[Senate Hearing 112-362]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-362
ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN LIBYA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 31, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
staement....................................................... 3
Steinberg, Hon. James B., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the
following:
Senator Richard G. Lugar................................. 39
Senator Mike Lee......................................... 41
(iii)
ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN LIBYA
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen,
Durbin, Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch, Rubio, Isakson, and Lee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Thanks very
much for coming this afternoon. As everybody knows, we are here
today to discuss the situation in Libya, and we're very pleased
to have with us the Deputy Secretary of State, Jim Steinberg.
All of us became aware this week that Secretary Steinberg is
going to be departing his current post and leaving government,
I hope temporarily, to return to academia as the dean of the
Maxwell School at Syracuse University. I'm not sure they want
to hear me say ``temporarily,'' but that's certainly the way we
feel.
Obviously, we wish you well in that endeavor, and we thank
you for your tremendous service to the country and to the State
Department.
I want to just remind my colleagues on the committee, lest
any of us accidentally cross over into forbidden territory,
that yesterday's briefing was classified and, since we're in an
open session here today, we all need to be careful not to base
any questions or draw any comments into yesterday's briefing.
Over the last 9 days, as we all know, the United States has
joined a robust international coalition and in my judgment and
the judgment of many has averted a humanitarian catastrophe in
Libya and sent a strong message to the region, even as we all
know things are not yet fully resolved.
Some people, have expressed reservations about this, which
is the way it works here, and it's a good and healthy thing,
and we welcome a debate. I certainly do. What I hope we can do
here this afternoon is contribute to that debate with facts and
obviously address important questions: Where do we go from
here? What's the path forward? Who are the Libyan opposition?
What diplomatic, economic tools are available to us to pressure
Qadhafi to accomplish the stated goal, not just of the United
States, but of the international community? And if and when he
is in a state of departure, what comes next?
All of these are important questions and we're very eager
to hear, Secretary, your views on this, how we transition from
missiles and bombs and overflights to stability and to peace in
Libya.
My views, I think, are relatively well known on this. I've
certainly made them public, and I've laid out what I see as the
justification for this military intervention. I'm not going to
go through all the details of that now. But I'd like to just
emphasize as some ask questions, I believe we do have strategic
interests at stake in this intervention and in Libya. I am
convinced, and particularly from a recent visit of 2 days in
Cairo and time in Israel and discussions in both London and
Paris with French and British allies, as well as with others, I
am convinced that we have strategic interests at stake.
What we do as part of this international coalition will and
does reverberate throughout North Africa and the Middle East, a
region where extremists have thrived and attacks against
Western interests have been incubated. By supporting the Libyan
opposition--I have met with them personally, incidentally, and
met with them when I was in Cairo, and I have asked members of
the opposition to come here and have talked with the White
House about that, and I hope they will in short order, so that
colleagues will have a chance to meet with them and size them
up for themselves, at least their representatives.
But I think that we at least give them a fighting chance to
oust a dictator with a long, strong history of terrorism and
the blood of Americans on his hands. At the same time, we keep
alive and even encourage the hopes of reformers in the Arab
world and we counter the violent extremism of al-Qaeda and
like-minded groups.
I think we also encourage a new generation of Arabs to
pursue dignity and democracy and perhaps create the opportunity
for a new relationship with the people of a greater, new Middle
East.
These are worthy goals and if we can accomplish them they
will significantly alter the options that we face with respect
to our foreign policy and our military policy. I also think
that if Qadhafi had been successful in just moving willy-nilly
into Benghazi and doing what he promised to do, which is show
no mercy and other things, then I think the suppression of the
aspirations of the Libyan people would have had reverberations
beyond, way beyond, Libya itself. I think it would have been a
setback for the dreams unfolding across that region, and the
legitimate demands of peaceful protesters I think we all know
should never be met with bullets. We need to send that message
loudly and clearly to adversaries and allies alike.
In any country of decency, unprovoked violence against
peaceful protesters is unacceptable, whether it's in Syria or
Bahrain or Yemen or anywhere else. I think that treatment of
one's own citizens in that way betrays basic notions of human
rights, and is contrary to the values that we hold so near and
dear.
Now, we're all concerned about the violence against
protesters in Syria. I thought that President Bashar al-Assad
could have used his speech yesterday to set out a more precise
course of action with respect to reforms. I gather today
there's been some further articulation of some measures. But I
think with large protests scheduled for tomorrow, it is
essential that his officials, that the officials in Syria,
refrain from using violence against their own people.
Some have asked, why Libya and not other humanitarian
situations? The truth is it's a perfectly appropriate question.
We're going to weigh our ideals, our interests, and our
capabilities in each case. The President said this the other
day. I think a number of us have said it over the course of
time. None of these countries or situations are the same, and
in each one of them we need to weigh our ideals, our interests,
our capabilities, and the possibilities, and then decide where
and how to become involved.
In the case of Libya, where the opposition and the Arab
League called for our help, I think the scales tipped heavily
in favor of the intervention that we have engaged in.
So I understand that some of our colleagues have concern. I
have no doubt that my good friend and the ranking member of the
committee will articulate some of those shortly. And some have
concerns about the question of consultation with Congress. That
is an important constitutional question and I have always as a
Member of Congress advocated the maximum amount of engagement
with the Congress and that clearly we're stronger where we can
act with the support of the American people as expressed
through the Congress.
But I do believe that here there was, given a number of
things, not the least of which was that Congress was out of
session--but I think that a lot of consultation took place.
Certainly Senator Lugar and I were part of several phone calls
with the President from afar, and that consultation has
continued even through yesterday and the briefing that all
Senators received.
Both Presidents, Democratic and Republican alike, have
authorized limited military action in the last 30 years. I've
been here for 27 of them and I have seen that in Grenada, in
Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Panama, Haiti, any number of situations.
That is not to say that each one has to meet the test of
the capacity of the Congress to respond and of the nature of
the event. But Somalia likewise, I guess, is one.
So the debate is healthy and we are already in fact
beginning the work of drafting an appropriate resolution.
Whether we will need it or not I don't know. But we are
beginning the work of drafting that so that we are ready in the
event that we need to proceed forward and put this question to
the Congress.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank the chairman very much for
holding this important hearing and join him in welcoming Deputy
Secretary Steinberg.
Over Libya, we have once again witnessed the skill and
courage of the men and women of our Armed Forces. The
warfighting prowess of the American military is extraordinary
in its capability and execution.
But success in war depends on much more than the abilities
of our fighting men and women and the quality of their weapons
and equipment. Any member who has been here to witness the last
10 years should understand that wars are accompanied by
mistakes and unintended consequences. War is an inherently
precarious enterprise that is conducive to accidents and
failures of leadership.
In the last decade alone, we have witnessed mission creep,
intelligence failures, debilitating conflicts between civil and
military leaders, withdrawal of coalition partners, tribal
feuding, corruption by allied governments, unintended civilian
casualties, and many other circumstances that have complicated
our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and raised their cost in lives
and treasure.
The last 10 years also have illuminated clearly that
initiating wars and killing the enemy is far easier than
achieving political stability and reconstructing a country when
the fighting is over.
This is why going to war should be based on the United
States vital interests. It is also why Congress has an
essential role to play in scrutinizing executive branch
rationalizations of wars and their ongoing management. This
holds true no matter who is President or what war is being
fought.
Congressional oversight is far from perfect. But it is the
best tool we have for ensuring executive branch accountability
in wartime and subjecting administration plans and assumptions
to rigorous review.
I offer these thoughts at the beginning of this hearing,
because I believe Congress has its work cut out for it with
regard to Libya. On March 7, 12 days before the United States
began hostilities, I called on the President to seek a
declaration of war from the Congress if he decided to initiate
hostilities. He declined to do that. As a result, the United
States entered the civil war in Libya with little official
scrutiny or debate. I continue to advocate for a debate and
vote on President Obama's decision to go to war in Libya. I do
not believe the President has made a convincing case for
American military involvement in that country. Declarations of
war are not anachronistic exercises. They force the President
to submit his case for war to Congress and the American public.
They allow for a robust debate to examine that case, and they
help gauge if there is sufficiently broad political support to
commit American blood and treasure and to sustain that
commitment. Furthermore, they define the role and strategy of
the United States.
Neither U.N. Security Council resolutions nor
administration briefings are a substitute for a declaration of
war or other deliberate authorization of major military
operations.
Actions leading up to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at
least acknowledged that congressional authorization was vital
to initiating and conducting war. Despite deep flaws in the
process of authorizing those wars, there was a recognition that
both required a deliberate affirmative vote by Congress. There
also was broad agreement that both conflicts required extensive
debate and ongoing hearings in congressional committees.
President Obama's intervention in Libya represents a
serious setback to the constitutional limits on the President's
war powers. Historians will point out that this is not the
first time that a President has gone to war on his own
authority. But the Libya case is the one most likely to be
cited the next time President Obama or a future President
chooses to take the country to war without congressional
approval. That future war may have far graver consequences for
American national security than the war in Libya.
With or without a debate in the Congress, the United States
is involved in a military intervention in a third Middle
Eastern country. This is a jarring prospect, given the enormous
United States budget deficit, the strains on our military from
long deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the certainty
that this won't be the last contingency in the Middle East to
impact our interests. In fact, even as the coalition drops
bombs in Libya, the Syrian regime has been shooting citizens in
an attempt to repress peaceful protests.
Our commitments in Libya and those of our allies leave less
military, diplomatic, and economic capacity for responding to
other contingencies. We need to know, for example, whether the
Libyan intervention will make it even harder to sustain allied
commitments to operations in Afghanistan.
The President clearly was motivated by humanitarian
concerns about what could happen if Qadhafi's forces were left
unchecked. But as many have observed, there is no end to the
global humanitarian emergencies to which U.S. military and
economic power might be devoted. The question now is, When is
that humanitarian mission accomplished, and has humanitarianism
evolved into supporting one side in a lengthy civil war?
In his March 28 speech, the President expressed hopefulness
that our intervention in Libya would have a positive effect on
democratic movements and regime behavior elsewhere in the
Middle East. Perhaps it will, but the President is guessing.
Nowhere in the world have we had more experience with
unintended consequences than in the Middle East.
A war rationale based on hopes about how U.S. military
intervention will be perceived in the Middle East is deficient
on its face. It is also uncertain whether pro-Western
governments can result from popular upheaval, especially in
Libya where we know little about the opposition. We also don't
know what this will mean for our efforts to stop terrorism and
defeat al-Qaeda, particularly since Middle Eastern governments
that are helping us with this problem are among those who are
repressing their people.
President Obama has not provided estimates for the cost of
our military intervention. Nor has he discussed whether the
United States would incur the enormous potential costs of
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Libya in the aftermath of
war. By some estimates, American military operations in Libya
may already have expended close to a billion dollars. The
President has not set these costs in the context of a national
debt exceeding $14 trillion, or indicated whether he is seeking
contributions from the Arab League to offset costs of the war,
as I have suggested.
We find ourselves in a situation where Congress is debating
cuts in domestic programs to make essential progress on the
deficit, even as President Obama has initiated an expensive,
open-ended military commitment in a country that his Defense
Secretary says is not a vital interest.
The President must establish with much greater clarity what
would constitute success. He has not stated whether the United
States would accept a stalemate in the civil war. If we do not
accept a long-term stalemate, what is our strategy for ending
Qadhafi's rule? Without a defined end game, Congress and the
American people must assume U.S. participation in the coalition
may continue indefinitely, with all the costs and risks of
escalation that come with such a commitment.
These questions require the type of scrutiny that Foreign
Relations Committee hearings have provided for the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. I know the chairman intends a new series of
hearings in the coming weeks on Afghanistan, and I support such
an inquiry based on principles that I have just cited. I
believe that the Foreign Relations Committee should also take
on the burden of detailed oversight of United States
involvement in Libya, and I thank the chairman again for
initiating that process today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Indeed, I think
we'll probably be having another hearing next week with outside
witnesses. So we would expect to continue the process.
Mr. Secretary, again thanks for being here. We're happy to
have you. If you want to place your entire statement in the
record, it will be placed in as if read in full, and we look
forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES B. STEINBERG, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Lugar, and members of the committee. If I could just briefly
begin, a little over 2 years ago you did me the great honor of
supporting my nomination to serve in this position, and it has
been a great privilege to serve the country and the President
and the Secretary and to work with this committee in
particular, which we see as our home committee. I appreciate
the courtesy and the engagement that we've had over these 3
years and I look forward to working with you in my future
capacity as well. So thank you all very much for that.
I also want to thank you for holding this hearing and the
opportunity to update you on developments in Libya, and to
answer the important questions that both you and Senator Lugar
and your colleagues have and will raise. I want to also express
my personal appreciation and all of us for the tremendous
dedication and commitment of the men and women of the armed
services who are serving, as they always do, with dedication
and courage and tremendous skill and proficiency and do great
credit to our Nation.
In his speech on Monday night, President Obama laid out our
goals and our strategy for Libya and the wider Middle East. I'm
grateful for the opportunity today to continue the ongoing
exchange between the administration and Congress that has been
going on as these events unfolded over the last several weeks.
