[Senate Hearing 112-86]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-86
NOMINATION OF RYAN C. CROCKER
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 8, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Crocker, Hon. Ryan C., of Washington, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan......................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
McCain, John, U.S. Senator from Arizona, statement............... 4
(iii)
NOMINATION OF RYAN C. CROCKER
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
----------
Hon. Ryan C. Crocker, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
----------
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen,
Coons, Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch, and Isakson.
Also present: Senator John McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you all very much. I apologize for being slightly
tardy here.
We welcome our friend and our colleague, Senator John
McCain. We're delighted to have him here for the purposes of
making an introduction.
Obviously, we're here today to consider President Obama's
nominee for Ambassador to Afghanistan, and I think we are very
fortunate that the President has chosen one of America's most
experienced and able diplomats to serve in Kabul, and we're
very fortunate that Ambassador Ryan Crocker has agreed to
serve.
We're happy to welcome him again before the Foreign
Relations Committee. As everybody knows, in his distinguished
career he has served as ambassador to five countries, including
such challenging posts as Pakistan, Iraq, and Lebanon; and
immediately after the Taliban's ouster he became charge
d'affaires in Afghanistan, reopening our Embassy for the first
time since 1989. So this is a man with experience in the region
and experience in these complicated and difficult tasks.
I think he thought he had retired to a quiet life in
academia, but the President had another idea, and I want to say
on behalf of all of us how grateful we are, Ambassador Crocker,
that you and your wife Christine were willing to agree to
return to public service.
Obviously, you will arrive in this post at a pivotal moment
in the conflict. We have a critical planning window in front of
us right now. This is a critical moment. It's a moment where we
have the ability to recalibrate, if that's what's needed, to
redefine, and to do the things necessary in the wake of the
successes that we have had against al-Qaeda, which was the
principal reason for being in Afghanistan in the first place.
So in order to ensure a transition, I think there are a number
of things that need to be thought through.
Last month we held five hearings on Afghanistan and
Pakistan to examine all the assumptions guiding our strategy in
the region and to help chart a path forward. In about 2 weeks,
Secretary of State Clinton will testify here on the
administration's thinking and address congressional concerns as
the President decides how many troops to draw down starting in
July. Needless to say, I think it would be very helpful if this
committee and the Senate can move very rapidly on this
nomination in order to put you in place to be part of those
deliberations.
I'd just say very quickly--I know Senator McCain is here,
so I'll truncate this. But I'll just say very quickly that I
think we ought to be guided by certain truths here. First,
while the United States has genuine national security interests
in Afghanistan, our current commitment in troops and in dollars
is neither proportional to our interest nor sustainable, in my
judgment.
Second, our military has made significant gains, clearing
and holding in the south, but as the President has said,
they're fragile and reversible absent continued U.S. robust
presence there. We've not yet made sufficient gains in the
east, where the threat from insurgent groups based in Pakistan
continues, and I will continue to beat this drum that the
principal equation with respect to our capacity to resolve
concerns in Afghanistan still lies in Pakistan and will lie in
our ability to adjust that relationship, and indeed to create a
regional framework with respect to this conflict. I want to
emphasize that regional framework.
Third, only a political settlement will resolve this. Every
military leader has said that. There is no military solution.
Reconciliation is not a silver bullet, but we're going to need
to support the Government of Afghanistan as it tries to engage
those willing to make some kind of acceptable agreement.
And finally, we need to reexamine the current plan with
respect to the Afghan National Security Forces because there
are serious questions about size, capability, sustainability,
and I think we need to examine those very carefully.
Also today, the majority on the committee is releasing a
report regarding assistance. This is a report meant to be
constructive. It's a report with critical observations but
observations that are made in the best spirit of joint
cooperative effort, and we appreciate Administrator Shah's
responses and assistance, and we appreciate the
administration's cooperation with us in efforts to address the
concerns that we have.
The report argues that U.S. assistance needs to meet three
basic conditions before that money is dispensed. The projects
have got to be necessary, achievable, and sustainable.
So over the next few months, there's a lot on the table for
the Congress and for the President, and Ambassador Crocker is
going to have an essential role, a critical role to play in
making sure that we get it right.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our very distinguished nominee.
Ambassador Crocker has returned from his well-earned
retirement to again apply his unsurpassed experience at
managing civil-military collaboration in a dynamic conflict
environment. I thank him for his commitment and know that he
will bring insight and informed judgment to his job in Kabul.
This is the sixth hearing the Foreign Relations Committee
has held related to Afghanistan during the last 2 months. We
have explored not just what is happening in Afghanistan and
neighboring Pakistan, but whether our vast expenditures in
Afghanistan represent a rational allocation of our military and
financial assets.
Our geostrategic interests are threatened, not just by
terrorism, but by debt, economic competition, energy and food
prices, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
numerous other forces. Solving these problems will be much more
difficult if we devote too many resources to one country that,
historically, has frustrated nation-building experiments.
The question the President must answer is whether we can
achieve the most important national security goals in
Afghanistan--especially preventing the Taliban from taking over
the government and preventing Afghan territory from being used
as a terrorist safe haven--at far less expense.
Ambassador Crocker would be assuming his post coincident
with the Obama administration's review of Afghanistan policy
that is anticipated to result in some level of troop reduction.
This opportunity should be used to do more than just withdraw
an arbitrary number of troops based on political expediency.
Rather, the President should put forward a new plan that
includes a definition of success in Afghanistan based on the
United States vital interests and a sober analysis of what is
possible to achieve.
Such a plan should include an explanation of what metrics
must be satisfied before the country is considered secure. It
should also designate and eliminate those activities that are
not intrinsic to our core objectives. The administration's
ambiguity on our goals must be eliminated in order to more
effectively address our national security interests and convey
to Afghans the continuing relationship we will maintain as
allies in the region.
Despite 10 years of investment and attempts to better
understand the culture and the region's actors, we remain in a
cycle that produces relative progress but fails to deliver a
secure political or military resolution. In Afghanistan,
measuring success according to relative progress has very
little meaning. Undoubtedly, we will make some progress when we
are spending more than $100 billion per year in that country.
The more important question is whether we have an efficient
strategy for protecting our vital interests that does not
involve massive open-ended expenditures and does not require us
to have more faith than is justified in Afghan institutions.
I would appreciate hearing the nominee's impressions of the
Obama administration's strategic review and of how we can
improve Afghanistan's capacity to defend and govern itself,
while reducing our own commitment of resources.
I applaud Ambassador Crocker's willingness, once again, to
take on an extremely difficult mission, and I look forward to
his testimony.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
As I said previously, it is a privilege for the committee
to welcome Senator McCain. As the ranking member and chair and
so forth, back and forth on the Armed Services Committee,
there's nobody with more experience in these matters or who
pays more attention to them in the Senate, and I appreciate his
taking the time to be here to introduce Ambassador Crocker.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for your kind words, and thank you for indulging me
to introduce this great American.
Senator Lugar and members of the committee, it's an honor
to introduce the President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador
to Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker, a man whose stellar record of
service precedes him and speaks for itself.
Obviously, I join the committee in recognizing two members
of Ambassador Crocker's family who are joining him today, his
niece Cameron, and of course the dedicated woman who has been
by his side ever since they were young Foreign Service officers
working together in Baghdad in 1979, Ryan's wife, Christine.
I understand the challenges of being a Foreign Service
couple, and I know that Ryan could never have enjoyed as many
successes without the support of Christine.
Those successes make the task of introducing Ambassador
Crocker quite easy. The U.S. Senate has had the wisdom to
confirm him to the post of ambassador, as the chairman pointed
out, five times already--Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, Pakistan, and
Iraq. And this is only a fraction of Ambassador Crocker's
story.
When the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed, Ryan Crocker
was a young officer who helped pull wounded colleagues from the
rubble. When the United States needed to reopen our Embassy in
Afghanistan after the Taliban were driven from power in 2001,
the Secretary of State sent Ryan Crocker. A few years later,
facing the same challenge in Iraq after the fall of Saddam
Hussein, once again Ryan Crocker was the only man for the job.
It is nearly impossible to find other American diplomats who
can match his record.
I had met Ambassador Crocker in his earlier posts, but
where I really came to know him and to respect him most was
during his amazing tour in Baghdad. It is difficult to remember
just what Ambassador Crocker was getting himself into when he
raised his hand to serve in 2007. The violence in Iraq was
spiraling out of control. Dozens of civilians were being killed
every day. The ethnic and sectarian battle lines were drawn.
Iraq faced the very real prospect of tearing apart, and America
faced the horrifying possibility of being driven from the
country in defeat.
Fortunately, President Bush adopted a new policy, and of
all the consequential decisions that he made in January 2007--
the change of strategy, the surge of forces, the nomination of
GEN David Petraeus--one of the most important and least
appreciated was the nomination of Ryan Crocker as his
Ambassador to Iraq.
I'm sure that if you asked Ambassador Crocker, he will say
he was just doing his part to serve his country where and when
he was needed most. Heroes always say that. The truth is, what
Ambassador Crocker accomplished in Iraq was nothing short of a
miracle. General Petraeus has obviously received huge praise
for the role he played in Iraq, and he deserves every bit of
it. But as General Petraeus would be the first to affirm, our
military strategy in Iraq would never have worked without Ryan
Crocker's constant, dogged, and tireless leadership of our
political strategy.
