[Senate Hearing 112-349]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-349
THE U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq
september 22, 2011
Page
Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary of Defense...................... 8
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 16
(iii)
THE U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Akaka,
Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss,
Wicker, Brown, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, Cornyn, and Vitter.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member;
and Michael J. Sistak, research assistant.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd, Maggie K.
McNamara, Brian F. Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett,
assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator
Hagan; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad
Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Ethan Saxon,
assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to
Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan
Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Matthew Rimkunas,
assistant to Senator Graham; Russ Thomasson, assistant to
Senator Cornyn; and Charles Brittingham, assistant to Senator
Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
receives testimony this morning on the U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan and in Iraq. This morning's hearing is Secretary
Panetta's first appearance before this committee as Secretary
of Defense and we welcome you, Mr. Secretary. It's also likely
to be Admiral Mullen's last appearance before he retires at the
end of this month.
Since the Admiral's appointment by President Bush as the
17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2007 and his
reappointment by President Obama in 2009, Admiral Mullen has
led our Armed Forces through one of the most complex 4-year
periods of security challenges in recent history.
Among the challenges occurring on Admiral Mullen's watch
have been the following: A drawdown of forces in Iraq; a shift
to a counterinsurgency strategy and the surge of U.S. troops in
Afghanistan; the reduction of U.S. troops in Afghanistan;
support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
operations in Libya; management of a volatile relationship with
Pakistan's military; and counterterrorism operations against al
Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups, including the
extraordinary raid by our Special Operations Forces (SOF) this
past May that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.
Throughout his chairmanship and more than 4 years of
extraordinary service to this Nation, Admiral Mullen has
provided steady, dedicated leadership and thoughtful,
principled, and courageous military judgment. Admiral Mullen
has been joined throughout this time by his wife, Deborah, who
has been equally tireless in promoting initiatives on behalf of
our military families and wounded warriors. On behalf of
everyone on this committee, Admiral, thank you.
The strategy the President charted in December 2009 in his
West Point speech is on track to achieving its objectives.
These include disrupting, dismantling, and degrading al Qaeda
and training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to
provide security for their country, so that Afghanistan will
not again serve as a safe haven for extremists plotting attacks
against us. As outlined in the West Point speech, the
President's strategy called for a surge of an additional 33,000
U.S. troops to Afghanistan to break the insurgency's momentum
and to help build the capacity of the ANSF. He stated at that
time that 18 months later these U.S. surge troops would begin
to come home.
Our military men and women have performed magnificently in
Afghanistan. Coalition and Afghan forces have reversed the
insurgency's momentum in much of Afghanistan and seized the
initiative in key areas, including Taliban strongholds in the
south. At the same time, the NATO training mission has added
100,000 soldiers and police to the ranks of the ANSF, which are
partnered with coalition forces in the field and are
increasingly in the lead in operations.
The Taliban has been reduced to suicide attacks and
roadside bombings. In this regard, the assassination of Mr.
Rabbani, the leader of Afghanistan's High Peace Council tasked
with pursuing reconciliation talks with the Taliban, was
tragic. However, that despicable act only highlights that the
Taliban can no longer hold territory and are detested more than
ever by the Afghan people because of their attacks on
civilians.
The President's decision to bring home the U.S. surge
forces by 2012 maintains the sense of urgency at the highest
levels of the Afghanistan Government. Further, as 33,000 U.S.
troops draw down by next summer, the Afghan army and police at
the same time will grow by another 70,000, to a total of over
350,000, and these forces will increasingly be in the lead, be
more capable and equipped, and more than willing to take on the
Taliban.
The growing capabilities of the ANSF represent the best
chance for success of the mission, creating a secure
Afghanistan which can no longer be the staging ground for an
attack against us.
This committee has heard directly that the military
commanders charged with implementing the President's decision
say that they support it. This includes Admiral Mullen, General
Martin Dempsey, who will succeed Admiral Mullen as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, and General John Allen, Commander of the NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
ANSF have now assumed the lead in seven areas throughout
Afghanistan. NATO and ISAF participating countries have agreed
with President Obama and President Karzai that ANSF should
assume responsibility for protecting the Afghan people
throughout the country by 2014.
This transition to Afghan control does not mean that the
United States will abandon Afghanistan. The strategic
partnership agreement currently being negotiated between the
United States and Afghanistan will help define the long-term
relationship between the two countries and play an important
role in demonstrating to Afghanistan and its neighbors that the
United States intends to remain engaged in this region and that
we're not about to repeat the mistakes of 1989, when the United
States turned its attention elsewhere following the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Clearly, great challenges remain. Foremost is the threat
posed by the militant extremists launching attacks against
Afghan and coalition forces from sanctuaries in Pakistan,
particularly the Haqqani group in North Waziristan and the
Afghan Taliban shura in Quetta. The U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker, has said that a series of recent
attacks, including the deadly attack on the U.S. Embassy
compound in Kabul, were the work of the Haqqanis operating out
of Pakistan.
Our Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, said that there
is evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistan
Government. The Ambassador added that: ``This is something that
must stop.'' Secretary Panetta recently said: ``The message
they need to know is we're going to do everything we can to
defend our forces.'' I was glad to read a few days ago that
Pakistan's leaders have been personally informed that we are,
in fact, going to do just that, and act more directly.
Now, I've repeatedly written to Secretary Clinton to press
to have the Haqqani group added to the Department of State's
(DOS) list of foreign terrorist organizations in order to make
more tools available to our government agencies to sanction
that organization. This step is long overdue. I hope DOS will
move quickly to designate the Haqqanis as a foreign terrorist
organization.
When Senators Shaheen, Merkley, and I visited Afghanistan
in August, we heard repeatedly how the insurgents' safe havens
in Pakistan posed the main threat to our troops and Afghan
troops and coalition troops in Afghanistan. In our discussions
with Pakistani officials, we heard the same excuses that we've
heard before about why Pakistan forces are unable, for whatever
reason, to go after the Haqqanis in Northern Waziristan in
Pakistan.
When I pressed Pakistan Prime Minister Gillani on why
Pakistan has not publicly condemned the deadly cross-border
attacks on our troops by the Haqqanis and by the Afghan
Taliban, he was unable to provide an answer.
It is simply unacceptable that these deadly attacks on our
forces continue, while Pakistan's leaders decline to go after
the Haqqanis and fail to publicly condemn their violent cross-
border attacks. Because of providing that safe haven, because
of connections between Pakistan intelligence and the Haqqanis,
Pakistan bears some responsibility for the attacks on us. A
positive relationship with Pakistan remains an important
objective, but in order for there to be a normal relationship
between our two countries, it is imperative that Pakistan
actively break its ties with the militant extremists using
their soil against us.
The balance of my statement relative to both Afghanistan
and Iraq will be put in the record at this point.
I now call upon Senator McCain.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
Good morning. The committee receives testimony this morning on the
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and in Iraq. This morning's hearing is
Secretary Panetta's first appearance before this committee as Secretary
of Defense. It is also likely to be Admiral Mullen's last appearance
before he retires at the end of this month.
Since his appointment by President Bush as the 17th Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2007, and his reappointment by President Obama
in 2009, Admiral Mullen has led our Armed Forces through one of the
most complex 4-year periods of security challenges in recent history.
Among the challenges occurring on Admiral Mullen's watch have been: a
drawdown of forces in Iraq; a shift to a counterinsurgency strategy and
a surge of U.S. troops in Afghanistan; support of NATO operations in
Libya; management of a volatile relationship with Pakistan's military;
and counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and other
transnational terrorist groups, including the incredible raid by our
special operations forces this past May that killed bin Laden in
Pakistan. Throughout his Chairmanship and more than 40 years of
extraordinary service to this Nation, Admiral Mullen has provided
steady, dedicated leadership and thoughtful, principled and courageous
military judgment. Admiral Mullen has been joined throughout this time
by wife, Deborah, who has been equally tireless in promoting
initiatives on behalf of our military families and wounded warriors. On
behalf of everyone on this committee, let me express our gratitude.
The strategy the President charted in December 2009 in his West
Point speech is on track to achieving its objectives. These include
disrupting, dismantling, and degrading al Qaeda and training the Afghan
security forces to provide security for their country so that
Afghanistan will not again serve as a safe haven for extremists
plotting attacks against us. As outlined in the West Point speech, the
President's strategy called for a surge of an additional 33,000 U.S.
troops to Afghanistan to break the insurgency's momentum and help build
the capacity of the Afghan security forces; and he stated at that same
time that 18 months later, these U.S. surge troops would begin to come
home.
Our military men and women have performed magnificently in
Afghanistan. Coalition and Afghan forces have reversed the insurgency's
momentum in much of Afghanistan and seized the initiative in key areas,
including Taliban strongholds in the south. At the same time, the NATO
training mission has added 100,000 soldiers and police to the ranks of
the Afghan security forces, which are partnered with coalition forces
in the field and increasingly in the lead in operations. The Taliban
has been reduced to suicide attacks and roadside bombings. In this
regard, the assassination of Mr. Rabbani, the leader of Afghanistan's
High Peace Council tasked with pursuing reconciliation talks with the
Taliban, was tragic. However, this despicable act only highlights that
the Taliban can no longer hold territory and are detested more than
ever by the Afghan people because of their attacks on civilians.
The President's decision to bring home the U.S. surge forces by
2012 maintains the sense of urgency at the highest levels of the Afghan
Government. Further, as 33,000 U.S. troops draw down by next summer,
the Afghan Army and police at the same time will grow by another 70,000
to a total of 352,000, and these forces will increasingly be in the
lead, capable, equipped, and more than willing to take on the Taliban.
The growing capabilities of the Afghan security forces represents the
best chance for success of the mission, creating a secure Afghanistan
which can no longer be the staging ground for an attack against us.
As this committee has heard directly, the military commanders
charged with implementing that decision have said they support the
President's decision. This includes Admiral Mullen; General Martin
Dempsey, who will succeed Admiral Mullen as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; and General John Allen, Commander of the NATO
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
Afghan security forces have now assumed the lead in seven areas
throughout Afghanistan. NATO and the ISAF participating countries have
agreed with President Obama and President Karzai that Afghanistan
security forces should assume responsibility for protecting the Afghan
people throughout the country by 2014.
This transition to Afghan control does not mean that the United
States will abandon Afghanistan. The Strategic Partnership agreement
currently being negotiated between the United States and Afghanistan
will help define the long-term relationship between our two countries
and play an important role in demonstrating to Afghanistan and its
neighbors that the United States intends to remain engaged in this
region and that we are not about to repeat the mistakes of 1989, when
the United States turned its attention elsewhere following the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Certainly great challenges remain. Foremost is the threat posed by
militant extremists launching attacks against Afghan and coalition
forces from sanctuaries in Pakistan, particularly the Haqqani group in
North Waziristan and the Afghan Taliban shura in Quetta. U.S.
Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker has said that a series of recent
attacks, including the recent deadly attack on the U.S. Embassy
compound in Kabul, were the work of the Haqqanis operating out of
Pakistan. Our ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, said that there
is evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistan Government.
Ambassador Munter added, ``This is something that must stop.''
Secretary Panetta said, ``The message they need to know is: we're going
to do everything we can to defend our forces.'' I was glad to read a
few days ago that Pakistan's leaders have been personally informed that
we are in fact going to do just that and act more directly.
I have repeatedly written to Secretary Clinton to press to have the
Haqqani group added to the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, to make more tools available to our government agencies
to sanction this organization. This step is long overdue and I hope the
State Department will move quickly to designate the Haqqanis a Foreign
Terrorist Organization.
When Senators Shaheen, Merkley, and I visited Afghanistan in
August, we heard repeatedly how the insurgents' safe havens in Pakistan
pose the main threat to our troops. In our discussions with Pakistani
officials, we heard the same excuses we have heard before about why
Pakistan forces are unable, for whatever reason, to go after the
Haqqanis in Northern Waziristan. When I pressed Pakistan Prime Minister
Gilani on why Pakistan had not publicly condemned the deadly cross-
border attacks on our troops by the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban, he
was unable to provide an answer. It is simply unacceptable that these
deadly attacks against our forces continue, while Pakistan's leaders
decline to go after the Haqqanis and even fail to publicly condemn
their violent cross-border attacks. Because of providing that safe
haven and because of connections between Pakistani intelligence and the
Haqqanis, Pakistan must bear some responsibility for attacks on us. A
positive relationship with Pakistan remains an important objective, but
in order for there to be a normal relationship between our two
countries it is imperative that Pakistan actively break its ties with
these militant extremists.
Other challenges to the success of our strategy in Afghanistan
include the need for the Karzai Government to improve governance, the
resolution of the current crisis within the Afghan Parliament, and
rooting out corruption at all levels. In addition, the sustainability
of the Afghan security forces is being closely reviewed, and more needs
to be done to bring down the long-term costs of maintaining those
forces. But the cost of the Afghan Army and police taking the security
lead will be a small fraction of the costs of U.S. and coalition
forces' operations.
In Iraq, U.S. forces are on a course to withdraw the remaining over
40,000 U.S. troops by December 31 of this year, as required by the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement concluded by President Bush and Prime
Minister Maliki in 2008. After more than 8\1/2\ years of conflict in
Iraq, the end of this year will mark the completion of the transition
of responsibility for Iraq's security to the Government of Iraq.
U.S. and Iraqi officials are discussing a possible small residual
U.S. military force to remain in Iraq after the December 31 deadline. I
have a number of concerns about these negotiations, both in terms of
process and substance. First, any continuing U.S. troop presence in
Iraq should be pursuant to an Iraqi request for that assistance. It is
inappropriate in my view for the United States to be publicly
soliciting a request--sometimes sounding like we're pleading for one--
from the Government of Iraq for the retention of U.S. troops in Iraq.
Instead, the United States should set a date by which the Iraqi leaders
need to make their request for U.S. forces in order for us to have
sufficient time to consider that request.
More importantly, I am concerned about the size of some options for
a U.S. residual force reportedly under consideration. News accounts
cite proposals varying from around 3,000 to as large as 18,000 U.S.
troops or more. The fundamental question that must be answered,
however, is what would be the mission or missions of any U.S. force
retained in Iraq past the end of this year. Army Chief of Staff General
Ray Odierno, who previously commanded U.S. Forces in Iraq, has warned
that the larger the residual force the greater the risk of creating the
impression of a U.S. ``occupation force'' in Iraq.
Leaving behind a stable Iraq, capable of providing for its own
security, may be assisted by our having a continuing training mission
in Iraq. There may also be a role for a small U.S. contingent to
support Iraq's counterterrorism operations and to protect our
diplomats.
Some have cited the need for significant numbers of U.S. forces to
be retained in northern Iraq to maintain the peace along the internal
boundary under dispute between the Kurds and the Government of Iraq.
General Odierno has suggested that one option may be to have a
multilateral peacekeeping force maintain stability along this boundary
while the political and security issues are addressed. I hope our
witnesses will address the merits of a multilateral approach to
addressing the internal boundary dispute in northern Iraq. In addition,
protecting Iraq's most vulnerable--those in religious minority groups--
must also be a concern after December 2011.
The administration needs to come forward with a clear explanation
of what missions any residual U.S. troop presence in Iraq would be
intended to carry out. I believe any such force should be limited in
purpose, scope, size, and the duration that they would be deployed to
Iraq. It would be a mistake, as the December 31 deadline set by
President Bush for the withdrawal of U.S. troops approaches, to retain
a large number of troops in Iraq in an open-ended commitment.
Chairman Levin. I now call upon Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank
our distinguished witnesses for joining us this morning and for
their continued service to our country. I also want to echo the
chairman in recognizing Admiral Mullen in his final appearance
before our committee as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and
thanking him for a lifetime of devoted service to our Nation
and to his fellow men and women in uniform, who do everything
we ask of them and more to keep us safe.
This is an important time for this committee to consider
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If we continue on our current
trajectory, all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq in just over 3
months. In that same time, 10,000 U.S. forces will depart from
Afghanistan to comply with the President's aggressive drawdown
schedule. I have deep reservations about both of these looming
deadlines.
In Iraq, during my repeated visits to that country, every
military commander I have spoken with and every knowledgeable
civilian expert I have consulted with has told me that the
United States must leave at least 10,000 troops in Iraq beyond
this year to support the Iraqis in safeguarding their country's
stability, which both of our nations have paid a huge price in
blood and treasure to achieve thus far.
For this reason, many of us were very concerned to see
recent media reports suggesting that the administration had
dramatically reduced the number of troops that it was
considering for a post-2011 force in Iraq, perhaps as low as
3,000 troops. Administration officials have since insisted that
such a number is not final and that no ultimate decision has
been made. I hope this is true because everything I have heard
from our military commanders on the ground, leads me to believe
that such a minimal force presence in Iraq after this year
would significantly jeopardize the real but tenuous gains we
have made in that strategically important country.
As Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin testified to this
committee in February, the Iraqi security forces (ISF) still
have major gaps in their capabilities that will persist beyond
2011. This leads to a set of missions in which Iraqi forces
will require sustained U.S. military support, from intelligence
collection and fusion, training and maintenance,
counterterrorism cooperation, air sovereignty, and perhaps most
importantly, a continued need for U.S. forces in the disputed
territories of northern Iraq.
If U.S. military support is not forthcoming in helping
Iraqi forces to fill these gaps in their capabilities, the
country's stability will be put at grave risk. I understand
that Americans are war-weary, but I would urge the President to
listen to the advice of our military commanders and to maintain
the necessary presence of U.S. forces in Iraq, that all of the
major political leaders in Iraq have told many of us they need
and want. In short, the administration must ensure that it does
not withdraw from Iraq as irresponsibly as they often claim
that the Bush administration invaded Iraq.
I would also urge the administration to listen to our
military commanders in Afghanistan and to consider slowing the
pace of the President's announced drawdown. The fact is, as
General Petraeus recently testified before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, no military commander recommended
the plan that the President adopted, to draw down 10,000 troops
this year and the remaining 23,000 surge troops by next summer.
Admiral Mullen, you yourself have stated that the President's
plan would incur more risk than you had been prepared to
accept.
The reason none of our commanders recommended this drawdown
plan is because it would take vital combat power out of the
hands of our commanders on the ground just when they need it
most, during next year's fighting season, which will continue
through the summer. After achieving so much after 10 hard years
of fighting and with the prospects of success finally being
within reach, at exactly the moment when we should be limiting
the risk to our mission, the President's plan would do the
opposite. It would increase the difficulties and risks to our
mission.
I visited Afghanistan in July again and it was clear that
our counterinsurgency strategy is working at a tactical
military level in all of the ways that Admiral Mullen outlines
in his prepared testimony. Our counterterrorism operations are
inflicting enormous damage on al Qaeda and their Taliban
allies. We and our Afghan partners have taken critical terrain
away from the insurgency. Afghan security forces are growing
bigger, better, and more professional. The Taliban can still
launch spectacular attacks like the one that tragically killed
former President Rabbani on Tuesday and these send a damaging
signal to our Afghan friends, who fear that our security gains
are fleeting and that the Taliban will return to power.
But such attacks are occurring from a position of growing
weakness, not mounting strength, and now is not the time to put
our security gains at unnecessary risk. This is especially true
in light of the ongoing strategic challenges we face in this
campaign, challenges that, if not seriously addressed, could
limit and even jeopardize the tactical gains that our troops
are making at such great cost.
One such challenge is the persistence of weak, corrupt, and
predatory Afghan governance. The other, far larger challenge is
the problem of Pakistan, in particular the fact that insurgent
groups like the Haqqani network continue to enjoy sanctuary in
the country as well as active support from Pakistan's
intelligence service, which they continue to use to attack and
kill Afghans, Pakistanis, Indians, and Americans. This is the
fundamental reality from which we must proceed in reevaluating
our policy towards Pakistan.
But we must also recognize that abandoning Pakistan is not
the answer. We tried that once. We cut off U.S. assistance to
Pakistan in the past and the problem got worse, not better.
I say this with all humility, not recognizing just yet what
a better alternative approach would be. I hope this hearing
will provide some clarity on how to proceed in this critical
matter, which likely will have the largest bearing of all on
our national security and interests.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Secretary Panetta.
STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask
that my full statement be made part of the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
Secretary Panetta. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members
of this committee: It is an honor for me to appear before you
for the first time as Secretary of Defense and to represent the
men and women of the Department of Defense (DOD) of our Armed
Forces. I want to thank you on their behalf for your dedication
and for your support, particularly in a time of war, and for
your determination to join me in doing everything possible to
ensure that they succeed in their mission of protecting America
and keeping us safe.
When I testified before this committee as the nominee for
the Secretary of Defense, I pledged that I would treat Congress
as a full partner, and in the months since, I've had the
opportunity to consult with you, many of you, on all the
challenges that DOD faces, and I will continue to do so. It's
important to have your guidance and your counsel as we deal
with the challenges facing DOD.
Before turning to the pressing issues of the challenges of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I would like to briefly
address the challenge of the defense budget, which relates to,
obviously, everything we do. DOD has been undergoing a
strategy-driven process to prepare to implement the more than
$450 billion in savings that will be required over the next 10
years as a result of the debt ceiling agreement. While this
review is ongoing and no specific decisions have been made at
this point, I'm determined to make these decisions
strategically, looking at the needs that DOD has to face, not
just now, but in the future, so that we can maintain the most
dominant military in the world, a force that is agile, ready,
capable, and adaptable.
These reductions will require hard decisions. Those
decisions will force us to take on greater risk in our mission
of protecting this country. My goal is to try to make those
risks acceptable, but that is the reality.
The guidelines that I will be putting in place as we move
forward on these decisions are the following: First of all, I
want to maintain the best military in the world.
Second, I do not want to hollow out the force. Every time
we have gone through these reductions in the past the danger
has always been that we've hollowed out the force. I am not
going to do that.
Third, it requires a balanced approach in order to achieve
the significant reductions that I'm required to do. So I am
going to look at all areas. I'm going to look at efficiencies,
reducing overhead, and duplication. There are opportunities to
try to achieve savings, additional savings, in those areas.
Procurement, looking at the whole process of tightening up on
our contracting, creating greater competition with regards to
our procurement area. I'm also going to look at the
compensation area. The fact is that in some of those areas the
costs have increased by 80 percent. Health care alone in the
military costs some $53 billion.
But I have to do it in a way that does not jeopardize the
volunteer force, and to that extent I have to maintain faith
with those that have gone deployment after deployment, put
their lives on the line. We cannot undermine the commitments we
have made to them. Nevertheless, we do have to look at reforms
in these areas.
Lastly, as I said, we do have to maintain faith with those
that are out there fighting every day.
We are going to have to look at how we turn a corner. We
have gone through a decade of war, in which the defense budget
has more than doubled. Now we have to look at a decade where we
have to prevent war, but be able to fight wars and win wars if
we have to, recognizing we will have less resources. That's the
challenge that we face as we confront this budget issue.
DOD is taking on its share of our country's efforts to
achieve fiscal discipline and we will. I want to caution
strongly against further cuts to defense as we go through that,
particularly with the mechanism that's been built into the
agreement called sequester. This mechanism would force defense
cuts that, in my view, would do catastrophic damage to our
military and its ability to protect this country. I know you
share my concern about the process of sequester. It is kind of
a blind formula that makes cuts all across the board and
guarantees that we will hollow out the force.
Working with this committee and others in Congress, I am
confident that we can meet our national security
responsibilities and do our part to help this country get its
fiscal house in order, but at the same time maintain a strong
national defense. We do not have to make a choice between
fiscal security and national security.
Even as DOD grapples with the budget, our most immediate
challenges are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. My submitted
statement goes into more details on the progress we are making
and the challenges that remain to achieving our strategic
objectives, but let me just briefly address both of these
efforts.
I'll begin with Iraq, where our focus has been on ending
the war in a responsible way that allows Iraq to become a
secure, sovereign, stable, and self-reliant nation and a
positive force for stability in that region. Today, fewer than
50,000 U.S. forces remain in Iraq and, based on the November
2008 security agreement reached with the Iraqi Government and
the last administration, we are planning to draw down our
combat troops in Iraq by the end of the year.
Still, last month, the Iraqi political leadership indicated
publicly that they are interested in an ongoing training
relationship with the United States in the post-2011 period. As
a result, General Austin and Ambassador Jeffreys have been in
the process of negotiating with Iraqi leaders as to what their
needs are and how we can address that. We are seriously
considering this request and I want to make clear that no final
decisions have been made. We'll continue to consult extensively
with the Iraqis, but we will also consult with Congress before
such decisions are made as to what a post-2011 training
presence will look like.
I want to be clear that, obviously, any future security
relationship in Iraq will be different from the one that we've
had since 2003. The United States wants a normal, productive
relationship and a close strategic partnership with a sovereign
Iraq and with other countries, similar, frankly, to the
partnerships that we have with other countries in the region
and around the world.
This kind of security assistance would be a means of
furthering our strategic partnership with Iraq that looks to
the kind of future role that can best address their security
needs. But there's no question that challenges remain there.
They have to stand up a council for higher policies. They have
to develop a resolution to the Kirkuk situation and dispute.
They have to pass a hydrocarbons law. They have to promote
security efforts to deal with Iranian-supported Shia extremist
groups that have been attacking their forces as well as ours.
They have to have security efforts to go after the remnants of
al Qaeda which still remain in Iraq. They have to work at a
political process that builds a safer and stronger Iraq for the
future.
As we moved decisively since 2009 to end the war in Iraq,
we have also turned our attention, our focus, and our resources
to Afghanistan and the effort to build a stable and secure
country there that does not provide a safe haven to al Qaeda or
to its extremist affiliates. Because of the hard work and the
sacrifices of Afghan and coalition forces, we have established
conditions that are putting Afghans on the path to assume lead
responsibility for security nationwide by the end of 2014.
The insurgency has been turned back in much of the country,
including its heartland in the south, and ANSF are increasingly
strong and capable. As the chairman pointed out, we have made
significant progress with regards to our primary mission of
disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda,
particularly with the operations that took down bin Laden and
that continue to take down key leadership of al Qaeda and their
affiliates.
This undeniable progress has allowed us to begin
transitioning to Afghan security control. We've done that in
seven areas of the country since July. As this transition
commenced, we began implementing a gradual and responsible
drawdown that is essential to the success of that transition
process and lasting security and stability in Afghanistan.
General Allen, who has briefed me just this week again, is in
the process of laying out those plans that will provide a
responsible transition that will not undermine the security of
Afghanistan.
While my overall assessment is that our effort in
Afghanistan is headed in the right direction, I think we also
have to be clear-eyed about the challenges that remain. First,
as the Taliban lost control of territory last year they shifted
away from large attacks on our forces to greater reliance on
headline-grabbing attacks. In recent weeks we've seen a spate
of such high-profile attacks, including the attempt to attack
the U.S. Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul last week and
the assassination of former President Rabbani, the chairman of
the High Peace Council, this last Tuesday.
At this time of loss, we have conveyed our condolences to
the family of Professor Rabbani and the Afghan people. But we
are concerned that these attacks, because of the loss of life
and because they represent an effort to disrupt the process we
have made, must be confronted and cannot be allowed to
continue. Overall, we judge this change in tactics to be a
result in a shift in momentum in our favor and a sign of
weakness of the insurgency. While overall violence in
Afghanistan is trending down and down substantially in areas
where we concentrated the surge, we must be more effective in
stopping these attacks and limiting the ability of insurgents
to create perceptions of decreasing security.
We are working with our Afghan partners to discuss with
them how we can provide better protection against these
attacks. But the bottom line is that we can't let these
sporadic attacks deter us from the progress that we've made.
A second challenge is the difficult campaign we have ahead
of us in the east, where the topography, the cultural
geography, and the continuing presence of safe havens in
Pakistan give the insurgents advantages they have lost
elsewhere in the country. We cannot allow terrorists to have
safe havens from which they can launch attacks and kill our
forces. We cannot allow that to happen, and we have to bring
pressure on the Pakistanis to do their part to confront that
issue.
A third key challenge is that we must not underestimate the
difficult task the Afghans still face in developing governance
that can meet the minimum needs of the Afghan people and help
them take and sustain control of their country.
I believe we're capable of meeting these challenges if we
keep our efforts focused and maintain our dedication to the
fight. We've had some tough days in this campaign and
undoubtedly there are more tough days that lie ahead. This is a
heavy burden that I feel personally now as Secretary of Defense
every time I write a condolence letter.
Since taking this office, I've been to Dover to receive the
remains of those who were killed in the Chinook helicopter
crash last month. I've been to Arlington and I've been to
Bethesda. In spending time with the families of those who've
died or been seriously wounded in the service of our country,
there isn't a family member who hasn't come up to me and said:
``If you really care about what happened to my loved one, you
will carry on the mission that they gave their life for or were
seriously wounded.'' We owe it to those who've paid this price
to continue the hard work of doing this right and protecting
our country.
I'd also like to close by recognizing the man sitting next
to me, Mike Mullen. He has worked tirelessly and successfully
to advocate effective operations, for effective operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the strategy that is now bearing
fruit owes much of its success to his vision and his
determination.
I know that all of you and that all of America join me in
thanking him for his decades of dedicated service and his
extraordinary work on behalf of our country and our men and
women in uniform. Mike has set a standard for responsibility
and performance as Chairman that will forever be his legacy. I
am deeply grateful for his service and for his friendship.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Leon E. Panetta
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of this committee. It is an
honor to appear before you today for the first time as Secretary of
Defense, and to represent the men and women of the Department and our
Armed Forces. I want to thank you, on their behalf, for your support in
a time of war, and for your determination to join me in doing
everything possible to ensure that they succeed in their mission of
protecting America.
When I testified before this committee as nominee for Secretary of
Defense, I pledged that I would treat Congress as a full partner. In
the months since, I have consulted with you regularly about many of the
challenges the Department faces and I will continue to do so.
Before turning to the most pressing of these challenges--the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan--I would like to address another issue that I
know is of great concern to members of the committee, the defense
budget. The Department has been undergoing a strategy-driven process to
prepare to implement the more than $450 billion in savings that will be
required of it over 10 years as a result of the debt ceiling agreement.
While this review is ongoing and no decisions have been made, it is
clear that achieving these savings will be very hard and require
difficult tradeoffs for the Department and the country.