Let me begin by reviewing why we are a part of this broad
international effort. As the President said on Monday, the
United States has played a unique role as an anchor of global
security and an advocate for human freedom. When our interests
and our values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act.
As this committee knows, the crisis began when the Libyan
people took to the streets in peaceful protest to demand their
universal human rights and Colonel Qadhafi's security forces
responded with extreme violence. The U.N. Security Council
reacted unanimously by approving Resolution 1970 on February
26, which demanded an end to the violence and referred the
situation to the International Criminal Court, while imposing a
travel ban and assets-freeze on Qadhafi's family and government
officials.
Rather than respond to the international community's demand
for an end to the violence, Qadhafi's forces continued their
brutal assault. With this imminent threat bearing down on them,
the people of Libya appealed to the world for help. The Gulf
Cooperation Council and the Arab League called for the
establishment of a no-fly zone. This body voted itself to
support the idea of a no-fly zone on March 1.
Then, acting with partners in NATO, the Arab world, and
African members of the Security Council, on March 17 we
succeeded in passing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973,
which demanded an immediate cease-fire in Libya, including an
end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said
might constitute crimes against humanity, imposed a ban on all
flights in the country's air space, and authorized the use of
all necessary measures to protect civilians, as well as
tightening sanctions on the Qadhafi regime.
As Qadhafi's troops pushed toward Benghazi, a city of
nearly 700,000 people, Qadhafi again defined the international
community, declaring ``We will have no mercy and no pity.''
Based on his decades-long history of brutality, we had little
choice but to take him at his word. Stopping a potential
humanitarian disaster of massive proportion became a question
of hours and not days.
On March 18, the day after the Security Council resolution,
the President, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Clinton discussed
and consulted with you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, and others,
the leadership of the Congress, to explain our perspective on
these issues, and then we acted decisively to prevent a
potential massacre.
All of this has been accomplished consistent with President
Obama's pledge to the American people that the American
military role would be limited, that we would not put ground
troops into Libya, that we would focus our unique capabilities
on the front end of the operation and then transfer
responsibility to our allies and partners.
As we meet, the North Atlantic Council, the NAC, with
coalition partners fully at the table, has taken on full
responsibility for all of the United Nations' mandated action
against Libya, including enforcing the no-fly zone, policing an
arms embargo in the Mediterranean, and carrying out targeted
air strikes as part of the U.N. mandate to take all necessary
action to protect civilians.
As NATO assumes command and control of military operations,
we are confident the coalition will keep pressure on Qadhafi's
remaining forces until he fully complies with the terms of
Resolution 1973.
We became involved in this effort because America has, as
the President said on Monday night and you, Mr. Chairman, have
just reinforced, an important strategic interest in achieving
this objective. A massacre could drive tens of thousands of
additional refugees across Libya's borders, putting enormous
strains on the peaceful, yet fragile, transitions in Egypt and
Tunisia. It would undercut democratic aspirations across the
region and embolden repressive leaders to believe that violence
is the best strategy to cling to power. It would undermine the
credibility of the United Nations Security Council and its
ability to uphold global peace and security.
Now, many have asked--Senator Lugar, you have asked--why
Libya and not in other cases where we have seen force used
against civilians? The President explained on Monday night,
``In this particular country, Libya, at this particular moment,
we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific
scale. We had a unique ability to stop that violence, an
international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to
join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help
from the Libyan people themselves. We also had the ability to
stop Qadhafi's forces in their tracks without putting American
troops on the ground.''
I'd also like to say a word about three nonmilitary tracks
that are crucial to the President's strategy. First on the
humanitarian front, we are working with NATO, the EU, the U.N.,
and others, especially Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Gulf
States, to ensure that aid gets to the people who need it,
including the victims of Qadhafi's violence and the refugees.
The U.S. Government is providing $47 million to meet
humanitarian needs and support the work of NGOs on the ground.
The second track is to continue ratcheting up pressure and
further isolating Colonel Qadhafi and his associates. The
contact group that met in London on Monday sent a strong
international message that we must move forward with a
representative democratic transition, that Qadhafi has lost the
legitimacy to lead and must go.
But President Obama has been equally clear that our
military operation has a narrowly defined mission that does not
include regime change. If we try to overthrow Qadhafi by force,
our coalition could splinter. It might require deploying U.S.
troops on the ground and could significantly increase the
chances of civilian casualties. As the President has said,
we've been down this road before and we know the potential for
unexpected costs and unforeseen dangers.
The approach we are pursuing in Libya has succeeded before,
as we saw in the Balkans and Kosovo. Our military intervention
in Kosovo was also carefully focused on civilian protection and
not regime change. That military operation ended with Milosevic
withdrawing his forces from Kosovo. But our effort to support
democracy and human rights in Serbia did not end there. We kept
up the political and economic pressure, and 1 year after the
military operation ended the people of Serbia ousted Milosevic
and then turned him over to The Hague.
So we're moving ahead aggressively with nonmilitary
measures aimed at isolating Qadhafi and those who continue to
enable him, such as escalating financial pressure through
vigorous enforcement of international sanctions authorized
under the two Security Council resolutions.
In London we saw growing international consensus and
political and diplomatic pressure to this end. We've seen the
impact of the strategy just in the last 24 hours with the
defection of Libyan Foreign Minister, Musa Kusa, and the
defection of the former Libyan U.N. Ambassador, Ambassador
Teki.
That brings me to the third track, supporting the
legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people. As in Egypt and
Tunisia, we hope to see a democratic transition in Libya
through a broadly inclusive process that reflects the will and
protects the rights of the Libyan people. Now, we know this
won't be easy, but we appreciate the strong commitment that the
council has made in its statements, especially in the last
several days, committing to democratic ideals and its explicit
rejection of terrorism and extremist organizations, including
al-Qaeda.
In London, the international community agreed to establish
a contact group that will coordinate activity and provide broad
political guidance on the full range of efforts under
Resolutions 1970 and 1973. We're pleased that Qatar will host
the first meeting of this contact group.
So there is progress to report. But we are under no
illusions about the dangers and challenges that remain. We know
that Qadhafi is unlikely to give up power easily and that the
regime still has substantial military capacity. This is a
critical moment for Libya, for the international community, and
the United States. We're eager to continue our close
consultations with you about the way forward and hope to have
your support, and I look forward to our dialogue this
afternoon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg
Good afternoon. I want to thank Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member
Lugar for inviting me today. I am grateful for this opportunity to
update you and answer your questions.
In his speech on Monday night, President Obama laid out our goals
and our strategy in Libya and the wider Middle East. On Tuesday,
Secretary Clinton met with our allies and partners in London, as well
as with representatives of the Libyan Transitional National Council,
and yesterday she and Secretary Gates briefed members of both the House
and Senate. I am pleased to be here to underline their comments and to
continue the valuable and important exchange between the administration
and the Congress that has been ongoing since shortly after Colonel
Qadhafi's regime began to resort to violence against its own people.
Let me begin by reviewing why we are a part of this broad
international effort. As the President said, ``the United States has
played a unique role as an anchor of global security and advocate for
human freedom. When our interests and values are at stake, we have a
responsibility to act.''
This crisis began when the Libyan people took to the streets in
peaceful protest to demand their universal human rights. Colonel
Qadhafi's security forces responded with extreme violence. Military
jets and helicopter gunships attacked people who had no means to defend
themselves against assaults from the air. There were reports of
government agents raiding homes and even hospitals to round up or kill
wounded protestors, of indiscriminate killings, arbitrary arrests, and
torture as Qadhafi's forces began a full-scale assault on cities that
were standing up against his dictatorial rule.
The U.N. Security Council responded by unanimously approving
Resolution 1970 on February 26, which demands an end to the violence
and refers the situation
to the International Criminal Court while imposing a travel ban and
assets freeze on the family of Muammar al-Qadhafi, and certain
Government officials. Rather
than respond to the international community's demand for an end to the
violence, Qadhafi's forces continued their brutal assault.
With this imminent threat bearing down on them, the people of Libya
appealed to the world for help. The GCC and the Arab League called for
the establishment of a no-fly zone. Acting with partners in NATO, the
Arab World, and the African members of the Security Council, we passed
Resolution 1973 on March 17. It demanded an immediate cease-fire in
Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which
it said might constitute ``crimes against humanity,'' imposed a ban on
all flights in the country's airspace, authorized the use of all
necessary measures to protect civilians, and tightened sanctions on the
Qadhafi regime and entities it owns or controls, including the National
Oil Corp. and its subsidiaries. As his troops pushed toward Benghazi, a
city of nearly 700,000 people, Qadhafi again defied the international
community, declaring, ``We will have no mercy and no pity.'' Based on
his decades-long history of brutality, we had little choice but to take
him at his word. Stopping a potential humanitarian disaster of massive
proportions became a question of hours, not days.
And so we acted decisively to prevent a potential massacre. We
established a no-fly zone, stopped Qadhafi's army from their advance on
Benghazi, expanded the coalition, responded to the humanitarian crisis
in Libya and in its neighboring countries, and now have transferred
command of the military effort to NATO.
All this has been accomplished consistent with President Obama's
pledge to the American people that our military role would be limited,
that we would not put ground troops into Libya, that we would focus our
unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and then transfer
responsibility to our allies and partners. The President defined the
military mission succinctly at the outset, ``The international
community made clear that all attacks against civilians had to stop;
Qadhafi had to stop his forces from advancing on Benghazi; pull them
back from Ajdabiya, Misrata, and Zawiya; and establish water,
electricity, and gas supplies to all areas. Finally, humanitarian
assistance had to be allowed to reach the people of Libya.''
As we meet, the North Atlantic Council with coalition partners
fully at the table, has taken on full responsibility for all United
Nations-mandated action against Libya, that includes enforcing a no-fly
zone, policing an arms embargo in the Mediterranean, and carrying out
targeted airstrikes, as part of the U.N. mandate to ``take all
necessary action'' to protect civilians.
As NATO assumes command and control of military operations, we are
confident this coalition will keep the pressure on Qadhafi's remaining
forces until he fully complies with the terms of Resolution 1973. The
United States will continue supporting our allies and partners in this
effort.
We became involved in this effort because America has an important
strategic interest in achieving this objective. A massacre could drive
tens of thousands of additional refugees across Libya's borders,
putting enormous strains on the peaceful--yet fragile--transitions in
Egypt and Tunisia. It would undercut democratic aspirations across the
region and embolden repressive leaders to believe that violence is the
best strategy to cling to power. It would undermine the credibility of
the United Nations Security Council and its ability to uphold global
peace and security. That is why this administration concluded that
failure to act in Libya would have carried too great a price for
America and why we will remain vigilant and focused on the mission at
hand.
I would like to focus on three nonmilitary tracks that are crucial
to the President's strategy: delivering desperately needed humanitarian
assistance; pressuring and isolating the Qadhafi regime through robust
sanctions and other measures; and supporting the Libyan people as they
work to achieve their legitimate democratic aspirations.
First, on the humanitarian front, we are working with NATO, the EU,
the U.N., and other international organizations and regional partners--
especially Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and the Gulf States--to ensure aid
gets to the people who need it, including victims of Qadhafi's violence
and the many refugees who have fled from their homes and jobs. The U.S.
Government is providing $47 million to meet humanitarian needs and
support the work of NGOs on the ground. We're supporting relief centers
on the borders, repatriating third country nations back to their homes,
and providing food, nonfood and medical items to those in need. The
coalition military campaign is making it possible for more help to get
through to people in Libya itself. For example, a convoy organized by
the World Food Programme was able to reach Benghazi this weekend with
18 tons of supplies, including food and blankets.
The second track is to continue ratcheting up pressure and further
isolating Colonel Qadhafi and his associates. The Contact Group sent a
strong, international message that we must move forward with a
representative, democratic transition and that Qadhafi has lost the
legitimacy to lead, and must go.
But President Obama has been equally firm that our military
operation has a narrowly defined mission that does not include regime
change. If we tried to overthrow Qadhafi by force, our coalition could
splinter. It might require deploying U.S. troops on the ground and
could significantly increase the chances of civilian casualties. As the
President said, we have been down this road before and we know the
potential for unexpected costs and unforeseen dangers.
The approach we are pursuing has succeeded before, in the Balkans.
Our military intervention in Kosovo was also carefully focused on
civilian protection and not regime change. The military operation ended
with Milosevic withdrawing his forces from Kosovo. But an effort to
support democracy and human rights in Serbia did not end there. We kept
up the political and economic pressure and 1 year after the military
operation ended, the people of Serbia ousted Milosevic and then turned
him over to The Hague.
So we are moving ahead aggressively with nonmilitary measures aimed
at isolating Qadhafi and those who continue to enable him, such as
escalating financial pressure through the vigorous enforcement of an
international sanctions regime authorized under Security Council
Resolutions 1970 and 1973. At the same time, we are continuing to
implement our own domestic sanctions and are working with our
international counterparts on sanctions implementation, monitoring, and
enforcement. In London, we saw growing international consensus and
political and diplomatic pressure toward this end.
