advance policy
questions, you state that outside zones of hostilities, DOD plays a
supporting role in combating terrorism. Does that mean that outside of
Iraq and Afghanistan, the concurrence of our ambassadors is required?
Secretary Vickers. We work closely with our DOS and other
government agency colleagues to support whole-of-government approaches
to terrorism challenges both inside and outside zones of hostilities.
When directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, geographic
combatant commanders conduct counterterrorism operations in support of
U.S. Government objectives while ensuring appropriate Chiefs of Mission
are consulted and kept informed of all U.S. military activities.
15. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, how does DOD define zones of
hostilities in this context?
Secretary Vickers. In the context of my response, this term refers
to Iraq and Afghanistan.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
16. Senator Begich. Secretary Vickers, in your view, what
challenges will you face in integrating intelligence capabilities of
DOD with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal,
State, and local agencies?
Secretary Vickers. DOD enjoys a very positive relationship with
DHS. Our commitment to DHS expands far beyond intelligence integration.
I believe one of our greatest challenges to integrating
intelligence capabilities between DHS and DOD is the important policy
and legal balance regarding the protection of privacy rights and civil
liberties. In fact, this challenge expands beyond the DHS and the DOD
relationship and is indicative of the greater information-sharing
issues facing the whole-of-government. The protection of privacy and
other legal rights of Americans while defending our Homeland is no easy
task. As we develop solutions, this protection of civil liberties is a
core principle that must be kept in mind.
I recognize the imperative for efficient integration between DOD,
DHS, and other Federal, State, and local agencies and believe
collaboration is a key driver of effective integration. As such, I am
in the process of considering a first of its kind Joint Duty Assignment
of a DHS representative to serve as a full-time liaison between DHS's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office,
and the OUSD(I).
In their mission to detect, prevent, and respond to acts of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, State, local, and tribal
agencies depend on the relationship between DHS and DOD. This
relationship literally provides a critical link to actionable
intelligence information. For example, allowing select State and major
urban area fusion center personnel with appropriate security clearances
access to appropriate classified terrorism-related information residing
on DOD's classified networks is a major step forward. This information
will contribute significantly to improving their mission processes
supporting Suspicious Activity Reports and Alerts, Warning, and
Notifications of potential attacks on our Homeland. This example of a
joint initiative has bolstered increased collaboration between DHS,
DOD, and other Federal departments and agencies, enabling the trusted
and secure exchange of terrorism-related information in order to
detect, deter, prevent, and respond to Homeland security threats.
17. Senator Begich. Secretary Vickers, are there steps DOD can take
to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with other
agencies?
Secretary Vickers. DOD extensively coordinates its efforts to
combat terrorism with the National Security Staff, Chiefs of Mission,
Chiefs of Station, relevant departments and agencies, and field
activities to enable the broadest interagency collaboration consistent
with maintaining the security of our efforts. We recognize that this is
a constant process that requires regular and routine interface at
multiple levels within the respective organizations. We have made wide
use of the ``Joint-Interagency Task Force'' model to bring our
interagency colleagues into a collaborative planning and execution
forum, and are always vigilant for ways to share best practices and
make adjustments to the process.
It is critically important that DOD's counterterrorism activities
be fully synchronized and integrated with those of other agencies to
develop an optimal whole-of-government response to this vital national
security issue. Nowhere is this need for integration more important
than in our intelligence and information-sharing activities across the
entire Intelligence Community. To support this objective, the DOD focal
point for counterterrorism intelligence, the Defense Intelligence
Agency's (DIA) Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism,
has recently assigned a senior representative to work at the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as a means of improving coordination
between Defense and Intelligence Community counterterrorism analytic
efforts. Finally, as part of the Secretary of Defense Efficiencies
Initiatives, we have directed DIA to conduct a review of the overall
Defense relationship with NCTC and develop an appropriate course of
action and implementation plan to maximize the integration of analytic
capabilities and information-sharing across the national and defense
counterterrorism intelligence missions.
______
[The nomination reference of Hon. Michael G. Vickers
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 5, 2011.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Michael Vickers, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, vice James R. Clapper.
______
[The biographical sketch of Hon. Michael G. Vickers, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biography of Michael G. Vickers
Education:
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD (attended
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC)
Doctor of Philosophy, International Relations-
Strategic Studies
1991-2010 (non-resident since 1995); degree
awarded August 2010
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA
Master of Business Administration
1986-1988; degree awarded May 1988
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL
Bachelor of Arts, International Relations
1980-1983 (New College - External Degree
Program); degree awarded June 1983
Employment Record:
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low
Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities
2011-Present
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/
Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities
2007-Present
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies
1996-2007
Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies
Acting Co-Director, Strategic Studies, and
Professorial Lecturer (part-time)
1996-1997
Department of Defense
Special Government Employee (paid), Defense
Science Board Task Force (part-time), 1996
Unpaid member, Defense Science Board Task
Force (part-time), 1998, 1999
Independent Consultant
Principal clients: Science Applications
International (contract work for the Department of
Defense); Defense Budget Project (predecessor
organization of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments)
1994-1996
Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense
Strategic Studies Fellow (part-time)
1993-1994
News America Publishing (New York, NY)
Editor and Managing Director, The Daily
Intelligence Brief (start-up)
1990-1991
BioAutomation, Inc (Bridgeport, PA)
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
(start-up)
1988-1990
Metallic Ceramic Coatings, Inc. (Bridgeport, PA)
Vice President, Finance and Strategy
1986-1988; 1992-1994
Central Intelligence Agency
Operations Officer
1983-1986
U.S. Army
Special Forces Officer (Captain) and
Noncommissioned Officer (Staff Sergeant)
1973-1983
Honors and awards:
Distinguished Member, 1st Special Forces Regiment,
U.S. Army (2010)
Alexander Hamilton Fellowship (Smith Richardson
Foundation) (1993)
Certification of Distinction, Central Intelligence
Agency (1984)
Honors graduate (cum laude), University of Alabama
(1983)
Meritorious Service Medal (1976, 1983)
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain
senior military officers as determined by the committee, to
complete a form that details the biographical, financial and
other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon.
Michael G. Vickers in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Michael George Vickers.
2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).
3. Date of nomination:
Originally nominated: September 29, 2010; renominated: January 5,
2011.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
April 27, 1953; Burbank, CA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Melana Zyla Vickers.
Maiden Name: Melana Kalyna Zyla.
7. Names and ages of children:
Alexandra Novakovic Vickers, age 22.
Natasha Novakovic Vickers, age 19.
Sophia Novakovic Vickers, age 17.
Oksana Elizabeth Vickers, age 9.
Kalyna Cecilia Vickers, age 5.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 1991-2010, Doctor of
Philosophy, International Relations, degree conferred August 2010.
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 1986-1988, Master of
Business Administration, degree conferred May 1988.
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, 1980-1983. Bachelor of Arts,
International Relations, degree conferred 1983.
Hollywood High School, Hollywood, CA, 1968-1971, High School
diploma.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities); 2500 Defense Pentagon, Room
3C852A; August 3, 2007 to Present (confirmed July 23, 2007).
Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments; 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC;
September 1996 to August 2007.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Classified and unclassified contract consulting work for the
Department of Defense, 1994 to 2007 while employed by the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (1996 to 2007) and as a self-
employed consultant (1994 to 1996).
Part-time employment (paid) as a special government employee as a
member of a Defense Science Board Task Force, 1996; unpaid service as a
member of Defense Science Board Task Forces, 1998, 1999.
Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1983 to March
1986.
Commissioned Officer, U.S. Army, December 1978 to June 1983.
Enlisted, U.S. Army, June 1973 to December 1978.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Trustee, Vickers Family Revocable Trust since December 2004; Melana
Zyla Vickers (wife), co-trustee.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
None.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Meritorious Service Medal (U.S. Army); two awards, 1976, 1983.
Certificate of Distinction, Central Intelligence Agency, 1984.
Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, University of Alabama, 1983.
Alexander Hamilton Fellowship (Smith Richardson Foundation), 1993.
Distinguished Member, 1st Special Forces Regiment, U.S. Army, 2010.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
My most recent publication is my Ph.D. dissertation, ``The
Structure of Military Revolutions'' (Johns Hopkins University, July
2010), which is available through University Microfilms (UMI).
I am the author of two book chapters: ``The Revolution in Military
Affairs and Military Capabilities,'' in Robert Pfaltzgraff and Richard
Shultz, eds., War in the Information Age (Brassey's, 1997); and
``Revolution Deferred: Kosovo and the Transformation of War,'' in
Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, eds., War Over Kosovo: Politics and
Strategy in a Global Age (Columbia University Press, 2001).
I am the author or co-author of five Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments monographs: ``War in 2020--A Primer'' (1996);
``The Military Revolution and Intrastate Conflict'' (1997); ``The
Quadrennial Defense Review: An Assessment'' (1997); ``Strategy for a
Long Peace'' (2001); and ``The Revolution in War'' (2004). I am also
the author co-author of four CSBA Backgrounders: ``Intelligence Reform
and the Next CIA Director'' (2004); ``The 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review, the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Budget Request and the Way Ahead
for Transformation'' (2002); ``The Hart-Rudman Commission Report: A
Critique'' (2000); and ``Perspectives on the Revolution in Military
Affairs'' (1996).
I have had three opinion-editorials published by USA Today: ``For
Guidance on Iraq, Look to Afghanistan'' (June 2004); ``Will We Heed
Lessons of War in Kosovo?'' (June 1999); and ``Ground Troops, Yes, But
Whose?'' (April 1999). I have had one opinion-editorial published by
the Washington Post: ``Ground War: Doing More With Less'' (April 2003).
I have had two book reviews published by the Wall Street Journal: ``The
Destiny of Combat'' (Review of Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweitzer,
The Next War, and George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War,
March 1997) and ``The Future of Force'' (Review of Frederick Kagan,
Finding the Target, November 2006). I have had one book review
published by the Journal of Military History: The Making of Strategy:
Rulers, States, and War, Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin
Bernstein, eds. (October 1997). I have also had an article published by
Armed Forces Journal: ``What the QDR Should Say?'' (2006).
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None.
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Michael G. Vickers.
This 12th day of January, 2011.
[The nomination of Hon. Michael G. Vickers was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 17, 2011.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Jo Ann Rooney by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. Not at this time.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.
QUALIFICATIONS
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. My broad professional experiences, educational credentials,
and lifelong commitment to service provide a solid background for me to
recognize and contribute positively to myriads of formidable challenges
and tasks facing DOD and, in particular, Personnel and Readiness.
During my 8 years as president of a doctoral level university, we
successfully addressed not only difficult financial challenges,
enabling the institution to realize significant operating surpluses
after years of deficits, but developed an innovative educational model
that directly impacted retention, graduation rates, and student
success. By offering courses in a variety of delivery modalities,
including blocks sessions, accelerated, low residency, and traditional
semesters, we were able to deliver a unique, sustainable solution to
the educational needs of traditional, nontraditional, and graduate
students while at the same time creating a new business and human
resource model for the university. My work on the Jewish Hospital Saint
Mary's Healthcare System Board of Trustees in a leadership role has
allowed me to be directly involved in developing policies and
procedures impacting patient care, safety, operating efficiencies, and
human resource policies across a system encompassing ambulatory,
community hospitals and tertiary care facilities, an inpatient
psychiatric hospital, a comprehensive rehabilitation facility, and
clinical research. My current work as president of Mount Ida College
and being a member of the Board of Trustees of Regis University have
given me additional opportunities to lead an organization through a
period of significant transition and be at the forefront of educational
innovation. Other corporate and civic engagements have enabled me to
lead organizations through dynamic structural and financial changes
enabling them to better serve their constituents. My many years of
experience outside of post secondary education in tax law, business,
and finance provide me with a solid foundation and breadth of knowledge
to deal with complex legal, financial, and policy issues.
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (P&R)?
Answer. There are a number of challenges facing P&R to ensure the
human resource systems for civilian and military personnel, Active and
Reserve, provide the level of training and high level skills needed to
support current as well as potential future engagements. This includes
evaluating and providing appropriate compensation and personnel
policies commensurate with the skills and sacrifices being made by
those in service to our country; ensuring quality, world-class health
care, including mental health support, to ill and injured
servicemembers; and providing comprehensive support services to
families of servicemembers. In addition, there needs to be ongoing
evaluation of current policies and procedures to identify opportunities
for enhanced efficiencies without impacting service delivery.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. Although I do not have specific recommendations at this
time, if confirmed, I would review the plans currently in place to
address these challenges and determine what modifications, if any, need
to be made. I would look for opportunities to enhance communication and
collaboration with my colleagues throughout DOD to improve
effectiveness in delivering programs supporting Personnel and
Readiness.
DUTIES
Question. Section 136a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
in the performance of his or her duties.
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect to be
assigned to you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense to assign
me my duties, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, functions, and responsibilities currently mandated by law
and specified in the Department's directives for the position of
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness.
Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your
relationship with the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve the Secretary as his advisor
and advocate for the management of human resources in the Department.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve the Deputy Secretary as his
advisor and advocate for the management of human resources in the
Department.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
(ASD(HA)).
Answer. If confirmed, ASD(HA) would be my principal advisor for all
DOD health policies, programs, and force health protection activities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
(ASD(RA)).
Answer. If I am confirmed, ASD(RA) would be my principal advisor
for all Reserve component matters in the Department of Defense (DOD).
Question. The DOD General Counsel.
Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate regular communication,
coordination of actions, and exchange of views with the General Counsel
and the attorneys assigned to focus on personnel and readiness policy
matters. I would expect to seek and follow the advice of the General
Counsel on legal, policy, and procedural matters pertaining to the
policies promulgated from the USD(P&R).
Question. The DOD Inspector General.
Answer. The DOD Inspector General is in charge of promoting
integrity, accountability, and improvement of DOD personnel, programs,
and operations to support the Department's mission and serve the public
interest. If confirmed, I would fully assist in any investigations or
issues that relate to personnel and readiness.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretaries of
the Military Departments on all matters relating to the management and
well-being of military and civilian personnel in the DOD Total Force
structure.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to
the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces and
on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I would work through ASD(RA) to ensure effective integration
of National Guard capabilities into a cohesive Total Force.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with these officials as partners
in carrying out the human resource obligations of the Services.
Question. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for
Personnel, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Commandant of
the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with these officers to
ensure that DOD attracts, motivates, and retains the quality people it
needs.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. If confirmed, I would foster mutually respectful working
relationships that translate into providing the Total Force
capabilities needed to complete combat missions.
Question. The Joint Staff, particularly the Director for Manpower
and Personnel (J-1).
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek a close coordinating
relationship and open channels of communication with the Joint Staff
regarding personnel and readiness policy issues.
SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS
Question. Servicemembers who are wounded and injured performing
duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn
deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services,
healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007
illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of
returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation
and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
Answer. While I do not have enough information at this time to make
a full assessment, I am aware that medical, benefit, and transitional
assistance improvements have been made since 2007 to ensure our
wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers receive the care and support
necessary to either return to Active Duty or to civilian life. However,
it is a continually evolving process with ever increasing demands and
the Department must regularly evaluate its Wounded Warrior programs and
constantly strive to improve.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based?
Answer. A significant strength, in my opinion, is the highest level
priority the Department has placed on caring for our wounded warriors
and their families. The sustained focus and assessment of the needs of
the wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers will allow the Department
to continue its progress in caring for these members.
Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. The Department should better identify opportunities for
improvement by putting in place a proactive assessment and evaluation
process that corrects weaknesses.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. Although I do not have any specific recommendations at this
time, if confirmed, I would ensure that current programs and policies
are regularly evaluated and outcome assessments conducted with
adjustments made, as needed, to ensure necessary resources are in place
to take care of our recovering wounded warriors and their families.
Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A
DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, has been
established to improve processing of servicemembers.
What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
improve the Integrated DES?
Answer. There are always opportunities for improvements. I believe
the Department has an obligation to our servicemembers participating in
the Integrated DES to proactively evaluate the program and proactively
apply lessons learned.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
Answer. The Integrated DES is a collaborative effort between DOD
and the Department of Veterans Affairs. If confirmed, I would work in
close collaboration with the Department of Veterans Affairs to
continually evaluate the process and apply unified solutions to correct
identified deficiencies.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COLLABORATION
Question. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans
Affairs Shinseki have pledged their support for improving and
increasing collaboration between their respective departments to
support military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status,
in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and
compensation.
If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that
DOD and Veterans Affairs achieve the administration's objectives in DOD
and VA collaboration?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be intimately involved in the
collaborative efforts between DOD and the Department of Veterans
Affairs. I share the vision of a model interagency partnership that
delivers seamless, high quality, and cost-effective services to
beneficiaries and value to our Nation. I will do my utmost to provide
leadership that enables the interagency effort and facilitate the
completion of those goals. Together with USD(P&R), I will ensure that
DOD continues to work closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs
to ensure that transitioning servicemembers receive the benefits, care,
and transition support they deserve.
DISABILITY SEVERANCE PAY
Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced
severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted
from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for
disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in
a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in combat-
related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In
adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of
a combat-related disability contained in title 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)).
Rather than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a
more limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that
the disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict.
If confirmed, will you reconsider the Department's definition of
combat-related operations for purposes of awarding enhanced severance
pay and deduction of severance pay from VA disability compensation?
Answer. Although I do not know the details, it is my understanding
that a review of the policy implementing section 1646 of the Wounded
Warrior Act is currently underway. If confirmed, I would look into the
status of this review to ensure that any policy change relating to the
definition, if warranted, meets the intent of Congress and is
consistent with the governing statute.
HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY
Question. The current Homosexual Conduct Policy, commonly referred
to as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' went into effect in February 1994
after months of congressional hearings and debate resulting in the
enactment of a Federal statute. Although there have been some changes
in how this policy has been implemented, the basic policy has not
changed. President Obama made it clear that he intends to work with the
military and with Congress to repeal the policy. Following their
February 2, 2010, testimony recommending repeal of the policy,
Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Mullen, initiated a high-level, comprehensive review of the
impact of repealing the current law.
What is your view on repealing or changing this policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(P&R) to work closely
with the Military Department Secretaries and the Service Chiefs to
provide the Secretary of Defense the best advice possible on the way
forward regarding this issue.
Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you anticipate
playing in efforts to repeal or change this policy?
Answer. If Congress changes the law and if confirmed, I would
assist USD(P&R) in leading the implementation of the change in the
policy within DOD. I would work closely with the Services to ensure the
revising of this policy is done in a way that maintains our highest
state of military readiness.
RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES
Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. The Department does not endorse the establishment of
religion, but it does guarantee its free exercise. The Department and
the Military Services ensure servicemembers may observe the tenets of
their respective religions, including the right to hold no specific
religious conviction or affiliation.
Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles
of faith?
Answer. My understanding is that wearing particular articles of
faith are permissible so long as the articles are neat and
conservative; do not negatively impact the readiness, good order, or
discipline of the unit; and the mission is not jeopardized. If
confirmed, I would continue to monitor and evaluate this issue.
Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. It is my understanding that the military chaplaincy has
done an admirable job in ministering amidst the pluralistic environment
of the military. Even as chaplains express their faith, they and their
commanders also are asked to be as inclusive as possible when
ministering to an interfaith group. I believe that as a group, military
chaplains work to balance these responsibilities well.
Question. The Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that
``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations
urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for
religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to
task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-disciplinary
study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-
radicalization . . . ''.
What is your view of this recommendation?
Answer. I cannot make an assessment at this time, but if confirmed,
evaluating the adequacy of current policies concerning the safeguarding
of our servicemembers would be a top priority.
Question. Will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based
approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department's
relevant policies on this topic?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review the plans that are currently
in place to address these challenges, and determine what, if any,
changes should be made to them to address this critical issue. I would
intend to collaborate with my colleagues in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff in charting the
right course for the Department.
PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS
Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded
during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army medical
corps officer. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010
concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against
internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.
What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
Fort Hood?
Answer. It is my understanding that while the first responders and
initial response teams were well-prepared to react to this incident,
the proceeding warning signals were not properly recognized and
therefore, this tragedy was not prevented. If confirmed, I would work
with the USD(P&R) to gain a comprehensive understanding of the lessons
learned, corrective actions taken, and the plan moving forward in order
to increase our force protection on our installations.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with DOD leadership to
strengthen the areas identified by the Fort Hood Independent Review to
include mitigating violence in the workplace, ensuring commanders/
supervisors have access to appropriate personnel records, and
integrating and strengthening force protection policies. Furthermore, I
will work closely with our medical community to give commanders a
better understanding of how to identify violence indicators.
MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY
Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
Answer. Every servicemember has a right to practice their religious
faith without fear of persecution or retribution. If confirmed, I will
review policies to ensure that they are adequate to provide physical
and emotional safety from religious harassment and will take
appropriate action, if needed.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
U.S. military?
In order to safeguard the rights of servicemembers, there must be
both formal and informal feedback procedures that quickly identify and
assess any harassment, should it occur. Responses to grievances, or any
identified shortcomings in command climate assessments, must be quick,
thoughtful, and effective. If confirmed, I would review the viability
of these feedback systems, and take measures to correct them, as
appropriate.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Question. The Department has in recent years developed
comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing
appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in
combat areas of operation are still being reported. Victims and their
advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in
their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for
the victim. They assert that their command fails to respond
appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate
investigation of their charges followed by a failure to hold assailants
accountable.
Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has put
considerable effort into the development of policies and programs
designed to address sexual assault. If confirmed, I would review those
policies to ensure the Department provides the appropriate care to
victims and hold offenders accountable.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
which this new confidential reporting procedure has been put into
operation?
Answer. I have not been informed of any specific problems in the
implementation of the confidential reporting option, called restricted
reporting. I am aware that the restriction of no investigation when a
victim chooses restricted reporting has concerned commanders
responsible for the actions of their unit members. I believe that the
Department must find a balance between victim care and offender
accountability but of the utmost importance is that victims come
forward and obtain support they need following an assault.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to
prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including
assaults against contractor personnel?
Answer. I do not have enough information to make a detailed
assessment at this time, but I am aware the Department has focused on
educating servicemembers deploying to combat zones about how to prevent
sexual assault and what to do should it occur. That said, it has been
made clear to me that if anyone shows up at a military treatment
facility following a sexual assault, he or she will receive care.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. I know that all Services have been directed to establish
guidelines for a 24-hour, 7-day per week sexual assault response
capability for all locations, including deployed areas. At this time, I
cannot make an assessment of the effectiveness of those guidelines, but
if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy of training and resources
allocated to sexual assault investigation and response would be a top
priority.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
Answer. I strongly believe that anyone who commits a sexual assault
in the military needs to know that they will be held accountable. That
is how DOD removes perpetrators from our ranks and, at the same time,
show victims that taking the difficult step of assisting with an
investigation will help their fellow servicemembers. I understand that
the Services are working towards increasing the subject matter
expertise of those investigating and prosecuting sexual assaults. If
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that accountability remains a key
priority.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
sexual assaults?
Answer. Sexual assault reaches across the Department, and as such,
outreach and accountability efforts need to have the same reach. If
confirmed, I would ensure that the Department has the correct structure
in place to engage the departmental leadership, and the leadership of
other agencies such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Health and
Human Services, and Justice, in planning, guiding, and evaluating our
efforts.
SERVICE ACADEMIES
Question. What do you consider to be the policy and procedural
elements that must be in place at each of the Service Academies in
order to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults and
sexual harassment and to ensure essential oversight?
Answer. I believe the Department's sexual assault and sexual
harassment policies provide a foundation for combating sexual
misconduct at the Service Academies. There must be policies and
procedures that encourage victims to come forward and that hold
offenders accountable, as well as effective training programs. It is my
understanding that the academies have institutionalized prevention and
response programs. I further understand that the Department reviews the
efforts of the academies annually. If confirmed, I would continue that
oversight and determine whether additional measures need to be taken.
Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Service
Academies to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and to prevent
sexual assaults and sexual harassment?
Answer. Regarding religious tolerance, I do not have enough
information to make an assessment at this time. I believe it is
imperative that leaders, at all levels, must continue to ensure that
every member of the DOD respects the spirit and intent of laws and
policies surrounding the free exercise of religion.
On the topic of sexual assault, it is my understanding that the
academies have institutionalized prevention and response programs. I
further understand that the Department reviews the efforts of the
academies annually. If confirmed, I would continue that oversight and
determine whether additional measures need to be taken.
WOMEN IN THE MILITARY
Question. The Navy recently opened service on submarines to women
and the Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women
in intelligence specialties. The issue of the appropriate combat role
of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to
Congress and the American public.
Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for
service by women?
Answer. In my opinion, DOD has sufficient flexibility under current
law to make assignment policy for women, if needed. DOD should continue
to monitor combat needs as Services recommend expanding deployment
roles for women.
Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy
regarding women in combat are needed?
Answer. I am not aware of any changes necessary at this time. It is
my understanding that Department policy and practices are reviewed on a
recurring basis to ensure compliance and effective use of manpower. If
confirmed, I would take my responsibility to review each proposed
policy change very seriously and ensure changes to existing policy move
forward only when accompanied by a thorough plan for implementation.
RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE
Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
In April 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force
Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive.''
What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical
costs on future DOD plans?
Answer. I am informed that government estimates indicate these
costs could rise to over 10 percent of the DOD budget in just a few
years. If confirmed, I would research means to ensure that DOD provides
quality care, and it does so in the most cost-effective way that
provides the best value for our servicemembers and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
recommend to the Secretary of Defense to mitigate the effect of such
costs on the DOD top-line?
Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time.
However, if confirmed, I would work closely with our healthcare
leadership in DOD to examine every opportunity to assure military
beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible while
managing cost growth and to provide that advice to the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
the costs of military health care?
Answer. I believe that to control the costs of military health
care, DOD needs to research all possibilities. If confirmed, I would
examine the costs of the direct care facilities, determining where
efficiencies can be gained and investing wisely in infrastructure
requirements. I would look at the efficiencies in procuring health care
services in the civilian market, and, I would evaluate the benefit
structure to see where reasonable changes could occur. In the long
term, the promotion of healthy lifestyles and prevention among our
beneficiaries will also help greatly reduce the demand for health
services.
PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS
Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever
increasing portion of the DOD budget.
What actions do you believe can be taken to control the rise in
personnel costs and entitlement spending?
Answer. I am aware that personnel-related costs are consuming an
increasing proportion of the Department's finite resources. At the same
time, I believe DOD cannot fail to adequately provide for and support
our All-Volunteer Force and their families. This includes maintaining a
sufficient rotation base for both our Active and Reserve personnel. If
confirmed, I know achieving a right-sized mix of Active Duty, Reserve,
civilians, and contractors is imperative. A key part of this challenge
will be striking the optimum balance between personnel,
recapitalization, and operational and support costs, while ensuring
that related entitlements are appropriate and well-reasoned.
Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services
efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high
quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the
Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for others?
Answer. Although I do not have a detailed knowledge of the
Department's and the Services' special pay programs at this time, I
believe the use of targeted pays and bonuses can be effectively and
efficiently used in recruiting and retaining specific skills and
specialties.
MENTAL HEALTH
Question. Senior military leaders, including the Secretary of
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, increasingly
recognize the need to reduce the stigma for military personnel and
their families and veterans in seeking mental health care.
If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in expanding
breadth of this message to military personnel and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that existing DOD
efforts to combat stigma toward help-seeking behavior among
servicemembers be supported and, if necessary, would expand the breadth
of the outreach efforts. I fully support the Department's efforts to
improve health and mental health care services, and reduce the stigma
of mental health care.
SUICIDE PREVENTION
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has
increased in recent years. The Army released a report in June 2010 that
analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high-risk behaviors.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to
help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase
the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families?
Answer. I believe DOD must support a culture to promote health and
resiliency, and reduce high-risk behavior in the force. This requires
both military and civilian leaders to be active participants in this
effort and have essential roles in providing the requisite support. If
confirmed, I will assure that proper emphasis on suicide prevention is
placed through training, reducing stigma, increasing resilience, and
increasing access to care. I will focus on providing standardization,
integration of best practices, and general oversight, serving as a
change agent and providing guidance from which the Services can operate
their suicide prevention programs.
Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office
of the Secretary of Defense is taking in response to the June 2010 Army
report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
Answer. The Army released a report in June 2010 that analyzed the
causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in
drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high-risk behaviors. If confirmed,
I will ensure that the Army is enforcing existing regulations and
policies and has implemented risk mitigation strategies in suicide
prevention for the substance abuse and behavior issues (disciplinary
and high risk) they identified. In addition, I would support ongoing
assessment and monitoring of the impact of these policies and
regulations on the suicide rate.
READINESS RESPONSIBILITIES
Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., gives the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness certain
responsibilities for military readiness. Some important issues that
affect military readiness, however, such as logistics and materiel
readiness, have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Under
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in ensuring military
readiness?
Answer. I view the responsibilities of the USD(P&R) as to advise
the Secretary on all matters related to readiness. These include
oversight of civilian and military training and education, personnel
and medical readiness, and the analysis of broad mission assessments
from the combatant commanders regarding the readiness of key units in
support of the Secretary's deployment decisions. As for readiness
responsibilities across the Department, if confirmed, I will work
collaboratively with my colleagues in OSD, the Joint Staff, and the
Services to ensure our forces are ready to execute the National
Military Strategy, and I will sustain the readiness synergism and
linkages that exist today across the Department, the other Federal
Agencies, our coalition partners, and local governments and
communities.
Question. What are the most critical objectives to improve
readiness reporting and monitoring of the Military Forces, and if
confirmed, how would you work with the Military Departments as well as
other Office of the Secretary of Defense offices to achieve them?
Answer. I believe the Department needs accurate and timely
readiness assessments of our military forces. These are the gauge by
which DOD should measure our ability to execute the missions assigned
by the President and Secretary of Defense. Accurate assessments allow
the Department to effectively plan and manage its forces, and signal
where there are capability shortfalls or assets are needed. It is my
understanding that the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)
provides the means to capture these assessments from our military
commanders, and provides a holistic and important view of the
Department's readiness to the senior leadership. If confirmed, I would
personally review DRRS implementation to ensure the Department is
meeting the needs of the senior leadership and a unity of effort across
the Department to drive this important effort to a fully operational
capability.
ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH
Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, Congress authorized higher Active Duty end strengths for all the
Services.
In your view, what is the appropriate Active Duty end strength for
each of the Services?
Answer. While I cannot make an informed assessment at this time, I
believe strongly that our forces, both Active and Reserve, must be
large enough to not only satisfy deployed demands, but also have a
rotation base that recognizes the personal needs of our volunteers and
their families. If confirmed, I would devote considerable attention to
this important issue.
Question. What challenges will the Services face in maintaining
these higher end strengths?
Answer. The foremost challenge will be monitoring and responding to
retention and recruiting trends, especially as the economy improves.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Question. DOD continues to face significant shortages in critically
needed military medical personnel in both the Active and Reserve
components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support
requirements will compound the already serious challenges faced in
recruitment and retention of military medical, dental, nurse, and
behavioral health personnel.
What is your understanding of the shortages of health care
professionals currently being experienced in DOD and the sufficiency of
the plans to meet recruiting and retention goals?
Answer. Regarding military healthcare servicemembers, it is my
understanding the current overall manning of the health professions is
at or above manning requirements. If confirmed, one of my goals will be
to improve the recruitment and retention of health professional
specialties which currently fall below manning requirements. To retain
our health professionals, Congress has provided DOD broad authority to
provide special and incentive pays for all health professional
officers. I believe there is an increased need for civilian healthcare
providers and DOD must remain competitive to recruit from the civilian
labor market.
Question. What legislative and policy initiatives, including
bonuses and special pays, do you think may be necessary to ensure that
the Military Services can continue to meet medical support
requirements?
Answer. In regard to legislative and policy initiatives for the
Military Services, I do not have any specific recommendations at this
time. However, I believe there may be a need for more flexible
recruiting and retention strategies such as the recently granted
authority to use bonuses and special pays as needed to recruit, hire,
and retain medical specialties.
DWELL TIME
Question. Even though dwell time is improving as our forces draw
down in Iraq, many Active Duty military members are still not
experiencing the ideal dwell time of 2 years at home for every year
deployed.
In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be
met?
Answer. From my perspective, the largest impact to dwell time will
come from the balance of the drawdown in Iraq and the President's
decisions regarding Afghanistan. Increases in end strength for the
Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces over the past several
years should translate into dwell times increasing.
The Iraq drawdown will also serve to increase the dwell time for
our units as fewer forces will need to be deployed. How much this will
increase dwell time depends on the level of forces needed for
Afghanistan. In all cases, however, DOD must carefully manage our
forces across the Department. This involves careful assessment of where
and when military forces are needed, and how to structure the force to
best meet the projected demands.
Question. In your view, would additional Army end strength in 2011
or 2012 improve dwell time ratios and reduce stress on the force, and
if so, what numbers of Active and Reserve component members would be
necessary?
Answer. I do not have enough information to make an assessment at
this time. I defer to the analysis of the Quadrennial Defense Review as
to whether current end strength increases are sufficient in light of
anticipated strategy and projected needs.
MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
Question. Over the past 9 years, the National Guard and Reserves
have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since
World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures
for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening
and medical readiness, monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited
transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access
to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management
policies and systems have been characterized in the past as inefficient
and rigid and readiness levels have been adversely affected by
equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
do problems still exist?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has focused on
increasing the alert and mobilization times prior to mobilization; DOD
needs to ensure that we provide predictability to servicemembers, their
families, and employers. If confirmed, I would continue the efforts of
the Department to monitor this issue closely, as we know that
predictability is a major factor for all those affected, and I believe
strongly that National Guard and Reserve personnel deserve first-class
mobilization and demobilization procedures, health screening, and
transition assistance programs.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
Answer. It is my understanding the most significant enduring
changes are in the implementation of service force generation plans,
which have been created to provide a defined cycle to prepare Reserve
component units for employment as an operational force. This enables
units to train for a mission prior to mobilization and deploy and
redeploy on a predictable time line.
Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review existing authorities and
proposed legislation to ensure that the Department has appropriate
authorities in light of the role of the Guard and Reserves in our force
deployment plans.
MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES
Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
improved policy oversight and accountability.
If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
Answer. It is essential for DOD and all the Service components to
have a single repository of data which accurately reflects the medical
and dental readiness of the Reserve components. If confirmed, I will
work with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Health Affairs and
Reserve Affairs in bringing the appropriate parties, including
information management, medical, and line personnel, together to
examine the reporting processes in detail, to agree on the necessary
definitions of what and who should be monitored, and to fill any gaps
in the reporting processes.
Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to
produce a healthy and fit Reserve component?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the significant
progress in improvement that I understand has been made in medical and
dental readiness for the Reserve component and identify what still
needs to be accomplished to achieve the goal of a healthy and fit
Reserve component force.
MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE
Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of
key quality-of-life factors for military families, such as family
support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and
recreation services.
How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
and retention and quality-of-life improvements and your own top
priorities for the Armed Forces?
Answer. Quality-of-life efforts impact the recruitment and
retention of military personnel and are key to maintaining the All-
Volunteer Force. A servicemember's satisfaction with various aspects of
military life as well as the servicemember's family experience
influences members' decision to reenlist. If confirmed, I would review
how effectively our programs meet the needs of servicemembers and their
families, and ensure that they are contributing positively to
recruitment and retention.
Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
qualify-of-life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision
working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy
groups, and Congress to achieve them?
Answer. I would aggressively pursue the Department's priorities to
promote the well-being and resilience of servicemembers and their
families. I would focus on understanding the needs of our force and
their families and expand assistance such as access to counseling,
fitness opportunities, and childcare support to help minimize stress on
the force. The Department leadership should work together with advocacy
groups and Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in
programs and to communicate effectively to ensure that families know
how to access available support when they need it.
FAMILY SUPPORT
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, I would make family readiness issues one of
my top priorities. I would support, prioritize, and appropriately
resource quality physical and mental healthcare, spouse career
assistance, childcare, other elements of dependent support, and
education needs.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and growth in end
strength?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's current
approach to identify and address family readiness needs, to gather
information from the Services, commands, servicemembers and families,
professional organizations, and researchers about how to best prepare
families for rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and other stressful aspects
of military life.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve
component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family
readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a
military installation?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department's Yellow
Ribbon Program is properly focused and funded to address the issues
faced by members of the Active, Guard, and Reserve and their families.
The program should provide information, access, referrals, and outreach
to military members and their families. This needs to be underwritten
by a coordinated, community-based network of care encompassing DOD, VA,
State, local, non-profit, and private providers. My goal would be to
provide a full range of services for Active, Guard, and Reserve members
and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
enhance family support?
Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of
flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our
servicemembers and their families, whether they live on military
installations, near military installations, or far from military
installations.
ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE
Question. One of the major concerns for military family members is
access to health care. Military spouses tell us that the healthcare
system is inundated, and those stationed in more remote areas may not
have access to adequate care.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure complete access
to healthcare for the families of servicemembers?
Answer. I agree that access to care for family members is an
important concern and, if confirmed, I will work to ensure appropriate
access to care is a key feature of our TRICARE program and will
continually explore ways to ensure all beneficiaries are provided the
appropriate level of care within the established TRICARE Access to Care
Standards.
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FAMILIES WITH SPECIAL NEEDS
Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 (section 563), Congress required the establishment of an Office of
Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs within the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
The purpose of this office is to enhance and improve DOD support for
military families with special needs, be they educational or medical in
nature.
In your view, what should be the priorities of this Office of
Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs?
Answer. I believe the priorities of this office include medical and
educational programs to strengthen military families with special
needs. If confirmed, I would support the critical efforts of this
office to establish consistent policy and monitor its implementation
across the Services. I would identify programs already in existence
that can provide special services to military families.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those
military families with special needs dependents so they are able to get
the support they need?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure increased communication
efforts to reach families with special needs through the use of
webinars, social media outlets, base newspapers, commissaries and
exchanges, childcare centers and youth facilities, DOD schools and a
variety of DOD and Services' websites. In addition, I would emphasize
collaboration with civilian community resources.
MY CAREER ADVANCEMENT ACCOUNTS PROGRAM
Question. The Department established the My Career Advancement
Accounts (MyCAA) program, a demonstration project that provides
military spouses with funds through ``career advancement accounts'' to
help enable them to pursue portable careers. In February 2010, the
Department became overwhelmed by the numbers of program applicants,
subsequently ran out of funds, and then temporarily halted the program.
The program has now restarted, but the funds, as well as the number of
spouses who would be eligible for the program, will be more limited.
What is your understanding of the current focus and objectives of
the program?
Answer. I believe the objective of the MyCAA program is to ensure
that military spouses have opportunities to pursue and sustain a career
while supporting their servicemembers. It is my understanding that the
current MyCAA is available only to spouses of Active Duty members in
the pay grades of E1-E5, W1-W2, and O1-O2. MyCAA is restricted to
$4,000 per eligible spouse and must be used over a 3-year period for an
Associate's degree, a license, or a credential leading to a portable
career. I believe these financial parameters will allow the Department
to sustain the program. It is my understanding that DOD continues to
offer robust career counseling programs to all our spouses.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your objectives for the MyCAA
program and other spouse employment initiatives or programs?
Answer. My objective would be to assist, support, and empower them
in making informed decisions through offering them an opportunity to
obtain comprehensive information on high-growth, high-demand, portable
occupations that can move with them as they relocate. This would
include occupational information on education, license, and credential
requirements, how to access other Federal, State, and private
opportunities for financial assistance in achieving these requirements,
as well as understanding earnings potential. I would also promote the
outstanding pipeline of talent that military spouses represent to
America's employers. Military spouses are talented, diverse, motivated,
and bring strong values to the workplace.
MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS
Question. What do you see as the highest priority medical research
investment areas for DOD?
Answer. I believe the highest priorities are to address critical
research capability gaps related to the treatment and recovery of
wounded warriors, such as the diagnosis and treatment of Traumatic
Brain Injury (TBI), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and other
elements of combat related stress, development of improved prosthetics,
treatment of eye injury, and other deployment and battlefield-related
injuries.
Question. How will you assess the amount of investment made in
these research areas to determine if they are sufficient to meet DOD
goals and requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review the current research portfolio
to ensure it prioritizes and resources research appropriate to the
requirements of the Department.
Question. How will you ensure that DOD medical research efforts are
well coordinated with similar research programs within the private
sector, academia, the Services, DARPA, the Department of Veterans
Affairs, and the National Institutes of Health?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support coordination efforts to
ensure that research is being conducted jointly, building on and
partnering with industry, academia, and other government agencies to
ensure the greatest return to our warfighters. I am aware that joint
program committees have been established to engage with Federal
partners to ensure that our research reflects the best interests of our
service personnel.
Question. How will you ensure that new medical technologies
(including drugs and vaccines) are independently and adequately tested
before their use by DOD organizations and personnel?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department applies
the highest standards of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
ensure new medical technologies, drugs, and vaccines are safe and
effective before they are adopted for use in the Department.
Question. There have been growing privacy and security concerns
raised about the use of on-line social networks for medical research
purposes.
How will you ensure that the increasing use of social networking
media for medical research purposes will protect the privacy and
security of patients?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure active application of the
Department's policy, which states that the rights and welfare of human
subjects in research supported or conducted by the DOD components will
be protected. This protection is based on the ethical principles of
respect for persons and beneficence, and encompasses requirements to
obtain informed consent and to do no harm. In implementing this policy,
the Department will adhere to the applicable statutory provisions for
human protections in research as well as supporting Department
policies.
Question. What are your biggest concerns related to the DOD medical
research enterprise?
Answer. Although I do not have detailed knowledge of the entire
research portfolio, I am especially interested in ensuring the
responsiveness of the research program to medical readiness and our
warfighters' medical needs. This will be accomplished by assuring that
DOD has a balanced investment in medical science and technology and in
medical advanced development leading to timely incorporation into
clinical practice in the Military Health System.
MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
including Active Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining MWR programs
(particularly in view of the Secretary's efficiencies initiatives) and,
if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?
Answer. It is my understanding that the benefits of strong MWR
programs are critical to esprit de corps, stress reduction, and
personal health and well-being. Although there are very extensive
installation MWR facilities and programs, I believe there is an
immediate challenge in ensuring that MWR programs for our deployed
forces meet their needs, especially free access to the Internet to
communicate with family and friends back home and fitness and
recreation activities to keep forces fit to fight. Recreation support
for our wounded warriors is also critical. In the longer term, I
believe the Department needs to understand what programs are valued by
servicemembers and their families in order to make wise investments. In
addition, the MWR customers need to be involved in expressing their
needs and satisfaction with our programs and policies; I understand the
Department will conduct the second MWR customer satisfaction survey in
fiscal year 2011. If confirmed, these are all areas I would
aggressively pursue.
COMMISSARY AND MILITARY EXCHANGE SYSTEMS
Question. Commissary and military exchange systems are significant
quality of life components for members of the Active and Reserve Forces
and their families.
What is your view of the need for modernization of business
policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems, and what
do you view as the most promising avenues for change to achieve
modernization goals?
Answer. I understand that commissary and exchange programs and
policies must continue to evolve to meet the needs and expectations of
our changing force and a changing marketplace. I believe efforts should
be aimed at reducing overhead and pursuing new avenues to reach our
military families who do not live on military installations. The
commissary system should deliver customer savings and also achieve high
satisfaction ratings. The military exchange resale community must
continue to work, individually and collaboratively, to adapt marketing
and selling practices, invest in technologies, and improve merchandise
availability to be more responsive to military customers.
Question. In the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to
establish an executive governing body for the commissary and exchange
systems to ensure the complementary operation of the two systems.
What is your understanding of the purpose and composition of the
executive governing body?
Answer. I am aware the Department established the DOD Executive
Resale Board as the governing body to provide advice to the USD(P&R)
regarding the complementary operation of the commissary and exchange
systems. I have been informed that the Board works to resolve issues
and has been instrumental in pursuing matters of mutual benefit to the
elements of the military resale system. The Board is chaired by the
PDUSD(P&R), and members include both the senior military officers and
civilians who oversee and manage the commissary and exchange systems.
Question. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to the
governing body, and what would your expectations be for its role?
Answer. The Secretary designated the PDUSD(P&R) as the chairperson
of the Executive Resale Board. If confirmed, I would ensure the Board
would continue to meet regularly to review operational areas of mutual
interest to the commissary and exchange systems.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SYSTEMS
Question. Section 1113 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 repealed the statutory authority for the National
Security Personnel System (NSPS), and required that all NSPS employees
be converted to other personnel systems by no later than January 1,
2012.
What is your understanding of the Department's progress in
converting its civilian employees from NSPS?
Answer. I understand during fiscal year 2010, 172,000 employees
representing approximately 76 percent of the NSPS population were
transitioned from NSPS to the Government-wide General Schedule system.
I also understand the transition of all remaining NSPS employees to the
appropriate statutory pay and personnel system will be completed by the
statutory deadline of January 1, 2012.
Question. Section 1113 also provides DOD with extensive personnel
flexibilities for its civilian employees that are not available to
other agencies. In particular, section 9902(a) of title 5, U.S.C., as
added by section 1113, directs the Department to establish a new
performance management system for all of its employees. Section 9902(b)
directs the Department to develop a streamlined new hiring system that
is designed to better fulfill DOD's mission needs, produce high-quality
applicants, and support timely personnel decisions.
Do you agree that DOD's civilian employee workforce plays a vital
role in the functioning of the Department?
Answer. Yes, DOD's civilian employee workforce plays an
instrumental role in the functioning of the Department.
Question. What is your view of the personnel flexibilities provided
by section 1113?
Answer. I understand Congress provided these flexibilities to allow
the Department to better meet mission requirements. If confirmed, I
will support the work that I understand is under way to develop the
flexibilities.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
these flexibilities in a manner that best meets the needs of the
Department and promotes the quality of the Department's civilian
workforce?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Section 1112 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Department to develop a Defense
Civilian Leadership Program (DCLP) to recruit, train, and advance a new
generation of civilian leaders for the Department. Section 1112
provides the Department with the full range of authorities available
for demonstration programs under section 4703 of title 5, U.S.C.,
including the authority to compensate participants on the basis of
qualifications, performance, and market conditions. These flexibilities
are not otherwise available to DOD.
Do you agree that the Department needs to recruit highly qualified
civilian personnel to meet the growing needs of its acquisition,
technical, business, and financial communities?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, has the existing civilian hiring process
been successful in recruiting such personnel and meeting these needs?
Answer. Although I believe the Department currently has a highly
talented workforce, I wholeheartedly support the initiatives to
streamline and reform the civilian hiring process. There is much work
to be done in this area, and if confirmed, I would ensure that the
Department actively engages in the Government-wide initiative to reform
civilian hiring and aggressively pursues improvements within the
Department.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
the authority provided by section 1112 in a manner that best meets the
needs of the Department and promotes the quality of the Department's
civilian workforce?
Answer. Yes.
HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING
Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., as added by section
1108 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 requires the
Secretary of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human
capital plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's
civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. Section
115b requires that the plan include chapters specifically addressing
the Department's senior management, functional, and technical workforce
and the Department's acquisition workforce.
Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies
gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key
step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and
capabilities needed to meet future challenges?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements
for a strategic human capital plan under section 115b?
Answer. At this time, I have no recommendations. If confirmed, I
would review the strategic human capital planning that the Department
has conducted over the past years against the section 115b requirements
to determine if any changes may be needed to improve the Department's
overall workforce planning effort.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies
with these requirements?
Answer. Yes.
BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES
Question. In recent years, DOD has become increasingly reliant on
services provided by contractors. Over the past 8 years, DOD's civilian
workforce has remained essentially unchanged in size. Over the same
period, the Department's spending on contract services has more than
doubled, with the estimated number of contractor employees working for
the Department increasing from an estimated 730,000 in fiscal year 2000
to an estimated 1,550,000 in fiscal year 2007. As a result of the
explosive growth in service contracts, contractors now play an integral
role in the performance of functions that were once performed
exclusively by government employees, including the management and
oversight of weapons programs, the development of policies, the
development of public relations strategies, and even the collection and
analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in
the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and
perform many of the same functions as Federal employees.
Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees
and contractor employees is in the best interests of DOD?
Answer. I support the Secretary's initiative announced with the
fiscal year 2010 budget to reduce the Department's reliance on
contracted services contractors. I believe the desired outcome of the
Department's in-sourcing initiative is a balanced total workforce of
military, government civilians, and contracted services that
appropriately align functions to the public and private sector, and
results in the best value for the taxpayer.
Question. In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors
to perform its basic functions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department's ongoing
efforts to critically examine currently contracted functions. Striking
a balance between government and contractor performance that ensures
uncompromising government control of critical functions, while
providing best value to the taxpayer, is imperative.
SECRETARY GATES' EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES
Question. In May 2010, Secretary Gates launched an initiative to
strengthen and modernize our fighting forces by eliminating inefficient
or duplicative programs. In an August 16, 2010, memo to DOD components,
the Secretary directed 20 specific initiatives, many involving military
and civilian personnel and DOD contractors.
What is your assessment of the efficiencies announced by the
Secretary to date, and if confirmed, what criteria would you use to
identify and justify additional opportunities for efficiency in
programs within the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness?
Answer. I understand that Secretary Gates is attempting to identify
efficiencies and redundancies within DOD and, if confirmed, I would
support the implementation and continuation of this effort. I would use
the Secretary's criteria to divest the Department of missions that are
not appropriate or part of our core mission. I would also build on the
Secretary of Defense's work of finding greater efficiencies, with the
goal of applying those resources toward higher priority efforts within
the Department. From shared services to other process improvements, I
would strive to ensure Personnel and Readiness is on the leading edge
of efficiencies while still maintaining effectiveness for the
Department.
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE
Question. Over the past 15 years, DOD has dramatically reduced the
size of its acquisition workforce, without undertaking any systematic
planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the specific skills
and competencies needed to meet current and future needs. Since
September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on that workforce have
substantially increased. Section 852 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition
Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address shortcomings in its
acquisition workforce. The fund would provide a minimum of $3 billion
over 6 years for this purpose.
Do you believe that DOD acquisition workforce is large enough and
has the skills needed to perform the tasks assigned to it?
Answer. While I cannot make an assessment of the size of the
workforce at this time, I fully support the Secretary's goals of
increasing the capacity and capability of the acquisition workforce
through reducing reliance on contracted services in key acquisition
support functions.
Question. Do you support the use of the DOD Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees
with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes.
LABORATORY PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
Question. The laboratory demonstration program founded in section
342 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 as
amended by section 1114 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001, section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008, section 1108 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and section 1105 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, paved the way
for personnel management initiatives and new flexibilities at the
defense laboratories. These innovations have been adopted in various
forms throughout other DOD personnel systems.
If confirmed, will you fully implement the laboratory demonstration
program and the authorities under these provisions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the directors of the
defense laboratories are provided the full range of personnel
flexibilities and authorities provided by Congress?
Answer. Yes.
FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY
Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by
the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at
transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities, to include
revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities-based
requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for
both military and civilian personnel.
In your view, what should be the priorities of the Federal
Government to expanding the foreign language skills of civilian and
military personnel and improving coordination of foreign language
programs and activities among the Federal agencies?
Answer. The priorities of the Federal Government to expanding the
foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel and
improving coordination between foreign language programs and activities
among the Federal agencies should be an integrated, holistic, whole-of-
nation approach to developing these skills beginning in pre-school and
continuing through high school and college graduation. The shortage of
language and cultural skills is a national shortfall, not just an
isolated DOD problem. If confirmed, I will support and build upon DOD
efforts to ensure the education of a broader pool of Americans with
skills in critical languages. Early education and skill development in
critical foreign languages is paramount and must begin in pre-school
and continue through the high school and college years. Educating our
children beginning in pre-school and continuing throughout their
educational journey in critical languages will result in globally
competitive citizenry from which DOD, other Federal Government
agencies, and the private sector can recruit.
GI BILL BENEFITS
Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
Assistance Act in 2008 that created enhanced educational benefits for
servicemembers who have served at least 90 days on Active Duty since
September 11. The maximum benefit would roughly cover the cost of a
college education at any public university in the country.
What unresolved issues related to implementation of the post-9/11
Veterans Educational Assistance Act (e.g., coverage of additional
military personnel) do you consider most important to be addressed?
Answer. It is my understanding that there are two technical fixes
needed in the current statute. First, the original statute
inadvertently left out some National Guard Active Duty as qualifying
time for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. Second, although the statute
authorized the Services to offer a supplemental payment for enlistments
in critical skills (commonly called ``kickers''), it did not include
the specific language required to allow the Services to use the
Education Trust Fund to pay for these kickers. Both of these provisions
are rectified in the current version of S. 3447, recently introduced in
the Senate.
MILITARY RETIREMENT
Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the
benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than
the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for
retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending
accounts for servicemembers. The head of a Defense Business Board Task
Force has criticized military benefits as ``GM-style benefits''
describing the military retirement system as a ``pre-volunteer force
retirement system'' and criticizing ``taxpayer-subsidized grocery
chains and low out-of-pocket healthcare costs.''
What is your view of the adequacy of the current military
retirement benefit?
Answer. I have not yet formed an opinion on the adequacy of the
current military retirement benefit. However, it is only one component
of the entire military compensation system. I believe it will be
important to consider the impacts of making changes to one part of the
system so that DOD maintains their current high quality military force.
Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new
generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of
the government?
Answer. I don't have a recommendation at this time, but if
confirmed, I would review this issue carefully.
Question. Do you share the Defense Business Board Task Force view
of military benefits?
Answer. I have not reviewed this report in detail, but I know that
one of its major recommendations was changing the military retirement
system.
It is my understanding that the Defense Business Board is
considering alternatives to the current military retirement system and
alternatives for the Department to consider. If confirmed, I look
forward to reviewing these and other proposals with the military
departments.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
TRICARE IN ALASKA
1. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, there are over 89,000 TRICARE
beneficiaries in the State of Alaska. Active Duty military, their
families, and retirees face many challenges accessing health care in
Alaska. The Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) at Fort Wainwright and
Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) are top quality and provide many
services to military members and their families. However, many
specialties are neither available at the MTFs or at capacity and cannot
accommodate all customers. Many civilian specialists in Alaska do not
participate in the TRICARE network. I've worked extensively with
TRICARE Management Activity and the Services to improve access to care.
I commissioned an interagency working group which identified the need
for regulatory flexibility and a single reimbursement rate to improve
access to care in Alaska. Are you aware of these challenges? If
confirmed, what steps would you take to improve access to healthcare in
Alaska?
Dr. Rooney. I am aware of these challenges. I have been advised
that throughout Alaska there are roughly 1,783 non-Federal physicians
of whom 1,566 are TRICARE Participating Providers. Of the 1,566 TRICARE
participating providers, 793 are primary care physicians with
specialties in family practice, general practice, internal medicine,
and pediatrics. The TRICARE Management Activity's strong support in
approving 12 locality-based waivers ranging from 125 percent to 565
percent of the CHAMPUS Maximum Allowable Charge (CMAC) for critical
specialty providers, coupled with an existing Rate Reimbursement/Rate
Demonstration which sets rates in Alaska at 1.4 times the CMAC
allowable charges, has greatly increased acceptance of TRICARE by non-
Federal providers. A significant change was noted from early 2008 to
February 2011, when the TRICARE Preferred Provider Network increased
from 465 to 845 providers.
If confirmed, I would continue to support the TRICARE Management
Activity's efforts in this regard. While I was pleased to learn that
the Rate Reimbursement Demonstration initially set to expire in
December 2010 was extended until December 2012, I will ensure that
future changes to the rate structure are done collaboratively with the
various Federal agencies that are also exploring options resulting from
the Interagency Task Force's recommendation for regulatory flexibility
and a single Federal reimbursement rate.
2. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, please describe how
you would work with the Army and the Air Force to ensure the MTFs in
Alaska meet health care requirements of Active Duty military and their
families, especially as the Army increases personnel stationed at Fort
Wainwright.
Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I will meet regularly with the Surgeons
General of the Services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs to discuss provider and ancillary support staffing gaps
in the three Alaska MTFs. I will encourage support of the MTFs to the
maximum extent possible given the high operational tempo and associated
deployments. I have been advised that, in all forums, there appears to
be a strong interest in ensuring access for all. This guided the
TRICARE Management Activity's recently approved TRICARE Expansion Plan
favorably endorsed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs and the Services' Surgeons General in collaboration with the
Alaska community leadership. The focus of the Expansion Plan is on
improved access for Department of Defense (DOD) beneficiaries without
displacing non-DOD beneficiaries. In the context of improving access
and protecting non-DOD beneficiaries from DOD overflow, I will
encourage the Services' Surgeons General and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs to explore opportunities for partnerships
with the Alaska community for such programs as Graduate Medical
Education, thereby facilitating mutual positive outcomes. In addition,
Elmendorf AFB already supports internships in dental, pharmacy lab,
physician assistants, medical assistants, Doctor of Osteopathy, and a
physician residency. State-wide recruiting efforts are being initiated
by the State, hospitals, and our healthcare support contractor.
3. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, please describe how you would work
with TRICARE Management Activity as they work to increase the TRICARE
network in Alaska to provide for better access to health care for our
servicemembers and their families.
Dr. Rooney. Access to care issues in Alaska cannot be addressed
merely in terms of access to purchased care services in the community
(network or non-network). As the interagency working group which you
commissioned confirmed in their Report to Congress of September 2010, I
have been advised that some of the issues are not under the control of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R))
or the Federal Government. These include licensure and certification
rules, recruitment of primary care and specialty services, and
apprehension on the part of private practitioners regarding changes in
the reimbursement environment related to healthcare reform. Similarly,
access challenges faced by TRICARE beneficiaries are no different from
challenges faced by other beneficiaries covered by the Federal
Government health plans or by many Alaskans covered by private pay
plans. I was pleased to learn of the TRICARE Management Activity's
recent initiatives in the State of Alaska, which include:
Establishing a TRICARE Civilian Preferred Provider
Network requiring the West Region's Health Care Support
Contractor to develop and operate such a network in designated
Prime Service Areas.
Permitting eligible TRICARE beneficiaries to enroll in
Prime with assignment to MTF Primary Care Managers, or, as an
alternative, assignment to a civilian Primary Care Manager
within the TRICARE civilian preferred provider network. This
will allow approximately 250 to 300 beneficiaries to transfer
to a civilian Primary Care Manager. This will include family
practice, pediatrics, and internal medicine providers.
Offering this new program, first, to the Prime Service
Areas surrounding Fort Wainwright Army Base and Eielson AFB in
Fairbanks and then, second, evaluating whether to expand it
further into Anchorage surrounding the Joint Base Elmendorf
Richardson.
Working jointly with the political leadership, the Services, and
the community, the TRICARE Management Activity's 18-month effort in
bringing these initiatives to fruition is notable. If confirmed, I will
continue to support these ongoing efforts while closely monitoring the
impact these programs have on improving access to health care for our
servicemembers and their families.
FAMILY DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT
4. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, one of my priorities is support for
our military families, especially those in Alaska. The 1st Stryker
Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division will deploy to Afghanistan
in May and I want to make sure their families are taken care of as
their loved ones face yet another deployment. What do you consider to
be the most important family readiness issue for servicemembers and
their families?
Dr. Rooney. I share your priority of supporting our military
families. The impact of a deployment or multiple deployments on
military families is the most significant family readiness issue for
servicemembers and their families. The challenges to military family
readiness and resiliency are numerous stressors related to separation,
deployment, geographic isolation, high operational tempo, and financial
worries.
The Department has a network of Family Support Programs at all DOD
installations worldwide that provide resources to prepare military
families to effectively navigate the challenges of daily living
experienced in the unique context of military service. Family Support
Programs provide information and referral, education and training, and
counseling services to educate families about the potential challenges
they may face. The goal is to equip them with the skills needed to
competently function in the face of such challenges and to increase
their awareness of the supportive resources available to them. The
focus of the support is to assist families with deployment, relocation,
spousal employment, family life education (including parenting skills),
personal financial management, volunteer opportunities, and non-medical
counseling.
The Family Support Programs are designed to provide training and
support to servicemembers and families during all phases of deployment.
In particular, to address the impact of deployment on children and
youth, the Department augments Family Support Programs with licensed
counselors placed in child development centers, schools, and State
family programs. The counselors provide specialized non-medical
counseling education, and training for parents, teachers, child
development staff, and with parental permission, children and youth.
Given the frequency and length of deployments, and the impact those
separations can have on military children, the support provided by the
child and youth counselors throughout the deployment cycle is very
important.
5. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, how would you ensure
those needs are adequately resourced?
Dr. Rooney. I will ensure funding and trained personnel are
provided to support the ongoing needs of the families. I share the
Department's strong commitment to providing assistance to
servicemembers and their families, particularly in light of the
unprecedented demands that have been placed on them. Family assistance
programs serve a critical need in direct mission support for the
mobilization and deployment of both the Active Duty and the Reserve
components and I would work closely with the Services to ensure
resources are adequate to meet the identified needs.
In meeting the direction and goals of the Secretary of Defense to
create a more efficient and effective organization, we will continue to
review and assess where we can take offsets from existing programs to
meet the high priority requirements and needs of the servicemembers and
their families.
6. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, what additional steps will you take
to enhance family support?
Dr. Rooney. I will ensure that existing as well as any new programs
that serve families are continually assessed so that only those
programs that add value and enhance family readiness and resilience are
given resources and continued. I will insist that we integrate programs
into a delivery system that is easily accessible and that ongoing
evaluations focused on obtaining evidence of successful outcomes are
developed. Successful support programs are those that respond directly
to the needs identified by members and their families.
The promotion and publicizing of these support programs to
servicemembers and their families are also priorities. It is critical
to make sure the breadth and depth of the programs are known, that they
are being used to their full potential, and that they are being
recognized as valuable to helping servicemembers and their families
cope with the challenges of daily living experienced in the context of
military service.
In summary, it is important that:
A. Programs that support our servicemembers and their families
which are regularly evaluated and have been shown to add value and
enhance family readiness are resourced and continued;
B. Programs that are evidence-based are integrated into a delivery
system that is easily accessible and those outcomes that respond to
identified support needs of members and families are measured for
effectiveness;
C. The support programs are adequately promoted and publicized;
and
D. Innovative and effective programs are identified and presented
as best practices for others to emulate.
OUTSOURCING VERSUS INSOURCING
7. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, regarding DOD's outsourcing and
insourcing efforts, it seems that the pendulum swings one way and then
the other. I recently read an article which indicated the Army put
their insourcing efforts on hold, and Secretary Gates has indicated the
insourcing is not saving as much money as initially thought. In your
opinion, how can DOD strike a balance between civilian and contractor
employees that is in the best interest of DOD and the taxpayers?
Dr. Rooney. When issues of sourcing are discussed within DOD, the
goal is to consider it from the perspective of Total Force Management.
Across the entire Department, it is recognized that continuous
improvement to the Total Force Management of Active and Reserve
military, government civilians, and contracts for services are
critical. We must ensure that our military is not considered a free
source of labor by organizations within the Department who rely on the
Services to finance their recruitment, training, and development.
Rather, the true cost of military, government civilians, and/or
contracted support should be determined depending on individual facts
and circumstances. To that end, the strategic view of the Total Force
continues to evolve as the mission and plan across the FYDP are
executed.
Total Force Management requires a holistic analysis and
prioritization of the work to be done. It requires identification of
and investment in the most effective and efficient component of the
workforce to best accomplish the tasks to deliver the required
capabilities and level of readiness. The separate decisions that affect
each component of the Total Force must be synchronized to achieve the
desired outcomes and balance operational, fiscal, and acquisition
risks.
The challenge faced with Total Force Management is that it is
dynamic and requires judgment informed by sound analysis. This not only
includes the development and promulgation of policies, but also
requires the Department to provide managers with the tools, resources,
training, and information necessary to achieve the desired outcomes,
all of which must occur in a difficult fiscal environment. Current
business processes must be synchronized to ensure the risks associated
with decisions made in the context of Total Force Management are fully
considered.
There is work being undertaken to improve the Department's
Inventory of Contracts for Services, as recommended by the most recent
Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of DOD processes and in
compliance with changes to the governing statute as directed in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. The tools and
processes that inform the Department's inventory of military and
civilian workload, the Inherently Governmental and Commercial
Activities Inventory, are also being reviewed. Improvements to these
tools are critical to achieve a more appropriate balance in the
workforce, aligning inherently governmental activities to military and
civilian workforces and commercial activities to the most cost
effective service provider, whether military, civilian, or contracted
support.
8. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, how will you approach this issue?
Dr. Rooney. I will approach this issue by recognizing that there
has been a focus over the past few years on insourcing. The Department
is committed to meeting the statutory obligations under title 10, which
require an annual review of contracted services and identification of
those services that are more appropriately performed by the government
workforce and should be insourced.
There is no prescribed solution, and neither all insourcing nor all
outsourcing is ideal. The private sector and contracted support are,
and will continue to be, a vital source of expertise, innovation, and
support to the Department's Total Force.
We also acknowledge the concern express by Congress as related to
the A-76 public-private competition program, and the opportunity in the
past year to review related policies, tools, and processes. We believe
that the A-76 public-private competition process along with insourcing
are critical tools for commanders and managers to have available to
them for the purposes of validating manpower and other requirements;
driving more consistent delivery of mission critical support and
services to warfighters and families; and delivering required readiness
levels while minimizing fiscal opportunity costs to meet the compelling
needs of the Department.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMS
9. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, the United States has come to rely
heavily on our National Guard members. Our Guard has experienced the
largest and most sustained deployment since World War II. In New
Hampshire, we have seen the largest Guard deployments in the history of
our State. You mention in your advance policy questions that you
believe that National Guard and Reserve personnel ``deserve first-class
mobilization and demobilization procedures, health screening, and
transition assistance programs.'' If confirmed, what role would you
play in ensuring our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers are
extended first-class support benefits--before, during, and after their
deployments?
Dr. Rooney. I share Congress' sentiment that our National Guard and
Reserve servicemembers deserve first-class mobilization and
demobilization procedures, medical and dental screening, and transition
assistance programs. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to
ensure that they comply with departmental activation policy and that
the policy is balanced and effective. I would support current
departmental initiatives aimed at providing as much advanced notice to
deploying servicemembers and units as possible. This will ensure that
servicemembers receive their entitlements in a timely fashion. I also
believe that it is imperative that transition assistance be made
possible to all redeploying servicemembers of the Reserve component. I
will work with the Services to ensure that pre- and post-deployment
health assessments are conducted, and any identified medical issues are
dealt with as soon as possible and in a compassionate manner. I support
the current policy which authorizes medical benefits to our National
Guard and Reserve servicemembers before, during, and after their
activation. In addition, I fully support the Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program that provides access to services and information
for our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their families
throughout the deployment cycle. I am aware that there are a number of
State-sponsored programs that exemplify innovative and effective
support programs for National Guard and Reserve members throughout the
cycle. I am interested in learning more about these initiatives and
finding ways to emulate and integrate these best practices on a wider
scale. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure
that our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers receive the benefits
they deserve as they are activated in support of the defense of this
Nation.
10. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, I'm especially concerned about the
unique challenges and factors that affect our returning National Guard
members as they reintegrate back to their jobs, homes, and families.
Oftentimes, our State's National Guard leadership has a better
understanding of the unique support needed on a State-by-State basis,
and--in some States like New Hampshire--they have developed their own
effective full-cycle deployment support programs. Will you commit to
working closely with individual States and their National Guard
leadership in order to develop the most effective, first-class programs
you mention in your testimony?
Dr. Rooney. Yes. Understanding the unique needs and ensuring the
effective reintegration of our National Guard and Reserve
servicemembers back into their families, communities, and jobs is one
of our most important responsibilities. The Department's Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program has been effective at addressing many of the
issues that confront our returning warriors and their families and I am
aware of some of the successful programs developed by individual
States. I am committed to working with the broad array of Federal,
State, and community programs and services to most effectively meet the
needs of our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their
families.
SUICIDE PREVENTION
11. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, each of the Services has reported
increasing numbers of suicides in recent years. If confirmed, what role
would you play in shaping DOD policies to help prevent suicides not
only to Active Duty personnel, but also to National Guard and Reserve
servicemembers and their families?
Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I would play a very active role. I have
read the DOD Task Force Report on Suicide Prevention and found it to be
thorough. I am impressed with the quality of the programs that each of
the Services is currently employing and the active role that the
Services' senior leaders play in the effort to prevent suicides among
their respective members. There is still more that can be done,
however. I believe that a single entity in the Department that would
serve as a consistent policy and oversight authority DOD-wide, which
would include the National Guard and Reserve, could disseminate
information and interact with other departments, agencies, or
organizations. This could also accelerate the implementation of key
policy initiatives. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the
recommendations which could have the most impact, as outlined in the
report, were implemented in a timely and effective manner.
12. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, are you content with the programs
as they are currently structured?
Dr. Rooney. While I believe the current suicide prevention programs
among the Services as a whole are effective, there is clearly more that
can be done. In early 2000, the overall DOD suicide rate was well below
the rate of a comparable sample of the civilian population by almost
half. One of the most promising avenues currently being pursued is our
increasing emphasis on resilience across the Department highlighted by
programs such as the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF). CSF is
a structured, long-term assessment and development program to build
resilience and enhance performance of every soldier, family member, and
civilian employee. It incorporates the principles of Total Force
Fitness that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have populated across the
Services. These concepts have also been embraced by the National Guard
and Reserve Forces so training has been modified to meet the needs of
this population. I believe the Department's focus on getting out ahead
of this issue will pay dividends in the future and go a long way
towards building a formula for resistance, resilience, and recovery.
13. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what more can we do to reduce the
number of these tragedies?
Dr. Rooney. There are two other areas in which I believe we can
make some progress. The first is data collection and standardization of
reporting. I believe that more accurate and timely data can help us
gain a further understanding of the complex issues and identify key
leading indicators that we can use to take action before a potential
suicide occurs. The second area is peer-to-peer programs that use the
skills of our many veterans to directly interact with those in
distress. I think this type of personal intervention program has
significant potential to reach out to servicemembers particularly in
the National Guard and Reserve where recent data has indicated a
disturbing increase in suicide rates. Across the States, there are many
great examples of National Guard and Reserve suicide prevention
programs, self-assessment programs, and other web-based tools. I
believe that it is incumbent upon the Department to ensure that we are
aware of these State-led programs and share the information across
States so that others can build on their successes.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
14. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, in a February 15 Federal class-
action lawsuit, more than a dozen female and two male current and
former U.S. military servicemembers allege that incidents of sexual
assault and misconduct were not adequately investigated or pursued.
Sexual assault is an extremely grave concern, and all allegations
should be taken seriously and investigated immediately. What is your
response to this lawsuit and allegations that commanders are failing to
respond appropriately to allegations of sexual assaults?
Dr. Rooney. I cannot comment directly on current litigation.
However, clearly, sexual assaults have no place in the U.S. Armed
Forces. One sexual assault is one too many, and leadership throughout
DOD has expressed this as well. However, when an assault does occur,
victims are encouraged to come forward using one of the two reporting
options available to get the help and services they need.
The Department reviewed pre-command training and has proposed
revised training standards for the Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response (SAPR) policy that will be reissued this spring. In addition,
all of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries of the Military Departments
have aggressively championed the SAPR program at Service summits and
through a variety of communication channels. We have and will continue
to make it clear that commanders have a duty to take every allegation
of sexual assault seriously, to see to the safety and care of the
parties involved, and to hold offenders accountable in each and every
case where evidence supports such action. There is progress being made.
In cases where there was sufficient evidence for commanders to take
action and the victim has chosen unrestricted reporting, the percentage
of subjects who had court-martial charges initiated against them
increased from 30 percent in 2007 to 52 percent in 2010.
15. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what specific levels and kinds of
training are provided to officers and commanders in the field to
respond in an appropriate way to allegations of sexual assault and
misconduct?
Dr. Rooney. DOD Instruction (DODI) 6495.02, SAPR Program
Procedures, requires the Military Services to provide periodic,
mandatory education at installation and fleet unit commands, during
pre-commissioning programs and initial-entry training, and throughout
the professional military education (PME) systems. All servicemembers
are also required to receive SAPR training when they deploy to
locations outside the United States that includes specific information
addressing the location's customs, mores, and religious practices.
The Department conducted Policy Assistance Team (PAT) visits in
2009 to review commander training across the Services. Overall, the
observed training met the requirements of DODI 6495.02, and the PATs
found the training to be implemented in accordance with Department
policy. However, the PATs recommended revisions to strengthen commander
training by including concrete examples of supportive behavior to the
program and the chance to practice skills or answer questions.
The Services have also worked to ensure SAPR commander training is
instituted. For example, the Army embedded SAPR training in
professional military education at training institutions, including
specific training support packages for pre-command courses and senior
leaders. Work with Training and Education Command's Ground Training
Branch produced an Interactive Media Instruction module on SAPR,
targeting mid-level Marine Corps leaders who may be unable to
physically attend annual training. The Navy briefs new installation and
regional Commanding Officers on SAPR at the Navy's Senior Shore Station
Leaders course a minimum of four times a year. The Air Force provides
training to all new wing and group commanders five times a year and
squadron commanders also receive training during their new commanders'
orientation training. All of these meet DODI 6495.02 requirements.
16. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, are the levels of training
currently in place adequate to address this issue?
Dr. Rooney. As my response to the previous question indicated, the
Department conducted PAT visits in 2009 to review commander training
across the Services. Overall, the observed training met the
requirements of DODI 6495.02, and the PATs found the training to be
implemented in accordance with Department policy. However, the PATs
recommended policy revisions to strengthen commander training by
including concrete examples of supportive behavior to the SAPR program
and the chance to practice skills or answer questions. These revisions
will appear in the reissuance of DODI 6495.02 scheduled for later in
2011. However, the Services incorporated most of these revisions into
their commander training programs in fiscal year 2010, as briefly
described below:
In fiscal year 2010, the Army developed training
specifically for senior leaders. During fiscal year 2010, the
U.S. Army School of Command Preparation (Pre-Command Course)
trained 197 brigade commanders, 542 battalion commanders, and
195 command sergeants major. In addition, the Army Reserve
reported training 400 brigade and battalion commanders.
In fiscal year 2010, the Navy revised key SAPR command
personnel training to improve response to sexual assaults. Navy
installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC)
reported training on roles and responsibilities for 1,807
commanders in fiscal year 2010, as well as training for 805 new
command SAPR program points of contacts, 484 new command
liaisons, and 681 new SAPR data collection coordinators.
Marine Corps provided command team training on SAPR
roles and responsibilities to 258 commanders in fiscal year
2010, which included how to perform commander-led discussions
during installation orientation for newcomers.
In the Air Force, senior pre-command training is
conducted at Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. In fiscal year
2010, 122 wing and vice wing commanders and 270 group
commanders received SAPR training as part of this training.
Installation SARCs also provided SAPR-specific training to
3,342 squadron commanders and first sergeants.
The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is
currently working with the Defense Equal Opportunity Management
Institute to develop questions for the Defense Equal Opportunity
Climate Survey (DEOCS) that address SAPR. The DEOCS is a commander's
management tool that allows him or her to proactively assess critical
organizational climate dimensions that impact the organization's
effectiveness. These questions are being formulated to specifically
assess the extent of knowledge, impact of messaging, and levels of
skill associated with SAPR policy within military units. While survey
responses for individual units will be provided back to commanders for
their use, Service-wide response trends will be analyzed for Service
strengths and potential gaps in training effectiveness. These
cumulative survey results will be used to improve DOD training
requirements for both servicemembers as well as commanders. In
addition, commander training will continue to receive attention by
SAPRO in its program oversight role. The Services also review commander
training as part of their Service Inspector General assessments of the
SAPR program at military installations.
17. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what additional measures--if any--
would you recommend in order to more effectively respond to allegations
of sexual assault in the field?
Dr. Rooney. At this time, the Department is continuing to implement
the recommendations of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the
Military Services--many of which were legislated in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. To date, 26
recommendations have been completed or closed, 61 are in progress, and
only 4 cannot move forward or are outside the Department's control.
Some of the 26 recommendations that have been completed include:
Including the SAPR program in the Department Program
Objective Memorandum budgeting process to ensure a separate
line of funding be allocated to the Services.
Setting forth clear guidance to all commanders that
their leadership of their commands' SAPR program is a non-
delegable responsibility.
Ensuring that Sexual Assault Forensic Examination
(SAFE) kits are either available or accessible in sufficient
time to preserve evidence.
Some of the 61 recommendations that are in progress include:
Developing standardized SARC and Deployable SARC duty
descriptions in the SAPR DOD Instruction to ensure qualified
personnel are appointed to fill these critical positions and to
clarify roles and responsibilities.
Directing SAPRO to develop training policies and
exercise oversight of Military Service SAPR training programs.
Note: The Training Subcommittee of the Sexual
Assault Advisory Council developed training
requirements for servicemembers, commanders, senior
enlisted members, and first responders, and are
included in the SAPR policy scheduled for reissuance in
spring/summer 2011. A Working Integrated Product Team
has been established to discuss and address this
recommendation in regards to SAPR training for Equal
Opportunity Advisors.
Enacting a comprehensive military justice privilege
for communications between a victim advocate and a victim of
sexual assault.
Note: The Department has submitted a proposed
Executive order that would create a Victim Advocate
Privilege to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
for formal coordination. This Executive order is
currently under OMB Federal Agency review and signature
is expected in the coming months. Once signed, it will
become part of the Manual for Courts-Martial Military
Rules of Evidence and will be included in the Federal
Register as a policy change that will extend privileged
communication to include all victims of sexual or
violent offenses, including domestic violence in all
cases arising under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
The four recommendations that cannot move forward or are outside
the Department's control are:
Establish a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART)
protocol. At a minimum, this protocol should include that the
SART convene within 24 hours of a reported sexual assault.
Under further review. The Department altered
this recommendation to meet the intent. It is
impractical to mandate a SART meeting within 24 hours
of a reported sexual assault especially in a deployed
environment.
Ensure that victims of sexual assault in training
environments are provided confidential access to victim support
services and afforded time for recovery.
On hold. All victims are provided confidential
access to victim support services. However, further
analysis needs to be given to restricted reporting in
the training environment and the impact it may have on
an individual's progress. The Department developed an
action plan to implement this recommendation at a later
date.
Enact a law exempting Federal medical personnel from
State provisions requiring them to report sexual assaults to
civilian law enforcement to ensure all servicemembers have the
restricted reporting option.
This recommendation lies with Congress.
However, the Department is exploring options on how to
otherwise implement this recommendation.
Ensure the Services consistently implement the titling
standard.
On hold. Military law enforcement
organizations already adhere to DOD Instruction 5505.7,
``Titling and Indexing of Subjects of Criminal
Investigations in the Department of Defense.'' The
Department developed an action plan to further
implement this recommendation at a later date.
In addition to the above, we have received approval to conduct a
survey of victim experience with the SAPR program. This survey is
expected to produce a measure of victim satisfaction that can be used
to assess program effectiveness. This survey is expected to be
completed in the fall of 2011. Also, as the Task Force was extremely
thorough in its review of the SAPR program, the Department continues to
believe greater program effectiveness will be achieved through these
recommendations.
18. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, do you believe that reporting
procedures and policies currently in place are effective?
Dr. Rooney. The reporting procedures and policies enacted in 2005
have been effective in bringing additional victims forward for
assistance and care. While there are many victims that still do not
report the crime, more sexual assault victims are coming forward to
make a report and get assistance than at any time in the Department's
history. However, as more information is gathered, current policies and
procedures can continue to evolve, further improving victim response
and prevention of sexual assault.
Most sexual assaults in civilian and military communities alike go
unreported because of victim concerns about the stigma associated with
the crime and loss of privacy. However, civilian research shows that
when victims report the crime, they are more likely to get care. In
2010, Department policy, training, and messaging brought forward 105
percent more victims than what was received in 2004. Restricted Reports
now account for nearly 30 percent of all initial reporting and increase
on average by about 8 percent each year. Unrestricted Reports have
increased on average by about 5 percent each year. The Department
believes that much of this increase in reports is due to its reporting
policy and training. In 2010, more than 93 percent of Active Duty
members received training on sexual assault reporting options, how to
report, and to whom reports should be made.
Increased reports of sexual assault do not mean that more assaults
are occurring. Given the historical underreporting of sexual assault,
the Department believes that its policies are providing the support
necessary to bring a greater proportion of victims forward and to
establish a culture of prevention. This belief is supported by
Department research in 2010 that found that the incidence rate of
sexual assault during the year prior to the survey decreased by one
third since 2006, while the number of reports made by victims actually
increased. As a result, the Department now has greater visibility over
the sexual assaults that occur against servicemembers. We believe that
greater visibility leads to improved victim response, more
opportunities to provide care, and heightened offender accountability.
19. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what more can DOD do in order to
improve its responsiveness to these serious allegations?
Dr. Rooney. When the Department enacted its current SAPR policy in
2005, it created new resources for victims and required specialized
training for all first responders, including healthcare providers,
investigators, military attorneys, and chaplains. Currently:
Over 700 SARCs and over 11,000 victim advocates were
trained in fiscal year 2010 to assist victims of sexual assault
all over the world.
All first responders get annual and other specialized
training on how to assist and treat victims, including unit
commanders who receive SAPR program training prior to taking
command.
Victims today have greater access to SAFEs, trained
personnel, and follow-up care than before the policy.
Most victims who make Unrestricted Reports of sexual
assault contribute to legal action against the alleged
offender. However, a few hundred victims each year decline to
participate in the military justice process.
While the Department has improved its response system substantially
by establishing a 24/7 response capability at every military
installation worldwide, it must continue to improve the
professionalism, capabilities, and resources of all who support victims
seeking support. In addition, we must continue to create a culture
where victims of crime are treated fairly by those with whom they
serve. This includes our current policy of training all deployed
personnel, including Guard and Reserve. These efforts take continuous
time, attention, and resources, as well as patience and resolve, such
that widespread victim support becomes a permanent feature of military
culture. The Department believes that its current efforts to improve
the confidentiality of victim communication with SAPR personnel sends
an important message that victim privacy will be respected. In
addition, ongoing efforts to teach commanders how to champion the SAPR
program will further improve the professionalism of DOD's response to
this crime. Ultimately, these efforts contribute to the Department's
strategic priority of establishing a climate of confidence such that
more victims will want to report the crime.
20. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, sexual assault has been a
particular risk in combat areas. In your advance policy questions, you
suggested that you ``did not have enough information to make a detailed
assessment'' about steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond
to sexual assaults in combat zones. Can you provide a more thorough
assessment of the steps the Services have taken in order to prevent and
respond to sexual assaults in combat zones?
Dr. Rooney. The Department has been diligent in addressing SAPR in
combat zones and must be ready for any eventuality when it deploys
people into these areas. Over the past 7 years, it has responded
directly to the special circumstances that impact sexual assault in
combat zones. A number of specific steps have been taken by the
Department.
In 2004, the Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force was
begun and its recommendations became the framework for the Department's
SAPR policy enacted in 2005. Both of these efforts focused intently on
the special circumstances that impact sexual assaults in combat zones.
Deployable SARC and Unit Victim Advocate positions were created to
ensure that SAPR services were available wherever servicemembers
deployed. In addition, a special training requirement was developed to
give pre-deployment training to individuals before they arrived in
theater. This training addresses reporting procedures in theater, local
customs and mores, and prevention skills.
Following a 2008 GAO recommendation, the Department drafted changes
to existing directives detailing responsibilities for the commanders of
the combatant commands in deployed and joint environments.
In 2009, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military
Services visited forward deployed installations that support Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Task Force
recommended that the Department improve access to qualified medical
personnel to conduct evidence collection, especially in deployed and
remote environments. The Services implemented this recommendation in
fiscal year 2010. DOD is also in the process of fulfilling additional
Task Force recommendations to improve the training of Deployable SARCs
and establish Deployable Victim Advocate positions.
In fiscal year 2010, the Department was tasked by Congress to
report on the current availability and adequacy of comprehensive and
proper medical care for victims of sexual assault in combat zones, as
well as the availability and adequacy of post-mobilization medical and
mental health care for victims of sexual assault in the Reserve
components. The results of this review were forwarded to Congress in
2010 and the three lines of action identified from this review are
currently being pursued.
OSD SAPRO and the Military Services continue to focus on these
challenges. In fiscal year 2010, none of the Military Services reported
any gaps in supplies, trained personnel, or transportation resources;
reported any cases in which lack of an available SAFE kit or other
medical supplies hindered care; or had any verifiable reports of
victims for whom timely access of laboratory testing resources hindered
care. The Marine Corps reported one case in which a victim had to be
transported 90 minutes to undergo a SAFE and was addressing the matter
at the end of fiscal year 2010. Department research since the SAPR
policy was enacted in 2005 has found that, while most sexual assaults
occur at one's home station, 25 percent of women and 27 percent of men
indicated the unwanted sexual contact occurred while they were deployed
to a combat zone or to an area where they drew imminent danger pay or
hostile fire pay. This dictates that SAPR in combat zones must remain a
focus of concern.
Prevention of sexual assault in combat zones is challenging.
However, the Department's strategy has been to teach skills and
techniques that apply universally, regardless of location. The Services
have all enacted programs that teach Active Bystander Intervention
skills that enable members to identify situations that are at risk for
sexual assault and safely intervene before the crime occurs. These
programs mesh well with the battlefield ethos of ensuring the safety of
fellow servicemembers, and the Department believes these strategies
have contributed to a reduction of the sexual assault incident rate by
one-third since 2006.
When sexual assaults do occur, the delivery of comprehensive care
to victims, wherever they are located, requires training care providers
with the right skills and having the appropriate equipment at the right
time and place. The unique and unpredictable circumstances in deployed
environments can make it difficult for SAPR responders to deliver
comprehensive and consistent care to victims. Tracking victim services
accurately and consistently can also be challenging in deployed
environments. Unit rotations and redeployment make it difficult to
provide consistent assistance once a report has been made.
The work on both prevention techniques and response effectiveness
continues. Most recently, at the request of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, U.S. Central Command recommended changes to the policies and
procedures of the OSD and Military Departments that they believed may
hinder theater operations in a deployed environment. One of its
recommendations was for the USD(P&R) to issue enduring guidance
describing the SAPR services a combatant command must provide to
contractor staff when contractors deploy with U.S. Armed Forces. OSD
SAPRO proposed revisions to the SAPR Policy that will fulfill this
recommendation when the SAPR Policy is reissued in 2011.
21. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what additional measures--if any--
will you recommend in order to more effectively prevent sexual assaults
in combat zones?
Dr. Rooney. DOD prevention programs appear to be working and have
contributed, at least in part, to a decrease in sexual assaults
occurring annually against Active Duty servicemembers. The incidence
rate of sexual assault has decreased substantially, according to the
Defense Manpower Data Center Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of
the Active Duty:
In 2006, 6.8 percent of women and 1.8 percent of men
on Active Duty indicated experiencing some form of sexual
assault in the year prior to being surveyed.
In 2010, 4.4 percent of women and 0.9 percent of men
on Active Duty indicated experiencing some form of sexual
assault in the year prior to being surveyed.
This decrease in incidence rate suggests that there were nearly
one-third fewer incidents of sexual assault in 2010 than in 2006. The
decrease also reflects the fact that prevention concepts are well
understood throughout the military community:
93 percent of Active Duty received prevention training
in 2010 (up from 88 percent in 2006).
93 percent of Active Duty believe it their duty to
prevent harm to a fellow servicemember.
The Department plans to continue its prevention training
initiatives as well as its predeployment briefings to servicemembers
traveling to combat areas about prevention and response procedures
specific to the area. However, prevention programs used by the
Department are universal--the concepts taught apply anytime, anywhere
servicemembers are stationed. The Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault
in the Military Services also recommended that each installation and
operational commander assess the adequacy of installation measure to
ensure the safest and most secure living and working environments. This
includes installations and forward operating bases in combat zones.
Implementation of this recommendation is ongoing, and, if confirmed, I
would continue to support these initiatives.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
NATIONAL GUARD YOUTH CHALLENGE PROGRAM
22. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Rooney, the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe
Program (NGYCP) works to intervene in and reclaim the lives of at-risk
youth by transforming their values and enhancing their skills,
education, and self-discipline. The program has distinguished itself as
an effective intervention in the lives of troubled youths. Despite this
track record of success, I understand that the National Guard Bureau is
considering a significant reduction in the national training program
for the NGYCP. What is your assessment of the program and what is DOD's
plan to fund this program going forward?
Dr. Rooney. The NGYCP training and education program is a direct
investment in the ChalleNGe program staff. The aim of the training and
education program is to improve the performance of NGYCP staff and
provide a cumulative effect of individual staff performance on cadet
recruiting, retention, graduation rates, mentoring, and a positive
placement following graduation.
Course attendees consistently agree that the course offerings are
of great value and benefit. Over 93 percent of the attendees report an
increase in their performance and 85 percent of the attendees'
supervisors report the performance for those who complete training and
educational offerings as excellent. In summary, trained and educated
staff members improve ChalleNGe program's overall performance in cadet
recruiting, retention, graduation rates, mentoring, and positive
placement following graduation.
For fiscal year 2011, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs provided funding and budget guidance for
the NGYCP to operate under the ongoing Continuing Resolution. This
guidance stated that the priority during the continuing resolution
period is to make the necessary funds available to fully support the
ChalleNGe programs at the cost share percentage authorized under 32
U.S.C. 509, and to provide funds to increase enrollment at current
programs in States that have the fiscal resources to meet the cost
share funding requirements. Travel and training for the NGYCP staff
should be considered after core NGYCP requirements were funded. While
under the continuing resolution, the Department is limited to fiscal
year 2010 spending levels which are less than the fiscal year 2011
President's budget request. If and when the continuing resolution is
resolved, then we plan to review the entire fiscal year 2011
appropriation for the NGYCP. If the amount appropriated supports the
President's budget request, then additional funding to support training
for the rest of fiscal year 2011 will be available.