As we approach these decisions, I am determined to make them
strategically, so that we maintain the most dominant military in the
world--a force that is agile, ready, capable, and adaptable. We must
preserve capabilities that are most important to protecting our vital
interests, and we must avoid hollowing out the force and breaking faith
with the men and women who are fighting for us. We have a strong
military and strong national defense, but one that has been stressed by
a decade of fighting, squeezed by rising personnel costs, and is in
need of modernization given the focus the past decade on capabilities
for ongoing wars. While the Department will look first to reduce
overhead and duplication, make no mistake that the reductions will
require hard decisions that will force us to take on greater risk in
our mission to protect the country. My goal is to make that risk
acceptable.
This Department is taking on its share of our country's efforts to
achieve fiscal discipline, but I want to caution strongly against
further cuts to defense, particularly through the mechanism known as
sequester. This mechanism would force defense cuts that, in my view,
would do catastrophic damage to our military and its ability to protect
the country. I know you share my concern about sequester. Working with
this committee and others in Congress, I am confident we can meet our
national security responsibilities and do our part to help the country
get its fiscal house in order.
Even as the Department looks to maintain the ability to protect our
core national security interests over the long-term by making these
budget decisions strategically, our most immediate challenges are the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today I will update you on the progress
we are making in these efforts, and the challenges that remain to
achieving our strategic objectives.
iraq
Let me begin with Iraq, where our focus has been on ending the war
in a responsible way that allows Iraq to become a sovereign, stable,
self-reliant nation and a positive force for stability in the region.
Given Iraq's importance, situated strategically in the Middle East, it
is profoundly in the American national interest that it emerge as a
strategic partner for the United States, and our broader goal moving
forward is to build an enduring partnership with the sovereign Iraqi
Government.
The fact that we are in a position to build this kind of
relationship is a reflection of how much progress has been made over
the past 4 years, and a tribute to the extraordinary sacrifices of our
men and women in uniform and the Iraqi people, who have fought to build
a stable and secure country. I visited Iraq in 2006 with the Iraq Study
Group, at a time when the country was in considerable turmoil.
Returning on several visits over the last 2\1/2\ years, first as CIA
Director and then as Secretary of Defense, the change in the situation
on the ground has been profound.
Today fewer than 50,000 U.S. forces remain in Iraq, and based on
the November 2008 Security Agreement reached with the Iraqi Government
under the last administration, we are planning to remove all of our
troops from Iraq by the end of the year. Under the capable leadership
of General Austin, we are moving ahead on implementing that agreement
and withdrawing our forces. Still, last month, the Iraqi political
leadership indicated publicly that they are interested in an ongoing
training relationship with the U.S. military post-2011. Since we
believe a relationship with the ISF will be an important part of a
broader enduring partnership with the Iraqi people, we are now
negotiating with the Iraqi Government about the future nature and scope
of our military-to-military ties. While we are open to considering this
request, no final decisions have been made, and we will continue to
consult extensively with Congress before such decisions are made about
a post-2011 training presence.
At the outset of these negotiations, it's important to make clear
that any future security relationship with Iraq will be fundamentally
different from the one that we have had since 2003. The United States
wants a normal, productive relationship and close strategic partnership
with a sovereign Iraqi Government going forward--similar to the
partnerships we have with other countries in the region and around the
world.
Moreover, Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to
maintain internal stability. We have drawn down more than 100,000 U.S.
forces without a significant or sustained uptick in attacks, and with
the ISF in the lead for security, levels of violence have remained
dramatically reduced from where they were in 2006 and 2007. Our
commanders in the field believe that the ISF are competent at
conducting counterinsurgency operations, but that the Iraqis will have
gaps in their ability to defend against external threats and in areas
such as integrated air defense, intelligence sharing, and logistics. It
is the Iraqi interest in filling these gaps that is guiding our
conversations about a post-2011 training role. This kind of security
assistance would be a means of furthering our strategic partnership
with Iraq that looks to the kind of future role that can best address
Iraq's security needs.
While Iraq today is closer than ever to being a stable and secure
country, we are mindful of the challenges that remain to achieving our
strategic objectives. The Iraqis are taking critical steps to resolve
ongoing political issues, but internal divisions remain. For example,
they still have to stand up the National Council for Higher Policies
and implement other power sharing arrangements. The status of Kirkuk
and the disputed territories also remains unresolved and they have yet
to pass a hydrocarbons law. These issues must be addressed to avoid
potential conflicts, and Iraqi leaders are talking about ways to
address these challenges. Regardless of DOD's post-2011 training role,
our civilian mission will be focused on helping address these issues
through a robust and representative political process, which is the
best safeguard against a return to violence.
Another ongoing challenge in Iraq is the push for influence by
Iran, and the activities of Iranian backed militias that have attacked
U.S. forces and the Iraqi people. We take this issue very seriously, as
does the Iraqi Government, and the ISF have been more active and
successful against this threat in recent months. We have also worked
with the Iraqi Government to conduct joint operations against Iranian-
backed militias, and we reserve the right to take other steps as
necessary and appropriate based on right of self-defense consistent
with the security agreement we have with the Iraqi Government--a point
I made very clearly when I visited the country in July. Unlike Iran,
the United States is working to build a safer and stronger Iraq, and it
is that shared interest that gives me confidence we can build an
enduring partnership with the Iraqi Government.
afghanistan
As we have moved decisively since 2009 to end the war in Iraq, we
have also turned attention, focus and resources to Afghanistan, which
has become our military's main operational effort. The core goal of
President Obama's strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, to deny it safe haven in the region,
and to prevent it from again attacking the United States and our
allies, as it did on September 11, 2001. Earlier this month, in
observances large and small, the Nation came together to mark the 10
year anniversary of that horrific attack--one planned and directed by
al Qaeda from the safe haven they were afforded in Afghanistan by the
Taliban Government.
In our determined response to September 11, our military quickly
toppled the Taliban regime and drove al Qaeda's leadership from the
country. But in the ensuing years, as the war in Iraq drew attention
and resources, we lost our focus and allowed the Taliban and insurgents
to regroup and threaten to topple Afghanistan's legitimate government--
a recipe for regenerating the conditions that enabled the planning and
execution of the September 11 attacks.
Although we have achieved significant success in weakening al
Qaeda, particularly with the operation that took down Bin Laden, and
the threat from al Qaeda and violent extremism has spread to new
geographical centers such as Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa, a
central part of the mission to defeat al Qaeda remains our effort to
build a stable and secure Afghanistan that does not provide them safe
haven. Under President Obama's strategy, this effort finally has had
the resources and focus needed to achieve these objectives. It also has
an extraordinary leadership team in General Allen and Ambassador
Crocker, who this summer assumed lead of our military and civilian
efforts.
This has been a difficult fight for our country, our coalition
partners, and the Afghan people. Significant challenges remain. But,
because of the hard work and sacrifices of Afghan and coalition forces
we have established conditions that are putting Afghans on a path to
assume lead responsibility for security nationwide by the end of 2014.
The insurgency has been turned back in much of the country, including
its heartland in the south, and Afghan National Security Forces are
increasingly strong and capable.
This undeniable progress allowed us to begin transitioning to
Afghan security control in seven areas of the country in July. As a
result, nearly 25 percent of the Afghan population now lives in areas
of the country where Afghan forces have the lead responsibility for
security. As this transition commenced, we began implementing the
responsible drawdown that is essential to the success of that
transition process, and the lasting security and stability in
Afghanistan. The drawdown of the surge forces began on schedule with
July's redeployment of two Army National Guard battalions. Through the
remainder of this year, a total of 10,000 troops will redeploy, and
another 23,000 troops will come home by the end of summer 2012.
This is a measured drawdown of our surge forces that provides our
commanders with the right mix of flexibility, resources, and time to
continue building on our progress on the ground. The reduction in
roughly 33,000 American personnel takes place as we are adding more
than 50,000 new personnel to the Afghan National Security Forces. That
means by the time we have finished drawing down our surge forces, the
insurgents will face more forces than they did during this summer's
fighting season--and substantially more of those forces will be Afghan.
The development of the Afghan National Security Forces over the
past 2 years has been one of the most notable successes of the
campaign, and it has only been possible with the solid support of
Congress--especially the leadership and members of this committee.
Surveys conducted regularly for ISAF now show that 86 percent of the
Afghan population see their local shuras and village elders, the Afghan
National Police and the Afghan National Army as bringing the most
security to their areas. The police and army achieved their respective
October 2011 growth targets of 134,000 and 171,600 personnel ahead of
schedule, and they are already moving out on their respective October
2012 targets of 157,000 and 195,000 toward a total force of 352,000.
This growth in numbers occurs as we continue to strengthen the
emphasis on quality. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has
completed the establishment of all 12 branch schools where Afghans are
now developing key enabling capabilities in logistics, engineering,
medical, intelligence, signals, and other specialty disciplines.
Together with steady growth in the officer and non-commissioned officer
ranks, as well as the experience gained through partnered operations
with coalition forces, Afghan units continue to improve their ability
to carry out operations with decreasing levels of advice and
assistance.
Despite this progress, we recognize the work that remains before us
in developing the Afghan National Security Forces. Attrition rates in
particular have remained too high--sometimes as much as 3 percent per
month. Although some of these personnel subsequently return to the
force, overall attrition still impedes the development of experience
and leadership that are essential to force professionalization.
Likewise, we know that the long-term sustainment of these forces
will outstrip Afghanistan's own resources and will require continued
support from the United States and our international partners for years
to come. Given our growing budgetary constraints, we need to ensure
that our support for the Afghan National Security Forces is fiscally
sustainable at home. To that end, already we are looking at where we
can take additional steps to reduce the costs of these force
development efforts.
Even as the growth in the credibility and capabilities of the
Afghan National Security Forces are allowing a responsible transition
to proceed, another critical component of a durable transition will be
for the United States to address concerns about America's long-term
commitment to Afghanistan's security and stability. To that end, we are
putting into place the long-term architecture that will support and
sustain security and stability in the region beyond 2014. This
Strategic Partnership Declaration, which the Department of State is
working with the Afghans to develop, is a framework of mutual
commitments that will help focus the sovereign efforts Afghanistan will
take in the years ahead to develop its government, expand its economy
and improve its security.
While my overall assessment is that our effort in Afghanistan is
heading in the right direction, we must also take a clear-eyed look at
the challenges ahead.
First, as the Taliban lost control of territory last year, as
expected, they shifted away from large attacks on our forces to greater
reliance on improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks,
assassinations, and headline-grabbing attacks. In recent weeks we've
seen a spate of such high-profile attacks, including the attempt to
attack the United States embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul last
week and the assassination of former President Rabbani, the Chairman of
the High Peace Council, on Tuesday. At this time of loss, I want to
extend my condolences to the family of Professor Rabbani and the Afghan
people. We're concerned about these attacks because of the loss of life
and because they represent an effort to disrupt the progress we have
made. These kinds of attacks were not unexpected and we have been able
to prevent the vast majority of the Taliban's efforts to carry them
out.
Overall, we judge this change in tactics to be a result of a shift
in momentum in our favor and a sign of weakness in the insurgency.
Still, these attacks show the adaptability of the insurgents and can
have powerful psychological effects on the Afghan people and on public
sentiment in coalition nations, creating the appearance of increased
violence and insecurity, even when the opposite is increasingly true.
While overall violence in Afghanistan is trending down--and down
substantially in areas where we concentrated our surge--we must be more
effective in stopping these attacks and limiting the ability of
insurgents to create perceptions of decreasing security. We are working
with our Afghan counterparts to discuss with them how we can provide
better protection against these attacks. But the bottom line is that we
can't let these sporadic events deter us from the progress that we've
made.
Second, we have a difficult campaign ahead of us in the east, where
the topography, cultural geography, and continuing presence of safe
havens in Pakistan give the insurgents advantages they have lost
elsewhere in the country. Additionally, as relations with Pakistan have
become strained over the past year, and as we have met Pakistan's
requests to reduce our training and liaison presence in their country,
our diminished ability to coordinate respective military operations in
the border regions has given insurgents greater freedom of movement
along the border. Our forces are working in the east to cut off
insurgent lines of communication and deny their ability to threaten
Kabul and other population centers. Nonetheless, progress in the east
will likely continue to lag what we see elsewhere in the country.
Third, we must not underestimate the difficult tasks the Afghans
still face in developing governance that can meet the minimum needs of
the Afghan people and help them take and sustain control of their
country. Over 10 years, our military has learned that one indispensable
element of modern counterinsurgency warfare is civilian partners who
bring skills and capabilities beyond the expertise of our military. The
Department of Defense is working hard with the Department of State, the
U.S. Agency for International Development, and other civilian agencies
on these challenges. I appreciate the efforts this committee has
already made, and would ask for your continued support in working
together with those agencies' oversight committees to ensure that our
civilian partners have the authorities and resources they need to
succeed in this mission.
While these challenges are considerable, I believe that we are
capable of meeting them, if we keep our efforts focused and maintain
our dedication to this fight. We have had some tough days in this
campaign, and undoubtedly many more lie ahead. This is a heavy burden
that I feel personally as Secretary of Defense every time I write a
condolence letter. Since taking this office, I've gone out to the war
zones, and looked the troops in the eye. I've been to Bethesda and to
Walter Reed and seen those who have been terribly wounded as a result
of the wars. I've been to Dover to receive the remains of those who
were killed in the Chinook helicopter crash. I've been to Arlington.
The greatest inspiration to me has been that, in spending time with
the families of those who have died in the service of their country
there isn't a family member that hasn't come up to me and said, if you
really care about what happened to my loved one, you will carry on the
mission that they gave their life for. We owe it to those who have paid
this price to continue the hard work of protecting our country, and its
interests, in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I would like to close by recognizing the man sitting next to me
here, Admiral Mullen. He has worked tirelessly and successfully to
advocate for a greater focus on operations in Afghanistan, and the
strategy that is now bearing fruit owes much of its success to his
vision and determination. I know that you join me in thanking Admiral
Mullen for his decades of dedicated service, and his extraordinary work
on behalf of our country and our men and women in uniform. Mike has set
a standard for the responsibilities and performance of Chairman that
will forever be his legacy.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Panetta.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the situations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. As this will--and Mr. Chairman, you said
``most likely''; I actually liked Senator McCain's
characterization of it--it definitely will be my last hearing.
[Laughter.]
This will be the last time I appear before you in uniform.
Let me begin by expressing my deep gratitude for the
exceptional support you provide our men and women and our
families.
You and I may not always agree on every issue and I think
it's fair to say that you don't always agree amongst
yourselves, but none of you ever has failed to put foremost in
your minds the best interests of our troops and their families.
The issues you debate here, the votes you take, hold in the
balance the very lives of America's sons and daughters. Where
they fight, whom they fight, how they fight, and, just as
critically, what care and support they need when they come home
from the fight, dominate your discussions.
It is easy to lose perspective in this town, to forget what
really matters. You haven't, and for that, Deborah and I are
eternally grateful.
Now, let me turn to some of those fights I talked about. In
Afghanistan, I believe the security situation is steadily
improving. The military component of our strategy, to the
extent it can be separated from the strategy as a whole, is
meeting our objectives. Afghan and ISAF forces have wrested the
initiative and the momentum from the Taliban in several key
areas. The number of insurgent-initiated attacks has for
several months been the same or lower than it was at the same
time last year. We are on a pace and even slightly ahead of our
end strength goals for the ANSF.
The process for transition to Afghan lead of certain
districts and provinces has already begun, with seven
localities now in Afghan hands. We are well-postured to begin
the withdrawal of 10,000 American troops by the end of this
year.
As we have advanced, the Taliban have adapted. More than
ever before, they are concentrating their efforts on attacks
that will produce a maximal psychological impact for a minimal
investment in manpower or military capability. The recent truck
bomb in Wardak falls into this category, as do the attacks last
week in Kabul, including the one on our embassy and the
assassination Tuesday of former Afghan President Rabbani. These
acts of violence are as much about headlines and playing on the
fears of a traumatized people as they are about inflicting
casualties, maybe even more so.
We must not misconstrue them. They are serious and
significant in shaping perceptions, but they do not represent a
sea change in the odds of military success. We will continue to
work with the Afghanistan Government to improve the protection
of key leaders. We will continue to put pressure on the enemy
and expand the ANSF, their capability, and the territory they
hold.
But as I have said many times, Mr. Chairman, no amount of
military success alone in counterinsurgency is ever enough.
Other critical challenges plague us, challenges that undermine
our efforts and place at risk our ultimate success in the
region. First among them in my view is the pernicious effect of
poor governance and corruption. Corruption makes a mockery of
the rule of law. It delegitimizes the very governing
institutions to which we will be transitioning authority and it
sends an aggrieved populace further into the waiting arms of
the Taliban.
If we continue to draw down forces at this pace--while such
public and systemic corruption is left unchecked, we risk
leaving behind a government in which we cannot reasonably
expect Afghans to have faith. At best, this would lead to
localized conflicts inside the country. At worst, it could lead
to government collapse and civil war.
A second, but no less worrisome, challenge we face is the
impunity with which certain extremist groups are allowed to
operate from Pakistani soil. The Haqqani network for one acts
as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Internal Services Intelligence
(ISI) agency. With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and
conducted that truck bomb attack as well as the assault on our
embassy. We also have credible intelligence that they were
behind the June 28 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in
Kabul and a host of other smaller, but effective operations.
In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of
policy, the Government of Pakistan and most especially the
Pakistani army and ISI jeopardize not only the prospect of our
strategic partnership, but Pakistan's opportunity to be a
respected nation with legitimate regional influence. They may
believe that by using these proxies they are hedging their bets
or redressing what they feel is an imbalance in regional power,
but in reality they have already lost that bet. By exporting
violence they have eroded their internal security and their
position in the region. They have undermined their
international credibility and threatened their economic
wellbeing. Only a decision to break with this policy can pave
the road to a positive future for Pakistan.
I have expended enormous energy on this relationship and
I've met with General Kayani more than two dozen times,
including a 2\1/2\ hour meeting last weekend in Spain. I have
done this because I believe in the importance of Pakistan to
the region, because I believe that we share a common interest
against terrorism, and because I recognize the great political
and economic difficulties Pakistan faces. I have done this
because I believe that a flawed and difficult relationship is
better than no relationship at all.
Some may argue I've wasted my time, that Pakistan is no
closer to us than before and may now have drifted even further
away. I disagree. Military cooperation again is warming.
Information flow between us across the border is quickening.
Transparency is returning slowly.
With Pakistan's help, we have disrupted al Qaeda and its
senior leadership in the border regions and degraded its
ability to plan and conduct terror attacks. Indeed, I think we
would be in a far tougher situation in the wake of the
frostiness which fell over us after the bin Laden raid were it
not for the groundwork General Kayani and I had laid, were it
not for the fact that we could at least have a conversation
about the way ahead, however difficult that conversation might
be.
What matters most right now is moving forward. While the
relationship must be guided by clear principles to which both
sides adhere, we can no longer focus solely on the most obvious
issues. We should help create more stakeholders in Pakistan's
prosperity, help the Pakistani people address their economic,
political, and internal security challenges, and promote
Indian-Pakistani cooperation on the basis of true sovereign
equality. It can't just always be about counterterrorism, not
in the long run. Success in the region will require effort
outside the realm of security.
We must agree upon a strategic partnership declaration with
Afghanistan that will clarify and codify our long-term
relationship. We must work toward a reconciliation process
internal to Afghanistan that provides for redress of grievances
and a state-to-state interaction between Afghanistan and
Pakistan to resolve matters of mutual concern. We must make
clear to friends and enemies alike that American presence and
interest and commitment are not defined by boots-on-the-ground,
but rather by persistent, open, and mutually beneficial
engagement.
That leads me briefly to Iraq, where we are now ending our
military mission and setting the stage for just such a long-
term strategic partnership. We are on pace to remove all
American troops from Iraq by the end of the year, per the
strategic framework agreement and the orders of the Commander
in Chief. We are also in discussions with the Iraqi Government
about the possibility of leaving behind a residual training
force. No final decisions have been made by either our
government or theirs, but I can tell you the focus of those
discussions remains centered on capability, the sorts of
capabilities for which the Iraqis believe they need help and
the sorts of capabilities we believe we can offer them.
I know you share my conviction that, having shed the blood
we shed in places like Mosul, Fallujah, Tikrit, and Basra, we
owe it not just to the Iraqi people, but to the memory of those
who never made it home, to get this partnership right for the
future.
Mr. Chairman, I came into this job humbled by the scope of
these efforts and the sorts of challenges that exist by wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan that weren't heading in the right
direction. I leave satisfied in the knowledge that one of those
wars is ending well, while the other one certainly could if
larger and more local issues are addressed. I leave humbled now
by the performance and the resilience of men and women in
uniform and their families, who did not shrink from duty when
duty sent them in harm's way.
Again, thank you for all you have done to make possible
what they have done.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Michael Mullen, USN
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify on the situations in Afghanistan, where
nearly 98,000 U.S. forces are currently deployed; in Pakistan; and in
Iraq, where we are transitioning to a more normal military-to-military
relationship. As this should be my last appearance before you, I want
to thank you for your unwavering commitment to our national security
and especially to our servicemembers and their families. I greatly
appreciate the tremendous support you have consistently given our
military.
The security situation in Afghanistan is steadily improving. The
military component of our strategy--to the extent it can be separated
from the strategy as a whole--is meeting our objectives. Afghan and
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces have wrested the
initiative and momentum from the Taliban in several key areas of the
country and have forced them out of critical population centers,
particularly in the south and southwest. Some of these areas have been
Taliban controlled for years. Our combined forces are placing sustained
pressure on insurgent groups. As a result, the number of insurgent-
initiated attacks has for several months been lower than it was at the
same time last year. Security is holding in most cleared areas,
particularly in those districts where governance and economic
opportunity were also playing a constructive role. Critically, NATO
members and other coalition partners remain committed.
As a result, the insurgents have predictably shifted tactics.
Rather than confront Afghan and international security forces directly,
insurgent groups have and will increasingly focus on high profile
attacks as well as assassination attempts against high-level officials.
Like the recent complex attack in Kabul and the assassination of former
President Rabbani, these incidents are designed to reap a maximum
strategic and psychological effect with minimal input. Make no mistake,
combating an insurgency is about combating perceptions. We must not
attribute more weight to these attacks than they deserve. They are
serious and significant, but they do not represent a sea change in the
odds of military success. We will step up our protection of key
officials, continue our pressure on the enemy, and patiently,
inexorably expand the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), their
capability, and the territory they hold. I expect that following the
consolidation of gains in Kandahar in the south and Helmand in the
southwest, our forces will increasingly focus on eastern Afghanistan
going into next year's campaign season. Given the sequencing of this
campaign plan, we do not expect to see the full extent of the effects
of our military operations until late next year.
While ISAF and Afghan forces are fighting, they are also
transitioning security responsibilities. A sensible, manageable, and,
most importantly, Afghan-led transition process is up and running. The
first tranche of transitions--selected by President Karzai in March
2011--has already changed hands. The three provinces and four districts
in which ISAF forces have transferred lead for security
responsibilities to the ANSF are home to nearly one quarter of the
Afghan population. However, it is too early to judge how well Afghan
structures handle transition, because the first tranche locations were
already fairly developed and secure. The Afghan Government and ISAF are
receiving feedback from these districts and provinces and incorporating
lessons drawn from the experience into future plans. President Karzai
is expected to announce the areas in the second tranche of transitions
in the next few weeks. I expect ISAF will be able to thin out forces
and employ them elsewhere in the country, and as conditions on the
ground allow, U.S. and other coalition forces will redeploy. As
directed by the President, we will withdraw 10,000 American troops by
the end of this year and complete the withdrawal of the remaining
23,000 surge troops by the end of next summer.
Vital to this process is ANSF development. Placing security
responsibilities into Afghan hands rests on the availability of
capable, credible, and legitimate Afghan security forces. The Afghan
army and police have progressed in quantity, quality, and effectiveness
far more than we thought possible 1 year ago. We have helped the ANSF
to already reach their 2011 end strength goal of 305,600. They are
ahead of schedule. More important, the ANSF are in the fight, and the
reviews from the field are increasingly positive. The Afghan National
Police, whose capabilities and professionalism for a long time lagged
behind the Army's, are also seeing capability gains. The ANSF now have
a training base, and they will be taking on more force-development
tasks during the coming year. Overwatch remains essential, and reports
of human rights violations are serious and will be investigated and
fixed. I expect the ANSF to be able to increasingly assume
responsibility for securing Afghanistan and to meet the goal of
assuming lead responsibility for security by the end of 2014.
Despite this steady progress in the areas of security and ANSF
development, however, a successful military strategy alone cannot
achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. Other critical problems remain,
problems that will undermine hard-won gains if they are not addressed.
The fact remains that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network
operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as
proxies of the Government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and
civilians as well as U.S. soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani
Network--which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the
Pakistani Government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency--is responsible for the
September 13 attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. There is ample
evidence confirming that the Haqqanis were behind the June 28 attack
against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and the September 10 truck
bomb attack that killed 5 Afghans and injured another 96 individuals,
77 of whom were U.S. soldiers. History teaches us that it is difficult
to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside
national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today. The Quetta
Shura and the Haqqani Network are hampering efforts to improve security
in Afghanistan, spoiling possibilities for broader reconciliation, and
frustrating U.S.-Pakistan relations. The actions by the Pakistani
Government to support them--actively and passively--represent a growing
problem that is undermining U.S. interests and may violate
international norms, potentially warranting sanction. In supporting
these groups, the Government of Pakistan, particularly the Pakistani
Army, continues to jeopardize Pakistan's opportunity to be a respected
and prosperous nation with genuine regional and international
influence. However, as I will discuss later, now is not the time to
disengage from Pakistan; we must, instead, reframe our relationship.
There is also notable lack of progress in improving governance and
countering corruption in Afghanistan. Pervasive corruption, by criminal
patronage networks that include government officials--at both national
and local levels--impedes all efforts to consolidate tactical
successes. Corruption makes a mockery of the rule of law, something
demanded with increasing urgency by peoples across the region. It also
hollows out and delegitimizes the very governing institutions to which
we will be transitioning authority. Few efforts to improve government
capabilities and legitimacy over the past several years have borne
fruit, and without a serious new approach, systematic change in next 3
years, before 2015, increasingly seems improbable. If we continue to
draw down forces apace while such public and systemic corruption is
left unchecked, we will risk leaving behind a government in which we
cannot reasonably expect Afghans to have faith. At best this would lead
to continued localized conflicts as neighborhood strongmen angle for
their cut, and the people for their survival; at worst it could lead to
government collapse and civil war.
Pakistan also increasingly faces the threat of corruption. It
consistently ranks among the most corrupt countries in the world by
numerous international organizations. Corruption is a hidden tax that
retards business investment and economic growth, makes politicians less
responsive to people's needs, degrades the ability of the government to
provide services, and undermines public confidence. Just as in
Afghanistan, the people of Pakistan will struggle until the country's
leadership addresses corruption head-on.
Despite these challenges and their implications for local and
regional stability, al Qaeda in this part of the world seems
increasingly incapable. With Pakistan's help, we have disrupted al
Qaeda and its senior leadership in the border regions and degraded its
ability to plan and conduct terror attacks. The deaths of al Qaeda
founder, Osama bin Laden, and a great number of other senior leaders
and operators have put the organization in the worst position it has
seen since the September 11 attacks. While the terrorist group still
retains the ability to conduct murderous attacks, with continued
pressure on all fronts, the defeat of al Qaeda's leadership and
dismantlement of its operational capabilities in the region is within
reach.
Our interests in the region, however, do not rest solely in the
operational effectiveness of al Qaeda's senior leadership. The United
States, the countries in the region, and their neighbors all share
interests in regional stability, nuclear surety, and increased
prosperity. That stability is threatened by too many other factors for
the United States to simply walk away once al Qaeda is effectively
crippled. We must and will remain steadfast partners with Afghanistan
and, yes, work closely with Pakistan, as difficult or as uneven as that
relationship might be. Even as we remain committed to a conditions
based drawdown in Afghanistan and the transition of lead for security
responsibilities by the end of 2014, we must further develop the ANSF.
We should shape our ongoing assistance to Afghanistan so as to promote
reliability, accountability, and representation in both governance and
the economic environment. We must continue to work with the government
and military in Pakistan to forge a constructive relationship.
I have spent a great amount of time during the past 4 years
cultivating a relationship with Pakistan's military. I have been
dedicated to this task because I know the importance of this
relationship, strained as it is, and because I recognize the
difficulties Pakistan has had and the many sacrifices it has made in
its own internal fight against terrorism. Despite deep personal
disappointments in the decisions of the Pakistani military and
government, I still believe that we must stay engaged. This is because
while Pakistan is part of the problem in the region, it must also be
part of the solution. A flawed and strained engagement with Pakistan is
better than disengagement. We have completely disengaged in the past.
That disengagement failed and brings us where we are today. Thus, our
engagement requires a combination of patience with understanding what
is in Pakistan's national interests, and a clear-eyed assessment about
what is in ours.
Even in the midst of extraordinary challenges in our relationship
today, I believe we can take advantage of this situation and reframe
U.S.-Pakistan relations. While the relationship must be guided by some
clear principles to which both sides adhere, we can no longer simply
focus on the most obvious issues. We must begin to address the problems
that lie beneath the surface. We must also move beyond counterterrorism
to address long-term foundations of Pakistan's success--to help the
Pakistanis find realistic and productive ways to achieve their
aspirations of prosperity and security. Those foundations must include
improved trade relations with the United States and an increasing role
for democratic, civilian institutions and civil society in determining
Pakistan's fate. We should help the Pakistani people address internal
security challenges as well as issues of economic development,
electricity generation, and water security. We should promote Indo-Pak
cooperation and strategic dialogue. We should also help create more
stakeholders in Pakistan's success by expanding the discussion and
including the international community; isolating the people of Pakistan
from the world right now would be counterproductive.
