[Senate Hearing 112-87]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-87
TWO NEW SUDANS: A ROADMAP FORWARD
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 14, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening
statement...................................................... 5
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Lyman, Hon. Princeton N., U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Elnail, Bishop Andudu Adam, Episcopal Bishop of the Diocese of
Kadugli, Sudan, prepared statement............................. 30
Enough Project, prepared statement............................... 30
(iii)
TWO NEW SUDANS: A ROADMAP FORWARD
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THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Coons, Udall, Lugar, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Thank you all
very much for being here this morning.
Ambassador Lyman, it is a great privilege to welcome you
back to the committee. We appreciate enormously the work that
you are doing as the President's Special Envoy to Sudan, and I
want to just thank you personally.
I've had a chance to see you working in many meetings that
we have had together there in Sudan, and I have been
extraordinarily impressed by your steady, calm, tireless
commitment to working under difficult circumstances to make
progress. It's the essence of good diplomacy, and I really
congratulate you and thank you.
I thank the President and the NSC and all of the folks,
including Secretary Clinton, who have been engaged in this
effort. They have done a terrific job of laying out a roadmap,
living up to it, nurturing the process, and staying committed,
when a lot of people thought it might have been impossible.
And I know that 6 months, 9 months ago, even a year ago,
when we were working with General Gration and yourself, there
were a lot of doubters as to whether or not a referendum could
ever take place. And I think that it was the good efforts of a
lot of folks who came together and stayed steady, and our
allies in that effort. The Norwegians, others, the British,
have been particularly committed to this. And I think it shows
what can happen when people stay focused and put their energy
into things.
So we welcome you here this morning to discuss a remarkable
and a rare event that took place last week, the birth of a new
nation, the Republic of South Sudan.
Six months ago when the referendum that set this in motion
I had the privilege of being in Juba with you, Ambassador, and
others, and General Gration, and it was really impressive. It
was a remarkable event. I had the privilege of speaking in the
cathedral with President Kiir.
Millions of southern Sudanese stood in line for hours to
cast their votes for independence. And I remember coming out of
one of the voting places, and I had a sense of, gosh, some of
these people are going to walk away, their lines are so long,
and they can't wait that long to vote. So I went up to them,
and I said, you know, I hope you will be patient and wait to
vote. And so help me, two or three people in good English just
turned around to me and said, ``Senator, we have been waiting
for 56 years. We can wait a few more hours.'' They didn't mind
it.
And last Saturday, as a result, 5\1/2\ decades of waiting
came to an end. And today, even as we are here now having this
hearing, events are taking place in New York at the United
Nations, and South Sudan becomes the 193rd member.
We should recognize, and I know you do, Mr. Ambassador,
that while only one country is joining the community of
nations, the reality is that two nations emerged on July 9--the
newly independent South and the greatly changed North.
Both of these nations are fragile, and they will remain
that way until they reach an agreement that allows them to live
separately but work together.
Sudan and South Sudan share more than a poorly defined
border and a bloody history. They share traditions of migration
that must be respected. They share trade routes that need to be
reopened. And they share a mutual interest in not merely
avoiding a return to all-out war but in crafting a lasting and
genuine peace.
Abyei is at the heart of this conflict and of any lasting
resolution. Tomorrow, international peacekeepers will begin to
arrive there, and I hope that they can pave the way for the
return of the tens of thousands of displaced Ngok Dinka who
call Abyei home, and for a resolution that addresses the needs
of the Misseriya migrants as well.
Abyei is one crisis point. Southern Kordofan is another.
And once again, we are hearing chilling reports of serious
human rights abuses by government forces. There are new and
serious allegations of mass graves, shells are falling in the
Nuba Mountains, and people in need have been cut off from
humanitarian relief.
Sudan must not go down this road again. Southern Kordofan
needs the United Nations monitoring mission, and both sides
need to agree and abide by a cease-fire. If atrocities are
occurring, they must stop and there must be accountability.
Despite these grave worries, there are also positive signs.
Sudan was the first country to recognize the South as an
independent state. And it is worth pausing to acknowledge that
fact, not just because it suggests hope for the relationship
between North and South, but for the relationship between Sudan
and the United States as well.
Because of the successful January referendum, President
Obama initiated a review of Sudan's designation as a state
sponsor of terrorism. Completion of that process rests on the
review itself, as well as the resolution of all the major
issues outstanding from the comprehensive peace agreement,
including Abyei. And obviously, this process will not go
forward if gross human rights violations are taking place.
Finally, the true transformation of the United States-
Sudanese relationship runs through Darfur.
Khartoum needs to reject its recent return to old
destructive patterns and recognize that reform can bring with
it a new relationship with the international community,
including the United States. I very much would like to see that
happen, but wishful thinking will not bring it about. It is
actions by the GOS that will make that happen.
We are also entering a new relationship with South Sudan.
Along with President Salva Kiir, we hope that July 9 will mark,
as he said, in his words, ``a new beginning of tolerance,
unity, and love,'' in which cultural and ethnic diversity can
be a source of pride and strength, not parochialism and
conflict.
South Sudan bears the scars of wars in many forms,
including roads, schools, and hospitals that were never built.
They provide their own sense of permanent scarring.
It must also overcome internal corruption and internal
rebellions. But as they have already showed the world, the
people of South Sudan are capable of rising to the challenge.
America has stood with the peoples of Sudan throughout
these struggles. We helped to broker the CPA. We have provided
billions of dollars in humanitarian assistance. Our
representatives, including Ambassador Lyman, are working
tirelessly, as I said, to bring the parties together. And we
must remain involved until there is a lasting peace in the
region.
I would remind people that the war that took place there
was the longest war in Africa's history, and it cost over 2
million lives. The last thing that we want to do is go
backward.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming back to the committee our
distinguished witness, who has a long record of service to our
country and an unsurpassed depth of experience in African
affairs.
On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was declared
by its elected government to be independent of the Republic of
Sudan. This is a rare modern milestone and one that follows
decades of violent oppression and conflict. The people of South
Sudan have realized their dream of independence and deserve
recognition for the sacrifice and commitment they made to
achieve it in the face of enormous odds.
The people of the United States, from Government officials
to religious and academic communities, to young citizens, have
had a profound impact in elevating the importance of resolving
this deadly conflict. There is a prospect for new life and
economic and social development in South Sudan.
Nonetheless, violence remains a real prospect for millions
along the borders of these two newly defined countries. Each
country's respective security forces are continuing to engage
in the three disputed areas along their common border, and
there remains untold suffering, scarcity, and tension within
both countries as well.
It falls to the leaders of each country to acknowledge the
challenges and begin to respond fairly and clearly to the needs
of the people and to build upon an inclusive vision of a stable
and productive future.
The challenges are daunting. Both Sudan and South Sudan
represent widely diverse populations with a history of often
violent competition. Khartoum will continue to govern many
regions in the north that bridle at the harsh yoke of the Omar
al-Bashir government.
Darfur remains unresolved, a region with millions displaced
as a result of genocide, and the eastern provinces continue to
suffer atrocities. In South Sudan, the leaders in Juba must
learn how to govern and empower a new country with few common
ties other than a common enemy.
That enemy will remain a threat, as it was through proxy
militias during the decades of war. The prospect of civil war
across the south looms if the oil becomes a source of
intertribal conflict rather than the means to build a better
country.
Oil, the primary source of income for both countries, could
also be a bitter disappointment if, as many experts believe, it
is limited and diminishing. South Sudan will initially join
Sudan near the top of the list of the world's failed states and
both must cooperate if they are to realize the hope of leaving
this ignominious listing.
While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 achieved
the independence celebrated last weekend in Juba, there has
been little progress in concluding the essential agreements
between the north and south also required by the CPA, such as
wealth-sharing and border demarcation. The new country has
limited governance capacity, weak and nonexistent government
institutions, and heavy reliance on outside donors. High
capital costs limit prospects for private investment.
These factors increase the likelihood of competition among
ethnic tribes and diminish the odds for near-term stability and
growth.
While the United States should maintain its critical
interest in a stable and productive South Sudan as well as a
more responsible and responsive Republic of Sudan, it is
evident these countries must begin to deliver for themselves.
The United States has played a prominent role so far, from
Senator Danforth's efforts at concluding the CPA to Secretary
Powell's efforts to stop the genocide in Darfur, to Secretary
Clinton's recent direct engagement at the U.N. on an Abyei
peacekeeper agreement.
Now the administration must clearly define and limit its
responsibilities and expectations associated with a long-term
relationship with this nascent nation. The heavy burdens that
now fall upon the people of both Sudans should be tempered,
when and where appropriate, by the international community.
Neighbors like Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda must help
integrate the new country into the region while balancing
emergent threats such as the approaching famine in the Horn of
Africa and the human calamity in Darfur, which still lacks a
viable peace process.
I thank Ambassador Lyman for his decades of dedicated
diplomacy. I look forward to hearing from him how the
international community can assist in this effort across both
Sudans and how the United States roadmap has worked to date and
prospects for its continuation.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling the
hearing.
The Chairman. Thanks a lot, Senator Lugar.
Normally, we just have the openings of both the Chair and
the ranking member, but today we are going to make an exception
to that rule.
Senator Isakson has taken a great interest in this area,
this region, as well as in this issue, and he has taken time to
travel there.
And, therefore, it is my pleasure to recognize Senator
Isakson for an opening.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, I thank the Chair.
And I want to do two things in particular. First, I want to
thank Princeton Lyman for his dedicated service to this area
and to this cause, and acknowledge that in the last 10 years,
between the Bush administration and the Obama administration,
there than five special envoys, beginning with Mr. Danforth.
And their work really has brought about the comprehensive peace
agreement, culminating in the peaceful election that took place
to create the independent Nation of the South Sudan. And I
thank you very much for your commitment to that.
The second thing I wanted to is really acknowledge what the
chairman said in his remarks with regard to the admonition to
the North regarding the removal of state-sponsor of terrorism
status. That is a process that is predicated on good behavior,
and it is predicated on us being sure that there is no more
violence and continuing atrocities taking place in that part of
the world. That is an important component part of the overall
deal that we made to bring about a peaceful election, which
took place.
So I thank the Chair very much for pointing that out. I
thank Princeton Lyman for his service, and I look forward to
his testimony today.
The Chairman. Thanks very much, Senator Isakson.
Mr. Ambassador, it is our pleasure to welcome you, and I
look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. PRINCETON N. LYMAN, U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR
SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry,
Ranking Member Senator Lugar, two giants of leadership. It is a
very great privilege to be here.
Senator Isakson, who has taken such a great interest in
Africa all the time you have been on this committee, it is
really a privilege to be here. Thank you for the very kind
words.
I have to say I have never worked on an issue in which
there has been so much sustained support from the
administration, from the President, the Vice President, the
National Security Council, the Secretary, this committee,
people in the House, people in the public. It makes an
extraordinary amount of difference.
It's a high priority for the United States and the United
States public and all branches of our Government, and that
makes a tremendous difference in the work we try to do.
So thank you very, very much for all you are doing.
I would like to submit a full statement for the record, if
that's all right?
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record as if read in full.
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you.
I agree that one of the first things to recognize is that
one of the fundamental objectives of the comprehensive peace
agreement was for the people of South Sudan to have a choice as
to whether to stay within one state or separate. They were able
to make that choice, as you pointed out, in January. And on
July 9, they were able to achieve their independence.
And it was an extraordinary event, and it was a privilege
for me to be there, a very happy event. There must have been
over 100,000 people at that ceremony, and it was quite moving.
I think all who have been working on this for decades,
Senator Isakson is quite correct, over many administrations,
over many people in and out of government, they can take a
great deal of satisfaction from what has happened in that
regard.
Nevertheless, as you have all pointed out, the past few
months have not been free of conflict and they haven't been
free of tension. The parties failed to reach agreement before
July 9 on some of the most important issues that they face to
have a full and productive relationship. And then we had crises
in the disputed area of Abyei, as you pointed out, and now an
ongoing conflict causing many deaths and abuses and displacing
over 70,000 people in Southern Kordofan.
We had to focus a lot of our efforts in the last few weeks
on those two crises to keep them from derailing the entire
peace process. So the entire relationship between the two
countries after July 9 is going to be one that is not yet free
of tension and not free from the threat of future conflict. The
next few weeks will be very critical in this regard.
They must follow through, first of all, on the agreement
you mentioned, Senator Kerry, on Abyei, an agreement that
allows an enhanced peacekeeping force to come into Abyei,
mainly of Ethiopian troops, and the withdrawal of Sudanese
Armed Forces that took over Abyei a few weeks ago.
