[Senate Hearing 112-368]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-368
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 15, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-921 WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois MIKE LEE, Utah
TOM UDALL, New Mexico BOB CORKER, Tennessee
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Barbara Boxer.............................................. 44
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Richard J. Durbin.......................................... 45
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Dizolele, Mvemba Phezo, fellow, Hoover Institution, Washington,
DC............................................................. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Gambino, Anthony W., fellow, Eastern Congo Initiative, Bethesda,
MD............................................................. 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis
Group, Washington, DC.......................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
ECI Paper ``Technical Issues Threaten Free, Fair, and Transparent
Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Urgent Steps
Required'' submitted for the record by Anthony W. Gambino...... 47
(iii)
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:25 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
A. Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Coons and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. I am pleased to call to order today's
hearing of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and I am honored to, once again,
serve with my friend and colleague, Senator Isakson. I would
like to welcome the other members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee who will be joining us later and thank our
distinguished witnesses: On the first panel, Ambassador Johnnie
Carson, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs;
and on the second panel, Mark Schneider, Senior Vice President
of the International Crisis Group; Mvemba Dizolele, fellow at
the Hoover Institution; and Anthony Gambino, a fellow at the
Eastern Congo Initiative.
Today's hearing on the elections and governance of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is both timely and important.
Last month's elections have been marred by reports of
widespread irregularities that are symptomatic of greater
challenges of governance. Today we will consider steps that can
and should be taken to improve governance in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. We will look at U.S. policy toward this
country that has been tragically plagued by decades of
conflict, poverty, and insecurity.
The recent Presidential and legislative elections in the
Congo have become the subject of intense international
scrutiny. Election observers from the European Union and the
Carter Center have both recently concluded that the results are
lacking credibility. Reports have detailed mismanagement of the
tabulation process, restricted access for international
observers, missing ballots, and voter turnout in some districts
allegedly greater than 100 percent. This was clearly not a
well-run election, and I insist that Congolese authorities must
now engage in a thorough and transparent review of the results
to address important unanswered questions.
Now that the Congolese Independent National Election
Commission, known as CENI, has released data from all polling
stations, there should be a thorough review of the results
taking into account reports of irregularities from the many
observer missions. As the U.S. State Department said last
night, the United States stands ready to provide technical
assistance for such a review that will shed light on whether
these irregularities were caused by a lack of organization or
by outright fraud.
New questions surrounding the election are emerging each
day this week, and I have received a steady flow of both
information and phone calls from concerned Congolese Americans
reporting fraud and concerns about post-election violence.
Today I call on both President Kabila and Mr. Tshisekedi to
urge their supporters to resolve their disagreements peacefully
and avoid an escalation of violence. The unresolved issues
surrounding this election cannot be answered through violence
in the streets. Instead, all sides should engage in dialogue
about the best next steps and consider establishing a formal
mediation process with the active support of the United States
and the international community.
It has been the hope of many in the DRC and around the
world that these elections would help move the Congo further
toward peace and stability after a terrible civil war that
left, by some estimates, 5 million people dead between 1998 and
2003. The United States and many in the international community
have invested significant resources and diplomatic capital into
improving governance and human rights in the DRC, including
more than $13 million to support free and fair elections in
this election cycle alone.
A stable and democratic Congo is in America's interest
because of its critical role in the region, its large
population, and its vast natural resources, but also because it
is in our interest to promote fundamental values, human rights,
transparency, freedom of expression, and rule of law. These
values we hold dear have been sadly routinely trampled on in
the DRC where in some instances gender violence and rape has
been used as a weapon of war to punish and silence civilians,
especially women and children.
As I said earlier, the problems with this election are
indicative of far greater problems facing the DRC, rooted in a
lack of strong, democratic, and transparent governance which we
hope, in partnership, to move the Congo toward over time.
Without government control over its territory and security
forces, armed soldiers and militia members will continue to
prey on Congolese civilians. Weak institutions prevent the DRC
from upholding human rights and the rule of law and
successfully addressing complex issues surrounding conflict
minerals and sexual violence. The recent elections presented a
great opportunity to further strengthen the foundation of a
more effective and credible government, and I am concerned that
this goal has not been achieved.
I look forward to hearing from our experienced and talented
witnesses about what concrete actions the United States can and
should take to help resolve the pressing and difficult
questions both about the conduct of the recent elections in
order to improve governance, but also how best to mitigate
post-election violence and strengthen the rule of law and human
rights in the Congo. We stand with the Congolese people in
their attempt to advance democracy and hope it can be achieved
peacefully.
I would now like to turn to Senator Isakson for his opening
statement.
Senator.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Chairman Coons.
First of all, I want to recognize my friend, Johnnie
Carson, the Under Secretary of State. He and I are the only two
guys over 50 named ``Johnnie'' in Washington, DC, and I am
proud to be one of the two. [Laughter.]
I also want to thank Chairman Coons for calling this
hearing. I was thinking, as I heard his opening statement, he
and I traveled to Nigeria earlier this year where they had just
completed their first really successful democratic election
with the election of Goodluck Jonathan. And we later went to
Ghana where President Mills has a great country, a great, free,
open, transparent democracy, and the benefits that are coming
to them.
So we think this is a particularly important time to focus
on the elections in the DRC, some of the alleged difficulties
with those elections, and hopefully find ways we can lead the
DRC to have more transparent, secure elections in the future
and be a role model democracy in that part of Africa. As
Chairman Coons has said, it is a critical country and a
critical continent to the United States of America, and we
appreciate our relationship and friendship with the DRC. And we
understand the problems with the Lords Resistance Army, with
lots of other things, but we also know there is a long way we
can go in terms of democracy, ending gender-based violence, and
having a more civil society.
So I commend you today on calling this year. I look forward
to hearing from my buddy, Johnnie Carson, and our other
witnesses who are here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator.
I join you in welcoming Ambassador Carson, a real leader in
United States-Africa policy and someone to whom we both look
for a close and effective partnership between this committee
and the committee and the United States Department of State. So
I will now turn it to Ambassador Johnnie Carson for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Carson. Thank you very much. Good afternoon,
Chairman Coons, and also good afternoon, Ranking Member
Isakson. It is an honor and a pleasure to appear before this
committee this afternoon to testify before you about United
States policy toward the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The DRC is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa with a
population of over 71 million people. It is bordered by nine
other countries and is connected regionally and geographically
with east Africa, southern Africa, and central Africa. It is
also a country with enormous natural resources, valuable
minerals, and abundant water sources. But despite its great
potential, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the
poorest countries in Africa. The DRC's turbulent pre- and post-
independence history has never allowed it to live up to its
economic promise. Nor has it been able to achieve the peace and
stability its people desperately need and seek.
The Congo's problems are centered around a lack of
functioning state authority throughout much of the country. The
state is unable to provide basic services such as health care,
education, and an infrastructure. The bureaucracy is weak and
sometimes dysfunctional and lacking in power. The security
forces are frequently undisciplined and certainly ill-equipped
and poorly trained and irregularly paid. Corruption is
widespread and the problems go on from there.
The United States, nevertheless, is the DRC's largest
donor, having committed over $900 million this past year
bilaterally and through multilateral organizations for
peacekeeping, humanitarian and development assistance projects.
We have supported the DRC's efforts to emerge from conflict and
realize a just and lasting peace that is based on democratic
principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The
top priorities for the United States and the DRC are promoting
credible elections, strengthening capacity to govern and
protect, improving economic governance, and reducing violence
and conflict in the eastern DRC. My statement will focus this
afternoon on our immediate concern in the DRC, the stability of
the country after the current elections.
On November 28, the DRC held its second democratic election
since the end of the Mobutu era. Eleven candidates vied for the
Presidency and almost 19,000 candidates competed for 500 seats
in Parliament. The independent electoral commission, known
frequently as CENI, announced the provisional results on
December 9, declaring the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila,
the winner with approximately 49 percent of the vote. Second
place went to the leading opposition candidate, Etienne
Tshisekedi, with 32 percent of the vote, and a distant third
the CENI's provisional results accorded Vital Kamerhe with 7.5
percent of the vote.
Both national and international observer missions,
including the U.S.-funded Carter Center observer mission,
identified flaws with the vote tabulation process, as well as
other problems that occurred ahead of the actual vote.
On December 10, the Carter Center released a public
statement on its assessment that the CENI's provisional results
``lack credibility'' noting ``the vote tabulation process has
varied across the country ranging from the proper application
of procedure to serious irregularities.''
The statement goes on to say, however, that, ``this
assessment does not propose the final order of candidates
necessarily different than announced by the CENI, only that the
results process is not credible.''
We share these deep concerns expressed in the Carter
Center's assessment over the execution of the election and the
vote tallying process. It is clear that the elections were
deficient. The CENI did not meet internationally accepted
standards in the vote counting process.
We have been watching the electoral process for months. I
have met with and spoken with all of the major candidates on
numerous occasions. Last week I spoke with Mr. Tshisekedi and
also with the CENI chair, Pastor Mulunda. The State Department
has found the management and technical aspect of these
elections to be seriously flawed, the vote tabulation to be
lacking in transparency, and not on a par with positive gains
in the democratic process that we have seen in other recent
African elections.
However, it is important to note that we do not know and it
might not be possible to determine with any certainty whether
the final order of candidates would have been different from
the provisional results had the management of the process been
better. Further assessments by election experts could determine
whether the numerous shortcomings identified were due to
incompetence, mismanagement, willful manipulation, or a
combination of all three.
President Kabila has publicly acknowledged that there were
``mistakes'' in the process, but has reportedly rejected any
assessment that the results were not creditable. An opposition
candidate has formally filed a petition with the DRC Supreme
Court which is presently reviewing the results and has until
December 19 to issue its ruling.
We continue to advocate that all Congolese political
leaders and their supporters act responsibly, renounce
violence, and resolve any disagreements through peaceful,
constructive dialogue, and existing legal remedies. We believe
that a rapid technical review of the electoral process by the
Congolese authorities may determine ways to provide more
creditable results, shed light on whether irregularities caused
by lack of organization or fraud or whether they will provide
guidance for future elections. The United States stands ready
to provide technical assistance for such a review.
It is important that the relevant Congolese authorities
complete the remaining steps in the electoral process with
maximum openness and transparency. We are urging them to put
forward greater efforts for improved tabulation throughout the
rest of the Congolese election cycle. This is especially
important as the tabulation process is ongoing for 500 national
assembly seats where, unlike the Presidential election, a small
number of votes could determine the winner.
We are also engaging with other governments at the highest
levels, particularly in the region, asking them to reach out to
President Kabila and Etienne Tshisekedi and other relevant
actors to embrace a peaceful solution to this potential
impasse. We have called on all Congolese political leaders to
renounce violence and resolve any disagreements through
peaceful dialogue and existing legal mechanisms.
Although there are major challenges with these elections, I
want to note a few accomplishments. Unlike in 2006, the
Government of the DRC was principally responsible for the
organization and for much of the financing of these elections.
This was an important first step. The CENI was able to register
over 32 million Congolese voters, and over 18 million voters
endured admittedly difficult conditions to cast their votes.
The voter turnout and enthusiasm for these elections broadly
reflected the determination of the Congolese people to have
their voices heard through the democratic process.
The United States played an active role in assisting in the
electoral process. We committed approximately $15 million from
multiyear bilateral funding in election assistance through
USAID. The funding supported the Carter Center's 4 million
dollars' worth of projects, and we also supported the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, known as IFES,
with an additional $11 million. This funding was used for civic
and voter education, for national election observer training,
and capacity-building of human rights organizations. In
addition, we deployed mission observer teams in each of the 10
provinces and Kinshasa, enabling wide coverage and observation
of the elections.
On the public diplomacy side, VOA and Embassy Kinshasa
conducted a program to strengthen democratic and social
institutions.
Our involvement and observation of the elections was indeed
extensive.
Moving beyond the recent elections, I would like just to
take a few minutes to state that the United States strongly
supports the United Nations stabilization mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and its efforts to help the
Congolese Government bring peace and stability to the DRC.
Although MONUSCO cannot be in the Congo forever, any decision
on the mission's drawdown or eventual withdrawal must be
condition-based to avoid triggering a relapse into broader
insecurity. We recognize that sustainable peace and stability
in eastern Congo will require professional and accountable
Congolese security forces and a strong and independent judicial
system, and we are working with other nations to promote these.
The United States also wants to help the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to counter the threat of rebel
armed groups and to help the DRC establish sustainable
security, something that has eluded the country for decades. We
continue
to work closely with the people and Government of the DRC on
countering the LRA and enhancing the protection of its civilian
population.
We are also concerned about the illicit trade in the DRC's
natural resources. Unregulated exploitation and illicit trade
in minerals have exacerbated the climate of insecurity in the
eastern DRC as armed groups have used profits from such trade
to fund their illegal activities. We currently have
approximately $11 million in funds specifically aimed at
increasing the transparency and regulation of the illegal trade
in key minerals in the eastern DRC.
The United States also has other major objectives in the
Congo. We want to help to strengthen good governance, promote
economic development, improve human rights, support judicial
reform, and end the cycle of impunity. We recognize that there
are great challenges across the DRC. However, the DRC and the
United States have a solid and positive relationship, and our
governments continue to engage at the highest level on a number
of issues.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson
Good afternoon, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, honorable
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you on the United States policy toward the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the DRC.
The DRC is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa. With a
population of over 71 million, it lies at the core of Central Africa
and is bordered by nine other countries. It is also a country of
enormous economic potential, with vast natural resources and large
mineral deposits. This economic wealth has contributed to the DRC's
turbulent history and the current complex political situation. This is
the site of what has been dubbed Africa's World War--a series of
conflicts that devastated the country for some 7 years and led to
continued violence in the eastern provinces even after a peace
agreement concluded in 2003. Rebuilding the DRC, establishing security,
and helping its people to improve governance are some of our highest
priorities on the continent. It is critical for us to stay engaged in
the DRC, because the DRC's trajectory is pivotal to security and
stability in the region.
The United States is the DRC's largest donor, having committed over
$900 million this past fiscal year bilaterally and through multilateral
organizations for peacekeeping, humanitarian and development
assistance. We have supported the DRC's efforts to emerge from conflict
and realize a just and lasting peace that is based on democratic
principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The top
priorities for the United States in the DRC are promoting credible
elections, strengthening capacity to govern and protect, improving
economic governance and reducing violence and conflict in the eastern
DRC. My statement will focus on our immediate concern in the DRC--the
stability of the country and the current election cycle.
elections
On November 28, the DRC held its second democratic election since
the end of the Mobutu era. Eleven candidates vied for the Presidency,
and almost 19,000 candidates competed for 500 seats in Parliament. The
Independent National Electoral Commission (known by its French
acronym--CENI) announced the provisional election results on December 9
declaring the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila, the winner with
approximately 49 percent of the vote. Second place went to leading
opposition candidate, Etienne Tshisekedi, with 32 percent of the vote.
In a distant third place, per the CENI's provisional results, was Vital
Kamerhe with 7.7 percent of the vote. Both national and international
observer missions (including the U.S.-funded Carter Center observer
mission) identified flaws with the vote tabulation process as well as
other problems that occurred ahead of the actual vote. Mr. Tshisekedi
responded to the announced results by calling them a ``provocation of
the Congolese people'' and declaring himself President. He has also
called on the international community to help address the problems in
the electoral process.
On December 10, the Carter Center released a public statement on
its assessment that the CENI's provisional results ``lack
credibility,'' noting that ``the vote tabulation process has varied
across the country, ranging from the proper application of procedure to
serious irregularities.'' The statement goes on to say, however, that
``this assessment does not propose the final order of candidates is
necessarily different than announced by the CENI, only that the results
process is not credible.'' Other observer groups, including the EU,
have since issued similar assessments.
We share the deep concerns expressed in the assessments of the
Carter Center and others over the execution of the election and the
vote tallying process. It is clear that the elections were deficient in
many ways. The CENI did not meet internationally accepted standards in
the vote counting process. The U.S. Government along with some of our
international partners has found the management and technical aspect of
these elections to be seriously flawed, the vote tabulation to be
lacking in transparency, and not on par with positive gains in the
democratic process that we have seen in other recent African elections.
However, it is important to note that we do not know--and it might not
be possible to determine with any certainty whether the final order of
candidates would have been different from the provisional results had
the management of the process been better. Further assessments by
elections experts could determine whether the numerous shortcomings
identified were due to incompetence, mismanagement, willful
manipulation, or a combination of all three.
President Kabila has publicly acknowledged that there were
``mistakes'' in the process but has reportedly rejected any assessment
that the results were not credible. An opposition candidate has
formally filed a petition with the DRC Supreme Court which is presently
reviewing the results and has until December 19 to issue its ruling,
which is just one day before the inauguration planned for December 20.
