[Senate Hearing 112-336]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-336
TESTIMONY ON WHETHER THE CHIEF,
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, SHOULD BE A
MEMBER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Testimony on Whether the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should be a
Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
november 10, 2011
Page
Johnson, Hon. Jeh C. Johnson, General Counsel, Department of
Defense........................................................ 6
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 10
Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff................................................ 12
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 14
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........ 16
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps........ 17
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.. 20
McKinley, Gen. Craig R., USAF, Chief, National Guard Bureau...... 22
(iii)
TESTIMONY ON WHETHER THE CHIEF,
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, SHOULD BE A
MEMBER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin,
Shaheen, Blumenthal, Inhofe, Wicker, Brown, Ayotte, and Graham.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling,
counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member;
and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Hannah I.
Lloyd, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Bryon Manna,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant
to Senator Webb; Stephen Hedger, assistant to Senator
McCaskill; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich;
Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad
Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Anthony Lazarski,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles
Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to
Senator Ayotte; and Andrew King and Sergio Sarkany, assistants
to Senator Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to receive testimony on whether the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau (CNGB) should be a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
I believe that this hearing is a first, the first time that
we have had every member of the JCS testify at a single
hearing. Each of them has appeared before us individually and
in different combinations, but never all together.
In addition to all the members of the Joint Chiefs, we have
the Department of Defense (DOD) General Counsel, and we have
the CNGB with us today. We welcome each of you to this hearing.
We look forward to your testimony on a very important issue.
The role of the National Guard, as well as the role of the
other Reserve components, has grown significantly since
September 11, 2001. Substantial numbers of National Guardsmen
and reservists have deployed to and continue to serve in combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Large numbers have served multiple tours. Many have given
their lives in service to our Nation, and many more have
returned with wounds of war. Their service has been
outstanding, and we commend them for their dedication, courage,
and patriotism.
The National Guard has also risen to the challenge by
serving in diverse Homeland defense and civil support missions.
The Reserve components have made a highly successful transition
from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve.
The question of whether to include the CNGB as a member of
the JCS is a complex issue with significant policy
implications. To properly address this issue requires an
understanding of the role of the National Guard, the role of
the JCS, and the role of the CNGB. I believe that we have the
right witnesses before us today to help us understand all
aspects of this issue.
When individuals enlist or accept a commission in a State
National Guard unit, they simultaneously enlist or are
commissioned in the Army National Guard of the United States or
the Air National Guard of the United States, which are
components of the Army and the Air Force. These individuals
retain their status as State Guard members unless and until
they are ordered to active Federal service, and they revert to
State status upon being relieved from Federal service.
There is a third hybrid status, commonly referred to as
``Title 32 status,'' where the members are in a federally
funded State status. I understand that Mr. Johnson, the DOD
General Counsel, will discuss some of the ramifications of
these different statuses in which members of the National Guard
serve.
The composition of the JCS is defined by statute and
consists of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and the Military
Service Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
The Chairman of the JCS is the principal military adviser to
the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
The other members of the Joint Chiefs may submit to the
Chairman advice in disagreement with or in addition to the
advice presented by the Chairman, and the Chairman must present
that advice at the same time that he presents his own advice.
Additionally, the other members of the Joint Chiefs provide
military advice when requested by the President, the National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense. A member of the Joint Chiefs may make
recommendations to Congress relating to DOD after first
informing the Secretary of Defense.
I am looking forward to the testimony of the members of the
JCS as they provide more information on the role that the Joint
Chiefs play in our national security, how the interests of the
Army and Air National Guard are addressed by the Joint Chiefs,
and how the CNGB interfaces with the JCS.
The National Guard Bureau is a joint activity of DOD. By
statute, it is the channel of communications on all matters
pertaining to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of
the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United
States between the Department of the Army and the Department of
the Air Force and the several States.
The CNGB is a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense
through the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving non-
federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as
determined by the Secretary of Defense. He is also the
principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of
Staff of the Army and to the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force on matters relating to the
National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States,
and the Air National Guard of the United States.
Beginning in 2009, when the position of the CNGB was
increased to a four-star rank, the CNGB was given a standing
invitation to attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs. I look
forward to General McKinley's testimony to further elaborate on
the role and function of the CNGB and how that relates to the
role and function of the JCS.
At Congress' direction, the Commission on the National
Guard and Reserves addressed the issue that we are looking at
today, and they did so in its second report to Congress, dated
March 1, 2007. The commission recommended against making the
CNGB a member of the Joint Chiefs.
This is what that commission said, ``The commission does
not recommend that the CNGB be a member of the JCS on the
grounds that the duties of the members of the JCS are greater
than those of the CNGB. For example--and this is a long quote
from that commission report.
``For example,'' they said, ``the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau is not responsible for organizing, manning,
training, and equipping the National Guard to the same extent
as are the Service Chiefs of Staff. The qualifications to be
selected as a Service Chief of Staff,'' they said, ``also are
materially different from and more rigorous than those for
selection to be Chief of the National Guard Bureau.''
Moreover, they said that ``making the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau a member of the JCS would run counter to
intraservice and interservice integration and would reverse
progress toward jointness and interoperability. Making the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the JCS would be
fundamentally inconsistent with the status of the Army and Air
National Guard as Reserve components of the Army and the Air
Force.''
Finally, the commission concludes that this proposal
``would be counter to the carefully crafted organizational and
advisory principles established in the Goldwater-Nichols
legislation.''
Now I note that Congress has implemented many of the
recommendations of that commission, including the following:
increasing the grade of the CNGB from lieutenant general to
general and making him a principal adviser to the Secretary of
Defense through the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving
non-federalized National Guard forces.
Another of their recommendations, which was implemented by
Congress, was establishing the National Guard Bureau as a joint
activity of DOD, enhancing the functions of the National Guard
Bureau to include assisting the Secretary of Defense and
coordinating with other Federal agencies, the adjutants general
of the States, and the combatant command with responsibility
for the U.S. Homeland, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
We require that at least one deputy of NORTHCOM--again, the
combatant command with responsibility for the United States--
that at least one deputy be a National Guard officer in the
grade of lieutenant general, and we have increased the number
of unified and specified combatant command positions for
Reserve component officers.
We all are grateful to the witnesses, to the men and women
with whom they serve for service to our Nation. We thank the
witnesses for being with us today.
Before calling on Senator Inhofe, I will note that we have
two votes today scheduled for 12:05 p.m., I believe.
Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe that is right. I looked back in the 8 years I
spent in the House and the 17 years in the Senate. This is the
first time that all members of the Joint Chiefs are here. So
this is kind of a neat deal.
I think the greatest trust that is placed upon Congress by
the American people is to provide for their security and
maintain a strong national defense. Our Constitution gives
Congress specific national security authorities--to declare
war, raise and support armies, provide for the Navy, establish
rules and regulations for our military forces, and organize and
arm the militias in the States.
Chairman Levin. I hate to interrupt you, Senator Inhofe,
but we do have a quorum here now, and we have some business
that we can attend to if we can interrupt your statement.
Senator Inhofe. Sure. Let us do that.
Chairman Levin. There is a quorum now present, and we were
about to lose that quorum, by the way. So that is why I am
interrupting our friend, Senator Inhofe.
I ask the committee to consider a list of 4,022 pending
military nominations. All of these nominations have been before
the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to
favorably report these?
Senator Inhofe. I so move.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay. [No response.]
Chairman Levin. The motion carries.
Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. You bet. Well, anyway, let me just mention
that I have had--we are all close to all the branches, the
Active, the Reserve, the Guard--and I don't think there is a
person up here on this committee who hasn't had very close
relationships with Active Duty and have visited quite often in
the areas where they are stationed, they are deployed.
In my case, we have 3,000 members of the Oklahoma 45th
Infantry Brigade Combat Team, our Oklahoma National Guard. I
went down when they were deployed from Camp Shelby in
Mississippi and talked to them and then left about 3 weeks
later and talked to them over in Afghanistan. I know that it is
one where you have probably a closer relationship because they
are sitting there in your hometown, and you visit with them,
General McKinley, and so, I know that that happens.
I have very close friends in Oklahoma 45th, they weren't
deployed until July, and yet we have lost 14 of our people over
there. One was Chris Horton--his wife worked in my office.
I remember so well during the August recess going into a
small town in Oklahoma where she was there, and we were making
arrangements; I was getting ready to go to Afghanistan so I
could meet with Chris Horton, her husband, and 2 days before I
left, he was killed in action. These are things that we are all
very, very close to the people in all the Services.
Earlier this week, our Oklahoma 45th helped in capturing
Bari Ali, a mid-level insurgent leader in Afghanistan, and his
brother, as well as weapons and hand grenades, tactical
fighting gear, and cell phones that were there. They did it
without firing a shot.
They did great work over there. Their efforts will lead to
a stable Afghanistan and prevent insurgents from gaining safe
haven.
Our National Guard has transitioned from a strategic to an
Operational Reserve Force. This means that the National Guard
has to be trained and equipped the same as our Active units and
the Reserves. It also means that we must fully integrate our
Active and Reserve components so they can seamlessly execute
any mission this country asks them to do.
I am proud of the contributions that have been made and the
sacrifice that our military and their families have made and
continue to make. We have made a lot of progress. I think
General McKinley will probably have this--I read part of his
statement--in terms of the relationship between the Guard and
the Active units.
I have to say, I think this might be the first time that I
can remember ever coming to a committee hearing--I had dinner
the other night with Bud Wyatt, the Air Guard Chief, and he
started talking about this. I said, ``Bud, leave me alone here.
We are going to have a hearing. Let me hear from everybody at
the same time.''
I was going to say, Mr. Chairman, this might be the only
time I have ever come to a hearing where I am really open on
this. I want to hear the answers, and we have specific
questions.
I think this is going to be a very helpful hearing, and I
appreciate your holding it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
We are hearing from members of our family. These witnesses
are part of our family, our American family and this Senate
committee's family. We are personally close to each of you, and
we have a difficult policy decision to deal with. We do that as
family members.
While there may be differences, and there obviously are,
that is what democracy is all about. We need to consider these
as members of one unit with all having the same mission, which
is the security of this country. You all have that mission, and
we all have that mission.
We are going to call on our witnesses today in the
following order. First will be the General Counsel to DOD, Jeh
Johnson. Then will be the Chairman of the JCS, General Dempsey.
Then will be the Vice Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Winnefeld.
Then will be the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno;
our Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Greenert; the Commandant
of the Marine Corps, General Amos; the Chief of Staff for the
Air Force, General Schwartz; and the CNGB, General McKinley.
So let us start with you, Mr. Johnson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEH C. JOHNSON, GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify here today.
You have asked me to discuss a provision of the proposed
legislation that would make the CNGB a member of the JCS.
At the outset, I will tell you that there are no outright
legal barriers to enacting this legislation. Nothing in the
Constitution prohibits it, and the Joint Chiefs are a statutory
creation. Congress can, therefore, change the membership of the
Chiefs by statute if it so desires.
I believe it is important, however, that the committee be
aware of some of the legislation's legal implications and
complexities. Before I get to those, here is some general legal
background on the National Guard, the CNGB, and the JCS. Mr.
Chairman, you alluded to some of this in your own remarks.
The National Guard is a unique entity that operates at
different times under Federal and State authorities. All
members of the Guard are members of both the State National
Guard and the Federal National Guard of the United States. The
Army and Air National Guards of the United States are two of
the six Reserve components of DOD. The Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps Reserves are the other four Reserve
components.
Members of the National Guard can serve in three distinct
statuses, each of which has differing responsibilities and
authorities. First, National Guard members may serve in what is
known as State Active Duty. State law dictates when Guard
members assume this status.
Typical State Active Duty missions include first responder
responsibilities after a natural disaster. The State pays for
and the Governor of that State commands the National Guard when
it is on State Active Duty. DOD plays no direct role in that
status.
Second, National Guard members may be ordered to duty under
title 32 of the U.S. Code, which I will call title 32 duty.
When the Guard performs title 32 duty, it is performing
federally funded military training subject to Federal standards
or domestic missions, both of which are under the command and
control of the State Governor. Examples of Title 32 missions
include post-September 11 airport security, southwest border
security, and counterdrug support.
Third, DOD may call the National Guard to Federal service,
including in times of national emergency, as authorized by law.
National Guard members ordered to Active Duty lose their status
as members of the National Guard and become members of the
Reserves of the Army or the Reserves of the Air Force. For
example, this is the status of Guard members who have been
called to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD both commands and funds the Guard when it is in Federal
service. Thus, at different times, the National Guard may act
as either a State or a Federal entity.
Indeed, many of the functions the Guard performs are under
neither the command nor the control of DOD. Rather, for much of
what the Guard does, State Governors are in command. When the
National Guard does act in Federal service, it does so as part
of the Reserves of the Army or the Air Force.
The CNGB does not command the National Guard acting in any
of these three statuses. Rather, by Federal statute, the CNGB
acts as a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on all
matters involving federalized National Guard forces. He also
has the statutory duty to advise the Secretaries and the Chiefs
of Staff of the Army and the Air Force on all National Guard
matters.
A DOD directive further explains the CNGB's authorities and
responsibilities, consistent with guidance provided by
Congress.
Now some legal background on the JCS. The JCS serve as the
senior military advisers to the President, the National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs are currently composed
of six statutory members: the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and
the Chiefs of the four Services.
The Service Chiefs have a broad range of leadership and
command responsibilities that extend throughout their
respective Services, encompassing both the Active and Reserve
components of the Service. Each of the Service Chiefs is the
senior military officer of their respective Service.
Against this backdrop, I turn to the proposed legislation,
which would make the CNGB a member of the JCS. As a matter of
practice, the CNGB currently attends meetings of the Joint
Chiefs, as does the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
The purpose of the proposed legislation is, thus, to make
the Chief of the Guard Bureau's attendance at Joint Chiefs
meeting a statutory entitlement, with its attendant statutory
authorities and responsibilities. In connection with the
legislation, I make two points. First, the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 struck many
carefully crafted balances of both intraservice and
interservice equities.
The CNGB represents only the Army and Air National Guards,
and the proposed legislation would thus alter some of
Goldwater-Nichols careful balances by: (a) for example,
altering the fact that each Service is statutorily represented
by one Service Chief in the Joint Chiefs, and (b) providing
only two of DOD's six statutory Reserve components with
additional Joint Chiefs representation.
Second, elevating the CNGB to represent National Guard
equities to the Joint Chiefs could create legal confusion as to
whether the Army and the Air Force Chiefs of Staff continue to
represent their total force. Current law requires the CNGB to
advise the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff on all National
Guard matters.
Finally, I note that you have already received letters from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Service Chiefs that
detail their concerns with the proposed legislation. The
Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and the Service Chiefs are far
more conversant than I with respect to the operational and
administrative consequences of adding the CNGB to the Joint
Chiefs.
From my perspective, I hope that any legislation does not
add ambiguities with respect to authorities in the place where
we can tolerate such ambiguity the least--at the top of the
Service hierarchies, especially in a time of war.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear here today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Jeh Charles Johnson
Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain, thank you for the opportunity to
testify here today.
You have asked me to discuss a provision of the proposed ``National
Guard Empowerment and State-National Defense Integration Act of
2011''--specifically, the provision that would make the CNGB a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before I get to the specifics of the
proposal, however, I thought it might be helpful to the committee if I
provided some general legal background on the National Guard, the CNGB,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The National Guard is a unique entity that operates at different
times under Federal and State authorities. All members of the Guard are
members of both their State National Guard and the Federal National
Guard of the United States. The Army and Air National Guards of the
United States are two of the six Reserve components of the Department
of Defense; the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserves are
the other four Reserve components.
Members of the National Guard can serve in three distinct statuses,
each of which has differing responsibilities and authorities.
First, National Guard members may serve in what is known as ``State
Active Duty.'' State law dictates when Guard members assume this
status; typical ``State Active Duty'' missions include first responder
responsibilities after a natural disaster. The State pays for, and the
State Governor commands, the National Guard when it is on ``State
Active Duty.'' The Department of Defense plays no direct role.
Second, National Guard members may be ordered to duty under title
32 of the U.S.C., which I will call ``Title 32 Duty.'' When the Guard
performs ``Title 32 Duty,'' it is performing federally-funded military
training subject to Federal standards or domestic missions, both of
which are under the command and control of the State Governor. Examples
of ``title 32'' missions include post-September 11 airport security,
southwest border security, and counter-drug support.
Third, the Department of Defense may call the National Guard to
``Federal service,'' including in times of national emergency, as
authorized by law. National Guard members ordered to active duty lose
their status as members of the National Guard and become members of the
Reserves of the Army or the Reserves of the Air Force. For example,
this is the status of Guard members who have been called to serve in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense both commands and funds
the Guard when it is in ``Federal service.''
Thus, at different times, the National Guard may act as either a
State or a Federal entity. Indeed, many of the functions the Guard
performs are under neither the command nor the control of the
Department of Defense; rather, for much of what the Guard does, State
Governors are in command. When the National Guard does act in Federal
service, it does so as part of the Reserves of the Army or Air Force.
Thus, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does not command the
National Guard acting in any of its three statuses. Rather, by Federal
statute, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau acts as a principal
adviser to the Secretary of Defense on all matters involving non-
federalized National Guard forces, and he also has the statutory duty
to advise the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air
Force on all National Guard matters. A Department of Defense Directive
further explicates the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's authorities
and responsibilities, consistent with guidance provided by Congress.
Finally, I will briefly provide some legal background on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as the senior military
advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs are
currently composed of six statutory members: the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Chiefs of the four Services. The
Service Chiefs have a broad range of leadership and command
responsibilities that extend throughout their respective Services,
encompassing both the Active and Reserve components of the Service.
Each of the Service Chiefs is the senior military officer of his
respective Service.
Against this backdrop, I turn to the proposed legislation, which
would make the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. I understand that the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau currently attends meetings of the Joint Chiefs. The purpose of
the proposed legislation is thus to make the Chief of the Guard
Bureau's attendance at Joint Chiefs meetings a statutory entitlement,
with its attendant statutory authorities and responsibilities.
There are no outright legal barriers to enacting this legislation.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits it, and the Joint Chiefs are a
statutory creation. Congress can therefore change the membership of the
Chiefs by statute if it so desires.
I think it is important, however, that the committee is aware of
some of the legislation's legal implications and complexities. Here I
make two points.
First, I note that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 struck many carefully crafted balances of
both intraservice and interservice equities. The Chief of the National
Guard Bureau represents only the Army and Air National Guards, and the
proposed legislation would thus seem to me to alter some of Goldwater-
Nichols's careful balances by, for example: (a) altering the fact that
each Service is statutorily represented by one Service Chief in the
Joint Chiefs; and (b) providing only two of the Department of Defense's
six statutory Reserve components with additional Joint Chiefs
representation.
Second, elevating the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to
represent National Guard equities to the Joint Chiefs could create
legal confusion as to whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff
continue to represent their total force. Current law already requires
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to advise the Army and Air Force
Chiefs of Staff on all National Guard matters.
In closing, I would note that you have already received letters
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs
that detail their concerns with the proposed legislation. Although
Congress legally could make the proposed change, the much more
important question would seem to be whether it should. With respect to
this latter question, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Vice Chairman, and the Service Chiefs are far more conversant than I
with respect to the operational and administrative consequences of
adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the Joint Chiefs. From
my perspective, I only hope that any legislation does not add
ambiguities with respect to authorities in the place where we can
tolerate such ambiguity the least: at the top of the Service
hierarchies, especially in time of war.
I thank you again for the opportunity to appear here today, and I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.
General Dempsey?
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Senator
Inhofe.
I want to point out before we begin, I appreciate the
spirit of the family metaphor you used for this. I do want to
make a point that as we have talked about this, Craig McKinley
has been in the room in every instance. So everything we have
done to try to talk about this among ourselves has been done
with the CNGB present. I thank you for the opportunity to
continue that discussion here with you today.
I would also like to thank my colleagues at the table. We
share a bond of trust with each other and with the Nation that
will be sustained regardless of how we answer the question
before us today.
Let me be clear, I am both an admirer and an advocate for
the National Guard. Our entire Reserve component makes an
indispensable contribution to our national security.
Throughout our Nation's history and certainly in the decade
since September 11, we have depended on our citizen soldiers
and airmen to help defend us, our allies, and our interests. At
home and abroad, the National Guard serves with courage,
discipline, skill, and distinction.
I am proud to be the chairman of our total Joint Force--
Active and Reserves, civilian and families. I take seriously my
responsibility to give voice to their achievements and to their
needs. I ensure their voice, including the voice of the CNGB,
is heard.
This said, I join the Secretary of Defense and the Service
Chiefs in counseling against making the Chief of the National
Guard a statutory member of the JCS. There is no compelling
military need to support this historic change. Two primary
concerns lead me to this conclusion--representation and
accountability.
First, our success as a Joint Force is due in large measure
to our ability to integrate the Active and Reserve components
so that they are indistinguishable on the battlefield. I
believe we have accomplished this because the Service Chiefs of
the Army and Air Force are the single voice for their
respective Services.
With the Service Secretaries, they bear sole responsibility
for making the key resource decisions that produce an
organized, trained, and equipped force, and this includes the
National Guard and Reserve components. The proposed change
could undermine this unity of effort.