In summary, success in Afghanistan and in the broader region will
require substantial efforts outside the realm of security--they are now
largely in the political domain. We must address the unfinished
business of safe havens in Pakistan, poor Afghan governance, and
corruption for there to be any hope of enduring security in
Afghanistan. We must work toward a reconciliation process that produces
both an intra-Afghanistan compromise providing for a real redress of
grievances and state-to-state interaction between Afghanistan and
Pakistan to resolve matters of sovereign concern. We must agree upon a
Strategic Partnership Declaration with Afghanistan that will clarify
and codify our long-term relationship. Addressing these and other
internal problems will require hard work by the Afghans and by the
Pakistanis and also by us. We cannot afford to put off tackling these
problems for later.
Turning briefly to Iraq, we have ended our combat mission there,
and, over a year ago, we successfully transferred lead for security
responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces. Iraq's military and
political leaders are responding to the residual, but still lethal,
threat from al Qaeda and Iranian-sponsored militant groups. As a
result, and despite a drawn-out government formation process, the
security situation there remains stable, and the Iraqi people are
increasingly able to focus on jobs and development. However, the end of
the war in Iraq will not mean the end of our commitment to the Iraqi
people or to our strategic partnership. We must focus on the future to
help Iraq defend itself against external threats and consolidate a
successful, inclusive democracy in the heart of the Middle East. As we
continue to draw down forces through December 31, 2011, in accordance
with the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement, we will transition to a more
normal military-to-military relationship.
It has been a privilege working with this committee over the past 4
years while serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in my
previous positions, as well. Your untiring efforts, while important in
themselves to our Nation's security, also serve as a much appreciated
salute to our men and women in uniform and their families during this
time of war. I thank you, and the entire Congress, on their behalf, for
your unwavering support.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, again, on behalf of every member
of this committee and I know every Member of the Senate and all
the people who we represent, we thank you for that
extraordinary service and your statement as well about our
troops.
Let's try a 7-minute first round. Hopefully, there will be
time for a second round, but we never know that in advance.
Let me go back to Pakistan. Admiral, you made a very strong
statement about the Pakistanis giving safe haven to the Haqqani
network, to the al Qaeda group, that are attacking and killing
our people, the Afghan troops, the coalition troops. I totally
share it and I just want to ask the Secretary the first
question.
I assume from your statement that you basically share what
Admiral Mullen has said in perhaps more detail than you did,
but that you basically share his thoughts about the need for
Pakistan to end that safe haven situation?
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. You said the other day that we're not going
to allow these types of attacks to go on. I'm wondering, can
you make it clear what kind of options are available to us to
stop those attacks if the Pakistanis will not prevent them from
happening?
Secretary Panetta. Mr. Chairman, I've made clear that we
are going to do everything we have to do to defend our forces.
I don't think it would be helpful to describe what those
options would look like and talk about what operational steps
we may or may not take.
I think the first order of business right now is to put as
much pressure on Pakistan as we can, to deal with this issue
from their side. Admiral Mullen has met with General Kayani. I
know that Director Petraeus met with General Pasha. There's
been a very clear message to them and to others that they must
take steps to prevent the safe haven that the Haqqanis are
using. We simply cannot allow these kinds of terrorists to be
able to go into Afghanistan, attack our forces, and then return
to Pakistan for safe haven, and not face any kind of pressure
from the Pakistanis for that to stop.
Chairman Levin. Now, that's been our position for some time
and we've heard their excuses for some time as well. When I
pressed Prime Minister Galani about not publicly condemning
those attacks, his first reaction was that he has. I said:
``Well, send me the clippings if you have.'' He backed off
immediately and he said: ``Well, maybe I didn't, but at a lower
level we've made statements publicly.''
Mr. Secretary, a number of us, our leaders, have told the
Pakistanis apparently fairly directly that we are going to have
to take steps to end these attacks. Even though you're not able
to outline those kind of possibilities here publicly, would you
say that the Pakistani leaders are aware of what options are
open to us so that they're not caught by any surprise, if, in
fact, we take steps against that network?
Secretary Panetta. I don't think they would be surprised by
the actions that we might or might not take.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, on the troop reductions in
Pakistan, the President has announced that after the surge
forces are returned home, the 33,000, by next summer, in his
words, that our troops are going to continue to come home at a
steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead. Is
that a position or policy that you support?
Admiral Mullen. I do.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, is it your assessment that the
NATO training mission is on track to build an Afghan army
capable of assuming security responsibility in Afghanistan in
accord with the timetable that's been set?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, my own perspective on the
training mission is one, if we go back a couple of years--and I
think sometimes we understate the significant improvements. We
had no structure, meaning schools, classrooms, curriculums, et
cetera, a couple of years ago, and I think General Bill
Caldwell and a lot of other people have focused on this in a
way that has provided a dramatic both breakthrough and ramp-up
of Afghan security force capability.
A couple of years ago, many of us, yourself included, Mr.
Chairman, and this committee, were increasingly concerned about
the police in particular. Not unlike Iraq, the police training
and getting them on the street lags the military. But that gap
has been significantly closed.
The issue of illiteracy, which was a huge issue, and it
still remains a challenge, but we have put in place a literacy
training which has been very effective. So we see them out now,
trained. Typically during a week we have somewhere between
25,000 and 35,000 Afghan military and police in training. We
are putting in place branch schools for their army. We've
improved the training capacity and capability on their air
force, for their air force.
So we've really made great strides there. They are more and
more taking the lead in the field. I am encouraged by the
advancements. There are a lot of tough issues left with respect
to them, but the way it's being integrated is a great
improvement, and I think so far it's been very successful. We
are by no means where we need to be as of this moment, though.
There's a lot of hard work left.
Chairman Levin. The course that we're on you believe will
allow us to meet the calendar?
Admiral Mullen. As far as I can see, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, relative to Iraq. Admiral, let me ask you this
question. There is a security agreement which was entered into
by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in 2008, which set
a deadline of December 31 of this year for the withdrawal of
the remaining U.S. troops in Iraq. After 8\1/2\ years of
conflict in Iraq, the end of this year is going to mark the
completion of the transition of responsibility for Iraq's
security to the Government of Iraq.
What you've testified to here today is that what we are
considering is a training mission, at the request of the
Iraqis, so that that particular part of our presence could
remain if it is negotiated and agreed to. The Chief of Staff of
the Army, General Odierno, has cautioned publicly that we
should avoid creating the impression of a large American
presence in Iraq by agreeing to have too many U.S. soldiers in
that country after the deadline to withdraw this December.
Have you read those comments of General Odierno or have you
talked to him about this, and do you basically agree that that
appearance needs to be avoided?
Admiral Mullen. I actually did talk to General Odierno
about his comments and we had a very good discussion about
that.
Chairman Levin. I assume you urged him to keep the comments
private while the President is considering his decision?
Admiral Mullen. There was no one more sensitive when he was
a commander on the ground over there on comments from some of
us in Washington. So I think we just all have to be very
careful.
Chairman Levin. I agree with that. But putting that aside,
in terms of a mission in Iraq, would you agree that we must be
careful to avoid keeping a large number of troops in Iraq as
being, number one, inconsistent with the agreement that
President Bush has entered into; and number two, that it could
unleash some street demonstrations which possibly could result
in instability, but that whatever we are negotiating should be
at the request of the Iraqis and we should be very careful in
terms of the numbers that we might negotiate?
Admiral Mullen. I think we have to be very careful about
the numbers. For me at a very high level, the most critical
part of this is to get the strategic partnership right, as the
Secretary testified, and that we really are in the middle of
negotiations right now with respect to what do the Iraqis want
and what, quite frankly, can the Iraqi political leadership
deliver. As the Secretary said, there has been no determination
and no decision at this point.
Chairman Levin. The issue is not what the Iraqis want; the
issue is what we believe is going to be appropriate, if any,
after they make a request.
It's our decision; is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. I think it will be, certainly. But that's
part of the negotiation.
Chairman Levin. Of course.
Secretary Panetta, do you want to add anything to that in
terms of a continuing training mission in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. I think it's important that the whole
purpose of these negotiations is to listen to what it is that
they need in order to ensure that they can provide security,
and that they can deal with the threat of terrorism, in order
to ensure that they can take the steps necessary to be able to
deal with security threats within their country.
We have to listen to their needs, take them into
consideration, indicate what can be provided in order to meet
those concerns, and then, obviously, through a process of
negotiation, arrive at what that is going to look like. That's
the process that's going on now. Clearly, it's going to be
limited. Clearly, it's not going to reflect the numbers that
we've had there in the past. But it does have to meet their
needs, and that's what's being negotiated by General Austin, as
we speak.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, I don't want to waste
the time of the committee in my questioning, but the fact is
that one of the reasons why this has been delayed as much as it
has been is because the Iraqis wanted to know what our
assessment was as to how many troops should be there and that
has not been forthcoming, and it's very difficult for the
Iraqis to make a decision without our input into what those
needs are. If we are basing it all on Iraqis' needs, that to me
is an incomplete picture, because we need to know what
America's national security needs are as paramount reason for
leaving American troops in harm's way.
Admiral Mullen, do you believe that U.S. forces should
remain in the disputed territories of northern Iraq as part of
a post-2011 mission?
Admiral Mullen. Again, Senator, I think certainly that is a
very contentious area and it----
Senator McCain. Do you believe or not believe that we
should----
Admiral Mullen. I think the security posture in that area
has to be such that that doesn't in any way, shape, or form,
blow up. It's a very tough area, and the exact composition of
how that should happen is a product of these negotiations.
Quite frankly, I've gotten----
Senator McCain. So you will not give your opinion as to
whether we need to have a residual peacekeeping force in
northern Iraq post-2011?
Admiral Mullen. Quite frankly, very recently there is still
a very contentious debate about that issue.
Senator McCain. I understand there's a debate. I was asking
for your opinion.
Admiral Mullen. That an issue that a security force is
going to have to be there to resolve, yes. Its composition is
to be determined.
Senator McCain. Every number that I have heard and been
briefed on has stated that at least 5,000 troops would be
needed in that area, U.S. troops, to prevent what has already
been a very volatile area and if we weren't there, there
probably would have been conflict.
Admiral Mullen, from a military and strategic standpoint,
how beneficial would it be if the President decided to delay
the departure of the remaining surge forces from the summer of
next year to the end of next year?
Admiral Mullen. I think from the standpoint, now that I'm
now into Afghanistan, sir, from the standpoint, as I testified
to before, in terms of risk, every commander, and this is not
just General Allen or General Petraeus before him, would like
as much combat power for as long as possible. So I think there
is increased risk, although to get it done by the end of
summer, and while I said to the chairman a little while ago, do
I support the President's policy, and absolutely I do; General
Allen is working his way, really through what it's going to be
at the end of this year. He hasn't worked through what it means
for next year. That will be based on conditions on the ground.
So, generally speaking, a commander is going to want combat
power for as long as possible. That said, the decision has been
made to bring them out by the end of summer and while the risk
is up, I think it's manageable and that there's no question
that we can get there and sustain the military success and the
military component of the campaign.
Senator McCain. But there is no doubt that every military
leader, including General Allen, has testified openly that by
accelerating the withdrawal it does increase the military risk?
Admiral Mullen. It does increase the risk.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. The military risks, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. The military risk.
Admiral Mullen. Senator McCain, if I could just say one
other thing just quickly. One of the things that we've
learned--and all of you have been going to Iraq and Afghanistan
certainly as long, if not longer, than I. I started in 2004.
We've learned a lot about the importance of composition of
forces in addition to just sheer numbers. So there's been
pressure on both sides of this issue in two countries, and that
is something that I take away at the end of my tour, that it
isn't just simply always about numbers.
In Afghanistan, in particular, it's the combined security
forces, because the ANSF are going to be in a lot better shape
a year from now. So that's just part of the lesson that I've
learned.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Finally, getting back to Iraq, Mr. Secretary, it's not a
training mission in the disputed areas; it's a peacekeeping
mission. So if you're confining it only to a training mission
then you haven't got that complete picture of the security
risks in Iraq that I have.
Mr. Secretary, obviously you have stated publicly, and I
appreciate it very much, the degree of cooperation between the
Haqqani network and the ISI, the trucks, the improvised
explosive device (IED) factories, the ammonium nitrate
factories, the attack that was based at the hotel. You
understandably said that you couldn't share with us the
operational options you have, and I understand that.
But we better understand what the options are to bring
about a change in the present status quo, which is not
acceptable, which is the Haqqani network killing Americans and
that being supported by Pakistanis. So Congress does have a
role to play, not on just policy, but also on funding. I think
you're going to have a real uphill battle here in convincing
Congress to maintain a level of funding and assistance to
Pakistan unless there is some change.
As I said, I don't know exactly what the way through this
is. As I mentioned earlier, we all know that we tried cutting
off all relations with them once and that didn't turn out well.
But I strongly recommend that you start discussing with Members
of Congress what our options are to try to bring about a change
in the status quo.
Finally, doesn't Tuesday's killing of former President
Rabbani show that the Taliban doesn't want to reconcile; it
wants to murder and maim its way to victory?
Secretary Panetta. There's no question that when that
happens and it's done by the Taliban that it certainly is an
indication that at least that particular faction, that that
individual was from, is not interested in pursuing
reconciliation if they're blowing up a peacemaker in that
process.
I think it does raise concerns. It raises suspicions.
Nevertheless, I think, obviously, we have to continue to try to
pursue the opportunities that are out there, but we ought to do
it with our eyes open. We ought to do it understanding who
we're dealing with and where they're coming from, and not
expect that this is by any means going to be easy in dealing
with them.
Senator McCain. My time has expired, but General Allen said
that it's pretty clear that the Taliban still has their highest
priority winning on the battlefield. Would you agree with that?
Secretary Panetta. I think from everything I've seen they
continue to pursue their goals, and I don't think we can, as I
said, underestimate where they're coming from. The best signal
we can send to the Taliban is that we're going to continue to
fight them and that we're going to continue to be there and
that we're not going anywhere. If we can send them that clear
signal, I think that more than anything would influence their
willingness to develop reconciliation.
Admiral Mullen. Senator McCain, to some degree that's
becoming more and more aspirational. In a discussion I had with
General Allen earlier this week and with Secretary Panetta, he
sees their leadership parked in Pakistan. The fighters in the
field in Afghanistan are more and more disgruntled. Their
morale is down. It's harder to resource them.
So I would agree that that is what they would like to
accomplish. They're just moving further and further away from
accomplishing that part of their mission.
Senator McCain. I wish we were sending as clear a signal as
you just described, Mr. Secretary.
Again, I want to thank Admiral Mullen for his outstanding
and dedicated service to the Nation.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary, and let me also thank Admiral
Mullen for his extraordinary service to the Navy and to the
Nation, his great integrity, intelligence, and remarkable
service. So thank you very much, sir.
In fact, I think in your opening comments you mentioned how
you have been the principal intermediary with General Kayani,
and I think when the history is written your contributions will
be extraordinary, particularly at the time when they had to
redeploy from their border with India into the tribal areas,
your efforts and others were critical in making that happen.
But in your dialogue with General Kayani--and I think
you've expressed the complex relationship we have with
Pakistan. They are at times helping us immeasurably and at
other times aiding people who are attacking us. Correct me if
I'm wrong, but there's two points that I think I hope you're
making. One, is that we will have a presence in Afghanistan
after 2014, a robust counterterrorism presence, a training
presence, an assistance presence, because one of the notions
running around is that we're going to be all out by 2014 and
it'll be Pakistan's exclusive enclave.
The second point, if you have raised or not--and correct me
if you think I'm wrong--is that when we come out or come down,
I should say--let me say ``come down''--in 2014, we will not
have to rely upon the lines of communications through Pakistan
and other support mechanisms they provide, which would give us
more operational flexibility to strike anywhere in the region.
Is that accurate and have those points been made?
Admiral Mullen. At least from my perspective, I think it's
important to know that we continue on this path to shift lead
security responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014.
While there may be some ongoing discussions about what's next,
the discussions that I've seen essentially model, if not
unlike, Iraq--a shift to a training mission and then obviously
a negotiation with the Afghans about what the long-term
strategic relationship will be.
That's why I think this strategic partnership declaration
currently being negotiated is so important, because that really
is a commitment we're going to be there longer than 2014. Not
unlike Pakistan, we left Afghanistan in 1989. They remember
that. So that long-term commitment is absolutely critical.
The pieces of it, we just haven't put that together. We can
speculate about what the composition might be. I honestly don't
know, and there's been no determination, except to say that
there is this long-term commitment, and how we do that, which I
think will be critical, is going to be important. If we leave,
if we leave the region, it's my view, not unlike what happened
before, we'll be back. It'll only get worse, and you have two
unstable countries, quite frankly, one with nuclear weapons,
terrorists who seek nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of
them without any question should we depart will bring us back
in a much more difficult situation.
Senator Reed. Before I ask the Secretary to comment,
though, we are going to have a long-term presence, but it's not
going to be the same footprint we have today.
Admiral Mullen. No.
Senator Reed. We're not going to be supplying 150,000
troops, we're not going to depend upon the gasoline being
trucked from Karachi up through there, et cetera. That, I would
think--and again, correct me if I'm wrong--would give us more
operational flexibility, which I would hope the Pakistanis
would appreciate.
Admiral Mullen. I think they will. Certainly we will have
more operational flexibility because we just won't have as many
troops. That said, we're working hard to create other options
even right now to supply our troops. There are a lot of
difficulties associated with that. So, I would not say that
we're going to be completely done with respect to needing the
ground lines of communication coming up from the south.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, your comments on these topics?
Secretary Panetta. I think from the very beginning the
President's made clear that we will have an enduring presence
there, and we're in the process, obviously, of negotiating that
now with the Afghans with regards to the agreement on forces.
But I think it's clear that as we draw down, as we try to
provide this transition that we're working towards, that in the
future we have to be prepared to listen to their needs and what
will they need in terms of training, in terms of security, in
the future; that will give us the opportunity to ensure that
all of the gains that have been made will continue on the right
track.
Senator Reed. Let me raise another aspect of the policy in
the region. That is, as we come down we're going to put a lot
of increased burden upon first the ANSF. I concur with your
assessment and particularly Admiral Mullen's assessment that
there's been remarkable progress. The question is, first, can
that progress be sustained; and then second, the issue of
governance, which is the wild card every place we look across
the globe, and not just in the developing world, but everywhere
we look.
But I would have to think that the strongest element we
have is the ANSF. The issue of corruption, we have a task
force; I know we're trying to root it out. But frankly, that's
a long-term effort.
Then the question comes, I think, how are we going to
financially support ANSF? The United States can't do it alone.
Is there an international agreement? Because it consumes
probably what, 40 percent of the budget if they were fully
funding their forces, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. First of all, Senator, I think I'm
relying a great deal on General Allen as he develops the plans,
not only for how we begin to bring down the surge, but also
what happens between now and 2014. I have a tremendous amount
of confidence in his ability to lay out a plan as we
transition, that we bring in capable Afghan army and police to
be able to provide security.
In the seven areas that we have already transitioned, by
the way, it is working very well. Now, admittedly those are the
easier areas. We have some more difficult tranches to do. We'll
do another tranche in the fall.
But I think one of the things that he's working on is to
make sure that as we transition, as we reduce our forces, that
there is a competent Afghan military force that's in place to
provide security. We'll have a chance to see that takes place
and I think that will obviously impact how we measure the
transition going down.
With regard to the cost, it is a concern that we develop
this large force; what is the sustainability because it's not
cheap. So the effort right now, and I think General Allen is
making good progress on this, is how can we reduce the costs of
how we maintain and sustain that force in the future? They are
making progress at reducing the cost.
In addition to that, this isn't a cost that we ought to
bear. It's a cost that NATO and others ought to bear as well.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you very much, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I echo the remarks made about you, Admiral
Mullen, for your service. I thank you very much for that.
Secretary Panetta, I was jotting down things during your
opening statement. Some things I didn't find in the printed
statement, but I applaud you on a great statement, but I'd like
to comment on three things, in particular.
First of all, a lot of people question the mission, the
value of the mission, where we are today, and the ones who know
it best are the fighters in the field, the commanders in the
field, and the families of those who've lost their lives.
When you made this statement, I was thinking that was just
unique to me. As I visit the families of those who have lost
people, I have yet to have one of them deny that, I talked
about, how we cannot allow this mission not to be carried
through. That's a very difficult thing. These are young people
and the families of these young people. So I think maybe that's
pretty consistent, not just in Oklahoma and our exposure to
these people, but elsewhere, too.
The second thing you said that I think is very significant
is looking at any future cuts, whether they come through
sequestration or anything else, would be, using your words,
devastating to our abilities to defend ourselves.
Closely related to that and the question I wanted to ask
you, when you talked about the hollow force and we're going to
avoid the hollow force, the easy thing to do for someone in
your position is to put all the resources into what's bleeding
today, and all too often that happens. So what gets neglected
is usually maintenance and modernization. If we don't do that,
we're going to have a hollow force.
So I guess the first thing I'd ask you is--I know what's
happening to your resources, I know where they're committed.
How are you going to maintain things and avoid the hollow force
that we've seen in the past?
Secretary Panetta. I think the key is not to take the
simple way out, which is to reduce everything by some kind of
percentage across the board and try to take everything down.
That's what we've done in the past.
Senator Inhofe. Right.
Secretary Panetta. The result is that training was
weakened, the force was weakened. They didn't have the
weaponry, they didn't have the equipment, they didn't have the
training, and as a result, we did hollow out the force.
So my approach to it is to look at key areas here and make
some tough decisions with regards to savings that do not
involve just saying we're going to take everything down by a
certain percentage. I'm just not going to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Also, I would hope that you would be
looking towards the future in terms of modernization and
maintenance, those things that are not visible to the American
people today. I know that's what you meant and that's what you
will do.
Let me just ask both of you. Senator Reed talked about the
fact of the long-term commitment and something that a lot of
the American people don't think about, and that is if we have
to come back a year from now, each month that goes by the
terrorists gain greater capability. We're talking about nuclear
capability, delivery systems, and all of that. I know that when
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid his visit here,
his concern is that as time goes by--he was referring to Iran--
the capability of the other side is increasing.
So to me, that ties into something that I have thought was
a mistake, whether it's this President or past presidents, in
making withdrawal dates, just the general concept, the fact
that we are telling the enemy what to do--what we're going to
do and when we're going to do it. If they know the time line,
and thinking about the mentality that we're dealing with--we
think in terms, Americans generally do, of hours and days. They
think in terms of years and decades.
Last week, Ambassador Crocker said, and I'm going to quote
now, he said: ``What we have to do is, I think, demonstrate the
strategic patience that is necessary to win a long war. It's
going to require more resources, it's going to require more
time.'' I hope we can bring those to bear, because it's hard
and painful. As expensive as it has been in blood and treasure,
it's cost us a lot less actually than 9/11 did.
In terms of the concept of setting these dates, I would
just say, that when the dates were set, one already gone by us,
that is July 2011, then the summer 2012, and then December
2014, do you think that demonstrates the strategic patience
that he was talking about? What's your feeling about the
withdrawal dates as a concept?
Secretary Panetta. I understand your view on that. I guess
my approach to it is that the most important signal we can send
is if we do this right and we pay attention to conditions on
the ground and make sure that it works. Whether we have a date
or not, the key here is making this transition work, making
sure that the areas that we transition remain secure, making
sure that stability is put in place, making sure that we don't
allow that country to ever again become a safe haven for the
Taliban.
In many ways, that's my test for whether this works or not.
Whether there's a date or not, obviously we'll have differences
over that. But I think the real key is how do you conduct this
transition in a way that makes it clear that we're headed in
the right direction.
Senator Inhofe. Right. I think it's a difficult thing to
deal with. I have to say this, that during every visit I've
made over there the Afghan and coalition personnel unanimously
said that setting the dates was a bad idea. I know that you
take that into consideration.
We've talked a little bit about something I want to
elaborate on, and that is we seem to concentrate on the bad
things that are happening, but, Admiral Mullen, this thing
that's happening over there in terms of the training program--I
was over there on New Year's Day and I spent a long time going
over and looking at what they are doing in this--in the Kabul
Military Training Center. You look at that, it mirrors what
we're doing in this country, the segregation between infantry
and artillery.
I just applaud everyone who had anything to do with that.
The last figure I got was about $12 billion a year, the cost. I
would hope that you would look at the successes we're having
there, not just in the abilities of these guys that we're
training, but in their attitudes, because in each case they'd
stop and say, why are you doing this, and they were very proud.
They are looking for the day when they are going to be able to
do the very job that they're being trained for.
Do you have any comments to make on that?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, I visited the police academy
there, and one of the things that I took away was exactly what
you said. What I didn't understand was, clearly we've focused
so much on illiteracy, but in fact the officer corps is a
literate force, an 85 to 90 percent force. So the illiteracy
challenge has obviously been on the enlisted side, and we've
made great improvements there, against what seemed to be
impossible 2 years ago, as we used to discuss it.
This year, General Caldwell has actually returned, because
of the analysis, $1.6 billion in 2011. We know $12 billion a
year isn't going to work. There has been a lot of detailed work
now to look at how to get that significantly down. Actually,
John Allen has a lot of confidence in that work. We know that
there has to be something there long-term, but it can't be at
that level. So do the Afghans. They understand that.
So from that model standpoint, I'm very encouraged with
where we are and where we've come from in less than 24 months.
Senator Inhofe. I am too. I know, Secretary Panetta, you're
new in this particular job, but you're fully familiar with what
we're talking about there and the successes. I would just hope
that nothing is done that's going to change that successful
pattern that has been developed.
My time has expired, but I do have a question for the
record having to do with coalition forces, which I will submit.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. It will be asked for the record.
Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by joining everyone else in thanking Admiral
Mullen for his many years of service and adding a particularly
personal note in that we've had the pleasure of knowing each
other for more years than I can count, since we were plebes at
the Naval Academy, trying to figure out what entropy was and
how you can measure the thermodynamic properties of steam. It's
been a long journey and Mike Mullen from day one all those
years ago has always been known for his forthrightness and for
his integrity.
It's been just a great honor to be able to work with you in
your present capacity. I also wish your family and Deborah
well. She has done enormous things for veterans and for wounded
warriors in those other areas. So again, thanks so much for
your service and we look forward to seeing you on other
occasions.
It occurred to me when listening to the exchanges that we
tend to go tactical when we have these discussions. At the same
time, I think from my perspective we should be struggling here
with the strategic and operational model, that we should be
using looking into the future in order to address the issue of
international terrorism. There's not a cure-all, but I think if
we look at the models of the past 10 years, how we have
struggled with this issue, we ought to have a better idea in
terms of how we're going to move into the future on these
things.
We can start with the model of Iraq. Certainly the
discussions that I've listened to today clearly indicate that
we have inherited certain responsibilities as a result of what
in my view was a great strategic blunder. There was no al Qaeda
activity in Iraq when we invaded. We ended up as an occupying
force in the middle of sectarian violence that followed our
invasion.
We've spent well over $1 trillion. At the same time, as I
and others were predicting, we have seen the empowerment of
Iran in the process.
We can then go to the Afghanistan model, where there were
legitimately issues in terms of international terrorism, but
more recently we have assumed the risk and the expense clearly
of nation-building. It's costly, it's casualty-producing. I
quite frankly don't know what the outcome is going to be. I'm
going to ask a question about that in a minute.
Then we've seen recently an addition to this model in
Libya, where we have seen unbridled presidential discretion in
terms of the decision when to use military power beyond all
normal historical precedent. I've spoken about this many times.
We have a definition of humanitarian mission in order to
unilaterally introduce the American military into a theater of
operations.
I worry about that. It's a vague and worrisome standard
when you apply it into the future and when an administration
comes forward and says, this isn't conflict, we don't have to
discuss that with Congress, I think we all ought to be thinking
hard about the implications down the road.
Then we have, especially recently, the use of special
operations, and more particularly Predators, from remote bases,
attacking terrorist targets in highly secret missions in remote
locations, and all of these occurring in areas which have
fragile governmental systems or, quite frankly, no governmental
systems.
So really what I come back to is what have we learned from
this? What is the model now for the future in terms of how we
define the existential threats to the United States and how we
apply military force to them? Admiral, this is your final
voyage here on the Senate Armed Services Committee. I'd like to
hear your thoughts on that.
Admiral Mullen. As I listened to you, Senator Webb--and I
appreciate not only your comments, but obviously the friendship
that is pretty special just because of where we both came from.
I think, honestly, we're to some degree learning as we go here.
Obviously, decisions get made about where we go to fight and
how we fight, and we learn lessons from that.
Clearly, Iraq--this is notwithstanding whether we should
have gone there or not, but certainly, once there, with a
conventional force that needed to dramatically shift, and a
development of an understanding which we'd lost. We've
forgotten about what counterinsurgencies were. Now evolution in
that regard to where we are, and in my view, which I spoke to
very early in this job, left us underresourced in Afghanistan.
Clearly, the main effort has shifted there. In ways it's
the same kind of fight, but it's a much different place and the
complexities are enormous, and it's not just one country any
more.
Just back to Iraq for a second, I hear the Iran
emboldenment piece and I get that, but I've watched them. In
ways, what's happened in the Arab Spring is just rejected al
Qaeda, rejected Iran. So as they've tried to insert themselves
even in the opportunities in the Arab Spring, in fact, it's
continuing to be rejected.
Then the President's decision with respect to Libya,
obviously it was a completely different way to support the
overall effort. We have in these hearings and historically,
we've beaten NATO to death. We haven't heard a word today about
NATO support, negative word today about NATO support in
Afghanistan. I met with all my counterparts last weekend. It's
extraordinary where NATO is on these kinds of things versus
where they were 2 or 3 years ago.
I would argue there--and I was delighted to see Europe take
the lead there--again, I don't get to decide what we do; that's
somebody else--and, quite frankly, have an impact, however we
got to that decision.
But I think all of that--and I take the tactical counsel
well, but there are strategic implications for all these
things, significant differences. I guess I would want to really
carefully look at the lessons and integrate that into the
longer-term strategic view, how do we get ahead of this? Right
now it's very much one at a time.
For me, there's only two existential threats to our country
right now. One, the nuclear weapons that Russia has, and I
think we have that very well-controlled inside New START. Two,
is cyber, quite frankly. So, you pose very important and
difficult questions that, out of all this, if we can step back
from day to day, we owe ourselves some answers about how to
move ahead, because it's not going to get any easier.