We can't have a political solution to Abyei while it's
being occupied by one side militarily. That process is just
getting underway, and it must be implemented.
They also have not resolved one of the most important
economic issues between them, and that is the financial
relationships related to the oil sector. And I fear that if
they don't come to some resolution by the end of July, we could
have a serious confrontation over that issue. Threats from each
side to shut down the oil flow are not helpful, and they only
raise the specter of confrontation.
Now this is a difficult issue for the South to deal with,
because they see any final resolution of how to share the
resources from oil as linked to the solution for Abyei and some
of the other unresolved issues, and the timetables now are not
in sync.
So what we are urging is that by the end of July, at least
they reach an interim agreement to keep the oil relationships
going and set up a very firm timetable on dealing with Abyei
and the remaining issues, like disputed border areas.
They both face problems inside their countries, as you have
indicated. We are very concerned about the situation in
Southern Kordofan.
Fighting broke out there, and as you well know, Southern
Kordofan is a state in the North. It was heavily involved in
the civil war. People there fought on the side of the South but
they're from Southern Kordofan. And there are elements of the
SPLA, the Southern People's Liberation Army, which come from
Southern Kordofan. And the CPA calls for a political process
called popular consultations, in which their political rights
would be addressed, and their grievances.
Now fighting broke out there June 5 between the Sudanese
Armed Forces and these SPLA units. The issues are complex. They
are political. They are security.
We're very concerned by very critical allegations of
targeted and ethnic-based killings and other gross human rights
abuses. As you said, Senator Kerry, these abuses must end,
there must be an investigation, and perpetrators held
accountable.
The two sides on June 28 signed a framework agreement
covering both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. And it is a
promising agreement in that it provides for talks on both the
political and the security issues. But unfortunately, President
Bashir has now raised objections to portions of that agreement,
and that puts the negotiations at risk.
Without those talks, without parallel political as well as
security talks, the chances of ending the hostilities and
reaching the thousands of people in need are, frankly, slim. So
we hope these talks will resume very shortly.
In the meanwhile, we call on the Government of Sudan, which
so far has resisted in allowing for a U.N. presence to remain
in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, because we need that
presence not only to monitor what's happening but to help in
humanitarian activities.
Now, the situation in Darfur, which you have all mentioned,
remains a very serious problem as well. This week, in fact
probably today, the Government and one of the armed groups, the
Liberty and Justice Movement, the LJM, are expected to sign a
peace agreement or a protocol around the peace agreement. But
one other major group, JEM, Justice and Equality Movement, is
at best on the fence, and most of the others did not take part
in the Doha peace process at all.
What we have emphasized to the Government of Sudan is that
signing an agreement with the LJM is a positive step, but it
has to continue to negotiate and be ready to negotiate with the
other armed movements. They can't say, well, now we've done it
and the other armed movements either sign this or they're
outside the process.
We're also concerned that several of the other armed groups
are not very interested in Darfur so much as they are
interested in broad change in Sudan, and are fighting on that
basis, which makes it almost impossible for them to come and be
part of a Darfur-based political process. And we have urged
them to come to the table and negotiate around the issues of
Darfur.
Also, to look ahead, we need to engage the people of
Darfur. They deserve as much of a right to participate much
more greatly in determining not only the process of peace, but
their future.
But the conditions aren't right yet for carrying out a
Darfur-based political process. So we have set forth a list of
conditions that we think are very important to create what we
call an enabling environment, so that you can have a Darfur-
based process. It means lifting the state of emergency; it
means freeing political prisoners; it means allowing for
freedom of movement and expression; better for rights for
UNAMID, et cetera. And we hope to pursue those with the A.U.,
the U.N., and the Government of Sudan in order to make it
possible to have such a Darfur-based process.
Now let me turn to the issue you also all raised, which is
our relationships with the Government of Sudan in Khartoum.
Sudan needs to end its isolation in the international
community. It has to secure relief from an estimated $38
billion of debt. It has to obtain access to the international
financial institutions. It has to create an environment that
will attract private investment.
None of those things can happen when it's engaged in
constant conflict and under sanctions not only from us but from
others.
We have told Khartoum, as you have pointed out, Senator
Kerry, that we are prepared to help, and we've laid out a
roadmap to normalize our bilateral relations. And the President
followed through after the referendum on January 9 to open up
some licenses and to initiate a process of reviewing Sudan's
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. And that review is
continuing.
But we can't move forward, as all of you have pointed out,
with improved bilateral relations, as we have said in the
roadmap, if the Government of Sudan does not fulfill its
obligations from the CPA.
And that isn't just the position of the United States. It's
also the view of other members of the international community
and of international creditors.
The negotiations, of course, require readiness on the part
of both parties to take what are often very difficult political
decisions. So we will be working with both the NCP and the SPLF
to encourage a commitment to reaching agreement on all
outstanding issues as soon as possible.
Now, South Sudan, again as you have all pointed out, faces
enormous governance and development challenges. Antigovernment
militia are causing havoc in parts of the country. And the
Government needs to respond, both politically and militarily,
to these challenges, so that legitimate local or ethnic
grievances are not ignored.
There is also a staggering lack of infrastructure and
educational levels on which to build development. The
Government of South Sudan will depend heavily on international
support as well as its own resources to address these
challenges.
We have strong ties of South Sudan, and they go back many
decades. And we are committed to continuing that partnership
and helping them meet those challenges. But we are not going to
be alone.
The U.N. is inaugurating a major program helping the
Government in a variety of areas. Other donors are coming in,
in various aspects of economic and security assistance.
But we've told the leaders in Juba that to succeed, they
must work to build an effective democratic and inclusive
government that embodies South Sudan's diversity, respects
humans rights, and delivers services with transparency and
accountability.
And I'm very pleased that President Kiir in his inaugural
address spoke to those very same issues at the ceremony in
Juba.
The challenges ahead are great, but the historic occasion
last Saturday offers a new beginning for the people of both
South Sudan and Sudan. And it's now up to the leaders and
people of both to turn this moment of promise into lasting
peace.
Over the coming months, the Obama administration's
engagement will be unwavering, and we will be a steadfast
partner to all those in Sudan and South Sudan who seek a better
future of peace and prosperity.
Thank you, and I'm more than happy to answer questions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lyman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Princeton Lyman
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, Members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here to
discuss the historic achievement symbolized by South Sudan's
independence and the opportunities and challenges ahead as Sudan and
South Sudan seek to define their future relationship with each other
and the international community.
I will discuss below the many tasks and challenges that lie ahead.
But first we should recall that a fundamental objective of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was to provide the people of southern
Sudan a choice whether to continue within one country or to separate.
The people made that choice in January, voting for separation, and the
independence of South Sudan was achieved July 9 without major conflict
and with the recognition of the Government of Sudan. All those, in the
Congress, among the many public organizations and advocates, the
government entities and individuals over two administrations, all those
who worked for this over many years should take pride and joy in this
achievement.
I was in Juba last Saturday for South Sudan's independence
ceremony. It was a very moving occasion. As President Obama said in his
statement recognizing South Sudan, the day reminded us ``that after the
darkness of war, the light of a new dawn is possible.'' Tens of
thousands of people endured sweltering heat for hours to celebrate the
birth of their new nation. Sudan was the first country to recognize
South Sudan's independence. This was a historic achievement that
represents a new beginning for the people of South Sudan as well as
those of Sudan.
Mr. Chairman, this achievement was far from inevitable. Just a year
ago, the peace process between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement was stalled. Many doubted whether it would
be possible to have an on-time, peaceful referendum for Southern Sudan
and whether the Government of Sudan would ever accept the results. A
return to open conflict seemed very possible.
During that time, President Obama committed to reenergizing the
peace effort, and since then, we have intensified our diplomatic
engagement with the CPA parties as well as our partners in the African
Union, IGAD, Europe and the United Nations. The President himself, the
Vice President and his entire national security team have been involved
in this effort around the clock. We are grateful for the support that
this committee and you in particular, Mr. Chairman, have given to this
effort. We also appreciate the efforts that so many Americans have made
to keep a spotlight on the situation in Sudan.
Over the last year, the leaders of Sudan and South Sudan have
demonstrated their capacity to work together on the major task of
separation and to overcome great odds in their search for peaceful
completion of the CPA. Nevertheless, this period has also been marked
by armed clashes along the border, a crisis in Abyei, and fighting
currently under way in the northern state of Southern Kordofan. Several
critical issues regarding relations between the two states that were to
be negotiated by July 9 have not been resolved. Thus the situation
remains fraught with serious threats to peace. The two states must work
to rekindle the spirit of cooperation that was so evident after the
referendum of January 9 and which was promised again by the two leaders
in the ceremony of July 9.
The CPA parties have made some progress in their negotiations over
the past few months, but as I indicated above some of the most
important issues namely oil, Abyei and citizenship remain unresolved.
How these outstanding issues are managed over the near term will define
the future relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. At the IGAD
summit on July 4, President Bashir and President Kiir committed to
continue negotiations beyond July 9. We are urging the parties to
quickly return to the negotiating table in the coming days and set a
firm deadline for completing this unfinished business. The parties
should work with the support of the African Union High-Level
Implementation Panel (AUHIP) to finalize mutually beneficial
arrangements, in particular, oil revenues, citizenship, Abyei, and
their shared border. Allowing these issues to linger without resolution
for too long could destabilize the future relationship between Sudan
and South Sudan.
Of particular importance is the contentious issue of Abyei. After
months of rising tensions and a buildup of forces by both sides, the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) forcefully took over the disputed area of
Abyei in May. An estimated 100,000 people were forced to flee their
homes. After weeks of intense negotiations, the parties signed an
agreement on June 20 outlining temporary arrangements for Abyei, to
include the establishment of a new U.N. peacekeeping force in Abyei and
the redeployment of all Sudanese military forces from the area.
Secretary of State Clinton met with the parties in Addis Ababa during
these talks and played an important role in finalizing this deal. We
then led efforts in the U.N. Security Council to quickly secure a
resolution authorizing this new peacekeeping force, which will consist
of up to 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers.
The violence that flared in Abyei cannot be allowed to return and
jeopardize the larger peace. It is critical that the parties move
forward with genuinely implementing this agreement over the coming
weeks as they continue to work toward a final arrangement on Abyei. The
Ethiopian peacekeepers have begun deploying to Abyei. The SAF and Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) must follow through with their
commitment to withdraw their forces. Conditions must be put in place to
allow those displaced from Abyei to voluntarily return home in safety
and dignity as soon as possible. Enormous damage was done to homes and
other structures in Abyei and much was looted during the SAF takeover.
Considerable assistance will therefore be needed for those returning
home. We are working closely with the Ethiopian peacekeeping force, the
United Nations humanitarian agencies, and our own USAID to arrange
support for a safe, voluntary return. At the same time, as part of
their negotiations, the parties need to resolve Abyei's final status.
Negotiations on this matter were delayed by the SAF takeover of the
area and the extensive negotiations for assuring the departure of
military forces from there. This delay was costly. It will take weeks
for the Ethiopian forces to be fully deployed and some time for the
displaced to feel it safe to return.
Negotiations on the oil sector are equally important, but they must
move on a quicker timetable. By the end of July, there has to be an
understanding of how oil will be marketed and sold and to what extent
the SPLM will provide some tapering off of reductions of income to the
north. Agreement is made more difficult, however, because the SPLM does
not want to make such a decision without final agreements on Abyei, the
border, and perhaps some other issues. We are thus faced with
conflicting timelines. In this situation, it is imperative that if
there is no final resolution of oil revenue distribution, there must be
an interim agreement by the end of July. Each side has claimed it is
ready to shut down the oil flow if there is no agreement, positions
that if acted upon would only hurt both sides and above all the people
of all Sudan. Thus this issue demands action very soon.
Mr. Chairman, beyond their negotiations with each other, Sudan and
South Sudan must also work to establish peace within their respective
borders. Despite their separation, both countries have significant
diversity and must decide how they will manage that diversity over the
coming years.
Most immediately, we remain deeply concerned about the situation in
the northern border state of Southern Kordofan, an area that is home to
tens of thousands of SPLA fighters. The people of Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile were promised in the CPA that their political interests would
be addressed in a process of popular consultations. Unfortunately,
those consultations have not occurred in Southern Kordofan. Tensions
increased in Southern Kordofan following the state's heavily contested
elections in May. The SPLM refused to accept the results of the
election in which the sitting Governor was declared the winner. It was
in this atmosphere that the Government of Sudan issued an order to the
SAF to dissolve the Joint Integrated Units and forcibly disarm SPLA
units that remained in the state. On June 5, intense fighting broke out
between the SAF and SPLA forces in the state. To date, the fighting has
continued, with the SAF carrying out aerial bombardments of SPLA areas.