Ambassador Crocker put the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on a
counterinsurgency footing. He established a seamless
partnership with General Petraeus and his military leaders
which set the standard for civil-military partnerships at every
level of our effort across Iraq. He also established a
relationship of trust with Prime Minister Maliki and his
government, and then used that relationship to push, prod,
encourage, and support the Iraqis in saving their country.
Throughout this struggle, as rockets smashed into his
office in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker performed his duties with
courage, poise under pressure, a unique ability to marry
strategic vision with tactical effectiveness, and a relentless
work ethic that literally almost killed him.
I commend the President for recognizing that there is no
better man for the job of Ambassador to Afghanistan than Ryan
Crocker. I also commend Ambassador Crocker for again answering
his country's call to service. In Afghanistan today, a new
generation of Americans, both military personnel and civilians,
is writing the inspiring next chapter to the history of our
great Nation. The challenge for all of us, in our time of
service, is to strive to be equal to these heroic fellow
Americans.
In nominating Ryan Crocker as Ambassador to Afghanistan,
the President has chosen a man who is worthy of the service and
sacrifice of those he must lead. I hope all of you will reach a
similar judgment and vote him out of committee quickly so that
the full Senate can confirm Ambassador Crocker as rapidly as
possible.
And I'd like to finally add, I think that the chairman and
ranking member and others would agree with me. We've had the
great privilege of having so many outstanding Americans serve
in our diplomatic service in our State Department, and
Americans probably are not appreciative of the enormous
sacrifices they make. There is no greater example of that kind
of service and sacrifice than the man whose nomination is
before you today.
I thank the chairman, and I apologize for the length of my
opening statement.
The Chairman. Well, Senator McCain, no apology needed at
all. I think it's a very important statement. I appreciate the
fact, both the length and the thought that went into it. I
think it's very helpful to the committee. It's important for
the record, and I think it really states in a very articulate,
clear way the assets that Ambassador Crocker brings to this
task. And I think it's important that you've said those things
and I've said those things so that the message goes clear to
President Karzai, to President Zardari, to others in the region
that this is a serious person that we all have confidence in
and brings a great deal of experience. So I think your
introduction was, frankly, superb and really welcome. Thank
you.
Ambassador Crocker, you're flying alone now, but you've
done that a lot. So we are delighted to welcome your testimony
and you to the committee.
You know how it works. If you want to put your full
statement in the record as if read in full, it will be placed
there. If you want to summarize, we can then have a good
dialogue and look forward to the questions. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, OF WASHINGTON, TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to become
U.S. Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. And I'm
very grateful to Senator McCain for his most generous
introduction and for his recognition of the Foreign Service, my
colleagues that over the years have labored hard on behalf of
America's vital interests and sometimes paid the ultimate
price.
I am also grateful to the President and to Secretary
Clinton for placing their trust in me. If confirmed, I look
forward to cooperating with you to advance America's interests
in Afghanistan.
I had the privilege of opening the Embassy in Kabul in
January 2002. As you noted, I worked closely with President
Karzai in those early days and developed respect for his
commitment to a stable, unified Afghanistan. If confirmed, I
look forward to renewing our relationship and working together
toward that vision.
I also had the honor of serving as the U.S. Ambassador to
Pakistan from 2004-07, which developed my understanding of the
region and which, if confirmed, I hope will be a useful asset
as we work with our regional and international partners.
As you know, our core goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan is
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to deny it safe
haven in those countries. Osama bin Laden's death is an
important step, but much work remains to be done to ensure that
al-Qaeda can never again threaten us from Afghanistan, with the
Taliban providing safe haven.
Our efforts to pursue this goal are focused on three
mutually reinforcing surges--military, civilian, and
diplomatic--all aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan so it will not
become a safe haven for terrorists again.
The military and civilian surges that President Obama
announced in 2009 have stolen momentum from the Taliban-led
insurgency. Today, more than 1,100 U.S. civilian experts are
serving alongside our troops to help establish the conditions
for a sustainable and irreversible transition of security
responsibility to the Afghan Government. If confirmed, it will
be an enormous privilege to serve with these courageous and
committed Americans.
Working together with the Government of Afghanistan and our
coalition partners, we have made significant progress. But as
you have noted, as the President has noted, this progress is
still fragile and reversible. Enormous challenges remain:
governance; rule of law, including corruption, which undermines
the credibility of the Afghan state; narcotics; sustainable
economic development, including employment, increased revenues,
along with the capacity for the government to provide basic
services such as education and health care. Failure in some of
these areas can mean failure of the state and the creation of
an environment in which our strategic enemies can regroup.
Making progress on these issues has been hard, and it will go
on being hard, but hard does not mean impossible. As Secretary
of Defense Gates has noted, we walked away from Afghanistan
once in 1989 with disastrous consequences. We cannot afford to
do so again.
Ultimately, all of this will be an Afghan responsibility,
realized through a responsible transition. A key U.S. priority
in Afghanistan is supporting the Afghan-led transition process
that was agreed upon by the Afghans and NATO-ISAF partners at
the November 2010 NATO summit at Lisbon. This process will
enable Afghans to systematically assume full responsibility for
their security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
The transition process will begin this July with the
transfer of lead security responsibility to the Afghan National
Security Forces in seven provinces and municipalities, which I
understand contain roughly one-quarter of the Afghan
population. If confirmed, I will work hand in hand with our
military partners, as I did as the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, to
continue this responsible, conditions-based transition to an
Afghan security lead.
Alongside this transition process, the Afghan Government
has launched a peace effort to reconcile insurgents. President
Karzai formed a High Peace Council that includes
representatives from across Afghanistan. The United States
supports this Afghan effort. Over the last 2 years, we both
have laid out our unambiguous redlines for reconciliation with
the insurgents: renounce violence; abandon their alliance with
al-Qaeda; and abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan and its
protections for all Afghans, including women. Those are
necessary outcomes of any negotiation. If former militants are
willing to meet these redlines, they would then be able to
participate in the political life of the country.
If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will work closely with
Ambassador Grossman, our Special Representative to Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and Ambassador Munter in Pakistan, among others,
to continue our efforts to build support for an Afghan-led
reconciliation process. I will maintain our efforts to support
Afghanistan's long-term reconstruction, sustainable economic
development, and the strengthening of key Afghan institutions
critical to ensuring that transition is sustainable and
irreversible.
We do look forward to a long-term relationship with
Afghanistan and have initiated negotiations on a long-term
Strategic Partnership Declaration with the Afghan Government in
March of this year. This political framework document will help
normalize our relationship and provide a roadmap for our
political, economic, and security cooperation. We respect
Afghanistan's proud history of independence, and we do not seek
any permanent military bases in their country or a presence
that would be a threat to any of Afghanistan's neighbors.
In closing, I want to thank this committee for the support
it has provided and continues to provide for the vital work of
the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. As you know, Mr. Chairman, you
have held a series of useful hearings over the past several
months to examine our policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and,
if confirmed, I will listen to your guidance and continue a
dialogue with Congress on our progress on the ground. And in
that context, I would note that I've just received a copy of
the report you cite. So if confirmed, I think I know where that
dialogue is going to begin.
I will also ensure that the precious U.S. taxpayer
resources being used in Afghanistan are applied effectively,
transparently, and with an eye toward the long-term
sustainability of these efforts by the Afghans themselves.
As the Secretary said in her February 18 speech at the Asia
Society, ``The United States is not walking away from the
region. We will not repeat the mistakes of the past. Our
commitment is real and it is enduring.'' As we approach the
10th anniversary of the horrible attacks of September 11, it is
a time to remember those who died that day and to honor the
sacrifices that so many Americans have made, military and
civilian, to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe
haven for terrorists from which they can attack America.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the
committee. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama's
nominee to become U.S. Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan. I am grateful to the President and to Secretary Clinton
for placing their trust in me. If confirmed, I look forward to working
closely with you to advance America's interests in Afghanistan.
I had the privilege of opening the Embassy in Kabul in January
2002. I worked closely with President Karzai in those early days and
developed a great deal of respect for his commitment to a stable,
unified Afghanistan. If confirmed, I look forward to renewing our
relationship and working together to help the Afghans realize our
shared vision for the future of their country, one that is free,
secure, democratic, and can stand on its own feet, and plot its own
course toward its destiny. I also had the honor of serving as the U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan from 2004-07, which developed my understanding
of the region and, which, if confirmed, I hope will be a useful asset
as we work with our regional and international partners towards a
stable Afghanistan.
As you know, our core goal in Afghanistan, and Pakistan, is to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda, and to deny it safe haven in
those countries. Our efforts to pursue this goal are focused on three
mutually reinforcing surges--military, civilian, and diplomatic. Osama
bin Laden's death is an important step toward achieving this objective,
but much work remains to be done to ensure that al-Qaeda can never
again threaten us from Afghanistan with the Taliban providing safe
haven.