We have been watching the electoral process for months. I have met
and spoken with all of the major candidates numerous times. Last week,
I spoke with Mr. Tshisekedi and CENI Chair Pastor Mulunda. We continue
to advocate that all Congolese political leaders and their supporters
act responsibly, renounce violence, and resolve any disagreements
through peaceful constructive dialogue and existing legal remedies. We
believe that a rapid technical review of the electoral process by the
Congolese authorities may shed light on the cause of the
irregularities, suggest ways in which governance could be structured to
give better effect to the will of the Congolese people, and provide
guidance for future elections. The United States stands ready to
provide technical assistance for such a review and will encourage other
countries to contribute as well.
It is important that the relevant Congolese authorities complete
the remaining steps in the electoral process with maximum openness and
transparency. We are urging them to put forward greater efforts for an
improved tabulation process throughout the rest of the Congolese
election cycle. This is especially important as the tabulation process
is ongoing for 500 National Assembly seats where, unlike with the
Presidential election, a small number of votes could determine the
winners.
We are also engaging with other governments at the highest levels,
particularly in the region, asking them to reach out to President
Kabila and Etienne Tshisekedi and other relevant actors to embrace a
peaceful solution to this potential impasse. We have called on all
Congolese political leaders to renounce violence and resolve any
disagreements through peaceful dialogue and existing legal mechanisms.
Although there are major challenges with these elections, I want to
emphasize that these elections demonstrated important and positive
attributes of a democracy--the election was competitive, and the voters
who turned out in large numbers were committed to selecting their
government through peaceful, democratic means. Unlike in 2006, the
Government of the DRC was principally responsible for the organization
and, conduct for much of the financing of these elections. This was an
important step forward. The CENI was able to register over 32 million
Congolese voters, and over 18 million voters endured admittedly
difficult conditions to cast their votes.
The United States played an active role in assisting in the
elections process. We committed approximately $15 million from
multiyear bilateral and multilateral funding in election assistance
through USAID. The funding supported The Carter Center ($4 million) and
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) ($11 million)
projects on civic and voter education, national election observer
training, and capacity-building of human rights organizations. In
addition, we deployed mission observer teams in each of the 10
provinces and Kinshasa enabling wide coverage and observance of the
elections.
On the Public Diplomacy side, VOA and Embassy Kinshasa conducted a
program to strengthen democratic and social institutions. VOA spear-
headed a ``citizen journalist'' training of key opinionmakers
(nonjournalists) in local communities to report on important domestic
issues, including elections. By using inexpensive mobile phones, the
citizen journalists posted texts, videos, photographs and audio
directly to the ``100 Journalistes'' Facebook page.
continuing insecurity
Both in the context of the elections, and more broadly across many
of our key objectives, the United States strongly supports the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO) and its efforts to help the Congolese Government bring peace
and stability to the DRC. The mission is essential to the international
community's efforts to promote the protection of civilians, which
remains its number-one objective, as outlined in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1991 (2011). It has undertaken new initiatives in the last
few years--including the deployment of Joint Protection Teams,
Community Liaison Assistants, and Community Alert Networks--that have
made it more responsive to the vast needs of the eastern provinces. We
continue to believe MONUSCO must remain in the DRC until the government
can effectively take over protecting civilians and legitimately take
over the security function. Any decision on the mission's drawdown or
eventual withdrawal must be conditions-based to avoid triggering a
relapse into broader insecurity.
At the same time, MONUSCO cannot be in the Congo forever.
Sustainable peace and stability in eastern Congo will require
professional and accountable Congolese security forces and a strong and
independent judicial system. The Congolese Armed forces (FARDC) is
faced with numerous challenges partly due to integrated former armed
groups who continue to maintain parallel command structures. The FARDC
remains a force that is continuously trying to integrate former rebels
into a force structure that is itself oversized, unprofessional, and
lacking training on almost all levels. The DRC Government has no real
command and control over many of these forces, particularly the ex-CNDP
forces that remain under the command of the ICC-indicted Jean Bosco
Ntaganda, whose forces continue to commit human rights abuses and
engage in illegal minerals trafficking and whose arrest we continue to
call for. In many cases, the Government of the DRC is unable to
properly provide its forces with the necessary logistical support.
Helping the DRC develop professional forces that are able and
disciplined enough to protect civilians is essential to ending sexual
and gender-based violence and other serious human rights abuses.
U.S. Government assistance attempts to address some of these
underlying problems by providing military and police
professionalization training with an emphasis on rule of law, respect
for human rights and developing leadership skills that set a high moral
bar for subordinates to emulate. For FY 2011, the State Department
funded approximately $30 million in bilateral security assistance to
support peace and security in the DRC. One critical component of this
support is our training and assistance to the Congolese military
justice sector. Effective and independent military judges and
prosecutors helped prosecute and convict the officers accused of
responsibility for the January 1 mass rapes in the town of Fizi. We
continue to urge the DRC Government to take vigorous and effective
actions in investigating and prosecuting security force officials
accused of rape or other crimes.
Helping the governments of the region, including the DRC
Government, to counter the threat of rebel armed groups is another key
element of our approach to help the DRC establish sustainable security.
As this committee knows, countering the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
continues to be a particular priority for us. The LRA's continued
atrocities are an affront to human dignity and a threat to regional
stability. In line with the legislation passed by Congress last year,
we are pursuing a comprehensive, multiyear strategy to help our
partners in the region to better mitigate and ultimately the threat
posed by the LRA.
As part of developing that strategy, we reviewed how we could
improve our support to national militaries in the region to increase
the likelihood of apprehending or eliminating the LRA's leaders. In
October, President Obama reported to Congress that he had authorized a
small number of U.S. forces to deploy to the LRA-affected region, in
consultation with the region's national governments, to act as advisors
to the militaries that are pursuing the LRA. Starting this month,
advisor teams are beginning to deploy forward to certain LRA-affected
areas, subject to the consent of the host governments. Let me also
stress that although these advisors are equipped to defend themselves
if the need arises, the U.S. forces in this operation are there to play
only an advising role to the militaries pursuing the LRA.
We continue to work closely with the people and government of the
DRC on countering the LRA and enhancing the protection of civilians.
With our encouragement, earlier this year, the Government of DRC
deployed a U.S.-trained and -equipped battalion to participate in
counter-LRA efforts in the LRA's areas of operations in the DRC. We
continue to work with this battalion. We are also working to help
MONUSCO augment its protection efforts in LRA-affected areas. At
MONUSCO's request, the United States has embedded two U.S. military
personnel into MONUSCO's Joint Intelligence and Operations Center in
Dungu. These personnel are working with MONUSCO, FARDC, and UPDF
representatives there to enhance information-sharing, analysis, and
planning with regard to the LRA threat. Finally, we are also funding
projects to expand existing early warning networks and to increase
telecommunications in the LRA-affected areas of the DRC. In addition to
the LRA, we are also working with the DRC Government to address other
violent armed groups that continue to destabilize the country's eastern
region.
illicit minerals trade
We are also concerned about the illicit trade in the DRC's natural
resources. Unregulated exploitation and illicit trade in minerals have
exacerbated the climate of insecurity in the eastern DRC as armed
groups have used profits from such trade to fund their activities. It
has also denied the Congolese population opportunities for livelihoods
in the mineral trade market. Consistent with the provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the Department has updated its strategy to break the
links between the illicit minerals trade and abusive soldiers and armed
groups. Using a variety of tools and programs, our strategy aims to
help end the commercial role of DRC security forces in the minerals
trade; enhance civilian regulation of the DRC minerals trade; protect
mining communities; promote corporate due diligence; support regional
and international efforts to develop credible due diligence mechanisms,
particularly the certification scheme of the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region; and, contribute to establishing secure trade
routes for legal mining.
We currently have approximately $11 million in funds specifically
aimed at increasing the transparency and regulation of the illegal
trade in key minerals in the eastern DRC.
These efforts, as well as the Public-Private Alliance (PPA) that we
recently launched with our private and civil society partners, are
aimed at supporting the creation of pilot conflict-free supply chains.
These are intended to demonstrate that minerals can be ``cleanly''
sourced from the DRC and that the legitimate, conflict-free trade in
minerals can continue even as companies begin to apply internationally
agreed principles of due diligence. The PPA has already received
commitment from more than 20 companies, trade associations, and NGOs
prepared to contribute their funds or expertise to these efforts. More
notably, the Secretariat of the International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region (ICGLR), a group comprised of representatives of each of
the Great Lakes countries, is a participant demonstrating that the
initiative has regional buy-in to support the intended pilot supply
chain efforts.
We recognize that there are great challenges in the DRC. However,
the DRC and the United States have a solid and positive relationship,
and our governments continue to engage at the highest levels on all of
these issues.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Carson.
Let me begin, if I might, what will be a 7-minute first
round.
Please, if you would, describe the technical assistance
that the United States is prepared to offer the Congolese
authorities to facilitate their conducting a transparent and
thorough review of the election process. And what steps can be
taken by CENI and by other Congolese institutions to improve
the credibility of both the outcomes and the process and create
stronger institutions both as the next steps of the tabulation
of the national assembly elections are moving forward and in
advance of future elections?
Ambassador Carson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that
excellent question.
First, let me say that we pushed very hard for CENI to
release all of the numbers that are currently being reviewed,
contested, and disputed. I spoke with the chairman of the CENI,
Pastor Mulunda, and encouraged him not just to release the
aggregate totals, but to release all of the numbers from the
63,478 polling stations across the country, as well as the 169
compilation centers. It was our nudging and pushing that
resulted in all of these numbers coming out.
We have said to the authorities, in response to your
question, Mr. Chairman, that we are prepared to help come up
with resources to fund a technical assessment of the elections.
We are prepared to look for resources, in conjunction with
others, to have groups such as IFES, the Carter Center, and
other respectable and internationally acknowledged election
organizations go into an in-depth audit of exactly what
occurred. This would permit an examination of the logistical,
the administrative, and the management processes that are part
of the election, as well as any irregularities that would also
be discovered in such an audit.
We think that this is important to do in order to develop
an understanding of what went wrong in the loss of ballots and
votes by individuals, but most importantly, it would provide a
foundation on which to improve the next set of elections for
that country. We all know that this is not a one-only process.
Our desire is to see better elections in the future. The only
way that can happen is to be able to identify the reasons why
this election did not live up to the expectations of the people
of the Congo, as well as many in the international community
who support democracy.
So it would be an audit. We would not attempt to do it with
our own individual resources, but would go out and contract
groups that are election experts to do this to provide a
foundation to find out what went wrong and to provide a basis
and a roadmap for improvements as we move ahead.
Senator Coons. Let me ask a next question, if I might,
about post-election violence. Given how quickly developments
may unfold in the DRC, both the Supreme Court ruling and the
scheduled inauguration, how quickly can the international
community, the U.N., the AU, SADC, other partners of ours, get
engaged with the United States, get engaged with the Congolese
Government and conduct this audit? And what impact might this
have on post-election violence, and what do you think the
international community and the United States can and should do
to minimize the risks of widespread violence?
Ambassador Carson. Mr. Chairman, we have been sending a
very loud and clear signal to all of the candidates to not
engage in violence. We have said repeatedly that violence has
no part in the electoral process or in democracy. We have
encouraged them to resolve any differences that they have had
or might have with the process through legal means.
We have reached out to a number of key leaders around the
region to ask them to reinforce this message as well. I myself
spoke this past weekend to the chairman of the African Union
and encouraged him to convey the same message to officials
there.
I think that with respect to the issue of violence, all
violence is unacceptable and should not be tolerated, but the
reality thus far, Mr. Chairman, is that there is significantly
less violence following this election so far than there was
after the second round of the 2006 election in which President
Kabila beat his closest rival, Mr. Bemba. Following the
elections in 2006, there were armed battles in the streets of
Kinshasa and in a number of other major towns between rival
armies of the two contending candidates. That had to be
eventually put down over several weeks by the Congolese
military, supported by the U.N. I am not saying that the
prospect for violence does not exist going forward, but thus
far, we have not seen anywhere near the level of violence that
we saw in 2006.
We continue to encourage all candidates to act responsibly.
We have encouraged neighboring state leaders to enforce that
message as well, and we will continue to do so.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Ambassador.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Secretary Carson, when the chairman and I
were in Nigeria, we had an interesting, if I remember
correctly, 2\1/2\-hour meeting with Mr. Yaeger who is the head
of the election commission that was put together in Nigeria to
conduct the election that was so successful. And one of the
things that they used, which was impressive to both of us, is
cell technology to communicate from the polling place to
Lagos--Abuja what the count was at the polling place, so if it
got to Abuja and it was different, they had some idea there was
some fooling around. And evidently it was the key cog in having
transparency and accountability in the vote process.
I know we have talked about--you used the term ``improved
tabulation process.'' That was an improved tabulation process
in Nigeria. Could we recommend or ask the Nigerian Government
if they would invite Mr. Yaeger in to consult with them on
reforms like that that could help to have more transparent and
fair elections?
Ambassador Carson. Senator Isakson, the answer is ``Yes,''
and I hope that as we go out and try to put together an effort
to have a technical assessment made, that those who might win
the contract to do this would, in fact, invite in people like
the Nigerian election commissioner. I think he did an
extraordinarily good job also in very difficult circumstances.
You are absolutely right about the importance of cell phone
communication there where people were able to send their
results in telephonically so that there was a way to double and
triple track the numbers that were being received at the
central compilation centers.
But something else was also there that was missing from the
DRC process which I think is useful in many elections across
Africa, and that is a parallel vote count in which there is a
system put in place to have a very good, legitimate counting
and tabulation that runs parallel to that of the government's
or the electoral commission. So that is an important thing.
One of the other things I might add too is that there were
enormous logistical and technical complications with this
election, but this election also took place in the worst time
of the year for the DRC, right in the middle of their rainy
season, and that also helped to add complications on top of
very serious additional shortcomings, which have already been
mentioned.
Senator Isakson. In your testimony, you talked about a lack
of functioning authority in a good area of the DRC. And as I
understand it, there are places in the DRC that are really
under good control and have good functioning authority, but
there are some pockets that are pretty lawless, ungoverned, and
hard to reach.
In the election tabulations, was there any correlation
between the problems with the election as to those that did not
have functioning authority and those that did?
Ambassador Carson. I have not been able to make that kind
of assessment myself, but I do know that it was, in fact, very
difficult to carry out the elections in the south Kivu area,
which is an area where armed groups continue to operate quite
widely. But I know that the problems that were experienced in
this election were widespread. They occurred in Kinshasa. They
occurred in Katanga. They occurred in Equator. So I am not able
to say whether they were better or worse in places where
government authority was or was not effective.
Senator Isakson. Were any of the 100 advisors that the
President sent to Uganda positioned also in the DRC?
Ambassador Carson. At this point, there are only several
there in the DRC, and they are located up in the far
northeastern part of the country.
Senator Isakson. And that is part of the effort to go after
the Lords Resistance Army?
Ambassador Carson. It is, indeed. As we have indicated, the
President authorized a mission of approximately 100 military
advisors who will help provide information and better training
for the forces in the region to effectively track down the
remnants of Kony's organization and Kony himself. We hope that
over time that these advisors will be located in Uganda, in
parts of the northeastern corner of the DRC, as well as the
CAR, and in South Sudan.
Senator Isakson. Based on my mail and based on being a
member of the Vietnam generation, there is a lot of concern
about loaning those advisors because it is kind of an unknown
mission in the public. And so I would encourage you and
Secretary Clinton, in whatever way is appropriate given
security, national security, and also the security of those
personnel, to have a periodic reporting back to us over the
progress of what they are doing in their stated mission and
also what their rules of engagement are because, quite frankly,
most of us between 65 and 70 remember what happened in the
1960s with a handful of advisors that actually President
Eisenhower sent in to Southeast Asia that later became a major
deployment. I am not suggesting that is either the intent or
possible, but I think the transparency that people look for in
elections I think they are also going to be looking for in
terms of this assignment of personnel. And I would appreciate
it, to the extent you can and it meets our national security
and the interest of those advisors, that we be periodically
advised of their progress, the rules of engagement they operate
under, and their mission.
Ambassador Carson. Yes, sir. I actually agree and I think
there is probably no reason, Senator Isakson, that we cannot in
fact do this. And I will make sure, when I go back to the
building, that we have no problems with doing so, but I have no
problem with giving you a periodic update. If I do not do it, I
will make sure that my colleagues over in the Department of
Defense are aware of this request and transmit it for them to
make sure that it happens. But I think that is certainly a
suggestion that we can follow through on.