Each of our Services has a Reserve component, but only the
Army and the Air Force have a National Guard. This proposal
will also create a situation among our Reserve component forces
whereby two of the six, as Mr. Johnson mentioned, would be
represented differently, creating what could at least be the
perception of inequity.
My second and more important concern, though, is one of
accountability. Each of the Joint Chiefs is subject to the
civilian oversight of a single appointed and confirmed
Secretary. The CNGB has no such oversight.
Elevation to the JCS would make him equal to the Service
Chiefs without commensurate accountability. This seems to me to
run counter to the carefully crafted organizational and
advisory principles established by Goldwater-Nichols.
I don't find the argument to change the composition of the
JCS compelling. It is unclear to me what problem we are trying
to solve. Here is what I do know with certainty. The CNGB has
and will continue to attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs that I
chair. I want and I need him in the tank.
The Chief provides valuable insights and experience for
matters of importance to the National Guard and, therefore, the
Nation. This advice is also carefully considered when the Army
and Air Force Chiefs make decisions that affect their Service.
The CNGB has a voice, and it is heard.
Over the last 10 years, the relationship between our Active
and Reserve components has grown into a well-integrated
fighting force. You really can't spot the difference between
Active and Reserve component soldiers or airmen. We are and we
will remain one force.
Again, I would like to thank the committee for its
continued support to all of our men and women in uniform, as
well as their families, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the proposal to make the Chief
of National Guard Bureau a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the table. We share
a bond of trust with each other and the Nation that will be sustained
regardless of how today's question is answered.
Let me be clear, I am both an admirer and an advocate for the
National Guard. Our entire Reserve component makes an indispensable
contribution to our national security. Throughout our Nation's history,
and certainly in the decade since the September 11 attacks, we have
depended on our citizen soldiers and airmen to help defend us, our
allies, and our interests. At home and abroad, the National Guard
serves with courage, discipline, skill, and distinction.
I am proud to be their Chairman--the Chairman of our total Joint
Force--Active and Reserves, civilian and families. I take seriously my
responsibility to give voice to their achievements and needs. I ensure
their voice--including the voice of the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau--is heard.
This said, I join the Secretary of Defense and the Service Chiefs
in counseling against making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a
statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is no compelling
military justification to support this historic change. Two primary
concerns lead me to this conclusion--representation and accountability.
First, our success as a Joint Force is due in large measure to our
ability to integrate the Active and Reserve components--they are
indistinguishable on the battlefield. I believe this is because the
Service Chiefs of the Army and Air Force are the single voice for their
respective branches. With the Service Secretaries, they bear sole
responsibility for making the resource decisions that produce an
organized, trained, and equipped force. This includes the National
Guard and Reserve components. The proposed change could undermine this
unity of effort. Each of our Services has a Reserve component but only
the Army and Air Force have a National Guard. This proposal will also
create a situation among our Reserve Forces whereby two of the six
Reserve components would be represented differently creating at least a
perception of inequity.
My second and more important concern is one of accountability. Each
of the Joint Chiefs is subject to the civilian oversight of a single
appointed and confirmed Secretary. The CNGB has no such oversight.
Elevation to the JCS would make him equal to the Service Chiefs without
commensurate accountability. This proposal runs counter to the
carefully crafted organizational and advisory principals established in
the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
The argument to change the composition of the JCS is simply not
compelling. It's uncertain to me what problem we're trying to solve.
Here is what I do know with certainty. The Chief of the National
Guard Bureau has and will continue to attend meetings of the Joint
Chiefs that I chair. I want and need him in the Tank. The Chief
provides valuable insight and experience for matters of importance to
the National Guard and the Nation. This advice is also carefully
considered when the Army and Air Force Chiefs make decisions that
affect their service. The CNGB has a voice and it is heard.
Over the last 10-years, the relationship between our Active and
Reserve components has grown into a well integrated fighting force. You
can't spot the difference between Active and Reserve component soldiers
or airmen--we are and will remain one force.
Again, I would like to thank the committee for its continued
support to ALL our men and women in uniform, as well as their families.
I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Dempsey.
Admiral Winnefeld?
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD JR., USN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Winnefeld. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Inhofe, distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Let me start by saying how much I honor and have a deep
appreciation for the men and women of our Nation's entire
Reserve component, including the fine citizen soldiers and
airmen of our National Guard for their incredible contributions
to our Nation's defense and security, as well as their
considerable sacrifices both at home and abroad.
There should be no doubt that I am a huge supporter of and
believer in America's National Guard, and I have a personal
connection to the Guard. Indeed, when I was nominated to be the
commander of NORTHCOM and North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD), my first call was to my friend and soon-to-be
partner, General Craig McKinley.
While there, I worked very closely with my Guard partners
and the Council of Governors to bring to life the dual-status
commander concept. We migrated more chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear response to the Guard while I was at
NORTHCOM. With the help of the National Guard Bureau, we
brought more guardsmen into the NORTHCOM headquarters,
including doubling the number of National Guard flag officers
in the headquarters.
When I walked around my NORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters, I
could not have told you who was a guardsman and who was not. I
wouldn't want it any other way.
Along the way, I have come to count many of the States'
adjutants generals as my personal friends. It was not by chance
that my first speaking engagement as Vice Chairman was at the
National Guard Association of the United States annual
conference this past August.
During my time as Vice Chairman thus far, we have been
successful in bringing the CNGB into more senior-level DOD
forums. I have personally advocated for the expansion of the
State Partnership Program, which I think is so important to our
country.
I fully advocate elevating the position of the Deputy CNGB
to three-star rank and would happily support a future NORTHCOM
commander being a guardsman, as well as key component
commanders being guardsmen, though I do not believe the law
should go any further than it already does in specifying which
components hold which billets. I have put my money where my
mouth is in support of the Guard, and they can count on my
continued support.
Nonetheless, and despite my support for this great
institution, I am concerned about the pending National Guard
Empowerment Act legislation regarding full membership of the
CNGB on the JCS.
The spirit of jointness kindled by the Goldwater-Nichols
reform legislation is truly alive and has served our Nation
well and reflects the wisdom of Congress. I do not believe it
needs to be fixed, and we don't need to take a step backward in
the unity of effort that that legislation did so much to
promote.
As General Dempsey said, the Service Chiefs who serve on
the JCS have great responsibility for manning, training, and
equipping both the Active and Reserve components of their
Services. The CNGB, despite being my great friend and for whom
I have great respect, does not have the same level of
responsibility or command authority, and we should not send the
signal that we have two different U.S. Armies or U.S. Air
Forces.
Second, while this legislation may send a very positive
message to the terrific men and women of the Guard, I am
concerned that it will send a negative message to the remaining
46 percent of our Nation's Reserve component that they are
somehow of lesser importance and that future decisions could be
taken at their expense. I hear that from some members of the
Title 10 Reserve components whom I have asked.
Third, some may believe that this legislation would provide
a tangible benefit by empowering the Guard with a vote on the
JCS. Mr. Chairman, I would tell you there is no voting process
on the Joint Chiefs. Instead, we all provide our best military
advice to the Chairman, who then formulates his advice to the
Secretary of Defense and to the President.
We already receive fantastic military advice from General
McKinley, who, as General Dempsey said, is always invited to
that table, just as we do from the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, who is also always invited to that table, although the
Coast Guard is not asking for similar legislation.
In the end, I am not sure what is broken and what we are
fixing. But I also would assure you, as General Dempsey did,
Mr. Chairman, I would assure the members of this committee--
because we are, indeed, a family--that my colleagues and I will
do everything to prevent this issue from driving a wedge
between our fantastic, capable, and brave National Guard and
the rest of the U.S. military's fantastic, capable, and brave
Active and Reserve components.
I thank you again for the opportunity to appear this
morning. Thanks again for your continued support and that of
your staff for our men and women in uniform, and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the Armed
Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
Let me say at the outset, I honor the men and women of our National
Guard for their incredible contributions to our Nation's defense and
security, both abroad and at home, there should be no doubt that I am a
huge supporter of and believer in America's National Guard.
When I was nominated to be the Commander of U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command, my first call
was to my friend and partner, General Craig McKinley.
While there, I worked closely with my Guard partners on bringing to
life the Dual Status Commander concept, and migrating more chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear response capability into the
Guard. With the help of the National Guard Bureau, we brought more
guardsmen into the NORTHCOM headquarters, including, two additional
general officers. When I walked around my NORTHCOM headquarters, I
could not have told you who was a guardsman and who was on active duty,
and I liked it that way.
It was not by chance that my first speaking engagement as Vice
Chairman was at the National Guard Association of the United States
annual conference this past August. During my time as Vice Chairman,
we've been successful in bringing the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau into more senior-level DOD forums. I have advocated for
expansion of the State Partnership Program. I fully advocate elevating
the position of the Deputy Chief of the National Guard Bureau to three
star rank, and would happily support a future commander of NORTHCOM and
key NORTHCOM component commanders being guardsmen, though I do not
believe the law should go any further than it does in specifying which
components hold which billets.
I have put my money where my mouth is on support for the Guard, and
they can count on my continued support. Nonetheless, and despite all my
support for this great institution, I am concerned about the pending
National Guard Empowerment Act legislation provision regarding full
membership of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The spirit of Jointness kindled by the Goldwater Nichols reform
legislation is alive, and has served our Nation well. I do not believe
it needs to be fixed. The Service Chiefs who serve on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) have great responsibility for manning, training, and
equipping both the Active and Reserve components of their services.
They also provide Title 10 military advice on strategy and the use of
force to the Chairman, the Secretary and the President. The Chief of
the National Guard Bureau does not have commensurate responsibility,
nor should we send the corrosive signal that we have two different U.S.
Armies and two U.S. Air Forces.
Second, while the legislation may send a positive message to the
terrific men and women in the Guard, I'm concerned that it will send a
very negative message to the remaining 40-plus percent of our Nation's
Reserve component that they are somehow of lesser importance, and that
future decisions could be taken at their expense.
Third, some may believe this legislation would provide a tangible
benefit by empowering the Guard with a vote on the JCS. Mr. Chairman,
there is no voting process on the Joint Chiefs. Instead, we all provide
our best military advice to the Chairman, who then formulates his
advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. We already
receive fantastic military advice from General McKinley, who is always
invited to that table, just as we do from the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, who also is at the table. Yes, statutorily we have the right of
dissent through the Chairman and Secretary to the President, but that
is very, very seldom used.
In the end, however this is resolved Mr. Chairman, I can assure the
members of the committee that my colleagues and I will do everything we
can to prevent this issue--despite having been elevated to this level--
from driving a wedge between our fantastic, capable, and brave National
Guard and the rest of the U.S. military.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear this morning, and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you so much.
General Odierno.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMY
General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
other members of the committee. It is an honor to be here in
front of you, as always, today.
I have had the opportunity both in my current position, and
in my previous positions to see firsthand the power and
capabilities of the total Army. The performance, selfless
service, and dedication of our Active component, our Army
National Guard, and our Army Reserves all have contributed
directly to our successes. I am proud and humbled that I am
currently the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, the total Army.
The Reserve component connects the Army to the American
people. The Guard and Reserve soldiers that live and work in
over 3,000 communities have shared the burdens of war, with
over 900 killed in action and more than 7,500 wounded. They are
a critical component of the Joint Force and connect us to Main
Street America.
We have built a strong relationship between all of our Army
components, and I would argue probably the strongest we have
ever had. It is our goal to sustain and increase this momentum
as we move forward. But with all due respect to the CNGB, my
good friend Greg McKinley, with whom I have the utmost respect
for and have worked closely with on numerous critical issues, I
am bound to communicate my explicit opposition to this post as
a member of the JCS.
First, representing only two of the six Reserve components,
the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, at the JCS
level will create confusion, imbalance, and potentially
challenge interoperability. It would run counter to
intraservice and interservice integration and negatively impact
the progress we have made toward jointness.
Second, the proposed legislation would complicate the
central principle of civilian control of our Nation's military.
This proposal risks creating a bifurcated force--one focused
internally, another focused abroad. It is important that we
have clear authorities and responsibilities to ensure effective
employment of the total force.
Third, this could lead to divided or redundant force
management, funding, modernization, and training and doctrine,
creating a high level of complication and friction.
The Reserve component forces will continue to play a
critical role in our national security strategy, and the advice
of the CNGB will always be, as it has been, extremely valuable
and essential within the context of our total Army in a
balanced joint portfolio. The integration of the regular Army,
the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves has proven over
the last decade to be unbeatable on the battlefield and
irreplaceable at home and abroad. Now, more than ever, we are
truly one Army, and we cannot sacrifice the fact that we are
truly one Army as we face many critical challenges ahead.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again
for allowing me the opportunity to appear before you and for
your support, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Odierno follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the
committee.
I have seen first-hand the power and capabilities of the Total
Army. The performance, selfless service, and dedication of both the
Army National Guard and the Army Reserves have contributed directly to
our successes.
The Reserve component connects the Army to the American people. The
Guard and Reserve soldiers that live and work in over 3,000 communities
have shared the burdens of war, with over 900 killed in action and more
than 7,500 wounded. They are a critical component of our Joint Force
and connect us to ``Main Street America.''
We have built a strong relationship between all of our Army
components; probably the strongest we have ever had. It is our goal to
sustain and increase this momentum as we move forward.
With all due respect to the Chief of National Guard Bureau--with
whom I have worked closely on a variety of critical issues--I am bound
to communicate my explicit opposition to this post as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for several reasons.
First, representing only two of the seven Reserve components--the
Army National Guard and the Air National Guard--at the Joint Chiefs of
Staff level, will create confusion, imbalance, and challenge
interoperability. It would run counter to intra-service and inter-
service integration and negatively impact the progress we've made
toward jointness.
Second, the proposed legislation will complicate the central
principle of civilian control of our Nation's military. This proposal
risks creating a bifurcated force--one focused internally and another
focused abroad. It is important that we have clear authorities and
responsibilities to ensure effective employment of the Total Force.
Third, this could lead to divided or redundant force management,
funding, modernization, training, and doctrine creating a high level of
complication and friction.
The Reserve component forces will continue to play a critical role
in our National Security Strategy and the advice of the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau will always be--as it has been--extremely
valuable and essential within the context of our Total Army in a
balanced Joint Portfolio.
The integration of the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army
Reserves has proven--over the last decade--to be unbeatable on the
battlefield and irreplaceable at home and abroad. Now, more than ever,
we are truly one Army.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again for
allowing me the opportunity to appear before you and for your support.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Odierno.
Admiral Greenert.
STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to comment on and to testify in
the matter of including the CNGB as a member of the JCS.
I fully support continued participation by the CNGB in
Joint Chiefs deliberations, particularly regarding the issues
that deal with or affect the National Guard. Our National Guard
Chief, General McKinley, who we really do consider a brother in
the tank, has made notable input and provided valuable
contributions to issues of importance to those of us serving in
the tank and DOD. I think this relationship should continue.
However, in my opinion, making the CNGB a member of the JCS
adds unnecessary complexity to the principle of unity of
command. Unlike the Service Chiefs, the CNGB does not represent
a branch of Service, nor is he responsible for organizing,
manning, training, and equipping the National Guard to the
extent of the Service Chiefs and their respective Services.
Making the CNGB a member of the Joint Chiefs may also
insert an ambiguity regarding the status of the Army National
Guard and the Air National Guard as Reserve components of the
Army and Air Force, respectively. This could create a
perception that the National Guard is a separate service, and
that perception could instigate an inequality sense among the
National Guard and its Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force
Reserve counterparts.
I appreciate the committee's longstanding support for the
men and women of the Navy, and I look forward to continue
working with this committee as we address the challenges we
face, both for the Nation and for our Navy.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Jonathan Greenert, USN
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the matter of including
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
Making the CNGB a member of the JCS adds unnecessary complexity to
the principle of ``unity of command'', and could confuse the intended
clear and unambiguous source of best military advice to the Secretary
of Defense and President.
In my opinion, the Service Chiefs (Army, Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps) should continue to be held singularly accountable to the
executive and legislative branches of government for the readiness and
combat effectiveness of all personnel in their respective Services, and
for the welfare of all their respective servicemembers and families. I
believe they are best positioned to report to the President and
Congress on their Services' readiness and preparation for military
missions that support our national interests.
After 10 years of war, the Guard and Reserve are more fully
integrated with our Active component than ever before. Today's synergy
of effort is outstanding and unprecedented. Making the CNGB a member of
the JCS could create ambiguity in the chain of command and erode this
momentum.
This assessment is consistent with the Commission on the National
Guard and Reserves Second Report to Congress--which recommended the
CNGB not be made a member of the JCS.
Making the CNGB a member of the JCS may insert ambiguity regarding
the status of the Army and Air National Guard as Reserve components of
the Army and Air Force and create the appearance the National Guard is
a separate Service. This could also introduce an inequity between the
National Guard and its Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reserve
counterparts.
I concur with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the
CNGB's advisory roles under 10 U.S.C. 1050(c) are essential and
sufficient. The CNGB should continue to advise the Secretary of
Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters
involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as
determined by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, I fully support
continued CNGB participation in JCS deliberations that deal with issues
that affect the National Guard, and to provide insight on National
Guard concerns.
I appreciate the committee's longstanding support of the men and
women of the Navy. I look forward to continue working with the
committee as we address the challenges we face as a nation and as a
service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
Next, General Amos.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS
General Amos. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, fellow
committee members, thank you for the opportunity to provide my
advice on whether the CNGB should become a voting member of the
JCS.
In my view, there should be no change to the status quo.
Let me first acknowledge my colleague, General Craig McKinley,
the current CNGB, and the many men and women who have
faithfully served in our States' National Guard units.
They have served our Nation and their States well for many
decades, for this and much more, we owe them our great debt of
gratitude.
By virtue of its limited role in DOD and its supporting
role in Army and Air Force affairs, the CNGB lacks the
requisite broad insight into all levels of strategic planning
for JCS membership. Additionally, the CNGB's dual mission and
State focus creates an unavoidable conflict of interest
inconsistent with voting membership.
In this sense, voting membership would introduce
irrevocable State interest into an inherently Federal activity
and process. CNGB membership in the JCS could complicate unity
of command for both the Army and the U.S. Air Force.
Congress intended the current structure ensures that the
Service Chiefs are singularly accountable to the executive and
legislative branches of the Government for the combat readiness
of their respective Services, to include their Reserve
components. I think it is critical that we safeguard this unity
of command.
Lastly, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force
are best suited to advise on the most effective employment of
their supporting elements. Under law, the National Guard has a
supporting relationship with the Army and Air Force when
federalized as their Reserve component.
Providing JCS membership to the CNGB creates unnecessary
leadership duplication in the JCS, contrary to Congress'
longstanding policy. This duplication could unfairly amplify
Army and Air Force concerns and create a representational
imbalance prejudicial to the Reserve components other than the
National Guard. The CNGB's advisory voice in the JCS is
appropriate and adequate as it currently stands.
Thank you for the opportunity to offer this statement, and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James F. Amos, USMC
Thank you for the opportunity to address with you the important
question of whether the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), should be
a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). I cannot overstate the
dedication and bravery of our Reserve Forces in the current fight.
Because of their contributions and sacrifices, there is an
understandable desire to extend to our Reserve Forces an appropriate
level of recognition. While I would support almost any effort to
provide such well-deserved recognition, I do not think that changing
the national command structure is a necessary or appropriate tribute.
In my view, the CNGB's current, limited supporting role is an
appropriate one inasmuch as the CNGB lacks the overarching strategic
insight necessary for JCS membership. I also believe that CNGB
membership would create unnecessary duplication within the Department
of Defense (DOD) and the JCS, complicate unity of command within the
Army and Air Force, fragment the Reserve community, and create
uncertainty with regard to National Guard leadership.
Although the National Guard is without doubt a key player in
today's conflicts, I believe the CNGB lacks the requisite insight into
all levels of strategic planning by virtue of his limited role in DOD,
and more specifically, Army and Air Force affairs. The JCS provides
direct military advice to the President, the National Security Council,
the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In order
for the JCS to carry out this duty, its members must be able to address
the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. They must be capable of
preparing strategic plans, to include plans which conform with resource
levels; preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those
strategic plans; performing net assessments to determine the
capabilities of the Armed Forces; preparing contingency plans
conforming to the guidance of the President and the Secretary of
Defense; advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths
in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility
support); establishing and maintaining a uniform system of evaluating
the preparedness of each command to carry out missions; and providing
advice concerning the extent to which the program recommendations and
budget proposals of DOD conform with the priorities established in
strategic plans and with the priorities established for the
requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.
Additionally, JCS members provide advice concerning doctrine, training,
and the education of the Armed Forces. The JCS' responsibilities
therefore require a leadership structure that is wholly dedicated to
the national defense, and thoroughly knowledgeable of the processes
that resource and develop our defense strategies and the programs and
resources required to develop and maintain responsive capabilities. The
staffs of each Service Chief gain this detailed understanding through
multi-layered integration with the joint staff and key DOD staffs. The
integration of the staffs is a key enabler of success. The preparation
of strategic and other plans outlined above therefore requires much
more than the ability to cast a vote; it requires participation at
every level and an undivided focus. With its dual mission, supporting
role, and state focus, the CNGB is not structured for full
participation in the roles set for the Chiefs in Title 10. Accordingly,
I do not believe the CNGB has the currency or capability to assume the
necessary level of engagement requisite for JCS membership.