The military and civilian surges that President Obama announced in
2009 have stolen momentum from the Taliban-led insurgency. Today, more
than 1,100 U.S. civilian experts are serving alongside our troops to
help establish the conditions for a sustainable and irreversible
transition of security responsibility to the Afghan Government.
Working together with the Government of Afghanistan and our
coalition partners, including many Muslim majority nations, we have
made significant progress, but this progress is still fragile and
reversible. Enormous challenges remain: governance; rule of law,
including corruption, which undermines economic growth and the
credibility of the Afghan state; narcotics; sustainable economic
development, including adequate employment opportunities, increased
revenues along with the capacity for the government to provide basic
services, such as education and health care. Failure in some of these
areas can mean failure of the state and the creation of an environment
in which our strategic enemies can regroup. Making progress on these
issues has been hard, and it will go on being hard. But hard does not
mean hopeless. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, we
walked away from Afghanistan once in 1989 with disastrous consequences.
We cannot afford to do so again.
Ultimately, all of this will be an Afghan responsibility, realized
through a responsible transition. A key U.S. priority in Afghanistan is
supporting the Afghan-led transition process that was agreed upon by
the Afghans and NATO-ISAF partners at the November 2010 NATO summit at
Lisbon. This process will enable Afghans to systematically resume full
responsibility for their security across Afghanistan by the end of
2014. President Karzai has repeatedly, and understandably, requested
that the United States and our partners and allies phase out parallel
structures and move to less intrusive forms of assistance that enable
the Afghans take control of their own future. We support that goal and
appreciate President Karzai's March 22 speech announcing the start of
transition.
This transition process will begin this July with the transfer of
lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces in
seven provinces and municipalities, which contain roughly 25 percent of
the Afghan population. If confirmed, I will work hand in hand with our
military partners, as I did as the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, to continue
this responsible, conditions-based transition to Afghan security lead,
which is a major priority for President Karzai.
Alongside this transition process, the Afghan Government has
launched a peace effort to reconcile insurgents. President Karzai made
a good start by convening a broad-based Peace Jirga last June that set
out a framework for national reconciliation. He then formed a High
Peace Council that includes representatives from across Afghanistan.
Council leaders are holding meetings in key provinces throughout the
country with tribal leaders, civil society, women, and villagers to
hear their hopes and concerns for a reconciliation process. They are
working to form local councils to begin engaging the insurgents and the
broader community.
The United States supports this Afghan effort. Over the past 2
years, we both have laid out our unambiguous redlines for
reconciliation with the insurgents: renounce violence; abandon their
alliance with al-Qaeda; and abide by the constitution of Afghanistan
and its protections for all Afghans, including women. Those are
necessary outcomes of any negotiation. This is the price for reaching a
political resolution and bringing an end to the military actions that
are targeting the insurgency's leadership and decimating its ranks. If
former militants are willing to meet these redlines, they would then be
able to participate in the political life of the country under their
constitution.
As transition proceeds and Afghan leadership strengthens across the
country, a process of political reconciliation will become increasingly
viable. In turn, successful reconciliation will reduce the threat to
the Afghan Government, making transition more sustainable. If
confirmed, I will work closely with Ambassador Grossman, our Special
Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ambassador Munter in
Pakistan among others, to continue our efforts to build support for an
Afghan-led reconciliation process. I will maintain our efforts to
support Afghanistan's long-term reconstruction, sustainable economic
development, and strengthening of key Afghan institutions critical to
ensuring that transition is sustainable and irreversible.
The United States and our partners will continue to support the
Afghan Government and a durable responsible political settlement.
Toward that end, we initiated negotiations on a long-term Strategic
Partnership Declaration with the Afghan Government in March 2011. This
political framework document will help normalize our relationship with
the Afghan Government, and provide a roadmap for our long-term
political, economic, and security cooperation. In no way should our
enduring commitment be misunderstood as a desire by America or our
allies to occupy Afghanistan against the will of its people. We respect
Afghans' proud history of independence, and we do not seek any
permanent American military bases in their country--or a presence that
would be a threat to any of Afghanistan's neighbors.
In closing, I want to thank this committee for the support it has
provided and continues to provide for the vital work of the U.S.
mission in Afghanistan. You have held a series of useful hearings over
the past month to examine our policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and,
if confirmed, I will listen to your guidance and continue a discussion
with Congress on our progress on the ground. I will also ensure that
the precious U.S. taxpayer resources being used in Afghanistan are
applied effectively, transparently, and with an eye toward the long-
term sustainability of these efforts by the Afghans themselves.
As the Secretary said in her February 18 speech at the Asia
Society, ``The United States is not walking away from the region. We
will not repeat the mistakes of the past. Our commitment is real and it
is enduring.'' As we approach the 10th anniversary of the heinous
attacks of September 11, it is a time to remember those who died that
day and to honor the sacrifices that so many Americans have made,
military and civilian, to ensure that Afghanistan never becomes a safe
haven for terrorists from which they can attack America.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward
to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker.
I want to come back--that last sentence sort of hit me, and
I want to come back to it in a minute. But let me say, first of
all, that I support and agree with the transition process that
will begin this July with the lead responsibility going to
Afghan security forces in seven provinces, representing the
somewhat roughly 25 percent of the Afghan population. Clearly,
the Taliban are trying to disrupt that with their increased
violence in the last days, targeting some of the governors and
high-level officials.
I also am particularly supportive of the Afghan-initiated
peace process, the reconciliation President Karzai has
initiated with his broad-based jirga last year and the things
coming out of it that you have mentioned in your testimony.
My concern is a little bit in sort of pinning down our own
definitions here and the breadth of what you've said, and
particularly this sort of notion, ensure that Afghanistan never
becomes a safe haven for terrorists from which they can attack
America.
I think we have to really kind of bear in on this question
of what that really entails. What is a safe haven, and how much
guarantee is there? To the degree there's a safe haven, if
that's what we're worried about, and we want to spend dollars
most efficiently, the safe haven is in the western part of
Pakistan. We're spending $120 billion in a country where there
is no safe haven and about $2.8 billion where there is a safe
haven.
The Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura, Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Jaish-e-Muhammad, these folks are the problem, and they're the
ones responsible for most of the violence that's taking place
in Afghanistan.
So I think the question is how do we get this right? I
mean, what I saw in RC East when I was there a few weeks ago
convinced me that if all we do is the current paradigm where
attacks are launched out of the western part of Pakistan, we're
not going to find a very successful road here. I'd like you to
comment on that.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These are very
important points. I have said in testimony before this
committee during that brief but happy interlude when I was out
of the Service that you cannot really succeed in Afghanistan
without a fair measure of success in Pakistan. That's why I
think your legislation, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, a
multiyear commitment, was so important.
These are hard problems to solve. I wrestled with them as
Ambassador to Pakistan. I had numerous meetings, as you've had,
with the Pakistani leadership to press on the Quetta Shura, on
the Haqqani Network, and clearly with the most limited of
results.
So again, I think that is why the administration has been
right in talking about the two nations together and having
Ambassador Grossman now succeeding Ambassador Holbrooke so that
you do have an approach that crosses the borders, because
certainly that's what the militants are doing.
How to crack that conundrum? Sir, I know you have made huge
efforts, as has Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Grossman in
recent weeks. We'll have to see whether the Pakistanis do take
these actions. And as I noted in my statement, I look forward
to working with Ambassador Munter, as well as Ambassador
Grossman, because we face a common problem.
The last thing I'd say, Mr. Chairman, is, quite frankly,
the reason that most of the problem is in Pakistan and not in
Afghanistan at this time is because we are in Afghanistan. And
as we go through a responsible transition, it I think has to
be, as the President and others have said, conditions-based to
ensure that as we draw down our forces--and I'm keenly aware
from my consultations of the mood both here on the Hill and
publicly, there has to be transition. But at the end of the
day, we have to be sure that the safe haven doesn't then
relocate from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
The Chairman. I understand that. The question is, Does it
take 150,000 troops to guarantee that doesn't happen?
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, that's again a question
that the President will be seized of. I am not part of those
deliberations or consultations, and indeed----
The Chairman. That's an unfair question. It's a question
that's on the table. I want to put the question to you, but I
understand you're not part of those deliberations now, so I
don't expect you to answer it today.
But let me ask you this. In your testimony you say enormous
challenges remain: governance; rule of law, including
corruption which undermines economic growth, credibility of the
Afghan state; narcotics; sustainable economic development,
including adequate employment opportunities, increased
revenues, along with the capacity for the government to provide
basic services; education; health care. Failure in some of
these areas can mean failure of the state and the creation of
an environment in which our strategic enemies can regroup.
Can you narrow that down for us? Which of those areas means
failure of the state and are essential to the accomplishment of
our goal?
Ambassador Crocker. I think clearly the issues of
governance, rule of law and corruption have to improve if
Afghanistan is to go forward as a stable state charting its own
destiny.
The Chairman. Are you saying, then, that taming corruption
is essential to our capacity to achieve our goal of preventing
strategic enemies from regrouping?
Ambassador Crocker. I think corruption, Mr. Chairman, and I
draw on my Iraq experience here, corruption totally unchecked
becomes, as prominent Iraqis put it, a second insurgency. It
undermines the confidence on the part of the people in their
government, and it makes groups like the Taliban look
attractive.