______
[The nomination reference of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 5, 2011.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Jo Ann Rooney, of Massachusetts, to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, vice Michael L.
Dominguez.
______
[The biographical sketch of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biography of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney
Education:
Boston University School of Management
September 1979-May 1983
B.S. Business Administration, Finance
Concentration, Summa Cum Laude, awarded May 1983
Suffolk University Law School
September 1984-February 1987
Juris Doctorate Degree awarded February 1987
Boston University School of Law
August 1989-May 1991
LL.M. (Master of Laws) in Taxation awarded May
1991
University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of
Education
August 2003-May 2005
Ed.D. (Doctorate in Education) in Higher
Education Management
Employment Record:
Jewish Hospital & St. Mary's HealthCare
(uncompensated)
Member, Board of Trustees (2007-present)
Vice Chair (July 2008-present)
System includes primary, ambulatory,
in-patient psychiatric, inpatient
rehabilitation center, et cetera
Approximately $1 billion in revenue
Committees:
Environment of Care (2006-present)
Strategic Planning (2007-present)
Investment (2007-present)
Management Review (2008-present)
Transition Committee (2009-present)
Benefits Measurement Committee (2009-
present)
CEO Search Co-Chair (2009-present)
Regis University (uncompensated)
Member, Board of Trustees
2004-present
Executive Committee and Standing
Committee Chair (2008-present)
Mount Ida College
President
July 2010-December 2010
Mount Ida College
Professor of Business Administration
July 2010-December 2010
Spalding University
President
August 2002-June 2010
Spalding University
Professor of Business Administration
August 2002-June 2010
The Housing Partnership (uncompensated)
Member, Board of Directors
2003-June 2010
Chair of the Board (June 2008-June
2010)
Chair Elect (2006-2008)
Executive Committee-Treasurer (2005-
2006)
Emmanuel College
Adjunct Faculty
August 1994-August 2002
The Lyons Companies, LLC (and affiliated companies)
Corporate General Counsel
Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
Chief Operating Officer (COO)
Partner
September 1994-August 2002
Maselan & Jones, PC
Tax Attorney
July 1993-September 1994
Steams, Rooney & Associates
Partner
July 1992-December 1993
CIGNA Companies - IFSD
Staff Attorney
Technical Manager
June 1991-July 1993
Caprio Law Offices
Attorney
September 1990-May 1991
The Codman Company
Vice President
Senior Property Manager
Regional Marketing Director
Director of Residential Market
Research
June 1984-September 1990
Boston University Metropolitan College
Senior Lecturer
September 1986-December 1987
Honors and Awards:
Beta Gamma Sigma (1983)
Lock Honorary Society (1983)
Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of
Louisville, KY (2010)
Scholar House, Lucy Award (2009)
Business First, Partners in Health Care Award (2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010)
Today's Woman Magazine, Most Admired Woman in
Education (2006)
Business and Professional Women/River City, Woman of
Achievement (2006)
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Jo Ann
Rooney in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Jo Ann Rooney.
2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness.
3. Date of nomination:
Originally nominated: September 29, 2010; renominated: January 5,
2011.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
March 23, 1961; Hazleton, PA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Single.
7. Names and ages of children:
None.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of Education, August
2003-May 2005, Ed.D. (Doctorate in Education) Higher Education
Management, May 2005.
Boston University School of Law, August 1989-May 1991, LL.M.
(Master of Laws) in Taxation, May 1991.
Suffolk University Law School, September 1984-February 1987, J.D.
(Juris Doctorate), February 1987.
Boston University School of Management, September 1979-May 1983,
B.S. Business Administration, Finance Concentration, Summa Cum Laude,
May 1983.
West Hazleton High School, September 1975-June 1979, High School
Diploma, June 1979.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
7/2010-12/2010, President of Mount Ida College, Newton, MA
7/2010-12/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Mount Ida
College, Newton, MA
8/2002-6/2010, President of Spalding University, Louisville, KY
8/2002-6/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Spalding
University, Louisville, KY
8/1994-8/2002, Adjunct Faculty, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA
9/1994-8/2002, Corporate General Counsel/Chief Financial Officer
(CFO)/Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Partner, The Lyons Companies, LLC.
(and affiliated companies) - Waltham, MA
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Jewish Hospital Saint Mary's Healthcare (JHSMH), Louisville, KY -
Vice Chair, Board of Trustees.
Regis University, Denver, CO - Board of Trustees.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Bar Association Massachusetts Bar Association and
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers
Rhode Island Bar Association
Florida Bar Association
Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society
Member - Trustees of the Reservations (MA)
Member - Boat U.S.
Member - U.S. Rowing
Member - Hull Lifesaving Museum
Penn Alumni Association
Suffolk University Alumni Association
Boston University Alumni Association
St. Paul Parish (Hingham, MA)
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Beta Gamma Sigma
Lock Honorary Society
Today's Woman Magazine, 2006 Most Admired Woman in Education
Business and Professional Women/River City, 2006 Woman of
Achievement
Business First, Partners in Health Care Award 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, and 2010
Scholar House, Lucy Award 2009 (outstanding achievement supporting
educational opportunities for women and families)
Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville,
February 1, 2010 (presented for distinguished and outstanding service
to the City of Louisville)
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Dissertation Spring 2005 - Navigating in a Building Sea of Change:
Successful Growth Strategies of Two Private Higher Education
Institutions, Author: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
April 2009, Association of Governing Boards (AGB) National
Conference on Trusteeship, ``Board Engagement in Major Academic
Change,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney and Dr. L. Randy
Strickland.
May 2008, Kentucky Council on Post Secondary Education (CPE) 8th
Annual Conference on the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning -
Challenging Student to Think Critically and Learn Deeply, Keynote
Address ``Boomers vs. X vs. Y: Educating Across Generations,'' Prepared
and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
April 2008, Association of Governing Boards (AGB) National
Conference on Trusteeship, ``Fostering Active Board Participation in
Academic Governance,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney and
Dr. L. Randy Strickland.
February 2008, Kentucky Council on Post Secondary Education (CPE)
Adult Learner Summit, ``Best Practices in Retention in Accelerated
Programs,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
December 2007, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association
of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, ``Reaffirmation 101: A
Case Study of Spalding University'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo
Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette, and Victoria
Murden McClure.
December 2007, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association
of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, ``General Education
Assessment ASAP'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L.
Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
November 2007, Council for Accelerated and Experiential Learning
(CAEL) International Conference, ``Demonstrating the Effectiveness of
Accelerated Programs'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney,
Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
November 2007, Commission for Accelerated Programs (CAP) Annual
Meeting Plenary Session, ``Best Practices in Retention in Accelerated
Programs'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy
Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
May 2007, Educational Policy Institute RETENTION 2007, ``How to Use
Assessment Data and Accreditation to Develop a QEP focused on Improving
Students' Math Skills and Increasing Retention'' Prepared By: Dr. Jo
Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
April 2007, N.C. State Undergraduate Assessment Symposium, ``From
Assessing for Accreditation to Assessing for Improvement - The Case of
Spalding University'' Prepared By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy
Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
January 2006, CIC President's Institute, ``Restoring the Luster to
Good Places: Institutional Turn-around Stories'' Prepared and Presented
By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
November 2005, Commission for Accelerated Programs (CAP),
``Teaching Accelerated Courses or Achieving Successful Outcomes with
Adult Learners in Accelerated Courses'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr.
Jo Ann Rooney.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
See attached list.
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely mannerwhen requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Jo Ann Rooney.
This 20th day of January, 2011.
[The nomination of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 26, 2011.]
NOMINATION OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Blumenthal, McCain,
Inhofe, Chambliss, Brown, and Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John
W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Daniel A.
Lerner, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Christine
G. Lang.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Jennifer Barrett and Casey Howard, assistants to Senator Udall;
Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne
McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier,
assistant to Senator Shaheen; Jeremy Bratt, assistant to
Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch,
assistant to Senator Brown; Pam Thiessen, assistant to Senator
Portman; and Grace Smitham, assistant to Senator Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nomination of General Martin
Dempsey to be Chief of Staff of the Army.
General Dempsey, we welcome you here today, along with
members of your family. We look forward to your testimony and
to your continuing service.
America's Army today is as great as it has ever been in its
235 years of service to our Nation. As we are reminded every
day, this service continues to come with great sacrifice.
Our Army remains globally committed and overstretched by
nearly 10 years of continuous combat. The Army has met the
challenges of the last decade with courage, determination, and
professionalism for which they and all of us are justifiably
proud and profoundly grateful.
The challenges of the decade ahead, however, will be no
less daunting. Over the next 4 years, under General Dempsey's
leadership, the Army must deal with many enduring and new
challenges. First and foremost, the Army must continue to meet
the demand for trained and ready forces in support of
operations in Afghanistan and, for a short while, longer in
Iraq.
Thankfully, the U.S. drawdown of forces in Iraq has begun.
But, nearly 40,000 American soldiers remain there, contributing
to the continued strain on our troops and their families.
At the same time, over 60,000 Army troops are committed to
operations in Afghanistan. Hard fighting will continue, even as
we and our allies continue to build the Afghan security forces
so that they may take more and more responsibility for their
security.
As adaptable and well prepared as our soldiers are today to
support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the future beyond
these operations holds real questions about what we will need
the Army to do and how it will be structured to do it. In a
speech to cadets at the U.S. Military Academy last week,
Secretary of Defense Gates outlined what he considers the
greatest challenges facing the Army as it takes on board the
lessons of the last decade and prepares for the uncertain and
dangerous world that lies ahead. Secretary Gates argued that it
is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land forces to
future conflicts and that the Army must ``confront the reality
that the most plausible high-end scenarios for the U.S.
military will be primarily naval and air engagements.'' He
cautioned that in a strategic environment where we are unlikely
to fight an enemy employing large armored formations the Army
will find if difficult to justify the number, size, and cost of
its heavy armored brigades.
In a press interview last week, General George Casey, the
Army's current Chief of Staff, seemed to go in a different
direction when he said that he expects that over the next 10
years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in
combat.
We look forward to hearing General Dempsey's views on these
perspectives and how they may shape the Army's plans and
priorities in the coming years.
In his speech at West Point, Secretary Gates also said that
his first concern is how the Army will structure itself--that
is, its size and the number and composition of its deployable
units, such as combat brigades--how it will structure itself
for the missions it is most likely to perform. In restructuring
itself, the Army must find ways, he said, to maintain its hard-
won combat-proven current capabilities and invest in the right
future capabilities within a fiscally constrained environment.
Budget pressures are already being felt throughout the
Defense Department. The Department's sufficiency initiative is
intended to take funds away from less important or inefficient
programs or activities and give them to higher, more relevant
current and future modernization priorities.
As the next Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dempsey
will need to find ways to deal with the spiraling growth of
personnel costs. In the face of these challenges, additional
budget reductions, although still being debated, are more
likely than not. We are interested to hear General Dempsey's
assessment of the efficiency initiative and any ideas that he
may already have for improving processes and systems to ensure
that we get the most out of every dollar the Army spends.
More directly related to its force structure, the Army
needs to begin planning for the end strength reductions
announced by Secretary Gates in January. The Army intends to
begin drawing down 22,000 soldiers of temporary excess end
strength, which was approved by Secretary Gates in the summer
of 2009, and needs to do that between now and 2013. This
reduction should not impact Army force structure, as this
additional end strength was always temporary and intended to
allow the Army to fill its deploying units and to end the use
of stop loss that is holding soldiers beyond their enlistment.
However, the Army also plans to reduce permanent end strength
by another 27,000 people between 2015 and 2017, assuming
security conditions are on track with current strategic plans.
This second part of the drawdown plan should result in some
reduction of the Army's force structure, likely including the
elimination of some combat brigades. Although this reduction is
not planned to begin until after 2014, which would be at the
back end of General Dempsey's tenure as Army Chief of Staff, he
will nonetheless be responsible, at a minimum, for the
analysis, planning, and the initial implementation of these end
strength and force-structure changes.
The Army needs to rebuild its strategic depth--that is, the
desired readiness in the nondeployed force--such that it is
capable of responding to any unforeseen contingency. Strategic
depth has been sacrificed over the last 10 years by the
consuming force requirements of operations in Afghanistan and
in Iraq. In order to gain and maintain the necessary higher
readiness levels in our deployed forces, the readiness of our
nondeployed forces has been at historic lows. Although the Army
continues to meet the demand for counterinsurgency and support
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world, and
despite the amazing resilience of our troops and their
families, the Army remains stressed in many ways. Given the
planned Army drawdown, budget pressures, and force demands for
operations in Afghanistan, we continue to face substantial
risk, should we need the Army to respond to another
contingency.
As the next Chief of Staff, General Dempsey will have the
opportunity, as commitments in Iraq are concluded, to rebuild
some degree of strategic depth. We're interested to hear
General Dempsey's assessment of Army readiness and his views on
the prospects for its improvements over time.
The Army needs to continue to rationalize and stabilize its
near- and long-range modernization strategies and programs. In
general, major Army modernization efforts have not been
successful over the last decade or more. But, over the last 2
years, under the leadership of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Peter Chiarelli, and the Under Secretary of the Army,
Dr. Joseph Westphal, the Army has worked diligently, through an
objective and detailed series of capability portfolio reviews
that has started it on a path towards achieving rational,
stable, and affordable Army modernization strategies and
programs. As a result of this analytical process, the Army has
terminated over-ambitious, redundant, or unaffordable weapons
systems. We're interested to hear General Dempsey's assessment
of this review process and to share with the committee what
role he might play in sustaining the momentum achieved over the
last 2 years.
Finally, the Army must work as long and as hard as possible
to deal with the human cost to soldiers and their families of
the pressures and consequences of an Army in continuous combat
for 10 years. A high priority of the Army's leadership over the
last 4 years has been dealing with the stress of multiple
combat rotations and long separations, the stress on soldiers
and their families.
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army set a goal
that soldiers in units would have twice as much time at home as
they would deployed, and that Army families would enjoy greater
stability and less stress. Also, the Army has instituted
significant programs for the improved care of our wounded
soldiers and their families. Despite the efforts of the Army
and leaders throughout the chain of command, heartbreaking
incidents of suicide continue in the Active-Duty Force, and are
now increasing in the National Guard and Reserves, as well. The
committee is interested to hear General Dempsey's assessment of
the Army's efforts in these areas.
General Dempsey, the Nation could not be more proud of our
Army, its soldiers, and their families. We are grateful for
your leadership and for your willingness to assume
responsibility for the readiness and the care of our
magnificent Army. You are extraordinarily well qualified to
undertake the position to which you have been nominated.
We are also grateful for the service and sacrifices of your
family in supporting you over the years. When we call upon you
for your opening statement, we would be delighted if you would
introduce your family who are with you here today.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome, and congratulations on your nomination.
I'm grateful for your extraordinary service and personal
sacrifices throughout your career. I'm very appreciative of
your family and the support they've given to you.
Since the attacks of September 11, soldiers and their
families have served under the stressful conditions of active
combat for nearly 10 years as the Army has transformed itself
into a modular expeditionary force while simultaneously meeting
the demands of two wars. We're enormously grateful for the
sacrifices soldiers and their families have made for their
Nation, for their units, and for one another. The human costs
of combat have been great. But, I applaud the efforts of senior
military leaders in DOD and the Army to provide the best
medical care possible to respond to the needs of wounded
soldiers and to assist the families of all soldiers. If you're
confirmed, there will be no higher priority than continuing
this work.
While the cost of defeating al Qaeda and the Taliban, and
those who would attack us again if they could, has been great,
Army leaders at every level can take pride in their
accomplishments. Four years ago, how different the situation
was in Iraq. I described it then as dire and deteriorating, and
there were those who declared that the war was lost and we
should accept defeat. I shudder to think of how the Middle East
would look today and what condition the Armed Forces would be
in today if the Army had not surged troops to Iraq and not been
so decisive in providing the security needed to turn the tide
there.
Winning the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan must
continue to be the Army's priority, and the next Chief of Staff
must ensure that soldiers have what they need to succeed. As
Chief of Staff, you will have to develop and justify your
vision of what the Army should look like in the future.
In his speech last week to the cadets at the U.S. Military
Academy, Secretary Gates expressed his predictions about what
their future service in the Army would look like. He discounted
the likelihood of another land campaign like Operations Iraqi
Freedom or Enduring Freedom, and forecast an Army, in coming
years, that would most likely engage in short-duration, low-
intensity operations engaged in counterterrorism, rapid
reactions, disaster response, and stability security-force
assistance missions. I'm interested in how much you share
Secretary Gates' views.
The budget plan for the Future Years Defense Plan through
2016 also calls for reducing Active-Duty strength by 47,000
soldiers. I'd like your views on whether such manpower
reductions are consistent with the Army's focus on full-
spectrum operations and readiness to conduct missions of any
kind.
Debate about the future missions of the Army is a necessary
predicate for the weaponry the Army will need to succeed. I am
deeply concerned by the Army's inability to manage successfully
its major defense acquisition programs; most prominently, the
Future Combat System (FCS). With the arguable exception of the
Stryker, the Army has not successfully brought a major system
from research and development, through full production since
the so-called ``big five,'' the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting
vehicle, Patriot missile, and Blackhawk and Apache Helicopters,
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To my knowledge, the Army
has yet to negotiate the termination cost for the FCS contract.
As such, the total cost of FCS has yet to be fully determined.
Unfortunately, this failed 11-year investment in a
``modernization program'' has served only to set the Army and
the American taxpayer back. I'd be interested to hear from you
how we intend to improve the management and oversight of major
Army acquisition programs so that something like FCS doesn't
happen again.
On balance, the Army can take great pride in its record of
accomplishment, particularly those of its troops and its
transformation from a garrison force to an expeditionary,
mobile, and highly adaptable fighting force. Many challenges
lie ahead, and the fiscal environment we are in will be very
unforgiving if we repeat the mistakes of the recent past.
I thank you for your willingness to take this assignment
on, and look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
We're delighted that Senator Reed is going to be
introducing our nominee.
You couldn't have anyone better to be introducing you. I
want you to know that, General. You're very well served by the
person we're going to hear from next.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
RHODE ISLAND
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, Senator
McCain, my colleagues on the committee.
It is a pleasure and a privilege to have the opportunity to
formally introduce General Martin Dempsey to this committee as
we consider his nomination as the 37th Chief of Staff of the
U.S. Army.
I recognize that many, if not all, of you have had the
opportunity to meet and to work with General Dempsey in the
various challenging assignments he's held in recent years in
our Army, particularly his command of the 1st Armored Division
in Operation Iraqi Freedom, taking a force into the country and
then being suddenly told to stay longer than expected, and
doing it with superb professionalism; and then his succeeding
command as the leader of the Multi-National Security Transition
Command in Iraq, responsible for the training, support, and
establishment of the Iraqi security forces.
Throughout his more than 36 years of Active service,
General Dempsey has demonstrated the professional skill and
personal character to lead our Army in challenging times. Our
soldiers are engaged in two major operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Army has been engaged, since 2003, in the
longest sustained combat operations in this history of our
country. General Dempsey recognizes this. He also recognizes
that his first priority is to support our soldiers in the
fight. This support requires the continued training, equipment,
and leadership that has made our Army the superb force that it
is today.
Support for our soldiers also means support for their
families, and General Dempsey knows about Army families.
Throughout his career, his lovely wife, Deanie, has been
serving with him, by his side, and together they have raised
Major Christopher Dempsey, who's currently assigned to the
Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point, and daughters, Megan and Caitlin, both veterans of the
U.S. Army. The Army is indeed a family affair with the Dempsey
family.
But, General Dempsey also has the daunting challenge of
shaping a force for the future in a time of increasingly
constrained budgets. Dynamic change in technology, in
international economic forces, in international institutions--
indeed, even the notion of national sovereignty--all of these
forces, and more, will shape the future and must, indeed, shape
the Army. They must be responded to with innovative and
creative proposals, and I am absolutely confident that General
Dempsey will meet these challenges as we go forward.
He is superbly prepared to provide this critical leadership
at this challenging moment. I would urge my colleagues to
confirm him speedily so he can assume these responsibilities.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
A couple of our colleagues have asked their statements be
submitted for the record, I will insert them here.
[The prepared statements of Senator Begich and Senator
Gillibrand follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mark Begich
General Dempsey, the Small Business 8(a) Business Development
Program is a vital economic tool for Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians,
and Native American Tribes in the lower 48. This program provides for
education opportunities, cultural preservation, infrastructure
development, and other opportunity for tribal members. The program is
directly tied to the U.S. Government's commitment and policy of the
right of self-determination to our first people.
Recently, the 8(a) program has unfairly been subject to criticism.
Although some participants have pushed the limits of the opportunity
provided to them, the majority of companies in the program have sound
business practices and offer critical services and advantages to the
Government. Additionally, to address loopholes that undermine the
intent of the program, the Small Business Administration recently
released the most comprehensive and thorough regulatory reform on the
8(a) program in its history.
A few 8(a) Army contracts have been subject to public scrutiny and
criticism in the press. Addressing criticism, valid or not, can result
in restrictive guidance undermining the 8(a) program, or a reluctance
by contracting officers to contract with 8(a) Alaska Native
Corporations, Native Hawaii Organizations, and tribal entities.
However, the program itself is still a valid and important tool for
Native peoples and for the Government.
Collectively, contract performance for the services rendered by
8(a) companies to their customers, including the Army, has been
commendable. In addition, the contracting flexibility provided to the
Army under this program has allowed it to address requirements for
services in a timely and inefficient manner that could not otherwise be
achieved.
If confirmed, I request you continue to utilize this program to
contract for appropriate services required by the Army.
______
Prepared Statement by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
Admirals Row, built in the 19th century, consists of 11 brick
buildings built to house high ranking Navy officers located in
Brooklyn, NY. The buildings, which are architecturally distinguished
and of historical importance, have been left mostly abandoned since the
mid-1970s and are severely deteriorated and in dire need of repair. The
Army National Guard currently controls the property, and has identified
the Timber Shed and Building B for preservation. The Brooklyn Navy Yard
Development Corporation (BNYDC), the non-profit corporation that
manages the Navy Yard under a contract with New York City, has
expressed its willingness to execute an emergency stabilization of
these buildings prior to the property transfer between the National
Guard and the city. The BNYDC would like to begin construction on the
buildings at Admirals Row immediately, but is currently prohibited from
starting work because the National Guard will not allow access to the
site.
I have written to Secretary McHugh to request that the Army take
quick action to allow emergency stabilization of the Timber Shed and
Building B in advance of the planned property transfer, while also
completing the transfer expeditiously. I appreciate Colonel Presnell's
response to BNYDC with a promise to expedite the environmental review.
I want to reiterate my belief that the Army's flexibility in allowing
the BNYDC to stabilize the buildings coupled with an expeditious review
and transfer is in the best interest of both the Defense Department and
the local community.
Chairman Levin. General Dempsey, the committee has a series
of standard questions that we ask all of our nominees, and I
will ask them of you now.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Dempsey. I have, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
General Dempsey. I do.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Dempsey. I have not.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Dempsey. I will, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Dempsey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Dempsey. They will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
General Dempsey. I do, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such document?
General Dempsey. I do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Dempsey.
Now we're ready for your statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
I do this at my great peril, but I'd like to stray from my
prepared remarks, just at the beginning here, because I was
struck by the, I hope, intended symbolism of having Senator
Reed sit next to me during his introduction, because I've
always felt as though this body, in particular, was a wingman
of the Army's. Senator Reed has always been a great wingman;
that is to say, someone who watches out for you and who helps
you see yourself in ways that perhaps you're unable to see. I'd
like to have that relationship with this committee and with the
Congress of the United States, because, Mr. Chairman, I think
you and the Ranking Member have mentioned the challenges we
have before us, and articulated them very well, and we're going
to have to work together to settle those.
Chairman Levin. We look forward to working with you,
General, on that basis, as a matter of fact. Very eloquently
and aptly put.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee today in support of my nomination as the 37th Chief
of Staff for the U.S. Army.
Senator Reed, thank you again, and the members of this
committee, for allowing me to be part of this process. Thank
you for your unwavering support and commitment to the soldiers
of the U.S. Army and their families.
I've known some of you for a decade or more, and I've met
some of you only recently, in the last few days. I always
welcome the chance to discuss our national security challenges
with you, and I sincerely admire what the members of this
committee and your professional staffs have done to support
those who courageously serve and are resilient in the service
of their Nation.
I'd like to take a moment, as you suggested, Chairman
Levin, to introduce my wife, Deanie, to you. I know she
appreciates your kind words about her, too. We've been married,
as you noted, for almost 35 years. She has joined me in
commissioning all three of our children as officers in the
Army, and she's sent two of them off to war. One of them, our
son, Major Chris Dempsey, is here today.
Deanie and I have built our lives both within and around
the Army, and I can report to you that there is no greater
champion for soldiers and their families than Deanie. If I am
confirmed, the Army will receive the great gift of her
continued service with, I must be honest, the occasional break
to care for our three grandchildren, and soon-to-be five
grandchildren. She is my hero, and I love her for many reasons,
not least of which is her shared commitment to the U.S. Army.
I'd also like to congratulate my predecessor, General
George Casey, who will soon complete 41 years of distinguished
service to our Nation.
I've always considered service in the Army to be a
privilege. That privilege is even more apparent when our way of
life is challenged as it has been over these past 10 years. I
sit before you today with confidence that whatever challenges
confront us in the future, your Army will respond with the same
courage and resolve that has characterized it for the past 235
years.
You have seen firsthand the superb performance of our
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less visible, but equally
important, are the contributions of soldiers currently deployed
in over 150 nations around the globe. These men and women are
fulfilling tasks assigned to us in the National Security
Strategy to seek to prevent conflict by representing our Nation
and its values and by increasing the capabilities of our
international military partners. They are Active, Guard, and
Reserve. We are truly one Army, and we serve America proudly.
Here at home, we partner with local communities, schools,
and colleges. Each year, 75,000 of America's sons and daughters
make a commitment to leave their homes and serve their Nation
in the uniform of the U.S. Army. In return, we make a
commitment to develop them as soldiers and as leaders. As
Commanding General of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), I've met with soldiers serving in the very center and
at the very edges of freedom. I've met with their families,
living both at home and abroad. I've met with our wounded and
with their families.
They are inspirational. They understand the challenges that
we face as an Army and as a Nation. Their expectations of us
are as simple as they are profound. They trust that we will
provide the resources necessary for them to succeed in the
fights in which we are currently engaged, and they trust that
we will have the wisdom and resolve necessary to prepare them
for the missions unknown to us today, but which surely await
us.
If you confirm me as the Army's 37th Chief of Staff, you
can be sure that I will act to earn their trust every day. I
will work to match their drive, their sacrifice, and their
resolve. I will partner with the Congress of the United States,
and this committee in particular, to ensure we remain worthy of
the title ``America's Army.''
Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you and the members of this
committee that I understand the gravity of the task at hand.
The position to which I have been nominated carries daunting
responsibilities. I embrace the challenge.
I want to thank President Obama, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary McHugh for their trust and their confidence in
nominating me. I want to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Let's try a 7-minute first round for questions.
I made reference to Secretary Gates' West Point speech, and
quoted from it. I wonder if you could give us your reaction to
his remarks, both the ones that I quoted and any other part of
that speech that you might like to refer to.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, in his speech at West Point, pulled
together themes that he's been discussing with us for some
time. It's an aggregate, if you will, of the professional
conversations we've had about the current state and the future
state of our Armed Forces. It's not a conversation he's had
uniquely with the Army. He's challenged the other Services, as
well.
It seems to me that, in terms of the reference you made to
his discussions about the heavy force, in particular, what he's
challenging us to do is to reconsider the way we've
proportioned our force--the force mix, if you will--and
determine if that's the force mix that best suits our needs
today. I don't think he's predisposed to the answer to that
question. I think he's encouraging us to confront it. As we
confront it, I think he is challenging us equally to look at
the institution that supports it and the leaders that we
develop. My personal, professional judgment, where I sit today,
in TRADOC, is that we have to become an institution that
accepts adaptation as an imperative. It has to be part of our
fabric. Where that takes you is, we might develop an Army
suitable for 2020 that, consciously, we know will not be
exactly the Army we need in 2030, because the current and
future operating environments, as we anticipate them, will
require an institution that provides what the Nation needs when
it needs it. I think that the key to that, actually, is the
development of leaders; so, leader development is job one.
Systems and processes have to become more responsive to change
and allow for the introduction, laterally, of changes to
technology, for example. Organizations, which always change in
our Army, have to be prepared and embrace change. I think we
understand the signal we're receiving, and I think we can find
the answer.
Chairman Levin. One of the points that he made at West
Point was his identification of ``ongoing and prospective
requirements to train, equip, and advise foreign armies and
police.'' That raised the question, he said, as to how the Army
should ``institutionalize security force assistance into the
Army's regular force structure and make the related experience
and skill set a career-enhancing pursuit.'' He flagged the
importance of the Army's doctrine on this new advise-and-assist
brigades, which he said have played the role that they've
played in the last couple years, which is a ``key role in the
successful transition to full Iraqi security responsibility.''
Now, building the security forces of foreign forces has
traditionally been a Special Operation Forces mission. But, in
both Iraq and Afghanistan, our general-purpose forces have been
performing that mission for some time, in the form of those
Advise and Assist Brigades. I'm wondering what your reaction is
to the possibility of adding that as a required fundamental
capability for general-purpose forces, which would require
additional education, training, and readiness challenges for
the Army to meet.
General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do think it becomes a core competency for our force in
the future, as part of our effort to prevent conflict. I think
that we've made some dramatic and very successful adaptations
at the tactical level in understanding what it takes to partner
with indigenous forces and partners. I think where we probably
have room to grow and room to learn is in how we partner with
institutions, how we accomplish what we formerly called
security sector reform at the ministerial level, because it's
not simply enough to partner with international partners at the
tactical level; we have to ensure that they have the systems
and the institutions that support them so they become viable
partners into the future. I do think, if confirmed, that will
be an area that I would pay particular attention to.
Chairman Levin. There were plans, some years ago--when
Secretary Gates became Defense Secretary, there had been plans
to restation two Army brigades currently in Europe back to the
United States. Those plans were put on hold when Secretary
Gates came into office. The Department has now started a global
posture review to reexamine the purposes, locations, and costs
of U.S. forces stationed around the world, including the Army's
combat brigades in Europe.
Can you give us your understanding of the status of that
review--I believe you're a part of that review, maybe a major
part of it--and give us the status of the review and whether or
not that will include an assessment of Army forces stationed in
Europe, as to whether we should continue them in the current
numbers and configurations that they're at?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir. The study that you refer to, of
which TRADOC is part, is essentially the force mix and force
design--how many types of each brigade and what are the
internal capabilities of them. We are involved in that.
We haven't made any decisions, because the recent
announcement of the additional 27,000 has put us back to the
drawing board, if you will, on trying to understand the
implications of that and the assumptions we're making about the
demand on us into the future.
But, to your point, if I could knit your previous question
and this one together, the issue at hand for us will be,
whenever we decide our force structure and its location, is,
what purpose does it serve, where it sits? I'm a product of 12
years of the U.S. Army-Europe, and found great benefit in being
immersed into that culture. I think that there will always be
reason for us to have a forward-deployed force, both for the
benefit of our partners, but also for our own benefit. But, I
think that the size of that forward presence will be reexamined
as we determine what our future force structure will look like.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, congratulations, General Dempsey.
Prior to the Iraq war, there was a no-fly zone imposed as a
result of the cease-fire agreement. That went on for, I
believe, a decade. Isn't that correct?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. We did not take out the Iraqi air defenses?
General Dempsey. Actually, we did, Senator.
Senator McCain. From all parts of Iraq?
General Dempsey. This predates my time at U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM). I was back in Germany, as it turns out
during those years.
Senator McCain. Yes.
General Dempsey. But, I do recall working on the Joint
Staff. When there would be issues with Iraqis positioning air
defense elements south of the latitude that we had established,
we would attack them.
Senator McCain. But, we didn't take out all Iraqi air
defenses?
General Dempsey. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Our aircraft were within range of those
defenses?
General Dempsey. When they moved into a position that they
were in range, we would attack them.
Senator McCain. That wasn't too hard to do.
General Dempsey. Not being part of it, Senator, I can't
speak to the difficulty of it.
Senator McCain. Have you seen media reports that Gaddafi is
using some of his air assets to attack, or attempt to attack,
the pro-revolutionary forces?
General Dempsey. I have, Senator.
Senator McCain. You have seen that. You might tell Admiral
Mullen that you've seen that.
Do you believe that the Arab League and the people on the
ground in Libya that are being attacked by Gaddafi's air assets
should be listened to when they are asking for us to see that
it is stopped?
General Dempsey. I think that they will have voice, and are
having voice, inside the government.
Senator McCain. As a veteran of several conflicts, isn't it
true that if you tell the enemy that if they take certain
measures, there will be reprisals--what I'm trying to say, if
we tell the Libyans and Gaddafi that we are imposing a no-fly
zone, that is a strong deterrence to many of their pilots as to
whether to fly or not. We've already seen pilots defect. We've
already seen a couple of them land in Malta. Wouldn't that have
a certain deterrent effect on them, psychologically?
General Dempsey. Deterrence is always one of the options
that we should have available to the national command
authority. I will say, of course, that my own personal
experience is, sometimes the way our potential adversaries
interpret our deterrent actions is not exactly as we've planned
it. But, deterrence is a valid option.
Senator McCain. The perception of Libyan pilots who now
take off and land and attack pro-revolutionary forces might
prove rather cautionary to them if they think that we will stop
them and shoot them down if they carry out those missions.
General Dempsey. We have the finest air force in the world,
Senator.
Senator McCain. May I just say, personally, I don't think
it's loose talk on the part of the people on the ground in
Libya, nor the Arab League, nor others, including the Prime
Minister of England, that this option should be given the
strongest consideration.
I'm very concerned about Wikileaks. Almost daily, we see
some additional revelation of the Wikileaks situation. First of
all, how did this happen? Second of all, who has been held
responsible for this greatest disclosure, frankly, of
classified information in the history of this country?
General Dempsey. Senator, I can't answer the question,
``How did it happen?'' I have been made aware that there's an
ongoing--you know it as a 15-6 investigation--essentially, a
commander's inquiry--commissioned by the Secretary of the Army,
to answer that exact question. I know that the individual
responsible for the investigation has had a series of meetings
with Secretary McHugh. I'm looking forward to learning more
about that, as well.
To your point about the protection of information, I think
that this will be a wake-up call for us. We have to go forward,
but we have to balance our protection of information with the
competing requirement to continue to collaborate with
interagency partners on information so that we can be as agile
as the networks that we fight.
Senator McCain. To my knowledge, no one besides Private
First Class Manning has been held responsible for Wikileaks. Is
that correct?
General Dempsey. To this point, that is correct, Senator. I
don't know that that'll be the outcome.
Senator McCain. One of your major responsibilities will be
the issues of acquisition. A recently completed Decker-Wagner
Army acquisition review paints a rather gloomy picture.
According to this report, between $3.3 and $3.8 billion of the
Army's research and development budget has been wasted per
year, since 2004, on programs that were subsequently canceled.
Do you believe those figures to be accurate?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
Senator McCain. Let me specifically mention one program to
you, as I conclude my questioning, that I don't understand, and
maybe you could provide us with some written response, because
you may not know a great deal about it. But, the title is,
``U.S. to spend $800 million as it leaves MEADS program.'' It
goes on to say, ``Over the next 3 years, the U.S. Government
plans to spend more than $800 million on a missile defense
proof of concept that Army Secretary John McHugh has little
confidence will even work.'' In this article, it says the
termination costs would be very high. I still don't quite
understand why we would negotiate a contract that, if a
contractor fails to meet its goals and we have to cancel the
contract, we have to pay off the contractor. Do you know very
much about this particular program, General?
General Dempsey. I do not, Senator.
Senator McCain. Good. Maybe you could provide us with a
written response after you are sworn in.
But, this kind of thing--I don't think there are stronger
advocates in support of our defense spending and our need to
equip and train our men and women who are serving, but when our
constituents read stories like this--and it may not be totally
accurate--but, when they read stories titled, ``U.S. to spend
$800 million as it leaves the MEADS program,'' I think they
deserve better, or at least a better explanation, at best.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), not the contract, established the terms by which
the international parties negotiated that the withdrawing partner would
bear the responsibility for contract termination. These terms on
withdrawal are normal for international agreements. According to the
MEADS MOU that we have with Italy and Germany, the Department of
Defense (as the withdrawing participant) would be required to pay all
contract modification or termination costs that would not otherwise
have been incurred but for its decision to withdraw, up to its share of
the cost ceiling for its financial contributions. The purpose of
including this provision, during the negotiations, is to make it more
difficult for a country to withdraw from a multilateral agreement--a
withdrawal that could really leave the remaining countries in a
difficult and costly position. This provision provides all MOU
participants with positive incentive to stay in MOU programs that have
awarded substantial MOU-related contracts to implement the MOU scope.
This provision is value neutral in its applicability and protects the
United States (normally the largest partner nation) from potential
withdrawals by other partner nations that could have major negative
impacts on the United States.
If the United States unilaterally terminated its participation in
the MEADS program, we estimate our cost would be as high as the MOU
ceiling amount of $846 million for the United States. Allowing the
contractor to proceed to ``Proof of Concept'' avoids the expense of
termination and allows the best use of remaining funds while maximizing
return on investment.
Conversely, if the United States and its partners pursue the
proposed Proof of Concept effort using the remaining MEADS MOU funding
our cost would be limited to the current MOU commitment of $804
million. In addition to saving money, the United States and its
partners would derive substantial benefit in terms of hardware,
software, or intellectual property deliverables from the MEADS prime
contractor. This would allow Germany and Italy to proceed into
production and provide the United States with an expanded array of
future choices with regard to future Air and Missile Defense system-of-
systems capability.
Senator McCain. I thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
General, you, then, will supply an assessment of that
program and of that issue that Senator McCain has just raised,
after you are confirmed.
General Dempsey. If I could clarify. The Senator said,
``when sworn in.'' So, sometime after April 11, I will
dutifully respond.
Chairman Levin. I will stand corrected.
General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. After you are sworn in, then we would
expect an answer.
General Dempsey. Actually I should say, ``if I'm sworn
in.''
Chairman Levin. You are correct.
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. We assume that. I'm glad you also do not
assume that.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it's a good assumption.
I thank you, General Dempsey, for your career of service.
It has impressed me, as I've had the honor to get to know
people in our military, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan in
recent years, that the quality of leadership, really, from top
down, is quite remarkable. I would set--and I particularly mean
it in your case--the level of capacity against leadership in
any other sector of our society. We're very lucky to have had
you rise to the position that you've been nominated for by the
President. I look forward to working with you in the years
ahead.
I wanted to ask you one question about the ongoing
situation in Libya, following up with what Senator McCain said.
I, too, have felt that the no-fly zone ought to be under active
consideration, premised on a request from the opposition, once
it established a provisional government, which now seems to
have happened. Second, of course, hoping that we would have
allies in that effort.
I want to ask you about another alternative here, because
this is an ongoing situation and its outcome will determine, I
think, not only how the lives of the people of Libya are, and
whether more blood is shed there at the hands of a truly
maniacal leader, Gaddafi, but also has an impact on the
succession or transition to democracy in the rest of the Arab
world. That's why we're all focused on it.
Another alternative, obviously, is to try to help the
opposition and stop Gaddafi, is to provide them with air
defense systems, and train them in those systems. The question
of whether we do that is not what I want to ask you about,
because that has to be determined at a higher level. But, am I
correct in saying that the Army has had experience in training
militaries around the world in the use of air defense systems?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. If I can respond to that,
recalling my experience as the Acting CENTCOM Commander, the
answer to that is yes.
Senator Lieberman. Right. While we're considering the no-
fly zone--and I hear all the concerns about how it would be--
how difficult it would be to implement another alternative that
we might provide the Libyan opposition with the capacity to
defend themselves from Gaddafi's aircraft. I assume that, if
directed to do so, the Army would be prepared, in your opinion,
to carry out that mission, to train the opposition in Libya, to
Gaddafi, in the use of better air defense systems.
General Dempsey. Internal to TRADOC, we do have coursework
and expertise in air defense.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
You're not going to be surprised to hear that I'm concerned
about the proposals to reduce the Army's end strength, although
when Secretary Gates was before us, and when he made the
announcement, it was very clear that this is conditions-based,
depending on what the demands on the Army are, as we head into
2015, which is the date when the reduction is supposed to
occur. All of us are haunted by the phrase ``hollow Army''. We
don't want to go through that again. We fought hard, side by
side, in the spirit that you suggested earlier, to increase the
end strength.
I want to read to you an answer that you gave to one of the
advance policy questions submitted to you by the committee. You
were asked about the possible impact of decreasing Army end
strength, and the Service's ability particularly to achieve the
dwell ratio of 2 years at home for every year our soldiers are
deployed. That was a big motivator for the statutory
authorization of increased end strength. Your answer was, ``The
decreases in Army end strength are condition-based, and I'm not
in a position, at this time, to assess whether there will be an
impact on the dwell goal of 1-to-2, based on these
reductions.''
I want to ask you whether you would say that one of the
conditions that should be met, before the Army is asked to
reduce its current end strength, would be a judgment that the
2-to-1 or 1-to-2 dwell ratio for our Active-Duty Army will not
be jeopardized by that reduction in end strength.
General Dempsey. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that very much.
We don't know now whether the Government of Iraq will
request that any of our Armed Forces remain in Iraq after the
end of the current Status of Forces Agreement, at the end of
this year. I hope they do, because I think it's necessary to
protect all that we've given there to achieve what has been
achieved. But, just assuming, for a moment, that the Iraqi
Government did ask us to maintain some number of our Armed
Forces in Iraq after December 31st of this year, and we decided
to do so, I assume that would have an impact on dwell ratios
for our Army and on proposals for reducing U.S. Army end
strength.
General Dempsey. It may, Senator. It would turn on the
depth of that commitment they were asking us to make and our
assessment of what common interests we have in doing so. At
some point, there is a bit of science to it. We know how big
the Army is. We know what we're asking it to do. We know we
want to have it on a 1-to-2 boots-on-the-ground (BOG)-dwell,
because of the human dimension, and we can figure it out.
Senator Lieberman. Good enough.
One part of Secretary Gates' speech at West Point that's
received less attention than other parts--and it was a very
important and thoughtful speech--was his focus, not on the
Army's hardware, but on the software of training, professional
military education, doctrine, career management, and
promotions, so much of which you've had a leadership role in,
in recent years and overall in your career in the Army.
I wanted to ask you--I know you've been leading a study on
the Army as a profession of arms, in your current capacity--
whether you could give us any of your initial thoughts on how
the Army can best rise to what I describe as the software
challenge, particularly the element of leadership, which you
referred to in your excellent opening statement.
General Dempsey. Yes. Thanks, Senator.
It won't surprise you, I get a little advice, on occasion,
in that regard from the junior officers and noncommissioned
officers (NCO) among us. Incidentally, in my office calls, over
here with many of you, I tend to have time to chat with your
fellows, who, by the way, are just a remarkable bunch. That's
across the Services. The question I always ask them is, how are
you doing? How are we doing? What are you doing? What do you
want to do? Some of your military legislative assistants are
recently retired or resigned military. I ask them, was there
something we could have done to keep you in the ranks? I get a
lot of inputs.
I like the problem we have. We talked about all the
challenges we have. But, I'll tell you, I really like the
problem we have, in terms of the leaders, and even the
individual soldiers; because 10 years ago, Senator, we didn't
really know whether we were a courageous, resilient, resolute,
inquisitive, adaptable force. We didn't know. We hadn't been
tested. We certainly have been tested over the past 10 years.
That's the foundation on which we now have to build the future
Army.
Our challenge will be that these young men and women have
had capabilities, authorities, and responsibilities, as
captains, that I didn't have as a two-star general. I'm not
exaggerating a bit when I say that. So, continuing their
development, from that point, a much higher entry level than I
had, is our challenge. We think there are different
attributes--inquisitiveness--we think, the ability to adapt. We
have to line up our evaluation system with these attributes. We
have to relook at our professional military education, how much
in the brick-and-mortar schoolhouse, how much can be done
through these mobile learning devices. We have to find ways to
broaden these young men and women at places like these
fellowships.
We can figure this out. But, what we can't do--and I think
the message that the Secretary of Defense is sending us is, we
can't simply--if I can use probably a poorly phrased metaphor
here--but, if we were a rubber band and have been stretched
over the last 10 years, we can't let ourselves simply contract
back to our previous shape, because they won't stand for that.
Senator Lieberman. Very well said.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
We are setting up a briefing on Libya that we will have
tomorrow. It will be a classified briefing. We will share with
the members of the committee, as soon as we have it, the time
of that briefing.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate Senator Lieberman talking about the end
strength and the fellowship program. I was going to ask about
that, and I appreciate your answers.
The fellowship program, I see a guy sitting, two seats to
your left, who was a part of that--the only problem with that
program: you learn to love these guys and gals and then they're
gone. I don't know how we can correct that, though. I
appreciate the fact that we started limiting that program,
here, about 15 years ago, and it's been increasing since then.
I would encourage you to keep that trend up.
Let me say this. Your predecessor, General Casey--one of
the things I liked and appreciated about him--and I know you
have those same characteristics, because I've already been
exposed to them--and that is, he's very hands-on. He wanted to
know for himself what was going on. Of course, you're
interested in the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System
(JFETS) Program and Air Defense Artillery and some of these
things that are going on today. I hope that we can continue
with that. I'm sure that we can. I appreciate the fact that you
have, in our Fires Center of Excellence and all these things.
It's a whole new concept, this simulation level that we've
gotten to right now. People are in shock when they come from
other countries and see and witness this thing. I'm hoping that
you would keep that up.
Do you have any comments about the JFETS program?
General Dempsey. I think it's game-changing.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Dempsey. For the other members, it's a simulation,
where we can link several different locations around the
country. For that matter, we can link forward-deployed forces
and have a common, live, virtual, and constructive environment
in which leaders can grapple with complex problems, some of
which are military, some of which are not.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Dempsey. We're working to actually impose that
model on the rest of the Army, at least in the institutional
force. I think, eventually, though, the next training
revolution in our Army will be what occurs at home station,
because we have to raise the bar at home station. But, JFETS is
groundbreaking.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I agree with that.
Just one quick thing on some of the problems we're having
that are health-related. We know, of course, with the strain,
the tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) and all of this, the suicide
rates, divorces, and all of this stuff that have gone on--and I
know that we are addressing these but, I'd specifically talk
about one of them, this traumatic brain injury (TBI). I've been
interested in this for some time. In fact, the Chairman was
good enough, at my request, to hold a hearing. We've made
another request to hold a hearing that would include not just
the vice chiefs, which is what we had the first hearing, but
also the medical people, civilians, some of the troops
themselves. I would like to be able to have such a hearing.
Would you encourage us to get into the TBI and some of the
other related problems, health problems that our troops are
having?
General Dempsey. Senator, anything that this committee will
do to remain teamed with us on the issue of care for wounded
warriors, I will deeply appreciate and completely support.
We all saw that Frank Buckles, our last World War I
veteran, passed away, just a few days ago, at 110. The scars of
this war will be with us for the next 90 to 100 years. Shame on
us if we forget, when the conflicts dissipate a bit. Shame on
us if we reflect that this is a long-term issue for our Army,
but also for our Nation.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. I don't mean to imply
that this is having that negative an effect on individuals. I
spent New Year's Eve in Afghanistan with the troops, and then
again last week. It's just shocking to me. I was a product of
the draft, and so I'd never thought an All-Volunteer Army would
be what this is. But, the spirits are so high, and it just
seems that, even when the OPTEMPO is high, the spirits are
high, and we've done a good job. I know you'll carry that on.
Senator McCain talked about some of the aging equipment
that we have. General Casey and General Chiarelli have stated
that we're burning up equipment as soon as we can field them.
This is something that is a concern of mine. There was a
statement that was actually in the press, and I'll read it. The
study of the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant
Secretary of the Army, Gilbert Decker, and retired General
Louis Wagner, found that the Army has spent $3.3 to $3.8
billion annually since 2004 on weapons programs that have been
cancelled. I am concerned, and you wouldn't know now, but for
the record, I want to see if that has stopped by now. If not,
maybe we can address and find out why.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army Acquisition Review Panel submitted its report in February
2011, which includes 76 recommendations in 4 broad areas that extend
across various Army organizations. Those broad areas address
requirements generation, risk management, organizational alignment, and
resources. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology
(ASA(ALT)) to assess those recommendations. The ASA(ALT) will provide
specific recommendations for implementation of those portions of the
report which are judged to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the Army's Acquisition process. That initial assessment is due to the
Secretary in April. Following that, the Army will determine the path
forward on implementation of the recommendations.
Senator Inhofe. On the equipment, and the aging equipment,
specifically, I've been concerned, as time has gone by--and I
think Senator McCain mentioned this--and a good example would
have been the Crusader. We needed to increase that non-line-of-
sight capacity that we had. The Paladin, that we're using
today, is the same technology that was there 50-some years ago,
when I was in the U.S. Army. Now we have a Paladin Integrated
Management (PIM) program. But, we went through the FCS and--as
has been stated before--we get down the road to these things,
then someone comes along and we whack them and start something
new.
I hope, and I believe, that you will do all you can--now
that we have the PIM program--down the road a little ways, that
we can continue to do that. It's just remarkable that our
capability with the old Paladin, there are five countries,
including South Africa, that make a better artillery piece than
what we're using now.
Do you have any comments about where we're going to go in
the future and what you're going to try to keep the
discontinuation from happening again?
General Dempsey. Simply my commitment, Senator, to work
that. I am familiar with the work of Dr. Decker and General
Wagner. I think it's good work. My own professional view is
that some of the programs that we aspire to field fail because
of the time horizon we establish for them. I have been vocal,
within TRADOC, that requirements determination and the
acquisition solution to those requirements and capabilities
need to be taken on a shorter timeline, a 5- to 7-year time
horizon instead of a 10- to 15-year horizon, because if we try
to project our needs 10 or 15 years in the future, it's almost
certain we won't get it right. I think we have some good ideas
in that report to work on. You have my commitment, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I'm sure that's right. My time has
expired, but I would only tell you that--I remember the last
year that I served on the House Armed Services Committee was
1994--we had a witness that came in that said, ``In 10 years,
we'll no longer need ground troops.'' You're right. As smart as
all the generals are, we don't know what's out there in the
future. But, I would like to get to the point where, no matter
what is there, our kids have the best that there is out there,
and I'm sure you feel the same way.
I look forward to serving with you.
General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, welcome.
Let me follow up on a point that you responded to, to
Senator Inhofe, in that this 100-year burden for soldiers and
marines and sailors and airmen who are bearing the fight now,
it has to reflect not only in the DOD budget, but the Veterans
Affairs budget. I think you concur. I just want that for the
record.
General Dempsey. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
We're talking, now, about the future. That is being shaped,
or thought about, in terms of several different dimensions. One
is a changing context: new technologies, social networking,
climate change affecting the natural resources and will be the
struggles. That has to be factored in.
But, the other fact is the traditional threat; what other
countries or non-state actors have, in terms of weapon
capabilities and intentions. Can you talk about that aspect, as
you go forward, of how you're trying to weigh that threat? Does
it synchronize well with Secretary Gates' speech at West Point?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir, I will speak to that. It gets at
the reason--I don't think the Secretary was saying, ``Shed the
heavy force and invest entirely in the light force and special
forces,'' because he and I have had conversations, for example,
about the Israeli experience in southern Lebanon in 2006, where
a non-state actor, a terrorist organization, was as well
organized, trained, and equipped as the traditional Israeli
defense force that was confronting it: shore-to-ship missiles,
air defense weapons, electronic warfare, advanced anti-armor
capabilities. I mean really remarkable stuff. So, as the
Secretary and I--and this is mostly in my job as acting CENTCOM
commander--but, as we talked about the future of conflict, we
generally believe that the future will be more a series of
hybrid threats, where you have to be prepared to confront your
adversary wherever he chooses to confront you.
Sometimes it'll be very irregular and decentralized, and
sometimes it will look a lot like a conventional conflict. So,
what we owe the Nation is a force that has capabilities
proportional to what we believe we'll confront but has all
those capabilities. We need an institution that's adaptable
enough that if we get it wrong--and, as we've said here
earlier, we are likely to get it wrong--we have to have an
institution that is adaptable enough to rebalance itself on a
far more frequent basis than we have in the past. I think the
world is a far more dangerous place today than it's ever been,
and we owe the Nation an agile force that can adapt to the
future, whatever it finds in that future.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me go to another point that was raised in the West
Point speech; that is, developing, not just an officer corps,
but NCO corps of expertise and flexibility and agility. Part of
that goes as a reward structure. Do you have any thoughts or
comments now about how you're going to think about changing the
reward structure so that you find people at the upper levels of
both the commissioned officer corps and noncommissioned corps
who have a cultural awareness, who have a range of skills that
are not the traditional tactical operational skills that have
in the past been the gate to get into the upper ranks?
General Dempsey. Yes. I will say, Senator, that's really
been my life's work for the last 2 years, has been looking at
leader development, really, all four cohorts; and I'll define
the cohorts as officers, NCOs, warrant officers, and civilians
as well, working a great deal with the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on civilian
development.
I think we've done some very good work, in particular, in
the NCO corps. When I came in the Army in 1974, a NCO was very
likely not to have a high school education. Now, it's the
expectation that, if a soldier rises to the rank of sergeant
major, he'll have a bachelor's degree before he gets there. By
the time he retires, he'll have a master's degree.
We haven't actually adjusted how we use them yet to account
for that additional capability. Someone approached me yesterday
about the possibility of having NCO fellows here in the
Congress of the United States. You kind of slap your forehead
and say, ``Why didn't I think of that?'' We haven't really
adjusted the way we use them. But, I have great faith, and I
applaud the selection that General Casey made of the new
Sergeant Major of the Army, Ray Chandler, who will push us in
that regard, in development of the NCOs.
On the officer side, and others, we're looking at a new
personnel management model. You may have heard of the Blue
Pages in IBM. We have a prototype, on a thing we call the Green
Pages, that allow an individual officer to actually collaborate
more on their career development, allows us to understand what
they're interested in, not just the classes we've given them,
but we might have somebody who worked in Outward Bound as a
child or as a military child, spent 18 years in the Pacific
Rim. We wouldn't know that today, but we'd like to know that.
There's a number of programs that are out there. Technology
provides huge opportunities to use them.
What I will tell you, in closing this question, is, I am
deeply committed to the development of our leaders, because we
are likely to get the equipment, sort of right, but not
perfect, and the organization sort of right, but not perfect.
We're probably going to give guidance a little late, I've
found. The person that pulls it together is that leader on the
ground, and we have to keep committing to their development.
Senator Reed. Just let me follow up on that and second your
comment about the NCOs; they are the heart and soul of any
military force, particularly the U.S. Army. In 1971, when I
came on Active Duty, the same comment could be made about the
NCOs' education level, and now they're superbly trained. I
think you're absolutely on target.
Second is that, with the advent of social networking--and
this is not going to be a social network--but I was extremely
impressed, years ago, when some enterprising young officers set
up, sort of, Company Commander, Inc. or CompanyCommander----
General Dempsey. Dot com.
Senator Reed.--dot com. Is that informal learning--how are
you going to integrate that into our plans?
General Dempsey. That's the question that provides the
greatest opportunities for us, I think, in terms of leader
development.
I have to just back up a second and tell you, when I took
the job at TRADOC, Senator, I found a CD of General Donn
Starry. Now, he's a name familiar to you.
Senator Reed. I know.
General Dempsey. But, Donn Starry was considered to be one
of the great thinkers of our Army in the 1970s, and helped the
Army, under other leaders, build to what it became in 1991, and
even what it is today. But, he had a video--it was one of the
first VCR tapes ever made in the Army--and it showed him
walking into a mall in Hampton, VA, and looking at young men
and women playing video games. He turned to the camera and
said, ``We know they're in there. They're in there playing
these games. They're paying for the opportunity to play.
They're learning something. What we don't know is what they're
learning.'' That was in 1981.
I feel the same way today about social networking. We have
young men and women playing massive multiplayer online role-
playing games, MMOs as they call them, World of Warcraft and
others--I mean, millions of children playing these interactive
games. They're learning something about developing as leaders,
believe it or not, because of the way these games structure,
and you have to impose your own leadership into the game.
We can figure out how to leverage a game like that for
leader development, linking schoolhouses across the country--
I'm talking about military schoolhouses. I think we'd be onto
something in helping these young men and women collaborate,
meet their desire to social network, and also facilitate the
kind of learning we're going to need by introducing complex
problems in that environment, that we can't replicate
physically at places like Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, and Fort
Carson. I think social networking has enormous opportunities
for us.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think I recognize General Gordon
Sullivan, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army is in the
audience today. His distinguished service must be applauded.
Thank you, General Sullivan.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed. Thank you for
making that reference to General Sullivan.
We are very much intrigued by your answers here, I must
tell you, General Dempsey. It's really mind-opening.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, let me echo the sentiments of my
colleagues in congratulating you on this nomination, and also
to thank you and your family for your service to our country
and your continued commitment to freedom and democracy around
the world.
Also, I want to commend you, likewise, on this fellowship
program, and I appreciate your comments and strong support of
that. I have been blessed, going back to my days in the House,
with outstanding young men and women serving in my office. It's
been a privilege to have a chance to dialogue with those folks,
one on one, about what really is happening out there which, in
addition to the great service they provide from a information
standpoint, personal-wise, they're just such an asset. It's a
very valuable program.
I want to go back to the question that Chairman Levin asked
you about, on this decision regarding personnel serving in
Europe. You'll recall, a couple years ago, a decision was made
to put three brigades back in the continental United States,
one at Fort Bliss, one at Fort Carson, one at Fort Stewart. I'm
not sure how the decision can be characterized as a reversal,
putting on hold, or whatever. But, I'd like for you to
characterize exactly where that is. What kind of importance is
that decision being given in your current discussions, relative
to what's going to happen, as far as bringing troops back from
Europe? Lastly, what's your timetable on that study?
General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator.
We, at one point, were going to build 76 brigade combat
teams. We took a decision--the Department did--that we would
build only out to 73, and we held the 4 brigades in Europe,
pending the outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
because we had them--all of the Army, on such a 1-to-1 BOG-
dwell ratio that it would have been too disruptive to move
them, under that situation.
Now we're looking at absorbing, potentially, the 27,000
reduction, and it is inevitable, as Chairman Levin said, that
there will have to be some structural changes to account for
that 27,000. The analysis is just really beginning on that, and
I haven't been made privy to it.
If confirmed, of course, that will come to the Chief and to
the Secretary of the Army to determine which brigades are
essentially the billpayers for that 27,000 end strength. I'm
not suggesting it will be all brigade combat teams. It'll have
to be some portion of the entire Army, to include the
generating force. I think the timeline for that is probably the
analysis over the next 6 months, because it'll be executed in
the--in Program Objective Memorandum 13-17 and the timeline for
our submission of 13-17 is on or about July 1. That's about the
timeframe for this analysis.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. While impressive gains in security
have been made throughout the country of Iraq, Iraq still
remains a very dangerous place to live, travel, and work in
2011. Targeted assassinations, corruption, and Iraqi security
force, medical, logistical, planning, and transportation
shortcomings continue to undermine the Iraqi Government
security and infrastructure improvement efforts throughout the
country. The security of their oil fields, pipelines, and
terminals, while also much improved, remain a critical
vulnerability and a prime target of insurgent forces.
As U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq, the Department of State
will have to act quickly to significantly increase their
security footprint in Iraq so that their diplomats can maintain
a significant construction presence in Iraq for years to come,
a job required sustained oversight engagement to watch over
what remains of the $58 billion in U.S. construction programs.
While that ability to find, vet, and hire so many professional
security personnel in such a short period is by no means a
certainty, neither is continued stability in Iraq. As we're
seeing throughout the Middle East right now, there is all kinds
of instability regarding neighbors to Iraq.
My question is, with this sustained instability throughout
the Muslim world, is the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces
from Iraq at the end of this year still the right thing to do?
General Dempsey. I can't speak to whether it's the right
thing to do for Iraq. I think that's the piece of this,
Senator, that we would have to examine.
We certainly have interests in Iraq and in the broader
region. It will have to be determined whether Iraq's interests
and ours will be matched, and that part of that match will be
additional force structure remaining in Iraq. I mean, that's
very much a negotiation that will have to occur between the two
sovereign nations.
I will say that some forward presence--U.S. military
presence, but, even more specifically, U.S. Army presence--in
that region is important to me. I think that's a very important
region of the world, and will be, for the foreseeable future,
and I am advocate of a forward presence there.
Senator Chambliss. There's also been some preliminary
discussion and conversation about, when it becomes time to
leave Afghanistan, that we may leave that country from a combat
standpoint, but that we will establish at least one base in
Afghanistan. What's your thought, with reference to that issue?
General Dempsey. I haven't been made aware of that
planning. I'm not surprised that someone is--someone should be,
in fact, looking beyond the date 2014, which is the commitment
we've made with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies
to provide the kind of support, and to be in the lead. I'm not
surprised folks are beginning to look beyond that to determine
what is our long-term interest there.
I think the answer to that question, Senator, very similar
to the one I gave vis-a-vis the Arabian Peninsula. We are very
closely partnered with Pakistan and have some shared interests.
We are currently in Afghanistan and have shared interests. How
those interests are managed over time, I think, will be
dependent upon how the situation on the ground plays out in the
next 3 or 4 years.
Senator Chambliss. As my time has expired, General, thanks
again for your service. We look forward to continuing to work
with you in your new role.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, General Dempsey, thank you for your service, and
your family, for their service, as well.
On a visit to Iraq, you and I spent time talking about how
you were able to take the processes and procedures of
acquisition of the U.S. military and use that to make
acquisitions for the Iraqi military, recognizing that, in the
absence of those processes and procedures--acquisition
procedures in the Iraqi Government--they were basically
incapable of getting all the money spent in the right way, 100
percent for the acquisitions. By doing that, using Iraqi money,
you were able to acquire their military material for their
needs. I thought that was novel at the time. It also showed me
that there was a recognition by the Iraqi Government that their
responsibility was clearly theirs, not just simply the United
States, to provide for the cost of their defense.
As we look toward leaving in December 2011, there is a
possibility that we're going, as you and I discussed, that the
Iraqis are able to provide for their own defense, but they
might decide that they need continuing support for their
defense. We understand. If they can't defend, they can't
govern. Self-defense and self-governance go hand-in-glove.
What I'm getting to is, they're facing deficits in their
budgets, as we're facing deficits in our budgets. On a relative
basis, I would take theirs over ours. My point is, can we look
to ways in negotiating anything, if we're going to stay and
provide assistance, where they can pick up a bigger share of
the cost so that the American taxpayer doesn't end up picking
up a bigger share of the cost?
General Dempsey. Senator, I think General Lloyd Austin,
who's in Iraq--would be better positioned to answer whether
they----
Senator Nelson. Well, I asked him, too.
General Dempsey. Oh, you did?
Senator Nelson. Yes.
General Dempsey. I probably should have read their answer
before I tried to hazard a guess at my own.
As I said in an earlier answer, Senator, I think this is
all about identifying our common interests, and then
challenging each of us to invest in those common interests. I
think that the proposal would be absolutely appropriate.
Senator Nelson. You may very well be, in your new position,
when not only the Iraqi war winds down, but also perhaps, if
we're so fortunate, that we would see a reduction in the level
of activity and the costs associated with Afghanistan.
While the Army is always engaged in planning, do you
believe that we will be in a position to start looking towards
some planning for a reduction in forces in Afghanistan? I know
this is something we're going to ask General Petraeus, when
he's here. But, from your standpoint, if that decision is made,
that we are going to reduce forces, that you will take that
into consideration, looking at our continuing end strength
needs, as well as the rest of the military needs, to support
the kind of defense that Secretary Gates has been talking
about.
General Dempsey. Senator, you will consider me for
confirmation both as the Chief of Staff of the Army, but also
as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that last point
there is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs, to balance our
commitments around the world for our national security. If
confirmed, I'll absolutely take that obligation to heart.
Senator Nelson. If we do that, how will this affect the
current situation, where we're looking to draw down 27,000
troops from the Army? By 2014, will that be reevaluated, do you
believe? Will that have constant reevaluation, or is that a
date set and a goal that just must be achieved, or will that
have to be constantly reevaluated in the days ahead?
General Dempsey. I consider it to be the latter case,
Senator, where the assumptions on which those decisions were
made need to be reevaluated as we see what occurs with Iraq,
post-December 11, and what occurs with Afghanistan post-2014.
Senator Nelson. Now I'm really going to test you on what
our Chairman said at the beginning, about giving your opinion,
no matter how it might shape up with other opinions with your
colleagues.
Chairman Levin. He's not confirmed yet, though. [Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. That's true. You can tell me anything----
Chairman Levin. But, we still expect that of you.
Senator Nelson. We still expect it.
Chairman Levin. Yes, I support Senator Nelson.
General Dempsey. Thank you for your first response,
Chairman Levin. [Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. If confirmed as the Army Chief of Staff,
can we expect that you would be a very strong advocate for our
National Guard?
General Dempsey. That's an easy one, Senator. Absolutely.
Senator Nelson. Now the tough one. Do you believe that the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau should become a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff? That's the tougher one.
General Dempsey. Yes. It's tough, only because I haven't
thought about it. I have learned, long ago, not to render an
opinion about something I haven't thought about. What you can
count on me to be is openminded about that.
Senator Nelson. I hope that you will be openminded about
it. The Guard has established itself as an operational force,
no longer as a supply force. It's operational. It's not on the
shelf, ready to go. It's active, as active as the Active Duty
military. I would hope that you would consider that. Keep an
open mind, but consider it. I'm going to keep pushing for it,
because I think the importance of the role that the Guard has
now taken is something that needs to be at the table all the
time. Getting a four-star in charge of it was step number one.
But, step number two, as a full partner, I think, involves
being a member of the Joint Chiefs. I know it's touchy, but I
hope that you and your colleagues will look very carefully at
that.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, and good luck.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, I want to thank you for your distinguished
service to our country.
I also want to thank your wife, Deanie, and your son,
Christopher. It's wonderful to have a military family here. The
sacrifices that your entire family has made, we're deeply
appreciative of.
I welcomed the opportunity, also, to sit down with you
yesterday.
I want to take this moment just to express my deep
condolences to the families of the Air Force members who were
killed yesterday in Germany on their way to Afghanistan. I
think it reminds us that we continue to be at war with
terrorists, and the difficulties that we face, and also the
sacrifices that our servicemen are making across the branches
on behalf of our freedom and democracy in the world.
General Dempsey, in your answers to the advance policy
questions, you state that the significant increase in the
number of soldier suicides is of greatest concern to you, and I
share your concerns. With the number of suicides in the
National Guard rising to especially troubling levels, I share
your goal of reducing those suicides. In particular, as we
discussed yesterday, in New Hampshire we have the National
Guard's Deployment Cycle Program which I believe is the model
program, because we not only need to make sure that programs
are in place for the full deployment cycle for our Active Duty
members, but also, we've asked so much of our guardsmen and -
women in the Reserve to make sure that we are taking care of
our soldiers when they come home from the Guard, as well. This
program is a highly effective and fiscally responsible
initiative. It's really a public-private partnership that I
think is unique across the country.
Yesterday, Senator Shaheen and I wrote a letter to Admiral
Mullen, urging him to take a close look at this program, and
also to support this program. We have seen the program work to
help on retention, to help with the many issues and challenges
that our guardsmen and -women face when they return from duty,
and also when they are going to duty, as well their families. I
would ask you--and I will provide you with a copy of this
letter--for your support for this program, and for you to take
a close look at it. I think it's a model for other States
across the country, and very important that we not lose sight
of our soldiers when they come home. Particularly in the Guard,
when we've asked so much more of the Guard, with multiple
deployments, than we have historically, that we make sure that
those programs are in place.
I just wanted to get your thoughts on what you envision,
going forward, in addressing our guardsmen and -women and the
deployment cycle support for them.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for, by the
way, your role as the spouse of an air national guardsman. I
know you've been through a couple of deployments, as well.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
General Dempsey. You speak with great authority and
experience in that regard.
I have already passed to my staff, as the TRADOC commander,
the task to look at that program you mentioned to me yesterday.
In general, though, I'll tell you that we continue to learn
as we go. We've been reminded, recently by some of those
statistics, other kinds of trends within the force, of the
accruing effects of 10 years of war. The Guard presents a
unique problem, because they don't come back to a central
location. They come back, they spend a brief period of time,
and then they dissipate, sometimes within a single State,
sometimes within 10 or 15 States. I can assure you, at this
point, that we are beginning to grapple with understanding the
problem, and we will partner with you and others to solve the
problem. Because, it's one, again, that will be with us for
some time.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I very much appreciate that, and
look forward to working with you on solving that problem, which
is so important in supporting not only our Active Duty troops,
but our guardsmen and -women, and Reserve, who we're asking so
much of them at this time.
General Dempsey, Chairman Mullen has also stated his belief
that the national debt represents a preeminent threat to our
national security. Do you share that concern?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator. The instruments of national
power--diplomatic, military, and economic--have to be in
balance for us to be the power we need to be.
Senator Ayotte. If we don't restore fiscal sanity to
Washington and reduce our national debt, one of the concerns
that I have is that the rising debt payments will begin to
significantly crowd out the finances we have to be able to
protect our Nation and its interests and, obviously, to fill
our commitment to our Active Duty troops and to our veterans,
who have sacrificed so much for us.
I would ask you, as the--hopefully--new Chief of the Army,
to look at two things, and also to get your thoughts on it. One
is the recently released March Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report. In that report, the GAO found that there were
instances of duplication and waste among the branches, where
the branches could better coordinate, where there were
redundancies on areas of equipment and areas where we could
work together to reduce costs. Have you had a chance to review
that report yet?
General Dempsey. No, I haven't reviewed the actual report,
but I have seen the reporting on it.
Senator Ayotte. I would ask you to review that report and
look for ways to implement some of the recommendations that are
made in that report so that we can reduce those duplications
and make sure that we are using taxpayer dollars as effectively
as possible, given the great challenges that we face right now.
General Dempsey. I will.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I also wanted to follow up on
the comments that Senator McCain made about the acquisition
programs in the Army. We've seen, in some instances, where
there have been billions of dollars that programs have been
canceled, programs have been broken. How do you plan to address
acquisition in a way that uses taxpayer dollars more wisely?
Hopefully we can see some cost savings from that, as well.
General Dempsey. Senator, we have to. We can't continue to
hemorrhage resources that you'll be increasingly challenged to
help provide.
I think that the Decker-Wagner report gives an aperture
through which to look at this issue much more seriously.
One of the earlier comments was about these things called
``capability portfolio reviews''. I think you're familiar with
them. The capability portfolio review process is really senior
leadership of the Army, personified now as the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army himself, Pete Chiarelli--bringing together
the requirement side of the house and the acquisition side of
the house periodically to do exactly what you're talking about.
I think the first step, in answering your question, is to
institutionalize those capability portfolio reviews and then to
take the Decker-Wagner report and implement it, or at least
determine which pieces of it should be implemented.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, General.
My time is up. I want to again commend you and your family
for your service. I look forward to working with you to make
sure that you have the equipment that you need, but also on
these issues of where we can save taxpayer dollars and do
things more effectively and more efficiently.
General Dempsey. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before, General, I direct some comments and questions your
way, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator
from New Hampshire. She's on point. The Senate, right now,
seems to be the one institution here in Washington that's
really working on a long-term deficit and debt-reduction plan.
A broke country is a weak country. We have some serious work to
do. DOD can help us get the job done.
You've talked about dwell time, General, and you know that,
under the current Army force generation cycle, we're not able
to provide the goal of 2 years at home. My question is, since
the quantity of time at home station is limited, what steps
would you take, as Chief, to improve the quality of time at
home for soldiers?
General Dempsey. That's a interesting way to put it,
Senator. I haven't heard it phrased that way, but it's worth
thinking about.
Senator Udall. I have great staff, General.
General Dempsey. Any of them behind you?
Senator Udall. Yes.
General Dempsey. Okay. Good.
Senator Udall. He's a retired Army helicopter pilot.
General Dempsey. Ah, a retired helicopter pilot. I might
have known. I'm surrounded by helicopter pilots here, it seems.
Senator, just before I talk about the quality issue, I
don't want to walk away from the absolute imperative of the
quantity issue, because every study we can possibly get our
hands on suggests that it takes at least 2 years to fully
recover from the experience that a young man or woman will have
in a forward-deployed combat environment. So, it is quantity. I
have to remain firmly committed to it.
In terms of the quality, the issue, for me, is to
determine--it's back to this best practices. There are some
remarkable practices out there, some of which, by the way, we
saw in effect at Fort Carson, CO, in a recent visit there. We
have centers of excellence in different programs. One program,
in particular, ties it together, called the ``Comprehensive
Soldier Fitness Program,'' that has to be extended, and is
being extended, into families, how to make families more
resilient, right from the start of their service, not waiting
until some crisis comes their way.
But, what we're trying to do is take the best of ideas out
there, and share them and institutionalize them, because some
of the family care programs have been like a thousand flowers
blooming. With good intentions, we've wanted to do as much as
we could. Now we're in a position where we've seen a thousand
things; we need to decide which 50 of them actually have the
impact we're seeking. We need to invest in those to get at the
quality issue you're talking about. That work is ongoing,
generally through our Installation Management Command,
commanded by Lieutenant General Ricky Lynch, but also in
partnership with the Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Senator Udall. I think that fits into, I don't know if
you've put this in a doctrine or not, but I think you have the
rule of 5 versus the lure of 55. I hear you voicing that same
kind of an approach to this.
If I might, let me turn to a question of Civ-Mil jointness,
if you will. We're asking our soldiers to be diplomats,
ambassadors, trainers, and negotiators--even have an eye for
business cycles and dynamics--in all these theaters in which
they're deployed. They come back as experts in areas we never
could have envisioned a few years ago. I'm wondering how we can
ensure that they share what they've learned with other agencies
before and after future combat rotations. Is there any joint
predeployment training with nonmilitary agencies, like the
State Department, at the National Training Centers? Would you
see any value in such training?
General Dempsey. First of all, absolutely, Senator. We are
doing a good bit of it now. We jointly train the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), for example, that are forward-
deployed. We train with them. To the extent we can, we try to
get them, as well, to go through our mission readiness
exercises with deploying brigades. Now, sometimes, because
those other agencies of government are one deep at many of the
skilled positions, unlike us, they can't make that training.
But, we never deploy either a PRT or a brigade combat team
without some of that training. Could and should we do more?
Yes.
Second, in the educational system of our Army, we have
several programs. I'll mention one. We have a interagency
fellowship program at the Command and General Staff College at
Fort Leavenworth, KS, where we take young Army officers who
have gone through an abbreviated Command and General Staff
College course, and we'll put them into an agency of
government--U.S. Agency for International Development, the
Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of
Transportation--displacing one of their folks; that allows that
person, then, to come to Fort Leavenworth and go through the
10-month Command and General Staff college experience. We have
about 20 of them out there now. We have the capacity to take
36.
But, those are the kind of programs I think we need to take
a look at in the future, as well.
Senator Udall. That would be a fantastic way to take
advantage of that investment we've made. I know those soldiers
are keen to share what they've learned.
By the way, I wanted to comment on your comments about the
NCO-in-residence opportunity here. I had the great privilege of
having Master Sergeant Rubio serve for a year in my office in
the first year of the NCO fellowship. It was phenomenal. I want
to just underline the importance of that approach.
Let me, in my remaining time, move to energy. DOD's been
leading the way in the development of renewable energy programs
that will reduce the force's need for fossil fuels. It's first
and foremost about security. We know that many of the grievous
injuries in theater, delivered by improvised explosive devices,
are aimed at supply convoys and the like.
The Marine Corps has set up what they're calling an
experimental forward operating base in California. They're
working with private industry to develop and test solar cells,
batteries, and other products. Then they've taken the most
promising approaches to Afghanistan, and they've cut their fuel
consumption in the process.
Do you have plans, in the Army, to look at this
Expeditionary Forward Operating Base model. If you don't, what
can we do to help make that a reality?
General Dempsey. No, we do, Senator.
All the technological advances that we're introducing into
the force all put an increasing demand on the generation of
power. So, we have a capabilities-based assessment on the issue
of power.
There's sort of a joke in Afghanistan: You can follow a
U.S. Army unit through the mountains of Afghanistan by the
trail of batteries they shed, because of the power requirement
that all of these systems require.
We have a study in place--a capabilities-based assessment--
to try to determine how we can meet those power demands and
become more self-sustaining. The aspiration is to eventually,
in the out years, develop the capability to have a self-
sustaining brigade that can produce its own water, its own
power, its own energy. We're a long way from that, but that's
the right question to be asked to those that partner with us,
like Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Army
Research, Development, and Engineering Command, even the
private sector, to try to help us become more self-sustaining.
Senator Udall. That's exciting news, and count on me to be
an advocate for what you're doing.
Thank you, again. When you're confirmed, I look forward to
further working with you.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall. Thank you for
raising the energy question. It's a critically important
question for the Army. I also talked to General Dempsey about
that, and the need for our security, in many ways, to address
that issue which you have raised. Thank you for your ongoing
interest in that piece.
Senator Brown is next.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm bouncing back and forth, between hearings, like many
others.
Sir, I met you yesterday. Obviously, I asked a lot of the
questions. I appreciate your candor. I look forward to voting
in support of you.
I have a couple of questions. I think you know that I have
an interest in Guard and Reserve troops, and I attended the
first National Guard Caucus event this year. I agree with many
of the priorities referenced by Senator Graham, a dear friend
of mine. He drilled down on several key themes that, if
implemented, I believe would have a positive impact on our
Nation's operational service and security.
He was in the Reserves and, I just found out, the Guard, as
well. I look forward to hearing his perspective on a whole host
of issues regarding the Guard and Reserves.
I'm concerned with the fact that our depressed economy is
having a terrible effect on our heroes that have served,
especially the Guard and reservists. Over 30 percent of our
young non-Active-Duty soldiers are unemployed. I'm wondering,
what does this mean to you, in your efforts, if any? Is there
anything that we can do, and you can help us with, to have
employers not only hire, but keep onboard, members of the Guard
and Reserves?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, thanks. Thank you for your
service in the Guard.
We are partnered with the other agencies of government,
notably the Veterans Administration, of course, but also with
Governors across the country, in trying to raise the interest
and awareness of the plight of the returning veteran, if you
will.
General Petraeus' wife, Holly, was appointed to look at the
predatory practices of some on trying to take advantage of
soldiers, with things like loans and so forth.
Senator Brown. Senator Reed and I actually dealt with that
in our Financial Regulation bill, to try to address those.
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator Brown. I recognize that, as well.
General Dempsey. That crosses all components--Active,
Guard, and Reserve.
Senator Brown. Right.
General Dempsey. We've partnered with academia, to the
extent we can, to find educational opportunities. I won't name
them, but there's some remarkable initiatives out there, in
academia, where they are reaching out to veterans to allow them
to use their GI Bill in a way that is both financially vital
for them, but also to account for their unique needs as
veterans as they come back from a conflict.
Those are the things we're doing. What I would say to you,
in response to your question, is, if confirmed, we have to keep
the fire burning in that regard.
Senator Brown. Right.
General Dempsey. Because, again, this is not a 2-year
problem or challenge, this is a multiyear challenge.
Senator Brown. Sir, also, I know that you're dealing with
the real issue of not only Active-Duty suicide rates, but, the
Guard and Reserves rate seem to be dramatically higher. I'm
trusting that you'll continue on with that effort and try to
address what the needs are and try to have more intervention.
General Dempsey. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Brown. Thank you. I'd appreciate that.
Also, I was wondering if you could give any insight as to
the M-9 pistol competition, where that will stand in the new
go-round. Anything you can share?
General Dempsey. In TRADOC, most of my attention to date,
in terms of personal weapons, has been on the individual
carbine, because TRADOC was tasked by the Secretary of the Army
to run an analysis of whether it was time to move away from the
M-4.
We're actually doing two things with regard to the carbine.
One is, improving the M-4, both its performance, but also the
performance of the ammunition. We're looking at whether we need
an individual carbine beyond the M-4. That work is ongoing. I
think the request for proposal (RFP), in draft, has been
released. I think the final RFP will be issued sometime in the
third quarter of this fiscal year.
I have not been involved, to date, Senator, on the issue of
the M-9. Based on our conversation yesterday, I will look
forward to learning more about that, if I'm confirmed.
Senator Brown. Great. Sir, just in conclusion, I know the
challenges are huge. My concern is that we get the best value
for our dollars, but also that we can provide the tools and
resources to our men and women who are fighting to not only do
the job, but come home safely.
One of the issues we talked about yesterday was the rules-
of-engagement issue, and making sure that's revisited and
updated so we can allow the soldiers to do the job without
being handcuffed by attorneys. I'm one of them. But, obviously,
I think that's important. Out of all the things I've heard
about the morale, the issues, it's that one issue that always
seems to come back with us, saying, ``You know what? I'd love
to do A, B, C, and D, but the JAG says--or this person says--
the commander's guidance is''--and I think, in some respects,
at times, we may be jeopardizing the safety of our soldiers.
I know you said you were going to look into that, and I
appreciate it. Good luck to you and your family.
Thank you.
General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Senator Hagan is next.
After Senator Hagan, Senator Shaheen, I believe, will be
the last Senator, on this side at least, and she has agreed
that she could stay on, if other Senators appear, and take the
gavel at that point. I very much appreciate that.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome General Dempsey, and really appreciate
your service to our country, and your continued service.
I also wanted to welcome your wife, Deanie, and your
family. It's obviously a family affair, when somebody spends
the number of years that you have with our military. I want to
thank you so much. To have three children also having been in
the Army certainly is a testament to you and your wife. So,
thank you both for that.
I want to ask a question about the sexual assaults. I know
you will take this seriously, but I did want to bring this up.
Last month, a group of veterans and Active-Duty servicemembers
sued the Pentagon, citing military commanders aren't doing
enough to prosecute sexual assault cases. If these claims are
founded, the failure to provide basic guarantees of safety to
women, who now represent 15 percent of the Armed Forces, is not
just a moral issue or a morale issue, it is a defining
statement about the condition and the approach of our military.
The Pentagon has issued a statement, saying the issue is a
command priority and that it is working to make sure all troops
are safe from sexual abuse.
In the Army today, what do you foresee as the challenges in
implementing a safe and timely reporting system for sexual
assaults?
General Dempsey. You have my commitment, as I expressed
yesterday, that this issue is foremost in mind, and here's why,
Senator. It rubs at the fabric of our profession. You may have
heard that we're doing an analysis this year of, what have the
last 10 years of war done to our profession? How are we
different? How do we perceive ourselves to be different? How
have some of the responsibilities we've pushed to the lower
echelons--should they have changed the way we develop leaders?
These things are all tied together. One of the things that has
come out of the analysis already is that the core of our
profession--if we're going to be a profession--and we can't
take that for granted--is trust. The reason that an issue like
sexual harassment is so important is not just because we should
be protecting young men and women from sexual predators, but it
tears at the very fabric of our profession. It breaks the bond
of trust between leader and led. That's why it's important.
We have made some inroads. You're well aware of our three-
phased program. We're well on the way to executing the program.
Some of the reporting indicates, in the Active component, that
it's steadied out. But, that's not good enough. It needs to
nosedive, the number of incidents.
You'll hear folks talk about whether it's better reporting
or more incidents. I find that to be somewhat irrelevant,
actually, because, again, it tears at the fabric of the
profession. I do think the key is experts inside of brigade
combat teams--and we're putting them there; education of our
leaders about why it's important--not just because of the
gender issues, but because of this issue of trust. We're doing
that. But, what you have is my assurances that, if confirmed, I
will press down even harder on the accelerator.
Senator Hagan. I appreciate that. Thank you. I'm sure
everybody will appreciate that.
In the last decade, the Army has attempted to field the
Crusader, the Comanche, the FCS, the non-light-of-sight
missile, and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. This research
and development adds up, I believe, to about over $10 billion
of research and development for equipment that was actually
never fielded.
The ground combat vehicle (GCV) is the latest possibility
that will be added to the Army vehicle fleet. Do you think the
requirements for this vehicle are realistic in development?
More importantly, is the use of research and development funds
being spent on the ground combat vehicle going to transform the
battlefield capabilities? Will the ground combat vehicle be
superior to the Bradley enough to justify the costs associated
with developing and fielding it?
General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator.
I am convinced that the requirements for the ground combat
vehicle have been articulated in a way that actually begins to
get at some of our aspiration for acquisition reform, meaning
this: We collaborated, right from the start, among senior
leaders, those who do the requirements determination and the
acquisition community, on the requirements, as opposed to,
potentially, some of the other programs you mentioned, where
the requirements were determined, passed to the acquisition
community, and the collaboration clearly wasn't adequate.
The other thing we've done with the GCV is, we've said,
``Look, if you can't give it to me in 5 to 7 years, I don't
need it.'' Because, we know that if we shoot our aspirations
beyond that technology we can see, generally speaking, we will
be disappointed in the outcome.
I think that the GCV is actually prototypical, not only of
the next generation of ground combat vehicle, but of a process
change. That's how we should look at it.
The Bradley has been a venerable part of our inventory.
But, it has reached its maximum capacity in weight and energy.
As we continue to add technological advances, as we continue to
learn more about what it means to protect, when we continue to
learn more about the mobility required in urban areas, that's
why we think the GCV is an important step in our modernization.
Senator Hagan. Where are we on that timeline now?
General Dempsey. The RFP is out, and I think we're
approaching one of the milestones--I don't recall which--in the
fall of this year.
Senator Hagan. Okay. I think the collaboration is obviously
very important to getting the right vehicle at the right time
for the right price.
As addressed in General Chiarelli's Suicide Awareness
Report, published last July, in 2010, the life demands of a
soldier today, when you look at the moving, the promotions, the
combat stress, the exposure to trauma--all of these issues are
disproportionately high, the suicides are comparatively high,
compared to their civilian counterparts of the same age. The
Army developed the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness to
institutionalize mental resiliency. Although the Army is
treating the symptoms of deployments, the larger issue, I
believe, is rebalancing the force to allow the soldiers and
their families to reset.
As the Army works to teach soldiers to be internally
prepared to deal with the challenges of the Army at war, what
is the Army doing to create balance within the force, in terms
of shorter deployments and longer stability within the
assignments? We spoke a little bit about this yesterday.
General Dempsey. We did, Senator. But, I appreciate the
opportunity to reinforce it.
We must get to a position where we have a minimum of 2
years at home with 1 year deployed in the Active component.
It's 1-to-4 in the Reserve component. I'm not sure that's going
to be enough, to tell you the truth. I don't know.
As I sit here today, I'm confident that, if we can get to
1-to-2, we will be doing our soldiers and families a great
service, that they well deserve, in terms of helping them cope
with these life demands that Pete Chiarelli, who, by the way,
deserves every accolade we can possibly heap upon him for the
work he's doing in this regard.
As we see these conflicts extend--and again, we're making
some assumptions about Iraq and Afghanistan; and if those
assumptions prove true, then 1-to-2 might be adequate to the
task. But, if we continue to deploy in the numbers we're
deploying, then we might have to reconsider and seek an even
different BOG-dwell ratio. It might have to be 1-to-3. But, I'm
not in a position--none of us are, really--to say that, right
now.
You know this, Senator, but, we'll always do what the
Nation needs. If we have to break our BOG-dwell because of an
emergency for this Nation, we're there. But, as a routine
matter, when these issues become prolonged, we need to have a
standard of 1-to-2 so we can address the issues you're
addressing.
Senator Hagan. It's so important for the soldiers, as well
as their families.
I thank you for your testimony, and I look forward to your
confirmation.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Good morning. It's still
``good morning''.
General Dempsey, congratulations to you on your nomination.
Thank you, to you and your family, for all of the service
you've given to this country.
I've been particularly impressed in the parts of your
testimony, and questions that I've been able to hear this
morning, about your work on leadership development. I would
suggest that perhaps you could design a course for Members of
Congress, because I think that would be helpful.
General Dempsey. I think the appropriate response there is,
``No comment,'' Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. I know that Senator Ayotte, in her
remarks, mentioned New Hampshire's Deployment Cycle Support
Program, which we have had in place for several years to help
our deploying Guard and Reserves and their families. I would
just like to reiterate how important this program is. I think
it's a model for the rest of the country. There's some very
impressive data on the successes of the program. People who
have been part of it are four times more likely to stay married
when they come back. They're four times more likely to stay in
the military. They're five times less likely to become
homeless. On the very critical issue of suicide prevention,
that a number of people have raised this morning, 100 percent
of those people considered at risk for suicide are in active
prevention with licensed support personnel.
It has been a hugely successful program. With the largest
deployment in New Hampshire's history right now, we think it's
very important. I hope, after you are confirmed, that you will
help us figure out how we can continue this program, which had
been supported primarily through congressionally directed
spending. I hope you will take a look at this.