I think there will be situations where the use of military
force will continue to rise, maybe not in the scale that we
have right now. But taking what we've learned, as difficult as
this decade has been, and figuring out what that means for the
future is a very important effort.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, if I could?
Senator Webb. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, you've raised some very
important issues. This is really a very appropriate time to
raise those questions, as we're in the process of trying to
trim over $450 billion from the defense budget. We have to look
at larger strategies here as to what kind of defense system do
we need to build as we confront those challenges and as we look
to the future.
Part of this has to be based on the threats that are out
there. Clearly, we're going to continue to have a threat from
terrorism and we're going to have to confront that. I don't
think it necessarily means that we put 150,000 people into
different countries in order to deal with that. We have ways to
do that that are much more effective, much more agile, much
more efficient, that can confront that. But that's an area we
need to talk about.
We continue to have the threat of nuclear capability from
both North Korea and Iran. We have to be prepared to deal with
that threat. We have to be able to confront China. We have to
be able to deal with the cyber threat. We have to deal with the
challenge of other rising powers.
All of these things are the kinds of threats that we're
going to confront. What kind of force do we need to have that
would make us effective at dealing with those threats? That's
something clearly I need your advice and guidance on as we try
to structure the future in DOD.
Senator Webb. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I'd just
like to--on that point, Mr. Secretary, just one sentence, that
if we or you indeed want the country to have the patience with
respect to fighting a long war, I think it's going to be even
more important to define very clearly what is the vital
national interest in terms of our current operations in
Afghanistan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, Mike, good luck to you.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Thank you for that good discussion. It's the kind of thing
that we do need to be talking about. It's critical to the core
of our strategic world positioning.
Secretary Panetta, you said that DOD had doubled in the
last 10 years. Actually, I find that to be an 84 percent
increase, not quite doubled. Over 10 years--that's the base
budget. That's a significant increase, but not as much as a lot
of the other accounts in our government have had over the last
10 years.
The war costs are beginning to come down. This year it's
$159 billion. Next year we expect $118 billion, thereabouts,
the cost of both wars, overseas contingency operations. The 10-
year cost for both wars was about $1.3 trillion and that's less
than this year's deficit. Our total deficit this year will be
about $1.4 trillion and the war costs will be a little more
than 10 percent of that.
So, I guess, I think it is important for all of us to
realize we will not balance the budget by the war costs coming
down.
Secretary Panetta. That's true.
Senator Sessions. They just will not. It did cost us a lot
of blood and a lot of treasure and we should never
underestimate that. But in terms of balancing the budget--and
I'm ranking on the Budget Committee, so I'm seeing these grim
numbers. They are really tough. They are really tough, and I
believe DOD has to tighten its belt, as I think both of you do.
Admiral Mullen, you've been quoted frequently about the
greatest threat to our national security is our debt, and I
think it is.
So you've used today, I believe, Secretary Panetta, $450
billion as the amount that was part of the debt ceiling that
we've already voted. So the vote we did on the debt ceiling
takes the defense budget down about $450 billion over 10 years,
which is pushing 10 percent. However, the challenge I know that
you are faced with is what happens if there's not an agreement
within the committee and the sequester takes place.
Admiral Mullen, it looks to me like it'll be about $850
billion over 10 years, maybe $800 billion, some have said,
reduction in spending. In your best military judgment, is that
acceptable? Is that an acceptable reduction in spending?
Admiral Mullen. Absolutely not. Actually, our estimates go
to about $1.1 trillion if sequester goes into effect. But it's
not only just the amount; it's how it's executed, because it's
peanut butter, it's everything. From my perspective, it has a
good chance of breaking us and putting us in a position to not
keep faith with this All-Volunteer Force that's fought two wars
and that needs to be reset in everything else that we look at
for the future. It will impose a heavy penalty on developing
equipment for the future.
If we're not able to--and it will hollow us out. So I think
we do need to participate, and I have argued for doing that in
roughly the current amount.
Secretary Panetta said a very important thing in his
opening statement, that whatever changes we make, and this also
is at the heart of this discussion with Senator Webb, we have
to be strategically focused. We have to have a strategy, and
having that strategy or different views of the future, and then
what is it going to take to meet that. This is not the 1970s,
it's not the 1990s. This is from my perspective a much more
dangerous time because of the world that we're living in, and
the world keeps showing up on our doorstep for the use of the
military.
So we have to be very judicious about that. I think the
work that we've done to look at how we would do this at the
$450 billion plus level has forced us to look into the abyss of
what it would be if we had to roughly double that. I think it
would be incredibly dangerous for our country's national
security to go there.
To your point, we are not going to solve that debt problem
on the back of DOD. You can't do it if you zeroed the budget.
Senator Sessions. That's correct. We have a $1,400 billion
deficit this year and the total defense budget is $529 billion.
It's not possible.
Admiral Mullen. Senator Sessions, just one other thing. We
have the same problem you have here. Yes, it's 10 percent, but
we have our own discretionary accounts and our own mandatory
accounts, and in fact, if we can't get at some of the mandatory
side, pay, benefits, those kinds of things, we're way above 10
percent on the accounts that we can affect modernization, which
is where we always end up going, modernization and force
structure, the people accounts. So we get smaller faster, which
again, I think, would be significantly smaller faster, and I
think it would be very dangerous.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Mullen, just briefly, you said
you could break the military. I have a sense about our fabulous
men and women in uniform. They're willing to do tough things.
They're willing to take their share of the cuts. But it could
be very demoralizing if there is a perception that they've been
targeted for exceptional cuts that others aren't taking. Would
not you agree?
Admiral Mullen. I would, completely. I think the Service
Chiefs would tell you, and I've seen it myself, we've all
talked about tightening our belts and we don't get much
pushback. There can be some specific areas. There is concern
for changing the retirement system and that isn't on the
immediate horizon.
We, Secretary Panetta and I, both agree we have to figure
out, if we make these changes, that we grandfather them
properly to keep faith with those that we contracted with that
are in the force right now.
But yes, they are extraordinary and I think they are
willing to do their fair share here, but they would not be
willing and should not be willing to do that at an exceptional
level.
Senator Sessions. Let me just point out for my colleagues,
the sequester is not an across-the-board sequester. DOD, even
though last year we went up, it was a flat budget, from $528
billion to $529 billion, got no increase basically last year in
the base defense budget. So you're talking about 15 or more
percent, maybe more percent than that, whereas in the last 10
years defense has gone up 84 percent, but the food stamp
program has gone up 297 percent, the Medicaid program has gone
up 113 percent. In the last 2 years, nondefense discretionary
went up 24 percent.
So, I guess, what I'm worried about is that our committee,
they really do need to reach an agreement that can produce some
reductions in spending that are significant and meet the goal
that the committee was given. But it would be unacceptable, I
think, to allow these unfair cuts, because Medicaid, for
example, and the food stamps, earned income tax credit, are
exempted under the sequester from any cuts.
Secretary Panetta, thank you for your strong opening
statement that represents a mature, solid view of where we are.
Would you like to comment before we wrap up?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, I'm probably one of the few
people here that, having worked on a number of budget summits,
ultimately did achieve a balanced budget. Let me tell you, if
the idea is that you can rely on sequester in order to get
there, that's an irresponsible view. Sequester was always
fashioned--I actually was present at the conference in Gramm-
Rudman, when we fashioned the first sequester, and it involved,
incidentally, entitlement programs as part of the sequester.
That's why it never happened.
But when you develop these kinds of doomsday mechanisms
that are supposed to blow everybody up, in the hope that
they'll do the right thing, very frankly, it doesn't work very
well. The responsibility does lie with the people on that
committee to look at the entire Federal budget. You can't deal
with a Federal budget that's close to $4 trillion and expect
that you can do it through sequester on the discretionary side
alone. Discretionary accounts for one-third of that budget.
Two-thirds of that budget is in the mandatory area. You have to
be willing to put all of that on the table if you're serious
about reducing the deficit. I hope the committee does do that
when they look at all these issues.
Senator Sessions. Briefly, one quick question. Based on
your experience in the previous effort that succeeded in
balancing the budget, would you agree that the depth of our
challenge this time is far greater than it was when you made
that achievement last time?
Secretary Panetta. It sure is. The last time we balanced
the budget, I thought we were in Valhalla and that we'd be able
to continue to operate on a balanced budget and that it would
stay in place and we wouldn't dare put us back into a huge
deficit again. Unfortunately, that happened and now it's much
worse than it was when I faced that issue. It's a huge
challenge.
But nevertheless, this Congress has the responsibility,
working with the administration, to get us on a track to
ultimately reduce that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say good morning and, Admiral, welcome to our
witnesses this morning. Admiral Mullen, please convey my aloha
to Deborah as well. I join my colleagues in thanking you and
your family for the many years of outstanding service to our
country.
To my classmate, Secretary Panetta, I want to say aloha to
you, too, and to Sylvia, and wish you well in your
responsibilities.
I want to thank our men and women in uniform, as well as
the families, for all of their sacrifices. As we both know, we
face difficult decisions regarding our future in Iraq and
Afghanistan. However, the one thing that is not in doubt is the
fact that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines continue
to serve with honor and distinction, and we are proud of them.
Secretary Panetta, the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan released an audit showing that efforts to track the
billions of dollars in aid provided to Afghanistan since 2002
has been hampered by numerous factors. As we look to the
future, what are some of the adjustments that are being made to
increase the accountability of how these dollars are being
spent?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, one of my concerns is that, I
think, we have to be able to audit the books of DOD. While this
is done now in each of the areas, we don't have an overall
auditability for DOD. The effort right now, I think, is on
track for something like 2017 in order to complete that
process. I think that's too long. I think we have to be able to
be auditable, we have to be accountable to the American people
about how these dollars are being spent.
So for that reason, I've basically urged all of the people
in our budget shop to do everything necessary to try to speed
that process up so that we can track these dollars and make
certain that the taxpayers are getting the best bang for the
buck.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Secretary Panetta, last quarter ISAF rated three additional
units within the Afghan National Army that are capable of
operating independently. As we continue to transition regions
of Afghanistan back to host nation control, what is the state
of the remaining units that are attempting to achieve this high
rating level?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, I'll yield to Admiral Mullen,
who has worked directly with this issue. But my understanding
now is that the number of units that had that capability has
gone up, gone up dramatically. What I've seen, both in the
trips I've taken there and listening to General Allen, is that
there are more and more units that are operational, that are
able to go into battle, that are able to conduct the kind of
operations that have to be conducted in order to defeat the
Taliban.
So we are seeing--it's taken a while, it's taken a lot of
training, it's taken a lot of work. But what we are seeing are
units that are increasingly capable of engaging in battle. If
we're going to be able to make this transition, we have to make
sure that all of their units have that capability.
Admiral Mullen. I'd just say, Senator Akaka, that over 70
percent of the police units are rated in the top three
proficiency levels. 90 percent of the overall ANSF units are
partnered with ISAF and the ANSF lead occurs in about 60
percent of our operations. That is just a far cry from where we
were 12 or 18 months ago.
So, as the Secretary says, the trends are all in the right
direction. I don't want to overstate this. There's an awful lot
of hard work that's left, but in this area in particular it has
been extremely successful over the course of the last year and
a half, and we look for that to continue and we see nothing
that gets in the way of them continuing to take the lead,
become more proficient, so that they can have the lead
throughout the country by the end of 2014.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen, the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
was created in 2006 to reduce or eliminate the effects of all
forms of IEDs used against U.S. and coalition forces. What is
your overall assessment of how the organization is achieving
its three-part mission: attack the network; defeat the device;
and train the force?
Admiral Mullen. I think JIEDDO has been an enormous
success. I'm not unaware of the amount of investment that it's
taken. What strikes me is when it was stood up and heavily
focused, although not exclusively on Iraq, it had an enormous
impact across all three of those mission sets.
It's currently being led by somebody who's been in the
fight. As we shifted the main effort to Afghanistan, the IED
threat is still extremely difficult, and yet the enemy is
shifting more and more to these spectacular attacks, on the one
hand, and to a very heavy focus on IED implants. It's a
different IED set. We've needed this organization, I think, to
be in touch with the fight and to be able to respond as rapidly
as we can.
Actually, I appreciate the efforts on the part of many here
in the Senate, Senator Casey leading the effort to continue to
put pressure on the ammonium nitrate piece in Pakistan, so that
we can cut that down as rapidly as possible.
There is a view that we should integrate this into our
overall organization. I'm not there yet. I think we need to
wait until it's much more obvious that we fully integrate
JIEDDO, because oftentimes in our big bureaucracy that can
bring an outfit to parade rest or elimination, and it's too
vital for our overall fight to do that at this time.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen, you are an outstanding leader and have
served your country with honor over the last 4 decades. In your
view, aside from budgetary issues, what do you see as the
biggest challenge facing our military in the future?
Admiral Mullen. I think when people ask me about the
future, as we look in the discussions that we're hearing right
now, I think if we are able to retain the right people, take
care of our families, reset this force, we're the most combat-
experienced force in our history, and that we not hollow it
out. It may be best summarized by: We may be the biggest threat
to ourselves if we don't get this right.
But if we keep the people right now, that doesn't mean keep
all the people. If we are able to ensure that this best force
I've ever seen in my life stays whole at whatever size and is
supported, then I think we can address whatever threats are out
there and provide the military capabilities and provide for the
vital national interests.
So it may be that in the budget world our care has to be so
precise that we don't break this force or break faith with our
people. If we get that right, I think we'll be okay for the
future.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral Mullen, and
thank you for your service, and my best to you and your family
in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of you for being here today. Admiral
Mullen, obviously we will miss having you before this
committee, and thank you so much for your decades of service to
our country.
Director Clapper testified last week before the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees that the reengagement rate from
those that we have released from Guantanamo Bay is at an all-
time high, 27 percent, which means that out of the 599
detainees who have been repatriated from Guantanamo, there are
161 of them who we've either confirmed or suspected of
reengaging in terrorist activities or insurgent activities that
obviously put our troops in danger, further undermine security
in areas that we're fighting, and are threats to the American
people.
So I would ask both of you: At this point, would you agree
with me that that reengagement rate is unacceptable?
Secretary Panetta. There's no question that we can't allow
that to happen, where you release individuals that immediately
go back into the battle and start killing our forces. Now, one
of the protections is that any kind of transfer that's made I
have to certify that the country that accepts that transfer has
taken all of the precautions necessary to ensure that that
doesn't happen. I haven't done any of that up to this point as
Secretary, but you can be assured that I'm not going to certify
unless I am damn sure that that's going to happen.
Senator Ayotte. Can we have your assurances that you, as
you just said, that you won't allow someone to be transferred
from Guantanamo to another country unless you can be assured
that they're not going to reengage back in the battle to harm
us.
Secretary Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that. One of the issues I
would ask both of you about is, if tomorrow we capture a high-
value terrorist outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, where do we
put them, assuming we want to interrogate, assuming we want to
detain, assuming we continue to have security concerns about
them if we were to immediately release them or put them in some
other country?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, the approach now in dealing
with that is very much looking at a case-by-case approach. We
did it recently with Warsami, who was a terrorist who we
located and captured. We were able to gather a great deal of
intelligence from him. As we developed that case, there was a
decision made that he could be prosecuted in the courts, so he
was transferred for the purpose of being prosecuted.
With regards to the issue of ability to detain individuals
under the law of war provision, that is an area, frankly, that
I think we need to work with Congress to decide how we do that,
because the answers to that aren't very good right now.
Senator Ayotte. I would agree with you. I think we need a
long-term detention policy. Right now, would you both agree
with me there isn't an alternative to Guantanamo that exists
right now?
Admiral Mullen. First of all, I agree with the thrust of
what you're saying. There's not a military commander out there
that wants to see anybody back, and the return rate is far too
high. Secretary Panetta as well. None of us want to see that
happen.
We do need a long-term detention policy. I think the
Warsami case actually is instructive. In that case, we actually
kept him at sea for a while. Now, that has limits. You don't
want your Navy completely tied up and this is a case-by-case
basis, and in fact, moving in that direction. There is a way to
keep him and he is being kept right now, having gotten to the
point where he can be prosecuted.
But the law of war piece, it's a very hard problem that is
going to, from my perspective, take everybody getting together.
It's been very contentious. We understand all that. But without
that, it's given us this return rate and it puts people on the
ground who are in the fight in a pretty tough spot.
Senator Ayotte. When you talk about the situation with
Warsami, we couldn't do that with every single individual,
though, put them on a ship, could we, in terms of a practical
reality?
Admiral Mullen. No, not really.
Senator Ayotte. I think we're going to need more ships if
we're going to do that.
One of the concerns that I have that brings me to this is
Attorney General Holder pledged this week that the
administration would close Guantanamo Bay prior to the 2012
presidential election. My concerns about his comments are that,
hearing what you have said and what our military leaders have
said before this committee, right now we don't have an
alternative, and we have a recidivism rate that's unacceptable.
So I would just say to both of you, I think it's very
important that we not put political considerations ahead of
making sure that these individuals don't get back in theater to
further harm us, our allies, and our troops.
Secretary Panetta. The bottom line here, Senator, is we
have a real conflict here. Obviously, the President is very
intent on closing Guantanamo and not adding to the Guantanamo
population. At the same time, Congress has made very clear that
there's no other place that we're going to be able to put these
individuals through legislation of one kind or another.
We have to be able to resolve that for the benefit of this
country, and I would hope that, working together with Congress,
we could find a way to deal with these conflicts.
Senator Ayotte. I hope so, too. I firmly believe we should
keep Guantanamo open. I think that it is a top-rate detention
facility. I've been there, and I think that is the best way to
move forward. I am hopeful that we will resolve. It must make
our troops so angry when they come across someone that we
released, and they're confronting them again. So I don't want
them to be in that position.
I wanted to ask you about Iran, and in particular Iran's
influence on Iraq right now. Admiral Mullen, how would you
describe Iran's surrogate activities in southern Iraq, and is
Iran providing weapons to Shiite militias in Iraq who are in
turn attacking our troops, and how much is Iran contributing to
increased violence in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. I think over the summer there was a
significant spike, what the Secretary said earlier, with
respect to Iran supporting two Shia extremist groups, Asa'ib
al-haq (AAH) and Kata'ib Hizballah (KH). They have control of
that, very clear, because we went by several channels, but
politically to Iraq. Iraq went to Iran and it stopped. So it
is--there's no question that Iran can control this, and it's a
very dangerous potential. They're shipping Explosively Formed
Penetrators (EFP) and Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions
(IRAM) in particular, and the IRAMs are getting bigger and
bigger.
So there is a great down-side potential for destabilizing,
particularly southern Iraq, that actually I think Prime
Minister Maliki and the Iraqi leadership are concerned about.
So in that regard, it is on the one hand up to them. It's very
clear that if they want to do it they can do it. They have been
warned about continuing it and, consistent with what the
Secretary has said about the Haqqani network, that if they keep
killing our troops that will not be something we will just sit
idly by and watch.
Senator Ayotte. My time is up, but I appreciate your
answer, and I would suggest also that as we look at troop
levels that it is in our national security interest,
particularly with respect to Iran, that we have a government in
Iraq that is independent of Iran and that we do not allow Iraq
to be in a situation where Iran has a greater influence than we
would want them to, given our posture toward Iran, our concerns
about Iran. So I'm hopeful that we will take that into
consideration and make sure we have enough troops to secure
Iraq.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We're all sounding like a broken record, Admiral Mullen,
but you're the real deal. You have been an incredible leader
for our military and your family has been terrific. I haven't
always liked every answer you've given, but I never doubted for
a minute you were giving me absolutely your most honest
assessment of any question that was being put your way. That's
all we can ask for as the U.S. Senate, is that kind of
forthright, this isn't always easy, real good information. So
thank you for that.
I want to talk a little about sustainability. I think it is
something that as we have developed as the strongest military I
believe in the world counterinsurgency strategies, I think that
the military has done a good job of figuring out how we work
with a counterinsurgency situation, but I'm not sure that we
focused enough on sustainability. We have a country,
Afghanistan, that has without our help somewhere between $2 and
$3 billion gross domestic product (GDP), and they're now
getting $16 billion a year in GDP because of foreign aid.
Now, there are two parts of sustainability. One is what
we're doing for their Armed Forces and what we're doing for
infrastructure. I have yet to have anybody explain to me how
they afford the army we're building for them. They can't afford
it. They can't afford to pay for the army we're building for
them. We've built a university for them, for their military,
that will cost $40 million a year just to maintain and operate,
and their GDP without all the foreign aid is not going to be
sufficient to even operate that.
The other part, before either of you respond, is the
infrastructure. I need to know who did the sustainability
analysis on the Kabul power plant. How do we spend $300 million
taxpayers' dollars for a power plant that they can't afford to
operate now, even with the $16 billion GDP that they have with
our aid. It is sitting there as a $300 million generator that
is used every once in a while when there's a power plus or when
there is a problem with the electricity they're buying. I don't
remember which one of the Stans, but they're buying electricity
from one of the Stans at a much cheaper cost than it will be to
operate the $300 million power plant we built for them.
I'm very worried that we are throwing money at something
that is just not sustainable, and that is the ultimate insult,
I think, to the men and women who have risked their lives.
Admiral Mullen. We talked about this earlier, Senator
McCaskill. This is a critical issue that we, one, understand;
and two, there's a lot of detailed work going on right now, and
it is not finished. It isn't something I could bring and say,
here's the answer. But we recognize that $12 billion a year for
the ANSF isn't anything close. It has to be dramatically, 70,
80 percent less at best, in order to be able to sustain it. It
also needs to be shared. This isn't just a U.S. burden in the
long run. It needs to be shared with other partners from an
international perspective, but done in a way that allows them
to provide for their security.
So, we just got them to a point where we started to build
them up. Your questions are valid. We're asking them of
ourselves from an infrastructure standpoint. But I also don't
associate their GDP this year with what it's going to be
forever as well. There's an opportunity to develop. Whether it
will or not, I think, is an open question.
It's a question actually, I think, Afghan seniors are
starting to understand, the Government of Afghanistan, to some
degree. I don't think we're going to have any answers here in
the next couple of months, but over the course of the next 12
to 18 to 24 months, I think, we'll know a lot more about that,
and we'll have a better perspective on questions like the one
you raised.
I'll have to get back to you on the Kabul electric plant.
But it's the same kind of question. We are looking at it, and
the President has tasked us with looking at the infrastructure
piece of this along the lines of what you're talking about, not
just the military, but DOS and other agencies as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Kabul Power Plant, more commonly called the Tarakhil Power
Plant, was a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) project.
According to USAID, in March 2007 USAID and Embassy Kabul sent a
message to Washington relaying their support for the Government of
Afghanistan's plan to guarantee long-term, 24-hour access to
electricity in Kabul through the construction of the Tarakhil Power
Plant. The plant would provide insurance against disruption of power
supplies from Central Asia and as peak backup. The March 2007 message
passed on the Government of Afghanistan's request for urgent donor
assistance to construct Tarakhil after it was determined that
significant power shortages would persist throughout Kabul even after
the North East Power System (NEPS) came online. According to the
message, the grid at the time did not include back up capacity to
provide sufficient electricity to overcome operating constraints of the
NEPS and potential supply disruptions of electricity coming from
Central Asia. During Ambassador Eikenberry's remarks at the
commissioning of the first 35MW block of the Tarakhil Power Plant in
August 2009, he specifically attested to the use of this plant as a
peaking and backup power plant.
On the issue of sustainability, USAID has been working with the
Afghan national utility Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) on two
fronts. First, they have been providing extensive hands-on training to
DABS engineers charged with operating and maintaining this power
facility so that they carry out their duties effectively. Second, USAID
is working with DABS to strengthen its commercial operation so that it
can sustain the operation of the entire power network, including the
Tarakhil Power Plant, with reduced support from donors. With USAID
assistance, DABS' revenues have reached $175 million per year and are
increasing--a situation that now permits the Government of Afghanistan
to cease providing an annual operating subsidy of $150 million per year
as it has had to do in the past.
Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, we've spent $70
billion in Afghanistan just on reconstruction and development.
That's not MILCON. That's not any of our ongoing training of
the military. That's none of our military operations on the
ground. I really do think it's important that you require both
your replacement, Admiral Mullen, and you, Secretary Panetta,
require the senior leadership of all of our military and DOD to
read the War Contracting Commission's summary report.
It is an eye-opening piece of work, done by a very credible
and bipartisan organization made up of a lot of expertise. The
report has just come out, and it is really frustrating when you
realize how fast and loose and sloppy that we have played with
so much of this money.
I need to know right now who is making the decision on the
$400 million--I don't know if the American people are aware
that, for the first time in history, DOD has asked for a
reconstruction fund. We've gone from the Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP), which started--I remember it being
described to me when I first came to this committee as money
that would be used to fix broken windows in storefronts. We're
now up to multiples of billions of dollars in the CERP.
Now for the first time, we actually have an Afghanistan
reconstruction fund as part of the defense budget. I don't know
what the thought process was that we would get. What I don't
like about it is it gives everyone the opportunity to blur the
lines between DOS, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and DOD as to who's in charge of this
reconstruction and who is making the decision as to whether or
not there's sustainability and security that is adequate enough
for us to begin to invest hard-earned Missouri and U.S.
taxpayers' dollars in these various infrastructure projects.
I'm not confident about the process of approval, especially
in light of some of the things that have been built that
clearly have been a giant waste of money.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, I don't disagree with a thing
you said. My job is to try to make sure that we take a hard
look at all of those issues, because frankly, based on the
budget constrictions that we're facing, we simply can't afford
to operate that way. We're going to have to go back, we're
going to have to look at these infrastructure issues. We're
going to have to look at reconstruction funds. We're going to
have to look at every area to determine just exactly what is
needed, are we doing this right, are we getting the best bang
for the buck, or is it something we just simply don't have to
do.
For example, on the whole issue of sustainability of the
force, in looking at what now is an unacceptable cost of about
$12 billion a year, they've been able, by virtue of looking at
infrastructure--we don't have to build the level of
infrastructure in Afghanistan that we built here in this
country. It doesn't have to be that. So we can find savings
there. We can find savings in other areas to try to reduce
those costs.
We are going to have to implement much better discipline in
order to make sure that we not only are accountable to you, but
to the American people.
Senator McCaskill. I just want to make sure we circle back
and make sure that the CERP funds and the infrastructure
investments we've made, I hope someone is tasked to going back
to Iraq and actually trying to document what difference it made
in the success or failure of our mission. I don't think we
should hold onto the notion that we have to spend a huge amount
on building schools and health centers and hospitals and roads
and power plants, that the American people have to spend a lot
of money on that under the rubric of counterinsurgency.
I just want to make sure that that strategy has been borne
out as successful, and I frankly haven't seen that
documentation yet.
Admiral Mullen. I think it's, and we can certainly do the
work. From my perspective, when I go back to the origins of
CERP, while there certainly were those projects that were more
expensive than others, but the vast majority of it was,
particularly at the height of the surge, in that timeframe, was
turned to enable young soldiers in the field.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Admiral Mullen. It wasn't just windows and store fronts. It
was a lot of other things that really did make a difference.
While it may not be documented to the degree that we need to,
there's no question in my mind that it was significant in
turning the tide and getting Iraq to where we are right now.
Some of the bigger projects we can certainly take a look at and
answer that question.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Panetta, first let me thank you for your very
forthright comments on the dangers of excessive budget cuts. I
too am very concerned about the possibility of a sequester. I
think it would be the height of irresponsibility for Congress
to allow that kind of indiscriminate, automatic cuts to take
place, particularly since it so disproportionally affects DOD.
That's just wrong.
It troubled me when it was included in the debt package,
and I had a hard time deciding to vote for the package because
of it. So I very much appreciate your putting this committee on
notice about how devastating it would be were that to go into
effect. So I just wanted to begin by thanking you for that.
Admiral Mullen, I also would be remiss if I did not thank
you for your more than, I think it's 40 years of service. It
has been such a great pleasure to work with you, not only in
your current position, but when you were Chief of Naval
Operations. I appreciate all that you've done for our Navy, for
our country, and for working with us in such a collaborative
way. You've been an extraordinary leader and we will miss you
both.
I want to follow up on the issue of Iranian influence in
Iraq, because I am very concerned that with the withdrawal of
our forces and the shrinking of our civilian presence as well
that we're creating a vacuum that Iran is rushing to fill. We
have seen a steadily increasing flow of arms and money and
training to the Shiite militias, particularly in southern Iraq.
My fear is that there will be some in Iraq who will use those
strengthened militias to exert power and seek to affect change
outside of the newly established political channels, especially
in southern Iraq.
So, Admiral Mullen, I will start with you. What concrete
steps are we taking to counter that malign Iranian influence in
Iraq? I know we've made it clear verbally that it's
unacceptable, both of you have. But what are we doing about it
and what can we do about it?
Admiral Mullen. I talked about the political channel, which
actually for temporary effect, and that temporary effect is
still in place, shut it down significantly from where it was
when it was spiking this summer. General Austin is not sitting
back at all in terms of his operations, and actually our
support for Iraqi security forces in these operations.
I think, along the lines of what you talk about, Senator
Collins, obviously Sadr and his group are not insignificant,
but they're outliers, and this is something that, from the
standpoint of this is an area they also really want to focus
on. I think the political leadership and I know that Prime
Minister Maliki very much understands this, I get the vacuum
piece, but at some point in time Iraq has to take charge of its
own.
Iran is not going away. They've had influence on that
border and particularly in the south forever, and actually over
the course of my time in that region, which started in the
early 80s, there is an understanding up to a point. But at some
point in time the Iraqis say, that's enough.
I'm hard-pressed to believe that, having fought for what
they've fought for, that they're going to sacrifice their
sovereignty to this country. The backgrounds are deep and very
contentious historically, and that Iraq has to take concrete
steps, and they are taking some. They're clearly consumed in
the political battles right now to figure out how they're going
to move forward here, to include that kind of balance.
In the end, and I don't know if it's next year or the year
after that, Iraq is going to have to figure that out. That's
part of what I think needs to be tied to the strategic
relationship we have, that they know from a strategic level
we're not going anywhere, we're going to be there with them in
support. We certainly want to continue to push back on Iran in
every single way, not just in what they're doing in Iraq.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, when I last went to Iraq it was
right in the middle of these IRAMs being provided that we were
taking heavy casualties as a result of that. I made very clear
to them that that was unacceptable.