Mr. Chairman, we're not out to clearly create a shining
city on a hill. That's not going to happen. That would apply to
all of these sectors I've mentioned. But there needs to be
progress. We went through the same thing in Iraq. We chipped
away at it. Over time, we got them to take some measureable, if
partial, steps on the issue of corruption so that you have a
situation in Iraq today that is not, again, a city on a hill,
but where they have a good chance of carrying forward without
U.S. forces on the ground.
It's the same kind of dynamic that I think we have to go
through in Afghanistan, not to solve these problems----
The Chairman. Do you think that billions of dollars coming
from America that are spent through contractors which don't
have adequate oversight contributes to corruption?
Ambassador Crocker. It's certainly something I'm going to
take a careful look at, Mr. Chairman. I have met with the State
Department's inspector general. They, as you know, did a recent
report. We have your staff report. I have spoken to colleagues
in government. It's clear that there is a need for more
contracting officer representatives. State and AID recognize
this. There have been initiatives that you're aware of and that
the staff report notes USAID forward, the Accountable
Assistance for Afghanistan initiative, the military's Operation
Transparency.
So I think there clearly have been problems. I think
equally clearly there is a recognition that we have to be a
part of the solution, not a part of the problem, and I'm
encouraged by what I've heard of the steps that have been
taken.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Ambassador Crocker, this committee has
discussed, as you have in your opening statement, the
possibility of passing to the Afghans control over military and
police functions, presumably for seven provinces or about 25
percent of Afghanistan, with the thought of this as the first
of such large transitions in the next few years, hopefully
occurring before 2014.
I want to ask, however, about the whole conduct of the
Afghan state and really how the budget of Afghanistan is put
together, in other words, how its obligations are paid for.
Now, in the case of the military and the police, the training
has been paid for largely, if not completely, by the United
States and its allies, and the sustenance of all of that will
be expensive.
But beyond that, enlighten us a little bit more about
commerce in Afghanistan. That is, how do ordinary people make a
living? What kind of industries are there? What sort of
investment has been coming into the country or has been
generated by any profits or success?
The reason I ask this question is that many stories about
Afghanistan's economy indicate that the income coming into that
government is pretty low given the ambitions of Afghans and the
United States and its allies, which causes the resources
required in maintaining some level of security to constitute a
significant expense. But with regard to civil society and the
economy moving forward, thoughts have come even from President
Karzai himself in personal visits with Members of Congress that
Afghanistan has remarkable natural resources that might be
found, extracted, and sold to others in due course, but that
this will require a considerable amount of investment and a
security environment in which the safety of investors can be
better guaranteed. Of course, many of the investors may or may
not be friends of ours, or may have very different foreign
policy views.
Now, I don't mean to make the question impossibly complex,
but as you survey the scene, how is Afghanistan going to raise
revenue? And second, if Afghanistan is not able to raise
revenue, are you in your preparation for this ambassadorship
working with the State Department or other officials on some
estimates as to what obligations the United States may have for
many years to come? I don't mean solely our expenditures
related to our military's continuing involvement there in the
near future. Instead, I'm focusing on the long run, as some
with whom we've raised this question in previous hearings have
said, as a matter of common sense, that our obligations will
last for a long time, for a decade or even decades.
This really has to be an important part of our calculations
as Members of Congress working with the administration now on
5- or 10-year budget plans for the United States. This could be
a major factor, and if we do not get it right, it could have
very grave consequences for Afghanistan or their expectations
that the American support might be forthcoming.
Can you discuss this general area?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator. It is a very
important and, as you note in your question, a very complex set
of issues.
And again, at this point I have, shall we say, an imperfect
understanding of exactly how Afghanistan works, having not yet
been confirmed and not having gotten out there. But I did note
employment and economic development because I think these are
critical factors.
How does the economy work now? Services are an important
part. Agriculture is an important part. I am told that the
agricultural sector accounts for 80 percent of employment in
Afghanistan, which is why I think we have to continue to
support its development in a reasonable way that leads to,
again, ultimately an Afghan capacity to carry forward.
Senator Lugar. What part of that is drugs as opposed to
legitimate crops?
Ambassador Crocker. I'm talking about the part that isn't
drugs, primarily wheat. We would certainly like to see them
move into, as they want to do, higher yield products such as
fruit and pomegranates, which Afghanistan used to be famous for
and which provide a better return to the farmer actually, I'm
told, than poppies.
But based on what I know, I think the administration is
right in dealing with the narcotics issue, not to emphasize, as
we tried at one point, the eradication but alternatives,
economic alternatives that cause Afghans themselves to turn
away from these kinds of things.
I'd make a couple of other brief points on the Afghan
economy. As you know, there are substantial mineral resources
over the longer term. These can be a significant benefit to the
state, but this will take time for them to develop and, as you
point out, it's going to require security conditions. The
development of a robust private sector is going to be
important, and I am pleased to learn that OPEC is significantly
engaged in Afghanistan, working on upward of 50 projects. I
would like to see United States private investment come into
Afghanistan. I worked hard on that in Iraq with some success.
Customs revenues have to pick up, and I know there is a
major effort underway where our trainers, mainly from the
Department of Homeland Security, are working side by side with
the Afghan border police. Corruption gets into this, too, but
they've got to increase their revenues.
The final point I'd make is Afghanistan is a country
centrally located in an important region. I think the Afghan-
Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement was a very important step.
I understand that President Karzai will be visiting Islamabad
in just a few days time, I think the day after tomorrow, which
is good in and of itself. Obviously, the leaders of the two
countries talk through their issues.
But I understand one of the objectives is to lay out the
actual implementation of this agreement, because Afghanistan as
a trade and transit center through Pakistan, into India, up
into the former Soviet Republics to the north, with Iran, I
think all of that can provide a major difference for Afghans'
economic future.
Senator Lugar. My time is expired, but I just want to
underline I think it's a remarkable fact you presented, that 80
percent of the employment of Afghanistan is in agriculture.
That is huge, and success in this area is obviously paramount.
But I get back to the fact that while perhaps eventually the
Congress or the public will have a better idea of the budget of
Afghanistan, most estimates analyzing Afghanistan's budget
indicate that the government's revenues are a very, very small
percentage of its obligations, both from a security standpoint
as well as the commercial standpoint that we're talking about.
So I get back to my problem, and that is how long a stream
of income from the United States going to Afghanistan is going
to be required. If assistance to Afghanistan at current levels
is not forthcoming in the future, is it likely that the economy
and the security situation there will collapse, causing
Afghanistan to be back to square one again regardless of any
success we achieve in the meantime in providing some security
there?
But I thank you again for at least that discussion, and as
you get out there you will have more to say.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar.
I'll recognize Senator Casey, and I'm also going to pass
the gavel to Senator Casey because I need to go to another
committee.
Ambassador Crocker, I hope you'll forgive me for that, but
I appreciate your testimony this morning. As I said earlier,
we're going to try to move your nomination as rapidly as we
can, hopefully have a business meeting in short order and get
the full Senate to move on it. We look forward to getting you
there, and I thank you again for coming in and for your
willingness to do this.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and
thanks for this hearing.
Ambassador Crocker, it's great to see you again, and we're
so grateful for your public service and your willingness to
commit yourself to yet another very difficult assignment. But I
know that you're not only prepared but I have confidence, total
confidence that you'll be confirmed, and you should be
confirmed because we need you there, we need you on the ground.
I wanted to raise a couple of questions with you. And
again, I'd also commend the commitment that your family makes
when you take on a tough assignment like this.
But I wanted to bring you back to a meeting that you and I
had, and I've spoken about this a number of times, but I think
I keep coming back to it because I think it has a lot of
relevance to not just our policy in Afghanistan but where we
are now this year, this summer, making some difficult
decisions, the Congress, the administration, and the American
people.
And I start with the setting. It was in Iraq, and it was a
small group of people, and you were there. It was in August
2007. And I was complaining at the time, very bluntly, about
the language that was used to describe progress in Iraq,
victory and defeat, win or lose, all language which I thought
was not only inappropriate but, frankly, sometimes misleading,
I hope not deliberately so, at the time in Washington. I won't
cast blame on who used the language, but a lot of folks did,
and it was wrong. It was wrong then; I think it's wrong now.
And I asked you at the time what language do you think is
appropriate to the mission, and you gave a very cogent answer.
But what I remember most about it was that you said two words,
sustainable stability, which has stayed with me ever since.
So I ask you, in light of this mission which is, frankly in
my judgment, more complicated, as difficult as Iraq was, a
different set of priorities, and frankly a different set of
challenges in Afghanistan. But I ask it in light of some of the
real numbers that folks in Pennsylvania live with, and I know
comparable numbers around the country.
We have--we're at 70 right now killed in action. Sixty-nine
is the last number I saw, but it could actually be now 70,
which is about a third of where we were with regard to Iraq. We
fell just short of 200 there, 197, 198, depending on what
accounts you read. So we're about a third of the killed in
action as we were in Iraq in Afghanistan now. The wounded
numbers, my numbers in Pennsylvania are 455 in Afghanistan,
1,233 in Iraq. So again, about a third of the number in Iraq as
it relates to the wounded.