General Dempsey. I will, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
This summer, I had the opportunity to visit Iraq for my
first time, and Kuwait. We visited Camp Arifjan. I was truly
amazed--and I think most people don't recognize that the
deployment out of Iraq is the largest movement of people and
materiel in the military since World War II. It was really
quite amazing. General Patton, I know, would be proud of what
General Webster and folks there have been able to accomplish.
One of the things that impressed me the most was the way
they had integrated savings into the entire operation there so
that all of the men and women who were part of that effort are
looking at how they can be more efficient in bringing people
out and the operations of that unit.
I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how you see
integrating that kind of culture into the entire Army, and
what's happening on that right now.
General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator, because it gives
me the opportunity to point out that I'm deeply committed to
supporting the Secretary of the Army and what he's doing to
inculcate that culture that you describe into our Army.
Secretary McHugh has been very clear with us, with the
four-stars as we assemble from time to time with him, on that
issue. We both respect his judgments and the course that he's
charted for us.
I would also mention that one of those who has accepted
that responsibility is General Ann Dunwoody, who, you probably
know, is our Army Materiel Command Commander. I've often said
to her that she is accomplishing this retrograde of equipment
out of Iraq in a way that actually almost makes it invisible to
the rest of us, and suggested maybe it shouldn't be. She's done
a remarkable job.
I think what you're reflecting is, you've seen, at the
tactical level, the kind of adaptations and efficiencies that
we're capable of. What you're suggesting is, we have to do the
same thing as an institution, and you're exactly right.
Senator Shaheen. How do you make that happen?
General Dempsey. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, for
the past few years, have pursued a thing that they call the
``enterprise approach,'' which is a way of suggesting that the
stovepipes of the Army--and, sad to say, but not surprising, I
suppose, we do have our own stovepipes: TRADOC, Forces Command,
Army Materiel Command, the forward-deployed forces--we tend to
see things inside of our own, if you will silos.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
General Dempsey. What the approach encourages is cross-
collaboration. Now, I'd be disingenuous to suggest we're where
we need to be. But, where we want to be, and where I think
Secretary McHugh will guide us, is to an approach that allows
us to see issues right from the start, with a resource-
sensitive eye, which, frankly, to our discredit in some ways,
we haven't had to do that because the American people have been
so generous with their resources over the last 10 years.
We've done fairly well with those resources, by the way. As
has been said earlier, today's Army is the best Army it's ever
been. Thank you for that. But, we have to understand that we
also share part of the Nation's responsibility to be viable and
to support the economic instrument of power, not just the
military instrument of power. We're prepared to do that. To do
that, we have to be more resource-conscious. We will.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I want to also follow up on Senator Udall's question about
how we reduce the dependency of our military on foreign oil and
on how we are more efficient around energy use. You got into
that a little bit, but I wonder if you could elaborate some
more on the kinds of things that we're doing and what kind of
support would be helpful from Congress as you're looking at
what you need to do.
General Dempsey. You know what I'd like to do, Senator, if
confirmed, is take on board the opportunity to actually engage
this committee--and you, in particular--on what we're doing
with regard to this issue of power and energy, because we are
doing a great deal. Much of it is really nascent. It's not
really very well developed. But, we're looking at the same
things that our civilian counterparts are looking at, in terms
of solar and wind and the other noncarbon fuels that we might
leverage to make ourselves more reliant. It's actually a matter
of military necessity, because the more you're reliant on a
fuel convoy, the more you're stuck to lines of communication;
and you've what that's--happened to us in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
General Dempsey. Let me take on board the opportunity to
engage you on that more coherently or articulately to let you
know what we're doing and to seek your advice on what more we
might do.
Senator Shaheen. Good. I will definitely take you up on
that.
General Dempsey. Okay.
Senator Shaheen. At this point, my time has expired. Since
I am the last remaining Senator, I would like to again thank
you. Thank you for being here, for your candor in your
responses, and for your willingness to continue to serve.
At this point, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to GEN Martin E. Dempsey,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. No.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. None. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has worked quite well in
making the armed services an integrated joint force.
QUALIFICATIONS
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have over 35 years of experience in Army, Joint, and
Coalition organizations from the tactical to the strategic levels of
command, all of which have allowed me to see our Army at work in a
broad variety of capacities and missions. Some of my most relevant
experiences have been during periods of deployment when we have faced
significant threats to our Nation's security. I served as a field grade
officer during Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm and then
Operation Iraqi Freedom as the Commanding General of 1st Armored
Division. Later as the Commanding General, Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq training Iraqi Security Forces, I experienced
firsthand the importance of preparing our Army for joint and combined
operations. Returning from Iraq, I served as Deputy and then Acting
Commander of U.S. Central Command. Most recently, as the Commanding
General for Training and Doctrine Command, I have had an opportunity to
reinforce the training ethos of our Army as we look toward an uncertain
future. I have travelled across our Army and at every turn have seen
the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families. Our soldiers are the
best the world has ever seen, and they remain fiercely dedicated to our
Nation and its security. If confirmed by this Senate, I would be
honored to serve as their Chief of Staff.
DUTIES
Question. Sections 601 and 3033 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes
the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief
of Staff of the Army?
Answer. The Chief of Staff, Army serves as the senior military
advisor to the Secretary of the Army in all matters and has
responsibility for the effective and efficient functioning of Army
organizations and commands in performing their statutory missions.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect
that Secretary McHugh would prescribe for you?
Answer. I expect that Secretary McHugh would prescribe the
following duties for me if I am confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the
Army:
(a) Serve as the senior military leader of the Army and all of its
components;
(b) Assist the Secretary with his external affairs functions,
including presenting and justifying Army policies, plans, programs, and
budgets to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Branch, and Congress;
(c) Assist the Secretary with his compliance functions, including
directing The Inspector General to perform inspections and
investigations as required;
(d) Preside over the Army staff and ensure the effective and
efficient functioning of the headquarters, to include integrating
Reserve component matters into all aspects of Army business;
(e) Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide
independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, President, and
Congress. To the extent that such action does not impair my
independence as the Chief of Staff of the Army, in my performance as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the
Army informed of military advice rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on matters affecting the Department of the Army. I would inform the
Secretary of the Army of significant military operations affecting his
duties and responsibilities, subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense;
(f) Represent Army capabilities, requirements, policy, plans, and
programs in joint fora;
(g) Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and
activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution
of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and
(h) Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army
Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the
Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.
Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign
to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army would be responsible
for providing advice and assistance in the execution of my
responsibilities for those missions and functions related to manpower
and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements and
programs; intelligence; command, control and communications; and
readiness.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the
Army?
Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will continually
assess my ability to perform my duties and, if necessary, implement
measures aimed at improving my ability to lead our Army.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship
with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of
Defense and the principal assistant to the President in all matters
relating to the Department of Defense, issues guidance and direction to
the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army,
for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. As a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser
to the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with
the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements
the policies established by his office. In coordination with the
Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense
in articulating the views of the Army.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and
exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The
Secretary of Defense also delegates to him full power and authority to
act for the Secretary of Defense and exercise the powers of the
Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized
to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
Secretary of Defense, and to his deputy, through the Secretary of the
Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives.
Also, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will
communicate with the Deputy Secretary of Defense in articulating the
views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the
Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction
issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under
Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to
time, to issue guidance--and in the case of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction--to the
military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary
of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in
articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to
ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance
and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the armed
forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and
budgets identified by the commanders of the combatant commands;
develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports
on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces;
provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff
Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may
be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the
Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military
advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President,
the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my
duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to
assist in his performance of these responsibilities. As appropriate, I
will also provide advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of
the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional
relationship with the Chairman, and will communicate directly and
openly on policy matters involving the Army and the Armed Forces as a
whole.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the
Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and
the President. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
it would be my duty to ensure that the Vice Chairman is provided my
frank views and opinions to assist him in his performance of his
responsibilities.
Question. The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the
Army would be close, direct, and supportive. Within the Department of
the Army, a large part of my responsibility as Chief of Staff would be
to serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My
responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's
plans to the Secretary and supervising the implementation of the
Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff, commands and agencies. In
this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction,
and control of the Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, I would also be responsible for appropriately
informing the Secretary about conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and about significant military operations, to the extent such
action does not impair independence in the performance of my duties as
a member of Joint Chiefs of Staff. I anticipate that I would work
closely and in concert with the Secretary to establish the best
policies for the Army in light of national interests.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's
principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises
such powers as the Secretary prescribes. His responsibilities require
him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army
Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary, and to the
Under Secretary for the operation of the Army in accordance with such
directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary to ensure
that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of the
Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and directly
with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army Staff,
commands, and agencies.
Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal
advisor and assistant to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Vice
Chief of Staff, Army.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I
will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each
of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative
teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal
together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning
requirements facing the Army.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Army. His/Her duties include coordinating legal and
policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of
interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the
Army on any legal question or procedure, other than military justice
matters, which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If
confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
relationship with the General Counsel to assist in the performance of
these important duties.
Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
Answer. The Inspector General is responsible for inspections and
certain investigations within the Department, such as inquiring into
and reporting to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff regarding
discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing
assessment of command, operational, logistical, and administrative
effectiveness; and serving as the Department of the Army focal point
for Department of Defense Inspector General inspections and noncriminal
investigations, as well as the Department of Defense inspection policy.
If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
relationship with the Inspector General to ensure effective
accomplishment of these important duties.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to
the Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the
Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal
advice directly to the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff in matters
concerning military justice, environmental law; labor and civilian
personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and
the worldwide operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff
does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the
personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate
General to provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the TJAG
as my legal advisor and I will assist him in the performance of his
important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The National Guard Bureau is a joint bureau of the
Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force. Appointed by
the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of
Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National
Guard matters. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is also the principal
advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on matters
relating to the National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and
maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, National
Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between
the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau, as we deal together with
the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing
the Army.
Question. The Director of the Army National Guard.
Answer. The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for
assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Vice Chief, National
Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard
Bureau, as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the
Director, Army National Guard to foster an environment of cooperative
teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau. This
will be essential as we deal together with the day-to-day management
and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and
improve Army National Guard's operational capabilities.
Question. The Chief of the Army Reserve.
Answer. The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for justification
and execution of the personnel, operation and maintenance, and
construction budgets for the Army Reserve. As such, the Chief, Army
Reserve is the director and functional manager of appropriations made
for the Army Reserve in those areas. If confirmed, I will establish and
maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, Army
Reserve as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-
range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve the
Army Reserve operational capabilities.
Question. The Chiefs of the Other Services.
Answer. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it
would be my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and
opinions with my fellow Service Chiefs. I look forward to developing
strong working relationships with these colleagues.
Question. The Combatant Commanders.
Answer. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant
commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to
the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands to
carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of
Defense, the Service Secretaries assign all forces under their
jurisdiction to the unified and specified combatant commands or to the
U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, to
perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and
the authority of combatant commanders under title 10, U.S.C., section
164(c), the Service Secretaries are responsible for administering and
supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant command. If
confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in
performing these administrative and support responsibilities. I will
establish close, professional relationships with the combatant
commanders and communicate directly and openly with them on matters
involving the Department of the Army and Army forces and personnel
assigned to or supporting these commands.
VISION FOR THE FUTURE
Question. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?
Answer. The Army will remain a critical component of the Joint
Force, providing an affordable mix of tailorable and networked
organizations operating on a rotational cycle, providing a sustained
flow of trained and ready land forces for full spectrum operations,
prepared for unexpected contingencies and at a tempo that will sustain
our All-Volunteer Force.
Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in
contingency, humanitarian, and stability operations?
Answer. We are capable of executing contingency, humanitarian or
stability operations, as directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense, under the control of the appropriate Combatant Commander. We
are also capable of assisting our international partners in building
their own operational capacity. Through security force assistance, we
can increase the ability of other nations to uphold the rule of law,
ensure domestic order, protect its citizens during natural disasters,
and avoid conflicts, which would otherwise require U.S. military
support.
Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and
Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light or
medium weight divisions and Marine Corps divisions?
Answer. No. We each have unique but complementary capabilities that
provide the National Command Authority with options for dealing with
emerging threats and contingencies.
ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE
Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to
achieve realistic training in preparation for military operations. The
Army provides trained and equipped forces for joint military
operations.
How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint
military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities
and culture?
Answer. The Army works our relationships with Sister Services
diligently while maintaining our unique values, culture, and
traditions. The Army provides forces for prompt and sustained combat
operations on land as a component of the Joint Force. Through sustained
operations on land and among populations, we make permanent the
advantages gained by joint forces.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. We have to win our current conflicts while simultaneously
preparing for future security challenges. We must take care of our
soldiers, our wounded, and their families. We must meet this challenge
in an environment that demands more efficient use of limited resources.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. The Army, with support from Congress, is already working to
understand and address many of these challenges. Although we don't have
all the answers yet, it is clear that to be prepared for an
increasingly complex and unpredictable future, we need thinking,
adaptable, and resilient leaders. Investments in our human capital,
both uniformed and civilian, coupled with a sustainable rotational
force structure model, will ensure we are postured to meet the
challenges of the future.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would
impede the performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that our management
systems are maintained or refined to meet challenges facing the Army. I
have not yet determined specific plans to modify systems currently in
place or under revision but if confirmed will carefully assess how we
execute our management functions to ensure appropriate stewardship of
our resources.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to talk
with the Secretary of the Army, to develop priorities for our force. In
my current position, I've asserted that we must be a learning
organization, we must make training credible and relevant at home
station so that it replicates more closely the challenges of the
operational environment, and we must develop our leaders differently.
It's also clear that we must work to preserve the All-Volunteer Force,
care for our Wounded Warriors, continue to work to deliver Full
Spectrum Capabilities, and transform systems and processes to build
true adaptability into our institution.
ACQUISITION ISSUES
Question. Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of
the Army and the other military departments continue to be subject to
funding and requirements instability.
Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives
up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon
systems?
Answer. A variety of factors contribute to increased risks of cost
increase and delay, depending on the program, the technologies
involved, and the acquisition strategy employed. However, I agree that
the foundation for any successful large acquisition program rests on
carefully refined requirements, a sound program strategy, and funding
stability.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
to address funding and requirements instability?
Answer. Requirements must be carefully refined to meet realistic
and affordable objectives, and they must account for the rate of
technological and scientific change in meeting needed capabilities.
Question. What is your view of the Configuration Steering Boards
required by statute and regulation to control requirements growth?
Answer. I support efforts by Congress to control costs, refine
requirements, and reduce program risk in our major acquisition
programs. The Configuration Steering Boards play a significant role in
oversight of acquisition programs and compliment Army efforts to
validate requirements and eliminate redundancies through Capability
Portfolio Reviews. In tandem, these oversight processes help the Army
avoid cost increases and delays in our programs.
Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if
confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?
Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will work diligently with
the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology to ensure that all oversight
mechanisms for acquisition programs are used effectively to reduce cost
and schedule risk. In the area of requirements, I will work with TRADOC
to refine requirements to meet affordable and achievable acquisition
strategies.
Question. The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often
move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack
clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies
that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and
production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at
appropriate junctures in the development process.
Do you agree with the Comptroller General's assessment?
Answer. I agree that this assessment is valid with respect to some
of the Army's past programs. However, the Army has already adopted
different approaches in the development of more recent programs. I
understand that prior to the release of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
Request for Proposals (RFP) in November 2010, the program's
requirements were carefully reviewed, prioritized and weighted in the
RFP to avoid reliance on immature technologies, mitigate cost and
schedule risk, and provide an achievable and affordable framework for a
new vehicle. The GCV program involved close coordination between
acquisition, requirements and resourcing experts to provide a solid
program foundation. The Army is vigorously working to avoid the
characterizations in the Comptroller General's assessment in future
programs.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the
Army should take to address these problems?
Answer. The Department of the Army has already begun taking
significant steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed
emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition
communities in the development of new programs. Last year, Secretary
McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army's acquisition process
led by The Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a
blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the
Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to
implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must
continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay
in our programs.
Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if
confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?
Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will continue to work
with Department of the Army leadership to implement any necessary
changes to ensure that the Army's acquisition programs succeed in
providing needed capabilities to our soldiers.
Question. Beginning in 2010, the Army began a series of
capabilities portfolio reviews that have contributed to the
rationalization of the Army's modernization plans and resulted in
significant programmatic decisions, including the termination of major
weapons programs.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
capabilities portfolio reviews and process?
Answer. The capabilities portfolio reviews have been successful in
identifying redundancy and finding efficiencies across system
portfolios. The Army is now studying how to best institutionalize the
capabilities portfolio reviews process to identify additional
efficiencies, and then work to achieve them.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to
institutionalize the portfolio review process within the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the studies to
institutionalize portfolio review process to identify and achieve
further Army efficiencies.
ARMY MODERNIZATION
Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not
been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, Army
modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved
under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After
Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and
Modularity. According to press reports, a recent modernization study
done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the
Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner found that
the Army has spent $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 on
weapons programs that have been cancelled.
What is your assessment, if any, of the Army's modernization
record?
Answer. Over the last 10 years, our Army has achieved a remarkable
degree of modernization in areas such as improving soldier protection,
increasing battlefield intelligence, and bringing the network to
individual soldiers. At the same time, we have nearly completed the
modular conversion of over 300 brigade level organizations and to
complete the conversion of our division and higher level headquarters
to enable mission command in the operational environments we anticipate
in the first half of the 21st century. If confirmed, I look forward to
studying the Decker-Wagner recommendations to identify areas where we
can improve.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program
for the Army?
Answer. I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and
program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to
exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If
confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve
this.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
current modernization investment strategy?
Answer. While it is true that several of our major modernization
efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit
that the American soldier today is the best equipped and enabled
soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker
vehicle, world class body armor, soldier night vision equipment,
soldier weapons, precision fire systems such as Excalibur and High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and vehicles such as the family of
medium trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous
success in modernization.
I believe the Army has learned some valuable lessons and now has
both the processes and the mindset to more carefully and rigorously
review programs both before we initiate them and while they are in
progress. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am
confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this committee
my frank assessments.
Question. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and
sustainable?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to
ensure it is affordable and sustainable.
Question. In your view does the Army's current modernization
investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and
future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or
irregular conflict?
Answer. From my current position, I believe the current
modernization investment strategy strikes an appropriate balance
between current and future capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward
to studying this further with the Army staff.
Question. Does the investment strategy appropriately or adequately
address requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with a peer or
near-peer enemy?
Answer. From my current position, I believe the current
modernization investment strategy appropriately and adequately
addresses requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with the
peer or near-peer enemy we can reasonably foresee in the fiscal year
2012-2016 FYDP time horizon.
Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any,
would you pursue with respect to unconventional or conventional
capabilities?
Answer. I have not yet formulated investment initiatives particular
to either conventional or unconventional capabilities that are
different from those the Army is currently pursuing, but I look forward
to doing so, if confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and
projected Army budgets?
Answer. To be good stewards of the resources provided, the Army
must continue to internalize a ``cost culture'' that considers
``affordability'' as an essential element of all (not just
modernization) initiatives. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
the Secretary to ensure future initiatives are affordable within
current and projected budgets.
Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely
have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is
planned to fund the Army's modernization efforts?
Answer. While I do not have that information at this time, I
believe trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully
considered and coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.
ARMY WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
following research, development, and acquisition programs?
Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
Answer. In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle--the
replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle--the Army is
fully committed to the ``Big Four'' imperatives: soldier protection;
soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across
the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (7 years to the first
production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will
be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to
operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular
armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on
the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be
designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to
incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an
incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first
increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently
reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.
Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).
Answer. I believe that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
is one of the Army's most important programs. It provides the broadband
backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began
fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network
down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
Increment 2 begins fielding in fiscal year 2012 to provide an initial
On the Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved
capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more
bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126
brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.
Question. Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Network
Integration Kit (NIK).
Answer. The E-IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will
allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an
opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army's
tactical network strategy.
The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to
continue evaluation and development of incorporated network
technologies.
Question. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground
Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS)
radios.
Answer. Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services' future
deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army
forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting
the soldier to the network. Fiscal year 2012 procurement funding
supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to eight
Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet fiscal years 2013/2014 network
requirements.
The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability
using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to
meet tactical networking requirements.
The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical
Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations.
The man pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with
legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems,
Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio
primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier
Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information
from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three
radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual soldier.
Question. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull
initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker
mobile gun variant.
Answer. The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight
and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on applique (armor and
devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it
is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V-Hull (DVH)
Stryker. In the mid-term, Stryker modernization will improve protection
and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and allowing
integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants. Fleet-
wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-IED,
drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management,
and digital communications and network integration.
Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June
2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating
the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled.
Non-Double V Hull and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV): The Army will procure 168 Stryker
NBCRVs in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for a total quantity of 284 (an
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model rotation quantity). These
vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a
unique capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of
Homeland Defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration.
Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded
142 of 335 MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue
additional MGS procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide
modernization.
Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
Answer. The JLTV is a joint program with the U.S. Marine Corps,
Navy, and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in
the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital
program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently
satisfied by the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. It will
also fill the mobility, transportability and communication architecture
gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a
third of the LTV fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is
currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it
meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in
terms of protection.
Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS).
Answer. I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed
aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program.
This requirement will be validated by the ongoing Armed Aerial
Scout Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release
in third quarter fiscal year 2011.
Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization.
Answer. In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will
initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide
ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future
modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality,
protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to
maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and restore space, weight, and
power margins to keep the Tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams
modernization program is funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget request.
If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program
matures.
Question. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.
Answer. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be
replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants)
modernization will address recoupment of Space, Weight and Power to
provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility
and ability to integrate the emerging network.
Question. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP).
Answer. I understand the LMP is an Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) system in the Operation and Support phase of its life-cycle.
Based on commercial off-the-shelf SAP Corporation software
technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply
chain solution at the national level that improves overall
synchronization of information.
I concur with the Army's vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end
modernized logistics enterprise and to develop and implement logistics
enterprise architecture with joint interoperability. To support that
vision, the LMP will integrate with other Army ERPs, including General
Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support
System-Army (GCSS-A), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics
environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the
approved Army ERP Strategy.
Question. Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program.
Answer. I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM)
program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-
propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the
termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts [Crusader and Non-
Line-of-Sight-Cannon (NLOS-C)]. The PIM program provides upgrades that
allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and leverages the
commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive
components. PIM should provide growth potential in Space, Weight and
Power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer
related needs, to include the addition of such Force Protection
packages as add-on armor.
Question. M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition.
Answer. The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based
on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement
Program. The Army's effort is designed to integrate full automatic
firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable ``heavy''
barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open
competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution.
Results of the competition are expected in fiscal year 2013.
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES
Question. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army's
long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large
MRAP and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle fleets?
Answer. The Army needs to continue to provide the best level of
protection for our deploying soldiers. Given what we have learned
during the last 10 years, I believe we should attempt to provide MRAP
levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with
the mission assigned. The Army will integrate MRAPs into the force.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
Question. The 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
provides guidance that military forces shall be sized to prevail in
ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as
well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter
attacks or the emergence of other threats.
What is your assessment of the Army's current size and structure to
meet the QDR report's guidance?
Answer. The Army's size and structure have proven adequate to meet
the demands of our defense strategy as we know them today, although a
very heavy demand has been placed upon soldiers and their families for
nearly 10 years. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match end strength, structure,
and tempo in our ARFORGEN rotational model to meet demands as they
change.
Question. If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you
pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army's capability to meet
these requirements?
Answer. The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army
to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It's
taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can
reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we
will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to
maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the
Nation's needs at a sustainable tempo.
Question. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement
for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas.
For each, what is your assessment of the Army's current ability to
provide capabilities to support these mission requirements?
If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the
Army's capabilities to support:
Defense of the United States.
Answer. The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility
to defend the homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and
if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both
state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to
enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker
Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides
us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination
capability.
Question. Support of civil authorities at home.
Answer. The Army is well postured to provide support to civil
authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and
flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence
management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD
operations and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue
to address the challenges associated with this mission set including
unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the
integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces.
Question. Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and
counterterrorism operations.
Answer. We are highly proficient in counter insurgency, stability
and counter-terrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army
for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons
learned across the operating and generating force.
Question. Build the security capacity of partner states (including
your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the
security force assistance role).
Answer. General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building
sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces
and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best
opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose
Forces are well suited to support these activities through Security
Force Assistance.
Question. Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.
Answer. The Army's ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-
access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the
demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some
tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our
ongoing conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We
work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct
entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the
improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by
potential adversaries.
Question. Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass
destruction.
Answer. The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with
capabilities to support combatant commander requirements to counter the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Current capabilities
include operating effectively within a chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear environment, specialized teams to locate and
neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an operational
headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.
Question. Operate effectively in cyberspace.
Answer. We are on the right glide path to support U.S. Cyber
Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively
in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three star
command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations
and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-
spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of
network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one
operational level command to integrate and synchronize global
operations for the first time.
MODULARITY
Question. Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental
reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based
structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades
are supposed to be just as, or more capable than the divisional
brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of
equipment--such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment.
To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned
modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully
equip this force as required by its design has slipped to 2019.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity
transformation strategy?
Answer. The modular transformation strategy reorganizes Army
brigades, divisions and corps headquarters, and theater armies and
subordinate commands into standardized designs. 98 percent of all Army
brigades have converted or are in the process of converting to modular
design. The remaining 2 percent are projected to begin modular
conversion by 2013. Modular transformation improves the Army's ability
to meet combatant commander requirements and National Security Strategy
objectives by providing tailorable formations and leaders who are
accustomed to building teams based on changing requirements.
Question. In your view, what are the greatest challenges in
realizing the transformation of the Army to the modular design?
Answer. The most significant challenge associated with modular
transformation is the full fielding of authorized equipment. Although
all units will be organized in a modular design by the end of fiscal
year 2013, full fielding of some items of equipment will take longer.
Question. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you
propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, we will continue to review Army plans and
strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, to ensure
the Army continues to provide the joint force with the best mix of
capabilities to prevail in today's wars, engage to build partner
capacity, support civil authorities, and deter and defeat potential
adversaries. If confirmed, I will continue to assess Army structure
against current and potential threats to provide the best mix of
capabilities and the highest levels of modernization possible.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting
units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?
Answer. These modular capabilities increase the effectiveness of
the Army by better supporting the needs of combatant commanders across
the full spectrum of operations.
Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular
design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit
employment to improve performance or reduce risk?
Answer. At Training and Doctrine Command, we are currently working
with current and former commanders, to examine our organizations to see
if they are the best we can provide. We are continuously looking at
alternate force designs and force mixes to see how we can improve, in
both effectiveness and efficiency, our force structure.
Question. With respect to the Army's modular combat brigade force
structure design, press reports indicate that the Army is reassessing
its heavy and infantry brigade structures and may add a third maneuver
battalion to each where there are only two battalions now.
If confirmed, how would you propose to implement a decision to add
a third maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry combat brigades?
Answer. We are examining the current brigade designs and associated
force mix including the number and type of brigades. This will produce
alternatives to be analyzed. As the results of this analysis emerge, we
will make appropriate decisions on the implementation of any of such
proposals and their affect on our available resources. No decisions
have been made regarding future force design or force structure
changes.
ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH
Question. The Army has increased its Active-Duty end strength over
the last several years to meet current and what was believed to be the
demands of future operational requirements. Authorized active duty Army
end strength is now 569,400. The Secretary of Defense has announced
Army Active-Duty end strength reductions beginning this year through
2014 of 22,000 soldiers followed by another 27,000 beginning in 2015.
The fiscal year 2012 budget starts this reduction by requesting 7,400
fewer soldiers.
In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength
needed to meet today's demand for deployed forces, increase nondeployed
readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on soldiers and
their families?
Answer. We are continuously assessing the factors that affect end
strength including assigned missions, operational demands, unit
readiness, soldier and family well-being, Reserve component capability
and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to determine required
Active-Duty end strength. Our Active-Duty end strength is adequate to
meet current demand. As future demand is better understood, we will
assess its impact.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty
end strength needed to meet the likely future demand for deployed
forces, maintain nondeployed readiness, ensure ground force strategic
depth, and avoid increasing stress on soldiers and their families?
Answer. I am not yet prepared to provide you with an answer on
future Army end strength.
Question. Plans for the reduction of Army end strength assumes that
the cuts will be made gradually over several years.
What, in your view, are the critical requirements of the management
of this end strength reduction to ensure that should strategic
circumstances change the cuts can be stopped and, if necessary,
reversed?
Answer. End strength reductions are not automatic. They are
conditions based and will require periodic assessment. If confirmed, I
will work with Secretary McHugh and Army Leadership to develop a plan
that will allow us to accomplish current and projected missions,
balance the well-being of soldiers and families, and keep us prepared
to meet unforeseen operational demands.
Question. The gradual reduction of end strength may provide a hedge
against an unforeseen contingency requiring sufficient and available
Army forces, however, savings from the reduction of forces could be
realized sooner and with greater long-term advantages with faster
implementation.
What, in your view, are the most important advantages and
disadvantages of faster end strength reductions?
Answer. The Army's deliberate and responsible draw-down plans will
proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success, the well-being
of soldiers and families, compliance with directed resource constraints
and flexibility for unforeseen demands.
The advantage of drawing down faster would be the flexibility to
invest in other required areas. The disadvantages lie in the reduced
flexibility for meeting unforeseen demands and the precision to
maintain the skills and quality of the remaining force.
Question. End strength reductions totaling 49,000 soldiers will
also require force structure reductions as well.
If confirmed, how would you propose to reduce Army force structure,
if at all, to avoid the problems associated with a force that is over-
structured and undermanned?
Answer. The Army is coordinating the end strength reductions with
its deliberate Total Army Analysis process to ensure Army force
structure contains required capability and capacity to meet current and
future operational requirements within authorized end strength.
Question. How will these planned end strength reductions impact the
Army's plans for overseas basing of its units?
Answer. In my present position, I have not had a chance to examine
the potential impact of end strength reductions on overseas basing.
Question. The Army has had two other major post-conflict end
strength reductions in the last 40 years after Vietnam and after
Operation Desert Storm.
What, in your view, are the critical elements of the planning and
management of a major force reduction to ensure that the health of the
Army as a whole is not crippled impacting ongoing operations or general
readiness?
Answer. End strength reductions are conditions based and must be
deliberate and responsible. The Army's plan should ensure
accomplishment of its assigned missions, operational readiness for
future demands, compliance with directed resource constraints while
treating soldiers and their families with the dignity and respect they
deserve.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
the planning and management of an end strength reduction minimize the
negative impact on the readiness of the Army and soldier families?
Answer. Throughout my entire career, I have focused on taking care
of soldiers and families. If confirmed, I will look carefully at the
impact on soldiers and families.
Question. Does the Army have the legislative authority it needs to
properly shape the force as part of the personnel drawdown?
Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any additional legislative
authority the Army needs to shape personnel drawdown. If confirmed, I
will consult with Secretary McHugh and Senior Army personnel leadership
to determine if additional authorities are necessary.
STRATEGIC RISK
Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic
risk for the United States based on the lack of availability of trained
and ready forces for other contingencies?
Answer. In my current position, I have not yet had the opportunity
to examine strategic risk given our global demand. If confirmed as a
member of the Joint Chiefs, I will have the opportunity to look closely
at this issue.
Question. If so, how would you characterize the increase in
strategic risk in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy and
employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of
risk acceptable?
Answer. As mentioned in the previous question, I have not yet had
the opportunity to examine strategic risk.
Question. What is the impact of the decision to increase Army
forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security
obligations in other parts of the world?
Answer. The impact is manageable as we have available forces in the
Train/Ready pool of forces to meet potential future requirements with
an acceptable degree of risk. The Army is currently meeting all
requirements and mitigates the Afghanistan additional commitment with
forces made available commensurate with the drawdown in Iraq. The Army
continuously balances meeting current requirements against building/
maintaining strategic depth and capacity for contingency, full spectrum
operations.
Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will
reductions to Army end-strength increase or aggravate this risk?
Answer. These projected reductions, as mentioned by the Secretary
of Defense in his 6 January announcement, are based on the condition of
a decrease in demand. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh
to ensure our force structure is adequate to meet all future demands.
Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if
any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
Answer. The Army has a mature planning process to determine force
structure changes within the approved end strength for all Army
components. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the full readiness of
units generating to deploy to known operations in or in preparation for
contingency operations.
``INSTITUTIONALIZING'' SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE
Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years has
been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency,
and stability type operations. All of which are areas that place a high
premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a
rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then
sustainable, Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department
to ``institutionalize and finance'' the support necessary for the
irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last
few years and will be needed in the future.
What, in your view, does it mean to ``institutionalize''
capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the
Army?
Answer. The Army views Irregular Warfare as an operational theme
rather than a particular type of operation. We must be able to conduct
Stability Operations, Counter-Insurgency, Counterterrorism, and Foreign
Internal Defense and support the Special Operations Forces in
unconventional warfare. I understand ``institutionalize'' to mean that
the Army's operating forces and generating forces view operations under
the theme of Irregular Warfare as a core capability. We must be able to
execute missions across the full spectrum of conflict, to include
irregular warfare.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts
to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?
Answer. The Army has institutionalized Irregular Warfare. We have
an Irregular Warfare proponent within Training and Doctrine Command
supported by an Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell that synthesizes Army
Irregular Warfare efforts including those from the Army's Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute, Counter-Insurgency centers and
others. The Army includes Irregular Warfare in our professional
military education. The Army has built four Counter-Insurgency Centers,
a Security Force Assistance training brigade, increased the military
police, and significantly increased Special Operations and Civil
Affairs forces.
Question. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to
institutionalizing this kind of support, and what will be necessary to
overcome them?
Answer. I have not seen any particular obstacles to
institutionalizing this kind of support. The Army has to balance risk
across the range of missions it may be called on to perform.
Question. While force structure and program changes may be
necessary, they are unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full
institutionalization. The greater challenge may be found in changing
Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path choices, for
example through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and
personnel policies.
In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that
might be necessary to complement programmatic changes in support of the
further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare in
the Army?
Answer. We have to retain the flexibility, adaptability, and
agility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended
distances and in missions requiring the establishment of security over
wide areas regardless of what kind of threats populate the battlefield.
Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular,
counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not
mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to be trained, equipped, and
ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of
operations.
If confirmed, how would you propose to allocate the Army's efforts
and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for major combat
while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes support for
irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?
Answer. We are training and educating our soldiers and leaders to
understand that they must be capable of both combined arms maneuver and
wide area security. In training, we replicate the threats and
conditions they are likely to face in their next mission. For 10 years,
that has meant irregular threats and conditions common in the wide area
security role that supports counterinsurgency operations. As the demand
for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is reduced, we will introduce
threats and conditions in training common in the combined arms maneuver
role. The goal however is to avoid the false dichotomy of ``regular or
irregular'' warfare. The future battlefield will be populated with
hybrid threats--combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and
criminal groups--and we must train and educate our leaders and units to
understand and prevail against them.
Question. Do you anticipate that the Army will continue to train
and equip general purpose force brigades for the ``advise and assist
brigade (AAB)'' mission after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to
an end?
Answer. I anticipate that there will be an ongoing requirement for
Security Force Assistance activities of the type carried out by these
brigades into the future. I believe building partnerships and partner
capacity will be key roles for the Army in the future. If confirmed, I
will continue to assess requirements and work with this Congress to
ensure we have the resources and flexibility required to meet them.
Question. If so, what mission essential task list changes do you
plan to institutionalize this mission set in training for the general
purpose force brigades?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our joint partners to
identify the mission essential tasks for Security Force Assistance and
incorporate them into the Unified Joint Task List and Army Unified Task
List.
Question. Do you foresee that general purpose force brigades will
be regionally aligned to carry out an AAB-type mission?
Answer. I believe it is too early to tell. I believe some brigades
may be regionally aligned. The number and type of brigades will depend
upon what we have available after the priority requirements in the
CENTCOM AOR, and the other COCOM requirements. If confirmed I will work
with Secretary McHugh to determine the best allocation to support
operational requirements.
Question. If so, what changes to training and equipping of the
ARFORGEN model will be necessary for regional alignment?
Answer. The ARFORGEN model and our modular design are well-suited
to the kind of adaptations that will be required to meet security force
assistance requirements in the future.
LESSONS LEARNED
Question. What do you believe are the major lessons that the
Department of the Army has and should have learned from Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) regarding its
title 10, U.S.C., responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping
the force?
Answer. We have learned that soldiers require more than a year to
fully recover from extended deployments and to prepare for another
deployment. In addition, the ability to adapt rapidly is the key to
success in the current and future operational environments. We have
also learned that a fully integrated Reserve component is critical to
meet force requirements.
Question. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you
address as a matter of urgent priority?
Answer. They are equally important and all must be addressed.
ROTATION CYCLES/SCHEDULES
Question. Although improving recently, the Active Army's ratio of
time spent deployed to time at home station has remained fairly steady
at 1:1--that is for each year deployed a soldier spends about 1 year at
home station. The Active Army objective is 1:2 where soldiers can
expect to be home for 2 years for each year deployed. The Reserve
component objective is 1:5 where soldiers can expect to be home for 5
years for each year deployed.
What impact do you expect the proposed troop reductions in Iraq to
have on the so-called ``dwell time'' of Army soldiers? Is it possible
that the reduction of demand for Army forces in Iraq alone will allow
the Army to achieve the 1:2 dwell time goal by the end 2011?
Answer. The proposed troop reductions in Iraq will allow the Army
to gradually increase dwell if there is not a significant increase in
demand in Afghanistan or in other contingencies. We do not believe that
the reduction of demand in Iraq alone will allow the Army to meet the
1:2 dwell goal.
Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact of the
decision to decrease Army end-strength on the rotation schedule and
meeting the dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty Forces?
Answer. With the proposed troop reduction in Iraq and projected
decrease in Afghanistan, we will see improvement gradually in dwell,
but the Army has not yet met its dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty
Forces. The decreases in Army strength are conditions based and I am
not in a position at this time to assess whether there will be an
impact to the dwell goal of 1:2 based on these reductions.
Question. How, in your view, will the proposed reductions in Iraq
impact the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to Homeland
Defense and support to civil authorities?
Answer. The return of these Army National Guard forces to state
control should provide the Governors and Adjutants General with
increased forces to conduct Homeland Defense, disaster response, and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities. These forces will be better
trained and more experienced due to their Iraq combat deployments.
Although the National Guard has been able to meet all disaster relief
requirements, the return of forces will allow more flexibility to
accomplish local missions.
EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY
Question. Both deploying and nondeploying Active and Reserve
component Army units are training without all their required equipment.
Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until late in
their predeployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater.
In your view, has deployment of additional brigades to Afghanistan
increased the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce
equipment availability for training?
Answer. There have been some challenges with equipment being
available for training when it has been fielded directly to theatre.
We're beginning to overcome this challenge.
Question. What is the impact of our drawdown from Iraq in this
regard?
Answer. The drawdown from Iraq should improve availability of
equipment for units to conduct pre-deployment training. For some
systems, such as tactical wheeled vehicles, it will have a larger
positive impact. For other pieces of more high demand equipment in
short supply across the Army, I anticipate it will have a lesser
impact.
Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough modern equipment
to fully support the predeployment training and operations of deploying
units?
Answer. The Army does not have enough equipment to fill all units
to their fully modernized capabilities. This means there are some
instances in which the most modern equipment is not available until
later in a unit's pre-deployment cycle or until it arrives in theater.
However, the Army uses the force generation model to resource units
with adequate levels of the available modernized equipment to conduct
their pre-deployment training and assigned mission upon deployment.
Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for
training and operations?
Answer. The Army is short unmanned aerial systems and some non-
line-of-sight communications equipment. Due to the nature of the
warfare in Afghanistan, we face shortages in light infantry specific
equipment. As we continue to reset equipment returning from Iraq we
will see a steady improvement in on hand equipment for units training
for contingency force missions.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these
shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and
operate?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue our capability portfolio
reviews to evaluate our priorities against mission requirements and
adjust our resource allocations to ensure the Army continues to strike
the critical balance between having enough modern equipment to fully
support pre-deployment training and operations in theatre. If
confirmed, I would support the Army Force Generation Model of phased
equipping through which the Army intensively manages our equipment on-
hand to ensure next deploying units, from all components, have
sufficient equipment for training and deployment.
EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET
Question. Congress provided the Army with approximately $15 to $17
billion annually to help with the reset of nondeployed forces and
accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. However, the amount
of reset funding requested for DOD in fiscal year 2012 decreased to
$11.9 billion from the fiscal year 2011 request of $21.4 billion.
In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only
prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve
the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?
Answer. It is my understanding that the $4.4 billion requested for
reset in fiscal year 2012, though lower than requests in fiscal year
2010 and fiscal year 2011, is adequate to replace equipment lost in
combat and to repair equipment available for reset. If confirmed, I
will closely examine this issue.
Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
reset?
Answer. My understanding is that repair depots are operating at
required capacity but not at their full capacity.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be
taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it
available for operations and training?
Answer. There are certain measures, such as contract augmentation
or rebalancing workload that could be used to increase capacity at our
facilities. At this time, I am not in a position to determine whether
these measures are necessary or appropriate.
Question. What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army
National Guard (ARNG) units to respond to Homeland Security and support
to civil authorities missions?
Answer. I understand that the reduction of reset funding for fiscal
year 2012 is commensurate with the reduction of troop and equipment
levels supporting Operation New Dawn. I believe that the ARNG will
still be able to respond to Homeland Defense missions and provide
support to civil authorities.
MISSILE DEFENSE
Question. The Department of Defense recently decided to terminate
the Army's Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile,
and not to proceed with procurement and fielding of the tri-national
Medium Extended Air Defense System, two Army air and missile defense
systems.
Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's core
missions?
Answer. Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and
Missile Defense is a core competency. Protection of our deployed forces
is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with
our sister Services and coalition partners.
Question. How do you believe the Army should manage the risks that
result from these decisions?
Answer. I believe the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat
and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide
effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.
Question. The Army has recently proposed transferring a number of
its air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA).
In your view, what is of the proper relationship between the Army
and the Missile Defense Agency?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Army relies on the MDA to
develop and produce the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The
Army works with MDA to provide those BMDS capabilities to the combatant
commanders. The Army maintains a relationship with MDA through the
Army/MDA Board of Directors and its four standing committees.
Question. The Army has recently completed a review of its air and
missile defense portfolio.
In your view, what are or should be the Army's responsibilities, if
any, with respect to development, procurement, and operation of missile
defense systems?
Answer. The Army's responsibilities depend on the type of missile
defense system being developed and guidance from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
SPACE
Question. The Army Space support to Strategic Command works closely
with Air Force Space Command in getting space based communications to
the warfighter. Recently the Army has begun to look at the possibility
of expanding the scope of data that could be provided to the last
tactical mile from space.
In your view, what are the needs that the Army could address from
space, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that this is coordinated
with OSD?
Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed
assessment, I understand that the importance of space programs
continues to increase across DOD, and the Army needs to keep pace to
fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are
appropriately prioritized within both DOD and the Department of the
Army.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your vision for the Army
space forces in the future?
Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed
assessment, one of my priorities, if I am confirmed, is to position the
Army to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space
systems are appropriately prioritized and resourced.
Question. The Army, as do all the Services, tends to lag behind in
the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new
satellite systems. Acquisition of GPS M-code capable equipment is just
one example of where there is needed capability on orbit but terminals
will not be available in a timely fashion to utilize the capability.
What is your view on this lag and, if confirmed, what actions would
you propose taking to resolve the lag?
Answer. If confirmed, I would need to examine this issue more
closely. While I understand that all of the Services have specific
requirements to meet specific needs for their forces and that the Army
depends heavily on these systems, I am not yet in a position to provide
an informed assessment.
LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES
Question. If confirmed, how would you address the Army's management
of low density units such as Special Operations Forces, military
police, civil affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in
this new strategic environment?
Answer. If confirmed, I would use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to
identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to
achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. When
requirements for additional low density/high demand capabilities are
identified through this process, they are resourced within acceptable
risk. This process will help determine where these capabilities should
reside: the Active component, the Reserve component, or a mix of both.
The Army balances the inventory of these low density units to ensure
availability of an affordable mix of flexible forces capable of
accomplishing the missions required within the most likely security
environment.
Question. Are there functional changes among the Active and Reserve
components that you believe should be made?
Answer. I am not yet aware at this time of any changes that may be
necessary.
ARMY READINESS
Question. How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed
and non-deployed units?
Answer. I have some concerns about the readiness levels of deployed
and nondeployed units. In the ARFORGEN model, deployed and deploying
Army units are given the highest priority for manning, equipping and
training to achieve the combatant commander's wartime/mission
requirements. Nondeployed Army units are used to provide the additive
resources to ensure that deployed and deploying Army units can meet
mission requirements. This requires the Army to continue to do risk
assessment so nondeployed units do not fall below an unacceptable level
of risk.
Question. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is
acceptable?
Answer. In my opinion, the Army is prepared to accomplish current
missions.
Question. How do you see operations in Iraq and the war in
Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called
upon to respond to an attack or another contingency?
Answer. The current demand for Army forces coupled with the
cumulative effect of nearly 10 years of conflict impacts the Army's
flexibility to provide forces to other contingencies.
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS
Question. Many soldiers are on their fourth and some their fifth
major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Beginning in August 2008
Department of Defense policy has been to limit deployments for Active
component soldiers and mobilization of Reserve component soldiers to
not longer than 12 months.
What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of
troops to Afghanistan and Iraq on retention, particularly among young
enlisted and officer personnel after their initial active duty
obligated service has been completed?
Answer. The Army monitors retention very closely, given the high
operational demand and multiple deployments that soldiers are
experiencing. Statistics reveal that multiple deployments to
Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely impacting retention. Continuous
improvements to Army benefits, such as world class healthcare advances
for wounded soldiers, enhancements in family support programs, and
additional monetary bonuses have encouraged large numbers of our
soldiers to continue their commitments beyond their obligated service
periods.
Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what
do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In
addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please
discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and
rates of indiscipline.
Answer. The indicators of stress on the force that the Army tracks
continuously include: Reenlistments, Chapter separations, Divorce,
Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Enlisted Desertion, AWOL offenses,
Drug and Alcohol Enrollments, Drug Positives, Courts-Martial and
suicides.
I understand that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including
desertion, absence without leave, and courts-martial have remained
steady or declined in the past year. Other indicators of stress on the
force, such as substance abuse and domestic violence have increased.
However, the significant increase in the number of soldier suicides is
of the greatest concern. Soldiers and their families continue to make
significant personal sacrifices in support of our Nation. If confirmed,
I am committed to providing soldiers and families with a quality of
life commensurate with their service and to continuing Army efforts to
develop multi-disciplinary solutions directed at mitigating risk
behaviors and enhancing soldier and family fitness and resilience.
Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments
can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for
the Army?
Answer. I am concerned about the long-term health of the force if
we are unable to achieve the appropriate deployment to dwell ratio for
the deploying soldier. Adequate dwell time should help the visible and
invisible wounds of this protracted conflict. If confirmed, I will
closely monitor indicators of stress on the force and work to ensure
that the Army has plans and programs to confront these issues
appropriately.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey has stated
that the Army is ``out of balance''.
What is your understanding and assessment of the concept and
efforts to achieve ``balance'' for the Army?
Answer. I understand balance to be the Army's ability to sustain
the Army's soldiers, families, and civilians, prepare forces for
success in the current conflict, reset returning units to rebuild the
readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments
and contingencies, and transform to meet the demands of the 21st
century. With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress
over the past 3 years to restore balance.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to
achieve and sustain Army ``balance''?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army
leadership to adopt measures and strategies to achieve and sustain
balance. Building resilience among our forces will be one of my highest
priorities.
RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its
longstanding traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?
Answer. The demand for U.S. ground forces over this past decade has
required continuous use of Active component (AC) and Reserve component
(RC) forces in order to meet the Army's operational requirements. The
RC is no longer solely Strategic Reserve. Current and projected demand
for Army forces will require continued access to the RC. Mobilization
and operational use of the RC will continue for the foreseeable future.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to
maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a
relevant and capable Operational Reserve?
Answer. In my opinion, the Army must ensure continued access to the
Reserves as an essential part of the Total Force. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure they have the necessary training equipment to accomplish
all missions. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing for the
Operational Reserve and mobilizing these forces on a predictable and
recurring basis will be challenges for the Army.
Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the
Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?
Answer. In my view, Reserve component forces play a critical role
in enabling the Joint Force Commanders to meet assigned missions.
Today's force is structured to balance maneuver capability in the
Active component with a majority of the enablers in the Reserve
component. This balance should provide capabilities to meet operational
requirements.
Question. In your view, should the Department of Defense assign
homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions
exclusively to the Reserve?
Answer. Reserve component forces are uniquely positioned to be the
first responder to these missions: however, the Army's Total Force must
be able to execute homeland defense or other global or domestic support
missions.
Question. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year
mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of
the All-Volunteer Reserve Force?
Answer. Once the Army can restore its balance and stress on the
force has been significantly reduced, a predictable cycle that ensures
full recovery and training will support the viability and
sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force. I think the exact
ratio--whether 1:4 or 1:5--requires further analysis.
MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most
sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the
planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g.,
inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors
caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance
programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Reserve Force management policies and
systems have been characterized in the past as ``inefficient and
rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment
stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What is your assessment of advances made in improving Army Reserve
component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
do problems still exist?
Answer. I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its
mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective
and responsive for Reserve component soldiers. I believe Reserve
components are a critical part of the Total Force, and if confirmed, I
will continue the effort to ensure that Reserve component soldiers are
mobilized and demobilized in the most effective and efficient way
possible and that their needs and the needs of their families and
employers are met.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?
Answer. As I understand current Reserve Force management policies,
the goal is to manage the force to produce a supply of units to the
combatant commanders with a short-term goal of 1 year of mobilization
every 5 years with a long-term goal of 1 year of mobilization every 6
years. The challenge the Army has faced has been that demand has been
greater than the supply and has caused the need for more frequent
mobilizations. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan start to draw-
down, the Army should be better able to attain the mobilization to
dwell goals.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
Answer. The Army Force Generation Model fundamentally changes the
way the Army builds unit readiness for mobilization requirements. The
ARFORGEN model presents a structured progression of readiness through a
multi-year long cycle.
Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
Answer. At present, I am not aware of a need to modify current
statutory authorities to facilitate mobilization of the National Guard
and Reserves. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to review
the statutory authorities to determine if they are sufficient.
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE
Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has
found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war
was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning
is a failed concept.
What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-
Volunteer Force?
Answer. I believe the IRR has proven an invaluable asset to all
Army components to support contingency operations around the world.
Question. What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army
force management planning?
Answer. The IRR can serve as a source of experienced and highly-
skilled soldiers to help the Army meet critical skill and grade
requirements.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making
to the Army's IRR recall policy?
Answer. At this time, I do not have sufficient information to
recommend changes to this policy. If confirmed, I will consider input
from all components to determine the best IRR recall policy.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in
place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request
a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in
place for appealing the Army's decision on that request?
Answer. While this is an important part of the IRR mobilization, I
do not have sufficient familiarity with this policy to recommend
changes.
Question. Recent studies of Army suicides show higher rates among
the IRR.
What should the Army and DOD do to address this concern?
Answer. Suicides in the IRR are often more difficult to address
because those soldiers are not affiliated with a unit. If confirmed, I
will consider all methods to integrate IRR soldiers into the Army's
Health Promotion/Risk Reduction efforts.
PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS
Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
entitlement spending continues its steep upward growth and is becoming
an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in
the Army's personnel costs and entitlement spending?
Answer. We need to strike a balance between preserving the All-
Volunteer Force, accomplishing operational missions and retraining an
Army that is affordable to the Nation. If confirmed, I will work with
the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense on how best to
achieve it.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to avoid a
requirement for massive end-of-year reprogramming to cover personnel
costs?
Answer. My understanding is the President's budget is adequate to
meet current personnel costs.
Question. What would be the impact of a year-long continuing
resolution on Army personnel funding?
Answer. If the Army is given the flexibility to manage total
resources (both Base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds)
to pay its force, then fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution will have
minimal impact on military pay and allowances.
MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE
PERSONNEL
Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
improved policy oversight and accountability.
If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
Answer. I believe the Army should develop and resource mechanisms
to routinely identify screen and assess Reserve component medical
readiness. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary of the Army, the
Chief of Army Reserves, the Director of the Army National Guard, and
the Surgeon General to develop policies for more effectively
identifying personnel that are nondeployable for medical reasons.
Question. How would you improve upon the Army's ability to produce
a healthy and fit Reserve component?
Answer. This is a very important issue, and I will work with the
Army's Active and Reserve component leadership to assess whether there
are challenges in this area. The Army is moving forward with a
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. If confirmed, I would determine
how this program applies to Reserve component and National Guard
soldiers.
NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND READINESS
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in
the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard
and the National Guard Bureau?
Answer. The Army National Guard is a component of the Reserve and
Total Force. It responds to emergencies within the United States and
deploys to support contingency operations overseas. Throughout the last
10 years, the Army National Guard has transformed from a Strategic
Reserve to an operational Reserve. The National Guard, with the support
of the National Guard Bureau, has proven critical to the Army's Total
Force, and I believe it will continue to do so in the years ahead.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
commitment to fully fund 100 percent of National Guard equipment
requirements? In your view, do Army processes for planning,
programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the
National Guard?
Answer. I understand efforts are underway to modernize the Reserve
components and to ensure they are equipped to fulfill their missions.
If confirmed, I will examine the funding of the National Guard to
ensure it receives the appropriate level of resources to maintain its
role as a vital component of the Total Force.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing
needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced
through the Army budget? In your view, what is the appropriate role for
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National
Guard Bureau, to ensure that Army National Guard requirements/needs are
appropriately synchronized with Army priorities and resourcing
strategy.
Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of
increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to
General (O-10)?
Answer. The increase in grade reflects the significant
responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Question. In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to
consider this issue.
Question. What is your understanding of the role and authority of
the Director of the Army National Guard?
Answer. The Director of the Army National Guard assists the Chief
of the National Guard Bureau, organizing and managing its personnel and
other resources to accomplish the responsibilities and functions. The
Director of the Army National Guard assists in carrying out the
functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army.
Question. In your view, should the Director of the Army National
Guard be ``dual hatted'' as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to see
how these positions would function together and have not formed an
opinion.
ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T)
Question. What do you see as the role that Army science and
technology programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for
current and future Army systems?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Army's science and
technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention,
innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and
future warfighter. The science and technology program should retain the
flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through
current operations.
Question. What in your view have been the greatest contributions,
if any, of Army science and technology programs to current operations?
Answer. I believe the most significant contribution the Army
science and technology community has offered to current operations is
the ability to use technology to significantly improve warfighter
capabilities. Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid
development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable Armor solutions
that have been critical to addressing emerging threats, enhancing
intelligence capabilities, and better protecting our deployed forces.
Question. What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the
value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?
Answer. To judge the value and investment level in Army science and
technology programs, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved
warfighter capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align
technology development to warfighter requirements.
Question. What new S&T areas do you envision the Army pursuing, for
instance to lighten soldier load, and to improve the survivability and
combat effectiveness of dismounted soldiers and ground vehicles?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the Army's science and
technology program and its stakeholders, including the acquisition
community, Training and Doctrine Command and the combatant commanders
to discuss the needs of the warfighter and the ``art of the possible''
for future technology-enabled capabilities to ensure the Army remains
the best equipped force in the world.
ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTERS
(RDEC)
Question. How will you balance the role of Army laboratories
between long-term fundamental research, support to current operations
and the development of new capabilities to support current and future
Army missions?
Answer. The Army laboratories are science and technology performing
organizations and as such have and will continue to play a major role
in supporting current operations with best capabilities available.
Through their broad range of investments in key strategic science and
technology areas, they also provide critical new capabilities for
soldiers.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army
laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce,
laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can
continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation
capabilities?
Answer. Army laboratories and Research and Development Centers need
to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and
advancements that support the warfighter. If confirmed, I will learn
more about their operations and support efforts to improve best
practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.
ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS
Question. In the past, the DOD Test Resource Management Center did
not certify the Army's test and evaluation (T&E) budget due to
identified shortfalls in T&E range sustainment, operations, and
modernization.
If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's T&E
infrastructure is robust enough to test new systems and technologies
and reliably verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?
Answer. Testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's
combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of
testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the
capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Army T&E community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
T&E leadership to ensure the Army's T&E infrastructure is adequately
resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test
capabilities.
ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) PROGRAMS
Question. What major improvements, if any, would you like to see
made in the Army's development and deployment of major information
technology systems?
Answer. I believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical
standards, make acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or near-
COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces
more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave
us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.
As Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I helped
establish a center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX--the Army
Evaluation Task Force (AETF). It will serve as the Network's primary
test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from
the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate
new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to
operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately
provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.
Question. How will the consolidation of IT systems announced under
Secretary Gates efficiency initiative reduce the IT support cost per
user to the Army?
Answer. I understand the two primary Army initiatives that fulfill
Secretary Gates' mandate are Enterprise Email and consolidation of Army
data centers. Implementation of these initiatives should help reduce
the cost of information technology support to the Army.
HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to
institutionalize the Human Terrain System (HTS) program? Given the
proliferation of such capabilities across the Services, what are your
views, if any, on developing a joint HTS capability?
Answer. The Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as
an enduring capability assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and
funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I believe there is
merit to developing a joint capability. In September 2010, I directed a
Training and Doctrine Command capability based assessment of all Socio-
cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services.
The intent is to identify other ongoing socio-cultural initiatives, to
determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop
and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment
are due in the spring of 2011.
OPERATIONAL ENERGY
Question. Prior to and since the creation of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Program, a number
of the Services have made progress addressing concerns associated with
operational energy. The Army has announced its operational energy
aspirations for the future but, unlike the other Services, the Army's
five strategic energy security goals appear vague and lack quantitative
metrics against which to measure progress.
If confirmed, how would you propose that the Army address its
operational energy challenges, requirements, and opportunities in the
immediate short-term?
Answer. The most important issue with operational energy is the
amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is
used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and
accelerated deployment, of generators that use less fuel as well as
microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more
efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters
and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and,
ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is
addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and
power constraints. As the Commanding General of the Army Training and
Doctrine Command, I'm a charter member of the Army's Senior Energy and
Sustainability Council, which is responsible for addressing energy
challenges across the Army. If confirmed I will continue efforts
currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in
theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of
command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's progress with
respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?
Answer. The Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include
industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our
operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated
tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also
evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce
the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to
theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices and employ
energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as
an operational advantage.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is taking
advantage of its labs and research, engineering and development centers
to further its operational energy and security goals?
Answer. The Army has integrated the national laboratories with
Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a
range of operational energy, power and security needs. Some of the
initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of
components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various
emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will
increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for contingency
bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual
soldiers. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the research
conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the
operational energy needs of the current and future Army.
INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE
Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in recent years
have testified that the military Services under-invest in their
facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-
investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of
facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working
conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies
that could increase productivity.
What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?
Answer. Since fiscal year 2007, with BRAC, Transformation, and Grow
the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant MILCON investments
in its infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant
Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, and the
Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our
infrastructure investments.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?
Answer. Proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the
Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess
facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out
our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to
support the mission.
If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to
include evaluating whether the Army should increase operation and
maintenance funding for restoration and modernization and Demolition.
ARMY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of
soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you
agree with this policy?
Answer. Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative
separation for all soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution,
possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires
initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or
separate a soldier.
I concur with this policy.
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who
have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or
prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
Answer. Army policy requires that the separation authority consider
a soldier drug offender's potential for rehabilitation and further
military service. For this reason, soldiers who commit drug and alcohol
offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse
counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). Commanders
consider the recommendation of ASAP counselors when determining a
soldier's potential for rehabilitation and retention.
I concur with this policy.
Question. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient
resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and
objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?
Answer. My personal experience at various command levels since 2001
has been that the Army devotes sufficient resources to implement these
objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level
of resourcing for this important area.
Question. What measures are being taken to improve the Army's
performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?
Answer. Army policy requires a comprehensive approach by
commanders, law enforcement and the medical community for drug and
alcohol abuse. The Army is working diligently to improve its
surveillance, detection, and intervention systems for drug and alcohol
abuse.
The Army investigates all reported drug and alcohol incidents to
assist commanders in properly adjudicating the offense. The Army is
also enhancing detection capabilities through the Drug Suppression
Teams.
The Army is also working to improve intervention systems. In
addition to increasing the number of ASAP counselors to accommodate the
increasing demand, the Army continues to expand the Comprehensive
Soldier Fitness program to build resiliency in the force. The Army is
also conducting the Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot
program at six installations to promote help seeking behavior by
allowing soldiers to confidentially seek help for alcohol problems.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Question. The Army continues to face significant shortages in
critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve
components.
What is your understanding of the most significant personnel
challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the
Army?
Answer. There continues to be a national shortage of medical
professionals that challenges the Army's efforts to recruit and retain
healthcare professionals. The Army competes with governmental and non-
governmental agencies, as well as private healthcare organizations to
attract and retain the most skilled and talented healthcare providers,
in a uniformed or civilian capacity. The Army continues to evaluate
initiatives to provide more flexibility to allow the Army to adequately
compete in these areas.
Question. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review
of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new
requirements for 2011 and beyond?
Answer. I believe it is important to review medical support
requirements on a regular, recurring basis. With that in mind, if
confirmed I will assess whether the Army should undertake a
comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army.
Question. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives,
if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to
fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?
Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the
changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, I do not believe additional legislative
authorities are needed to ensure that the Army fulfills medical support
requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this area and will
work closely with the administration and Congress to seek any
additional authorities identified as necessarily to maintain this goal.
WOMEN IN COMBAT
Question. What is your view of the appropriate combat role for
female soldiers on the modern battlefield?
Answer. Female soldiers have been and continue to be an integral
part of our Army team, contributing to its success and overall
readiness as they perform exceptionally well in specialties and
positions open to them. Women are employed in units and positions and
trained in theater--specific roles that often necessitate combat action
such as defending themselves or their units from attack or accompanying
patrols.
Question. In your view, should the current policy prohibiting the
assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified in
any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the changing
nature of warfare?
Answer. Existing Army policy is more restrictive than the 1994
Department of Defense policy. If confirmed, I will assess Army policies
against the evolving nature and realities of modern combat.
Question. Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers
to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?
Answer. Yes. Women are serving in positions that expose them to
combat today and continue to make tremendous contributions as well as
demonstrate their selfless - service and sacrifices in roles and
responsibilities critical to the safety and security of our Nation and
to the readiness of the Army.
FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY
Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by
the Department of Defense in March 2005, directed a series of actions
aimed at transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities to
include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based
requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for
both military and civilian personnel.
What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in
increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Answer. As Commanding General for the Training and Doctrine
Command, I witnessed a tremendous increase in foreign language
capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its
recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital
interpreter/translator positions. Pre-deployment training for the
General Purpose Force Soldiers and Civilians has transformed to include
Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program, Language Enabled Soldiers training,
the Rapport Program, and other Soldiers and Civilians with Culturally
Based Language Training. The Reserve Officer Training Corps has
introduced a very successful Culture and Language Program, which
provides incentives and immersion opportunities for cadets who take
foreign language and related cultural studies. Overall, these
initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency
operations and building partner capacity overseas.
Question. In your view, what should be the priorities of the
Department of Defense, and the Army in particular, in responding to the
need for improved foreign language proficiency and improving
coordination of foreign language programs and activities among Federal
agencies?
Answer. In my opinion, one of the highest priorities for the
Department of Defense should be the continued support of the Defense
Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally
Based Language Training to all Services and Department of Defense
Components. With the increasing demand for Pashto and Dari instructors,
and foreign language professionals in general, the Department of
Defense must coordinate with Federal agencies to ensure best practices
are shared to recruit and retain personnel with these critical skills.
PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS
Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded
during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army Medical
Corps officer. A Department of Defense review of the attack concluded
that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal
threats, including radicalization of military personnel.
What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
Fort Hood?
Answer. The lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive
to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units
against emerging threats. Through a holistic Protection approach, the
Army is aggressively fielding material and nonmaterial solutions to
address internal and external threats.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to integrate
and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our
soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army civilians by
ensuring that commanders and leaders have the information and tools
needed to address the ever changing threat environment.
RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES
Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed
that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
self-radicalization'' and recommended that the policy be updated.
What is your view of the need to clarify the policy regarding
religious accommodation in the Army?
Answer. The policies for religious accommodation in the Army are
published in AR 600-20, Army Command Policy. The policy must be clear
and provide appropriate guidance to both soldiers and commanders
regarding how the Army accommodates for religious beliefs and
practices. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy
and determine if further changes are necessary.
Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Army?
Answer. Your question raises a valid concern. However, the Army is
a diverse force. As soldiers in the profession of arms, we understand
the key role that good order, discipline, morale, and safety have in
ensuring units are at all times ready to defend this nation. The Army
has long been a place where people from all walks of life can serve
proudly and where the many become one--a U.S. Army soldier.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
Army?
Answer. The Army has a longstanding commitment to treat all
soldiers with dignity and respect. Treating soldiers with dignity and
respect requires continuous leader emphasis and vigilance.
Question. Do Army policies regarding religious practices in the
military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that
require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles
with religious significance?
Answer. Regulations regarding wear of religious clothing or items
are found in two regulations (AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and AR
670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia). The policy
provides the authority to wear religious jewelry, apparel or articles
if they are neat, conservative, and discreet and compliant with these
regulations.
Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who
have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. In my opinion, current Army policies provide commanders
with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious
beliefs and maintain good order and discipline.
Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. The Army does not have a policy regarding public prayer by
military chaplains. As a matter of practice, however, chaplains are
encouraged to be considerate of the audience.
FAMILY SUPPORT
Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in
identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to
ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
resourced?
Answer. In my view the most pressing family readiness issues
include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication
and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and
services the Army has to improve soldier and family quality of life.
In 2007, the Army Family Covenant was unveiled to improve quality
of life by providing programs and services that enhance soldier and
family strength, readiness, and resilience. Since then, the Army has
made great progress and continues to fulfill its commitment to provide
soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with the quality
of their service.
The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army Families, and other
studies revealed that soldiers and families may not be aware of the
myriad of available support services. To address this concern, the Army
is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect soldiers
and families to the right service at the right time. This
transformation will create a more streamlined and modular support
structure that better supports our modular Army at every installation.
The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates
completion by October 2011.
The Army has made great progress in building a wide range of
support capabilities over the last few years, but the strain on the
force continues. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our
support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of
the soldiers and families who use them.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, BRAC, and lengthy deployments?
Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that Army Family
programs reach out to all soldiers and their families, regardless of
geographic location or deployment status. I will also work to ensure
that family program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a
mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so
services are available to the soldiers and families who need them.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve
component families related to mobilization, deployment and family
readiness, as well as active duty families who do not reside near a
military installation?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring soldiers and families remain
connected to Army Family services and programs, whether by internet,
telephone, or in person regardless of geographic location or Component.
Army OneSource (www.MyArmyOneSource.com) is the website of choice for
information on Army Family programs and services. Army OneSource
highlights Active and Reserve Component Family Programs, is publicly
accessible, and thus available to all components and immediate and
extended family members.
The State Joint Force Headquarters is the platform for support of
geographically dispersed servicemembers and families. This platform
projects the Joint Family Support Assistance Program resources, ARNG
Family Assistance Centers (FACs), ARNG Family Readiness Support
Assistants, and the ARNG Child and Youth program in support of Reserve
component families and Active component families that do not reside
near the installation. Additionally, Army sponsored programs including
Operation Military Kids and Community Based Child Care and Respite Care
programs build community capacity for the geographically dispersed Army
population. These programs offer similar services and assistance to
geo-dispersed Reserve component families as would be available on
installations and are connected to local resources that soldiers and
families are eligible to use.
MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAMS
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in
Iraq and Afghanistan have been valuable in identifying the extent of
mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being
experienced in combat theaters. The most recent report, MHAT VI, stated
that multiple deployments were related to higher rates of acute stress
and psychological problems, that servicemembers on their third and
fourth deployment ``reported using medications for psychological or
combat stress problems at a significantly higher rate,'' and that
``soldiers with short dwell-time report high mental health problems,
high intent to leave the military and low morale.''
Based on the findings of MHAT VI that soldiers experience increased
stress due to multiple deployments and short dwell time, what actions
would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate mental health
resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their
return?
Answer. The MHAT studies play a key role in proactively identifying
how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to
provide behavioral health care. Since OEF MHAT VI, the number of
behavioral health personnel in theater was significantly increased to
improve the ratio of behavioral health specialists to soldiers.
Specifically, the MHAT team recommended one behavioral health personnel
should be deployed for every 700 soldiers, and this ratio was met.
Second, the MHAT team recommended a redistribution of behavioral health
personnel to ensure that each BCT had one additional dedicated provider
to augment their organic provider. This ``dual provider'' model was
designed to ensure that a provider would be available to travel to
remote outposts to see soldiers who had limited access to the larger
Forward Operating Bases. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army
continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of
health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and
services.
Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of
the Army's Mental Health Advisory Teams, and what are the lessons which
can be applied to future deployments?
Answer. One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been
to document that soldiers on multiple deployments report higher mental
health problems. This finding was first observed in 2005 (MHAT III),
and has been replicated in every subsequent MHAT. Another valuable
finding noted in the question was the observation that mental health
problems are related to dwell-times. Specifically, short dwell-times
are associated with a heightened increase in reports of mental health
problems. Other key findings include the observation that deployment
length is strongly associated with reports of mental health problems
and deployments have put a strain on marital relationships. Overall,
the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care
system and the behavioral health status of soldiers through programs
such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being responsive to the
needs of deployed soldiers to include refining behavioral healthcare
delivery models.
SUICIDES
Question. The committee continues to be concerned about the
continuing increase in soldier suicides, especially the sharp increase
in Reserve component suicides. In June, 2010, the Army released a
report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention that
analyzed the causes of suicides in the Army and reported disturbing
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors.
Chapter III of this report discussed the lost art of leadership in
garrison.
In your view, what is the cause of this surge in the number of
suicides of Reserve Component members?
Answer. The number of ARNG suicides for calendar year 2009 and
calendar year 2010 were 62 and 112, respectively. The increase in
suicides is due in part to improved reporting over the past 18 months
for the Reserve components. This increase is not directly associated
with deployments or unemployment as over 50 percent of ARNG suicides
were soldiers who never deployed.
Question. The Army is focusing attention on the differences between
our Active-Duty (AD) and non-Active-Duty suicides because there are
external variables at play. The Army believes that factors such as the
economy (particularly a difficult labor market) are creating stress in
our non-AD population. Data indicates that unemployment among our young
non-AD soldiers is above 30 percent and we are experiencing an increase
in requests for employment assistance through ESGR (Employer Support of
the Guard and Reserve). Additionally, Reserve component soldiers do not
have the same access to medical care as their AD counter parts.
Answer. We continue to pull all accessible national data to better
understand current trends. The CDC has a 3-year lag in reporting. So,
while we have anecdotal indication of increased suicide in some
civilian sectors, we don't have a clear picture of the national suicide
rates for calendar year 2008-calendar year 2010. This is particularly
important because these unreported years encapsulate the largest
recession since WWII (Dec. 2007-June 2009). The Army is improving
awareness of and access to training and resources; working with
employers and private sector to mitigate economic stress; and improving
the quality and access to health care for all Reserve component
soldiers.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's response to the
continuing increase in suicide rates?
Answer. Leaders across the Army have taken aggressive steps to
improve the health of the force, decrease high risk behavior and stem
the increasing rate of suicides in our formations. This is a very tough
issue and it is going to take consistent vigilance to fully understand
the causes for this increase, identify the indicators and implement
appropriate intervention measures. After nearly a decade of war, we are
working to keep pace with the expanding needs of our strained Army, and
continuously identify and address the gaps that exist in our policies,
programs and services. The Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and
Suicide Prevention Report 2010, along with the DOD Task Force on the
Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces and other
strategic reports, serve as the foundation for our systemic effort to
improve.
Question. What is the Army doing to address the issues raised in
the Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention?
Answer. The Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention
(HP/RR/SP) report was a focused 15 months effort to better understand
the increasing rate of suicides in the force. This candid report
informed and educated Army leaders on the importance of identifying and
reducing high risk behavior related to suicide and accidental death,
and reducing the stigma associated with behavioral health and
treatment. Important issues raised in the HP/RR/SP Report include: gaps
in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and programs necessary to
mitigate high risk behavior; an erosion of adherence to existing Army
policies and standards; an increase in indicators of high risk behavior
including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts and an
increased operational tempo.
To address gaps in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and
programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior, the Army has taken
actions such as disseminating policy addressing the issues of
polypharmacy, requiring a comprehensive medical review of any soldier
who is receiving four or more medications when one or more of those is
a psychotropic or antidepressant.
To address the erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and
standards, the Army has issued commanders a compendium of Army policies
emphasizing the Army's current policies and systems for surveillance,
detection and intervention of high risk behavior. This has already
increased our compliance and utilization rates across numerous proven
policies and processes.
To address the increase in indicators of high risk behavior
including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts, the Army
has taken actions such as instituting a new online system giving
Medical Review Officers improved access to drug and alcohol information
systems resulting in enhanced identification of prescription/illicit
drug use.
To address stressors associated with an increased operational
tempo, the Army has increased the number of Military Family Life
Consultants. These consultants work with soldiers and their families to
provide them support during transitions and separations. They are
available to support soldiers both prior to deployment/mobilization and
during reintegration upon return from deployment.
Question. What is your assessment of the status of the Army's
Resiliency program in ensuring the readiness and well being of the
Total Force?
Answer. The Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program is a
ground breaking way of addressing stress on the force. We have migrated
from treating stress and stress-related outcomes to developing
resiliency in our young soldiers to get ahead of the effects of this
hazardous occupation. We are shifting our focus from intervention to
prevention, from illness to wellness.
It is my view the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is a critical
component to the Army's holistic approach to the wellness of the Force.
As part of our program we have fielded Master Resiliency Trainers into
our training base to start early in developing resiliency among our
recruits and trainees. We are gradually expanding this fielding to
incorporate all units, particularly timed to our deploying forces
during pre and post-deployment phases.
Question. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is currently
performing a 5-year study on suicides in the Army.
Has the Army received any interim reports from this study that may
influence Army suicide prevention programs?
Answer. The Army has received several interim reports from the NIMH
and is evaluating the findings. The Army continues to work with our
national partners in academia to develop groundbreaking programs and
initiatives, in particular the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience
in Servicemembers being conducted by the NIMH.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose
that the Army take in the meantime to enhance its suicide prevention
program?
Answer. If confirmed, I will sustain the extensive leader focus on
this issue and its challenges. This is an enduring problem that
requires enduring solutions.
SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS
Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi
Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Army for
support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation
for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required,
and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007 revealed,
the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded
soldiers.
In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior
care since 2001?
Answer. The quality of military medical care is in my opinion
cutting edge and unequaled. In my opinion, at the outset of Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army's infrastructure was
lacking in the area of housing and managing outpatient care for
returning wounded, ill, and injured soldiers received. Additionally, we
identified shortcomings in Traumatic Brain Injury, Post Traumatic
Stress, Behavioral Health, and Pain Management. Since 2001, we have
invested significant research, resources and developed formal programs
to improve warrior care.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's response?
Answer. With the support of Congress, the Army has addressed the
issues of housing wounded and injured soldiers, developed well
resourced Wounded Warrior Transition Units (WTU) and effectively
centralized our Army programs under the Warrior Transition Command.
Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded
personnel who have separated from active service?
Answer. In 2004, the Army created the Wounded Warrior Care program
to provide follow on assistance to wounded personnel who separated from
service. Under the program, the Army maintains contact with soldiers to
provide a continuum of care and support.
Question. How effective, in your view, are those programs?
Answer. With more than 170 Advocates stationed around the country
in Department of Veterans Affairs medical facilities, at Warrior
Transition Units, and everywhere severely injured Army Veterans reside,
the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program is where it needs to be to
support those who have bravely served this great nation. As part of the
Warrior Transition Command, AW2 is now positioned to ease the
transition from soldier to veteran as part of a continuum of care and
support that stretches from the battlefield to where they reside today.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for
wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty
or to civilian life?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously assess the efficiency and
appropriateness of the Army's support for wounded personnel. I would
implement strategies and seek resources as needed to ensure that the
Army meets the needs of wounded soldiers.
Question. Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to
the need to reform the Army's disability evaluation system.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's disability
evaluation system?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the disability
evaluation system to reveal any areas that need to be improved or that
could be streamlined. I would also work with Army, DOD and VA
stakeholders to decrease the length of time to complete these
evaluations and facilitate the transition to civilian life for those
determined to be not fit for duty.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
address any need for changes in this system?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with experts in this area and
with the stakeholders in the Army, DOD and VA to identify elements of
the current system that should be changed and develop a strategy for
accomplishing those changes.
ARMY WARRIOR CARE AND TRANSITION PROGRAM
Question. The Pittburgh Tribune-Review recently published a series
of articles that alleged that the Army's 38 Warrior Transition Units
had become ``a dumping ground for criminals, malingerers, and dope
addicts'' creating an imbalance of soldiers who need complex medical
case management and soldiers that commanders do not want to take on
combat deployment.
Does the Army have adequate guidelines to ensure that only those
soldiers with qualifying medical needs are assigned to Warrior
Transition Units?
Answer. I am concerned that Warrior Transition units maintain the
focus on complex medical care management and support those soldiers
with a genuine need. If confirmed, I will continuously assess
guidelines to ensure that only soldiers with qualifying needs are
assigned to the WTUs.
Question. In your view, are the Warrior Training Units serving the
purpose for which they were created?
Answer. Over the past 4 years, the Warrior Care and Transition
Program has significantly improved the quality of care and support
soldiers and families have received.
Question. If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the
criteria for assignment to a Warrior Training Unit?
Answer. While I do not have plans to change the criteria for
assignment to Warrior Training Units at this time, this is an issue I
will thoroughly assess if confirmed. Also, I will continually assess
the effectiveness of the Warrior Care and Transition Program to ensure
it provides the level of care and support our wounded warriors deserve.
Question. Staffing of Warrior Transition Units has been a major
issue, especially at installations experiencing surges of redeploying
troops.
In your view, are the Warrior Transition Units staffed with
sufficient numbers of qualified personnel?
Answer. I am not fully aware of the existing staffing levels in the
Warrior Transition units. I will, if confirmed, learn more about this
area and to ensure appropriate resourcing of Warrior Transition Units
to support the soldiers under their care.
implementation of the repeal of ``don't ask don't tell'' policy
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's readiness and
capability to implement the repeal of the ``Don't Ask Don't Tell''
(DADT) policy?
Answer. The Army is on track with its implementation plan in
accordance with DOD guidance and timelines, and I believe the Army is
fully capable of executing the implementation. Our plan includes
periodic assessments to review and consider feedback from the field
throughout the implementation.
Question. What in your view are the major challenges, if any, that
could confront the Army in implementing the repeal of DADT? If
confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose taking to deal with
these challenges?
Answer. The most important challenge is that we educate our
soldiers who are in combat situations with a minimum of disruption and
risk. We are making every effort to train units prior to deploying. We
will also provide the training to currently deployed units and we will
follow up with these deployed units to ensure that all soldiers receive
the required training upon their return from deployment.
Question. What measures is the Army taking to focus training on
combat units and other deployed units and ensure that repeal of the
current policy does not adversely affect combat operations?
Answer. The Army is using a Chain Teach methodology, where each
commander is responsible for educating his/her subordinates and they in
turn train their Solders. Commanders and leaders will carefully manage
deployed units' training to minimize impact on the mission. The Army is
making every effort to train units prior to deployment.
Question. If confirmed, what conditions or circumstances would you
expect to be achieved, if any, before recommending that the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs certify that DADT can be repealed without adversely
affecting the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I would base my recommendation on the input I
receive from commanders and leaders consistent with the requirements
established by Congress and Department of Defense leadership. I would
also seek to ensure that the Army completes training according to Army
guidance.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Question. Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers in
Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several
years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were
victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by
unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the
Army failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services,
including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges
and, ultimately, appropriate disciplinary action.
What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army
has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults
the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
Answer. I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault
anywhere in our Army but especially in deployed locations. We cannot
tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. While the deployed theatres
pose special challenges, the Army is committed to providing victims in
deployed units with appropriate medical care, resources and support.
The Army has taken a number of significant steps to improve the
assistance to victims of sexual assault, including enhanced recognition
of the special circumstances posed by deployed soldiers. The Army's
Sexual Harassment Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program
includes medical, advocacy, chaplain, investigative and legal services.
This program requires every brigade sized unit to appoint and train a
deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every battalion to
appoint and train unit victim advocates.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as
home stations?
Answer. In 2008, the Army implemented its I. A.M. (Intervene, Act,
Motivate) Strong Sexual Assault Prevention Campaign. The campaign
includes strategic, operational and tactical level execution of the I.
A.M. Strong Campaign, with heavy emphasis on soldiers' commitment to
intervene and protect their fellow soldiers from the risk of sexual
assault and from the risk of sexual harassment. The campaign places
additional emphasis on establishing a command climate that deters
sexual harassment and assault.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. While increasing emphasis to prevent sexual assaults before
they occur, the Army continues to emphasize victim services and
response capabilities, to include enhancements to investigation and
prosecution resources.
The SHARP Program is a great start to managing strategies, policies
and resources necessary to adequately prevent and respond to incidents
of sexual assault. This is a challenging problem that will require
leadership and constant vigilance at all levels.
Question. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault
policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
to be effective?
Prior to implementation of the I. A.M. Strong Prevention Campaign,
the focus of the Army program was primarily on victim response. Part of
that response focus was the implementation of confidential reporting,
or restricted reporting, which is an effective way to allow a victim to
come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be
associated with a criminal investigation. If confirmed, I will continue
to look closely at the Army's sexual assault program.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?
Answer. Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be
challenging; however, I am not aware of any specific problems with the
current reporting procedure. Confidential reporting, or restricted
reporting, allows a victim to come forward and have their personal
needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal
investigation.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior
military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in
overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating
to sexual assault?
Answer. Perhaps the most important role of any Senior Army Leader
is to ensure there is an adequate assessment of an organizational
climate, where such behavior is not tolerated and where victims feel
free to report incidents without fear of reprisal.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
senior management level direction and oversight of Departmental efforts
on sexual assault prevention and response?
Answer. If confirmed, I will have an active role in the oversight
and implementation of the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and
Prevention (SHARP) Program. I will work with the Secretary and the Army
leadership to ensure the Army's SHARP program continues to receive the
appropriate level of supervision, guidance, and support needed to
drastically reduce incidents of this unacceptable crime.
MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, and their eligible family
members.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Army MWR
programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to
achieve?
Answer. The Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain
Families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include
many family and MWR programs and services. In October 2007, the Army
leadership unveiled the Army Family Covenant, which institutionalized
the Army's promise to provide soldiers and their families with a
quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation.
The Soldier Family Action Plan provided the original roadmap to
implement the Army Family Covenant, and includes such important
programs as Soldier Family Assistance Centers, Survivor Outreach
Services, improved services to the geographically dispersed,
Exceptional Family Member respite care, Army OneSource, Child, Youth
and School Services, Child Development Center and Youth Center
construction, and more.
A challenge will be to sustain a consistent level of funding for
these programs. If confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers
and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their
needs.
DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS
Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes. The U.S. military has always adhered to one simple,
enduring principle regarding detainees: they are to be treated
humanely, no matter what the circumstances of their capture, and no
matter how the conflict is characterized.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. Both of these documents provide effective, practical
guidance and direction to the field on critically important issues
relative to detainee treatment, detainee operations training, and the
interrogation of detainees.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military
operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. The requirements of Common Article 3 are nothing new
to the U.S. military. The protections outlined in this article have
been a part of U.S. policy on the law of war and the treatment of
detainees for some time.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field
Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and
international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. First and foremost, I would set the right tone for the
force by taking every opportunity to talk about the importance of
ethical conduct on the battlefield. I would stress that the Army earns
the trust and respect of the American people by our actions, especially
our actions in combat. I would tell them that by adhering to the laws
of war, treating detainees humanely, and showing compassion and
restraint, we prove to America and to the world that we are what we say
we are: a disciplined, professional fighting force.
Second, I would sustain and improve our existing systems for
helping our soldiers understand and adhere to the proper standards for
detainee treatment, detention operations, interrogations, et cetera.
Finally, the Army is committed to adherence to the Law of War and
the humane treatment of detainees. When allegations of wrongdoing by
soldiers surface, the Army must continue to fully investigate. If
misconduct is substantiated, there are procedures in place to hold
soldiers accountable.
Question. In the past 2 years, significant changes have been made
in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a
counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of
reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.
What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the
changes to detention operations in Iraq?
Answer. The two primary lessons learned from detention operations
in Iraq were the need for centralized command and control and the
requirement to nest with the host nation's correctional system and rule
of law.
Centralized command and control of detainee operations is necessary
to ensure uniform implementation of policy.
The other lesson we learned from Iraq was that detainee operations
cannot stand alone; it must nest with the host nation's correctional
system and rule of law. Integration of detainee operations with host
nation police, judiciary and penal systems is essential to a smooth
transition to host nation control.
Question. What is your understanding of how these lessons are being
applied in Afghanistan?
Answer. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435 in
Afghanistan incorporated the above lessons learned. The CJIATF
incorporates detainee operations, corrections, and rule-of-law concepts
that provide assistance to the GIROA to assume full detention and
correction responsibilities. The CJIATF works closely with the
Department of State and the host nation.
Question. What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned
into Department of Defense doctrine, procedures and training for
personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. As the DOD Executive Agent for detainee operations, the
Army is working closely with DOD and the Services to incorporate these
lessons learned into DOD-wide doctrine, procedures and training. The
Army continues to compile and assess lessons learned to inform and
update policy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the
Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
FUTURE ARMY AIRLIFT
1. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, as the head of the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), you were responsible for
studying the challenges to rapid deployment of ground forces to distant
theaters from the Continental United States, and determining methods
for increasing our responsiveness. Afghanistan is a case in point--a
distant, landlocked theater that, like most of the Third World, has few
airfields large enough to handle our long-range transport aircraft.
Moreover, the few large airfields that do exist tend to have very
limited space on the ground to park aircraft for unloading or staging
personnel and equipment. This means that even when we can get to a
region by air, the throughput is very limited. Moving even a single
brigade in this fashion can take weeks or even months.
In the ongoing Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) process for a
replacement of the C-130, the Army's concern is that the large fleet of
C-17s, C-5s, and C-130s has limited utility in the Third World, where
airfields are scarce and restricted. In the AOA, the Army favors a
replacement for the C-130 that has a vertical takeoff and landing
(VTOL) capability much like that of the V-22. U.S. Transportation
Command is also very interested in high-capacity alternatives to
complement traditional fixed-wing lift assets. What are your views on
the need for a C-130-sized VTOL capability to support the Army?
General Dempsey. The Army has been actively collaborating with the
U.S. Air Force for over 3 years to validate the Joint Future Theater
Lift (JFTL) requirements and move to a Milestone A decision for a
theater airlift capability with more payload and greatly improved
access than a C-130. Our lessons learned from past and recent
deployment experiences and studies support the need for a heavy-lift
VTOL aircraft. This airframe will require the ability to operate in
austere environments on unimproved landing areas within close proximity
to objective areas and supported units. It will also require the
ability to bypass known, prepared airfields, which an adversary can
easily interdict or deny.
2. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, do you think this would be an
important capability for the Army and worth the significant investment
it would require from the Air Force to develop and produce?
General Dempsey. The Army has in-depth studies substantiating the
capability. The promise of the technology represented by the JFTL could
address the need for an intra-theater VTOL airlifter for the entire
Joint Force. The Army will continue to collaborate directly with the
U.S. Air Force to complete the ongoing JFTL Joint Technology Study in
order to continue to march toward a Milestone Decision Document and
`Milestone A' decision. The development of the JFTL will be a challenge
because of the technical and engineering requirements, the reality of
rapid deploying expeditionary formations, the costs associated with
developing and fielding a truly transformational lift platform coupled
with today's fiscal realities--not to mention the challenge in
balancing the need for ``lift'' with ``strike'' capability to our
Sister Services.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
ENERGY SOURCES
3. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, energy is vital to the
operational capability of the military. However, our current energy
dependence puts lives at risk and undermines our operational
capability. I know the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services
understand how vulnerable our reliance on oil, especially oil from
foreign countries, has made us as a nation and are taking many steps to
alleviate dependency. Nevertheless, the bottom line today is the
military needs access to fossil fuels for energy needs. I prefer those
sources to be domestic instead of overseas to ensure access and
strengthen our national security. Please describe your view of how
reliance on oil for fuel impacts Army operations and personnel.
General Dempsey. The Army's reliance on oil, from domestic and
foreign sources, for essentially all operational energy needs impacts
our operations and personnel by placing the Army at risk of not meeting
fuel requirements when supply chain disruptions occur. The logistical
burden of fuel and water convoy operations needed to supply contingency
bases has lead to significant loss of personnel and equipment. To the
extent we can use energy more efficiently or, in some cases, use
alternative energy sources, we can reduce the number of shipments and
lessen the risk to our soldiers.
4. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, what is your understanding of
steps that have been taken to alleviate consumption of oil for current
operations and what impact have those efforts had?