And that brings me to the third track: supporting the legitimate
aspirations of the Libyan people. As in Egypt and Tunisia, we hope to
see a democratic transition in Libya through a broadly inclusive
process that reflects the will and protects the rights of the Libyan
people. This won't be easy. Four decades of Qadhafi's rule have left
Libya fractured and without strong institutions or civil society--
crucial building blocks of successful democracy. The Qadhafi regime has
exploited assets that rightfully belong the Libyan people, diminishing
their opportunities for economic opportunity and growth. In London,
Secretary Clinton met with a senior representative of the Transitional
National Council to discuss how we can support this process. The
Secretary also stressed that the United States will join the
international community in our commitment to the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and national unity of Libya. For its part, the
Council has publicly stated its commitment to democratic ideals and its
rejection of terrorism and extremist organizations, including al-Qaeda.
Now we are moving forward on all three of these tracks with a
growing coalition of allies and partners. In London, the international
community agreed to establish a Contact Group that will coordinate
activity and provide broad political guidance on the full range of
efforts under Resolutions 1970 and 1973. We are pleased that Qatar will
host the first meeting.
So there is considerable progress to report. But we are under no
illusions about the dangers and challenges that remain. Qadhafi is
unlikely to give up power quickly or easily. The regime still has
substantial military capacity and continues offensive operations in
Misrata and elsewhere.
This is a critical moment--for Libya, the international community,
and the United States. We are eager to continue our close consultations
with you about the way forward and hope to have your support. I look
forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary.
What could you share with the committee about the breadth
of the knowledge of the opposition at this point in time and
your sense of their defined platform/direction?
Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Chairman, we've had increasingly
intensive conversations with the Transnational National Council
and other opposition forces both in and outside of Libya over
the past several weeks. The Secretary has met several times
with one of the leaders of the Transnational National Council.
We've had an opportunity to have others, including yourself,
who have had these dialogues. And we've begun to have dialogues
with them in Libya as well.
We're in the process of sending our own special
representative into Libya to deepen those conversations. I
think we are growing to know them better. There's obviously a
diverse group of people there. But what we have seen through
this dialogue is a strong recognition on their part that
there's an expectation that to continue to have the support of
the international community they need to demonstrate their
openness to a broad democratic process, to inclusiveness, to
representation, a recognition that the international community
and especially the United States will be watching to make sure
that the values that we are seeking to support are really
carried out by those forces.
We recognize that part of the reason that we have taken
this step-by-step approach to engagement and the decision thus
far not to fully recognize them as the Government of Libya is a
part of making sure that we have a full appreciation and
understanding of just what their path is.
But I do put significance in the statements they've issued.
We obviously want to make sure that their actions reflect that
as well.
The Chairman. What would you say concomitantly about the
military component and the military leadership at this point?
Mr. Steinberg. I think it's fair to say, Mr. Chairman,
although I would obviously, not being a professional in the
matter, would want to defer to some extent to our military
colleagues, that this is a group with limited military
capability. Some of them come from the Libyan military itself,
but many of them are just courageous individuals who are trying
to defend something, the values that they hold for themselves
and their families.
I think one of the challenges going ahead is to understand
just how they can become an effective force. I think it's also
important to state, because I know there's been a lot of focus
on the council itself, that this intervention is not on behalf
of the council. This is an intervention on behalf of the Libyan
people, to stop the massacre and to create the conditions for a
true democratic transition.
We see the council as an important expression of that, but
this is not the United States taking the sides of one group or
another, but rather supporting this broader goal of the
democratic aspirations of the people of Libya.
The Chairman. Well, when you talk about sort of the broad
aspirations of the Libyan people, is it your conviction at this
point and do you have evidence that in effect both groups
represent the broad aspirations of the Libyan people? Both
groups, the opposition political and the military components.
Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Chairman, I think it's obviously
difficult in a situation where there's been the kind of
repression that Qadhafi has undertaken and the fact that many
people within the country are under military siege and don't
have an opportunity to fully participate. But what has
impressed us is the recognition by the members of the council
that they do need to reach out, that they should not be kind of
a self-appointed group that's deciding the future for others,
but recognize that as they move forward they want to include
larger voices and broader cross-sections of the Libyan
population.
So I think that that's what's significant here, is they're
doing what they can under the circumstances that they are, but
the fact that they have recognized the need to broaden their
base, to try to be more inclusive, to try to find ways to reach
out to those in the west, for example, who aren't as able to
participate as those in the east, I think is a positive sign
that they understand their responsibilities and what it would
mean to move forward with a really inclusive transition.
The Chairman. You mentioned the notion of an envoy. What
would that expectation be and when might that occur?
Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Chairman, as you can imagine, for
operational security reasons I don't want to comment on the
specifics. But that we do anticipate in the very near future
that a representative from the United States to work with the
council would be able to be in Libya.
The Chairman. Now, the President sent a letter to the
majority leader and to the Speaker of the House on March 21
notifying them, as appropriately, of the introduction of armed
forces into Libya on the 19th. Sixty days past March 21 is May
20. In light of NATO's assumption of the operations in Libya
and the changed role of the United States, my question is
whether the administration will expect that by May 20 Armed
Forces of the United States of America will be engaged in,
specifically using the words of the War Powers Act, or
resolution, ``hostilities or situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.''
Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Gates has said, I
think it's impossible to forecast anything of this sort with
certainty. I can only say that, as you know and the committee
knows, we have already begun the transition. NATO has taken
over control and the role of U.S. military forces has already
begun that transition; that the President has said and
Secretary Gates has said that we envision our role being
focused on support of the others which will be conducting the
enforcement of the no-fly zone and the targeted civilian
strikes, that we are mostly focusing on support and
intelligence.
So obviously we'll have to have a continued conversation
with this committee, not just at the 60-day point, but all
throughout, as to see how that evolves.
The Chairman. Well, we anticipate obviously staying in
close touch with you on this. I asked that question because
it's relevant, needless to say, to our thinking as well as the
essential formulation of any kind of resolution. And needless
to say, I think the next days will tell more about that than
anything else, most likely.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Steinberg, there's a published article in the New
York Times this afternoon, with the headline: ``NATO Warns
Rebels Against Attacking Libyan Civilians.'' It points out that
as NATO has taken over control of air strikes in Libya, the
coalition has told the rebels that the fog of war would not
shield them from possible bombardment by NATO.
The point NATO is making is that, although the President
may have rationalized our involvement in Libya on the basis of
humanitarian concerns pertaining to civilians in Benghazi, many
Libyan civilians, even in Benghazi, have been moving out, and,
depending upon which side they are on, taking up arms, as they
attempt to involve themselves in at least some military action
in other cities of Libya.
In short, NATO is saying this has got to be a fair fight.
If those armed by the rebels attack civilians, then they're
subject to NATO bombardment. Now, that's sort of a new twist,
but it is not totally unexpected.
It simply makes my point again that we are in a situation
in which we in the United States have to be very clear, even in
the context of our role as a NATO coalition partner, precisely
why we are conducting operations in Libya and furthermore what
outcome we would see as success. Now, the President has
indicated Qadhafi must go. Secretary Clinton has discussed
other countries that might offer him exile.
But here we have a situation in which there's a civil war
going on. People are arming each other. And we know that on the
eastern side of the country, a fair number of persons are now
armed, and while these are supposedly Libyan civilians, they
are, in fact, rebels, some of whom were fighting against us
recently, either in Iraq or Afghanistan. These are people who
do not wish the United States well.
Now, at the end of the day it may be the will of the
President and the Congress that Libya is of sufficient
importance that we devise a military strategy to obtain the
ends that we want and achieve victory; and subsequently, try to
organize the country, find who the opposition people are in a
disparate number of cities, and bring them into some sort of
government and attempt at least to fashion, if not nation-
building, a more stable situation there.
If so, this would be a road we have been traveling in two
other instances recently. But in the initial planning, I don't
see this sort of strategy being developed thus far. That being
said, our goals in Libya remain unclear, which is why continued
dialogue with the administration, both in the context of this
hearing and otherwise, is very important.
We all have a stake in this. It's not my purpose to try to
make life difficult for you or the President. However, I do
believe that this committee must raise substantive and
sometimes difficult questions, even with regard to the nature
of our alliance with NATO and the passing over of authority.
Now, at what point do you believe it's possible that the
administration will come forward with a comprehensive plan of
what we believe should occur in Libya, one that clearly answers
questions with regard to our own forces, our allies, our goals,
a definition of success, potential budgets to pay both for the
war inself and any efforts following its conclusion, and
finally, also attempts to gain the support of the American
people behind this endeavor?
Without such a plan, I fear this will not be the last
unusual headline to appear in the New York Times or elsewhere
which details that hostilities have taken very unusual turns
and that the United States has not made clear a definition of
success in Libya. This seems to me to require really intensive
thought at this particular point.
Do you have some general agreement with that proposition?
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Obviously, we very
much appreciate your focus on this. You've been a great leader
and an advocate for a strong role for the United States in the
world, but a careful role in the world, and we take that very
seriously.
I can't comment on this New York Times headline, to be
honest. I don't recognize that as ringing particularly in terms
of anything that I've heard before and, with all respect for
the Times, I don't think I necessarily know what they think
they're getting at with that. So let me answer your question
more broadly.
I think that what is very clear in our engagement with the
opposition forces is, first, we do expect them to avoid any
humanitarian disasters on their part, that they have an
absolute obligation to protect civilians, that they should not
in any sense endanger civilians. That is something we would
hold anybody to.
Senator Lugar. What happens if they don't agree with that?
This is the point of the story now. NATO is saying we could
bomb them.
Mr. Steinberg. But again, Mr. Chairman, I think that one of
the--what I was going to go on to say was that one of the
reasons we are engaging with the opposition is because I
believe the fact that we are involved along with our NATO
partners actually allows us to shape this. And I think one of
the deeper interests that we have here--and both of you have
alluded to this--is how this turns out, because there is a
conflict going on there. And we want this outcome to be one
that is looking positively toward the United States, positively
toward the values that we support, creating more rather than
less stability in the region.
And by being engaged, by being supportive of the legitimate
aspirations of the Libyan people and working to defend them
against these humanitarian catastrophes, I think the chances, I
believe the President and the Secretary believe, the chances
that we will get the kind of outcome that you want to see is
much greater than if we leave them to their own, because if
they do this with the rest of the world turning the back on
them who will come to their support?
We've seen others who we don't wish well saying, well, they
want to try to take this over and see this as an avatar of
their goals, whether it's forces of extremists or other
countries. So I think there is an opportunity here for us to
shape this, to engage with the constructive elements that are
there that want to be associated, that want to embrace the
values that were in the Transnational National Council's
statement.
So I think we can't guarantee anything going forward, but I
think the best chances of having an outcome, of preventing
extremism from taking hold in Libya as this moves forward, is
precisely by having engagement.
I think, going on to your broader question, part of the
reason we've done this as an international coalition is that we
don't have the full burden and responsibility for this. We've
already turned over and our costs and role on the military side
has already begun to decline. Similarly in terms of the support
for the opposition. It's critically important that this is not
just a made-in-Washington effort, that this is something that
we're doing with our allies, with the contact group.
The contact group discussions yesterday--Monday--were not
just about the military operations. It was how all these
countries can come together to support that. I think that again
leads to a much greater chance of an outcome.
So in terms of the objectives, you've raised all the right
questions. I think--we hope we've begun to answer those in
terms of what we're trying to achieve, what the specific role
of the military forces is, what the other tools are. And
obviously we look forward to a more extensive conversation with
you and your colleagues.
Senator Lugar. Well, we thank you again for your
distinguished service.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar, we hope you'll feel better.
You're making us all feel sick.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I admire your stay at the State
Department. I'm actually going to miss you when you go.
Syracuse is going to end up being a lot better off as a result.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, sir.
Senator Menendez. I sponsored the resolution supporting a
no-fly zone with Senator Kirk. I get it. I understand and fully
agree with the need to stop a massacre. I acknowledge that we
could have seen a tremendous outflow of refugees into Egypt
trying to avoid the impending massacre, and all of the
challenges that would have presented in the transition there.
What I don't get, however, is how we reconcile that with
your statement that we are not seeking regime change, when the
contact group has sent a strong international message that we
must move forward with a representative democratic transition
and that Qadhafi has lost the legitimacy to lead and must go.
So if Qadhafi has lost his legitimacy and must go, but our
effort is not regime change, are you suggesting that, in fact,
we can reconcile those and would accept Qadhafi's continued
rule as having met our aspirations in this respect?
Mr. Steinberg. No, sir. As I tried to make clear in my
opening statement, what I said was that the military operation,
that is the strikes themselves, are not--the test of their
success will not be regime change; but as was the case in
Kosovo and Serbia, that we have other tools available to us as
we carry forward.
So after 78 days of bombing in Kosovo, we ended the
military operation because we had achieved the humanitarian
objective, but----
Senator Menendez. Our ultimate goal, not through the
military exercise, but our ultimate goal is to see Qadhafi
leave?
Mr. Steinberg. Correct, absolutely.
Senator Menendez. Now I understand it, when you phrase it
that way.
Now, in respect to the Transitional National Council, many
voices have been raised in concern with there allegedly being
al-Qaeda and other elements within it. I read in your statement
that the council has publicly stated its commitment to
democratic ideals, and its rejection of terrorism and extremist
organizations, including al-Qaeda.