Additionally, contrary to Congressional policy, including the CNGB
into the JCS would create unnecessary duplication within the JCS
because the federalized National Guard, as the Army and Air Force's
Reserve component, serves a supporting role. This duplication could
result in an unfairly amplified representation of Army and Air Force
concerns. It will also create a representational imbalance with regard
to Reserve affairs in favor of the federalized National Guard. The Army
and Air Force Chiefs of Staff are best suited to equitably advise on
the most effective employment of their supporting elements.
Moreover, providing full voting membership to the National Guard
Bureau--an organization not primarily responsible for the planning and
execution of national strategy--would not only be unprecedented; it
would be an extraordinary ``solution'' to an unclear problem. When
Congress established DOD, it codified a policy that called for
eliminating unnecessary duplication in the DOD. Congress designed this
policy, which exists in Title 10 today, in effort to seek more
effective, efficient, and economical administration not only in the DOD
but in the National command structure.
The role of the National Guard, when executing a Federal mission,
is to fold in with and execute missions in support of the Army and Air
Force Chiefs of Staff. In preparation for these missions, and in
recognition of its supporting role, the Guard is permitted to train
with these Services and at their schools.
For title 32, non-federalized National Guard matters, the CNGB
serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the
CJCS. In this title 32 capacity, no unnecessary duplication exists
because the CNGB is uniquely situated to channel communications between
the several States and the Secretary of Defense. Where Congress
federalizes the National Guard, however, the CNGB serves as the
principle advisor to the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of
Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Force Chief of
Staff. Due to the importance of this supporting role, the CNGB
appropriately maintains an advisory voice within the JCS. This
structure is intuitive; it reflects the manner in which Congress
intended to use the federalized National Guard and Air National Guard
as the Army's and Air Force's Reserve component.
As noted in the recent JCS letter to this committee, CNGB
membership in the JCS would also complicate unity of command for both
the Army and the Air Force and contribute to Service balkanization. The
current organizational structure ensures that the Chiefs of Staff of
the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force are held singularly accountable to
the executive and legislative branches of Government for the readiness
and combat effectiveness of their respective Services, including their
Reserves. This is as it should be, and this is what Congress intended
when it created the existing structure. Unity of purpose and of command
is crucial in both the preparation and employment phases of the Armed
Forces. When it comes to making decisions for the defense of the Nation
and the preparations necessary for the achievement of its national
objectives, success requires single-mindedness.
Also as noted in the JCS letters to this committee, elevating the
role of the CNGB would further segment one community of reservists--a
community that is already challenged with executing its dual mission.
When the National Guard is federalized, the command relationship
between the CNGB and the Army Chief of Staff and the Air Force Chief of
Staff mirrors the Navy and Marine Corps' unified command relationship
for their Reserve components. Marine Forces Reserve, for example, as
the Reserve component for the Marine Corps, is organized, trained, and
equipped under the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This Service
identification and matriculation enhances unity of command and the
cohesion of combat units. In my interactions with Marine reservists,
I've noted their pride and motivation in simply continuing their
service to the Nation as marines. I applaud the lack of cultural
distinction between Active Duty and Reserve marines, and I am confident
that this same motivation also drives reservists in other Services to
step forward. The proposed elevation of the CNGB risks fracturing the
successful dynamic that our forces have achieved by diluting the
understanding of the supporting and supported command relationships,
and unbalancing the appropriate preparation of our Active and Reserve
Forces.
Lastly, I believe that CNGB membership on the JCS could create an
unhealthy ambiguity in the responsibility for leading the men and women
of the National Guard. As a Service Chief, I fully subscribe to the
notion that I am singularly accountable for the welfare of all marines
and their families, Active and Reserve. As Commandant of the Marine
Corps, I have the same responsibility to the Marine Forces Reserve as I
do to the regular forces.
The missions for which all marines are trained and equipped is
unified with the command structure that leads them. The families that
decide to stay with the Corps know whose job it is to ensure their best
care: it is mine. Bifurcating leadership, however, might lead to
critical leadership gaps recognizable only after some future failure
occurs. Most concerning, these gaps could affect the responsibility of
caring for these troops and their families. For the sake of our
reservists and their families, we cannot afford such a risk.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Amos.
General Schwartz.
STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and members
of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to offer my
views today.
On behalf of the men and women of the U.S. Air Force, I
thank you for your ongoing support of our servicemembers and,
importantly, their families.
I join my colleagues in definitively stating that the CNGB
is a very important senior leader under our total force
construct. Through his role in advising the Secretary of the
Air Force directly and the Secretary of Defense through the
Chairman of the JCS, the National Guard Bureau Chief is a daily
contributor to many of the consequential decisions that are
made by the total force leadership.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides the Bureau Chief's
advisory role and preserves unified service leadership. This
advisory role and the Bureau Chief's relationship to each
Service continues to be important and is currently appropriate
in the performance of organizing, training, and equipping
functions for which the Service Secretaries and the Service
Chiefs are singularly responsible.
But because the National Guard Bureau Chief does not
represent a single or separate branch of Service, making him or
her a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs would reach beyond
the appropriate role for the Bureau Chief. Because the Bureau
Chief's advisory role to the Service Secretaries and Chiefs is
for all National Guard matters, including notably those that
are related to the Federal service of the National Guard,
providing statutory Joint Chiefs membership to the National
Guard Bureau Chief would disrupt the lines of authority and
representation that are already in place for the Chiefs of the
Army and the Air Force. Therefore, the current arrangement
should not be altered.
The Joint Chiefs exist in large part to provide military
advice on the employment of Federal forces. Total force
employment considerations are best served by those who possess
supervisory and moral authority over fielded forces; who
organize, train, and equip personnel of all components of each
Service; and who are responsible as force providers to the
combatant commanders.
Consequently, the National Guard Bureau Chief's membership
on the Joint Chiefs presents issues concerning his or her
appropriate role in offering advice on the employment of the
Armed Forces in a designated title 10 role. Moreover, beyond
the established relationships among the military services,
interactions with the interagency and international partners
also could be confused.
Existing law and policy provide appropriate roles and
requirements for the CNGB. His or her authorities, augmented by
the JCS Chairman's standing invitation to the Bureau Chief to
attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs, ensure that the Chief of
the Bureau will continue to have a strong voice and will remain
an essential and a highly valued partner for any Air Force
Chief of Staff or Joint Chiefs team.
But for the foregoing reasons, the CNGB should not be
included as a statutory full voting member of the JCS
independent of service leadership.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and members of the committee,
I thank you for your time. We look forward to your questions.
If I may, sir, I would like to publicly recognize and state
our admiration and respect for our teammates from the U.S.
Marine Corps, who celebrate their 236th birthday today.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) is a very important
senior leader in our Total Force construct, and through his role in
advising the secretaries of the Air Force and the Army directly, and
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). CNGB is a daily contributor to many of the
consequential decisions that are made by the Total Force leadership.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. Sec. 10502(c)) provides for
CNGB's principal advisory role, through CJCS, to SECDEF for matters
involving non-federalized National Guard forces. By contrast, his
advisory role to the Service Secretaries and Chiefs is for all National
Guard matters--notably, including those that are related to the Federal
service of the National Guard. Providing statutory JCS membership to
CNGB will blur this crucial distinction.
The CNGB relationship to each service is important and currently
sufficient in the performance of the organizing, training, and
equipping functions for which the Service Secretaries and Chiefs are
singularly responsible. But because CNGB does not represent a single or
separate branch of Service, making CNGB a statutory member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would reach beyond the appropriate CNGB role and
disrupt the lines of authority and representation that are already in
place for the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army and Air Force. This
current effective arrangement should not be altered.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff exists, in large part, to provide
military advice on employment of Federal forces. Total Force employment
considerations are best served by those who possess supervisory and
moral authority over field units; who organize, train, and equip
personnel of all components of each Service; and who are responsible as
force providers to the combatant commands. Consequently, CNGB
membership on the JCS presents issues concerning his or her appropriate
role in offering advice on employment of the Armed Forces in a
designated title 10 role. Moreover, beyond the established
relationships among the Military Services, interactions with
interagency and international partners also could be confused.
Existing law and policy provide appropriate roles and requirements
of CNGB and the National Guard Bureau. The authorities of CNGB,
augmented by CJCS's standing invitation for CNGB to attend all JCS
meetings, ensure that CNGB will continue to have a strong voice, and
will remain an essential and highly valued partner for any Air Force
Chief of Staff and the Joint Chiefs. But, for the reasons above, CNGB
should not be included as a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, independent of service leadership.
Chairman Levin. Happy birthday, General Amos. [Laughter.]
General Amos. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. Didn't know you were that old, but----
[Laughter.]
General Amos. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Yes. We congratulate you and all the
marines.
Thank you, General Schwartz.
General McKinley?
STATEMENT OF GEN. CRAIG R. McKINLEY, USAF, CHIEF, NATIONAL
GUARD BUREAU
General McKinley. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Let me take a point of personal pride in thanking you for
co-hosting a Public Broadcasting Service special that will be
seen tonight, ``Where Soldiers Come From,'' honoring eight of
your soldiers from the upper peninsula of Michigan.
Senator Inhofe, thanks for your support of the 45th. Your
relationship with your Oklahoma National Guard is one to be
emulated, as all the other members of this great committee.
All the distinguished members of this committee, it is an
honor to be sitting before you today to provide my opening
comments on the matter at hand.
I admire all the Service Chiefs, the Vice Chairman, and the
Chairman very, very much. I can tell you that our relationship
will not be broken by the testimony given here today, and I
thank them for the honor of letting me be part of this dais
today.
Mr. Chairman, for me to be here today to provide my
personal views on whether the CNGB should be a member of the
JCS, I am sitting here believing now in the 21st century, after
3 years in the job as CNGB and 11 total years serving in the
Pentagon, that it is now in the best interests of the American
people for the CNGB to be made a full member of the JCS.
While the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
and resulting DOD initiatives made important fundamental
changes in the role of the CNGB and the Bureau, only full JCS
membership for the CNGB will ensure that the responsibilities
and capabilities of the non-federalized National Guard are
considered in a planned and deliberate manner that is not based
upon ad hoc or personal relationships but is, instead, firmly
rooted in the law and the national strategy.
The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken
into account when making military contingency plans, when
allocating scarce readiness resources, and when advising the
President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security
Council, and the Homeland Security Council on strategies and
contingency response options. Homeland defense and civil
support must be at the core of our National strategy due to the
changing threat environment, one that is asymmetrical and more
dangerous within our homeland than at any time in our history.
It is for those reasons now that I now believe that the
CNGB should be a member of the JCS. Our Nation's military
planning and resourcing would be vastly improved, in my
opinion, more comprehensive, more effective, and more
efficient.
I do not personally support a change in the Title 10
relationships among the Services and the Army and the Air
Guard, nor do I support the National Guard becoming a separate
service. We in the National Guard are all very proud members of
the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force.
The issue at hand, in my opinion, does not in any way
impact unity of command, which will remain unchanged; or
fragment the Reserve component, as only the National Guard has
a dual Federal/State mission; or create uncertainty, in my
opinion, with respect to National Guard leadership, which
clearly resides in our Governors and adjutants general when the
Guard is non-federalized and with the Federal commanders when
it is.
Nor does it increase the risk, in my opinion, of over-
representation of any Service at the highest levels of our
military. Rather, this would add to the JCS in an enduring
manner the expertise and knowledge of the CNGB as it pertains
to the National Guard in its non-federalized role in the
defense and safety of the homeland.
Indeed, the CNGB, who is a Title 10 officer under the law,
and the DOD directive pertaining to the National Guard should
be counted on as the Federal officer best postured to advise
the JCS and their clients on the capabilities of the non-
Federal National Guard.
I have read the letters of the Service Chiefs submitted to
your committee, and I provided the Chairman of the JCS a copy
of this DOD directive on Monday. These letters and other
comments focus, whether directly or indirectly, primarily on
five discrete themes: budget authority; the CNGB's statutory
advisory role as it currently exists, that it is sufficient;
that the National Guard could become a separate service or will
be somehow advantaged over the other Reserve components;
maintaining Title 10 command authority; and, finally, civilian
oversight.
In the area of budget authority, the CNGB plans, programs,
and administers the budgets of the Army and Air National Guard,
and I am directly responsible for nearly $28 billion annually.
I am the appropriation sponsor for the Army National Guard
Military Personnel Account, Operation and Maintenance (O&M),
Military Construction (MILCON), and the Air National Guard
Military Personnel Account, O&M, and MILCON.
By law, the CNGB is responsible for the entire planning,
budgeting execution, and accounting of these appropriations.
The CNGB competes for, defends, and validates the requirements
for the above appropriation and submits budget materials
through the Services to DOD.
The CNGB is required to provide an annual financial report
to Congress that states how the specific National Guard
appropriations funding was spent.
In my regard as a statutory adviser, there is sufficient
and significant difference between the CNGB's principal adviser
authorities and the JCS members' military adviser authorities.
The JCS members advise the President, National Security Council
(NSC), Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
The JCS members may also submit advice or an opinion, in
addition to the advice presented by the Chairman.
Additionally, the President, NSC, Homeland Security
Council, and Secretary of Defense may request advice directly
from the JCS members, and JCS members may make recommendations
to Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense. In
contrast, the CNGB advises the Secretary of Defense through the
CJCS on matters involving non-federalized National Guard
forces.
The CNGB must declare an interest in order to have a voice
on these limited matters. Without statutory JCS membership, the
CNGB's role in the JCS is ad hoc, as determined by each
successive Chairman.
In regards to separate service or advantage over other
Reserve components, the National Guard is unique, thanks to
Article 1, section 8, clauses 15 and 16 of the U.S.
Constitution and title 32 of the U.S. Code. It is unlike the
other Reserve components, which can perform title 10 duties
under title 10 command authority.
The National Guard performs the same title 10 duties when
federalized, plus diverse non-Federal duties and State duties
under State command authority. The command chains are
unambiguous. The other Reserve components have no analogy to
the National Guard's non-federalized duties and command
authorities.
The non-Federal National Guard's missions include, but are
not limited to, air defense, ballistic missile defense, weapons
of mass destruction response, disaster response, counterdrug
support, border security, airport security, and national
special security events.
In regard to unclear title 10 command authority, the issue
discussed today, in my opinion, would not alter title 10
command authorities or accountability over federalized National
Guard forces. There would be no change to the title 10
authorities of the Service Secretaries or the Service Chiefs.
Conversely, they would take on no new title 32
responsibilities.
The CNGB is not, nor would he be, within the title 10 chain
of command for Title 10 National Guard forces. When
federalized, National Guard forces are and will remain under
the command of Federal commanders.
Total force integration would not be compromised. If
anything, it would be enhanced by greater situational awareness
of Title 32 National Guard missions, capabilities, and
leadership on which the CNGB is uniquely qualified to advise.
Total force integration would also benefit from enhanced
understanding of the homeland defense and civil support
missions that are performed by non-federalized National Guard
forces.
In regards to civilian oversight, since 2008, under the
provisions of the DOD directive, the CNGB is under the
authority, the direction, and control of the Secretary of
Defense. The Secretary normally exercises authority, direction,
and control through the Secretaries of the Army and of the Air
Force for matters pertaining to their responsibilities in law
or DOD policy.
To conclude, much has changed since 2008. The National
Guard Bureau is now a joint activity of DOD, and the CNGB has
enhanced authorities short of JCS membership, and for those, we
are very appreciative.
Yet the CNGB still does not have an institutional position
from which I can advise the President, the NSC, the Homeland
Security Council, and Congress on non-federalized National
Guard forces that are critical to homeland defense and civil
support missions.
Adding the CNGB to the JCS, in my opinion, would ensure
that in the post-September 11 security environment the National
Guard's non-federalized role in homeland defense and civil
support missions will be fully represented in all JCS
deliberations. This would not detract, in my opinion, in any
way from its other critical JCS functions.
Without statutory membership on the JCS, the CNGB's ability
to participate in deliberations is determined solely by the
discretion of the Chairman. I believe this role should be
established in law. This view is also fully shared by former
assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security Paul
McHale, who has consented to let me inform you that he, like
me, did not have this opinion several years ago, but now agrees
that the CNGB should be made a full member of the JCS.
In my role as the channel of communication for the States,
the territories of Guam, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, and
the District of Columbia, I would be remiss without speaking on
behalf of the 54 adjutants general. In a letter I would like to
submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, the adjutants general have
provided their unqualified support for placing the CNGB on the
JCS.
I appreciate very much again sitting with these
distinguished gentlemen on this dais and the opportunity to
discuss this issue with you today, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General McKinley follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Craig R. McKinley, USAF
opening remarks
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the
committee; I am honored to appear before you today, representing
465,000 citizen-soldiers and airmen in the Army and Air National Guard,
an organization that is historically part of the foundation of our
great democracy. America's National Guard remains ready, reliable, and
accessible. As members of an operational force, regularly used by the
President and State Governors, the soldiers and airmen of the National
Guard contribute daily to our Nation's overseas and domestic security
objectives. I thank you for the opportunity to discuss the possibility
of making the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) a statutory member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). I would like to address some of the
issues surrounding this debate.
the national guard as a reserve component
The National Guard of the United States is by statute a Reserve
component of the U.S. Army and Air Force, and representation on the JCS
would not degrade that relationship. We are very proud of our history
with and lineage to the U.S. Army and Air Force. Never have we
contemplated abandoning our historical ties, and suggestions that
adding the CNGB as a JCS member would create a separate military
service are divisive and unfounded. Pride in our Service affiliations
is a core competency of the National Guard. The Secretaries of the Army
and the Air Force would continue to prescribe the training of the
National Guard, procure its equipment, and validate its requirements.
The Directors of the Army and Air National Guard would continue to
participate in planning and budgeting meetings as representatives of
the Reserve components of those Services.
the national guard and the secretary of defense
Statutorily, the CNGB is a principal advisor to the Secretary of
Defense through the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving non-
federalized National Guard matters that are not under the authority and
direction of the Secretaries or the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the
Air Force. As the ``channel of communications,'' the CNGB is the most
current and knowledgeable source of information within the Federal
Government about the National Guard in its non Title 10 roles, and is
thus the best single source of advice for leaders about unique Guard-
related matters, particularly those which are critical to homeland
defense.
unique role of the national guard
Two unique roles that stand out are the CNGB's expertise in the
National Guard's employment and deployment for domestic purposes, and
experience in the vitally important interagency collaboration needed
for domestic response in the homeland. Indeed, roughly 70 percent of
the Department of Defense's (DOD) response to Weapons of Mass
Destruction is comprised of National Guard forces. Threats faced by the
United States have significantly grown since the 1990s, especially in
the decade since September 11 when America herself became a
battleground. Domestic response in the homeland is a matter of national
security with international ramifications. In light of these changes,
the duties of the JCS were adjusted; in 2006, providing military advice
to the Homeland Security Council was added to the JCS statutory
responsibilities. The CNGB is uniquely positioned to both provide
situational awareness of State and Federal military forces operating in
unity of effort in the homeland and to ensure that resourcing decisions
fully consider the domestic mission. Adding CNGB as a full member of
the JCS would be the next logical step to improve the Joint Chiefs'
ability to provide the best possible military advice to civilian
leaders.
The CNGB's advice and opinion are also uniquely relevant because
DOD policy charges CNGB with responsibility to ``facilitate and
deconflict the use of National Guard forces among the States to ensure
that adequate and balance forces are available and responsive for
domestic and foreign military operations, consistent with national
security objectives and priorities.'' Whereas the Service Chiefs
provide definitive advice as to the capabilities of their Federal
Reserve component to perform foreign military operations and domestic
title 10 missions, only the CNGB can speak with authority on the
strategic balancing required to ensure that the National Guard forces
of 54 States and territories have the capability to perform their
Federal missions and their domestic title 32 and State missions.
national guard budget
Under U.S. Code, title 10, chapter 1011, which establishes the
National Guard Bureau, the Secretary of Defense-approved charter (DOD
Directive 5105.77) specifies CNGB's functions and responsibilities,
both as identified in the statute and others. Relative to National
Guard budgets and capabilities, the DOD Directive indicates the CNGB
shall:
(a) Plan, program, and administer the budget of the Army National
Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United
States. The CNGB is directly responsible for nearly $25 billion
annually, and is the appropriation sponsor for National Guard Military
Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Military Construction, and
Procurement (via National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation),
and thus responsible for producing a President's budget submission to
Congress for these appropriations.
(b) Supervise the acquisition and supply of Federal property
through the U.S. Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFO) appointed under
section 708 of title 32, U.S. Code. The USPFO's work directly for the
CNGB and provide the Federal oversight and accountability of Federal
funds and property issued to the States, Territories, and District of
Columbia, to ensure compliance with the Purpose and Anti-Deficiency
Acts as well as with diverse DOD directives and regulations.