We are extremely concerned by credible allegations of targeted and
ethnic-based killings and other gross human rights abuses. These abuses
must end, an investigation must be conducted, and perpetrators must be
held accountable. The U.N. estimates that 73,000 people have been
displaced by the fighting, and critical access and resupply routes for
humanitarian agencies have been blocked.
Negotiations over Southern Kordofan began in Ethiopia in late June
under the auspices of the AUHIP. The Government of Sudan and the SPLM-
North signed a framework agreement on June 28 outlining new political
and security arrangements for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states.
This agreement has the advantage of calling for addressing political
issues at the same time as security ones, which is indispensable for
reaching an agreement to cease hostilities and lay the groundwork for a
longer term settlement. Unfortunately, President Bashir has raised
problems with the framework agreement, which puts negotiations at risk.
We continue to call on the parties to return to the negotiating table,
to recognize the need to address both political and security issues,
and to agree on a cessation of hostilities which would allow unfettered
humanitarian access. Despite the opposition of Khartoum, we also
continue to call on the Government of Sudan to accept a continued U.N.
presence in the two states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile to
support a cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access, and the
establishment of new security arrangements. We believe, and we know
that much of the international community agrees, that it is in their
interest to do so. The Security Council has expressed its readiness to
authorize continued U.N. operations if Khartoum consents.
Within Sudan, we also remain deeply concerned about the security
and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Clashes continue to occur in North
and South Darfur between the Government of Sudan and an alliance of
Darfur rebel groups, notably the Sudanese Liberation Army and the
Justice and Equality Movement. The SAF continues to use aerial
bombardments as well as proxy militias as part of its military strategy
against the movements, thereby resulting in civilian casualties.
Conflict and widespread insecurity impact the humanitarian situation
negatively and hamper humanitarian organizations from carrying out
their activities in the deep field. The GOS continues to obstruct
access of U.N.-African Union peacekeepers and humanitarian
organizations struggle to obtain visas and travel permits from the GOS,
which undermine the effectiveness and independence of humanitarian
efforts. We have consistently pressed the Government of Sudan to
provide full and unfettered access for aid workers and peacekeepers, in
order to deliver humanitarian assistance across Darfur. Our own
humanitarian staff is only able to access Darfur with high level
visits. Otherwise, operational access is simply not possible. Although
there has been some limited IDP resettlement in West Darfur and a
significant increase in seasonal IDP returns for cultivation, around 2
million Darfuris overall remain in IDP camps. Approximately 70,000
additional persons have been displaced since December 2010.
We have invested considerable efforts in pushing the Government of
Sudan and the armed movements to commit to serious negotiations in
Doha. Two of Darfur's rebel groups, the Liberation and Justice Movement
(LJM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have participated in
the Doha negotiations. The LJM may sign a peace agreement with the
Government of Sudan this week; however LJM has little military strength
on the ground. Negotiations between JEM and the Government of Sudan
have been suspended since early May, and JEM is currently reconsidering
its position on the results of the Doha process. We have emphasized to
the Government of Sudan that an agreement with the LJM would be a
positive step toward peace, but that it must continue to negotiate with
the other armed movements. We also will be applying pressure on the
nonnegotiating armed movements to return to peace talks.
The position of the armed movements is also of concern. Several of
them insist that they do not wish to negotiate on Darfur so much as on
changes to the regime in Khartoum, and in some cases are determined to
pursue that objective through fighting in and beyond Darfur. This
position does not permit realistically peace talks with the Government
of Sudan. We will also continue to encourage the nonnegotiating armed
movements to return to peace talks on Darfur. While the Doha process
has now come to an end, other venues can be developed if talks are
possible. In this regard, we are currently consulting with the AU, the
U.N. and our international partners on a way forward after Doha that
builds on progress achieved in Doha and leads to a more comprehensive
settlement.
Any successful peace process must engage not only the armed
movements, but also the people of Darfur. The U.N. and the AU have put
forward the initiative of a Darfur Political Process, through which
Darfuris would express their views on the way forward for a political
settlement. However, we feel strongly that the current security and
political environment would not lend itself to a credible or legitimate
peace process in Darfur. For this reason, we will be coordinating with
the AU and the U.N. on the necessary enabling conditions that we
believe must be in place before the United States will support a
Darfur-based process.
Mr. Chairman, Sudan needs to end its isolation in the international
community and secure a more prosperous future for its people. It has a
historic opportunity to do so with the completion of the CPA. Sudan
faces an uncertain economic future as it adjusts to a significant loss
of oil revenue and continues to shoulder nearly $38 billion of debt.
Undoubtedly, Sudan is in need of debt relief, access to the resources
of the International Financial Institutions, and a sustainable climate
for private investment. Provided Sudan fulfills its obligations under
the CPA, the United States is prepared to help.
We have laid out a roadmap to normalize our bilateral relations and
taken initial steps in that direction. In February, following a
successful referendum, the President began the process of reviewing
Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Last month, the
President dispatched Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan to
Khartoum to discuss this review and to demonstrate our commitment to
this process. Additionally, we have been actively involved in the World
Bank technical working group to review the process for Sudan's debt
relief. We have also approved licenses for several American companies
wishing to participate in agricultural development in the north.
However, we can only move forward with improved bilateral
relations, as outlined in the roadmap, if the Government of Sudan
fulfills its obligations under the CPA and demonstrates its commitment
to peace within its borders and with its neighbors. A failure to reach
a cessation of hostilities will negatively impact this process. U.S.
Government action to lift remaining U.S. economic sanctions and to
request legislative assistance with the removal of applicable foreign
assistance restrictions also will be dependent on Sudanese actions in
Darfur. We will expect to see concrete actions on humanitarian access,
freedom of movement for UNAMID peacekeepers, engagement in peace talks,
an end to the use of proxy militias and targeting of civilians, and an
improvement in justice and accountability so the reign of impunity in
Darfur does not continue. This is not just the position of the United
States. It is also the view of other members of the international
community and international creditors.
Mr. Chairman, the Government of South Sudan will also depend on
international support as it seeks to address its many challenges. South
Sudan has some of the lowest development indicators in the world, and
its people have high expectations that their lives will improve with
independence. Many of its people also remain vulnerable to the activity
of armed militias in the border states of Unity, Jonglei, and Upper
Nile to the North, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the state of
Equatoria regions to the south. The United States has provided
significant support for South Sudan over the years, and we will remain
a steadfast partner as South Sudan seeks to peacefully meet these
challenges. The strong ties between our peoples go back many decades,
and we want to continue to build on that partnership.
Over 15 countries have offered capacity building assistance to the
GOSS. Following the Troika development ministers' visit in May, USAID
is working closely with the AU, U.N., ADB, EU, India, China, South
Africa, Uganda and others to ensure that the ROSS has a viable human
capital plan in place to build capacity for key functions in Juba and
state governments. This builds upon the work USAID has done over the
last 7 years in the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of South
Sudan, health, education, and agriculture. USAID is working with
partners to scale up to ensure that stop gap measure along with medium
to long term capacities are being addressed. The United States, the
U.N., the U.K., and other donors will focus on building a human rights
culture throughout the GOSS, including the SPLA. All the donors will
help in economic development. The United States plans in particular to
make a major effort in agricultural production, which can help the vast
majority of South Sudanese and for which there is much promise.
To succeed and to sustain international support, the Government of
South Sudan must demonstrate its commitment to building an effective,
democratic and inclusive government that embodies South Sudan's
diversity, respects human rights and delivers services with
transparency and accountability. The eyes of the world will indeed be
on South Sudan in the weeks and months ahead. The government must
deliver on its commitment to a broad-based, inclusive process to write
its permanent constitution. The government must also put in place
safeguards to prevent corruption and avoid the pitfalls that have
befallen many other oil-producing nations. President Kiir made a strong
statement in his inaugural address on these very issues. The United
States will work with other international partners to provide advice
and support for the government to help him implement those pledges.
Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, the challenges
ahead are great, but the historic occasion last Saturday offers a new
beginning for the people of South Sudan and Sudan. Now it is up to the
leaders and people of South Sudan and Sudan to turn this moment of
promise into lasting peace. We will continue to assist them in this
hard work. Over the coming months, the Obama administration's
engagement will be unwavering, and we will be a steadfast partner to
all those in Sudan and South Sudan who seek a better future of peace
and prosperity.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. That was
very helpful and very comprehensive. I appreciate it.
Let me begin by asking you on the Southern Kordofan issue,
first of all, do you have any evidence at this point or hard
information with respect to the scale of the abuses?
Ambassador Lyman. I don't have hard information on the
scale, but it's very credible allegations of very gross human
rights abuses.
Let me say something more about this, because I have raised
with the Sudan Government. They have a pattern of fighting
their wars in a way that invites gross violations of human
rights. We've seen this historically, and we saw it in Abyei,
and we are now seeing it in Southern Kordofan. The army comes
in and then is followed by and supports militias, the people's
defense forces, the PDFs, and other groups, who come in and
loot and kill, and do all of these things.
And I said to the Government of Sudan, this is not the way
an army in the 21st century fights wars. There are human rights
principles, and they don't follow them. And as long as they do
that, they are always going to be subject to the harshest
criticism and sanctions for what happens. This is not the way
to fight a war, even when you're fighting a war.
Now what's happening in Southern Kordofan is that it has
raised some very fundamental issues for both sides, fundamental
political issues, because what the political issues in Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile raise, and in Darfur, is how is the
Government of Sudan going to be structured and operated now
with the secession of the South. Is it going to be a government
that recognizes diversity, that decentralizes authority and
opportunities for wealth, or is it going to be highly
centralized and trying to force these issues? That is what is
really issues raised in Southern Kordofan.
For the SPLM there, headed by the former deputy governor,
Abdul Aziz, these are the fundamental issues they fought for
during the civil war. They're not prepared to be disarmed or
have their forces integrated into a single Sudanese Army until
they know these political issues are being addressed.
The other side, the Government, says, wait a minute, we
can't have two armies in one country, so we have to disarm you
first. And that's not tenable in this situation.
That's why the agreement that they signed to deal with the
political issues as well as the security issues was so
critical. And we've got to get them back to that agreement, and
to get those talks underway. Otherwise, we're not going to get
either side to agree to a cessation of hostilities and be able
to open up the door to humanitarian aid.
The Chairman. You're talking about the SPLM-North.
Ambassador Lyman. Right.
The Chairman. The Kadugli agreement.
Well, Mr. Ambassador, to whatever degree that it is
helpful, and since I have relationships with a lot of those
folks built over these last few years, I hope you will convey--
and I will be speaking, actually, with President Kiir later
this morning. But I think it's important to log some calls to
the North also, to emphasize that everything that was talked
about in the roadmap and all of the transitional components
that they are hopeful can be affected as we go forward, with
respect to their economy and debt in the future, depend on, as
you said and we said, but I want to reemphasize it, it depends
on their behavior and what happens in these next weeks and
months in terms of accountability.
And so I hope, to the degree they're listening to this
hearing or to any of our other comments, it's not a matter of
dictation; it's a matter of living up to international
standards of behavior and their promises, their own promises.
So this is going to be a critical component of their own
ability to succeed. I know there's a lot of turmoil in the NCP,
a lot of questions about the future politics of the North,
which is why I mention that they are also a new nation now.
They're going to have to figure out a constitution and other
components that meet with this new situation.
But we will back you up, and I want them to know that, to
the nth degree in your efforts to create accountability here
and to move us to a new standard. And I think that is
absolutely critical.
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Do you have any sense of how rapidly or where
we would stand with respect to getting a cease-fire, restoring
a monitoring presence, or perhaps reestablishing humanitarian
aid?
Ambassador Lyman. I wish I could be more optimistic on
this, Senator, quite frankly, because I have talked extensively
to both sides on this. I've talked to Abdul Aziz. I've talked
to Malik Agaar, the leader of the SPLM-North. I've talked with
the Government about it.
I think until we get those political talks going, it's
going to be hard for them to agree on the security side.
Now, what we have pressed for----
The Chairman. Until you get?
Ambassador Lyman. Until we get political talks or a process
going, it's going to be very hard.
And they differ with how to deal even with a cease-fire or
the security side.