Senator Isakson. Thank you. My suggestion is not just for
myself and Senator Coons, but we could be the conduit to ensure
that the Senate understands that issue because if it were to
bubble up, a lack of knowledge can be a real threat to the
mission. I have not talked to the chairman about this, but I
would be happy to be a part of a conduit to periodically give
that report to the Members of the Senate.
Ambassador Carson. Absolutely.
Senator Coons. I would like to follow up, if I might, on
that same line of questioning. During the runup to the
elections, the idea of having Ugandan troops on DRC soil
pursuing the LRA was increasingly controversial. Now that the
elections have passed, is there any confidence in your part
that there will be improved collaboration between the DRC,
Uganda, and other regional players in pursuing Kony and the
LRA? And what do you see as the scale of the ongoing--the scope
and the nature of the ongoing threat that the LRA poses to
civilians in the DRC and the region?
Ambassador Carson. The LRA continues to pose a serious
threat to civilians in a wide area, extending from the
northeastern part of the Congo into the Central African
Republic and all the way to the South Sudan border. They
continue to kidnap young men for conscription into their ranks
and women to be sex slaves and porters. We believe that the
total strength of the LRA probably does not exceed any more
than approximately 250 individuals, but these 250 individuals
are known to be killers and to be extraordinarily ruthless.
They are dispersed in a number of groups fanning out over a
very, very large and heavily treed and forested area. So they
do continue to be a threat in the area, and we think that it is
important to continue to help the countries in the region go
after them.
The DRC Government did ask for a reduction in the number of
Ugandans on their soil in the runup to the elections. We hope
that following the conclusion of these elections that we will
see a return to the stepped-up cooperation that has led to the
degrading of the LRA over the last year/year and a half.
I note that the DRC has committed one battalion, the 391st
Battalion, to operations in the northeast in the Gorompa
forest. It is a battalion of soldiers trained by DOD and
AFRICOM. They remain very much engaged in the search and the
fight against the LRA. They are using information that is
shared among Uganda, the DRC, and the United States. And that
information-sharing between the countries has not ceased, and
we know that those who are sharing this information from both
armies in the DRC and Uganda work together across the border.
Senator Coons. What is the likely role of the new special
advisor?
First, let me commend the administration for appointing
Ambassador Walkley as the Special Advisor for DRC and Great
Lakes Region.
Help us understand, if you would, how he is going to focus
and elevate U.S. policy in the region around LRA, around
conflict minerals, around improving governance, and resolving
ongoing disputes in the region. What will his role be?
Ambassador Carson. Well, first of all, we are extremely
pleased with the presence and selection of Ambassador Walkley.
He is an enormously experienced diplomat, having served a great
deal in Francophone Africa, as Ambassador to Gabon, Ambassador
to Guinea Conakry, and about a decade ago/decade and a half
ago, was deputy chief of mission in Kinshasa. He was most
recently our consul general and charge d'affaires in Juba. He
is a highly skilled diplomat.
We hope that Ambassador Walkley's appointment will signal
to all who are concerned about the DRC that the United States
remains serious and deeply interested in the issues of the
Great Lakes region and the DRC in particular. We hope that
Ambassador Walkley will be able to effectively strengthen
coordination of our policy in Washington within the interagency
and within the State Department among the various offices that
are responsible and have an interest in Great Lakes issues.
We also hope that he will be able to work with the
governments in the region to promote greater security
collaboration and information-sharing, help them work together
on strengthening common economic ties that are important across
the border, help them to address the issues of conflict
minerals and the movement of conflict minerals illegally across
one border into another state for export.
And we hope that he will be our conduit and liaison with
the international community and those in the international
community who are also concerned about issues in the Great
Lakes.
So we see essentially a three-part role for him in his
obligations for us.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. I do not really have another question. I
just want to thank Secretary Carson for his active engagement
in the entire continent and for his keeping Senator Coons and I
so well informed. I think the successes of the last year have
been quite remarkable if you look at the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement in the Sudan and the potential for what is happening
there, the positive potential there, and some of the other
things that have happened in large measure have been because of
your diplomacy and your engagement. And I personally
acknowledge that and appreciate it very much.
Ambassador Carson. Senator, thank you very much. And thank
you for your support as well and the chairman's support in
addition. I think that both of you have been strong supporters
of strengthening our engagement with Africa and developing a
positive and strong relationship with the continent.
Senator Coons. Let me, if I might, just ask one or two more
questions. I had understood Senator Durbin was making his best
efforts to join us and now may have been unavoidably detained.
So I am going to leave the record at the end of this hearing
open for longer than usual. I believe he may have some
questions about conflict minerals or the LRA or other topics
that would be of interest.
I also wanted to just add a question about leaders like
President Kabila who have made constitutional changes right
before elections and the implications of such actions in the
democratic process. I have heard from a number of constituents
real concern about Cameroon and President Biya who modified the
Cameroonian Constitution to run for a sixth term and is now
beginning his fourth decade in office after their recent
elections.
What more can the United States and the international
community do to ensure in Cameroon that the political
opposition is not silenced and to discourage other leaders in
the region, including, for example, as we spoke about the other
day, President Wade in Senegal, from forcing similar
constitutional challenges or extending their terms of office
beyond what might be positive and reasonable in the interest of
their people and the democratic process?
Ambassador Carson. Mr. Chairman, a very good question.
The decision by the President and the Government of
Cameroon to end term limitations was deeply, deeply
unfortunate. I think that the elimination of terms helps to
fuel some of the difficulties that arise when leaders have an
opportunity to extend themselves in office indefinitely.
We are clearly opposed to the extension or we are clearly
opposed to the reduction and elimination of term limits. We
have voiced our concern about this issue to President Paul
Biya. I hope that he and others in his government will see the
value of reinstating term limits. I think that it helps to
create an opportunity for political mobility by the most senior
political officials in any country. But the elimination of term
limits in the Cameroon, as around other parts of Africa, is
regrettable.
Senator Coons. My last question. The Democratic Republic of
the Congo is at the bottom in terms of the human index. The
international community has contributed $2 billion. We are, as
you mentioned, the single largest donor.
Given the outcome of these elections so far, given the very
real challenges facing the DRC going forward, what aspects of
our assistance and of international engagement do you think
have the best prospects for improving human conditions,
improving governance, making the DRC a more just and positive
place for its residents in the years ahead? What can we be
doing to improve governance that will have a lasting impact?
Ambassador Carson. Well, we are working to improve the
judicial system. We are working with civil society
organizations. We are working with the legislature. We have to
continue to do all of these things. We are working with civil
society to fight corruption. We are working to improve the
capacity of the judicial system as well. These are things that
do take an enormous amount of time.
But I would like to say that a lot of our resources going
into the Democratic Republic of the Congo are there to address
human needs, sexual and gender-based violence, ending the cycle
of impunity that has led to enormous human rights violations
against women and others across the country, improving health
care as well. So it is across a wide area that we are working.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you. I would like to offer our
sincere appreciation, Ambassador Carson, for your leadership,
and we would like to now move to our second panel today, if we
could. Thank you so much for your testimony, Assistant
Secretary Carson.
Ambassador Carson. Thank you.
Senator Coons. We would like to welcome our second panel,
and we are going to begin, if we might, with Mr. Mark
Schneider, proceed to Mr. Anthony Gambino, and then conclude
with Mr. Mvemba Dizolele. We are grateful for your willingness
to join us today and to testify.
In the interest of time, I have dispensed with a recitation
of the biographies of each of our witnesses today. They are
accessible through the committee Web site and online. But all
three of you bring a great range and depth of experience in the
challenges facing the DRC, and we are grateful for your making
yourselves available to the committee today.
Mr. Schneider.
STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schneider. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Isakson, to you both for holding this hearing at a watershed
moment in the history of the Congo.
As you know, Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan,
nongovernmental organization, and our mission is to seek to
prevent and to help resolve deadly conflict.
I do not think there is any question that this second
election, since the end of a brutal civil war which produced
some 5 million victims, had seemed to be a moment for the Congo
to move forward on a democratic journey. Instead, we meet at a
time of desperation, enormous frustration, and a great degree
of fear.
There are estimates now that a total of several million
voters who courageously went to vote, cast their ballots and
then those votes were not counted or the results were never
even transmitted to the central tabulation centers. And in some
cases, it now appears that some of the original tally sheets
and the ballots may not have been preserved. So the issue of
auditing is going to be very difficult.
I should add that the reports that we have received, which
echo the findings of the Carter Center, the European Union, and
the more than 30,000 Congolese that the Catholic Church
deployed as observers is, as the Carter Center stated, that
these preliminary results issued by the CENI lacked
credibility.
And let me just emphasize at the outset and I will then go
into some detail. While I also have the highest regard for
Assistant Secretary Carson, we do not believe this is a
technical issue. This is a political issue. There are technical
problems, but it is a fundamental political issue.
[Applause.]
Senator Coons. Mr. Schneider, let me be clear. We are not
going to allow demonstrations, comments, or conversations
during this hearing. I will have people removed. Please allow
us to conduct the hearing in some peace and order. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. You made the point about the question about
the implications of the absence of functioning authority in
different places in the country, and I think it is important to
recognize that the initial reports that we have indicate, as
Assistant Secretary Carson mentioned, that among the worst
situations were in Kinshasa where the Carter Center found some
2,000 polling stations in Kinshasa where the results simply
were not counted in the final tally sheets and another thousand
around the country. They estimate 850,000 votes were affected.
The EU, in its detailed report that came out yesterday, now
estimates 1.6 million votes that were not counted.
And I think the fundamental issue here is about the
disenfranchisement of Congolese voters. This was their right.
This is a right that clearly seems to have been denied to a
substantial degree.
I should also add that we have now heard--and there is a
report again in the EU report--that there were some polling
stations where there were more votes tabulated than voters
registered where close to 100 percent of the votes from those
stations reported by CENI were for President Joseph Kabila.
Yet, in some of those very instances, observers were able to be
there through the end of the tallying and in fact they found
very different results. In some cases, the results were more
balanced; in other cases, the second place finisher, Etienne
Tshisekedi, actually came in first.
In a sense, these results show that our worst nightmare in
the preelectoral period has come to pass; that is, the results
are so marred by widespread charges of fraud and dishonesty
that the credibility of the entire election may be fatally
impaired and so too the legitimacy of the government that
follows.
But our major concern right now is that we are deeply
disturbed by the loss of life that has already occurred and,
unfortunately, the potential for ever-widening regional
domestic conflict and upheaval. And that is where we argue that
this has to be the central focus right now. We believe there is
an overriding responsibility of the international community
from the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission, the United States, and
others, particularly the African leadership and the African
Union, to join with the Catholic Church and others to find a
path away from a return to national violence in the Congo. That
is really where we see the gravest danger.
And I should add that while the international community now
has indicated that it believes these results were fatally
flawed, there must be a mechanism proposed, beyond the question
of technical experts, in order to participate in the
verification of these initial results and to provide some
degree of mediation in the Congo. And we believe that that is
crucial. The African Union, the United Nations, the European
Union, and the United States should immediately be focused on
what is the mechanism that can help lead the Congo in a
different direction.
And I should add that ultimately the goal should be to
permit that those voters who were not able to vote or whose
votes were not counted to revote in those areas in order to
ensure that their right is recognized. And that ultimately is
the only way that you will ever really know who won this
election. Essentially, what
we are asking is that this be done at a time when the country
is poised on whether or not there is going to be additional
conflict or whether it is going to move forward in a democratic
fashion.
And remember that we have not yet had even the preliminary
results with respect to legislative voting. Again, that
verification will need some participation of an independent
international body, along with the Congolese, because of the
immense amount of suspicion that has occurred.
Just let me give you four examples and the preliminary
issues. One, the constitutional amendment that changed the
playing field. Two was that the voter registration rolls were
challenged. The political parties, the opposition parties,
never had a chance to audit them. Three was the nature of the
membership of the CENI with a clear bias toward the current
government. And fourth was the naming in early November of a
Supreme Court which is ultimately going to preside over the
dispute resolution, again with a heavy partisan cast to it.
These are essential questions.
And I will stop by simply noting that there are two other
issues that have been raised, and I think they are crucial in
terms of the future of the Congo. One is security sector reform
and reform particularly within the army, and the second is the
noncorrupt management of the country's natural resources.
And I should add that we agree with Assistant Secretary
Carson on the need for the action that was taken with respect
to the LRA, but there is far more that needs to be done with
respect to the nature of the integration of militias into the
armed forces of the Congo that must be changed if you are going
to have an end to the kind of violations that we have seen in
the past.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Schneider
The International Crisis Group appreciates the opportunity to
testify today and I would like to thank Chairman Coons, Ranking Member
Isakson, and the members of this subcommittee for holding this
important hearing during a precarious moment for the people of the DRC.
Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan, nongovernmental
organization that provides field-based analysis, policy advice and
advocacy to governments, the United Nations, and other multilateral
organizations on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict.
Crisis Group was founded in 1995 as an international nongovernmental
organisation by distinguished diplomats, statesmen, and opinion leaders
including Career Ambassador Mort Abramowitz; Nobel Prize winner and
former Finland President; Martti Ahtisaari, the late Congressman,
Stephen Solarz; and former U.N. and British diplomat, Mark Malloch
Brown, who were deeply concerned at the international community's
failure to anticipate and respond effectively to mass atrocities in
Rwanda and Bosnia. Senator George Mitchell was our first chairman;
Ambassador Thomas Pickering is our current chairman. Louise Arbour,
former chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights is our
current president. In 2011, Crisis Group was awarded the Eisenhower
Medal for Leadership and Service.
Crisis Group publishes annually around 80 reports and briefing
papers, as well as the monthly CrisisWatch bulletin. Our staff are
located on the ground in 10 regional offices and 16 other locations
covering between them over 60 countries focused on conflict prevention
and post-conflict stabilization. We maintain advocacy and research
offices in Brussels (the global headquarters), Washington and New York
and liaison and research presences in London, Moscow, and Beijing.
Crisis Group's Africa program oversees four projects covering
Central, Southern, and West Africa, and the Horn of Africa, reporting
on 21 different countries within these regions. We have produced 34
reports/briefings on the DRC and circulated an urgent statement on 8
December.
current context
Crisis Group's DRC reporting, in particular over the last 18
months, raised alarm bells regarding the coming elections and their
implications for future governance in a country which was barely 8
years removed from a state of anarchy resulting from a civil conflict
and the military interventions of neighbors directly and through
militia proxies. Our recent reports questioned the consequences of a
hasty constitutional change in January 2011, flawed voter registration
and voter roll issues, minimal outreach by Congo's Independent National
Election Commission (CENI) to the political parties, the lack of
transparency, a sharp increase of political tension, incidents of
violence, the general inadequate preparation of the elections, and the
late design of an integrated electoral security plan. And we especially
pressed unsuccessfully, given all of these suspect issues, on the CENI,
the government, opposition parties, MONUSCO and the larger
international community, including the United States and the European
Union, to insist on development of a consensual Plan B if, despite all
good faith efforts, the outlook for decent elections appeared grim well
before 28 November. Otherwise, we warned that without concerted and
unified action by the DRC and committed international diplomacy, the
November general elections, the second since the end to the Congo
conflict, would result in irregularities if not massive fraud with the
potential for widespread violence and the undermining of the legitimacy
of any pronounced elections winner.
We recognize the international and U.S. diplomatic engagement
leading up to the 28 November elections and welcome the new appointment
of Ambassador Barrie Walkley as Special Advisor for the Great Lakes and
the Democratic Republic of Congo to coordinate and respond to the
myriad challenges for the region over the coming weeks and months.
Unfortunately that engagement was not enough. The Democratic Republic
of Congo faces a political crisis that already has resulted in loss of
life. Every diplomatic measure needs to be exerted to avoid a return to
national violence. The 9 December provisional results were announced by
the electoral commission, with Kabila declared by the CENI to have won
the Presidential election (49 percent of the votes) by 17 percentage
points. The longtime opposition leader Tshisekedi came in second place
with 32 percent and Kamerhe came in third with 7.7 percent. Both
opposition candidates have rejected the results. Scheduled on 28
November, it was extended for 2 days as materials arrived late and many
names were missing from voter lists. Estimated voter turnout was
reported at 58 percent which reflects the courageous commitment of
millions of Congolese voters to democracy. However, they along with the
international community are living through their worst nightmare, an
electoral result marred by such widespread charges of fraud, deceit,
and dishonesty that the credibility of the process may be fatally
impaired and so too the legitimacy of the government that follows.
Tallying of the legislative elections results is not going to be
concluded for many weeks and the preservation of those ballots to avoid
further ``losses'' and the transparent verification of that vote
tabulation is essential.