And I guess what people want to know, taxpayers want to
know, certainly the families that have loved and lost, families
that are contributing at a minimum the time and the sacrifice
of their loved ones, is what is the mission and therefore what
is the goal? And I'd ask you to comment on that in light of the
discussion we had in 2007.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do clearly
recall that conversation. That was shortly before the September
2007 hearings that General Petraeus and I took part in, and
again, as you may recall from that conversation, I was not
among those who have ever used the words ``winning'' or
``victory,'' not then, not now, not in Iraq, not in
Afghanistan.
Sustainable stability were words or a concept that I stood
by then and would stand by now in the case of Iraq. Another way
to put it is good enough governance, governance that is good
enough to ensure that the country doesn't degenerate back into
a safe haven for al-Qaeda, and that's what I was attempting to
get at in my conversation with Chairman Kerry, I think before
you arrived, that there is no intention that I see in any of my
consultations here, I certainly don't come with such an
intention to produce the perfect society. We can't. But I think
by judicious use of resources and conditions-based
redeployments and transfers of responsibility as will begin
this July, we can get to that sustainable stability.
I have always been and always will be frank and open with
this committee. It's my responsibility as an official if you so
choose to make me one again, but even as a citizen. As I look
at Afghanistan's past, the 50 years of relative tranquility
from, say, 1928 to 1978, Afghanistan did require outside
assistance, and we provided some very important contributions
to their economic development that are still favorably
remembered through the Point 4 program, which later became
USAID.
So in my--well, again, I'm not well informed enough to lay
this out as a thoroughly considered view, but I would
anticipate--and this gets a bit at what Senator Lugar was
touching on--that beyond 2014 there will be a requirement for
outside assistance from the international community, and I
think part of our obligation is being sure that the
international community continues to understand that they have
a great deal at stake here. This is not an American problem
only or an American obligation.
But that, in short, is how I would view it, getting--and
it's going to be incremental. It's going to be kind of issue by
issue, case by case as to what sustainable stability and good
enough governance is going to look like, but that certainly is
what I see as my responsibility.
Senator Casey. Thank you. I'm over on my time, but I'll ask
you a second round about how we measure that, and I think
that's also something a lot of the American people are
concerned about.
Senator Menendez.
Oh, I'm sorry. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. I thought I moved up one in seniority.
That's OK.
Senator Casey. Senator Ben Cardin, State of Maryland, Class
of 2006.
Senator Cardin. Ambassador Crocker, first of all, thank you
very much for your service. You have served our Nation with
great distinction, and I thank you for that, and I thank you
for your willingness to come back into public service. I can
think of no one
who is more qualified for the position than you in a very tough
situation.
As everyone is suggesting, Afghanistan needs to change, its
United States role in Afghanistan needs to change. We could
talk about the military aspects and the fact that we are
looking toward a redeployment of our combat troops starting in
the next month or two, and that we expect that we might be able
to accelerate that considering the current status of terrorist
organizations operating in the region.
Now, having said that, I want to concentrate on the other
part of our role. We have had our military presence, but we
also have had an effort to provide economic development
assistance to the people of Afghanistan. Now, I know you just
recently got the report that was commissioned by this
committee, but let me just share with you some observations
that should not be a surprise.
It's rather critical of the efficiency of the deliverance
of our aid to accomplish any long-term economic stability for
the people of Afghanistan. It also questions as to whether we
really are operating with a leadership team in Afghanistan that
can deliver the type of economic promise for the people; and
probably worse than that, that we're creating an arbitrary
economic activity in the country based upon a war economy that
will not be sustainable, and that we are, in fact, creating an
inflationary situation within Afghanistan that will cause a
serious problem as we transition to a country that can take
care of itself, admittedly with international assistance. I
don't deny the long-term need for humanitarian and economic
assistance to the people of Afghanistan.
My question is one of how you see your role as the
Ambassador to assist us in being able to evaluate how we can
transition the United States role and be as helpful as we can
so the Afghans can take care of their own people and that we
have at least a strategic ally in our war against terror. How
do you see using the information that you have learned or will
learn or know from the region to assist in helping us, the
United States Senate, in transitioning to the next phase in
Afghanistan?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator. It's clearly an
important question. I see my responsibilities at a number of
levels.
First, it is ensuring that we are properly organized as a
civilian mission, as an embassy, to ensure that our assistance
is accountable and it is effective, and effective for me means
it's got to be about transition, building Afghan capacity,
helping the Afghans again carry forward without assistance at
this scale in the future.
So I know that Administrator Shah and Deputy Secretary
Nides have provided some responses already to this report. I
have not had the chance to go through it in depth, but I know
it will be useful to me if I'm confirmed out at post looking at
how we're structured and deployed, looking at our programs and
being sure they're effective, again to this end of sustainable
stability, with the Afghans increasingly taking the lead. So,
you know, obligation begins at home within the Embassy.
The second thing that I clearly would be focusing on is
developing a partnership with the Afghan Government. Our
programs have to support their vision and have to be
sustainable by them, and I know that we already have in place
several mechanisms, formal mechanisms that focus on transition.
This is a major concern of President Karzai. He has chosen
Ashraf Ghani, who I also came to know in my early days in
Afghanistan, to head this up from his side precisely so that we
don't create that unsustainable wartime economy.
I understand that USAID and other donors have already taken
steps, for example, to ensure that they are not inflating
salaries. I think that would be very important. For example,
the worst thing we could do I think is be competing with the
Afghan Government for talent. It needs all it can get and a lot
more to function as a government. So that would be another key
part of it.
It's their country, and how it moves forward is ultimately
their responsibility. I want to establish myself as a reliable
partner but keeping the emphasis on sustainable development and
transition, which is what they themselves seek.
And third, I would say again this will have to be in
consultation with Ambassador Grossman and others. We have a lot
of international partners engaged in Afghanistan, NATO and non-
NATO. The United Nations plays an important role, the special
representative to the Secretary General. Staffan de Mistura
performed that role in Iraq, and I cooperated closely with him
there. I look forward to doing the same in Afghanistan.
As I said earlier in a slightly different context,
Afghanistan is not a uniquely American problem. It is a threat
to international peace and security and requires an ongoing
international commitment. So what role I play in that is still
something to be sorted out, but clearly I believe I will have a
role to play. I hope that gives you some sense of----
Senator Cardin. I thank you for your answer. I think it's
going to be a real challenge because we're not necessarily
paying salaries or competing with the Afghan Government. We're
paying salaries that look like we're giving just cash bonuses
well above reasonable salaries to make friends with Afghans,
which ends up supporting a corrupt system.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Senator Casey. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I'm here out of respect for you as a person
and the role you've played in much of our foreign policy. I
know we had an extensive conversation in our office. General
Petraeus has asked that we support efforts in Afghanistan
through this fighting season, and I think people, generally
speaking, have been willing to do that. But I think you sensed
certainly in our conversation, but probably among numbers of
people here, we're expecting pretty dramatic changes at the end
of this fighting season and expect and know that you will help
guide those changes into a different place.
All of us know the model that we have in Afghanistan is not
sustainable for multiple reasons that we've talked about again
in detail in private, and I'm just here to thank you today for
your willingness to do this. I don't know why you'd come back
and do this other than you're a great American, and we thank
you for that.
And again, without belaboring, I know there's numbers of
questions that we can ask you that you cannot answer yet, but I
think you all know there's a great degree of--it's not
impatience--a great degree of us knowing that what we're doing
there is not sustainable that is greatly changing the character
of the country that your knowledge there hopefully will help us
do, and the partnership that doesn't exist the way that it
should in Pakistan also. But again, we thank you for that. I
look forward to talking to you on the ground in Afghanistan,
and I thank you for your willingness to do this.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, sir.
Senator Casey. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Ambassador, let me pile on with everybody else. You're
clearly a national treasure here, and we're happy to see that
you are going over into that part of the world.
I think my major concern--and you and I had the opportunity
to discuss this when you visited with me--is how we define our
strategic objectives in Afghanistan and how that matches up
with what we are able to actually accomplish in a cost-benefit
way. I think this is one thing you're hearing from a lot of
people right now.
How much do we actually need to achieve in Afghanistan with
respect to our national interest? How much do people want to
achieve that may be above what we need to and are we getting
into this area of nation-building? How much can we achieve? And
how much of that actually benefits our strategic objectives?
That's what I've been struggling with for more than a year now.
I don't know if you saw the column that Peggy Noonan wrote
recently for the Wall Street Journal. It's been a few weeks. I
don't have it in front of me, but she clearly is not a radical.
She was one of the bright lights of the Reagan administration
in which I was very proud to serve. One of the strong comments
that she was making was if there is any nation in the world
that needs nation-building right now, it's the United States of
America. And when we're putting hundreds of billions of dollars
into infrastructure in another country, it should only be done
if we can articulate a vital national interest because we,
quite frankly, need to be doing a lot more of that here.