What we have pressed hard for is, on the humanitarian
front, that they have got to allow for more help for the people
who are being killed, displaced, et cetera. And so one of the
things we have proposed is how about a humanitarian pause, a
72-hour pause. That has happened in other conflict situations,
where you can get in food, get in medicine. Both sides have
said they are open to that. We are going to kind of press that,
if they can't reach a broader cessation of hostility agreement.
But I'm hoping that the talks are going to start very soon,
and that they clarify these objections to the framework
agreement and get started. And we'll continue to press on that,
and particularly if we can't get a longer cessation of
hostilities, try and get a period where we can get help to the
people who need it.
The Chairman. Do you believe that among the leaders in the
North, there may be any doubts or reservations about how the
United States may behave here? Are our cards on the table
sufficiently? Do they have confidence in the roadmap still, I
guess as a way to say it?
Ambassador Lyman. I think there are elements in the
Government who do not have confidence in the roadmap. Every
once in a while, we hear that publicly. I hear it a lot
privately, because they think we've moved the goalposts or they
accuse us of moving goalposts. And there's a coterie of people
who continue to argue inside the Government that don't trust
the United States, don't base your policies on that roadmap, et
cetera.
But I think we have made some progress in that regard. And
we have stuck to the roadmap, we have not added new conditions.
You've made it very clear, as you said in your opening
statement and subsequently, the conditions were the same ones
that you talked to when you came out.
And we have done our part, and they've got to do theirs. So
we keep making that point. I think more and more, there are
people in the Government who do realize it. But it's still an
argument inside the Government, ``Oh, the U.S. will never do
this.'' And it becomes an excuse, if you will, for them
following other policies.
The Chairman. I think you made an important point that we
need to think more about and perhaps examine more here, and
that's the Doha process and the Darfur issue itself.
I gather that even this morning, it is possible that they
may have signed that agreement in Doha. Do you know if they
did?
Ambassador Lyman. You know, I haven't had a report. It was
supposed to be 4 o'clock their time.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Lyman. Forgive me, I was just told they didn't
sign. I knew there were some outstanding issues still.
The Chairman. If they did sign it, or when they do sign, if
they contemplate signing, it still leaves us with the same
problem, and that's an important one, which is that JEM and two
major factions of the SLA, the Abdul Wahid and the Minni Minawi
factions, are not there. And as you appropriately stated, they
have a different agenda. And I think we all are going to have
to think carefully about how you measure it.
One of the things I heard repeatedly from people over there
is, look, you can't hold us to the Darfur Accountability Act,
which requires a complete settlement in Darfur before you do
certain things with us, if the players in Darfur aren't
choosing to be part of the process. And if their goal is our
overthrow, that is different from the struggle that took place
in terms of the genocide in the 2000s; 2004 and 2005.
And I think that's, frankly, a legitimate position. I think
it is fair to say that if those groups have a different agenda,
and they're behaving differently, and they're going to do their
own thing, not to mention some of the other groups which are
kind of criminal enterprises, to put it bluntly, I think we
have to think very carefully about the makeup of those groups.
I wonder if you would comment on that.
Ambassador Lyman. Senator, it is exactly as you say, and we
have said to those groups very candidly that you can't expect
the government to come to the table to talk about your
overthrowing the regime. And we said something else. We said if
you're interested in change in Sudan, why don't you demonstrate
that by getting change in Darfur and becoming a political part
of the process. And we've pressed them very hard on this.
I think they are also, some of them, watching as to what
happens in Southern Kordofan, and between the North and the
South as to whether there is going to be a great deal of
instability, and how that affects their calculations.
So I think if we're successful in containing the situation
in Southern Kordofan, improving the North-South relations, it
may help change the calculations as to where they should go.
But we've been very clear on that. And you're right, the
government has a legitimate complaint, if these groups are not
prepared to talk about Darfur and engage in a peace process. So
we will continue to press them on that, and your point is
quite, quite valid.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask you to discuss for just a moment the role of
the United States as we go forward, not only in the Republic of
South Sudan but also in the Republic of Sudan, including Darfur
and the three contested areas, in this respect: Will the
international community join us in large measure, or will the
United States again be the default lead donor in stabilization
and nation-building efforts?
Furthermore, if your response is that the international
community will join, can you identify some of the players?
Which countries are likely to be involved in joining with us or
already have, for that matter?
This is of considerable interest, I think, to many
Americans who take a look at the challenges ahead and
understand our interests in a humanitarian way, but also ask
who else in the world will provide assistance.
So, describe if you can, that context.
Ambassador Lyman. Oh, I'm glad you raised that, Senator.
Up to now, we've had a large degree of international
involvement. Other donors have contributed roughly $700 million
a year to Southern Sudan and humanitarian activities in Sudan.
Of course, others carry three quarters of the peacekeeping
budgets for UNAMID, for the new mission in the South, for the
new mission in Abyei.
But I want to take it to another point that you mentioned,
because I just met, before I left Khartoum, with the
representatives of most of the European countries, and we were
asking that very question. How should we organize ourselves now
when the CPA is formally over even though the issues, several
issues, remain? How should we organize ourselves now to
continue to have a major role in bringing about peaceful
resolution of these issues?
And we're talking about a number of ideas of how to create
or re-create, if you will, this kind of group of international
companies, all of which committed to this peace process.
We also have the African Union, of course. It has the
mandate to oversee the negotiations on North-South, and we work
very closely with Thabo Mbeki and his colleagues on that.
But we need to think now in this new situation exactly how
to do that. And I'll come back to you, because we've agreed to
think altogether about this, get together again in a couple of
weeks, and think about exactly that: How do we keep up not just
the donor program, all of which are very important, but
politically, how do we act together in the consistent way on
the issues we've been just talking about?
Senator Lugar. It may be obvious to all of us listening
today, but underline why it is important that indeed the
international community, as opposed to just the United States,
play a key role here. Additionally, please describe the
feelings in the North, the South, and Darfur with regard to
international participation.
Ambassador Lyman. Well, it's very important, and others
have special contributions to make that are extremely
important.
The British have played a major role in security sector
reform in the South. They have connections in the North that we
don't have, that we can draw on. The Dutch are extremely
knowledgeable about all the Arab tribes along the border. The
Norwegians play a major role in sorting out the issues of oil
and advising both sides how to treat the oil sector. The E.U.
has its own set of sanctions, its own set of responsibilities.
And so working together, it reinforces the political impact
that we can all have, and also, of course, sharing the burden
of resources.
I want to mention two other countries that play a major
role, and that's China and Russia. And I've been in touch with
both of them about their role.
China, as you now, is a major investor in the oil sector in
Sudan. And we have urged them to play a very important role on
issues with President Bashir and others on Southern Kordofan,
on resolving the issues on oil.
Now China understands that they have important investments
in both the North and the South, because the oil industry in
which they're heavily invested is in both the North and South.
So they are picking up rapidly their relations in the
South, and stability becomes very important to them. So we look
to them to play a very important role in this regard.
I met yesterday with the Deputy Foreign Minister from
Russia, because although they are not as heavily invested,
they're arms suppliers to Sudan. They're, of course, a member
of the P5, and how they play their role with us in the Security
Council is extremely important.
So getting them as well as our Western European friends on
the same wavelength becomes very important, so that the
messages that various parties are receiving in Khartoum are
consistent.
Senator Lugar. You specifically mentioned China. I would
note that a good number of Americans have observed that
throughout all the problems in Darfur, with the charge of
genocide and crimes against humanity by the government of
President al-Bashir duplicating their behavior in the south,
China has certainly realized that some very bad things were
happening, but obtaining oil from Sudan remained its first
priority. This priority was perceived as so dominant that,
despite diplomatic overtures by the United States or others',
the Chinese were not particularly forthcoming.
What is likely to change in the current situation?
Ambassador Lyman. Well, I think two things: One, the
emergence of South Sudan as independent country, which has 75
percent of the oil. So if oil is one of their interests, than
having not only a positive relationship with South Sudan but
also stability and no confrontations over oil, no turning off
the pipeline or turning off the oil-pumping center, which each
side would do, might do, in a confrontation.
And it also means they have to balance their relationships
in Khartoum and Juba. They're not inclined to trade one for
another, but they do realize that they need to have good
relations with both. And that gives them a stake in seeing some
of these conflicts resolved and not having instability or
conflict between the two. And we talk about that a lot
together.
Senator Lugar. Last year the United States spent
approximately $1.5 billion, including $\1/2\ billion for
peacekeeping, in the Sudan. What is your estimate on whether
there will be requests by the administration for more than $1.5
billion in the coming year?
Can you give us any benchmarks? Our whole budgetary
situation, as you recall, is tense elsewhere, but Sudan is
important. What would you predict in this area?
Ambassador Lyman. Well, I realize that we have one of the
largest combination of peacekeeping operations in Sudan as
anyplace in the world. We have the combined U.N.-EU force in
Darfur, and we have a new mission in South Sudan, which is not
so much peacekeeping. It's partly peacekeeping, but it's a lot
of assistance to creating a viable government and system in the
South. And now we have the special force an Abyei, without
which we would not have been able to get the Sudanese Armed
Forces to withdraw.
I don't see any major additional activities. The Government
of Sudan has said we don't want a continuation of the U.N. in
the North. But there is a role and not a heavy role in helping
monitor the border that is under discussion. But it's not
another big mission, et cetera.
So I don't see any major new mission requirements. But I
can't say that the ones we have will diminish in the near
future until some of these big issues are resolved.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Isakson.
Excuse me--Senator Isakson, and then we'll go to Senator
Udall.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief.
My impression when I was in Khartoum, as far as their view
of Darfur, was they were pretty much content to fight a
surrogate war in Darfur, because it was far enough removed from
Khartoum where they didn't feel any real pressure to do so.
But you made an interesting comment a second ago, talking
about how the JEM and the SLA are watching Southern Kordofan
and what is happening there. Because of its proximity
geographically, if the North continues the alleged or apparent
atrocities that we have had some evidence of from satellites
and others, that changes that paradigm a lot and runs a greater
risk of a new war in the North, does it not?
Ambassador Lyman. That's exactly the risk, and it's exactly
the one that the Government needs to avoid.
They don't want a war in the North. They complain about
what they think is an attempt to create a new, as I say, a new
CPA between the southern part of Sudan and the rest of it. But
the fact is that if they don't address those basic political
issues in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and Darfur, et
cetera, they will have problems, serious problems in Southern
Kordofan and Darfur, armed problems.
So, yes, these are linked. They are linked in the sense
that the Government in Khartoum--and they've said as much--
needs to think through what kind of a new constitution they
need, what kind of a new political set of relationships they
need. But they haven't indicated just exactly where they're
coming out, and they're being challenged forcefully to make
those decisions, and hopefully not make them with just a
military response.
Senator Isakson. So the North, which is interested in self-
preservation first and foremost, in terms of the Government,
runs a risk if they continue in Southern Kordofan, first with
the removal from state sponsor of terrorism, because if they
continue, that will be a violation of that, plus they run a
risk of an expansion of hostilities against them. Is that not
correct?
Ambassador Lyman. That is really a very major risk.
Senator Isakson. Hopefully that will be a motivating factor
for them to improve.
Ambassador Lyman. I hope so.
Senator Isakson. Have they done better with NGOs in Darfur?
I know there was a lot of manipulation of visas and entrance in
and out.
Ambassador Lyman. It's very uneven. It's still not fully
satisfactory. UNAMID has better access than it had before, but
it's not perfect.
We still run into some problems with the NGOs, and it's one
of those conditions, as we said, for having a Darfur-based
political process, because it reflects a lack of openness and
movement. So we continue to work on those all the time.
Senator Isakson. So the number you mentioned, the
conditions aren't right yet for a Darfur agreement. The main
condition is that Khartoum is not ready to be a player in doing
that. Is that correct?
Ambassador Lyman. I think Khartoum is not yet ready to
create an atmosphere of real freedom inside Darfur, so you
could have a real political process there.
We've had occasions in the past where people speak up and
then they are arrested. They just released some political
prisoners yesterday, but there are more.
So people have to feel that if they speak out in some kind
of a domestic political process, they're not going to be
harassed or jailed or something. And that's something you don't
just do overnight. You prove it by creating an atmosphere that
people can watch it and see it happen. But we don't have that
yet. They have to lift the state of emergency. They said they
will. We'll see.
But until you have that environment, it's hard to say you
can have a really effective Darfur-based political process.
Senator Isakson. They are somewhat masters of their own
destiny, if they just wake up and realize that.
Ambassador Lyman. They are. They are. I mean, they have
these armed movements who are fighting. But they have a lot of
opportunity to create an environment that is very different in
Darfur.