The Carter Center, which maintained 26 teams of international,
impartial observers deployed in Kinshasa and the 10 provinces for the
counting and tabulation, issued this statement: ``Carter Center
observers reported that the quality and integrity of the vote
tabulation process has varied across the country, ranging from the
proper application of procedures to serious irregularities, including
the loss of nearly 2,000 polling station results in Kinshasa. Based on
the detailed results released by CENI, it is also evident that multiple
locations, notably several Katanga province constituencies, reported
impossibly high rates of 99 to 100 percent voter turnout with all, or
nearly all, votes going to incumbent President Joseph Kabila. These and
other observations point to mismanagement of the results process and
compromise the integrity of the Presidential election. Candidates and
parties have a limited time to submit any complaints to the Supreme
Court, and tabulation for the legislative elections is ongoing. The
problems observed in the tabulation and announced results are
compounded by inadequate access for observers at multiple compilation
centers around the country and no official access to the national
results center in Kinshasa. The Carter Center is therefore unable to
provide independent verification of the accuracy of the overall results
or the degree to which they reflect the will of the Congolese people.''
The responses from other key organizations:
``After analyzing the results that were made public by the
(election commission) this past Friday, December 9, 2011, we
could not help but conclude that the results are not founded on
truth or justice,'' said Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, the head
of the influential Catholic Church in Congo. The Catholic
Church deployed 30,000 observers, more than any other group,
nationwide.
In a 12 December MONUSCO press release: ``MONUSCO notes with
deep concern the findings of these observer missions relating
to the significant irregularities in the management of the
results process, in particular the counting and tabulation of
the votes.'' It went on to recommend, as we have that CENI
``undertake a timely and rigorous review of the issues
identified by observer missions with the full participation of
witnesses and observers, including foreign observer groups . .
.''
In the EU Electoral Monitoring Mission (EUOM) preliminary
statement: ``a strong mobilization of the electorate in a
process inadequately controlled'' and noted that ``poor
communication between INEC and the actors of the process has
had a negative impact on transparency and trust.''
The lack of credibility of the preliminary results already has
sparked opposition protests that, in turn, prompted heavy-handed
repression by Congolese security forces in Kinshasa and could lead to
wider disorder. To avert further violence, Congolese authorities must
make possible the in-depth verification of the counting process. The
United Nations, African Union, and European Union must work together to
impress on Congolese leaders the need for immediate action to allow
transparent, independent verification of the initial results and full
participation of international observers as an essential first step to
find a way out of the crisis.
The vote marked the culmination of a troubled year of preparations,
with the playing field increasingly skewed toward incumbent President
Joseph Kabila. Constitutional changes dropped the requirement for a
runoff, which, with opposition leaders failing to unite behind a
candidate, effectively split their vote. Kabila loyalists were
appointed to the election commission at the beginning of the year and
to the Supreme Court on 9 November, which settles electoral disputes.
Despite discrepancies in registration figures, opposition parties and
observers were unable to audit voter rolls. The state-run media drummed
up support for the President. Nonetheless, considerably less popular
than when he won the 2006 polls, Kabila faced stiff competition,
especially from veteran opposition leader Tshisekedi. With another
candidate, Vital Kamerhe, threatening to sap Kabila's votes in the
Kivus--vital to his win 5 years ago--the President's reelection was far
from secure.
As requested by the international community, the electoral
commission published results by polling station, which in theory would
permit their verification by opposition parties and observers. However,
the Carter Center noted that the tabulation process lacks transparency,
the votes of the results of 2,000 voting stations in Kinshasa and 1,000
voting stations in the rest of the country were lost or at least never
made it to the final compilation, indicate that at least 850,000 voters
who reached the polls and voted were effectively disenfranchised. This
is all the more disconcerting as the criteria for disqualifying ballots
are unclear, with Kinshasa--an opposition stronghold--
disproportionately affected and Katanga--a Presidential stronghold--
overestimated. Results returned from Katanga--a Presidential
stronghold--show, on the other hand, an extraordinarily high turnout,
as noted by the Carter Center, suggesting skewed representation.
Moreover, electoral material is now at risk of being lost because of
poor storage conditions.
Election day flaws were bad enough; but perceptions that results
are fiddled behind closed doors remain. Congo's electoral woes reflect
the country's broader lack of democratic and institutional development
since 2006. But they also stem from weak international and continental
engagement, from MONUSCO and the AU to donors--especially the EU and
the U.K., who partly funded the polls, and the U.S. All have been
largely ineffective in preventing Kabila's consolidation of power and
stacking the decks.
A sense of foreboding now hangs over Kinshasa. The fierce crackdown
by the security forces against opposition protesters on the eve of
election, according to Human Rights Watch, which left 18 dead and more
than 100 injured, has been followed by violence on the day of elections
and repression the days after. Thousands of Congolese reportedly
crossed into neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville, fearing violence. Rumours
of machetes distributed, gangs mobilizing and a heavy security presence
risk spreading panic in the capital where all activities are suspended
since Thursday evening. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
prosecutor, meanwhile, has stated that the DRC situation was under
watch.
Given the electoral commission's partisanship and the widespread
irregularities, the preliminary results cannot inspire much confidence.
Opposition politicians have already rejected them out of hand and Vital
Kamerhe lodged a complaint to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
should resolve disputes, but with that body also dominated with Kabila
loyalists, some additional support may be needed to avoid losers taking
their grievances to the streets. To this point, the opposition leaders
have shown some restraint in that respect.
While the focus is on Presidential election, legislative elections
are forgotten. In the absence of international observers to ensure
results counting and compilation are transparent, frauds and
irregularities are to be expected. The Carter Center and the EU mission
either have left or are planning to soon leave the country and the
legislative results will not be under watch. Already governmental
security forces are threatening opposition MP candidates from Kasai
Occidental, Bas-Congo, North Kivu, and the U.N. is providing them with
temporary protection.
next steps?
The key problem now is how to get a peaceful outcome out of a
messy, polarized, and fraudulent electoral process. The management of
the electoral process has been extremely difficult and the management
of the coming weeks will be much more difficult. The preliminary
electoral results have already been rejected by Etienne Tshisekedi and
Vital Kamerhe and most of the Congolese voters have a firsthand
experience of the bad performance of the electoral commission (general
lack of confidence in the electoral commission, the 2011 elections are
a step back compared to 2006 elections). In addition, President Kabila
has been reelected with what appears to be a much lower turnout this
year (70 percent turnout in 2006 at the first round and 58 percent this
year). The key issue is to avoid more post-electoral violence and to
design a government that will provide stability for the next 5 years.
The publishing on CENI's Web site of the detailed results by polling
station, as called for by the United States and others, now requires
in-depth verification and the monitoring of the dispute resolution. If
not, the electoral process cannot be regarded as credible.
Election Recommendations
The published results polling station by polling station
must now be verified by the political parties and independent
observers from civil society and international organizations in
order to ensure the transparency of the tabulation process.
Electoral authorities must explain clearly how political
parties and observers can contest the results of any polling
station and provide free access to the relevant information and
explanations about the lost results of several thousands of
voting stations. Those stations that returned suspicious
results or where observers report irregularities should be
subject to rigorous investigation--again in the presence of
observers--with clear criteria applied when disqualifying
ballots. Voters in areas where polling did not take place or
where the results have been lost should be given the
opportunity to vote.
The rules of the Supreme Court must be revised, notably the
proceedings must not be in camera.
The tabulation process for the legislative results must
urgently be corrected on the basis of the errors and problems
encountered during the tabulation process of the Presidential
results and the electoral material secured. Given the poor work
done by the electoral commission and the failure to secure
voting results from more than 3,000 polling stations covering
some 850,000 votes demonstrates the absolute requirement for
independent monitoring of the tabulation process for the
parliamentary election.
All Congolese leaders must avoid inflammatory language.
Given that protests will almost certainly turn violent,
opposition politicians should appeal to their supporters to
stay off the streets.
If protests do occur, security forces must refrain from
heavy handed responses--with clear instructions along those
lines given by military and police commanders and by the
President. Violence that happened since the end of the
electoral campaign should be subject to investigation by
Congolese and international human rights groups, as well as the
ICC, if appropriate.
The U.N., AU and EU should urgently dispatch a high-level
team, perhaps comprised of distinguished African leaders, to
mediate between factions. Mediators should explore options as
part of the verification process for alternative dispute
resolution, modifications of the Supreme Court's rules or
independent oversight of existing mechanisms--possibly under AU
auspices and with international support--given distrust in the
responsible Congolese institutions. The mediators should also
engage the factions on the long-term stability of the country
and the necessity of an inclusive government.
In the meantime, the U.N., donors and regional leaders must
make clear that any interethnic violence between Kasaians and
Katangans will be condemned as such as harassment of opposition
candidates. They must avoid statements that could legitimise a
badly flawed vote and destroy what is left of their credibility
in the Congo. They cannot paper over electoral flaws. No leader
should be congratulated until all disputes are resolved.
The U.N. should deploy additional peacekeepers to the
Western provinces and Kinshasa and should increase its
surveillance in Katanga where anti-Kasaian feeling is presently
on the rise. The return of ethnic violence in Katanga or/and a
bloodbath in the capital of a country hosting the world's
largest U.N. peace operation are unthinkable.
In addition to resolving the current electoral crisis, there are
other serious questions affecting DRC's future stability.
We believe that two critical challenges to development, governance,
and civilian protection in the Congo are army reform and more competent
and noncorrupt management of the country's natural resources--both of
which are conspicuous failures at the moment. The result has been
participation by an array of militias as well as FARDC units in rape
and marauding in the Eastern Congo and an unending competition over
conflict minerals that sows the seeds of violence throughout the
region.
security sector reform
Leading the agenda for stability in the aftermath of the elections
remains the question of army reform. The army is undisciplined and too
often, unpaid. The ineffective integration of militias into the army
and military operations against armed groups combined to increase the
insecurity of communities throughout the Kivus. It also produced
militarization of mineral production sites during the last 2 years. The
consequence of this is violence against civilians and the emergence of
mafia behavior by mine operators. Corruption in the natural resources
sector overwhelms attempts to police and regulate the sector.
Altogether, these problems indicate that there must be major reform of
the army and general reform of the security sector as a whole.
Also, there has been an almost grotesque incapacity to manage the
demobilization and integration of former armed militias into the FARDC.
Too many former militia members have not been vetted; too many have not
been paid or trained; and too many have not been held accountable for
past crimes against humanity.
A critical mistake was made by allowing the militias to operate as
an army within an army by not dissolving militia command structures
after integration. Violent outbreaks persist throughout the country,
particularly in the Kivu provinces, which will likely only intensify
with growing tensions. As well, the justice system, plagued with
corruption and limited resources from the DRC Government, has to be
fundamentally reformed with an emphasis placed on holding accountable
those who are accused of vicious crimes such as rape and sexual
violence. Until prosecution and conviction become the norm for
violators of fundamental principles, it will be very difficult for
national development to take place.
It also tends to underscore the rising unhappiness of sectors of
the military over nonpayment of salaries, and the failure of
integration of various armed groups (Mai Mai, FRF, PARECO and CNDP) in
the FARDC. With respect to the CNDP, it once again shows that the
failure to dismantle CNDP units as they were integrated into the FARDC
harmed international efforts, including those of the EUSEC, to
restructure the national army.
With respect to army reform, the critical steps--regardless who
ultimately is sworn in--are the following:
Comprehensive review of the chain of payment in the army;
Vetting of officers and investigation of suspected
involvement into natural resources trade by a special
commission of inquiry;
Design of a pension plan and retirement for the soldiers;
Restoring and reforming the military justice (revision of
the military code, training, screening of military magistrates,
appointment of ``clean military judges,'' etc.)
sexual and gender-based violence
DRC has made little if no progress on sexual and gender-based
violence. Suspected rapists among FARDC are almost never charged or
arrested. Impunity is still the norm concerning FARDC. DRC Government
and MONUSCO publicized the very few FARDC officers who were tried but
prosecutions are usually cosmetic.
The National Strategy against SGBV has been elaborated without deep
civil society involvement and lacks ownership. There is no genuine
political commitment by the Congolese Government. There is very little
coordination between the various national civil society actors,
international organizations, United Nations Agencies and local
authorities.
lord's resistance army
The LRA legislation that President Obama signed into law in May
2010, which received broad bipartisan support in Congress, was an
enormous step forward and reflected steps that Crisis Group had
recommended, including: increased institutional capacity, enhanced
coordinated DDR alongside greater military pressure which would include
greater shared intelligence resources by UN/EU/US, and greater
humanitarian support to LRA victims.
On 14 October, 2011, the Obama administration announced the
deployment of 100 military advisors to the region, making the clear
point that they will be there in an advisory capacity, helping the
UPDF, and are not authorized for combat unless in self-defense. A
majority of the military advisors will stay in Kampala, with the rest
to advise in the field. The move is part of a broader ramping up of its
political and military engagement against the LRA. It has also offered
to train more Congolese soldiers and has given equipment to the CAR
army in order to win the operation political space. The few score field
advisers should be able to improve the Ugandans' performance. The
deployment, the Obama administration has made clear, will be short
term.
Uganda, with U.S. advice and support, should, therefore, lose no
time in launching a reinvigorated attack on the LRA, if possible while
most of the group's senior commanders and fighters are still in the CAR
and before they can return to the DRC's more restrictive operational
environment. A key part of the advice the United States should press on
the Ugandan army is the need to prioritise protecting civilians,
provide access to humanitarian agencies and accept stricter
accountability for its actions. At the same time, full coordination
with the AU is essential, particularly if it is able to oversee a
multidimensional regional initiative, continuing after Kony's death or
capture. Greater cooperation from Kinshasa with combined effort to put
an end to Kony is essential.
conflict minerals
We still have a long way to go to halt illegal trade of conflict
minerals in the Great Lakes Region. On 10 September 2010, Kabila
appeared to have banned the production and trade of minerals in the
Kivus and Maniema and ordered the demilitarization of the mining zones.
However, that declaration neither ended the mineral smuggling nor
militarization of the mining zones, and the ban was lifted on 10 March
2011.
International actors responded by attempting to preemptively
resolve the illegal trade problem by developing regulations aimed to
prevent the flow of conflict minerals into the raw materials market,
such as with the Dodd-Frank Act passed by Congress in July 2010.
The provision mandates identifying the mines under the control of
armed groups, introducing traceability and certification mechanisms to
cover transfer from the mines to the trading counters, and encouraging
importers to only buy certified minerals. The delay in the final SEC
regulations (due in April, 2011 and now expected by the end of
December, 2011) and the resulting required annual report submissions
have stalled the full implementation of the Dodd-Frank measure.
conclusion
DRC faces enormous challenges: Only one 1 of 10 Congolese has
access to electricity; three-fourths of the population is
undernourished according to the Global Hunger Index; less than a third
of the rural population has access to clean water, less than half in
the cities. The DRC ranks last, 187 out of 187 in the Human Development
Index in 2011.
During this tense and uncertain time in the DRC's history, it is
imperative that the United States and the international community
remain engaged.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Gambino.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY W. GAMBINO, FELLOW, EASTERN CONGO
INITIATIVE, BETHESDA, MD
Mr. Gambino. Thank you very much, Chairman Coons, Ranking
Member Isakson. Thanks for the opportunity to testify before
you at this historic, crucial moment for the Congo.
I am a fellow at the Eastern Congo Initiative, but the
views in this statement are mine alone.
The Congo's recent election was clearly fraudulent. The way
in which the aftermath of these fraudulent elections is managed
will affect every issue of interest to the United States in the
Congo. The outcome will decide whether Congo, after badly
stumbling, can regain a democratic path. But the outcome also
will have a determinative effect on U.S. efforts on sexual and
gender-based violence, on broader respect for human rights, on
security sector reform, on conflict minerals, on general
development prospects, and on all other issues of interest to
the United States regarding the Congo. If this crisis is not
successfully resolved, it will not be possible to improve
governance in meaningful ways, and Congo could descend into a
deeper humanitarian disaster becoming unstable once again,
affecting all of Central Africa and beyond.
In 2006, the Congo held relatively good, free, and fair
elections. Mvemba Dizolele and I were election monitors in
2006. We saw this. The elections had flaws, but ultimately and
most importantly it was clear that the person announced as the
winner in the Presidential election, Joseph Kabila, indeed had
won.
How did Congo so rapidly descend from successful 2006
elections to chaotic, brazenly fraudulent elections last month?
As these elections approached, alarming signs grew that the
Congolese electoral commission was fumbling badly in its role
to plan and manage the elections.