Although the CNGB has clearly delineated budgetary authority, this
authority and responsibility are not necessary to perform JCS members'
statutory duties, which include providing military advice to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Counsel, and the Secretary of Defense. This advisory role is separate
and distinct from the role they fulfill in leading and administering
their respective Services, whose budgets are ultimately the
responsibility of the Service Secretaries. Duty as a Joint Chief is
additive to, and not a function of, Service responsibilities.
similar examples
Considering the example of the Navy and Marine Corps Chiefs both
being members of JCS contradict any contention as to a separate Service
being divisive, or a Service having authority without accountability.
The Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy and their budget
request to Congress is included inside the Navy request. Yet no one
would argue that the marines are hindered by this construct in being
able to articulate their requirements or deliver their unique
capabilities. The CNGB has a similar departmental-level role, and, as
outlined above, also possesses significant budget authorities and
responsibilities.
closing remarks
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General McKinley.
That letter will be made part of the record, as will a
statement of Senator Rockefeller, who has also asked that his
statement be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you
for holding this hearing on whether the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thanks to all
of the Chiefs of our Armed Forces--both Active Duty and Reserve--for
being here today. There is no question--as a matter of both principle
and of national security--that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
should be elevated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Guardians of
Freedom Act, which passed overwhelmingly in the House of
Representatives on May 25, would accomplish this goal. I hope that
today's hearing will lead to swift action on this important
legislation, and I look forward to the testimony of each of the
witnesses.
It is important to acknowledge that the role of the National Guard
has evolved over the last 10 years. Since September 11, National
Guardsmen have mobilized more than 700,000 times to support overseas
and domestic missions. They have played an essential role in the
conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq and are a critical Operational
Reserve for our Armed Forces. Today's National Guard accounts for more
than 460,000 servicemembers from every State in the Union--roughly 25
percent of all of our 1.9 million-member force.
The Guard has also become an essential part of our Nation's
response to both man-made and natural disasters. This August, when
Hurricane Irene slammed the East Coast, the National Guard responded by
calling up over 11,000 soldiers and airmen from 24 States to coordinate
the relief efforts. Our Guard is being trained to respond to chemical,
biological, nuclear and radiological attacks. It is being trained to
deal with pandemics. It is asked to be the first on the scene after
major earthquakes, snowstorms, and hurricanes. These Homeland defense
responsibilities will continue to increase, as well.
The National Guard also brings capabilities and efficiencies to the
table that we need in these tough economic times. For example, the Air
National Guard provides 35 percent of the total Air Force capability
for 7 percent of the cost. The Army National Guard provides 40 percent
of the Army's capability for just 11 percent of the Army budget.
Together, 464,900 members of the National Guard provide a capable,
operational and affordable military force--at just 6 percent of the
Pentagon's annual budget.
The absence of the National Guard from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
has very real consequences. Full membership of the National Guard in
the Joint Chiefs could have better prepared the marines' response to
the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, our Nation's initial response to the
September 11 attacks, or our response to Hurricane Katrina.
In October 2005, the Government Accountability Office called into
question the Army National Guard's ability to carry out its domestic
mission. Then, just like now, there is no permanent system in place to
replenish necessary equipment once it is removed from Guard units in
individual States. The Pentagon has required National Guard units to
leave behind critical equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan. A drastic
shortfall in equipment levels has led to a drop in mission readiness.
As a result, the Guard's ability to respond to domestic emergencies has
been severely inhibited. I find it hard to believe this would be the
case if the Guard had a seat at the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
With no seat at the table, the National Guard Chief must rely
solely on active duty military leaders to make funding decisions. Under
the circumstances, General McKinley can do nothing to stop the Joint
Chiefs if they put recommend cutting a key program or ignore an
opportunity to maintain critical operational capability.
In many ways, the Guard has earned the right to be in the room.
Today, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau wears four stars. He
attends regular Joint Chiefs meetings. While I understand that General
McKinley enjoys a good relationship with Chairman Dempsey,
personalities can't be everything. Now, it's time to give the National
Guard a seat at the table. We need to make sure the National Guard has
the voice it needs--not just to protect its capability, but because of
its increasingly active role in overseas operations, because of its
role in homeland security initiatives, and because of the cost
efficiencies it can offer in these turbulent economic times.
Ultimately, I understand that change is hard. Some may argue that
these changes are not necessary. Some may argue that the National Guard
does not deserve a seat at the table, that the National Guard is well-
represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or that the National Guard
has the resources it needs.
Critics may say that elevating the National Guard would provide a
``second voice'' to the Army and Air Force. That is wrong. The National
Guard's participation would be no different than that of the Marine
Corps, which is both part of the Navy and has its own seat on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Today, as we all know, the Commandant is a valued
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and no one would argue that his
advice over the last 30 years has not been valuable.
Some may counter that elevating the National Guard could muddy the
Guard's dual commitments to member States and the Federal Government.
In reality, it would not alter lines of authority, but better enable
the Guard to provide unfiltered advice on its capabilities and
resources. The Guard wouldn't just have its domestic responsibilities--
it would have the capabilities, clout, and access to do them better.
Critics may also say that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
has no budgetary authority, but that argument is misleading. The role
of the Joint Chiefs is to provide sound, useful advice to the
President. In fact, the perspective of the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau could save our country billions of dollars. Earlier this year,
for example, the Air National Guard Bureau offered a proposal that
would have saved up to $42 billion. Unfortunately, the Air Force
dismissed it almost immediately--likely, I've been told, for turf
reasons. That would not have happened had the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau been able to make his case, offer his perspective, and
share his expertise with our planners at the Pentagon. The National
Guard can help the Pentagon cut costs without cutting capabilities--but
only if it is an equal partner in the decision-making process.
Some may argue that a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would give
the National Guard too much influence at the Active-Duty components'
expense. But we know better than that. Look at the size of the
Services' congressional liaison staff, the military fellows in our
offices and the attaches in the halls--or even the number of Senators,
including many on this Committee, who are former Active-Duty
servicemembers. An enhanced role for the National Guard would not
diminish the Active-Duty Services' clout among lawmakers.
Now is the time to give the National Guard the voice it needs on
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to give the President a broader
perspective of the capabilities and resources at his disposal. Now is
the time to use all of the tools in our arsenal to create a more secure
Homeland.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee--thank you
for holding this hearing. I look forward to swift passage of the
Guardians of Freedom Act. Thank you to my good friend, Senator Leahy,
for his leadership on this important issue.
We have given the National Guard the right to be in the room. Now,
let's give them a seat at the table.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Let us have a 6-minute first round for
questioning here so we can perhaps all get a round in--there
are a lot of us here--before the votes, and then if we need a
second round, we can take that.
Mr. Johnson, let me ask you first about a statement in your
prepared statement where you say that the proposed legislation
would alter some of the Goldwater-Nichols careful balances by
altering the fact that each Service is statutorily represented
by one Service Chief in the Joint Chiefs and providing only two
of DOD's six statutory Reserve components with additional Joint
Chiefs' representation.
Now, you also said that elevating the CNGB to represent
National Guard equities to the JCS, in your words, could create
legal confusion as to whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs of
Staff continue to represent their total force. Now, can you
tell us what potential legal confusion could result that you
are referring to?
Mr. Johnson. 10 U.S.C. 10502 spells out the role of the
National Guard Bureau and the CNGB. The CNGB, in his advisory
capacity, has principally two functions. One is to advise the
Secretary of Defense through the Chairman on matters involving
non-federalized Guard. The second component of that is to be
the adviser to the Service leadership of the Army and the Air
Force on matters concerning the Federal Guard.
The way this statute breaks it out, 10 U.S.C. 10502, when
we are talking about the Guard in Federal status, the law
contemplates that the CNGB will represent those interests to
the Service leadership and to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army
and the Air Force. But when we are talking about the State
Guard and the State Guard role, the CNGB advises the Secretary
of Defense.
This legislation that you have before you will not change
any of that. So, if the CNGB is now also a member of the Joint
Chiefs, he is, on the one hand, an adviser to General Schwartz
and General Odierno on matters concerning the Federal Guard,
but he also now has an independent seat on the Joint Chiefs as
an adviser to the President and the Secretary and the National
Security Council on the very same matters. So it creates an
issue of dual representation.
Second, as I think the Chairman alluded to, when the CNGB
is advising with respect to the non-federalized National Guard,
he is representing the interest of the State National Guard,
who are commanded by the Governor of each of those States. So
it creates a dynamic--which I am not saying is necessarily
wrong or right--but it creates a dynamic where the interest of
the State Guard, the Governors, has a seat at the Joint Chiefs
advising the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense.
Chairman Levin. This perhaps is a related question to you,
General McKinley. Under title 10, the CNGB is the principal
adviser, among others, to the Chief of Staff of the Army and
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on matters relating to the
National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States,
and the Air National Guard of the United States.
My question is this. Is there not an inconsistency with an
adviser participating as an equal with the principals whom he
is advising, as you would be as a member of the JCS, along with
the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force?
General McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the best way to answer that is to look at the
Empowerment Act and the NDAA of 2008, which established the DOD
directive that Secretary Gates signed in 2008 directing the
conduct of my job. If I could read from the organization and
management piece which you refer to, it says that the CNGB is
under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
Defense. The Secretary normally exercises his authority and
direction and control through the Secretaries of the Army and
the Air Force for matters pertaining to their responsibility in
law.
The second section I would like to just refer to is that as
the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the
Chairman of the JCS, it allows me and directs me to advise on
matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces.
So I think the answer to your question is, in my opinion,
my personal opinion, it doesn't raise inconsistencies wearing
that hat and that this DOD directive following the NDAA Act of
2008 gave me the authorities to do just what I addressed in my
opening statement.
Chairman Levin. General Dempsey, in your opening statement
you made reference to the fact that the Services have never
been closer to their Reserve components, and separating them by
title risks creating unnecessary friction in the ranks. Can you
tell us why it is and what you meant when you said that
separating the Reserve components from the Services create
unnecessary friction in the ranks?
General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
The issue for me is let us call it one of branding. Does a
soldier see himself as a soldier? Does a guardsman see himself
as a soldier first or a guardsman first?
It seems to me that where we are today as a force, we are
where we are because we have all seen ourselves as branded by a
single Service Chief and his subordinate leaders into soldier,
sailor, airman, marine, and, for that matter, coast guardsman,
as the Vice mentioned.
I am just not sure that establishing, Craig's cautions
notwithstanding, I think that the way this will resonate
through the force--forget about the leadership you see before
you--but the way this could resonate through the force is that
we have kind of separated ourselves, and our brand is no longer
as clear and defined as we would like it and need it to be.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I recall, General McKinley, back when we were working on
the 2009 NDAA, the issue at that time was the three-star versus
four-star. I was trying to remember and talking to my staff
just a minute ago about what the arguments were.
I do recall the perception argument, that those in the
field--and I heard that firsthand. But I also recall that--I
got the impression that if we made that change, and that was in
the 2009 NDAA, that that would resolve a lot of these problems.
I didn't hear that we would want to come along with another
change in the relationship.
Do you remember that, or would you like to comment as to
what benefits came with changing that from a three- to four-
star?
General McKinley. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I obviously took this position in November of 2008. I was a
beneficiary of the legislation that passed before I became the
CNGB. Much has improved and much has been given to me in terms
of my access to the Chairman and to participate in major
meetings affecting the Services, the National Guard, the Army
and the Air Guard.
I do remember the discussion of the grade, and I do work
very closely with the other Reserve component chiefs--Jack
Stultz in the Army Reserve, Dirk Debbink in the Navy Reserve,
Steve Hummer in the Marine Corps Reserve, and Charlie Stenner
in the Air Force Reserve. It is important not to get
imbalanced.
I would just suggest that the 468,000 members of the
National Guard who reside in the States and the territories
look to me as their representative and their channel of
communications to DOD. But the willingness of the men sitting
before you to allow me to communicate and to conduct discourse
with them and to interact with them has significantly improved
since I became the Chief of the Bureau in 2008.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
General Odierno, tomorrow I am going back to your old
place, Fort Sill, where you started, I think, in the middle
1970s and have had several tours there. I will be participating
in their veterans celebration tomorrow morning. I know that
they will be discussing this at that time.
The question I would have of you because, after asking you,
I want to ask General Schwartz the same thing. Have you seen,
in terms of the Army, you have the Guard coming in, fighting
side by side with you guys, with any difference in equipment or
capability or resources between the Guard and the Active Duty
Army?
General Odierno. Senator, I would tell you that we have
made great strides over the last 7 to 10 years in improving the
capability, more importantly, the equipping of the National
Guard. In our assessment, by October 2012, the National Guard
will have achieved about 92 percent of their total equipping
necessary, and in the Active component, we will be at 92.5
percent.
I think that sends a strong message about how we have been
able to equip. I think I would just comment that understanding
the total Army is incredibly important as we walk our way
through this. We have to have all these different components.
You have to have an Active component that is ready and
prepared to respond immediately at a certain readiness level.
We need our National Guard prepared and capable of responding,
and they have to be able to work together at all times.
We have been able to work that over the last several years,
and I think we have gotten the right solution, as our Army has
been taxed with many, many deployments. I worry that we will
lose the one, single voice that has driven us here if we move
forward.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I just wanted to ask the question. On
the equipment, the quality of the resources used, are they the
same?
General Odierno. They are.
Senator Inhofe. They are.
General Schwartz, I would ask you the same thing, because I
am active in aviation, I can remember back some time ago when
we were going to the Block II and the F-16. You had the two
engines, the 220 and the 229, I believe the 229 having greater
thrust.
When deployments were necessary, as I recall, it was my
State of Oklahoma and the State of Ohio where they were not
able to get for their deployment the 229 engines, which
provided greater thrust. As a result of that, and I am going
from memory now, I believe they deployed together as a unit and
took only the 229s from Ohio and from Oklahoma, which was a
disparity in how they are treated in terms of equipment.
I would say, number one, is my memory correct? Number two,
has that been corrected?
General Schwartz. Senator Inhofe, generally speaking, the
equipage of the Active Duty, the Guard, and the Reserve is
common. There are some anomalies with regard to aircraft
configuration based on their maturity, and so on and so forth.
We have not corrected or normalized every single
configuration in every one of our aircraft, but I think the
point is, is that the Air Guard in the U.S. Air Force has
always been an Operational Reserve. It has always shared the
same readiness with their Active Duty and Air Force Reserve
counterparts. That is still the case, and that certainly is our
conviction going forward.
Senator Inhofe. But there was a disparity at that time in
that particular aircraft.
General Schwartz. Sir, there was a difference in the
engines. There is a difference in the configuration of
airplanes as they are produced. Certainly, it is the intent of
the Air Force to equip the National Guard so that they remain
an Operational Reserve.
Senator Inhofe. Are we in better shape on that issue now
than we were back then?
General Schwartz. Absolutely.
Senator Inhofe. I think that is right. Do you agree with
that, General McKinley?
General McKinley. Sir, we have worked closely with General
Wyatt, as the director of the Air Guard, in trying to achieve
the proper balance in equipage of our National Guard. I can
attest over my 38 years in the Air Force that the Air Guard
today has the oldest legacy fleet in its history.
I am concerned, as I am sure the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force is, over future modernization plans that we can have the
balanced force that has made the Air Force and the Air National
Guard so close throughout its history. I am concerned about the
future capitalization of the Air National Guard.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
My time is up. But I would like for the record, in writing
for a later time, if you would respond to the--three of the
witnesses talked about the confusion--the word ``confusion.'' I
would like to have you respond for the record on that
particular issue.
[The information referred to follows:]
In earlier testimony, the word ``confusion'' was used to describe a
potential ``confusion as to whether the Army and the Air Force Chiefs
of Staff [would] continue to represent their total force.''
Placing the Chief of the National Guard Bureau of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff would not confuse whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs of
Staff represent their total force. It would not alter title 10 command
authorities over federalized National Guard forces. There would be no
change to the title 10 authorities of the Service Secretaries or
Service Chiefs; conversely, they would take on no new title 32
responsibilities. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is not, nor
would he be, within the title 10 chain of command for title 10 National
Guard forces. When federalized, National Guard forces are, and will
remain, under the command of Federal commanders. Total Force
integration would not be compromised; if anything, it would be enhanced
by greater situational awareness of title 32 National Guard missions,
capabilities, and leadership on which the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau is uniquely qualified to advise. Total Force integration would
also benefit from enhanced understanding of the Homeland Defense and
Civil Support missions that are performed by non-federalized National
Guard forces.
General McKinley. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you for being here.
I guess I would say that on this interesting and important
question, I am a member of the Jim Inhofe open-minded caucus
because I am undecided. So this discussion has really been very
helpful.
I wanted to get on the record just some basic facts. I will
start with you, General McKinley. What is the number of
personnel in the Army and Air Guard?
General McKinley. We have approximately 468,000 combined,
between Army and Air.
Senator Lieberman. Right. I don't know that you would know
it. I would ask General Dempsey, how about in the other Reserve
components? What is the number there?
General Dempsey. The only one I have committed to memory is
the Army Reserve, and that is about 208,000.
General Schwartz. Sir, for the Air Force, 71,000 on the Air
Force Reserve, 106,000 and change on the Air National Guard.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Admiral, how about the Navy
Reserve?
Admiral Winnefeld. Sixty-five thousand, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Right. General Amos?
General Amos. Sir, 39,600 Marine Reserves.
Senator Lieberman. Pretty definitive answer right there.
Thank you.
Okay. Clearly, there is a larger number in the Army Guard
and Air, but there is not inconsequential numbers in the other
Reserve components as well. Obviously, some of us think about
the Coast Guard Reserve, which is another part of the Reserve
component.
Let me ask this question, and I think I am probably focused
on it here because of the other hat I wear on the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. I wanted to begin
this discussion with you, General McKinley.
I take it that we start with the understanding that the
other Reserve components don't have non-Federal
responsibilities. Correct?
General McKinley. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. This is an interesting issue, as I am
sure you all know, because there is, of course, from our home
States, we are getting tremendous support for putting the
National Guard Bureau commander in chief on the JCS. There is a
lot of support here in Congress, but obviously, there is a lot
of opposition in the military.
One of the unique functions here, and I want to ask you to
talk a little more about it than you did in your opening
statement, is these what I would call ``homeland defense
missions'' that are part of the Guard's responsibility--
disaster response, border security, et cetera.
In some of the discussions I have had with folks at home
about this I think involve a concern that those homeland
defense missions, which are obviously critical to our national
security, are not receiving sufficient attention from the Joint
Chiefs now, and that if you were on the Joint Chiefs, they
would receive more attention. So I wanted you to respond to
that or say anything you want about that unique function. Then
ask General Dempsey if you would speak from the perspective of
the JCS.
General McKinley?
General McKinley. I think that I am not critical of the
other Service components, Army or Air Force, in representing
homeland security. I just think it is the unique capability of
the CNGB, with its relationship to the 54 adjutants general who
work for the Governors, that intricate and delicate
relationship, that allows me to provide the best, and that I
should be a focal point.
Our intergovernment relationships with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, those types of relationships that are built at the
community level are significant. I wouldn't expect but wouldn't
be surprised if the Chiefs of the Services know a lot about it.
I just think we are uniquely qualified with our role in title
32 in State Active Duty to operate in the statuses in the
several States that we represent.
Senator Lieberman. Would you say that that is one of the
major reasons why you support putting the CNGB on the Joint
Chiefs?
General McKinley. As I said in my opening statement,
Senator Lieberman, that is really where I am zeroing in on, is
to institutionalize the role of the National Guard Bureau Chief
in becoming that spokesperson through the JCS, through the
Chairman to the Secretary of Defense to give my best military
advice when asked so that we don't miss a beat in this very new
age of asymmetric--I got it right this time--asymmetric
challenges that face our Nation.
Senator Lieberman. General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Remember, the Joint Chiefs are statutorily responsible for
the federalized portion of our defense, and the JCS would
normally get its advice on Homeland security matters through
NORTHCOM. So you may want to ask Admiral Winnefeld.
Senator Lieberman. That is a good point.
General Dempsey. But--and the point there is that NORTHCOM
would then--the impact statement, if you will, that Craig is
talking about right now would come to us through the Service
Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs would compare the impact on the
Services with the demand that would be articulated by NORTHCOM,
and we would figure out what to do. This adds another voice
into that mix that, frankly, I don't believe we need.
Senator Lieberman. Admiral, I would invite you into this,
both on the direct point and also just to pose a second kind of
question for you.
It is true that as General Dempsey just said, that the JCS,
obviously, have focused I would say the overseas responsibility
to protect our national security. On the other hand, the very
reconstitution of NORTHCOM involves, post-September 11, an
assumption of some responsibility for Homeland defense in the
Pentagon that was a bit different than before.
Would you agree, and how does that reflect on this matter
that we are discussing this morning?
Admiral Winnefeld. Well, Senator, I think September 11
certainly was a wake-up call that was the genesis of NORTHCOM.
Of course, NORAD existed all along.
He does represent, as do the other combatant commands from
the other various regions of the world, represent his theater
in terms of what the title 10 needs are, whether it is
intelligence or action on the ground or readiness or what have
you. He does a good job of that, the current commander.
I can't speak for the last commander.
Senator Lieberman. We can. [Laughter.]
Admiral Winnefeld. In partnership with DHS, there is an
essential partnership there that does have the ability to
respond in the event of a disaster or a security issue, sir,
from your position as the chairman of that committee.