Time is short obviously, but could you please articulate
your view of the strategic interest of the United States in
Afghanistan and how the current military policy can help to
bring us to an endpoint in that strategic objective?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator. That is, of course,
the essential question. As I said in my statement, and as the
President and others have said, our ultimate strategic
objective is to disrupt, dismantle, defeat al-Qaeda, and in the
Afghan context to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes
what it was before
9/11, an area in which al-Qaeda can reconstitute itself under
protection of like-minded elements.
Senator Webb. I watched your opening statement from my
office, and I don't disagree with the objective. But you can
pretty well fight international terrorism without remaking an
entire societal structure. Wouldn't you agree? And I know--I
watched your comment about how they are not in Afghanistan now
because they are in Pakistan--because we're in Afghanistan, et
cetera. But you can end up in that region playing ``whack-a-
mole.''
So the real question is what is the ultimate objective with
all of these ground forces and all these infrastructure
programs in terms of the long-term advantage?
Ambassador Crocker. Again, an important and multifaceted
issue. What we've seen with the additional forces and the
effort to carry the fight into enemy strongholds is, I think,
tangible progress in security on the ground in the south and
the west.
This has to transition, and again we're seeing a transition
of seven provinces and districts to Afghan control, to
sustainable Afghan control. So I think you can already see what
we're trying to do: province by province, district by district,
establish the conditions where the Afghan Government can take
over and hold ground. And you're absolutely right, you don't
have to build a whole nation, I think, to achieve that.
Senator Webb. International terrorism and guerilla warfare
in general is intrinsically mobile. I fought a guerilla war in
Vietnam, and I've written about this for a long time. So
securing one particular area--I don't say this critically but
out of concern for where this policy is going it doesn't
necessarily guarantee that you've reduced the capability of
those kinds of forces. They're mobile, they move. The reason
that they're international in scope is that they do not align
themselves with any particular governmental structure. I just
want to lay that out as an area of continuing concern.
I want to ask you one more question in the time that we
have. I mentioned to you when you visited my office, and that
is we tend to speak of the conciliators in this region simply
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan-India axis, when I believe there
is a role here that China could play if they would step up to
the mat and be a little more overt in their willingness to
participate in these types of solutions. They're clearly going
to benefit if there's more stability in the region. What are
your thoughts on that?
Ambassador Crocker. It's a great point, Senator. That's--as
we talk about the three elements of our strategy, the third one
is very much involved in regional engagement. And I would join
you in including China in that discussion.
The Chinese, as you are aware, have the copper concession
in Afghanistan. OK, that's great. You can only really make that
pay off for you if the conditions on the ground permit its
extraction and its transport.
Senator Webb. They also have a long relationship with
Pakistan. I know there are some people who would say that's
overstated, but clearly they do, and in fact when Chairman
Kerry returned here from Pakistan, that same day while we're
sitting here in a hearing the Prime Minister of Pakistan
immediately made a state visit to China and was welcomed and
then stated that China was Pakistan's greatest friend.
I wish you the best. I am grateful that you are undertaking
this, and I look forward to visiting you and perhaps continue
our discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, sir.
Senator Casey. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Ambassador Crocker, I join my
colleagues in thanking you for your willingness to continue to
serve the country, and I think I certainly stand ready, and I'm
sure all of us do, to be helpful to you as you take on this new
assignment.
I know that you haven't had a chance to review the report
that was released this morning from the committee, but I think
it does provide a renewed perspective on how difficult the
challenges are in Afghanistan, particularly the civilian
challenges, and much of that has been discussed by others here.
But the report certainly underscores the need for our
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan to be necessary,
achievable, and sustainable. And I know there have been some
concerns about the projects undertaken under the CERP program.
I certainly share concerns about how those dollars are
distributed. And I, like others, have called for a number of
steps to try and address more accountability in Afghanistan.
I'm very pleased to see the overhaul of the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, something
that I thought also was long overdue; the appointment of the
senior civilian representative to serve as a counterpart to the
military commander there.
And I wonder--I know you haven't gotten on the ground
there, but I wonder if you can assess at this stage what
difference that might be making in Afghanistan and what you
would expect your relationship as Ambassador to be with those
two civilian counterparts there.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator. I join you in a
concern for accountability. I was Ambassador in Iraq, as you
know, and I think we all learned a lot of hard lessons.
I would hope to see those lessons being applied now in
Afghanistan, and I think they are through some of the
initiatives you note and others that I mentioned earlier, the
USAID Forward Initiative, Operation Transparency that the
military runs, the joint military-USAID vetting mechanism for
contractors, the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan
Initiative, and so forth.
One of my first consultations was with the State inspector
general. I had a very close working relationship with the head
of SIGAR in Iraq, Stuart Bowen, who I have a lot of regard for.
So again, I'm pleased that SIGAR seems to be moving forward
with real capability, and if confirmed I look forward to
welcoming the GAO, which I understand plans to set up a
permanent staff in the fall.
I think all of these institutions--the State IG, the USAID
Regional Inspector General, SIGAR, the GAO--all have an
important responsibility in ensuring oversight and
accountability. And you know the phrase, ``we're here to
help.'' Well, sometimes help can be painful. But in my
experience in Iraq, I found that kind of oversight to be
absolutely essential going forward, and I will certainly, if
confirmed, employ the same approach in Afghanistan.
Senator Shaheen. And are there experiences from your time
in Iraq that you think can be helpful in terms of coordinating
all these efforts? Because for those of us looking at what's
going on on the ground, as you point out, there are a lot of
people there trying to address oversight and accountability,
but how is all of that getting coordinated? We know we have
General Petraeus on the military side, but is there a similar
command structure on the civilian side, and who is responsible?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you for that question because it
is an important one, Senator. Basically, there are two and only
two U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, as there were in Iraq, one
military and one civilian. The civilian commander is the U.S.
Ambassador, and I would like to say that as I have consulted
and read in, I think Ambassador Eikenberry has done an amazing
job in the swift ramp-up of the civilian presence in ensuring
that it has been done in an orderly and organized manner.
Obviously, if confirmed, I will need to make my own
assessments. But my sense is he has handled a huge challenge
with great care, thoughtfulness, and ability.
There are microcoordination issues, and this may be what
you were referring to. I have an obligation to see that the
entire U.S. mission is effectively carrying out its various
roles. I also want to be sure that the accountability element
of this, the different inspection agencies are themselves
coordinated. We had to wrestle with this a bit in Iraq so that
we did not have different inspectors inspecting the same thing
and not working in coordination.
There's also, of course, a whole military inspection
apparatus which also has to be woven into this. So as I did in
Iraq, again I have a responsibility of seeing that the whole
mission is operating effectively, and again I give huge credit
to Ambassador Eikenberry that, if confirmed, I have the sense
I'm going to be inheriting a going concern, but also on the
specific issue that our accountability and oversight mechanisms
are working as a team and not in isolation or competition with
each other.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Casey. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Casey. I'll join the
other members of this committee in thanking Ambassador Crocker
and your family for your willingness to come out of retirement
and take on yet again another vital mission for the United
States, this time in Kabul. And I'm very encouraged by your
successful previous service in Iraq and the very difficult
circumstances that you negotiated there.
I was concerned on my one visit to Afghanistan as a
relatively new Senator to hear repeatedly about our
generational commitment to the stability and security of the
nation of Afghanistan. In your opening testimony you cited
Secretary Gates' comment that we walked away from Afghanistan
in 1989 with disastrous consequences and we cannot afford to do
so again, and I think in the previous questions by Senator
Lugar and others a number of us are trying to get at the
question if we're not going to walk away, how long are we going
to stay, and at what level?
And there is a lot of focus on the immediate decision about
a drawdown, but I'm really equally, if not more, interested in
the post-2014 structure and what it looks like, and was very
surprised to hear in-country assertions that we were committed
to sustaining a more than 300,000-member Afghan National
Security Force, which meant paying for it, and to a sustained
U.S. military presence for the foreseeable future, a decade or
more.
You also made a comment that we are not seeking permanent
military bases in Afghanistan, and I wondered, just as my first
question, if you'd comment on the importance of achieving a
United States-Afghan strategic--excuse me--a U.S.--in Iraq you
achieved a strategic agreement that allowed for long-term
stabilization. What importance is there in Afghanistan to our
having a long-term United States or coalition military
presence? Where do you think we are headed in terms of
retaining strategic regional abilities? And how sustainable do
you really think, past 2014, assistance required to support a
300,000 ANSF really is?
A few questions, right? Nothing really difficult at all.
These are shared questions that I think many of us are
confronting.
Ambassador Crocker. Well, they certainly are the mega
questions, and they're important ones. They're ones, if
confirmed, I'll be very much focused on since I would expect to
be out there for a couple of years. And I'm not ducking by
saying that I just don't know the answer now.
You know, I do think that we have an interest, again, in
ensuring that the country doesn't backslide, that it just does
not again become an al-Qaeda safe haven. I think we all would
share that. The trick is how do you do it, how much does it
cost, and how long does it take? And these are questions that
my colleagues and I will have to work on, and we're accountable
to you as you ask them.