What is our depth of certainty as to that view?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I think it's growing as we deepen
our involvement there. A number of members of the
administration have spoken to that. I think that the general
judgment is that we--first of all, this movement was not
impelled by al-Qaeda in the first place; and that we don't see
at the moment a significant presence there.
It's something we obviously have to be alert to. It's
something that we have to understand better. And we also have
made very clear that our continued ability to engage with and
be supportive depends on seeing in deed as well as in word the
kinds of commitments that they've made there.
But I think, as I said to Senator Lugar, I think the more
we're involved the better chance there is that those who might
try to hijack it, whether it's Iran or al-Qaeda, will be kept
on the sidelines because the forces that want to be associated
with democracy and freedom and the kinds of values that we
share will be seen as having the support of the United States,
of NATO, and others.
So I think that the goal here is we have an opportunity for
movement which was not impelled by these forces to make sure,
or at least to substantially increase, the chances that it
doesn't go in that direction.
Senator Menendez. I would hope that we learn our lessons
from history. We don't want to end up arming another Taliban.
So at the end of the day I assume that we are using every
intelligence tool we have to ascertain the nature of this
council's membership.
Mr. Steinberg. I would just say--I won't comment
specifically on intelligence matters, but that's obviously a
priority for us.
Senator Menendez. Now, on a related matter, as you may
know, I have been pursuing with other colleagues from the
committee the issue of Libya and Qadhafi's engagement with the
bombing of Pan Am 103. The former Libyan Justice Minister
Mustafa Abdel-Jalil has indicated that he has evidence that
shows that Qadhafi personally ordered the attack on Pan Am 103
that killed 270 people, including 34 New Jerseyans.
Qadhafi is also suspected of being behind the 1985 attacks
by gunmen at the airports in Rome and Geneva that killed 19
innocent travelers, and wounded approximately 140, including an
11-year-old American child.
My question is what steps is the Department taking to
ensure that we take this moment--I know that there's a bigger
issue here, but we can do multiple things at once, I would
hope, as the greatest country on the face of the Earth--to
collect the evidence about the Pan Am bombing and other
terrorist acts perpetuated and financed by Qadhafi that the
former justice minister or other former Libyan officials may
have? What are we doing specifically?
My second question relates to the recent defection of the
Foreign Minister, Musa Kusa. He may very well likely have had a
hand in the planning of the Pan Am bombing. I am concerned that
a man who at a minimum may be responsible for countless deaths
and human rights abuses in Libya saw the writing on the wall
and found it to be in his best interests to switch sides at a
propitious time for himself and try to insert himself in a
powerful role within the Transitional National Council.
Do we intend to investigate his role in the Pan Am 103
bombing and, if so, are we ready in both of these cases to,
one, amass the evidence, and, two, use that evidence?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, we are working with the Justice
Department on the questions about how we can get additional
information about accountability on this and take advantage of
all the new information that is emerging out of this. Because
it's, as you will understand, related to grand jury and other
investigations, it's difficult for me to be more specific than
that. But it is----
Senator Menendez. I don't want you to give me specifics and
I know all about grand juries. The question is are we making it
a priority to ensure that we take advantage of this opportunity
to get information and evidence that could be brought to court,
whether in the International Criminal Court or even in the
courts of the United States?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I think, as you know, this is
something that Secretary Clinton takes very personally, and she
has been very focused on this issue and we've made clear with
our colleagues and others in our own engagement that we expect
and we are focused on that.
On the issue of Musa Kusa, one of the things I think that's
important to recognize and was emphasized by the British
Foreign Secretary in his statement today is that no offers of
immunity have been given to Musa Kusa and that they do intend
to make him available to authorities for information. So the
answer is yes, we are pursuing this. Yes, we think it's
important. We have a very strong commitment to the Pan Am 103
families and others to make sure that all the information comes
out and that it falls to its logical conclusion.
We also have the very strong mandate of the Security
Council, which has established a frame of reference for all
this to the International Court of Justice, as well as our own
criminal proceedings.
Senator Menendez. Well, my time has expired. I just want to
say that I hope that when this chapter has passed I won't have
someone here from the State Department or the Justice
Department telling me how we lost the opportunity to document
whatever evidence could be deduced from these individuals as to
the involvement of Qadhafi and others in the killing of U.S.
citizens.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for having
this hearing.
Mr. Steinberg, thank you for your service. I very much
appreciate it.
I know there's been reference made about the congressional
schedule and all that. I do hope that everyone in the
administration knows that if we're going to begin a war all of
us are glad to catch a flight back to Washington and talk about
it. I hope the congressional schedule won't be used again as a
discussion point.
At the same time, I do appreciate the fact that the
administration tried to build a coalition. I know a lot of
people have criticized that. I think that was a good move. I
know it's one of the most narrow coalitions that we've built in
recent times. But we did build it and I know that we are
turning over activities.
I think here's the question that a lot of us have. You
know, we look at what happened in Afghanistan. We basically had
a very narrow mission. In the beginning it was in some ways
about one person. And let's face it. We can talk about narrowed
mission in Afghanistan all we wish, but by the time it's all
said and done we will have engaged in one of the most mammoth
state, nation-building efforts in modern history. I mean,
that's what we're doing there right now, is we have a huge,
mammoth state and nation-building effort under way today.
So we look at--we look at Libya. We began talking about a
no-fly zone. Within 48 hours, a no-drive zone. Now we're
reading news reports of CIA being on the ground. I think a lot
of us have this question. I mean, the old adage that's become a
cliche: If you break it, you own it. We're talking about not
taking Qadhafi out militarily, but I think the administration's
hoping at this point to get lucky and he leaves or maybe
slightly less lucky and he's assassinated through covert
operations or some other type of activities, but he's gone.
The question is, What kind of discussions have we had
relating to nation-building there? I mean, there are no
democratic institutions. Where do we go once he leaves? What
have we talked about with our allies as far as our commitments
on the ground, and can it become much like what we've seen in
Afghanistan?
Mr. Steinberg. Well, thank you, Senator. I think we
certainly see this as more than a question of just getting
lucky in terms of his leaving. Part of the reason I come back
to the analogy of Milosevic and Serbia is because I do think we
have some experience about some of the tools that can be used
and, although I don't want to overstate the significance of the
two defections that we saw today, the fact that the Foreign
Minister and the former U.N. Ambassador at this stage of events
have now decided to break from the regime is at least some sign
that there is internally concerns about what's going on there.
We intend to continue that pressure, to make clear that
there are consequences and that people will be held to it. And
we believe that this is a strategy that can lead to success.
In terms of the nation-building dimension, I think one of
the things that the President is very conscious about is the
limited commitment that we have made and the fact that within 2
weeks of beginning this military operation we have already
begun to scale down our engagement I think is a strong
reflection of his strong conviction about the kind of role the
United States should play.
One of the reasons why this meeting in London was so
important was not simply on the military side to facilitate the
transition to NATO, but also on the civilian and political
side, to engage the broader international community, to have a
contact group which is not chaired by the United States but by
Europeans and Arabs, who are going to take the principal
responsibility for carrying that forward.
I think we do have a role to play. As I said, we've done
$47 million in humanitarian assistance. There may be other
kinds of democracy assistance that it would make sense for us
to continue to play. But I do think this is one in which we
recognize that the United States can play a supportive role,
that it's useful for us to be part of this overall effort, but
we are not taking the kind of responsibility that we have in
other circumstances.
Senator Corker. So we've had zero discussions about our
involvement in building democratic institutions post-Qadhafi,
whenever that occurs?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, the conversations began in London in
terms of the role of this contact group, the role that the EU
will play, the role that the U.N. will play. The reason for
creating this contact group is to create a body that isn't
dependent on the United States to plan this, but rather for
other partners to take a key role in shaping this so that
there's an understanding that as they help shape this that they
have a responsibility for the financial resources behind it.
Senator Corker. So we started this no-fly zone to make it a
fair fight, and my understanding is we're pulling out our A-10s
and our AC-130s now, which basically--again, we started no-fly
zone, then it became a no-drive zone, and it appears that we
feel like we've now made it a fair fight. If Qadhafi goes into
Misurata and starts killing folks--now he's got folks in the
back of pickup trucks with machine guns, just like the
opposition does--and we are able to watch this on television,
what is the--I guess I'm confused as to what our goals are, if
we see that happening on the ground, which likely--I mean, it
certainly is a possibility now--what is going to be our
response?
Mr. Steinberg. A couple of points, Senator. First, as you
know, from the perspective of the administration we had
concerns about only a no-fly zone. So from our perspective we
never had a no-fly zone that then converted to something else.
We worked very hard in the Security Council resolution to
broaden that, because our concern was if we only had a no-fly
zone that we would encounter precisely the situation that you
describe, that we would be taking his planes out of the action
but he would be able to mass armor and commit the kind of
atrocities that we're afraid of.
So I think we were very pleased that we were able to
fashion the Security Council resolution in a way that did have
that broad authority so we didn't have some of the dangers that
you first--you identified.
Second, we don't define the mission as a fair fight. We
define the mission as preventing these massive humanitarian
attacks on civilians by Qadhafi, and that is what the focus is.
And that is something that continues to be within the mandate
of NATO and that is within both the mission that NATO has
adopted and the role that the NATO forces that include both
allies and others, to actually implement. And the NATO
commanders will have a set of rules of engagement and a concept
of operations as events unfold, if they see those kinds of
events unfolding, within the mandate that they----
Senator Corker. So we have 700,000 folks in Misurata and
now everybody's kind of fighting the same way, out of the back
of pickups and Toyotas. So again, I don't see how you do that
from the air if he goes into Misurata and starts killing folks,
which it seems to be that's where he's headed right now. How do
we prevent that with our NATO forces when we do it strictly
from the air?
Mr. Steinberg. I think the mission that we agreed to, that
NATO agreed to, and that was authorized by the Security Council
resolution is to prevent the kind of massive attacks that we
were concerned about in Benghazi. We have--as I say, that's the
military mission. But there's the broader mission. We recognize
that ultimately the security and safety and the stability of
Libya does depend on Qadhafi and his team going, and that's why
we have a broader set of tools.
But, as Secretary Gates has said several times over the
last few days, we have more than just the hammer in the tool
chest. The hammer is one piece of it. It can stop the most
egregious attacks, like the air campaign by Qadhafi, like
massed armor. It doesn't stop all of it, but there are other
tools that we have available and we believe that the combined
application of all of those tools can be successful in the
mission.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I do want to say
I thought that the briefing we had yesterday--I thought both
Secretaries handled themselves very professionally, and I
thought that was an outstanding hearing. And I appreciate the
way the administration has tried to build a coalition.
I'm one Senator who has witnessed Afghanistan up close and
personal several times and have seen huge mission creep and
evolving reasons for our involvement, and I guess I'm just
expressing concern about--I don't think anybody has really
thought through the end game yet. I'm not saying that maybe we
even can at this point, but it is of great concern watching the
mission creep that we've had in the past.
But I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Steinberg, thank you for your service. I have
really enjoyed working with you and I know that it will
continue, and thank you for your public service and wish you
well.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. I think Senator Corker expresses the view
of many of us, as does Senator Menendez. We're all very pleased
by the way the administration engaged the international
community. I think we all want to take action against the type
of brutality that Colonel Qadhafi represents and save innocent
lives. And the administration was able to work with the
international community and we think that's the only way this
could have worked. So I applaud you on that.
I also am pleased to see that other nations are stepping
forward to take the major leadership role. I think that's
extremely important and I agree with what you've done.
I do think that Senator Corker expresses a view of many of
us in the Senate and that is whether the mission is clear
enough that it won't change the role in which the international
community participates in Libya. As you were saying, talking
about the rebels, we're getting to learn more about them. A lot
of us are concerned as to what happens when Colonel Qadhafi
leaves. Do we have a responsible group of people that are
prepared to step forward to lead Libya, and what do they look
like and who are they, what are their backgrounds, and will it
be some retreads of people who were part of the atrocities in
Libya? That's some of the issues that I hope we will have more
confidence as the coalition moves forward.
Can you share with us some of the requests that you're
getting from the representatives of the opposition? There's
been reports that they want military supplies, that they want
training, they want different things. Can you tell us what some
of their requests have been?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I think it's fair to say they've
requested almost anything you could imagine that one might want
under these circumstances. And we obviously take their requests
very seriously. What we're trying to do is evaluate them, not
just ourselves, but with our partners, in terms of what makes
sense under the current set of circumstances, what they can use
effectively, how that will affect the overall set of
circumstances, how we can avoid unintended consequences,
particularly if it should come to the issue of military
equipment, and making sure that that doesn't go to purposes
that we would not be comfortable with.
I think we recognize in these circumstances that, on the
one hand, the situation is time-urgent. At the same time, we do
want to do this deliberately and not do this in ways that would
lead to unintended consequences. That's part of the reason why
we have this intensified engagement with the opposition.
As I said earlier, I think we believe very strongly that we
have a much better chance of shaping how this group evolves and
how the future evolves for Libya if we're part of it and that
they see that a decent amount of support from countries in NATO
and other countries in the region can lead them to feel that
they will have support to pursue a moderate course and not
allow this to be hijacked by extremist groups.