We also have a number of other robust relationships. I
would point out the wisdom of Congress in encouraging the
department to establish--to work with the Governors and the
Council of Governors. We get very good advice and guidance,
frankly, from the Council of Governors. I also would tell you
we get great advice from Craig on matters that have to do with
title 32 State Active Duty and the like and how the Guard, like
other Reserve components and other components of the military,
can contribute to a Homeland security issue.
So I think we have a pretty good situation where we are
getting the advice we need. We have a good commander in the
field for this who works closely with his civilian counterparts
at DHS.
As I pointed out in my remarks, I am not sure what is
broken that we need to fix. We have a good system going now.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Will we be able to submit questions for the record as a
follow-up?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Senator Brown. Because 6 minutes really isn't----
Chairman Levin. We will also have a second round for
questioning if we need it.
Senator Brown. Great.
Chairman Levin. As you suggest, questions for the record
will be welcomed.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
I am looking at a letter from General Amos and Admiral
Greenert. Paragraph three of the letter says that CNGB does not
represent a branch of Service nor is CNGB responsible for
organizing, manning, training, and equipping the National Guard
to the extent of the Service Chiefs.
I have to respectfully disagree. Pursuant to, obviously,
the DOD directive as to the responsibilities of what the Guard,
in fact, does, they are responsible for entire cradle-to-grave
planning program, budgeting, and execution of these budgets;
provides the President's budget submission for each of the
appropriations, which goes to Congress; validates those
requirements; provides the annual financial reports to
Congress. It is, in fact, the Service Chiefs that don't have
any of that budget responsibility.
Was there a misstatement in your letter there?
Admiral Greenert. Well, Senator, the point that I was
making in the letter, we, the Service Chiefs, testify to or are
held accountable to Congress for the execution of those budgets
as well. We have budget submitting offices--pardon me--in the
Navy who do similarly that you just listed there, that----
Senator Brown. Yes, but you said specifically they are not
responsible at all, and in fact, that is not correct. That
being said, I would like to just shift gears a little bit.
Mr. Johnson, you indicated that you felt that maybe it
would create confusion as to who represents the Army and Air
Force. I have reference letters and General Odierno's
``confusion'' and ``imbalance;'' obviously, General Schwartz,
``confusing lines of authority;'' and you, sir, Admiral
Greenert, ``complicated unity of command.''
I mean, is there really any question as to what the chain
of command is with the Joint Chiefs? Obviously, General
McKinley will go through General Odierno, and General Schwartz
to General Dempsey. There is no chain of command breach at all.
I think it is very clear.
In addition to that, I don't think there is any question
that the title 10 command authority wants to change. I don't
believe the Guard or General McKinley in his capacity as
seeking a seat wants to change that at all. He wants, and I
believe--I don't want to speak for him. But I guess I will just
ask you, sir. You don't want to change the title 10 command
authority at all, do you?
General McKinley. No, sir. As I said in my opening remarks,
that is working well for us.
Senator Brown. There is no confusion as to who, you have to
go through the chain of command, is there?
General McKinley. I have no confusion.
Senator Brown. With regard to the total force integration,
do you feel that that would be benefited by you having a seat
at the table?
General McKinley. It is improved greatly, as the Service
Chiefs have testified. It can only get better.
Senator Brown. Is there any question that you in your
capacity of having a seat at the table would be the person that
could best advise not only--in any capacity through any of the
Service Chiefs or the President or anybody on the domestic
mission and what the non-federalized units would be able to do,
especially in light of the homeland security issues that we are
facing?
Is there anyone else better qualified than you in your
capacity to do that?
General McKinley. These are all talented gentlemen in front
of you, sir. I think it is my role and responsibility to be
that person.
Senator Brown. I would agree with you. Just to follow up on
what Senator Inhofe said, General Schwartz. On the fighter
aircraft issue, is it a fair statement that due to the effort
to save money with the Air Force, the Guard units are going to
be eviscerated when it comes to aircraft. Especially I have
heard and others have commented that The Adjutant Generals
(TAG) can't gain access to the plans as to what wings will be
affected, how many aircraft are going to be lost.
Isn't that another reason to have somebody like General
McKinley at the table that can advise those TAGs and others as
to what the plan is for the Air Force in the Guard units?
General Schwartz. Senator Brown, that is not a role of the
Joint Chiefs. But beyond that--the reality is that if the Air
National Guard is going to be eviscerated, so will the Active
Duty and the Reserve. We are getting smaller together. That is
what is underway here.
I would emphasize the point that we are now the smallest
Air Force we have ever been. Because of that, those reductions
that occur because of diminishing resources, which we all face,
will be shared by all the components.
Senator Brown. Well, it is interesting. That is another
reason why we need to get back to the table and get the Select
Committee to work so sequestration doesn't come in and
dramatically affect that more.
What this reminds me of, in doing history and, obviously,
being in the military and just understanding the relationship
between the Marines and the Navy, this is very similar. The
Marines, you have General Amos here, who we all have tremendous
respect for. He is at the table, and yet he does all his
budgeting through the Navy and everything basically flows
through the Navy to him in some respect.
I am trying to----
General Amos. Sir, that is not correct. We do our budgeting
through the Department of the Navy. I am an equal Service
Chief, along with the Chief of Naval Operations. The Secretary
of the Navy controls the budget.
Senator Brown. Right. So how would that be different than
General McKinley wanting that same type of opportunity that you
have, actually, in working through the Guard? How would that be
any different?
General Amos. Well, I can't speak to the budgeting of the
Guard aspect, but we are a Service. We have been one for 236
years.
When the Marine Corps got its seat at the table in 1978, we
had been fighting our Nation's battles as a Service for over
200 years. That is different. The Guard is not a Service.
Senator Brown. My time is up. I have other questions. I
have to get to another meeting and come back. I am looking
forward to Senator Graham's as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKinley, your reputation for professionalism and
skill and dedication precede you. So thank you for your
service.
Having just 2 weeks ago visited the 43rd Military Police
Brigade in Afghanistan and the 143rd Airlift Wing in
Afghanistan, the service of the National Guard, Army and Air,
is not only commendable, but essential to the Nation's
security.
But as I look at title 10, U.S.C. 10502, the first step in
getting your job is getting recommended by a Governor. Is that
correct?
General McKinley. The process by which they select the
Chiefs does require the Governor's nomination. That is correct.
Senator Reed. So looking ahead, effectively, some Governor
is going to have to be either the nominator or vetoer of a
member of the JCS. Is that correct?
General McKinley. I think the initial submission of the
name goes to the Departments of the Army and the Air Force for
vetting, and they submit a name each to the Secretary of
Defense so that they can recommend to the President. That is my
understanding of the process, sir.
Senator Reed. But as the law goes, the Governor will
essentially recommend the National Guard Bureau Chief, who
will, if this statute passed, be by law a member of the JCS. So
some to-be-announced Governor will be selecting a member of the
JCS, in effect.
General McKinley. It is correct, sir, that we hold dual
statuses in the National Guard and that we must be confirmed as
a Federal officer and a member of the State. You are right.
Senator Reed. So would you be adverse to eliminating the
gubernatorial recommendation, since this statute would create a
position on the JCS, which I don't see a gubernatorial--
particularly since it is kind of a random process of which
Governor would be doing it. Would you object to those changes?
General McKinley. Senator, I think the Chairman can
establish the process to pick my successor. I will finish my 4-
year statutory term in 2012. So we are on the verge of doing
that. I have no objections to doing that.
Senator Reed. So you would not object to eliminating a
gubernatorial recommendation for the CNGB?
General McKinley. I personally would not. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Okay. Now, let me ask you, to what extent do
you have authority over the actual budgets of the non-Federal
units and the actual policies of the non-Federal units that you
would be advising the Joint Chiefs on?
General McKinley. As we work within the Service lines, with
our staffs here in Washington, through the Army National Guard
Readiness Center and the Air National Guard Readiness Center,
which work with the Army and the Air Force as we prepare the
budget, once those budgets are approved, we are given the funds
and push those out to the States.
Senator Reed. You are talking about Federal funds, which we
appropriate. I am talking about the non-Federal activities of
the Guard. Can you direct a TAG or a Governor to increase their
spending or to change the configuration of their forces?
General McKinley. No, sir. That is their responsibility.
Senator Reed. You are going to be advising the JCS on non-
Federal functions which you have no authority to affect on the
ground.
General McKinley. The constitutionality of my role would be
that the Governors and their TAGs decide what small percentage
of the budgets are given through the State. It is the large
preponderance of funds, 98-plus percent, which are Federal
funds given to the Guard.
Senator Reed. But they are Federal funds that we provide in
anticipation of units being federalized to perform Federal
missions that fall clearly--and I don't think you dispute
this--within the chain of command of the Service Chiefs and,
ultimately, General Dempsey and the Secretary of Defense.
General McKinley. The Federal missions certainly are as you
stated, but the State missions are under the command and
control of the Governor.
Senator Reed. Right. But as I understand this whole
procedure is to give you access to talk about those State
missions, which you effectively don't have any control of
because you can't force them to change their budgets. You can't
force them to take particular people and make them--you have no
say in who is running the show.
In fact, there is one State in which the TAG is elected by
popular vote, one State in which he is elected by the assembly.
Just raises serious questions, I think, about what you are
going to do on the Joint Chiefs that you cannot do effectively
and perhaps more effectively now.
But let me conclude just simply by saying once again, you
have done a superb job and your colleagues in the Guard and
Reserve. I must tell one story. I was out with General McBride,
the TAG in Rhode Island, and I was asking what units he was
commanding, the 43rd Military Police Brigade. When he mentioned
my old battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division, I knew this was
one Army and one Air Force.
We want to get this right, and I think there are some
serious questions here.
Thank you very much.
General McKinley. Thanks, Senator Reed.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to follow up, General Amos, on what Senator
Brown had asked you about. Isn't it true that in 1978 the
Chairman of the JCS opposed having the Commandant of the
Marines be a member of the JCS?
General Amos. Senator, I don't know whether he did or not.
I just know that it became law in 1978.
Senator Ayotte. Well, if I would represent to you,
certainly, Admiral Greenert, that your predecessors, Admiral
Holloway and Admiral Hayward, at the time opposed having the
Commandant of the Marines before the Chairman and JCS, I assume
you would disagree with that position now?
Admiral Greenert. I certainly would, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. I assume that having the Commandant is
incredibly valuable on the Chairman of the JCS and that it has
not resulted in any confusion on the role of the Navy with
respect to the Marine Corps and advising the Chairman?
Admiral Greenert. No, ma'am, it has not.
Senator Ayotte. Do you have any reason to believe that
General McKinley or his successors would not be able to draw
any distinctions clearly as to what the appropriate role he
would have if a member of the JCS?
Admiral Greenert. General McKinley may not. Most of my
concern, as stated, is really what is in the force. How do the
forces see it? Is there a clarity of, again, the unity of
command? Who is ultimately accountable for the budgeting, the
source of the budget to Congress, to the Secretary of Defense?
It is really a lot of what Chairman Dempsey stated before,
not what we can work out, because we work fine in the tank. It
is very clear how we can work together. It is what is the
perception out there and perhaps confusion.
Senator Ayotte. I certainly have great confidence in all of
you and the tremendous service that you have that whatever
decision Congress makes, that it will be very clear to our
service men and women as to the chain of command. I know that
all of you will work very well together, as you do now, on
behalf of our country, and we deeply appreciate it.
General Dempsey, I wanted to follow up on something that
Admiral Winnefeld had stated. Do you also support the potential
of making the next commander of NORTHCOM a Guard officer?
General Dempsey. I do. But I also would add that I would
rather that none of that be legislated because it is my job to
find the best athlete available. It is also my job to grow the
athletes who are competitive to do those jobs.
Senator Ayotte. But certainly it would be an appropriate
athlete to have a Guard officer as a candidate for that
position?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
General Dempsey, do you think it would be right not to
bring forward the NDAA for the first time in 50 years in the
history of our country this year?
General Dempsey. No, Senator. I think we should have a NDAA
as soon as possible.
Senator Ayotte. Is that very important to our military and
to what you need to accomplish?
General Dempsey. It is, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, sir.
General Schwartz, on a different topic, and I just feel the
need to ask about this. I am deeply troubled by the reports
about what has happened at the mortuary at the Dover Air Force
Base. I am sure you would agree with me, this is outrageous
that remains of our soldiers would be put in a landfill and not
treated with the appropriate dignity and honor which they
deserve.
Can you tell me where we are with this and how we are going
to ensure that this never happens again? Most importantly,
those who have participated in this outrage are going to be
held accountable?
General Schwartz. Senator Ayotte, first of all, let me
clarify the allegation about putting remains in a landfill.
These were portions prior to 2008 which were sent away from the
Dover mortuary to a funeral home for cremation, which is an
authorized method of dealing with remains, particularly those
that are separated from the larger portion of remains returned
to the family.
After that, the results of the cremation came back to the
mortuary, were sent to a medical support company for
incineration. So you had cremation, then incineration, and it
was at that point that this medical support organization placed
the residuals from that effort to a landfill.
In 2008, the Air Force came to the conclusion that that was
not the best way to deal with those remains, and so it is now
done in the traditional fashion of burial at sea. It has been
that way since 2008. It will continue to be that way in the
future.
Let me just conclude by saying the Secretary of the Air
Force, Mike Donley, and I take personal responsibility for
this. Our obligation is to treat our fallen with reverence and
dignity and respect and to provide the best possible support
and care for their families. That is our mission. The people
who did not fulfill our expectations were disciplined, and
there is no doubt what our expectations are today.
Senator Ayotte. General Schwartz, I appreciate your
updating on that. When I think about the fact that we have
Veterans Day tomorrow, this is so important that we obviously
treat the remains of our fallen with dignity and respect. I
know that you share that concern as well.
Please know that members of this committee will be there to
support you in any way, to make sure that the families know
that we certainly won't allow this to happen again.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to add my welcome to our very distinguished
panel of witnesses that we have today, on the eve of Veterans
Day. I thank you and the men and women you lead in serving our
country and defending our freedoms.
I have read that most of you are opposed to elevating the
Guard Bureau Chief to the JCS. I want you to know that while I
might disagree on this issue, I have the complete respect for
you and the opinions that all of you hold.
Let me take a moment to say that, understandably, change is
not always a welcome concept. In the evolution of the JCS,
there has been significant opposition to structural changes.
However, there is precedent in changing the composition of the
JCS to account for readiness, policy, and budgetary issues.
For example, in 1953, President Truman signed the law to
add the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the JCS to discuss
issues related to the Marines. It was controversial at that
time, but several years later, the Commandant was elevated to
full voting member status. Today, I think we would all agree
that making the Commandant a voting member was the correct
decision.
While the National Guard is not a separate Service, it does
have a complex set of needs based on the dual missions it must
be prepared to execute. Guard members are in every State and
for the last decade have been heavily involved in the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
No one better understands their requirements than the CNGB.
Future force structure adjustments will have a direct impact on
the task and missions the Guard will be asked to perform. I am
sure they will be asked to do more, and not less, in the
future.
Now making the CNGB a full-fledged member will update the
structure of the JCS to reflect the operational reality in wars
overseas, as well as in homeland defense and security missions.
It would also enhance the effectiveness of the total force.
No one knows exactly what the next conflict will entail,
but we can be confident that we will again call upon the
460,000 men and women of the National Guard to do their part. I
believe that elevating the CNGB to the JCS is something that is
overdue and will show our guardsmen and their families that
they are a true partner. It will also let them know that their
voices and views will be represented at the highest levels of
Government.
General Dempsey, you have stated that the CNGB will be
invited to attend JCS meetings as long as you are Chairman. I
think this is great for cooperation and transparency and
overall effectiveness of the group.
However, I am concerned that if a future Chairman is not as
inclusive as you are, the CNGB would be left out in a Pentagon
hallway while relevant discussions take place in the tank. Do
you think, General Dempsey, that an CNGB advice to the
Secretary of Defense would be different if he were a full-
fledged member versus an invited nonmember? If so, how
different is it?
General Dempsey. First, Senator, thanks for remembering
that it is the day before Veterans Day, and I was hopeful to
get a chance to mention that at the end, but thanks very much
for that.
I don't know whether his advice would change. I also want
to make it clear that I am not the first Chairman to include
the CNGB. My predecessor certainly did that as well.
It seems to me to be a reasonable assumption that we would
continue to do that no matter who the Chairman was, and I don't
know whether his advice would change. I don't know what
additional influences might be brought to bear. I just can't
answer that question hypothetically.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, General.
General McKinley, the Guard has carried a tremendous load
for this country to include their efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In the future, I am certain the National Guard
will again be called to serve abroad while continuing its
required domestic missions.
Can you say something about how things would improve for
both the Guard and the total force should the CNGB be given a
seat at the table?
General McKinley. I can assure you, Senator Akaka--and
congratulations to you also for being the recipient of the
Harry S. Truman Award recently. I can assure you that we have
made significant progress over the last 8 years in terms of the
transparency and integration.
I will not dispute the fact that this Chairman and the
former Chairman have opened their doors willingly. I am
concerned that that continue, and I believe it needs to be
institutionalized to ensure that that service continues.
I also believe, like what is going on in your home State
right now, in Hawaii, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) summit is going on. Your National Guard is being heavily
used in security and administrative duties. I need to be able
to service that issue unfettered to the top, and I think the
seat will give me the advantage, as my fellow Service Chiefs,
the Service Chiefs who sit before you have, to go in an
unfettered fashion and give those types of homeland security
issues to the Chairman and, if requested, by the Secretary of
Defense. Those are very important things.
We have about seven more NSSEs in the upcoming 8 months
that I feel the CNGB should be fully integrated with, so that
we can dedicate the forces--as you have 5,000 members of the
National Guard in Hawaii--to the task. I think elevating and
institutionalizing the position will give me a better
opportunity to fulfill my responsibilities.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General McKinley.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
having the hearing.
This has been very informative. I appreciate all of you. I
respect you greatly, appreciate the comments you have made and
the advice you are giving. This is ultimately up to Congress
and the President to decide what to do.
General Amos, pound for pound, do you agree the Marine
Corps is the best fighting force in the world? [Laughter.]
General Amos. Yes, sir. We celebrate that today on our
birthday.
Senator Graham. Okay, good. I agree with you. Do you agree
with me the only thing older than the Marine Corps when it
comes to defending America is the citizen soldier?
General Amos. Sir, I believe that is true.
Senator Graham. Okay. So I am here to tell everybody, I
appreciate it, but the citizen soldier's time has come. You are
going to get a seat at the table, General McKinley, if I have
anything to say about it.
We are long into this fight as a Nation. The first shot was
fired by the citizen soldier. It is time for the citizen
soldier to be sitting at the table, not just for political
reasons, but for substantive reasons. So let us talk a little
bit about substance.
General Dempsey, do you agree that one of the great threats
America faces is not just attack from a foreign enemy, but from
nature and natural disasters?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. When it comes to front-line service
against natural disasters and the havoc it can reap on the
American people, do you agree the National Guard is the front-
line force?
General Dempsey. Generally law enforcement, then National
Guard, then Active----
Senator Graham. When it comes to uniformed personnel?
General Dempsey. Yes, I do.
Senator Graham. Okay. General McKinley, Hurricane Irene, is
that right? Is that the name of the last big hurricane?
General McKinley. That was our latest event, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Tell me, who talked to you about
Hurricane Irene?
General McKinley. I was consulted by the assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul Stockton, and
that was the extent of my discussions.
Senator Graham. Did anybody from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs call you and ask, ``Hey, what is going on?''
General McKinley. No, it was incumbent upon me to pass that
information up, but nobody made that call.
Senator Graham. Okay. So did anybody from the White House
call you?
General McKinley. No, sir.
Senator Graham. All right. So if you believe that the
Nation is threatened by natural disasters and the front-line
uniformed force is the National Guard, I would like to have you
sitting there--not by invitation, by the way. General Dempsey,
you are a very fine man, but if you got ticked off at him,
could you tell him to get out of the room?
General Dempsey. Yes, I could.
Senator Graham. Okay. Good. Well, at the end of the day, I
think you need to be in the room with some weight behind you,
not just an invitation.
Now let us talk about the structure of the State-Federal
responsibility. Who talks more to the adjutant generals of each
State, you or General McKinley, General Dempsey? Who has more
contact?
General Dempsey. I don't have any contact with the adjutant
generals.
Senator Graham. Okay. Well, if you believe that the
adjutant generals who have responsibilities over the National
Guard, if you don't have any contact with them, how much
contact do you have, General McKinley?
General McKinley. Daily.
Senator Graham. All right. If you can't tell them how to
spend their money, you can at least tell the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, if you are in the room, what is going on. Don't
you think it would be important institutionally, beyond the
life of you and General Dempsey, to have somebody in that room
advising the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs exactly what is going
on in the States?
General McKinley. I think in a post-9/11 world, it is
essential.
Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more.
Now let us talk about the history of the Joint Chiefs, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, when it comes to supporting
legislation that we now all agree is important. Do you agree
that the Marine Corps, being a voting member of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, hasn't give the Navy two votes? Do you agree
with that, General Amos?
General Amos. It has not given the Navy two votes.
Senator Graham. Well, that was the big concern. Senator
Webb was your biggest advocate. That was a real fight back in
1978, that if you put the Commandant on, all hell's going to
break loose. The Navy is going to run the world.