I do think, as we saw in Iraq, that by going in big, you
can then come out small. Now, Iraq has oil, and it always helps
to have oil, moving aside the corruption issue there. They can
pay for a lot of things that the Afghans can't.
I do think the Strategic Partnership Declaration process is
important, as the Strategic Framework Agreement was in Iraq. It
lets both countries kind of know where they want to move in the
future. Obviously, the SPD is going to look different than the
Strategic Framework Agreement in Iraq, but I think broadly
speaking it's intended to serve the same purpose.
In terms of the ultimate end state for Afghan National
Security Forces, the target is to, as you know, is to have the
police and army combined at the 300,000 level by this October.
To me, that is not a number that's engraved in stone and it
would never change. I think, again--and I'm speculating here. I
mean, we just have to see how circumstances develop over time,
as this first transition of seven districts and provinces takes
place, how they do. And farther down the road, 2014, 2015, the
Afghans may decide that they really don't need a security force
of this size.
Senator Coons. Another key factor to the sustainable
progress in Iraq was the not just reconciliation but the
reintegration of more than 100,000 through the Sons of Iraq
program. So far, reintegration of the Taliban is going quite
slowly. It isn't proceeding at anything like the pace you and
others were able to accomplish in Iraq.
Do you think reintegration is going to be critical?
Because, frankly, the size of the Afghan National Security
Force required is partly directly correlated to the size of the
ongoing insurgency or Taliban or other extremist activity.
Ambassador Crocker. It's a great question, Senator, because
you're right, and we haven't talked that much about this so
far. The Afghans are focused on two elements to bring this
insurgency to an end. One is reconciliation, kind of big R, and
then the other reintegration, which I guess would be little R.
Both I think are premised on a concept we would all share,
which is that you can't kill your way out of an insurgency.
There has to be ultimately a political solution.
I think reintegration is part of it. I'm told that there
are some 2,500 former insurgents that are either processed or
in process. It's an Afghan process, of course, and I think
Afghan capacity is again an issue here about how fast they can
move.
There is another element that I think is significant, and
that is the Afghan local police initiative, not quite like the
Sons of Iraq. The Sons of Iraq, as you remember, was a pretty
varied group. Some of them were former insurgents, some were
not. The Afghan local police initiative focuses on individuals
who want to stand up for their community and who were not part
of the insurgency. I think their numbers are 6,000, and I've
been advised that we expect to be able to continue to expand
that possibly to 10,000 by September.
Again, in the lessons learned category, the Sons of Iraq
were never tied to the Iraqi Government until quite late in the
process, when the Prime Minister made some undertakings to
incorporate some into the security services and provide
civilian employment for others. The Afghan local police have
started out linked to the Ministry of Interior. So you've got
all three of those in play, all three Afghan supported and
Afghan led, which I believe is important.
Clearly, we'd like to see the reintegration process move
more quickly, and if confirmed, that is something that will
have my focus because it can be a very--as it was in Iraq, it
can be a very important component of a broader process.
But unlike Iraq, I think the ultimate solution will come
through a successful reconciliation process, and we'll see what
effect the death of Osama bin Laden might have on Taliban
leadership attitudes, to what extent the linkage is personal
rather than institutional. I don't think we know the answer to
that yet, but it is going to be a very important question.
Senator Coons. Thank you for your answers, Ambassador.
Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Coons.
I'd ask our distinguished ranking member, Senator Lugar, do
you have a second round?
I wanted to ask one question. I know Senator Shaheen might
also have a followup, as well as if Senator Coons does.
Just one quick question, and we can amplify this, or I
should say you can amplify this, Ambassador Crocker, with
written responses. But I wanted to ask you a related question
about the set of questions I asked you about how the American
people view the mission and the goals and how we define it.
One way to analyze that not just for Members of Congress
but for the American people is to have metrics, measurements,
reporting that we know we've had in place. There's probably a
good debate about whether they're adequate enough. We learned a
lot in the conflict in Iraq about how difficult that can be to
measure and to report, but I think we've got to have metrics
like that in place.
I want to get your assessment of kind of where we are with
that and how you view that, similar to what Senator Shaheen
talked about with regard to accountability and having some
reporting so that as people analyze the policy and debate it,
they have some way to measure progress.
Ambassador Crocker. It's an important point, Mr. Chairman.
And again, I think it's part of that accountability process
that Senator Shaheen was alluding to, how do you measure
progress. And as you point out, that can be hard in certain
areas. In other areas, I think it's easier.
In education, for example, we know how many Afghan kids are
in school, over 7 million, 2\1/2\ million of whom are girls.
And again, as we consider our costs and our options, I just
would like to take a minute, with your permission, to comment
on girls and women in Afghanistan.
One of the first things USAID did when we reopened the
Embassy in January 2002 was to start educational programs for
girls who were completely shut out of the educational system,
as you know, under the Taliban. And in the middle of January
2002, on a freezing day, I took then-Senator Biden to visit a
girls' school that we had just established. We visited a first
grade class that had girls whose ages ranged from 6 to 12
because the 12-year-olds had become of school age when the
Taliban took over.
And I remember asking a 12-year-old whether it bothered her
at all to be kind of in there with the little kids, and she
said I am just so happy to have the chance for an education. I
was touched at the time, and I still am.
As we consider, again, hard options, it certainly is my
intention to see that there would be nothing in my
recommendations and nothing in policy decisions over which I
might have input or control that would put at risk half the
population of Afghanistan, the girls and women who still face
some significant challenges but who are in school, in business,
and in government.
So I'm sorry for a slight digression, but again, it does
touch at metrics. I think these are things we can measure, and
I take the point. I mean, I'm not far along into this to be
able to give you large quantities of statistics, and not
everything is measureable that way. But I take the point that
that which can be measured and metricized should be, so the
American people and the Congress have a sense of what is
actually happening out there.
Senator Casey. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you very much,
Ambassador Crocker, for that commitment, because that's exactly
what I was going to ask as we talk about the potential for
reconciliation and reintegration of the Taliban, how do we
ensure that women's rights aren't traded away in any
negotiations. And I think for all of us who have watched what's
happened in Afghanistan, one of the biggest concerns as I think
about what happens after the United States leaves is what
happens to half of the population, who is women. So I very much
appreciate your commitment to ensure that those rights are
protected.
Senator Casey. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Casey. If I might, just
one last question, to take us back to I think the very first
point Chairman Kerry raised about Pakistan and the
disproportionate or significantly different investment we're
making in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan and then trying to
sustain this uneven partnership, relationship, whatever it is
with the people of Pakistan.
As a former Ambassador to Pakistan, I just wanted to ask
your advice or input on how you see the prospects of our ever
being successful in persuading the Pakistanis to change their
relentless focus on India as the primary source of threat to
their nation and instead throw in their lot more decisively
with us in the war on extremism, particularly against the
Quetta Shura in North Waziristan and against LET, and what
initiatives you think we can or should be taking to engage New
Delhi in this and in helping realign the strategic calculus of
the Pakistanis.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator. I would imagine
that my colleagues from Legislative Affairs would say you're
not the nominee for Pakistan, so be careful, but I was the
Ambassador to Pakistan, and it is an important question.
The Pakistanis, of course, have been engaged against
militants on their soil, and they have lost a very large number
of forces fighting them. So it's not like they're not doing
anything. But the problems of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani
Network, the Quetta Shura, as you note, persist.
Just in recent weeks since the death of bin Laden, of
course, we've had a number of senior visitors who have engaged
the Pakistanis, including the chairman, as well as Secretary
Clinton, Admiral Mullen, and Marc Grossman, and they have made
some statements. It's clearly going to be important for them to
follow through on them.
With respect to India, I'm pleased to see from my possible
future perspective in Afghanistan that the dialogue between the
foreign secretaries of the two nations has resumed. I think
that's an important step. I hope they sustain it and they
broaden it because clearly the degree to which India and
Pakistan start to see some capacity to work together, it's to
the benefit of the region, and it's to the benefit of us. But
again, that falls to the purview of others, particularly as it
relates to India.
Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you for your input, and
thank you for your willingness to take on this vital mission.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Coons.
Ambassador Crocker, I'm going to be leaving. I'm going to
be turning the gavel over to Senator Menendez. He will be the
next questioner. But we're grateful for your service, and thank
you for the testimony today.
And with that, I'll turn to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your past service, and for
your willingness to continue serving. We had a good discussion
when you came to my office, and I would like to pursue some of
the things we discussed at that time.
I know you don't determine war strategy, but I do wonder
what your role will be as Ambassador in terms of informing
Congress about where we're at. I'm one of those who believe
that we would be more successful in Afghanistan by reducing our
troop presence in the south and continuing support for
institution-building in the north. It seems to me that a
counterinsurgency strategy, which is where we fight insurgents
to give the government time to gather the wherewithal to stand
up for itself, defend itself and govern itself might be a
worthwhile policy if we had a solid partner in this regard,
which in my view we do not.
That present policy has had an enormous toll on American
lives and on American treasure, and I don't think we've won the
hearts and minds.
So give me a sense. Do you believe that we're making
sustainable progress in the south? I know that we're clearing
and holding, but after that, it will not be sustainable for us
to be able to stay. What happens in the follow-on?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator, and thank you also
for the time you gave me in your office. That was very valuable
to me in trying to get my mind around the big issues.