Just within Eastern Congo Initiative, we have been working
all year for good elections, and an ECI delegation, headed by
Cindy McCain, wife of Senator McCain, and ECI CEO Whitney
Williams, was in Congo for the elections. A little earlier, in
September of this year, my good friend, Mvemba Dizolele, and I
published a paper in which we recommended greater engagement by
the United States. Our paper's title was not particularly
terse, but it certainly was clear: ``Technical Issues Threaten
Free, Fair, and Transparent Elections in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Urgent Steps Required.'' Mr. Chairman, I
respectfully request that this ECI paper be included in the
record.
Senator Coons. Without objection.
Mr. Gambino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Even earlier, in March, ECI's founder, Ben Affleck, sounded
the alarm. This is what he said. ``The United States must do
more to support the 2011 elections. Once these elections occur,
the free and fair nature of the results should be above
reproach. A finding of anything less risks Congo's stability
and democratic progress.'' He then provided a long list of
concrete recommendations for U.S. policymakers. I am sad to say
every one of those recommendations was ignored. He said ``if we
continue to place the Congo on the back burner of U.S. policy,
it will come back to haunt us.'' That is precisely where we are
today.
Let us be clear about the facts. The election results
lacked credibility for two central reasons. First, the head of
the electoral commission, Reverend Mulunda, badly botched
preparations for the elections and was complicit in the
preparation and reporting of clearly fraudulent results.
Second, there has been a massive attempt by other supporters of
President Kabila to steal the election.
One clear implication of these facts is that Reverend
Mulunda should immediately be replaced. No reasonable person
can have any confidence in his ability to play a useful role in
this process from this point on.
A second implication is that the United States needs to
think through what it means that supporters of a sitting head
of state just organized a massive effort across multiple
provinces to fraudulently alter and manipulate election
results. And right now, it is clear that President Kabila's
security forces are working hard to suppress, harass, and
intimidate opposition supporters through the threat and in some
instances the use of violence.
Intense discussions are underway around the world to
consider what to do next. Many different scenarios and options
are under discussion. Whichever specific route is taken, the
required end point is clear. The Congolese people must see the
man they have democratically chosen as their next President as
the man who takes office for the next 5 years. And I want to
emphasize that as of today, it is simply not possible to know
whether Joseph Kabila or Etienne Tshisekedi is that man, the
legitimate democratically elected President of the Congo, based
on a credible electoral victory.
Absent a reasonable process, if President Kabila continues
to function as head of the Congo, he governs without a shred of
democratic legitimacy. That is not a formula for stability in
the Congo or in Central Africa as a whole. Such an outcome
would be deeply counter to both the interests and the values of
the United States and would risk another humanitarian crisis
and greater prolonged conflict and instability in Central
Africa.
Secretary Clinton and President Obama need to state now,
both publicly and privately, that the United States is engaged
both to help diffuse this crisis and to find a way forward that
respects and honors the democratic aspirations of the Congolese
people. They should communicate this directly to a number of
people, including President Kabila and Mr. Tshisekedi.
Thank you very much. I am happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gambino follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anthony W. Gambino
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, members of the Subcommittee
on African Affairs, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify
before you at this historic, crucial moment for the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC). I am a Fellow at the Eastern Congo Initiative
(ECI), but today I am not here representing ECI; the views in this
statement are mine alone.
The Congo's recent election clearly was fraudulent. The way in
which the aftermath of these fraudulent elections is managed will
affect every issue of interest to the United States in the Congo. It is
apparent that the outcome will show whether Congo, after badly
stumbling, can regain a democratic path. But the outcome also will have
a determinative effect on U.S. efforts on conflict minerals, on sexual
and gender-based violence, on broader respect for human rights, on
general development prospects, on security sector reform, and on all
other issues of interest to the United States. If this crisis is not
successfully resolved, it will not be possible to improve governance in
the Congo in meaningful ways. If the present situation is not managed
successfully, Congo could descend once again into a deeper humanitarian
disaster.
I first went to the Congo in 1979 as a Peace Corps Volunteer and
have followed it ever since. Please allow me to emphasize what a great,
important program the Peace Corps is. I wouldn't be doing what I am
doing now--I wouldn't be before you today--if the Peace Corps had not
given me the opportunity to spend 3 years as a teacher in a country
then called Zaire. I left Zaire with the clear sense that my Congolese
students, colleagues, and many new friends had given me so much more
than I was able to give them.
I continued to look for ways to work on the Congo after my Peace
Corps service, and, in 1997, after Mobutu fell, I moved from the State
Department to USAID to coordinate USAID's reengagement. In 2001, I was
given the honor to return to Congo to run the USAID mission, which I
did from 2001-2004. Despite the many difficulties in governance in the
Congo, USAID supported programs that had great success in many areas,
including improving the health of Congolese and fighting corruption.
During my 3 years in Zaire as a Peace Corps Volunteer, I saw the
life-diminishing, debilitating effects that a corrupt dictatorship had
on the citizens of a country. During my 3 years in Congo with USAID, I
witnessed something positive and life-affirming: the ending of a
horrible war and the start of a transition to democracy. President
Joseph Kabila deserves tremendous credit for leading his country away
from the path of war, division, and destruction taken by his father,
Laurent, and toward reconciliation, unity, and peace. And the United
States deserves credit for supporting the move to peace and
reconciliation. I was in Congo when the transition began in mid-2003,
and saw firsthand all the work that our able diplomats did to support
this fragile, complex process.
In 2006, at the end of the transition period, the people of the
Congo voted for their national leaders. I returned to the Congo then as
an elections observer for the Carter Center. I saw what can happen when
a government and its citizens are strongly, effectively supported by
the international community. The 2006 elections had flaws, but,
ultimately and most importantly, it was clear that the person announced
as the winner in the Presidential election--Joseph Kabila--indeed had
won. Following these elections, the Carter Center noted: ``The Carter
Center election observation mission to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is confident the results announced by the Independent Electoral
Commission (CEI) are consistent with the results obtained in the
polling stations. The provision of original tally sheets to candidate
witnesses, combined with the publication of results by polling station,
introduced a strong measure of transparency that virtually eliminated
the possibility of significant fraud after the ballots were counted.''
The Congo has just held its next national election. Here is what
the Carter Center published on December 10: ``The Carter Center finds
the provisional Presidential election results announced by the
Independent National Election Commission (CENI) on December 9 in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to lack credibility.'' The head of the
Catholic Church in Congo, Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, said on December
12 that ``after analyzing the results made public by the CENI on
Friday, December 9, 2011, it is appropriate to conclude that these
results do not conform to the truth, nor to justice.''
What happened? How did the Congo backtrack from relatively good
elections in 2006 to the brazenly fraudulent elections of last month?
What role did U.S. actions play?
The United States saw the 2006 national elections as an exit
strategy from heavy political/diplomatic involvement in the Congo. In
2006, the United States and others felt that the situation finally was
good enough in the Congo because successful elections had taken place.
This conclusion was reached despite evidence to the contrary both from
the Congo itself and from careful international research on the
trajectory of conflicts. After years of serious diplomacy to help the
Congolese transition succeed, key international actors succumbed to
wishful thinking, reducing their levels of political engagement with
the new Congolese Government.
Research on fragile states like the Congo strongly suggests that
these states become more, not less, fragile after elections, and are
acutely vulnerable in the period following elections. Such elections
are not an exit strategy; rather, successful democratic elections
require maximum support and engagement from the United States in the
months and years immediately afterward. Instead of doing this, the
United States did the precise opposite.
In the runup to the 2011 elections, the United States, the U.N.
Mission in the Congo, known as MONUSCO, and other international actors
chose not to engage adequately to support free, fair, transparent, and
credible elections in the Congo. As the 2011 elections approached,
alarming signs grew that the Congolese Electoral Commission (known by
its French acronym as the CENI) was fumbling badly in its role to plan
and manage the elections.
In a Special Election Report released by the Eastern Congo
Initiative in September of this year, Mvemba Dizolele and I recommended
greater engagement by the United States and others in the international
community. The paper's title was not terse, but it certainly was clear:
``Technical Issues Threaten Free, Fair, and Transparent Election in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Urgent Steps Required.'' I
respectfully request that this ECI report be included in the record.
Even earlier this year, in March, Eastern Congo Initiative's
founder, Ben Affleck, sounded the alarm loudly in a hearing on the
other side of Capitol Hill. He said then that ``the U.S. must do more
to support the 2011 elections. . . . Once the elections occur, the free
and fair nature of the results should be above reproach. A finding of
anything less risks Congo's stability and democratic progress.'' He
provided a long list of concrete recommendations for U.S. policymakers,
all of which were ignored.
He ended his testimony by stating his belief ``that if we continue
to place the Congo on the back burner of U.S. policy it will come back
to haunt us.''
That is precisely where we are today.
Now that the Congo has held clearly fraudulent elections, the
United States faces another crisis in the Congo. To move forward, the
United States must come to terms with a series of uncomfortable facts.
First, as the Catholic Church, the Carter Center, the European Union
Observer Mission, and others have said, these election results lack
basic credibility. Second, they lack credibility because of
disorganization on the part of the CENI, and also because of a massive
attempt by supporters of President Kabila to steal the election. Third,
the present head of the Congolese Electoral Commission, Reverend
Mulunda, not only badly botched preparations for the election, he was
complicit in the preparation and reporting of clearly fraudulent
results.
One clear, immediate implication of these three facts is that
Reverend Mulunda should immediately be replaced. No reasonable person
can have any confidence in his ability to manage this process from this
point on. A second implication is that all of us need to think through
what it means that supporters of the sitting Head of State just
organized a massive effort, across multiple provinces, to fraudulently
alter and manipulate election results.
Inside and outside the Congo, inside and outside the U.N. and
governments like our own, intense international efforts are under way
to help the Congolese avert disaster. Many different scenarios and
options are under discussion. Whichever path is taken, the end point is
clear: The Congolese people deserve the leader that they have
democratically chosen as their next President. As of today, it is not
clear who that man is. A way must be found to do so.
The way in which the aftermath of these fraudulent elections is
managed will affect every issue of interest to the United States in the
Congo. It is apparent that the outcome will show whether Congo, after
badly stumbling, can regain a democratic path. But the outcome also
will have a determinative effect on U.S. efforts on conflict minerals,
on sexual and gender-based violence, on broader respect for human
rights, on general development prospects, on security sector reform,
and on all other issues of interest to the United States. If the crisis
is not successfully resolved, it will not be possible to improve
governance in the Congo in meaningful ways. If the present situation is
not managed successfully, Congo could descend once again into a deeper
humanitarian disaster.
A new development in the State Department is the recent appointment
of a Special Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs for the Great Lakes and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
ECI and other organizations have long bemoaned problems of coherence
within the U.S. Government--that the United States has many people
working on many different issues relating to the Congo, but not in a
well-coordinated fashion. This was a central reason that ECI and other
organizations called for the appointment of a special envoy. The newly
appointed Special Advisor to Assistant Secretary Carson, Barrie
Walkley, should be given the authority within the State Department and
elsewhere within the U.S. Government to forge much better coordination
across issues. Of course, his ability to be effective will depend on
actions by senior U.S. officials, including President Obama and
Secretary Clinton, to successfully resolve the present crisis.
Why has the United States encountered so much difficulty in
wrestling with problems like conflict minerals and continued high
levels of sexual and gender-based violence in eastern Congo? Will the
appointment of a Special Advisor fix the problem? On one level, the
answer is simple: When senior officials in the Congolese state are, at
best, uninterested and, at worst, complicit in the abuses, how much
progress can outside actors make? When a government is unresponsive to
the suffering of its own people, how much progress can outside actors
make?
After the 2006 elections, the Congolese national government
continued to struggle to exercise the essential functions of an
effective state. Instead of focusing on key development priorities, the
Congolese state took a different path. The dominant ruling party moved
to further concentrate and centralize its power. This was done despite
strong decentralization provisions in the Congolese Constitution and
general agreement that effective decentralization is essential for
improved governance the Congo.
These governance problems are so daunting, in fact, that some argue
that in the face of so little political will, the right decision is
withdrawal. I utterly reject that option. Withdrawal by the United
States and others is not a plausible option since it necessarily leads
backward to catastrophic collapse, humanitarian disaster, regional
instability, and renewed warfare. Disengagement runs counter to both
the interests and values of the United States.
The dilemma of engagement, however, remains: What should
international actors do when the state is not fulfilling its basic
functions? There is a straightforward set of actions that, if followed,
provide a coherent framework of action to improve governance in the
Congo. The heart of this proposal, which I call ``TPA,'' is that
successful programs to improve governance require consideration of and,
if necessary, action on three specific elements:
Effective Training,
Adequate Pay, and
Accountability for actions.
First, the ``T.'' Training is a staple of U.S. activities, but
training is normally done as a stand-alone intervention, with the
regularly unrealistic assumption that somehow disparate, scattershot,
uncoordinated training will lead to better performance and on-the-job
results. Facts on the ground from around the world, including in the
Congo, amply prove otherwise. Even assuming well-coordinated and
effective training (far from today's reality), training alone, while
necessary, remains insufficient.
The key is the ``P.'' Pay affects performance: When trained
officials return to their horribly paid positions, they revert to poor
performance. Adequate salaries, with salaries paid on time every month,
to both civil servants, police, and soldiers, is essential to improve
governance in fragile states like the Congo.
However, efforts to accomplish salary reform at a national level
almost always fail in states like the DRC. To pay adequate, sustainable
salaries to all civil servants requires fundamental civil service and
budget reform. In the Congo, the government is presently unwilling to
do this. Under TPA, the donors do not have to choose between the
equally unpalatable options of pushing the government toward
politically dangerous comprehensive civil service reform or doing
nothing.
The optimal approach is for the Congolese Government to provide all
the necessary resources, including salaries that are at least minimally
adequate, using its own funds. Determining the actual capacity of the
Congolese state to do so should be done by the IMF and the World Bank.
If the IMF and Bank believe that the Congolese Government does not
possess sufficient resources, or if the Congolese Government is
unwilling to do so, donors must engage in a frank dialogue with the
Government regarding the provision of these resources.
Of course, adequate pay is only one of the necessary requirements
to create incentives for acceptable on-the-job performance. Officials
require adequate resources in a variety of areas relating to the
conditions of their service in order for them to perform their
functions effectively.
The United States present approach to providing these resources,
including paying salaries or salary supplements, is incoherent. In
lower priority countries, U.S. officials say that they cannot pay
salaries because it is not sustainable. Yet, the ``T'' and ``P'' part
of TPA describes the way the United States does business in countries
of particular interest. For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
United States has trained and paid enormous numbers of officials. The
United States has paid police salaries in Liberia and elsewhere.
My point is not that the United States should be paying salaries
everywhere; rather, it is that the United States must recognize the key
importance of this issue and think through coherent, sensible, workable
approaches. Too often in countries like the Congo--I made this mistake
myself when serving as the USAID Mission Director--U.S. officials just
refuse to think carefully through these issues, because they raise
difficult, uncomfortable questions both for U.S. and Congolese
policymakers.
Finally, the ``A'' of accountability. It is particularly in the
context of accountability that Congolese civil society has a crucial
role to play. The United States should support civil society's role in
monitoring and evaluating the government's implementation. This is an
essential part of a durable solution.
Assuming that Congo emerges from its present electoral crisis and
regains a democratic path, TPA can help guide the U.S. Government
toward a more effective approach to improve governance.
If the Congolese military and police continue to be ill-paid and
unaccountable for their actions, no amount of training will change
that, and the Congolese security forces' role in committing sexual
crimes will continue.
If the Congolese justice sector continues to be severely
underfunded and staffed by unqualified, untrained personnel who are
poorly paid and receive few incentives for good performance, do we
think that impunity will be reduced through legal action and occasional
aid projects? If so, we, too, are engaging in wishful thinking.
If customs officials and others responsible for maintaining a
responsible chain of supply from the mines are ill-paid and subject to
harassment from armed men who act with impunity because the legal
system is dysfunctional, do we believe that the conflict minerals
problem will diminish?
The US needs to work with Congolese actors and a wide spectrum of
international agencies, from the IMF to USAID-funded NGOs, to attack
the fundamental deficiencies underlying poor governance.
Following the 2006 elections, the United States based its actions
in the Congo on President Kabila's new legitimacy, gained through
reasonably free and fair elections. Last month, millions of Congolese
turned out to vote for their leaders at the national level. The vast
majority of Congolese want peace and development. They want a better
life for their children. Human aspirations are the same, whether you
live in Bukavu or in Bethesda.