Well, that did work. I don't think the National Guard being
in the room is going to change the world as we know it--only
for the better.
Now, Mr. Johnson, headlines are made at every hearing. Is
the headline from this hearing, ``Obama administration opposes
putting the National Guard Bureau Chief on the Joint Chiefs?''
Mr. Johnson. Senator, you have heard the best military
advice from----
Senator Graham. Well, I am going tell you what Vice
President Biden said in 2008 when he spoke to the National
Guard conference in Baltimore. ``It is time for change. Change
begins with giving the Guard a seat at the table, that table in
the Pentagon where the Joint Chiefs sit.''
President Obama's campaign document, ``Blueprint for
Change,'' page 55, if you want to read it. I haven't read it,
and I will be the first one to admit to it. But this part I do
like.
``Obama will restore the readiness of the National Guard
and Reserves. He will permit them adequate time to train and
rest between deployments, provide the National Guard with
equipment they need for foreign and domestic emergencies. He
will also give the Guard a seat at the table by making the
Chief of the National Guard a member of the JCS.''
Has he changed his mind?
Mr. Johnson. Not to my knowledge----
Senator Graham. Well, don't you think when he said that, he
thought long and hard about this, and he came to conclude, as a
prospective commander in chief, this would be a good idea? You
are not here to tell us he is wrong, are you?
Mr. Johnson. The President and the Vice President are above
my pay grade.
Senator Graham. Well, I think they are wrong a lot, but I
think they are right on this.
Now let us talk about Goldwater-Nichols. How many of you
believe it works? Who believes it doesn't work? Speak up.
Nobody. All right. Let me give you a little history.
There is an article that I read called ``The Campaign for
Goldwater-Nichols'' by John T. Correll. I will read a brief
excerpt.
``The bill was being prepared and had been written in final
draft, and Senators Nunn and Goldwater go to have a meeting
with the Joint Chiefs. Admiral Crowe was the new chairman. He
supported it. But during that meeting, everyone else opposed
and said in no uncertain language. The hot-tempered Goldwater
took their criticism as attack on his efforts to make
improvements and roared, 'If you think you can bully Sam and
me, you are mistaken.'
``The next day, he got eight letters from the Pentagon
talking about how bad of an idea this would be. Senator
Goldwater said, `I will not be deflected or sidetracked in this
effort, even if I get a letter a day from everyone in the
Pentagon.' ''
The only reason I mention that is that the institution
resisted Goldwater-Nichols, the institution resisted having the
Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. I think we should consider the time has come, given
post-September 11 duties of the National Guard, to have a seat
at the table. It doesn't change command authority, doesn't turn
the world upside down.
But if any group ever deserved recognition now, it is the
members of the National Guard. Their voice needs to be heard,
not through invitation, but by us saying, ``You have a seat.''
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You can all relax. I am not going to try to top Senator
Graham. But as a former Governor--and I know there are two
other former Governors seated here--we have had that special,
unique relationship with the Guard. Now we have a relationship
with the entire military, the total force.
I suppose having called out the Guard on occasions, that it
gives me a special feeling of a relationship with the Guard,
going back to my adjutant general, the late Stanley Heng, who
was an outstanding military officer and an outstanding TAG. In
addition, since I have been in the U.S. Senate, I have had a
relationship with former TAG Gene Lempke and the current
Adjutant General, General Lyons.
The relationship is clearly a unique one from the
standpoint that has been described by everyone so far of having
a Federal and a State component to the relationship. It isn't
like any other branch of the Service or any branch of the
Service in particular. It is unique to the Guard.
It would be unique if it applied to one of the other
branches, not just the Air Guard or the Army Guard, but if
there was another Guard, it would be the same situation.
General McKinley, you said in your letter, ``The CNGB is
uniquely positioned to both provide situational awareness of
State and Federal military forces operating in unity of effort
in the Homeland and ensure that resourcing decisions fully
consider the domestic mission.''
I think you are right about that, and I think, as we have
looked back, we have seen at times that the Guard has not been
adequately resourced. I am not going to suggest that that will
go on indefinitely in the future because we are seeing the
change to an Operational Reserve that will have to be
adequately resourced.
But I can tell you that as Governor, I would feel much
better that that resourcing would occur if I knew that the head
of the Guard was seated at the table. It doesn't take anything
away from any of you, distinguished as you are and committed to
the total force and to the total security of our country, both
at the Homeland and nationally, internationally, as well.
I understand that change is difficult. It is not easy to
come by. Whether or not something occurred 20 years ago or not
probably doesn't necessarily mean that we can't look at it
today in light of the changes that the Guard has gone through
as we have seen it throughout these last 10 to 12 years.
General Schwartz, I do have a question--because I know that
part of the requirement for adding CNGB is at least a
recognition that his advice would be more critical than ever
heading into a period of budget austerity. I know as you are
looking toward your future requirements for the Air Force, how
are you going to work with General McKinley to have a total
force approach in terms of your resources and your readiness?
General Schwartz. Senator Nelson, I think it is important
to say at the outset that the Joint Chiefs is not a resource
forum. It is a strategic forum for, again, employment of the
Armed Forces and for providing best military advice in that
context. There are other resource fora in the department where
the CNGB clearly has a seat at the table.
But with regard to the Air Force specifically, Craig
McKinley's Deputy, Lieutenant General Bud Wyatt from the great
State of Oklahoma, is our principal staff officer regarding
National Guard matters. He and his people have complete access
to all of our internal activities with regard to the
headquarters, whether it is resourcing, whether it is making
decisions on equipment, and so on and so forth.
Additionally, we have offered--and the adjutants general
will take us up on this--to have a presence on what we call our
Air Force council, which is the senior-most resourcing activity
within our headquarters. The bottom line is that the Air
National Guard has a consistent seat at the table for internal
deliberations.
We certainly interact with Craig, as I think he will
verify, on all matters, including management of senior
officers. This is a partnership between us. But I would go back
to first principles in that the Joint Chiefs is not a
resourcing fora.
Senator Nelson. No, I understand. But the recommendations
that you make are based on what you think the resources that
you would require and are necessary for carrying out your
mission. So whether it is establishing the resources or making
the recommendations, you still have to discuss what resources
are necessary, in your opinion, for you to be able to carry out
your message--or your mission. General McKinley obviously has a
role there.
I would assume that would be true, General Odierno, with
the Army Guard as well?
General Odierno. Senator, as we develop the Army budget
every year, there is complete transparency. The Guard plays a
critical role in developing our budget. So that happens today,
and this change does not impact that at all. That will happen
today and will always happen, no matter whether he becomes a
member of the JCS or not.
Senator Nelson. I commend you all on your ability to sit at
a table and disagree, but not be disagreeable, and appreciate
very much your input. Obviously, it is a challenge to try to
decide how to best take care of our national defense. You do it
every day, and we appreciate and thank you for your service,
particularly as we, on this eve of Veterans Day, go home and
speak to our veterans at home.
Thank you all.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for holding this hearing. I think it has been
very healthy for this discussion.
General Dempsey, has any former Chairman of the JCS
supported this legislation?
General Dempsey. Not to my knowledge, Senator, no.
Senator Webb. Mr. Johnson, has any current or former
Secretary of Defense supported this legislation?
Mr. Johnson. I have no knowledge of that, Senator.
Senator Webb. Do you have any knowledge of anyone
supporting it?
Mr. Johnson. I don't have knowledge of the contrary either.
Correct.
Senator Webb. All right. I would like to start by saying I
think that anyone who is saying that citizen soldiers are not
at the table right now is being unnecessarily divisive and, I
think, unfair to the stewardship and leadership of the Army and
the Air Force. Citizen soldiers are at the table.
They have been respected throughout the entire history of
this country. When we talk about the operational changes since
September 11, and we all have great appreciation for that, but
at the same time we need to recognize that throughout history
the National Guard has frequently answered the call.
If you looked at the number of the forces that came from
the National Guard in World War I, World War II--100,000
National Guardsmen went to Korea--this has always been the
case. I think particularly since the total force concept was
announced--and I had the privilege of being the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs at a time that we were
really working these matters out--the National Guard has really
been able to have an input in a very measurable way.
I believe this legislation is unnecessary. I would like to
respond to some of the comments that have been made about the
Marine Corps and my role, which I am very proud of, by the way,
in terms of articulating the legitimacy of the Marine Corps
role in Joint Chiefs.
I wrote an article in 1972--hard to believe this. This
article has been circulated by the proponents of this
legislation. I wrote it for the Marine Corps Gazette. I was a
25-year-old captain of the Marine Corps. I am flattered, by the
way, that somebody remembered this article from 39 years ago.
But at the same time, the most important aspect of that
article was that the Marine Corps is a separate Service. To
state the obvious, take a look at General Amos and Admiral
Greenert. They are wearing different uniforms.
The Army National Guard has a history of being trained and
equipped as a part of the U.S. Army. The Air National Guard has
a history of being trained and equipped as a part of the U.S.
Air Force. That is conceptually an entirely different matter.
I don't believe that the JCS have been failing to represent
the interests of the Army Guard in the Army or the Air Guard in
the Air Force. General Dempsey, would you say there has been
any indication of that?
General Dempsey. Absolutely no indication. Not only is
there no indication, it just isn't accurate. They are
represented by the two Service Chiefs.
Senator Webb. Would you also agree that the Guard is as
well represented as the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
Senator Webb. Would there be any justification for adding
the Reserve Chiefs as members of the JCS?
General Dempsey. I would recommend against it for the same
reason I recommend against adding the Guard.
Senator Webb. With respect to non-Title 10 obligations, I
have an observation from having spent 3 years being Secretary
Weinberger's principal adviser on Guard and Reserve matters.
There are a number of other jurisdictions in which non-Title 10
obligations of the National Guard are considered, and some of
them, to be quite frank, are jealously guarded by the political
processes of the Governors. I certainly don't think they are in
any way disregarded.
To make a further point on this, we do have an Assistant
Secretary of Defense who is responsible for Homeland security
matters and is a direct adviser to the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Chairman, I would just have to say that I am opposed to
this legislation. I believe it is unnecessary. I don't see a
value, and I do understand the complications.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have more respect than I can ever describe for the guy
that is sitting to my immediate left here for a myriad of
reasons, including his incredible service to our country as a
member of our armed services and as a Marine. I also
appreciated the incredibly effective cross-examination that
Lindsay Graham did. You can tell he has spent some time in the
courtroom.
I do think that this is a difficult question, and the only
thing I want to point out with Mr. Johnson is I have looked at
your testimony very carefully, Mr. Johnson, and it appears to
me that you have not said whether or not you support or oppose
this legislation but have rather asked to make sure that it is
not legally ambiguous. Is that a correct characterization of
your testimony?
Mr. Johnson. Yes. I am not here to state a policy position
one way or the other. I was asked to attend to point out the
legal implications and potential ambiguities of this becoming
law. I think that, as you have noted, I have laid that out in
my prepared remarks.
Senator McCaskill. I just wanted to put that on the record
because I was a little surprised that we were going to campaign
materials as part of this hearing. It seems like we have enough
politics around this building. It doesn't seem like we have to
bring it into this hearing also.
I want to specifically for a minute, General Schwartz, go
to the situation at Dover. I don't want to dwell on how hard
this has to be for you and the leadership at the Air Force. No
one needs to convince me that you want to get this right at
Dover.
I will tell you what I do want to bring to your attention,
and I have done so with a letter today, and that is the finding
of the Office of Special Counsel. So people understand what the
Office of Special Counsel is, it is an investigatory and
prosecution-oriented agency whose primary responsibility under
our law is to be independent of all of the agencies and protect
whistleblowers.
What I am concerned about is their investigation into what
the Air Force did in response to the whistleblowers.
Specifically, the fact that the IG of the Air Force, failed to
admit wrongdoing in their report. While I understand people
have been moved around as a result of the problems that have
occurred because of the mishandling of the sacred remains of
the fallen, I am not sure that they have been held as
accountable, for example, as what we saw happen at Arlington
Cemetery in connection with that heart-breaking incompetence.
What I want to make sure is that there is an independent
investigation as to whether or not the IG shaded it a little
bit because everyone was feeling protective of the institution,
for all the right reasons. The vast majority of people who
serve at Dover and who do this work I am sure do it with a
heavy heart, but with a passion for getting it right.
But when we have a circumstance like this arise, I want to
make sure that the inspector generals are not so busy looking
after the institution that they fail to point out wrongdoing,
which was not ever acknowledged, and that there is
accountability for the people involved. So, I want you to
address the special counsel's report as it relates to the Air
Force investigation.
General Schwartz. Senator McCaskill, there clearly were
unacceptable mistakes made. Whether they constitute wrongdoing
is another matter entirely.
When you look at a situation like this, you look at the
facts of the case, as an attorney might say. You look at the
context in which the event or the mistakes occurred, and you
also consider the demands that are placed on individuals and
organizations.
With respect to accountability, we also had an obligation
to ensure that the statutory requirements for due process were
followed. We did that precisely.
I can only speak for the case of the uniformed officer, but
the uniformed officer received a letter of reprimand. We
established an unfavorable information file. We removed him
from the command list and his anticipated job as a group
commander at Shaw Air Force Base was redlined. This is not a
trivial sanction.
Senator McCaskill. I understand that is not a trivial
sanction. I am worried that there was a conclusion that there
was not an obligation to notify the families in these
instances. Obviously, this deals with more than uniformed
personnel, and obviously, the Secretary of the Air Force is
also copied on the letter that I sent today calling for this
independent investigation.
What happened at Arlington, nobody was intentionally
mismarking graves. They were mistakes, too. I just want to make
sure that we have really clear eyes while we have full hearts
about the right, aggressive need for investigations by
inspector generals in circumstances like this.
Thank you very much, and thank all of you for being here
today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me, first of all, thank each and every one of you. It
is very impressive to have the leaders of the Services of the
greatest defense of a country one could ever hope to live in,
and I appreciate it. The respect you all have for each other is
evident, and I appreciate that also.
I must say that my experience as a Governor, which I think
is the greatest honor that I could ever have bestowed upon me
as a citizen of the great State of West Virginia is to be
Governor of my great State, and also with that having a close
relationship with my Guard. That close relationship, you get a
title as Governor, which is commander in chief, which is a
little bit much, if you will. But I can assure you that
watching the performance of my Guard and the guardsmen that I
have met all over this country is unparalleled to anything I
have been witness to.
I had the chance also to travel with other Governors, and
we would go, and you all would be so kind to take us over to
visit in Afghanistan and Iraq. We would go in and be able to
say thank you to our troops for the Services they gave. To a
``T'' I will say this. Every one of the commanders of every
base that we attended and visited, they would make a point to
come up to me and say, ``I want to tell you of the expertise,
the professionalism, the commitment that your guardsmen have
and what an asset they are to our command.''
With that, I would say that I didn't see the difference. I
really didn't. I never really thought about why it hadn't been
looked upon equally at the Pentagon or the Joint Chiefs.
I have thought about this quite a bit since then. I know
change is hard. Being in the positions, I have had to make a
lot of decisions, and I know it comes very, very hard. The
thing I would ask, and whoever would want to answer this--and
General Dempsey, you might want to start with yourself. Do any
of you believe--and I think you can tell there has been some
wonderful questions here and some wonderful testimonies.
Senator Graham does such an expert job of holding his emotions
back and his feelings.
But with that being said, do any of you believe that this
legislation--and I believe it will be passed--that you would
have a hard time cycling and being able to do the job that you
are charged with doing at the level that needs to be done for
the defense of our country?
General Dempsey. I will start, Senator. Thanks for the
opportunity.
Also, you are the second Senator to sort of imply that we
are averse to change. We are, I promise you, one of the most
change-oriented organizations you are going to see appear
before you at any time. That change will be clear to you, as
you see the effect of some of the budget decisions that are
being made.
So we are not averse to change, nor are we resistant. In
fact, this body charges us to give you our personal best
military advice. That is what you are getting today. You are
getting it because we have a system in place right now that
actually works remarkably well. We have one Army. We have one
Air Force.
I don't know what impact this will have. Therefore, you are
sensing some reluctance on our part to embrace something. It
could be that nothing changes. That would be the best possible
outcome. But then one might say, well, if nothing is going to
change, why are we changing?
I would say the decision before you is one of context, the
context of adding Craig McKinley to the Joint Chiefs, which, in
some ways, would be a powerful symbol to our citizen soldiers.
I got that.
But the other context is the, for me, more compelling
argument about turning to Ray Odierno and saying, ``I want
soldiers from you,'' and I don't care if they are Active,
Guard, or Reserve.
So I don't know the answer to your question, Senator. But I
am concerned about it.
Senator Manchin. Well, let me just say this. I have the
utmost confidence in all of you. I know that you wouldn't be in
the position you were if the orders that were evaluated and
then accepted and then fulfilled. I don't anticipate anything
different from that.
The thing that I observe is that truly the Guard is the
only visible part of our Defense Department right now that the
citizens of this great country can connect to. If it wasn't for
the Guard, we wouldn't even know there was a conflict.
But it is the moms and the pops and uncles and aunts and
brothers and sisters that get redeployed, and that we are all
there, sending them off. Our towns come out, and our States
come out. They come home, and we welcome them home. We will cry
with them. We mourn with them when we have a loss of one of our
loved ones.
So they are the fabric of our whole defense system. I think
that is why some of us are so passionate about this piece of
legislation to have an equal footing.
I will finally say this, that there is not--I think you
have to be as frustrated as maybe myself and other people
around this country as they look at the functions of Congress
right now. We can't come to agreement on anything. This is one
thing I think we are agreeing on. Please don't deny us this
moment. [Laughter.]
Please don't deny us the chance to come together as
Democrats and Republicans for the sake of this great country
and put America first. That is what we are asking.
So, with that, we might respectfully disagree, but we sure
do respect--and hopefully that we respect you at the highest
levels. I want to thank you, and we hope you would consider
this legislation.
I want to encourage the chairman to make sure that our
leader, majority leader, knows how important it is for the
NDAA--I am sure this will be an amendment to that legislation--
but for this bill to move forward. I know you have been working
diligently, sir, and I support you 100 percent. We have to get
this bill, and I support the Guard being a full standing
member.
Thank you so much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
This has been a very important hearing. We obviously have
very divided views on this committee. I hope we get the bill to
the floor. I hope we get it to the floor before we get to
Thanksgiving.
In any event, we have commitments that our bill will be
coming to the floor. I am sure there will be an amendment, and
I am sure there will be a very vigorous debate on an amendment
on this particular issue.
I think the fact that you have all appeared here today with
such dignity, such character, and such directness, which we
welcome--and it is important that we hear the views
unvarnished. We got them from all of you.
We got the legal opinion, which is what we sought, which
was a legal opinion from you, Mr. Johnson. We did not seek
policy from you, nor do you give policy when you are asked as a
lawyer to appear before the committee.
We are very grateful to you for your service. We thank our
vets on the eve of Veterans Day, and we will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
hurricane irene
1. Senator Levin. Admiral Winnefeld, during the hearing there was a
reference to preparations for Hurricane Irene, including the actions of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Can you describe the role of the JCS,
including The Joint Staff, related to preparations for Hurricane Irene,
and provide a description of the role and actions of U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM)--the combatant command responsible for Homeland
defense and defense support to civil authorities--to prepare for
natural disasters such as Hurricane Irene?
Admiral Winnefeld. As a former Commander of NORTHCOM, I have a
great appreciation for the synergy and coordination between the
Department of Defense (DOD), including the National Guard, and other
Federal agencies in response to a natural disaster. Hurricane Irene was
no exception and indeed showcased a key initiative with--and extensive
coordination with--the National Guard and the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau (CNGB). The DOD as a whole was proactive in establishing
communications early and offering its collective support to the overall
response effort. To facilitate enhanced coordination at the senior
echelon, the Joint Staff stood up a Crisis Management Team responsible
for synchronizing efforts of the JCS, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), NORTHCOM and the NGB on requests for assistance from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the primary coordinating
agency for Federal disaster response.
During Hurricane Irene, the Commander, NORTHCOM exercised his
authority under the Secretary of Defense-approved Defense Support of
Civilian Authority execution order by providing resources requested by
Federal FEMA. DOD also appointed four National Guard officers as dual-
status commanders in support of relief efforts for Hurricane Irene,
marking the first time the dual status commander concept has been
implemented in support of a natural disaster. The dual-status commander
concept, developed to foster effective and efficient cooperation among
Federal and State assets during a domestic incident like Hurricane
Irene, allows the appointed commander to direct both Federal Active-
Duty Forces and State National Guard Forces.
Extensive formal and informal DOD coordination also occurred
throughout the response effort. For example, the NGB Director of
Operations (J-3) had daily two-star level communications with the Joint
Staff, J-34, who serves as the Joint Staff lead for homeland issues.
OSD, Joint Staff, and NGB also participated in daily NORTHCOM
coordination meetings (three daily) during the response. Lastly, all
DOD agencies participated in daily FEMA senior leader update meetings.
NORTHCOM continuously prepares for and exercises its civil support
mission through policy and product refinement, engagement, conferences,
tabletop exercises, interagency rehearsal of concept drills, and large-
scale exercises.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
joint chiefs of staff duties
2. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Johnson, General Dempsey, Admiral
Winnefeld, General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General
Schwartz, could you explain what the official duties of the JCS are, as
reflected in the statutes that prescribe those duties?