I think, as the Admiral has pointed out, we actually did
have some encouraging results. Prime Minister Maliki was
concerned. He indicated that concern, but, more importantly,
his national security adviser and he made very clear to Iran
that that had to stop. That was a very important message to the
Iranians.
Second, there were operations. General Austin conducted
operations. The Iraqis conducted operations against those
groups as well, to make clear that we were not going to give
them a free license to be able to conduct those kinds of
attacks.
The combination of that did result in a hiatus in terms of
what was taking place. We don't assume, however--and General
Austin has made clear--that this is a temporary thing and that
Iran is going to come back and try to do the same thing.
I think Prime Minister Maliki, he understands that his
country cannot allow Iran to be able to conduct that kind of
influence within his country, provide those kinds of weapons,
and basically undermine his government. That's what's
happening, and I think he gets that message. But we're going to
have to continue to make sure that they take the right steps,
and I think Iran needs to understand that we're going to be
around a while here, making very clear to them that we're not
simply going to ignore what Iran is doing in Iraq.
Senator Collins. Another troubling player which all of us
have discussed is Pakistan providing safe havens and
undermining the efforts in Afghanistan. Senator Graham and I
are both members of the Senate Appropriations Committee and
last night we met late and approved the foreign operations bill
that places several conditions and restrictions on the Pakistan
counterinsurgency capability fund. One of them is that the
Secretary of State must certify that Pakistan is cooperating
with U.S. efforts against the Haqqani network and other
terrorist groups.
Do you, Mr. Secretary, support putting that kind of
restriction on our assistance to Pakistan?
Secretary Panetta. I'm going to let DOS reply to you
directly, but as far as I'm concerned, anything that makes
clear to them that we cannot tolerate their providing this kind
of safe haven to the Haqqanis and that they have to take
action, any signal we can send to them, I think, would be
important to do.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I had a feeling you might defer
to DOS on that. But I do think it's really important, and the
best way to send a strong message is to start conditioning the
funding.
Admiral Mullen, a successful transition in Afghanistan
depends in part on the Afghan forces' willingness and
motivation to fight for their own country. I know you've told
me before that the Afghans are fierce fighters, and I've heard
that from troops on the front lines as well. But attrition in
the ANSF continues to run very high, as much as 32 percent per
year. Between January and June of this year, there were more
than 24,000 Afghan soldiers who went AWOL.
What troubles me is that is more than twice as many as for
the same period a year ago. So that to me does not represent
progress. DOD has noted in its most recent 1230 report that if
levels of attrition seen throughout the last 5 months continue
there is significant risk to the projected ANA growth.
What efforts have been undertaken to increase the long-term
commitment among Afghans? After all, as with Iraq, ultimately
both of these countries' citizens are going to have to take
responsibility for their own security.
Admiral Mullen. Ma'am, it wasn't that long ago that we had
those kinds of numbers and that kind of percent in the police
as well. I think you've seen the attrition rate in the police
come down to meet our goal. We're not happy with that. I know
on the army side in particular that this is an issue that
General Allen, General Caldwell, and the command address
regularly.
Some of it got better tied to how we pay them. But it still
is, as you've described, a significant issue that's approaching
roughly, at least my numbers are, about 30 percent per year.
We do find an awful lot of Afghan soldiers who want to be
there and who want to provide for their country. But there's
clearly a lot that don't have that message yet. We need to
continue to work on that. I know this is a huge priority for
Minister Wardak, the minister of defense, for General Karimi,
who is my counterpart there, and that they continue to work
very specifically to reduce this.
But we don't have all the answers. To your point, clearly
it is a significant risk factor in the overall strategy. But at
least I haven't seen, nor has any commander told me, that it
puts the strategy at risk. So it's significant, but it's
something we think we can continue to address over time and
know we have to.
Senator Collins. Thank you both.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. I know it's been one of those
mornings on Capitol Hill when we have a lot happening, but I
think it's illustrative of the importance of this testimony
today that I think every member of the committee is finding
time to come and ask questions and engage in a dialogue with
both of you.
I think, Admiral--and I wasn't here, but I think in your
testimony you said that we need to reframe our relationship
with Pakistan. I want to build on Senator Collins' line of
questioning about sanctions, with a bit of a focus on how
sanctions or reductions in military aid to Pakistan might
hinder our mission in Afghanistan. More broadly, I'd invite
both of you to just comment further on what we can do to
reframe that relationship with Pakistan.
Secretary Panetta. We have indicated, with regards to
assistance to Pakistan, that it is conditioned on several
things that we have to pay attention to. Number one, are they
cooperating with regards to going after targets in al Qaeda,
the remaining targets? In my prior position, we identified a
series of those targets that remain and we said, we need your
cooperation to be able to go after them. So I think that's one
test.
Second, is whether or not they're going to take action with
regards to the safe havens and dealing with the Haqqanis. I
think that is another area in which we have to say, you have to
take steps to be able to stop that from happening.
Third, that we would like, frankly, for them to continue
efforts to go after the terrorists that are threatening them.
They did, to their credit, took action in Swat, took action in
South Waziristan. They took a lot of casualties. I commend them
for the action they did. But very frankly, they have to
continue that pressure on those terrorists.
Look, I have made clear to them that terrorism is as much a
threat for them as it is for the United States. But it's very
important that they cannot choose between terrorists. If you're
against terrorism, you're against all terrorists, and that's
something, I think, that we have to make clear to them time and
time again.
Admiral Mullen. I would try to expand the discussion
beyond--certainly it has to be where the Secretary mentioned in
terms of included in the framework. I went to Pakistan in 2008
and one of the things that I addressed to the political and
military leadership, along with Steve Kappas, who was then the
deputy at the CIA, I actually believe that the ISI has to
fundamentally shift its strategic focus. They are the ones who
implement, I would argue, as part of government policy the
support of extremists. It's not just Haqqani, because we've
also had our challenges with Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is an
organization they put in place.
So in many ways it's the proxy piece here, the support of
terrorism as part of their national strategy to protect their
own vital interests, because of where they live. That has to
fundamentally shift.
I also believe there has to be enough patience on both
sides. They'll probably be the last ones to shift, and how
quickly that can be done certainly is an open question.
I think we need to listen to them. This is a country that's
generally in decline, although their financial situation is
better now than it was a year ago. So much of it focuses on, as
it does in many countries, how is their economy doing? Is there
a way to open up their markets? As they look out to the future,
would they like to see Afghanistan settled, I believe for some
time? Kashmir actually unlocks the whole region. It's an
enormously difficult problem that I don't think from my
perspective--there has to be pressure brought to bear on
solving that problem as well. One of the things I get
constantly is their number one crop is cotton. They can't
market that cotton here, for lots of reasons that are well out
of my lane.
So much of it is far beyond just the security issue. He has
2,000 detainees in Swat, roughly. He has no place to put them,
no place to take them into a legal system that can't handle
them. So there's a whole rule of law piece here. There's a
chairman of accountability for corruption in this country that
needs to sign off on corruption charges. It's a terribly
corrupt country in many ways, and that chair's been vacant for
the last 18 months.
So there's a series of things that I think we need to look
at and have some patience. I get this has been a long time.
It's just not going to be solved overnight. But I think we need
to broaden it, certainly to include the security issue, the
support. They have, quite frankly, supported us to
significantly impact al Qaeda. But they're pretty choosy about
which terrorists they support with us and the ones that they
won't support.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that comprehensive overview.
It strikes me--and I wouldn't want to pin the two of you
down, but at times it appears like Pakistan and its leadership
are both playing the role of arsonists and firemen, and that's
problematic.
Admiral, you mentioned the economic policy change tied to
their textile industry. It would, I think, still be worth
considering on behalf of Congress, or on the part of Congress,
and that's some homework for us.
Let me move in the time I have remaining to reports of
fraud, waste, and abuse in Federal contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Commission on Wartime Contracting estimated
that at least $31 billion has been lost to fraud and waste.
This is not a surprise to you two. It's not acceptable in good
economic times, certainly not when we're in tough times.
But at the same time, I think we have to be careful that we
don't in putting in place more oversight bog down the good
projects that are under way. How do we get the right amount of
money to the right projects on time? Mr. Secretary, what other
steps are we going to take to ensure that tax dollars are not
squandered by contractors?
Secretary Panetta. There actually were some pretty good
recommendations in that report. I've asked our people to
implement those recommendations. I think the key here is that,
without burdening the operation with additional bureaucracy,
the fact is in the contracts themselves, when you develop the
contracts, that's the first point where you put the right
requirements in and you do the kind of immediate oversight at
that point that assures you that these contracts are being
handled right.
There's a series of other steps that they've recommended.
But my goal is to try to put those into effect because,
frankly, that kind of waste, that kind of loss, is something
that's intolerable.
Admiral Mullen. Can I just make one quick comment? When
General Petraeus took over there out at ISAF, he put in place a
Navy two-star admiral that had done this work in Iraq for him
to run a task force over the course of about, I think, 6 or 8
months, to attack this issue. She came up with many good
recommendations, and those now are being implemented against
existing contracts. Some contracts were cancelled as a result
of that because we recognized we were feeding the enemy in too
many places.
We've also in DOD and this came out of Iraq--over the
course of the last many years, dramatically increased the
number of contract expertise in our own department, which we
had devastated in the 1990s, to put back in place individuals
that can oversee this.
So I think we all recognize that this is an area that we
have to improve on, one, financially; two, we're feeding the
fight against us. We're trying to do that as rapidly as we can.
Senator Udall. Admiral, good points. That's the worst kind
of two-fer, taxpayers' dollars being squandered plus going to
the enemy.
Any opportunities to recoup some of those pilfered funds?
Any plan in place to do so?
Secretary Panetta. Frankly, it's too early to tell right
now. I have asked that they look at that and determine whether
or not some of that can be regained. I doubt it, but I think
it's worth a shot.
Senator Udall. Maybe Admiral Mullen in retirement could
take that on as one of his missions.
Thank you, Admiral Mullen, by the way, for your tremendous
service. I know we all on the committee wish you the very best.
I think it's a tribute to you--you don't like to hear these
expressions of gratitude, but we're going to keep them coming
your way regardless of your sentiments. So, thank you so much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service. I apologize if I go over
questions that other members have asked when I was absent.
Admiral, what advice would you give us as to the right
number of U.S. troops to keep in Iraq next year?
Admiral Mullen. I actually believe that it's--and this is
in the training piece. I really do believe it's tied to the
mission. I think, first of all, assuming there is a number,
first and foremost we have to be able to protect ourselves. We
cannot put anybody in a position that is not able, whatever our
mission, to protect ourselves. I'm actually confident that's
well-understood up my entire chain of command.
Second, we're in the middle of negotiations right now and
honestly, in the end I actually believe, and we've been working
with the Iraqi military for a significant period of time, so we
think we understand where the gaps are, the Iraqi military
understands where the gaps are. In the end, it's going to be
something that now Prime Minister Maliki and the political
leadership makes a decision on, tied to actually not just the
training mission, but also to look at, there's a DOS mission
here as we move to normalize and put a relatively significant
mission in under the DOS umbrella as well.
There has been a lot of analysis on this. Lloyd Austin has
covered this extraordinarily well. But it really, in the end,
depends on the mission, and that's not determined yet.
Senator Vitter. Let's take parts of that at a time. What's
the minimum number, in your opinion, that would be required to
protect themselves? That's the way you start.
Admiral Mullen. But inside, how much training am I going to
do, who's going to do it, again assuming we're going to do
this, where is it going to exist? It depends on where it is in
the country. It's different west than it is north than it is
south or in Baghdad. I know people, you, others, would love to
have me get a number out there. Honestly, just it's not
determined yet. It really does depend on what we're going to do
and where we're going to do it and how often we're going to do
it.
Senator Vitter. I guess I'm a little frustrated, Admiral,
because on our side, on the U.S. Government side, we're part of
the political leadership. So I'm asking for that advice as we
have that discussion.
Admiral Mullen. Secretary Panetta said earlier, and I think
it's important, that when we get to that point, I probably
won't be here, but he'll consult with Congress, we'll consult
with Congress when we get to that point. But honestly, we're
just not there yet. We'd be having, from my perspective,
circular conversations about this, because we just don't know
what's going on in Baghdad.
Senator Vitter. To both of you: We've talked a lot about a
new approach to Pakistan and it's been a pretty broad
discussion. It seems like we don't have a clearly defined new
approach and that's because it's a difficult issue, and I'm not
suggesting it's an easy thing. But it seems very important to
me that we come up with a clearly defined approach and clearly
lay that out.
I think that's important to the Pakistani Government. I
think it's also important for the American people to have
confidence that we're not just moving along and being taken
advantage of again.
When do you think and how do you think we'll lay out that
clear new approach?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, I think that's already
happening. The Pakistanis--as we all understand, this is a
complicated relationship. On the one hand, it's necessary
because we're fighting a war there and we're trying to defend
our country there. They do give us some cooperation in that
effort. Just recently they helped us with a guy named Maritani,
who's a terrorist who they helped capture. They've given us
other areas of cooperation.
At the same time, we know what these other problems are
when they allow these safe havens to take place from which
forces attack our people.
I think the most important thing is that the United States
and Congress, we all have to speak with one voice, one clear
voice to the Pakistanis, that makes very clear that we cannot
tolerate their having these kinds of safe havens. We cannot
tolerate having terrorists coming across the border, attacking
our forces, killing our soldiers, and then escaping back into
that safe haven. That is not tolerable, and they are the first
ones that ought to take action on that.
My experience with the Pakistanis is that if everybody
speaks with one voice, if we all convey the same message--
Admiral Mullen has done that with Kayani, Director Petraeus has
done that with General Pasha, I've done that with my
counterparts, send a very clear message that this is
unacceptable, that the more we keep that kind of pressure on
them, the more they understand that they have to do something
about it.
Now, that's just the nature of the relationship. Sometimes
that's not very satisfying. But frankly, the only way to deal
with the Pakistanis is to keep giving them a clear message
where the lines are.
Senator Vitter. I agree with all of that, and I agree with
speaking with one voice. Has it been articulated about what the
consequences of their not changing in those ways are?
Secretary Panetta. I have made very clear that we will do
everything necessary to protect our forces. I haven't spelled
that out for them, but I would be very surprised if they were
surprised by what we did to fulfill that commitment.
Senator Vitter. What about in terms of aid to the Pakistani
Government?
Admiral Mullen. I like the term that Senator Collins used,
and obviously Senator Graham. I think it needs to be
conditioned. I think we need to be careful about definitions
and terms here, because if they're too broad there can be lots
of things, did they make progress or didn't they make progress.
I think I've been there 27 times. I've met with them multiple
more times than that, with Kayani and with the rest of their
leaders many times. It's an enormously complex problem.
The strategic way to approach this from my perspective?
Secretary Panetta, Secretary Gates before him, Secretary
Clinton, the President, the Vice President, SRAP Holbrooke,
SRAP Grossman, terribly talented people, and not just our
country, for a long time. I think we need to continue to stay
engaged. I don't know where the breakthrough is going to take
place, but I think we can get there and we need to be there
when the light goes on. If we're not, I think it's a very
dangerous long-term outcome should we cut it off. So I think we
have to be careful about the conditioning, and yet it is an
area, it's a lot of money. This is a two-way street.
Senator Vitter. Let me just end on how I began this line of
questioning, which is, I think, a new approach to Pakistan
needs more definition, at least for the American people. Maybe
it's been more clearly defined in private discussions with
them. I don't know. I think it needs more definition for
purposes of our continuing to support any engagement, and I
would encourage that, because I don't think it's clearly
defined even among members, much less the American people.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Admiral Mullen, again congratulations on a
most successful career. I look forward to your next career of
service, because I'm sure it will be something. I don't think
that you're ready to retire.
Admiral Mullen. Oh, yes I am. [Laughter]
Senator Manchin. Of course, Secretary Panetta, I have the
utmost respect, but mostly the confidence. I feel more
encouraged and confident with you coming in in this new venture
of yours and all your past service. So I look forward to much
success.
With that, I want to make a statement. I think you probably
have known my feelings about what is going on and how I feel
about the engagements we have. But it's my deep belief that we
should be rebuilding America, not Afghanistan or Iraq. Today,
with our Nation facing a stagnant economy and a death spiral of
debt, I don't believe we can have it all, or pretend that we
can. We must choose what as a Nation that we can and cannot
afford to do. We must make a choice whether we will spend
hundreds of billions of dollars to rebuild our own Nation, or
build other nations.
Some may believe that making the choice will weaken our
security and I truly don't believe that. Admiral Mullen, as you
have said yourself, debt is the greatest threat to our national
security. If we as a country do not address our fiscal
imbalances in the near-term, our national power will erode, and
the cost to our ability to maintain and to sustain influence
could be great.
This Nation cannot in good conscience cut billions in
services and programs at Home or call on Americans to pay more
in taxes in order to fund nation-building in Afghanistan that
is estimated to cost $485 billion just over the next decade.
Let there be no mistake, we are at a crossroads in our Nation's
history and, I think, every one of us in Congress and the
President and, Secretary, yourself as Secretary of Defense, we
all have choices to make.
I, for one, will not ask Americans to pay to rebuild
another nation, and I have simply said I choose to rebuild
America. To be clear, I want to share with you just a few of
the facts and insights that have helped me formulate my opinion
that we must, for the good of our Nation and our national
security, fundamentally shift from the President's strategy in
Afghanistan to a pure mission of counterterrorism. I will be
specific for the record.
At the current rate of our deficit spending, the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) projects our national debt
will exceed $23.1 trillion by 2021. By the next decade, we will
spend more on interest on our debt than defense, education, and
energy combined. At the same time, the Afghan economy is
growing at leaps and bounds, while our economy stagnates, and
that's only because American tax dollars are funding the Afghan
economy.
Preliminary estimates suggest that Afghanistan's GDP growth
rate was 20.4 percent in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, while the
U.S. growth rate of GDP was 2.2 percent.
Also, in 2011 Afghanistan's growth rate was 8.2 percent,
while our United States of America's growth rate was only 1.6
percent.
This might be worthwhile if we were building a stable and
self-sufficient Afghanistan. But instead of building capacity,
the World Bank reports that Afghan imports and exports have
declined for the last 4 years. Domestic revenues funded only 9
percent of Afghanistan's public expenditures from 2006 to 2010.
This isn't an economy that can function on its own in any way.
It's an economy that is entirely fueled by American tax
dollars.
In the coming days and weeks, we will engage in endless
partisan fights over whether we could and should be investing
$50 billion more to rebuild American transportation
infrastructure, funding that I do support. But we could have
already paid for that and more with the $72.7 billion we have
already invested to build Afghanistan infrastructure since
2002, not to mention the billions more that we are projected to
spend in the years ahead.
We will debate how to pay for the billions needed to
modernize American schools, while the Commission on Wartime
Contracting estimates that $30 to $60 billion has been wasted
on corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is money wasted and
stolen from the taxpayers that could pay for all the school
modernization that the President has proposed and again that I
support.
Perhaps the greatest insult of all is that, in spite of the
blood and treasure that we have invested in Afghanistan, we are
still not their preferred partner of future economic growth
projects, and I'll be specific. In 2007 the state-owned China
Metallurgical Group Corporation won a contract to develop the
Aynak copper deposits in Logar Province. This deposit may yield
up to $88 billion of copper ore. To my knowledge, China does
not have one boot on the ground and has not contributed one
penny to security of Afghanistan. Instead, we are directly and
indirectly helping China profit while we lose our brave men and
women fighting to keep Afghanistan safe.
Secretary Panetta, as I've said, I have great respect for
you, I truly do, and for your service, Admiral Mullen. I know
that this is a new challenge for you, Secretary Panetta, but I
hope that you would take these concerns to heart. I am truly
sincere about what I believe and what I've said, and I've given
it great thought and I have researched the best that I can with
all of the different information available to me to come up
with the conclusion that I have come up with, that we should
get out as quickly as we can, go and fight terrorism anywhere
and everywhere it may take us to keep it from the shores of
America, and I think the American people will be behind us. But
I do not believe that we can win and change the Afghans or the
Iraqis or the Pakistanis from what they believe in.
With that being said, I hope that we really do prevent that
from happening here again as happened on 9/11, and we will
support that effort.
So, with that I have a statement for you on that, if your
people would like to respond to that. If either one of you
would want to, you're more than welcome.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, you've shared those views with
me before and I understand your concerns. I think all of us, as
the Admiral has expressed, are concerned about the economic
situation in this country and that it is a threat to our
national security, and that we have to pay attention to it.
At the same time, it's important that if we're going to
protect this country, protect our economy and protect our
people, that we also have to be able to respond to those
threats to our national security, and that it would not behoove
us to just focus on the economic challenges without focusing on
the national security challenges as well. That's our
responsibility.
I think the reality is that from 9/11, we just celebrated
the tenth anniversary of 9/11, we were attacked. This country
was attacked and a lot of people died as a result of that
attack. We had a responsibility to respond to that. What we
have to do now is to make sure that places like Afghanistan and
Pakistan don't become safe havens so that al Qaeda can again
plan those kinds of attacks against the United States,
particularly with regards to Afghanistan.
So that's the mission here. I know there are differences as
to why we got into it. I know there are differences that are
there as to how a lot of this has been conducted. But I also
want to tell you that I think all of the efforts and all of the
blood that has been spilled, that, in fact, we have made
important progress here, that with regards to terrorism, I
think, we have seriously weakened al Qaeda and their ability to
conduct those same attacks.
I think, with regards to Iraq and Afghanistan, we've turned
a corner. We're in the process of beginning to draw down in
Iraq. We're in the process of drawing down as well in
Afghanistan. I really do think that if you look at that we're
on the right path in both places towards hopefully having a
stable government there in both areas that can both secure and
govern themselves.
It's going to take work. It's going to take commitment. I
understand there's been waste. I understand that mistakes have
been made. But I also believe that this is a point where the
United States has to stick with it and not just walk away from
those responsibilities, largely because the last thing we
should do is to say to those families who have lost loved ones
that somehow all of this was in vain. The most important thing
we can do to pay tribute to those that have lost their lives is
to make this right.
Senator Manchin. Sir, I know my time has expired, and I
would only say that I support the war on terror wherever it may
take us and whatever it costs. I just don't think, at the
expense of the United States, when we have our infrastructure
crumble, that we're building their infrastructure, which does
not seem to give us much of an advantage with them because they
don't seem to appreciate it or respect what we're doing, the
sacrifices we're making. So let's take the war of terror to
them anywhere they may go. Let's make sure that we never forget
what they have done, and we'll punish and bring justice
wherever it may be.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. If I could just say very quickly to
Secretary Panetta's last point, I just think we have to be very
careful and thoughtful about the consequences of how we come
out, how we withdraw, and that against the price that has been
paid, and what does that mean for the future about the health
of our force and that sacrifice.
Then lastly, just briefly on Iraq, I was there not too long
ago, a month and a half, 2 months ago, flying over Baghdad at
night, and I had a couple of soldiers with me who had fought,
lost colleagues, troops that they cared dearly about in
Baghdad. It looked like--the lights at night, it almost looked
like Las Vegas. But more importantly, they saw traffic on the
streets. They'd never seen traffic on the streets in Baghdad at
night.
It is a different place. When I took this job, we were at
the height of the surge discussion and debate then. The despair
about where this was going was enormous, with no end in sight.
Now the end is in sight. There is potential for 26 million
people to lead a better life.
I understand the investment. This isn't about how we got
there, why we got there. It's just where we are right now.
That's why the responsible movement here in the course of the
next year or so, whatever it is, and the strategic partnership
and the opportunity that we have in that part of the world to
have a friend, is pretty enormous.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, when you look back on your time in DOD. I
hope you feel very satisfied, because it's been a tough tour of
duty. We haven't always agreed, but there's been a lot of
social change in the military, there's been a lot of change in
the world. You have been consistent. You have told us what you
think, what you think is best for the country, for the
military, and that's the best anybody could do. So I am very
proud of your service and I consider you a friend.
To my good friend from West Virginia, I couldn't disagree
with you more. Let me tell you that if you don't see things
different in Iraq, you just haven't been there lately.
To those Iraqis who have fought and died, God bless you. Al
Qaeda is the biggest loser in Iraq; would you agree with that,
Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. They came to Anbar and they tried to take
over, and the Iraqi people said: No, thank you. With our help,
al Qaeda was delivered a punishing blow in Iraq. Do you agree
with that?
Secretary Panetta. Yes.
Senator Graham. Now, you're the guy that said we need to go
into Pakistan and get bin Laden. God bless you. That was a hard
decision by the President and he took your advice and he made a
calculated risk. Well done, Mr. Secretary. Going in on the
ground was the most risky option, but the highest payoff, and
well done.
To be secure, don't we have to do more than just kill
terrorists in the war on terror?
Secretary Panetta. That's right.
Senator Graham. All right. So here's my construct. It's
great to kill bin Laden because that deters other people from
wanting to be bin Laden, if they can be deterred. But the best
thing I think we could do as a Nation, Admiral Mullen, is to
provide capacity to will. If there is a country out there who
says, ``I see al Qaeda just like you do, and I don't like the
Taliban any more than you do, and I am willing to fight them
with your help,'' isn't it in our national security interest to
help them?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, certainly in terms of
counterterrorism.
Senator Graham. There will be 352,000 Afghans under arms by
the end of the year, is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. That's correct, by the end of next year.
Senator Graham. Excuse me, by the end of next year.
So that makes me feel good as an American, knowing that
those 352,000 Afghans will take the fight to the Taliban
because, talk about infrastructure crumbling here at home, the
World Trade Center crumbled. That infrastructure crumbled
because a place called Afghanistan provided sanctuary to al
Qaeda and they executed the whole attack for less than a
million dollars.
Do you agree with me, Secretary Panetta, that if things
continue to go like they're going in Afghanistan, the
likelihood of Afghanistan ever becoming a safe haven for
terrorists to attack this country is very remote?
Secretary Panetta. That's correct. The whole point is for
them to achieve sufficient stability so that never happens
again.
Senator Graham. Simply put, isn't it better to fight them
in their back yard, with the help of people who live in their
back yard, than having to do it all from home?
Secretary Panetta. Yes.
Senator Graham. All right. So those who've served in
Afghanistan and Iraq, you are changing the world. It is costly,
it takes more time, it's more labor intensive, to build will,
capacity to will, than it is to kill a single individual.
Drone attacks are part of a strategy, but the ultimate blow
to this ideological movement called the war on terror is to
have the good people over there fight back and win. You know
what? They want to fight back. With our help, they'll win. So
that's my two cents worth.
Back here at home, you're trying, Secretary Panetta, to go
through the defense budget and over the next decade take out a
substantial amount of money because we're broke as a Nation,
right?
Secretary Panetta. That's what they tell me.
Senator Graham. It's painful.
Secretary Panetta. It is.
Senator Graham. You do it with a smile on your face, but
you have to--and I want to help, because the defense budget
should be on the table. Nothing is sacrosanct. The Senator from
West Virginia is right, we're broke. But you don't become
wealthy by allowing your enemies to grow in strength and come
back and get you the second time.
So, we're going to put the defense budget under scrutiny.
Whether it's $400 billion, $350 billion, $450 billion, it's
going to be substantial over the next decade. Triggers in the
debt ceiling bill, are you familiar with them?
Secretary Panetta. Yes.
Senator Graham. As I understand this legislation, if this
supercommittee can't find the $1.4 trillion they're charged
with finding in terms of savings over the next decade, there
will be a trigger pulled to achieve those savings, and $600
billion will come out of DOD. Is that correct?
Secretary Panetta. Roughly in that area.
Senator Graham. On top of what you're trying to do.
Secretary Panetta. That's right.
Senator Graham. If we pull that trigger, would we be
shooting ourselves in the foot?
Secretary Panetta. We'd be shooting ourselves in the head.
[Laughter.]
Senator Graham. That's why I like you.
It would be the dumbest thing. Do you know why Congress
would do such a dumb thing? You don't have to answer that. I
don't know either.
That's the dumbest construct in the entire world, to try to
find $600 billion in savings, is to put DOD at risk, destroy
the finest military in the history of the world. I am
disappointed in my Republican Party for allowing that to be
part of the puzzle.
Now, let's go to Iraq. You're not going to tell me the
number. I understand why you're not going to tell me the
number. But we're going to talk about Iraq in terms of our
strategic interests. On a scale of 1 to 10, how important is it
that Iraq end well in terms of our national security interest?
Secretary Panetta. It's certainly eight and above.
Senator Graham. Okay. So let's look at it in terms of eight
and above. The resourcing for an eight-and-above situation
should be robust, but reasonable. When General Odierno says
that we don't want too large a force, I agree. The Iraqis want
to take over, but they need our help.
If you looked at the Kurdish-Arab dispute as a potential
failure point in the future of Iraq where fighting could break
out, Admiral Mullen, how would you rate that as a risk?
Admiral Mullen. High.
Senator Graham. If you look at the construct that you've
come up with, where you have a Peshmerga, Iraqi security force,
and American soldier forming a new brigade or company, that
construct is paying dividends, isn't it?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it has.
Senator Graham. They call it the Lion's Brigade. So what I
would ask you to do when you sit down and look at the numbers
of troops, to make sure that that fault line does not crack,
because we have a plan to integrate the Peshmerga, the Iraqi
security forces, and we're the referee. Over time, we're going
to build a transition force that will be more stable.
You said something, capacity and capability are as
important as numbers. I agree with that, but there's a time in
military engagements where numbers do matter. We're at the
point now where capability matters.
So my point about 3,000--and I know that's not the number--
providing intelligence-gathering; but what ability do the
Iraqis have to gather intelligence on their own, compared to
us?
Admiral Mullen. I would describe that as one of the gap
areas that they clearly need to work on. It's not none, but
it's an area that----
Senator Graham. But they don't have close to what we have,
and if you want to keep Iran at bay, the more we know about
what Iran is doing, the better off the Iraqis are?