General Dempsey. The Army is pursuing a comprehensive energy
strategy that will reduce consumption across our installations and
operational forces. We are developing and deploying advanced
technologies and solutions to reduce fossil fuel demand and to increase
energy efficiency across platforms, theater base camps, and
installations. The Army is also adopting alternative and renewable
energy systems, where life cycle cost effective, to expand operational
alternatives and help reduce fossil fuel consumption. We're taking
action to quantify and analyze the impacts of these initiatives. In the
last year especially, the Army has taken definitive steps to more
clearly articulate its energy security requirements and accelerate the
development, integration, and deployment of capabilities to the field.
If confirmed, I will continue to focus on this important area.
5. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, in your view, what remains to
be done?
General Dempsey. I recognize that much more needs to be done. While
the Army is already making positive strides, it must continue to pursue
and field solutions in the areas of smart micro-grids, renewable energy
technologies, and energy-efficient structures. As TRADOC Commander, I
was a member of the Senior Energy and Sustainability Council. So I know
that the Army's senior leaders are working these issues hard. Part of
this effort is for Army leaders, at all levels, to understand the
importance of operational energy considerations in mission success.
6. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, how does the price of oil
impact the Army's budget during these times of constrained resources?
General Dempsey. Oil price increases have a definite impact on the
Army budget in the year of execution. Since 2007, the Army has spent an
average of more than $3 billion per year on fuel and energy, with more
than half supporting liquid fuels for operations and the remainder
representing power and energy at our installations. Higher oil prices
mean higher energy costs and a significant reallocation of financial
resources, which could impact the Army's ability to support important
mission priorities.
7. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, if confirmed, what steps will
you take to alleviate dependency on foreign sources of energy, and
ultimately decrease reliance on oil for fuel?
General Dempsey. The Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy
establishes principles that directly address this objective. If
confirmed, I will continue to support and advocate for the Army's
campaign to reduce consumption, expand energy alternatives, and improve
management capabilities. We must curtail our reliance on oil and other
imported sources of energy, in order to reduce our vulnerability
associated with disruptions of supply or price fluctuations.
IRREGULAR WARFARE
8. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, Army units from Alaska have
made a significant contribution to operations overseas. Last week, I
visited the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT) at the National
Training Center (NTC) in California during their predeployment training
exercise. In May, they will deploy to Afghanistan. Due to the
operational tempo, their training is focused on capabilities required
for the mission in Afghanistan. It is my understanding in fiscal year
2012 the Army will be able to begin full spectrum operations (FSO)
training as dwell time increases. However, as Secretary Gates
highlighted in a speech at West Point last week, it is imperative the
capabilities required for these types of missions are
institutionalized. Yet the force must also be trained for the many
different types of threats we will face in the future. If confirmed,
what action will you take to institutionalize irregular warfare?
General Dempsey. We recently published Change 1 to our capstone
operations manual, FM 3-0. This manual explicitly states that the
Army's operational concept is FSOs. FSOs is a combination of offensive,
defensive, and stability or civil support operations undertaken
simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create
opportunities to achieve decisive results. FM 3-0 goes on to state that
these operations are conducted amid populations, and that shaping the
conditions with the civilian population is just as important to
campaign success as are offensive and defensive combat operations.
We are currently institutionalizing Irregular Warfare by
highlighting it in our capstone doctrine, by inculcating it throughout
our professional military education system, and by reshaping our
training strategies to include stability and civil support operations
in addition to standard offensive and defensive operations.
At our Combat Training Centers (CTCs), the scenarios are developed
to enable commanders to train their units on FSO mission essential
tasks. These tasks include offensive operations, defensive operations,
and stability and civil-support operations. During a typical FSO
rotation at a CTC, the training unit will conduct both Combined Arms
Maneuver against regular forces, and Wide Area Security against
irregular forces and criminal elements. The degree of focus on offense,
defense, and stability operations will vary based on unit training
objectives and potential missions for the training unit. This wide
array of tasks in a very complex operational environment will ensure
our forces possess the agility to succeed in FSOs, including irregular
warfare.
9. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, how do you propose to sustain
the capability currently at the NTC like role players and
infrastructure that has been built up in recent years for irregular
warfare?
General Dempsey. The CTC Program, based on the TRADOC G-2's
Operating Environment Master Plan and the Army Training Strategy, has
identified enduring training enablers (including role players and
infrastructure) that are required for training FSOs against hybrid
threats. These enduring enablers will be prioritized based on the
operational force needs, programmed in the Army's Program Objective
Memorandum, and sustained in a resource-informed manner. For example,
we currently use around 800 role players at each CTC per rotation
through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to support
Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation New Dawn counterinsurgency-focused
mission rehearsal exercises. However, our initial estimate is that we
will need 466 role players for FSOs training at the Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC) and Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC)
and 296 role players at the NTC to conduct full-spectrum operations
training against hybrid threats. We will also continue to maintain the
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) villages at the CTCs,
though we'll only man them to the minimal degree required.
ALASKA LAND MOBILE RADIO
10. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, the Alaska Land Mobile Radio
(ALMR) system provides interoperable communications for Federal, State,
and local government agencies consistent with national interoperability
objectives set by the Department of Homeland Security. ALMR is
maintained cooperatively through a cost share with all partners. ALMR
is used for operational needs of the Army like installation security,
radio communication for convoys, synchronization of personnel during
deployments and redeployments, transportation management, training
support, and communication with other agencies. I understand the Army
will be divesting 41 roadway sites in Alaska over a 2-year period
beginning this summer. I appreciate the Army's proposal to transfer the
sites to the State of Alaska at no cost. If confirmed, will you fully
examine the impact of the divestiture on all partners to ensure the
system will remain viable until it is replaced or upgraded?
General Dempsey. We will absolutely continue to examine the impact
of our divestiture, as I think we have done to this point, and will do
our best to ensure that ALMR remains viable within the limitations we
have. The Army no longer has a sufficient ``business case'' for
continuing to maintain those sites that do not directly support day-to-
day Army requirements. However, we remain fully committed to being good
partners in this arrangement. To that end, we have offered to transfer
the assets at our 41 sites, approximately $18 million in capital
investment, to the State of Alaska at no cost. This will allow the
State to continue to benefit from the Army's capital investment into
ALMR that directly supports public safety and other State agency
missions. We will also maintain our remaining sites in accordance with
the ALMR Cooperative Agreement and will continue to share the use of
Federal frequencies with the State, which is a key enabler of this
system.
11.Senator Begich. General Dempsey, if confirmed, will you work
with the other partners to ensure the divestiture timeline allows for
all partners to make the necessary preparations to assume
responsibility for the sites if they choose to do so?
General Dempsey. We have worked closely with ALMR partners and will
continue to do so as we go through the divestiture process. While the
ALMR Cooperative Agreement requires a 12 month notification for
termination, in this case we provided a 16 month notification through
Alaskan Command (ALCOM), our DOD Representative to the ALMR Consortium.
We also developed a 2-year phased transfer plan with only one-third of
the sites being transferred in the first year in order to provide
maximum fiscal planning opportunity. Additionally, Brigadier General
Scott, U.S. Army Pacific G-6, personally traveled to Alaska in March to
meet with Commissioner Becky Hultberg and her staff to see if there was
a way to further assist. At that meeting, the Army proposed additional
accommodations by delaying start date of the planned divestiture (first
13 sites) until January 2012, with the Army maintaining the sites in a
reduced maintenance (or break-fix) posture for an additional 6 months
before transferring equipment. This allows ALMR partners a total of 22
months of preparation time from our original notification. We are
absolutely interested in being good partners and will continue to do
all we can to enable this transition within our limitations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
ARMY TRANSFORMATION
12. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) reinforced the focus on stability operations as an
integral and co-equal element of FSOs. As such, the role of Civil
Affairs (CA) forces as subject-matter experts for key stability tasks
was elevated in two directives included in the Rebalancing the Force
section of the QDR as enhancements to the capabilities of the U.S.
Armed Forces. The first of these--``expand CA capacity''--provides
resources and potential, creates opportunity, and presents challenges.
The second one--``increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and
counterterrorism competency in general purpose forces''--is an
important implied task for CA that presents its own opportunities and
challenges.
As the Commander, TRADOC, part of your mission was to: . . .
design, develop, and integrate capabilities, concepts, and doctrine in
order to build an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable,
adaptable, and networked organizations operating on a rotational cycle
for FSOs. During your tenure there, part of TRADOC's web-based
initiatives included the development or maintenance of a Capabilities
Needs Assessment website, which documented CA capability requirements
but never resolved the gaps in CA capabilities.
How do you reconcile the status of these efforts to close the CA
gaps and shortfalls while you were Commanding General, TRADOC, with the
elevated status of stability operations, and by extension the
importance of CA, within the 2010 QDR?
General Dempsey. CA forces are an important part of Stability
Operations. We identified through our Capability Needs Assessment
process that the Army lacked sufficient resources, specifically CA
capabilities, for Building Partner Capacity. Our analysis identified
capability gaps. Our follow-on processes addressed those gaps, and we
implemented solutions like resourcing the 162nd Infantry Training
Brigade to prepare General Purpose Forces (GPF) for conducting
Stability Operations. We have been expanding CA forces to provide the
increased level of support required by both ongoing operations and
anticipated future requirements in both the Reserves and the Active
Force. In 2007 we had 29 CA Battalions with just 9 percent of the force
in the Active component. By 2013 we will have 43 CA Battalions with 32
percent of the force in the Active component. The continued growth and
transformation of CA forces is a work in progress.
13. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, in these tight financial
times where we actively seek efficiencies wherever we can find them, is
creating additional CA force structure (military construction dollars,
training dollars, etc.) the best use of taxpayer funds?
General Dempsey. The Army regularly assesses its ability to meet
the demands of the combatant commanders. We identified the need for
additional CA capability in ongoing operations and see the need for
these capabilities continuing beyond those operations. CA specialists
bring unique capabilities to the force, not only in our current
operations, but also in our engagements and activities to build partner
capacity. Our growth and transformation of Civil Affairs forces is a
work in progress that we will continually assess as part of the Army's
ongoing force modernization and development processes.
14. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, is creating additional CA
capacity (soldiers/units) the proper way to solve a capability
shortfall?
General Dempsey. CA forces provide a unique capability to the whole
force, enabling us to better meet the needs of our National Security
Strategy. When deciding how to solve a capability shortfall, the Army
conducts a formal Capability Based Assessment (CBA) process resulting
in a recommendation of how to meet the need. In this instance the
recommended solutions broadly included creating additional CA units as
well as resourcing the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade to prepare GPFs
to conduct Stability Operations. We continuously assess how to maximize
our capabilities and reduce shortfalls as part of our strategic reviews
and the Total Army Analysis.
15. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, would embedding CA within
the Army BCT help resolve some or all of these capabilities gaps while
simultaneously conserving precious resources during an era of
increasingly constrained budgets?
General Dempsey. As we look beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, we see the
need to maintain flexibility to task organize our CA forces, which we
anticipate may include the ability to operate outside a BCT, in
conjunction with other Special Operations Forces (SOF).
SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES
16. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, section 167, title 10,
U.S.C., defines 10 activities as special operations (SO) activities
insofar as each relates to SO. While there is a catchall proviso listed
as well, designating ``such other activities as may be specified by the
President or the Secretary of Defense'' as SO activities, given the
2006 realignment of all Reserve CA and psychological operations/
military information-support operations (PO/MISO) forces from the U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), where they supported both the GPF
and SOF, to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), where they now
primarily support the GPF. Should CA and PO have remained on this list
of SO activities?
General Dempsey. Active component CA and Military Information
Support Operations (MISO) should remain on the list of Special
Operations Activities. However, Reserve component (RC) CA and MISO
should be removed for two reasons. First, because RC CA and MISO
support the GPF, they should be aligned with them to better facilitate
their operational employment. Second, the complexities of managing a
force the size and composition of the RC CA and MISO force are best
handled by the USARC.
Consistent with section 167, title 10, U.S.C., SOCOM is designated
the joint CA Proponent. Within SOCOM, the Army SOCOM is the proponent
for CA. It has long been acknowledged, in both design and practice,
that CA is not an exclusively special operations discipline. The GPF
has a longstanding history of employing CA that certainly extends to
operations conducted abroad today.
17. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, given this change of
command and control, how do you reconcile the fact that Reserve
component CA and PO/MISO soldiers continue to perform what is
technically defined as a SO activity without commensurate authorities,
training, equipping, or funding every time they deploy in support of
combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa?
General Dempsey. Per section 167, title 10, U.S.C., ``For purposes
of this section, special operations activities include each of the
following insofar as it relates to special operations . . . Civil
Affairs . . . Psychological Operations . . . ''. Based upon this
definition, the CA and MISO missions conducted by the Reserve component
(RC) in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa are not Special
Operations Activities because they are conducted in direct support of
GPFs, not SOFs. The RC CA and MISO soldiers have the appropriate
authorities (i.e. Commanders Emergency Relief Program), training (AC
and RC CA and MISO forces are trained using the same Program of
Instruction and Doctrine, with the exception of language training being
optional for the RC), and Major Force Program 2 (MFP2) funding to
support their combat operations and other operational employment.
18. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, what can be done to clarify
this statutory discrepancy?
General Dempsey. If deemed necessary, a decision to clarify any
perceived discrepancy would have to be in the form of a recommendation
from the Secretary of Defense to Congress to address section 167, title
10, U.S.C.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
M9 PISTOLS
19. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, what is the future of the M9 in
the Army?
General Dempsey. It is undetermined at this time. The Army is
reviewing a current Modular Hand Gun requirement developed by the U.S.
Air Force for applicability to the Army and adoption as an Army
requirement. The review is still in early staffing so it would be
premature to speculate on replacing the M9 at this time. The M9 Pistol
has served the Army well over the past quarter century and has proven
itself in numerous combat operations, including Panama, Desert Storm,
Somalia, as well the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
20. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, does the Army plan to procure
more M9s or to compete for a replacement pistol?
General Dempsey. No, the Army is not currently planning to procure
any more M9s to include sustainment quantities. Current Army policies
allow for 100 percent replacement of parts to include receivers during
reset if necessary to maintain the required quantity of pistols in the
Army inventory. The M9 Pistol has served the Army well over the past
quarter century and has proven itself in numerous combat operations,
including Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, as well the current wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Army does not have a current plan to
compete for a replacement pistol, the Army is reviewing a current
Modular Hand Gun Capabilities Production Document developed by the U.S.
Air Force for applicability to the Army and adoption as an Army
requirement. The review is still in early staffing so it would be
premature to speculate on replacing the M9 at this time.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman
ABRAMS TANK
21. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, in your written answers to
the advance policy questions posed by the committee regarding Army
weapon system programs you stated, ``In my view, the Abrams
modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the
emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of
120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability
improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and
reliability intended to maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and
restore space, weight and power margins to keep the tank relevant
through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the fiscal
year 2012 budget request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an
assessment as the program matures.'' Do you acknowledge that the fiscal
year 2012 budget request ends U.S. production of the tank for the first
time in modern history?
General Dempsey. The Army has continuously built Abrams tanks since
1979. The M1A2SEPv2 production ends in fiscal year 2013, last fielding
in fiscal year 2014. M1A1AIM SA production ends in fiscal year 2011,
last fielding in fiscal year 2014.
22. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, are you willing to work with
this committee to address alternatives that would continue production
of Abrams tanks beyond 2012?
General Dempsey. We share your concerns over the viability of the
industrial base and recognize the challenges associated with starting
and stopping production. Abrams upgrade production will continue
fielding 18 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) equipped with M1A2SEPv2s
and 6 HBCTs equipped with M1A1AIM SA by fiscal year 2014. Because of
this effort, the Abrams tank will remain a critical part of the Army's
combat vehicle force beyond 2014.
23. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, what is the impact on ending
tank production on U.S. industrial capability in our depots, armor
facilities, and private companies across our Nation?
General Dempsey. There will be a production break for the Abrams
tank in fiscal year 2013. This is the result of the Army completing its
objective to field upgraded Abrams tanks to 18 HBCTs. The near-term
plan for Abrams modernization sustains government and contractor System
Engineering capability. It will not provide the production workload at
Anniston Army Depot in Anniston, AL and the Joint Systems Manufacturing
Facility in Lima, OH (formerly known as the Lima Army Tank Plant) that
would adequately sustain these facilities and key suppliers and
subcontractors after fiscal year 2013. We are seeking to minimize the
impact of the break with the approval of the requirement for the next
package of Abrams tank improvements. At a minimum, the Army anticipates
the break to continue for at least 2 years.
24. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, the Army has acknowledged
that the Abrams tank will remain in the inventory for the foreseeable
future. What is the Army doing to upgrade the current fleet including
the Abrams tank in terms of research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) and production?
General Dempsey. The Abrams Program is moving towards a Materiel
Development Decision in third quarter of fiscal year 2011 that will
define the next package of improvements for the Abrams tank. Abrams
near-term modernization will focus on leveraging mature technologies to
increase power generation, power distribution and fuel efficiency.
Long-term modernization will provide capability improvements in
lethality, survivability, mobility and reliability intended to maintain
the Abrams tank combat overmatch and provide the size, weight, power,
and cooling margin to keep the Abrams relevant through 2030 and beyond.
25. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, I understand the Army intends
to begin modernizing the Abrams tank with new capabilities including
those directly tied to lessons learned from Iraq deployments, but the
fiscal year 2012 budget request includes less than $10 million for
Abrams RDT&E. How is $10 million sufficient in fiscal year 2012
sufficient for this task?
General Dempsey. The $9.7 million of RDT&E funds requested in the
fiscal year 2012 President's budget is sufficient for Abrams
modernization because the Army anticipates that the majority of the
$107.5 million in fiscal year 2011 RDT&E funds will carry over to
fiscal year 2012, thereby providing sufficient funding to execute all
anticipated fiscal year 2012 RDT&E efforts.
26. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, will you please provide a
detailed modernization plan for the Abrams tank?
General Dempsey. Abrams tank modernization will be done in two
phases: Near term, we will pursue Power Generation and Power
Distribution Modernization to enable integration of the Army Directed
Requirements along with the ability to fire the next generation of
120mm ammunition. This will be done through field modifications and
technical insertions as the vehicles are at the depots. Long term
modernization will provide major capability improvements in lethality,
survivability, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the
Abrams tank combat overmatch and provide the size, weight, power, and
cooling margin to keep the Abrams relevant through 2030 and beyond.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
WEST POINT SPEECH
27. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in a speech at West Point on
February 25, 2010, Secretary Gates stated, ``The Army also must
confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for
the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements--whether in
Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere . . . But in my opinion, any
future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big
American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should
`have his head examined'.'' The United States has sent 100,000 or more
ground troops into these very regions five times over the last 6
decades. Does our Nation need to maintain its ability to carry out
large-scale ground campaigns in order to ensure our national security,
or is the requirement for these types of land operations truly a thing
of the past?
General Dempsey. The Secretary clarified his statement a week later
at the Air Force Academy, stating that it would be wrong to interpret
his statement as ``questioning the need for the Army at all, or at
least one its present size, the value of heavy armor generally, and
even the wisdom of our involvement in Afghanistan.'' We believe that
the intent is for all the Services to think harder about the entire
range of missions and how to achieve the right balance of capabilities
in an era of tight budgets, how to use the assets we have with the
greatest possible flexibility, and how to truly take advantage of being
part of the Joint Force. I agree with all of those goals. Most
importantly we need to look at how we prepare ourselves for an
uncertain future, since the challenges we will face are different than
those we grew up with. We take our profession of arms seriously; at all
levels we are continuously assessing and adapting to changing
environments. Trends in the 21st century security environment continue
to create conditions leading to increased instability. The combination
of population growth, fragile states, demand for natural resources,
rapid diffusion and access to technology, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction increase the likelihood of conflict. The
Army mitigates these conditions through our engagements, exchanges,
exercise programs, security force assistance activities, and by
building partnership capacity. As such, we as professionals are working
to ensure the full complement of Army capabilities are available when
needed. To meet these requirements we need a consistent flow of forces
provided by a balanced and affordable Army comprised of ``tailorable''
and networked organizations, operating on rotational cycles and capable
of providing trained and available forces to conduct full-spectrum
military operations.
28. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, Secretary Gates also
highlighted that the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan must be
``incorporated into the Service's DNA and institutional memory.'' He
went on to say that the Army has always needed ``entrepreneurial
leaders with a broad perspective and a diverse range of skills.'' In a
recent interview, you said that the Army needs to focus on mastering a
few skills that will prepare it for whatever future missions it is
given, rather than becoming a ``jack-of-all-trades'' in a postwar era.
In your view, what lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are most important
for the Army to carry forward?
General Dempsey. Our Army is a learning organization--from the
accumulation of all our experiences in peacetime and at war. Our
Campaign of Learning is evidence of our commitment to learning. Within
the Army, leadership remains the multiplying and unifying element of
combat power. Our lessons learned garnered from 10 years of war for
leader development clearly highlight the need for agile and adaptive
leaders who are critical thinkers, innovative and can recognize and
manage transitions to exploit opportunities for success on the
battlefield. This also drives a requirement for learning systems that
facilitate the education and training of our leaders.
Continuation: As campaigns progressed over the last 10 years, U.S.
Army forces learned the importance of counter-insurgency and other
variations of stability and support operations. Leaders of all
echelons, but especially leaders of squads and platoons, had to become
masters of negotiation, persuasion and influence with local nationals.
They had to bridge cultural barriers with local politicians, foreign
security forces, spiritual leaders and citizens and had to learn ways
to establish trust across these boundaries. They had to adapt their
interpersonal skills to move others to the desired end state with
indirect influence, instead of force or use of direct authority. They
had to be prepared for rapid transitions between civil support missions
to instantaneous response to attacks from insurgents and then back to
peaceful interactions. With greater application of mission command,
company and higher-level leaders had to learn to operate at greater
levels of trust down the chain of command. Awareness of the importance
of the alignment of intent and means across echelons was heightened.
Army systems for leader development were required to adapt
concurrently to meet the operational demands for more competent and
agile leaders of character. This adaptation was deliberately aimed at
developing critical and innovative thinkers prepared to meet the
evolution of the Operational Environment. CTCs underwent significant
adaptations to provide the conditions to train individuals and units in
all aspects of deployed operations. Authentic native noncombatants were
introduced in the mission rehearsal exercises, and opposing forces
(OPFOR) role played the practices of terrorists and insurgents.
Situational training exercises provided exposure to critical tasks and
used increased variability to present soldiers with opportunities to
practice adaptation. Leader development systems and management
practices were updated to steward the effective development of leaders.
Professional military education (PME) was modified to push senior- and
mid-level learning outcomes down to lower ranks. Senior- and mid-level
education addressed the broadened requirements for stability and
support operations and operations with joint, interagency,
intergovernmental and multinational forces. PME also adapted to the
requirements of modularity and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) in
order to man deploying units with qualified leaders. We have learned
that we must anticipate change early, to recognize the ``weak signals''
in order to maintain our learning advantage over our adversaries, and
we have learned that we must have training, education and assignment
systems in place to develop our leaders that are equally as adaptive as
the leaders themselves.
Our experiences have underscored the importance of the role of
leadership at all levels in our Army, the Joint Force, and with our
partners to accomplish our Nation's aims. Within the Army, leadership
remains the multiplying and unifying element of combat power.
Leadership requires influencing others to accomplish the mission while
improving our organizations at all levels of the Army to maintain the
successful edge as the Nation's premier land power force. Leadership
doctrine, founded on the principle of competent leaders of character
supporting and defending the Constitution, subordinate to civilian
authority, set the foundation for Army leaders to adapt to the rapid
onset of operational requirements following 9/11 and the global war on
terrorism. Our leadership requirements model establishes the attributes
and competencies expected of all Army leaders. Leaders are responsible
for upholding Army values and exercising the discipline necessary in
combat as well as garrison to reflect those values to one another, to
our citizenry, and to the world. We have learned to emphasize the
responsibility for all leaders to influence beyond the chain of
command, to operate in a ``whole-of-government'' approach to the
Operational Environment and with our international partners. Increased
attention has also been given to the requirement for resilience in
leaders and leaders helping others deal with the stresses stemming from
complex operations and recurring overseas deployments.
29. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, what specific skills that have
fallen by the wayside over the past decade are in need of further
development?
General Dempsey. To date, the Army has had the opportunity to only
conduct one rotation at a CTC focused on FSOs against a Hybrid Threat,
which is an insufficient number upon which to draw hard conclusions.
However, that rotation indicates several areas within warfighting
functions may need improvement. These warfighting functions include:
Mission Command on the move, massing the effects of Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, fires, and maneuver at a decisive
point, optimizing use of engineering assets for mobility, counter-
mobility, and survivability, and operating away from protected fixed
bases, such as Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts. Our next
FSO rotations at CTCs are in August at the NTC, and in September at the
JRTC. At these training rotations we'll aggressively work to both
validate our initial impressions and gain new insights into skills that
have atrophied over the past decade.
ARMY END STRENGTH
30. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in your advance policy
response to the committee, you stated that it has taken the Army ``10
years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can
reasonably describe as balanced.'' During this time, the Army has
increased its Active-Duty end strength in order to meet current and
future operational requirements. However, as part of his cost-saving
initiatives, Secretary Gates has proposed reductions to the Army's
Active-Duty end strength of 22,000 soldiers by 2014, followed by an
additional 27,000 soldiers beginning in 2015. Over the last 40 years,
the Army has conducted two major post-conflict end strength reductions,
first after the Vietnam War and then again after Operation Desert
Storm. Given that we live in what some senior military leaders,
including the current Chief of Staff of the Army and the current
Secretary of the Army, refer to as an ``era of persistent conflict,''
how risky is it to reduce our Army's end strength so soon?
General Dempsey. Assumptions about future demand for Army forces
are critical to assessing potential implications associated with both
end strength and force structure adjustments. DOD's assumption is that
the drawdown in Iraq will continue, and that it will be completed by 31
December 2011. DOD also assumes that forces in Afghanistan will
moderate to a sustainable level, in accordance with current
administration policy. While we cannot predict with certainty when and
where crises may occur, we do anticipate that in an era of persistent
conflict, Army forces will continue to be required for a variety of
missions. The Army does not anticipate that near-term future demands
will reach a level of commitment seen in recent years, and we are in
the process of conducting deliberate analysis to determine how and when
to implement directed reductions. The Army will continue to ensure
accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness
to meet future demands, and care for the well-being of its soldiers and
their families.
31. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, extended deployments and the
high operational tempo have put a substantial strain on our All-
Volunteer Army, resulting in high rates of post-traumatic stress
disorder, suicide, and alcohol and drug abuse, as well as other health
issues within the force. The Army's increase in Active-Duty end
strength was designed, in part, to mitigate these effects and allow for
longer dwell-time between deployments. If conditions on the ground in
Afghanistan do not allow for the administration's planned drawdown of
U.S. troops by 2014, will the reduction of 22,000 soldiers to the
Army's Active-Duty end strength have a negative impact on the quality
and resiliency of our force?
General Dempsey. The additional 22,000 end strength has been an
integral part of the Army's ability to meet the manning requirements of
deploying units. The planned reduction is based on the assumption that
the demand for Army forces will decline by the end of 2013. If that
assumption proves to be inaccurate, the Army will re-evaluate its
ability to meet the new demand and engage with the Secretary of Defense
to determine the appropriate mitigation strategy to meet the new demand
signal.
As far as quality and resiliency of the force, the Army will
continue its efforts to retain soldiers with the greatest potential to
serve and align them with our leadership development strategy. The
Army's deliberate and responsible drawdown plans will take into
consideration operational demands, individual and unit readiness, and
sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force.
ARMY COMBAT BRIGADES IN EUROPE
32. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, the Pentagon reportedly
intends to decide in the near future how many Army BCTs to keep in
Europe, which could be as many as four or as few as two. Meanwhile,
since 2002, two Germany-based BCTs have essentially been in limbo while
the Pentagon debates their fate. It now appears unlikely that these
units, which had been scheduled to return to the United States by 2013,
will meet that deadline. One of these BCTs has been slated to relocate
to Fort Bliss, TX, a post whose role in our national defense has
increased greatly in recent years. At Fort Bliss, soldiers are afforded
unparalleled training opportunities at its vast ranges, whose
conditions accurately replicate those faced by soldiers in Afghanistan
and Iraq. In addition, military quality of life at Fort Bliss is high,
partly as a result of substantial Federal investment in its expansion.
In your view, is delaying the return of these Army units from Europe
the right course of action, given that our European allies have their
own highly capable militaries?
General Dempsey. The National Security Strategy and the QDR affirm
the importance of investing in the capacity of strong and capable
states. These efforts further U.S. objectives of securing a peaceful
and cooperative international order. The Army's forces represent the
Nation's enduring commitment to the defense of Europe specified in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Article 5, ensure a
credible deterrent against all forms of aggression, and provide a
robust capability to build Allied and partner capacity for coalition
operations such as in Afghanistan. It must also be noted that the
majority of nations contributing troops in support of the International
Security Assistance Force, the NATO's largest and most complex out-of-
area operation, come from NATO members. The relationships needed to
support these types of operations can only be developed through long-
term, sustained relationships achieved with American servicemembers
stationed in Europe.
33. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, why are these Army BCTs still
permanently stationed in Europe, and when will the Army bring them
home?
General Dempsey. The Office of Secretary of Defense is currently
reviewing the disposition of forces in Europe. A decision on the future
posture in Europe is expected soon. Army forces in Europe will have
better facilities for soldiers and families, access to better training
facilities and ranges, and a consolidated footprint that will help U.S.
Army Europe operate more cost effectively and efficiently.
PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION POLICIES
34. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, current Army policy requires
relatively frequent Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves for most
soldiers and their families. At a time when our military is being
pressured to find ways to stretch each and every dollar and improve its
fiscal stewardship, a thoughtful and sensible revision of the Army's
PCS policies could potentially save millions of dollars annually, which
the Army could use to meet other requirements. Requiring PCS moves
every 5 or 6 years--instead of every 2 or 3--would also reduce the
strain on military families. In so doing, you would enable many
military spouses to pursue their own careers without facing frequent
relocations, and you would ease the stress that frequent moves and
school relocations puts on military children. Do you see any potential
for the Army to rethink its current PCS policies to cut unnecessary
expenses and improve the quality of life for military families?
General Dempsey. As a general rule, the Army does not require
soldiers to move simply because they have remained at one location for
a set number of years. Overseas moves are an exception, by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense policy. They have established specific tour
lengths based on environmental conditions in the overseas locations.
Two-thirds of all Army PCS moves result from accessions,
separations, and professional development. The remaining third are used
to distribute soldiers internal to the Army. They are used to maintain
an acceptable match of skills and grades in units to meet operational
requirements. Over the past 10 years the requirements for moves has
accelerated by the need to meet the demands of filling deploying units.
As demand for Army units decreases, we will work to increase the time
on station for soldiers and families while maintaining the critical
match of skills and grades across the Army.
______
[The nomination reference of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 7, 2011.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a
position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C.,
sections 601 and 2033:
To be General
GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 8511
______
[The biographical sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Duke University - MA - English
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts
and Sciences
National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic
Studies
Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
National War College
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Foreign language(s): French
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Date of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 5 Jun 74
1LT....................................... 5 Jun 76
CPT....................................... 8 Aug 78
MAJ....................................... 1 Sep 85
LTC....................................... 1 Apr 91
COL....................................... 1 Sep 95
BG........................................ 1 Aug 01
MG........................................ 1 Sep 04
LTG....................................... 8 Sep 05
GEN....................................... 8 Dec 08
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 75.......................... May 76............ Platoon Leader, B
Troop, 1st
Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
May 76.......................... Sep 77............ Support Platoon
Leader, 1st
Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Sep 77.......................... Jun 78............ S-1 (Personnel),
1st Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jul 78.......................... Jan 79............ Student, Armor
Officer Advanced
Course, U.S. Army
Armor School,
Fort Knox, KY
Apr 79.......................... Jan 80............ Motor Officer, 1st
Squadron, 10th
Cavalry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO
Jan 80.......................... Oct 80............ Commander, A
Troop, 1st
Squadron, 10th
Cavalry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO
Oct 80.......................... Jun 81............ S-3 (Operations),
1st Squadron,
10th Cavalry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO
Jun 81.......................... Jul 82............ Commander,
Headquarters and
Headquarters
Troop, 1st
Squadron, 10th
Cavalry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO
Aug 82.......................... May 84............ Student, Duke
University,
Durham, NC
Jun 84.......................... Jul 87............ Instructor, later
Assistant
Professor,
Department of
English, U.S.
Military Academy,
West Point, NY
Aug 87.......................... Jun 88............ Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Jul 88.......................... Sep 89............ Executive Officer,
4th Battalion,
67th Armor, 3d
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Sep 89.......................... May 91............ S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 3d
Brigade, 3d
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
Jul 91.......................... Jun 93............ Commander, 4th
Battalion, 67th
Armor, 1st
Brigade, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jul 93.......................... Jun 95............ Chief, Armor
Branch, Combat
Arms Division,
Officer Personnel
Management
Directorate, U.S.
Total Army
Personnel
Command,
Alexandria, VA
Aug 95.......................... Jun 96............ Student, National
War College, Fort
Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, DC
Jul 96.......................... Jul 98............ Commander, 3d
Armored Cavalry
Regiment, Fort
Carson, CO
Jul 98.......................... Oct 99............ Assistant Deputy
Director for
Politico-Military
Affairs, Europe
and Africa, J-5,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Oct 99.......................... Aug 01............ Special Assistant
to the Chairman
of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Sep 01.......................... Jun 03............ Program Manager,
Saudi Arabian
National Guard
Modernization
Program, Saudi
Arabia
Jun 03.......................... Oct 04............ Commanding
General, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Oct 04.......................... Jul 05............ Commanding
General, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 05.......................... May 07............ Commander, Multi-
National Security
Transition
Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO
Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Aug 07.......................... Mar 08............ Deputy Commander,
U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Mar 08.......................... Oct 08............ Acting Commander,
U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Dec 08.......................... Present........... Commanding
General, U.S.
Army Training and
Doctrine Command,
Fort Monroe, VA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistant Deputy Director for Jul 98-Oct 99 Colonel
Politico-Military Affairs, Europe
and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC....................
Special Assistant to the Chairman Oct 99-Aug 01 Colonel
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The
Joint Staff, Washington, DC.......
Commander, Multi-National Security Aug 05-May 07 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Aug 07-Mar 08 Lieutenant General
Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
FL................................
Acting Commander, U.S. Central Mar 08-Oct 08 Lieutenant General
Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
FL................................
Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Jan 91-Feb 91 Lieutenant Colonel
Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army, Operations
Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.
Commanding General, 1st Armored Jun 03-Oct 04 Brigadier General/
Division, U.S. Army Europe and Major General
Seventh Army, Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq.....................
Commander, Multi-National Security Aug 05-May 07 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Combat Action Badge
Parachutist Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form
that details the biographical, financial, and other information
of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Martin E. Dempsey,
USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Martin E. Dempsey.
2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
3. Date of nomination:
7 February 2011.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
March 14, 1952; Jersey City, NJ.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Diane Sullivan Dempsey.
7. Names and ages of children:
Christopher, 32.
Megan, 31.
Caitlan, 27.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Member, Association of U.S. Army.
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees:
I, Martin E. Dempsey agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify
upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.
13. Personal views:
I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, when asked before any duly constituted
committee of Congress, to give my personal views, even if those views
differ from the administration in power.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Martin E. Dempsey.
This 1st day of February, 2011.
[The nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 16, 2011.]
NOMINATION OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin,
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, and
Cornyn.
Other Senators present: Senators Feinstein and Boxer.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Travis E. Smith, special assistant.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak,
research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Brian F.
Sebold, Bradley S. Watson, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant
to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant
to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator
Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad
Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman,
assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Jeremy Bratt and Ethan Saxon,
assistants to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant
to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Tyler Stephens, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; William Wright,
assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Taylor
Andreae, assistant to Senator Graham; Dave Hanke, assistant to
Senator Cornyn; and Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
This morning, the committee meets to consider the
nomination of Leon Panetta to be Secretary of Defense. Director
Panetta is no stranger to testifying before Congress over the
course of his long and distinguished career in public service.
We welcome you to the committee today, and we thank you, Mr.
Panetta, for your decades of dedicated service to our Nation
and your willingness to answer the call once again.
We know your wife, Sylvia, is not able to be here with you
today. She has made her own sacrifices over the last 50 years,
supporting your efforts in both the public and private sector.
I know that I speak for the committee when I say that we would
love to thank her in person for the sacrifices that she has
made. Director Panetta, please let your wife know of the
committee's gratitude for her support and her sacrifice.
If confirmed, Director Panetta will replace Secretary
Robert Gates at the helm of the Department of Defense (DOD).
When President Obama asked Secretary Gates, then-President
Bush's Secretary of Defense, to stay on in that position, it
provided welcomed continuity and experience in our defense
leadership. Director Panetta's nomination to be Secretary of
Defense represents change, but brings an impressive level of
continuity as well.
The next Secretary of Defense will face an extraordinarily
complex set of demands on our Armed Forces. Foremost among them
are the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Between these 2
conflicts, we continue to have approximately 150,000 troops
deployed.
The U.S. military is also providing support to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Libya. In
addition, even after the extraordinary raid that killed Osama
bin Laden, terrorist threats against our Homeland continue to
emanate from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere.
The risk of a terrorist organization getting their hands on
and detonating an improvised nuclear device or other weapon of
mass destruction remains one of the gravest possible threats to
the United States. To counter this threat, the Defense
Department is working with the Departments of State, Energy,
Homeland Security, and other U.S. Government agencies to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, fissile
materials, and dangerous technologies.
A number of key national security decisions will have to be
made in the coming weeks and months. Even as the drawdown of
U.S. forces in Iraq is on track, recent signs of instability
may lead Iraq's political leadership to ask for some kind of
continuing U.S. military presence beyond the December 31st
withdrawal deadline agreed to by President Bush and Prime
Minister Maliki in the 2008 security agreement between our
countries.
Another key decision point is looming in Afghanistan
regarding reductions in U.S. forces starting in July. President
Obama said the other day that, ``It is now time for us to
recognize that we have accomplished a big chunk of our mission
and that it is time for Afghans to take more responsibility.''
The President has also said that the reductions starting in
July will be ``significant'' and not just ``a token gesture''.
I support that decision. The more that Afghan leaders
understand that we mean it when we say our commitment is not
open-ended, the more serious they will be in preparing Afghan
security forces to assume security responsibility for all of
Afghanistan.
I support the so-called ``transition strategy'', which
calls for Afghan security forces to take more and more of the
lead in providing for their country's security. The more that
Afghan security forces do that, the better are the chances of
success because the Taliban's biggest nightmare is a large,
effective Afghan Army, an army already respected by the Afghan
people, in control of Afghanistan's security.
Having Afghan security forces in the lead would deprive the
Taliban of their biggest propaganda target, the claim that
foreign troops are occupiers of Afghanistan. There is nothing
inconsistent between transitioning security responsibility to
Afghan security forces and a long-term strategic relationship
with Afghanistan, which is also important to sustaining a
successful outcome.
Another major issue facing the Department is the stress on
our Armed Forces after 10 years of nonstop war. The repeated
deployments of our military over the last decade has resulted
in many of our servicemen and women being away from their
families and homes for two, three, four, or more tours. It is
not only our force which is stressed, so are our military
families.
Our incredible men and women in uniform continue to answer
the call, but we must act to reduce the number of deployments
and to increase the time between deployments.
The next Secretary of Defense will be required to juggle
the competing demands on our forces while Washington struggles
with an extremely challenging fiscal environment. The defense
budget will not, and should not, be exempt from cuts. But this
will require Congress, working with the next Secretary of
Defense, to scrub every program and expenditure in the defense
budget and to make tough choices and tradeoffs between the
requirements of our warfighters today and preparations for the
threats of tomorrow.
The administration in February submitted a defense budget
for fiscal year 2012, which included some efficiency savings.
But in April, President Obama announced he wanted to reduce
security spending by $400 billion over 12 years, starting in
the next fiscal year, presumably including under the umbrella
of security spending the budgets of the Pentagon, Departments
of State and Homeland Security.
Now we have asked the administration what part of the $400
billion reduction do they recommend be Pentagon cuts, and how
many of those for fiscal year 2012? So far, we have received no
answer.
Hopefully, today we will get Mr. Panetta's understanding of
that matter and his opinion on the central fiscal issues. His
service as President Clinton's Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) is invaluable because he
understands the inner workings of the budget process and
because he shaped the decisions that helped achieve the budget
surpluses of the late 1990s.
Fortunately for the Nation, Director Panetta brings a
compelling record of achievement and experiences well suited to
the demands of the position for which he has been nominated.
Leon Panetta has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to work
across party lines. Since entering public service in 1966, he
worked on the staff of the Republican Whip in the U.S. Senate,
and headed the Office of Civil Rights in the Nixon
administration. He later won election to the House of
Representatives as a Democrat, where he served eight terms and
became chairman of the House Budget Committee.
Throughout his time in public service, Leon Panetta has
been guided by a clear moral compass. He has said, ``In
politics, there has to be a line beyond which you don't go--the
line that marks the difference between right and wrong, what
your conscience tells you is right. Too often,'' he said,
``people don't know where the line is. My family, how I was
raised, my education, all reinforced my being able to see that
line.''
Finally, Leon Panetta has been intimately involved in the
most pressing national security issues of our time during his
tenure as President Obama's Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). This includes his having personally
overseen the manhunt for Osama bin Laden and the impressive
operation that brought an end to al Qaeda's murderous leader.
This operation epitomizes the way in which the CIA and the
Defense Department are finally working together to support each
other in the counterterrorism operations. The assault on bin
Laden's hideout is the first significant instance, I believe,
of an operation that could have been conducted under Defense
Department authorities under U.S. Code title 10 but that was
instead executed under the authorities of title 50, with the
Director of the CIA exercising operational control over our
elite military force.
Now let me conclude by expressing, on behalf of this
committee, our gratitude and our deep admiration for the man
whose shoes Director Panetta has been nominated to fill,
Secretary Robert Gates. Secretary Gates' service to the country
has been extraordinary, having worked in the administration of
eight Presidents.
He left the comfort and rewards of private life, following
a long career in Government, to serve his country again in the
critical post of President Bush's Secretary of Defense at a
difficult time in our history. Throughout his tenure across the
Bush and Obama administrations, Secretary Gates' leadership,
judgment, and candor have earned him the trust and respect of
all who have worked with him.
Secretary Gates has combined vision and thoughtfulness with
toughness and clarity and courageous, firm decisionmaking. I
would add that right from the start, Secretary Gates
established a direct and open relationship with Congress, and
this committee in particular, for which I am personally most
grateful.
I believe history will judge Secretary Gates' time as
Secretary of Defense to have been truly exceptional.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me welcome Director Panetta and congratulate him on his
nomination to be the next Secretary of Defense.
I am grateful for his remarkable career of public service
and his willingness to serve in this new and very important
capacity. I am appreciative of your family and the support they
have given to you.
Let me also welcome our colleagues from California today,
who will shortly underscore your extraordinary qualifications
to assume the position of Secretary of Defense.
Your successes as Director of the CIA over the last 2
years, and there have been many, especially finding and
eliminating Osama bin Laden, are a credit to you, and to the
men and women of the Intelligence Community. At the same time,
you and I know the director would be the first to admit that he
has big shoes to fill, if confirmed, in the person of Robert
Gates.
I have seen many Secretaries of Defense in my years, and I
believe that history will long remember Secretary Gates as one
of America's finest, most effective, and most impactful
Secretaries of Defense.
One of the key criteria that we should be looking for in
the next Secretary of Defense is continuity--the continuation
of the wise judgment, policies, and decisionmaking that have
characterized Secretary Gates' leadership of DOD. Thanks to the
good work of Secretary Gates, his team, and our men and women
in uniform, the next Secretary of Defense will take office with
a great deal of positive momentum. But many consequential
challenges remain.
Indeed, over the next several years, our country faces
decisions related to our national security and defense that
will echo for decades to come, decisions that will determine
whether we remain the world's leading global military power,
able to meet our many commitments worldwide, or whether we will
begin abandoning that role.
What will have perhaps the most impact on this outcome is
the President's stated goal of cutting $400 billion in defense
spending by 2023, on top of the $178 billion in efficiencies in
top line reductions that Secretary Gates has already announced.
In recent weeks, Secretary Gates has been sounding the
alarm against misguided and excessive reductions in defense
spending that cut into the muscle of our military capabilities.
I could not agree with him more. Defense spending is not what
is sinking this country into fiscal crisis. If Congress and the
President act on that flawed assumption, they will create a
situation that is truly unaffordable--the decline of U.S.
military power.
I know there will be cuts to defense spending, and some
reductions are no doubt necessary to improve the efficiency of
DOD. But I also remember, and I think you do also, Director
Panetta, when General ``Shy'' Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the
Army, who warned in 1980 after draconian cuts were made,
testified before this committee that we had a ``hollow army''.
That is not an experience that we can or should repeat in
the years to come. We must learn the lessons of history. I
would welcome the nominee's opinion on this vital matter,
including how the President's proposal could be implemented.
Another major decision involves how we achieve our
objectives in the three conflicts in which U.S. forces are now
engaged--Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. In Iraq, the key
question now is whether some presence of U.S. forces will
remain in Iraq beyond the end of this year, pending Iraqi
request and approval, to support Iraq's continuing needs and
our enduring national interests. I believe such a presence is
necessary, as Secretary Gates has argued.
In Afghanistan, the main question is the size and scope of
the drawdown of forces beginning this July. Here, too, I would
agree with Secretary Gates that any drawdown should be modest,
so as to maximize our ability to lock in the hard-won gains of
our troops through the next fighting season.
Finally, in Libya, there are signs that Gaddafi may be
starting to crack, but the odds of a stalemate remain far too
high. I believe U.S. strategy should be to reduce those odds as
much as possible and quickly force Gaddafi to leave power,
rather than hoping we achieve that objective with minimal
effort.
Another significant challenge facing the Defense Department
is acquisition reform for its weapons and services. Secretary
Gates has made some courageous decisions in attempting to get
major weapons procurement programs on track. A similar focus
needs to be brought to how the Defense Department chooses to
buy billions of dollars in services to maintain the highest
degree of readiness.
In addition, especially in this budget environment, it will
be important to continue to eliminate weapons programs that are
over cost, behind schedule, and not providing improvements in
combat power and capabilities. After 10 years of war, we must
continue to eliminate every dollar in wasteful spending that
siphons resources away from our most vital need--enabling our
troops to succeed in combat.
Director Panetta, you are nominated to lead our Armed
Forces amid their 10th year of sustained overseas combat. Not
surprisingly, this has placed a major strain on our forces and
their families. Yet, our military is performing better today
than at any time in our history.
This is thanks to the thousands of brave young Americans in
uniform who are writing a new chapter in the history of our
great country. They have shown themselves to be the equals of
the greatest generations before them.
The calling that all of us must answer in our service is to
be equal and forever faithful to the sacrifice of these amazing
Americans.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe has to leave, and he would
like to make just a very brief 10-second comment.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, thank you, Senator McCain.
I only want to say that because of an unavoidable conflict,
I have to leave. But I was honored to serve for 8 years with
then-Congressman Panetta, and I have always considered him to
be a very close friend.
I look forward to supporting his confirmation and serving
with him in his new capacity.
Thank you for the opportunity to say that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
We have our two wonderful colleagues from California here
to introduce Director Panetta, and we are delighted to have
both of you here and to have you as colleagues. It is a treat
for all of us that you are with us.
Senator Feinstein?
Who, by the way, is also chair, may I say, of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, so she has a lot of very direct
experience now and long before with Director Panetta.
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee.
It is really a distinct pleasure for me to introduce the
Director of the CIA and distinguished Californian, Leon
Panetta, who was nominated by President Obama on April 28 to be
the 23rd Secretary of Defense.
As members of this committee well know, in his 47 years of
public service, Director Panetta has held the positions of
congressman, chairman of the House Budget Committee, Director
of OMB, Chief of Staff to the White House, Co-Director with his
wife of the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public
Policy--which I have had the pleasure of speaking before--
member of the Iraq Study Group, Director of the CIA, and from
1964 to 1966, a second and then a first lieutenant in the U.S.
Army as an intelligence officer.
I would add to that list trusted adviser to the President
and respected member of his national security team. In the
course of 2 years as Director, he has mastered the intelligence
field, led the CIA through a very tumultuous time, restored
badly damaged relationships with Congress and with the Director
of National Intelligence, and carried out President Obama's
personal instruction to him to find Osama bin Laden.
I have no doubt that his past experience and his
capabilities prepare Leon Panetta to meet the major challenges
before DOD. With knowledge of CIA operations and analysis, he
will come to the Pentagon with a thorough understanding of the
situation in Afghanistan, as well as the aggravating factors of
our relationship with Pakistan. Through CIA analysis and
operations, he is also well aware of the other contingencies
around the globe where the U.S. military may be called to
deploy.
Director Panetta is also well positioned to guide the
Department through the constrained budget environment, which
the chairman spoke of, along with the rest of Government. He
possesses the credentials and experience to make cuts where
needed and where prudent. I am confident that he will do so in
a way that keeps the military strong and capable and in a way
that maintains the cohesion of the Department and its Services.
Finally, let me recognize that there are many officials in
the Government with the intellect and management skill to do
this job. Leon brings something more. He has an interesting
leadership style, with a deft personal touch that really
matters to the people in his charge and that greatly benefits
the oversight responsibility that we in Congress have.
Let me give you an example. It was early in his tenure at
the CIA in 2009 when Director Panetta requested an urgent
meeting with the Senate Intelligence Committee to brief us on a
program that he had just learned of and that he had learned had
never before been briefed to Congress. He found that
unacceptable, and we very much appreciated his position.
In the 2 years since, he has never declined to answer a
question or provide us with his candid views. I believe the
vice chairman of the committee, who is a member of this
committee, Senator Chambliss, can testify to this. Leon has
been completely forthright and motivated only by what is best
for the CIA and, more importantly, this Nation.
Let me conclude. A National Public Radio interview last
week with Secretary Gates noted that the healthcare budget of
DOD was bigger than the entire budget of the CIA and that no
other position can fully prepare someone to be Secretary of
Defense.
I have great respect for Secretary Gates and praise him for
his service to this country. Beyond all reasonable
expectations, he has been an outstanding Secretary of Defense.
But I would suggest to you that Leon Panetta, who has served
honorably and successfully in Congress, at OMB, at the White
House, and now the CIA, is prepared and uniquely qualified to
be another outstanding Secretary of Defense in this very
challenging time.
I thank the committee.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein, for
a very strong introduction.
Now, Senator Boxer?
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
I clearly appreciate every word that my colleague Senator
Feinstein said about my friend Leon Panetta. What I am going to
try to do is add a little bit more of a personal side because I
have known this man and worked with him since 1982, when I was
elected to Congress, and he became one of my mentors at that
time.
Eventually, I served on the House Budget Committee where he
was the chairman, and I watched him very carefully reach out
across every kind of line that would divide us--Republican,
Democratic, liberal, conservative, moderate. We were facing at
that time a lot of new, perplexing issues.
One was the AIDS crisis. No one quite knew where this was
headed, what it was about. I remember going to Leon and saying
there is this new disease, and nobody quite understands it, and
we haven't done anything about it. He said, ``You know, why
don't you hold some hearings on it? It seems to really concern
you, and bring in the Republicans,'' and we did.
We were able to get the very first funding in that time for
AIDS research because Leon was willing to listen. This is
someone who is very smart, and he gets it. But he also was
willing to listen to all sides, and I think we have seen that
in every single job that he has fulfilled. This is a man who
has dedicated himself to public service, and we are so grateful
to him.
I won't go through every job he has held. First of all, it
would take too much time. Second of all, Senator Feinstein
highlighted so many of those. But to be someone who could work
as effectively behind the scenes as you can in front of a
camera, to be someone who could be such a trusted adviser that
two Presidents have chosen him.
I could just go on about Leon. I am sure you don't want me
to because you have a lot of work to do. Let me say for the
people of California what he has meant to us.
He has recognized the importance of our resources in our
State, namely our coast and our ocean. He stepped out in front
in the early years and said this is an economic issue for us,
and he preserved that coast. That is forever. That Monterey
sanctuary is forever. He is visionary.
Then when we saw him move into the national security arena,
as he did at the CIA, and the work he did in the latest
achievement that he can talk about, and doesn't really do that
much, in terms of making sure that Osama bin Laden was finally
taken out. This was a brave mission by our military, and Leon
Panetta was a part of the decisionmaking.
I think at this time where we are engaged around the world
in so many difficult conflicts, so many difficult conflicts, he
is bringing now the intelligence perspective to the job.
I would ask unanimous consent that my formal statement be
printed in the record.
I just want to turn to Leon at this time, just as a Senator
from California and a friend, and say thanks so much for
everything you have done throughout your career for this
country. I know your origins. I know how proud your family is,
and I think we all share that pride in you.
Good luck, and I hope the committee confirms you quickly.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Barbara Boxer
Mr. Chairman and colleagues--good morning.
I am so very pleased to be here today to introduce my former
colleague and fellow Californian, Leon Panetta, President Obama's
nominee to be Secretary of Defense.
I can think of no better person to fill this critical post at a
time when our Nation continues to face threats to our national
security.
Mr. Panetta has devoted 4 decades of his life to public service.
During that time, he has earned the trust and confidence of his
colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
The son of Italian immigrants, Mr. Panetta was born and raised in
the city of Monterey, CA.
Shortly after earning his bachelor and law degrees from Santa Clara
University, Mr. Panetta joined the U.S. Army as an intelligence officer
and went on to receive the Army Commendation Medal for his service.
Mr. Panetta came to Washington in 1966 and rose to become the
Director of the U.S. Office for Civil Rights, where he fought for the
desegregation of public schools even as other government officials were
calling for slower enforcement of civil rights laws in the south.
Mr. Panetta does what he thinks is right, and I saw him bring that
same strength and passion to his work as a Member of the House of
Representatives, where I am proud to have served with him.
He was my chairman of the House Budget Committee and together we
worked on the first ever funding to fight AIDS.
Among his many accomplishments, Mr. Panetta authored the Hunger
Prevention Act of 1988, worked to extend Medicare and Medicaid to cover
hospice care for the terminally ill, and was a critical voice in
protecting California coastlines.
As the Director of the Office of Management and Budget during the
Clinton administration, Mr. Panetta learned the intricacies of the
Federal budget process and, most importantly, how to effectively set
and manage a budget.
He also served as President Clinton's Chief of Staff, engaging at
the highest levels on critical national security matters.
For the past 2 years, Mr. Panetta has served as Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, where he has been responsible for
protecting Americans around the world. Most recently, he oversaw the
covert mission that located and killed Osama bin Laden, the founder of
al Qaeda and mastermind behind the horrific attacks of September 11,
2001.
Bin Laden's death was the result of close coordination between our
military and intelligence communities and Mr. Panetta's deep
understanding of our Intelligence Community will be particularly
beneficial in this new role.
I think it is clear that Mr. Panetta has the unique experience
needed to serve our Nation at this critical time and I know he will
continue to work tirelessly to keep America safe.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of
Mr. Panetta.
I hope that he will get a favorable vote from your committee.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Boxer, for a very moving
introduction and tribute.
You are both welcome to stay or leave. I know you both have
committee chairs that you have to fulfill responsibilities.
Senator Boxer. I have a bill on the floor. By the way, we
do have a bill on the floor about the Economic Development Act,
and I want to remind everybody. So I will be going down on the
floor.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. You never miss an opportunity to make your
point effectively. [Laughter.]
Thank you very much.
Let me now call on Mr. Panetta. After your opening
statement, we will ask you the usual questions and then turn to
our questions.
Thank you very much again for your service. Director
Panetta?
STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, NOMINATED TO BE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin, Ranking
Member McCain, all of the distinguished members of the
committee.
I am deeply honored and deeply humbled to be here as the
President's nominee to be Secretary of Defense.
I also want to take this moment to thank my fellow
Californians, Senators Feinstein and Boxer, who are not only
distinguished Senators who have represented their State well,
but are dear friends and dear colleagues.
The role of Secretary of Defense, while, without question,
it involves a very large responsibility in size alone, still in
a very basic way is similar to the role of the CIA Director in
that our first and foremost mission is to protect the country.
If confirmed, my number one job will be to ensure that America
continues to have the best-trained, the best-equipped, and the
strongest military in the world in order to make sure that we
protect our country.
As many of you know, I have devoted my career to public
service. But it began a long time ago when I served as an
intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. I was proud to wear the
uniform of our country, and my respect and my admiration for
our Nation's Armed Forces has only grown in the decades since.
My youngest son, Jim, served in Afghanistan and received
the Bronze Star. I have personally witnessed the tradition of
service and sacrifice that drives each generation to fulfill a
fundamental duty to our country.
In addition to respecting that great tradition of duty, I
have done a number of things to try and prepare for this very
difficult and challenging job. First, in the weeks since my
nomination, I spent a number of hours with Bob Gates. Bob is a
dear friend, and he and I first got to know each other as we
were building our careers in public service.
We also served together on the Iraq Study Group, and we
continue to serve together as members of the President's
national security team. We share a common belief that the
national security of this country is the responsibility of all
Americans, regardless of party.
I, too, believe that he will be remembered as one of the
greatest Secretaries of Defense in our Nation's history for the
way he led the Department during a time of war and for the
crucial reforms that he has tried to put in place in the way
the Pentagon does business. Those are reforms that I intend to
carry on.
Second, I talked with our Service Secretaries and the
Service Chiefs. I believe it is important to have a candid,
open line of communication between the Secretary and all of the
Service Chiefs. They are the ones that are out there leading
each of their Services, and I need to know what they are
thinking, and I need to know what is important in terms of
serving the interests of the troops that they directly lead.
One of those chiefs told me for our troops, there has been
no shortage of war. Indeed, we are a Nation at war. Our All-
Volunteer Force has been stretched by combat that has lasted
nearly a decade. We owe it to them, we owe it to their families
to ensure that they have the best leadership, the best
training, the best equipment, the best benefits, and the best
healthcare that we can give them.
I pledge to them and I pledge to you that every deployment
decision that I make will be mindful of the stresses on our men
and women in uniform and on their families.
Third, I have reached out to the former Secretaries of
Defense, both Democrat and Republican, and asked for their
advice. To a person, they impressed upon me how important it
was to stay focused on the management of the Pentagon. This is
the biggest enterprise in our Government, and it requires
focused, hands-on management, which is, frankly, the only way I
know how to do business.
Fourth, I have sat down with many of you and have known
many of you throughout my career. Because I really do believe
that Congress has to be a partner in this role in the
protection of our country, I am a creature of Congress and I
believe that the Pentagon is made stronger by your oversight
and by your guidance.
As a young legislative assistant a long time ago here in
the Senate, I had the honor of seeing firsthand the
bipartisanship of leaders like Dick Russell and Henry Jackson,
John Stennis, and Barry Goldwater. As a Member of Congress, I
saw that tradition carried on by other great leaders.
I believe deeply in the tradition of strong, bipartisan
national security leadership. You, Mr. Chairman, and you,
Senator McCain, have carried on that tradition. I thank you for
that.
This is a time of historic change. Unlike the Cold War,
when we had one main adversary, we face a multitude of
challenges--al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks,
places like Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, not just the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.
Dangerous enemies spread out across the world.
We face insurgents and militants who cross borders to
conduct attacks. We face the proliferation of dangerous weapons
in the hands of terrorists, in the hands of rogue nations. We
face cyber attackers, a whole new arena of warfare that can
take place not only now, but in the future, and something we
have to pay attention to.
We face the challenge of rising and changing powers and
nations in turmoil, particularly in the Middle East, undergoing
enormous political transformation. We are no longer in the Cold
War. This is more like the ``blizzard war'', a blizzard of
challenges that draw speed and intensity from terrorism, from
rapidly developing technologies, and the rising number of
powers on the world stage.
But despite the times we live in, there is reason to be
confident. The operation that killed Osama bin Laden, in my
view, has not only made clear to the world that we will do what
we have to do, but it has also given us the greatest chance
since September 11 to disrupt, dismantle, and to defeat al
Qaeda.
But to do that, to be able to finish the job, we have to
keep our pressure up. If confirmed, my first task at DOD will
be to ensure that we prevail in the conflicts that we are
engaged in. In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the
Taliban. We have to train security forces. We have to help the
government take ownership of their country so that they can
govern and protect their country.
In Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi military and
security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation so that
it can become a stable democracy in a very important region of
the world.
As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly
disciplined in how we spend the taxpayers' precious resources.
This committee well knows that the days of large growth and
unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to
design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending
while protecting those core elements that we absolutely need
for our Nation's defense.
I do not believe, based on my long experience in government
and working with budgets, that we have to choose between strong
fiscal discipline and strong national defense. I don't deny
that there are going to be tough decisions that have to be made
and tough choices that have to be made. But we owe it to our
citizens to provide both strong fiscal discipline and a strong
national defense.
Finally, and most importantly, it is the job of Secretary
of Defense to be a tireless advocate for our troops and for
their families. It is their sacrifice and their dedication that
have earned the respect of a grateful nation and inspired a new
generation to volunteer to wear the uniform of our country.
They put their lives on the line to fight for America, and
I will just as surely fight for them and for the families who
support and sustain them.
As Director of the CIA, I had no more solemn duty than
sending young people into harm's way to put their lives on the
line. After we lost seven of our colleagues in Afghanistan in
December 2009, I had to do what my colleagues in the military
do all too often--visit the wounded at Bethesda, attend the
ramp ceremony at Dover, offer a prayer at the side of an
Arlington Cemetery gravesite for a patriot who left this world
too young.
Not one day will pass when I don't think of the brave souls
who have fought and died and those who fight today for our
freedom. As Secretary Gates emphasized in his last trip to the
troops, they will always be in my thoughts and prayers.
If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that I will
always keep our troops foremost in my mind, that I will be a
careful, accountable steward of our Nation's precious
resources, that we will have the strongest national defense in
the world, and that you will always have my best and most
candid advice, and that I will always, always seek yours.
I am the son of Italian immigrants. My father used to say
to me time and time again that to be free, we have to be
secure. That is the pledge that I make to you, that I will do
everything I can to keep America secure so that it can be free.
I will do that if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Panetta follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Leon E. Panetta
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
the committee.
I am humbled to be here as the President's nominee to be Secretary
of Defense. The role of the Secretary of Defense is similar to the role
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director--first and foremost
to protect the country. If confirmed, my number one job will be to
ensure that America continues to have the best-trained, best-equipped,
and strongest military in the world.
I have devoted my career to public service--and it began when I
served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. I was proud to wear
the uniform of my country--and my respect and admiration for our
Nation's Armed Forces have only grown in the decades since. My youngest
son Jim served in Afghanistan and received the Bronze Star. So I have
personally witnessed the tradition of service and sacrifice that drives
the generations to fulfill a duty to our country.
In addition, I have done a number of things to try and prepare for
this job.
First, in the weeks since my nomination, I have spent a number of
hours with Bob Gates. Bob and I first got to know each other as we were
building our careers in public service. We also served together on the
Iraq Study Group. We share a common belief that national security is
the responsibility of all Americans, regardless of party. I believe he
will be remembered as one of the greatest Secretaries of Defense in our
Nation's history for the way he led the Department during a time of
war, and for the crucial reforms he made in the way the Pentagon does
business--reforms that I intend to carry on.
Second, I talked with the Service Secretaries and the Service
Chiefs--I believe it is important to have candid, open lines of
communication between the Secretary and the Services. One of those
chiefs told me, ``For our troops, there is no shortage of war.''
Indeed, we are a Nation at war. Our All-Volunteer Force has been
stretched by combat that has lasted nearly a decade. We owe it to them
and their families to ensure that they have the best leadership, the
best training, the best equipment, the best benefits and health care
that we can give them. I pledge to them and I pledge to you that every
deployment decision I make will be mindful of the stresses on our men
and women in uniform and their families.
Third, I reached out to every living former Secretary of Defense--
Democrat and Republican--and asked for their advice. To a person, they
impressed upon me how important it was to stay focused on management of
the Pentagon. This is the biggest enterprise in our government, and it
requires focused, hands-on management--which is, frankly, the only way
I know how to do business.
Fourth, I sat down with many of you--because Congress is my partner
in this role and in the protection of the country. I'm a creature of
Congress and I believe that the Pentagon is made stronger by your
oversight. As a young legislative assistant, I had the honor of seeing
firsthand the bipartisanship of leaders like Dick Russell, Henry
Jackson, John Stennis, and Barry Goldwater. I believe deeply in the
tradition of strong bipartisan national security leadership that you
and this committee carry on.
This is a time of historic change. Unlike the Cold War, when we had
one main adversary, today we face a multitude of challenges--al Qaeda
and other global terrorist networks, insurgents and militants who cross
borders, the proliferation of dangerous weapons, cyber attackers,
rising and changing powers, and nations--particularly in the Middle
East--undergoing enormous political transformation.
We are no longer in the Cold War. This is the Blizzard War--a
blizzard of challenges that draws speed and intensity from rapidly
developing technologies and the rising number of powers on the world
stage.
But, despite the times we live in, there is reason to be confident.
The operation that killed Osama bin Laden, in my view, has given us the
greatest chance since September 11 to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda permanently. We must keep up the pressure.
If confirmed, my first tasks at the Department of Defense will be
to ensure that we prevail in the conflicts in which we are now engaged.
In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the Taliban, train the
security forces, and help the government take ownership for the
country's progress and security. In Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi
military and security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation.
As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly disciplined
in how we spend the taxpayer's precious resources. This committee well
knows: the days of unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge
will be to design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative
spending while protecting those core elements we need for our Nation's
defense. I do not believe that we have to choose between strong fiscal
discipline and strong national defense. We owe it to our citizens to
provide both.
Finally, it is the job of the Secretary of Defense to be a tireless
advocate for our troops and their families. It is their sacrifice and
dedication that have earned the respect of a grateful nation . . . and
inspired a new generation to wear the uniform of our country. They put
their lives on the line to fight for America, and I will just as surely
fight for them and for the families who support and sustain them.
As Director of the CIA, I had no more solemn duty than sending
young people into harm's way. After we lost seven of our colleagues in
Afghanistan in December 2009, I had to do what my colleagues in the
military do all too often--visit the wounded at Bethesda, attend the
ramp ceremony at Dover, and offer a prayer at the side of an Arlington
Cemetery grave for a patriot who left this world too young.
Not one day will pass when I won't think of the brave souls who
fight for our freedom.
If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that I'll always keep
our troops foremost in my mind . . . that I will be a careful,
accountable steward of our national resources . . . that we will have
the strongest national defense in the world . . . and that you'll
always have my best and candid advice. To be free, we must be secure.
That is my pledge to you if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Director Panetta, for a
powerful, moving, and a very straightforward statement.
We have standard questions, which we ask of nominees before
we take turns at asking our own questions, and I will put those
questions to you now.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation progress?
Mr. Panetta. No, I have not.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, they will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I think what we will do is we will be here all morning, and
then we will have a break for lunch. Then we are going to go
into a classified session this afternoon.
Let us start with a 7-minute first round here for
questions.
Director Panetta, in answer to prehearing questions, you
said that you support the July 2011 date set by President Obama
for the beginning of a process of transferring increasing
responsibility for Afghanistan's security to the Afghan
security forces and of drawing down U.S. forces from
Afghanistan. President Obama recently said that the size of
U.S. troop reductions from Afghanistan will be significant.
Director Panetta, do you agree that the U.S. troop
reductions from Afghanistan beginning in July should be
significant?
Mr. Panetta. I agree with the President's statement.
Chairman Levin. There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan
soldiers and police today than there were in December 2009. The
NATO training mission in Afghanistan is ahead of schedule in
meeting the target of 305,000 Afghan security forces by this
fall.
In addition, a new target of 352,000 Afghan security forces
by 2012 has been set to ensure that these forces have the
specialized skills needed to sustain these units over the long
term, and I very much support that decision. Do you agree,
Director Panetta, that training and partnering with the Afghan
army and police and getting those forces in the lead on
operations is key to the success of our counterinsurgency
strategy in Afghanistan?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
Chairman Levin. Now, Pakistani leaders deny being aware of
the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. It is
counterintuitive to believe that none of their leaders knew of
it. But nonetheless, that is not my question.
Pakistan's leaders are well aware and acknowledge their
awareness of the sanctuaries in Pakistan by the Haqqani network
and the Afghan Taliban down in Quetta. Now those people are
attacking our troops, Afghan troops, coalition troops across
the border in Afghanistan and then go back to their sanctuary
in Pakistan.
A recent Defense Department report called the extremist
Haqqani network ``the most significant threat in eastern
Afghanistan,'' and yet the Haqqanis continue to enjoy open safe
haven across the border in Pakistan. I think this is a totally
unacceptable situation. I am wondering if you agree, and if so,
what should be done about it?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I share your concern with regards to
the safe haven in Pakistan, particularly as it relates to
groups like the Haqqanis. I have strongly urged those in
Pakistan to take steps to do whatever they can to prevent these
kind of cross-border attacks and to prevent the safe havens
that do exist on the Pakistani side of the border.
This is a difficult challenge. The relationship with
Pakistan is at the same time one of the most critical and yet
one of the most complicated and frustrating relationships that
we have. It is extremely critical in that we are conducting a
war against our primary enemy in the FATA in their country.
It is critical because supply lines, vital supply lines go
through their country. It is critical because they are a
nuclear power, and there is a danger that those nukes could
wind up in the wrong hands.
At the same time, it is very complicated, complicated by
the fact that they maintain relationships with certain
terrorist groups, that they continue to not take aggressive
action with regards to these safe havens, and that their
concern about the sovereignty results in criticism of the
United States when, in fact, my view is that the terrorists in
their country are probably the greatest threat to their
sovereignty.
Having said all of that, we have to maintain the
relationship. We have to do everything we can to try to
strengthen that relationship so that both of us can work to
defend both of our countries.
Chairman Levin. Director Panetta, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, the President has called for $400 billion in
reductions to national security spending over the next 12
years. Now do you have any understanding of the proposed
breakdown of that $400 billion as to how much he is proposing
for reductions in Pentagon spending, how much in intelligence
spending, the intelligence organizations, and how much he is
proposing to reduce in the Homeland Security Department?
Mr. Panetta. No, I do not.
Chairman Levin. Can you try to find that out for us?
Because we need to find that out, and give us an answer for the
record.
Mr. Panetta. I will certainly ask whether or not that
decision has been made.
[The information referred to follows:]
The administration has not made final decisions concerning the
specific details on the $400 billion reduction.
Chairman Levin. Do you know whether we are going to receive
a budget amendment for the fiscal year 2012 DOD budget?
Mr. Panetta. I do not know the answer to that.
Chairman Levin. All right. On the question of torture, you,
in your answers to the committee's prehearing policy questions,
said the following, ``I will ensure that all interrogations
conducted by DOD personnel are conducted consistent with the
Army Field Manual and in accord with the Geneva Conventions.''
My question, is waterboarding consistent with the Army
Field Manual and the Geneva Conventions?
Mr. Panetta. I have taken the same position as the
President of the United States. I believe that waterboarding
crosses the line, the use of that tactic with regards to
interrogations. The President outlawed the use of that, plus
other enhanced interrogation techniques, in an Executive order
that he issued when he first came into the presidency.
Chairman Levin. I need to switch gears here on you a lot
because time requires that we do that. Senator Webb and I
recently went to Okinawa, Guam, and Senator Webb was in Korea
before. Senator McCain obviously has great personal experience
in this area as well. Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I
proposed changes to basing plans on Okinawa and Guam. We urged
a review of the plans in Korea because we believe that the
current plans are unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable.
Then, independently, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) concluded that the cost of these military realignments
are higher than expected and in many cases largely unknown, a
highly critical GAO report of this direction that we are
currently moving. I am wondering whether or not you are
familiar with this issue. If confirmed, in any event, whether
you are familiar with these issues or not in those three
places, will you agree to review this matter and work with us
to find a solution that helps advance our strategic objectives
in the region.
Because we have strategic objectives in the region, but
they are currently unaffordable. They are unknown in terms of
cost. Would you be willing to review this matter and to work
with us?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will, Senator. You discussed this with
me when I met with you, and also Senator Webb discussed his
concerns about that area. I agree with you that it is a very
important strategic area for the United States. We do have to
maintain a presence there.
But there are a lot of issues to be resolved and worked on,
and I look forward to working with you, Senator McCain, Senator
Webb, and others to try to determine what the best and most
cost-effective approach would be.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director Panetta.
What is your assessment of the battlefield situation in
Afghanistan since we inaugurated the surge?
Mr. Panetta. I think the assessment is that we have made
progress with regards to security in that country. Albeit
fragile and reversible, I nevertheless believe that progress
has been made to try to advance security.
We also have made good progress in training the forces
there in Afghanistan, both their police and military force. I
think the area where, frankly, greater progress needs to be
made is on the governance side, to try to ensure that they
improve their governance so that, ultimately, they can take
responsibility for that country.
Senator McCain. When you point out that it is fragile and
reversible, I think that is absolutely accurate. So you would
agree with Secretary Gates' repeated statements that
withdrawals in July should be modest?
Mr. Panetta. I agree that they should be conditions based,
and I am going to leave it up to Secretary Gates, General
Petraeus, and the President to decide what that number should
be.
Senator McCain. If you are the Secretary of Defense when
that decision is made, obviously, you will have significant
influence. You just came from a position where you have a very
good assessment of the military situation. I think it is not
inappropriate for you to answer when I ask if you agree with
Secretary Gates' assessment that the withdrawal should be
modest.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, if I am confirmed, I will have to,
obviously, arrive at a decision myself that I will have to
ultimately present to the President. But I am not in that
position now, and that decision really does rest with General
Petraeus, Secretary Gates, and the President.
Obviously, I have tremendous admiration for Secretary
Gates. He and I pretty much walk hand-in-hand on these issues.
But with regards to specific numbers, I just am not going to--
--
Senator McCain. I wasn't asking for specific numbers. On
the subject of Iraq, if the Iraqi Government and all its
elements agree that there should be a residual U.S. military
presence in Iraq, particularly in three areas--air defenses,
intelligence capability, and security in the areas around
Kirkuk and that part of Iraq where there has been significant
tensions--would you agree that that would be a wise thing for
us to do?
Mr. Panetta. I believe that if Prime Minister Maliki and
the Iraqi Government requests that we maintain a presence
there, that ought to be seriously considered by the President.
Senator McCain. Do you think it would be in our interest to
do that, given the situation?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I have to tell you, there are 1,000
al Qaeda that are still in Iraq. We saw the attack that was
made just the other day. It, too, continues to be a fragile
situation, and I believe that we should take whatever steps are
necessary to make sure that we protect whatever progress we
have made there.
Senator McCain. Do you know of anyone of authority either
in Congress or in the administration who believes that we
should send ground troops into Libya?
Mr. Panetta. I haven't met anybody yet who supports that.
[Laughter.]
Senator McCain. I haven't either. Nor do I. In fact, I
think it would be a great mistake.
Do you believe that it is a proper role of Congress to
restrict the powers of the President of the United States to
act? In other words, you and I were around when there was a
vote for cutoff of funds for Vietnam. Whether that was right or
wrong, that was the appropriate role of Congress.
Does it worry you if Congress begins to tell the Commander
in Chief as to exactly what he can or cannot do, what the
President can or cannot do in any conflict?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I believe very strongly that the
President has the constitutional power as Commander in Chief to
take steps that he believes are necessary to protect this
country and protect our national interests. Obviously, I think
it is important for Presidents to consult, and to have the
advice of Congress. But in the end, I believe he has the
constitutional power to do what he has to do to protect this
country.
Senator McCain. I agree. In 2007, the last time we went
through a very serious crisis, it was concerning whether we
should withdraw from Iraq or not, and I see some parallels as
the rising and understandable war-weariness of the American
people continues to be manifested.
One of the things that we did at that time was set up some
benchmarks that we expected to be met by both the Iraqis and
the United States. As I recall, there was 13 or a number of
those. Over time, most of those benchmarks were met.
Don't you think it would be appropriate for us to do the
same thing as far as Afghanistan is concerned? We can measure
progress by certain metrics, and I think it would be important
in order to gain or keep the confidence of the American people
that we should set up some benchmarks for progress, both in
Afghanistan and as far as Pakistan is concerned, since we are
sending billions of dollars of taxpayers' money to Pakistan as
well.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think we all know what the
fundamental goal here is to try to develop a stable enough
Afghanistan that it will never again become a safe haven for al
Qaeda or----
Senator McCain. My specific question is----
Mr. Panetta.--for other terrorists.
Senator McCain.--would you agree----
Mr. Panetta. But with regards to achieving that goal, I
think that working with the administration, working with the
President, working with the Secretary of Defense, establishing
some of those areas where we need to make progress and
identifying those, I think that is something that would be
worth pursuing.
Senator McCain. Thank you. I thank you for your service,
and I thank you for your willingness to continue to serve.
My time has expired. But one of the biggest problems that I
see--and I apologize, Mr. Chairman--but is this whole issue of
acquisition. We have terrible out-of-control costs for
literally every weapon system that we have acquired in the last
10 years that I know of.
I believe you have a good team there in the Pentagon. I
think that Mr. Carter is doing a good job. But we are going to
have to get our arms around this. We cannot afford aircraft
that double and triple the original estimated costs and don't
meet the timelines that are set up. The F-35 is just the most
outstanding example.
I know you will make this as one of your highest
priorities. It is simply not affordable for us to continue
business as usual the way we acquire weapons today. It may
require some really fundamental changes in addition to the
legislation that we have already passed to try to address this
issue.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you, sir.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator. I agree with you fully on
that issue.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. He speaks, I think, for our
entire committee in saying that, and I think it is also clear
you have the background to really do something about it and to
dig into it.
Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Director Panetta, thank you for answering the call to serve
your country again. I have the greatest confidence in your
ability and your principles.
I love the quote from your father. Our fathers must have
come out of the same cloth, which is to value the freedom that
America provides is our unique and distinguishing contribution
to governance, but to understand that without security, there
is no freedom. I can't think of anything I would rather hear
from a nominee for Secretary of Defense than that.
I want to begin with a few quick questions about Iran. Do
you agree that the Islamic Republic of Iran is working very
hard to develop a nuclear weapons capability?
Mr. Panetta. Our concern with Iran is that they continue to
try to develop some kind of nuclear capability. As to whether
or not they have made certain decisions as to how far they
should go, those are questions that I would probably have to
address in another forum. But there is no question that they
continue to work to try to develop some kind of nuclear
capability.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Also, to the best of your
knowledge, is the Islamic Republic of Iran working to develop
increased capacities in intercontinental ballistic missile
systems to deliver nuclear or other weapons?
Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
Senator Lieberman. As I am sure you know, there has been a
lot of both diplomatic and economic sanctions work being done
to attempt to discourage Iran's nuclear ambitions and really to
end them. However, as President Obama has said, all options
have to remain on the table.
I wanted to ask you whether, as Secretary of Defense, you
will consider it to be one of your responsibilities to have
credible military plans to strike and destroy Iran's nuclear
facilities if the President, as Commander in Chief, decides
that it is necessary to use that option?
Mr. Panetta. I think in line with the President's statement
that we should keep all options on the table, and that would
obviously require appropriate planning.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Let me go to Afghanistan and see if I can approach it this
way. I thought the President made not only a correct, but a
courageous decision in 2009 in deciding to raise the number of
our forces in Afghanistan by 30,000 plus, a so-called
Afghanistan surge. At the time, the statement was made that we
would begin to draw those troops down around July of this year,
2011.
There was a lot of anxiety in the region, particularly in
Afghanistan and Pakistan and beyond, about whether that was the
beginning of a kind of early withdrawal and, again, a retreat
from the region. Discussions were had, particularly between us
and the Afghans, and President Obama settled with President
Karzai, as you well know, on a plan that will begin the
transition around July of this year. But the goal is to remove
effectively all of our forces, unless there is a mutual
agreement to the contrary before then, by the end of 2014.
You have said today and in the answers to the questions we
submitted earlier that you thought we were making measurable
progress. The American military are making measurable progress
in Afghanistan, but that the progress was reversible. Rather
than asking you to adopt an adjective that someone else has put
on it, is it fair to say that the standard you would apply to
the drawdown of American forces that would begin in July of
this year, is it that it not be so great as to risk the gains
we have made, which, as you have said, are reversible?
Mr. Panetta. There is no question we ought not to take any
steps that risks the gains that have been made, and I have
great confidence, frankly, that General Petraeus and Secretary
Gates and the President will make the right decision in a
transition that has to take place going towards 2014.
Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to say that if you are
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, that the goal that you see
is to turn responsibility for security of Afghanistan over to
the Afghans at the end of 2014 and not to jeopardize our
capacity to do that before then?
Mr. Panetta. No, that is absolutely correct. At the Lisbon
conference, 48 nations plus President Karzai made the decision
that there would be a transition going towards 2014, and it
would be then that, hopefully, we would be able to transfer
responsibility. We ought to do nothing that jeopardizes that
path.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. Let me just briefly
read you what Secretary Gates said this weekend in Afghanistan.
``I think that once you have committed, that success of the
mission should override everything else because the most costly
thing of all would be to fail.''
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answers to those
questions.
Let me move to another part of the world. I think at the
end of the last century, if you asked most people up here and
in the Defense Department, State Department, et cetera, CIA,
what would be our focus in this century, they probably would
have said that the Asia-Pacific region would be the strategic
center of gravity of the 21st century.
We were obviously and necessarily distracted by the attack
on us on September 11, and I think we have responded with
remarkable courage and effectiveness. But I think that the
Asia-Pacific remains the strategic center of gravity for the
21st century.
As I think you know and those of us who have been there
recently have found, there is an anxiety among our friends in
Asia about, one, China's growing military capabilities and,
two, about America's staying power and commitment to the
region. I wanted to give you an opportunity to speak to that
anxiety that, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense,
notwithstanding the budget pressures on the U.S. Government,
would our strategic involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, in
your opinion, continue to be a national security priority?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely. I think that region is very
important to us from a strategic point of view. We have to
maintain a presence in the Pacific arena. I think we also, in
line with that, have to maintain a relationship with China.
Building that kind of relationship for the 21st century, I
think, is extremely important.
Obviously, there are concerns, concerns about some of the
things they are doing in modernizing their military. At the
same time, I think we have to be able to work with them in
terms of scale and transparency so that we are working together
and not in opposition to one another in order to make sure that
we protect the security of that region.
Senator Lieberman. But in your watch as Secretary of
Defense, you certainly don't anticipate any withdrawal or
retreat of America's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region and
our allies there?
Mr. Panetta. Not at all. Not at all.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Director Panetta, thanks for your willingness to continue
to exhibit great public service.
As you and I have had the privilege of working together for
many years now since I was a freshman member of the House, and
you were a member of the Clinton administration. We don't need
to talk about how many years that has been. But I respect your
service and value our friendship.
I would just say that I know you will be the first to
credit the many hard-working and very professional men and
women in the intelligence and military community that led to
the successful takedown of bin Laden, and you would be right to
do that. But the fact is without strong leadership at the top,
that mission would not have been successful. I give a lot of
the credit for that mission to you, and it is well deserved.
You and I had the opportunity to talk about the issue of
rising healthcare costs in the DOD budget when we visited a
couple of weeks ago. I noticed you had several questions on
that issue in your advance policy questions, and I appreciate
your responses.
I don't have a question on this. But as the chairman said
earlier, you are going to have a very difficult job when it
comes to trying to find savings and become more efficient at
DOD. There is no bigger expense, at least from the standpoint
of increasing annually, than the healthcare costs.
I just want to reemphasize the fact that this is an
extremely important issue, and we need to get our arms around
it. I look forward to working with you. I encourage you to
continue to think creatively about how we can bring these costs
down without negatively impacting the quality of service to
those who depend on that system.
I want to go back to the line that Senator McCain was
addressing on Afghanistan. Regarding the troop withdrawals, I
think it is clear from an operational perspective that the
withdrawal of U.S. troops at this point makes no sense. It may
make sense from a domestic political perspective. It may make
some level of sense in terms of waking up the Afghans to the
fact that we are not going to be there forever, and they need
to step up to the plate.
But I am concerned that a significant withdrawal of U.S.
forces will reverse the progress that we have made in
Afghanistan and that the Afghans have made. I am glad to see
you say in your responses to questions that you ``support a
responsible, conditions-based withdrawal''. However, I would
prefer there to be no withdrawal until it is clear that the
gains that we have made will not be reversed.
My question for you is, as we withdraw troops from
Afghanistan, if it becomes clear from an operational
perspective that the withdrawal is negatively affecting
progress and stability, will you advise the President that the
withdrawal should be stopped and that, if necessary, additional
U.S. forces be sent back to Afghanistan?
Mr. Panetta. As I have said and as the President has said,
and the Secretary has emphasized, this has to be a conditions-
based withdrawal. That means you look at the conditions on the
ground as it proceeds, obviously, we need to do everything we
can to try to stay, hopefully, on target with regards to the
2014 date.
But again, it is conditions based, and I think based on
what changes take place, then obviously the President and the
Secretary would have to make adjustments.
Senator Chambliss. I would hope that from a conditions-
based standpoint, Leon, that you would give strong
consideration to the safety and security of our soldiers. I
know they are of number one importance to you.
If withdrawal of troops puts our men and women in greater
harm's way, I hope that we would make it conditions based and
that we would cease the withdrawal. I hope that would be your
recommendation to the President.
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Senator Chambliss. Another issue that I want to bring up
with you that we have discussed is the issue of tactical
aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. Let me just say that
several years ago, Secretary Gates made a push to place the
future of tactical aviation on basically one weapon system, and
that is the F-35.
He argued that it had stealth and other advanced
capabilities that made it the airplane of the future. However,
at a recent hearing, last month Secretary Carter indicated, in
fact, that DOD has taken money out of the F-35 program to buy
fourth-generation fighters.
Not only are these fourth-generation fighters costing
billions of dollars, but they are going to be in the inventory
for probably 20, 30 years, and we are going to be paying to
maintain them at even a greater cost. Yet their utility is
greatly limited against any kind of modern threat, and in my
view, this does not seem to be a very good way to expend
taxpayer dollars.
What is your perspective on this issue? If confirmed, will
you absolutely be committed to preserving U.S. supremacy and
air dominance and ensuring our resources are spent most wisely
towards that end?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, I want to make sure that
we have the very best in terms of our fighter planes, and I
know the F-35 is a plane that is being developed as the next-
generation fighter. But I also know that there are extensive
costs associated with how that plane is being developed, and I
think we have to watch it very carefully.
I want to assure you that one of my responsibilities, in
line with what Senator McCain said, is to take a very hard look
at all weapon systems to make sure that they are cost effective
and that they are, in the end, providing the very best
equipment our forces need.
Senator Chambliss. What really concerns me about where we
are with that program is exactly what Senator McCain alluded
to. That is that we just seem to be out of control and that we
keep moving the goalpost with contractors and then blaming
contractors for an increase in cost, when, frankly, part of it
is due to our inefficient management of the systems.
If we are going to spend the kind of money that we are
committed to spend on that fifth-generation fighter, because
that is where we are headed, and we all know that. We have to
have that airplane in the inventory. The decisions that are
going to be made by you, as Secretary of Defense, relative to
procurement, to acquisition, as well as to the testing of that
airplane, are going to be critical.
You bring a wealth of knowledge from that perspective from
your years at OMB, as well as where you are today. Again, we
look forward to dialoguing with you, between you and this
committee on that issue as well as our other acquisition issues
that are going to be before you.
Let me ask you one other matter relative to Libya. I notice
that you agree that the Gaddafi regime must go. How are we
going to do it? Based on what we are doing today, from our
participation in the NATO operation, how are we going to make
that happen?
Mr. Panetta. That is, as the President has said, the
objective. It has to be done by a number of means.
Number one, we are bringing strong economic sanctions
against them. Number two, we are bringing strong diplomatic
pressure against them. We have implemented embargoes and, more
importantly, the work that NATO is doing, pursuant to the
United Nations (U.N.) resolution.
The NATO forces that are there are bringing tremendous
pressure, I believe, on them, not only fighting obviously to
protect civilians, but to implement the no-fly zone. But in
addition to that, target the command and control elements of
the regime. I think all of those factors have to continue in
order to put pressure on Gaddafi.
Frankly, I think there are gains that have been made. We
have seen the regime weakened significantly. We have seen the
opposition make gains both in the east and the west. I think
there are some signs that if we continue the pressure, if we
stick with it, that ultimately Gaddafi will step down.
Senator Chambliss. Again, thanks for your service, and I
look forward to continuing to work with you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director, for your extraordinary public service,
particularly in the last few months for your decisive and
courageous advice to the President, which led to the successful
raid against bin Laden. It would not have been as successful or
as effective without your participation.
Thank you personally for your friendship over many years.
Let me return to the topic of Afghanistan. We are looking
at a decision shortly that will be based on conditions on the
ground. But it strikes me, and I think implicit in what you
said in your testimony, that those conditions on the ground
might be more relevant vis-a-vis Pakistan than Afghanistan.
That, in fact, as long as the Government of Pakistan at
least appears to see some of these terrorist groups on their
soil as strategic assets and not liabilities, that our
operations in Afghanistan are going to be very difficult.
Going to the real conditions on the ground, your comment on
whether those conditions are really more about Pakistan than
Afghanistan, and whether our effort, our strategy, our focus
has to be there as much as Afghanistan. I would also include in
this context some type of regional dialogue, including
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Your comments, Mr. Director?