Senator Isakson. Well, as I said in my opening remarks,
thank you very much for your service and thanks for being here
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Kerry.
And I also want to thank you, Ambassador Lyman, for your
service.
South Sudan, one of the critical issues is education. And
as you're very, very aware, it's one of the least educated
countries in the world, with one of the highest rates of
illiteracy. I am wondering, are there any plans to increase the
amount of U.S. volunteers to go to South Sudan? Would it help
our relations and strengthen our relationship with them by
encouraging young Americans to volunteer to help teach the next
generation?
Ambassador Lyman. Senator, I'm glad you raised that,
because you're exactly right. It's one of the highest
illiteracy rates, and it's going to be a major drag on
development.
We do have a lot of NGOs and a lot of church-related
activity, including Sudanese churches, which are providing the
bulk of health and education services right now.
We have had some discussion of whether we can bring the
Peace Corps to South Sudan. You have to be sure that the living
conditions are possible and the other things there, so we'll
look at that and other ways for NGOs and young people to
volunteer, because I think there's a real opportunity.
One of the areas is that teachers who are coming back to
South Sudan from the North have been teaching in Arabic. And so
English language training is going to be very important, even
for teachers who are trained as teachers, but need now to
operate in the South where Arabic is not going to be the major
language.
So there are a lot of opportunities of the kinds that you
mentioned. And we'll pursue them, and I'll let you know what
happens there.
Senator Udall. You mentioned the Peace Corps. Are you doing
an evaluation to see if the conditions are right to have the
Peace Corps there?
Ambassador Lyman. There've been some discussions of it, and
I'll check with the Peace Corps what the next plan is. Of
course, we had to wait until the South was independent.
But I'll check with the Peace Corps and see what their
current thinking was. One of our Peace Corps officials, Dick
Day, was in fact at the ceremony in Juba, so there's been some
discussion back and forth, and I'll check on what the status
is.
Senator Udall. You mentioned the lack of education being a
drag on development. One of the other issues is this issue of
sustainability and land use and those kinds of use of natural
resources.
And I'm wondering what we're doing as a country to ensure
that sustainable development practices are put in place, so
that there will be cropland there viable for future
generations.
Ambassador Lyman. Well, we have been fortunate, and I
appreciate the congressional support on this. We have been able
to draw on the Bureau in the Department, the Conflict
Reconstruction and Stability, the CRS Bureau, to provide a lot
of the surge capacity for the African Bureau to deal with the
Sudan.
And one of the things that they have been doing is
providing expert teams that go out to all the states in the
South and look at what are the issues out in those areas. Land
is an important issue, land ownership, land management, et
cetera, especially as hundreds of thousands of people who had
left the South are coming back. Local corruption questions are
important.
And that information is leading us and the U.N. to
structure our programs to reach out to the state and county
level, and urge the Government to deal with those issues out
there because those could be sources not only of injustice but
of instability.
So issues of land, issues of access, opportunities, et
cetera, these are important issues. And we're getting a handle
on them, and we're trying to build up the capacity of the
Government to deal with it.
Senator Udall. And then also, I think infrastructure is
currently lacking in South Sudan. And if South Sudan is going
to achieve some economic freedom, then it will need to be able
to bring goods to market. What needs to be done to improve
transportation and to create the infrastructure needed so that
farmers can sell their crops outside the country?
Ambassador Lyman. When you fly over South Sudan, you don't
see hardly any roads. The USA is building a major road down to
the Uganda border and a couple other roads. But we're hoping
other donors are going to come in more heavily on
infrastructure. We're going to do a lot on agriculture and
health and education.
But we're hoping the World Bank will come in heavily, the
Chinese, and others, because exactly right: We're going to do a
lot in agriculture, but if there are no roads for people to
market their commodities, it won't have the right result.
So we're going to look to other donors to do more in the
infrastructure area.
Senator Udall. Great. Thank you very much, and thank you
for your service again.
And I see Senator Coons is here, so I will yield my time.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Lugar, I'd also like to thank Chairman Kerry as
well as Senator Lugar for their leadership.
And I join my colleagues in thanking Ambassador Lyman and
all the dedicated people who have worked so hard to make South
Sudan achieve independence.
Less than a year ago, it looked unlikely that independence
day would ever come for South Sudan, and it not only came, it
came on time, and through a peaceful and free and fair
referendum.
And while we all celebrate the establishment of South Sudan
as the 54th nation in Africa, I remain concerned, as I know
many of my colleagues do, about the path forward, particularly
the North-South border and in Darfur. And that's why Senators
Isakson, Durbin, Wicker, and I will soon introduce a resolution
welcoming independence and congratulating the people of South
Sudan, and calling on the governments of both Sudan and South
Sudan to peacefully resolve the many outstanding issues,
including final status of Abyei, division of oil revenues,
citizenship, and the current, as you detailed, very troubling
conflict in South Kordofan.
The recent violence in Abyei and Southern Kordofan, and the
displacement of many, many people, remind us of the very real
human toll of conflict. And that's why both the international
community and the United States, in my view, must continue
their sustained efforts to urge peaceful resolution to the
difficult, ongoing challenges that South Sudan will face in
order to become a stable and peaceful nation.
I know, Ambassador, you already discussed the current
situation in Abyei, but I'd be interested in what you believe
to be the outlook for a final agreement or referendum, and I
would be interested in what became of President Mbeki's plan.
He and I met, and we discussed this a number of months ago.
What became of his proposal on Abyei that would, I had hoped,
have the backing of the international community?
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you, Senator.
What happened is that, as you know, Thabo Mbeki, as part of
this A.U. high-level panel, was to develop a proposal back to
the two Presidents on Abyei. And our timetable got derailed by
the military takeover of Abyei. And even though the government
said, ``Well, we can have a political solution while we're
occupying it,'' nobody felt that that was a situation that was
tenable. So we were diverted, basically, and lost weeks in
working through a way for the withdrawal of Sudanese troops and
introducing peacekeepers.
The feeling now is we've got to get those peacekeepers
there, the Sudanese troops out, and begin to get the displaced,
which is about 100,000 people, back in. And then that will be a
better atmosphere for bringing a final solution idea to the
table.
And unfortunately, what that does is delay this for weeks
and maybe a couple months. I'm very bothered by that, but I
understand the logic of it. And it impacts on the other
negotiations, resolving the oil issues, et cetera.
But the advice of most of the people working on this,
people who are close to it, and I've talked to people on both
sides and others involved, is we need to make sure that Abyei
is demilitarized and that people feel safe, and then we can
deal with this issue.
So it's been delayed, and I'm bothered by it. And that's
why I said earlier I think we ought to have a very firm
timetable for addressing it, because otherwise it just lingers
as a source of conflict.
Senator Coons. You mentioned the peacekeeping mission.
There's actually, if I understand correctly, three distinct
peacekeeping missions across a very wide area.
Ambassador Lyman. Right.
Senator Coons. And I'm concerned about coordination,
sustainability, the quality of the troops in some of the
peacekeeping missions.
What sort of work is being done to coordinate around supply
lines, logistics, the quality and sustainability of the troops
engaged? And for how long do you think they might continue
operations or continue to be necessary?
Ambassador Lyman. This is an issue where our colleagues in
the U.S.-U.N. have been very concerned about as well. We have
three different missions right now.
There is talk of creating a special envoy who will work on
some of these issues from the U.N. It hasn't been finalized,
but it's one way to try and have someone who is dealing with
all of that. But I think right now we're going to have to rely
on the leadership in the U.N. on the ground to do this.
The peacekeeping operation going into Abyei responds to a
point you just made, that is the effectiveness of peacekeeping
operations. The peacekeeping operation that was in Abyei was
not effective. If it had been, we might not have had the crisis
we had.
So we turn to a country we knew would put in peacekeepers
who would carry out their mandate vigorously, and that's the
Ethiopians. But it took us a long time to work that out.
And I think they're going to be there for at least months
and maybe longer until we get a resolution.
The mission in the South is a big mission. It's going to be
there for a while. UNAMID, if we can get Darfur settled, that
will be wonderful, but that's going to take some time.
So I can't honestly put a timetable on when these missions
will end. But I think this issue of coordination is very much
on the mind of the U.N. and our U.S.-U.N. people. And as they
work that through more, I will get back to you on some of their
ideas on it.
Senator Coons. And last, I know you already addressed, in
response to Senator Lugar, some concerns about China and their
role. But I would be interested in whether you can elaborate on
where you see the interests of the United States and China
overlapping with regards to Sudan and South Sudan, and are
there examples of China playing a constructive role?
What advice would you have for us? We're going to have a
hearing on the role of China in Africa within the next few
months, and I'm concerned about better understanding what
constructive role they might be able to play or be asked to
play in South Sudan.
Ambassador Lyman. Well, I think China is already a vigorous
player in Africa. They've got important commercial as well as
political interests. Some of them correspond and overlap with
ours. Sometimes we're in competition.
In Sudan, I think it took a long time before we got on the
same page on Darfur; a long time. But now, as I mentioned
earlier, now that South Sudan is independent, they have a stake
in resolving the oil issues and stability, and having a good
relationship with both.
I expect them to develop a fairly substantial presence in
South Sudan. I'm hoping they will contribute to the
infrastructure areas as well as other training. We look to
them, and we've discussed this together with the Chinese, in
their contacts with President Bashir and others in the North to
press hard for the points we were just discussing earlier about
resolving issues like Southern Kordofan differently.
The Chinese and the Russians stood with us in the P5 and in
the U.N. Security Council to urge the North to keep a U.N.
presence in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.
So I think we're getting closer with them, in terms of
shared interest there. And I think that's an opportunity for us
to see them making an even bigger contribution.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Thank you
for your service as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, our relationship right now
with the North, with Sudan, is both caught up and controlled
by, as you know, a number of overlapping laws that have been
passed over the course of about 10 years. But obviously, as of
last Saturday, the map has been completely redrawn.
In looking at the map, I see that you are currently able to
do certain kinds of work in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue
Nile. But you're not allowed to do it along the rest of the
border.
But obviously, the relations between Sudan and South Sudan
aren't limited to those areas now. And particularly, there's
this cuteness of delivery I think on our part, both to the
South and the North, to South Sudan and the North.
So my question is, as you know, our staff has been working
on trying to figure out how we might adjust some of these laws,
which I think personally it is important to do for a lot of
different reasons, not the least of which I think we're
constrained in our ability to deliver to the North unless we
do.
So would you comment on whether or not you think it would
be helpful, for instance, for you to have the legal authority
to work on a peace empowerment zone that stretches across the
entire border, rather than have certain sections carved out the
way it is now?
Ambassador Lyman. There's a lot of attraction to that idea,
Senator, because the border area is where a very large portion
of the population on both sides live, and there are a number of
flashpoints there. There are some disputed border areas. There
is going to be questions of crossing borders of mutual
development, et cetera.
And I think it's an area where we can make a significant
contribution. If we had the ability to work wherever we
thought, that would help alleviate both pressures and real
humanitarian needs. I think it would be wise.
The Chairman. Can you share with us sort of a sense of the
kind of projects that you think might facilitate a more lasting
peace?
Ambassador Lyman. I think, you know, part of the tension
that arises is in the migration from North to South, access to
water, access to pasturage, et cetera.
What we had talked about in some cases, can you get joint
development zones that transit North and South that would make
people comfortable that everybody is developing equally from
that kind of development? You would also ease some of the
migration pressures, if you could develop better some of the
pasturage and water above the line. We see that in Abyei and
Southern Kordofan.
So those things would help alleviate some of the tension
but I think equally important build cooperation, because you
really want on the border cooperation between the governors on
each side. And a lot of the governors are very interested in
this. And perhaps programs that facilitated that, as well as
conflict resolution, could be useful.
The Chairman. What about legal authority to work in an area
like food security or on democracy projects?
Ambassador Lyman. Well, I think on food security, I think
Sudan, the Government of Sudan, is going to face a lot of very
difficult economic challenges. They're losing a lot of their
oil income. But I think as somebody, maybe it was Senator
Isakson, mentioned, or maybe it was you, Senator Lugar, that
the oil doesn't last that long anyway. The Norwegians predict a
sharp decline for both.
So the adjustment, the economic adjustments are going to be
great. And food production is one of Sudan's great potentials,
if they would invest in it.
Now, I think that our readiness and willingness to do so
should, however, reflect the political relationship and their
fulfillment of major issues like CPA and Southern Kordofan. But
I think opening that possibility up is important for the people
in Sudan, and it will be important for everyone because of the
trade.
The Chairman. Might we not provide you with some leverage
in negotiation?