As of today, it is not possible to know whether Joseph Kabila or
Etienne Tshisekedi is the legitimate President of the Congo based on a
credible electoral victory. Absent a reasonable process, the next
person who declares himself head of the Congo would govern minus
democratic legitimacy. This is not a formula for stability in the Congo
or in central Africa as a whole. Such a result would be deeply counter
to both the interests and values of the United States and risks another
humanitarian crisis and greater, prolonged conflict. The United States
must dramatically ratchet up its efforts to find a way to defuse this
crisis and find a way forward that respects and honors the democratic
aspirations of the Congolese people.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Gambino.
Mr. Dizolele.
STATEMENT OF MVEMBA PHEZO DIZOLELE, FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Dizolele. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, thank
you for the invitation and honor to testify before your
committee today. I greet you on behalf of the millions of
Congolese in the homeland who look up to the United States as a
beacon of democracy. I would also like to thank you on behalf
of the Congolese community of the United States for your
interest in the alarming developments in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Thank you.
My name is Mvemba Phezo Dizolele. I am a native Congolese
and a naturalized U.S. citizen. I would like to note that I
received my American citizenship through service in the United
States Marine Corps Reserve where I was a noncommissioned
officer and served in infantry, intelligence, training and
operations, and public affairs positions.
I recently returned from Congo where I observed the
contentious Presidential and legislative elections that have
led to the current legitimacy crisis between President Joseph
Kabila and his main challenger, Etienne Tshisekedi.
I am neither a member of the opposition nor a supporter of
the Presidential majority. I speak on behalf of the Congolese
people. While I do not represent all 70 million Congolese, I am
confident that I speak for a good many of them. Still, my views
are my own today.
I would just like to put a little bit of context in this.
The most widely accepted narrative of U.S. Congo policy defines
the predicament of the country as a humanitarian crisis through
the binary prism of sexual violence and the so-called conflict
minerals. This narrative has now become the standard
perspective through which Americans view Congo, and most NGOs,
activists, academics, and policymakers like yourselves build
your work around this prism. Not only is this narrative wrong,
it has led to misguided initiatives such as the Dodd-Frank Act
which contains an important resolution on Congo's conflict
minerals, effectively turning U.S. Congo policy into a Kivu
policy. This narrative oversimplifies the problem and makes
American taxpayers believe that if only the challenges of
sexual violence and conflict minerals were solved, then Congo
will get back on track and peace will follow. Nothing, however,
is farther from the truth. The Congo crisis is first and
foremost political and requires political solutions.
The disproportionate attention that policymakers directed
to sexual violence and conflict minerals distracted them from
the many other important core issues, such as governance,
security sector reform, mining sector reform, decentralization,
and the elections. The result has been catastrophic for the
Congolese.
The crisis, as we know it and as we discussed today,
started, of course, on December 9 when Daniel Ngoy Mulunda,
chairman of the electoral commission, declared President Kabila
winner of the contentious election with 49 percent of the vote.
Tshisekedi who placed second has rejected the results, called
Mulunda's statement a ``provocation of the people'' and
declared himself President-elect. The main opposition parties
have rallied behind Tshisekedi and are calling on the
international community to help solve the impasse.
Meanwhile, the government has reacted swiftly and
forcefully unleashing armed antiriot policemen, and elements of
the elite Presidential guard, into the streets of Kinshasa to
confront Tshisekedi's partisans. Several people have been
killed in clashes between state security agents and the
protesters. An unconfirmed number of young men have been
abducted from their homes by the same agents and driven to
undisclosed locations.
The government has cut off text messaging services and
Internet access is now limited, slow, and intermittent. The
diplomatic community has exhorted Tshisekedi supporters to
refrain from violence, but has not condemned abuses by state
security agents. As of this writing, the Limete neighborhood
where Tshisekedi's residence and party headquarters are located
is under heavy police siege. The movement and activities of his
supporters are curtailed by state security agents who harass
and manhandle them at checkpoints, provoking them into more
violence.
But the real genesis of the crisis goes back to December
2010 when Tshisekedi, who had been sick and seeking treatment
in Europe, returned unexpectedly to Congo and announced his
candidacy for the Presidency. Kabila's advisors panicked and
the President's parliamentary majority passed a hasty
constitutional revision in January 2011 that scrapped the two-
round voting process in favor of a one-round, all within 1
week.
Opposition parties, along with civil society groups,
denounced the constitutional revision calling it irresponsible
and dangerous for the security and stability of the country.
Major powers in the West, however, especially the United
States, France, and Belgium, wrote off the power play as an
internal affair. Throughout all of this, Western embassies
appeared content to look the other way. Diplomats from the
United States, France, Britain, and Belgium praised the CENI
for enrolling 32 million voters, no doubt an impressive feat
considering the enormous logistical challenges. But voter
enrollment was the first step of an electoral process, not the
end.
These same international actors remained silent about the
allegations of fraud and irregularities, even as Congolese and
international human rights organizations denounced violence and
abuses. Their silence has helped spawn the crisis that could
have easily been averted.
At stake is nothing less than the stability of the country
of 70 million people. Unless the international community takes
its responsibility to help protect the Congolese from conflict
seriously, Congo will slide into greater post-election
violence. If this fits with the mandate of your committee, the
U.S. Senate should investigate this electoral disaster. A mixed
panel of highly respected Congolese and outside negotiators
should be selected with the full support of the United States,
France, Belgium, and other relevant powers to review and
address inconsistencies that have caused this crisis. The
alternative is to let the Supreme Court certify Kabila's
provisional victory and hand him another 5-year term, in which
case we better watch out. The opposition will reject this
victory, but an emboldened Kabila with questionable legitimacy
will assert his power with greater popular repression,
triggering a cycle of violence with untold ramifications.
After decades of mismanagement and chronic conflict in
Congo, this election presented the people with a chance to
rebuild their country. With its vast natural and human
resources, Congo has the potential to be a regional power, as
it once was, providing stability and leadership in an area
known for turmoil. But if the Congolese are robbed of a fair
and honest say in their national politics, such potential will
remain but an illusion.
I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dizolele follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mvemba Phezo Dizolele
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the
Subcommittee on African Affairs, thank you for the invitation and honor
to testify before your committee today. I greet you on behalf of the
millions of Congolese in the homeland who look up to the United States
of America as a beacon of democracy. I would also like to thank you on
behalf of the Congolese community of the United States for your
interest in the alarming developments in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Thank you.
My name is Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, a native Congolese and a
naturalized U.S. citizen. Let me note that I received my American
citizenship through service in the United States Marine Corps Reserve,
where I was a noncommissioned officer and served in infantry,
intelligence, training and public affairs positions. I am a writer,
foreign policy analyst, independent journalist, and a Visiting Fellow
at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford
University.
Over the last decade, I have returned to Congo several times as a
journalist, researcher, businessman, vacationer, and election monitor.
In 2006, I was embedded with United Nations peacekeepers in Ituri, Lake
Albert, and South Kivu as a reporter. I also covered the first round of
the election that summer and returned in the fall to serve as an
election monitor with the Carter Center. In March 2007, I was stranded
at the Grand Hotel in Kinshasa for 4 days while troops and militiamen
loyal to President Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba fought each
other in the city streets and around the hotel. I recently returned
from Congo where I observed the contentious Presidential and
legislative elections that have led to the current legitimacy crisis
between Joseph Kabila and his main challenger, Etienne Tshisekedi.
Today, however, I represent neither the Marine Corps nor the Hoover
Institution. I speak on behalf of the Congolese people. While I do not
represent all 70 million Congolese, I am confident that I speak for a
good many of them. Still, the views expressed in this statement are my
own.
The most widely accepted narrative of U.S. Congo policy defines the
predicament as a humanitarian crisis through the binary prism of sexual
violence and the so-called conflict minerals. This narrative has now
become the standard perspective through which Americans view Congo, and
most NGOs, activists, academics, and policymakers build their efforts
around this prism. Not only is this narrative wrong, it has led to
misguided initiatives, which have effectively turned U.S. Congo policy
into a Kivu policy.
Tremendous efforts have been devoted to sexual violence and
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which contains an important
resolution on Congo's conflict minerals. This narrative oversimplifies
the problem and makes American taxpayers believe that if only the
challenges of sexual violence and conflict minerals were solved, then
Congo will get back on track and peace will follow.
Nothing, however, is farther from the truth. The Congo crisis is
first and foremost political and requires political solutions. Sexual
violence and the looting of natural resources are ramifications and
symptoms, not the causes of the political crisis. Focusing U.S. Congo
policy primarily in the eastern province, particularly the Kivus, which
are but a fraction of the country, has not helped the people of Congo
solve the bigger problem. This would be akin to designing a U.S.-India
or U.S.-Pakistan policy based on the conflict in Kashmir.
The disproportionate attention that policymakers directed to sexual
violence and conflict minerals distracted them from the many other
important core issues, such as governance, security sector reform,
mining sector reform, decentralization, and the elections.
The result has been catastrophic for the Congolese. For instance,
nowadays, nowhere are crises more predictable than in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. And yet, when they unfold as anticipated,
Western policymakers and diplomats always seem caught off guard--
raising questions about the competence, willingness, and commitment of
the Kinshasa-based diplomatic corps and the United Nations mission to
discharge their responsibilities.
Nothing underscores the apathy and inconsistency that characterize
Western diplomacy in Congo more than the current impasse between
incumbent President Joseph Kabila and veteran opposition leader Etienne
Tshisekedi, each of whom has claimed victory in the November 28
Presidential polls. The legitimacy crisis threatens to trigger another
round of civil war in a country that has already lost over 6 million of
its people to the repercussions from a long and senseless conflict.
On December 9, Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, chairman of Congo's Independent
National Electoral Commission, declared President Kabila winner of the
contentious election, with 49 percent of the votes. Tshisekedi, the
main challenger, placed a distant second with 32 percent. Tshisekedi
has rejected the results, called Mulunda's statement a ``provocation of
the people'' and declared himself President-elect. The main opposition
parties have rallied behind Tshisekedi and are calling on the
international community to help solve the impasse.
The opposition has a strong case. A day after Mulunda declared
Kabila the winner, the Carter Center's election monitoring mission
issued an unequivocal statement charging that the results announced by
the electoral commission lacked credibility. The observers noted that
the mismanagement of the vote tabulation process compromised the
integrity of the election, which was fraught with damning legal,
technical, and logical deficiencies from the outset. The Carter Center
cited serious irregularities, including the loss of nearly 2,000
polling station results in Kinshasa, a Tshisekedi stronghold,
representing as many as 350,000 voters. Another 1,000 polling station
results were mysteriously lost elsewhere in Congo, representing 500,000
voters.
Meanwhile, according to the Carter Center, multiple locations in
Katanga province, a bastion of Kabila supporters, reported impossibly
high rates of 99 to over 100 percent voter turnout, with all or nearly
all votes going to the incumbent. The observers also noted that a
review of locations with similar high percentage votes for Tshisekedi
did not reveal the same coincidence of perfect collection of polling
station results and extremely high voter turnout--meaning that voter
turnout in Tshisekedi's strongholds was within expected norms. The
Catholic Church, arguably Congo's most influential institution, which
deployed 30,000 election observers across the country, backed the
Carter Center's statement. Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, Archibishop of
Kinshasa, told journalists the electoral commission's results conformed
with neither truth nor justice. ``These observations pose a serious
credibility problem for the election,'' the cardinal said.
Kabila waited nearly 3 days to hold a news conference and react to
the Carter Center's statement and Tshisekedi's rejection of the
results. He conceded that there had been problems with the process, but
dismissed the mission's conclusion that the results were not credible.
``The credibility of these elections cannot be put in doubt,'' the
President insisted, as he accused the Carter Center of going beyond
what was expected. Throughout the process, the electoral commission had
maintained that the role of monitors was only to observe, not to ask
questions.
While Kabila remained silent, his government was reacting swiftly
and forcefully, unleashing armed antiriot policemen and elements of the
elite Presidential guard into the streets of Kinshasa to confront
Tshisekedi's partisans. Several people have been killed in clashes
between state security agents and the protesters, and an unconfirmed
number of young men have been abducted from their homes by these same
agents and driven to undisclosed locations.
The bustling capital of nearly 10 million has turned into a ghost
city, as the people are afraid to venture out of their homes. The
government has cut off text-messaging services, and Internet access is
now limited, slow and intermittent. The diplomatic community has
exhorted Tshisekedi's supporters to refrain from violence, but has not
condemned abuses by state security agents. As of this writing, the
Limete neighborhood where Tshisekedi's residence and party headquarters
are located is under heavy police siege. The movement and activities of
his supporters are curtailed by state security agents who harass and
manhandle them at checkpoints, provoking them into violence.
In the meantime, Tshisekedi is threatening to appoint his
ministerial cabinet and Congolese diaspora communities have taken to
the streets in Pretoria, Brussels, Washington DC, and Toronto to
protest these abuses and demand that the international community
respect the will of the people as expressed through their vote. Some
exiled groups, however, are speaking of potential armed insurrection.
How did we get here? The root cause of the crisis can be traced
back to bad policymaking by the pro-Kabila Presidential majority in
Parliament. After Jean-Pierre Bemba, former Presidential hopeful and
Kabila's main challenger in the 2006 election, was arrested by the
International Criminal Court in 2008 for crimes committed by his
soldiers in Central African Republic, Kabila's reelection in 2011
seemed all but certain. Tshisekedi, who had boycotted the 2006
election, was old, sick, and seeking medical care in Europe. No other
potential candidate had either the stature or the funds to compete with
Kabila.
All that changed when Tshisekedi decided to return home in December
2010 and announced that he would run for President. With thousands of
supporters turning out to greet him at the airport, his cortege took 8
hours to travel 10 miles to his party's headquarters in Limete.
Kabila's advisers panicked, and the President's parliamentary majority
passed a hasty constitutional revision in January that scrapped the
two-round voting process in favor of one round within 1 week.
Without the possibility of a runoff, Kabila--with his 10 years in
office, an organized network of parties, and substantial government
funds not available to the opposition--gained a disproportionate
advantage as the incumbent. The constitutional revision meant that the
President only needed to garner the most votes of all 11 candidates,
rather than a majority.
Opposition parties along with civil-society groups denounced the
constitutional revision, calling it irresponsible and dangerous for the
security and stability of the country. Major powers in the West,
however, especially the United States, France, and Belgium, wrote off
the power play as an internal affair.
For reasons that elude Congolese analysts, Western diplomats feel
more comfortable with Kabila, whom they see as the defender of
stability and peace in Congo. It is true that the government in
Kinshasa has recently made economic gains. The country coasted through
the global financial crisis relatively unscathed. In 2010, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank approved a $12.3 billion
debt relief package to help alleviate Kinshasa's financial burden,
which was part of the Mobutu legacy. And largely because of investment
in the country's extractive sector, particularly copper, the World Bank
expects Congo's economy to grow over the next several years at around 7
percent annually, one of the fastest economic growth rates in Africa.
But over the last decade of Kabila leadership, little has changed for
the average Congolese--who is worse off than he or she was in the
previous decade. With a chronically weak state, Congo has consistently
performed poorly on human development rankings and continues to place
at the bottom of most indexes.
These same diplomats view Tshisekedi as intransigent and difficult,
and often dismiss him as irrational. In private, they point to his
uncompromising positions and the statements he made last month in South
Africa (declaring himself President) as signs of an unsuitable
personality for the nation's highest office. But many Congolese see him
as the father of the modern democratic movement. His partisans revere
him as a messiah--in part, no doubt, because he is everything that
Kabila is not: He has no money, no militia, and no state machinery
behind him.
A former close associate of the late President Mobutu, Sese Seko,
Tshisekedi broke off with the strongman to fight for democracy in 1982
when he cofounded the Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social
(UDPS). He has built a loyal and committed base over three decades.
Over the years, Tshisekedi was imprisoned, tortured, and deported to
his native village by both the Mobutu and Kabila regimes. But he never
relented.
Western diplomats' bias notwithstanding, the crisis also stems from
the inadequate performance of Congolese leaders, who waited until March
2011 to set up the electoral commission, known as the CENI, to carry
out the vote. The delay--the law mandated that it be established in
2007--undermined the complex operations ahead. Just days before the
election, ballots and boxes had still not made their way to all of the
country's polling places.
Tshisekedi's Democratic Union for Social Progress sounded the alarm
in July about potential problems with the process and filed an official
complaint with the CENI about what it called massive fraud and
corruption of the voter registry. UDPS alleged that the CENI had been
stocking voter rolls with potential Kabila supporters. They also
alleged that more than 2 million voters listed in areas favorable to
Kabila were either redundancies or phony names. For its part, the CENI
has repeatedly rejected UDPS's call for a transparent, independent
audit of voter lists.