Mr. Panetta. I would agree with that, Senator. I think it
is pretty clear we can't succeed in Afghanistan if we are not
succeeding in Pakistan in terms of controlling the safe havens
and the cross-border operations. We have to work at both in
order to ensure that we are able to stay on path with what we
would like to achieve in Afghanistan.
In addition to that, I agree with you this is a regional
issue. To the extent that the countries in that region can work
together and relate to each other instead of being suspicious
of each other and creating the kind of dynamic that, frankly,
has not been very helpful, I think it would be in the interest
of peace in that region if we could get all three to continue
to work together to advance the same goals.
Senator Reed. One of the points that I believe your
predecessor made--I, too, will join my colleagues in commending
him for exemplary service. Indeed, one of the challenges you
have is following an extraordinarily talented, successful, and
decent human being. You will do it, I know. But you have a
challenge.
Secretary Gates pointed out how important non-DOD
operations were at the Department of State, and agricultural
programs at the Department of Agriculture. Now we are getting
also into the spectrum of these violent climate episodes
throughout the globe of scientists in the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and others. Yet there is a real
danger here that those budgets might suffer.
In terms of Afghanistan, my colleagues on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee yesterday released a report
criticizing the build stage in the operation. Can you comment
upon that partnership and how critical it is?
Again, when we look ahead at the conditions on the ground,
we could be successful interdicting terrorist groups, seizing
caches of weapons, even interdicting transmissions from
Pakistan. But if there is no political capacity or governmental
capacity, healthcare, education, or anything, we are going to
still have a population that is disgruntled and probably
destructive towards us.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I agree with what you have said. It
has to be a whole-of-government approach as we deal with these
issues. Clearly, the State Department plays a very important
role in providing assistance to individuals to ensure that an
area remains secure: the education area. The Justice Department
provides assistance. The area of agriculture also provides
important assistance.
I know DOD is our primary military weapon in terms of
securing areas. But if we don't follow it up with these other
important assets, we will never be able to fully secure these
countries.
Senator Reed. Let me change topics for a moment. It strikes
me that I am old enough to remember when there were three
dimensions of conflict--air, land, and sea. I did some land
stuff and technically air because I jumped out of airplanes.
But there is a whole new dimension, cyber. I don't think we
know enough yet to be fully prepared, fully conversant. But can
you comment briefly on the strategy that you will try to
develop? I presume that strategy will involve some deterrence,
preemption, offense, and defense. As was just indicated, there
is a policy now within the context of the rules of war, what
would constitute some type of casus belli?
I think you are stepping in at a critical moment where we
are just beginning to develop a strategy for a new dimension of
warfare that we have never really confronted yet, and your
leadership will be critical.
Mr. Panetta. There is no question that the whole arena of
cyber attacks, developing technologies in the information area
represent potential battlefronts for the future. I have often
said that there is a strong likelihood that the next Pearl
Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyber attack that
cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our
financial systems, and our governmental systems.
This is a real possibility in today's world. As a result, I
think we have to aggressively be able to counter that. It is
going to take both defensive measures as well as aggressive
measures to deal with it. But most importantly, there has to be
a comprehensive approach in Government to make sure that those
attacks don't take place.
I have a huge responsibility, if confirmed in this new
position, in dealing with the cyber area through the National
Security Agency (NSA) and others. My goal would be to work very
closely with them and with others to develop not only the
capability, but also the law that I think we need to have in
order to determine how we approach this challenge in the
future.
Senator Reed. Just a final topic, and really echoing what
Senator McCain said, Senator Chambliss, and others, is that
there is an acquisition bow wave coming, as you recapitalize
and innovate our military forces, and that has been pushed off
a bit. It has been deferred a bit, but it is coming.
One of the aspects, as Senator Chambliss pointed out, is
that it is not simply the sheer number of systems that we have
to buy--land, sea, air, and others--it is the price tag on each
one of these systems. I know Secretary Carter has been working
very hard to make affordability part of the design. But all of
those efforts are going to be absolutely necessary because
there will be no room within even a generous budget to do
everything that has to be done unless we make significant
progress in that area. Just your comments again, Mr. Director.
Mr. Panetta. In the briefings that I have had, it is
obvious that this is an area that we have to pay a lot of
attention to because of the efficiencies, because of
competition, because of the nature of expanding contracts that
have taken place there.
We have seen these weapon systems grow in cost. It takes an
extraordinary amount of time to field a system--from the
beginning of moving that kind of weapon system to the time it
is finally developed, finally deployed, it almost becomes
outdated. We have to improve that process.
I know Congress has taken steps in that arena, but I look
forward to working with you and with the members of this
committee to take greater steps to make sure we are looking at
every possible efficiency in the procurement arena in order not
only to save dollars, but to make sure we are getting better
equipment as a result of it.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Director.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you again, sir. I appreciate you taking time
with me yesterday, I look forward to voting to confirm you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
I echo a lot of the same thoughts that my colleagues do
regarding the cross-border operations, the tremendous amount of
aid we give to Pakistan, $4 billion, I think, give or take. I
have deep concerns that as we try to move forward with
completing our mission and bringing our men and women home from
Afghanistan that we are having these areas where you have the
safe havens, yet we are giving them billions of dollars in aid.
It is either you are with us or you are not? Either you are
helping or you are not. Is there an effort and/or what is your
position with regard to carrying that message that people like
me and others in Congress are getting a little bit frustrated
with that duplicity?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I want to assure you that Secretary
Clinton; Chairman Mike Mullen, who meets with them regularly;
myself; my deputy, who was just there; have all made the same
point that we need to have their cooperation, we need to have
their partnership in confronting what, frankly, is a common
enemy here.
Terrorism just isn't our problem. It is their problem. They
are the subject of attacks every day from terrorists. It is in
their interest to try to take greater action to control
terrorism within their borders, and I think they have to
recognize that we expect in a relationship and a partnership
that it is a two-way street, that it isn't just one way. It has
to be two ways if we are going to protect both of our
countries.
Senator Brown. Right. I mean, the fact that bin Laden was
there. Clearly, if they didn't know he was there then--I, quite
frankly, don't believe them. But I am hopeful that message
continues very strongly. I know when I went over there, I
conveyed that same message as well.
If you are walking down the hallway and a media group grabs
you and says, ``Sir, what is the mission in Afghanistan?'' What
is your response? When I go back home, what should I convey to
the people back in Massachusetts as to now that, obviously, we
have made progress there? We have done A, B, C, and D. What
should I convey and what do you convey, sir, in your everyday
conversations, what is the mission in Afghanistan right now?
Mr. Panetta. The fundamental mission in Afghanistan is to
provide sufficient stability so that country never again
becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda or al Qaeda's militant
allies. I think that is the fundamental mission.
Senator Brown. Is it your plan to achieve that mission by
setting benchmarks that will hopefully be attained so we can
step back and bring our men and women home? Let me ask you that
first.
Mr. Panetta. I think the President has made clear that
there are goals that we are continuing to work on. We need to
weaken the Taliban. We need to develop the force structure in
Afghanistan with the police and the army so they can assume
these responsibilities, and we need to develop the governance
system there so that it can provide greater security for the
future. Each of these areas has to be focused on in order to
arrive at our goal.
Senator Brown. Is it your opinion that there is a will in
Afghanistan with the people and the government folks there to
do that, to ultimately be self-sufficient?
Mr. Panetta. I think there is. I think in the discussions I
have had there, I think they really do want their country to
succeed. It is not always easy. This is a tribal society. It is
not a simple thing to be able to work together.
Senator Brown. You have the tribal society, then you have
the central government. There is very little interaction.
Mr. Panetta. It is not easy. It is difficult. Yet, I think
they understand that, ultimately, this is their country, and
they are going to have to provide the security in their
country.
Senator Brown. I am also deeply concerned and I am hopeful
that you will look at it, we keep hearing reports that monies
that we are providing are going ultimately to terrorists and
ultimately being used against our men and women that are
serving. Is that something you have a comment on?
Mr. Panetta. I think we have to continually oversee that
and make certain that doesn't happen. I don't deny that there
has been corruption in that country, and I think we have to
ensure that one of their responsibilities as a government is to
make sure that doesn't happen.
Senator Brown. Just to shift gears a little bit, what is
happening in Egypt and that region of the world, obviously,
people are hopeful that they are having an opportunity to share
in the freedoms and privileges that we and other countries like
us have. Yet there is also deep concern about voids that may be
left after these transitional periods.
For example, in Egypt, we have given them billions of
dollars, and they have purchased billions of dollars of
military equipment and the like. They have upcoming elections
at some point. Depending on who gets in power, they still have
the equipment. They still are receiving aid.
I am concerned about Israel and its safety and security. I
am concerned about other parts of that region. What are your
thoughts on the relationship with Israel, the transition we are
seeing over in the Middle East?
Mr. Panetta. We will and have to continue to maintain a
strong relationship with Israel and that part of the world, and
we have to reach out to other nations in that part of the world
as well if we are going to ultimately preserve peace in that
region.
This is an area that is in great turmoil now. I think you
have just commented on that. A lot of these countries are going
through turmoil--Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen. There
are a number of countries that are dealing with uncertainty.
I think the United States has to, on a case-by-case basis,
work with each of these countries to ensure that they reduce
the violence, to ensure that they are recognizing some degree
of universal rights, and that they are implementing economic
and political reform. That is not going to be easy. There are
tremendous changes going on, but we have to play a role in what
is developing in the so-called ``Arab spring''.
I think the President spoke to that. The fact is that if we
don't, there are other countries in that region like Iran that
are going to try to influence what takes place. We can't afford
for that to happen.
Senator Brown. Thank you, sir. Good luck.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say aloha and welcome to Director Panetta, who is
a dear friend and a former colleague. We have so many things
that we can talk about, but I want to tell you, Director
Panetta, that I am really impressed with your opening
statement. What else can I say, as we consider a person who was
nominated by the President to be Secretary of Defense who will
be a tireless advocate of our military and will bring about
support and sustain them?
For me, this is great and that this will be in your
thoughts and prayers and supported by your dad's principles of
having a free country and a country that is secure and that you
would continue to bring strong discipline and national defense
for our country. With all of this, I want to wish you well and
tell you that you certainly have my support.
As we discussed, you will face significant challenges, if
confirmed. The men and women of the Armed Forces have served
with honor and resolve in two major conflicts that have taken a
tremendous toll on our Armed Forces. We must do all we can to
care for them. Fulfilling this sacred obligation is dependent
on DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) cooperation.
I am glad that you stated in your advance policy questions
that you would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with
the VA to support servicemembers and their families, and we
talked about working on a seamless transition between DOD and
the VA. With this, as you carry on into the position of
Secretary, you certainly have my support.
Director Panetta, if confirmed, what will be your top
priorities as you look to care for men and women in uniform and
their families?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, my first and foremost
priority is to protect this country, but I can't do it unless
we have good fighting men and women who are willing to put
their lives on the line in order to defend this country. I
think we owe it to them as a result of that, and we certainly
owe it to their families, to make sure that we are doing
everything possible to meet their needs.
I think, obviously, providing the kind of healthcare,
providing the benefits, providing the counseling that is
necessary, particularly for wounded warriors, making sure that
they can transition to the VA in a seamless way, all of these
are areas that I have to pay attention to because I have seen
it firsthand that these kids are out there. They are, indeed,
putting their lives on the line, and we have asked them to go
there time and time again.
We have to make sure that they know that they are fully
supported in this effort. It is going to be my job, if
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, to ensure that we are
providing those benefits. Obviously, I want to work with people
like yourselves that have been working at this for a long time
to make sure that we are covering all of their needs.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
I am impressed as you did tell us just about five steps of
what you are planning to do and have social reforms. I thought
it was unique where you want the Service Chiefs and the
Secretaries to work together and share their concerns as well
and that you want to work on the Pentagon management, which I
think is so important as well. This is also important, to
regard Congress as a partner and to work with Congress as well,
and then to deal with the challenge of nations that are rising
and changing, as you mentioned.
Director Panetta, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990
required DOD to prepare financial statements, which were found
ultimately unreliable. In 2010, the National Defense
Authorization Act requires the Department to provide auditable
financial statements by 2017. I believe in accountability, and
I know you do, too. We owe the American people complete and
accurate financial information from the Pentagon.
Additionally, accurate books would allow Pentagon leaders
to make better-informed decisions in a resource-limited
environment. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that the
Department meets these requirements?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I was concerned in finding out that
the Department would not be able to achieve full auditability
until something like 2017. I understand how areas of the budget
developed, the American people should know that, obviously,
there is auditing that does go on within each of these areas.
But as a department, we should be able to audit that
department.
If I am confirmed, one of the first things I am going to do
is to try to see if we can't take steps to try to improve on
that timetable so that we can say to the American taxpayer that
what we are spending on national defense is being fully
audited.
Senator Akaka. Director Panetta, DOD is one of the few
departments that has recognized the importance of developing
and maintaining its language and cultural awareness
capabilities. A number of steps have been taken to improve
these skills within the Department and across the country, such
as leading the National Language Service Corps and coordinating
its activities with other Federal agencies.
What are your thoughts on the importance of cultural and
foreign language capabilities within DOD?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I am a big believer in language
training and getting our people equipped with the ability not
only to speak the language, but to understand the culture of
the countries that we are dealing with. I say that not only
because I think it is good for each individual to be able to
have that capability, but I have to tell you it is important to
our national defense to have that capability.
At the CIA, I have developed a requirement for analysts,
for those that are operations officers to have a language
capability. It makes them not only a better individual, it
makes them a better intelligence officer to have that
capability.
I think at DOD, I think we need to also encourage greater
language training so that they understand not only the
language, but the culture of the countries that they are
involved with. Having that capability makes us much better at
doing our job.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much, Director Panetta, for your leadership
and distinguished record of service to our country.
I wanted to ask you, the President's proposal starting in
2013 to cut $400 billion, do you agree with that proposal, and
is it a realistic number in terms of preserving our national
security?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, I agree with the
commitment of the President to try to take action to reduce the
deficit and the number that he suggested. I do want to say that
there is a comprehensive review that is going on that the
President himself stated would take place, the Secretary has
stated would take place.
That comprehensive review is looking at a number of issues
related to the Defense Department in order to determine what is
the right pace, what are the right areas, what is the right
transition in order to achieve that savings. I look forward to
the results of that comprehensive review.
Senator Ayotte. As a follow-up, you have certainly
expressed your admiration for Secretary Gates, and I share that
admiration for his service to our country. He has made some
recent statements expressing concerns over the $400 billion
proposal and I think, in fact, talked about it cutting into the
meat, in terms of the muscle of our defense. Do you disagree
with him on that front?
Mr. Panetta. No, no. I share his concerns. I share his
concerns about the possibility of hollowing out our force. I
think that would be a terrible mistake. I share his concern
about some kind of automatic, across-the-board cuts and just
implementing some kind of formulaic approach to cutting defense
when we have to look at each area and determine where we are
going to achieve savings in order to protect defense.
Obviously, I share those concerns. But what I want to do is
to be able to look at that comprehensive review in order to
make sure that none of the concerns that Secretary Gates has
raised or that I am concerned about take place in seeking those
reductions.
Senator Ayotte. In conducting that review, when you get
into the position of being the Secretary of Defense, if you
disagree that $400 billion is a reasonable number and could
jeopardize our national security, would you express your
opposition to the President on that?
Mr. Panetta. If the end result of that comprehensive review
were to come to that conclusion, then obviously, I would share
those concerns. I don't think it will, but I think that if
there was something that indicated that our national defense
would be impacted, obviously, I would share that with the
President.
Senator Ayotte. Director, I wanted to ask you about the CIA
and interrogations. Does the CIA currently conduct
interrogations of high-value targets or of terrorists or those
that are captured?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, the way it works now is that when a
high-value target is captured, there is a high-value detainee
interrogation group (HIG) that comes together. That involves
the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
CIA working as a team. They will go and interrogate an
individual for intelligence as a team. It works pretty well,
but that is the way it works now.
Senator Ayotte. But just to clarify, does the CIA actually
do the interrogations themselves? Meaning I understand what the
HIG does, but as I understand it, the CIA has really--while
participating in the HIG, has not been doing interrogations. Am
I wrong on that?
Mr. Panetta. Generally, the CIA individual there can ask
questions. Generally, what is done is that they will share with
each other what questions ought to be asked by the
interrogator. That could be the Army individual. It could be
the FBI. But every once in a while, the CIA individual asks
questions as well.
Senator Ayotte. Is there anything that prohibits the CIA
from taking the lead in conducting interrogations under current
policy?
Mr. Panetta. The way the team works now is that, if it is
someone where intelligence is the primary objective here, going
after and trying to find that out, then the CIA individual
becomes pretty central to the questions that are asked. That is
the way it works now.
In other words, if there is a real emphasis on that, that
is one case. If it is an FBI case and they are looking at
trying to prosecute that individual, then obviously FBI takes
the lead. If it is a military case or individual that could
involve follow-up on the military, then they would take the
lead.
It really works as a team. That is probably the best way to
say it. It is a team, and they do it on a case-by-case basis.
Senator Ayotte. Nothing currently prohibits the CIA from
being the lead in conducting interrogations?
Mr. Panetta. Nothing prohibits that from happening.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. To your knowledge, does it happen
now? I understand it is a team. But I am just trying to
understand whether the CIA ever takes the lead.
Mr. Panetta. It is not the direct interrogation that used
to take place early on in this decade, but it is much more of a
team approach right now, and that is the way it works.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to follow up with respect to the
Detainee Treatment Act. Do you agree with all the provisions of
the Detainee Treatment Act, including the provisions that
provide legal authority regarding interrogations?
Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I agree with the law, yes.
Senator Ayotte. You talked about your view on
waterboarding. Do you think that all of the enhanced
interrogation techniques cross the line, I think, was what you
used when you discussed waterboarding.
Mr. Panetta. No, I don't have the same view with regards to
all of the other enhanced techniques that I do with regards to
waterboarding.
Senator Ayotte. So, right now under the President's
Executive Order, the interrogations are limited to the Army
Field Manual. Is that right?
Mr. Panetta. Correct.
Senator Ayotte. You would agree that there are some
enhanced interrogation techniques that don't necessarily cross
the line but wouldn't be contained within the Army Field
Manual. Is that right?
Mr. Panetta. The enhanced techniques that were used early
on have now been forbidden by the President's Executive order.
It is the Army Field Manual that is the primary guide with
regards to interrogations.
Senator Ayotte. But to the extent that some of those
techniques may be permitted under the Detainee Treatment Act,
and would you necessarily disagree with the law contained
within the Detainee Treatment Act?
Mr. Panetta. If it is permitted under the Army Field
Manual, then obviously, I would support that.
Senator Ayotte. My time is up. I appreciate your answering
my questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Panetta, thank you for your decades of public
service and your willingness to step forward and extend that
public service in this new position.
You will inherit 10 years of war, budget belt-tightening,
and two wars winding down, if confirmed. You will be tasked
with reshaping DOD, including resetting its combat-weary units,
drawing down the DOD budget, and taking care of the DOD members
and their families. To say that is a set of tall orders is an
understatement of giant proportions.
With respect to Afghanistan, there has been quite a bit of
discussion about the need for benchmarks to do authentic
assessment of where we are in the transition to the Afghanistan
capability of defending itself so that it can govern itself
going forward. I have been a prime supporter of benchmarks,
first with regard to Iraq and now with respect to Afghanistan
as well.
I am introducing legislation today that will require
benchmarks to evaluate progress being made toward the
transition of security responsibility to the Government of
Afghanistan. The bill would call for the benchmarks on
transition to be included as a part of the already-established
reporting requirements for Afghanistan known by I think it was
1230 and 1231 reports to make it consistent.
I am encouraged by your discussion and your support of this
method of evaluating progress by some form of metrics so that
we are not in a gray area always about whether we are winning
or we are losing or making progress. It gives us an opportunity
to decide what level of progress have we made, what remains to
be accomplished for us in that regard. I am encouraged by many
of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle talking about the
benchmarks as well.
Because if we intend to transfer security responsibility to
the Afghan Government by 2014, obviously, it is important to
mark our progress. Do you have any preliminary thoughts as to
the kinds of things you might look at as part of benchmarking
that would help you evaluate conditions on the ground as to
whether or not we are making satisfactory progress to where you
can say we are 25 percent there, 50 percent there, or we have
50 percent yet to go?
Mr. Panetta. I think that to establish any metrics or
guideposts here, it is very important that General Petraeus,
that obviously our diplomatic leaders there, the administration
participate in trying to identify those areas that are
important.
Levels of violence is an important area to look at. A
district assessment that looks at each of the districts and
tries to determine the stability in each of those areas.
Clearly, an evaluation of the development of the Afghan army,
police operation, and how they are performing. That is another
important element. Obviously, the governance responsibilities
within Afghanistan. I mean, those are all key areas that I
think need to be evaluated.
Senator Nelson. In your view, and it is obviously a unique
view as Director of the CIA, can you give us some idea of what
you think the impact of the death of Osama bin Laden might have
on the campaign going forward in Afghanistan and keeping it
from a safe haven for future al Qaeda operations?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, with regards to specific intelligence
on that, that is probably more appropriate in another forum.
But I think it is fair to say that the death of Osama bin
Laden, there is no question that it impacted al Qaeda. He was
the spiritual leader of al Qaeda, and I think it did impact on
their capability. In addition to that, obviously, there are a
number of operations that I think have impacted on their
command and control capabilities as well.
But having said that, they still remain dangerous, and they
are dangerous with regards to the efforts they continue to work
at in Pakistan. One of the concerns that I will share with you
is that I think we do have to pay attention to these nodes that
are developing where al Qaeda has moved some of its operations,
places like Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Those are areas
that I think we have to continue to focus on.
So, yes, it has had an impact. Yes, I think it has weakened
them. But they still remain dangerous, and we still have to go
after them.
Senator Nelson. I agree with you, and I appreciate that
view.
We have had a very touchy situation develop with respect to
Pakistan in terms of what level of support Osama bin Laden may
have had from anyone involved in the Pakistan Government. It is
a complicated relationship, we understand. But the American
people are really quite concerned about double dealing. You
can't have a friend be your friend and your enemy at the same
time. Your friend, but working against you.
Do you think that the relationship with Pakistan is
transparent enough at the present time? Is there something we
can do so that the American public can make a better
determination of that relationship that we share with the
Government of Pakistan?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think we have to continually work
at that. We have to work at developing a relationship of trust
with the Pakistanis. I don't know that we are totally there. I
mean, there are some areas where, frankly, we have good
discussions. We have good communications. But there are a
number of areas where, frankly, we don't have that level of
trust or communication capability.
I think we have to work at that. We have to develop it
because, as I have said, it is in the interest of both
countries to have a trusting relationship because terrorism is
an enemy not just for the United States. It is an enemy for
Pakistan.
Senator Nelson. Do you think that an internal investigation
with some level of transparency within their government to try
to determine responsibility for anyone who may have had
involvement in trying to protect the presence of bin Laden in
their country, that that will be fruitful? If it is fruitful,
that it will be looked as credible by our Government first, but
by the American people?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, at this point, we don't have any
intelligence to indicate that there was any relationship here.
But having said that, I do believe that the Pakistanis are
conducting several investigations at different levels to try to
investigate what took place, and I think probably would be
important to see what the results of those investigations are.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. Good luck in your new position,
which you are about to achieve.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Director, I can't thank you enough for being willing to
do this job after being CIA Director. I just think the
President has put together an A-plus national security team,
and you are one of the linchpins of that. So now, some hard
questions. [Laughter.]
You mentioned to Senator Nelson that you think the killing
of bin Laden has created some momentum. I couldn't agree with
you more. What to do with that momentum?
The statement to me that it makes, there is no place you
can go and no passage of time that will protect you from
justice being delivered by the American people. I think that is
a statement that needs to be made. But we also need to make
another statement. You can count on America.
My general belief is that this war is more complicated than
killing terrorists. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Senator Graham. We have to make an equal investment in
helping those who would fight the terrorists in their own
backyard and be our partner. Don't you agree that takes more
time, that it is more costly and, in many ways, more deadly to
build up partnerships than just killing an individual?
Mr. Panetta. It absolutely does take more time.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the payoff is
much more enormous if we can get it right?
Mr. Panetta. Correct.
Senator Graham. What happens if we lose in Afghanistan?
Mr. Panetta. I think if we lose in Afghanistan, we not only
create another safe haven for al Qaeda and for their militant
allies, but I think the world becomes a much more threatened
place because of that loss, particularly in that region.
Senator Graham. I can't agree with you more. I think that
is absolutely dead on.
What do I tell a family in South Carolina who has lost a
son or daughter in Afghanistan to an improvised explosive
device (IED) that we know was made in Pakistan, and we can't do
a damned thing about it? What do I tell them?
Mr. Panetta. I think that is one of those situations that
is frustrating and angering. One where we have to say to that
family that we are not just walking away from that
responsibility, but we are continuing to put pressure on those
countries that are involved with that.
Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. I don't
think, quite frankly, we are going to be able to sustain our
efforts in Afghanistan until we deal with the safe havens. I
trust you and General Petraeus to deliver that message.
But on behalf of the people of South Carolina and I think
most members of this committee, if you are listening in
Pakistan, you need to choose. Because it is in your interest to
help fight the people that would undermine Afghanistan, as well
as Pakistan.
I am all in for winning in Afghanistan and doing what we
need to do in Iraq. But Pakistan needs to get with the program
one way or the other.
Now, the Pentagon itself. Do you agree that the general
system we have today to buy weapons is that the longer it takes
to develop a weapon and the more it costs, the more the
contractor makes?
Mr. Panetta. That is right.
Senator Graham. Isn't that kind of stupid? [Laughter.]
Mr. Panetta. Not for the contractor.
Senator Graham. I mean, it really is. Yes, yes, yes. I
don't blame the contractor. I blame us.
What if we did this? What if we said to the contractors in
the future, you are welcome to bid on major weapon systems, but
why don't you share 25 percent of the development cost, and at
the end of the day, we are going to have a fixed price, not a
cost plus. If there are any overruns, you share in the
overruns. Do you think that is some idea to at least consider?
Mr. Panetta. I think that is a suggestion worth looking at.
Senator Graham. Yes, I think it is, too. I think it would
save us a lot of money. One thing I would like you to do is go
back in the past, and if you had a cost-sharing arrangement,
how much money would we have saved in the last 20 years if we
had that arrangement versus the longer it takes, the more it
costs, the more you make? I think it is a way to save money and
actually get weapons done quicker.
When it comes to Iraq, if the Iraqis ask us to provide some
troops in 2012, Secretary Gates says he thinks that would be
smart. Do you think that would be smart to say yes?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Senator Graham. Okay. Secretary Gates, do you agree that he
has a pretty good view of what is going on in the world?
Mr. Panetta. He sure does.
Senator Graham. He has served our country in an
extraordinary manner, I think. If he says 3,000 to 5,000 makes
sense when it comes to July withdrawal in Afghanistan, would
you give great consideration to that number?
Mr. Panetta. I don't want to speculate on what the number
is. But whatever Secretary Gates recommends----
Senator Graham. Well, that is what he said. It is not
speculation. He said 3,000 to 5,000 would be a wise move in
July. Would you at least consider that request?
Mr. Panetta. I think Secretary Gates' position, General
Petraeus' position, obviously the President's position, all of
that ought to be considered.
Senator Graham. Would you agree that between all of us,
that probably Gates and Petraeus have the best view of anybody
that I know of, if I had to pick two people to ask?
Mr. Panetta. They have a pretty good view.
Senator Graham. I would put you on that list, too. Okay.
Now, when it comes to Libya. If Gaddafi stays, what does that
mean for our national security interests after we said he must
go?
Mr. Panetta. I think it impacts on our national security
interests in the world if that happens.
Senator Graham. Do you think it kills the Arab spring?
Mr. Panetta. I think it sends a terrible signal to these
other countries.
Senator Graham. Do you think it tells the Iranians that you
really don't have to fear America when it comes to developing
nuclear weapons?
Mr. Panetta. I think it tells them that our word isn't
worth very much if we are not willing to stick to it.
Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. I can't
wait to vote for you. [Laughter.]
Now, when it comes to detainees, if we captured someone
tomorrow in, say, Yemen or Somalia, some of these failed
states, high-value target, where would we put them as far as a
jail? Do we have a jail available to our Armed Forces?
Mr. Panetta. Probably better than anyone here, the----
Senator Graham. Can I tell you what Admiral Mullen said
when I asked him that question?
Mr. Panetta. Sure.
Senator Graham. We don't have an answer for that question.
Would you help me come up with an answer?
Mr. Panetta. That is probably not a bad answer.
Senator Graham. I think it is the truth. But do you think
that is a smart policy, to be a nation without a jail in the
war on terror?
Mr. Panetta. I think we have to have facilities to be able
to provide to detainment of these individuals. That is clear.
Senator Graham. To the committee, we don't, and we need to
find one. I think Guantanamo Bay is a good candidate because it
is the only one left.
Now, in 2014, everybody is focusing on a transition in
Afghanistan. I think, if we do this smartly, we can transition.
But I am very interested in making sure, as you said,
Afghanistan never becomes a failed state.
Secretary Gates said today, and he said in February when I
asked him this question, that he believes that joint basing
past 2014, where you would have American air power and
counterterrorism units left behind in Afghanistan in a joint
environment for training and counterterrorism, if the Afghans
request it, would be a very good policy for us. Do you
generally agree with that?
Mr. Panetta. I think the President has made clear that we
have to make a long-term commitment to stability in that region
not just now, but in the future.
Senator Graham. Can I read you what Secretary Gates said to
my question in February about joint basing?
Mr. Panetta. Sure.
Senator Graham. ``A security agreement with Afghanistan
that provided for a continuing relationship and some kind of
joint facilities and so on for training, for counterterrorism,
and so on beyond 2014 I think would be very much in our
interests.'' Do you think that is a reasoned statement?
Mr. Panetta. I think that is worth looking at.
Senator Graham. I do, too. Now, at the end of the day, you
are taking over at a time when the budget for the Nation has
never been more out of whack. We're in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya. You have a very big agenda to fulfill.
At the end of the day, we are a war-weary Nation. What
would you tell the American people in terms of the attitude we
need to take as a country? Address their war weariness and tell
them why, in your view, we should consider staying behind in
Iraq, why we should consider a long-term relationship with
Afghanistan. Why is it so important that we continue to stay in
the fight after 10 years?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, it goes back to my father's
statement. If you want to be free, you have to be secure. The
only way to ensure that security is to be able to establish
some kind of peaceful solution to these challenges abroad.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome you and thank you for your service and look
forward to working and supporting you in every way possible.
Obviously, part of our mission in counterinsurgency is to
secure and stabilize and enhance the infrastructure, and I want
to certainly commend to you and ask you to direct the folks
that work with you to pay attention to some of the findings of
the Commission on Wartime Contracting. They issued a report
last Friday, and I think it is full of very basic common-sense
information that seems to be escaping us in the area of
contracting and contingency operations.
That is two important factors. One on the front end is
security, whether or not the security is available and
appropriate in order to support the building of projects that
we put a lot of money in. We saw this in Iraq over and over
again, where we would build a power plant, we would work on an
oil refinery, and then 2 months later it would be blown up. So,
I think that security piece and, obviously, the cost of the
security piece in order to build the projects needs to be taken
into account.
But the second one, and this report they came out with
Friday is a really important report, Director, and that is
sustainability. We have white elephants all over this part of
the world, all brought to you courtesy of the American
taxpayer. I will read you just one quote from this report. ``A
project may be carefully planned, well executed, and
economical, but become wasteful if the host nation cannot
provide trained staff, afford parts or fuel, perform necessary
maintenance, or produce intended outcomes.''
We have one of these white elephants we spent $300 million
on in Kabul, a power plant that was designed to be dual fuel,
and Afghanistan made a commitment to us that they would fuel
it. Now they say they can't afford the fuel. The fact that it
is a dual fuel makes it complicated in terms of the technology.
So, basically, it is now only being used as a backup, and
Afghanistan is buying electricity from another country.
This is a great example, but it can be replicated over and
over again. I really think it is time--and I understand the
mentality. I respect greatly General Petraeus and his
strategies in terms of counterinsurgency, but what happens is
there is this almost myopic focus. If we can build this
project, we will put people to work. This is good. This is what
counterinsurgency is all about.
They don't think about what is it going to look like in 3
or 4 years. Especially in Afghanistan, you and I discussed the
sustainability questions in Afghanistan are particularly acute.
This is not a nation that is ready to take over many things,
including some of these projects that we are building.
I really think that if we don't begin analyzing
sustainability at the front end--and I am going to make a
formal request to you that every project that is being built
right now--whether it is a road, whether it is a healthcare
center, whether it is a school--every project be analyzed right
now for sustainability.
If it is obvious it is not going to be sustained, I really
believe you have to pull the plug. I mean, this is hundreds and
tens upon billions of dollars have just gone down a rat hole
because we didn't think about what happens when we are finished
building it. I think it is really important.
This is the hardest question, and you and I talked about
this. What are the conversations that are ongoing and what is
the planning that is ongoing about how Afghanistan, with their
very meager gross national product (GNP), very meager GNP, how
in the world do they afford what we are building them, both in
the projects and, more importantly, this army that we are
building for them?
It is very difficult for me to figure out what happens to
this army when we leave because they can't afford it.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, first of all, on your first point, I
want you to know that if I am confirmed, I really do want to
work with you closely with regards to the contracting issue in
order to ensure sustainability. I share all of your concerns. I
know why it has happened. I know how that has developed. But at
the same time, I don't think we have paid enough attention to
that issue, and I would like to work with you in trying to
improve that whole aspect.
With regards to the issue of Afghanistan, again, I share
your concern about where are they going to draw the resources
they need not only to sustain the army and the police force,
but to be a country, to be able to carry on their
responsibilities. I think that is going to be part of the
governance challenge that we are going to face there is to
ensure that, as a nation, they begin to develop the resources,
develop the revenues that they need in order to be able to
govern that country. That is going to be part of it. Otherwise,
it is not going to work.
Senator McCaskill. Is there a plan in place for short term
and long term? Is there some kind of plan that is in the works
that we will be putting I think it is $13 billion this year?
What is the plan for 4, 5 years from now? Is there a plan that
we will continue to spend upwards of $5 billion or $6 billion a
year just keeping this army?
We are building them an army with a size and scope that is
beyond--they have never had an army, a national army in
Afghanistan. So this is new, and is there planning going on,
joint planning or anything else that would indicate how this is
going to look 2, 3, 4 years down the line in terms of what we
have built?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I have not been fully briefed on what
directly is being looked at in terms of that longer term. But
let me get into that. If I am confirmed, I would like to look
at that and then be able to give you a better answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
The administration is working to ensure a successful transition to
the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) having the lead
responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
We are making steady progress in developing the quantity, quality,
and operational capacity of the ANSF. We remain on track to reach the
envisioned end strength of 195,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and
157,000 Afghan National Police personnel. Our effort now include the
development of logistical, engineering, communications, medical, and
other enabling capabilities that the ANSF will need to support their
own operations, as well as organic training and education capabilities
they will need to sustain themselves by developing their future
recruits. Our efforts also include the development of ministerial-level
management and oversight capabilities necessary to lead and sustain the
ANSF.
Detailed planning for long-term ANSF sustainment is an ongoing,
active effort. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is
collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Staff, and NATO to analyze the long-term requirements for ANSF
capability in light of current fiscal constraints. We envision a
continuing role for the United States and expect continued
contributions from international donors. To that end, before retiring,
then-Secretary of Defense Gates challenged our partners in the
International Security Assistance Force to contribute a combined 1
billion euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund.
Although international support for the ANSF will likely be required
for some time to come, ultimately, Afghanistan must continue to
increase its funding for its own security. This will depend on
continued economic growth and governance in Afghanistan, which, in
turn, will benefit from the security that a properly sustained ANSF can
provide, as well as from the stabilizing effects that can result from a
strategic partnership between Afghanistan and the United States and the
continued presence of U.S. forces.
As our plans evolve, we will engage you and congressional
colleagues on the details of this challenging effort.
Senator McCaskill. That is great. The only other topic is
warning you that I will subject you to pop quizzes on the
Wartime Contracting Commission's work. They have done some
really good work. My colleague Senator Webb and I have worked
very hard getting it established, and I think it is like many
other commissions. Unfortunately, it is not getting enough
attention, and really, where it needs to be front and center is
going to be under your purview.
I am hoping that you will make sure that your immediate
staff is aware of its work and takes it to heart. Because we
have an awful lot of lessons learned that we have never
learned. I think it is really important, as we try to do things
with less money.
The only other issue I want to bring up with you today that
I don't think has been discussed yet is just getting your
commitment and your comments about what needs to be done and
should be done as it relates to the problem of sexual assault
within the military, women in the military that have had a
great deal of difficulty accessing some sense of justice.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, we talked about that together in your
office, and I totally share your concerns. We have to have zero
tolerance for any kind of sexual assaults in the military, and
we have to allow the victims of those sexual assaults the
ability to be able to complain, to have those complaints
listened to, and to have the evidence that is necessary to be
able to establish those cases.
There are a lot of steps that need to be taken, and I look
forward to working with you and with others in the Department
to make sure that we protect women, who have served so well in
the military these days.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you so much for your time here
today. Most of all, thank you for loving your country so much
that you are willing to take on this incredibly big, huge, and
important responsibility.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Panetta, good to see you.
Mr. Panetta. Nice to see you.
Senator Cornyn. As you and I discussed in my office, and
thank you for coming by recently to talk about some of my
concerns with the financial management problems at DOD, I think
most Americans would find it shocking that DOD is unable to
produce timely, accurate, and complete information to support
management decisions.
As we also discussed, the law of the land requires DOD to
be able to complete a clean audit by 2017. Again, I think that
would be shocking to most people.
But I appreciate your response on page 74 of your advance
policy questions, the answers you submitted to our questions
that you said achieving clean audit opinions would be one of
your top management improvement priorities. Certainly, you have
the background and experience to move the Department in that
direction and to complete that requirement of the law.
I am advised that the Marine Corps actually is doing a
relatively good, compared to the other Services, job in this
area, and they are experiencing a 3-to-1 return, on for every
dollar they spend on improving financial management, actually
getting a good return on that investment. I know that it may be
the attitude, there may be strong institutional resistance at
DOD--believe me, as many do and as I do--that their main job is
to fight and win the Nation's wars, but that this is not a
priority.
But you know and I know, we all know, the budgetary
pressures the Department and others are going to be under as we
deal with this unsustainable debt and these huge deficits is
important. I think this is important to me and I know important
to you to make financial management reform one of your
important priorities.
Having said that, I would just ask you the straight-up
question, do you agree with Secretary Gates when he said that
the defense budget, however large it may be, is not the cause
of the country's fiscal woes?
Mr. Panetta. I agree with that. I think it isn't. It is by
no means the cause of the deficits, the huge deficits that we
are incurring today.
Senator Cornyn. The President has requested $671 billion
for fiscal year 2012. That is a lot of money, $671 billion. I
know that there is going to be room for the Department to share
in some of the budget cuts that are going to be on the table.
But of course, as you and I have discussed, I hope that
this is not seen as an opportunity for those who want to whack
the Pentagon budget to do so in a way that will impair our
ability to defend ourselves or protect our national security
interests. I am sure you share that view as well, don't you?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
Senator Cornyn. Let me just ask a question, you have the
benefit of great experience and long experience with
Government. But that also means you have a record that I want
to ask you about. Of course, you were President Clinton's Chief
of Staff and Director of OMB before that. You played a big role
in the budget decisionmaking during the presidency of President
Clinton, overseeing a major reduction in DOD procurement
spending, including a 13.4 percent decline in fiscal year 1994.
Some have called that a procurement holiday. Others have
said we were cashing the peace dividend, even though we still
had many threats to our country. I want to give you an
opportunity, if you would, to explain your role in those cuts
and whether you think they were deeper than they should have
been or just please give us your perspective. Because, frankly,
I hope we don't try to cash a peace dividend in 2012 while we
are engaged in two and a half wars.
Mr. Panetta. As Director of OMB, obviously, I was given the
responsibility by the President to try to achieve significant
savings as part of the economic plan that was adopted by
Congress that, by the way, reduced the deficit by almost $500
billion. I think that, plus other agreements that were made in
the Bush administration and, ultimately, with the Republican
Congress all contributed to our ability to achieve a balanced
budget.
Specifically, with regards to the defense area, my
responsibility as OMB Director was to provide a number to the
Defense Secretary and allow the Defense Secretary and those at
the Defense Department to determine how best to try to achieve
those savings. I do understand that was part of what they
proposed.
But looking at it in hindsight, it might not have been the
best way to achieve those savings, but it was a decision that
was made at the Defense Department.
Senator Cornyn. Turning to Afghanistan, I know there is a
lot of comment and favorable comment about your involvement,
and I think you deserve credit for your part played in taking
down Osama bin Laden. Congratulations to you and the
President's national security team for that accomplishment.
But I get the sense that people are sort of prematurely
declaring that the fight is over because we have degraded al
Qaeda in Afghanistan. I am glad to hear you point out that they
have metastasized to other parts of North Africa and the
region.
But I just want to ask you in particular, I know there are
other groups that may not be as familiar to Americans as al
Qaeda, like Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups. Could you just
talk a little bit about the Islamic jihadist groups that are
out there that could easily morph into a threat as dangerous as
al Qaeda?
Mr. Panetta. There are a number of terrorist groups that
are out there, Senator. Obviously, al Qaeda is the one that we
are principally concerned about because they attacked this
country, and they continue to plan to attack this country.
But there are interrelationships that they have with other
terrorist groups. The Haqqanis, for example, are a group that
has relations with al Qaeda. They, in turn, obviously are
conducting attacks in Afghanistan. There is a group called
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which is another group in the FATA
that has relationships with al Qaeda that conduct attacks, not
only plan attacks against us, but also have conducted attacks
within Pakistan as well.
There is Lashkar-e-Taiba which is a terrorist group that
focuses on attacks largely in India but have been known to
discuss attacks elsewhere as well.
If you move to the area of Yemen, there, al Awlaki who is
associated with al Qaeda, but nevertheless I think represents a
real threat on his own because he is very computer oriented
and, as a result of that, really does represent the potential
to try to urge others, particularly in this country, to conduct
attacks here. So that is a concern.
We have Somalia, where al Shabaab operates in Somalia.
Although it is primarily located in Somalia, we do have
intelligence that indicates that they, too, are looking at
targets beyond Somalia. Then if you add to that Hezbollah and
Hamas, you can see that you have a pretty good array of
terrorist groups to confront.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. My time is up. But I
think it is important that the American people understand the
threat to our country, our national interests, our interests of
our allies and American citizens extends beyond solely al
Qaeda. I appreciate your answer.
Thank you. I look forward to working with you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
hearing.
Thank you so much, Mr. Panetta, for your extraordinary
public service to our country. I am extremely grateful.
I want to touch upon three issues, if we have time. I want
to explore a little more on Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), and then go to a little bit of cyber warfare.
Chairman Mullen stated a few months ago that it is fairly
well known that elements of the Inter-Services Intelligence had
a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani network.
Obviously, addressing the Haqqani network is really important
to reaching our goals in Afghanistan.
Yet a week ago, he reported that Pakistan has agreed to go
after the terrorist group. How will you judge the seriousness
of Pakistan's commitment to that effort?
Mr. Panetta. I think there is probably a simple test, which
is whether or not the Haqqanis are continuing to go into
Afghanistan and attacking our forces. It seems to me that if
they have an influence over the Haqqanis, that they could urge
them to cease fire and to stop those kinds of attacks.
Senator Gillibrand. I appreciated your testimony earlier
about the nature of al Qaeda, that it has fundamentally
metastasized, and in fact, many believe that al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula is perhaps far more dangerous than any other
aspect of al Qaeda today.
You also mentioned that al Qaeda works in a very diffuse
way, that oftentimes, it is inspiring groups like al-Shabaab in
Africa and AQAP in Yemen. Of the three terrorist attempts on
our homeland since September 11, the one on New York came out
of Pakistan, the Christmas Day attempt on Chicago from Yemen,
and the Fort Hood massacre motivated out of Yemen. Al Awlaki
recruits online, including from Europe and the United States,
and we need to focus on a smart strategy to address these
threats.
I support your view that we have to take these threats
head-on and we have to make them very much part of our mission.
I want to understand why in Yemen our approach is so different
than that of Afghanistan. Perhaps not in this setting, but to
talk a little bit about what some of your long-term strategies
are to deal with the fact that al Qaeda has changed so much.
Mr. Panetta. With regard to specific operations, I would
have to do that in another forum. But just generally, I think
our approach has been that because of these nodes that have
developed, our approach has been to develop operations in each
of these areas that will contain al Qaeda and go after them so
that they have no place to escape.
So that we are doing that in Yemen. It is obviously a
dangerous and uncertain situation, but we continue to work with
elements there to try to develop counterterrorism. We are
working with Joint Special Operations Command as well in their
operations. Same thing is true for Somalia and with regards to
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, we are working
with both the Spanish and the French to develop approaches
there that will contain them as well.
I think we have at the CIA tried to develop a more
comprehensive strategy to kind of look at all of those nodes,
look at all of those threats, and not just focus on the FATA or
Pakistan, but focus on all of those threats in order to try to
deal with it.
Senator Gillibrand. Right. Now, obviously, Yemen is under
substantial turmoil, and we don't know whether the government
survives or not. Do we have strategies in place to make sure
that if there is a transition that we are very knowledgeable
about what military assets are there, what will happen to them?
Have you engaged the Saudis or any other potential allies in
what we can do there to protect against future growth of
terrorism?
Mr. Panetta. Again, with regards to specific operations, I
really have to discuss that in another forum. But it is a very
uncertain situation. It has been destabilized, and yet we are
continuing to work with those individuals in their government
to try to go after AQAP, and we are continuing to receive
cooperation from them.
At this point in time, I would have to say that while,
obviously, it is a scary and an uncertain situation, with
regards to counterterrorism, we are still very much continuing
our operations.
Senator Gillibrand. Last, if I still have time, Mr.
Chairman, I appreciated the testimony you gave earlier, Senator
Reed asked about it and others, about cyber terrorism, cyber
crime, cyber attacks, and cyber warfare. I appreciated the fact
that the statement was made that a cyber attack could well be a
declaration of war, and you and I had a chance to talk about
this in some respects.
Can you share with us any of your vision, design, goals
with regard to how we create a greater platform for
cybersecurity and cyber defense? In particular, I have worked
with Senator Hatch on creating some international protocols to
create alliances and working relationships with both allies and
nonallies on how to begin to have an ability to enforce laws
against cyber attacks, cyber criminals, cyber terrorists, and
any other form of cyber mischief. I would love your thoughts on
what you can share with us.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, as we discussed in your office, this
is an area of great concern for me because I think what I have
witnessed at the CIA and elsewhere is that we are now the
target of increasing attacks that go after our systems, and it
is extremely important for us to do everything we can to
confront that threat.
Obviously, I have a great resource with the NSA that has
tremendous expertise and tremendous knowledge in this area.
What I would like to do is to develop an even more effective
force to be able to confront cyber terrorism, and I would like
to work with you on the effort to try to develop those kinds of
relationship not only here, but abroad, so that other countries
can work with us in this effort.
We talk about nuclear. We talk about conventional warfare.
We don't spend enough time talking about the threat of cyber
war.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Last, I just want to thank you for your testimony today
about your priority to look out for the men and women serving
in our armed services and their families. I think not only must
that be one of your primary responsibilities, but I appreciate
that it is in the forefront of your mind.
My time has expired. I will just leave you with I hope you
continue that focus and particularly focus on the issue of
housing. Because a lot of troops are coming back from various
missions, and Fort Drum and other places around the United
States really have inadequate housing supply. I hope that you
can address that in a perhaps more aggressive and more nuanced
way.
Thank you so much, very much for your testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, you certainly deserve the widespread accolades
and expressions of gratitude that you are receiving from
virtually every member of this committee today, and I want to
add my own thanks for your willingness to continue to serve our
country during such a difficult time.
But like my colleagues Senator Graham and Senator Brown,
now the hard questions start. I want to start with Libya.
You have repeated today the administration's goal that
Colonel Gaddafi must go. But what then? If there is any painful
lesson that we have learned from our experience in Iraq, it is
that if we do not have a plan in place after we have deposed a
tyrant, that chaos and violence ensues.
Do you have confidence that we have a plan for dealing with
Libya post Gaddafi, and do we even really know who we are
dealing with in the opposition?
Mr. Panetta. I know that Secretary Clinton is spending a
great deal of her time working with our allies to respond to
that concern, to try to work with those in the opposition who
have come together in the consuls that they have developed
there, to try to work with them in terms of greater support so
that if they do, in fact, have to take control of the country,
that they will have that capability.
What you have raised is a legitimate concern, and it is an
area that we have a lot more work to do in order to ensure that
if Gaddafi does step down that we can ensure that Libya will be
a stable country.
Senator Collins. It really concerns me, particularly when
you look at the leadership of al Qaeda and the Libyan presence
there, if you look at the number of foreign fighters in Iraq
that have come from Libya. I just don't feel any confidence
that we know what comes next.
Mr. Panetta. The opposition, obviously, has been made up of
various tribal groups that have come together, and there are
concerns about some of the other influences that are now trying
to impact on the opposition. It is something that we are
watching very closely, but I do think that if we can get
Gaddafi to step down that I am confident that there are enough
leaders in the opposition who can provide, hopefully, that
continuity.
Senator Collins. Let me next turn to Afghanistan. No one
wants to lose Afghanistan, and all of us are so mindful of the
enormous sacrifices that our military men and women have made
in Afghanistan and the enormous amount of taxpayer dollars that
have been spent.
Senator Brown asked you a key question today about what is
our mission? You talked about the goal of having Afghanistan be
a stable state, and that certainly is something that I want
also. But to me, that seems to be a never-ending mission. I
don't see how we get to a stable state in Afghanistan.
Let me give you an example. A key to our transition in
Afghanistan, the key to our troops being able to come home is
the development of a competent, aggressive Afghan security
force, and we have made a lot of progress in that area.
But I look at the cost of maintaining the Afghan security
force. In this year's presidential budget request, it is $12.8
billion. The total Afghanistan gross domestic product (GDP) is
about $30 billion, and 97 percent of Afghanistan's GDP is
derived from spending related to international military and
donor community presence.
When I look at that imbalance, I don't see how Afghanistan
is ever going to be able to even afford its own security
forces. That says to me that we are going to have to continue
to be a major contributor to paying for those security forces
forever, virtually. Tell me how this ends. I just don't see how
it ends.
Mr. Panetta. I understand the concerns that you have
raised, Senator, and I think we all share those concerns. I
guess I can only say, having served on the Iraq Study Group,
there was a moment in time when I had a lot of the same
concerns about Iraq and whether or not Iraq would ever be
stable enough to be able to draw down our forces there.
While Afghanistan is a very different country and has a
very different history, the fact is that over the last few
years, I have seen progress made with regards to governance in
some of the key areas, with regards to security, with regards
to the role of the Afghans in participating with our forces to
try to secure area. They have gotten better.
Whether or not, in the end they are going to be able to
develop the resources, develop the revenues, develop the
governance that needs to be done, those are major questions.
But I think if we stick with it, if we continue to provide help
and assistance to them, that I think there is going to be a
point where Afghanistan can control its own future. We have to
operate on that hope.
Senator Collins. Finally, let me echo the concerns that my
colleagues have raised about whether the budget constraints,
which are very real, are going to drive our military
requirements rather than vice versa. This is an issue we
discussed in my office.
This year, when the independent panel looked at the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it concluded that the QDR had
been molded by the budget rather than being what it is supposed
to be, which is an unvarnished assessment of what our military
requirements are. I am particularly concerned about the gap
when I look at the Navy's shipbuilding budget. The Chief of
Naval Operations has testified before our committee that we
need, at a minimum, a 313-ship Navy, and we know the 313-ship
goal is much smaller than the actual requirement that our
combatant commanders have for ships.
Indeed, there was a recent report just 2 months ago from
the Navy on the ballistic missile defense (BMD) force structure
requirements that states that the Navy currently does not have
the capacity to meet the demands of our combatant commanders
for BMD capable ships. I am very worried about that gap in this
time of budget constraints. I am worried that the Navy has yet
to complete the contracts on the DDG-1000, the second and third
ships.
What actions do you think need to be taken to help close
the gap between the 285-ship Navy today and the, at a minimum,
313-ship requirement?
Mr. Panetta. I strongly believe that the Navy has to
project our force throughout the world and that the Navy is
obviously crucial to that mission. I agree with the ship
numbers that have to be developed for the Navy in order to be
able to do that.
I think the key here is going to be something that has
happened in your own State, which is that shipbuilding
operations have to develop greater efficiencies. Yours is a
great example of having developed those kinds of efficiencies
that helps us on the cost control side and at the same time
allows us to continue our shipbuilding capability.
I do think that greater competition, greater presence of an
industrial base here that deals with these issues will provide
the kind of cost savings that we will need in order to fulfill
that mission.
Senator Collins. Thank you, and I look forward to working
with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I don't know if you are going to take
a break. But I just----
Chairman Levin. Yes. I think it sounds to me like we are
going to take a break. [Laughter.]
But this will not be a lunch break. This will just be a
very brief 5-minute break, and Senator Blumenthal will be next.
Just take a very quick break and then back here. We will finish
the questions, and then we will have a lunch break.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you. [Recess.]
Chairman Levin. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Panetta, thank you for answering all our questions, for
your extraordinary service, and for your very powerful and
eloquent testimony today and your very responsive answers to
all of the issues that have been raised.
I want to second the sentiment that has been expressed by
Senator Graham, which is I can't wait to vote for your
confirmation, and I appreciate your willingness and patriotism
to take on this very tough assignment. Also to second Senator
Graham's views, and I think they are widely shared, that we
need fundamental and far-reaching reform in our methods of
acquiring and terminating weapons programs.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
Chairman Levin. I think, Senator Blumenthal, that probably
Director Panetta would also agree that Secretary Gates can't
wait for us to vote for Director Panetta's confirmation.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Panetta. I think that is fair to say.
Chairman Levin. That will not be taken out of your time, by
the way.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Speaking of Secretary Gates, I hope and assume you would
agree with him that the second engine for the F-35 is
unnecessary and should be terminated?
Mr. Panetta. I support that position.
Senator Blumenthal. Also that we need to continue the sub
building program at the rate of two per year, which I think is
fairly noncontroversial?
Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you also agree with Admiral
Mullen that talking about a secure and thereby free America,
that the greatest threat to our security today is the national
deficit?
Mr. Panetta. There is no question in my mind that the size
of the deficit we are confronting represents a threat to our
security.
Senator Blumenthal. That we need to address that problem
without excessive cost cutting in the defense budget?
Mr. Panetta. Obviously, defense needs to play a role. But
when you are facing that size deficit, everything has to play a
role.
Senator Blumenthal. I want to talk for a moment about one
of the causes of those costs in both our defense budget and our
veterans programs, and they are a cause of cost that is not
necessarily in the headlines or even reported, and those costs
have to do with tobacco use and tobacco addiction and the costs
of tobacco-related diseases.
I know that the Defense Department is very much aware of
these costs because, as a matter of fact, it asked all military
personnel last year to make their 2011 New Year's resolution to
quit smoking. In fact, about $1.6 billion a year in DOD costs
are related to medical care that is provided for tobacco-
related diseases. Among the retirees from our military for
veterans, about 80 percent of the $5 billion in annual costs of
treating pulmonary disease are directly attributable to
smoking.
The costs of smoking simply in dollar terms, medical
treatment, are at least $5 billion a year, not to mention the
impacts on readiness, which are, in effect, less fit, less
physically able military personnel, more likely to sustain
injuries, more likely to be stressed out, more likely to be
dependent and addicted to nicotine. The stark fact is that
military personnel are 50 percent more likely to smoke and more
likely to use tobacco products than their civilian peers.
My question to you is both an immediate and a longer-range
one. First, whether you have any suggestions as to what can be
done immediately? Second, would you be willing to commit the
resources and interests of DOD to addressing the problems of
nicotine addiction and tobacco use and the related medical
impacts?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, if I am confirmed, one of the areas I
have to focus on is the health costs that are impacting here. I
think the area that you have just defined is one area that we
do have to pay attention to in terms of its implications on
health and its implications on cost. I would look forward to
working with you to try to develop an approach that would allow
us to, again, not only deal with smoking, but deal with other
threats to healthcare that impact on not only our soldiers but,
frankly, that impact on Americans.
Senator Blumenthal. On the families of our soldiers and our
veterans?
Mr. Panetta. That is right.
Senator Blumenthal. Because of not only the immediate
effects of smoking or other kinds of health problems, but also
the related impacts on families.
Mr. Panetta. No, that is right. I think smoking, good
nutrition, good exercise. I mean, there are a number of areas
that I think need to be focused on as part of the solution to
dealing with healthcare costs.
Senator Blumenthal. I would welcome the opportunity to work
with you on those issues.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me say while we are talking about
veterans, I have offered a measure, a number of other Senators
have, to broaden and deepen the commitment of our country to
caring for issues relating to employment, homelessness,
healthcare of our veterans and would hope that DOD would also
increase its commitment in that area and hope under your
leadership, it would, given your very moving and powerful
remarks about the need to take better care of our military
personnel.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I really do feel an obligation to
those that served, and I don't treat this like a situation
where once you have completed your service and you become a
veteran that somehow you are somebody else's responsibility. I
think we have an obligation to make sure that people are
treated right once they have served this country not only now,
but in the future.
Senator Blumenthal. Finally, because my time is close to
expiring, let me ask you one last question. The ammonium
nitrate fertilizers that are the cause of probably the vast
majority of the IED very tragic and unfortunate injuries to our
troops are transported from Pakistan, and I wonder what can be
done to stop that flow of fertilizer, the ammonium nitrate
substances that are the basis for those explosive devices?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, that is a continuing concern for us,
and it is not so much the transfer of the material, but it is
actually the development of IEDs, the explosives themselves,
that we see taking place in Pakistan that make their way into
Afghanistan. We have to take a number of steps not only with
the Pakistanis, but also trying to check at the border to make
sure that we do everything possible to stop that flow of IEDs.
It is a very real threat, and a lot of that is coming across
the border.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, and I look forward
to working with you. Thank you once again for your service to
our Nation.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a pleasure to have you before the committee. As I
told you, Mr. Panetta, when we had the opportunity to speak, I
am delighted to see that a former OMB Director could actually
make something of himself. You have done a great job as CIA
Director, and I know that you have had the opportunity today to
answer some tough questions, but also I am sure that the tone
has been appreciative and respectful.
I am most concerned on the budget front and particularly
with regard to our major acquisitions programs. The cost
growth, the time delays have been particularly troubling to me.
On this committee over the 4 or 5 months, we have heard lots of
testimony, and this is at the same time, of course, that we are
talking about not just restraining spending but actually
putting everything on the table to deal with our historic
deficits and the debt overhang that is affecting our economy so
directly and affecting our future.
This concerns me greatly. It also, I think, impacts our
national security because our men and women in uniform need the
best equipment and they need it in a timely manner, and they
are not getting it.
A couple of data points, and you know them well. Cost
overruns annually now are, in some years, over $300 billion a
year. This is, as compared to just a decade ago, when annual
overruns were on average about $40 billion year. The average
delays almost 2 years in delivering initial capabilities for
these programs.
The reasons are varied. Sometimes it is internal DOD
processes, I think. Sometimes it is these contracting processes
that still aren't working, and these practices have been
subject to a lot of GAO reports, directives, and public and
private studies. There has been some good work done on it, and
the chairman has done some good work on it, but we still have a
long way to go.
This would be one of my major concerns. Given your
background and experience, I think you are well qualified to
address it. I would like to hear a little about that.
Senator Graham apparently talked earlier today about cost-
sharing arrangements and the potential for that. I think that
is an interesting idea. On the Joint Strike Fighter program
alone, we heard testimony before the committee that we are 80
percent over cost from the original estimates. That is over
$150 billion and 30 percent more than the current baseline that
was just set in 2007.
After 15 years of development and 2 years into operational
production, we still don't have a stable design. Again, I think
that impacts our warfighters as well. I realize the Defense
Department is working on implementing the Systems Acquisition
Reform Act, and the better buying power initiative is ongoing.
But, frankly, there is a lot more that needs to be done.
Could you talk a little about this and particularly the
benefits of competition, as we talked about privately, and
finding efficiencies?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, because we share a common background,
I think we understand the costs that are involved in this area.
I think we are dealing with a culture that has developed that
somehow we have to change. I know during the period from
September 11 there has been an awful lot of money that has been
put into the defense budget, a lot of equipment that has been
developed during that period. I think at the same time, a lot
of it has certainly been worthwhile, been important to our
national defense. But a lot of bad habits have developed during
that period.
I think there is an assumption that somehow this thing can
play out and that the cost can increase as dramatically as you
have pointed out in some of these areas and that somehow
somebody is still going to pay the bill. I think what we have
to do is to make clear that those who are involved--and they
are great companies; they are good people; a lot of them do a
great job--that they have a responsibility here to be able to
work with us to develop better competition, to do some of the
things that Senator Graham mentioned in terms of absorbing some
of the costs of development.
The work that they are doing is not just money in their
pocket. What they are working on is important to the national
security of this country, and I think what we have to do is
work with them, work with contractors, work with others to try
to develop approaches that can try to shape the costs that are
involved and the delays that are involved here.
I know this is tough. I know that some of this military
technology is extremely intricate. It involves a lot of
complicated work. But I am absolutely convinced that there has
to be a way to achieve greater cost savings, and I hope to work
with you and others to try to see what we can do to do that.
Senator Portman. I am encouraged from our conversations and
this testimony today that you are prioritizing that.
Ultimately, if we don't fix it, we will be robbing from some of
the fundamental responsibilities you would have as Secretary of
Defense to protect our country. Because looking at some of
these projections over the next decade or 2 decades, if we
don't begin to figure out how to deal with these overruns on
the acquisition programs, they will quickly take the entire
current defense budget.
We need to be sure that our men and women in uniform are
getting what they need and be sure that this and the healthcare
issue, which I know you have also addressed here today, is the
other one where I think you look at the huge cost increases
there, has to be handled in a way that, again, ensures that the
focus is on our national security concerns.
Quickly, on trade agreements, as you are aware, we are
hoping soon to be reviewing proposed export opening agreements
with the Republic of Korea, with Panama, and with Colombia.
This has been increasingly clear in the post Cold War
environment, all elements of our national power must be used to
provide for our security and build effective allies, and these
three countries are great allies.
In response to prepared questions, you noted that the U.S.-
Republic of Korea alliance remains one of the cornerstones of
U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific. I found that interesting,
and you have pledged to stay in close contact with your
counterparts there and build on the relationships laid by
Secretary Gates.
You also noted the importance of the Government efforts to
support DOD activities providing training, equipment, and so on
to our Central American partners, including Panama, given the
importance of the canal particularly and the U.S. Southern
Command's (SOUTHCOM) work there.
Also with regard to Colombia, in testimony earlier this
year, the commander of SOUTHCOM described our trade agreement
with Colombia as ``a very positive, beneficial aspect for our
cooperation because of a growing capacity to support the
capabilities of Armed Forces and law enforcement.''
My question would be to you, how do you assess the value
from a security standpoint of building upon these commercial
ties through these trade opening agreements with these allies,
and do you agree that these enhanced trade and investment
agreements is one way to combat the threats that these states
face to their security and to the broader region?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think that when it comes to
protecting our security, there are a number of areas that have
to be addressed, and one of those, obviously, it is not just
the military responsibility, but there is an economic side of
this that plays a very important role in terms of promoting
better security.
The ability of these other countries to develop trade with
us, to develop their economies creates greater stability within
those countries. I think that is a fact. To the extent that we
can help promote that kind of trade, that we can promote that
kind of economic development, I think it assists these nations
in their ability to achieve stability.
Colombia is a good example. They have done a great job
going after narco-trafficking. If we can help, be able to help
them develop their economy, that could become another added
factor in providing greater security in that region. The same
thing is obviously true for Korea.
Senator Portman. Do you think ratification of these three
agreements would be positive for our national security
interests?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I would.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Panetta, again, I appreciate your having come by
my office to have detailed conversations on a number of areas.
Having had the honor and the privilege of meeting with Caspar
Weinberger, when he was Secretary of Defense, on a daily basis
for 4 years, I am well aware of the challenge of your job. I
honestly believe that, other than the presidency itself, this
is probably the most difficult and complicated job in our
Federal Government, and I wish you the best.
I also appreciate or was gratified to hear your response to
Senator Collins with respect to the need to rebuild our Navy,
to get the Navy's numbers up. I think as the situation in
Afghanistan and Iraq allows us more leeway in terms of how we
shape the DOD budget, we really do need to do that.
If you are looking at the size of the Navy right now, I
think it is about 282 ships, and the ground floor goal of 313
and all of the interests, the vital national interests that we
have with respect to the stability of East and Southeast Asia,
it is going to be a very important thing for us to look at. In
that regard, I would like to raise two points with respect to
the situation in East Asia, and then I also would like to ask
you a question about Libya.
First, when we are looking at the tempo in East Asia, we
see clearly that Chinese military activities have dramatically
increased over the past 15 or 16 months. The two most glaring
examples of that were the set-to with Japan in the Senkaku
Islands about a year ago, and then most recently, the Chinese
naval vessels actually cutting the cable of a Vietnamese ship
that was exploring oil, the possibility of oil in the South
China Sea.
These incidents are basically related to sovereignty
issues, and they are not only national security issues, they
obviously have downstream economic consequences. But to me,
they clearly talk to the commitments that we have for stability
in this region.
We have made these commitments. We are the key, I think, to
the strategic balance in that region. I am wondering if you are
of the same mind as Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates were
last year, a year ago, when they pretty strongly stated that we
are not going to be deterred from protecting the interests of
countries in international waters in that part of the world?
Mr. Panetta. Very much. That is an extremely important
region. We have to have a presence there in order to protect
our own interests and to work with other countries in that
area. In order to do that, there has to be respect for
international law, and there has to be freedom of the seas so
that we can do our job.
I think it is important to have a relationship with China,
but they also need to understand that by trying to advance in
the China Sea, they can't interfere with our ability to
navigate in that part of the world.
Senator Webb. Or to unilaterally address sovereignty issues
with respect to other countries?
Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
That also gets to the very important question of our basing
system in this part of the world. I know Chairman Levin
addressed this, and I heard your response to that. I think the
timing of addressing these basing issues, particularly with
respect to the Japanese, is vital. This has been going on for
15 years, and we keep kicking the can down the road on it.
We are not going to have stability in Asia if we don't have
it in Northeast Asia. It is the only place in the world, as you
well know, where the direct interests of Russia, China, Japan,
the United States intersect, and the Korean Peninsula is right
in the middle of all of that. I hope that we can work with you
on the suggestions that Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and I
brought forward in order to have a timely solution of that
basing issue.
Mr. Panetta. No, I really appreciated the conversation we
had in your office. I know this isn't--it is not an easy issue.
That is why the can has been kicked down the road, I guess, all
of these years because of the cost and the politics and the
diplomatic problems involved with each of these decisions.
I think it absolutely has to be addressed. We have to
establish a stable situation there. We can't have a situation
in which we are just playing this year to year. I think we need
a long-term solution, and I really want to work with you and
the chairman and others to try to find a solution.
Senator Webb. I thank you for saying that. Because I do
believe this is fixable and have spent many years thinking
about this. I believe what we were able to come up with is at
least the right approach, and it could be done in a timely way
if we could get people to work with us on doing that.
With respect to the situation in Libya, I take your point
during your exchange with Senator McCain that it is the
President's responsibility to ensure national security. At the
same time, we have a situation where when the President
unilaterally decides to begin a military operation and then
continues it, where, clearly, I think as a former Member of
Congress, you would agree that Congress needs to be involved in
shaping downstream when something like that occurs?
Let me say it another way. No one would disagree that with
the President's authority to unilaterally order military force
if the country was under attack, under imminent threat of
attack, invoking the inherent right of self-defense, which is
actually I think what we are doing in a lot of these strikes,
even places like Yemen. Or if we are coming to the aid of an
ally based on a treaty commitment, or we are defending
Americans, protecting Americans who are in distress.
But when you have a situation like in this case where the
justification is humanitarian, you can see the potential for a
very broad definition of what a humanitarian crisis is. Once
that decision is made unilaterally by the President, it needs
to be subject to the review and the direction of Congress, in
my view.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, it has been my experience, both as a
Member of Congress and member of administrations, while
obviously that constitutional power does rest with the
President, that once those decisions are made, in order for
those decisions to be sustained, that it is very important to
work with Congress, seek the best advice and counsel of
Congress, and hopefully to get Congress' support for those
actions.
Senator Webb. I did hear you agree with Senator McCain or
to his comment that nobody is thinking about putting American
ground forces in Libya?
Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
Senator Webb. I assume that also means after the fall of
the Gaddafi regime?
Mr. Panetta. As far as I know, no one is discussing any
boots on the ground there--at any time.
Senator Webb. The House passed a provision to that effect
with 416 votes, and I have introduced a provision here. I just
think we have our hands full, and it is not something we should
be doing in the future in that part of the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are almost done, Director Panetta. I was listening to
Senator Nelson's litany of the challenges ahead of you once you
get confirmed, and I certainly intend to vote for that. I think
you will get confirmed. I wondered, ``Hmm, why does he want to
do that?'' But like everyone on this committee, I am very
grateful that you are willing to do that and appreciate your
patriotism and commitment to the country. Thank you very much
for that.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. I also very much appreciated the
opportunity to sit down with you and your willingness to listen
to some of our particular concerns in New Hampshire and was
very pleased to hear that you are familiar with the work of the
men and women at the Portsmouth naval shipyard and was pleased
to hear your comments to Senator Collins about your commitment
to address the backlog that both the shipyard and other
shipyards around the country are facing.
I was also very pleased that you were willing to listen to
the good work that has been done by New Hampshire's National
Guard deployment support program. Listening to your commitment
today to better serve men and women after they get out of the
military, I hope you will look at programs like New Hampshire's
and some of the other States that have been so successful.
Because not only are our National Guard and Reserves going to
continue to play a greater role in our defense, but there is
some very good data that shows how successful these programs
have been.
I think they serve as a good model for the rest of the
Military Services to look at. I hope you will do that.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. One of the reasons that we have been so
successful in developing the technology for our national
security and have given us really our superiority in terms of
our military might around the world is because of our national
defense technology sector. New England and New Hampshire have
been a knowledge center for that defense technology sector, and
I wonder if you could speak to how DOD or what DOD is currently
doing to ensure that there is a sustained commitment to that
defense technology sector so they will continue to be there as
we need them in the future?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I haven't been fully briefed on all
of the efforts to try to deal with preserving that kind of
technology. But if I am confirmed, I just want you to know that
I am a very strong believer that if we are going to have a
strong defense in this country that we have to have industries
here that are American. We have to have technology capabilities
that are American. We have to be able to have a base of support
in this country in order to maintain our defense systems.
It doesn't mean that we don't deal with our allies. It
doesn't mean that we try to negotiate agreements with them in
certain areas. But if we are going to protect our national
defense, we have to protect our industrial base. We have to
protect our technological base. We have to be able to protect
the capabilities that we need here in order to make that
happen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much for that commitment. A
piece of that is the research and development (R&D) needs, and
obviously, DOD has been a very important part of ensuring that
that R&D gets done. Given the budget constraints that we are
facing, how do you see that affecting our ability to continue
to ensure that the R&D that we need is done?
Mr. Panetta. Again, I don't think we can do this job
without investing in R&D as part of the process of making sure
we are at the cutting edge for the future.
I recognize that, obviously, as part of the effort to look
at the entire budget in order to achieve savings that all of
those areas will be looked at. But my view is that if we want
to protect the weapons systems, if we want to protect our
capabilities for the future, we have to be able to have good
R&D at the same time.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
In talking to some of those New Hampshire and New England
companies that are part of our national defense manufacturing
base, one of the concerns that I often hear from them, because
they are often doing commercial work as well as work for the
military, is their frustration with our export control system.
As I know you know, International Traffic in Arms Regulations
restrictions are onerous. In many cases, they are out of date.
They were really designed for a Cold War system that no longer
exists, and I know that Secretary Gates has been a real
proponent of addressing that system.
I hope that you will be as committed, and I would ask how
you see moving forward an agenda that updates our export
control system in a way that both protects our national
security, but also recognizes that we need to be competitive
globally?
Mr. Panetta. I want you to know, Senator, that I share
Secretary Gates' attitude here. I think we have to be able to
develop 21st century approaches to this kind of exchange in
order for us to be able to make sure that the technologies we
have are, in fact, technologies that we are working with others
to assure and to have.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I know earlier you were asked about Iraq and whether we
would continue to stay in Iraq if we are asked. Like others, I
have been concerned about increasing violence in Iraq, about
the recent casualties. We just lost someone from New Hampshire
in the attack over the weekend. I wonder if you could talk to
what we need to do to keep our focus on the efforts in Iraq,
and assuming that we are not asked to stay, how we will deal
with drawing down the remaining troops that are there?
Mr. Panetta. We are, at the present time, on track to
withdrawing our forces by the end of 2011. But I think that it
is clear to me that Iraq is considering the possibility of
making a request for some kind of presence to remain there. It
really is dependent on the prime minister and on the Government
of Iraq to present to us what is it that they need and over
what period of time in order to make sure that the gains that
we have made in Iraq are sustained.
I have every confidence that a request like that is
something that I think will be forthcoming at some point.
Senator Shaheen. My time has expired. I would like to
explore that more later.
Mr. Panetta. Okay.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Director. I was going to say good morning, but
I realize it is the afternoon. Thank you for your patience.
I want to also, with everybody else on the committee,
acknowledge your tremendous leadership, your personal
friendship, and your willingness to take on yet another
assignment, perhaps one of the biggest and most important in
the Federal Government.
I think you and I share a concern about the country's
fiscal trajectory. Of course, Secretary of Defense Gates has
pointed out that this is a key threat to our national security,
as had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen.
I know we are going to not support any cuts that will harm
our capacity to secure our Nation or the well-being of our
troops. But we are going to have to make some tough decisions.
A broke country is a weak country. Conversely, a solvent
country can be a strong country.
You have had to deal with this at the agency. That is, how
do you balance the needs and the resources? I think we have all
said, hey, everything has to be on the table. But I am curious
what your thoughts are about what the right size is of our
military and how do we determine what our mission ought to be?
I have two easy questions for you. What role do you believe
that the American military should play in the world? As the
senior military adviser-to-be to the President, when you are
confirmed--I am going to be that optimistic--what would be a
set of guidelines that you would use to recommend to the
President whether military action is justified?
Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I think that the United States
exercises a unique role in the world by virtue of our
leadership in the diplomatic arena, but also because of our
military power, we are able to back that up. I think it is
extremely important in today's world, where there are so many
challenges and so many threats that we are confronting, that we
maintain a strong military in order to deal with those kinds of
threats.
It is not only the fact that we are involved in wars, but
clearly, we are facing increasing turmoil. We are facing
terrorism. We are facing other challenges. In my view, the
United States plays a very unique role in the world as far as
providing the kind of leadership that tries to advance
universal rights, a peaceful approach to dealing with the world
that tries to advance good economic and political reform.
That is a unique role for the United States, and I think we
need to continue to send that message and to continue to exert
that leadership. For that reason, I think having a strong
military is essential to that larger role that the United
States plays in today's world.
We hope that others would work with us. We do, obviously,
work with our allies. We work with NATO. We work with other
nations. But there is no question in my mind that the United
States is the fundamental leader right now in the world in a
number of ways, and having the military strength to back up
that kind of leadership is very important.
With regards to how we approach the use of force, I think
there are several important guidelines. Number one, what is the
threat to our national interests? What is our capability to be
able to respond, our military capability to respond to that
kind of a threat? Have we exhausted all other remedies and
options to the use of force? Lastly, what are the prospects to
get the support of not only Congress, but the American people
in that effort? I think all of those things are important
considerations.
Senator Udall. Thank you for those thoughts, Director
Panetta. I think this will be a topic of ongoing conversations,
obviously, as we work to consider how, if we need to
reconfigure DOD and how we are prepared in a world of
insurgencies and cybersecurity needs, satellite systems that
are very important to all of us. There is a real change
underway.
I also hope that we will continue to do what we can to
strengthen our relationship with China as it becomes more of an
economic powerhouse. Hopefully, it will shoulder some of the
responsibility on a worldwide basis because of its own self-
interest, frankly.
Let me turn to energy. I think this has been an area of
your interest as well. It is one of a deep concern, but I also
think a great opportunity for us. Admiral Mullen has said
saving energy saves lives. He recently pointed out that before
we buy another airplane or a ship, we ought to look at what we
can do to save the lives of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and
sailors through our dependence on oil and other energy
technologies.
What are your thoughts on what DOD can do to continue to
push alternative technologies and reducing our dependence on
foreign oil?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, this is an area that I want to learn
a lot more about in terms of how the Defense Department is
approaching this. At least from some of the briefings I have
gotten, I think the Defense Department really is a leader in
terms of trying to develop better energy efficiency, and we
need to be because we use an awful lot of fuel.
My hope is to continue those efforts and to work with you
and others to try to determine what additional steps can we
take, both in the development of weapons, the development of
technologies, how we can better use clean energy, how we can
better use some of the new forms of energy in order to reduce
fuel costs at the Pentagon. But more importantly, in order to
contribute to, hopefully, a cleaner environment.
Senator Udall. I have just introduced a bill along with
Congressman Giffords, I should say reintroduced a bill that we
had put in the hopper in the last Congress, that would provide
more direction to DOD. It has widespread support from
particularly retired general officers and others, and I look
forward to working with you and the chairman as we move to
authorize the Defense Department's activities for 2012.
You are right. DOD's energy bill is about $13 billion a
year, and DOD uses more energy than most countries use, which
stands out. But it is an opportunity. I don't see it as a
burden. I see it as a real opportunity. I think you do, too.
Mr. Panetta. I think it is.
Senator Udall. I see my time has expired. But maybe for the
record, I could ask one question and you could maybe give a
brief response. Then if you want to expound on it for the
record, that would be great.
I know 2014 is our date for Afghanistan, the full handoff.
I do worry about and you know all too well about the safe
havens and the sanctuary they provide for the Taliban. If we
can't reduce those safe havens or, at best, eliminate them,
what are your thoughts on what that means for the hopes of a
resolution of the situation in Afghanistan?
Mr. Panetta. I think we can only win in Afghanistan if we
can win in Pakistan by reducing those safe havens. I think the
two go hand-in-hand. The ability to achieve stability in
Afghanistan is dependent on whether or not we can limit and,
hopefully, stop the transfer of terrorism across that border.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Director. You and both the
chairman are my heroes because you have both been sitting here
for some 4 hours and with great patience and articulate
answers.
Thank you. I look forward to serving with you. Thank you.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
Let me just, before we break for lunch, try to clarify two
parts of your testimony regarding the transition of security
responsibility to the Afghan security forces.
First, would you agree that security transition to Afghan
security forces is to be completed by 2014, but that the
process of transferring provinces and districts to an Afghan
security force lead begins in July?
Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. That President Karzai in March identified
the first group of areas to begin transition this year,
including a number of identified provinces, and that has
already been presented and approved by NATO?
Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. Next, my staff tells me that they have not
been able to find any statement of Secretary Gates in which he
specifies a number of U.S. troops that he believes should be
withdrawn from Afghanistan starting in July. Are you aware of
any statement by Secretary Gates identifying such a number,
whether it is 3,000 to 5,000 or any other number?
Mr. Panetta. I have discussed this with the staff at DOD,
and they are not aware of any statement that he has made that
has indicated a number that would be involved.
Chairman Levin. At this point?
Mr. Panetta. At this point.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
It looks like it is about 5 after 1 p.m. Is that right? We
will meet at 2:30 p.m. in a classified session.
Thank you all. Thank you again for your testimony and for
your service.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Leon E. Panetta by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. It has been 25 years since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols
legislation which has prepared the Department of Defense (DOD) to
better meet today's challenges. At this time, I do not believe
Goldwater-Nichols should be amended, but, if confirmed, I will continue
to evaluate this issue and will work with the committee on this very
important topic.
DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Section 113 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Secretary of
Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters
relating to DOD. Subject to the direction of the President, the
Secretary of Defense, under section 113, has authority, direction, and
control over DOD.
Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your
ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Current authorities for the Secretary of Defense appear to
be clear and appropriate.
Question. What changes to section 113, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. At this time, I have no recommendation for changes to
section 113. My view may change based on the perspectives I may gain
while serving in the position of Secretary of Defense, if confirmed.
PRIORITIES
Question. If confirmed, you will confront a range of critical
issues relating to threats to national security and ensuring that the
Armed Forces are prepared to deal with these threats.
What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with
respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?
Answer. The top priority of the Secretary of Defense is to ensure
the security of the American people.
We face a number of challenges: first, prevailing in the current
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al Qaeda;
second, keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of
terrorists and rogue nations; third, preparing to counter future
military threats; fourth, preserving the finest fighting force in the
world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and fifth,
continuing the reforms DOD's leadership has initiated which will be
crucial in this time of budget constraints.
NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS
Question. The President has called for $400 billion in reductions
to national security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013,
and has asked Secretary Gates to lead a review to provide
recommendations on where to make those cuts.
What is your understanding of the current status of that review?
Answer. Secretary Gates has discussed with me his overall approach
for the Comprehensive Review. It is my understanding that the process
initiated focuses principally on driving program and budget decisions
from choices about strategy and risks. Such a strategy-driven approach
is essential to ensuring that we preserve a superb defense force to
meet national security goals, even under fiscal pressure.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in guiding
the review and in determining what cuts, if any, should be made to the
defense budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to play a large role in the
Comprehensive Review and to have it completed in the fall.
Question. Do you believe that a national security spending
reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant
adverse impact on our national security?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to make disciplined decisions in
ways that minimize impacts on our national security. But it must be
understood that a smaller budget means difficult choices will have to
be made.
Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of:
making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing
requirements for completing the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan,
resetting of the force, meeting ongoing operational commitments across
the globe, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the
President?
Answer. From my years of service in the public sector, I recognize
the importance of balancing immediate and future needs. In national
security matters, such a balance is essential to keeping America safe
both today and tomorrow. Decisions on budget must be carefully made so
that none of the listed objectives is compromised.
If confirmed, I will work with both DOD's civilian and military
leaders to seek the right balance and I will not hesitate to provide my
views on the potential consequences of proposed future changes in the
DOD's budget.
CHAIN OF COMMAND
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section
163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct
communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the
Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in
performing their command function.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. Based on my understanding of the existing authorities and
the practice I have personally observed while Director of the CIA, I
believe there is currently a clear and effective chain of command. If
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will work to ensure that the chain
of command continues to be clear and effective.
Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade
civilian control of the military?
Answer. I believe these provisions enhance civilian control of the
military.
Question. In your capacity as the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, you were reported to have been in charge of the
recent operation against Osama bin Laden, an operation using military
forces of DOD, presumably under the authorities in title 50, U.S.C.
Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for
U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of
an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10,
U.S.C.?
Answer. I believe the chain of command established by title 10 is
the appropriate mechanism for command and control of military
operations. Without commenting on the bin Laden operation in
particular, I will state that in general there are instances in which
military capabilities are temporarily made available to support an
activity of a non-DOD U.S. Government department or agency. In those
circumstances, it is appropriate for the head of such department or
agency to direct the operations of the element providing that military
support while working with the Secretary of Defense. In such
situations, the President remains at the top of the chain of command
and at all times has overall command and responsibility for the
operation. The military units supporting such an operation are still
governed by the laws of armed conflict. Military personnel remain
accountable to the military chain of command, including the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
Question. Can you explain the chain of command for U.S. military
forces in the operation against bin Laden, and what role, if any, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of
Defense each had in that chain of command?
Answer. I cannot comment publicly on the chain of command for the
bin Laden operation, in particular. In general, see my answer above.
Question. Please explain the pros and cons of utilizing U.S.
military personnel for missions under the authorities contained in
title 50, United Sates Code.
Answer. Non-DOD Federal departments and agencies may, in carrying
out their duties, occasionally require support that only the U.S. Armed
Forces can provide. It is therefore sometimes preferable to make an
appropriate military capability temporarily available to support the
operations of other departments and agencies. A significant advantage
of doing so is that it permits the robust operational capability of the
U.S. Armed Forces to be applied when needed. A potential disadvantage
is that the department or agency receiving the support may not be
specifically organized or equipped to direct and control operations by
military forces.
Question. If the reports mentioned above are accurate, please
describe the authorities and agreements which are in place to allow
U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the authorities
contained in title 50, U.S.C. Do you believe any modifications to these
authorities are necessary?
Answer. As noted above, consistent with title 50 of the U.S.C., the
President may authorize departments, agencies, or entities of the U.S.
Government to participate in or support intelligence activities. I
cannot comment publicly on any specific arrangements in this regard. As
stated above, military personnel in support of any such activities
remain subject to the laws of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice while operating under the direction of the head of a
non-DOD Federal department or agency. I believe that existing
authorities are sufficient to facilitate DOD's providing appropriate
support under title 50 while ensuring necessary oversight.
Question. Please explain your views on the preferred chain of
command structure for counter terrorism operations conducted outside of
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Answer. My view is that the chain of command established under
title 10 is appropriate for command of U.S. military operations,
regardless of the location. The determination of whether a military
counterterrorism operation is appropriate will depend on the nature of
the contemplated operation and the circumstances specific to the time
and place of that operation.
ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS
Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., provides, in part, that
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military
adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense and that if any member of the Joint Chiefs submits
to the Chairman advice or an opinion, in disagreement with, or advice
or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman, the
Chairman shall present that advice or opinion at the same time he
provides his own advice to the President, the National Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the combatant
commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their
commands.
Question. What changes in law, if any, do you think may be
necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs and
of the combatant commanders are presented and considered?
Answer. At this time, I do not recommend any changes to the law. If
confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to
determine if changes are advisable, I will recommend changes as
appropriate or necessary.
Question. Do you believe the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. No. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a 4 star
general and attends Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings and provides
invaluable advice. Members of the Guard are members of the uniformed
services and adding its Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
introduce inconsistencies among its members and will create the
impression that the National Guard is a separate military service.
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS FOR THE INTERAGENCY (POLICY)
Question. Several groups and individuals have been calling for a
Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire Federal Government. They argue
that the U.S. and allied militaries can prevail on the battlefield but
that the global war on terror requires a concerted effort by a host of
U.S. agencies.
What are your views on the merits of instituting a Goldwater-
Nichols Act for the entire Federal Government?
Answer. In the 25 years since Goldwater-Nichols much has changed.
In the post-September 11th era, there have been significant benefits
due to increased unity of effort and interagency cooperation. Civilian-
military collaboration has improved, and our military commanders expect
to operate in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment.
Diplomats, development experts, intelligence analysts, and law
enforcement must work together in today's complex operations.
At this time, I do not know that instituting such a change across
the entire Federal Government is needed. However, there may be
additional ways to develop more effective and inclusive approaches to
our national security challenges that do not require legislation.
If confirmed, I intend to reiterate to all civilian and military
personnel in DOD the important role each interagency partner plays in
supporting our Nation's security.
USE OF MILITARY FORCE
Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should
participate in potentially dangerous situations is one of the most
important and difficult decisions that the national command authorities
have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decisionmaking for such
situations.
What factors would you consider in making recommendations to the
President on the use of force?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consider many of the same factors
that previous Secretaries of Defense have evaluated in their
recommendations to the President on the use of force, including the
threat to our vital interests, the ability to employ non-military
methods to respond to the threat, our capability to defeat that threat
and improve our strategic situation through the use of military force,
and the prospects for sustained public support for military action.
Question. What circumstances should pertain for you to recommend
that the President employ preemptive force?
Answer. As the 2010 National Security Strategy discusses, military
force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or
to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting
civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis.
While the use of force is sometimes necessary, if confirmed, we
will continue to exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and
carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and
risks of inaction. When force is necessary, if confirmed, we will
continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our
legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with
such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.
The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if
necessary to defend our Nation and our interests, yet we must also seek
to adhere to standards that govern the use of force.
Question. What degree of certainty do you believe is necessary
before the United States would use preemptive force?
Answer. I believe the use of preemptive force should be based on
the strongest evidence of the need. It is a decision that must not be
taken lightly.
Two years as CIA Director has made me realize that intelligence is
often ambiguous. I believe the men and women in the Intelligence
Community do their best to get the most reliable intelligence possible.
Still, we need to be aware of the caveats that come with intelligence
products. We need to continue to ask hard questions about the
information presented to policymakers.
department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
Question. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans
Affairs Shinseki have pledged to improve and increase collaboration
between the respective departments to support military servicemembers
as they transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental
health care, disability evaluation, and compensation.
If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that
DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs achieve the administration's
objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?
Answer. I understand significant improvements have been made in
DOD-VA collaboration in the last few years. If confirmed, I will
continue the efforts made by Secretary Gates, and look forward to
working with Secretary Shinseki to accelerate current timelines. If
confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to
support servicemembers and their families in all facets of making a
seamless transition to veteran status will remain a top priority.
DISABILITY SEVERANCE PAY
Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced
severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted
from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for
disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in
a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in a combat-
related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In
adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of
a combat-related disability contained in 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)). Rather
than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a more
limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that the
disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict.