Admiral Mullen. But, Senator Graham, I don't think we
should make them us, either. Yes, they need to improve, but
it's not----
Senator Graham. But we have a national security interest
still in Iraq, right? So it's in our national security interest
to know what's going on inside that country. So when you look
at the fault line of the Kurd-Arab dispute, you look at
intelligence-gathering capabilities they don't have, when you
look at training their air force, training their army, and
having a force protection plan for our diplomats, the numbers
begin to add up. Would you feel comfortable with a member of
your family serving in a follow-on force of 3,000?
Admiral Mullen. I would, I have confidence that whatever,
assuming there is a number, that force protection will be, that
our force protection will meet the needs of whoever might be
there. So in that regard, yes.
Senator Graham. Okay. One last question. I know my time has
expired. Secretary Panetta, we've come up in the Appropriations
Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee markup with some
conditions and benchmarks on Pakistan. I want to provide it to
you and would you write me a letter and see if you think we're
on the right track?
Secretary Panetta. Sure.
Senator Graham. Simply put, you have informed the
Pakistanis that enough is enough. I believe we can't trust them
or abandon them. Do you agree with that simple statement?
Secretary Panetta. That's where we are.
Senator Graham. You can't trust them, but you can't abandon
them. But would you agree with me, if something doesn't change
in Pakistan substantially that we're on a collision course with
Pakistan?
Secretary Panetta. It has to change. We can't continue the
situation that's there now.
Senator Graham. Thank you both for your service.
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Thank you all very much,
Secretary Panetta, Admiral Mullen, for being here this morning
and for your endurance. Hopefully, this is the end.
I want to echo all of my colleagues, Admiral Mullen, in
expressing my deep appreciation for your leadership and for
your service to the country. Thank you.
I would like to pick up from where Senator Graham ended on
Pakistan, because, as you both pointed out in your comments,
what happens in Pakistan has a great deal to do with what
happens in Afghanistan. I had the opportunity to accompany
Chairman Levin to Afghanistan in August. Senator Merkley was
with us as well. One of the things that we heard from our
military leaders when we were there was the growing influence
of the Haqqani network and the impact that they were having,
because of not only their own operations, but because of their
support for the Taliban and other terrorist groups, not only in
Afghanistan, but inside Pakistan itself.
So my question, Admiral Mullen, is first to you, and that
is, do you think that General Kayani, the Pakistani leadership,
recognizes the threat that the Haqqanis present not only to
Afghanistan and to our forces there, but also to their own
internal security and to their own military?
Admiral Mullen. You said something very important, Senator,
and I think the Secretary would agree with this, which is what
we've seen over the course of the last several years is the
coming together of many of these terrorist organizations in
ways that--years ago, they didn't like each other much at all.
But we see more and more of that, including recently the attack
on our embassy, and that's worrisome.
With respect to the future, it's very clear the toughest
fight's going to be in the east, and the Haqqani network is
embedded in Pakistan, essentially across from Khost, Paktia,
and Paktika, which, as General Petraeus said, is the jet stream
to Kabul. They want to own that. That's really their goal.
But they also have, because of the relationships with other
organizations--Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan would be one, al Qaeda
would be another, there is also an internal threat that
Pakistan is trying to deal with, and, in fact, they've
sacrificed greatly, lost lots of soldiers, lost lots of
citizens. That is a priority for General Kayani and his
leadership.
He has about 150,000 troops deployed in the west. He can't
sustain that. He can't rotate them. Not many of them have been
able to rotate out over the last several years. So I think we
need to recognize there has been plenty of sacrifice there.
Haqqani, that group is a tough group and they have not been
willing to take them on militarily. There's concern about the
ability to do that. That's why this emphasis, I think, is so
important, and in the end it's going to be the strategic
leadership of the Haqqani network, not the troops on the ground
for the Haqqanis, that can affect this change.
So I think the risk there is very high over the course of
the next couple of years. I think the biggest fight is going to
be in the east, enabled certainly by us, but also Afghan
Security Forces and coalition forces, more than anyplace else.
The south I'm not going to say is not problematic, but we're in
a much better place in Kandahar and Helmand than we were a
couple of years ago. It's going to be the east, I think, that
in the end answers this from a security standpoint, and Haqqani
is at the heart of that.
We haven't talked about Quetta today. We haven't talked
about Mullah Omar and the Taliban. They haven't gone away, and
that's a part of this which also we need to work with the
Pakistanis to help address. We do get some cooperation there as
well.
So it's a mixed bag in terms of their overall support. In
ways, as the Secretary said, they've helped; in other ways they
haven't.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I was not aware until we had
our meetings in Pakistan of the extent to which they still had
troops fighting the terrorists within Pakistan and the amount
of casualties, both civilian and within their military, that
they have already endured. So I think it is important to point
that out.
We also visited Regional Command East while we were there.
Are you confident that we have enough troops and we have a
strategy on the ground there that can address the growing
influence of the Haqqanis and that path or trail that goes back
and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan in that region?
Admiral Mullen. I think one of the things that General
Petraeus did while he was there was set up this layered
defense, and it's a much tougher spot, tougher fight, for the
Haqqanis than it was a couple of years ago. We have a new
commander, we didn't talk about this today and, I think,
actually it's important, but there is a new team there with
Ambassador Crocker, as well as General Allen. It's an
exceptionally strong team and I look for a positive outcome
because of that team and a positive trend.
General Allen is looking at how to, first of all, finish
this fighting season, if you will, and then based on the
results most of us expect, he's going to have to redistribute
some forces in the east from the south for next year. The
specifics of that I think he's still working his way through.
So, in that regard, my expectation is that there will be
some net increase in the east, not coming from outside the
country but from inside the country, as things have gotten
better in the south and he looks to the tougher fight in the
east in the next couple of years.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate your mentioning the new team
there. They were very impressive.
I think both of you also mentioned the confluence of India
and their impact in the region. One of the things that we heard
from the leadership in Pakistan was their overtures to try and
reduce tensions with India. How much of that do you think is
real and has the potential to have a real impact, and how much
of it is show and not going to have any real impact?
Secretary Panetta. I think it is real. I think they are
making an effort at trying to see if they can find a way to
resolve the issues between Pakistan and India. They've made
efforts at that. I think what has to happen is that they really
do have to make this a higher priority. They have to really
focus on this.
I think in terms of the security of Pakistan that if they
could find a way to resolve their differences with India that
country would be a different country. But to do that, to
achieve that, I really do think that they have to put a much
larger effort into trying to resolve those differences with
India. You can't meet one day and then wait a long time and
then come together. It has to be constant, and that's something
that they're not doing right now.
Senator Shaheen. My time has expired, but just a final
follow-on. How receptive do you think India is to those kinds
of overtures?
Secretary Panetta. India has in some ways resisted engaging
as well. I think both sides need to roll up their sleeves and
get to work on this. It's tough. It's tough politically in both
areas. But in the end we are never going to achieve stability
in that region until the issues between Pakistan and India are
resolved.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both very much.
At this time we'll close the hearing. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
strategic stewardship
1. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, as much
as I'm concerned about finding specific savings, I strongly believe we
have a new imperative for strategic stewardship of our national
treasure by the Department of Defense (DOD) and its leadership. I am
sure we are in agreement that DOD must continue to aggressively look
for ways to save money without compromising its ability to fight and
win the Nation's wars, but what really concerns me is that DOD has not
fully and thoroughly come to embrace the fact that the way it spends
money is just as important as the way it fights because we can't win if
we continue to waste money. In fact, I believe we will erode the will
of the American people if we are not good stewards of both the lives of
our servicemembers and the treasure of our country. As you are fully
aware, without the trust and confidence of the American people we can
win every tactical fight on the ground and still not be strategically
successful. Given the incredibly challenging financial times in which
we find ourselves and the hard slog of the past 10 years at war, how
does DOD, and each of the Military Services, ensure leadership at every
level pay as much attention to how it uses its resources as it does to
how it takes care of its men and women?
Secretary Panetta. I am confident DOD can meet its national
security responsibilities and do its part to help the country get its
fiscal house in order. To do this, DOD must work even harder to
overhaul the way it does business. An essential part of this effort is
improving the quality of financial information and moving towards
auditable financial statements. To that end, I directed DOD to cut in
half the time it will take to achieve audit readiness for the Statement
of Budgetary Resources, so that in 2014 it will have the ability to
conduct a full budget audit. This focused approach prioritizes the
information used to manage DOD, and will give financial managers the
key tools needed to track spending, identify waste, and improve the way
DOD does business as soon as possible.
This is a priority for me across DOD. I will engage in this effort
personally and directed the Deputy Secretary, in his role as DOD's
Chief Management Officer, to conduct periodic reviews. Auditability is
a goal that every commander, every manager, and every functional
specialist must understand and embrace to improve efficiency and
accountability within DOD. Financial Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR)
goals are being included in Senior Executive performance plans
throughout DOD in fiscal year 2012 and DOD is working to include them
in General and Flag Officer performance plans as well.
Admiral Mullen. DOD is adapting to the changing fiscal environment
and will continue to strengthen its analytical processes for making
difficult budget choices. DOD will also reinforce a culture of cost
discipline, which will enhance our ability to be good stewards of our
national resources. These focused approaches will give our financial
managers, at all levels, the key tools they need to track spending,
identify waste, and improve the way DOD does business.
The Chief Financial Officer and the Military Departments play an
integral role in the financial governance processes, including
overseeing the processes and implementation of new systems. Senior
leadership within DOD is committed to, and accountable for,
accomplishing the goals of FIAR.
leadership in contracting policy
2. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, it
seems to me that part of the problem is that contingency contracting
continues to be side-lined in DOD as something it requires and
therefore something it must do, but something to which it does not give
adequate oversight or priority. As a case in point, in June the
Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) had a hearing on this issue,
where I addressed this concern with DOD officials. I simply asked who's
in charge of contingency contracting within DOD--its planning, its
oversight, et cetera. To put it mildly, the answer was lacking and
elusive. Who is the most senior official, aside from the Secretary of
Defense, in charge of contingency contracting policy, planning, and
execution within DOD?
Secretary Panetta. Specific to contingency acquisition and
contracting, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) is the senior official in DOD
responsible for supervising acquisition and establishing policies for
acquisition, to include contingency contracting efforts in DOD. Within
AT&L, these responsibilities are discharged by the Director, Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Program Support.
The importance of contingency contracting is recognized within both
operational and acquisition communities and currently being
institutionalized across DOD in policies, doctrine, and plans.
Operational Contract Support (OCS) has been defined as the ability to
orchestrate and synchronize the provisions of integrated contract
support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the
joint force within a designated operational area.
OCS responsibilities within DOD are set forth in DOD Directive
3020.49, ``Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program
Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and its Operations
Execution,'' which recognizes the roles of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Services, and the combatant
commanders with respect to OCS.
Admiral Mullen. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for AT&L is the
senior official in DOD responsible for contingency contracting policy,
oversight, and execution. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, is
responsible for issuing strategic planning guidance to the combatant
commands, planning system automation support, and review of operational
plans for adequacy and compliance with said guidance. The combatant
commands develop and execute operational plans and the Military
Services provide actual contracting in accordance with Title 10
authority.
afghanistan infrastructure fund
3. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, DOD and
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are now planning for
the implementation of the Afghan Infrastructure Fund, which will spend
$400 million in DOD funds and hundreds of millions more from the
Department of State (DOS) and USAID. The projects include maintaining
and operating power generators in Kandahar, building power transmission
networks, and $23 million for a new road connecting Nawa to Lashkar
Gah. I have asked questions about this fund before in hearings in the
Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight of HSGAC and I continue to have
serious concerns about the fact that DOD is building these projects
that the Afghan Government cannot possibly sustain, particularly in a
time of budget shortfalls and real needs here at home. Can you tell me
how DOD plans to ensure that this $400 million doesn't go down the
drain?
Secretary Panetta. Sustainability is critical to the success of
infrastructure projects. Recognizing this, DOD continues to develop and
implement a number of processes to ensure that the infrastructure it
builds can, and will, be sustained by the Afghan Government and people.
For example, the electrical, water, and other infrastructure projects
funded by the Afghan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) are reviewed for
sustainability by a variety of stakeholders, including DOS, USAID,
international donors, the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), and regional
and local government officials and citizens. All AIF projects must also
have sustainability plans, which identify local responsibilities, non-
U.S. funding sources, and maintenance and operation requirements. In
addition, to help ensure that the electrical projects are sustained,
USAID is engaged in a robust initiative to build the capacity of the
national power utility company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, to
generate revenue and sustain necessary infrastructure. Through
interagency and intergovernmental partnerships such as this, DOD is
working to ensure that all infrastructure projects are sustainable by
the GoA.
Admiral Mullen. We acknowledge that, if unassisted, the Afghan
Government would likely have challenges maintaining these
infrastructure projects. However, there are capacity-building efforts
underway to assist the Government of Afghanistan in developing the
required abilities to maintain these infrastructure projects. In the
case of Kandahar power generation, the Afghan Public Utility has made
great progress in the last few years training the necessary maintainers
for some of these projects. USAID has been engaged in training and
capacity development, and has planned $300 million over the next 5
years to work specifically on capacity development in order to provide
the depth of manpower needed to manage operations.
In the cases cited, future plans for additional power generation
from more sustainable sources, like an additional turbine planned for
the Kajaki Damn and integration of the power transmission networks,
serve to reduce the requirements for sustaining the diesel power
generation stations in Kandahar. Twelve-month contractor warranty
periods have also been added for such projects as the Nawa to Lashkar
Gah road. These types of projects, coupled with capacity development
efforts, and the security efforts provided by the International
Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) will contribute toward the long-term sustainability desired.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
iraq strategy
4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, there are approximately
46,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. The 2008 security agreement between Baghdad
and Washington requires all U.S. forces to be out of Iraq by December
2011. The Iraqi Government must ask for and approve the presence of
U.S. forces beyond 2011. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi
leaders have indicated they would like a U.S. presence beyond 2011,
focused on training their forces, intelligence, and protecting their
air space and borders. Massoud Barzani, President of Iraqi Kurdistan,
said if American troops leave, the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq
after U.S.-led operations began might erupt anew and called on the
Iraqi Government to sign an agreement with the Americans to keep forces
in the country. The Obama administration is finalizing several options
that could leave as few as 3,000 to 4,000 U.S. Forces in Iraq beyond
December 2012. No official decision has been made by Iraq or the United
States. This number is significantly lower than the 14,000 to 18,000
recently presented at DOD by General Lloyd Austin, Commanding General,
U.S. Forces-Iraq. I believe leaving 3,000 to 4,000 U.S. forces in Iraq
increases the risk to those forces and jeopardizes the successes
achieved by the Iraqi people and the coalition of nations who help
liberate them. How does U.S. force presence contribute to the U.S.
Government's strategic plan in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. Strategically, a long-term partnership with the
Iraqi Government and people is in the United States' interest, and a
relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will be an important
part of that partnership. We are currently in discussions with the
Iraqi Government about the nature of that relationship. These
discussions to date have focused on possible mission sets to support
the ISF in areas that Iraqi commanders have identified as shortfalls,
such as: logistics, air and maritime security training, combined arms
training for Iraq's external defense, and intelligence fusion for Iraqi
counterterrorism operations.
Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to maintain
internal stability, and U.S. commanders in the field assess that the
ISF can handle counterinsurgency operations. The ISF has the lead for
security, and levels of violence remain dramatically reduced from where
they were in 2006 and 2007.
At this point, no decisions have been made about any force levels
in Iraq after 2011. We are drawing down U.S. forces in accordance with
the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.
5. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, what are the courses of
action (COA) currently being looked at in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. Courses of action are focused on discussions
with the Iraqi Government about the nature and scope of a potential
future relationship between the United States and Iraq. Any future
security relationship would be fundamentally different from the one we
have had since 2003. We want a normal, productive relationship with
Iraq going forward--a partnership similar to those we have with other
countries in the region and around the world.
For some time, we have been engaged in informal consultations with
our Iraqi partners, including senior ISF officials, regarding ISF gaps
and areas in which the ISF might request training post-2011. These
areas include combined arms training necessary for Iraq's external
defense; intelligence fusion (essential for a counterterrorism
capability); air and maritime security training; and logistics.
Discussions to date with the Iraqis have focused on possible
mission sets to support the ISF in these and other areas. Any post-2011
U.S. force presence upon which the United States and Iraq might
ultimately agree would involve forces appropriate to support training
and related mission sets.
Again, we have made no final decisions--nor reached any agreement
with the Iraqis--about a post-2011 U.S. force presence in Iraq. We are
drawing down U.S. force in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement.
6. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, what are the risks associated
with COAs with regard to troop levels and what missions can be
accomplished with those force levels?
Secretary Panetta. We are currently in discussions with the Iraqi
Government about the nature and scope of a potential future
relationship. These discussions are focused on the types of training
the United States may provide after December 31, 2011, and no final
decisions about the nature of a U.S. presence in Iraq post-2011 have
been made.
With regard to missions and force levels, discussions with the
Iraqis are focused on possible mission sets to support the ISFs in
areas that Iraqi commanders have identified as shortfalls, including
logistics, air and maritime security training, combined arms training
for Iraq's external defense, and intelligence fusion for
counterterrorism. Any post-2011 U.S. force presence upon which the
United States and Iraq might agree would involve forces appropriate to
support the training Iraq identifies and requests.
Again, we have made no final decisions--nor reached any agreement
with the Iraqis--about a post-2011 U.S. force presence in Iraq. We are
drawing down U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement.
afghanistan strategy
7. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen,
Afghanistan remains one of the epicenters of violent extremism.
Progress is being made, but it is fragile and reversible. The July 2011
and December 2014 deadlines seem to loom over all operations in
Afghanistan. Enemy activity in Afghanistan historically intensifies
during the summer, and this summer proved no different as evidenced by
the bombing in Wardak Province on Sunday, the high level attacks in
Kabul, and the greatest single month of U.S. casualties during
Operation Enduring Freedom. A drawdown of U.S. Forces began in July
2011. Almost 1,000 soldiers from the 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team
(IBCT) from Oklahoma were rerouted at the 11th hour to Kuwait. This
strategy of not replacing units as they rotate out of Afghanistan is
disruptive and increases risk as the Oklahoma 45th IBCT is required to
complete a mission at about two-third strength. Since July 29, 13
Oklahoma soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan--they are doing a
great job, are well-trained, and are executing the mission we have
given them. President Obama has ordered the withdrawal of 10,000 U.S.
forces this year and another 23,000 by the summer of 2012, leaving
about 68,000 forces on the ground. What rationale drove the drawdown at
the height of fighting season?
Secretary Panetta. The surge of U.S. forces ordered by President
Obama in 2009 was never intended to be open-ended, and has always been
connected to the transition process, which began in 2011. Campaign
progress has set the conditions that allowed us to begin recovering
surge forces, marking an important milestone toward the completion of
the transition of lead security responsibility to the ANSF by the end
of 2014. Further, decisions over the pace and timing of the drawdown,
within the designated milestones, have been delegated to Commander,
USFOR-A/ISAF. DOD is carefully monitoring campaign progress, and will
ensure that decisions about force strength support our strategy.
Admiral Mullen. President Obama's decision to begin the deliberate,
responsible redeployment of 10,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan
over the course of this year, with a further recovery of the remaining
23,000 by the end of summer 2012 was based on clear progress in our
strategy, particularly in our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and
ultimately defeating al Qaeda. We are seeing steady progress in the
development of the ANSF, and there has been a clear decline in violence
in 2011 when compared to the previous year.
At the end of summer 2012--when the recovery of U.S. surge forces
is complete--there will be a greater number of Afghan and coalition
forces in the fight than there are today because we will have added an
additional 55,400 members to the ANSF.
Additionally, over the coming year, we will continue to develop and
professionalize an even more capable ANSF. A well-trained,
operationally effective ANSF will allow Afghans to assume greater
responsibility as we redeploy the U.S. surge forces, maintain a
necessary level of combat operations against anti-coalition forces, and
prepare for the successful transition of lead security responsibility
to the Afghans by the end of 2014.
8. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, Ambassador
Crocker said earlier this month that the United States must demonstrate
strategic patience to win this long war in Afghanistan. Do you believe
setting withdrawal dates of July 2012 and December 2014 demonstrate
strategic patience and shows U.S. long-term commitment?
Secretary Panetta. The date of July 2011 marks the beginning of the
transition to Afghan security lead, which will be completed by December
2014. July 2011 also marks the beginning of our withdrawal of 33,000
U.S. surge forces, which will be completed by the end of summer 2012.
At that time, the United States would still have 68,000 forces in
Afghanistan.
Our approach demonstrates strategic patience and long-term
commitment. When the surge began, there were roughly 190,000 personnel
in the ANSF. Today, there are more than 305,000 members, and by the
time we complete the withdrawal of our surge forces, the ANSF will be
approaching their approved level of 352,000 personnel. The ANSF of
today and the future benefits from extensive training and partnering by
U.S. and coalition forces that is producing a far more capable army and
police force than we had in 2009, and that has already begun proving
itself in transitioned areas.
Finally, the strategic partnership document that we are negotiating
with Afghanistan is a clear message that the United States will not
abandon Afghanistan when transition is done. U.S. forces will continue
to train and advise the ANSF and support them with important enabling
capabilities. This is a patient and strategic approach focused on
securing our long-term security interests.
Admiral Mullen. President Obama's decision to begin the deliberate,
responsible redeployment of U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by the
end of summer 2012 was based on clear progress in our strategy,
particularly in our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and
ultimately defeating al Qaeda. We are seeing steady progress in the
development of the ANSF, and there has been a clear decline in violence
in 2011 when compared to the previous year.
The United States and the international community have sacrificed
an extraordinary amount--in lives and resources--for the Afghan people.
We remain committed to assisting Afghanistan in seeking a secure
country that is free of al Qaeda safe havens. Ultimately, however, the
Afghans must be responsible for taking the lead for security in their
country. The transition process supports this objective.
President Obama and President Karzai have agreed that the United
States and Afghanistan should have an enduring strategic partnership
beyond 2014. NATO and the international community have also made clear
that their commitment to Afghanistan is enduring and will continue
beyond the completion of the transition to Afghan security
responsibility. We are currently engaging with the Afghans to outline,
in broad terms, a vision for our long-term cooperation and presence.
Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to
come; this is the reality of over 30 years of war. Our assistance,
however, must be focused on helping the Afghans take full
responsibility for their own future. We need to ensure that, as a
nation, they begin to develop the capacity and the resources they need
to reduce their reliance on international aid.
9. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, do you
believe that a stable Afghanistan will help prevent future attacks on
this country like that of 9/11?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. President Obama's strategy--as laid out in
his West Point address on December 1, 2009--focuses on the core goal,
which is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates
and prevent al Qaeda's capacity to threaten the United States and our
allies and partners in the future.
To accomplish this, DOD is pursuing three objectives that will
secure and stabilize the country: deny al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse
the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's
security forces and government so that they can take lead
responsibility for Afghanistan's future.
The United States made substantial progress on these objectives. We
have exceeded our expectations on our core goal of defeating al Qaeda,
removing 20 of its top 30 leaders from the battelfield, including Osama
bin Laden. We have broken the Taliban's momentum in their heartland in
Kandahar and Helmand. We have trained more than 305,000 ANSF personnel,
who are now in the lead for security responsibilities in seven areas of
the country, with more to follow with the implementation of the second
tranche of transitioning areas currently scheduled for December 2011.
This undeniable progress is important to American security because
it helps foster an Afghanistan that is stable and secure--a country in
which extremists will not find a safe haven or a platform for launching
attacks on the United States and our allies and partners.
Admiral Mullen. I believe that a stable Afghanistan, one that
denies our enemies a safe haven, will prevent future attacks from
Afghanistan on our country like those experienced on 9/11.
boycotts of certain u.s. defense contractors by foreign interest groups
10. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, in recent years, global
activists, foreign business enterprises, and certain governments have
demonstrated an increased willingness to advance de facto foreign
boycotts on contractors and subcontractors of DOD that provide certain
products. If successful, such actions would not only harm the U.S.
defense industrial base, but also impede the military strategy and
tactics of our Armed Forces and allies in regions where our forces are
deployed or our interests are at stake. Such endeavors include a recent
effort to classify the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) as a prohibited weapon
under the terms of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), and
ongoing attempts today to pressure investors and suppliers to terminate
their relationships with U.S. manufacturers that provide key SFW
components to DOD. Meanwhile, similar but less reliable weapons
possessed by other governments are permitted for use under the CCM. The
motivations and efforts of those now seeking to enforce the CCM--which
was forged outside recognized international bodies--contrast sharply
with ongoing efforts by our government and others to address the true
humanitarian impact of cluster munitions while recognizing the SFW's
enduring and critical importance to our military strategy on the Korean
Peninsula, Persian Gulf, and other sensitive regions. I understand that
in the coming weeks, U.S. diplomats will have an important opportunity
to advance a responsible course of action with regard to cluster
munitions during preparations for a review of the United Nations (UN)
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW). Given the potential negative impact of the
CCM on the SFW, its role in our military strategy, the defense
industrial base, and foreign military sales (FMS) to allies in key
regions, what actions will you take to support and reinforce U.S.
diplomatic efforts to achieve tangible progress on an alternative
agreement under the auspices of the CCW?
Secretary Panetta. The administration supports concluding a
comprehensive and binding protocol to the Convention on CCW that
addresses all aspects of cluster munitions, including use, transfer,
stockpiling, and destruction, and that will have a significant
humanitarian impact on the ground while preserving an important
military capability. The draft protocol presented by the CCW Group of
Governmental Experts Chair provides the basis for such a protocol.
I am committed to protecting the U.S. defense industrial base and
our national security interests. To that end, DOD is actively
supporting current DOS efforts to contact CCW High Contracting Parties
to urge these states to seize the opportunity to conclude a new
protocol regulating cluster munitions at the CCW Review Conference in
November. This includes targeted ministerial-level engagements with key
detractors of the proposed protocol, as well as pressing major users
and producers of cluster munitions for increased transparency. I will
join in these efforts to engage foreign governments on such issues, as
appropriate.
operation enduring freedom/afghanistan benchmarks
11. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, on April 10, 2008, the
Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the situation in
Iraq, progress made by the Government of Iraq in meeting benchmarks and
achieving reconciliation, the future U.S. military presence in Iraq,
and the situation in Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates
were the witnesses. The hearing focused on Iraq, conditions on the
group post-surge, and status of Iraq meeting specific benchmarks. The
aforementioned was one of many hearings and discussions this committee
had regarding progress being made in Iraq. The weekly updates on
benchmarks along with 10 visits to Iraq allowed me to understand what
was going on in Iraq and how we were executing our mission--which often
differed drastically from what was being reported in the news back in
the United States. During a press conference with General McChrystal on
June 10, 2010, he was asked about benchmarks and what metrics where
being used to determine conditions on the ground and how the United
States is meeting strategic objectives in Afghanistan. His answer did
not give specifics but touched on a variety of metrics such as capacity
of Afghan governance, basic rules of law, freedom of movement, combat
capacity of ANSFs, IEDs, and price of goods. In 2009, Congress imposed
a new reporting requirement in the Supplemental Appropriations Act. It
required the President on behalf of the administration as a whole to
submit regularly a policy report on Afghanistan and Pakistan. An
initial report submitted on September 2009 listed eight objectives. It
was followed by a March 2010 report that provided some metrics,
additional reports, and classified briefings to Congress. The reports
describe developments in each objective area. However, determining if
enough progress has been made in each area to be successful and how
that translates into achieving our overall strategic objectives in
Afghanistan is difficult at best. Like in Iraq, Congress and the
American people want to know how we are doing in Afghanistan and how
that is being determined. What are the benchmarks being used in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta. In summer 2009, the National Security Staff
(NSS) coordinated the interagency effort to develop a series of
indicators and metrics to measure progress against the objectives in
the administration's Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Implementation Plan
(SIP). The NSS worked with--and received input from--congressional
staffs, and, in fall 2009, the NSS provided both classified and
unclassified metrics and indicators (or benchmarks) to Congress.
The SIP metrics track progress in Afghanistan against:
disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and
its affiliates;
reversing the Taliban's momentum;
building the ANSF capacity to enable transition;
building the capacity of the Afghan Government to
allow the Afghans to solidify security gains in transitioning
areas; and
involving the international community more actively to
forge an international consensus to stabilize Afghanistan.
The SIP for Pakistan assesses three main focus areas, which are the
following:
Status of security (level of militant-initiated
violence in Pakistan; and extent of militant affected areas in
Pakistan);
Perceptions of security and stability (internally
displaced persons population; population perception of security
in the community; and, economic opportunities in the
community); and
Security forces capability and capacity (effectiveness
of Pakistani COIN operations).
12. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, what are the trends and
status of those benchmarks?
Secretary Panetta. Overall, the United States and our coalition
partners are seeing clear progress with regard to the benchmarks as a
result of our strategy in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to our
core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda
and its affiliates. As was reported in the September 2011 metrics
report, our surge forces--along with those of our allies and partners
and the expanding ANSF--have broadly reversed the insurgency's
momentum. There has also been a marked decline in violence in
Afghanistan so far in 2011, compared to the same period last year. We
have also made steady progress in assisting Afghanistan's development
of its own forces, which have begun assuming the lead for security for
more than a quarter of the Afghan population, with the transition of
seven provinces and municipalities having occurred this past summer.
President Karzai is expected to announce the second tranche of areas to
transition later this fall, which would result in the ANSF having
security lead for as much as 50 percent of the Afghan population.
13. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, what do we need to do to
achieve success in each of the benchmarks?
Secretary Panetta. Achieving and sustaining success in each of the
benchmarks requires continued congressional support for the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund, for Overseas Contingency Operation funds, and for
our counterparts in civilian agencies whose efforts are central to
developing Afghanistan's capacity for governance and sustained economic
growth. Sustained support will ensure U.S. and Afghan forces have the
resources needed to maintain our security gains, complete the process
of transition, and build an enduring partnership with the Afghan
Government. In turn, a secure and stable Afghanistan--bolstered by an
enduring partnership with the United States--will further enable the
Afghans to deny safe haven to terrorists. Additionally, continued
financial support to the Afghan campaign will signal to the Afghans and
the region that the United States remains committed, and that the
hedging strategy used by some in the region is futile. Thus, a positive
political environment in Afghanistan will better enable coalition and
Afghan forces to meet the operational benchmarks in Afghanistan.