But we are certainly engaged with them on the humanitarian
side, on the possibility of nonlethal assistance, and there is
a discussion as to whether other assistance may make sense.
Senator Cardin. Well, and I certainly understand those
types of requests. But as I think you understand, as you're
explaining, that how the international community responds to
those requests, particularly with the United States
participation, could very well affect the perceived mission
here. So I would encourage you to consult closely with us as
these issues unfold.
I want to go to a second subject. We all understand that
one of the major reasons why international action was needed
was to prevent the massive migration of people from Libya to
other countries that could have caused major problems for other
countries. However, there has been reports by the International
Organization for Migration that there already has been a
significant amount of migration from Libya to avoid the
conflict and avoid the violence.
Do you have any information or could you provide us any
information as to the magnitude of individuals who have been
displaced as a result of the conflict in Libya?
Mr. Steinberg. I do have that, Senator. If you wouldn't
mind, I'd prefer to provide it more precisely for the record.
But I can check my notes here if you'd like me to.
Senator Cardin. If you provide it for the record, that
would be fine.
[Editor's note.--At the time this hearing went to press the
requested information had not been provided.]
Senator Cardin. I would also like to know whether there has
been any discussions in the international coalition as to
whether there will be assistance provided to other countries in
regards to migrations from Libya or whether there's other
efforts being made in order to bring in some of the
international organizations that deal with refugee issues.
Mr. Steinberg. As you mentioned, Senator, and you know well
from your own work, the IOM and others, the U.N. Commission on
Refugees and others, are deeply involved in this, and we've
been actively engaged with them. So in addition to our own
direct assistance, IOM, HCR and others, have been supportive.
They have additional appeals coming out for their work there.
So I think there will be a need for support both directly to
the international organizations and to the affected countries,
and that's an area that we've been very focused on.
Senator Cardin. Let me just underscore this. In Iraq those
issues were not dealt with for the longest period of time and
still have not been satisfactorily dealt with, causing
significant burdens in Jordan and Syria and other countries.
These issues need to be gotten on immediately rather than
sitting there for months or years causing significant problems
in stability in the region.
So I would just urge that you make that the very high
priority, to engage the international community. We do have
organizations that are prepared to help, but they need the
leadership, particularly of the coalition now that's been put
together.
Mr. Steinberg. Absolutely. I think your reference to the
Iraq situation is a very cogent one, because we obviously have
a long-term problem there that we've been struggling to get and
to make sure that we do have the resettlement, both internally
within Iraq and externally.
Just to give you what I have for right now, approximately
390,000 refugees have left Libya. That includes both Libyans
and third country nationals who have left since the conflict
began.
Senator Cardin. So there is a significant impact now.
Mr. Steinberg. Yes; no question about it.
Senator Cardin. I think we all need to understand that. We
talk about preventing massive migration, which we have as a
result of the efforts. But there is still a significant issue
today as a result of the problems.
Mr. Steinberg. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Kerry.
Mr. Steinberg, first of all I want to say that I don't want
what I'm going to say here to be taken as combative. I really
really want to support the administration on this. When we're
talking about these matters, we're all Americans and it's
important that we pull the wagon together.
But I have some--I've listened to the President. I've
listened to Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and yourself
talk about the goals that I just have real trouble reconciling.
The goals from a political standpoint is regime change, but not
a military standpoint. And then the goal of humanitarian
protection of citizens is the military objective, but not the
political objective.
I just have real trouble. I don't know who came up with
this, but for instance, if you leave Qadhafi in power and you
don't use your military might as you've already pulled the
trigger and done, how in the world can you say that you're
going to stop atrocities or protect the civilian population? If
he stays in power and this thing collapses, there's going to be
a humanitarian catastrophe there that is going to be incredibly
large, it would seem to me.
I just don't understand how you can justify these. I've
listened carefully and it's articulated that they're different,
that these are different goals. But I just can't reconcile it.
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I think what we've tried to say is
that there are many tools that are available to achieve policy
objectives and that we're trying to adapt the right tools for
the right job. The reason I've mentioned on several occasions
the situation in Kosovo is because I think we demonstrated
there that it was possible to have a limited military
intervention to stop an imminent and massive humanitarian
crisis, which we did through the air campaign in Kosovo, which
caused the end of the ethnic cleansing and the withdrawal of
Milosevic forces. But the longer campaign to restore democracy
and to get rid of Milosevic took longer, but did not depend on
military tools, and we were successful.
Similarly here, we believe that it is possible to combine
the different tools with a focus on a limited application of
force to stop the kind of aggression against civilians that
Qadhafi was taking with the broader efforts that include
economic sanctions, political pressure, and other tools that we
have that will lead to the removal of Qadhafi from power.
There's not a guarantee that it will work here, but it has
worked in the past.
So I think that's how we've tried to explain the two
together. It's not unprecedented and it has been something
which has been proved to be successful in other circumstances.
Senator Risch. Do you really believe that if we withdraw
our military might, which apparently we're going to today or
tomorrow, whenever it's going to be, and Qadhafi stays in power
and the rebels collapse, that there isn't going to be a
humanitarian slaughter there that's going to be of an epic
nature?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, the coalition isn't withdrawing its
military power. The United States is moving to a different
role, but the NATO mission and mandate stands, and that----
Senator Risch. They tell me the NATO forces don't have what
we have. They don't have the A-10s, which are absolutely
critical in this situation, from what I understand. Am I right
on that?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I used to serve as a staff member
on the Armed Services Committee, so I could pretend to go back
to my old expertise. But I'd rather defer to my military
colleagues in terms of what's needed. But I do think we believe
that NATO has the capacity to carry out this mission, and that
was the important consideration. I think SACEUR, Admiral
Stavridis, was quite insistent on making sure before he took
that on that he felt that he had the tools available to conduct
the mission.
Senator Risch. I hope you're right.
Let's move to another subject, and that is another issue
that I have real difficulty with here is who we're helping.
People have made reference to it here, but, with all due
respect, I just don't feel we've gotten a decent answer on
that. I've heard the administration say, well, we're getting to
know them better. Well, that's not good enough for me.
If we're going to start killing people on behalf of
someone, I want to not get to know them better. I want to know
who they are before the trigger is pulled. That's the
difficulty I'm having here.
Now, everybody can agree that Qadhafi is a really, really,
really, bad guy, and as a result of that I think the temptation
is to say, well, the people that are trying to get rid of him
must be OK, or at least OK. I'm not there. I'd like a better
understanding of who it is that we're helping here.
I hear about the council. I hear about different--I hear
the talk of al-Qaeda being involved. But I haven't heard names.
Who is this? What is the group? I want to look at the track
record of these people before I decide whether it's a good
thing to put American lives at risk or, for that matter,
American treasure at risk. Help me out.
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, the way we see it is we're not
intervening on behalf of the Transnational National Council.
We're intervening to stop a humanitarian massacre against the
Libyan people. We are working with these individuals who are
beginning to try to see if they can organize opposition forces,
to see if we can move them in a direction so that they are
supportive of the kinds of long-term future that we want for
Libya.
There are some who criticize----
Senator Risch. Who are they? Who are they?
Mr. Steinberg. If I could just, a little bit more.
Senator Risch. Please.
Mr. Steinberg. Some have criticized us for not formally
recognizing the council. Precisely the reason we haven't is
because before we want to move to that step we want to make
sure that they are representative, that they are consistently
supportive of the values and principles that we believe in. So
that's why what we are doing is intervening, not on behalf of
them, but for the Libyan people, and looking to see whether
this council can become a representative group that can be a
good partner for the United States in the Libyan people.
It's a diverse group of people, there's no question about
it. We have a fair amount of detail. Some of it you'll
understand we'd probably want to share with you in a closed
session. But the fact is what we have seen is a group which
understands the need to reach out to others, which has been
very explicit in its public pronouncements in support of
democratic principles and values of tolerance and moderation,
have been explicit in rejecting the idea of any support from
al-Qaeda or terrorist organizations.
Those are positive steps. We need to encourage those
things. We need to continue to make sure that what they do in
practice is consistent with those deeds. I think that's the
best way to engage with them.
Senator Risch. Is there a putative leader? Is there
somebody that stands up and says ``follow me'' and people do?
Is there a name associated with this?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, Senator, I don't think this is not a
government. This is a group of people who are coming together
to try to oppose Qadhafi, just as the democratic forces in
Egypt came together. It wasn't a single leader. There were a
number of people.
This over time we believe can lead to a process that would
lead to a representative government there. But again, the
council is an element of the various individuals and forces in
Libya trying to come together to form a different future for
the people. We haven't blessed them. We haven't said these are
the people who are the only people we'll deal with or they are
the right people to deal with.
Ultimately they will need to get the validation of their
own people to confer legitimacy on them.
Senator Risch. My time is up and I understand that. I guess
you haven't helped me out as to who these people are. I've
heard the general description that you've given, but I don't
know any more than when I sat down here as to who it is that we
have expended our treasure for to protect. Can you help me any
more?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, as I said, the people we've
expended our treasure to help are the young men and women, the
children, the mothers, of Benghazi and elsewhere who are under
attack. That is the basis of our intervention. It's not an
intervention on behalf of this group.
This group may form over time the kernel of a new
representative democracy there. We obviously want to understand
who they are and what they're doing. As I said, we could go
through individuals. Some of it we'd want to do with you in
closed session. We can talk about individuals, but I don't
think that really is what the purpose of our intervention is.
This is not two combatants where we're taking the side of one
side or the other. We are intervening on behalf of the Libyan
people, who are under attack by their own government.
Senator Risch. Put me in the column as agreeing that I also
want to find out who they are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate Senator Risch's questions because I'm going to
also talk along that line in terms of who the rebels are and
what support they have and that kind of thing. But let me just
at the outset say that I support the President and the
international community moving the way it has moved to protect
the civilian population.
But I am very worried about this whole idea of mission
creep and how we move to the next phase. I mean, is the next
phase arming the rebels? Is the next phase doing additional
things that take a side in the conflict? So I'll have a
question there.
But first of all, just to the arming the rebels. What is
the United States doing to determine the level of al-Qaeda
influence among the rebel groups and what do we know with
respect to that?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, we've made that a priority in our
engagement with them. We obviously used our own information and
sources to try to make our own judgments about that. As Admiral
Stavridis and others have said, we don't see significant al-
Qaeda presence. There obviously was some elements of al-Qaeda
in the past and we have to be attentive to make sure that they
don't come back.
We have made it very clear to the individuals that we've
been dealing with there that we expect them to be categorical
in rejecting support from or engagement with or advocacy on
behalf of terrorism, violence, or any of the extremist views
that al-Qaeda takes. I put significance on the fact that the
Transnational National Council yesterday came out with a
categorical statement rejecting any affiliation or involvement
with al-Qaeda or extremist organizations.
Now, we obviously have to make sure that's carried out in
deed as well as word. But they get the message from us about
the importance of that and, as I've said before, I think the
more we engage and are seen to support their legitimate
aspirations and to work with the progressive and tolerant
democratic forces, the better chance that what emerges in the
post-Qadhafi era will embody those things.
So we're very attentive to that concern. I think that we
see a real possibility of it moving in the direction that we
want, and we've certainly made clear to those individuals that
we're interacting with in Libya that we will have zero
tolerance for the presence of al-Qaeda there.
Senator Udall. Before we took the international step to
create a no-fly zone, was there a significant al-Qaeda presence
in Libya?
Mr. Steinberg. No, sir.
Senator Udall. No; OK.
Who is the leader or leaders of the rebel groups, and do
they assert any effective amount of control over their
fighters?
Mr. Steinberg. I think it's a very diverse group. They have
people from different walks of life. There are professionals,
there are academics, there are people who have been involved in
politics, there are people who had some involvement in the
previous regime. There are former military officials.
It's a very diverse group. There are some young people.
There are some more senior people. This is a group that has, as
we've heard from our discussions today, come together to try to
bring as much of a broad-based coordination of the opposition
to Qadhafi. But it's a work in progress and it's not a kind of
structured organization, it's not a government. I think that
they are themselves struggling to have both a sense of
political coherence and also military effectiveness.
One of the reasons that we do engage with them is to try to
understand better what their strategy is and hopefully to make
it possible for them to evolve in a way so that they can be
both more effective and also have a more coherent political
strategy going forward.
We've been encouraged by what we heard, particularly with
the Secretary's interactions with Mr. Jabril, both in Paris 2
weeks ago and in London this past week, that they are beginning
to understand the need to organize themselves, to develop a
coherent platform going forward. What we've seen in the
statements that they issued both on Monday and Tuesday is some
evidence that they're beginning to be responsive in that
respect. Again, it's a work in progress.
Senator Udall. I'd like to get you to focus on the U.N.
Resolution 1973 and the issue of shipping weapons to rebels.
There have been reports that Egypt is shipping weapons to the
Libyan rebels. Is this true and is the United States supporting
the Egyptians' movement of weapons in any way, including with
the use of taxpayer funds?
Mr. Steinberg. First, certainly not with taxpayer funds.
Second, there are a variety of reports out there, but to the
best of my knowledge we don't have any confirmed reports of
others providing lethal military assistance.