If confirmed, would you review the interpretation of this provision
by the Department's subject matter experts and reconsider the
Department's definition of combat-related operations for purposes of
awarding enhanced severance pay and deduction of severance pay from VA
disability compensation?
Answer. I understand this matter is currently being reviewed. If
confirmed, I will continue that review and ensure that any policy
change, if warranted, meets the intent of Congress.
HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY
Question. The ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010,'' enacted
on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy
concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days
after the Secretary of Defense has received DOD's comprehensive review
on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the congressional
defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed
plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and
regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and
that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with
the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion,
and military recruiting and retention.
What is your view on repealing the current DOD policy?
Answer. I support the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 and
the certification process defined in the law.
If confirmed, and in the event Secretary Gates does not sign such a
certification prior to his departure from office, I will work closely
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess whether the elements for
certification in the law are met before signing it myself.
PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS
Question. On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier
Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 13 people and wounding or
injuring 43 others. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010
concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against
internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.
What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
Fort Hood?
Answer. I understand that the Fort Hood review released by DOD in
August 2010 included 79 recommendations on how to improve personnel
policies, force protection, emergency response and mass casualty
preparedness, and support to DOD healthcare providers. I am told that
DOD has completed implementation of half of these recommendations.
If confirmed, I intend to review all the lessons learned,
recommendations for improvement, and progress made to date and work
closely with Members of Congress to ensure that DOD is prepared to
defend against internal threats, including radicalization among DOD's
military and civilian personnel.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
Answer. I understand that the findings and recommendations of the
Fort Hood Review are the foundation of DOD's current strategy and
leadership and accountability are key. If confirmed, I will review this
strategy and how it has been implemented, seek the advice of DOD's
civilian and military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure
that DOD implements the most effective policies to prevent and mitigate
such threats in the future.
RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES
Question. The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort
Hood observed that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks
the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate
religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for
violence or self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final
Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify
guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the
Department to task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-
disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and
self-radicalization . . . .''
What is your view of these recommendations?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Fort Hood Follow-on Review
prepared an implementation plan in response to both of these
recommendations. If confirmed, I will review that report and the
progress that has been made to ensure DOD policies, programs, and
procedures appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion
while effectively protecting our servicemembers from harm.
Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. It is my understanding that the military places a high
value on the rights of servicemembers to observe their respective
religious faiths and that policies and programs reflect this.
Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. I understand each Religious Ministry Professional has
committed to functioning in a pluralistic environment and to
supporting, both directly and indirectly, the free exercise of religion
by all members of the Military Services, their family members, and
other persons authorized to be served by the military chaplaincies. If
confirmed, I will review the relevant policies, seek the advice of the
military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that DOD
appropriately accommodates the free exercise of religion.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. I understand current policy appears to strike the proper
balance by allowing chaplains to voluntarily participate, or not
participate, in settings which conflict with their faith traditions,
while also ensuring chaplains performing in an interfaith setting, such
as an official dinner or interfaith memorial service, are mindful of
the requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I will monitor these
policies and practices.
Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific
fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the
Department's relevant policies?
Answer. I understand DOD has commissioned a Defense Science Board
study on violent radicalization and plans to commission two additional
clinical studies to identify any potential indicators of violent
behavior in military personnel. The results of these studies will
inform DOD's policies and programs on radicalization. If confirmed, I
intend to ensure that DOD continues to rely on a scientific, fact-based
approach to countering radicalization and protecting our force.
Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to
military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and
appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The
Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly
exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.
In your view, do DOD policies appropriately accommodate religious
practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?
Answer. I understand the important and delicate balance that must
be struck between accommodating religious practices that require
adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the
military's uniform grooming and appearance standards. If confirmed, I
will work with the leaders of the military services to achieve an
appropriate balance between maintaining the military's uniform grooming
and appearance standards and approving requested religious
accommodations.
MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY
Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
Answer. I recognize the events related to the attack at Fort Hood
are first and foremost a tragedy for all involved. While it is possible
that such a tragic act could spur harassment and violence as a means of
retaliation, I am informed that military leaders and supervisors at all
levels take precautions to prevent such occurrences and maintain good
order and discipline in the force. No form of harassment will be
tolerated.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
U.S. military?
Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate open communications,
decisive action on the part of military leaders and supervisors, and
command emphasis on the military standard for maintaining good order
and discipline. More specifically, this would include safeguarding the
rights of servicemembers by exercising the established procedures and
processes for addressing all indications of harassment and complaints.
If confirmed, I would review the effectiveness of these feedback
systems, and take measures to improve them, as appropriate.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Question. The Department has in recent years developed
comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing
appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in
combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being
reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized
twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive
or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that their command
fails to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an
adequate investigation of their allegations followed by a failure to
hold assailants accountable.
Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be
effective?
Answer. Sexual assault has no place in DOD--and it will not be
tolerated. DOD's zero tolerance policy on sexual assault is the right
policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs,
and the Service Secretaries are continuously and directly engaged in
emphasizing the importance of addressing sexual assault. DOD is deeply
committed to broad and focused improvements in how it prevents and
responds to sexual assault. Advancements in development of policies and
programs, such as hiring additional investigators, field instructors,
prosecutors, and lab examiners have been made. But there is still work
to do to integrate and continue to improve our efforts across DOD and
the Services. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure DOD is committed
to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive manner.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
which the restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?
Answer. I have not been informed of any specific problems in the
implementation of the restricted reporting option. It is my
understanding that restricted reporting allows victims who wish to
remain anonymous to come forward and obtain the support they need
following an assault without being identified. I believe that the most
important concern in reviewing the reporting procedure should be to
ensure that victims are coming forward. If confirmed, I will review
DOD's program to gain a clear picture of progress and areas for future
improvement in sexual assault reporting procedures.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to
prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including
assaults against contractor personnel?
Answer. Sexual assault against anyone is unacceptable in any
location. I do not have enough information to make a comprehensive
assessment at this time, but it is my understanding that if any of our
deployed servicemembers, civilians, or contractors is assaulted, he or
she will receive appropriate and responsive support and care. It is
also my understanding that individuals who commit sexual assault are
appropriately punished. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure DOD is
committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive manner across
the Services in all locations. There is no tolerance in DOD for sexual
assault in any location or for any personnel who serve in DOD.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a
comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. It is my understanding
that all Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-
hour, 7 day a week sexual assault response capability for all
locations, including deployed areas. I also understand that the
Services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and
prosecuting sexual assault cases. While, I cannot make a specific
assessment at this time, if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy and
efficacy of training and resources allocated to the Services for sexual
assault investigation will be a priority.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
Answer. DOD's policies emphasize the command's role in effective
response to sexual assault. DOD has taken action to provide training
for commanders and to ensure adequate training and resources for
prosecutors and investigators. I understand that DOD's policies seek to
balance victim care and appropriate command action against offenders,
with one of the aims being to build the victim's confidence to assist
in an investigation. If confirmed, I will ensure accountability,
appropriately balanced with victim care, remains an important focus of
DOD's sexual assault prevention and response efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
sexual assaults?
Answer. I believe that sexual assault has no place in the Armed
Forces, and that DOD currently has a zero tolerance policy. I
understand DOD has assigned a General/Flag Officer with operational
experience to provide direct oversight of the Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response Program office. This senior leader will facilitate and
integrate a comprehensive and uniformed approach to sexual assault
prevention and response policy across DOD. If confirmed, I will
continue to make sexual assault prevention and response a priority for
DOD and will work closely with the Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the Chiefs of the Military Services to ensure that DOD
maintains senior leadership focus on this issue.
mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves
Question. In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National
Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained
employment since World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time
in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization,
e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-
connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited
transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient
policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve
Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the
past as ``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been
adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset
policies.
What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
do problems still exist?
Answer. I understand there have been many changes made in policies
governing the utilization of the Guard. There is now a 180-day
notification prior to mobilization, dwell ratio standard of no more
than 1 year mobilized for 5 years not mobilized, and Guard and
reservists can only be involuntary activated for 1 year.
These changes have improved morale by providing a predictable cycle
of active duty.
A key problem that remains is there are over 30 different duty
statuses for Guard and Reserve personnel. This diversity of duty status
is cumbersome and results in mobilization and de-mobilization delays.
MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES
Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
improved policy oversight and accountability.
If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
Answer. In order to fully assess the capability of the Reserve
Force, it is critical to measure and report medical and dental
readiness in a standardized manner. It is my understanding that over
the past several years, small, but steady improvements have been made
across the Services, but there is more work to do in confirming the
medical and dental readiness of the entire Reserve Force.
Medical and dental readiness is tracked through standardized
calculations each quarter. Currently, the medical readiness achievement
goal is 75 percent and DOD is at 63 percent. The dental readiness
achievement goal is 85 percent, and DOD has met that goal.
While progress can be seen, the medical and dental readiness of the
Reserve component remains a priority if I am confirmed.
Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to
maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component?
Answer. It's my understanding that DOD continues to pursue new and
improved opportunities to provide flexible options for the Guard and
Reserve to improve their overall readiness.
Producing and maintaining a healthy and fit Reserve component
requires more than access to health care--it also requires command
emphasis and individual accountability.
Recently, the Army Reserve approved and funded two medical/dental
readiness days per soldier starting in fiscal year 2010.
If confirmed, I will work with the Services to incorporate the
findings and recommendations from the executive-level DOD Prevention,
Safety and Health Promotion Council (PSHPC) recently created to advance
health and safety promotion and injury/illness prevention policy
initiatives to address readiness requirements developed from evidence-
based research.
DWELL TIME
Question. While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in
Iraq, many Active Duty military members are still not experiencing the
dwell time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.
In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be
met?
Answer. I understand that the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, on
average, are meeting or exceeding DOD's dwell time goal of 1:2 for the
Active component. The Army is now averaging 1:1 but expects to be 1:2
by October 2011. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor this issue
closely.
Question. When will dwell time objectives be met for the Reserve
components?
Answer. I understand Reserve component dwell time is improving, but
has not reached DOD's dwell time goal of 1 year of active duty and 5
years at home, or 1:5. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward the
goal of a 1:5 dwell time ratio for the Reserve component.
ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH
Question. Secretary Gates announced this year that the Army would
reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including
7,000 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary
increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to
cease relying on ``stoploss'' and to make up for a growing population
of non-deployable soldiers. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, depending on
conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce
their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and
at least 15,000 marines, respectively.
Do you agree with this Active-Duty end strength reduction plan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the plan, but it is my
understanding, that based upon what we know today, and the well
reasoned assumptions that have been made, that the current plan strikes
a prudent balance between serving operational needs and ensuring the
funds available for recapitalization which are critical to future
readiness. However, I know that ensuring that commanders have the right
numbers and right kinds of volunteers to perform their mission is of
critical importance. As future national security circumstances could
change, if confirmed, our plan will change accordingly.
Question. What is your view of how these planned end strength
reductions will affect dwell time ratios?
Answer. The Army and Marine Corps end strength reductions, planned
for fiscal year 2015, are based on the assumption of a future draw-down
in Afghanistan. If this assumption holds true, the dwell ratio of 1:2
should not be affected.
Question. What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives
have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take into consideration dwell time
objectives and our ability to meet competing strategic objectives
before implementing the planned end strength reductions.
Question. In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its
planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse
impact on national security?
Answer. I am unable to express an opinion on this issue at this
time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army on appropriate
end strength.
Question. What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating
the Army's force reduction plan?
Answer. That would depend on the Army's deployment footprint and
the period of acceleration. However, I would anticipate that the Army
may not be able to achieve the dwell ratio goal of 1:2 on its current
schedule. This is an issue that I will need to evaluate, if confirmed.
Question. What are the assumptions regarding ``conditions on the
ground'' that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015
to occur on time?
Answer. Generally speaking, I would consider our progress against
the established security objectives at the time. I would solicit the
advice of DOD's senior military and civilian leaders to inform my
judgment on such decisions.
Question. The Navy and Air Force have requested congressional
authorization of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength
limits and save money.
In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get
down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require
Congressional authorization?
Answer. I understand that some of the authorities used during
previous force reductions have expired or are expiring soon. DOD is
seeking to renew these authorities and is requesting new legislation to
size and shape the force. My view is that DOD should make maximum use
of voluntary authorities; however, great care should be taken to ensure
those who leave are not going to be needed in the near term. If
confirmed, I will study this issue closely and rely on the advice of
both civilian and military professionals at the Department.
RECRUITING STANDARDS
Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military
service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents
unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for
relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with
respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical
fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal
misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Army, G-1, recently testified, less than 25 percent of all 17-24 year
olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and educational
requirements.
What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards
regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?
Answer. From my understanding, the current enlistment qualification
standards are well-defined and have stood the test of time. They are
driven by the need to provide the Services with men and women who are
prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet performance
requirements. To that end, the Services carefully screen applicants,
who come from all walks of life. The traditional high school diploma is
the best single predictor of attrition. Some standards may change over
time. Medical standards have been revised, for example, as pre-
enlistment treatments result in improved outcomes.
Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of
eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?
Answer. From my understanding, the Services are exploring ways to
improve our ability to predict attrition. The Services may be able to
augment their screening procedures by incorporating other measures,
such as personality, to identify applicants who are likely to adapt
well to the military. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to
continually find new ways to recruit.
Question. Are there any enlistment requirements or standards that
are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful
military service?
Answer. I am not aware that DOD assesses that military enlistment
standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness,
adaptability, and aptitude standards which correlate to the physical,
disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to
succeed in the Armed Forces.
Question. Do you believe that current policies defining three tiers
of high school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition
during the initial enlistment term, should be retained?
Answer. My understanding is the Services track the attrition rates
of military recruits, by a variety of credential types, and traditional
high school diploma graduates have lower rates of attrition than any
other type of credential holder.
WOMEN IN THE MILITARY
Question. The Navy has opened service on submarines to women, the
Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women in
intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment
policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women
in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and
the American public.
Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for
service by women?
Answer. It is my understanding DOD believes it has sufficient
flexibility under current law to make appropriate assignment policy for
women. DOD will continue to monitor combat needs as Services recommend
expanding combat roles for women and notify Congress accordingly as
required by statute (10 U.S.C., Sec. 652 and/or Sec. 6035). Any
decision regarding opening additional specialties for service by women
should be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission
readiness of our All-Volunteer Force.
Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy or
legislation regarding women in combat are needed or warranted?
Answer. I understand DOD policies and practices that restrict
assigning female servicemembers are currently under review per section
535 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. If
confirmed, I will take my responsibility to thoroughly review any
proposed policy change and ensure changes to existing policy move
forward after appropriate notice to Congress.
RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE
Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
In April, 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force
Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive.'' The
administration has proposed health care efficiencies to save nearly
$8.0 billion through 2016.
Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?
Answer. As they have been described to me, I believe that the
proposed health care efficiencies are sensible efforts to control DOD's
health care costs while maintaining the same level of care. I also
believe the modest increases in beneficiaries' cost shares are
reasonable.
Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
the costs of military health care?
Answer. While the proposals included in the fiscal year 2012
President's budget are a significant first step, I believe that we need
to continue to explore all possibilities to control the costs of
military health care. In the long term, the promotion of healthy life
styles and prevention among our beneficiaries is one way to help reduce
the demand for health services.
Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising
medical costs on future DOD plans?
Answer. I understand that even with the estimated savings from the
health care efficiencies proposed in the fiscal year 2012 budget, the
cost of the Military Health System continues to increase as a
percentage of the DOD budget and will exceed 10 percent of the budget
in just a few years.
During a period when there is heavy downward pressure on all
Federal spending, including defense spending, we must make smart
choices that permit us to maintain a balance between personnel benefits
and funding for equipment and readiness.
If confirmed, one of my highest priorities would be to ensure that
DOD provides quality care, and it does so in a way that provides the
best value for our servicemembers and their families, as well as the
American taxpayer.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time. If
confirmed, I would work closely with the health care leadership in DOD
to examine every opportunity to ensure military beneficiaries are
provided the highest quality care possible while managing cost growth.
PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS
Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever
increasing portion of the DOD budget.
What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to
control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?
Answer. I am aware that an increasing portion of DOD's limited
resources are devoted to personnel-related costs.
I understand there have been many incremental adjustments to
military pay and benefits over the years; however, much of the military
compensation system remains rooted in structures established
generations ago. If we are going to manage costs, I believe everything
must be on the table. It may be appropriate to conduct a comprehensive
review of the military pay and benefits structure to determine where
costs can be contained.
I believe that it may be possible to restructure our military
benefits in a way that reduces costs, but any such effort must continue
to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families
in a wide variety of situations.
Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services
efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high
quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the
Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for other elements of
the force?
Answer. I understand recruiting and retention bonuses are cost-
effective tools to achieve DOD's personnel strength and experience
objectives. However, we must continually monitor these tools to ensure
they are being used efficiently as well as effectively. A review of the
utilization and efficacy of bonuses should certainly be part of any
comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure.
MILITARY RETIREMENT
Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
(QRMC) proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more
resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement
System than the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE
fees for retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible
spending accounts for servicemembers. The head of a Defense Business
Board Task Force has criticized military benefits as ``GM-style
benefits'' describing the military retirement system as a ``pre-
volunteer force retirement system'' and criticizing ``taxpayer-
subsidized grocery chains and low out-of-pocket healthcare costs''.
What is your view of the adequacy of the current military
retirement benefit?
Answer. I understand that the military retirement system was
created in an earlier era and, in general, accomplishes the purpose for
which it was designed; to provide a strong incentive to attain 20 years
of service and then to leave shortly thereafter. To maintain the right
military force structure, the comprehensive mix of pay and benefits,
which includes military retirement, needs to be adequate. However, over
time, the world has changed and private-sector compensation practices
have changed, but the military retirement system has remained
essentially the same. I believe it may be appropriate to also review
the military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies.
Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new
generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of
the government?
Answer. I understand there are many proposed alternatives to the
current military retirement system. I am unable to make recommendations
at this time but will closely study proposals and their impact if
confirmed.
Question. Do you share the Defense Business Board Task Force view
of military benefits?
Answer. I am aware that the Defense Business Board is reviewing
military retirement, but I do not believe it has released their report.
I look forward to reviewing it once it is made available. I agree that
it may be possible to restructure our military benefits in a way that
reduces costs, but any such effort must continue to attract and support
our men and women in uniform and their families.
DEPENDENT CARE AND FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS
Question. The 10th QRMC recommended providing dependent care and
flexible spending benefits to Active-Duty servicemembers. Providing
these benefits would seem consistent with the initiatives of First Lady
Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It
would appear that no new legislative authority is needed for the
Department to provide these benefits to servicemembers and their
families.
If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the active duty
servicemembers and their families?
Answer. I understand that in response to the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, DOD examined and provided a
report on the advantages and disadvantages of providing flexible
spending accounts to military members. If confirmed, I will review
whether flexible spending accounts should be extended to Active-Duty
servicemembers and their families.
SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS
Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured performing
duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn
deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services,
healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007
illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of
significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the
enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain,
including a growing population of soldiers awaiting disability
evaluation.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
Answer. Although I do not have sufficient information to make a
full assessment at this time, I am aware that significant improvements
in these areas have been made in the last 4 years. However, it is my
opinion that more must be done. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure
DOD regularly evaluates and seeks to improve its wounded warrior
programs to ensure that the needs of our wounded warriors and their
families are met.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based?
Answer. In my opinion, one of the most significant strengths is the
high priority which DOD has placed on caring for our wounded warriors
and their families. In my view, next to the wars themselves, there is
no higher priority, and if confirmed, I will continue to place the
highest priority on these efforts.
Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. A challenge facing DOD in this area, as in other areas, is
to ensure that in delivering the highest standard of care for our
wounded, ill and injured, we do so in an effective and cost-efficient
manner.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. I do not have any specific recommendations at this time. If
confirmed, I will closely monitor and evaluate this issue to ensure
necessary resources are in place to take care of our recovering
wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families.
Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A
DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, have been
established to improve processing of servicemembers.
What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
improve the Integrated DES?
Answer. I have been told that a revised and improved disability
evaluation system developed by the Departments of Defense and Veterans
Affairs, known as the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, today
serves over half of those in the system, and that its wide adoption is
a priority of the VA and DOD leadership. I do not currently have any
specific recommendations regarding the Integrated Disability Evaluation
System, but I support these ongoing efforts and, if confirmed, will
look for opportunities to further improve on them.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change,
particularly the Army's growing problem?
Answer. I do not have specific recommendations at this time, but,
if confirmed, I will work with DOD and VA to continually evaluate the
system and identify opportunities for improvement.
SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services has
increased in recent years. The Army released a report in July 2010 that
analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In
addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in
theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in
mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced
multiple deployments.
In your view, what role should DOD play in shaping policies to help
prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the
resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members
of the Reserve components?
Answer. The rise in suicides in the military and by veterans is
tragic and DOD has a responsibility to address the factors that
contribute to suicidal behavior among our military men and women
whether they are deployed, at a military installation or in their home
communities. I understand all of the Services have implemented
prevention and resilience building programs. The Final Report of the
Department of Defense Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by
Members of the Armed Forces is being used as a vehicle to review all
Departmental policies and procedures related to suicide prevention. If
confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to improve suicide
prevention policies and processes.
Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Army are taking in response to the
July 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to read Army Health
Promotion, Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention Report 2010, I know that
sustaining a force steadily engaged in combat for over a decade has
unexpected challenges. Some of those challenges include a rise in
``high risk'' behaviors and suicides. It is my understanding the Army's
report provided an introspective look at these issues and concluded
that suicide and other high risk behaviors must be addressed with a
more holistic and multidisciplinary approach. If confirmed, I will work
to see the Services share lessons learned to jointly address these risk
factors.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
home station?
Answer. Ensuring that our servicemembers and their families have
sufficient access to the mental health resources that they need is
critical to the wellness of our total force. I am advised that DOD is
working to determine workforce requirements for mental health
professionals, and utilizing all the medical, educational, and
counseling resources available, but there is further room for
improvement. If confirmed, I will monitor how well we are meeting these
goals by assessing current utilization rates and further determining
ways in which we can leverage more resources for our servicemembers and
their families.
MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE
Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of
key quality of life factors for military families, such as family
support, child care, education, health care and morale, welfare and
recreation services.
How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
and retention and quality of life improvements and your own top
priorities for the Armed Forces?
Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to read the
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, I know that quality of life
factors, such as those highlighted in the report, contribute
significantly to recruiting and retention are key to maintaining the
All-Volunteer Force. It is well known that a servicemember's
satisfaction with various aspects of military life, as well as the
servicemember's family's experience, has a strong influence on a
member's decision to reenlist. If confirmed, I will monitor how
effectively DOD programs, in conjunction with community efforts, meet
the needs of servicemembers and their families, and ensure that they
are contributing positively to recruitment and retention.
Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
quality of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision
working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy
groups, and Congress to achieve them?
Answer. I understand the importance of quality of life programs on
the wellness of the total force as well as on recruiting and retention.
If confirmed, I will study the key areas such as access to counseling,
fitness opportunities, child care support and spouse employment
opportunities. I look forward to working with advocacy groups and
Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and
to communicate effectively with families to ensure that they know how
to access available support when they need it.
FAMILY SUPPORT
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, I will study this issue in great detail, but
I believe that family readiness is tethered to family resilience. It is
DOD's responsibility to ensure that families are well prepared to meet
the challenges that come with deployment and service. Through focusing
on the psychological, social, financial, and educational well-being of
military families, DOD can continue to build family resilience. I
understand that great strides have been made in improving access to
resources for families through such programs as Military One Source,
the Yellow Ribbon Program, but DOD can always improve.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, base realignment and closure, deployments,
and growth in end strength?
Answer. Given upcoming structural changes across the world, it is
DOD's responsibility to ensure that all resources including those in
health care, education and employment are available to families at the
level they need wherever they may be located. In order to accurately
address the needs of these families in a changing environment, it is
also critical to DOD's success to build community partnerships between
all Federal agencies and with local governments, businesses, and non-
profit organizations that are stakeholders in addressing the stressful
aspects of military life. If confirmed, I will monitor the changing
needs of our military families closely.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve
component families related to mobilization, deployment and family
readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a
military installation?
Answer. DOD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to
quality resources, regardless of location. These resources should
provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to all military
members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a
coordinated, community based network of care encompassing DOD, VA,
State, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding
that DOD's Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in addressing
these needs. If confirmed, I will assess this program to ensure that it
is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by Active
Duty, Guard, and Reserve servicemembers and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
enhance family support?
Answer. During my pre-hearing office calls, I heard about many
excellent State programs that support servicemembers and their
families. If confirmed, I would like to explore these further and see
if they can be expanded across all States.
Question. In your view, are the recent increases in military family
support (which have risen to $8.3 billion in the fiscal year 2012
President's budget) sustainable in future years?
Answer. I believe family programs are sustainable in future years.
It will be necessary to review family programs with respect to
efficiencies just as every other program in DOD will be reviewed
against the overall needs of DOD. The focus should not merely be on
more resources, but rather on the efficiency and quality of Family
Support programs along with the leveraging community-level
organizations and citizens who desire to help their military-connected
neighbors. DOD efficiency, along with community partnerships and
cooperation, are key to allowing DOD to meet the long-term needs of our
military families in an ever-increasing fiscally constrained
environment.
DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD's leadership should always be
mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for
detainee treatment, including the risk that the manner in which we
treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which
U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts.
Question. Do you consider waterboarding to be torture?
Answer. As I stated at my February 2009 confirmation hearing and
prior to that hearing, I believe that waterboarding crosses the line
and should not be employed. Having said that, I also believe, as the
President has indicated, that those individuals who operated pursuant
to a legal opinion indicating that the technique was proper and legal
ought not to be prosecuted or investigated. They were acting pursuant
to the law as it was presented to them by the Attorney General at that
time.
Question. Do you believe that waterboarding is consistent with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. As stated, I have expressed the view that I believe that
waterboarding crosses the line and should not be employed. I therefore
believe that waterboarding is inconsistent with the requirements of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.
Question. Do you believe that we have obtained intelligence through
waterboarding that we would not have been able to obtain through other
means?
Answer. As I have stated previously, the Intelligence Community
relies on many sources of information. Whether that technique is the
only way to obtain certain information is an open question, as I have
repeatedly said. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will ensure
that all interrogations conducted by DOD personnel are conducted
consistent with the Department of the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 and in
accord with Geneva Conventions Common Article 3.
Question. Do you believe that the intelligence we received through
waterboarding was accurate, or did we receive false leads?
Answer. I cannot generalize about the quality of the intelligence
that has been obtained through any particular technique. I am aware of
instances in which useful information has been obtained from detainees
and other instances in which detainees sought to provide false
information.
Question. Are there any circumstances under which you believe the
United States should resume waterboarding of detainees?
Answer. As I testified at my February 2009 confirmation hearing, I
fully support the President's decision to establish the Army Field
Manual, which does not permit waterboarding, as the single standard
applying to all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel and have
upheld this standard while I was CIA Director. I will continue to do so
if confirmed as Secretary of Defense. I believe we should do everything
possible to collect intelligence while remaining in compliance with the
law.
Question. Are you familiar with the ``enhanced interrogation
techniques,'' other than waterboarding, that have been applied to so-
called ``high value detainees'' at Guantanamo and elsewhere?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe that these enhanced interrogation
techniques are consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. I would refrain to offer a legal opinion on this question
as the answer also depends upon the nature and extent of the technique
employed.
COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Question. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOD
established the U.S. Northern Command and an Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.
What is your assessment of the current situation regarding
cooperation and coordination between DOD and DHS on homeland security
matters, and what will be your goals in this regard if you are
confirmed?
Answer. I understand that DOD has established a strong relationship
with DHS.
I believe DOD and DHS have a common goal: the protection of the
United States.
Elements of DOD work very closely with a number of the operational
components of DHS including the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the Secret Service, Customs and Boarder
Protection, and others.
DOD and DHS work hand in hand with the Council of Governors to
reach common goals. I understand DOD has a number of liaison and
coordination officers throughout DHS and its components. I also
understand that there are a number of cyber security related issues on
which the Departments are also in collaboration.
If confirmed, my goal would be to continue this strong relationship
and build upon a number of these important initiatives.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate mechanism for DOD
to respond to the needs of domestic agencies for DOD support--whether
through new or modified programs within DOD or otherwise?
Answer. I understand the mechanisms for DOD to respond to the needs
of domestic agencies appear to be working effectively. During the 2010
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, DOD responded to 141 requests for
assistance from DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard, by providing ships to
skim surface oil, air traffic control capabilities, and other critical
assets. DOD has responded to over 50 requests for assistance from FEMA
in the past year for a variety of disasters. DOD also regularly assists
other agencies in the homeland as well, including the Department of
Agriculture for fighting wildfires, and the Secret Service for security
during special events such as the Presidential Inaugural. If confirmed,
I will work closely with domestic agencies to ensure DOD is prepared to
continue to support civil authorities, when appropriate.
IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED
Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?
Answer. One of the most important lessons is the U.S. Government
must train and plan for post-combat operations. Conflict can occur
along a spectrum. Our military must be prepared for combat, but also
may have a role in shaping the political, cultural and economic factors
that can fuel conflict. The U.S. military must plan and train with
civilian counterparts, be prepared to operate effectively in all phases
of conflict, and develop better awareness of political, cultural, and
economic factors to ensure that our actions will meet our objectives.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force
structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?
Answer. I understand that lessons learned from Iraq and other
recent engagements have led to deep and wide-ranging changes in
doctrine, organization, training, and policy. For example, the
counterinsurgency doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in
the publication of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. The development
of Advise and Assist Brigades and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance units are examples of force structure changes.
Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you
propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating
concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in
Iraq?
Answer. I am not in a position to recommend specific measures at
this time. I understand that many of the lessons from Iraq are in the
process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine, and are
contributing to the effort in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will monitor
this ongoing process closely.
LEAD AGENCY TRANSITION IN IRAQ
Question. Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq
is scheduled this year to transition from DOD to Department of State
(DOS). By October 2011, DOS is supposed to achieve an initial operating
capability as lead agency and achieve full operating capability by
December.
What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning
and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your
view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current
plan and successful implementation of this transition?
Answer. DOD, State Department, and other agencies and offices have
undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the
transition in Iraq. I understand that DOD has an excellent working
relationship with DOS and that the two departments are working together
at all levels to achieve a successful transition. As one would expect
with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist and
DOD is doing everything it can to help set up DOS for success.
The biggest concern I am aware of is that the State Department may
not receive the resources it needs for the transition.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?
Answer. I believe the current plans are sufficient, based on what I
have been briefed to date. If confirmed, I would review and assess the
Iraq transition planning and make recommendations on any necessary
changes.
STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has
underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the
conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-
conflict situations.
In your view, what are the appropriate roles and responsibilities,
if any, between DOD and other departments and agencies of the Federal
Government in the planning and conduct of stability operations?
Answer. As seen in recent operations, there is a great need for
economic development, governance, and law enforcement experts who work
for the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the Justice Department. As appropriate, I understand that
DOD operates within U.S. Government and international structures for
managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the
deployment and use of the appropriate civilian capabilities and
resources. Ideally, I understand that DOD usually will be in a
supporting role. But when no other options are available, and when
directed, DOD has led stability operations activities to establish
civil security and control and to restore essential services, repair
and protect critical infrastructure, deliver humanitarian assistance,
and then transitioned lead responsibility to other U.S. Government
agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international
governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.
Question. In developing the capabilities necessary for stability
operations, what adjustments, if any, should be made to prepare U.S.
Armed Forces to conduct stability operations without detracting from
its ability to perform combat missions?
Answer. I note DOD policy states that ``stability operations are a
core U.S. military mission that DOD shall be prepared to conduct with
proficiency equivalent to combat operations.'' This represents a
significant cultural and programmatic shift in recent years. If
confirmed, I intend to familiarize myself with the efforts of the
Military Departments to enhance proficiency on these missions and will
work with the Chairman, the Military Department Secretaries, and
Service Chiefs to ensure appropriate adjustments are made.
Question. Do you believe that the authorities provided under
section 1206 (Building the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces) and
section 1207 (Security and Stabilization Assistance) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 contribute to a policy
of military engagement?
Answer. I believe the authorities provided under sections 1206 and
1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
have made the government more agile in its ability to respond to urgent
and emergent counterterrorism and stabilization challenges. I am told
that the ``dual-key'' processes established to manage these projects
have fostered greater collaboration between the Departments of State
and Defense. If confirmed, I intend to apply the lessons learned from
our experience with these programs in future security and stabilization
assistance efforts with Secretary Clinton and other interagency
partners.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to
establish new organizations or offices to manage stability operations?
If so, why?
Answer. Although I have not studied this issue in detail, my
understanding is that the U.S. Government does not need to establish
new organizations or offices to manage stability operations. If
confirmed, however, I will be open to the advice of others on this
issue.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to
establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?
Answer. I think one area where we can improve is to strengthen our
combined ability to conduct ``whole-of-government'' planning which will
enhance the management and the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's
stabilization and reconstruction activities. If confirmed, I will
review how to make such planning a priority.
Question. What role do you believe DOD should play in providing
training and advocacy for ``rule of law'' development in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Answer. Without fair and effective rule of law, neither Iraq nor
Afghanistan will be able to prevent the return of terrorists. Both
countries require U.S. Government assistance in rule of law capacity
building in such areas as civilian police forces, attorneys, and
judges. I strongly support the State Department's lead in this critical
endeavor. However, in fragile security environments, my sense is that
DOD rule of law practitioners can also play a major and useful role in
providing training and assistance.
SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
in Iraq?
Answer. Iraq still faces dangerous and determined enemies, but
these enemies do not have the support of the Iraqi people. Although
occasional high-profile attacks still occur, the underlying security
situation in Iraq remains stable and these attacks have not sparked a
return to widespread insurgency or civil war.
Question. What are the main challenges to stability and security in
Iraq over the coming months?
Answer. The main challenges to internal stability and security in
Iraq are al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed Shia extremist groups.
Moreover, the unresolved status of territories claimed by the Kurdistan
Regional Government has the potential to create fissures that can be
exploited by extremist groups, and could even lead to an escalation of
tension between Kurdish and central government forces. However, with
sustained political engagement by Iraqi leaders and a strong U.S.
support role, the ISF should be able to handle these challenges.
DRAWDOWN IN IRAQ
Question. Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S.
forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of
2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued
presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you
support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond
the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?
Answer. Iraqi leaders and U.S. officials have acknowledged that
there will be gaps in Iraqi Security Forces' capabilities after 2011,
especially in external defense. I believe the United States should
consider a request from the Government of Iraq to remain in Iraq for a
limited period of time to provide limited assistance to fill these
gaps.
U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
Question. In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq
strategic relationship after December 31, 2011?
Answer. The nature of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship desired
by both countries is articulated in the November 2008 Strategic
Framework Agreement (SFA). The SFA establishes a structure for
cooperation and collaboration across a variety of sectors, including
commercial, education, cultural, political, energy, and defense.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that
relationship over the coming years?
Answer. The greatest challenges will be maintaining U.S. engagement
and support for Iraq during a time of change. Recent turmoil in the
broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement
and maintaining strategic partnerships with regional partners based on
mutual interests and mutual respect. We must maintain focus on Iraq in
order to advance broader U.S. objectives of peace and security in the
region.
AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for
Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?
Answer. Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set
forth and I believe it is the right strategy. We have the necessary
resources and strategy in place to succeed in our focused
counterinsurgency campaign. This strategy has reversed the insurgency's
momentum and is helping the Afghans increase their governance capacity
and build security forces that are capable of providing the security
and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan
that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. The gains made
are fragile and reversible.
Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an
increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The
administration tracks metrics of progress throughout the year and
conducts annual reviews to determine whether adjustments are necessary.
Counterterrorism is a significant part of the counterinsurgency
strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an
ongoing process.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
Answer. Important gains have been made over the past 18 months,
establishing security and Afghan Government authority in former Taliban
strongholds such as Helmand and Kandahar, as well as building the
capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Although the gains are
fragile and reversible, momentum has shifted to the Afghan Government,
and they are on track to begin the transition process by assuming lead
security responsibilities in several areas of the country this summer.
Question. In your view, how significant an impact does the death of
Osama bin Laden have on the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant victory in
our campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, which is the
core goal of our efforts in Afghanistan. The successful operation does
not mean we can rest, but rather we have a unique opportunity to make
new gains on al Qaeda while it is in disarray. It is too early to
assess the long-term impact of his death, but it clearly conveys our
persistence, determination and capability to achieve our goals.
TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. TROOP
REDUCTIONS
Question. Do you support the July 2011 date announced by President
Obama to begin transferring more and more responsibility for
Afghanistan's security to the Afghan security forces and to begin the
drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, with the pace of reductions
to be based on conditions on the ground?
Answer. I support the July 2011 date to begin the process of
transferring lead security responsibility to the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) and to begin a responsible, conditions-based
drawdown of U.S. forces. Over the preceding 18 months, the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its ANSF partners
have made significant gains in the overall security environment. Their
hard-earned gains have set the necessary conditions to begin the
transition of responsibility.
Question. Do you support a significant drawdown of U.S. troops
starting in July of this year?
Answer. I support a responsible conditions-based drawdown as called
for by the President. I believe we have made the progress necessary to
give the President meaningful options for his decision. Decisions
regarding the size and pace of the drawdown will be based on
commanders' assessment of conditions and warfighting requirements.
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, does the death of
Osama bin Laden have on the size or time table for the reduction of
U.S. troops in Afghanistan?
Answer. It is too early to know the implications of Osama bin
Laden's death on the region and how it will affect the campaign. While
bin Laden's death sends a clear message to other al Qaeda and Taliban
senior leaders about U.S. resolve, there are no indications at this
stage of what impact, if any, it might have for decisions regarding the
size or time table for reducing forces in Afghanistan.
Question. Do you support the goal of transitioning security
responsibility to the Afghan security forces by 2014?
Answer. Yes. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the participants in ISAF
endorsed President Karzai's goal of ANSF assuming lead responsibility
for security throughout Afghanistan by 2014. Although much work is
still left, I am confident that this objective can be met.
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
professional and effective ANSF?
Answer. The ANSF have made enormous progress in size and quality
over the past 2 years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth
targets this year. In addition, both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
Afghan National Police (ANP) have made significant gains in
effectiveness and professionalism, although more remains to be
achieved. The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program
has also fostered greater local capability to resist insurgents. U.S.
and NATO efforts to recruit, train, equip, and deploy these forces, in
conjunction with very capable Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior,
are paying real dividends on the ground in Afghanistan. These gains
have set the ANSF on a path to be capable of assuming lead security
responsibilities across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
Question. Do you support the increase in the size of the ANSF
beyond the level of 305,000 by the fall of 2012?
Answer. Yes. Military commanders, who are closest to the problem
and have expert knowledge, have conducted detailed studies on ANSF
personnel and capabilities requirements. These requirements were
developed by examining the terrain, the strength of the enemy, and the
core goals in the DOD campaign plan. In order to ensure the Afghans
have the capabilities they need to secure their country in the current
threat environment, continued ANSF growth is needed. The President has
endorsed growth to 352,000 and I support that decision.
Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any,
would you make for addressing those challenges?
Answer. Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the
ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan
population which constrain the development of more advanced
capabilities such as logistics, aviation, medical and communications
units. These are capabilities that will be necessary for the ANSF to
ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put a lot of attention on, and
resources toward, the literacy problem. Another key challenge is the
development of strong and capable leadership, which takes time and
experience. If confirmed, I will work with military and civilian
leaders and international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF
capacity.
AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
Question. While improving security for the Afghan people is a key
component of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the success
of that strategy also depends on improving the Government of
Afghanistan's capacity to provide governance, better services and
economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance
of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan
people and fighting corruption.
What do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the
Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better
governance, improve economic development and fight corruption in
Afghanistan?
Answer. I strongly agree that improving governance and economic
development is as crucial to our strategy in Afghanistan as is
improving security. While DOS and USAID are the lead agencies within
the U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in
Afghanistan, the DOD contributes to this effort and must cooperate
closely with State and USAID. Coordinating DOD stabilization projects
with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the
military and civilian activities work together to support longer-term
development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization.
In areas where civilians cannot operate independently due to an
insecure environment, they regularly collaborate with military
counterparts. Recognizing that corruption erodes the legitimacy of the
Afghan state and fuels the insurgency, the Commander, ISAF, created
Task Force Shafafiyat (``Transparency'') to foster a common
understanding of the corruption problem and coordinate anti-corruption
efforts among ISAF, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the Afghan Government, and
the international community. The task force has enabled ISAF to begin
helping the Afghans address corruption and has improved U.S.
contracting practices to ensure our funds are not being used in ways
that contribute to the corruption that enables the insurgency
RECONCILIATION
Question. Under what conditions should reconciliation talks with
the Taliban leadership be pursued?
Answer. The President has clearly outlined our support for an
Afghan-led process to achieve a political resolution to the conflict in
Afghanistan. I support Afghan Government efforts to achieve the
reconciliation of groups and individuals who agree to cut ties with al
Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution.
Question. What is your assessment of the likelihood that such
conditions may be achieved in the near future?
Answer. The clear successes we have seen in the military campaign
are helping to create the conditions for reconciliation. The insurgency
does not represent a clear hierarchy, and includes a variety of
competing and affiliated groups. Resolution of the conflict in
Afghanistan will likely require a process that includes both national
and local dispute resolution. I am optimistic that the sustained
combination of our military, governance, and diplomatic efforts is
helping to set the conditions for the Afghan Government to build the
political consensus that will ultimately bring about a resolution to
the conflict.
U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN
Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
with regard to Pakistan?
Answer. Most importantly, the core national security goal remains,
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its militant allies, and
eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States and its allies
in the future. U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our
relationship with Pakistan itself and Pakistan's role in the campaign
against al Qaeda. Al Qaeda and other extremists use safe-havens in
Pakistan to plot and prepare attacks against the U.S. and our allies
and partners, and it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to
eliminate these safe havens.
In addition, Pakistan's civilian-led government requires
international support to maintain political stability and to work
toward the ability to govern all of its territory effectively. The fact
that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal threats from
extremist organizations adds to the urgency of these requirements.
Furthermore, U.S. economic interests in South Asia require stability in
the region. Preventing, if possible, a potential Pakistan-India
conflict is another important and strategic interest. For these
reasons, it is in the United States' interest for Pakistan to have a
strong civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace
and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets
remain secure, in accordance with international standards. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we pursue these
strategic interests with Pakistan.
Question. U.S. and Pakistan officials have been working together
for years to counter the threat of terrorism. However, the revelation
that Osama bin Laden has been hiding out apparently for years at a
spacious, highly-secure compound in Pakistan, less than 35 miles from
the capital, has raised disturbing questions about the nature of
Pakistan's cooperation with the United States in the fight against
terrorism.
What in your view are the key lessons from the operation to kill
Osama bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?
Answer. The operation against Osama bin Laden was a vital element
of the President's comprehensive strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al Qaeda, but it is far from the only element in this strategy.
One of the key lessons from this operation is that we have seen no
clear evidence to indicate that senior Pakistani leaders were involved
in harboring Osama bin Laden or knew of his whereabouts. Although the
relationship with Pakistan is not always easy and we have our
differences, continuing cooperation with Pakistan is critical to keep a
tremendous amount of pressure on al Qaeda's leadership and the networks
that provide it support and safe haven at a time when it is most
vulnerable. The operation presents a historic opportunity not only for
us, but also for Pakistan, to advance our shared interests and
strengthen our cooperation in eradicating terrorist networks that
threaten both nations. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our
partners in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve our goal of
eliminating terrorist networks that threaten the United States and our
allies and partners and continue to seek Pakistan's unambiguous support
in the fight against al Qaeda and the regional syndicate of terrorist
networks.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
military relations?
Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like
our overall relationship, has featured ups and downs and is challenged
by a long-term lack of trust within Pakistan about our intentions. If
confirmed I will continue to focus on building the trust that is
necessary for the effective partnership we need with Pakistan.
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing
and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to
conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States
has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection
with Operation Enduring Freedom.
How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving
Pakistan's efforts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?
Answer. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements,
and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped
enable Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign. Since 2009, Pakistan has
undertaken counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations
in the northwest, including in Swat, South Waziristan, Mohmand, and
Bajaur, with varying levels of success. Pakistan's level of commitment
is reflected in the enormous casualties it has suffered as a result of
terrorism in the last few years, including more than 11,000 military
personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian
causalities in recent years, most recently in significant attacks
following the bin Laden operation. However, Pakistan continues to lack
the necessary military and civilian capacities to ``hold'' and
``build'' in cleared areas. If confirmed, I will work Congress to
ensure that the support we provide is yielding the results we seek.
OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA
Question. What changes, if any, should the United States make to
its security assistance policy regarding Pakistan in light of the
revelation of Osama bin Laden's hideout within Pakistan?
Answer. The current ``train-advise-and-equip'' programs with the
Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important
component in pursuing the near-term objective of eliminating terrorist
sanctuaries and disrupting the al Qaeda network. It is vital, however,
that Pakistan live up to its end of the bargain, cooperating more fully
in counterterrorism matters and ceasing to provide sanctuary to Afghan
Taliban and other insurgent groups. Therefore, in the wake of the Osama
bin Laden raid, we have asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete
steps to demonstrate cooperation and counter-terrorism. Future requests
for security assistance will be informed by Pakistan's response to the
counter-terrorism steps we have proposed.
Question. In your view, will the death of Osama bin Laden have a
significant impact on the conflict against al Qaeda and if so, how?
Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant blow to al
Qaeda and brings us closer to its strategic defeat. However, al Qaeda
remains a potent, dangerous, and adaptable foe. Its close allies, such
as Pakistan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, have increasingly adopted
al Qaeda's jihadist vision and, as core al Qaeda is weakened, there is
a risk that decentralized affiliates may pose an increased threat to
the United States. To achieve the President's objective of defeating al
Qaeda and preventing its return to either Pakistan or Afghanistan, it
is vital that we continue to aggressively pursue our accelerated
counterterrorism campaign in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western
interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
Answer. Al Qaeda and its adherents are diverse, dispersed, and
decentralized. They are present in the Arabian Peninsula, North and
East Africa, South Asia, Iraq, and elsewhere around the globe,
including within the United States. Intent and ability to attack the
United States varies by group, but such attacks are a common theme in
their propaganda and planning. Bin Laden himself remained very focused
on attacking the Homeland. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has
already demonstrated both the intent and the capability to conduct
attacks against the United States. Despite the death of Bin Laden, core
al Qaeda and its adherents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain a
very dangerous threat.
ARAB SPRING
Question. The Arab Spring has changed--and will likely continue to
change--the political dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa for
many years to come. These changes will require the United States to
adjust our military-to-military and defense civilian relations in this
region. Some observers argue that the United States should reduce
significantly our military-to-military contact in countries as a result
of the ongoing changes and others advocate more robust and stepped-up
contact with our partners in this region.
In your view, what should be the posture of the U.S. Government on
military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?
Answer. The DOD's military-to-military and defense civilian
relations with our partners in the Middle East and North Africa have
played a critical role in advancing U.S. strategic interests: defeating
extremists, countering weapons of mass destruction, countering
terrorist organizations, ensuring the free flow of commerce, preventing
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, disrupting smuggling and piracy,
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and securing Israel.
Engagement with our key Middle Eastern and North African partners'
defense ministries and militaries, building partner capacity to meet
common challenges, having a forward presence to enable operations and
deter potential threats, and being able to access regions--if and when
necessary for future contingencies--require considerable effort on the
part of many organizations within DOD working in tandem with DOS.
During this time of change and uncertainty in the region, I understand
that DOD will continue to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and
substance of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S.
values and advance U.S. vital national interests.
LIBYA
Question. Do you support the limited U.S. military mission in
Libya?
Answer. Yes. DOD is supporting operations against Libya as a part
of an international coalition that is enforcing United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. The coalition's combined efforts have
prevented the mass killing of civilians in Libya. The President was
clear from the beginning that the United States would bring its unique
set of capabilities to bear on the front end of this conflict to stop
the advance of Qadhafi's forces, take out regime air defenses, and set
the stage for the NATO mission. While our role is now to support and
assist, the U.S. military can provide unique capabilities to this
effort that our NATO allies and other partners cannot provide either in
kind or at the levels required, such as electronic warfare, aerial
refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support, and
unmanned aerial vehicle strikes.
Question. Do you support broadening the military mission to include
regime change?
Answer. No. While I do believe that the Qadhafi regime has lost all
legitimacy and must go, the goal of our military effort, and the
mandate of the United Nations (U.N.) resolution, is very clear: protect
the Libyan people. We must continue to use a range of diplomatic and
economic tools to apply further pressure on the Qadhafi regime.
Ultimately, however, it will be up to the Libyan people to decide their
future.
Question. Should the United States provide arms and training to the
Libyan rebels?
Answer. The purpose of our military action is grounded in UNSCR
1973, to protect the Libyan people in population centers like Benghazi
from a massacre at the hands of Qadhafi's forces, and any assistance
will be for that purpose. The administration has chosen not to provide
arms or training to the rebels at this time, but it is my understanding
that DOD has authorized up to $25 million of non-lethal support which
includes medical equipment, protective vests, binoculars, and radios.
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded an increasing
number of psychological operations and influence programs. While the
Department does not have any separate documentation outlining its
strategic communication activities, GAO reports that DOD ``spent
hundreds of millions of dollars each year'' to support its information
operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support
of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support
Teams (MISTs) from United States Special Operations Command are also
deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around
the globe to bolster the efforts of DOS and the USAID. Further, the
geographic combatant commands are moving into this operational space.
What are your views on DOD's psychological operations and influence
programs and its integration into overall U.S. foreign policy
objectives?
Answer. I understand that DOD's capability to effectively operate
in the information environment is essential to the U.S. Government's
ability to engage foreign audiences and adversaries to service our
strategic and operational interests and objectives. It is particularly
important to counter the rise of violent extremism, reduce the
influence of those who challenge our interests and military operations,
and it is a critical element of Combatant Command strategies for
security and stability in their respective geographic regions. To be
effective, these activities must be nested in U.S. foreign policy
objectives and integrated across government and with our allies. I have
seen much improvement in the coordination and de-confliction of these
activities across the interagency and, if confirmed, will seek to build
on these relationships.
I am aware that there has been acute interest from Congress in this
area as budget requirements have risen sharply in recent years based on
the growing realization of our military leaders that we must
effectively operate in the 21st century information environment. Over
the last year, DOD has taken significant steps to improve and ensure
appropriate and focused management and oversight of all influence
programs including psychological operations (now re-named Military
Information Support Operations). If confirmed, I will continue this
effort fully cognizant of both its importance to our military strategy
and the requirements to ensure that DOD operates as a mutually
supporting partner in a cooperative effort to advance our Nations
objectives.
Question. You were reportedly a strong supporter of the creation of
the State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications. In your view, what--if any--support should DOD provide
to this Center?
Answer. As the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I
supported the creation of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (CSCC) and it will continue to have my support should I
be confirmed as Secretary of Defense. Both DOD and CIA support the
Center with personnel. DOD currently provides three military
servicemembers in support of the CSCC, and I understand that DOS has
requested several additional personnel. This request is undergoing
review and consideration within DOD.
Question. In 2005, al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that ``We
are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the
battlefield of the media.'' Last year, a non-partisan study highlighted
the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment
violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-Jihadism).
What is the role of DOD versus the Intelligence Community and the
State Department?
Answer. I understand DOD participates in several interagency
efforts to counter violent extremism and works closely with not only
DOS, but also CIA, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and
others to ensure DOD programs are synchronized and deconflicted with
programs of the other departments and agencies. Due to DOD's global
presence, DOD personnel often encounter the effects of radical
ideologies and the violence propagated by Islamist extremists on a
daily basis. DOD personnel are thus well situated to contribute to U.S.
Government efforts to counter the messages of violent extremists. DOD
seeks to reduce support for violent extremist organizations by engaging
foreign local populations, countering adversary propaganda, and
developing relationships with key leaders and credible local
interlocutors across the globe.
Question. In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that
foment violence?
Answer. The efforts of the U.S. Government to counter radical
ideologies must be persistent and long-term, and should be developed in
order to shape and support collaborative regional security initiatives.
One critical area of focus is those populations that are most
vulnerable to extremist messaging. The U.S. Government should work
within the interagency framework to build and implement programs and
activities that address these at-risk audiences, which are
predominantly under 30 years of age and mostly, but not exclusively,
male. We have learned from experience that one of the most effective
ways of countering such messaging is by seeking to amplify the credible
voices of our Muslim partners.
Question. Defense Secretary Gates launched the Minerva Program in
2009 to develop deeper social, cultural and behavioral expertise for
policy and strategy purposes.
Do you support this program and its goals?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to be briefed on the program
and its specifics. In general, I agree that understanding the dynamics
of social, political, economic, and cultural systems is critical not
only for national security policy makers and strategic planners, but
also for commanders down to the lowest tactical level.
SOMALIA
Question. Somalia is a collapsed state with a weak government
unable to project either power or stability or to provide services to
its people. Somalia is also a training and operations hub for: al
Shabaab and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian
Ocean and Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans,
and drugs; and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was
responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and
Nairobi in August of 1998.
What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabaab to the
U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S.
Homeland?
Answer. The threat from al-Shabaab to the U.S. and Western
interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. Homeland is significant
and on the rise. Al-Shabaab leaders, who have claimed affiliation with
al Qaeda since 2007, are developing ties with al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, and are showing an increasing desire to stage international
terrorist attacks in addition to their acts of violence inside Somalia.
Al-Shabaab employs several hundred foreign fighters and regularly tries
to recruit fighters from Somali diaspora communities in the United
States and Europe. The Kampala bombings last July, which killed 79
innocent civilians, were a wake-up call and a reminder that al-Shabaab
is willing to operationalize its rhetoric. As al-Shabaab faces
increasing international pressure, we may see the group increase its
international attacks. Al-Shabaab continues to repress the Somali
people and remains the main adversary to the Somali Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) and to the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) peacekeepers in Mogadishu.
Further, Somalia's lack of governance and sparse population could
make it appealing as a safe haven for al Qaeda. As al Qaeda undergoes
leadership changes and regroups from counterterrorism operations in
Pakistan, we need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of
operations to Somalia.
Question. Given your knowledge of the role of the various U.S.
Government departments and agencies in the Horn of Africa, what
changes, if any, would you make to DOD's current role in the Horn of
Africa?
Answer. I understand the DOD mission in the Horn of Africa is to
build partner-nation capacity in order to promote regional security and
stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe this
mission is appropriate. I am informed U.S. Africa Command is
undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how our military
efforts in the region work in concert with our interagency partners to
achieve our collective regional goals and counter al Qaeda's linkages
to elements of al-Shabaab. DOD's ultimate goal is a fully integrated
strategy under which security assistance, capacity building,
operational collaboration with regional partners, and counter-terrorism
actions are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability
that is in the interest of both the United States and our regional
partners.
This review of DOD's East Africa strategy will also review the
status of Joint Task Forces to determine if any should be considered
for transition to a more permanent Joint Interagency Task Force--
including recommendations on basing and funding for Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure our strategy is developed as part of a
coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of Africa,
and to determine how the DOD can and should best support this policy.
YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
Question. A number of senior U.S. officials, including you, have
indicated the most significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently
emanates from Yemen.
What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen?
Answer. U.S. goals in Yemen are to ensure Yemen is stable, unified,
and economically viable, and to help Yemen deny al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) a safe-haven and operational platform. We do not yet
know how the current crisis will play out.
The ongoing unrest has weakened an already fragile economy and
allowed AQAP to expand its influence and to make some tactical gains in
the tribal areas--in several cases seizing and holding territory now
outside of Republic of Yemen Government control. However, despite
AQAP's limited gains, they remain distant from, and largely counter to,
the current anti-government movement in Yemen.
AQAP is intensely focused on conducting a near-term attack against
the United States, and poses an immediate terrorist threat to U.S.
interests and the Homeland. The Christmas Day attempted bombing of the
Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the failed package bombing attempt
in October 2010 were the more recent attempts by al Qaeda to attack the
U.S. Homeland. Despite these setbacks, al Qaeda and its affiliate,
AQAP, are still actively plotting attacks, with the principal goal of
successfully striking the U.S. Homeland. If confirmed, I will continue
to work to achieve U.S. objectives in Yemen.
Question. Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of
the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States
continuing to provide security assistance--most significantly DOD
section 1206 funding--to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?
Answer. In consideration of the ongoing political environment in
Yemen, I understand DOD is constantly evaluating our security
assistance and capacity building programs--particularly those provided
under section 1206. The Republic of Yemen Government currently remains
a critical partner in the war against al Qaeda, and DOD remains
particularly mindful of the continued and growing threat to the
Homeland from AQAP.
NATO
Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, NATO members
adopted a new Strategic Concept setting out the Alliance's vision for
the coming decade. In their communique from that Summit, NATO countries
envisioned a more agile, capable and cost-effective alliance, able to
defend against a full range of threats and to operate effectively with
other international organizations and non-NATO nations. At the same
time, many NATO members have significantly reduced their national
defense budgets in response to the global economic crisis.
What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee
for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next 5 years?
Answer. The United States has enormous stakes in a strong, mutually
supportive NATO alliance, and the President has stressed his strong
desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships to
meet 21st century security challenges. NATO's new Strategic Concept is
an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its
unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its
members and it will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution. Over the
next 5 years, top-tier NATO-related challenges include, first and
foremost, achieving durable progress on a successful transition in
Afghanistan, implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the
deterioration in European military capability. It is my sense that a
number of our NATO allies, while fulfilling their current commitments,
have been underperforming in terms of their own investments in defense
capabilities, especially when it comes to deployable expeditionary
forces. Many are planning further cuts to defense investment in order
to sustain their operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere while coping
with the financial crisis. The challenge will be for allies to work
together to determine which capabilities must be sustained and how that
can be done in a more cost-effective manner, while also identifying
other capability or mission areas where a higher degree of risk is
acceptable.
Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the
next 5 years?
Answer. The President has stated that NATO enlargement should
continue so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful, and
willing to contribute to common security. Precisely which countries and
within what timeframe NATO would undertake further enlargement are
important questions which the administration would need to address in
close consultation with Congress and our allies. It is important that
each NATO aspirant should be judged on its individual merits and
progress in implementing political, economic and military reforms.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. NATO's New Strategic Concept stated NATO's commitment to
the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear
weapons, but made clear that as long as there are nuclear weapons in
the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. At Lisbon, NATO also
initiated a review of its overall posture in deterring and defending
against the full range of threats to the Alliance. I am informed that
this review will recommend an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional
and missile defense capabilities for the Alliance. This provides an
opportunity to adapt NATO's nuclear posture to the realities of the
21st century. NATO's new Strategic Concept reflects allies' commitment
to NATO as a nuclear alliance and to nuclear burden sharing as
fundamental to deterrence and assurance in Europe. NATO has rightly
made clear that it will not unilaterally eliminate its nuclear
capabilities absent an agreement with Russia on non-strategic nuclear
weapons. The administration is exploring negotiations with Russia to
address the disparity in non-strategic weapons, and will consult with
allies on those negotiations.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have
mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and
enablers that directly support their operations.
Do you believe that we should further increase the number of
special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
Answer. I believe that the current growth in special operations
personnel is appropriate. I understand that U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) is programmed to meet the growth mandated by the last
two QDRs. If confirmed, I will examine if additional growth of Special
Forces is needed, but only after that programmed growth is complete.
Question. In your view, how can the size of Special Operations
Forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and
training standards for special operators?
Answer. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced. Special
Operations Command leaders have stated that Special Operations growth
should not exceed 3 to 5 percent per year in order to ensure quality of
the manpower being produced. I have been informed that this is the pace
SOCOM has sustained to great effect over the past several years and is
on track to sustain over the next several years.
Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
extremist organizations, including those related to information and
military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
divested by SOCOM, and why? Are there any additional missions that you
believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you
advocate adding them?
Answer. I understand that DOD uses a range of processes, such as
the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and
responsibilities it assigns to SOCOM on an ongoing basis. Additionally,
the law provides the President and the Secretary of Defense flexibility
needed to meet changing circumstances. At this time I would not
advocate significant changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions. If
confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to
determine if changes are advisable, I will consider any recommend
changes as appropriate or necessary.
Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as
unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much
emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?
Answer. The activities of Special Operations Forces are quite
varied, from high-risk strikes and counterterrorist raids to working
by, with, and through local partners, whether training and advising
foreign counterparts or providing support to civilian authorities
abroad. I believe that each of these missions is highly valued within
the special operations community. However, as the security landscape
has changed, the demands for these kinds of missions have begun to
exceed the ability of the Special Operations community alone to meet
them. As a remedy to this situation, Secretary Gates advocated that the
conventional forces be prepared to take on more of the kinds of
missions that used to fall exclusively to SOF, including, for example,
Security Force Assistance. I agree that broadening the spectrum of
irregular missions that our conventional forces are able to take on
will alleviate some of the demands being placed on the SOF community
and ensure that the Total Force is adequately prepared to undertake
both direct and indirect missions.
COMBATING TERRORISM
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's strategy
for combating terrorism?
Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its
efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and
agencies?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD strategy for combating
terrorism is comprised of three elements: antiterrorism--defensive
measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property
to terrorist acts; counterterrorism--offensive actions to disrupt,
dismantle and defeat terrorists, and resolve terrorist incidents; and
consequence management--measures to recover from terrorist attacks.
Each of these components of combating terrorism has its own policies
and strategies, developed in close coordination with interagency
partners.
While I served as Director of the CIA, I worked closely with my
interagency counterparts on strategies to defeat terrorism around the
globe and will bring that experience to bear if confirmed as Secretary
of Defense. If confirmed, I will continue to work with my interagency
partners and the National Security Council and Staff to ensure the best
coordination possible.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES
Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence
agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in
Afghanistan and Iraq on special operators engaged in direct action
operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and
Special Operations Forces engaged in indirect activities, including
foreign internal defense and population protection, receive less
intelligence support.
Do you believe this is true?
If so and if confirmed, how would you ensure Special Operations
Forces engaged in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence
support?
Answer. The Intelligence Community (IC) supports a range of DOD
customers to include those involved in foreign internal defense and
population protection. Especially in light of efforts over the last
several years, the IC and DOD are appropriately providing intelligence
support to all warfighters across the board. For example, DOD created
the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force to
field ISR platforms rapidly and, with the committee's support, has
continued to work to expand airborne ISR capabilities. Over the past
year, the IC has also provided significant support to the surge of
forces to Afghanistan through Attack the Improvised Explosive Device
Network capabilities that support both general purpose and Special
Operations Forces. DOD and the IC are also substantially increasing
intelligence support to Village Stability Operations and to the Afghan
local police. The IC has also put greater emphasis on developing a
comprehensive understanding of the socio-cultural environments within
which terrorist networks and insurgent forces operate, which has
enabled all warfighters to effectively engage the local population
during stability operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
such programs, which support all warfighters, remain robust.
SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including
training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces,
and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S.
Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. I understand that section 1208 authority is a key tool that
combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to
combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the
Special Operations Forces under their control to leverage willing
partners that possess access to areas, people, and information that are
denied to our forces, but critical to tactical and strategic success.
The authority has allowed DOD to respond immediately to emergent global
challenges. Section 1208 requires appropriate civilian oversight,
including Secretary of Defense approval and congressional notification.
CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
Question. The 2010 QDR called for increased counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the
general purpose forces.
What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of
responsibilities assigned to general purpose and Special Operations
Forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and
building partner military capabilities? Do you believe that our general
purpose forces need to become more like Special Operations Forces in
mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?
Answer. I concur with Secretary Gates that America's dominance in
traditional warfighting has created powerful incentives for adversaries
to use alternative methods to counter U.S. influence and interests. I
also agree that, for the foreseeable future, the most likely
contingencies the United States will face will involve irregular
threats. Therefore, I believe the 2010 QDR's strategic shift toward
expanding general purpose forces' capabilities and capacity for these
contingencies makes sense. The overall flexibility of our Armed Forces
can be greatly improved by investing in key enablers within our
conventional force, such as strengthening and expanding capabilities
for security force assistance; increasing the availability of rotary-
wing assets; expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; improving counter-
improvised explosive device capabilities; and enhancing linguistic,
cultural, counterinsurgency, and stability operations competency and
capacity.
Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved
for Special Operations Forces only?
Answer. Special Operations Forces are a unique component of our
U.S. Armed Forces that are trained to conduct operations in areas under
enemy control or in politically sensitive environments, including
counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special
reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. In such environments, Special Operations
Forces provide a unique and essential capability.
U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION
Question. The Defense Department's 2010 report of the QDR states
that the United States needs to ``sustain and strengthen our Asia-
Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests
and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,'' and that, to
accomplish this, DOD ``will augment and adapt our forward presence'' in
the Asia-Pacific region.
Do you agree that the U.S. needs to augment and adapt our presence
in the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. Yes. DOD must keep pace with changes in the Asia-Pacific
security environment that pose profound challenges to international
security, such as the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-
state actors, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).
DOD should maintain an enduring military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region that provides a tangible reassurance that the United
States is committed to Asia's security, economic development, and the
prosperity essential to the region's success.
Question. If so, what specific capabilities or enhancements are
needed in your view?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review DOD's posture in Asia and make
appropriate recommendations on any enhancements. In general, our
regional allies and partners must remain confident in the continued
strength of our deterrence against the full range of potential threats.
Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the
Asia-Pacific region?
Answer. As outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the
United States must develop a positive security agenda for the region.
DOD's priorities include protecting U.S. territory, citizens, and
allies; deterring aggression and maintaining regional stability;
maintaining free and open access to the maritime, air, and space
domains; deterring and defeating violent extremism; and preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated
materials.
NORTH KOREA
Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near term
threats to regional security and stability. This seriousness of the
threat is seen by North Korea's continued pursuit of a nuclear
capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the
past year, by North Korea's unprovoked and deadly attacks against South
Korea--specifically the attack on the Republic of Korea navy ship
Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea's
Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.
What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
Korean peninsula?
Answer. North Korea's large conventional military, pursuit of
asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs, including the newly revealed uranium
enrichment activities, and proliferation behavior, underscores that
North Korea poses a growing and direct threat to the United States, our
allies in the region, and to the international community. If confirmed,
I intend to monitor the security situation on the Korean Peninsula
closely, work for the continued transformation of our alliances and
partnerships in the region, and maintain the military capabilities
necessary to protect our interests, defend our allies, and deter North
Korea from acts of aggression and intimidation.
Question. In your view does the lack of progress in diplomatic
efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear
weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the
region?
Answer. I understand that U.S. strategy toward the Korean Peninsula
is centered on maintaining peace through deterrence and diplomacy. The
U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy has helped to prevent renewed war on
the Korean Peninsula for more than half a century through escalation
dominance, secure second-strike capabilities, and robust extended
deterrence commitments to regional allies. Successful deterrence
creates the space within which diplomacy can operate. The success of
diplomatic efforts, however, will ultimately hinge on the willingness
of North Korea to comply with the agreements it makes.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a serious
threat to U.S. regional allies and partners, and increasingly, are
becoming a direct threat to the United States itself. The United States
must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's WMD and missile
development programs and related proliferation activities. If
confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other
parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging
threats, reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and
partners, and work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our
contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.
Question. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could
take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?
Answer. I understand that DOD, with its interagency partners, has
taken several measures to prevent North Korea's proliferation of
weapons-related technology, to include working to advance international
nonproliferation norms, and cooperating with partner nations to inspect
and interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying illicit cargo.
If confirmed, I would continue to work to strengthen international
consensus against proliferation, invest in capacity building programs
with partner nations, and find ways to increase WMD-related information
sharing with international partners.
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Question. Since the end of World War II, the alliance between the
United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of
security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through
periods of inevitable change.
What is your understanding of the current U.S. security
relationship with the ROK?
Answer. In my view, the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains one of the
cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific and is as strong and
viable today as it has ever been. A mutual commitment to common
interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, combined planning, and a
recognition of the need to transform the relationship in light of the
changing regional and global circumstances provide a strong
underpinning to the Alliance and can serve to inform U.S. and ROK
efforts going forward as the Alliance becomes a more equal military
partnership.
Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?
Answer. As I understand it, DOD and the ROK continue to work
closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and prepare for the
transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015.
As part of these efforts, for example, DOD is repositioning U.S. forces
to bases south of Seoul. This will make the U.S. presence less
intrusive to the Korean people, will remove U.S. forces from the center
of Seoul, and result in a U.S. force posture that enhances U.S. forces'
readiness and quality of life. If confirmed, I would maintain close
contact with my ROK counterpart and build upon the solid foundation
laid by Secretary Gates to continuously improve and transform this
important security relationship.
Question. What is your view regarding the timing of turning over
wartime operational command to the ROK?
Answer. I understand that the United States and ROK have an
understanding on a comprehensive way forward for the transfer of
wartime operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with my ROK counterpart to complete this process.
Question. Do you believe that current planning regarding tour
normalization in the ROK should be reconsidered in view of the high
cost of the plan and the risks associated with significantly higher
numbers of dependents on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to
further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and
family members. It was to be implemented on an ``as affordable'' basis
and not according to any specific timeline. If confirmed, I will
continue to assess the cost of implementation and our proposed force
posture to determine the best way forward.
CHINA
Question. Much has been made about the economic and military growth
in China and what that growth might mean in terms of regional and
global security.
From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding economy and
growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth
influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific?
Answer. China's sustained economic growth is in the United States'
interest and has contributed to the Asia-Pacific's economic growth and
development in recent years. In terms of regional security, China's
economic growth has increased China's international profile and
influence, and has enabled China's leaders to embark upon and sustain a
comprehensive transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale
of China's military modernization, coupled with the lack of
transparency, raises many questions, both within the United States and
the region as a whole, about China's future.
From my perspective, DOD has a special responsibility to monitor
China's military and to deter conflict. Through a robust forward
presence, prudent capability developments, and, sustained action to
strengthen alliances and partnerships, DOD can support our national
interest in promoting a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific
region.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's
military modernization program?
Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and
win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its
near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies
involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention. Its
modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area capabilities.
China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting
operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. Beijing's
growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian
assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy
support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrence and
enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through modernization of
its nuclear forces and improving other strategic capabilities such as
space and counter-space operations and computer network operations.
Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to
China's military modernization program?
Answer. I believe that we should continue to monitor closely the
growth of China's military capabilities while continuing to encourage
Beijing to be more transparent about its military and security affairs.
Our strategy must be designed to preserve peace, enhance stability, and
reduce risk in the region. Our response to China's military
modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued
transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific, the
maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our
own capabilities, and the strengthening of our Alliances and
partnerships.
Question. U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue has been
strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and
maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by
China's propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in
an apparent effort to influence U.S. actions.
What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-
to-military relations with China?
Answer. President Obama and President Hu Jintao have expressed that
a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military
relationship is an essential part of their shared vision for a
positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I
fully agree with that assertion. The complexity of the security
environment, both in the Asia-Pacific region and globally, calls for a
continuous dialogue between the Armed Forces of the United States and
China to expand practical cooperation where we can and to discuss
candidly those areas where we differ.
Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the
quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what
changes and why?
Answer. I understand that our two Armed Forces have made progress
in recent months to build toward a more sustained--and sustainable--
relationship. I was informed the recent visit of General Chen was a
success. We can build on that progress to improve the U.S.-China
military-to-military relationship, both in terms of the quantity of
exchanges, but more importantly, the quality of the dialogue. I believe
that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly
work if China is willing to reciprocate with transparent and
substantive discussions. If confirmed, I will look for ways to deepen
and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to
encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS
Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department's CN
operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around
the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that
DOD ``does not have an effective performance measurement system to
track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.'' This is the
second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade.
What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?
Answer. Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are a
multidimensional threat to the United States. In addition to the impact
on our Nation's public health and economy, drug trafficking and other
forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for
terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government
institutions, and contribute to international instability.
I have not had an opportunity to assess the DOD counternarcotics
program. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and the
Office of National Drug Control Policy to ensure that these programs
achieve measureable results and that those results are clearly aligned
with the goals of the National Security Strategy and the National Drug
Control Strategy.
Question. In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in
attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?
Answer. Based on my experience with this issue from my time in
Congress, in the Clinton administration, and in my most recent
assignment, all agencies must work to confront the flow of illicit
narcotics. This whole-of-government approach has been critically
important to the progress we have made since the 1980s and should
continue.
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to consider
directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers,
civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I
should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
more military personnel to both military observer and staff positions
in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
additional military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. The United States has a stake in the success of U.N.
peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United
States should continue to provide military personnel for U.N.
peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can
help shape the direction and success of the mission. However, as with
any investment, there are associated costs. If confirmed, I will
carefully evaluate any proposals to contribute military or civilian
personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, weighing the potential
positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other
military commitments we have around the globe and the proposed cost of
U.S. involvement.
COUNTER THREAT FINANCE
Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
Community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources
in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist
networks and illicit trafficking. The objective would be to identify
key individuals, as well as individuals enabling the flow of money
outside of certain countries of interest.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely
heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their
activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. It is critical
to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money
associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DOD
has capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries' finances while
working with its interagency counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter threat finance
but, it plays a supportive role by working with other departments and
agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries' ability
to use global financial networks.
CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO
Question. During a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command and Southern Command discussed
the increasingly dangerous region along the northern and southern
borders of Mexico and the devastating impact transnational criminal
organizations are having on the people and security of southern Mexico,
Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The United States has
increased its assistance in this region, but--to date--DOD has had only
a small role.
What are your views on the threats posed by transnational criminal
organizations in this region?
Answer. These threats are real and are felt throughout Mexico,
Central America, and elsewhere in the region. Transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) threaten the security and prosperity of the United
States' neighbors and have the resources to impact the stability of
some of the more vulnerable nations in the region. To confront these
threats effectively, it is necessary to harness the talents and
resources of DOD, in coordination with those of DOD's Federal partners
and the governments of Mexico and Central American nations.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's current activities in
Mexico and Central America?
Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to make a thorough
assessment but generally speaking, DOD activities such as training,
equipping, information sharing, infrastructure support, operational
support, and related cooperation with Mexican and Central American
militaries and security forces complement other U.S. Government
security efforts under the Merida Initiative and the Central America
Regional Security Initiative. I am mindful, however, that DOD plays a
supporting role to its law enforcement partners in the fight against
TCOs and that DOD-led efforts alone are not enough in the long term. I
believe a long-term solution will require a whole-of-government effort.
Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the DOD's
current activities in this region?
Answer. As I noted above, I have not had an opportunity to make a
thorough assessment of DOD's current activities in the region. If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with DOD's Federal
partners and the U.S. Government's partners in the governments of
Mexico and the Central American nations, in consultation with Congress,
to shape the scope and scale of continued DOD efforts in the region.
INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. Our Nation has learned many hard lessons about the
importance of whole-of-government approaches in counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations over the past several years. One of the
most important lessons of our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq is
that success in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and post-conflict
stability operations depends upon the integrated efforts of both
civilian and military organizations in all phases of an operation, from
planning through execution. Sustainable outcomes require civilian
development and governance experts who can help build local civilian
capacity. DOD supports civilian agency lead in areas such as fostering
political reconciliation, building accountable institutions of
government, restoring public infrastructure, and reviving economic
activity, so that DOD can focus on providing a safe and secure
environment and assisting in building accountable Armed Forces. If
confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure that interagency
collaboration is as robust and effective as possible.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved? How can
the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine
and adopted as ``best practices'' for future contingency operations?
Answer. I believe interagency collaboration can be improved by
continuing to ensure that the U.S. military plans and trains with our
civilian counterparts and is prepared to operate effectively in all
phases of conflict, including post-conflict reconstruction and
stabilization. In addition, improving the interagency planning process
would ensure that optimal use is made of all national instruments of
statecraft, while also enhancing the ability to conduct comprehensive
assessments, analysis, planning, and execution of whole-of-government
operations. Robust civilian capabilities are critical to realizing any
improvements in interagency efforts and best practices for future
operations.
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (IRTPA), among other actions, realigned the responsibilities for
budgeting for and management of intelligence organizations between the
Secretary of Defense and the head of the Intelligence Community, the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
What do you believe is the role of DOD in intelligence under IRTPA?
Answer. I believe the role of DOD, including its intelligence
components, is spelled out clearly in law. Under title 50 of the
U.S.C., the Secretary of Defense has responsibility for all
intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by DOD
components. DOD contains a number of elements of the Intelligence
Community, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the
National Reconnaissance Office. Consistent with the statutory
authorities of the DNI under the IRTPA, the Secretary of Defense is
responsible for the continued operation of these elements as effective
unified organizations within DOD for the conduct of their missions in
order to satisfy the requirements of the Intelligence Community. The
Secretary is also responsible for ensuring that the budgets of these
elements are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the geographic combatant commanders,
and other departments and agencies, as well as ensuring that such
elements are responsive and timely in satisfying the needs of
operational military forces. In the period since IRTPA's signing, a
tremendous amount of integration has occurred within the Community and
I believe the elements of the Intelligence Community, including those
within DOD, are working together more closely than ever.
Question. Do you believe that the IRTPA strikes the correct balance
between the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary and the DNI?
Answer. Yes. Based on my understanding of authorities granted under
IRTPA, I believe the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary and
the DNI are sufficiently balanced. The IRTPA gave the DNI strong
authority over core intelligence functions for the National
Intelligence Program, such as setting requirements and budgets, as well
as determining priorities for and managing the analysis and
dissemination of national intelligence, while leaving the
responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence activities to the
Secretary. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is dual-
hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the DNI
which helps ensure the equities of both the DNI and Secretary of
Defense are taken into account. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I
will maintain the current strong working relationship with the DNI to
address any issues that might arise over the balance of
responsibilities.
Question. What changes in the IRTPA, if any, would you recommend
that Congress consider?
Answer. At this point, I do not recommend any change to the current
law. If confirmed, I will wait until I have sufficient time to weigh
options, should I discover a reason to recommend a change.
QUALIFICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OFFICIALS AND SECRETARIES OF
DEFENSE
Question. During the Bush and Obama administrations, there has been
significant criticism about the appointment of active duty and retired
military officers to senior positions in the Intelligence community,
including as Director of National Intelligence and Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Some have referred to this as the
``militarization'' of the CIA and the Intelligence Community. With your
nomination to be Secretary of Defense, we now have the situation where
the last two nominees to be Secretary of Defense have been CIA
Directors.
Is there reason to be concerned about current or former military
officers serving in senior positions in the Intelligence Community?
Answer. No. I have served alongside many current or former military
officers and have been impressed with their knowledge, professionalism,
and effectiveness. While it is important to maintain a military and
civilian balance across the Intelligence Community, in my view, there
is no reason to be concerned, as a general matter, about current or
former military officers serving in senior positions in the
Intelligence Community. The challenges facing the Intelligence
Community are enormous and require the most capable leaders available.
Our military possesses a considerable pool of talented leaders who have
proven experience within, or related to, the Intelligence Community.
The wealth of experience and leadership these military officers bring
with them is invaluable in meeting the Community's challenges.
Question. Is there reason to be concerned about civilian heads of
Intelligence Community elements serving in senior positions in the
Defense Department, including as Secretary of Defense?
Answer. No. I think it is fair to say that DOD and IC integration
has never been better. This is a product, in part, of people like
Secretary Gates, who brought his wealth of experience as a CIA officer
and National Security Council official to DOD. Both the head of an
Intelligence Community element and the Secretary of Defense strive to
achieve the same central objective: keeping the American people safe. I
believe that the knowledge and experience obtained as a senior leader
in the Intelligence Community is extremely valuable and will improve my
ability, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, to successfully prevail
in this mission.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
Question. The 2010 report of the QDR provided that military forces
shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational
activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other
threats. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for
improved capabilities in key mission areas such as counterinsurgency,
stability, and counterterrorism operations, as well as building the
security capacity of partner states.
What is your understanding and assessment of the current ability of
each Service to provide capabilities to support these mission
requirements and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue
to improve these capabilities?
Answer. Our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan attests to the fact
that U.S. forces have made tremendous strides over the past decade in
developing capabilities and doctrine for effective counter-terrorism,
counter-insurgency, and stability operations. This is true across the
board, but particularly in our Army and Marine Corps forces, which have
borne the brunt of the burden of bringing stability to these two
countries.
Further improvement is always possible and it will be important
that we continue to gather and assess ``lessons learned'' from our
forces in the field. If confirmed, I will continue to press for
enhancements in our capabilities for all-source intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination; rapid, secure communications
to units in remote areas; defeating improvised explosive devices;
training, advising, and assisting host-country forces; and cultural
understanding.
Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years, as
well as guidance in the QDR report, has been toward increasing emphasis
on and institutionalization of lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency,
and stability type operations.
In your view, what does it mean to ``institutionalize''
capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in each of
the Services? What is your understanding and assessment of Department's
efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?
Answer. Institutionalizing these capabilities means working to
ensure that our forces actively maintain and continue to improve
effective capabilities for counter-insurgency and stability operations
even after we have achieved our goals in the current conflicts. This
will entail not only retaining much of the equipment that has been
fielded over the past decade for ongoing operations but also sustaining
the improvements in doctrine and training of experienced warfighters
that has been central to the successes we have achieved.
I understand DOD has taken steps to accomplish this. For example,
as units rotate back to home station from deployments to Iraq and
Afghanistan, they have been resetting equipment for operations that
include COIN and stability operations. Furthermore, military education
and training programs have been revised to place much greater emphasis
on counter-insurgency and stability operations.
The United States will continue to face challenges from non-state
adversaries and regions threatened by terrorist and insurgent violence.
Our Armed Forces must, therefore, retain the ability to counter these
threats effectively.
Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular,
counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not
mean ignoring the requirement to be trained, equipped, and ready for
major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of operations.
If confirmed, how would you propose to redistribute the
Department's efforts and resources, if at all, to ensure that the force
is prepared for major combat while at the same time it increases and
institutionalizes capabilities and support for irregular,
counterinsurgency, and stability operations?
Answer. The 2010 QDR recognized the imperative to improve
capabilities for operations against both irregular adversaries and
states equipped with advanced anti-access and area-denial weapons.
Accordingly, DOD is allocating resources to both ends of the spectrum
of operations. This is appropriate, given the array of threats and
challenges facing our Nation, but it is also difficult to accurately
predict future threats and, accordingly, allocate sufficient resources,
particularly in an era of fiscal austerity. Secretary Gates has pointed
out that it may be necessary to shrink the force and accept that we
will have less overall capacity in order to ensure that the forces we
field are superbly trained and equipped for the most important
missions. If confirmed, this is a set of issues to which I will devote
priority attention.
TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS
Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will
face over the next several years is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation
tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology.
Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the
requirements for and timing of these programs?
Answer. I understand that the F-35 will replace a range of legacy
tactical aircraft in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps with a fifth
generation fighter. Based on the current and projected threats, I
believe it is important that we transition to a fifth generation
tactical aviation capability across the U.S military services as soon
as practical. I understand that one F-35 variant, the Marine Corps'
Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35B is on ``probation''
while technical issues are addressed. Overall, I believe we should
maintain sufficient legacy inventory to support the force structure
needed to prevail in the wars we are currently engaged in, as well as
in possible future conflicts, while we field the F-35.
Question. What is your assessment of whether the restructuring of
the JSF program that we have seen over the past 2 years will be
sufficient to avoid having to make major adjustments in either cost or
schedule in the future?
Answer. It is my understanding that the F-35 program restructure
was intended to put the program on solid ground, with realistic
development and production goals and significant reduction in
concurrency. I support DOD's current effort to focus on and reduce F-35
sustainment costs. If confirmed, I will review the overall F-35
program's status and health.
NAVY SHIPBUILDING
Question. Today's Navy is at its smallest size in decades and could
decline further without additional shipbuilding efforts. The Chief of
Naval Operations has concluded that the Navy requires a fleet of at
least 313 ships to perform its mission.
What are your views regarding the CNO's conclusions about the
appropriate size and composition of the fleet, and the adequacy of the
Navy's current and projected plans to deliver that inventory of ships?
Answer. A strong naval force is essential to project U.S. military
power and ensures a global presence. I am not familiar with all of the
analysis performed in the Chief of Naval Operations' assessment to
reach a minimum number of 313 ships. However, if confirmed, I will work
with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to
ensure that the appropriate force structure requirements are fully
identified and supported.
INFORMATION ASSURANCE
Question. Protection of military networks, information, and
communications is critical to DOD operations. The Department has not
yet provided Congress with a comprehensive legislative proposal that
would allow the Department to implement the President's guidance on
dealing with current and future cyber threats.
What is your assessment of the cyber security posture of the
Department's critical information systems?
Answer. From my understanding, DOD is developing a solid foundation
for securing critical information systems. Given the lack of strong
security features in today's commercial information technology,
however, DOD's critical information systems, like other critical
financial, energy, transportation information systems, contain
vulnerabilities that are at risk of being exploited by a sophisticated
adversary. To mitigate these vulnerabilities I understand that DOD has
implemented and continues to improve a capability for protecting and
defending its networks. Among other actions, the recent stand-up of
U.S. Cyber Command has brought increased operational focus to these
tasks.
Going forward, an enormous amount of work is required to keep pace
with technology and capabilities, and to stay ahead of system
vulnerabilities that put our information and communications technology
systems at risk. If confirmed, I will continue the efforts to secure
DOD's information and communications technology, address cyber
challenges, and ensure DOD can defend against network adversaries.
Question. What Department-wide policies, guidance, or changes in
legislation do you believe are necessary to address information and
cyber security challenges for current and future systems?
Answer. I am not in a position to recommend specific policies,
guidance, or changes to authorities at this time. The administration is
currently working with Congress to fashion new cyber legislation, and
DOD is an active participant in these ongoing discussions. If
confirmed, I will be studying this issue and if I determine any
recommended changes in legislation to address information and cyber
security challenges, I will work with the administration to provide
those recommendations to Congress.
FUTURE ARMY
Question. In a speech at West Point last February, Secretary Gates
argued that it is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land
forces to future conflicts, and that the Army must ``confront the
reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S.
military [will be] primarily naval and air engagements.'' Accordingly,
the Army will find it difficult to justify the number, size, and cost
of its heavy forces. On the other hand, former Chief of Staff of the
Army, General George Casey Jr., said he expected that over the next 10
years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in combat.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen said that for
planning purposes the Department assumes 6 to 10 combat brigades will
likely be deployed.
Do you agree with Secretary Gates assertion that the commitment of
land forces, on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, is unlikely in the
future? Why or why not?
Answer. I think our historical experience argues for humility in
predicting the shape or direction of future conflicts. Dismissing the
prospect of a particular type of warfare could lead to unpreparedness
or strategic surprise. Therefore, we must be prepared to conduct
operations across the spectrum of conflict, and our forces, including
the Army, need the ability and flexibility to adapt to a changing
security environment. However, I believe that we should employ the full
range of diplomatic, economic, and informational tools to achieve
national security objectives with reduced reliance on military force
whenever possible.
Question. Do you agree that high-end military operations will
primarily be naval and air engagements such that the Army will have
difficulty justifying the size, structure, and cost of its heavy
formations?
Answer. It is always difficult to predict the characteristics of
future conflict, but I think DOD must be prepared to confront potential
adversaries armed with advanced technologies, such as integrated air
defense systems, long-range ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise
missiles. Given the importance of power projection for U.S. operations,
naval and air assets will undoubtedly play a key role in these future
military engagements. However, robust Army capabilities, which provide
an unquestioned and essential ability to find and defeat opposing
ground forces and establish security over wide areas, also serve as a
deterrent to potential aggressors. Our experience in Iraq and recent
military operations by our allies and partners has informed our
thinking on the role of heavy forces across the spectrum of conflict,
including in urban areas and the conduct of counterinsurgency
operations. Of particular concern for ground forces are not only the
modernization efforts of nation-states but also the proliferation of
increasingly advanced weaponry, such as precision-guided anti-tank
weapons, manportable air defense systems, and precision-guided rockets,
artillery, and mortars, to non-state actors. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Services to assess current and future challenges and
adjust the size and focus of each Service accordingly.
Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations
or criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with
strategy and resources? If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you
propose to properly align the Army's size and structure with the
requirements of security strategies and the likely availability of
resources?
Answer. I understand that our Nation needs an Army that can win on
conventional battlefields, that can conduct effective counterinsurgency
and stability operations, and that can partner with the ground forces
of partner states to impart skills that can help them bring security
and stability to their own countries and regions. Maintaining skills
across this broad mission set while ensuring excellence will be a
challenge, particularly in a period of budget austerity, and may
require some tradeoffs across the force. If confirmed, I will work
closely with military and civilian leaders to balance these risks.
ARMY MODERNIZATION
Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not
been successful over the past decade. According to a recent study done
for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army
Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner the Army has sunk
$3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 into weapons programs
that have been cancelled. The report states that, ``The Army lacks a
credible, quantitative model and process for determining realistic,
achievable requirements for modernization and recapitalization given
reduced budgets.''
What is your assessment of the Army's modernization record?
Answer. I understand that many of the Army's development and
procurement problems stemmed from pursuing programs that ultimately did
not match the needs of DOD, were cost prohibitive or were
technologically infeasible. I understand that the Army has been working
to rapidly review and implement many of the innovative recommendations
of the Decker-Wagner panel. If confirmed I will review current Army
programs to ensure this history is not repeated.