Ambassador Lyman. I think it would be important in terms of
demonstrating something we've tried to say over and over again,
which is it's in the interest of the United States to see two
viable, successful states. Without that, there's not going to
be stability in either one. And that we don't want Sudan,
northern Sudan, to be in deep economic trouble anymore than we
want southern Sudan to be.
So, yes, I think it sends an important message to say that
if you are moving in this direction, coming back into the
international community, we're very serious about the people of
your country not going into economic turmoil.
The Chairman. Well, let's assume that you get an agreement,
ultimately a sort of grand bargain that addresses Abyei, the
borders, the other critical issues, including the apportionment
of debt, would you not need some kind of legal change here or
redress, in order to be able to address the issue of debt
relief?
Ambassador Lyman. There are very clear restrictions, as you
know, in the legislation on that. Debt relief is an
extraordinarily important issue for the Government of Sudan,
because under the agreement they have with the South, they have
taken on the full burden of that $38 billion of debt on the
conditions that the international community will eventually
afford them debt relief and the South will support them in that
politically.
I think as we move forward, the President will need an
understanding with Congress about those restrictions. Right
now, it's in a technical mode. That is, the World Bank is doing
what they have to do, which is to gather all the detailed
knowledge of the loans and reconcile the records of the
creditors and noncreditors. But after that, it will start to
move into serious----
The Chairman. We need discussion. We need to address it,
bottom line.
Ambassador Lyman. I think it's going to be important.
The Chairman. OK.
Just a couple quick other questions. How would you say
South Sudan Government is doing right now in terms of
prioritizing its own governance agenda, its development agenda?
Ambassador Lyman. I think it's really still in very early
stages. The USA is going to sponsor a conference here in
September in which they are--it's not a donors conference, it's
not a pledging conference. It's a conference for them to come
and present exactly that: What are their priorities in
governance and development, and how can the private as well as
public sector help?
But I think they're at early stages. They have really been
focused so heavily on becoming independent. They are really
moving from being a liberation army to being a government. And
that transition isn't entirely complete.
They have to engage in a new constitution. They have an
interim constitution. But they need to develop a constitution
that brings much, much more popular participation into the
process.
So I would say they're at early stages on a lot of those
things and will need a lot of encouragement and help.
The Chairman. You mentioned the question of the army and
its own transition. I guess they have a force of about 140,000
soldiers. But they've incorporated within those ranks a number
of different armed groups. So my question is, I mean I don't
think that's sustainable for the long term, both politically
and otherwise, so what should their priority be for security
reform? And how can we have an impact, or should we have an
impact, with respect to that?
Ambassador Lyman. One of the ways in which they deal with
some of these militia is to bring them in and incorporate them
into the army, which means the army gets bigger. And it's
probably getting bigger before it gets smaller.
The Chairman. Buy them out, in colloquial terms.
Ambassador Lyman. But also a great many members of the
armed forces are illiterate and not trained for anything else.
So just rushing into a demobilization process is not going to
be good, because then these people will be out there with no
way to make a living other than to join another militia.
So what the Government has talked about, and we think is
the right way to go, is a program which develops a lot of the
skills within this military, build a much more professional
Ministry of Defense and oversight, and then engages in a
program of reduction and demobilization, where people go out
with skills to be able to make a living. And so we are now
working with others on this issue of security sector reform.
And this is exactly the questions we're working on them with.
The Chairman. Final question. Some people have--well, up
until now, I think we've provided nonlethal support, some
military assistance in support of the transformation of their
security sector. There are some, I won't say it's a huge
debate, but there is some suggestion that now that they're an
independent nation, it may be time to consider the provision of
lethal support, including air defense training, technology, et
cetera.
Do you have any counsel to this committee with respect to
that?
Ambassador Lyman. We have not made a decision to provide
any lethal assistance. We are focused very heavily on the
issues you first raised; that is, how do you develop this into
a better organized, more professional national military force?
So we have made no decisions on lethal assistance.
If we do so or are contemplating it, I want to come back to
the Congress and discuss that before we make a decision.
The Chairman. Well, we will welcome you back. We're going
to stay actively engaged and try to provide some transparency
to this transition process, and hopefully that can be helpful
and assist you in the process. And we'll do it, obviously, in
consultation with you, Ambassador.
So again, I just want to thank you personally. I need to
run to another thing.
Senator Lugar, do you have more?
Senator Lugar. Ambassador----
The Chairman. Let me just finish my thought.
I just want to thank you again for the tremendous work and
for working so closely with the committee, and we look forward
to continuing that. Thank you.
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you, Senator. We are very grateful
for the interest you have taken on this.
Senator Lugar. Let me just carry forward a question many of
us have raised about the lack of a South Sudanese constitution,
as you try to fill in some of the absence of our understanding.
Barring a constitution, there is at least a military force
there. And it's expanding as you have suggested.
The ordinary observer of this would say essentially that
the Government right now is the army or the military force. Is
this true in the sense that there are generals who are leading
the country? In other words, when trying to describe the
executive authority in the country, do we simply look at it in
terms of a military hierarchy at this point?
Ambassador Lyman. Well, they do have an interim
constitution, which President Kiir signed during the
independence day ceremony. It's supposed to be an interim
constitution. It's supposed to last--it doesn't have a terminal
date, which is one of the sources of great controversy.
But the pledge is to have a much more broad-based process
for developing a permanent constitution. This constitution that
they've just signed centralizes power quite a bit in the
Presidency. This is one of the sources of controversy when it
was developed.
Many of the leaders in the government are former generals
who led the liberation struggle, including Salva Kiir himself,
the President, and a number of the others, and they have a long
history of having fought. But there are others who are what we
would call technocrats, people who come with skills in those
areas.
But I think this is the transition from drawing heavily, as
they understandably have, on their military leaders to fill
these positions, and some of them are extraordinarily good, to
building a broader-based government that makes a clear
separation between the government and the military. And that's
going to be part of what security sector reform and
constitutional reform should do.
Senator Lugar. Is there a basis that, as we witness this
process unfolding, we could observe 3 or 4 years from now that
essentially this Government looks much like those governments
involved in the so-called Arab Spring? And by that, I mean the
presence of a strong man or woman, as the case may be, who is
not prepared to give up authority, and is surrounded by a
subservient military. And if so, what will be the debate in our
country as to what we have supported or helped produce, in this
case?
Ambassador Lyman. I think the challenge--I think we have to
really stay very close to these issues with the Government in
South Sudan, because it's very tempting, when you're the
overwhelming political as well as military force in the
country, to just run it as a quasi one-party state, and see any
challenges to you as something to push back on. And that's a
challenge.
And we have NDI there and other organizations that we want
to work with them closely to not let them go down that path.
They talk about it. They're very conscious of it. They're aware
that this is going to be a big challenge for them.
But I think we have to keep those issues in our dialogue.
It's political openness. It's fairness to allowing new
political forces to develop. It's human rights culture. And I
think that has to be on our agenda all the time.
Senator Lugar. Now we just touched upon oil and
agriculture, but let me carry this a little bit further. One of
the points often made about the recent Egyptian experience was
not just simply the young people in Tahrir Square, but the fact
that there were millions of people throughout the country who
very much lacked food this year. With the price of wheat having
doubled, and Egypt dependent upon us, the United States, for 52
percent or 55 percent of their wheat, the amount of so-called
subsidies, money disbursed out into the countryside, was
inadequate. And, therefore, a lot of the revolt really came
from people who were hungry.
Now here we're dealing with a South Sudan that we hope will
develop an agricultural base. That can be true in the North and
the South, for that matter, Darfur aside. But there's only
limited evidence of this at least thus far. And furthermore, as
the Norwegians have suggested, you mentioned this, the oil may
run out. So a crucial question for South Sudan, even if they
get it right constitutionally, is how are people going to make
a living there? Are projects focused entirely on agriculture
development? Or is there any potential industry of any sort?
Ambassador Lyman. The food problem is true of both the
North and the South. Food prices have been rising. There's been
a weakening of the currency, the Sudanese pound, which has
raised the price of imported food. The South, which is
dependent on the food coming from the North, as well from the
South, is also faced with very high prices on food. This is, in
my view, a very situation that both countries really have to
deal with.
And the investments in Sudan, the northern part, have not
kept pace in food and should have.
In the South, you just don't have a lot of organized
production, because of the displacement in the war. When you
fly over it, again, you look for farms. You don't see very
many.
Agriculture should absorb opportunities for most people.
But there are mining opportunities. There are even some tourism
opportunities, because they discovered a huge amount of
wildlife along the Nile in the South. It's that potential, but
you have to develop all the infrastructure for it.
But I think in the South, agriculture is going to be very
critical, and it's going to make people more self-sufficient
and reliable. It's going to cut down the need for food imports,
which they now rely on heavily. And then there are, as I say,
mineral, other mining
and other opportunities. Industry, maybe, if the infrastructure
improves.
If they join the East African Union, which they're talking
about, or COMESA, it does open up the opportunity for a bigger
trading area. But I think their ability to profit from that is
going to depend on developing more infrastructure and capacity.
Senator Lugar. Now, maybe this is for another hearing at
some point, but on the----
The Chairman. Let me just say thank you very much.
Ambassador Lyman. Oh, thank you very much, Senator.
The Chairman. And I'll see you on the trail.
Ambassador Lyman. OK, thanks.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. I'll conclude in just a moment.
Ambassador Lyman. Oh, sure, any time.
Senator Lugar. Essentially, one of the dilemmas in the
development of agriculture in many African countries, leaving
Sudan out of it altogether, has been this disagreement between
the United States and our European friends on so-called
genetically modified seed or procedures. And there still is a
debate in Brussels.
The Gates Foundation and the Department of Agriculture have
pointed out that if one is looking for the kinds of yield
increases that have made agriculture a very different situation
in the United States, so-called genetically modified seed and
procedures present a very viable option. I've seen the results
of this on our own farm, my dad getting 40 or 50 bushels to the
acre of corn, whereas we're now getting 170.
And this is why, as we take a look at the international
involvement in Sudan, I'm hopeful that somehow a humane streak
will come over all of us, Europeans as well as the United
States, because otherwise the possibility of getting the kinds
of yields that are going to be required to support that
population are pretty distant.
Now leaving aside all the other reasons for conflict, the
most essential reason people may fight is a lack of food and
the threat of widespread starvation. So I'm not putting too
grim a note on my final question, and I'm hopeful that in our
delegation to South Sudan, there are people who will be able to
convince our partners of our position on this matter. This is
important with regard to not only South Sudan, but really all
of the assistance we're giving to all African countries
presently.
Ambassador Lyman. Well, you touched on an issue on which I
have rather strong feeling, but I don't know what the U.S.
Government position is. But frankly, I think that debate has
not been fair to Africa. And Paul Collier, the author of ``The
Bottom Billion,'' wrote an article in Foreign Affairs not long
ago making the same point that you did and which I agree with,
is that there are opportunities in this technology for Africa
that may be vital and essential, and they ought to have the
opportunity to develop those.
So I happen to feel that way, too. I'll have to check with
others to see where the U.S. Government is.
But Raj Shah, our USAID administrator, told me that in his
visit to southern Sudan, the technology that we could introduce
today would have a dramatic effect on the yields in southern
Sudan. He's very optimistic that we can do that, and he's very
focused on it. I hope you get a chance to talk to him, because
he came back enthusiastic.
Also the Minister of Agriculture, Anne Itto, in South Sudan
is terrific. And she's heavily focused on these opportunities.
Senator Lugar. This is great news. Both Raj Shah and the
new secretary of agriculture in South Sudan appear to be on the
right track when it comes to benefiting of the people of the
country as well as formenting some degree of peace.
Well, I join the chairman once again in thanking you so
much for your coming today. This has been a very important
hearing, and you've given very important and encouraging
testimony to us.
Ambassador Lyman. Well, thank you. It's a great privilege
always to be before you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. And I will conclude by saying the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Bishop Andudu Adam Elnail, Episcopal Bishop
of the Diocese of Kadugli, Sudan
It is devastating and saddening, as a church and community leader,
to know that my people of Southern Kordofan--friends, brothers and
sisters, children, my flock--have been killed mercilessly and are lying
now in mass graves in Kadugli. To me, these people are not numbers and
statistics but people I interact with in the market, in the church
pews, in schools and villages.
I ask the world, Open your eyes and your heart for the suffering of
the people of South Kordofan, not only Christians, but my Muslim
brothers and sisters who are facing the same.
My sincere request to the United States and to the larger
international community is to:
Protect the Nuba people and stop the Sudan Armed Forces planes that
are bombing the civilians.