With respect to Resolution 1973, I think our position is
very clear, which is that the provisions that authorize the use
of all necessary means to civilians makes it possible--that is,
it's permissible under the resolution--to do it. But our
administration has made no decision to do that.
Senator Udall. Now, you're making the argument it's
permissible. The equally strong argument could be made that
it's not authorized in the resolution and so you cannot do so,
can it not? I mean, it's absolutely silent. I don't see--can
you point me to any language----
Mr. Steinberg. Yes; paragraph 4, which says----
Senator Udall. Do you have it in front of you, that you
could point me to the language where it says that any of the
coalition forces can specifically give arms to the rebels?
Mr. Steinberg. What it says is ``Notwithstanding any
provisions of previous resolutions, that members are authorized
to use all necessary means to achieve the objective.'' ``All
necessary means''----
Senator Udall. There's no specific authorization to give
support----
Mr. Steinberg. But ``all necessary means'' means all
necessary means. So it is our clear reading that ``all
necessary means'' means that it is not precluded. The transfer
of arms is allowed in international law except where it's
prohibited, and this clearly makes clear that it's not
prohibited.
Senator Udall. I see I'm getting close to the end of my
time here, so let me just ask one final question here. How many
of these rebels are professionals in other fields? You've given
some description. How many have died in the fighting? And how
many are there actually there fighting in Libya?
Mr. Steinberg. At that level of precision, Senator, I'd
have to ask our colleagues in the intelligence community to
give you the briefing on that. I can't give you specific
numbers.
Senator Udall. And you don't have any idea on the numbers
in terms of professionals in the field that are----
Mr. Steinberg. I think the numbers are small, but to be
more--to give you an actual number, I'd have to defer to those
who are doing the bean-counting for us in the intelligence
community.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, and thank you for your
service. I appreciate it.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary. I want to focus the questioning today
not on tactics, because this is not a military hearing. I want
to just kind of go through some of the goals. I think there
will be a debate about tactics and it probably is ongoing.
So let me begin by kind of stating the obvious, based on
your testimony. But our primary objective in this endeavor was
to prevent an imminent massacre, particularly in Benghazi,
correct?
Mr. Steinberg. Correct.
Senator Rubio. Had we not acted, would there have been a
massacre there?
Mr. Steinberg. I think, obviously, nothing is certain in
life. But Qadhafi had said that was his intention, was to show
no pity to his people.
Senator Rubio. And going forward, I think our goal remains
to prevent genocide or massacres to occur in Libya, correct?
Mr. Steinberg. Correct.
Senator Rubio. If Qadhafi survives and holds on, what are
the chances that we should take him at his own word that he'll
actually have no mercy and no pity, I think was the quote,
based on his history?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, Senator, that's why we have made
clear that our political objective here is to make sure that
Qadhafi goes.
Senator Rubio. So would you agree with the statement that
as long as Qadhafi is in control genocide and massacres is not
just a possibility, it's a real probability, at least against
his enemies?
Mr. Steinberg. I would certainly say it's a very
substantial risk; yes.
Senator Rubio. And that's how you reach the conclusion that
the ultimate goal--we can debate tactics, but the ultimate goal
is for Qadhafi to be gone from Libya?
Mr. Steinberg. Yes.
Senator Rubio. OK. Now, talk about Qadhafi for a moment.
Some of us, it's important to have this refresher history on
him. He has a long history of sponsoring terrorism, right, in a
pretty brazen way?
Mr. Steinberg. No question about it.
Senator Rubio. In fact, he is--there's reports he's been
implicated in things like assassination attempts against and
plots against other heads of state?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, without commenting on some of the
specifics, he has certainly been implicated in----
Senator Rubio. In a lot of things?
Mr. Steinberg. In a lot of activities.
Senator Rubio. Was he also--has it also been reported that
he had a weapons program, a nuclear weapons program, that he
was in the verge of acquiring at some stage, less than a decade
ago?
Mr. Steinberg. There's again no question that he had an
active nuclear weapons program. I think one of the great
successes of the past decade was the ending of that program.
But he was certainly pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
Senator Rubio. Then as far as this operation is concerned,
we, the United States forces in conjunction with an
international coalition, has attacked this guy that we've just
described, correct? And so he survives, we should expect--if he
survives this international action against him, we should
expect him to feel emboldened by the fact that he was able to
survive it.
Mr. Steinberg. Well, we haven't--I mean, the mission has
not been to attack him. The mission has been to----
Senator Rubio. His forces.
Mr. Steinberg [continuing]. To attack those forces which
were threatening----
Senator Rubio. But I'm sure he's taking it personally.
Mr. Steinberg. I don't suspect he thought it was a friendly
act.
Senator Rubio. And if he survives, not only will he be
emboldened, but is it fair to say he's probably going to be a
little bit upset? Angry maybe?
Mr. Steinberg. I think it's hard to know whether he'd be
emboldened or not. I think on the one hand he knows that we
have taken action against him. But I think whether he's
emboldened or not, that's part of the reason--we think the
threat is sufficient that we believe it would be important that
he go.
Senator Rubio. The bottom line is that at the end of all
this engagement, if he survives we are going to have on our
hands a potentially emboldened, definitely angry dictator with
a history of sponsoring terrorism and pursuing nuclear weapons
on our hands, correct?
Mr. Steinberg. Well, I wouldn't--on the nuclear weapons
thing, I would not--I couldn't make that judgment as to whether
he would feel that he was free to do that again. But I do think
that we have said that we think that we cannot envision a long-
term stable solution for Libya that involves----
Senator Rubio. I guess that's where I'm trying to arrive at
with the question. If he's able to survive and hold onto power,
what we're going to have--what the world's going to have on
their hands here is a pretty angry, I believe emboldened, guy
with a pretty bad track record; and therefore that's why it's
important that he not hold on and survive.
Mr. Steinberg. We share that view, Senator.
Senator Rubio. My last question has to do with this debate
about congressional authority and my recollection that the
Senate--and you may want to comment or maybe you know this or
don't, and I should. I believe the Senate passed a resolution
regarding a no-fly zone on March 1. The Department obviously
was aware of that and took that into consideration.
Mr. Steinberg. Yes.
Senator Rubio. When the decision was made to join this
international coalition, how far were we from this massacre,
potential massacre, likely massacre in Benghazi? Hours, I would
imagine, not----
Mr. Steinberg. Hours. I think the judgment we had was
hours, not days.
Senator Rubio. So suffice it to say that some folks
probably came to the conclusion that, given the--we're not
exactly--I've only been here a few months, but they don't
exactly set speed records here in Congress for dealing with
things. I would imagine that went into the consideration when
the decision was made to act.
Mr. Steinberg. I think, Senator, as you know, the President
brought in the leadership of both bodies. He spoke with the
chairman and the ranking member here and others of the key
committees, because he recognized that time was of the essence
and he was going to need to act quickly, but he did want to
reach out to the membership.
Senator Rubio. The bottom line is that if you had pursued
some sort of congressional authorization for the specific move
that you made, you wouldn't have had time to act to prevent--or
to be a part of this prevention of what happened, what could
have happened in Benghazi.
Mr. Steinberg. I certainly think that the exigency of time
was an important factor, correct.
Senator Rubio. My last question. I think I'm asking it just
to echo what Secretary Clinton's already said. I know the
position is that you didn't require congressional
authorization, but that you would welcome congressional
authorization.
Mr. Steinberg. Yes.
Senator Rubio. Is that still--I would imagine that's
still----
Mr. Steinberg. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thanks, Senator Rubio.
I might just mention to you, Senator, that I think that you
used words like ``survive'' and ``in control,'' and I think
there's a lot of distance here in between the way this can play
out, where there are a lot of options available that don't have
him necessarily in control at all and maybe even, like
Milosevic, it takes a little bit of time, but eventually he's
going to move. I think we need to sort of be thoughtful about
what those parameters are.
Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Steinberg, thank you. I'm sorry that I was tied up in
another meeting before I could get here.
Can you clarify? I know it's been raised by the chairman
and others. I want to understand exactly what the
administration's position is under the War Powers Act at this
moment?
Mr. Steinberg. Our position, Senator, is that the President
under these circumstances notified Congress consistent with the
War Powers Act and notification was given within 48 hours of
the beginning of hostilities. So the President under the
circumstances initiated a limited military action, but that he
did notify Congress consistent with the provisions of the act.
Senator Durbin. Under what aspect of the War Powers Act do
you believe it was a military action that was permissible?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, as I say, he acted consistent with
the War Powers Act, but the President also has constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief to engage in action,
particularly where it's limited in duration, scope, and when
the circumstances are exigent.
Senator Durbin. In the circumstances, of course, to protect
the United States or the people of the United States. Is there
another aspect of this that you would add to the list?
Mr. Steinberg. I think in the case where the President
decides it is in the interest of the United States in his
capacity as Commander in Chief, that he has the authority where
the action he contemplates is limited in scope and duration to
take those measures he feels is necessary.
Senator Durbin. And at this point do you believe that the
burden has shifted to Congress to move forward if they wish to
either consider a resolution of approval or disapproval?
Mr. Steinberg. I'm not sure I'd put it in terms of shifting
burdens, but obviously we would welcome action by Congress to
support the actions of the President.
Senator Durbin. Well, many of us have been engaged in this
debate many times.
Mr. Steinberg. Yes, sir.
Senator Durbin. And I can't think of a more awesome
responsibility that a Member of Congress faces than to consider
the authorization of this type of military action, knowing
that, even under the best of circumstances, that Americans are
risking their lives, if not losing them in the process. So we
take it very seriously.
But statements have been made by the administration that
suggest that this may be of short duration and that even before
Congress could consider, debate, and vote on a matter, that
this might be over. What is your estimate?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I think it would be imprudent to
try to predict exactly how long this will take. I do think it's
very clear that the President is committed to transfer the
primary responsibility for this military action to our allies,
both within NATO and elsewhere. We've already begun that
transition. NATO has taken control; and that we do see
ourselves in a support capacity.
I think that that's evidence of his strong intention as to
how he sees our role going forward. I think, as you know well
and as you say, it's been a long discussion, that Presidents of
both parties under exigent circumstances where the intervention
and the activity was limited have used that authority. But we
very much want to stay in consult with you. As you know, the
President reached out to the leadership on March 18 before we
felt the need to act, to make sure that there was consultation
with Congress, and we look forward to continuing that.
Senator Durbin. And who's going to pay for it?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, I think that this is a conversation
that we are actively engaged with. Secretary Gates testified
this morning about the military dimensions. On the civilian
side, up until now we've provided about $47 million in
humanitarian assistance. One of the focuses of our efforts and
Secretary Clinton's efforts in London was to strengthen the
international coalition supporting not just the military
operations, but the civilian operations as well.
Senator Durbin. That seems to bear some parallel with the
situation in Kuwait under President George Herbert Walker Bush.
Mr. Steinberg. Again, Senator, we would welcome as broad a
support for not just the military actions, but support on the
financial side as well.
Senator Durbin. Can you comment on some of the reports in
the press, specifically the Los Angeles Times, about the
tactics of the rebels, particularly in rounding up and
imprisoning certain individuals?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I've read newspaper reports. I
personally am unaware of reports to that degree. But what we
have said and we've made very clear is that, to the opposition
forces, to the Transnational Council, that we hold them to a
very high standard in terms of their own commitments to basic
human rights and to terrorism of civilians.
The fact that we have intervened on behalf of civilians to
prevent atrocities puts a special responsibility on those who
are opposing the regime to meet the highest standards.
Senator Durbin. Have we stopped the export of oil from
Libya to other nations?
Mr. Steinberg. Stopped the export? I'm not sure I can
answer that question, other than to say that if there is any
ongoing export the funds would be going to blocked accounts.
Senator Durbin. But you don't know if the oil is still
moving?
Mr. Steinberg. I would guess that it is. I don't know if my
colleagues have an answer to that. I'd have to get that for the
record. But what I do know is that the regime is not in a
position to benefit from the sale of oil.
[The answer supplied for the record to the requested
information follows:]
We are not aware of any shipments of hydrocarbons from the
territory controlled by the regime since the beginning of Operation
Odyssey Dawn. There has been one shipment of crude oil from TNC
controlled Tubruq.
Senator Durbin. Of the funds that we have secured in the
United States, over $30 billion, from the Qadhafi government
and regime--is that correct?
Mr. Steinberg. We have blocked over $30 billion. Some of it
is not resident in the United States, but because of the way
the banking system operates we are able to block those funds
even though they are not physically located here.
Senator Durbin. So is it fair to say we have control of
those funds----
Mr. Steinberg. Not fully.
Senator Durbin [continuing]. Or we've blocked their
transfer?
Mr. Steinberg. We've blocked their transfer, but we do not
have full control. Over some of them we do, but not all of
them.
Senator Durbin. So if you look back at previous conflicts
in similar circumstances, what ends up happening to funds like
that?
Mr. Steinberg. It's different in different circumstances.
But typically they are either part of an adjudication over
claims or there are other forms of settlement on the blocked
funds.
Senator Durbin. Have any statements been made by our
government as to where those funds might go in the future?
Mr. Steinberg. What we have said is that, pursuant to the
Security Council resolution, those funds are held in trust for
a future democratic government of Libya.