Question. What actions, if any, would you take to ensure that the
Army achieves a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely monitor and oversee the Army
modernization efforts. This will include reviewing the steps that the
Army is taking to improve the effectiveness of its requirements and
acquisition systems. Moreover, as the Army implements changes to its
acquisition system, I will encourage that the lessons learned from the
Army's efforts are infused into other programs across the Services and
DOD.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
Army's capabilities portfolio review process and its current
modernization priorities and investment strategy?
Answer. I understand that as part of his comprehensive efforts to
reform Army acquisition, in February 2010, Secretary McHugh ordered an
Army-wide ``capability portfolio reviews'' to scrutinize requirements,
identify potential redundancies and if appropriate, recommend program
changes, including terminations. These portfolio reviews appear to be
sound steps toward improving the results of the Army's requirements and
acquisition systems; however, I have not had the opportunity to review
this initiative in detail.
Question. What actions, if any, would you take to sustain the
momentum of these reviews in stabilizing the Army's modernization
strategy and priorities?
Answer. As noted above, if confirmed, I will closely monitor Army
modernization efforts. In doing so, I will encourage the Army to
continue its capability portfolio review process and share its lessons
learned from this effort throughout DOD.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of
Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles,
starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four
phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability
to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United
States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense
capability.
Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in
Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?
Answer. I support the President's policy on European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and, if confirmed, I will ensure DOD supports
the program's full implementation.
Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its
report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile
defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of
policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term
regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans,
programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and
enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to
defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range
missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging
against future uncertainties.
Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you
implement them?
Answer. I will need to further study the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review (BMDR), if confirmed, but as I understand the issue currently, I
support the administration's policies, strategies, and priorities as
set forth in this review. If confirmed, I will implement the policy
priorities of the BMDR, including sustaining and enhancing defense of
the homeland, while increasing our capability against the growing
regional threats.
Question. The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The
Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure
Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure and
will devise a plan to correct it, including two flight tests to confirm
the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the correction,
probably sometime in late 2012, the Director of MDA has suspended
production of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that
failed last year's flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKVs do
not contain a flaw that would need to be corrected later.
Do you agree that it is prudent to verify that the flight test
failure problem has been corrected before continuing production of the
EKVs, and before building more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) or
deciding how many additional GBIs may be needed in the future?
Answer. Verifying and correcting the problems with the EKVs prior
to continuing production is prudent and supports the administration's
policy to ``fly before you buy'' in order to improve reliability,
confidence, and cost control of U.S. missile defense systems.
Question. Do you support the continued modernization and
sustainment of the Ground-based midcourse defense system?
Answer. Yes. The United States is currently protected against the
threat of limited ICBM attack from States like North Korea and Iran. It
is important we maintain this advantage by continuing to improve the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.
Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced
that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
capabilities.
Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
nations such as Iran?
Do you agree that irrespective of Russian objections, the United
States is committed to the continued development and deployment of
United States missile defense systems worldwide, including qualitative
and quantitative improvements to such systems?
Answer. Yes, I believe that missile defense cooperation with Russia
can enhance U.S., NATO, and also Russian security. The United States is
committed to sustaining strategic stability with Russia, and it is my
understanding that neither current nor planned U.S. missile defenses
will impact this stability. The United States is committed to
continuing to develop and deploy missile defenses, including
qualitative and quantitative improvements.
SPACE
Question. China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a
turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to
ensure access to space. As a nation heavily dependent on space assets
for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets
became a national priority.
Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of
space assets should be a national security priority?
Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to
operate safely in an increasingly congested space environment and
enables the protection of space assets. Maintaining the benefits
afforded to the United States by space is central to our national
security.
Question. In your view should China's continued development of
space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National
Security space policy and programs?
Answer. I am not in a position to recommend any proposed changes at
this time. If confirmed, I would continue implementation of the
President's 2010 National Space Policy and the supporting National
Security Space Strategy. The two offer pragmatic approaches to maintain
the advantages derived from space while confronting the challenges of
an evolving space strategic environment.
Question. The Federal Communications Commission is currently
considering licensing a telecommunications provider who plans on using
a signal that has the potential to disrupt GPS signals.
If confirmed, would you look into this matter to understand the
impact on GPS signals?
Answer. Yes. I understand DOD is currently addressing this issue.
If confirmed, I will work with the FCC to ensure GPS remains accessible
to support national security, public safety, and the economy.
Question. The management of national security space and space
systems appears to be more fragmented than ever.
If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the overall management
and coordination of the national security space enterprise?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD recently took steps
intended to clarify and streamline space management, by amending the
Secretary of the Air Force's responsibilities as the Executive Agent
for Space, and by establishing a Defense Space Council. If confirmed, I
will assess what further steps may be required within DOD and in the
interagency to ensure effective management of the National Security
Space Enterprise.
Question. What is your view on weapons in space and the merits of
establishing an international agreement establishing rules of the road
for space operations?
Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National
Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and
use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act
responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and
mistrust. I understand that the Joint Staff is conducting an
operational assessment of the European Union's proposed Code of Conduct
for Outer Space; if confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this
assessment and considering appropriate steps to establish clear rules
of the road for space operations.
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin
studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next
15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic
nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.
Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to
afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the
rest of the DOD commitments?
Answer. I share the President's commitment to a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Sustaining our nuclear deterrent requires life extension programs for
warheads and modernization of delivery systems. I believe that
providing necessary resources for nuclear modernization should be a
national priority.
IRAN
Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has
failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current
and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In addition the P-5 +1 talks have stalled, with Iran setting
unreasonable preconditions to resume the talks.
Do you believe it would be in the United States' interest to engage
Iran in a direct dialogue regarding stability and security in Iraq?
Answer. The United States continues to reject Iran's destabilizing
behavior towards Iraq and calls on Iran to meet its international
obligations. The Iran and Iraq relationship is an issue that should be
negotiated by their respective governments, especially as the United
States draws down. However, I also believe we should continue the
current strategy of engagement and pressure and remain open to
additional talks with Iran through the P5+1.
Question. What more do you believe the United States and the
international community could be doing to dissuade Iran from pursuing a
nuclear weapons program?
Answer. I believe that we should explore ways to increase the
pressure on Iran, including through additional sanctions, and make it
as clear as possible that Iran's failure to meet its international
obligations will make it less--not more--secure. At the same time, we
should leave open the door for diplomacy, since it is not too late for
Iran to provide commitments and take steps that ensure that its nuclear
programs will remain peaceful.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iran?
Answer. Iran remains a significant threat to the United States, its
allies, and its interests in the region. Iran continues to enrich
uranium and pursue an illicit nuclear program, support terrorist groups
that attack U.S. forces and interests, and aggressively exert its
influence throughout the region. There is a real risk that its nuclear
program will prompt other countries in the region to pursue nuclear
options or threaten the broader global non-proliferation regime.
Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions
against Iran--have they been effective and should additional unilateral
or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?
Answer. The increasing economic pressure that the Obama
administration has brought to bear on Iran has caused surprise and
anxiety in Tehran. I do not believe that Iran's leaders believed that
we could generate the level of international support that we have for
sanctions. Iranian behavior has not changed, as Iran's leadership
continues to flout U.N. resolutions and has failed to meet its
international obligations. I believe, however, that we must continue to
increase the economic pressure on Iran in an attempt to change Iran's
behavior.
DOD'S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is
focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in the states of the former Soviet Union, has several
key objectives that include: (1) eliminating strategic nuclear weapons;
(2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting, eliminating and
preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and
capabilities; and (4) encouraging development of capabilities to reduce
proliferation threats.
In your view, what needs to be done to reduce the proliferation
threat from the residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD weapons and
materials in the former Soviet Union?
Answer. I believe the countries of the former Soviet Union have
made appreciable strides in the past two decades to reduce the threats
associated with the extensive Soviet WMD programs, facilities and
stockpiles in their territories--in many cases with the support and
assistance of DOD's CTR program. While much has been done, residual
Cold War stockpiles of WMD and materials continue to pose a threat to
U.S. national security, especially in light of the potential for WMD
terrorism. Where and when host governments are unable to mitigate this
threat on their own, CTR and other U.S. programs should work with these
nations to reduce this threat.
Question. Are Russia and the former Soviet Union countries making a
significant contribution to efforts to reduce the proliferation threats
they inherited?
Answer. It is my understanding that Russia and states of the Former
Soviet Union are making important contributions to reduce proliferation
threats they inherited and to address new ones. These contributions
include direct national funding as well as collaboration with U.S.
agencies and other international partners.
I understand that DOD's principal vehicle to support these efforts
is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which is
executed in close coordination with related activities of the
Departments of State and Energy. As examples, I understand that
Kazakhstan is partnering with U.S. agencies to reduce a variety of
nuclear and biological threats that were left by the Soviets on its
soil. Similarly, Georgia is taking a leading role, with U.S.
assistance, to eliminate Soviet-era biological threats and to turn
itself into a regional bio-defense leader. I am also told that we have
maintained a strong non-proliferation partnership with Russia in a
number of areas.
Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among
the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in
Russia, e.g., DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?
Answer. I understand that DOD's CTR mission is executed with
essential support from DOS, and in cooperation with the Department of
Energy and other interagency partners. Robust collaboration across U.S.
agencies and interagency coordination is a hallmark of the program and
key to its effectiveness. If confirmed, I will evaluate whether
interagency coordination can be improved.
Question. As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond
the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation
and threat reduction goals should the DOD establish?
Answer. Expanding the geographic reach of the CTR program beyond
the former Soviet Union strikes me as an important step toward
preventing and reducing WMD threats and building global partnerships.
The President has highlighted the threats posed by nuclear and
biological terrorism as key proliferation concerns requiring
international attention. In line with these priorities, I am informed
that DOD's goals for the program are: (1) reducing and eliminating
nuclear weapons threats; (2) improving the security and accounting of
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting,
eliminating and preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical
weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging development of
capabilities to reduce proliferation threats among key partners and
regions. I believe that these goals make sense.
PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE
Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will
continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has
been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the
effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global
strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national
security in the near future?
Answer. Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would
provide the Nation with a unique conventional capability to strike
time-sensitive targets, so that distant, hard-to-reach places will no
longer provide sanctuary to adversaries. It is my understanding that
the only current prompt global strike capability in the U.S. inventory
is a nuclear armed ballistic missile. CPGS would be a valuable option
for the President to have at his disposal.
CPGS systems could be useful in scenarios involving regional
adversaries considering an attack using weapons of mass destruction or
against high-priority non-state adversaries. More broadly, CPGS may be
the only systems available in situations where a fleeting, serious
threat was located in a region not readily accessible by other means.
Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would
you expect to pursue if confirmed?
Answer. I understand that DOD is developing and testing
technologies relevant to both land-based and sea-based CPGS. It would
be premature to make any decisions regarding a future deployed system
until the results of these tests are in-hand.
Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence
capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike
capability?
Answer. Like other weapon systems, effective employment of CPGS
weapons would depend on the availability of timely and accurate
intelligence on the nature, location, and disposition of a potential
target. If confirmed, I will consider what specific improvements in
intelligence capabilities may be needed to enable effective use of CPGS
systems for various types of targets. I believe that it is important to
pursue continued enhancements in our capabilities to collect, analyze,
and distribute intelligence irrespective of the development of CPGS
systems.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP
Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and
security of the stockpile?
Answer. It is my understanding that stockpile stewardship is
effective; today's stockpile appears to be safe, secure, and reliable
and not require further nuclear testing. But the stockpile is aging. I
understand that there are challenges in identifying and remedying the
effects of aging on the stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to
working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills,
capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety,
reliability, and security of the stockpile, all in a constrained budget
environment.
Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile
Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual
certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you
recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing?
Answer. As stated in my answer above, my understanding is that
today's nuclear stockpile appears to be safe, secure, and effective and
does not require a return to nuclear testing. I understand that nuclear
testing is not currently anticipated or planned. It is my understanding
that the Stockpile Stewardship Program has demonstrated an ability to
resolve problems that in the past would have been resolved with
testing, and I believe that if the Stockpile Stewardship Program is
adequately funded to maintain critical technical and manufacturing
capabilities, it can continue to fulfill this role. My recommendation
on a course of action in the event that I was unable to certify the
stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable would depend critically on the
root causes of problems in the stockpile.
Question. What considerations would guide your recommendation in
this regard?
Answer. The dominant considerations would be the safety, security,
and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and our ability to sustain the
U.S. nuclear deterrent. Technical and military considerations would
guide my recommendation to the President. I would certainly take into
account the expert technical judgment of the three nuclear weapons
laboratory directors, coupled with the military judgment of the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as well as the judgment of other
experts. I would also ask for the best military judgment of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review this report. If
confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to do so. I do believe
that maintaining a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear stockpile is a
critical national security priority. At the same time, I believe that
nuclear modernization, as with all DOD's efforts, must be undertaken in
a cost-effective manner. I am informed that Secretary Gates took steps
to reduce the estimated costs of the Ohio-class replacement ballistic
missile submarine and the new Long-Range Strike Family of Systems. If
confirmed, I would continue to work to ensure affordability while
sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you
believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
treaty limits for either the deployed or non-deployed stockpile of
nuclear weapons?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the timeframe of
the modernization program or to assess its relationship to reductions
below the New START treaty limits. I agree with the Senate's resolution
of ratification for the New START treaty in calling for negotiations
with Russia to ``secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a
verifiable manner.'' I understand that the administration has suggested
bilateral negotiations with Russia on this matter, after consultation
with our allies. I believe that any proposed further reductions should
take into account the status of the stockpile of nuclear weapons, and
that our investments and these negotiations should be pursued in
parallel.
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES INITIATIVE (MCMI)
Question. The administration has produced an interagency strategy
for the advanced development and manufacture of medical countermeasures
(MCM) to defend against pandemic influenza and biological warfare
threats. In this strategy, DOD will be responsible for the development
and manufacture of medical countermeasures to protect U.S. Armed Forces
and DOD personnel.
Do you support this interagency strategy and the MCM Initiative
and, if confirmed, would you plan to implement them?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to establish this important
capability that is needed to support our forces and sustain our global
operations.
DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM
Question. Two years ago, Congress enacted the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in
either House. WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition
programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing
problems late in the acquisition process.
What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements
in the Defense acquisition process?
Answer. I support the improvements in the areas of defense
acquisition organization and policy that are addressed in the WSARA.
WSARA mandated needed improvements in the defense acquisition process.
I support the law's requirements that DOD examine trade-offs between
cost, schedule, and performance to significantly reduce cost growth in
major defense acquisition programs. I am aware that DOD has undertaken
significant further acquisition reform. If confirmed, I will continue
the effort to improve the acquisition system consistent with the
direction provided in WSARA.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
the acquisition process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. I believe that the acquisition process must be closely
coordinated with the requirements and budget processes. Since enactment
of WSARA, progress appears to have been made in coordinating these
three processes, but I understand there remains room for improvement
and that DOD can reduce costs to get better value for its defense
dollar. I understand DOD is currently engaged in a comprehensive
initiative designed to reduce cost throughout the defense acquisition
system. I understand that a major part of this ``Better Buying Power''
initiative is to coordinate the requirements, acquisition, and budget
processes in a way that mandates affordable requirements and full
funding into weapon systems up front. I support these efforts.
I also believe that it is necessary to create a ``Fast Lane'' for
acquiring and fielding systems in response to urgent operational needs,
as was done with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD has
engaged in rapid acquisition through a variety of largely ad hoc
processes. Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD to consider a formal process for rapid
acquisition. If confirmed, I will make creating a formal process for
rapid acquisition a priority.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition
accountability?
Answer. Goldwater Nichols established a chain of command for the
acquisition process which provides for clear accountability. However,
the acquisition process must be operated in close coordination with the
requirements process and the budget process, and this requires active
participation by DOD's senior leadership to ensure all three processes
are properly coordinated and held accountable. If confirmed, I am
committed to ensuring accountability in all aspects of acquisition
during my tenure.
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
Answer. I have not reviewed DOD's investment budget in detail.
However, it is clear to me that in this current fiscal environment,
pursuing affordability and cost control are critical. In recent years,
Secretary Gates has cancelled a number of programs that were unneeded,
were not delivering affordably, or had been procured in adequate
numbers already. These efforts have gone a long way towards paring down
DOD's portfolio of major weapons systems to those that are truly
needed. Existing programs must be managed so that cost growth does not
make them unaffordable. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the
investment budget closely for affordability and for opportunities to
achieve cost savings.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
Answer. Clearly, continued implementation of WSARA is a critical
element in controlling cost growth. If confirmed, I will support this
and other ongoing efforts to control costs and reform the acquisition
system. In particular I will review DOD's major programs to determine
if they are affordable and I will direct the Services to do the same
for programs under their direction.
SERVICES CONTRACTING
Question. Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase
in the volume of services purchased by DOD. According to a recent
report by the Defense Science Board, the Department now spends
substantially more for contract services than it does for all products,
including weapon systems. Yet, the Department is still struggling to
establish a management structure for services contracts comparable to
the structure in place for the acquisition of products.
What is your view of the Department's reliance on service
contractors?
Answer. I recognize that the private sector is, and will continue
to be, a vital source of expertise, innovation and support and that
DOD, which relies on an All-Volunteer Force, simply cannot operate
without the support of service contractors. These contractors do
account for more of the defense budget than contractors who provide
products to DOD. I believe that properly managing service contractors
is just as important as managing DOD's contractors who provide weapon
systems and other products.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address the issue of
cost growth in services contracting and ensure that the Department gets
the most for its money in this area?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the processes DOD is using to
manage service contractors to ensure that they are providing good value
for the funds they receive.
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees.
In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support
the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. At this time I do not have enough information to make this
assessment. However, I believe that reliance on contractors is
something that must be assessed function by function. Many functions
are appropriate for contractor support, however some, such as program
management, are more appropriately performed by government personnel.
Some functions are inherently governmental and should not be performed
by contractors. If confirmed I will assess this issue to determine
whether or not DOD's reliance on contractors has become excessive.
Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
services contracts is in the best interest of DOD?
Answer. Although I am not familiar with the various types of
functions acquired through personal service contracts, or the extent to
which DOD acquires these functions through personal services contracts,
I understand there are statutory restrictions. In my view, the basis
for those restrictions is as applicable to DOD as to that of other
Federal departments and agencies. If confirmed, I will ensure that
personal services contracts are not used inappropriately.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of
personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements
to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those
performed by government employees?
Answer. When it is appropriate for contractors to perform work that
is similar to work performed by government employees, my view is that
those contractor employees should be subject to appropriate ethics and
conflict of interest requirements. Contractor employees should be held
to similar ethical standards as the Government employees they support,
and in particular, should not be allowed to misuse the information
which may be available to them as a result of their performance under a
DOD contract.
Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
relied on contractor support to a greater degree than previous U.S.
military operations. According to widely published reports, the number
of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has often exceeded
the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.
Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor
support for military operations?
Answer. I am not in a position to offer such an assessment at this
time. While DOD's use of contractors is high relative to previous
conflicts, current levels may be warranted. DOD now has several years
of experience with the widespread use of contractors to support the
All-Volunteer Force engaged in counter-insurgency and stability
operations. It is my understanding that the increased level of reliance
on contracted support in contingency operations is highlighted in a
recent study conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Furthermore, it is my understanding that based on a recommendation
by the Chairman, Secretary Gates recently issued a memorandum to DOD
regarding a wide range of initiatives associated with contractor
support in contingencies. This memorandum requires the military
departments to assess opportunities for in-sourcing contracted
capabilities that represent high risk to the warfighter. If confirmed,
I will review this study and the military departments' assessments.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
such contractor support?
Answer. Reliance on contractor support can lead to operational
problems if contractors fail to perform. Experience has shown that a
number of other problems can arise including a potential for increased
fraud, waste and abuse, problems that arise from contractor interaction
with local communities, and issues with the use of force. It is also
possible that skills needed in the military in the future will atrophy
or disappear due to reliance on contractor support.
Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
mitigate such risk?
Answer. I believe the first step in mitigating such risk is to gain
a thorough understanding of any risks we have with the current
workforce mix of military, civilian and contractors. The aforementioned
study led by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
assessments being conducted by the military services and agencies will
provide me with a baseline level of understanding. If confirmed, I will
review and continue ongoing efforts to conduct effective oversight of
service contracts in contingencies.
Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. It is my understanding that originally DOD was not properly
organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors in the ongoing
contingency operations, but that corrective actions have been taken
over the last several years. If confirmed, I will review ongoing
efforts to ensure DOD institutionalizes its contingency contracting
capabilities and the lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan are applied to future conflicts.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD has made significant
progress in implementing effective management of contractors during
contingency operations through several ongoing efforts. If confirmed, I
will review and ensure these efforts are adequate and effective and I
will work to institutionalize the effective management processes that
have been developed over the last several years as appropriate.
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS
Question. Federal agencies, including DOD, have spent more than $5
billion for private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over
the last decade. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of
abuses by private security contractors, including allegations of
contractors shooting recklessly at civilians as they have driven down
the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In September 2007,
employees of Blackwater allegedly opened fire on Iraqis at Nisour
Square in downtown Baghdad, killing more than a dozen Iraqis and
wounding many more. More recently, the Senate Armed Services Committee
reported on questionable activities by private security contractors in
Afghanistan.
Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely upon
contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be
expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public
areas in an area of combat operations?
Answer. Without a substantial increase in the force structure
committed to contingency operations, the use of contractors for some
security functions in contingencies is a necessity. However, these
contractors must be properly regulated and supervised and their mission
must be carefully limited. Contractors cannot engage in combat
operations. Their use of force is limited to self-defense and the
defense of others against criminal violence and the protection of
critical property. Under these circumstances, I believe that the
limited use of security contractors in contingency operations is
acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by
other departments. If confirmed I will ensure that proper limitations
on private security contractors are in place and enforced.
Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security
contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense
and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The use of force by contractors or military personnel can,
if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Contractors for
physical security missions have been a necessity in Iraq and
Afghanistan and will continue to be so. My understanding is that, over
time, DOD has established procedures to manage these contractors
effectively to prevent unnecessary violence that would be detrimental
to our policy objectives. This is an area that requires constant
attention and continued supervision and policy refinement is required.
If confirmed, I will focus on providing that supervision.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an
area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with
U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that two actions are
taken. First, the use of private security contractors in any area of
combat operations must be fully coordinated. There must be unified and
consistent procedures for all such contractors, regardless of which
U.S. agency hires them. Our commanders on the ground must have
authority to restrict security contractors' operations as the situation
requires.
Second, there must be assured legal accountability for the actions
of private security contractors. In a given circumstance, the host
nation will have responsibilities in this regard as well, such as
rigorous licensing procedures and enforcement of its own laws.
Question. Do you support the extension of the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of
all Federal agencies?
Answer. I support steps to ensure that there is legal
accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for
the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I
will consult with my interagency partners concerning appropriate
mechanisms to ensure such accountability.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate application of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security
contractors operating in an area of combat operations?
Answer. There must be assured legal accountability for the actions
of all contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. The
application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is one tool to do
this.
Question. OMB Circular A-76 defines ``inherently governmental
functions'' to include ``discretionary functions'' that could
``significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
persons''
Answer. In your view, is the performance of security functions that
may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly
hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently
governmental function? In your view, is the interrogation of enemy
prisoners of war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of
hostilities an inherently governmental function?
I am not familiar with DOD policies governing the use of
contractors in detention operations, but if confirmed, I will review
them to ensure they properly separate inherently governmental functions
from work performed by contractors. I am aware that Congress spoke to
the issue of interrogation by contractors in section 1038 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 which prohibits
the interrogation by contractor personnel of detainees or others in the
custody or under the effective control of DOD in connection with
hostilities. If confirmed, I will ensure this provision is enforced.
Question. Do you see a need for a comprehensive reevaluation of
these issues now?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review these issues to determine
whether there is a need to reevaluate these policies.
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE
Question. Over the last 15 years, DOD has reduced the size of its
acquisition workforce by almost half, without undertaking any
systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the
specific skills and competencies needed to meet DOD's current and
future needs. Since September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on
that workforce have substantially increased. Section 852 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address shortcomings
in its acquisition workforce. Over the last year, Secretary Gates has
stated that the Department must continue to rebuild its acquisition
workforce, even as it seeks efficiencies in other areas.
Do you agree that the Department would be ``penny-wise and pound
foolish'' to try to save money by cutting corners on its acquisition
workforce at the risk or losing control over the hundreds of billions
of dollars that it spends every year on the acquisition of products and
services?
Answer. Yes. I am aware that DOD is expending far more today on
goods and services with an acquisition workforce substantially reduced
in size from the 1990s. If confirmed, I will support a properly sized
and highly capable acquisition workforce.
Question. Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development
Fund is needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees
with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that DOD has used the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, which originated in this
committee, to resource a number of initiatives to attract, develop, and
retain individuals with critical acquisition skills. DOD must continue
to fund these initiatives which are critical to achieving a properly
sized and highly capable acquisition workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any will you ensure that the
money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in
a manner that best meets the needs of DOD and its acquisition
workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct that the Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics monitor the implementation of
the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to ensure that it
focuses on rebuilding critical skills in the workforce, without which
our goals for affordability, cost control, and reform of the
acquisition system cannot be met.
MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Question. The Government Performance and Results Act is intended to
provide managers with a disciplined approach by developing a strategic
plan, establishing annual goals, measuring performance, and reporting
on the results by for improving the performance and internal management
of an organization.
What do you consider to be the most important priorities and
challenges facing DOD as it strives to achieve these management goals?
Answer. I share Secretary Gates' concern, as noted in his recent
speech to the American Enterprise Institute, that the current systems
for managing people and money across the DOD enterprise are inadequate.
It is my understanding that the defense agencies, field activities,
joint headquarters, and support staff functions of DOD operate without
centralized mechanisms to allocate resources, track expenditures, and
measure results relative to DOD's overall priorities. If confirmed, I
look forward to addressing this issue.
Question. What are your views on the importance and role of
financial information in managing operations and holding managers
accountable?
Answer. I believe that having access to the appropriate financial
information, as well as other key performance indicators, is critical
towards managing operations and holding leaders accountable for
results.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Question. DOD spends billions of dollars every year to acquire,
operate, and upgrade business systems needed to support the warfighter,
including systems related to the management of contracts, finances, the
supply chain, and support infrastructure. Despite these expenditures,
the Department's business systems are stovepiped, duplicative, and
nonintegrated. As a result, the Department remains unable to produce
timely, accurate, and complete information to support management
decisions.
If confirmed, will you ensure that the financial management
problems of DOD receive priority attention at the senior management
level?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What priority do you believe the Department should place
on achieving a clean financial statement, as required by section 1003
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010?
Answer. Achieving clean audit opinions is one of my top management
improvement priorities. A clean financial audit opinion is important to
demonstrate that DOD is a responsible steward of public funds and to
ensure management has accurate and timely information for
decisionmaking. I understand DOD has a plan for achieving auditable
statements that includes goals, a governance process, and resources;
and that this plan depends in part on modernizing its business systems.
I expect senior leaders across DOD to work together to continue
progress towards meeting the legal requirement to be ready for audits
by the end of 2017, and will ensure that the Comptroller, in
partnership with the Chief Management Officers, devotes time and
resources to leading this effort.
HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING
Question. DOD faces a critical shortfall in key areas of its
civilian workforce, including the management of acquisition programs,
information technology systems and financial management, and senior DOD
officials have expressed alarm at the extent of the Department's
reliance on contractors in these areas. Section 115(b) of title 10,
U.S.C., requires the Department to develop a strategic workforce plan
to shape and improve its civilian employee workforce.
Would you agree that the Department's human capital, including its
civilian workforce, is critical to the accomplishment of its national
security mission?
Answer. Yes. DOD's human capital, including its civilian workforce,
is not only critical, but an essential element to the successful
accomplishment of its national security mission. It is my understanding
that the civilian workforce is viewed as one entity throughout DOD.
Given the intent to have civilians be capable and ready to move to
where an emerging requirement exists within DOD, collaboration is an
ongoing process amongst the Services, Defense Agencies, Joint Staff,
and Office of the Secretary of Defense. This process ensures that DOD
is speaking in one voice for its civilian workforce to ensure
transparency, develop and recommend enterprise policy, and support the
overall lifecycle. DOD employs a robust system of talent management to
ensure it possesses and plans for future workforce needs. If confirmed,
I will work to ensure that this ready and capable civilian force has
the support it needs through programs that foster ideas, methods, and
procedures for lifecycle management.
Question. Do you share the concern expressed by others about the
extent of the Department's reliance on contractors in critical areas
such as the management of acquisition programs, information technology
and financial management?
Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor whether or not DOD is too
reliant on contractors. The private sector will continue to provide
vital support to DOD. There are areas in acquisition, IT and financial
management where support from contractors is an appropriate and cost
effective solution to perform work that does not require government
personnel discretion. If confirmed, I will be committed to proactively
managing the Total Force of military and civilian personnel, and
support provided by contractors.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department
undertakes necessary human capital planning to ensure that its civilian
workforce is prepared to meet the challenges of the coming decades?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that a comprehensive
workforce plan provides strategies for recruitment, development, and
retention of a mission-ready civilian workforce is in place. Planning
is critical as fiscal constraints impact workforce capabilities and
sustainment.
TEST AND EVALUATION
Question. A natural tension exists between major program objectives
to reduce cost and schedule and the test and evaluation (T&E) objective
to ensure performance meets specifications and requirements.
What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the
desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform
adequate testing?
Answer. I support rigorous independent testing and evaluation to
provide accurate and objective information on the capabilities and
limitations of defense systems to both acquisition executives and
warfighters and to ensure contractors deliver products that meet their
requirements. When systems are urgently needed in the field, the
imperative for accurate and objective testing is still just as
important but should be addressed through efforts to expedite the T&E
process. I understand this has been accomplished successfully for such
urgent efforts as the MRAP vehicle program. In those urgent cases I
believe that some risk can be taken, but safety and basic performance
must be verified prior to fielding. Testing is needed to validate
system performance and I believe it is a necessary part of the
acquisition process. That said, there may be opportunities to achieve
this goal through more efficient processes than those currently in
practice.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we
should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been
demonstrated through T&E to be operationally effective, suitable, and
survivable?
Answer. In a limited number of urgent circumstances it might be
necessary to field a system prior to operational testing in order to
address an urgent gap in a critical capability. But even in such cases,
operational evaluation should still be conducted at the earliest
opportunity to assess the system's capabilities and limitations and
identify any deficiencies that might need to be corrected.
Question. Congress established the position of Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on
matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As
established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with
Congress, consistent with the statutory independence of the office.
Do you support the continued ability of the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation to speak freely and independently with Congress?
Answer. Yes.
FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS AND WORKFORCE
Question. In his State of the Union speech earlier this year, the
President said that ``maintaining our leadership in science and
technology (S&T) is crucial to America's success.'' In the fiscal year
2012 budget submission, despite the significant efforts to find
efficiencies, the DOD's basic research investments grow by 2 percent
per year and other S&T activities remain constant taking into account
inflation.
Do you support maintaining growth in the DOD's S&T investments?
Answer. I understand and appreciate the valuable role government
investment in S&T has had for the Nation and DOD. As Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, I noted that many of that agency's key
capabilities emerged from long-term S&T funding. I have seen the
results and I support long-term S&T investments. I am also aware that
the President has challenged S&T funding levels for all government
components. While S&T investment will be a high priority if I am
confirmed, all defense appropriations must be considered during this
time of budget constraints.
Question. How will you assess whether the S&T investment portfolio
is adequate to meet the current and future needs of the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate conducting an early review of
DOD's capabilities to support the administration's goals, including S&T
investment. DOD's budget must balance a number of competing needs and,
if confirmed, I will have to assess all those needs, and the risks
associated with various levels of funding.
Question. Well over half of all graduates of U.S. universities with
advanced degrees in S&T are non-U.S. citizens. Due to a variety of
reasons, many return to their home countries where they contribute to
competing against the United States in technology advancement.
What is your view on steps that the Department should take, if any,
to ensure that DOD and the defense industrial base are able to recruit
and retain scientists and engineers from this talent pool?
Answer. The issue of enabling and encouraging foreign students to
remain in the United States to pursue careers in science and
engineering is one that affects the Nation as a whole. If confirmed, I
would work within the administration and with Congress to find ways to
retain this talent pool.
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
Question. The latest QDR addressed the need for strengthening the
defense industrial base. Specifically, it said: ``America's security
and prosperity are increasingly linked with the health of our
technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain our strategic
advantage well into the future, the Department requires a consistent,
realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and
capabilities of the defense technology and industrial bases--a strategy
that better accounts for the rapid evolution of commercial technology,
as well as the unique requirements of ongoing conflicts.''
What is your view on steps that the Department should take, if any,
to strengthen the defense industrial base?
Answer. I believe a strong, technologically vibrant, and
financially successful defense industrial base is in the national
interest. I understand that national policy for many years has been to
let market forces adjust the defense industrial base to our evolving
threats and requirements, and to changing technology. The government
specifically supports defense S&T, and small businesses entering the
defense market. Occasionally, specific industrial policies are used to
assure the long-term health of particular sectors of the defense
industry. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD uses a sector-by-sector
approach to the defense industrial base, with productivity growth and
long-term health as its goals.
ENCROACHMENT
Question. Some of the most significant issues that impact the
readiness of the Armed Forces are categorized as outside encroachment
upon military reservations and resources. This encroachment has
included, but is not limited to environmental constraints on military
training ranges, local community efforts to obtain military property,
housing construction, and other land use changes near military
installations, airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines,
and transfer of radio frequency spectrum from DOD to the wireless
communications industry. Unless these issues are effectively addressed,
military forces will find it increasingly difficult to train and
operate at home and abroad.
In your opinion, how serious are encroachment problems for the U.S.
military? If confirmed, what efforts would you take to ensure that
military access to the resources listed above, and other required
resources, will be preserved?
Answer. I believe that encroachment is a serious issue for the U.S.
military. I am aware that DOD has a number of key programs to influence
activities outside our installations so that they do not conflict with
our training and operations. I strongly support such efforts and, if
confirmed, will work closely with Congress to ensure that these efforts
are effective.
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is
pending consideration in the United States Senate.
What is your view on whether or not the United States should join
the Law of the Sea convention?
Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention
help or hinder the United States' security posture?
Answer. Being a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would not
hinder the U.S. security posture, nor would it have any adverse impact
on our sovereignty. In fact, becoming a party would enhance our
security posture by enabling the United States to reinforce the
Convention's freedom of navigation and overflight rights, including
transit passage in strategic straits, and preserve our rights and
duties in the Arctic. In addition, becoming a Party to the Convention
would support combined operations with coalition partners and support
the Proliferation Security Initiative; establish undisputed title to
our extended continental shelf areas; and bolster our leadership in
future developments in the law of the sea. Accession would also add to
DOD's credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues
where Law of the Sea matters are discussed.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
EXPORT CONTROL REFORM
1. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, the outgoing Secretary of Defense
has been a leading proponent of the administration's effort to reform
our export control system. One element of that effort is a review of
the U.S. Munitions List (USML), which is expected to result in the
transfer to the Commerce Control List (CCL) less sensitive items that
do not require USML controls. What is your view of the administration's
effort to reform export controls?
Mr. Panetta. I fully support the reform efforts because I believe
they are absolutely necessary to meet 21st century national security
challenges. Secretary Gates played a key role in setting the
administration's export control reform objectives: a single list, a
single licensing agency, a single enforcement coordination agency, and
a single U.S. Government-wide information technology licensing system.
The administration has made significant progress in most areas. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has been fully engaged in revising the USML
and continue to focus on completing this important work with our
interagency partners to produce a single export control list that is
more transparent and predictable for government and industry.
2. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, if you are confirmed, do you plan to
continue the review of the USML, and to transition items, as
appropriate, to the CCL?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will work to ensure that DOD continues to be
the key driver in revising the USML into a positive list, tiering
controls based on the criticality of items and technologies for
military and intelligence applications, and identifying items that
should be moved to the more flexible licensing policies under the CCL.
3. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, what is your understanding of the
timing for this effort?
Mr. Panetta. With respect to revising the USML and moving items to
the CCL, DOD has developed initial drafts of 19 categories of the USML.
My understanding is that following interagency deliberations, the plan
is to incrementally publish these re-built categories for public
comment in the latter part of 2011 and early 2012.
With respect to establishing a single information technology
system, DOD is leading this critical step. Using DOD's U.S. Exports
System (USXPORTS) program, for the first time, all agencies will have
access to a full licensing dataset that will facilitate fully informed
and timely decision making. The Departments of State and Commerce will
be connected to USXPORTS this year; the Treasury Department is expected
to have connectivity in 2012.
My understanding is that the administration is working to finalize
the rules for the Export Enforcement Coordination Center (EECC) as
directed by Executive Order 13558, signed by the President in November
2010. The EECC is a key pillar of export control reform.
Finally, the administration will need to work with Congress on
legislation that would allow the President to establish a single U.S.
export control licensing agency.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
BUDGET
4. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen
have recently been vocal about DOD being unable to sustain any more
cuts to force structure. I do not agree that DOD is in a position where
it cannot achieve additional cost savings and efficiencies through
elimination of poor performing programs and a reassessment of
priorities and requirements, especially in light of some requests made
this year by DOD which do not make fiscal sense and are not in the best
interest of the force. For instance, DOD is requesting $804 million to
continue developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). Yet
we will not procure this system and based on the programs past
performance we will not get anything viable out of continued
development. Additionally, DOD intends to carry out tour normalization
in Korea. Moving dependents to this increasingly volatile area will
cost billions in military construction and basic housing allowance over
the long term. It doesn't make fiscal sense or common sense. Another
example is the realignment of marines to Guam. The cost is astronomical
and the agreement may not be executable and need re-examining as
Chairman Levin has pointed out this year. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has also identified several actions DOD could take to
eliminate redundancy and save money. If confirmed, will you closely
examine previous decisions and agreements that are costing taxpayers
billions of dollars and are not enhancing national security or
providing for our military?
Mr. Panetta. The Department has begun a comprehensive review of the
defense programs in light of the current fiscal environment. Everything
is on the table and we will assess each program in terms of the
contribution the program makes to our national security strategy.
5. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what type of review will you
conduct?
Mr. Panetta. I will continue the comprehensive review begun by
Secretary Gates and bring it to a conclusion by this fall.
6. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, how will you manage/
prioritize DOD's budget in this time of scare resources to ensure the
readiness of our forces but eliminate wasteful spending?
Mr. Panetta. During both the current comprehensive review and the
development of subsequent budgets, I will ensure we protect our
essential military capabilities while continuing to pursue additional
efficiencies, streamline operations, control acquisition cost growth,
and identify lower priority efforts that can be eliminated or
curtailed. That said, difficult choices will have to be made to operate
within reduced resources.
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
7. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, I support eliminating the threat to
U.S. national security in Afghanistan and Pakistan by defeating al
Qaeda and preventing those countries from being safe havens again.
However, like many of my colleagues, after a decade in the country I am
concerned about an indefinite U.S. presence. In light of the recent
killing of Osama bin Laden and elimination of many terrorists and
insurgents, I believe we need a thorough threat assessment and to
concisely define a realistic and achievable end-state. What is your
assessment of our current strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Mr. Panetta. Our strategy is working, but much work remains.
Although the death of Osama bin Laden was a significant achievement in
our Nation's effort against al Qaeda, his death does not mark the end
of our efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its
affiliates. Al Qaeda and other extremist groups continue to threaten
the United States and U.S. allies and partners from safe havens in
Pakistan, and wish to reestablish safe havens in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the progress that we have made over the past 16
months in driving the Taliban from their home territory in Helmand and
Kandahar is evidence that the insurgency is under intense pressure and
that their capabilities are being degraded. We have reversed the
insurgency's momentum in many key areas and are now making strides with
the Afghans to enable a government capable of providing basic services
and security. The implementation of this strategy has moved us closer
to our desired end-state of an Afghan state capable of repelling
insurgent threats to the central government, and of denying the
reestablishment of a safe haven for al Qaeda.
Although our relationship with Pakistan is a challenging one,
continued cooperation with Pakistan is important to maintaining
necessary pressure on al Qaeda leadership and the networks that provide
it support and safe haven, at a time when it is most vulnerable. Al
Qaeda vulnerability in the wake of the death of Osama bin Laden
presents an historic opportunity not only for us, but also for
Pakistan, to advance our shared interests and strengthen our
cooperation in eradicating terrorist networks that threaten both
nations, as well as our partners in the region and the world. I will
continue to seek Pakistan's unambiguous support in the fight against al
Qaeda and the regional syndicate of terrorist networks.
8. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of the
threat to U.S. national security in the region?
Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how do you view the United States'
long-term commitment--financially, reconstruction, and security-wise?
Mr. Panetta. The United States and the international community have
sacrificed an extraordinary amount--in lives and resources--for the
Afghan people. We remain committed to assisting Afghanistan in seeking
a secure Afghanistan that is free of al Qaeda safe-havens. Ultimately,
however, the Afghans must be responsible for taking the lead for
security in their country, and the transition process through 2014 will
support this.
President Obama and President Karzai have agreed that the United
States and Afghanistan should have an enduring strategic partnership
beyond 2014. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
international community have also made clear that their commitment to
Afghanistan is enduring and will continue beyond the completion of the
transition to Afghan security responsibility. We are currently engaging
with the Afghans to outline in broad terms a vision for our long-term
cooperation and presence.
Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to
come; this is the reality of over 30 years of war. Our assistance,
however, must be focused on helping the Afghans take full
responsibility for their own future. We need to ensure that as a nation
they begin to develop the capacity and the resources they need to
reduce their reliance on international aid.
10. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of
President Hamid Karzai as a partner?
Mr. Panetta. President Karzai is the democratically elected leader
of Afghanistan, and we are committed to working with him to achieve our
shared objectives. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan is not contingent on
a single leader; our commitment is to the people of Afghanistan, based
on the core interests that we share.
President Karzai faces a difficult situation in Afghanistan. He is
fighting an insurgency with the assistance of more than 140,000 foreign
forces. The burden of this war has been great on the Afghan people.
They have been traumatized by some 30 years of war. Inevitably, there
will be times of tension or disagreement, and just as President Karzai
needs to listen to our concerns, we also need to listen carefully to
his. President Karzai sometimes airs these concerns in ways we find
unhelpful. But ultimately, he appreciates what the United States is
doing and the sacrifices made by our forces.
11. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what do you see as the role for
DOD in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to
deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic
development, and fight corruption in Afghanistan?
Mr. Panetta. Although the Department of State (DOS) has the lead
for governance and economic development activities in Afghanistan, DOD
brings capabilities and resources that augment civilian efforts,
particularly in contested areas. As part of the counterinsurgency
strategy, U.S. military forces also support developing Afghan
governance and economic capacity, particularly at the district and
provincial levels. U.S. military forces use Commanders' Emergency
Response Program funds to carry out small-scale projects designed to
meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction
requirements of the population, with a focus on short-term stability
rather than long-term development. Military commanders provide co-
leadership of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and generally are key
partners of Afghan Government officials at the district level.
Further, the President's December 2009 strategy review designated
DOD as having primary responsibility for building capacity within the
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. This includes a range of
responsibilities to help build ministerial capacity to recruit, train,
equip, and sustain their own forces. DOD also contributes to anti-
corruption efforts through its Shafafiyat task force and its support to
the Ministry of Interior's law enforcement activities.
12. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, do you have concerns with the
Afghan Government's ability to sustain our efforts--like funding their
own security forces? What more can we be doing?
Mr. Panetta. After 30 years of war, the institutional and economic
capacity of Afghanistan is badly damaged. Nonetheless, Afghanistan has
several areas with great potential for economic development and revenue
generation, but we expect that the Afghan Government will require
international assistance for years to come to realize that potential. A
key aim of U.S. assistance, therefore, must be to help the Afghans take
full responsibility for their own future, and we need to ensure that as
a nation they begin to develop the capacity and the resources they need
to reduce their reliance on international aid. This is why the design
of U.S. Government-funded projects is increasingly focused on Afghan
capacity to sustain those projects.
Projects to help build the Afghan Government's capacity include
improvements to the Afghan energy sector (a major catalyst for economic
development), transportation and associated infrastructure to
facilitate regional trade, improvements to the agricultural sector, and
efforts to improve the Afghan Government's ability to collect customs
revenue. In addition DOD has implemented programs through its Task
Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) to connect outside
investors to potential Afghan producers and to help Afghanistan build
the capacity to develop its mineral and other natural resources in
environmentally sound and sustainable ways.
Aside from increasing the Afghan Government's capacity and revenue
to sustain the current joint efforts with the United States, we
anticipate that costs for Government services, such as the funding the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), could be adjusted over time.
Detailed planning for long-term ANSF sustainment is an ongoing, active
effort. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is
collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Staff, and NATO to analyze the long-term requirements for ANSF
capability in light of current fiscal constraints. We envision a
continuing role for the United States and expect continued
contributions from international donors. To that end, before retiring,
then-Secretary of Defense Gates challenged our partners in the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to contribute a combined
1 billion Euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund.
The Department is working with our international partners to pursue
that initiative.
13. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you support the
drawdown in July?
Mr. Panetta. I will support the President's decision.
14. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how long should the drawdown take?
Mr. Panetta. The pace and scope of the drawdown should take into
account security and other conditions on the ground. I will listen to
the recommendations from the commanders and provide my best military
advice to the President. A successful transition of security lead to
ANSF requires careful planning and implementation.
15. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of the
progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?
Mr. Panetta. Progress in developing professional and effective ANSF
has been steady. One hundred thousand have been added to the rolls of
the ANSF since the establishment of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
(NTM-A) in November 2009. NTM-A has set the conditions for enhancing
professionalism by the opening of twelve branch schools in the past
year, implementing an aggressive literacy program, and establishing
leadership training for officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).
The focus this year is on training Afghan trainers to train their own.
A sign of progress in this regard is the graduation 2 weeks ago of 26
new Sergeants Major from the Sergeant Major Academy--the first class
trained solely by Afghan Instructors and leaders. Similarly the
Commander of ISAF Joint Command (IJC) has led improvements in the
operational effectiveness of the ANSF through partnering. Ninety-Five
percent of all Afghan Kandaks (battalions) are partnered with coalition
forces. In the ISAF's main effort operation in Kandahar Province,
HAMKARI, ANSF comprise 60 percent of the total forces and are
increasingly taking the lead in planning and executing operations. The
response to the recent Taliban attacks in Kandahar City on 7 May 2011
was an example of the improving effectiveness of the ANSF. They dealt
with the attackers in a deliberate manner, eliminating the threat with
minimal casualties and limited ISAF support. Clearly there are
challenges and issues as we continue to grow and develop the ANSF, but
commanders at all levels are working shoulder to shoulder with their
Afghan counterparts to resolve them. I am confident that we can proceed
with transition of security responsibilities in designated areas to the
ANSF, and meet our goal of ANSF lead for security countrywide in
Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
16. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you make it a
goal to transfer the security mission to the Afghans sooner than 2014?
Mr. Panetta. President Karzai established the 2014 transition goal,
which NATO subsequently endorsed based on joint assessments with the
Afghan Government about the state of the insurgency, the rate at which
the ANSF can develop their capability to take over security lead, and
the level of governance capacity and development throughout the
country. Actual conditions on the ground will drive the ultimate rate
and sequence of transition, but the 2014 goal remains a realistic
target for a responsible transition.
17. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what changes, if
any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly
in terms of military-to-military relations?
Mr. Panetta. I would continue to seek Pakistan's unambiguous
support in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates operating in
the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Pakistan, however, must choose what
kind of partnership it seeks. Pakistan's own security depends on its
civilian and military efforts to deny safe havens in the tribal and
border regions and to extend economic opportunity and the government's
writ to those areas. It is also in the United States' interest that
Pakistan take these steps. Strong military-to-military relations and
assistance can be an important means of building Pakistan's
capabilities for this effort, but it will also require a mutual effort
to build and sustain trust in a commitment to achieving shared
objectives.
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
18. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (CLOS) is pending consideration in the U.S. Senate.
I support ratification of this treaty and know the Arctic is an
increasingly important region. What is your view on whether or not the
United States should join the CLOS?
Mr. Panetta. I support U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention (LOS Convention). The rights guaranteed under the LOS
Convention are essential for the global presence of U.S. forces,
enabling large-scale movement of materiel through the Straits of
Gibraltar, Malacca, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb and into the Persian Gulf
to sustain our combat forces into Iraq and Afghanistan. These rights
also permit the U.S. submarine fleet to transit submerged through key
choke points on critical missions and allow the U.S. Air Force to
conduct global missions without overflying foreign national airspace.
Finally, freedom of navigation and overflight rights ensure the
uninterrupted flow of commerce to and from our shores.
19. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how would being a party to the
CLOS help or hinder the United States' security posture?
Mr. Panetta. Becoming a Party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
(LOS Convention) would enhance our security posture by enabling the
United States to reinforce the LOS Convention's freedom of navigation
and overflight rights, including transit passage through strategic
straits, and preserve our rights and the duties of all States in the
Arctic. In addition, becoming a Party to the LOS Convention would:
support combined operations with coalition partners; support the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); establish undisputed title to
our extended continental shelf areas; and bolster our leadership in
future developments in the law of the sea. Accession to the LOS
Convention would also add to DOD credibility in a large number of Asia-
focused multilateral venues where law of the sea matters are discussed.
20. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what will you do to get this
treaty to the Senate for approval?
Mr. Panetta. I look forward to supporting the administration's
continued engagement with the Senate toward favorable consideration of
U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention).
I have been and remain a strong advocate of the LOS Convention. I
will support the administration's goal of ratification of this treaty.
GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE
21. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) system in Alaska and California is the only missile defense
system that protects the U.S. Homeland from long-range ballistic
missile attacks. This is an extremely complex program that was
simultaneously fielded and developed. It is our only line of defense
and it is imperative there is confidence in the system and the
appropriate resources are allocated. If confirmed, will you support the
2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review which established GMD as a
priority and ensure the program is resourced to be able to protect the
U.S. Homeland against evolving threats?
Mr. Panetta. I support the priority given to GMD in the 2010
Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
22. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what role do you see GMD playing
in the long-term security of the Nation?
Mr. Panetta. The protection of the United States against a
ballistic missile attack remains a vital security priority. As the
Secretary of Defense, I will work to ensure United States citizens have
the best possible defenses against such an attack. With GMD and a
successful intercept, the United States retains a broader range of
response options than without. I also believe that threat nations will
be less inclined to prosecute a ballistic missile attack against the
United States if they believe that we have the capability to destroy
the ballistic missile in flight, before it reaches its target. For
these reasons, we must continue to maintain a viable defense and
continue to evolve our capability so that it is effective against
future threats.
RARE EARTH-DEPENDENCY ON FOREIGN SOURCES
23. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, I am concerned about a potential
threat to U.S. national security and military operability: the issue of
rare earth elements and our military's dependence on unreliable foreign
nations for our supply. China produces approximately 97 percent of the
world's rare earth supply and has restricted export quotas of rare
earth elements based on their own internal demand. Rare earths are
essential components to clean energy technologies. They are also
critical to many modern defense applications, such as radar and sonar
systems and precision-guided munitions. DOD comprises a small segment
of aggregate rare earth demand, but we cannot function effectively
without these elements. Our most critical weapons systems rely on these
elements. Please share your view on the importance of rare earths and
our current dependency on China for them.
Mr. Panetta. I share your concerns that access to certain
individual rare earth elements and components may be an issue. We must
work to ensure that the U.S. has adequate supplies of the needed
elements and carefully monitor supply and demand.
24. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you ensure DOD
adequately and appropriately evaluates near-, mid-, and long-term
supply-chain availability, determines aggregate defense demand, and
establishes a plan to address potential supply chain vulnerabilities?
Mr. Panetta. Yes. While it appears expected domestic production of
rare earth elements should be substantial by the end of next year, I
remain concerned that access to certain individual rare earth elements
and components may be an issue and will continuously monitor the
situation.
25. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, where do you see it in the list of
priorities of DOD?
Mr. Panetta. Given the fact that rare earth elements are a critical
component of our defense capability, availability of these elements
will be one of my priorities and areas of focus.
26. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how long should it take to develop
a plan?
Mr. Panetta. Identifying individual rare earth elements of concern
to the defense industrial base is the focus of the rare earth materials
assessment required by Congress under section 843 of the Ike Skelton
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. Depending upon
its findings regarding defense demand and market supply for the
individual elements, the assessment will include, as appropriate,
options for mitigating risk in order to ensure the availability of the
necessary rare earth materials or components. It should be possible to
identify strategy options within months after identifying the elements
of concern.
RESERVE COMPONENT
27. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the National Guard and Reserves
are critical to our force. For the last decade they have performed
alongside their Active Duty brethren with honor and distinction as an
operational force instead of a strategic Reserve. If any lesson was
learned it is that they are critical to a ready force and during times
of high operational tempo. Over the last several years there has been a
total force approach to better incorporate the Reserve component. I
worry, however, business will go back to usual and funding and support
for the Reserve component will dramatically be reduced by the Services
thereby compromising their readiness. If confirmed, how will you
approach the Reserve component force structure role as operations
decrease?
Mr. Panetta. I agree that the Guard and Reserve have made major
contributions to the Department's efforts over the last 10 years, and
have been integral to the Total Force. Our Reserve component is a
valuable, highly experienced and well-trained element of that force,
and continuing to support their readiness is critical. Given the
current era of conflict and the broad range of security challenges on
the horizon, sound decisions regarding the rebalancing of capabilities
and aggregate capacity of the Total Force are essential to defending
and advancing our national interests. It will be my approach to make
the most efficient use of the Total Force--Active, Guard, Reserve,
civilians, and contractors. In order to reduce stress on the overall
force, maintain an All-Volunteer Force, and leverage the skills and
experience resident in the Guard and Reserve, their continued
contribution in the future is critical.
28. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, how will you ensure
total force integration initiatives, like associate units in the Air
Force, undergo a thorough requirements scrub and are properly resourced
to reflect the steady state requirements of the unit?
Mr. Panetta. In order to ensure Total Force integration, I would
work to use the Guard and Reserve in partnership with the Active Forces
to best advantage, increasing the capacity of, and reducing the burden
on, all our military personnel and their families. I will work to
ensure that the gains made in readiness, training, and equipping in the
Reserve components over the last decade are preserved and maintained,
reflecting the steady state demands on our Armed Forces.
We must adequately resource and effectively employ all elements of
the Total Force, consistent with their assigned missions. Accordingly,
I will continue the significant work by the Department and the Services
to sustain and refine the effectiveness of our total Force.
To this end, Secretary Gates approved a Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)-directed Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve
Components, which outlined the organizational and operational benefits
of initiatives such as the associate units in the Air Force, along with
other effective employment options, which use the Guard and Reserve to
best advantage. As this review was approved by Secretary Gates, it will
be my approach to take these important recommendations under my review.
In addition, we have defined the accepted use of Reserve component
units and personnel in response to unforeseen outside the continental
U.S. (OCONUS) events, which I will ensure that the Department embraces
as the United States continues to act as a stabilizing force throughout
the world.
DWELL TIME
29. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, when you visited me we talked
about the high operational tempo of the brigades and units in Alaska.
Currently, the 1/25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team is deployed to
Afghanistan and the other brigade--the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat
Team--will deploy at the end of the year. The brigades have not yet had
a 1:2 dwell time. Dwell time is crucial to an all-volunteer healthy
force. Please discuss your view on the importance of dwell time to the
force.
Mr. Panetta. I agree-dwell time is critically important to the
sustainment of the all-volunteer force. The Department struggles with
balancing critical operational requirements and the burden we are
asking some of our servicemembers to bear.
Six years ago, DOD established business rules designed to protect
dwell time. The Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, OSD, the
Chairman, and ultimately the Secretary of Defense review any deployment
order that exceeds dwell time goals; extends a unit in theater more
than 14 days beyond what they were originally told; or is longer than
365 days. These individual reviews look for other ways we can meet the
requirement without breaking a given unit's dwell. Frequently, options
include similarly capable units, volunteers, and task organizing units
to shield components that were deployed more recently than their parent
unit.
We currently have a deploy-to-dwell time of 1:1 and that will
increase to 1:2 by October 2011 for all Active Duty members. The goal
for reservists is 1:5.
30. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, in your view, will the Army and
Marine Corps planned manpower decreases facilitate the attainment of
DOD's dwell time objectives? If so, how? If not, do the cuts make
sense?
Mr. Panetta. The dwell times for our deploying forces are primarily
driven by our commitment in Afghanistan and other operations around the
world. I will take into consideration the conditions on the ground and
our ability to meet our strategic objectives before deciding the
appropriate course of action for force reductions. I will continue to
monitor dwell times and future manpower reductions as we move forward.
In the meantime, the Department will continue to use existing
processes to carefully vet all deployment orders that unduly burden our
servicemembers. This series of individual reviews, from the Service
Chiefs up to me, carefully considers all viable options for mitigating
deployment stress. Where there are no viable alternatives I ultimately
consider the criticality of the requirement, relative to the harmful
effects of the deployment. Unfortunately, we have not been able to
eliminate dwell shortfalls completely and this concerns me. The
Department must continue to look for solutions in order to maintain
this superb force.
31. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what should be the goal for dwell
time?
Mr. Panetta. The Department goal for dwell time for our Active
component is a ratio of 1:2. The goal for our Reserve component is a
ratio of 1:5.
department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
32. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, Secretary of Defense Gates and
Secretary of Veterans Affairs Shinseki have pledged to improve and
increase collaboration between their respective departments to support
military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status, in areas
of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and
compensation. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in
ensuring that DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs collaborate?
Mr. Panetta. I understand significant improvements have been made
in DOD-VA collaboration in the last few years, but much work remains to
be done. I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to
support servicemembers and their families, and I look forward to
working with Secretary Shinseki.
SUICIDE PREVENTION
33. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the number of suicides in each of
the Services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report
in July 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and
examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high
risk behaviors. In addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers
and marines in theater are showing declines in individual morale and
increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have
experienced multiple deployments. The 4/25 in Alaska has experienced
one confirmed suicide and two suspected suicides within the last month.
This brigade has experienced a high operational tempo and will deploy
again late this year. These incidents are tragic, unfortunate, and
impact the entire unit. In your view, what role should DOD play in
shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their
families, including members of the Reserve components?
Mr. Panetta. The Department should play an active role in shaping
policies to help prevent suicide no matter where it may occur and
whether they are Active, Reserve, or Guard. Suicide prevention is a
very important issue within the Department. Each Service acknowledges
the important role that leaders, both officer and Non-Commissioned
Officers (NCO), play in building resilience among those under their
command. At the OSD level, we have established a working group to
better integrate the efforts and programs across Services. To this end,
we are specifically looking at training leadership, effective peer-to-
peer programs, and outreach to Guard and Reserve members. As Secretary,
I will ensure the Department is fully engaged on this issue.
ENERGY SECURITY
34. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the 2010 QDR identified energy
security as one of four key priorities for reform because doing so will
reduce risks to military personnel, safeguard strategic interests, and
ensure troop readiness. Recognizing this, General Petraeus recently
issued guidance to the troops in Afghanistan asking them to reduce
energy consumption. I know DOD and the Services understand how
vulnerable our reliance on oil, especially oil from foreign countries,
has made us as a Nation and are taking many steps to alleviate
dependency. However, the bottom line today is the military needs access
to fossil fuels for energy needs. I prefer those sources to be domestic
instead of overseas to ensure access and strengthen our national
security. Please describe your view of how reliance on foreign oil for
fuel impacts the military and national security.
Mr. Panetta. America's dependence on foreign oil and fossil fuels
puts our national security at risk. For DOD, our reliance on oil shapes
our missions--both strategically and tactically. This is especially
true because we seek to purchase fuel as close to the fight as
possible--for both financial and operational reasons. Because assured
access to energy is a core part of fighting and winning the Nation's
wars, we can and must do better as a Department in improving the
efficiency of our use and the range of energy alternatives available to
our forces.
Success in this area will not come easily for DOD. But global
energy trends make success imperative. They include the rising global
demand for energy, changing geopolitics, and new threats, which mean
that the cost and availability of conventional energy sources will be
less certain in the future. By changing the way we power the force now
and in the future, America will have a military that is better able to
project and sustain power around the world for the full spectrum of
military missions.
35. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your understanding of
steps that have been taken to alleviate consumption of oil for current
operations and what impact have those efforts had?
Mr. Panetta. DOD components are taking steps to include energy as a
consideration in how they organize, train, and equip the Nation's
warfighters. In June 2011, the Department released its initial
``Operational Energy Strategy.'' The Strategy is the DOD roadmap for
transforming energy use in military operations and improving energy
security for the warfighter. Additionally, the Services have each
produced mission-specific energy strategies. Components are
implementing these strategies to improve their energy use.
The Department is taking steps to better track energy use, and is
testing and fielding systems to reduce the energy demand of our forces
and use alternate sources. Our technical initiatives include smart
micro-grids; energy-efficient shelters; solar energy; fuel cells;
waste-to-energy systems; hybrid engines; lightweight and low drag
materials; improved power generation and distribution; and energy
storage solutions. In addition, the Department is making non-materiel
changes, such as better aircraft routing and loading.
Many of these efforts are being fielded now and are making
immediate operational gains.
36. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, in your view, what remains to be
done?
Mr. Panetta. DOD is the Nation's single largest user of energy. In
2010, the Department consumed over 5 billion gallons of petroleum fuels
for military operations.
For the long term, if we are to significantly reduce our volume of
fuel use, we must systematically consider the risks and costs
associated with our energy use as we build the future force. As our
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, we cannot assume
secure logistics. The Department must integrate energy security
considerations into the full range of planning and force development
activities, including the requirements and acquisition processes.
Congress has given the Department the statutory tools it needs to
implement this change, and we are beginning to do so. If the Department
requires additional authority, I will not hesitate to seek the
necessary Congressional authorization.
37. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what steps will you
take to alleviate dependency on foreign sources of energy, and
ultimately decrease reliance on oil for fuel?
Mr. Panetta. While the Department is a significant consumer of
energy, it only accounts for about 1 percent of the energy all
Americans use. The cost of America's national energy consumption,
particularly oil, is too high, both in the billions of dollars the
Nation sends overseas, the geostrategic consequences, and costs to the
warfighter. The solutions to the Nation's energy challenges require
action at every level of Government as well as from the private
industry and every American. The Department has an opportunity to
reduce these costs by achieving energy efficiencies while leading the
way for the Nation by focusing on warfighter requirements.
PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES
38. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what priorities will
you establish?
Mr. Panetta. My top priority as Secretary of Defense is to ensure
the security of the American people.
We face a number of challenges: first, prevailing in the current
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al Qaeda;
second, keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of
terrorists and rogue nations; third, preparing to counter future
military threats; fourth, preserving the finest fighting force in the
world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and fifth,
continuing the reforms DOD's leadership has initiated which will be
crucial in this time of budget constraints.
39. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what do you believe
will be your greatest challenge? Do you have a plan for addressing that
challenge?
Mr. Panetta. We must ensure that we prevail in the conflicts in
which we are now engaged. In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade
the Taliban, train the Security Forces, and help the government take
ownership for the country's progress and security. And in Iraq, we must
assure that the Iraqi military and security forces are prepared to
safeguard their nation.
As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly disciplined
in how we spend the taxpayer's precious resources. The days of
unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to design
budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending while
protecting those core elements we need for our Nation's defense. I do
not believe that we have to choose between strong fiscal discipline and
strong national defense. We owe it to our citizens to provide both.
I will also be a tireless advocate for our troops and their
families. It is their sacrifice and dedication that have earned the
respect of a grateful nation, and inspired a new generation to wear the
uniform of our country. They put their lives on the line to fight for
America, and I will just as surely fight for them and for the families
who support and sustain them.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
40. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Panetta, in conflicts around the world,
rape of women and girls has become one of the most horrific weapons of
choice used systematically to attack civilians, devastate families, and
destabilize societies. Violence against women and girls is frequently
an early indicator of repressive regimes and instability and it is
often an obstacle to security, stabilization, and the development of a
sustainable peace. Despite the recognition of rape as a war crime, a
crime against humanity, and a form of genocide, over the years the
brutality and frequency of this crime has only increased.
Could you describe the steps taken by DOD to:
incorporate training on prevention and response into
the basic training curricula of foreign military forces and
judicial officials;
ensure that U.S. assistance to units involved in
regional or multilateral peacekeeping operations includes such
training; and
incorporate training on preventing and responding to
violence against women and girls when U.S. military personnel,
military contractors, and military observers are to be deployed
in humanitarian relief, conflict, and post-conflict settings.
Mr. Panetta. DOD recognizes that sexual and gender-based violence
(SGBV), particularly when used as a tactic of war, is not only a human
rights issue, but also an obstacle to conflict resolution and lasting
security. DOD has taken important steps to build the capacity of
partner militaries, as well as DOD personnel, to prevent and respond to
SGBV. The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
provides training on prevention and response to SGBV to foreign
military units receiving security assistance from the United States.
DIILS addresses SGBV as part of seminars such as ``Human Rights and the
Law of Armed Conflict'' and ``Developing a Professional Military
Force.'' In addition, geographic Combatant Commands provide targeted
training to address specific country contexts. For example, DIILS and
U.S. Africa Command train military judicial personnel in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to investigate and prosecute SGBV crimes.
As part of its efforts to build the capacity of partner countries
to participate in international peacekeeping operations, the Global
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) provides training to peacekeepers to
protect civilians from SGBV. Geographic Combatant Commands implement
half of GPOI activities, which are funded by DOS.
U.S. personnel also receive pre-deployment training on preventing
and responding to SGBV. Training on combating trafficking in persons
(TIP) and on sexual assault prevention and response are required,
including risk-reduction factors in specific deployment locations.
Combatant Commands and the Military Departments also provide mission-
specific pre-deployment training that addresses SGBV. For example, all
personnel who deploy to U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility
are required to take the ``Human Rights Awareness Education'' training
prior to deployment. U.S. Southern Command's training module includes
TIP specific scenarios, information on identifying victims, and
appropriate responses.
DOD is developing an action plan on women, peace, and security to
build on current efforts, including integration of prevention and
response to SGBV into training of partner militaries, peacekeepers, and
DOD personnel. This will be integrated into the National Action Plan
that the National Security Staff is developing with DOS, USAID, and
DOD.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
ENERGY REQUIREMENTS
41. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, section 526 of the Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) stated:
``Procurement and Acquisition of Alternative Fuels. No
Federal agency shall enter into a contract for procurement of
an alternative or synthetic fuel, including a fuel produced
from nonconventional petroleum sources, for any mobility-
related use, other than for research or testing, unless the
contract specifies that the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions
associated with the production and combustion of the fuel
supplied under the contract must, on an ongoing basis, be less
than or equal to such emissions from the equivalent
conventional fuel produced from conventional petroleum
sources.''
This provision effectively prevents DOD from procuring petroleum
from Canadian tar sands sources, a vital energy supplier for the DOD
mobility-related uses at our military bases along the northern tier of
the United States. DOD has apparently ignored this provision as it has
proven unworkable and completely unresponsive to the budgetary
constraints and wartime needs of DOD. I might add that President Obama
at Georgetown on March 30, 2011, stated: ``I set this goal knowing that
we're still going to have to import some oil. It will remain an
important part of our energy portfolio for quite some time, until we've
gotten alternative energy strategies fully in force. And when it comes
to the oil we import from other nations, obviously we've got to look at
neighbors, like Canada and Mexico that are stable and steady and
reliable sources.'' If confirmed, would you support DOD's current
actions to receive and use oil from Canada, a strategic ally and
trading partner?
Mr. Panetta. My understanding of this issue is that this particular
provision has not prevented the Department from meeting our energy
needs. I am also told that this is an area of active litigation for the
Department, so it would be inappropriate for me to comment further on
this issue.
42. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in your view, what would be the
burden placed on DOD from a fiscal perspective and on DOD contracting
personnel if required to enforce a strict compliance to section 526 of
EISA?
Mr. Panetta. My understanding is that the Department is already in
strict compliance with the provision.
43. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, would you support legislative
action that would repeal section 526 of EISA?
Mr. Panetta. This is an issue I look forward to learning more
about. I can say that energy security and, increasingly, climate change
are key issues for the 21st century defense missions. As the 2010 QDR
stated, ``although they produce distinct types of challenges, climate
change, energy security, and economic stability are inextricably
linked.'' Climate change and associated extreme weather events act as
an accelerant of instability around the world, which places demands on
civil and military institutions. As we make decisions about how we
assure that U.S. forces have a reliable supply of energy, now and in
the future, the Department must balance both energy security and
climate security considerations.
DEFENSE BUDGETS
44. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in your answers provided to the
committee prior to this hearing, you responded to a question about the
impact of defense spending reductions on our national security by
stating ``I will work to make disciplined decisions in ways that
minimize impacts on our national security. But it must be understood
that a smaller budget means difficult choices will have to be made. DOD
is in the process of working through fiscal year 2011 with about $20
billion less than what was requested by the President.'' If confirmed,
what priorities will guide the comprehensive review and these difficult
decisions?
Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that we protect our essential military
capabilities while continuing to pursue additional efficiencies,
streamline operations, control acquisition cost growth, and identify
lower priority efforts that can be eliminated or curtailed. That said,
difficult choices will have to be made to live within a reduced Defense
topline.
45. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, how would you propose reining in
spending in the short-term?
Mr. Panetta. Each defense program must be assessed in terms of its
contribution to the national security strategy. I will continue the
effort begun by Secretary Gates to seek efficiencies, eliminate
overhead, control costs, and identify lower priority efforts.
46. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, is it time to stop the spending
sprees that mark the end of each fiscal year for DOD program managers
trying to spend every dime they have before funds expire?
Mr. Panetta. I will vigorously investigate any indication of
wasteful year-end spending.
47. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what would you do to eliminate
wasteful spending?
Mr. Panetta. I will build on the efficiencies identified by
Secretary Gates and work with the Department's leadership to manage
defense spending prudently. Reducing spending on any lower priority
programs, or programs that are no longer needed, will be a key
component of that management effort.
48. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, Admiral Mullen stated recently
that in the search for $400 billion in savings that ``two of the big
places the money is, is in pay and benefits.'' He warned against the
``relatively easy'' choice of cutting hardware while maintaining the
increasing costs of pay and health care for military personnel,
retirees, and their dependents and asserted that ``all things are on
the table.'' In your advance policy questions, you talked about the
need for a ``comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits
structure to determine where costs can be contained.'' Do you agree
with Admiral Mullen that personnel costs have to be included in the
search for a solution to the response to a smaller DOD budget?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, everything must be on the table. Any such effort
should take into consideration that the Nation must continue to attract
and support our men and women in uniform and their families in a wide
variety of situations.
BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES
49. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, as you may know, DOD is required
by law to complete base realignments and closures (BRAC) resulting from
the 2005 BRAC round by September 15, 2011. Are you committed to DOD's
compliance with the BRAC deadline established by law to the maximum
extent practicable?
Mr. Panetta. Yes. Of the 222 recommendations forwarded by the
Commission to the President, the Department has a handful of
recommendations facing scheduling challenges. The Department is working
diligently to ensure we satisfy our BRAC legal obligations.
In order to ensure no disruption to the full and complete
implementation of each of the recommendations facing scheduling
challenges, as well as continuity of operations, the Department has
requested legislation that would provide the Secretary of Defense or
Deputy Secretary of Defense with limited authority to extend the BRAC
implementation period for up to 10 recommendations, for up to a year,
when such an extension is necessary to ensure the operational readiness
of units or functions being relocated as part of the recommendation.
This legislation would not modify the substance of any BRAC
recommendation nor would it eliminate the legal obligation to fully
implement each recommendation; it merely would provide the Secretary or
Deputy Secretary with limited authority to extend the implementation
period.
50. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in your opinion, given the need to
find another $400 billion over the next 12 years, should DOD conduct
another round of BRAC to reduce excess infrastructure?
Mr. Panetta. It is my understanding the Department has not asked
for authorization for another Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) and
is very single mindedly focused on the current one and meeting current
deadlines. Whether another round of BRAC is needed is something I will
assess.
DEFENSE FUNDS EARMARKED FOR NON-DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
51. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in these times of fiscal austerity
where DOD is making hard decisions about savings and efficiencies, DOD
should not be spending DOD funds on non-DOD requirements like local
roads, financial support for parks and recreation areas, and many other
worthy causes that have no connection to military readiness. If
confirmed, what would you do to ensure that funds provided to DOD are
spent only on essential defense and national security requirements?
Mr. Panetta. If confirmed, I will ensure that the President's
Budget requests will reflect the level of funding that is required to
meet essential defense and national security requirements each year.
Once funds are appropriated, I will ensure that the Department will
execute funds in accordance with the legislative direction provided in
the annual appropriations acts.
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
52. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the current DOD policy of relying
on market forces to sustain the health of the industrial base may not
account for instances where DOD is the sole customer for military
unique weapons. Do you intend to continue the current initiative to
develop an industrial base strategy?
Mr. Panetta. The Department recognizes the defense industrial base
is more global, commercial, and financially complex than ever before.
The Department regularly addresses specific industrial-base
concerns within programs and services and has also embarked on a more
comprehensive sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis of the industrial
base. This approach will help inform future programmatic decisions,
expand the scope of the Department's industrial base assessments, and
create a database on industry for use as an input to many decision-
making processes across the Department.
53. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, such a strategy will work best if
there is open communication between defense officials and industry
leaders so that industry can shape itself to meet the needs of DOD.
Secretary Gates began a Secretary/Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
dialogue to facilitate that communication. Do you intend to continue
that dialogue?
Mr. Panetta. I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with
industry and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the
maximum extent permitted by law.
54. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the current export control regime
is seen by some as reducing U.S. industries global competitiveness.
What actions do you believe are necessary to be taken to improve the
export control regime?
Mr. Panetta. There are compelling national security arguments for
fundamentally changing the regulations and procedures we have had in
place since the Cold War for determining what weapons and dual-use
equipment and technology may be exported and under what terms. Over the
years, we have made incremental changes--but this has not been
adequate. We need to establish new rules, organizations, and processes
that deal effectively and efficiently with 21st century challenges.
This is the basis for the ``four singles'' of the administration's
export control reform effort: a single export control list, a single
licensing agency, a single enforcement coordination agency, and a
single information technology system for export licensing. The export
control reform initiative is focused on protecting sensitive items and
technologies that are the U.S. ``crown jewels''. By doing so, we would
be better able to monitor and enforce controls on technology transfers
with real security implications, while helping to speed the provision
of equipment to allies and partners who fight alongside us in coalition
operations. This revised export control system, based on revised
controls and new licensing policies and procedures, would allow U.S.
companies to compete more effectively in the world marketplace.
MILITARY SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION
55. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, DOD is currently embarked on a
$4.0 billion investment plan over the next 5 years to address the
deteriorated facilities conditions of K-12 schools maintained and
operated by DOD Education Activity (DODEA). The urgent requirement was
revealed in a study requested by this committee which assessed the
condition of DODEA schools worldwide and the impact of underinvestment
of funding for replacements and renovations. As a result, Secretary
Gates established a priority to ensure that the children of our
military personnel are provided the best education opportunities in
world-class facilities with the most current technology available. If
confirmed, will you continue this firm and comprehensive commitment of
funds over the next 5 years to upgrade DODEA schools?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will continue to commit to funds for upgrading
DODEA schools. As Secretary Gates recognized, I too believe we have an
obligation to provide a quality education to dependents of our
servicemembers, and part of this is ensuring the facilities are in good
condition.
56. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what goals would you expect DODEA
to maintain in carrying out the upgrade and modernization of K-12
schools owned by DODEA?
Mr. Panetta. The Department's goal is to provide schools that will
best showcase a 21st century education. We can do this by enhancing the
curriculum to better support Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math
(STEM) programs, and use technology to create a teaching environment
that would increase student performance. Our future schools will focus
on how to best improve student learning and incorporate features that
can transition schools to a facility that incorporates various teaching
tools to accommodate differentiated learning to benefit all students.
57. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, should our commitment to quality
K-12 education facilities extend to the use of DOD funds to improve
schools owned and operated by local school districts?
Mr. Panetta. It is DOD policy to first rely on local education
agencies to provide for the education of military children. In some
locations, the Department has been able to make property on its
installations available for local educational agencies to construct,
operate, and maintain local schools. While the Department continues to
believe that school maintenance and repair is a local responsibility,
it cannot ignore the fact that its children are currently being
educated in less than ideal facilities. Recognizing this, Congress
recently appropriated $250 million ``to make grants, conclude
cooperative agreements, or supplement other Federal funds to construct,
renovate, repair, or expand elementary and secondary public schools on
military installations in order to address capacity or facility
condition deficiencies at such schools.''
The Department is reviewing needs of local schools on bases to
determine which have the most serious facility deficiencies.
58. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what guidelines for DOD investment
would you establish to manage the funding provided to local districts?
Mr. Panetta. As required by section 8109 of Public Law 112-10, the
Department will give ``priority consideration to those military
installations with schools having the most serious capacity or facility
condition deficiencies.'' We are implementing this requirement and will
manage the Department's investment accordingly.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
59. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the business processes and systems
at DOD lack the controls and discipline necessary for DOD to produce
auditable financial statements. This impacts the quality and timeliness
of information you will be receiving for critical decisions around how
to best utilize taxpayers' money. Secretary Gates recently conveyed his
frustration on this issue in a speech before the American Enterprise
Institute. What specific actions do you plan to take to ensure DOD
achieves the September 2017 date for obtaining an audit opinion of
DOD's financial statements?
Mr. Panetta. I intend to ensure the DOD financial statements are
audited as soon as possible. Financial statement audit opinions provide
the public a measure of confidence in the financial management of
Federal agencies. They provide an independent assessment of the
accuracy of financial information that management relies upon to make
critical decisions.
I understand DOD has a plan to improve processes and systems in
order to provide reliable and accurate financial information and
financial statement audit opinions. I plan to ensure this effort
receives the right amount of leadership attention and resources across
all functional areas.
60. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates set in motion a
focus on eliminating inefficiencies in DOD. The reductions he levied
across the Services may not achieve their intended results in view of
the fact that DOD did not assess how they could do business more
efficiently and with less cost, but instead levied budget cuts in areas
with the least resistance or complexity. It is imperative in the
current and foreseeable future of downward budgets that DOD makes
reductions in their spending in areas where solid business cases
justify the reductions. We cannot afford to have decisions made without
understanding the impacts of reductions on the overall mission of DOD.
What actions will you take to ensure that any decline in DOD's budget
is achieved in a responsible manner that supports DOD's mission?
Mr. Panetta. I will be guided by the objective of ensuring the
Department continues to meet its responsibility to support the national
security strategy. A strategy-driven approach is essential and the
ongoing comprehensive review seeks to do that. I will continue the
initiative to find additional efficiencies and eliminate lower priority
programs. However, it must be understood that difficult choices will
have to be made.
61. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what are the opportunities you
envision to consolidate administrative and leadership functions of the
various agencies or DOD enterprises? One example could be the
consolidation of the Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense
Contract Audit Agency under one leadership function with two operating
arms.
Mr. Panetta. I intend to continue Secretary Gates' effort to make
the Department more efficient. As part of this effort, I will explore
ways to consolidate functions in a manner that will still support
defense requirements.
MILITARY UNIFORM AND APPEARANCE POLICIES
62. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, military leaders have expressed
concern about the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) and whether it should apply to the uniform and personnel
appearance standards of military members. The requirements of military
discipline, unit cohesion, use of emergency protective equipment, and
so on, have produced insistence on uniform standards over many years.
Out of concern about the ability of DOD to prevail in litigation
challenging the applicability of the RFRA to the Armed Forces, the
administration forwarded a legislative proposal that would amend title
10 to specify that the language of the RFRA does not apply to the
military. What are your views about the importance of this issue and
the need for legislation to address this problem?
Mr. Panetta. I understand the important and delicate balance that
must be struck between accommodating religious practices that require
adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the
military's uniform grooming and appearance standards. I will work with
the leaders of the Military Services to achieve that balance.
HEALTH CARE COSTS
63. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in response to the advance policy
questions you stated: ``In the long term, the promotion of healthy life
styles and prevention among our beneficiaries is one way to help reduce
the demand for health services.'' Do you agree that tobacco use
adversely affects military performance and the health of DOD's
beneficiary population?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I agree. The negative health effects that are
commonly known about tobacco use, such as lung cancer and heart
disease, certainly adversely affect those military and civilian
beneficiaries who use these products. As such, I understand the
Department offers programs to assist servicemembers and their families
in quitting this habit.
64. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what is the rationale for DOD
selling tobacco products to servicemembers, retirees, and their
families at a discounted rate in military exchanges and commissaries?
Mr. Panetta. While DOD policies recognize that tobacco use is
detrimental to health and readiness, the rationale for the discount is
similar to other discounts we provide the servicemembers: to provide
savings on products they use.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
directed the Department to develop a smoking cessation benefit to
encourage users to quit or reduce their tobacco use. Moving forward, we
will build strategic partnerships with all the Military Services to
support the smoking cessation benefit. DOD continues to actively
encourage servicemembers to quit tobacco and many military treatment
facilities offer treatment and classes to assist with quitting.
65. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, is it time to reassess this policy
in order to achieve your goal of healthy life styles and prevention for
DOD beneficiaries, and if confirmed, would you pledge to do so?
Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that the Department undertakes a
thorough policy review to identify the best strategies to reduce the
impact of tobacco products on our servicemembers and their families.
The Department must support healthy lifestyles as a means of sustaining
the health of our servicemembers and their families.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM
66. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, the National Guard provides unique
capacity-building capabilities through its State Partnership Program
(SPP). SPP specifically supports both combatant commanders' and U.S.
ambassadors' strategic objectives by establishing sustainable
relationships with critical partner nations around the world. SPP
started back in the early 1990s as part of European Command's
engagement plan with former Warsaw Pact nations; SPP has grown and is
now engaged with 62 nations around the world. The National Guard Bureau
(NGB) has been developing an updated overall strategic plan for SPP
that looks at the world today and where we should be engaging with SPP.
One of those areas is the continent of Africa which currently has only
eight active partnership programs. Although the SPP has great
potential, cumbersome statutory limits and unsteady funding streams
have hamstrung positive efforts. I have been working with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), NGB, DOS, and others to deconflict the
statutes currently severely limiting how and where guardsmen can
operate when operating in the SPP. What are your views of our SPP?
Mr. Panetta. The SPP is an excellent security cooperation tool that
provides valuable training and experience to National Guard members
through interactions with foreign counterparts. The SPP contributes
significantly to achieving U.S. national security goals by building
partner capacity globally, and by providing unique, niche capabilities
in direct support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders and U.S.
Chiefs of Mission in fulfilling their theater and country engagement
objectives. In addition to building a partner nation's capacity, the
SPP forges personal relationships between the individual National Guard
members and foreign government personnel, creating an enduring bond
that, over time, fosters trust between the organizations involved.
67. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you continue to
work on improving and expanding this program, to include statute and
funding changes?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will. Over the past 2 years, OSD has been
working on a Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) that describes the use of
DOD appropriated funds for State Department Partnership Program
activities. They are in the final stage of completing the DTM which
will be the basis for a new DOD Instruction on the State Department
Partnership Program. During the creation of the DTM, we discovered that
there are a few limitations that need to be addressed in legislation to
allow us to conduct State Department Partnership Program engagements
more effectively in the area of defense related activities. We will
work to propose legislation that will allow us to expand our ability to
conduct these State Department Partnership Program activities to build
and strengthen our partner capabilities and relationships.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS
68. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, I have been one of the strongest
supporters of our security assistance and engagement programs, whether
it is foreign military financing and sales (FMF and FMS), international
military education (IMET), or our train-and-equip programs. These
programs have been extremely effective programs, executed predominantly
by DOD in close coordination with DOS. Our military-to-military (1206),
civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale Special Forces (1208),
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant
Commander's Initiative Fund (CCIF) have proven to be vital resources in
aiding developing countries in the professionalization of their
militaries, fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency
situations. A key to these programs has been that the engagements are
worked by both DOS and DOD, chiefs of mission, and combatant commanders
working together to increase the capabilities of our partner nations to
provide for their own security, increasing stability in their region
and around the globe. Are you familiar with these programs? If yes,
what is your opinion of them?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I am familiar with these programs. Building our
foreign partners' capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations and
creating an environment inhospitable to terrorists and insurgents are
among the major elements of Geographic Combatant Commanders' strategies
to counter terrorism and instability around the world. Enabling our
foreign partners to provide for their own security and contribute to
multilateral security efforts is an investment that pays immediate and
long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S.
interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S.
interests. As you note, collaboration between the Departments of State
and Defense in formulating and implementing these programs is a key
factor in their success, and promotes effective use of taxpayers'
dollars by combining the expertise and abilities of personnel from
across the Executive Branch. The security challenges facing partner
countries are linked to multiple parts of the security sector,
including the military, police, and judiciary. I look forward to
working with Congress and my counterparts in the administration to
fulfill this shared responsibility to build partner nation security
capability and capacity.
69. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, would you continue
to support investment by DOD in these programs?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I believe that continuing to engage with foreign
partners through counterterrorism and capacity-building efforts, and
maintaining strong international security relationships, will continue
to be an imperative for DOD. Enabling other countries to provide for
their own security will be an enduring test of U.S. global leadership,
and these efforts will be critical to protecting our national security
interests. In a world where the most likely threats will emanate from
failed and fractured states, building the security capacity of partners
is a vital warfighting instrument. It reduces the need for direct U.S.
military intervention, with all of its attendant political, financial,
and human costs. It also provides better security as capable partners
are often more effective addressing threats in their neighborhoods than
outside actors. Improving the way the U.S. Government implements these
programs requires continued investment across our national security
infrastructure, not just DOD. I look forward to continuing DOD's
partnership with Congress in developing innovative solutions that
enable the United States to respond with agility to emerging threats
and opportunities.
70. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, DOD and DOS are working on a
proposal to pool funding for security assistance into three long-term
funds totaling as much as $2 billion. This proposal would provide long-
term funding vice the year-to-year funding that has had a negative
impact on our current engagement programs. However, there are issues
with how the funding is pooled by the two departments, who has
oversight in Congress, and how will the funds get executed in a timely
and consistent manner. If confirmed, can you provide an update on the
status of this proposal and how you will resolve funding, oversight,
and execution issues?
Mr. Panetta. I would be happy to update the committee regarding
this proposal and the administration's efforts to resolve the issues
you mention.
The proposal to create a Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)
was included in the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request. The
proposal represents more than a year's work within the administration
to develop a new business model for addressing security sector
assistance requirements within the budget cycle. It also reflects an
appreciation for the degree to which defense, diplomacy, and
development must be better integrated so that U.S. assistance programs
are more effective and targeted in an era of transnational challenges
and rapidly changing dynamics.
I look forward to working with Congress to address any outstanding
concerns regarding the GSCF.
AFGHANISTAN
71. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, various press reports state that
administration officials are considering withdrawing from Afghanistan
more rapidly than currently planned. Secretary Gates said this weekend
in Afghanistan that pulling out of Afghanistan too fast would threaten
the gains made in the 18 months since the surge of 30,000 troops.
Secretary Gates told marines in Afghanistan on Sunday, ``If you guys
and everybody keeps the pressure on, we can hang onto everything we've
gained over the last year to 18 months, we can expand the security
bubble beyond that . . . We have succeeded in stopping the Taliban's
momentum . . . but we've just kind of turned that corner and I think we
need to keep the pressure on.'' In Kabul, he appealed for patience and
said that only modest U.S. troop reductions would make sense this
summer in a still unstable Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition commanders I
met on the ground in Afghanistan have repeatedly told me that it's too
early to make major changes on the ground, and some believe it will
take until the end of this fighting season to get a true assessment of
the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. I trust our military
leadership to make the right decision based on their assessment of the
conditions on the ground. Some argue that, with Osama bin Laden dead,
our mission in Afghanistan is complete. The killing of Osama bin Laden
was a great victory, but our mission in Afghanistan is to ensure that
it can never again become a staging area for terrorist attacks against
the American Homeland.
What conditions must be met in July 2011 to determine the extent of
a U.S. troop drawdown?
Mr. Panetta. The conditions for determining the extent of the
drawdown include progress on several interrelated aspects of our
counterinsurgency strategy, such as reversing the Taliban's momentum,
denying the Taliban access to and control of key population centers and
lines of communication, disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas
and denying al Qaeda safe haven, and developing the ANSFs and their
capability to manage a degraded insurgency. We have made progress in
each of these areas sufficient to enable the President to make his
decision about the drawdown and its extent.
72. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, which conditions have been met?
Mr. Panetta. There has been progress across the range of factors
and in some cases substantial progress. For example, the momentum has
shifted to the Coalition & ANSF and together we have degraded the
Taliban's capability and achieved significant security gains,
especially in the Taliban's heartland in the south. These security
gains are enabling key political initiatives to make progress. We have
begun a transition process that will ultimately put Afghans in the lead
for security nationwide by 2014. The growth in the quantity and quality
of the ANSF--which have fielded more than 100,000 additional forces
over the past 18 months--is one of the critical conditions that is
enabling the drawdown of U.S. surge forces. We are beginning to see
reintegration and reconciliation processes gain traction, and we are
discussing a strategic partnership with the Afghans to signal our
enduring commitment to regional peace and stability.
73. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what conditions would cause you to
ask President Obama to delay the withdrawal of troops?