Mr. Johnson. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the
duties of the JCS. Section 151 provides that the Chairman of the JCS is
the principal military advisor, and that the other members of the JCS
are military advisors, to the President, the National Security Council,
the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In
addition, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of
the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as he
considers appropriate.
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. The Chairman of the JCS is
the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
The members of the JCS are also military advisers to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President
and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS is responsible
for advising and assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense
with: providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces;
strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command
preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint
doctrine, training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may
be required to consult with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he
considers appropriate, in carrying out the Chairman's functions, duties
and responsibilities.
A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the
Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an
opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice
or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of such
member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.
The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their
capacity as military advisers, provide advice to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary requests such advice.
Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a
member of the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to
DOD as they consider appropriate.
General Odierno. Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(b), the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal military advisor to
the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(c),
the members of the JCS are also military advisors to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense.
Under 10 U.S.C. section 153, subject to the authority, direction,
and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS is
responsible for advising and assisting the President and the Secretary
of Defense with: providing for the strategic direction of the Armed
Forces; strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command
preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint
doctrine, training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may
be required to consult with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he
considers appropriate, in carrying out the Chairman's functions, duties
and responsibilities.
Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(d), a member of the JCS (other than the
Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in
disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice
presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If
a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman must present the
advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own
advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.
Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(e), the members of the JCS,
individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisors,
provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular
matter when the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.
Additionally, under 10 U.S.C. section 151(f), after first informing
the Secretary of Defense, a member of the JCS may make such
recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as they consider.
Admiral Greenert. The Chairman of the JCS is the principal military
adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS
are also military advisers to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President
and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS is responsible
for advising and assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense
with: providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces;
strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command
preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint
doctrine, training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may
be required to consult with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he
considers appropriate, in carrying out the Chairman's functions, duties
and responsibilities.
A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the
Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an
opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice
or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of such
member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.
The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their
capacity as military advisers, provide advice to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary requests such advice.
Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a
member of the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to
DOD as they consider appropriate.
General Amos. Under 10 U.S.C. section 155, the Joint Staff assists
the CJCS, and subject to the Chairman's control, other members of the
JCS in carrying out their responsibilities. The Joint Staff is
independently organized and operated to support the CJCS in providing
for the unified strategic direction of combatant forces, unified
command of combatant forces, and to their integration into an efficient
team of land, naval, and air forces.
General Schwartz. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the JCS
in accomplishing his responsibilities for: the unified strategic
direction of the combatant forces; their operation under unified
command; and for their integration into an efficient team of land,
naval, and air forces.
3. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Johnson, General Dempsey, Admiral
Winnefeld, General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General
Schwartz, what is it that the law really requires the JCS to do?
Mr. Johnson. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the
duties of the JCS. Section 151 provides that the Chairman of the JCS is
the principal military advisor, and that the other members of the JCS
are military advisors, to the President, the National Security Council,
the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In
addition, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of
the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as he
considers appropriate.
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. The CJCS is the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of
the JCS are also military advisers to the President, the National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President
and the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS is responsible for advising and
assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense with: providing
for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; strategic planning;
contingency planning; combatant command preparedness; requirements,
military programs and budgets; and joint doctrine, training and
education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult
with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate,
in carrying out the Chairman's functions, duties and responsibilities.
A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the
Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an
opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice
or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of such
member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.
The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their
capacity as military advisers, provide advice to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary requests such advice.
Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a
member of the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to
DOD as they consider appropriate.
General Odierno. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS are also
military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President
and the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS is responsible for advising and
assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense with: providing
for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; strategic planning;
contingency planning; combatant command preparedness; requirements,
military programs and budgets; and joint doctrine, training and
education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult
with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate,
in carrying out the Chairman's functions, duties and responsibilities.
A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the
Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an
opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice
or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of such
member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.
The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their
capacity as military advisors, provide advice to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary requests such advice.
Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a
member of the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to
DOD as they consider appropriate.
Admiral Greenert. The Chairman of the JCS is the principal military
adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS
are also military advisers to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President
and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS is responsible
for advising and assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense
with: providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces;
strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command
preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint
doctrine, training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may
be required to consult with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he
considers appropriate, in carrying out the Chairman's functions, duties
and responsibilities.
A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the
Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an
opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice
or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of such
member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.
The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their
capacity as military advisers, provide advice to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary requests such advice.
Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a
member of the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to
DOD as they consider appropriate.
General Amos. The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS are also
military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President
and the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS is responsible for advising and
assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense with: providing
for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; strategic planning;
contingency planning; combatant command preparedness; requirements,
military programs, and budgets; and joint doctrine, training, and
education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult
with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate,
in carrying out the Chairman's functions, duties, and responsibilities.
A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the
Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an
opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice
or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of such
member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.
The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their
capacity as military advisers, provide advice to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the
Secretary requests such advice.
Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a
member of the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to
DOD as they consider appropriate.
General Schwartz. The JCS are military advisers to the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense as specified in title 10, U.S.C., subsections 151
(d) and (e).
Subsection 151(d) provides that a member of the JCS (other than the
Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in
disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice
presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If
a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the
advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own
advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.
Subsection 151(e) provides that the members of the JCS,
individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers,
shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council,
the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a
particular matter when the President, the National Security Council,
the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.
4. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Johnson, General Dempsey, Admiral
Winnefeld, General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General
Schwartz, in light of the statutory requirements of the JCS, can you
provide your views on how adding the CNGB to the JCS would be either
consistent or inconsistent, help or not help, the JCS's ability to
carry out their statutory responsibilities?
Mr. Johnson. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 struck many carefully crafted balances of
both intra- and inter-service equities. The CNGB represents only the
Army and Air National Guards, and the proposed legislation would thus
alter some of Goldwater-Nichols's careful balances by, for example: (a)
altering the fact that each Service is statutorily represented by one
Service Chief in the Joint Chiefs; and (b) providing only two of DOD's
six statutory Reserve components with additional Joint Chiefs
representation.
In addition, elevating the CNGB to represent National Guard
equities to the Joint Chiefs could create legal confusion as to whether
the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff continue to represent their
total force. Current law already requires the CNGB to advise the Army
and Air Force Chiefs of Staff on all National Guard matters.
Finally, any legislation should not add ambiguities with respect to
authorities in the place where we can tolerate such ambiguity the
least: at the top of the Service hierarchies, especially in time of
war.
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. If I believed that not
having the CNGB sitting as a member of the JCS would expose the United
States to otherwise avoidable risk, no matter how small, I would not
hesitate to offer my full and unreserved endorsement for his full
membership. This should be the litmus test: Would the CNGB add
something that currently is missing from the JCS' present organization?
As I've previously stated before the Committee, the CNGB already
participates in all JCS meetings and I look to him as a trusted
advisor. But my statutory responsibility to the President and Secretary
of Defense is to act as the Nation's principal military advisor, and I
personally do not believe that the CNGB's formal membership on the JCS
would materially improve the quality or timeliness of my advice. I am
ably supported by the Service Chiefs and the Vice Chairman, and can
already count on the expert and frank advice of the CNGB, to aid my
deliberations and understanding of the National Guard's key non-
Federalized roles.
To the extent that the JCS is charged with providing advice on the
Federal military capability of the United States, I believe including
the CNGB on the JCS with a mandate to advise on the National Guard in
its non-Federal capacity is inconsistent with the purpose of the JCS.
Similarly, were the CNGB to offer his advice on the National Guard's
Federal role, this would conflict with his statutory obligation to
provide such advice through the Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the
Army and Air Force. At the very least, I see the potential for a very
confusing and inefficient arrangement being established.
General Odierno. Adding the CNGB to the JCS would complicate title
10 relationships for the Army, confuse the lines of authority and
responsibility over the Army National Guard, and potentially interfere
with the Secretary of the Army's (SecArmy) ability to support the Joint
Force.
Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(e), the members of the JCS,
individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisors,
provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular
matter when the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice. Under 10
U.S.C. section 151(e), the CSA is the principal advisor to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense on matters pertaining to the Army.
Addition of the CNGB as a standing member of the JCS, creates the
potential to skew JCS decision making and advice in favor of (or
against) the employment of Guard units, adversely affecting the ability
of the Army to execute its mission.
Under 10 U.S.C. section 10502, the CNGB is responsible for the
organization and operations of the National Guard Bureau; is a
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, on
matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces and on other
matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense; and is the principal
advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army
(CSA), and to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army
National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the
United States.
Addition of the CNGB as a standing member of the JCS, may place the
CNGB in direct conflict with his duties under 10 U.S.C. section 10502
to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretaries of the Army and
Air Force and their Chiefs of Staff. The ``Total Army'' concept is well
grounded in statute. The ARNGUS and Army National Guard are, by
definition, part of the Army while ``in service of the United States.''
The SecArmy has responsibility for organizing and preparing the Army
for combatant command missions and the CSA is his agent in this respect
and is the Army's representative on the JCS. There should only be one
voice representing the Army's interests on the JCS. Elevating the CNGB
to the JCS creates the possibility of friction and differing opinions
with respect to the organization, training, and deployment of National
Guard forces. To the extent that the CNGB's advice differs from the
CSA's, it may interfere with the SecArmy's authority to administer the
Army in the manner he deems best to achieve its mission pursuant to his
statutory mandate.
Admiral Greenert. Making the CNGB a member of the JCS adds
unnecessary complexity to the principle of ``unity of command'', and
could confuse the intended clear and unambiguous source of best
military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President. In my
opinion, the Service Chiefs (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps)
should continue to be held singularly accountable to the executive and
legislative branches of Government for the readiness and combat
effectiveness of all personnel in their respective Services, and for
the welfare of all their respective servicemembers and families. I
believe the Service Chiefs are best positioned to report to the
President and Congress on their Services' readiness and preparation for
military missions that support our national interests.
General Amos. I cannot overstate the dedication and bravery of our
National Guard and Reserve Forces in the current fight. Because of
their contributions and sacrifices, there is an understandable desire
to extend an appropriate level of recognition to our Reserve Forces.
However, I do not think that changing the national command structure is
a necessary measure.
Although the National Guard is undoubtedly instrumental in waging
today's conflicts, I believe the CNGB lacks the requisite insight into
all levels of strategic planning by virtue of his limited role in DOD,
and more specifically, Army affairs. The JCS provides direct military
advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In order for the JCS to
carry out this duty, its members must be able to address the strategic
direction of the Armed Forces. They must be capable of preparing
strategic plans (to include plans that conform with resource levels);
preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic
plans; performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the
Armed Forces; preparing contingency plans conforming to the guidance of
the President and the Secretary of Defense; advising the Secretary of
Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities
(including manpower, logistic, and mobility support); establishing and
maintaining a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each
such command to carry out missions; and providing advice concerning the
extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of DOD
conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the
priorities established for the requirements of the unified and
specified combatant commands. Additionally, JCS members provide advice
concerning the doctrine, training, and education of the Armed Forces.
The JCS' responsibilities therefore require a leadership structure that
is wholly dedicated to the national defense, and thoroughly
knowledgeable of the processes that resource and develop our defense
strategies and the programs and resources necessary to develop and
maintain responsive capabilities. The staffs of each Service Chief gain
this detailed understanding through multi-layered integration with the
Joint Staff and key DOD staffs. The integration of the staffs is a key
enabler of success. The preparation of strategic and other plans
outlined above, therefore, requires much more than the ability to cast
a vote. It requires participation at every level and an undivided
focus. With its dual mission, supporting role, and State focus, the
CNGB is not structured for full participation in the roles set for the
Chiefs in title 10. Accordingly, I do not believe the CNGB has the
currency or capability to assume the necessary level of engagement
requisite for JCS membership.
Additionally, including the CNGB into the JCS would create
unnecessary duplication within JCS because the federalized National
Guard, as the Army's Reserve component, serves in a supporting role.
This duplication could result in an unfairly amplified representation
of Army and Air Force concerns. It will also create a representational
imbalance with regard to Reserve affairs in favor of the federalized
National Guard. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff are best suited
to equitably advise on the most effective employment of their
supporting elements.
Moreover, providing full membership to the National Guard Bureau--
an organization not primarily responsible for the planning and
execution of national strategy--would not only be unprecedented; it
would be an extraordinary solution to an unclear problem. When Congress
established DOD, it codified a policy calling for the elimination of
unnecessary duplication in DOD. This policy exists in title 10 today,
in an effort to seek more effective, efficient, and economical
administration not only in DOD but in the national command structure.
The role of the National Guard, when executing a Federal mission, is to
integrate with and execute missions in support of the Army and Air
Force Chiefs of Staff. In preparation for these missions, and in
recognition of its supporting role, the Guard trains with these
Services and at their schools.
For title 32, non-federalized National Guard matters, the CNGB
serves as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the
CJCS. In this title 32 capacity, no unnecessary duplication exists
because the CNGB is uniquely situated to channel communications between
the several States and the Secretary of Defense. Where Congress
federalizes the National Guard, however, the CNGB serves as the
principle adviser to the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of
Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Force Chief of
Staff. Due to the importance of this supporting role, the CNGB
appropriately maintains an advisory voice within the JCS. Not only is
this structure intuitive, it reflects the intent behind current policy
to use the federalized National Guard and Air National Guard as the
Army's and Air Force's Reserve component.
General Schwartz. Adding the CNGB to the JCS would be inconsistent
with the statutory requirements of the JCS and would not help the JCS's
ability to carry out their statutory responsibilities. The JCS exists,
in large part, to provide military advice on employment of Federal
forces. Under existing law, for matters concerning National Guard
forces operating in a non-Federal capacity, the Chief of the Guard
Bureau provides the Secretary of Defense with input through the
Chairman of the JCS. Because the Chief of the Guard Bureau does not
represent a single or separate branch of Service, making the Chief of
the Guard Bureau a statutory member of the (JCS) would reach beyond the
appropriate authorities of the Chief of the Guard Bureau and disrupt
the lines of authority and representation that are already in place for
the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army and Air Force. Also, Total Force
employment considerations are best served by those who organize, train,
and equip personnel of all components of each Service, and are
responsible as force providers to the combatant commands. Consequently,
Chief of the Guard Bureau membership on the JCS presents issues
concerning his or her appropriate role in offering advice on employment
of the Armed Forces in a designated title 10 role. Beyond the
established relationships among the military Services, interactions
with interagency and international partners could also be confused.
guard and reserve
5. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, please
elaborate on how including the Chief of the Guard Bureau on the JCS
would affect the role, status, and relative influence of the other
Reserve components, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
Reserve.
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. The disproportionate
influence of any Service component, real or imagined, has the potential
for causing some significant negative second and third order effects. I
am concerned with the perception of inequity among the Reserve
component that could stem from the CNGB membership on the JCS, and how
this might then degrade the balance and unity of effort so deliberately
and painstakingly built into our very effective Total Joint Force. For
any of the Federal Reserves to become (or feel) disenfranchised by what
they view as the fundamental elevation of the National Guard--in terms
of importance and influence--would erode this balance. This would be
occurring at a critical juncture in our history, when fiscal realities
are compelling DOD to seek even greater efficiencies from the Total
Force and increased reliance on the Reserve component.
With respect to the role and status of the Federal Reserves, I do
not believe these would be affected by membership of the CNGB as they
are largely the object of law and policy. Whereas the actual or
perceived influence of a component might impact organizational
efficiencies, component roles and status are relatively fixed. The
Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries bear sole responsibility for the
resource decisions necessary to produce an organized, trained and
equipped force, and this includes their Federal Reserves and the
National Guard. Each Service determines the resourcing, readiness, and
projected roles for its Reserve component--this fact would not be
affected by CNGB's JCS membership.
General Odierno. It is absolutely vital in today's uncertain and
complex strategic environment that we maintain One Army. The Secretary
of the Army is responsible for generating Total Army readiness under a
fully integrated set of title 10 processes. There is no benefit to
dividing up Army components.
The JCS serve a vital role to the national leadership, as well as
exercising collective judgment regarding future capabilities and
requirements. Separating the Army interests may lead to improper
representation since the CNGB represents only two of the seven Reserve
components.
Admiral Greenert. Making the CNGB a member of the JCS may add
ambiguity to the status of the Army and Air National Guard as Reserve
components of the Army and Air Force. The creation of this additional
member of the JCS can create the appearance that the National Guard is
a separate service and potentially create inequity between the National
Guard and the Navy Reserve component.
General Amos. As noted in the JCS letters to this committee (see
letters following this answer), elevating the role of the CNGB would
further segment one community of reservists--a community that is
already challenged with executing its dual mission. When the National
Guard is federalized, the command relationship between the CNGB and the
Army Chief of Staff mirrors the Navy and Marine Corps' unified command
relationship for their Reserve components. The Marine Forces Reserve,
for example, as the Reserve component for the Marine Corps, is
organized, trained, and equipped under the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. This Service identification and matriculation enhances unity of
command and the cohesion of combat units. In my interactions with
Marine reservists, I have noted their pride and motivation in simply
continuing their service to the Nation as marines. I applaud the lack
of cultural distinction between Active Duty and Reserve marines, and I
am confident that this same motivation also drives reservists in other
Services to step forward. The proposed elevation of the CNGB risks
fracturing the successful dynamic that our forces have achieved by
diluting the understanding of the supporting and supported command
relationships, and unbalancing the appropriate preparation of our
Active and Reserve Forces.
Including the CNGB into the JCS would create unnecessary
duplication within the JCS contrary to current policy because the
federalized National Guard, as the Army's Reserve component, serves in
a supporting role. This duplication could result in an unfairly
amplified representation of Army and Air Force concerns. It will also
create a representational imbalance with regard to Reserve affairs in
favor of the federalized National Guard. The Army and Air Force Chiefs
of Staff are best suited to equitably advise on the most effective
employment of their supporting elements.
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General Schwartz. Consistent with the unity of effort embodied in
our Total Force approach, military advice in all matters concerning the
U.S. Air Force should come from the Chief of Staff. It is not a matter
of whether the Chief of the Guard Bureau is the most knowledgeable
source of information regarding the National Guard Bureau, it is
whether the Chief of the Guard Bureau is in a position to balance and
speak for all the components of the Air Force, of which the National
Guard Bureau is only one part. In addition, resource decisions that
implicate the National Guard also implicate all other components of the
Services and cannot be addressed in a vacuum. They must take into
account the simultaneous requirements of all combatant commanders (not
just NORTHCOM). Indeed, only a holistic service voice within the JCS
can provide the JCS the integrated representation of the Air Force that
is needed to capture Total Force capabilities.
6. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, much has
changed over the past decade with respect to the role the Guard and
Reserve have played in DOD's daily activities and deployments. We will
probably never go back to the pre-September 11 days of the Strategic
Reserve. How does this influence the way you view this issue?
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. While I devote considerable
energy on Reserve component aspects of our Joint Total Force, I don't
see how the increased employment of the Reserve component fundamentally
is germane to the issue of adding the CNGB to the JCS. It does not
matter whether the Reserve component is assigned a minimal role and
cast as a ``Strategic Reserve'' or is assigned to execute key missions
and is postured as an ``operational force''--Reserve component
utilization ultimately is a Service function.
The organization of our Armed Forces is defined in law. The Army
consists of the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United
States, and the Army Reserve, the whole of which is overseen by the
Chief of Staff of the Army. Likewise, the Air Force is comprised of the
Regular Air Force, the Air National Guard of the United States, and the
Air Force Reserve (AFR), the whole of which is managed by the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force. While all the Reserve component chiefs, to
include the CNGB, possess significant Service-directed responsibilities
related to maintaining their components' readiness, they nevertheless
remain but parts of the larger whole. The Service Chiefs bear ultimate
responsibility for preparing their Total Force. Rising OPTEMPO and
increasing interdependence among all components has not altered this
fact.
General Odierno. The Army's intent is to develop and sustain an
enduring operational Reserve component. Reserve component forces, both
Guard and Reserve, are crucial elements of the Army's overall
deployable strength and warfighting team. They provide essential
operational capabilities and serve specific functions to the Total
Army. The Reserve component provides necessary capacity to address
global operational requirements, maximize readiness, and provide
rotational availability while preserving Homeland Defense and Homeland
Security capabilities. The Total Army cannot function as it has over
the past decade without tightly integrated Active and Reserve Forces.
Both Active and Reserve components will contribute to Army force
requirements. The Reserve component will contribute mission trained
steady state, Homeland Defense and surge forces. As an Operational
Reserve, Reserve component forces maintain readiness levels that enable
them to serve as part of an enduring commitment to the Total Army
operations.
Admiral Greenert. I agree that much has changed with respect to the
role the Guard and Reserve plays in the DOD's daily activities and
deployments. After more than a decade of conflict, the Navy Reserve is
more fully integrated with our Active component than ever before and is
no longer strictly a Strategic Reserve, but an integrated part of
Navy's Total Force. The past 10 years have proven that the Navy Reserve
can operate anywhere along the spectrum of military operations. As long
as the Navy has assured access to their Reserve component sailors,
naval commanders can confidently assign missions to members of the Navy
Reserve where it makes operational and fiscal sense. This subordination
of the Reserve component to the Service Chief enables the CNO to be
held singularly accountable to the executive and legislative branches
of government for the combined readiness and combat effectiveness of
their service for military missions that support our national
interests. Adding the CNGB to the JCS could erode this unity of command
for the Army and Air Force.