As grievances and disputes over electoral law arose, the CENI
failed to provide an adequate forum for dialogue with the opposition,
holding meetings on an ad hoc basis, driven by events or crises, not by
a set schedule. As a result, UDPS staged weekly street protests in
Kinshasa to demand that the integrity of the electoral process be
reinstated through an independent audit of the voter registry. Police
and security services cracked down on the protests and intimidated
members of the opposition.
The CENI consists of four members from the majority, including
Chairman Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, and three representatives of the
opposition. But, the independence of these commissioners has been
called into question as the CENI has regularly shown bias against the
opposition. Mulunda is very close to President Kabila and the other
commissioners rarely took a public stance on the electoral debate to
assert their independence. The media landscape also tilted heavily in
the President's favor.
In its preliminary report on the election, the European Union
Election Observation Mission noted that state-run radio and television
channels did not grant opposition parties equal access to programming
time as required by law. During the news slot, Kabila received 86
percent of the time consecrated to Presidential candidates, Kengo Wa
Dondo received 7 percent, Vital Kamerhe received 3 percent, and Etienne
Tshisekedi received 1 percent. Indeed, the state media made no effort
to hide its bias: Gigantic posters of a smiling Kabila hung (and still
hang) on the two facades of the national radio and television
headquarters. In Kinshasa, the road from the airport to downtown was
(and is still) saturated with billboards of Kabila. All of these
violations were ignored.
Throughout all of this, Western embassies appeared content to look
the other way. Diplomats from the United States, France, Britain, and
Belgium have praised the CENI for enrolling 32 million voters, no doubt
an impressive feat considering the enormous logistical challenges. But
voter enrollment was the first step of an electoral process--not the
end. These same international actors remained silent about the
allegations of fraud and irregularities, even as Congolese and
international human rights organizations denounced violence and abuses.
Their silence has helped spawn a crisis that could have easily been
averted.
Inexplicably, even with the strong statements by the Carter Center
and the Catholic Church, Western diplomats--from the U.S. State
Department to the French and Belgian ministries of foreign affairs to
the United Nations--remain ambivalent. They continue to hedge their
positions, hesitant to speak in the strongest of terms in favor of a
transparent, credible, and fair process. They further worsen the crisis
by consistently blaming street violence on the opposition even as they
ignore the massive human rights abuses by state security agents. This
blatant bias in favor of perpetrators of gross human rights violations
erodes the fig leaf of credibility the international community has in
the eyes of the Congolese voters and opposition.
At stake is nothing less than the stability of a country of 70
million people. Unless the international community takes its
responsibility to protect the Congolese from conflict seriously, Congo
will slide into greater post-election violence. A mixed panel of highly
respected Congolese and outside negotiators should be selected with the
full support of the United States, France, Belgium, and other relevant
powers to review and address the inconsistencies that have caused this
crisis. The alternative is to let the Supreme Court certify Kabila's
provisional victory and hand him another 5-year term. In which case,
watch out: The opposition will reject this victory, but an emboldened
Kabila, with questionable legitimacy, will assert his power with
greater popular repression, triggering a cycle of violence with untold
ramifications.
After decades of mismanagement and chronic conflict in Congo, this
election presented the people with a chance to rebuild their country.
With its vast natural and human resources, Congo has the potential to
be a regional power, as it once was, providing stability and leadership
in an area known for turmoil. But if the Congolese are robbed of a fair
and honest say in their national politics, such potential will remain
but an illusion.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Dizolele.
All three of you have made direct reference to what is our
primary focus today which is our grave concern about the
legitimacy crisis that is produced by the widespread concerns
and questions about not just the technical mechanics, but the
actual outcome of the elections. And I have a question for all
of you, if I could.
You have all referred, either in your written testimony or
your spoken testimony, to a reasonable process, to a plan B, to
an active engagement by relevant powers in the multinational
community to opportunities missed in the runup to the elections
to insist on constitutional changes, or to push back on
constitutional changes, to insist on better preparations of a
technical and logistical nature. The Assistant Secretary spoke
of the United States having offered active, prompt engagement
in an audit and review, and several of you have spoken of that
as insufficient. I agree with you that this is fundamentally a
political problem and no matter what the outcome is here in the
short term of the review of the election, there is a real risk
of Congo slipping back into the tragic violence that caused
what has been referred to as Africa's world war.
If you would for our benefit review more concretely exactly
what it is you think the United States or at least this
committee can and should do to engage the international
community to deploy the moral authority and resources of the
United States in a way that will make a positive contribution
to airing the real challenges of this election and to moving
forward toward a productive and peaceful future for Congo. What
exactly would you urge us to do?
Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. I think the point that you made is very
important in terms of lessons learned. There were moments in
the preelectoral process when, at that point, a combined
international diplomatic message strongly to President Kabila
that he was going down the wrong path and this would result in
the country being isolated--that was not done. The kind of
effort that was done on Nigeria was not done early enough here.
That is one.
Second, now it seems to us that there is an essential need
to use, as you stated, all of the moral and political suasion
of the international community. You have the largest United
Nations peacekeeping force currently in the Congo. They also
have political capabilities. The Secretary General should be
engaged on this. The African Union has a major stake in the
Congo moving in the direction of stability, and we believe that
the United States can help to generate engagement by the
African Union and the United Nations in a concerted and unified
message to the Government of the Congo to permit independent,
international verification of the process, either with the
current government and CENI or parallel to it. There needs to
be full international involvement and engagement at a very high
diplomatic level. That, thus far, is not satisfied by
contracting with electoral experts. That is No. 1.
No. 2 is the Catholic Church which took a leading role in
the observation with civil society in the Congo. They need to
be a very strong dialogue partner in how to move forward.
Similarly, civil society in the Congo is very active. They too
need to be engaged fully in this process. And here again, the
United States does have a record of dealing with civil society
and it should be part of what we do moving forward in order to,
in a sense, give them some of the resources necessary to engage
in this process.
But the fundamental issue is independent international
verification and with the purpose, as I said earlier, of
enfranchising those who were disenfranchised in order to try
and move to a position that you do know who won the election
and initially aiming at preventing the country from slipping
down the path into regional and ethnic violence. And we already
see in Katanga some of that taking place.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Gambino.
Mr. Gambino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You certainly have asked a question that all of us are
thinking about a lot and talking to people in the Congo and
around the world about what are appropriate, very concrete
steps to take.
In addition to agreeing strongly with the points that Mark
just made, let me just add two. Then, I would like to comment
specifically on some of the points that Assistant Secretary
Carson made, because what we can see is movement in the policy
of the United States.
At the beginning of this year, when the constitutional
changes were made by President Kabila, moving from a two-round
system to a one-round system, the only comment on this came
from our Ambassador in Kinshasa, who referred to the change as
an internal matter. He made no criticism whatsoever of the
change.
Many of us urged much greater involvement and concern; we
kept getting replies that things were on track, that the
electoral commission was really doing a good job, that the
elections, with the support from the U.N. mission known as
MONUSCO, would work out fine. We were looking at it closely. It
really did not look that way to us. We kept saying please think
about it more. It did not happen.
Now we have this deeply flawed election and we are starting
to see some movement in United States policy in a statement
released yesterday by the State Department spokesperson.
But here are the two points that I want to make. We still
talk about working within existing legal remedies, but let us
look at the electoral commission. Does one really think, given
that the personnel of this electoral commission that were
responsible for this charade in front of us, that we should
expect the people of the Congo to rely upon them and have faith
in anything they do? I do not see how one can credibly assert
that. You keep the institution, but you certainly have to
change the personnel. That seems to me very fundamental. I
spoke about that in my testimony.
The Supreme Court is to make a ruling, and in the present
system there, they are supposedly the ultimate arbiters. On
that point, I would defer to the head of the Catholic Church in
Congo, Cardinal Monsenguo, who in a superb statement of just a
few days ago urged the Congolese Supreme Court to do the right
thing. But reading between the lines, if you will, there is the
sense that for the Cardinal the Court is not the end of this
process unless it does the right thing. So let us see what the
Court does. If they do the right thing, whatever that might be,
then we move in one direction. If, on the other hand, they
reach a decision that looks as flawed as some of the actions we
have seen from the electoral commission, then we are going to
have to look very seriously at other activities like the ones
talked about by Mark Schneider.
The final point on that is that Assistant Secretary Carson
in his testimony before you, in addition to using the phrase
``existing legal remedies,'' also used the word ``rapid,'' that
we need to work on these things rapidly. Now, I recognize that
one wants to get out of this crisis as quickly as possible. But
if you look at the mess that has been created by all these
irregularities and vote manipulation and everything around this
country with 18 million votes cast and all the myriad problems,
it is not going to be sorted through in a matter of a few days
or a few hours. It is just not possible given the scale of
this.
So we have to start to be reasonable about two things.
One, how long is it going to take? And then if it is going
to take a period of time, which I strongly suspect it will,
what are the implications for maintaining short-term stability
in the Congo in terms of governance structures, and for the
support that comes from us and others around the world?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Gambino.
Mr. Dizolele.
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you very much, Chairman.
I think the first step is really the message of the United
States. Our message has been, frankly, pathetic. I mean, at a
time when Secretary Clinton is urging the Russians to march in
the streets and reclaim their rights, we are getting the
message that is very rosy when it comes to the DRC. Between the
two countries, we know which country has suffered more
calamities and which country needs this more than the other.
You can answer that yourself. But it is ridiculous that for the
entire process my colleagues have mentioned, the United States
has given a nod to the process when everybody knows it has been
really despicable, and I think we need to change that, if your
committee can start sending a strong message that the United
States stands for something. We should not be sounding like the
Chinese. And so far in Congo, the United States diplomacy is
not different from the Chinese. We cannot continue like that.
So I think we need to put pressure. So like my friend Tony
has just said, we should put pressure so that the process is
not expedited. There is no point to expedite the process if
this is going to unravel not maybe in 6 months, but maybe in a
year. As things are, this is a ticking bomb. So we need to
insist. Congo depends on us. I know that it is a sovereign
country. It is my homeland but it is also a sick country that
depends on us. We have tremendous leverage on the Government of
DRC. The State Department does not like to acknowledge this,
but I am sure they know that they have tremendous leverage that
is not being used. We should use those levers and insist on a
delay on the certification of results, and then we will follow
what both Tony and Mark have just recommended, to start looking
beyond the technical review, the politics of it so that
disenfranchised Congolese voters finally will get their voice
heard. This may mean that Kabila is proclaimed President, but
people will have confidence in the process.
And also, I think more importantly--this is something that
has not been discussed often--is the crisis of personalities,
as we look at this. Mr. Tshisekedi and his group of opposition
leaders have a terrible relationship with the diplomatic
community, and in the process, the diplomatic community loses
sight of what really is at stake and start shortcutting people.
But that is not really the issue here. The issue is beyond
President Kabila and beyond Tshisekedi. So we need to look at
the process, keeping that in mind.
Thank you.
Senator Coons. Let me, if I might, Mr. Dizolele, seek a
clarification of your earlier testimony because you spoke in
fairly stark terms as if the United-States-focused efforts by
the Congress to make some impact on conflict minerals or on
sexual violence were misplaced or misguided or ineffective or
wasteful. What I think you were trying to convey to us was that
these are important and vital issues that deserve attention,
but that they exist within the larger context of a country
whose politics and whose governance are the main enduring
problem, and if we do not fix political legitimacy and we do
not, on behalf of the United States, engage in governance
questions, then we can do all the work we want to through Dodd-
Frank and conflict minerals and so forth, and we will not have
addressed the real driver. Was that your point?
Mr. Dizolele. Very much so, Mr. Chairman. And I will just
illustrate a little bit.
Congo is the size of Western Europe. So for us in the
United States, it is one-third of the United States from the
Canadian border to Florida. If we look at Vermont as eastern
Congo, what is happening in Vermont is important for the
country, but to claim that solving the problem in Vermont would
solve the larger crisis in the country would not be correct.
Part of the problem is that women that are being raped need
help. There is no doubt about the fact they needed help
yesterday, urgently. But the Kivus are part of the greater
country. What is happening in the Kivus is happening because of
what is not happening in the rest of the country, not the other
way around. If women are being raped in the Kivus--there are
about three questions that anybody asks whether you are a
Tibetan or Chilean or Congolese. Why--pardon my French--the
hell are these women being raped. Where is the government? Is
anybody protecting them? We have lost sight of that when we
look at these issues.
Or if we look at the conflict minerals issue, then the
issue is like, hey, why is this looting happening. Is anyone
responsible? Is there any adult in the house, and where is this
adult in the house? We should be starting putting pressure on
the adult in the house and not create a set of schemes that
keep on perpetrating the problems.
The main problem with Dodd-Frank is that the legislation
builds on the false premise that cleaning the mineral supply
chain will cut militias' funding, reduce their access to
weapons, and therefore bring peace. But even before it is
implemented, this legislation has already put hundreds of
thousands of Congolese out of work. In the meantime, mineral
smuggling across the border, particularly with Rwanda, has
increased. This smuggling is run by militia leaders who
continue to benefit greatly from the illicit trade. More
importantly, however, militias have other sources of income, as
they tax all business activities in the territories that they
control. In the end, with or without minerals, the conflict in
eastern Congo will continue as long as we ignore the bigger
context of the Congolese crisis. As such, if or when the
legislation is implemented, Dodd-Frank will effectively certify
the looting of DRC's mineral resources to everyone else's
benefit but at the expense of the Congolese people.
I will just finish with a story. I once visited Panzi
hospital in Bukavu, and Dr. Denis Mukwege told me a story of a
young woman. I will name her Sifa. Sifa was about 13 years old.
She came from Shabunda, a few hours by road from Bukavu, where
she had been raped. She came to Panzi. For those of you who
have been to Panzi, Panzi is a small hospital. It is famous but
it is very small. While this young woman was being treated, she
used to do her makeup every morning and talk to the doctor and
say, ``Papa, you see how beautiful I am. Whatever happens, do
not send me back to Shabunda.''
Six months later after she was fully healed, Dr. Mukwege
against his own judgment and against the will of the woman, but
because of capacity problems, sent her back to Shabunda. She
came back about 6 months later. She had been raped again and
this time it was worse. The surgery did not take and they ran
further testing on her only to find out that she was HIV-
positive.
So this woman, this Shabunda girl--she does not want the
United States to just give $17 million, as Secretary Clinton
promised when she did the tour of the area. She wants this
sexual violence to stop. And in order for it to stop, we, the
international community and humanity, have to have the courage
and say this has to stop, start arresting people, start putting
pressure on the adult in the house, which is the Congolese
Government, not just on the U.N. because often we displace the
discourse. Then we blame the U.N. We blame everybody else and
we give a free ride to the Government of DRC. That is not the
kind of policymaking that the Congolese people want.
Thank you very much.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Schneider, you said that there was
obvious fraud in certain regions or provinces and there ought
to be a revote in those provinces.
And then, Mr. Gambino, you said the whole election was
clearly fraudulent. Do you think there should be a revote in
the entire country?
Mr. Gambino. Senator Isakson, that is an extraordinarily
important issue. I think the Congolese themselves are going to
have to think that through, with help from international
actors, experts, and others to think through a way to get to a
reasonable democratic outcome.
As I look at it--and I have looked pretty closely at the
results around the country--we see obviously fraudulent results
in Katanga. You have three large areas amounting to about
three-quarters of a million votes where in two of them the
results are 100 percent of the voters voted for President
Kabila. So you can go through--and I have done this--hundreds
of pages of results for each voting station where there were
roughly 400 or 500 Congolese voting. Every single voter, we are
to believe, went and cast his or her ballot for President
Kabila in these polling places in each of these areas. That is
one example.
In certain areas of north Kivu, there are very clear
reports of intimidation and extremely troubling results as you
start looking at specific areas.
Others have referred to the Kinshasa results. There were
votes lost, perhaps as many as a million--and Mark Schneider
has talked about this--where they know people voted and then
the votes disappeared. So we have this as well.
Are you going to be able to sort all that through and
somehow come out to something and say we are absolutely
confident that either Joseph Kabila or Etienne Tshisekedi did?
If you can, fantastic. I am a little skeptical, frankly, given
the scale that one sees. I would defer to experts.
If we do not do it, then we have quite a problem. If you
can revote in certain areas, OK. But if those areas amount to
most of the province of Katanga, which is the size of Texas and
which where over 3 million people voted, a lot of Kinshasa, a
city of 10 million people and millions of voters, and
substantial portions of other provinces--you know, you see
where I am going. That starts to look like another full round
of voting.
I will just put out one more question for you to consider,
and I do not have the answer.
The Congolese had a system in 2006 which was a two-round
system. You had over 30 candidates for President in 2006. If no
one got over 50 percent, you went to a second round with the
top two candidates. That is what happened. You had a second
round against the top two candidates. President Kabila beat
Jean Pierre Bemba 58 to 42.