We must also continue our efforts to professionalize the Afghan
forces, especially in the areas of literacy, leadership, and
operational performance. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)
estimates that the ANSF will achieve 50 percent overall literacy rates
at the third-grade level in 2012, with more than 70,000 police and
55,000 soldiers having received some level of literacy training.
Achieving a 50 percent literacy rate in the ANSF will not only increase
the ANSF's operational effectiveness, but it will also contribute to
Afghanistan's overall economic development in the longer-term. Equally
important is maintaining our focus on improving the quality and
quantity of leaders in order to further accelerate the ANSF's
development.
Lastly, DOD must continue to work alongside the DOS to engage the
international community to help build Afghan governance capacity and
ensure stability in that country (and the region) over the long-term.
Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to
come. Our assistance, however, must be focused on helping the Afghans
take full responsibility for their own future.
14. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, how does achieving these
benchmarks translate into meeting overall U.S. strategic objectives in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta. The benchmarks were created as a mechanism for
measuring progress against strategic objectives, so achieving
benchmarks translates directly into meeting overall strategic
objectives. Military doctrine states that measures of effectiveness
(including benchmarks and indicators) are criteria used to determine if
operations are achieving strategic objectives. While strategic
objectives are broad, complex, and often abstract, qualitative and
quantitative metrics represent a tangible translation of objectives
into benchmarks that can be measured and tracked over time. These
measures of effectiveness are intended to answer the following
questions:
Are we doing the right things?
Are our actions producing the desired effects?
Are other actions required?
With this in mind, these benchmarks--taken as a whole--are a
representation of strategic objectives, so that when success is
assessed across the benchmarks, the strategic objective is achieved.
Conversely, they also provide a mechanism to adapt operations that are
not showing progress toward the objectives.
With regard to the SIP, the National Security Council assigned DOD
with lead responsibility for the Afghanistan strategic objectives
associated with defeating the extremist insurgency, securing the Afghan
populace, and developing a self-reliant, capable Afghan security force.
If DOD sees success in all of the benchmarks described in its response
to Question for the Record #11, it will assess that the strategic
objectives have been achieved.
afghan national security forces
15. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, the
United States pays over $12 billion a year for Afghan security forces
training. I personally saw the fruits of that labor during my latest
visit to Afghanistan over New Year's Day. I observed the training of
Afghan soldiers at Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and spoke with
several of the new recruits and new leaders of the Afghan Army. I was
impressed with what I saw and with the leadership Afghan Brigadier
General Patyani, KMTC Commander, British Brigadier David Patterson, and
U.S. Major General Gary Patton, then Commander and Deputy of NATO
Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A). The Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) report last month highlighted the significant progress
that the Afghan National Army is making in recruiting and training.
However, shortfalls remain and they need significant amounts of
trainers and support for many years to come. Is it correct to say that
the capability of the Afghan Security Forces is the decisive point of
our Afghan strategy?
Secretary Panetta. The development of capable and sustainable ANSF
is indispensible to strategic success in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will
only be able to continue developing and providing credible and capable
governance and economic opportunities if it has a foundation of army
and police forces that are able to deal effectively with the
insurgency, secure the nation's sovereignty, and enforce the rule of
law. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has made remarkable strides in
developing the ANSF, but developing specialized capabilities such as
logistics, medical, and intelligence remain essential to the ANSF's
future ability to sustain itself and reduce its dependence on coalition
forces. The ANSF's success in the transitioned areas where it already
has the security lead is a promising indicator of the progress made to
date and the prospects for a full transition process by the end of
2014. Nonetheless, even after transition is complete, DOD will have a
continuing interest in Afghanistan's sustainment of capable security
forces.
Admiral Mullen. Yes. The ANSF are a critical element in the
accomplishment of our strategy in Afghanistan. The ANSF are the most
highly developed component of the Afghan Government. Our literacy
programs are making the ANSF one of the largest literate populations in
Afghanistan. Polling data indicates that the population considers the
ANSF the most professional element of the Afghan Government. The ANSF
will enable ISAF to transition responsibility back to GIRoA and the
people of Afghanistan.
16. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, will they
be ready by the 2014 timeline that President Karzai has requested?
Secretary Panetta. The ANSF are on track to reach the goal of
completing transition by the end of 2014--as proposed by President
Karzai and confirmed by our allies and partners at the November 2010
NATO Summit in Lisbon.
This is because the ANSF continues to grow in quantity,
professionalism, and operational effectiveness. Both the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) reached their
October 2011 end strengths of 171,600 and 134,000 personnel,
respectively. Further, literacy training--an invaluable force
multiplier--continues to expand; more than 86,000 ANSF personnel are in
various stages of literacy training. The ANSF continues to translate
this training into operational effectiveness, as 72 percent of ANA
units and 70 percent of ANP units have been assessed as ``effective
with coalition assistance'' or better. This progress became readily
apparent as the ANSF began to assume lead security for over a quarter
of the Afghan population, with the transition of seven provinces and
municipalities announced this past summer. This transition continues to
move forward. The ANSF personnel in the lead in these areas proved to
be capable and resilient, and met the insurgency's challenges to
security.
I expect that, in mid-November, President Karzai will announce the
next tranche of districts and provinces to enter the transition
process. After implementation begins on this next tranche,
approximately half of the Afghan population could be living in
transitioned areas where the ANSF is in the lead for security, with
continuing coalition support.
Admiral Mullen. The decision to begin security transition in a
geographic area is determined by four assessed conditions:
1. ANSF must be capable of handling additional security
responsibilities with less assistance.
2. Security in a given area must be at a threat level that permits
the population to pursue routine daily activities.
3. Local governance must be sufficiently developed to provide a
complementary layer of stability as ISAF assistance is gradually
reduced.
4. ISAF must be properly postured to reduce its presence as ANSF
capacity and capabilities increase and the security environment
improves.
Meeting these conditions will enable the ANSF to assume security
responsibility for Afghanistan according to President Karzai's
timeline.
17. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen, can the
Afghan Government continue to fund and equip these robust security
forces in the future?
Secretary Panetta. The cost of sustaining the ANSFs will continue
to outpace the Government of Afghanistan's near-term resourcing
abilities. The ANSF will need continued international assistance until
new national sources of revenue can be brought on-line.
To that end, DOD is currently looking at how to reduce the
remaining ANSF development and long-run sustainment costs. This effort
includes looking into changes to the force size and shape that might be
possible in a post-counterinsurgency environment, as well as avoiding
redundancies and building only to the standards required in
Afghanistan. As we transition areas to Afghan lead for security, we
have emphasized to our allies and partners the importance of
maintaining their overall financial commitment to security in
Afghanistan. In addition, our allies and partners continue to make
contributions to ANSF sustainability through multi-donor trust funds,
such as the U.N. Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which
supports the ANP. DOD has also implemented programs through its Task
Force for Business and Stability Operations to connect outside
investors to potential Afghan producers, and to help Afghanistan build
the capacity to develop its mineral and other natural resources in
environmentally sound and sustainable ways.
DOD also continues to participate in a concerted interagency effort
to develop an overall economic strategy for improving Afghanistan's
economic sustainability, economic development, revenue generation, and
budget execution. Over time, such efforts will help enable the Afghans
to take on increasing financial responsibility for their own security
forces, with decreasing reliance on donor support.
Admiral Mullen. We are currently working with the Afghan Government
and our coalition partners to develop long-term plans for the ANSF.
Part of the planning process will include identifying the forces
required to secure Afghanistan at a level that they are capable of
sustaining with their internal resources and limited international
contributions.
reintegration of the taliban
18. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Panetta, 1,700 Taliban fighters have
accepted the offer of reintegration from the Karzai Government.
Estimates of the strength of the various Taliban factions vary from
20,000 to 40,000. The reintegration program is aimed at the so-called
``accidental guerillas'' for whom fighting in the insurgency is just a
job. What is the status of the reintegration program?
Secretary Panetta. Since the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration
Program (APRP) was created in the summer of 2010, the Afghan Government
has made steady progress in establishing structures at the national and
sub-national levels to support the program. Several groups have
reintegrated in recent months, bringing the number of former insurgents
formally enrolled in the APRP to 2,657 (as of late October). The High
Peace Council has conducted extensive outreach activities to spread
awareness of the APRP. To encourage greater reintegration in the South,
the High Peace Council convened a conference on September 12-13 with
more than 300 representatives of civil society, local elders, and local
government. A shared understanding of reintegration is important for a
program that centers on community support for the reintegration
candidates. Almost all provinces now have access to donor funds
provided for program implementation, and APRP officials have been
trained on proper execution of these funds. Furthermore, the Ike
Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
authorized DOD to use its funds to support reintegration.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
defense cuts
19. Senator Sessions. Secretary Panetta, in your testimony, you
stated DOD will be implementing more than $450 billion in savings over
the next 10 years in order to comply with the spending caps in the
Budget Control Act (BCA). Please provide a table showing the estimated
$450 billion in cuts to the base on a year-by-year basis.
Secretary Panetta. The BCA does not specify budgets for DOD. Rather
it specifies limits for broader categories of funding. If DOD takes a
proportional share of cuts, DOD's reduction appears to be roughly $450
billion over the next 10 years. All cuts are relative to the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget plan. During our comprehensive
review, which is anticipated to be completed this fall, we will
accurately determine how the $450 billion impacts each of the fiscal
years. We will provide the requested data with the fiscal year 2013
budget request.
20. Senator Sessions. Secretary Panetta, on July 31, 2011, the
White House stated that the BCA required savings of $350 billion from
DOD's base budget. Is the $350 billion figure part of the $450 billion
figure?
Secretary Panetta. The $350 billion reduction is equivalent to the
$450 billion cut but it is measured against the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) baseline, which OMB and Congress often use, rather than
the fiscal year 2012 budget plan. The CBO baseline is about $100
billion lower than the fiscal year 2012 budget plan, which makes these
two cuts roughly equivalent in size.
21. Senator Sessions. Secretary Panetta, why do these two estimates
of savings differ?
Secretary Panetta. The $350 billion reduction is equivalent to the
$450 billion cut but it is measured against the CBO baseline, which OMB
and Congress often use, rather than the fiscal year 2012 budget plan.
The CBO baseline is about $100 billion lower than the fiscal year 2012
budget plan, which makes these two cuts roughly equivalent in size.
22. Senator Sessions. Secretary Panetta, in August, the CBO
released ``The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update'' that noted that
the BCA set separate caps on security and non-security funding for
fiscal years 2012 and 2013, but no such distinction was made for
appropriations for fiscal years 2014 to 2021. While the programs funded
under the security cap, which comprises not only DOD but also the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
Intelligence Community management account, and all accounts in budget
function 150, would face a total cut of $48 billion over the initial 2-
year period, CBO stated that the BCA's caps could be met in the future
through many different combinations of defense and non-defense
appropriations. Do you agree with CBO's assessment that the BCA's caps
could be satisfied through different levels of defense and non-defense
spending?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, it's possible the BCA caps could be
satisfied through different levels of defense and non-defense spending,
but DOD is exploring the best way to reduce our budget by more than
$450 billion over the next 10 years in accordance with the direction
provided in the BCA of 2011.
23. Senator Sessions. Secretary Panetta, how did DOD arrive at the
$450 billion figure you cite as being consistent with the reductions
required by the BCA?
Secretary Panetta. If DOD takes a proportional share of cuts, DOD's
reduction appears to be more than $450 billion over the next 10 years
(fiscal year 2012-fiscal year 2021). All cuts are relative to the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget plan.
24. Senator Sessions. Secretary Panetta, what is the baseline DOD
is using for the reduction of $450 billion?
Secretary Panetta. All cuts are relative to the President's fiscal
year 2012 baseline budget plan.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
iraq
25. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, the U.S. Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq calls for the withdrawal of U.S. combat
troops by the end of 2011. However, the security environment in Iraq
continues to deteriorate. Iraqi political leaders realize the need for
continued presence of U.S. troops but are unwilling to publicly discuss
this possibility. What is your assessment of the situation in Iraq as
far as the Iraqi Government's desire to extend the U.S. mission there?
Secretary Panetta. In August, the Iraqi political leadership
indicated publicly that they are interested in an ongoing training
relationship with the United States post-2011. We believe that an
enduring partnership with the Iraqi Government and people is in the
interest of the United States, and a relationship with the ISFs will be
an important part of that partnership. Any future security relationship
will be fundamentally different from the one that we have had since
2003.
We are currently in discussions with the Iraqi Government about the
nature and scope of that relationship. Those discussions are ongoing,
and no decisions have been made at this point. In the meantime, we are
drawing down U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement.
26. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, how can we encourage the
Iraqis to extend the U.S. military mandate? Should we encourage them to
do so?
Secretary Panetta. The U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement will expire at
the end of this year, so any potential relationship with the Iraqis
will be different from the relationship we have had with Iraq since
2003. The Iraqis stated in August that they are interested in a long-
term relationship, so we are discussing with Iraq the nature of U.S.
military training that might be provided to the ISF. The primary
objective of this training would be to improve ISF capabilities in
furtherance of the President's objective of a sovereign, stable, self-
reliant Iraq that is a force for security in the region and a long-term
strategic partner of the United States, in accordance with the
Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA).
27. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, how can the United States
best nurture the Iraqi security forces should this mandate not be
extended?
Secretary Panetta. We are currently in discussions with the Iraqi
Government about the nature and scope of a future relationship. Those
discussions are ongoing. Any future security relationship will be
fundamentally different from the one we have had since 2003.
Regardless of how the discussions evolve, a cornerstone of our
relationship with Iraq and with the ISF will be the transformation of
the U.S. train-and-equip mission under the leadership of the Office of
Security Cooperation under Chief of Mission authority--similar to
security cooperation offices in other countries in the region--to
maintain a robust security assistance and cooperation relationship.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is also planning to propose regional
training and combined exercises with the ISF.
No decisions have been reached at this point. We are drawing down
U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.
28. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, the administration's current
strategy is to complete a near total withdrawal from Iraq, leaving only
3,000 troops in the country by the end of the year. Iraqi Ambassador
Jeffrey and General Austin, Commander U.S. Forces Iraq, have both
acknowledged before this committee that Iraq currently lacks the
ability to adequately defend itself from attacks against its
sovereignty. It is unlikely that Iraq will possess such capability by
the end of the year. Both Ambassador Jeffery and General Austin agreed
that the U.S. military would be the best force to support and nurture
the Iraqi armed forces. However, the Iraqi Government has not yet been
able to reach agreement on SOFA modifications that would allow American
troops to stay past the end of 2011. In light of recent violence and
unrest in Iraq, do you anticipate the Iraqi Government requesting an
extension to the American military presence there?
Admiral Mullen. Iraq's political bloc leaders expressed a desire
for U.S. training and assistance beyond 2011. However, absent a follow-
on agreement, the United States will withdraw our forces from Iraq by
31 December 2011 in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement.
Iraq has the capability to defend against internal
threats and possesses a confident and capable counter-
insurgency force
Iraq does have capability gaps that effect its ability
to adequately defend against an external threat such as:
Iraqi Army combined arms capability
Cross-ministerial and interagency intelligence
and information sharing
Strategic logistics and sustainment operations
Air sovereignty and integrated air defense
Counterterrorism force professionalism
Despite episodic high-profile attacks by AQI, overall
attacks in Iraq have decreased significantly
Absent a SOFA we will reduce our footprint to a small
Office of Security Cooperation to manage the extensive FMS
program
The United States will still have considerable
military capabilities in the region that will deter threats
against Iraqi sovereignty
The U.S. military will continue to develop the ISF
through a robust Office of Security Cooperation. U.S. and Iraqi
leaders agree that we can adequately continue ISF development
through rotational training and exercises and through arms
sales
29. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, how extensive is our engagement
with the Iraqi political and military leadership towards pursuit of a
modification to the SOFA to enable our presence in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. Ambassador Jeffrey is the lead agent for engagement
with the Government of Iraq to pursue a new security agreement to
facilitate a U.S. military presence beyond 2011. Senior leaders
throughout the government including the President and Vice President
have been extremely engaged in the process. The interagency met weekly
on Iraq to ensure a whole-of-government approach on this issue.
Additionally, Secretary Panetta and I both visited Iraq in recent
months and met with senior Iraqi leaders including Prime Minister
Maliki. Iraqi lawmakers expressed a desire for U.S. training and
assistance beyond 2011. However, without a follow-on security
agreement, we will--in accordance with Article 24 of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement--withdraw all our forces from Iraq by 31 December
2011. A very small office of security cooperation will remain to manage
the extensive ($6.4 billion) FMS program.
30. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, we are quickly approaching the
point where such a decision must be made. How much longer can we wait
before our planning and logistics capabilities cannot adjust for a
change in the current withdrawal plan?
Admiral Mullen. As the President has stated, we intend to fulfill
our obligations under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which
requires all U.S. forces to withdraw by the end of the year. We are on
track to meet that objective and are rapidly approaching the time where
a follow-on agreement would create significant logistical costs and
challenges for our forces. Although changes to the current plan would
likely increase costs, the U.S. military has sufficient planning and
logistics capacity to react to changes.
31. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, do you believe our
servicemembers and their families are prepared to deal with a continued
presence in Iraq should that eventuality come to pass?
Admiral Mullen. We intend to fulfill our obligations under the 2008
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which requires all U.S. forces to
withdraw by the end of the year. A small number of servicemembers will
remain in Iraq to support the U.S. Embassy and manage the extensive FMS
program as part of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). The
servicemembers working in the OSC-I will not be operational in nature.
Instead, they would perform functions such as managing FMS cases, just
as servicemembers do in our embassies around the world. The men and
women are prepared to handle these deployments like every other
military assignment: with strength, fortitude, and character in support
of U.S. strategic objectives.
We are also working to ease the deployment burden on our troops and
their families. For example, in 2012, the Army will shorten unit
deployment times from 12 months to 9 months.
32. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, what is your assessment of
the security situation on the ground in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S forces
to maintain internal stability. The ISFs have had the lead for security
for some time, and levels of violence have remained dramatically
reduced from where they were in 2006 and 2007. U.S. commanders in the
field assess that the ISF are competent at counterinsurgency
operations. The drawdown of nearly 100,000 U.S. forces since January
2009 without a significant or sustained uptick in attacks is evidence
that the ISF have made significant progress.
33. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, it seems to me that the
Iraqi Government is extremely fragile. Iraqi leaders privately concede
the need for an extended U.S. troop presence in Iraq but we all know
this may be a politically difficult--if not impossible--request for the
Iraqis to make. It appears on a practical level to me that the Iraqis
would prefer the presence of U.S. combat troops to the presence of
poorly-regulated contractors roaming the country. I pursue these
questions since the same issues will arise for us in Afghanistan in
2014. Iraq 2011 is definitely a test-case for Afghanistan 2014. What do
you think will happen at the end of 2011?
Secretary Panetta. In accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement, U.S. forces will redeploy from Iraq by the end of this year.
This is the drawdown that the President began with his announcement of
the U.S. strategy for Iraq in February 2009, which included an end to
the combat mission in August 2010, and a drawdown of all U.S. forces by
the end of this year.
In terms of security, Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S
forces to maintain internal stability. The ISFs have had the lead for
security for some time, and levels of violence have remained
dramatically reduced from where they were in 2006 and 2007. U.S.
commanders in the field assess that the ISF are competent at
counterinsurgency operations.
34. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, will the Iraqis ask us to
stay?
Secretary Panetta. In August the Iraqi political leadership stated
publicly that they are interested in an ongoing training relationship
with the United States post-2011. We believe that an enduring
partnership with the Iraqi Government and people is in the interest of
the United States, and a relationship with the ISFs will be an
important part of that partnership.
We are currently in discussions with the Iraqi Government about the
nature and scope of that relationship. Those discussions are ongoing.
Any future security relationship will be fundamentally different from
the one we have had since 2003. We want a normal, productive, healthy
relationship with Iraq going forward--a partnership similar to those we
have with other countries in the region and around the world.
No major decisions have been made at this point. We are drawing
down U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.
afghanistan
35. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, in light of continuing violence
and unrest in Afghanistan, do you anticipate the Afghan Government
requesting an extension to the NATO military presence after 2014?
Admiral Mullen. While the ISAF mandate will likely expire upon the
completion of transition in 2014, NATO will continue its presence as a
component of the international community's enduring commitment to
Afghanistan. NATO, the United States, and other international partners
are currently negotiating long-term strategic agreements with the
Afghan Government.
After 2014, the ANSF are on track to have the internal capability
needed to deal with internal threats and to preserve Afghan
sovereignty. These forces will continue to require limited enabler,
training, and financial support. The international community's
strategic agreements will define their enduring enabler, training, and
financial commitments to support the ANSF and the people of
Afghanistan. Post-2014 enabler requirements presume the responsible
drawdown of U.S. surge recovery forces in Afghanistan as directed by
the President of the United States in June 2011.
36. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, wouldn't an expedited
withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan that is not conditions-based be
irresponsible given our expenditure of American blood and taxpayers'
dollars? I am particularly concerned that local political
considerations on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan may override the
practical need for U.S. combat troops to help maintain a stable and
secure environment in those countries.
Admiral Mullen. With respect to Iraq, as of January 1--and in
keeping with our SFA with Iraq--we will maintain a normal strategic
relationship with Iraq. A relationship between sovereign nations, and
an equal partnership based on mutual interest and mutual respect. The
OSC-I will have a capacity to train Iraqis on the new kinds of weapons
and weapons systems that the Iraqis have purchased in recent years,
including F-16s. OSC-I will also facilitate future FMS with Iraq. U.S.
and Iraqi leaders agree that we can adequately continue ISF development
through rotational training and exercises and through arms sales. OSC-
I, training, and exercises coupled with thousands of U.S. forces
stationed throughout the Middle East, will help maintain stability in
Iraq and the region.
The transition and drawdown of troops in Afghanistan is a
conditions-based approach. Unfortunately, Afghanistan will require
international assistance for many years to come--a difficult reality
stemming from over 30 years of war. Our efforts to date have been aimed
at developing Afghan capacity and resources to reduce their reliance on
international support and aid. President Obama and President Karzai
have agreed that the United States and Afghanistan should have an
enduring strategic partnership beyond 2014. Our enduring presence in
Afghanistan must be focused on helping the Afghans take full
responsibility for their own future. NATO and the international
community have also made clear that their commitment to Afghanistan is
enduring and will continue beyond the completion of the transition to
Afghan security responsibility. We are currently engaging with the
Afghans to outline, in broad terms, a vision for our long-term
cooperation and presence.
37. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, what efforts are you making to
ensure our allies continue their commitment to the mission in
Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. We have maintained a thorough engagement strategy
with our coalition partners to achieve unity of effort with respect to
our mission in Afghanistan.
This engagement is founded on the basic expectations jointly
expressed in the NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration of 20 Nov 2010:
``Transition will be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will
not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops. Looking to the end of 2014,
Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across
the whole of Afghanistan.''
This understanding has been reinforced by the Secretary of
Defense's strategic engagement with the contributing nations to ISAF
(most recently with the NATO defense ministers in Brussels) and the
Secretary of State's engagement with international partners for the New
Silk Road Initiative. Additional engagements in Bonn, Istanbul, and
Chicago will further solidify our relations with our allies.
Finally, the ISAF commander continues his ongoing program of senior
leader visits in Kabul facilitating the strategic dialog with our
allied partners.
training of afghan security forces
38. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, since fiscal year 2005, annual
funding to train Afghan forces has grown rapidly from $1.3 billion to
$7.4 billion in fiscal year 2007. In 2008, DOD announced plans to
double the size of the Afghan security forces over the next 4 years at
a cost of about $20 billion. Building the capacity of the Afghan
security forces is a key element of the administration's Afghanistan
policy. Beyond measuring the number of graduates of Afghan security
training programs, it is difficult to gauge the capacity and
effectiveness of these troops. How capable are graduates of our
training programs in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. NTM-A's efforts at expanding ANSF capacity and
building a professional ANSF that will transition to a lead security
role through 2014 continue to show significant gains. Prior to 2009, 86
percent of the ANSF were illiterate. Since 2009, over 50,000 members of
the ANSF have gone through officer and NCO training programs, over
134,000 ANSF have attended literacy training, and over 116,000 have
graduated from literacy programs. Moreover, the ANSF's internal
training capacity continues to grow. The ANA has opened all 12 of its
branch schools and 7 regional training facilities, and the ANP are
running 37 regional training facilities. The ANSF's increased
leadership, literacy, and training capacity have allowed the Ministry
of Defense and Ministry of the Interior to generate their own forces
internally. These institutional improvements are indicators of the
increased capability and capacity of the ANSF.
39. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, I believe we must do all we can
to avoid a ``garbage-in/garbage-out'' situation with regard to our
training programs in Afghanistan. How are we screening applicants for
our training programs?
Admiral Mullen. All recruits currently go through an 8-step vetting
process prior to entering the ANSF training pipeline. The vetting
process includes the following critical steps:
1. Each applicant must have a valid national ID card.
2. Applicants must have two letters from their village elders
vouching for them.
3. Applicants must provide all of their personal information:
(name, father's name, village, and two photos).
4. Criminal records and background check.
5. Complete recruiting application and get it validated by
recruiters.
6. Complete drug screening.
7. Complete medical screening.
8. All recruits are enrolled into Afghan and coalition biometrics.
This screening process results in approximately 900 to 1,400
applicants being denied entry into the ANSF each month.
40. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, what tools do you utilize to
ensure that prospective applicants are not members of the Taliban?
Admiral Mullen. All recruits currently go through an 8-step vetting
process prior to entering the ANSF training pipeline. The vetting
process includes the following critical steps:
1. Each applicant must have a valid national ID card.
2. Applicants must have two letters from their village elders
vouching for them.
3. Applicants must provide all of their personal information:
(name, father's name, village, and two photos).
4. Criminal records and background check.
5. Complete recruiting application and get it validated by
recruiters.
6. Complete drug screening.
7. Complete medical screening.
8. All recruits are enrolled into Afghan and coalition biometrics.
This screening process results in approximately 900 to 1,400
applicants being denied entry into the ANSF each month.
41. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, are applicants literate and
willing to learn?
Admiral Mullen. Literacy continues to be a challenge for the ANSF.
The Afghan recruiting base averages an 86 percent illiteracy rate. This
varies depending on whether recruits come from rural or urban areas. In
either case, literacy training is critical for new recruits and is now
mandatory in every initial training course and at all ANSF schools.
These programs are having a profound effect on the ANSF as a whole.
Since 2009, over 134,000 ANA and ANP have gone through some form of
literacy training and over 116,000 have graduated from literacy
training. ANA and ANP recruits receive the same literacy training
reinforcing NTM-A's goal to graduate each new trainee at a first grade
level. These major changes in literacy levels greatly enhance the
professional development of the ANSF. Additionally, the ANSF have
recognized the value of the literacy programs which encourages their
willingness to learn.
42. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, are graduates of our training
programs able to comprehend American military values of respect for
civilian authority, rule of law, et cetera?
Admiral Mullen. Rule of law is a critical component of the training
we provide to all of the members of the ANSF. In light of recent
reports, ISAF has increased the number of institutional training hours
dedicated to rule of law, civil rights, and respect for the people.
ISAF Joint Command supports this effort by emphasizing rule of law
during all joint operations and engagements with key ANSF leaders.
43. Senator Wicker. Admiral Mullen, are these graduates able to
effectively lead their own forces and pass on knowledge obtained from
American trainers?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. This can be seen in the actions of the ANSF
currently operating in the tranche 1 transition areas. In each area the
ANSF have dealt with numerous threats and enemy engagements with
limited to no coalition support. Although their reactions have not
always been perfect, they clearly demonstrate the ability to lead and
execute operations on their own.
pakistan counterinsurgency capability fund
44. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, the committee recently took
up the fiscal year 2012 DOD authorization bill. The administration has
asked that Congress provide $1.1 billion for the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) which would be authorized in
that bill. I am taking a close look at the $1.1 billion requested by
the administration for the PCCF. I am of two minds: on the one hand, I
understand the importance of Pakistan if we are to succeed in
Afghanistan and in the region; on the other hand, Pakistan has received
a lot of U.S. assistance over the past few years (nearly $6 billion
combined in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 and over $5 billion
alone in the fiscal year 2012 request). My initial thinking is that the
funding needs additional benchmarks and criteria which ensure that our
money is spent wisely and that the Pakistanis are cooperating with us.
I am interested in your perspective on this subject, both broadly and
specifically on what Pakistan is doing (or not doing) to ensure
accountability for any aid we provide to the country.
Secretary Panetta. The DOS's PCCF and DOD's Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) have enabled us to train, advise, and
equip the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces so that they can
eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and be more effective in disrupting the
al Qaeda network.
DOD provides Congress updates on the effectiveness of these efforts
and the use of funds through both the biannual report to Congress,
Progress Towards Security and Stability in Pakistan, and notifications
of spending plans for PCF/PCCF appropriations. In particular, the
Pakistan report has addressed the question of Pakistan's will and
ability to fight, describing how PCF/PCCF has contributed to the
Pakistan military's effectiveness in operations since 2009 in Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa province and the federally Administered Tribal Areas. For
example, PCF/PCCF has enhanced the tactical-level capacity building of
Pakistan's Frontier Scouts and Special Services Group personnel, where
the provision of weapons and ammunition, complemented by training by
U.S. forces, has improved the effectiveness of these forces to engage
in targeting militants in counterinsurgency operations.
At the same time, the Pakistan report also addresses Pakistan's
unwillingness to operate against insurgents in other areas, such as
North Waziristan Agency. These existing means of reporting to Congress
provide adequate benchmarks and assessments of performance to support
decisionmaking about future assistance levels under PCF/PCCF.
education
45. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, the cost of educating our
military personnel seems to be increasing. At a time when we are trying
to downsize our forces and asking fewer personnel to do more work, I am
concerned that our military schools and education facilities are not as
efficient as they could be. I constantly hear anecdotal references made
to military schools that ``cram a week-long curriculum into a month-
long school,'' for example. This sounds ironic to me considering
today's fiscal environment. What are you doing to ensure that our
warfighters are receiving the best education and training possible in
the most efficient manner possible? By efficient, I mean both in terms
of time and money.