Send an effective peacekeeping force to monitor the situation, as
serious new negotiations have to start to bring freedom and lasting
peace for all marginalized people in Sudan.
Send humanitarian organizations to bring food, medicine, and aid to
the tens of thousands of displaced civilians.
I hope that the sources of the evidence, the eyewitnesses, will be
protected, and the evidence of mass graves preserved and fully
investigated to seek justice for the slaughter of an untold number of
civilians.
At this the time, I call all marginalized people to unite for peace
and reconciliation, to stop this state-sponsored ethnic cleansing
campaign, and to show the strength and unity that comes from a respect
for our diversity.
______
Prepared Statement of the Enough Project
Thank you Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar for holding
today's hearing at this critical moment for the two Sudans and allowing
the Enough Project to submit this statement for the record. Through
policy recommendations to the U.S. Government and the building of a
permanent constituency concerned with genocide and crimes against
humanity, the Enough Project hopes to play a role in the international
effort toward securing peace in both Sudans. This statement for the
record urges Members of Congress to recognize the insecurity that
prevails in Sudan after secession and that a change in current U.S.
policy is needed to bring lasting peace. The U.S.'s current strategy
incorrectly treats Sudan's multiple conflicts as disparate crises and
must shift to a more comprehensive approach that recognizes these
conflicts as symptoms of the same crisis of governance in Sudan today.
summary
Two new states--not one--joined the ranks of the international
community on July 9, 2011, the day that marked the official
independence of South Sudan from the remaining northern two-thirds of
the country. Much attention has been focused on the obstacles that the
new South Sudan will face. Less has been said of the fragility and
potential for mass conflict that exists in what will be left of Sudan
itself, and the policy changes needed to address this reality.
Since its independence, Sudan has experienced more years of
violence than peace. Decades of misguided government policies under
multiple regimes have economically and politically favored the Arab
Riverine people while trying to impose a singular Arab-Islamic identity
over what is an ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse
population. In the process, many communities have been left aggrieved
and disenfranchised, which on numerous occasions has triggered violent
rebellion, particularly on Sudan's peripheries. But instead of
political reform or decentralization of power, Sudanese governments
have consistently employed a strategy of divide and conquer, often
accompanied by violent oppression. The consequences of these tactics
were most vividly illustrated by the human devastation of the genocide
in Darfur and the North-South civil war, and continue today in the Nuba
Mountains. More generally, this strategy has resulted in a chronically
unstable Sudanese state, a situation that secession does not change.
The international community's robust push for southern
independence, while successful, has been the continuation of a
longstanding piecemeal approach to Sudan that addresses the symptoms,
rather than the root causes of the country's conflicts. Such an
approach, marked by multiple peacekeeping missions and peace talks, has
not achieved lasting or comprehensive peace throughout all of Sudan.
The international community must rethink its strategy vis-a-vis the
North by pushing for a comprehensive approach that is inclusive of all
of Sudan's regions and addresses the national issues that lie at the
heart of all of Sudan's fissures. The fundamentally similar grievances
that exist across Sudan's peripheries must be addressed on the national
level, starting with an inclusive constitutional process that brings
talks taking place between the government and these peripheral
communities into a single conversation. Without this necessary shift in
policy, sustained peace and stability in both Sudans and the larger
region will be impossible.
Southern secession ushers in an opportunity to begin to do this.
The confluence of heightened economic pressures and political energy
represents a moment of political reconfiguration in Sudan which could
force the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, to rethink its
strategy going forward. The international community should do the same.
pockets of instability and human insecurity across sudan
Even with the secession of the South, Sudan continues to be plagued
by multiple conflicts within its borders, as well as the potential for
new conflicts to emerge. The most volatile of these in recent years
have been the conflicts in the western region of Darfur, and in the
Nuba Mountains region of South Kordofan state. The eastern and far
northern areas of Sudan have previously organized formidable opposition
movements to the regime, but these regions have remained relatively
calm in recent years. Given the divisions that Khartoum has sowed among
its population and its precarious economic situation, there is a chance
that the number of conflicts within the North could increase.
Years after George W. Bush's administration first called the
government-instigated violence in Darfur a genocide, this western
region of Sudan continues to experience insecurity. Between December
2010 and March 2011 alone, the U.N. recorded over 70,000 Darfuris who
were newly displaced, while over 80 government aerial attacks against
civilian targets have already been documented so far this year. With
the abandonment of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, the continued
failure of peace negotiations in Doha, and the further splintering and
realignment of rebel groups, it does not appear that the violence
suffered by civilians will end any time soon.
In June, fighting between government forces and northern fighters
previously allied with the Sudan People's Liberation Army, or SPLA,
erupted in the border state of South Kordofan, following disputed
elections and attempts by the northern Sudanese army to forcibly disarm
the aggrieved fighters. Fighting, marked by indiscriminate air attacks,
has spread throughout the state, displacing a reported 73,000 people.
Reports coming from the ground indicate that government forces are
targeting civilians along ethnic and political lines, committing
summary executions, and conducting house-to-house searches for
opposition sympathizers. Humanitarian access to vulnerable populations
remains limited.
Other budding flashpoints have the potential to erupt into new
conflicts as fractures between communities historically aligned with
Khartoum and the government have grown. For example, disillusion with
the government has spread among the nomadic Misseriya, many of whom
were employed by the Sudanese Government as militias during the North-
South war. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA,
and the accompanying loss of government favor, left many Misseriya with
a growing sense of abandonment and estrangement from the government.
Recent reports of intense recruitment of Misseriya by the Justice and
Equality Movement, or JEM, a Darfuri rebel group, signal the potential
flashpoint that members of the Misseriya could pose should the
perception of marginalization by the government prevail.
Economic pressures on the North may result in the unraveling of a
NCP-headed patronage system that has helped the party maintain power in
its own and select constituencies' hands. Cuts to the North's
expenditures means that support for the NCP may falter in some
quarters--especially among those constituencies in the peripheries that
have been NCP allies despite the regime's treatment of their regions--
and open up new sources of grievances to manage. Citing an incident in
which a Darfur state governor threatened violence after the amount of
federal money disbursed to his state had significantly been cut, the
International Crisis Group offers this assessment: ``[I]f the [NCP]
loses the ability to provide benefits,'' profiteers of the patronage
system ``could easily abandon it. (. . .) Disagreements over resource
allocation of many kinds are becoming extremely divisive (. . .).''
Other measures taken to soften the economic blow have also stirred up
unrest. Austerity measures, such as cuts to key subsidies, led to
scattered protests in early 2011. Khartoum's faulty efforts at
reinvigorating its agricultural sector as a means of generating non-oil
revenue has in some cases led to increased dissatisfaction among
farmers.
same regime, same tactics
Sudan will continue to be governed under the same regime that views
stoking the peripheral unrest as its preferred means of ensuring
personal survival, and has overseen nearly perpetual violence against
its own population. The actions and words of the Khartoum regime in
recent months offer little indication that the leadership will move
toward a more inclusive strategy that addresses current and future
dissent with genuine engagement rather than oppression, violence, and
co-optation.
An undemocratic vision of Sudan
In mid-December, President Bashir announced that if southern
secession took place, Sharia would continue to be the source of law and
that ``there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and
ethnicity.'' This vision of Sudan sits at odds with the patchwork of
varying religions and tribes in the country and threatens the many
minority communities who do not identify with or support Bashir's
version of an Arab-Islamist state. Bashir's words suggest that the
regime will continue to pursue policies that favor the NCP's
interpretation of political Islam and concentrate political, economic,
and military power among the northern Riverine elite, further fueling
the roots of conflict in Sudan.
violent management of dissent
The Sudanese Government continues to silence political dissent
using brutal tactics. Scattered protests since January across major
cities in Sudan have been met with force by the regime's omnipresent
and sophisticated security apparatus. Arbitrary arrests and beatings
are consistently employed to put an end to demonstrations; detainees
have come forward to describe the severe psychological and physical
torture committed by members of the government security services,
including harsh beatings, electric shocks, sexual assault, and threats
of those violent acts. The NCP defends its actions by invoking the
state of emergency law, which is still in place in Darfur, Kassala, and
Red Sea states, as well as the National Security Act, which was put in
place in 2009. The state of emergency has been repeatedly used by the
government as a means to arbitrarily arrest and detain people
incommunicado, as well as to ban gatherings and peaceful demonstrations
that may be political in nature. The National Security Act grants
sweeping powers to the National Intelligence and Security Services, or
NISS, including to arbitrarily arrest and detain, and to search and
seize. Together, they allow the government to effectively intimidate or
silence those who might speak against it.
Across Sudan's restive regions, the regime also uses military means
to respond to what are fundamentally social and political problems--
even while peace processes remain an option. Indiscriminant air
attacks, targeting of civilians based on political sympathies and
ethnic affiliations, manipulation and obstruction of international
humanitarian assistance, and the use of proxy militias to sow divisions
between long coexisting communities, continue to be committed by
Khartoum's forces in Darfur and South Kordofan. In South Kordofan,
serious allegations of a government policy of ethnic cleansing have
emerged.
political machinations
Khartoum continues to disingenuously engage in peace processes
related to Sudan's various conflicts, be it through the
nonimplementation of agreements it has already signed or through the
manner of its participation in currently ongoing talks, such as those
regarding Abyei, post-referendum issues, Darfur, and the ``Two Areas,''
South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
During the Darfur peace negotiations in Doha, Khartoum sent
representatives lacking decisionmaking authority and put in place plans
to domesticate the peace process, in order to manipulate the talks and
undermine international involvement. At present, the NCP is pushing for
the Liberty and Justice Movement, or LJM, to sign a draft document that
has no hope of securing peace, but that will undoubtedly advance the
government's plans to push the international community out of the
process.
Despite ongoing negotiations to break the impasse on Abyei, the
Sudanese regime forcibly occupied the region, strengthening its
bargaining position vis-a-vis other post-referendum issues and creating
an environment in which the holding of a referendum, or any other kind
of negotiated resolution, would be impossible with the SPLM. Similarly,
Khartoum allowed its military to engage in hostile actions against the
northern sector of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, or SPLM-N,
even though the CPA provisions for South Kordofan and Blue Nile had not
been fulfilled and the African Union, or A.U., was already in the midst
of negotiating the status of those fighters after secession.
International mediators have often played into the hands of the NCP
by allowing Khartoum to constantly change the rules of the game. In
Darfur, for example, the government has been pushing for an internal
``Darfur Political Process'' as the only forum for talks despite the
importance for negotiations to take place on neutral and secure ground.
This idea has received support from some members of the international
community, even though it remains incredibly impractical at this time.
In talks on Abyei, the A.U. has consistently failed to press the NCP to
make the necessary compromises, either on the definition of ``Abyei
resident'' in order to hold the referendum, or when an exhaustive list
of extra-CPA solutions were put on the table. Further, through its May
invasion of the area, the government has successfully changed the
conversation from the status of Abyei to the more immediate problem of
securing SAF's retreat, thus delaying negotiations on the most crucial
issues.
Khartoum's political machinations are also well-documented in its
management of the April 2010 elections, and its questionable
involvement in the South Kordofan elections in May. In Darfur, long
before the April elections, for example, the NCP had changed the
political reality on the ground in Darfur by manipulating the census
and registration processes, and redrawing electoral districts in its
favor.
a situation in flux
South Sudan's secession will produce two fragile states that demand
the continued attention of the international community. In the North, a
period of political maneuvering is taking place alongside a number of
critical processes that will help shape the state that Sudan becomes
after secession. The international community should seize upon this
window of opportunity--as the Sudanese leadership recalculates its
relationship to its constituencies, its allies, its opponents, and the
international community--to encourage the regime to engage in genuine
dialogue with its population and move toward more inclusive governance,
for the sake of its own stability and its future relationships with
other countries.
Post-secession economic woes and increasing political pressures
have necessitated a rethink within the NCP. Economic pressures
resulting from the loss of oil revenues associated with secession could
lead Khartoum to greater engagement with the West, resulting in greater
international leverage over Khartoum's actions. At the same time,
hardliners within the NCP have reportedly strengthened relations with
Eritrean officials, cooperating in the trafficking of weapons through
eastern Sudan for financial compensation. Some of those routes
reportedly end in Gaza and begin in Tehran, adding Iran to the list of
parties disinterested in the normalization of Sudan's relations with
the larger international community, and especially the U.S.