It seems to me that as you look at these horribly complex
and flawed results right now, there are probably two things
that we can all agree on. Nobody won more than 50 percent and
the two top vote-getters are Joseph Kabila and Etienne
Tshisekedi. It may be cleaner to think about some kind of
competition that way. One can organize such an election
relatively quickly. The Congo is slated to have its next round
of elections nationwide in March. So we do have something
coming forward. So as you think it through--I am certainly not
making a proposal. I am just trying to think through with you
some of the options that people are discussing right now to
work through what is a mess without a clear, clean, rapid
outcome right now that most of us see.
Senator Isakson. Well, the reason I asked the question is
from listening to all three of you, in particular Mr. Dizolele
and his comments, I do not think a revote right now is really
possible or would bring a result that would be any different
without fundamental change in the process. Do you agree with
that, Mr. Dizolele?
Mr. Dizolele. I am sorry. I missed----
Senator Isakson. I really do not think a revote would be
possible to create any other change in the result immediately
because of the given corruption that exists today. Is that
correct?
Mr. Dizolele. I think there is a lot of truth to that in
the sense that Tony just mentioned that there are so many
things that have to change. I mean, if we are going to have a
revote, does that revote happen with the same team that we have
in place? And if it does, then what does that mean?
Senator Isakson. Well, let me interrupt you because you
made the statement parenthetically. You said, well, maybe we
ought to just let the President stay in for another year, but
then charge them to have another election and structure the
vote better. I think that is what you said.
Mr. Dizolele. No; I did not make that statement.
Senator Isakson. You did not make that statement?
Mr. Dizolele. No. That was not me.
Senator Isakson. OK. Somebody said that.
Mr. Gambino. I did not say it, Senator, but I think what
you asked is so important. But I am actually more optimistic
about this than perhaps some others.
We sometimes get a false dichotomy between the 2006 and the
2011 elections. People pretend that in 2006 the international
community did everything, and so the elections went reasonably
well, and that in 2011 the Congolese did most everything and
the results have turned out poorly. That is actually not true.
In 2006, yes, the international community did more, played
a better role, was more engaged. But there was a huge role
played by a much better Congolese electoral commission and a
much cleaner election all around. The Congolese did a fantastic
job in 2006.
I think this time around, as I have said and the others
have said, one should make some changes in personnel,
obviously, but also get the kind of heightened international
engagement that Mark Schneider and others are talking about. If
you came to a second round early next year, for example,
Senator, surely you should have some people placed in some of
those areas, Congolese observers, where we got the highly
dubious reports that 100 percent of the voters were for Kabila.
You know, some of these can be done. The Catholic Church had
30,000 observers at this election. Some of these things can be
done to get us to the kinds of credible outcomes that must be
attained.
Senator Isakson. Well, more transparency brings about a lot
more accountability. There is no question about that.
Mr. Schneider. If I could, it does seem to me that while we
can come up with a variety of scenarios to get to an end, that
has to be the result of negotiation in the DRC. And that is
where I think you need to have a combined, unified
international view, high-level, former Presidents from African
countries that are authorized by the African Union, in a sense
blessed by the United Nations and supported in terms of trying
to bring about a mediation that says, OK, we believe there
should be a second round for those two or revoting for these
areas and we will have essentially a parallel process to
determine the outcome.
But there needs to be--and here is where I guess I disagree
a little bit. I do think we need immediate international
engagement in this effort at this time because I am very
concerned that December 19--you heard the Supreme Court. That
is the last date. Well, the Supreme Court decides on these
disputes in-camera, closed sessions. Given what we have had
thus far and what we know, it issues a result that says the
preliminary results stand. Then you have essentially lit a
match. And it just seems to me that between now and then you
need to engage the international community to try and bring
about some process of discussion aimed at a compromise.
Senator Isakson. Well, my time is up and we are about to
have a vote I think.
But let me just add a comment to our Marine. Mr. Dizolele,
when you made your comment, I reflected back 2 years ago when I
was on the USS Eisenhower in a NATO exercise in the Atlantic
and went down to the mess hall and sat at the Congolese table.
There were 10 Congolese volunteers in the United States Navy
serving our country on a fast track to citizenship basis. And I
want to thank you for doing that and thank you on behalf of the
American people.
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Coons. Senator Isakson was referring to--we had a
scheduled 4 o'clock vote on the authorization for the Defense
Department.
Senator Isakson. Actually Senator Isakson was trying to
make an excuse to make an exit because I have one other stop I
gave got to make. [Laughter.]
Thank you all for your testimony.
Senator Coons. Well, then let me thank Senator Isakson for
his good nature, his disciplined and steady contributions to
the work of this subcommittee, and for the honor of serving
with him.
You have presented focused and concrete concerns about this
election. I am sorry we have not gotten into more detail about
the many other issues and challenges that face the DRC, the
role of the newly appointed special representative to the DRC
and the Great Lakes, the role that the U.N. peacekeeping
mission can and should play in security sector reform, whether
it is reasonably possible to certify conflict minerals as being
conflict-free and whether that is relevant to improving future
governance and outcomes in the east and northeast, what if
anything more we can and should be doing to promote civil
society and transparency, what we can do to ensure a more
effective electoral commission and Supreme Court. These are all
questions that I think are valued and important.
Let me first say that I--and I suspect all the other
members of this subcommittee--welcome your ongoing input as
this very fluid situation continues to evolve. It is my hope to
put out a statement promptly, possibly jointly with Senator
Isakson, that reaches our conclusions from this hearing, from
all the input that we have gotten. And our offices have gotten
quite a bit of input from the Congolese community in the United
States, for which we are grateful. And it is my hope that the
United States will take an active and engaged role in convening
the international community to try and ensure that we do not
miss an opportunity. We may well have missed them in the runup
to this election. And as I said in my opening statement, many
of us have really hoped that this election would secure steady
forward progress for the people of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo toward a sustained democracy.
I agree with you that this is a moment of great risk and
that there is a real possibility that it will slip as Cote
d'Ivoire did after a challenging contested election into
enormous difficulty. There is a moment here, I think, for the
faith community, for NGOs, for Congolese civil society, and for
the international community to negotiate an appropriate
resolution of what is a flawed election that could produce a
political crisis.
I am grateful for your testimony today. I look forward to
your continued input, and as we move to a vote on an equally
important issue for our Nation, I am grateful for your passion
about improving the lives of the people of the Congo and about
continuing America's role as one of the leaders in advancing
democracy around the world. Thank you very much.
We will leave the record open for 1 week from today given
the number of other members of this subcommittee who had
expressed strong interest but were unable to join us today.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson to Questions Submitted
by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. In late November, elections were held in the DRC, and all
signs suggest that they were anything but free and fair. The Carter
Center stated that it found ``the provisional Presidential elections
results . . . to lack credibility.'' And the head of the Catholic
Church in the DRC said that the ``results are not founded in truth or
justice.''
The State Department's Web site describes our relations with the
DRC government as ``very strong.'' The United States is also the
largest donor to the DRC. For example:
The United States provided more than $300 million in bilateral
foreign aid to the DRC last year alone.
The United States is the largest contributor to the U.N.
Stabilization Mission in the DRC, contributing to almost one-third of
its annual $1 billion budget.
The U.S. military has trained a Congolese Army battalion, to which
it is providing ongoing support.
How is the United States using its ``very strong''
relationship with the DRC government to help prevent a
widespread outbreak of post-election violence?
Can we use our influence to help explore a negotiated
solution to the current election?
Answer. The United States has been working hard to prevent post-
election violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Our
Ambassador to the DRC and I have been in constant contact with the
Congolese authorities, key opposition leaders, the U.N. Special
Representative in the DRC Roger Meece, other donors, and regional
leaders to forestall violence resulting from the elections. Our message
has been that all Congolese political leaders and their supporters act
responsibly, renounce violence, and resolve any disagreements through
peaceful constructive dialogue.
At this time, we do not see a need for international negotiation;
however. A rapid technical review of the electoral process by the
Congolese authorities and outside experts may determine ways to provide
more credible results, minimize irregularities, and generally provide
guidance that will improve future elections.
Question. Far too often, the perpetrators of sexual violence in the
DRC are members of the Congolese Army, or FARDC.
The FARDC is made up of ill-trained and ill-equipped soldiers, many
of whom are former member of militias. Few are regularly paid or fed by
the DRC Government. In turn, many prey on the communities that they are
ostensibly responsible for protecting.
A story told to Human Rights Watch by a 15-year-old-girl
illustrates the devastation of the problem: ``There were six soldiers
who came into my house. They first raped my 3-year-old sister, and then
two of them raped me while the other looted our house. They threw my
newborn baby onto the ground . . . the soldiers were wearing military
uniforms . . . after they raped me, they took my mother away with them.
She hasn't come back yet, and I think she must be dead. Five other
houses . . . were visited the same night by the soldiers.''
How is this outrage [Congolese Armed Forces committing
sexual and gender-based violence] allowed to continue?
What pressure can the international community bring to bear
on President Kabila to reform the military?
Has the Congolese Government made any significant efforts to
pay members of the FARDC and remove those responsible for past
crimes?
What, specifically, is the U.S. Government doing on this
front?
Answer. The perpetrators of this horrific sexual and gender-based
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) include the Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (known by its French acronym--
FDLR), various Mai Mai groups and some elements of the Congolese Army
(FARDC). This abuse is inexcusable and occurs largely because the state
security forces--the police and military forces are largely
unprofessional and in need of significant training and reform. The DRC
has also been slow to remove those in its military who abuse human
rights including Bosco Ntaganda and senior commanders such as Innocent
Zimurinda. We have called on the DRC and regional states to honor their
international obligations and arrest those for whom international
arrest warrants have been issued. In addition, we have called on the
DRC to arrest other senior commanders. We have pressed the DRC
Government to make security sector reform a greater priority and more
diligently pursue and prosecute perpetrators. The United States and the
international community also are assisting the DRC Government to
establish institutional structures and processes to support
stabilization, including security sector reform, as well as to develop
a professional military that will allow for an eventual drawdown and
withdrawal of the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
(MONUSCO). With our and other international assistance, the DRC
Government has begun paying the members of its armed forces more
systematically. The European Union has helped the government implement
a census of soldiers and a biometric database that is linked to the
armed forces' payment system. As a result, more soldiers are receiving
their regular salaries--though these salaries are often meager, and
some elements of the armed forces have attempted to remain outside the
biometric system. We insist that elements receiving U.S. training be
paid on time.
We also have assisted the DRC's judiciary and the investigations
and prosecutions of a growing number of cases, including the high-
profile conviction in early 2011 of a colonel and several other
officers for rape. The DRC Government is taking legal action against
three of the so-called ``FARDC five'' officers whom the U.N. Security
Council in 2009 alleged raped civilians. But tackling the problem
effectively requires further prosecutions, which we and the
international community continue to press for at the highest level.
Question. In May of this year, I spearheaded a letter with Senator
Moran and 12 of our colleagues to President Obama calling for the
appointment of a Special Representative to the Great Lakes Region of
Africa.
In the letter, we noted the multitude of challenges facing the
Great Lakes Region, including those in the DRC where ``extrajudicial
killings and the systemic and pervasive use of rape and sexual
violence, has destroyed the lives of countless civilians.''
In particular, we stressed how helpful the appointment of a Great
Lakes Special Representative could be, noting that such a position
could help build upon the work of the ambassadors in the region and
would send an important message that the Great Lakes Region is a high
priority for the Obama administration.
That is why I was so pleased to see the recent appointment by
Secretary Clinton of Ambassador Barrie Walkley as the Special Advisor
to the Great Lakes and the DRC.
Will Ambassador Walkley be fully empowered to negotiate with
regional governments, the Kabila government and international
entities, particularly at this critical time in the DRC. What
role will he play? Will there be any limitations placed on his
position?
Answer. Yes, Ambassador Barrie Walkley will be negotiating with
regional governments, the DRC Government and with others in the
international community on Great Lakes issues. As Special Advisor,
Ambassador Walkley will work closely with Secretary Clinton, Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, our ambassadors and
missions in the field, and other State Department officials to devise,
shape, and coordinate U.S. policy on cross-border security, political,
economic, and social issues arising in the Great Lakes and the DRC. He
will also coordinate with the interagency, the U.S. Congress and other
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to address issues
that cut across borders and bureaucratic divisions, including conflict
minerals and sexual and gender-based violence.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson to Questions Submitted
by
Senator Richard J. Durbin
Question. According to some estimates, more than 1,100 women and
girls are raped every day in the Congo. That is nearly one woman every
minute. That is the worst record of sexual violence of any nation on
Earth. During my most recent visit to Eastern Congo, I had the chance
to return to Heal Africa, a hospital in Goma that specializes, in part,
in treating victims of sexual violence. The scene of these women lining
up in the dust to be treated for obstetric fistula and other horrific
consequences of sexual violence is one I will never forget. I know
Secretary Clinton had a chance to visit the hospital as well during her
visit.
What steps are State and USAID taking to help reduce the
level of gender-based violence in the DRC?
Answer. The U.S. Department of State shares your concern and sense
of urgency about the continuing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)
waged against women and children in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). In FY 2011, USAID's SGBV programs helped 1,286,595 people
gain access to critical SGBV care and treatment services. In order to
prevent SGBV, USAID's programs engage both men and women at the
community and provincial levels through targeted advocacy campaigns. We
are working with the DRC Government, the United Nations, and our
international and regional partners to empower women, including
increasing their involvement in the political process and their role in
economic development.
In addition, to make inroads on SGBV prevention, more needs to be
done on security sector reform and strengthening the judicial sector.
The absence of professionalism in the police and military forces is a
key driver of many instances of this violence, and we have pressed the
DRC Government to prosecute perpetrators and provided assistance to
better enable them to do so. Our support to Congolese military justice
institutions and the American Bar Association has enabled
investigations and prosecutions of a growing number of cases, including
the high-profile conviction in early 2011 of a colonel and several
other officers for rape. The DRC Government is also prosecuting several
of the so-called ``FARDC five'' officers identified in 2009 by the
Security Council, who are alleged to have committed direct rape. The
progress in these cases is welcome, but grossly insufficient and
requires that the Congolese develop an independent and robust mechanism
to try politically sensitive cases of high ranking officers. For this
reason, we supported the Minister of Justice's legislative proposal to
establish specialized mixed courts to address atrocity crimes, which
would include international personnel on a temporary basis. Parliament
recommended that the legislation needed to be modified to address
constitutional issues, and we look forward to reengaging with the
government, Parliament, and civil society on this issue. At the same
time, we urge the GDRC to arrest known perpetrators, such as ICC-
indictee Bosco Ntaganda, in accordance with their international
obligations. We will continue to press for these reforms at the highest
level.
Question. One of the problems mentioned to me in Congo by very
brave and dedicated human rights NGOs was the impunity with which known
human rights violators operated in Congo, notably in the ranks of the
Congolese military. I spoke last year with then-U.N. Under Secretary
General for Peacekeeping, Alain LeRoy, about ensuring that the
important and sizeable U.N. peacekeeping forces in eastern Congo did
not cooperate or assist any Congolese military units with known human
rights violators in their ranks.
Can State comment on the Congolese Government's seeming
inability to go after these known criminals--is it a matter of
capacity or political will?
Can you also comment on the Congolese warlord, Bosco
Ntaganda, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court but
seems to operate and live with impunity in Goma?
Answer. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) does not currently have sufficient political will or security and
judicial capacity to arrest, prosecute, and imprison known or suspected
criminals. The military and police require professionalization and the
capacity and independence of the judicial system must be bolstered. To
do so will require significantly more commitment on the part of senior
Congolese leaders including the President, the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Justice.
The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), the ex-
armed group led by ICC-indictee Bosco Ntaganda, and formerly backed by
Rwanda, has been poorly integrated in the Congolese Armed Forces and
maintains its own parallel command structure in eastern Congo where the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has little
control or influence. Ntaganda surrounds himself with CNDP soldiers
loyal to him and has threatened that if any of his men are investigated
or prosecuted, he will pull the CNDP out of the Congolese Army and
return to fighting the government. Nonetheless, it is the obligation of
the DRC to arrest Bosco. We continue to urge the DRC Government to
ensure that perpetrators of serious human rights and international
humanitarian law are brought to justice in accordance with the DRC's
international obligations. We also continue to call on regional states
including Rwanda, to support Bosco's arrest. This support is key to the
GDRC's willingness to arrest Bosco, as well as mitigating any potential
violent fallout.
______
ECI Paper ``Technical Issues Threaten Free, Fair, and Transparent
Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Urgent Steps
Required'' Submitted for the Record by Anthony W. Gambino
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