Secretary Panetta. To ensure that servicemembers are receiving the
preeminent education and training to prepare for the challenges of
warfare while remaining mindful of efficiencies, DOD must remain
vigilant to best utilize resources. DOD is taking advantage of every
available option to streamline, including online training and
concentrated learning modules incorporating multiple concepts. In early
2010, Secretary Gates directed DOD to take a hard, unsparing look at
how it operates and prioritizes its resources with the objective of
identifying inefficient expenses that could be reinvested. The
Secretary of Defense Efficiency Initiative also tasked the Services
with cutting $100 billion over the next 5 years through a reduction in
operating overhead and administrative processes which included
examining all aspects of educating and training servicemembers.
To build on these efficiency goals, I challenged the entire DOD to
identify further savings, again with an astute focus on eliminating
inefficiency and finding cost saving changes in business practices
accumulated in a period of budget growth. DOD continues to take
dedicated action with regard to efficiencies in training programs.
Given the fiscal environment and the current operations tempo, DOD
cannot afford the time and expense of inefficient practices, but rather
must maintain the world's premier fighting force.
contracting
46. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, I am also troubled by the
expanding use of contractors and consultants to perform jobs typically
performed by our Active Duty personnel. Can you explain to me how it is
cost-effective when, for example, a senior enlisted servicemember
retires from Active Duty and returns to do essentially the same job as
a civilian, with a higher salary?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's ``sourcing'' of functions and work between
military and civilian personnel, as well as contract support, must be
consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness
and management needs, and applicable laws. These staffing decisions for
jobs must also be consistent with departmental policies such as those
regarding workforce mix and risk criteria which are governed by DOD
Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce
Mix, and cost, governed by Directive Type Memorandum-09-007: Estimating
and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and
Contract Support.
Consistent with these policies, and all applicable laws, DOD is
committed to conduct an annual inventory and review of its contracted
services, identifying those that may not be most cost effectively
performed by the private sector. Some of these services may be
determined to be no longer required or of low priority, and as a
consequence may be eliminated or reduced in scope, while others may be
identified for insourcing to government performance.
While the use of Active and Reserve Duty military personnel is
considered in making staffing decisions, functions that are commercial
in nature are designated for civilian performance. The exceptions are
when one or more of the following conditions apply: military-unique
knowledge and skills are required for performance of the duties;
military incumbency is required by law, executive order, treaty, or
international agreements; military performance is required for command
and control, risk mitigation, or esprit de corps; and/or military
staffing is needed to provide for overseas and sea-to-shore rotation,
ensure career development, maintain operational readiness and training
requirements, or to meet contingencies or wartime assignments. In
making staffing decisions, commanders must be mindful of using military
personnel to perform tasks that limit their availability to perform the
operational mission.
47. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, why are these people
performing maintenance or conducting training that has traditionally
been performed by the Active-Duty Force?
Secretary Panetta. The withdrawal and drawdown of forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan, respectively, and decreasing operational tempos, as
well as current national fiscal realities, have resulted in decisions
to decrease end-strength and make force structure revisions. As a
result, certain functions which in the past may have been performed by
military personnel, to include maintenance and training, are being
realigned to civilian performance. In conjunction with the
comprehensive review called for by the President and implementation of
the fiscal reductions called for in the BCA, DOD is assessing mission
requirements, associated workload, and necessary force structure
decisions. Recommendations for sizing the force will be based on
mission requirements and informed by our combatant commanders' needs to
meet the national military strategy and maintain necessary a state of
operational readiness while minimizing and mitigating any risks.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
protocol on cluster munitions to the convention on conventional weapons
48. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, a proposed Sixth Protocol to
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) is currently being
negotiated in Geneva. This protocol would establish sensible controls
on the production, stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions. The
negotiations which produced the current draft protocol have been
ongoing for several years with the active involvement of the U.S.
delegation to the CCW. The current draft is widely-supported within the
CCW, and would significantly advance global efforts to minimize the
risks to civilian populations of modern warfare while simultaneously
preserving the ability of the United States and its allies to utilize
munitions that will limit American casualties in future conflicts. The
draft is opposed by some nongovernmental organizations (NGO), however,
and several governments participating in the CCW may block approval of
the protocol at the CCW Review Conference in November, thereby killing
it. Does the Obama administration support the proposed CCW protocol on
cluster munitions?
Secretary Panetta. The administration supports concluding a
comprehensive and binding protocol to the Convention on CCW that
addresses all aspects of cluster munitions, including use, transfer,
stockpiling, and destruction, and that will have a significant
humanitarian impact on the ground while preserving an important
military capability. The draft protocol presented by the CCW Group of
Governmental Experts Chair provides the basis for such a protocol.
49. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, does the Obama administration
have in place a strategy for preventing a small group of countries from
blocking consensus on the proposed CCW protocol on cluster munitions?
If so, please describe that strategy.
Secretary Panetta. DOD is actively supporting current DOS efforts
to contact CCW High Contracting Parties to urge these states to seize
the opportunity to conclude a new protocol regulating cluster munitions
at the CCW Review Conference in November. This includes targeted
ministerial-level engagements with key detractors of the proposed
protocol, as well as pressing major users and producers of cluster
munitions for increased transparency on the number or percentage of
weapons that would be affected by the draft protocol in order to show
that a CCW protocol would have a significant humanitarian impact
despite NGO claims to the contrary.
50. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, will you work actively to
support approval of the cluster munitions protocol and to raise this
issue in your discussions with foreign counterparts?
Secretary Panetta. The draft CCW cluster munitions protocol
represents an important and successful balance between military
necessity and humanitarian interests, and is fully compatible with
DOD's June 2008 Cluster Munitions Policy. In this regard, I will work
actively to ensure that the efforts of the U.S. delegation to the CCW
Review Conference to obtain consensus on the draft protocol are
successful.
foreign boycotts of u.s. defense firms
51. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, there is an aggressive
campaign underway, led by foreign NGOs, and apparently abetted by some
foreign governments, to boycott U.S. companies involved in the
manufacture pursuant to contracts with DOD of weapons systems that they
don't think the United States should have. This campaign is currently
focused on manufacturers of landmines and cluster munitions, but can
easily be expanded to manufacturers of nuclear weapons-related items,
depleted uranium weapons, et cetera. The campaign has made surprising
headway in dissuading foreign banks from doing business with some key
U.S. defense contractors, and is clearly aimed at dissuading these
companies from continuing to supply the United States with these
weapons. Are you aware of this campaign?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, it is my understanding that DOD advisers on
the U.S. delegation to the CCW Review Conference are aware of the NGO
campaign to pressure banks and other investors not to invest in
companies participating in the manufacture of cluster munitions that
have been banned pursuant to the CCMs, to which the United States is
not a state party. I would emphasize that DOD is committed to ensuring
that the U.S. military has a supply chain that is able to fulfill the
needs of our forces.
52. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, does the Obama administration
believe that this campaign is exclusively driven by NGOs, or are some
foreign governments also complicit in it? If so, which ones?
Secretary Panetta. To DOD's knowledge, the campaign is driven by
NGOs and not by foreign governments. That said, a handful of states
party to the CCM (Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and New Zealand) have
chosen to criminalize investment in the production of cluster
munitions. DOD is not aware of any foreign governments currently
boycotting U.S. defense contractors for producing cluster munitions for
the U.S. Government.
53. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, what is the policy of the
Obama administration with respect to foreign boycotts of U.S. defense
contractors?
Secretary Panetta. Given the interdependence of global commerce, I
share the concern that national security and economic security face
interconnected risks. Foreign laws, policies, and international
agreements to which the United States is not a party, may affect our
industrial base and thus affect our national defense. If notified of
such a boycott by a foreign government, it is my understanding that DOS
would be willing to raise the issue with the appropriate foreign
officials. With respect to particular steps taken in responses to
action by specific foreign governments, I defer to the Secretary of
State.
54. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, if the Obama administration
opposes foreign boycotts of U.S. defense contractors, what specific
steps has DOS taken to resist this campaign and support U.S. defense
contractors that have been targeted by it?
Secretary Panetta. If notified of such a boycott, it is my
understanding that DOS would be willing to raise the issue with the
appropriate foreign officials. With respect to particular steps taken
in responses to action by specific foreign governments, I defer to the
Secretary of State.
55. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, if the Obama administration
opposes foreign boycotts of U.S. defense contractors, what steps do you
intend to take to resist this campaign and support U.S. defense
contractors that have been targeted by it? Are you committed, for
example, to raising this issue with foreign government officials?
Secretary Panetta. The influence of activists and foreign
governments on the U.S. defense industrial base is a complex issue.
Protecting the U.S. defense industrial base and national security
interests will require DOD to collaborate effectively with other
executive branch agencies and Congress. We must do more to understand
and communicate the risks to the industrial base and work closely with
other nations to preserve domestic industrial capabilities. I will join
in our administration's efforts to engage foreign governments on such
issues, as appropriate.
56. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, do you believe the U.S.
Government should continue to do business with foreign banks and other
foreign businesses that are engaged in boycotts of U.S. defense
contractors?
Secretary Panetta. The influence of activists and foreign
governments on the U.S. defense industrial base is a complex issue.
Protecting the U.S. defense industrial base and national security
interests will require the DOD to collaborate effectively with other
executive branch agencies and Congress. Before taking action, such as
ceasing business with a particularly entity, we must ensure we
thoroughly understand potential risks and communicate those risks to
our industrial base. We will work closely with industry and foreign
nations to preserve domestic industrial capabilities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
al qaeda
57. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in your prepared testimony
you note that ``al-Qaeda and violent extremism has spread to new
geographical centers such as Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa.'' In
July, you said that the United States was ``within reach of
strategically defeating al Qaeda.'' How has your assessment changed
since July?
Secretary Panetta. My assessment hasn't fundamentally changed. In
my July comments, I also acknowledged that al Qaeda operates in Yemen,
Somalia, and North Africa. If we maintain pressure on key leadership,
while also building partner nation counterterrorism capacity and
undermining al Qaeda's ideology, I still believe we can strategically
defeat al Qaeda. Our success stems from a steady pace of operations
over the past 3 years against core al Qaeda leaders and external
operations planners in Pakistan. We've recently intensified our efforts
in Yemen as well, and the deaths or detentions of several al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula top leaders in the past few months have
negatively impacted the group's capabilities. Likewise in Somalia, the
loss of al Qaeda leaders combined with increased effectiveness against
al-Shabaab by our regional partners has forced our adversaries to focus
more on their personal security than on external operations planning.
In North Africa, al Qaeda's efforts to exploit the Arab Awakening lack
resonance, and our counterterrorism partners in the region are steadily
improving their capabilities to control remote regions exploited by
terrorists and other extremists.
58. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, do you equate dispersal to
regions outside Afghanistan with defeat?
Secretary Panetta. While we have done much, particularly in the
past 3 years, to degrade core al Qaeda in Pakistan, we must continue
the pressure until the organization is operationally dismantled and
then strategically defeated, meaning that they no longer function as an
organization and do not find sanctuary from which to conduct external
attacks. This includes operations and activities to disrupt, degrade,
and defeat key al Qaeda affiliates that pose a direct threat to the
United States and its allies, wherever they may operate.
59. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, given the administration's
stated intent to continue withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan at a
pace more rapid than recommended by military commanders, do you believe
that the al Qaeda factions that have dispersed to these other regions
will actively seek to reestablish a foothold in Afghanistan? In your
opinion, what are their chances of success?
Secretary Panetta. The size and pace of reduction in U.S. forces
from Afghanistan will continue to be made based upon the advice of our
commanders and the operational and political conditions on the ground.
As we transition to Afghans assuming the lead for security by the end
of 2014, we are developing the ANSF necessary to prevent a degraded
insurgency from being able to threaten the Afghan Government and to
prevent al Qaeda from reestablishing an operational presence in
Afghanistan. Over the longer term, the United States will remain
committed to supporting a stable, democratic order in Afghanistan.
pakistan
60. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, earlier this month, Admiral
Mullen gave a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
where he stated that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is
waging a ``proxy war'' via the Haqqani Network. In Admiral Mullen's
prepared testimony for this hearing, he stated that extremist
organizations are ``serving as proxies of the Government of Pakistan.''
Do you share Admiral Mullen's opinion on this matter, and if so, can
you elaborate?
Secretary Panetta. [Deleted.]
61. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, what is your assessment of
the risk of Pakistan's ISI gaining a strong stake and influence in any
Afghan political settlements following a U.S. troop withdrawal?
Secretary Panetta. The United States supports a reconciliation
process that is Afghan-led, politically inclusive within Afghan civil
society, and has the support of Afghanistan's neighbors and the
international community. We recognize that the Government of Pakistan
plays an important role in this process and in achieving our goals and
objectives in Afghanistan and the region. This administration has
raised repeatedly with Pakistan our concerns about the terrorist safe
havens that are used to attack our forces, the Afghan people, and the
Afghan Government. We know that Pakistan seeks to play a role in the
region, but for that to happen, it must act responsibly by developing a
constructive relationship with the Afghan Government, denying
insurgents and terrorists safe havens inside Pakistan, and supporting
the efforts of the Afghan Government to reconcile with the Taliban.
62. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in your prepared remarks you
stated that a reduced training and liaison presence in Pakistan has
``diminished our ability to coordinate respective military operations
in the border regions,'' which in turn ``has given insurgents greater
freedom of movement along the border.'' Can you elaborate on that
statement?
Secretary Panetta. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has
some of the harshest terrain on earth, making it difficult for forces
on both sides of the border to deny insurgents freedom of movement. The
ability to coordinate between the Pakistan military and ISAF forces and
ANSF forces operating along the border can be enhanced by a training
and liaison presence in Pakistan that facilitates communications
through the technical knowledge of communications equipment and through
a conceptual understanding of ISAF and ANSF forces. We are working
closely with both Afghanistan and Pakistan to help them improve
communications and coordination along the border to minimize insurgent
freedom of movement.
63. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in your opinion does the
United States need an increased presence of military liaison and
training personnel in Pakistan to effectively combat insurgents who
find refuge within Pakistan's borders?
Secretary Panetta. Since 2009, Pakistani military operations in
Swat, South Waziristan, and other areas put continued pressure on
insurgent groups. U.S. training and equipment provided under the PCF
helped enhance Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities so that
Pakistan's security forces are more effective in these operations. An
example of these enhanced capabilities is in the tactical-level
capacity building of Pakistan's Frontier Scouts and Special Services
Group personnel, where the provision of machine guns, sniper rifles,
and ammunition, complemented by training by U.S. forces, improved the
effectiveness of these forces to engage in targeting militants in
counterinsurgency operations. U.S. liaison and training personnel have
been integral to these efforts, benefiting both U.S. and Pakistani
counterinsurgency interests, and providing a high return on investment.
Nonetheless, although an increased presence of these personnel would
strengthen Pakistan's counterinsurgency capability, the United States
must also use other means to address these challenges.
64. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in prepared statements and
during your testimony, you and Admiral Mullen made very strong
statements regarding Pakistan's active and passive support for
insurgent groups. In light of your allegations, would you agree that
aid to Pakistan is naive at best and counter-productive at worst?
Secretary Panetta. Our relationship with Pakistan is both vital and
consequential. Pakistan remains a critical country in the fight against
terrorism, and it provides critical counterterrorism cooperation that
we hope will continue to expand over the coming months and years to
bring about the regional stability that is in the interests of both of
our nations.
We provide Pakistan with assistance in accordance with our national
security interests. Security-related assistance--such as the PCF and
Coalition Support Fund reimbursements--have been an important component
in pursuing the near-term objective of improving Pakistan's
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities and enhancing
cross-border coordination.
It is vital, however, that Pakistan own up to its responsibilities,
including cooperating more fully in counterterrorism matters, expanding
its counterinsurgency campaign against all extremists that have found
safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province, and ceasing to provide sanctuary to Afghan
Taliban and other militant groups.
In the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, we asked Pakistan to take
a number of concrete steps to demonstrate its continued commitment to a
cooperative and mutually-beneficial relationship. The future provision
of security-related assistance will be informed by Pakistan taking
concrete steps that demonstrate its continued commitment to
cooperation.
65. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, do you agree that continued
unconditional foreign aid to Pakistan serves to undermine the
diplomatic efforts of yourself and Admiral Mullen?
Secretary Panetta. Our civilian and security-related assistance to
Pakistan directly advances U.S. national interests in Pakistan, but
that assistance is not unconditional. This assistance is designed to
promote a stable and prosperous Pakistan that is democratic and able
and willing to address the scourge of extremism. As President Obama has
said, it is in our national interest to support Pakistan's efforts to
develop democratic institutions, foster economic growth, and reject
violent extremism. To this end, we are continuing our civilian
assistance to demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the United
States is committed to a long-term relationship with them and their
civilian-led government. We are also closely reviewing our security-
related assistance to Pakistan, largely because Pakistan has directed a
drawdown of our military trainers, harassed our personnel in country,
and demonstrated insufficient cooperation with us on core objectives.
We have communicated to Pakistan's civilian and military leaders that
we are committed to improving their military's capabilities, but that
we cannot continue to provide this assistance at the same pace we have
been until our relationship improves.
66. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, why or why not would
conditional foreign aid to Pakistan serve as an incentive for the
Pakistani Government to disrupt ISI support for terrorist groups and
deny insurgents their safe havens?
Secretary Panetta. We have communicated to Pakistan that it cannot
pick and choose among extremists, that terrorism remains a common
threat to both of our countries, and that support for extremists who
are crossing the border and attacking our forces in Afghanistan must
end.
That said, we must remember that Pakistan remains a critical
country in the war against terrorism and does cooperate with the United
States. Since 2009, Pakistani military operations in Swat, South
Waziristan, and other areas have put continued pressure on insurgent
groups. Pakistan's level of commitment is reflected in the enormous
casualties it has suffered as a result of military operations and acts
of terrorism in the last few years, including more than 11,000 military
personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilians
killed or wounded. As the President has said, we could not have been as
successful as we have been in going after al Qaeda in the border region
between Pakistan and Afghanistan without the cooperation of the
Pakistan Government. Placing additional conditions on security-related
assistance to Pakistan would minimize the flexibility needed to provide
such assistance, which contributes to Pakistan's counterinsurgency
campaign and its ability to disrupt support for terrorist groups and
deny insurgents their safe havens.
india
67. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, estimates show that the
budget for the ANSF is over $11 billion for this year. Conversely, the
Afghan Government collected only $1 billion of tax revenue in 2010. It
is clear that the Afghan Government will require continued financial
assistance to support enduring ANSF efforts against insurgents, many of
whom find refuge and assistance in Pakistan, after U.S. forces depart
in 2014. To pay the enduring costs of supporting the ANSF, should the
United States pursue a financial partnership with India to defray the
expenses that are expected?
Secretary Panetta. The United States supports enhancing the
international commitment to the long-term stability and security of
Afghanistan. As noted, the costs of the ANSFs will require
international financial support, which India and other international
partners may contribute through established trust funds, such as the
NATO-led Afghan National Army Trust Fund or the U.N.-led Law and Order
Trust Fund for Afghanistan, supporting the ANP. Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh's visit to Kabul in May 2011--his first since 2005--underscored
India's enduring commitment to diplomatic and development efforts in
Afghanistan. During his visit, PM Singh announced to a joint session of
the Afghan parliament an increase in Indian economic support to
Afghanistan. PM Singh's pledge of an additional $500 million in aid--to
be spent mainly on development projects--raised India's overall
assistance pledge to a total of $2 billion.
During his June 2011 visit to New Delhi, Afghan Defense Minister
Wardak and Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony discussed expanding
cooperation to train ANSF personnel. India's assistance to the ANSF is
currently limited to training personnel in Indian institutions and some
transfers of mostly non-lethal materiel. India currently provides
scholarships for ANSF personnel to study in India, and the Indian
Government is also exploring options for training female Afghan police
in India. However, the recent strategic partnership agreement
reiterated India's interest in expanding efforts to build the capacity
of the ANSF. Indian support to Afghanistan could help defray the
enduring costs of supporting the ANSF.
iraq withdrawal
68. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, earlier this month, it was
reported that you would support a plan to keep 3,000 to 4,000 troops in
Iraq after December 31, 2011, to train Iraqi security forces. Reports
also indicate that the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, General Lloyd
J. Austin, is advocating keeping as many as 14,000 to 18,000 troops in
Iraq next year. What is your rationale for supporting this plan?
Secretary Panetta. The post-2011 U.S. forces presence and mission,
if any, will be addressed through U.S. discussions with Iraqi leaders.
Discussions are ongoing, no final agreement with Iraq has been reached,
and no final decisions have been made. U.S. forces continue their
scheduled redeployment from Iraq.
Again, we have made no final decisions, nor reached any agreement
with the Iraqis, about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.
69. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, how does your evaluation of
the current situation in Iraq differ from General Austin's, who is the
senior U.S. commander on the ground?
Secretary Panetta. I am not aware of differences between our
assessments. I rely on General Austin and his staff for regular
updates, and his judgments are essential to informing my own.
70. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in your opinion, what effect
would 3,000 troops have in Iraq, and what are the benefits and risks of
this proposal?
Secretary Panetta. The post-2011 U.S. forces presence size and
mission, if any, will be addressed through U.S. discussions with Iraqi
leaders. Discussions are ongoing, no final agreement with Iraq has been
reached, and no final decisions have been made. U.S. forces continue
their scheduled redeployment from Iraq.
71. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, do the perceived benefits
outweigh the risks?
Secretary Panetta. We believe that an enduring partnership with the
Iraqi Government and people is in America's interest. A relationship
with the ISFs will be an important part of that partnership. We want a
normal, productive, healthy relationship with Iraq going forward--a
partnership similar to those we have with other countries in the region
and around the world. Our and Iraq's primary objective for this
training relationship would be to improve ISF capabilities in
furtherance of the President's objective of a sovereign, stable, self-
reliant Iraq that is a force for security in the region and a long-term
strategic partner of the United States.
No decisions have been made at this point. We are drawing down U.S.
forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.
72. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, what is your assessment of
the ability of a 3,000-troop force to defend itself against attack,
much less to have a positive impact?
Secretary Panetta. It is important to note that the security
situation in Iraq is much different than in years past, so Iraq no
longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to maintain internal
stability. The ISFs had the lead for security for some time, and levels
of violence remained dramatically reduced from where they were in 2006
and 2007. U.S. commanders in the field assess that the ISF are
competent at counterinsurgency operations.
Again, there are no final decisions, nor any reached agreement with
the Iraqis, about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq. DOD is
drawing down U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement.
73. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, what is the status of
current negotiations to reach a post-2011 agreement with the Iraqi
Government regarding military-to-military relations?
Secretary Panetta. In August, the Iraqi political leadership
indicated publicly that they are interested in an ongoing training
relationship with the United States post-2011. We believe that an
enduring partnership with the Iraqi Government and people is in the
interest of the United States, and a relationship with the ISF will be
an important part of that partnership. We are currently in discussions
with the Iraqi Government about the nature and scope of that long-term
relationship. Those discussions are ongoing. We want a normal,
productive, healthy relationship with Iraq going forward--a partnership
similar to those we have with other countries in the region and around
the world.
Again, discussions are ongoing, and we have made no final
decisions, nor reached any agreement with the Iraqis about a post-2011
U.S. forces presence in Iraq. We are drawing down U.S. forces in
accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.
iraqi air force and f-16 purchase
74. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, last week, Major General
Russell Handy, commander of the 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task
Force-Iraq and Director of the Air Component Coordination Element-Iraq,
told reporters that the potential sale of 18 F-16 fighters to Iraq now
looks ``very promising.'' He went on to say, ``Everyone that I talk to
at every level of the government in Iraq is convinced that that's the
right approach for them. We're very encouraged by those words and we
feel that we're very close to them signing that letter of offer and
acceptance (LOA).'' What steps is DOD taking to move this important
sale forward?
Secretary Panetta. In late September, the Government of Iraq both
signed and funded a LOA for 18 F-16 aircraft. Concrete steps are now
being taken to establish U.S. and Iraq program offices, select a main
operating base, let contracts for aircraft and support equipment, and
further refine Iraq's requirements for F-16-related facilities,
support, and training. Although production schedules may not be
finalized until the end of November 2011, we expect the delivery of the
first F-16 to Iraq to occur not later than the end of 2014.
75. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, military and civilian
leaders have expressed serious concern about the Iraqi air force's
ability to protect its own air space once U.S. forces withdraw. It is
my understanding that 10 Iraqi pilots are already going through F-16
flight school in the United States, but the Air Force estimates that
should the F-16 sale go through, the ``best case'' for the first
aircraft delivery is probably ``late 2013.'' What steps have been taken
to date to enable Iraq to adequately defend its airspace following the
U.S. withdrawal?
Secretary Panetta. When the United States leaves, Iraq will have
radar coverage over approximately 60 percent of its airspace, a nascent
air command and control construct with minimally trained controllers,
and a limited number of air defense assets with which to respond to
airborne threats. Armed helicopters operated by the Iraqi Army Air
Corps provides a rudimentary armed intercept capability for low and
slow aircraft.
Despite a limited defense picture for Iraq in January 2012, they
will gradually mature and possess an organic air defense capability by
mid- to late-2015. Some of the steps we expect to occur, with U.S.
support, between now and late 2015 include:
(1) Completing the installation of two Long Range Radars (LRR)
providing approximately 60 percent coverage of Iraqi airspace.
(December 2011)
(2) Training Air Operations Center (AOC) and Sector Operations
Center (SOC) controllers. (April 2013)
(3) Developing a second SOC with two additional LRRs to provide
robust airspace coverage and additional regional control nodes.
(Expected; no program yet underway)
(4) Training F-16 aircrew and maintainers. (2012 to 2015)
(5) Delivering F-16 aircraft in sufficient quantity (estimated 12
or more aircraft required) to provide a basic 24-hour alert capability.
(mid- to late-2015)
(6) Developing a ground-based air defense system. (Expected; no
program yet underway)
(7) Executing a robust CENTCOM-directed security cooperation
program with exercises, continued advising and mentoring, military
personnel exchanges, and international military education and training
to expand air defense capacity and effectiveness.
76. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, particularly, what is being
done to ensure Iraq's self-defense capabilities during the interim
period before potential F-16 delivery?
Secretary Panetta. Strengthening the Iraqi Air Force is an
essential element of the contribution to the enduring SFA (signed in
2008). The SFA states: ``In order to strengthen security and stability
in Iraq, and thereby contribute to international peace and stability,
and to enhance the ability of the Republic of Iraq to deter all threats
against its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, the Parties
shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and
security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its
land, sea, and air territory.''
As of 1 January 2012, when the 2008 Security Agreement (SA)
expires, the United States cannot ensure Iraq's self-defense
capabilities during the interim period before potential F-16 delivery.
Iraq is a sovereign nation that must determine how to secure its own
future. Going forward, the United States will work closely with the
Iraqi Government and its armed forces to assist in building a stronger
and more prosperous country. In the interim, the United States will
conduct various Air Force-centric activities, training, and exercises.
These will be executed by the current program of record: the OSC-I.
From an air perspective, OSC-I is charged to develop and train the
Iraqi Air Force so it can defend its borders and airspace against
external threats. The Government of Iraq will go about this through
several means such as FMS, Foreign Military Financing, International
Military Education and Training programs, and security cooperation
activities, to include: exercises, combined arms training, and
mentoring activities.
There are several FMS cases that will aid development of the
foundational capabilities necessary for Iraq to build and maintain an
independent air force. Some examples include: Long Range Radars, Sector
Operations Control training, Ground Based Air Defense Systems, Air
Traffic Control training, Contractor Logistics Support, training in
various Attack, Mobility and Trainer aircraft (T-6, KA-350, F-16, UH-1,
C-130E, and C-130J, as examples). The long-term goal is to develop an
Iraqi Air Force that is independent, credible, and can provide enduring
activities and capabilities.
influence of iran
77. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, you acknowledge in your
prepared testimony that an ``ongoing challenge in Iraq is the push for
influence by Iran, and the activities of Iranian-backed militias that
have attacked U.S. forces and the Iraqi people.'' What is your
assessment of the evolution of this threat and has it grown in
correlation with the draw-down of U.S. forces in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. Earlier this year, we made clear we believed
that Iran was furnishing new, more deadly weapons to militant groups
targeting U.S. troops in Iraq as part of a pattern of renewed attempts
to exert influence in the region. These Shia proxy groups temporarily
escalated attacks against U.S. personnel this summer before declaring a
ceasefire following U.S. and Iraqi pressure. To this point, however,
these groups have failed to undermine the Iraqi public's confidence in
the ISF or the Iraqi Government.
The ISF have the lead for security, and levels of violence have
remained dramatically reduced from--for instance--where they were in
2006 and 2007. U.S. commanders in the field assess that the ISF are
competent at counterinsurgency operations.
78. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in your opinion, how capable
is the Iraqi Government to resist Iranian influence after U.S. forces
have been withdrawn?
Secretary Panetta. U.S. policy supports Iraqi efforts to counter
the most destabilizing and destructive elements of Iranian policy in
Iraq. U.S. policy leverages three key characteristics of Iraq that
serve to counter Iranian hegemony in Iraq as U.S. forces draw down.
These key characteristics--evident in almost all levels of Iraqi
society--combine to indicate that despite Iran's efforts and rhetoric,
Iran's influence will ultimately be attenuated.
The first and most important is Iraqi nationalism. Nationalism
remains a strong and enduring force motivating the Iraqi people. Iraq's
Kurdish and Sunni Arab populations are no friends of Iran, and
nationalism counteracts Iranian influence among the Iraqi Shia
population, as well.
A second key characteristic of Iraq that runs counter to Iran's
hegemonic ambitions is Iraq's publicly stated interest in a long-term
partnership with the United States.
A third is Iraq's objective to achieve regional reintegration. We
seek to support a strong, democratic Iraq, on mutually beneficial and
friendly terms with all its neighbors. To achieve this vision, we are
working hard to encourage Iraq's neighbors, particularly Gulf Arab
states, to overcome their inherent distrust of Iraq's new Shia leaders
and to establish mutually productive relations. We are encouraged that
some of Iraq's neighbors have leaned forward to engage the new Iraq--
including Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt--in part to counter Iranian
influence.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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