Politically, the NCP is also under pressure from some constituencies
for its decision to let go of the South. A number of recent decisions
made by the government--military invasion and occupation of Abyei, the
sacking of former security advisor Salah Gosh, considered a moderate
among Bashir's top associates, and attacks in South Kordofan--suggest
that at the moment the NCP is intent on appeasing hardliners in the
party and the military.
The South's secession has also prompted political posturing by
opposition parties in the North seeking to fill the open seats in
government left by the SPLM. In early 2011, a number of mainstream
opposition parties came together as the National Coalition Front, or
NCF, and called for a constitutional conference and a number of
reforms, threatening regime change if those demands were not met.
Although the coalition has issued the occasional public statement
together, it has largely fragmented. In particular, the mainline
opposition parties the Umma and the Democratic Union Party, or DUP,
have entered into separate bilateral talks at the invitation of the
NCP, undercutting the leverage that opposition unity might have posed,
to the ire of other members.
Dialogue between the Umma and the NCP appears to have yielded
progress on a number of key issues. Despite this progress, however, it
is unlikely that talks will result in any kind of dramatic reform or
political transformation. The Umma and the DUP appear to be more
interested in what share of the government they can acquire--which
depends on cooperation with the NCP--than in any substantive changes to
how Sudan is governed. The NCP's main concern appears to be
accommodating these parties just enough to quell their dissent while
maintaining its grip on power. More radical change is dependent on
clear alternative political agendas, which the traditional opposition
parties appear to lack, as well as the space for voicing differing
perspectives, which the government prevents.
In January, it seemed that the revolutionary fervor that had hit
Tunis and Cairo would spread to Khartoum. Sudanese youth led protests
against the regime and opposition parties, in cities and universities
across the North in a sign of growing frustration with the entire
political status quo. Scattered protests against austerity measures
instituted by the government, the conflict in Darfur, and government
attempts to take land without compensation, have also taken place. Thus
far, protests have had little traction, because government security
forces have swiftly crushed the demonstrations.
The government is also faced with militant groups on the periphery,
such as those in Darfur and South Kordofan, who recognize the links
between violence in their regions and broader government policies and
are therefore incorporating calls for national reforms into their
negotiating positions. For instance, the JEM has called for ``the
effective participation of Darfur and all other Regions of Sudan in
decisionmaking'' on wealth-sharing. Similarly, one of the principles
listed in the framework agreement outlining the path to peace for South
Kordofan is ``[a] commitment to balanced development in all parts of
Sudan with special attention to Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and other
less developed areas.'' This is followed by the assertion that the,
``[p]arties shall work together toward an inclusive national process in
the Republic of Sudan, aimed at constitutional reform.''
rethinking sudan's multiple processes
A number of political processes have been underway in recent years
that have the potential to begin to address the root causes of Sudan's
perennial instability. These processes--popular consultations in Blue
Nile and South Kordofan, peace talks and civil society consultations
for Darfur, and a constitutional review--are ideally forums in which
the wider Sudanese public and the various levels of government can
engage in a conversation on how the new Sudanese state should be run.
Without international engagement, the likelihood that the government
will participate in these processes genuinely or allow these processes
to be inclusive and transparent, is slim.
the ``two areas'': south kordofan and blue nile
Popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan are exercises
meant to ascertain whether the citizens of the two states are satisfied
with their peace protocol in the CPA. The protocol lays out how these
two areas, recognized as unique territories, should be administered--
including, among other items, how power and wealth are shared between
the federal government and the two states, and how land is managed. If
the consultations ultimately demonstrate that residents are
dissatisfied with the provisions in place, the states' legislative
assemblies can renegotiate with the government the terms of the states'
relationship with the center. Consultations have stalled in Blue Nile
and been upended by the return to war in South Kordofan, but they
should continue after July 9 according to the framework agreement
signed between the NCP and SPLM-N on June 28.
Internationally supported negotiations at the political party
level, between SPLM-N and the NCP, will also be ongoing. Aside from
securing a cease-fire and political arrangements amenable to both
parties in South Kordofan, talks will likely touch on the relationship
between the two states and the center, and the role the SPLM-N is
allowed to play in the constitutional review.
darfur
Negotiations in Doha between rebel groups and the government have
been ongoing since February 2009. The content of the talks have
included, among other things, the level of political power given to the
region on the national stage, the distribution of wealth, issues of
justice and reconciliation, and issues affecting the displaced, such as
their return, land, and compensation. Currently, only two rebel groups,
JEM and LJM, out of a number of other groups engaged in fighting, are
participating in the talks. In April, international mediators put
forward a draft agreement that some observers believe is a weak
document whose provisions will be unenforceable. The NCP is encouraging
LJM to sign the agreement, while JEM has put forward its own draft
document in response, which has been rejected by the NCP.
At the same time, the Sudanese Government, the A.U., and the AU-
U.N. Mission in Darfur, or UNAMID, are pushing for the continuation of
the peace process inside Darfur, which would consist of consultations
with Darfuri citizens without rebel representation. This comes in the
wake of the All Darfur Stakeholders' Conference, which brought
approximately 500 Darfuri leaders to Doha to express their views and
concerns about the peace process, and to gain their buy-in for the
draft peace document. Although the participants were allowed the unique
opportunity to publicly vent their frustrations, the government's
continuing control over stakeholder participation and its refusal to
discuss Darfur in the context of wider Sudanese issues, suggest that
the potential for the stakeholder conference to lead to significant
change was limited from the outset and the potential for any internal
process to bear fruit at this time is virtually negligible.
constitutional review
The interim constitution that has governed Sudan since the signing
of the CPA needs to be replaced with a permanent constitution. Under
the CPA, the constitution should be the result of a review process that
``provide[s] for political inclusiveness and public participation.''
Among other key details, the language of the text should define the
structure of the Sudanese Government, the source of legislation in the
country (currently Sharia and customary law), citizenship, and the
rights of the Sudanese population. The document should also touch
deeply on those issues that have become important in discussions in the
peripheries--including how to draw the administrative regions of Sudan
(15 states or 6 regions), define the type of federalism or relationship
that should be in place between states and the center, and lay out how
wealth is distributed throughout the country.
The process of drafting and approving the document is as crucial as
the text of the constitution itself. Civil society groups representing
all 15 states in the North have come together to collectively call for
a ``participatory, inclusive, and transparent constitution-making
process'' and a ``nationally owned nationally respected constitution
that reflects the needs and aspiration of the people of Sudan.'' The
coalition also highlighted the need for wide civic education to be
conducted in order for dialogue to be substantive and genuinely
participatory. A transparent, participatory, and inclusive Sudan-wide
dialogue on its future constitution should be viewed as an important
means of empowering the Sudanese people to decide the future of their
state.
In May, the government floated vague details of a constitutional
review process during a U.N. meeting that appears to fall well short of
the mark. During the meeting, government officials revealed that a
``National Committee'' for constitution-making would be created,
consisting of 300 to 400 members nominated by the President. Political
parties and civil society would be allowed to participate, though
remarks by officials at the time suggest that the selection of who gets
to participate and with what degree of representation would be
government-controlled. The committee would be charged with holding
consultative meetings--likely only one per state--followed by a
referendum on the final draft. Participants in the meeting predicted
that the mandate of the committee would be very broad given officials'
preliminary descriptions, and noted that officials voiced skepticism
over wider consultations with the public because of the financial
costs. Officials proposed a
4-month timeline, beginning after July 9, for the review.
Thus far, opposition parties have mistakenly only focused on the
content of the future constitution, rather than engaging with the
government on the review process itself. Some parties have demonstrated
no clear vision on an ideal process, and have appeared disorganized and
vague in their response to the government's proposed plans.
Talks in Doha have, to some extent, led to a larger conversation
about the need for national reform. However, the government, in
response, has expressed its unwillingness to address these nationwide
issues through its Darfur negotiations. Instead, it has pushed for a
Darfur-based process that, even in its most perfect form, would not
even begin to address the broader policies of Khartoum that led to
regional unrest in the first place.
The framework agreement signed between the NCP and the SPLM-N on
June 28, stated that, ``The Popular Consultations Process is a
democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and shall be complete and its outcomes
fully implemented and fed into the constitutional reform.'' While
undoubtedly an encouraging sign, the document itself is simply a
``framework,'' not a binding agreement.
one process going forward
The merits of holding separate tracks of negotiations on top of a
national process, which in theory would address many of the same
issues, should be reexamined. Fundamentally, grievances in Darfur, Blue
Nile, and South Kordofan are based on questions of how power and wealth
is distributed throughout Sudan, which in turn tie to questions of
Sudanese identity and the relationship between the country's diverse
communities. These questions are not exclusive to Darfur, South
Kordofan, or Blue Nile; they are national issues that can only be
genuinely addressed at the national level.
The plurality of processes, while seemingly all-encompassing, poses
a challenge to the future of Sudan.The danger is that separate
consultations will ultimately pit peripheries, all claiming pieces from
the same pie, against each other. Additionally, discussing national
issues with select regional actors has the potential to encourage other
regions to agitate for their own unique relationship with the center.
For example, discussions on wealth-sharing in South Kordofan and Blue
Nile have reportedly piqued the interest of the state government in
another northern state, Sennar, to negotiate a better wealth-sharing
deal itself. This is especially threatening under the watch of a regime
that has long mastered the art of sowing divisions between its various
constituencies.
The recognition that a national dialogue is needed to address the
root causes of Sudan's crises is not a new concept. In an effort to
create a New Sudan, in 1986 a large number of Sudanese political
parties and civil society representatives issued a declaration that
proposed a National Constitutional Conference, which would discuss
questions of Sudanese nationality, religion, human rights, system of
rule, and culture. More contemporary models are also worth examining.
For example, the popular consultations that have taken place in Blue
Nile could be replicated on a wider scale as a means to engage with the
Sudanese public on the draft of a constitution.
How talks in the peripheries can feed into, or are at least
coordinated with a national process is a complicated task, one that
will require the juggling of multiple agendas and personalities. On the
one end, the processes in Darfur and the two areas could be completely
scrapped in favor of a new, nationwide process that brings everyone to
the table. On the other, the different tracks could continue to proceed
in parallel, followed by last-minute efforts to reconcile and
coordinate the resolutions of each. Another option that has also been
proposed, is to continue the discussion on issues particular to the
regions in regional talks, while separating out national questions for
discussion at the national level.
recommendations for international engagement
The international community must be smarter in its engagement with
Khartoum after July 9, shifting its strategy to one that reframes the
country's multiple conflicts as manifestations of the same disease:
government policies that concentrate wealth and power at the center at
the expense of the people on the peripheries. While the United States
has been a critical actor in the history of international diplomacy
with Khartoum, Washington's hand will be constrained in pushing for a
national reconciliation process. As a result of its own policy that was
unveiled in November 2010, the U.S.'s biggest points of leverage are
tied to the implementation of the CPA and a resolution to the conflict
in Darfur. U.S. officials have also shown reluctance toward the
inclusion of national issues in the Darfur talks, citing doubts over
rebel movements' sincerity to push for a broader agenda, as well as the
Sudanese government's own unwillingness to discuss national issues in
that context.
Nevertheless, the U.S. can begin to engage in the peace processes
for Darfur and the Two Areas as pieces of a necessary national process,
rather than as end goals unto themselves. A strategic rethink beginning
in the U.S. Special Envoy's office is necessary to examine some
critical questions: How does the U.S. approach Sudan as a whole? And
how can the separate processes be sequenced to feed into a national
process?
In its public and private communications to Khartoum, as well as
international actors with influence over the regime, it is important
that the U.S. conveys its expectations of a participatory, inclusive,
and transparent constitutional review process. Particular emphasis
should be placed on the quality of the process, not just its outcome.
Support for a constitutional review should be accompanied by U.S. and
international pressure on Khartoum to create an environment conducive
to genuine dialogue including greater respect for human rights. This
pressure can and should be enhanced by U.S. support for and engagement
with civil society and political parties, as well as its support for
initiatives that foster independent media in Sudan, such as Radio
Dabanga.
The U.S. must continue its diplomatic response to the ongoing
crisis, which should be centered around pressure on Khartoum to protect
its civilians, and a push for a cease-fire in South Kordofan.
Consistent with stated Sudan policy, steps toward normalization should
be suspended absent progress on the ground. The expansion of targeted
sanctions and other unilateral and multilateral consequences for
individuals responsible for fomenting war in Sudan can and should form
an integral component of this effort. Going forward, however, the
deployment of such pressures--or any other diplomatic tools--must
secure more than just another regional peace agreement; it should be
used to advance the greater goal of laying the foundation for
sustainable peace throughout the whole of Sudan.
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