Senator Durbin. I see.
I think that's all I have. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. If Senator Isakson would permit me, is there
any reason that Colonel Qadhafi can't pay for this himself
through those funds?
Mr. Steinberg. Pay for?
The Chairman. Pay for the costs of this military effort.
Mr. Steinberg. I'm trying to think whether--I'm not sure
that we would at this point sort of recognize his control over
those. Part of the reason for blocking them----
The Chairman. Right. We've taken control of them. Wouldn't
we have a legal basis on which to lay a claim for the payment
for damages for the cost of his actions?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I think that we're exploring a
variety of options in terms of what might be available, and I'd
be reluctant at this point to, before we've had a chance to
explore all the options--one of the things that we want to make
sure is that we do this in a way that's coordinated with
allies, because a lot of other people have substantially
blocked funds and we'd want to make sure that whatever we did
would not trigger actions by others that we were not fully
comfortable with.
So I think it's important to have a consultation with
others, but we recognize there's a lot of interests in this and
I think it's a dialogue that we would welcome to continue with
you and your colleagues as to how to handle this.
The Chairman. Well, I think we'd like to very squarely put
it on the table that we ought to be looking at that hard. I
would think our NATO friends and others would be equally
interested in it.
Mr. Steinberg. Again, Senator, I think it's squarely on the
table and it's a conversation that we're prepared to engage in
a discussion with you and your colleagues about.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up on that comment, I would presume our ability
to block those funds is through an international banking
agreement; is that correct?
Mr. Steinberg. And through international banking structures
and processes.
Senator Isakson. I think Senator Kerry and Senator Durbin
raised an excellent point, and I think one of the things we
ought to be doing is looking at what that authority is and
creating the opportunity for those funds to be used to
reimburse the liberation of an oppressed people, if the funds
are in fact those of Mr. Qadhafi or whoever might succeed him.
A RICO statute, I guess, for bad guys, is what we need.
That would be a good thing.
But is there any precedent for that money being used to
reimburse a country for its effort in liberating a nation?
Mr. Steinberg. I'm not an expert in this, Senator. The only
one that I'm aware of is that in the case of Iraq some of those
funds were made available, and that's the only one that I'm
aware of.
Senator Isakson. And then, following up on Senator Durbin's
question, it is true the Kuwaitis paid for a substantial amount
of the cost of the liberation of Kuwait; is that not true? They
did so voluntarily.
Mr. Steinberg. In many other cases, we have had support of
others who have helped defray the costs of the operations, yes.
Senator Isakson. I'm sorry I was late, and this may have
been asked, and I apologize, but I was told earlier today that
we have withdrawn our 130s and our A-10s from the conflict. Is
that correct?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I'm always very cautious about
commenting on specific military operations. I do know we have
begun the process of transitioning to a support role, and we
certainly do not contemplate going forward that we will be
conducting enforcement of the no-fly zone or the targeted
strikes on the ground.
But whether that process--where we are in that process and
precisely what assets are involved there I'd rather defer to
the Secretary and the chairman.
Senator Isakson. Well, I think it is true that yesterday or
in the last 36 to 48 hours, we have been significantly
curtailed from our ability to operate because of sandstorms and
weather. Is that not true?
Mr. Steinberg. I checked this morning before I came over
and I was told that the coalition, in any event--I don't know
whether that's the United States or just the coalition--has
been conducting strikes on the ground.
Senator Isakson. Well, my concern is this: we are where we
are. What we do now and in the future in the Libyan conflict is
going to send a lot of signals to that part of the world. If,
in fact, our actions protract the ultimate resolution of the
problem by our disengagement or taking our more significant
assets out of play, we run the risk of having a protracted stay
by Qadhafi in a position he ultimately must go from, because we
weren't ever willing to fully commit or to say that regime
change was the ultimate goal. I think, in fact, if you read the
Arab Union piece, the U.N. piece, and the speeches that leaders
have made, everybody realizes Qadhafi's got to go; everybody
has expressed this verbally. But then we say we're not for
regime change, and if we're dissolving some of our emphasis in
that country we're running the risk of protracting what's a
terrible human situation in Libya.
I'm not asking you to ratify my opinion, but I'm just
telling you that's what I see. I think Secretary Clinton has
done an admirable job over the last month and the State
Department should be commended on what it's done to get the
U.N. resolution and get the players together and get the
commitment. But now that we're all of a sudden there and we're
at a point where it's going to go one way or another--and it
could be bad--we ought to do everything we can to see to it
that that does not happen.
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, the one thing I would say, again
without getting outside my lane, is that in the process of
transferring the command to NATO, NATO developed the concept of
operations, the military plans, based on the judgment of
SACEUR, Admiral Stavridis and others, that they had the
capacity to carry out the mission.
So it was certainly a factor in their own thinking about
what kind of assets they needed, taking into account what
countries were prepared to make available.
Senator Isakson. Well, I'm going to make a statement that
you don't have to respond to, and Chairman Kerry or Senator
Lugar can correct me, because my memory gets bad sometimes. But
in the 1970s when the Shah of Iran was ousted and he was our
``friend'' and we brought him to the United States for medical
care, we didn't really engage with those that were trying to
throw him out, and because of that, a vacuum was created, and
the ayatollahs came into power, and we are to this day still
dealing with that.
We have the potential of uprisings in other Middle Eastern
countries where people are seeking what appears to be democracy
or their form of democracy and freedom. What we do or don't do
in Libya's going to send a signal to the rest of that part of
the world as to how much support there will be for
democratization, freedom, and liberation from despots.
So, I remember the hostages in the American Embassy in
Tehran. I remember the embarrassment we went through as a
country, and I remember the difficulties of that day. And I
would hope--my opinion is--our actions now should be actions
that would send the signal: we're not going to withdraw or back
away from support for people that are seeking freedom, liberty,
and justice.
You don't have to comment on that. That's just----
Mr. Steinberg. I'll actually, if I could, Senator, I would
say, since part of my early service in government was working
on exactly that problem in the Carter administration and the
problem of Iran, I think, without commenting specifically on
what transpired during the revolution there, I think your
broader point is one that we share, which is that there is an
opportunity here--and I know there has been a lot of discussion
this afternoon about who the Transnational Council is and who
these people are. But we feel very strongly that by engaging
and working and trying to support the progressive, the freedom
and democracy-supporting elements of Libyan society, that we
have a chance to shape that, which will not only have a
positive impact on Libya, but beyond, and will have an impact
on the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt.
So I do think that we do see the reason for being involved
here, not just on the military side, but on the political side,
and engagement with the opposition forces is a chance to be on
the right side of history here and to help shape it in a
direction that's in the interest of both the people of Libya
and the United States.
Senator Isakson. Well, on a closing note, let me just
congratulate you on your service to the country and the State
Department and wish you the very best in your new adventure.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you very much, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me also apologize for missing most of the hearing this
afternoon. I was actually downstairs listening to Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen.
Mr. Steinberg. I'll be interested if you could tell me what
they had to say.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I was going to actually start with
one question, because one of the things that I asked is whether
we have military commitments from any other Arab countries
besides the UAE and Qatar to participate in the mission? And
Secretary Gates indicated that we don't at this time.
As I was watching the lead up to passing the resolution in
the U.N. and the actual decision by the allies to put in place
the
no-fly zone, I think one of the really important steps along
that way was having the Arab League pass their resolution
asking for a no-fly zone.
So I guess my question is, having heard Secretary Gates'
answer, are there diplomatic discussions under way with any
other Arab countries about participation in this effort and do
we expect to see additional support from them as this goes
forward?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, I think we are having conversations
with a number of countries and we're certainly urging the
broadest possible Arab participation in this. There are a
variety of ways that they can participate. Obviously, one
important way is actually in military operations and in air
operations. But some countries have already provided overflight
and other kinds of support. What we made clear is that we
expect that all the countries in the Arab League, having taken
that stand, provide some form of support, whether it's
financial or in kind or military, and those conversations very
much continue.
Senator Shaheen. Have we gotten commitments from any
countries other than Qatar and the UAE?
Mr. Steinberg. Senator, as you understand, for the reasons
that Secretary Gates probably didn't say specifically in his
testimony, we're obviously in conversation and it's probably in
terms of getting a positive outcome that we do this in
confidence now. But we could perhaps say more in closed
session.
Senator Shaheen. Are we also talking to the African Union
and what role have they played?
Mr. Steinberg. I think the positive side of the African
Union is that they have made very clear the necessity of
support for a democratic transition. The various statements of
the African Union, including at their special summit last
Friday, they gave a very strong statement, which was not as
explicit as the contact group in saying Qadhafi must go, but
the clear message was that a democratic, inclusive transition
had to take place. That I think was a very important message.
There's no question that it's a complicated picture in the
African Union. Many countries have received financial support
from Qadhafi. There are mixed views there. We've had some very
powerful statements, most impressively from Paul Kagame of
Rwanda, whom many of you have read his op-ed here, which is
very poignant given his own country's history, but also from
President Khama in Botswana and others who understand the
importance of responding here.
Other African countries have a more complicated
relationship. I think that we're not likely to see them having
a military role, but we do want to see them make clear that
they are not going to be tolerant of continued repression by
Qadhafi, and we continue to work very closely with the AU on
that.
Senator Shaheen. I happened to be in London last week with
some other Senators and we had the opportunity to meet with
Foreign Secretary Hague, and one of the things that he was
quite hopeful about was the meeting that happened in London
this week. I wonder if you could talk about whether you feel
like that meeting was successful, what the goals of that
meeting were, and what we hope will happen now as the result of
that meeting?
Mr. Steinberg. I think there were two broad important
outcomes of the meeting, because there were two separate groups
that met. They were overlapping groups, obviously, but one was
the group of the troop-contributing or force--I shouldn't say
``troop,'' but force-contributing nations, which helped pave
the way for this transition that's now taken place to NATO
control, but also to make sure that others who, although not
formally part of the North Atlantic Council, could be
associated with this and feel some ownership. I think that was
an important step in terms of strengthening the military
dimension of the coalition.
But equally important was the establishment of this contact
group. It was chaired in London by the U.K. and Qatar. They
will now be--or the meeting was there. The formal contact group
was established. The next meeting will be held in Qatar,
chaired by Qatar, and we envision rotating co-chairs. It was a
very broad-based group of countries, some of which are part of
the military effort, but others who go beyond that, who are
providing humanitarian assistance, political assistance,
elsewhere.
There was a very strong statement by Secretary Hague on
behalf of the contact group in terms of the political
objectives that you've all been discussing today, including a
clear message that although the military is focused on ending
the humanitarian catastrophe, that we have a broader political
objective here, which is democratic transition.
I think that the fact that there were important
participants from the Arab League there as well is a strong
signal that this is not just an effort by the United States or
NATO. There were others, like Jordan for example, which
participated in the contact group. So it is sending a powerful
signal of an engagement by others and a strong commitment to
keep this broader effort together beyond the military strikes
themselves.
Senator Shaheen. Do we have any intelligence--I mean that
in the loose sense of the term--tell us whether the other
countries in the Middle East who are witnessing demonstrations
right now are paying attention to what's happening with the
allied coalition with respect to Libya? Is it having any kind
of effect in Syria, for example, in Yemen, in others, in Egypt?
I mean, the places where they've also experienced an uprising.
Mr. Steinberg. I think it's always perilous to assert a
direct linkage. You can only sort of watch what's happening.
But I think if you look at countries where we have seen
problems with the reaction against peaceful demonstrations,
that I do think there is some sense that people recognize that
there are costs and risks associated with this.
I think in our engagement with our friends in Bahrain and
elsewhere I think it's helpful for them to see that we do
respond when there is unjustified violence against civilians. I
hope the message is clear to President Assad. I think tomorrow
will be a very important day in light of the speech that he
gave and the failure to address many of the legitimate
aspirations of the Syrian people.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time is up.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I'd just say in
closing, unless Senator Lugar has additional questions, that in
my meetings with Mahmoud Jabril I had a sense of clarity and
seriousness of purpose and certainly even a gravitas about what
their responsibilities are and the direction they're moving in.
So I think the more we can give them--I think that's the
wrong word. The more they can give themselves shape and form in
the next days and the more we can perhaps open up an
opportunity for people to feel who they really are, I think
that would help people's understanding of where we're going
here.
Mr. Steinberg. I think, Senator, if I could just say in
closing, that we have encouraged representatives to come here,
as you've said. I think it's important that there be more
engagement. I think we haven't mentioned it, but I think it's
also Ambassador Aujawi, who is here, Ambassador Shagam in New
York. There are a number of important voices that we're
hearing, and we encourage them to engage both with the American
public and with you, and we obviously encourage you to engage
with them.
I understand the sense of frustration of not fully knowing
them, but it is a work in progress, and we can shape this by
our own positive engagement.
The Chairman. I couldn't agree with you more.
Thank you very much. I think it was very helpful today. We
appreciate it, and we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Secretary James Steinberg to Questions
Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. During your testimony, you indicated that the
administration interprets U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 to
create authority for states to provide arms to the Libyan opposition,
notwithstanding the prohibition on the supply, sale, or transfer of
arms to Libya provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970.
Please explain the basis for this interpretation.