General Amos. I believe these facts enhance my position. As noted
in the recent JCS letter to this committee (see response to question
#5), CNGB membership in the JCS would complicate unity of command for
both the Army and the Air Force and contribute to Service
balkanization. The current organizational structure ensures that the
Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force are held
singularly accountable to the executive and legislative branches of
Government for the readiness and combat effectiveness of their
respective Services, including their Reserves. This is as it should be,
and is the intent behind current policy. Unity of purpose and of
command is crucial in both the preparation and employment phases of the
Armed Forces. As it relates to making decisions for the defense of the
Nation and the preparations necessary for the achievement of its
national objectives, success requires single-mindedness.
CNGB membership on the JCS also could create an unhealthy ambiguity
in the responsibility for leading the men and women of the National
Guard. As a Service Chief, I fully subscribe to the notion that I am
singularly accountable for the welfare of all marines and their
families, Active and Reserve. As Commandant of the Marine Corps, I have
the same responsibility to Marine Forces Reserve as I do to regular
Active-Duty Forces. The missions for which all marines are trained and
equipped are unified with the command structure that leads them.
Bifurcating leadership, however, might lead to critical leadership gaps
recognizable only after some future failure occurs. Most concerning,
these gaps could affect the responsibility of caring for these troops
and their families. For the sake of our reservists and their families,
we cannot afford such a risk.
General Schwartz. Senator Chambliss, your comments resonate with
the experience we have gained over the past decade. Much has changed
with respect to the role of the Guard and Reserve in our National
defense and I would say for the betterment of the Department and the
Nation. The Air Force has learned that the operations we have conducted
would not have been possible without the superlative teamwork of the
Total Force. I have walked the flightlines at Balad Air Base in Iraq,
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, Dover AFB, and Hickam, and I have met
outstanding Airmen from across the Nation. I cannot tell the difference
between a guardsman, a reservist, or an Active Duty airman. All are
doing exceptional work for this country.
Our challenge now is to develop and maintain the operational
training and capacity we need with a smaller force and fewer dollars
while maintaining the edge as the world's greatest air force. The Air
Force will stay focused on strategic priorities and continue to build a
Total Force that improves key capabilities and supports strategic
priorities while reducing other capabilities we can no longer offer to
the joint team. Even though it is likely that substantial reductions
will be required to meet budget projections--including force structure
and infrastructure--we will continue to rely on the capabilities of the
Total Force Enterprise to meet our mission.
7. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, does the
larger role the Guard and Reserve are playing now make a difference
when you are considering this issue of whether to add the Chief of the
Guard Bureau to the JCS?
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that the overall
role of the National Guard and Reserve--regardless of how big that role
is--really is a separate issue from that of the CNGB's membership on
the JCS. The Services are responsible to organize, equip and train
their Reserve components, and the Reserve components' ability to
accomplish their assigned missions largely is a function of this
Service preparation. We unquestionably have depended on our Citizen
soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines to help defend the United States
as well as our allies and national interests to a greater degree than
prior to September 11. This dependence is unlikely to fundamentally
change in the future. The security threats we face at home and abroad,
as well as the expectations levied on our military to respond to these
threats, have increased significantly over the past two decades, and
largely have driven our increased utilization of the Reserve component
for overseas and domestic requirements. But this increased utilization
was accommodated within the Service Chiefs' existing authorities. JCS
membership clearly was not necessary for the CNGB to exercise his
statutory duties related to leveraging the National Guard in support of
DOD's operational objectives, and I do not believe it will be necessary
in the future.
General Odierno. The Guard and Reserve are part of the Total Army;
Active and Reserve component. The number of deployments and the size of
their role are not central to this issue. The Guard and Reserve have
assumed an expanded role over the past decade because the Nation needed
increased resources from the Total Army. As we go forward, their active
involvement in contingencies will continue and is a vital component of
land power within the Joint Force. The efforts of all three components
of the Total Army need to be integrated. This integration requires one
civilian and one military leader supported by the Department of the
Army staff. Any dilution of command unity runs counter to professional
military principals and is not in the best interest of our Army and the
Nation.
Admiral Greenert. In my statement to the committee and my testimony
on this issue, I have thought about and considered the larger role the
National Guard and Reserve component assumed over the past 10 years and
will continue to hold in the future. However, I still believe the
Service Chiefs (Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) should continue
to be held singularly accountable to the executive and legislative
branches of Government for the readiness and combat effectiveness of
all personnel in their respective Services, and for the welfare of
their respective servicemembers and families. The Service Chiefs are
best positioned to report to the President and Congress on their
Services' readiness and preparation for military missions that support
our national interests.
General Amos. As noted in the recent JCS letter to this committee
(see response to question #5), CNGB membership in the JCS would
complicate unity of command for both the Army and the Air Force and
contribute to Service balkanization. The current organizational
structure ensures that the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army and the
U.S. Air Force are held singularly accountable to the executive and
legislative branches of Government for the readiness and combat
effectiveness of their respective Services, including their Reserves.
This is as it should be, and is the intent of current policy. Unity of
purpose and of command is crucial in both the preparation and
employment phases of the Armed Forces. As it relates to making
decisions for the defense of the Nation and the preparations necessary
for the achievement of its national objectives, success requires
single-mindedness.
CNGB membership on the JCS could also create an unhealthy ambiguity
in the responsibility for leading the men and women of the National
Guard. As a Service Chief, I fully subscribe to the notion that I am
singularly accountable for the welfare of all marines and their
families, Active and Reserve. As Commandant of the Marine Corps, I have
the same responsibility to Marine Forces Reserve as I do to regular
Active-Duty Forces. The missions for which all marines are trained and
equipped are unified with the command structure that leads them.
Bifurcating leadership, however, might lead to critical leadership gaps
recognizable only after some future failure occurs. Most concerning,
these gaps could affect the responsibility of caring for these troops
and their families. For the sake of our reservists and their families,
we cannot afford such a risk.
General Schwartz. No. Because the CNGB does not represent a single
or separate branch of Service, making CNGB a statutory member of the
JCS would reach beyond the appropriate authorities of the CNGB and
disrupt the lines of authority and representation that are already in
place for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Also, Total Force
employment considerations are best served by those who organize, train,
and equip personnel of all components of each Service, and are
responsible as force providers to the combatant commands. Consequently,
CNGB membership on the JCS presents issues concerning his or her
appropriate role in offering advice on employment of the Armed Forces
in a designated title 10 role. Beyond the established relationships
among the Military Services, interactions with Interagency and
international partners could also be confused.
8. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, can you
explain what role the Guard and Reserve play in the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) process?
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. The Total Force includes
significant capability provided by the National Guard. Because the
Guard and Reserve use the same equipment as the Active component, their
requirements are an integral part of Service processes. Accordingly,
the National Guard Bureau does not have a voting member on the JROC.
Title 10 equities are advocated by the individual Service Chiefs.
Additionally, as part of the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process, the National Guard Bureau is given
the opportunity to coordinate on every requirements proposal that comes
before the Joint Staff.
The Reserves are represented individually by each of their
corresponding Services.
General Odierno. The Total Force includes significant capability
provided by the National Guard. The National Guard Bureau does not have
a voting member on the JROC. Their requirements and budgets are planned
and executed as an integral part of Service processes. Their title 10
equities are advocated by the individual Service Chiefs. Additionally,
as part of the JCIDS process, the National Guard Bureau is given the
opportunity to coordinate on every requirements proposal that comes to
the Joint Staff.
The Reserves are represented individually by each of their
corresponding Services.
Admiral Greenert. The Total Force includes significant capability
provided by the National Guard and the respective Service Reserve
components. The National Guard Bureau does not have a voting member on
the JROC. Their requirements and budgets are planned and executed as an
integral part of service processes. Their title 10 equities are
advocated by the individual Service Chiefs. Additionally, as part of
the JCIDS process, the National Guard Bureau is given the opportunity
to coordinate on every requirements proposal that comes to the Joint
Staff.
As the Navy principal to the JROC, the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations (VCNO) represents Navy's Total Force (Active and Reserve)
perspective for requirements and warfighting.
General Amos. The Total Force includes significant capability
provided by the National Guard. The National Guard Bureau does not have
a voting member on the JROC. Their requirements and budgets are planned
and executed as an integral part of Service processes. Their title 10
equities are advocated by the individual Service Chiefs. Additionally,
as part of the JCIDS process, the National Guard Bureau is given the
opportunity to coordinate on every requirements proposal that comes to
the Joint Staff.
The Reserves are represented individually by each Service.
General Schwartz. Under current guidance, the NGB does not have an
official role in the JROC process. However, the NGB will have an
advisory role to the JROC Chairman in the revised JROC Charter (CJCSI
5123.01F). The Reserve does not have an advisory role in the JROC
process.
Both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC)
are permanent (voting) members of the Air Force Requirements Oversight
Council (AFROC). The AFROC reviews, validates, and recommends approval
of all Air Force operational capability requirements. The AFROC
directly supports the JROC process.
In addition, both the Air National Guard and AFRC have the
authority to sponsor operational capability requirements for
capabilities needed to accomplish their assigned missions.
Finally, the Guard and Reserve have the opportunity to review all
Air Force and Joint operational requirements documents through the
formal staffing process associated with the JCIDS and the JROC.
9. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, how are
Guard and Reserve inputs received and incorporated?
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. As part of the Total Force,
National Guard and Reserve requirements can be advocated by any
combatant command (including and especially NORTHCOM or U.S. Pacific
Command), by the individual Services, and by other DOD components and
agencies.
General Odierno. Reserve components actively participate in both
Army and Joint requirements forums. They provide essential insights and
advice to the Service Chiefs and Secretaries on matters that pertain to
resourcing and producing an organized, trained and equipped force. The
success of our Army is due to the integration of our Active and Reserve
components to the point they are indistinguishable on the battlefield.
The integration of the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the
Army Reserves has proven over the last decade to be unbeatable on the
battlefield and irreplaceable at home and abroad. We have built a
strong relationship between all of our Army components, probably the
strongest we have ever had. At the Joint level, the CNGB has a standing
invitation to attend all meetings with the Joint Chiefs which will
further strengthen our relationship and ensure their voice is heard.
Admiral Greenert. Navy Active and Reserve warfighting requirements
are received and integrated through the Navy's requirements management
process. The Chief of Navy Reserve (CNR) and Navy Reserve personnel
have the opportunity to submit requirements, and to review and comment
on Navy requirements in development. The Deputy CNR is invited to all
Navy Requirements and Resources Review Boards (R3B), the Navy
equivalent of the JROC.
After Navy review, Navy requirements are submitted for Joint Review
and JROC validation. As the Navy principal to the JROC, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations (VCNO) represents the Navy's Total Force (Active
and Reserve) perspective on requirements and warfighting.
General Amos. Our Reserve component submits its requirements
through the Marine Corps requirements management process. The
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) and the MARFORRES staff
may also review and comment on Marine requirements in development to
ensure that the process addresses any criteria unique to the Reserve
component. The Marine Corps provides a Total Force perspective to the
JROC, including requirements arising from MARFORRES.
General Schwartz. The Reserve components contribute to our national
security in support of every combatant commander and Air Force core
function, delivering the right capabilities to the right place at the
right time. The Reserve components' contributions to the Joint and
Coalition team are felt worldwide. Guard and Reserve members have
inputs into Air Force decisions at all levels, through the Air Force
Corporate Structure (AFCS) and throughout Air Force Strategic Planning
System processes. This integration of effort allows for senior-level
cross component discussions to refine our Total Force planning,
requirements, programming, budgeting, execution, and acquisition
efforts. Initiatives are vetted through the AFCS for approval and
linked to resource allocation, ensuring the initiatives approved are
appropriately funded. The Corporate Structure is the formal Air Force
process to inform Air Force senior leaders so they can provide
strategic direction on total force planning, programming, and
execution. The AFR and Air National Guard have membership at each level
of the AFCS, to include voting members on the Air Force Group, Board
and Council. The AFCS increases overall management effectiveness by
applying cross-functional judgment, experience, and analysis to program
adjustments in a resource limited environment. The Air Force will
continue to refine integration efforts of all three components to
ensure the most efficient and effective capabilities are delivered to
meet strategic requirements.
10. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, do you
feel those inputs are adequately considered?
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. The Services have never been
closer to their Reserve components. Because they use the same equipment
as the Active component, National Guard, and Reserve requirements are
not normally broken out as distinct and separate from the Total Force
requirements being considered during combined staffing during the JCIDS
process, or by the JROC when validating those requirements.
General Odierno. Absolutely. Now more than ever we are one Army and
an integrated Joint Force that is indistinguishable as a fighting
force. The integration of the Regular Army, the Army National Guard,
and the Army Reserves has proven over the last decade to be unbeatable
on the battlefield and irreplaceable at home and abroad. The Reserve
component forces will continue to play a critical role in our National
Security Strategy, and the advice of the CNGB will always be, as it has
been, extremely valuable to our Army and Joint Forces. The relationship
between all of components is the strongest it's ever been. The Reserve
components will continue to have a voice in Army and Joint forums to
keep the relationship strong. They actively participate and provide
essential insights and advice to the Service Chiefs and Secretaries on
matters that pertain to resourcing and producing an organized, trained
and equipped force. At the joint level, the CNGB has a standing
invitation to attend all meetings with the Joint Chiefs.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, they are adequately considered. There is no
distinction in consideration of Reserve and Active requirements input
into the Navy requirements process or the joint requirements process.
General Amos. Yes, they are adequately considered. There is no
distinction in the consideration of Reserve component and Active
component requirements input into the Marine Corps requirements process
or the joint requirements process. We are one fighting force.
General Schwartz. Yes. The AFR and Air National Guard (ANG) are an
integral part of the Total Air Force and we would not be able to do
what we do on a daily basis without soliciting and incorporating their
inputs. The AFR and ANG are Total Force partners and are completely
embedded in our staffing, planning, and execution of operations on a
daily basis.
11. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, in your
view do the Guard and Reserve have any separate and unique
requirements, or are their requirements essentially the same as the
Active Duty's requirements?
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld. As part of the Total Force,
the National Guard and Reserve make critical contributions to the
overall military capabilities of the United States. While the National
Guard may have some unique requirements to meet their title 32
missions, all their title 10 missions are met with the same equipment
used by the other Title 10 forces, whose requirements are determined
and addressed through coordination with the applicable combatant
command (NORTHCOM or U.S. Pacific Command) and/or Service.
General Odierno. As part of the Total Force, the National Guard and
Reserve make critical contributions to the overall military
capabilities of the United States. While the National Guard may have
some unique requirements to meet their title 32 missions, all their
Title 10 missions are met with the same equipment used by the other
title 10 forces, whose requirements are determined and addressed
through coordination with the applicable combatant command (NORTHCOM or
U.S. Pacific Command) and/or Service.
Admiral Greenert. Navy Reserve warfighting requirements are the
same as Active Navy requirements. Reserve Forces have unique manning
and training challenges to achieve those requirements, but the
warfighting requirements and associated systems are the same.
General Amos. Under title 10 U.S.C. section 10102, each Reserve
component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available
for Active Duty in the Armed Forces, in time of war or national
emergency, and at such other times as the national security may
require, to fill the needs of the Armed Forces whenever more units and
persons are needed than are in the regular components. Reserve Forces
have unique manning and training challenges to achieve these
requirements, but the warfighting requirements and associated systems
are the same.
General Schwartz. The operational requirements of the AFRC are
essentially the same as the requirements for the Active-Duty Force.
AFRC addresses the same combatant commander concept of operations
shortfalls as does the Active-Duty Force.
The operational requirements associated with the title 10 mission
of the Air National Guard are essentially the same as the requirements
for the Active-Duty Force. However, the requirements associated with
title 32 and State Active Duty are unique. These Guard missions focus
on Homeland defense and civil support. They include direct support for
Homeland security missions such as border patrol, counter drug, and law
enforcement. These mission sets have the potential to drive separate
operational capability requirements for the Air National Guard.
12. Senator Chambliss. General McKinley, I am particularly
interested in how you believe being a member of the JCS will help the
DOD and the Nation. I understand it may help the Guard, particularly in
terms of stature. However, I would like your views on how your
inclusion on the JCS would help provide better advice to the President
on issues under DOD's purview, and how it would help DOD better carry
out their own responsibilities on behalf of the Nation.
General McKinley. The National Guard Bureau is currently a joint
activity of DOD, and the CNGB has gained enhanced authorities since
2008. And yet, the CNGB still does not have an institutional position
from which he can advise the President, National Security Council,
Homeland Security Council, and Congress on non-Federalized National
Guard forces that are critical to Homeland defense and civil support
missions. In contrast, the CNGB advises the Secretary of Defense
through the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving non-Federalized
National Guard forces. The CNGB must declare an interest in order to
have a voice on these limited matters; without statutory JCS
membership, CNGB's JCS participation is ad hoc as determined by each
successive Chairman.
Adding the CNGB to the JCS would ensure that, in the post-September
11 security environment, the National Guard's non-Federalized role in
Homeland defense and civil support missions will be fully represented
in all JCS deliberations. Only full JCS membership for the CNGB will
ensure that the non-Federalized National Guard responsibilities and
capabilities are considered in a planned and deliberate manner that is
firmly rooted in the law and the National strategy.
The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into
account when making military contingency plans, when allocating scarce
readiness resources, and when advising the President, the Secretary of
Defense, the National Security Council and the Homeland Security
Council on strategies and contingency response options. Homeland
Defense and Civil Support must be at the core of our National strategy
due to the changing threat environment, one that is asymmetric and more
dangerous within our Homeland than at any time in our history.
13. Senator Chambliss. General McKinley, do you believe the Reserve
components are adequately represented on the JROC and, related to that,
do you believe the Guard and Reserve have any truly unique requirements
that necessitate specific representation by the Guard and Reserve on
the JROC?
General McKinley. The JROC consists of officers in the grade of
general or admiral from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
The JROC also includes advisors from the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Comptroller as well as the Director of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation. Combatant commanders and members of the Functional
Capabilities Board (FCB) have a standing invitation to participate in
JROC events. The National Guard Bureau participates on the JROC as a
member of the FCB. The FCB is a permanently established body that is
responsible for supporting the Chairman of the JCS in his title 10
responsibilities of providing independent military advice to the
Secretary of Defense. FCBs provide the assessments and recommendations
required for the JROC to validate and prioritize (if required) joint
military capabilities needed to comply with the guidance provided by
the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Strategy, Guidance for
Development of the Force, Guidance for Employment of the Force, and
National Military Strategy.
The National Guard has unique dual capabilities. The JROC has
validated numerous unique National Guard capabilities for domestic
operations including: State Joint Force Headquarters; CBRNE Enhanced
Response Force Packages; Joint Interagency Training Capability; and
Critical Infrastructure Protection--Mission Assurance Assessment Teams.
14. Senator Chambliss. General McKinley, what are your views on how
including the Chief of the Guard Bureau would affect the other Reserve
components who would, presumably, not be members of the JCS? In your
view, why would this not negatively affect joint-ness and the total
force concept that we have worked so hard to achieve?
General McKinley. The National Guard is unique, thanks to the
Militia Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and title 32 of the U.S.C. It
is unlike the other Reserve components which can only perform title 10
duties under title 10 command authority. The National Guard performs
the same title 10 duties when Federalized plus diverse non-Federal
duties and State duties under state command authority. The command
chains are unambiguous. The other Reserve components have no analogy to
the National Guard's non-Federalized duties and command authorities.
The non-Federal National Guard missions include but are not limited to:
air defense, ballistic missile defense, weapons of mass destruction
response, disaster response, counterdrug support, border security,
airport security, and national event security.
Placing the CNGB on the JCS would not alter current title 10
relationships. There would be no change to the title 10 authorities of
the Service Secretaries or Service Chiefs. Total Force integration
would not be compromised; if anything, it would be enhanced by greater
situational awareness of title 32 National Guard missions,
capabilities, and leadership on which the CNGB is uniquely qualified to
advise. Total Force integration would also benefit from enhanced
understanding of the Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions that
are performed by non-Federalized National Guard forces.
15. Senator Chambliss. General McKinley, the JCS was established by
the National Security Act of 1947 and at that time consisted of a
Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and the
Chief of Naval Operations. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was added
in the late 1970s and the position of Vice Chairman was added in 1986
as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is clear that those who
initially created the JCS did not see a need to include the Chief of
the Guard Bureau. In your view, should the Chief of the Guard Bureau
have been included in the first place, or what has changed since the
creation of the JCS that necessitates inclusion of the Guard Bureau
Chief at this point?
General McKinley. The events of September 11, 2001 have changed the
threats this nation faces. Homeland Defense and Civil Support must be
at the core of our national strategy due to this changing threat
environment, one that is asymmetric and more dangerous within our
Homeland than at any time in our history. On average, 5,800 National
Guard members are activated for Homeland missions at any given time.
Therefore, domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into
account when making military contingency plans, when allocating scarce
readiness resources, and when advising the President, the Secretary of
Defense, the National Security Council and the Homeland Security
Council on strategies and contingency response options.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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