We, as you point out, are successfully clearing and holding
in the south and the west. We're also going to be transitioning
seven provinces and districts in the month of July to Afghan
security control, and I don't have the list right in front of
me, but some of those are in these areas, as I understand it.
It will be an important step because that ultimately is our
goal and their goal for the entire nation. They are assured
that they can do this. What I understand from my briefings is
that we are confident that they have the capabilities in these
seven districts to do it. And if successful, that will be a not
bad start to the transition that we and they are committed to,
to cover the whole country.
Senator Menendez. What role will you play in helping to win
over Pashtuns and other groups in the south?
Ambassador Crocker. Again, at this stage in the process, I
cannot answer that with exact certainty because it will be part
of a process of consultation with others who are involved in
this matter, in particular Ambassador Grossman, who is both a
friend and a colleague.
That said, as the Afghans move toward a concentrated
reconciliation effort, I would certainly see a role for the
Embassy in working closely, as we already do, with Pashtuns in
the south. My position in Iraq was basically that we would talk
to anybody who would talk to us and not ask a lot of questions
as we entered those conversations, at least initially. Now,
whether I can get away with this in Afghanistan or not, I don't
know. But I do think it's important that we know what southern
Pashtuns are thinking, as it is important we know what northern
Tajiks and Hezaras and so forth are all looking at, especially
as a tricky reconciliation process moves forward.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me turn to a field that I do
think you do have a lot to say about, and that is what is the
continuing use of U.S. taxpayer dollars for an assistance
mission. My understanding is that the President's goal is to
reportedly shift from a military mission to an assistance
mission in Afghanistan, and that that mission is to help
rebuild lives and institutions to create a functioning
government. We've done this before, but we've done this with
more committed partners, from my perspective.
From 2002 to 2010, we have spent $19 billion in assistance,
and much of which is not sustainable is subject to endemic
corruption. I know that there is a report about to be released
suggesting that we have had only limited success, and this huge
attempt at nation-building may not survive an American
withdrawal, which is a real concern to me.
Is this a good use of U.S. taxpayer dollars?
Ambassador Crocker. I think we have had some significant
successes with our assistance.
Senator Menendez. Could you put on your microphone?
Ambassador Crocker. Sorry. I think we have had some
significant successes with our assistance, and I understand the
report touches on some of those--that would certainly include
education--we were talking about before you came in, and the
provision of basic health services. What I can tell you,
Senator, is that I am committed to ensuring that the assistance
we provide (a) makes an important positive difference, (b) can
be implemented, and (c) can be sustained.
I would agree personally with the three basic conditions
that I saw in the report, which I haven't had the chance to
fully study, that our assistance projects should be necessary,
achievable and sustainable. I know that Administrator Shah and
Deputy Secretary Nides have responded on behalf of their
respective offices. They are the ones to speak authoritatively
on the matter. But I can tell you that if I am confirmed, I
mean going forward, our assistance has to make a difference and
it has to be sustainable to build capacity.
Senator Menendez. You say we have some successes. Quantify
for me in the context of $19 billion what is success.
Ambassador Crocker. Well, I think clearly in education,
which was an early priority for us, the success of getting over
7 million kids into school, 2\1/2\ of those being girls, that
would be a metric of success.
Senator Menendez. If we put a dollar figure on that, what
would that be? Do we have any sense of that?
Ambassador Crocker. I can certainly get that for you.
[In answer to the above question, a written reply from
Ambassador Crocker follows:]
Since 2002, $685m has been spent on education in Afghanistan, or
roughly 3.6 percent of the total budget. Please know that while this
figure is derived from USAID and State funding, this figure does not
include DOD funding being spent on education programs in Afghanistan.
Senator Menendez. If you could get it to us, I'd appreciate
it, because I'd consider that a success, but I don't think
that's $19 billion, and this is--I'd admonish the audience that
we appreciate your attendance, but we're not subject to
comments.
I'm going to support your nomination. That's not the issue.
My point is that you're going to be in a role that is, yes,
diplomacy, yes, foreign policy, and I hope you look at it as a
fiduciary to the American taxpayer, because right now I do not
believe that we are being good fiduciaries to the American
taxpayer. Do you believe that the Karzai government is doing
what it needs to do to be an effective, honest, and transparent
partner?
Ambassador Crocker. There are several elements, again, to a
very important question. I'll start with the last. I noted in
my statement that I got to Kabul in the beginning of January
2002, just about 10 days after President Karzai had been named
by the Bonn Conference as chairman of the Afghan Interim
Authority, and I worked very closely with him during those
early days.
I believe he is committed to a unified, stable Afghanistan,
and I look forward to renewing that relationship. I'm certainly
going to make every effort as the Ambassador to have a
productive working relationship with the head of state to which
I'm accredited.
Have we had differences? Are there things that we wish he
would or would not have done? Are there things that he wishes
we would or would not have done? Of course there are. One key
issue is corruption. For the sake of the State of Afghanistan,
the Afghan Government is going to have to do more. We wrestled
with the same thing in Iraq, and you don't get positive change
overnight. But Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq expressed an
awareness of the problem, and incrementally some steps were
taken. We have seen President Karzai make the same commitments.
Words do count. Deeds count for more. But I would start, if
confirmed, from the assumption that we do have partners in the
Afghan Government. That is certainly what I hear in my
consultations. Some effective gubernatorial appointments in the
provinces, some increasingly effective members of the Karzai
Cabinet, that's a critical part of capacity-building and
transition. I would see that as, again, a key responsibility to
help them develop that capacity.
Senator Menendez. Well, I'll just say that when I see the
reports, both public and private, about where our money has
gone, where the corruption is, and I see Karzai talk about the
United States as an occupying force, I have real problems
having American lives shed and having American treasure
continuing to be shed. My understanding is that for that FY
2002 to 2010, we spent $672 million on education. That's far
from $19 billion of success.
One last question before I turn it over to Senator Risch.
What is the United States position and your position on the
efforts to alter the U.N.'s 1,267 list of persons associated
with the Taliban and al-Qaeda? Under the proposed plans, I
understand that two separate lists would be created, one for
each militant organization, and this separation would likely
provide the Afghan Government with a much greater say over
which Taliban would be on the new list and possibly allow them
to remove more than 100 people from the 450-person list that
presently exists, providing them with freedom to travel and
access to the banking system.
Do you support that effort, which would ultimately decide
who stays on the list and who gets off, and are you concerned
that potentially dangerous individuals can be removed from the
list?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, this is one of many issues,
frankly, that I am not fully briefed or fully up to speed on.
I'm aware of it. Again, the policy of the administration has
been that for reconciliation to take place, insurgents, the
Taliban, have to renounce violence, break with al-Qaeda and
agree to respect the Afghan Constitution. I can't speak for the
administration on this matter because I don't know if they have
a position.
I would be concerned about individuals who have a record of
extremist violence against us and against the Afghans having
freedom of movement and an ability to kind of do whatever they
want. But again, I cannot be authoritative on that matter.
Senator Menendez. I look forward to pursuing that with you
because I'm concerned about where we're headed with these
lists.
Senator Risch.
Thank you for your answers.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Mr. Crocker, first of all, thank you for what you do for
America. Certainly, your qualifications are impeccable here for
this job. I can tell you this, I don't envy what you're about
to take on. I've been following this hearing electronically
because I've had other things going, but let me just say that I
share some of the skepticism that--in fact, that's probably an
understatement. I share a lot of the skepticism that's been
expressed here this morning.
This is a messy situation that isn't getting any better,
and since I've been elected to the U.S. Senate, people back
home keep asking me what's going to happen, how is this going
to end, what kind of progress is being made there. Certainly
militarily we've done well, I believe, but beyond that, this is
very, very difficult, and to articulate what our objectives are
and what our goals are and how this is going to end with us
achieving those is very, very difficult to grasp, let alone to
convey to the American people.
So I wish you well. The problems here are very, very
significant, and I'm glad you're the one that's going there
because I think that you're the right person to do this job.
But again, I'm very skeptical about how we're going to be
able to end this. So, thank you.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator. I'm under no
allusions of the difficulty of the challenge. If Iraq was hard,
and it was hard, Afghanistan in many respects is harder. All I
can promise to you and the other members is that if confirmed,
I will give you an honest assessment of what conditions and
situations are, what are achievable ways forward, and what may
not be achievable. That much I certainly undertake to do.
Senator Risch. And I appreciate that, and I think your
observation regarding Iraq and Afghanistan is appropriate. Too
often people try to compare the two, and it's a comparison of
apples and oranges. What we're trying to give to the Afghan
people and have worked at for 10 years and given them in blood,
sweat, and tears, you really, really wonder whether they want
what we're trying to give them. And if they don't want what
we're trying to give them, it's not going to work. So that's
kind of where I am on it.
Thank you very much again for your service. I wish you
well, take care of yourself over there. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Risch.
With that, seeing no other members, the record will remain
open for 48 hours. We ask the Ambassador to respond to any
questions as expeditiously as possible so we can move the
nomination.
And with that, this hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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