Mr. Panetta. At this time, the progress that has been achieved has
established conditions necessary for the President to make his drawdown
decision on schedule.
74. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, are there future planned decision
points after July 2011 that will be used to determine further
reductions in U.S. troop commitments?
Mr. Panetta. Beyond the President's immediate drawdown decision,
commanders will need to make recommendations for decisions regarding
the overall pace and shape of the transition to Afghan security. Those
decisions will depend upon continued progress and conditions on the
ground.
75. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what conditions must be met in
2014 to transition to Afghan control?
Mr. Panetta. Transition will begin this July in seven districts and
provinces and then spread throughout the country by the end of 2014.
The exact conditions for entering and completing the transition process
in a given area will vary across the country, reflecting the
differences across Afghanistan. The ability of the ANSFs to carry out
lead security responsibilities effectively is a central consideration
as are the abilities of Afghan institutions of government, especially
at the provincial and district levels, to meet the basic needs of
citizens for dispute resolution and economic development.
76. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what are the minimum conditions
that must be achieved in Afghanistan, in order for Afghans to be able
to sustain stability with relatively limited international assistance?
Mr. Panetta. One of the most critical preconditions for Afghans to
maintain a stable, secure Afghanistan will be capable, professional
ANSF. Although support for the ANSF will continue to require
international assistance for many years, security forces continue to
make significant progress, with increases in quantity, quality, and
operational capacity. Over time, as U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces
continue to degrade the Taliban insurgency, the Afghan Government may
be able to reduce the size, and therefore cost, of the ANSF to address
a diminished threat.
Another essential condition to build sustainability will be
increased Afghan fiscal self-sufficiency. External support will likely
continue to be critical in the near and medium-term to help mitigate
shortfalls in infrastructure, human capacity, and security concerns.
However, over time, as economic growth continues and Afghanistan tax
revenues increase, levels of required assistance should decline.
77. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what impact would a failure in
Afghanistan have on U.S. national security in the long term?
Mr. Panetta. Failure in Afghanistan would mean a return of the
conditions that resulted in Afghanistan becoming the safe haven from
which al Qaeda plotted the September 11 attacks against the United
States. It would mean a perilous increase in the security threats the
United States faces from violent extremists, as well as in the threats
these groups pose to other countries in the region. Moreover, failure
in Afghanistan would undermine the credibility of U.S. security
commitments elsewhere around the world and jeopardize the national
interests they are meant to protect.
78. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, during my visit over New Years,
Afghan and coalition personnel unanimously told me that setting the
July 2011 timeline to begin withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan
had a devastating effect on operations--it sent the wrong signal to the
Afghan people, our coalition partners, and the Taliban. Do you believe
the announcement of a July 2011 withdrawal date negatively impacted
operations?
Mr. Panetta. No. Establishing the July 2011 timeline to begin a
conditions-based drawdown of U.S. surge forces struck an appropriate
and responsible balance between giving our commanders the resources
they need to carry out the strategy and communicating to the Afghans
that they must step forward and take on the responsibility for their
own security. The timeline additionally undercuts claims that we are
occupiers and assures the American people that the mission is not open-
ended. The date also provided ample time for our forces to turn back
the Taliban's momentum while building up capable ANSFs that are
increasingly taking on responsibility to hold and expand on the
security gains achieved thus far.
MILITARY SPENDING
79. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, the Office of Management and
Budget has asked DOD for $400 billion in cuts through 2023 . . . a 6\1/
2\ percent annual decrease from current spending rates. These cuts
would come solely out of base budget. On May 25, 2011, Secretary Gates
said at the American Enterprise Institute, ``The Reagan build-up of the
1980s fielded a new generation of weapons platforms that continue to be
the mainstay of the force today . . . In contrast, the 1990s
represented basically a procurement holiday . . . What remains are
much-needed capabilities . . . that our Nation's civilian and military
leadership deem absolutely critical. For example: we must build a new
tanker . . . field a next generation strike [fighter] . . .
recapitalize the ground forces . . . replace our ballistic missile
submarines.'' How will you balance the pressure to cut defense spending
with the military's readiness and acquisition priorities?
Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that future spending decisions are based
on the Department's priorities, national security strategy, and a clear
understanding of associated risks. It is an important process where we
must identify options for the President and Congress, to ensure that
the Nation consciously acknowledges and accepts additional risk in
exchange for reduced investment in its military.
80. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what do you see as DOD's top
readiness and acquisition priorities?
Mr. Panetta. My top priority is ensuring that the warfighters have
what they need to accomplish their missions and to provide for the
national security of the United States.
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
81. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, throughout the post-World War II
era, the United States has maintained its military leadership in large
part as a result of its industrial leadership--particularly in
aerospace and other defense industries. That leadership is due in large
part to the employees of that industry--the engineers, scientists, and
machinists. Maintaining this leadership in the future will require that
DOD identify and communicate what it needs to counter future military
threats. If confirmed, what will you do to map out the industrial
policy and needs of DOD?
Mr. Panetta. As Secretary of Defense, I will ensure DOD policies,
procedures, and actions: (1) stimulate and support vigorous competition
and innovation in the industrial base supporting defense; and (2)
establish and sustain cost-effective industrial and technological
capabilities that assure military readiness and superiority.
I will do so by: (1) monitoring industry readiness,
competitiveness, ability to innovate, and financial stability as the
Department moves to capabilities-based acquisitions in an era of
increasingly sophisticated systems; (2) leveraging DOD research and
development, acquisition, and logistics decisions to promote
innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; (3)
leveraging statutory processes (for example, the Defense Priorities and
Allocations System; Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust evaluations; Exon-
Florio Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
evaluations) and promoting innovation, competition, military readiness,
and national security; (4) leading efforts for the Department to engage
with industry to ensure openness and transparency; and (5) continuing
our long history of supporting science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics education initiatives in a collaborative process at local,
regional, and national levels.
NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS
82. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, during the New START hearings,
General Chilton was asked by Senator Feingold whether the New START
treaty allowed the United States to ``maintain a nuclear arsenal that
is . . . more than is needed to guarantee an adequate deterrent.''
General Chilton replied, ``I think the arsenal that we have is exactly
what is needed today to provide the deterrent. . . . [I]t is sized to
be able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the
current deployed arsenal and any . . . changes in the geopolitical
environment that might cause us to need more weapons deployed.'' Do you
agree with General Chilton?
Mr. Panetta. Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear strategy and
force structure have continually evolved with the global-strategic
environment. DOD will continue to assess the proper force size and
capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent. The DOD is
committed to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent in an efficient and cost effective manner that
maintains strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional
deterrence, and assures our allies and partners.
NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
83. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) and during the discussion on the New START treaty, the
administration made substantial commitments to the sustainment and
modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Secretary Gates was a
strong supporter of the nuclear triad and a robust modernization
program: ``In many ways, the primary threat to the effectiveness and
credibility of the American deterrent is one that we control ourselves,
and that is failing to invest adequately in our Nation's nuclear weapon
infrastructure, a point I have made a number of times in recent
years.'' Will you commit to the nuclear modernization plan (referred to
as the 1251 plan) that was the basis for Senate support for the New
START treaty?
Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
84. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you support decisions for a
follow-on nuclear bomber, air-launched cruise missile, intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBM)?
Mr. Panetta. I will continue the DOD commitment to sustaining and
modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that
supports strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional
deterrence, and assures our allies and partners in an efficient and
cost-effective manner.
85. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you support modernization of
our nuclear weapons laboratories and characterize such funding as
``national security activities'' as opposed to regular Department of
Energy funding?
Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010. As described in the 2010 NPR and in the
Report pursuant to section 1251, modernization of the nuclear weapons
infrastructure is a key element of the administration's nuclear policy.
This is exemplified by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) and the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF), which, when fully operational, will support production
of critical components needed to ensure a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear stockpile.
Funding for these activities is currently part of the Weapons
Activities Account in the National Nuclear Security Administration
budget; accordingly, it is already considered national security
funding.
U.S. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
86. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, the administration is reviewing
nuclear deterrence requirements and nuclear targeting guidance with a
goal of further nuclear reductions. This could precipitate a move away
from longstanding nuclear doctrine characterized by a second-to-none
approach, with flexible nuclear forces capable of providing the
President a wide array of targeting options, to a minimum deterrence
approach with too few forces that may lack credibility. The
administration has called for a study of current nuclear deterrence
requirements and nuclear targeting guidance. As the study progresses,
will you make yourself and your staff available for regular briefings
to describe the study?
Mr. Panetta. Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear doctrine and
targeting strategies have continually evolved with the global strategic
environment. Every President since the beginning of the nuclear age has
asked DOD to conduct such analyses and has used that information to
inform updated planning guidance provided to DOD. We would be remiss if
we did not re-examine our nuclear strategy in today's dynamic security
environment. It is my intention to keep Congress fully informed of U.S.
nuclear deterrence strategy.
87. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you ensure that a thorough
assessment is conducted, including analysis of the implications for
reductions on stability and preserving a second-to-none capability?
Mr. Panetta. Any future nuclear reductions must strengthen
deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic
deterrence and stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and maintain the
reliability and effectiveness of our security assurances to our allies
and partners. In the NPR Report follow-on analysis, we will identify
the force levels required to support those objectives and any potential
risks associated with each.
88. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you commit to a careful
consideration of the advice provided by our military leaders?
Mr. Panetta. It is my intention to work with the military
leadership to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
89. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you agree it is important to
determine deterrence requirements and the types of forces necessary to
achieve those requirements before engaging with the Russians in another
round of nuclear reductions?
Mr. Panetta. As noted in the 2010 NPR Report, any future nuclear
reductions must strengthen deterrence of potential regional
adversaries, maintain strategic deterrence and stability vis-a-vis
Russia and China, and maintain the credibility and effectiveness of our
security assurances to our allies and partners. In the NPR Report
follow-on analysis, DOD will identify the force levels needed to
support those objectives and any potential risks associated with each.
The analysis will help shape our negotiating position as further arms
reduction agreements are considered.
90. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you pledge to provide
detailed briefings to Congress on any future analysis in support of a
future arms control negotiation?
Mr. Panetta. It is my intention to keep Congress fully informed
about developments in U.S. nuclear strategy and arms control policy.
91. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, in 1992, you voted as a Member of
the House of Representatives to eliminate all U.S. non-strategic
nuclear warheads. The policy of this administration is to maintain non-
strategic weapons in Europe until such time that NATO consensus
supports their removal. Will you confirm your support for the
administration position?
Mr. Panetta. As noted in the 2010 NPR Report, reassuring U.S.
allies and partners is one of the key objectives of U.S. nuclear
deterrence policy and force posture. Any change in our nuclear posture
will be considered in the context of our continuing need to assure our
allies and partners of our commitment to their security. Any decision
to change the status of U.S. nuclear forces committed to the defense of
NATO would be after thorough review and consultations with NATO. I
fully support the administration's policy on this issue.
92. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you work to ensure that a
nuclear-capable F-35 is developed to allow the continuation of that
commitment?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I am committed to the development of a dual-
capable F-35 fighter. DOD will carry out the direction stated in the
2010 NPR Report, that ``the Air Force will retain a dual-capable
fighter (the capability to deliver both conventional and nuclear
weapons) as it replaces F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.''
As set out in the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the Air
Force will continue to conduct the dual-capable aircraft mission with
existing fighter aircraft until the F-35 is fielded.
SHIFT IN MISSILE DEFENSE
93. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, while directing that we sustain
and enhance our ability to defend the Homeland against limited numbers
of long-range ballistic missiles, the administration has made defending
against regional threats ``a top priority of our missile defense
plans,'' according to Secretary Gates. As a result, funding for the GMD
system has steadily declined, while the two test failures of the GMD
system in 2010 suggest the Missile Defense Agency is not doing nearly
enough to sustain and enhance the system. GMD reductions include:
Cutback deployment from 44 to 30 GBIs and cancellation
of 10 GBIs in Poland;
$500 million reduction to the GMD program in the
fiscal year 2010 budget request;
Fiscal years 2011-2015 funding for GMD declines by
$600 million when compared to President's budget last year; and
Obama GMD budget for fiscal years 2010-2013 is $4
billion less than Bush fiscal years 2010-2013 planned budget.
Will you pledge to end this neglect of the GMD system and provide
the attention and funding necessary to return the GMD system to full
operational reliability and ensure the system is improved and
modernized over time?
Mr. Panetta. I will support the continued sustainment and
improvement of the GMD system as a key priority.
I share Secretary Gates' view that the ``protection of the United
States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical
national security priority.''
The current ballistic missile defense posture for the United States
protects against ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North
Korea or Iran. Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in
addition to the procurement of additional ground-based interceptors
(GBIs) and radars, and the development of the SM-3 IIB interceptor,
will continue this protection against future ICBM threats from states
like North Korea and Iran.
MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA
94. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you commit to share with
Congress, no later than 30 days after your confirmation:
Missile defense and threat information provided to
Russia, including in the NATO context;
The draft Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement,
including the Bush administration's draft;
The Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement that had
been discussed with the Russians; and
Analysis of the location of the AN/TPY-2 radar being
considered for deployment in Turkey, and any other locations
being considered by this and past administrations.
Mr. Panetta. DOD and DOS have briefed Congress on cooperation
efforts with Russia and efforts to implement the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA), including the deployment of the AN/TPY-2
radar, and will continue to do so.
Discussions on the draft Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement
(DTCA) were initiated in 2004 at President Bush's direction to
establish a legal framework for purposes of conducting with Russia a
broad range of defense-related cooperative research and development
activities, which could include missile defense. The Obama
administration has continued these efforts to negotiate and conclude a
DTCA with Russia. A draft Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation
Agreement (BMDCA), which Russia declined to negotiate, would have been
a more limited form of the DTCA. These agreements were briefed in
detail to Senate staff members in December 2010 during discussions as
part of the Senate's consideration of the New START treaty advice and
consent to ratification. Finally, the United States only shares
sensitive information with foreign countries in accordance with Foreign
Disclosure laws and regulations.
NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
95. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, in the 2010 NPR and during the
discussion on the New START treaty, the administration made substantial
commitments to the sustainment and modernization of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. Enhanced safety, security, and reliability of nuclear
weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and
maintenance of the nuclear delivery systems are key to enabling
maintaining our nuclear deterrence. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission
stated it was alarmed by the disrepair and neglect of the nuclear
weapons stockpile and complex. Secretary Gates warned in October 2008,
there's ``no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the
number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing
our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.'' We are the only
major nuclear power not modernizing its' weapons. Our weapons are an
average of 26 years old and most are 15 or more years beyond design
life. Secretary Gates was a strong supporter of the nuclear triad and a
robust modernization program. Secretary Gates said, ``In many ways, the
primary threat to the effectiveness and credibility of the American
deterrent is one that we control ourselves, and that is failing to
invest adequately in our Nation's nuclear weapon infrastructure, a
point I have made a number of times in recent years.'' Do you support
the triad of bombers with gravity bombs and nuclear cruise missiles,
ballistic missile submarines, and ICBMs?
Mr. Panetta. I will continue the DOD commitment to sustaining and
modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that
supports strategic stability in an efficient and cost-effective manner,
deters regional threats, and assures allies and partners.
96. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, is it important to maintain a
nuclear triad?
Mr. Panetta. As stated in the 2010 NPR Report, each leg of the
triad has unique advantages. I will continue the DOD commitment to
sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent that supports strategic stability in an efficient and cost-
effective manner, strengthens regional deterrence, and assures our
allies and partners.
97. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, are you committed to the nuclear
modernization plan, referred to as the 1251 plan, that was the basis
for Senate support for the New START treaty?
Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
98. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you support modernization of
our nuclear weapons labs?
Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010. As described in the 2010 NPR Report and in
the Report pursuant to section 1251, modernization of the nuclear
weapons infrastructure, including the nuclear weapons laboratories, is
a key element of the administration's nuclear policy.
99. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, would you characterize this
funding as national security activities?
Mr. Panetta. Funding for activities needed to ensure a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear stockpile is currently part of the
Weapons Activities Account in the National Nuclear Security
Administration budget; accordingly, it is considered national security
funding.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE GLOBAL THREAT
100. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, on January 6, 2011, Secretary
Gates told Jim Lehrer that ``I think [the thing] people need to
remember is that providing for the common defense is an unambiguous
Federal responsibility. . . . I would argue that defense is not the
problem when it comes to the deficit. If you look at defense as a
percentage of Federal expenditures or as a percentage of gross national
product, we're at a lower level, particularly for wartime, than we have
been during any previous war, and as a percentage of the overall
Federal budget, about where we have been for a number of years.'' DOD
is executing several efficiency initiatives to make the most of the
limited budget it has been given but even those efficiencies will not
allow the military to fully sustain operations, maintain the force, and
modernize our equipment. DOD needs to fully fund current operations . .
. not just in Iraq and Afghanistan but at home and around the globe . .
. this includes training and exercises. It needs to take care of its
people . . . an exponentially growing cost. And it needs to modernize
its aging fleet of ships, vehicles, and aircraft or spend increasing
amounts of DOD dollars to sustain old equipment. The $400 million
across-the-board cut favored by the administration next year does not
take into account the risks to our national security or our ability to
execute the national security strategy. During questioning about
postponing weapon systems acquisition and maintenance at a hearing in
front of the Senate Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral Burke said: ``you can
pay for it now or pay more for it later.'' If confirmed, how will you
ensure our military is postured to counter the full spectrum of
national security threats?
Mr. Panetta. This spring, President Obama announced a framework for
deficit reduction. As part of that effort, the President set a goal of
holding the growth in base national security spending slightly below
inflation for the next 12 years, which would save about $400 billion.
Although defense spending is not the source of the Nation's current
fiscal condition, it will have to be part of the national solution.
In April, Secretary Gates launched a comprehensive review to ensure
that future spending decisions are focused on priorities, strategy, and
risks, and are not simply a math and accounting exercise. He said, and
I agree, that the choices we make in terms of reductions in defense and
security spending must be made with a clear understanding of the
potential risks and consequences of those choices.
The overarching goal of the comprehensive review is to preserve a
U.S. military capable of meeting crucial national security priorities
across the range of potential threats. This process seeks to inform and
support decisions by the President and Congress and to ensure that the
Nation consciously acknowledges and accepts the implications, including
additional risk, of reduced investment in its military in an uncertain
and still dangerous security environment. The defense of the United
States and the American people is a sacred trust. I take the Nation's
defense very seriously, as I know all Members of Congress do. I look
forward to working with Congress to maintain a highly capable military
that will protect and defend the United States and preserve security
abroad, now and in the future.
101. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, are we on a path to continue
acquiring the best systems and enough of those systems to meet the
current requirements or does there need to be a change in our National
Security Strategy modifying those requirements?
Mr. Panetta. As Secretary Gates has stated, we must ensure that
future defense spending decisions are strategically informed and
focused on priorities and risks. With regard to capabilities, the
Department over the past 2 years has cancelled acquisitions or
curtailed modernization programs that were badly over budget, behind
schedule, dependent on unproven technology, supplied a niche
requirement that could otherwise be met, or were impractical in a
rapidly changing security environment.
Particularly, amid declining resources, it is critically important
that we continue the Department's commitment to developing technology
and fielding weapons systems that are affordable, versatile, and
relevant to the range of threats in the decades to come. This approach
is consistent with the 2010 National Security Strategy, which notes
that ``we will scrutinize our programs and terminate or restructure
those that are outdated, duplicative, ineffective, or wasteful. The
result will be more relevant, capable, and effective programs and
systems that our military wants and needs.''
102. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, overall funding for procurement
is down $6 billion in fiscal year 2012 (base budget and Overseas
Contingency Operations) compared to the fiscal year 2011 Continuing
Resolution. Research and development is down $5 billion and military
construction is down $4 billion. What impact does this have on our
future forces and the cost to recapitalize our infrastructure,
vehicles, ships, aircraft, and other equipment 5 to 10 years down the
road?
Mr. Panetta. The impact is not precisely known at this time. If
confirmed, I intend to ensure that limited Defense resources are used
on those programs that will provide the warfighter with equipment and
support that is needed to accomplish the national security mission of
the United States. The Department will have to continue to identify
ways to become more efficient so that scarce Defense resources are not
wasted and the highest priorities are funded.
103. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what impact will delaying
modernization have on the cost of future weapons systems?
Mr. Panetta. Any cost impacts associated with the pace of
modernization would be highly dependent on the specific choices and
implementation. This is an area I will be looking at closely.
FORCE REDUCTIONS
104. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, in January 2007, the end strength
of the Army grew by 65,000 because we did not have enough ground forces
to sustain operations. Two years later Congress approved a temporary
increase in Army end strength of another 22,000. At the same time, we
also grew the size of the Marine Corps by 27,000. DOD is projecting
cutting the Army by 27,000 and Marine Corps by 20,000 between 2015 and
2016. Secretary Gates said this week that `` . . . the worst thing in
the world would be what was done in the 1970s and 1990s . . . give
everybody in the military a same percentage cut across the board.
That's the way you hollow out the military. That's the way you don't
have enough ammunition to use at firing ranges, you don't have enough
money for exercising or training, you don't have enough money for tank
miles or steaming days or flight hours . . . if we have to reduce the
size of the military in some way, I want the level of excellence when
we're done to be at the same standard it is today.'' I felt we cut our
force too deep during the Clinton administration which resulted in our
need to increase the force in 2007. In your answers to the advance
policy questions, you state that ``2 years as Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Director has made me realize that intelligence is often
ambiguous.'' I agree. Our crystal ball has been cloudy at best when it
comes to anticipating impacts to our national and global security. Do
you support cuts in Army and Marine Corps end strength?
Mr. Panetta. Any reduction will need to be monitored and will be
affected by security considerations around the globe and the readiness
of our military.
105. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do these cuts assume zero forces
in Iraq in 2012 and zero forces in Afghanistan in 2014?
Mr. Panetta. Any reductions in the Army and the Marines Corps will
be based on security considerations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as
around the globe.
106. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, are these personnel cuts being
driven by budget constraints or based on national security
requirements?
Mr. Panetta. DOD has increased U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps end
strengths in order to meet the demands generated by simultaneous
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The planned cuts in their end
strengths are deferred until after fiscal year 2015 to reflect our
expectation that ground force requirements for operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan will be markedly lower after fiscal year 2015. Although
realistic force planning must be mindful of resource constraints, it is
driven by strategic considerations that assess the nature of challenges
likely to be confronted in the future, the types of missions the U.S.
Armed Forces will be required to perform, and the capabilities and
capacities needed to execute those missions successfully.
GUANTANAMO BAY
107. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, I returned from my most recent
visit to Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) on May 20, 2011. It was important for me
to return to get an update on the operations and see firsthand the
current conditions of the detention facilities and the detainees. I
took six members who had never been to GTMO before. Each of them,
regardless of party, came away with a greater appreciation for the work
that is being done there. GTMO is the single greatest repository of
human intelligence in the war on terror. This intelligence has
prevented terrorist attacks, saved lives, and helped lead us to Osama
bin Laden. You said that ``enhanced interrogation techniques'' yielded
some of the intelligence information that ultimately led to Osama bin
Laden, but ``whether we would have gotten the same information through
other approaches I think is always going to be an open question.'' Do
detainees at GTMO pose a threat to U.S. national security?
Mr. Panetta. As I have stated before, I fully support the
President's decision to establish Army Field Manual 2-22.3 as the
single standard applicable to all interrogations by U.S. Government
personnel. This decision was based on the results of a careful review
conducted by the President's interagency Interrogation and Transfer
Policies Task Force which was charged with evaluating the sufficiency
of the interrogation practices and techniques in the Army field manual.
The Task Force found that additional techniques were not necessary. I
believe we should do everything possible within the law to gather
information, and I agree with those who state that information can be
obtained without resorting to measures such as waterboarding. I do not
support a set of classified interrogation methods that are not open to
public scrutiny.
108. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you believe the United States
will continue to capture terrorists around the world?
Mr. Panetta. Yes. When it comes to protecting the American people
from al Qaeda and its associated forces, intelligence is critical to
identifying and disrupting their plots, as well as to dismantling their
networks. Among our greatest sources of information about al Qaeda, its
plans, and its intentions have been the members of its network who have
been taken into custody by the United States and our partners overseas.
Wherever possible, we must maintain a preference to capture terrorists
and take advantage of the opportunity to gather information through
interrogation that is vital to the safety and security of the American
people.
109. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, where will you put existing
detainees and future detainees?
Mr. Panetta. The United States will continue to hold detainees in
accordance with the authority provided by the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force, as informed by the law of war. DOD's ability to
detain the enemy and interrogate them for intelligence in prosecuting
the war against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces is
essential to U.S. national security. The United States has been
detaining individuals in this war for nearly a decade and has learned
that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the complex issue of law
of war detention in a 21st century conflict with a transnational
terrorist group.
DOD currently holds detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo
Bay. We are transitioning our detention operations in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, with the intent of moving from a law of war detention
framework to a peacetime domestic legal framework where each respective
nation takes responsibility for its own citizens.
I fully support the President's commitment to close the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay because it is in our national security
interest to do so. I do acknowledge, however, that the United States
needs a place to hold individuals whom we capture abroad. This is a
very serious issue for our country, and it is one I believe
policymakers need to address expeditiously. The decision to capture an
individual outside an active theater of combat operations is a complex
issue, involving a range of factors unique to the individual and the
place and circumstances of capture. With respect to future detainees,
disposition recommendations would be informed by the unique
circumstances of each capture, with decisions made on a case-by-case
basis among policymakers.
110. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, if held at locations in other
countries such as Afghanistan or Yemen, isn't there a greater risk of
escape, attack on the prison, or release of these terrorists?
Mr. Panetta. The United States does not ask other nations to detain
on its behalf. When we transfer detainees to another nation, that
individual becomes subject to the laws of the receiving nation. In
certain cases, detainees have been held and/or tried by the receiving
nation for crimes they have committed. There have been instances where
former detainees, or dangerous individuals held by other nations, have
escaped or have been released. We take these instances very seriously,
and certainly factor them when assessing the transfer of a detainee to
the control of another government.
As we strengthen our own detention policies and procedures, we must
continue to work with our partners around the world to build their
capacity to confront this common challenge. Specifically, we must
deepen our cooperation with our international partners to develop
credible rehabilitation and reintegration programs as part of a durable
counterterrorism strategy. We must ensure that our detention policies
remain principled and consistent with the rule of law, that they evoke
credibility with our public and the international community, and that
they can be sustained into the future as a useful tool in our
counterterrorism fight.
IRAQ
111. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, there continues to be concerns
about our ability to safely withdraw forces out of Iraq by the end of
the year. Four days ago, several servicemembers were killed in eastern
Baghdad in a rocket attack. If confirmed, what steps will you take to
ensure our forces can safely withdraw from Iraq?
Mr. Panetta. The current security agreement gives us the right to
defend ourselves and Iraqi forces all the way through our drawdown. We
will approach our security posture throughout the drawdown in
partnership with Iraqi forces. We continue to ensure both U.S. forces
and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are prepared for this period of
transition by continuing to provide training for our Iraqi partners.
This includes training for Iraqi Police, ISF, and Iraqi Special
Operations forces. Additionally, we will continue to closely monitor
external malign influences and refine our deterrent options to address
any threat posed to our forces. Finally, we will maintain robust self
defense capabilities throughout the drawdown and address potential
threats through a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic actions.
We will maintain a full spectrum of land, air, and naval forces,
supported by a total complement of Special Operations Forces (SOF),
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, and
other enablers throughout the drawdown. The plan to withdraw U.S.
forces from Iraq has been thoroughly briefed and rehearsed, and we will
retain flexibility to react to changing circumstances.
112. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you think there will be a U.S.
military presence in Iraq after 2011?
Mr. Panetta. I believe some U.S. military personnel would be
appropriate to support Iraq's continuing needs and enduring U.S.
national interests, as Secretary Gates has stated. However, any post-
2011 U.S. military mission would require a formal request from the
Iraqi government, which we would be willing to consider. To date no
request has been received.
INVESTIGATION INTO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
113. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, you have opposed Attorney General
Holder's investigation of possible incidents of abuse by CIA personnel
during interrogations that went beyond guidelines imposed by the Bush
administration. You stated: ``I think the reason I felt the way I did
is because I don't believe there's a basis there for any kind of
additional action.'' What is the current status of the investigation
and your opinion of it continuing?
Mr. Panetta. I refer you to the Department of Justice with respect
to the status of any investigation. My views are stated in the record.
U.S.-GEORGIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
114. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, there have been multiple
terrorist acts and several terrorist attempts in the territory of
Georgia orchestrated by the Russian Federation. The last one happened
just 2 days ago when Georgian police prevented a terrorist plot
targeting the NATO Liaison office in Tbilisi. The Obama administration
is aware of these developments. On April 15, 2011, at a meeting in
Berlin between the foreign ministers of Georgia and NATO, Secretary
Clinton stated, `` . . . We share Georgian concerns regarding recent
Russian activities that can negatively affect regional stability.''
Despite the ongoing reset policy with the Russian Federation and the
attempts of the Obama administration to engage Russia positively,
Moscow persistently continues to undermine the security of Georgia.
While the timeline for Georgia's NATO membership remains unclear, what
is your opinion on the steps the United States should undertake to
enhance the security and stability of Georgia, including any
possibilities of supporting acquisition of defensive capabilities from
the NATO countries?
Mr. Panetta. The United States steadfastly supports Georgia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally
recognized borders, and is committed to maintaining a strong bilateral
defense relationship with Georgia.
Our security assistance and military engagement with Georgia
focuses on two areas. First, we are focused on strengthening defense
institutions and providing comprehensive defense assistance covering
doctrine, personnel management, logistics, education, and training to
support Georgia's defense reform and modernization efforts along Euro-
Atlantic lines. This approach will ensure the lasting institutional
transformation of the Georgian Armed Forces and provide the foundation
for a secure Georgia.
Second, the United States is assisting the Georgian Armed Forces
with training and equipping infantry battalions to deploy and operate
alongside U.S. forces in a counter-insurgency environment in
Afghanistan. Georgian forces are currently deployed, without caveats,
as part of the ISAF in Helmand Province.
In addition to these bilateral efforts, we also encourage our
international partners to demonstrate support for Georgia's territorial
integrity and sovereignty. Through NATO, we work with our allies to
assist Georgia with implementing its Annual National Program and to
encourage Georgia to use tools available through the NATO-Georgia
Commission.
HUAWEI AND THE IT SUPPLY CHAIN
115. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, as CIA Director, you must have
been concerned about the threat of foreign technology (i.e., hardware,
software, and services) in the U.S. information system supply chain,
especially where that technology originates from companies under the
control of the People's Republic of China. Would you be comfortable
with Huawei (or a companion company, ZTE) being significant vendors to
the CIA or DOD? If not, why not?
Mr. Panetta. Continued globalization marks today's information and
communications technology (ICT) marketplace. Moreover, DOD represents a
small portion of the commercial ICT market, and it is unlikely its
unique high assurance requirements can drive the development of
commercial off-the-shelf products. Yet the leveraging of the rapid
technology advancement of the commercial marketplace remains a key DOD
advantage. While globally sourced technology provides innumerable
benefits to the Department, it also provides foreign sources with
increased opportunity to compromise the supply chain by inserting
malware into ICT in order to access or alter data, and intercept or
deny communications. Even though the risk of such a supply chain attack
may be tolerable for many consumers of commercial ICT, the DOD cannot
ignore these risks to its national security missions.
In this setting, use of Chinese or other foreign-sourced equipment
in the absence of adequate risk management would concern me. The DOD is
taking a proactive risk management approach to address this issue,
enhancing the acquisition process in light of the changing global
market to ensure rigor in addressing foreign sourcing risks.
In response to these risks, DOD is in the process of
institutionalizing the Trusted Defense Systems/Supply Chain Risk
Management (SCRM) strategies described in the Report on Trusted Defense
Systems in Response to National Defense Authorization Act, section 254,
delivered to Congress in January 2010. The Department's strategy for
achieving trustworthy defense information and weapons systems in light
of supply chain risk contains the following core elements:
1. Prioritize scarce resources based on mission dependence--
Allocate the Department's systems assurance resources based on their
criticality and risk of attack.
2. Plan for comprehensive program protection--Employ comprehensive
program protection planning, including systems engineering, supply
chain risk management, hardware and software assurance,
counterintelligence, and information assurance to identify and protect
critical components, functions, technologies, and information using a
full range of tools, resources, and practices.
3. Detect and respond to vulnerabilities in programmable logic
elements--Invest in enhanced vulnerability detection research and
development, and transition such analytical capabilities to support
acquisition.
4. Partner with industry--Collaborate with industry to develop
commercially reasonable standards for global sourcing and SCRM and to
identify leading edge commercial practices and tools.
The forgoing strategy is being implemented to protect DOD systems
from supply chain risk. Through the application of these processes, any
particular proposed use of Chinese or other foreign-sourced equipment
would first be evaluated for the supply chain risk to DOD Systems and
Networks in light of system criticality, all source intelligence, and
the feasibility of adequate mitigation measures.
116. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you feel the private sector
also needs to make better procurement decisions, and also needs
additional information in order to make better decisions?
Mr. Panetta. Through the course of developing its Trusted Defense
Systems Strategy, it became increasingly clear that the DOD was exposed
to risk through the supply chains of the commercially-owned and
operated telecommunications infrastructures upon which DOD depends, and
that the forgoing strategy does not directly address these broader
risks. To address this gap, DOD and DHS are co-leading an Interagency
Task Force that will in partnership with industry develop a more
complete understanding of the relevant technical risks to the U.S.
telecommunications infrastructure and will assess the dependency of
vital governmental and economic operations upon that infrastructure. It
will then evaluate a range of potential technical risk mitigations
strategies. Central to this activity is an assessment of information
sharing deficiencies within the telecommunications sector. These
deficiencies inhibit effective risk management of supply chain risk
within that sector. While the Task Force is studying these issues, DOD
in cooperation with other parts of the national security community is
monitoring specific risks to the broader telecommunications
infrastructure related to foreign sourcing that could affect national
security and of which we are already aware. As a result, there have
been interim actions taken to address specific risks to the broader
telecommunications infrastructure posed by foreign sourcing.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
MISSILE DEFENSE
117. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, the Obama administration's
Phased-Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defense in Europe has
been criticized because it leaves a gap between Iran's movement towards
ICBMs that can threaten Europe and the United States, and on the other
hand, the deployment of an American missile defense system that is
capable of protecting the continental United States from ICBMs. Do you
see Iran's ICBMs as a threat to the United States and, if so, what
should be done to close the gap?
Mr. Panetta. The United States is currently protected against any
attacks from North Korea or Iran if those countries were able to
develop and deploy an effective ICBM capability today. This protection
is a result of investments made over the past decade in a system based
on GMD. Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the
number of GBIs now deployed compared to potential North Korean and
Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States
possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea
and Iran for the foreseeable future.
In order to maintain this advantageous position, the administration
is taking several steps to improve the protection of the United States
from the potential ICBM threat posed by Iran and North Korea. These
steps include the continued procurement of GBIs, the deployment of
additional sensors, and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications system.
118. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, while directing that we sustain
and enhance our ability to defend the Homeland against limited numbers
of long-range ballistic missiles, the administration has made defending
against regional threats ``a top priority of our missile defense
plans,'' according to Secretary Gates. As a result, funding for the GMD
system has steadily declined, while the two test failures of the GMD
system in 2010 suggest the Missile Defense Agency is not doing nearly
enough to sustain and enhance the system. GMD reductions include:
Cutback deployment from 44 to 30 GBI and cancellation
of 10 GBIs in Poland;
$500 million reduction to the GMD program in the
fiscal year 2010 budget request;
Fiscal year 2011-2015 funding for GMD declines by $600
million when compared to the President's budget last year; and
Obama's GMD budget for fiscal years 2010-2013 is $4
billion less than Bush fiscal years 2010-2013 planned budget.
Will you pledge to complete the deployment of an effective GMD
system?
Mr. Panetta. I will support the continued sustainment and
improvement of the GMD system.
I share the view of Secretary Gates, who said that the ``protection
of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a
critical national security priority.''
The current ballistic missile defense posture for the United States
protects against ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North
Korea or Iran. Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in
addition to the procurement of additional GBIs and radars, will
continue this protection against future ICBM threats from states like
North Korea and Iran.
119. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, should we support the emphasis
on regional missile defense at the expense of Homeland defense?
Mr. Panetta. The administration has put in place a balanced
program, which addresses both the short-range and longer-range threats
in a timely manner and is responsive to development of the threats. The
forward-based radar that will be deployed as part of Phase 1 of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and the deployment of the SM-
3 Block IIB to Europe in Phase 4 of the EPAA, will improve the missile
defense coverage of Europe while also enhancing protection of the
United States from a potential ICBM attack from Iran.
In addition, the administration is making improvements to the
existing GMD sensors and software and is procuring additional GBIs. The
United States must also be well hedged against the possibility of rapid
threat developments or delays in U.S. technological advances. The
administration has already made several decisions to strengthen the
U.S. hedge posture, including the construction of Missile Field 2 at
Fort Greely, AK, mothballing six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort
Greely instead of decommissioning them, and the development and
assessment of a two-stage GBI.
NUCLEAR POLICY
120. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, President Obama identified a
``world without nuclear weapons'' as a long-term national security goal
in an April 2009 speech. However, when asked in the advance policy
questions about your assessment of the threat posed by Iran and North
Korea, you responded that there is a real risk that Iran's nuclear
program will prompt other countries in the region to pursue nuclear
options. In addition, you stated that North Korea's newly revealed
uranium enrichment activities underscores that it poses a growing and
direct threat to the United States, our allies in the region, and the
international community. Do you share the goal of a world without
nuclear weapons?
Mr. Panetta. As stated in the NPR Report, the greatest threat
facing our Nation is nuclear proliferation. The NPR Report also stated
that the United States is committed to the long-term goal of a world
free of nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exist, however, the
United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrence force. The nuclear deterrence force will continue to play an
essential role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies
and partners around the world of the U.S. commitment to their security.
Therefore, without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and
reassurance goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policy
and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet our most
pressing security challenges.
121. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, do you believe that this goal
is realistic? If so, how does this square with the reality of the
threat posed by Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs?
Mr. Panetta. As the President stated, such a goal is ambitious and
will not be reached quickly. Presently, changes in the nuclear threat
environment have altered the hierarchy of our nuclear concerns and
strategic objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to
discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear-weapons
capabilities and stopping terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear
weapons or the materials to build them. At the same time, we must
continue to maintain stable, strategic relationships with Russia and
China. We must also counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed
states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies and
partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any
incentives that any emerging nuclear-armed states might have to seek
their own nuclear deterrents.
122. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, given that the nuclear age has
had an absence of great power conflicts like World War II, what are the
risks and dangers of a ``world without nuclear weapons''?
Mr. Panetta. Nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in
deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners
around the world. Until such time as the administration's goal of a
world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, the maintenance of nuclear
capabilities will remain a core mission of DOD.
Our defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the
strategic environment. Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments
in a world without nuclear weapons will demand an increased reliance on
tailored approaches to deterrence that integrate all aspects of
national power. This includes land, air, and naval forces capable of
fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-
access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to
respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state
groups.
The United States is positioned with capabilities across all
domains to deter a wide range of attacks or forms of coercion against
the United States, its allies, and partners. If deterrence fails and
adversaries challenge our interests with the threat or use of force,
the United States must be prepared to respond in support of U.S.
national interests. The range of plausible future challenges is
significant. Potential adversaries of the United States are likely to
employ a diverse array of approaches and capabilities if and when they
choose to oppose the United States, its allies, or its partners. In the
future, U.S. forces must be sized and shaped to provide the maximum
possible versatility for the broadest plausible range of conflicts. A
deliberate, continuing assessment of national interests, military
requirements, and the strategic environment should guide U.S. global
defense posture planning. In the emerging security environment, the
United States will tailor its defense posture to mitigate foreseeable
security risks and manage future security challenges effectively.
123. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, what are your views about
future nuclear force levels?
Mr. Panetta. As stated in the 2010 NPR Report, any future nuclear
reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional
adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China,
and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security
assurances to our allies and partners. We will continue to assess the
force size required for an effective deterrent. DOD is committed to
sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent in an efficient and cost-effective manner that supports
strategic stability.
124. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, are you committed to
supporting, maintaining, and modernizing America's triad of nuclear
delivery systems--that is, America's ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-armed
long-range bomber aircraft, in addition to specifically meeting the
commitments President Obama made in his letter during the START debate?
Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010. I will continue the DOD commitment in an
efficient and cost-effective manner.
125. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, as a Congressman, you voted
against nuclear testing and voted for a nuclear test ban. You also
voted for funding cuts and against the development of numerous missile
systems, including the MX missile, Pershing II, and Trident II, as well
as voting for funding reductions and cuts to the B-1 and B-2 bombers.
Will you support and fulfill policies even if you personally disagree
with them?
Mr. Panetta. Yes. As my record of service in the Executive Branch
demonstrates, I am fully committed to executing the President's
policies and complying with all legal requirements enacted by Congress,
while offering my own candid advice to the President.
RUSSIA COOPERATION
126. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, in your response to the advance
policy questions, you state that you agree with missile defense
cooperation with Russia. What evidence have you seen in the past that
would demonstrate that Russia is a reliable partner for cooperation in
missile defense?
Mr. Panetta. The United States and Russia conducted a robust and
successful missile defense exercise program, with five exercises
conducted between 1996 and 2006. This cooperation, unprecedented at the
time, contributed to the understanding of our respective missile
defense capabilities and interests and demonstrated our countries'
shared interest in and ability to work together to address common
security threats.
With our new push for deeper missile defense cooperation, we seek
to responsibly foster and sustain a stable relationship with Russia. As
the pace of military-technical innovation increases and the global
security environment evolves, we believe it is important to enlist
Russia's help in addressing common 21st century security challenges,
specifically regional actors seeking illicit capabilities.
Appropriate levels of cooperation with Russia on missile defense
would send a powerful signal to regional actors, such as Iran, that
Russia and the United States are working together to counter the threat
posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and pursuit of nuclear
weapons capabilities. Our goal is a level of cooperation that will
improve U.S. and Russian security and the security of our NATO allies
while increasing transparency to reduce Russia's concerns about U.S.
missile defense efforts.
127. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, what does cooperation mean to
you? Does it include a joint area where Russians have their hand on a
launch trigger?
Mr. Panetta. The administration has been clear that Russian
objections will not change or limit our missile defense system
capabilities or missile defense deployments, nor will Russia have a
``launch trigger'' that will control any U.S. or NATO missile defense
systems.
The administration's concept for missile defense cooperation stems
from the conviction that NATO must be responsible for defense of NATO
territory and that Russia should be responsible for defense of Russian
territory. We would operate our respective systems independently but
cooperatively, including sharing of sensor data that may enhance the
ability of both systems to defeat missile attacks by regional actors
such as Iran.
128. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, in 2009, the administration
initiated a reset in relations with the Russians. I would like to
understand your assessment of the impact of this so-called ``reset'' of
U.S.-Russian relations, especially in light of how they have threatened
their neighbors and invaded Georgia. Specifically, has the ``reset''
resulted in an improved Russian strategic, diplomatic, and economic
posture toward our allies in Central Europe, including Georgia?
Mr. Panetta. Our approach in transforming our defense relationship
with Russia has been to work to integrate Russia more closely into the
fabric of the international community to ensure that parties on all
sides have more of a stake in keeping the relationship on the right
track. Our goal has been to cooperate with Russia where we have common
interests but not at the expense of our principles or our friends.
Through interactions with Russia, we hope we can build the
infrastructure for future collaboration, identify and clarify the
extent of agreement and disagreement, counteract narratives of ``zero-
sum'' competition, and reform existing structures, such as the NATO-
Russia Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, to meet new challenges.
We have seen some key successes over the course of the past 2 years
on Afghanistan, strategic arms control, Iran, and bilateral defense
relations. Military-to-military relations were revitalized in 2009,
including the resumption of regular consultations between Chiefs of
Defense and their staffs; military exchanges, visits, and exercises,
and a broadening and deepening of cooperation in such areas as armed
forces reform, defense policy and national security priorities,
transparency and confidence-building measures, and regional and global
security.
In all our engagements, we remind our Russian counterparts of
Russia's obligation to respect the security, sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and independence of its neighbors. We are open about our
defense engagement with those countries and make clear that we welcome
the opportunity to work with Russia's neighbors as well as with Russia.
129. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, in addition, has the ``reset''
resulted in improved Russian cooperation on the nuclear proliferation
challenges posed by Iran and North Korea? Please explain specific
improvements.
Mr. Panetta. In general, the ``reset'' has resulted in greater
cooperation by the Russian Federation. For example, Russia agreed to
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1874 and 1929
against North Korea and Iran, respectively. After the adoption of UNSCR
1929, Russia cancelled the delivery of the S-300 missile defense system
to Iran.
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
130. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, the United States cannot give
away the work of its magnificent military in Afghanistan and Iraq by a
too precipitous withdrawal. How will you monitor the situation on the
ground in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure that stability remains during
and after the withdrawal of U.S. forces?
Mr. Panetta. I completely agree that the withdrawal from
Afghanistan must be meticulously planned and not precipitous in order
to not risk the gains we have made at great sacrifice of our blood and
treasure. I will monitor the situation through the eyes of our
commanders on the ground and by personally visiting Afghanistan to
assess for myself. Preserving our recent gains will be my top priority,
as we begin to transition security lead to the ANSF.
Regarding Iraq, General Austin and his staff have a number of
systems in place to monitor the situation in Iraq during the drawdown.
He will report regularly to me, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and General Mattis on issues relating to security, politics,
rule of law, and training and readiness for foreign military and police
forces. Additionally, my office and the Joint Staff participate in
National Security Staff led weekly updates at the deputies' committee
to discuss Iraq from a broader interagency perspective. Finally, DOD
maintains active involvement in a robust interagency process of weekly
working groups covering a variety of topics including security, rule of
law, transition, international engagement, and strategic
communications.
131. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, what contingency plans do you
have in place in the event that a redeployment is required during the
drawdown to ensure stability?
Mr. Panetta. Contingency planning is an ongoing effort by our
military to ensure we are ready for rapidly changing situations. I will
work closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
military commanders to ensure we remain ready for any contingency.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
LOANS AND CREDIT FOR SERVICEMEMBERS
132. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Panetta, I understand that DOD
regulates interest rates on short-term loans that do not amortize when
made to its uniformed servicemembers, capping them at 36 percent.
Traditional, amortizing installment loans are exempt from such interest
rate caps. What is DOD's current position on short-term loans that do
not amortize and those that do amortize?
Mr. Panetta. DOD does not have a position on any specific types of
loans given to servicemembers. The Department proposes to help ensure
that servicemembers and their families receive fair protections by
working with Federal and State governments on existing and proposed
policies impacting all consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the
need to identify servicemembers and their families separately for
protections, which may create unintentional barriers to credit.
133. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Panetta, how does DOD propose to
balance consumer protection for its members without creating
unintentional barriers to credit for them in the future?
Mr. Panetta. The Department proposes to help ensure that
servicemembers and their families receive fair protections by working
with Federal and State governments on existing and proposed policies
impacting all consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the need to
identify servicemembers and their families separately for protections,
which may create unintentional barriers to credit.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
FUTURE THREATS
134. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, the United States faces a number
of national security challenges today and our forces--our resources--
are stretched thin in order to meet those challenges. However, we also
know that the future will bring its own set of challenges and threats
to the security and prosperity of the next American generation. In
order to prepare for those threats and meet our responsibilities to
those who follow us, we must ensure the actions we take will give
future generations the flexibility and resources they need, including
an industrial base capable of sustaining our future military forces. As
Secretary, what actions will you take to examine the industrial base at
all levels, develop an industrial base policy and communicate that
policy with the private sector, to ensure that we maintain a robust and
capable aerospace and defense industrial base capable of meeting the
threats of the future?
Mr. Panetta. I understand the Department is examining the
industrial base by conducting a sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2)
research effort. S2T2 is a process to expand the scope of the
Department's industrial base assessments beyond their traditional
programmatic perspective and to create a database on industry for use
as an input to many decision-making processes across the Department.
I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with the private
sector and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the
maximum extent permitted by law.
EXPORT CONTROL
135. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, it is widely accepted that the
current export control regime is antiquated and reduces U.S.
industries' global competitiveness. Since the addition of commercial
satellites to DOS's technology control list, we have seen the U.S.
global share of that industry reduced from over 70 percent to less than
30 percent as the Europeans and others have marketed their products as
International Traffic in Arms Regulations compliant. What actions are
necessary to be taken to improve the export control regimen?
Mr. Panetta. On May 6, 2011, DOD and DOS transmitted a joint
interim report to Congress in response to section 1248 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The report, entitled
``Risk Assessment of United States Export Control Policy,'' is a
conservative starting point for transferring satellite and related
items from the USML to the CCL. It recommends that, under certain
conditions, commercial communications satellites, systems, subsystems,
and components be controlled on the CCL.
A more comprehensive assessment of controls on satellites, related
items, and technology is currently underway, as part of the
administration's Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative. DOD, with its
interagency partners, is expected to complete this review of USML
Category XV (Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment) in the coming
months. The draft will include recommendations for what items should
remain on the USML and those that can be moved to the CCL. No items
controlled on the USML by statute will be removed from the USML unless
and until the authority to do so is provided by Congress.
I understand that DOD expects to provide the final section 1248
report to Congress later this year, based on the findings from work
underway in the ECR initiative. Since the administration has not
completed its revision of controls on spacecraft in the USML, I cannot
provide any conclusions at this time regarding its recommendations.
However, consistent with our overall approach to ECR, I expect that the
administration will consider how to provide ``higher fences around
fewer items,'' and increase transparency and predictability so that the
U.S. space industry will be able to compete globally and more
efficiently.
I am aware that current U.S. law limits the flexibility of the
President and requires control of these items on the USML per section
1513 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on the legislative
changes that would be required to implement any proposed changes.
TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY
136. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, U.S. defense policy since World
War II has been to rely on advances in technology rather than force
size for our national security. Do you believe that the Pentagon should
strive to maintain our technological superiority in all mediums of
combat?
Mr. Panetta. I fully understand the role advanced technology and
technological superiority has on the strategic options available to the
President, including the size and shape of our forces. We live in an
era where nations have increased their investments in world-class
science and technology talent and facilities. While much of this
investment is centered on commercial applications, there are
significant national security implications. These investments provide
nations with options to develop new military capabilities and non-state
actors the opportunity to build asymmetric capabilities to challenge
our forces.
Given this environment, the Department must continue to build upon
the technical strengths it has developed over the decades since World
War II. The combined scientific, technical, and engineering talent in
our universities, the defense industrial base, other parts of
commercial industry, and Government labs are second to none in the
world. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department's investments in
research, development, test and evaluation protect this technical
advantage while providing the taxpayer with the greatest return on
their tax dollars in ensuring the technical superiority of our forces.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND LEADERSHIP
137. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, throughout the post-World War II
era, the United States has maintained its military leadership in large
part as a result of its industrial leadership--particularly in
aerospace and other defense industries. That leadership has only been
possible by tremendous work on the part of the employees of that
industry--the engineers, scientists, and machinists. Maintaining this
leadership in the future will require that DOD identify and communicate
what it needs to counter future military threats. As Secretary, what
will you do to map out the industrial policy and needs of DOD?
Mr. Panetta. As Secretary of Defense, I will ensure that Department
policies, procedures, and actions: (1) stimulate and support vigorous
competition and innovation in the industrial base supporting defense;
and (2) establish and sustain cost-effective industrial and
technological capabilities that assure military readiness and
superiority.
I will do so by: (1) monitoring industry readiness,
competitiveness, ability to innovate, and financial stability as the
Department moves to capabilities-based acquisitions in an era of
increasingly sophisticated systems; (2) leveraging Department research
and development, acquisition, and logistics decisions to promote
innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; (3)
leveraging statutory processes (for example, the Defense Priorities and
Allocations System; Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust evaluations; Exon-
Florio Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
evaluations) and promoting innovation, competition, military readiness,
and national security; (4) leading efforts for the Department to engage
with industry to ensure openness and transparency; and (5) continuing
our long history of supporting science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics education initiatives in a collaborative process at local,
regional, and national levels.
138. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, do you believe that our aerospace
and defense industrial base are essential strategic assets and that
strategic assessments must include the impact on the industrial base
from policy decisions?
Mr. Panetta. Yes. In order for DOD to develop, field, and maintain
high-quality equipment, it must rely on a robust and capable defense
industry. We must understand, therefore, the impact of the actions we
take on the industrial base and consider those impacts when making
strategic decisions.
139. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, as defense budgets flatten, how
do you think rapidly rising personnel and operations accounts can be
prevented from driving the investment accounts below 35 percent of the
defense top line needed to modernize the forces for future threats?
Mr. Panetta. The Department will need to continue to look for ways
to become more efficient to accomplish the core Defense mission. The
Department is conducting a comprehensive review of the Defense programs
in light of the current fiscal environment. I will ensure that
everything is on the table and assess each program in terms of its
contribution to our national security strategy.
140. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, alone among major nations, the
United States does not have a defense industrial base policy. The
current DOD policy of relying on market forces to sustain the health of
the industrial base ignores the fact that DOD is the sole customer for
military-unique weapons. Do you intend to continue the current
initiative to develop an industrial base strategy?
Mr. Panetta. The Department recognizes the defense industrial base
is more global, commercial, and financially complex than ever before.
I understand the Department regularly addresses specific
industrial-base concerns within programs and services and has also
embarked on a more comprehensive sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier
analysis of the industrial base, which will help inform future
programmatic decisions, expand the scope of DOD industrial base
assessments, and create a database on industry for use as an input to
many decisionmaking processes across the Department.
141. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, such a strategy will work best if
there is open communication between defense officials and industry
leaders so that industry can shape itself to meet the needs of DOD.
Secretary Gates began a Secretary/CEO dialogue to facilitate that
communication. Do you intend to continue that dialogue?
Mr. Panetta. I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with
industry and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the
maximum extent permitted by law.
PAKISTAN
142. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, I am taking a close look at the
$1.1 billion requested by the administration for the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). I am of two minds: on the one
hand, I understand the importance of Pakistan if we are to succeed in
Afghanistan and in the region; on the other hand, Pakistan has received
a lot of U.S. assistance over the past few years (nearly $6 billion
combined in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 and over $5 billion
alone in the fiscal year 2012 request). My initial thinking is that the
funding needs additional benchmarks and criteria which ensure that our
money is spent wisely and that the Pakistanis are cooperating with us.
I am interested in your perspective on this subject, both broadly and
specifically, on what Pakistan is doing or not doing to ensure
accountability for any aid we provide to the country.
Mr. Panetta. The PCCF and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
(PCF), jointly implemented by DOS and DOD, is the cornerstone of our
efforts to enhance the Pakistani military's ability to conduct
effective military operations against militants operating within the
country's borders.
Since 2009, DOD has executed PCF/PCCF to train and equip those
forces that Pakistan has committed to the counterinsurgency (COIN)
fight. Unlike traditional security assistance, PCF is structured such
that DOD's field element in Pakistan, the Office of the Defense
Representative-Pakistan (ODRP), plays the lead role in identifying the
Pakistani military's COIN capability shortfalls. ODRP also identifies
the requirements for training, equipment, and infrastructure that would
address these capability shortfalls. These requirements have focused on
enhancing COIN-specific capabilities like intelligence-driven
operations; air mobility; close air support, night operations, and
countering improvised bombs.
PCF/PCCF is structured so that the delivery of equipment is tied to
our ability to train Pakistan's security forces. In the weeks and
months ahead, continued delivery of PCF/PCCF training and equipment
will require resolution of issues like the Pakistan Army's ordered
drawdown of U.S. military personnel, the primary implementers of this
program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
DEFENSE SPENDING
143. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates has previously
identified the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark for defense
spending. Admiral Mullen previously stated that GDP should serve as a
reference to ``stimulate discussion relative to the affordability of
increased defense spending in a challenging security environment.''
Since 2003, GDP as a percentage of defense spending has increased
from 4.34 percent to 5.78 percent in 2010. As a percentage of our
Nation's wealth, these figures are on average markedly lower than
spending in other times of war:
World War II (5.72 percent to 42.04 percent);
Korean Conflict (8.25 percent to 15.01 percent); and
Vietnam War (7.65 percent to 10.86 percent).
Do you agree with Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and others that
the GDP should act as a marker for defense spending? If so, what does
the lower percentage average spent during the war on terror as compared
to other times of conflict lead you to conclude about future defense
spending as a percentage of GDP?
Mr. Panetta. Defense expenditures are currently at a much lower
percentage of GDP than during previous major wars. Defense consumed
more than half the Federal budget, and the portion of the Nation's
economic output devoted to the military was about 9 percent in 1961. By
comparison, this year's base defense budget of $530 billion--the
highest since World War II adjusted for inflation--represents less than
15 percent of all Federal spending and equates to roughly 3\1/2\
percent of GDP--a number that climbs to about 4\1/2\ percent when the
war costs in Iraq and Afghanistan are included. I do not believe the
Department is likely to return to Cold War levels of defense
expenditures, at least as a share of national wealth anytime soon--a
sentiment also expressed by Secretary Gates.
LIMITING INTERROGATIONS
144. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, I understand that you support the
Obama administration's policy of limiting the interrogation techniques
of U.S. military and CIA personnel to those consistent with a U.S. Army
Field Manual, FM 2-22.3. I am concerned that President Obama's
restrictions on interrogations are misplaced, unnecessarily hamper our
interrogators, and provide an advantage to our enemies. Should a U.S.
Army Field Manual be the single standard for governance on
interrogation methods for the U.S. intelligence community or should the
Intelligence Community have its own, possibly classified, standard?
Mr. Panetta. As I have stated before, I fully support the
President's decision to establish Army Field Manual 2-22.3 as the
single standard applicable to all interrogations by U.S. Government
personnel. This decision was based on the results of a careful review
conducted by the President's interagency Interrogation and Transfer
Policies Task Force which was charged with evaluating the sufficiency
of the interrogation practices and techniques in the Army field manual.
The Task Force found that additional techniques were not necessary. I
believe we should do everything possible within the law to gather
information, and I agree with those who state that information can be
obtained without resorting to measures such as waterboarding. I do not
support a set of classified interrogation methods that are not open to
public scrutiny.
145. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, do you believe there is any risk
in limiting all government interrogations to the U.S. Army Field
Manual, a publicly available document?
Mr. Panetta. No. I fully support the President's decision to
establish Army Field Manual 2-22.3 as the single standard applicable to
all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel. This decision was
based on the results of a careful review conducted by the President's
interagency Interrogation and Transfer Policies Task Force which was
charged with evaluating the sufficiency of the interrogation practices
and techniques in the Army field manual.
RAIL ASSETS
146. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, the use of rail to move,
mobilize, and reset our Nation's military personnel and assets has
proven to be a cost-effective, efficient, and environmentally-friendly
mode of transportation. Do you agree that the use of rail to move DOD's
assets is a ``must-be included'' in any mobilization or reset plan
developed?
Mr. Panetta. Rail as well as air, sea, and road are needed to
deploy and redeploy forces, and for the movement of sustainment
requirements. The effective use of the different modes must be
integrated to support and synchronize timely and cost-effective
deployment of personnel, their equipment and the associated
sustainment.
Surface (both ship and rail) are the most cost efficient modes for
moving large volumes of military equipment and sustainment/resupply
requirements.
The Department relies heavily upon commercial rail, truck, ocean
and air assets, and through the partnerships that are developed, to
meet national security objectives. It is our desire that commercial
industry maintains these critical capabilities.
147. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, with the drawdowns in Iraq and
Afghanistan, it is critical to have a logistics infrastructure capable
of moving DOD's vehicles and assets to and from their reset and storage
facilities. Do you feel the required rail assets are currently in place
to support the surge in reset and storage requirements that will come
from the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Mr. Panetta. Currently, the numbers of DOD and commercial rail
assets available are sufficient to meet requirements. However, over the
next decade commercial rail assets will reach federally-mandated
retirement timelines. DOD is currently studying this issue and is
assessing courses of action designed to ensure significant commercial
rail assets are available to meet the Department's future needs.
RADIATION AND MEDICINE
148. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, in light of the recent situation
in Japan, coupled with the ever-present threat of terrorist attacks on
our Nation, where do you rank the importance of our military's
capability to provide the best possible protection against radiation
exposure?
Mr. Panetta. Protecting our military forces from radiation exposure
is one of the Department's highest priorities. It is an integral part
of our overall emphasis on protecting the warfighters and our Nation
against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) events, whether intentional or accidental. The Department has a
well-established strategy designed to deter and deny our adversaries
the ability to threaten our Nation with weapons of mass destruction.
Should our forces face the dangerous effects of CBRN weapons or
materials, their protection and ability to mitigate those effects are
essential to our success. Currently, I see our radiation protection
priorities as being within larger CBRN defense efforts to: (1)
strengthen our capability to respond and recover from a CBRN incident;
(2) provide the necessary U.S. Food and Drug Administration-approved
prophylactics (vaccines and other preventative products) and
therapeutics (treatments) that protect against CBRN hazards; (3)
provide comprehensive situational awareness necessary to counter the
threat, along with the ability to share information and data analysis
to guide the appropriate response to a CBRN incident; (4) provide the
necessary detection and diagnostics to keep people safe and identify
those affected; and (5) maintain and improve current individual and
collective protection capabilities.
149. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, in your opinion, are our Nation's
first responders currently equipped with the best possible pre- and
post-exposure radiation therapeutics and, if not, would you agree that
we would be remiss in not ensuring that our government was doing
everything in its power to develop and stockpile the most advanced and
clinically-tested drugs presently available?
Mr. Panetta. It is DOD's policy to provide the best possible
medical countermeasures, including prophylaxis and therapeutics, to
protect our military and civilian personnel. To this end, I will
continue to work with the Service Chiefs to ensure our installation
emergency managers continue to reach out to their civilian counterparts
to ensure we are doing the right planning to meet any radiological
hazard. In addition, we will continue cooperating with the Departments
of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security to
maintain in the National Strategic Stockpile adequate supplies of the
best countermeasures available.
150. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, are you aware that the Armed
Forces Radiobiology Research Institute has committed years of research
and millions of dollars toward developing a very mature prophylactic
radiation protection drug and that it has received positive test
results and garnered widespread support across Government agencies?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I am aware of the efforts by the Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research Institute to develop new drugs that could be used
for protection against radiation. I understand that they have been
working on a promising candidate, which is in clinical testing
according to Food and Drug Administration protocols.
151. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, that despite all this, inter-
departmental procedures and roadblocks have inhibited such a drug from
being stockpiled by our military which has, in fact, repeatedly been
the request of the Office of Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs?
Mr. Panetta. We will work with the Food and Drug Administration as
it conducts clinical tests according to its protocols.
152. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, would you be
willing to further investigate this issue in order to determine what
roadblocks have halted the procurement of such a promising drug, and
how best to remove such hindrances?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I would be willing to look into this issue.
153. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, would you commit to further
dialogue on this issue and to provide regular updates to ensure our
government and the American people are as protected as possible against
these imminent threats?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will certainly look into this issue.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
DOD BUDGET CUTS
154. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in his April speech on debt
reduction, the President targeted security spending for $400 billion in
cuts over the next 12 years, the preponderance of which is expected to
come from the DOD budget. If confirmed, will you pursue cuts to the
defense budget that go even further than that?
Mr. Panetta. It is premature to provide an assessment of additional
defense cuts until we complete our review associated with the
President's target.
PAKISTAN
155. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in your written responses to the
advance policy questions, you note that ``U.S. strategic interests in
Pakistan encompass both our relationship with Pakistan itself and
Pakistan's role in the campaign against al Qaeda.'' What is absent from
your response is any mention of the major terrorist group, Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT). Director of National Intelligence Clapper recently
testified before this committee that LeT is becoming ``an increasing
threat to U.S. forces in Afghanistan.'' What is your assessment of the
threat that LeT poses to U.S. interests, as well as our allies?
Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]
OVERDUE DOD REPORTS
156. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, the Senate-passed version of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included an
amendment I sponsored that required DOD to report to Congress within 90
days on the status and capabilities of Taiwan's current air force, as
well as an analysis of the specific weapons systems Taiwan would need
in order to defend itself. That report is now 16 months overdue.
Likewise, DOD is also overdue in submitting the required annual ``China
Military Power Report'', which is mandated for delivery no later than
March 1 of each year. The failures by DOD to submit timely reports, as
mandated, undermine Congress' oversight role. If confirmed, will you
commit to ensuring that these two important reports are submitted to
Congress without further delay?
Mr. Panetta. Yes. I am committed to providing these and other
reports to Congress in a timely manner.
VIOLENCE IN MEXICO
157. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, I remain extremely concerned by
the intense cartel-driven violence occurring in Mexico, just a stone's
throw from my own home State, and also what I consider to be a lack of
focus on this problem by the current administration. This
administration does not seem to have a coherent, meaningful strategy in
place to help the Government of Mexico regain control over its country
and defeat the cartels. Instead, momentum seems to be moving in the
opposite direction. Mexican President Felipe Calderon has boldly taken
on the cartels, but I'm concerned about whether his successor will
share his commitment to fight the cartels and restore law and order in
Mexico. What do you see as the risks to our own national security if
the Mexican cartels are not defeated?
Mr. Panetta. I share your concern about the increased violence
levels in Mexico and the threats posed by transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) operating there and, increasingly, throughout the
region. Although concerned about the escalating violence, the U.S.
Government remains confident that Mexico's democracy is strong and its
government maintains control over its territory.
As I understand it, the U.S. Government began coordinating
assistance to Mexico under the Merida Initiative in 2008 with the goal
of supporting the Government of Mexico's efforts to build capacity to
combat TCOs, strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights,
reduce violence, and stem the flow of drugs north and arms and illicit
money south. DOD is working with its counterparts in Mexico to assist
their efforts to dismantle TCOs. The Department recognizes that, moving
forward, U.S. efforts should reinforce the progress made in disrupting
cartels. The United States should also reinforce Mexico's move toward
institutionalizing its capacity to act on public safety and security
issues, transform its borders to respond to security threats while at
the same time remaining competitive globally, and ensure that
communities see the benefit of respecting human rights and the rule of
law and adopting a culture of lawfulness.
It does not appear that TCO violence is spilling across the border
into the United States. Still, the Department recognizes that TCOs have
linkages to illicit groups operating inside the United States,
including drug traffickers and gangs that pose health, law enforcement,
economic, and security challenges to cities and towns throughout the
United States. Although Mexico has called upon its armed forces to
support Mexican law enforcement efforts in combating TCOs, they
continue to see the problem as law enforcement in nature, as does the
U.S Government. DOD, along with its interagency partners, is working
closely with its Mexican counterparts to support their efforts to
dismantle TCOs, and if confirmed, in coordination with interagency
partners, I will continue the Department's efforts to provide
assistance as requested by the Government of Mexico.
158. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, could Mexico become a failed
state?
Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]
159. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what would a failed state mean
for the United States?
Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]
160. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, I am encouraged by your written
response acknowledging that, in order to confront the threats posed by
transnational criminal organizations in Mexico, ``it is necessary to
harness the talents and resources of DOD, in coordination with those of
DOD's Federal partners and the Governments of Mexico and Central
American nations . . . . I believe a long-term solution will require a
whole-of-government effort.'' What would you do to leverage DOD
resources in confronting this growing threat on our southern border?
Mr. Panetta. U.S.-Mexico relations have grown significantly in
recent years. The increased military-to-military engagement between our
two nations is especially valued. DOD is working closely with
interagency partners to provide support and deliver assistance, as
requested by the Government of Mexico. As I understand it, DOD
representatives meet and speak regularly with Government of Mexico
officials to assess the progress we have made to date, and to identify
priorities moving forward through established forums such as the U.S.-
Mexico Defense Bilateral Working Group and other ongoing meetings with
Government of Mexico officials. As the force directly confronting the
TCOs, the Government of Mexico is best positioned to identify the
resources and support needed to challenge the organizations operating
in Mexican territory. The most important step DOD can take is to be
prepared to respond quickly when assistance is requested. I look
forward to working closely with U.S. national security agencies,
Mexico, Central American Governments, and Congress to shape the scope
and scale of continued DOD efforts.
161. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, how would you improve interagency
cooperation in this area?
Mr. Panetta. DOD has been engaged with its Mexican counterparts on
exchanges and training, providing equipment, and information sharing
for many years. But as I mentioned previously, defense assistance is a
small part of the U.S. whole-of-government support to Mexico, which
focuses on building civilian institutions and capacity and for which
DOD is in complete support.
I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other U.S.
departments and agencies and foreign partners to integrate our
cooperation with Mexico. DOD has unique capabilities within the U.S.
Government, but it must ensure that its policies are complementary
rather than duplicative, and that those agencies with the right tools
have a seat at the table. Although the Government of Mexico has called
upon its armed forces to support Mexican law enforcement efforts in
combating transnational criminal organizations, as I understand it,
Mexico continues to see the problem as law enforcement in nature, and
the U.S. Government agrees with this assessment. In addition to DOD's
engagement with its Mexican counterparts, if confirmed, I will ensure
that DOD remains prepared to provide support to U.S. law enforcement
agencies in their work with Mexico.
THE FUTURE OF IRAQ
162. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, the recent killing of five
American soldiers served as a chilling reminder that security in Iraq
remains fragile. The radical Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, is
attempting to reinsert himself into Iraq's political process through
demonstrations and threats of violence. Several military and civilian
leaders have expressed serious concern regarding the Iraqis' limited
military capabilities in the key areas of logistics, intelligence, and
aviation, and what those shortfalls will mean for Iraq once U.S. forces
withdraw as planned, by December 31, 2011. How concerned are you about
stability in Iraq following the departure of U.S. Armed Forces?
Mr. Panetta. Although the ISF are currently functioning well as a
counterinsurgency force and demonstrating the capability to maintain
internal security, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) assesses that gaps,
particularly in the capability to defend against external threats, will
exist. USF-I assesses that the broad categories of projected gaps are
cross-ministerial intelligence sharing; combined arms capability;
integrated air defense and air sovereignty enforcement; and sustainment
and logistics. USF-I will focus its efforts on these areas between now
and the end of the mission. Additionally, USF-I will continue to assist
the Iraqis in the fielding of modernized equipment, providing advice
during maneuver training, conducting advanced specialty skills
training, and working to mature maintenance and supply operations.
163. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, can the Iraqis adequately prevent
terrorist organizations from taking root and growing in Iraq?
Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]
IRAN
164. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, it remains clear that Iran plans
to influence the future of Iraq. The ongoing Iranian meddling in Iraqi
affairs is very concerning. In your opinion, how would a complete
withdrawal of U.S. forces impact Iran's relations with Iraq?
Mr. Panetta. We remain troubled by Iran's continued support to and
training of militant groups that target both Iraqi and U.S. personnel.
We encourage Iran to maintain constructive and peaceful relations with
its neighbor Iraq, with which it shares a long history of cultural,
religious, and economic ties. Iran should respect Iraqi sovereignty and
end its support to those who promote terrorism in Iraq. In addition,
Iraq is a sovereign country and has proven resistant to Iranian
meddling.
165. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, would this give the Iranians more
opportunity to influence Iraq's future course?
Mr. Panetta. Iran has pursued a multi-pronged strategy in Iraq
consisting of political outreach, soft-power initiatives, and lethal
support for surrogate groups. Iran often seeks to fill power vacuums,
real or perceived, in order to gain leverage. It is therefore possible
that Iran could view the U.S. draw down as an opportunity to gain such
leverage. However, Iraq is a sovereign country that, in its own
interest, would be expected to resist efforts by any of its neighbors
to exert improper influence.
INDIA'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN
166. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, as of February, there was a
shortage of 740 trainers in Afghanistan needed to train Afghan soldiers
and police. Last summer, Secretary Gates signed an order sending 850
military personnel to Afghanistan as a stop-gap measure to fill
vacancies in the high-priority effort to train local security forces.
Administration officials continue to reaffirm that the trainers'
mission is essential for preparing Afghan forces to take over the
security mission and remains a central tenet of the transition strategy
in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, India has proven its willingness to support
the effort in Afghanistan, playing an important role in the ongoing
reconstruction efforts. To date, India has committed some $1.3 billion
to this cause, in addition to some 3,500 Indian personnel working on
relief and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Given the clear and
immediate demand for more trainers and training options in Afghanistan,
as well as India's willingness to help thus far, should we invite India
to play a greater role in training the Afghan security forces?
Mr. Panetta. India provides scholarships for ANSF personnel to
study in India, and the Indian Government is currently exploring
options to train Afghan women police in India. We welcome these efforts
and have encouraged India to coordinate its efforts with the NATO
Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A).
We also encourage India to consider further assistance in
Afghanistan through priority infrastructure projects and additional
training and education assistance and technical assistance to the
agriculture sector. As Prime Minister Singh's recent visit to
Afghanistan illustrated, India continues to work bilaterally with the
Afghan Government to identify additional areas of cooperation.
During President Obama's visit to India in November 2010, he and
Prime Minister Singh committed to intensify consultation, cooperation,
and coordination to promote a stable, prosperous, and independent
Afghanistan. They agreed to collaborate closely to assist the people of
Afghanistan by identifying opportunities to leverage our relative
strengths, experience, and resources, including joint projects on
agriculture and women's economic development. Eighty-five percent of
Afghans derive their income from agriculture, and Afghan women continue
to lack economic, social, and political opportunities.
PERSONNEL COSTS
167. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in your written responses, you
note that the portion of DOD's budget devoted to personnel-related
costs continues to grow. You acknowledge that the current military
compensation system ``remains rooted in structures established
generations ago,'' and that you ``believe it may be possible to
restructure our military benefits in a way that reduces costs.''
Likewise, Secretary Gates, in his last major policy speech delivered on
May 24, stated that we may need to consider ``reexamining military
compensation levels in light of the fact that--apart from the U.S. Army
during the worst years of Iraq--all the Services have consistently
exceeded their recruiting and retention goals . . . '' If confirmed, do
you intend to direct a comprehensive review of military pay and
benefits?
Mr. Panetta. The fiscal environment requires us to look at all
areas to meet the savings target including compensation, but we will
take care of our personnel and their families, particularly our Wounded
Warriors whose sacrifices demand that we deliver on our promises.
168. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what overarching changes and
modifications do you believe are necessary to control rising personnel
costs, while continuing to adequately provide for servicemembers?
Mr. Panetta. We need to examine all aspects of compensation in a
manner that recognizes the unique nature of military life and the need
to attract and retain needed personnel. While I don't yet have any
specific proposals, I do recognize the importance of this review.
169. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, do you agree with the recent
recommendation of Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, that when implementing President Obama's call for $400 billion
in cuts to security spending, savings should be identified within
military pay and benefits before cuts are made to force structure, such
as weapons programs, equipment, and end strength?
Mr. Panetta. I look forward to working with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff about priorities and potential areas for savings.
Finding the $400 billion sought by the President will require us to
make disciplined decisions in a number of areas, and we will need to
find the right balance between military pay and benefits, weapons
programs, equipment, and end strength.
MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
170. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, your written responses also
evidenced your concerns regarding the military retirement system,
including that it was ``created in an earlier era,'' and that it ``may
be appropriate to also review the military retirement system for needed
changes and efficiencies.'' Secretary Gates also stated in his May 24
speech that we currently have a ``one-size-fits-all approach to
retirement, pay, and pensions left over from the last century.'' He
went on to say, ``a more tiered and targeted system--one that weighs
compensation towards the most demand and dangerous specialties--could
bring down costs while attracting and retaining the high quality
personnel we need . . . '' If confirmed, do you intend to direct a
comprehensive review of the military retirement system?
Mr. Panetta. I expect that, if confirmed, I will need to direct a
review of all aspects of military compensation including retirement.
That review needs to recognize the unique nature of military life. If
retirement changes are proposed, I am committed to grandfathering those
currently serving.
171. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what overarching changes and
modifications do you believe are necessary to control rising costs
while continuing to attract the high-quality personnel we need for our
national defense?
Mr. Panetta. Controlling rising costs will require us to make
disciplined decisions in a number of areas. We will need to find the
right balance between military pay and benefits, weapons programs,
equipment and end strength and understand the impact of any pay changes
on our ability to recruit and retain the future force.
MILITARY VOTING
172. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in a letter to me dated December
16, 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn wrote, ``I am
pleased to inform you that I will designate all military installation
voting assistance offices as National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)
agencies . . . Those designations will be advertised to State and local
election officials, as well as Uniformed Service voters, when
implemented.'' This action was taken under section 7(a)(2) of the NVRA.
Please provide a detailed status on the implementation of this
decision.
Mr. Panetta. Since July 2010, the Department has accomplished the
following:
Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) provided an
Installation Voter Assistance (IVA) Office Training Handbook
including specific step-by-step voting assistance decision
trees for both military and civilians entering the IVA office.
In-person training was provided in 36 military
concentration areas, and three webinars were conducted to
assist installation personnel who were unable to attend the in-
person training.
The Under Secretary for Personnel & Readiness issued
Directive-Type Memorandum 10-021, directing the Services to
establish IVA Offices at all military installations.
The Department is completing the revision of DOD
Directive 1000.04, FVAP, which includes instructions to the
Services for fulfilling all aspects of the Military and
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act. This is scheduled for
completion later this year.
The Service Senior Voting Representatives report
quarterly to the Director, FVAP, on the implementation of IVA
Offices and on other voting assistance metrics. The Services
expect to have 100 percent Voter Assistance Office and NVRA
implementation by the end of fiscal year 2011.
173. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what is your opinion on the
proper role of DOD in ensuring that our military personnel and their
families have a meaningful opportunity to vote in Federal elections,
regardless of whether they are stateside or overseas?
Mr. Panetta. The role of DOD is to assist uniformed servicemembers,
their families, and overseas voters to exercise their right to vote.
CIA LEGAL EXPENSES
174. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, Attorney General Eric Holder
reopened the investigations of several CIA interrogators in August
2009, after their cases had been formally closed in 2007 following
thorough consideration by Federal prosecutors. Has the CIA paid for any
of the legal expenses incurred by these interrogators as a result of
these re-investigations? If so, how much Federal funding has the CIA
spent on these efforts to date?
Mr. Panetta. The CIA's expenditure of its appropriations for legal
expenses incurred in connection with investigations of CIA
interrogators, and the Agency's potential need for additional Federal
funding for such expenses, are matters beyond this Department's
purview. Accordingly, I defer to the CIA for response.
175. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, how much additional Federal
funding does the CIA anticipate needing to spend on this?
Mr. Panetta. The CIA's expenditure of its appropriations for legal
expenses incurred in connection with investigations of CIA
interrogators, and the Agency's potential need for additional Federal
funding for such expenses, are matters beyond this Department's
purview. Accordingly, I defer to the CIA for response.
UNITED KINGDOM
176. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what are the implications of the
United Kingdom's reductions in military spending for the future of the
NATO alliance?
Mr. Panetta. We are concerned about the implications reductions in
defense expenditure across the Alliance will have on NATO's future
viability. The Department continues to engage in frank discussions with
all of our NATO partners, in public and private, regarding the
challenges associated with declining defense expenditures.
The United Kingdom faces an austere budget environment coupled with
an unsustainable defense program that needs to be overhauled. It will
implement a number of cuts as a result of its Strategic Defense and
Security Review (SDSR) reducing the size and some of the capabilities
of its armed forces. Nevertheless, we expect that the United Kingdom
will maintain its position as a leading NATO partner for the long term.
Although these are challenging economic times and many countries
have significant fiscal challenges, all allies will need to find ways
to spend limited funds more wisely through pooling, specialization, and
multinational procurement. Although not a panacea, these practices
should help our NATO allies to get more capability out of their defense
investment.
177. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, are there any lessons from the
United Kingdom's reductions that can be applied to the current U.S.
debate about defense spending reductions?
Mr. Panetta. Yes. The United Kingdom undertook a SDSR last year to
tackle the very difficult problem of an austere fiscal environment and
a defense program that was overspent, overstretched, and in need of new
strategic direction. It is important to note that, even after the SDSR,
the United Kingdom was able to maintain 2 percent of GDP expenditure on
its military, sustain its commitment to NATO operations in Afghanistan,
and respond to the situation in Libya as a leading partner in the
effort.
Our own defense establishment must also address an increasingly
austere budgeting environment, a complex set of security challenges,
and an uncertain future. We are consulting with the British on shared
lessons and experiences as our defense establishments continue to
explore efficiencies and best practices in our respective defense
models.
F-22 EXPORTS
178. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, Air Force Chief of Staff General
Norton Schwartz has previously indicated that having a fleet of only
187 F-22 fighters creates a high risk for the U.S. military in meeting
its operational demands. Given China's development of a stealth
aircraft and Russia's development and export of air defense systems,
the F-22 Raptor has taken on even greater importance. If confirmed,
will you consider creating an export variant of the F-22 for sale to
allied air forces?
Mr. Panetta. I will review the F-22 program, along with my planned
review of all of the Department's major weapons systems. However, it is
my understanding that export versions of U.S.-made weapons systems are
the result of interest from foreign countries through Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) requests. At this time I am not aware of any official
requests for F-22 FMS.
WEAPON SYSTEM CODEVELOPMENT WITH INDIA
179. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, there are eight partner nations
committed to the development and production of the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter. These partnerships are the source of extra investment for
development of the aircraft, help drive down per-unit cost, and support
the industrial base through foreign military sales. I believe there is
potential for the United States and our strategic partner India to co-
develop one or more military weapon systems, such as the replacement
aircraft for the Air Force's 40-year old T-38 trainer aircraft. Co-
development of a trainer jet would also expand the opportunities for
U.S. Air Force pilots and Indian Air Force pilots to train side-by-
side, which would be of great value. Do you agree that co-developing a
weapon system with India would be in both our strategic and fiscal
interest? Do you support this idea?
Mr. Panetta. The Department accrues significant benefit from
cooperative research and development projects with our NATO partners
and friendly foreign nations. 10 U.S.C. 2350a requires our acquisition
community to provide an assessment of cooperative opportunities prior
to the first acquisition milestone or decision point. I agree that co-
development is in both our strategic and fiscal interest and support
the idea. If an opportunity for co-development with India were to
arise, we would certainly pursue it if practically feasible.
180. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what other future programs would
be good candidates for DOD to embark on similar joint development
efforts with India?
Mr. Panetta. The Department identifies assessment of cooperative
opportunities for co-development at or before the first acquisition
milestone or decision point. During that analysis we identify good
candidates for joint development. I do not, at this point, know of any
specific candidates identified for co-development programs with India,
although there is an ongoing cooperative research and development
engagement with India.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
181. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, Iran continues to maintain a
rapid pace in its progress towards a nuclear weapons capability. The
International Atomic Energy Agency continues to report that Iran
conducts illicit nuclear activity. Iran's missile program also shows
progress towards a nuclear weapons capability that demonstrates
prospective increases in proficiency and range. In fact, Iran has
already enriched a sufficient quantity of uranium to produce multiple
nuclear warheads if it further enriched that material to weapons-grade
level. In response, the United States and our allies have imposed
significant sanctions on Iran, with the hopes that these steps will
press Tehran to change course. Do you agree that the prospect of a
nuclear-armed Iran and the persistent threat posed by Iran's proxies,
Hamas and Hezbollah, demonstrate the need for the missile defense
systems being developed by the United States and its allies?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, the ballistic missile threat from Iran and its
continued defiance of international obligations regarding its nuclear
program demonstrate the need for the development and deployment of
missile defenses for the protection of the United States, as well as
our deployed forces, allies, and partners.
182. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, do you agree that Iran's pursuit
of nuclear weapons poses an unacceptable risk to the United States?
Mr. Panetta. We remain committed to preventing Iran from acquiring
a nuclear weapon. The consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran would be
highly destabilizing for the Middle East, and could have significant
implications for U.S. interests. No one can say with certainty how the
situation might unfold, but a nuclear-armed Iran could cause other
states in the Middle East to pursue nuclear programs. It could also
embolden Iran in its actions throughout the region--most notably by
expanding its support for proxies. A nuclear-armed Iran could also
cause strategic instability that could eventually lead to a regional
conflict.
183. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, do you agree with the President
that all options must be on the table to address Iran's illicit
activities?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I agree with the President that all options
should remain on the table to address Iran's illicit activities. It is
DOD's responsibility to plan for all contingencies, and through prudent
military planning we continue to refine options to protect U.S. and
partner interests from Iranian aggression. However, we continue to
believe that diplomacy and economic pressure are the most effective
tools for changing Iranian behavior at this time.
184. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you ensure DOD
is prepared to carry out any orders the President may give to address
the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon?
Mr. Panetta. It is DOD's responsibility to plan for all
contingencies, and through prudent military planning we continue to
refine options to protect U.S. and partner interests from Iranian
aggression. However, we continue to believe that diplomacy and economic
pressure are the most effective tools for changing Iranian behavior and
achieving our objectives. I will continue to ensure the Department is
prepared to carry out any orders given by the Commander in Chief.
MILITARY PERSONNEL LOANS/CREDIT
185. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, I would like to raise an issue
regarding lending to military personnel that has come to my attention
and which I find very concerning. The North Carolina legislature is
considering legislation (HB 810) that would increase interest rates
charged by installment finance lenders. DOD has clearly defined
regulations governing lending to military personnel (32 CFR Part 232)
which imposes a 36 percent rate cap on short-term loans which do not
amortize. Yet, during a hearing military officers testified against the
bill indicating that the Office of Secretary of Defense ``found the
bill objectionable.''
Further, when Congress passed the Wall Street Reform Act, despite
the opportunity to do so, DOD did not recommend any changes to the
statute governing these regulations nor did Congress enact any changes.
When DOD reviewed and considered the regulation in place that
imposes a 36 percent rate cap on short-term payday loans which do not
amortize, it found that amortizing installment loans should not be
covered by the regulation.
72 Federal Register 5058 (August 31, 2007), at page 50582, reads:
``Likewise, there are installment loans with favorable terms and some
with terms that can increase the interest rate well beyond the limits
prescribed by 10 U.S.C. 987. Isolating detrimental credit products
without impeding the availability of favorable installment loans was of
central concern in developing the regulation. Consequently, installment
loans that do not fit the definition of `consumer credit' in section
232.3(b), including the definition of `payday loans,' `vehicle loans,'
or `tax refund anticipation loans' are not covered by the regulation.
The Department's intent is to balance protections with access to
credit. The protections posed in the statute assist servicemembers,
when applied with precision to preclude unintended barriers.''
However, I have seen reports of local commanders and civilian
representatives of DOD advocating at the State level against the very
types of loan instruments that DOD's own regulations call a favorable
form of credit for servicemembers and their families.
I am very concerned about continued credit availability to military
families. Has DOD changed its policy to include other lenders within
the coverage of the regulation?
Mr. Panetta. No, DOD has not changed its policy and does not intend
at this time to include other lenders within the coverage of the
regulation. The Department proposes to help ensure that servicemembers
and their families receive fair protections by working with Federal and
State governments on existing and proposed policies impacting all
consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the need to identify
servicemembers and their families separately for protections, which may
create unintentional barriers to credit.
186. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, has there been any study finding
abuse in this area?
Mr. Panetta. There have been no DOD-directed studies of installment
lending practices.
187. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, is it still the position of DOD
to balance consumer protection while preventing unintended barriers to
obtaining credit?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, this is still DOD's position. The Department
proposes to help ensure that servicemembers and their families receive
fair protections by working with Federal and State governments on
existing and proposed policies impacting all consumers. The goal is to
try to eliminate the need to identify servicemembers and their families
separately for protections, which may create unintentional barriers to
credit.
______
[The nomination reference of Hon. Leon E. Panetta follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 26, 2011.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Leon E. Panetta, of California, to be Secretary of Defense, vice
Robert M. Gates.
______
[The biographical sketch of Hon. Leon E. Panetta, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service of Hon. Leon E. Panetta
Education:
Santa Clara University, 1956-1960
Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science
awarded 1960
Santa Clara University School of Law 1960-1963
Juris Doctor Law Degree awarded in 1963
Employment Record:
The following are positions for which I received compensation:
Central Intelligence Agency
Director
2009-present
Santa Clara University
Presidential Professor
1999-2009
California State University Office of the Chancellor
Distinguished Scholar
1997-2009
Joint Ocean Commission Initiative
Commissioner and Co-Chair (compensation from
Meridian Institute)
1996-2009.
Meridian Institute .
Board of Directors (no compensation) Member,
Policy Planning Staff
2008-2009
Blue Shield of California
Director
2001-2009
International Advisory Board, Fleischman-Hillard,
Member
1998-2009
Corinthian Colleges Inc.
Director
2008-2009
BP Corp. North America, Inc.
Member of Advisory Board
2005-2009
Zenith Insurance Company
Director
2000-2009
California Forward
Co-Chair
2007-2009
Inns of Monterey LTD & Inns of Cannery Rd LTD
Director
2003-2009
Pacific Maritime Association
Governmental Advisor
1998-2009
IDT Corp.
Director
2004-2006
Connetics Corp. (Stiefel Laboratories)
Director
2000-2006
New York Stock Exchange
Director
1997-2003
New York Stock Exchange
Co-chairman, Corporate Accountability and
Listing Standards Committee
2002-2003
The following are uncompensated positions in which I have served,
although in some cases I was compensated for my necessary expenses
associated with my work in the organization:
Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy
Founder and Co-Director
1998-2009
Pew Oceans Commission
Chairman (2000-2003)
Commissioner (2003-2006)
Bread for the World
Director