Answer. Paragraph 9 of UNSCR 1970 imposed an arms embargo against
Libya. Paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1973, however, authorizes Member States to
``take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of
resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat of attack in'' Libya. The phrase, ``all necessary
measures'' is very broad language, including but not limited to the
authorization of the use of force. By explicitly providing a
``notwithstanding'' provision in relation to the arms embargo,
paragraph 4 confirms that the arms embargo is subordinate to the
authorization to use all necessary measures to protect civilians.
Under the administration's interpretation, are states also
free to provide arms to the Qaddafi regime for the purpose of
allowing it to protect civilians in populated areas it controls
from potential attacks by the Libyan opposition?
Answer. This is a regime with a brutal track record of attacks
against its own civilian population. It is not credible to suggest that
the provision of arms to the Qaddafi regime would serve the purpose of
protecting civilians or civilian-populated areas under threat of attack
in Libya.
What considerations will the administration weigh in
deciding whether to provide arms to the Libyan opposition?
Answer. The United States is not providing lethal equipment to the
Libyan opposition or the Libyan Transitional National Council. We are
assessing and reviewing options for the types of assistance we could
provide to the Libyan people, and are consulting directly with the
opposition and our international partners about these matters. As part
of any decision to provide nonlethal or other assistance to the
opposition, we would consider whether it will meet a specific need of
the Libyan people, be used for its intended purpose and to what extent
there is the risk of diversion to, and misuse by, unintended
recipients. Through our envoy in Benghazi, we continue to engage the
Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC) to assess their needs and
better understand their composition, organization, and goals.
What assurance does the administration have that any arms
provided to the Libyan opposition will be used exclusively for
the purpose of protecting civilians from attack or threat of
attack, and not for other purposes, including the conduct of
offensive military operations or the sale or transfer of the
arms to third parties?
Answer. The United States has not provided lethal equipment to the
Libyan opposition or the TNC. We have emphasized to the TNC the need to
use any assistance provided to it in a manner that respects the human
rights of all people and to prevent diversions of any equipment we
provide from opposition forces to other actors. In addition, we would
consider the risk posed by misuse of any equipment provided when
determining what assistance to provide.
Question. The administration voted in favor of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1970, which refers the situation in Libya since
February 15, 2011, to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court for the investigation and possible prosecution of crimes within
the ICC's jurisdiction.
In the event that the ICC referral proves an obstacle to
persuading Qaddafi to relinquish power, what options would the
administration have for seeking termination or suspension of
the referral?
Would the administration be prepared to support a negotiated
settlement of the situation in Libya under which Qaddafi would
leave power and be guaranteed safe passage to a country that is
not obligated to cooperate with the ICC?
Answer. The President has made clear that any political solution in
Libya must include the departure of Qadhafi from power to ensure that
the Libyan people have the freedom to determine their own political
future. Turkey and the African Union, among others, have put forward
proposals to resolve the crisis and we continue to discuss these and
other potential solutions with our allies and partners, including U.N.
Envoy al-Khatib. The United Nations Security Council referred the
situation in Libya since February 15 to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), who is currently reviewing the
matter, and at this point the administration has made no determination
that it would be necessary to support termination or suspension of the
ICC proceedings as part of an effort to ensure that Qaddafi
relinquishes power.
Question. Administration officials have repeatedly cited the
``limited duration'' of U.S. military operations in Libya in arguing
that congressional authorization was not needed prior to the initiation
of hostilities the operations. What is the administration's envisioned
end date for U.S. military operations in Libya?
Answer. ``Duration'' is only one element of the analysis of whether
prior congressional authorization was required for initiation of the
Libya operations. Specifically, the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel concluded that, given the limited nature, scope, and
duration of the anticipated military operations, as well as the
national interests at stake, those operations did not constitute a
``war'' in the constitutional sense requiring prior congressional
authorization, and it fell within the President's lawful authority to
deploy U.S. forces.
The United States has already shifted to a supporting role in what
is now a NATO operation. The precise end point for this limited mission
will depend in good measure on how facts continue to develop, making it
premature to state a definitive date at this time.
Question. How long does the administration believe military
operations in Libya may proceed before congressional authorization will
be required in order for them to continue?
Answer. The answer to this question is dependent on how the
operation develops over time and thus cannot be answered in the
abstract; the duration of our activities is not determinative. The
nature and scope of the operation also affects the analysis. Regardless
of whether congressional authorization is required, this administration
welcomes a dialogue on our policy in Libya and will continue to consult
with Members of Congress in order to obtain their views regarding the
mission.
Question. Administration officials have indicated that any oil
sales by the Qadhafi regime would result in funds landing in blocked
accounts.
Please provide information on oil shipments from Libya since
the beginning of Operation Odyssey Dawn, including their origin
and the quantities involved
Answer. We are not aware of any shipments of hydrocarbons from the
territory controlled by the regime since the beginning of Operation
Odyssey Dawn. There has been one shipment of crude oil from TNC
controlled Tubruq with an approximate volume of 1 million barrels.
Qatar arranged for the final disposition of this shipment in early
April.
Question. If the opposition forces were to export oil, are
mechanisms available for them to receive funds via nonblocked accounts?
Is there any international supervision in place to ensure those funds
are not misappropriated?
Answer. We support the resumption of oil and gas sales by the
Transitional National Council. We are currently seeking views from
Members of Congress, international partners, and allies on appropriate
mechanisms for pursuing this consistent with applicable legal
constraints, and taking into account the need to ensure the funds are
used as intended.
Question. There has been discussion of using blocked Libyan assets
to reimburse the U.S. Treasury for the costs incurred by the U.S.
Government in Libya.
Does the administration believe it has the legal authority
to use blocked assets for such purposes?
Does the administration have a view as to the advisability
of using these funds for such purposes?
Answer. The administration has been considering various approaches
for vesting, including possible uses of any assets. Consistent with
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, we believe that, if
assets were to be vested, they should be used for the benefit of the
Libyan people. We would welcome an opportunity to consult with Members
of Congress about what uses that might encompass.
______
Responses of Deputy Secretary James Steinberg to Questions
Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
I want to begin by expressing my support and appreciation for the
men and women of the United States armed services who, on a daily
basis, are willing to fight for the security of our Nation.
Any time that we ask our military to be prepared to make the
ultimate sacrifice--as is inherently the case when military action
occurs--we must show that it is for a very good reason. When the
security of the United States, our people, or our allies is threatened,
I will give my complete support to military missions to ensure our
safety and their success.
Over the last few weeks, I have failed to see a link between what
occurred in Libya and any direct threat to the security of the United
States. In addition, I have serious concerns about the methodology--and
lack of constitutional or legal authority--the administration employed
in regards to our military actions in Libya.
I understand that Senator Lugar has called for further hearings in
this committee on Libya. I strongly support such hearings.
Question. On March 19, President Obama ordered U.S. military forces
to strike Libyan military targets to enforce a no-fly zone and other
provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. Under what
constitutional authority did President Obama act?
a. Does the administration believe it is acting legally
under the War Powers Resolution? If so, please explain.
Answer. To the extent your question concerns the President's
constitutional authority to deploy U.S. Armed Forces to Libya, I refer
you to the April 1, 2011, opinion issued by the Department of Justice's
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). As concerns the War Powers Resolution
(WPR), while the administration has stated that U.S. military
operations in Libya are consistent with the WPR, the President also
made clear in his letter to Congress dated May 20, 2011, that it has
always been his view that ``it is better to take military action, even
in limited actions such as this, with congressional engagement,
consultation, and support.'' S. Res. 194, the bipartisan resolution on
United States military operations in Libya introduced by Senators
McCain, Kerry, Lieberman, Levin, Feinstein, Graham, and Chambliss,
fully captures the importance of congressional consultations by asking
for an additional report to Congress about U.S. policy objectives in
Libya and regular consultations on progress toward meeting them.
Moreover, this resolution would present the wider world with a formal,
unified position of the U.S. Government, help us continue to enlist the
support of other countries in maintaining and expanding the coalition,
and strengthen our ability to shape the course of events in Libya. As
Members of Congress consider the resolution, the administration will
continue to consult closely with them on any ongoing military
operations.
b. Is the administration using, or does it plan to use, the
Authorization for use of Military Force Against Terrorists
(enacted September 18, 2001) as justification for military
action in Libya?
Answer. The legal framework for our military actions in Libya is
discussed in the OLC opinion of April 1 and in the President's letter
of May 20, both as discussed above, and I refer you to those documents
for an explanation of our justification.
Question. Despite the subsequent debate and disagreement over the
United States military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, President Bush
sought and received resolutions from Congress to proceed in both
instances. Please outline the steps the administration took to consult
Congress before intervening militarily in Libya.
Answer. The Department of State defers to the Department of Defense
for the answer to this question.
Question. Given that pro Qaddafi forces are currently beating the
rebels (who appear to be disorganized and poorly equipped), is the
United States going to provide arms to the Libyan rebels?
If so, what, if any, training will be involved before
handing over such arms?
If not, will the President consult with Congress before
arming rebel forces?
Answer. The United States is assessing and reviewing options for
the types of assistance we could provide to the Libyan people, and have
consulted directly with the opposition and our international partners
about these matters.
We have seen the media reports indicating that others may be
providing arms to the opposition. Resolutions 1970 and 1973, read
together, neither specify nor preclude this, but we have not yet made a
decision to provide arms to the opposition.
Question. Reports indicate that the Libyan rebels include some
level of al-Qaeda presence. What efforts is the administration taking
to ascertain the level of al-Qaeda influence within the Libyan rebels
organization, and how will that affect our decision to support them?
Answer. There is certainly the potential that extremist groups
could try to take advantage of the situation, and we are being very
careful with whom we deal. On the other hand, the dangers of Qadhafi
returning to terrorism and destabilizing the region also exist. Our
challenge is to help the Libyan people navigate this transition in a
way that preserves our strategic interest in preventing the spread of
extremism. Continued dialogue with the members of the opposition is a
key step toward this goal.
Members of our Embassy in Tripoli, now back in Washington, know a
number of the Transitional National Council (TNC) members well--
including Chairman Mustafa Abdel Jalil and Co-Coordinator for Foreign
Affairs Mahmoud Jibril--having interacted with them when they were
members of the Libyan Government. Ambassador Cretz and others at the
State Department consult regularly with TNC representatives. In
addition, our envoy to the Council arrived in Benghazi on April 5 and
has had several productive meetings with high-level members of the
Council, including Chairman Abdel Jalil.
In these engagements, TNC members have stressed that the opposition
represents a secular, national, and popular movement. They have also
emphasized the transitional nature of the Council, which would focus on
a democratic transition for Libya in any post-Qadhafi future. During
the last week of March, the TNC issued a statement laying out its
vision for an inclusive, democratic Libya, as well as a statement
unequivocally rejecting terrorism and extremist influences.
Question. In the context of other Middle Eastern countries such as
Iran, Yemen, and Syria, is Libya the greatest threat to the security of
the United States in that region? Is Libya a greater threat to the
security of United States than North Korea?
Answer. Faced with peaceful demonstrations calling for political
reforms, the Qadhafi regime answered with brutal, deadly force. Qadhafi
promised ``no mercy'' to any who opposed him and threatened to hunt
people down from ``house to house.'' The regime employed snipers,
tanks, and rockets against civilians and civilian populated areas and,
prior to the intervention of the United States and its partners, was
marching on the city of Benghazi to continue the violence. Left
unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Qadhafi would have
committed atrocities against Libyan civilians there, leading to a
humanitarian crisis and thousands of civilian deaths. His actions could
have destabilized the entire region, endangering many of our allies and
partners and especially threatening the fragile transitions to
democracy occurring in Tunisia and Egypt.
As part of a broad international coalition, and under the mandate
of a United Nations Security Council resolution, the United States had
a window of opportunity to take immediate action to neutralize this
imminent threat. We initially employed our unique capabilities to
establish a no-fly zone and protect civilians, and have since
transitioned leadership of the operation and responsibility for combat
sorties to NATO. Our engagement in Libya has not diminished any other
ongoing strategic security efforts across the world, including working
to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, to verifiably
denuclearize North Korea in a peaceful manner, to neutralize al-Qaeda,
and to terminate Syria's support for regional extremists, among others.
Question. What is the end state (or the ultimate military goal) of
U.S. military action in Libya? What is the extent of our military
involvement in Libya now that the no-fly zone has been established? Is
it possible to complete our military mission in Libya with Qaddafi
still in power?
Answer. The goal of the United States military operations in Libya
is to enforce, in coordination with NATO and our other international
partners, the mandate of UNSCR 1973 to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas. During the initial stages of military action in Libya,
the United States employed its unique capabilities to help establish a
no-fly zone, stop the advance of regime forces and prevent a massacre
in Benghazi. Since then, we have transitioned leadership of the
operation and responsibility for combat sorties to NATO.
We firmly believe that a free Libya is in the best interest of the
Libyan people and do not see that as an outcome with Qadhafi in power.
While regime change is not one of our military objectives, we believe
that Qadhafi must give up power. We continue to pursue a number of
nonmilitary measures, including sanctions, that we believe will
maintain pressure on him to do so, and will seek to hold him
accountable for his actions.
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